Fire Hydrant of Freedom
Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities => Politics & Religion => Topic started by: Crafty_Dog on October 05, 2006, 10:08:07 AM
-
Woof All:
The WW3 thread was getting crowded, so we are starting separate threads for the different theaters of WW3.
I begin with some news (about 4 weeks old) that your normal news sources probably did not report.
CD
==================
68 INSURGENTS CAPTURED IN A 2-DAY PERIOD
CAMP AL ASAD, Iraq ? Iraqi police and soldiers, along with U.S. Marines and soldiers from Regimental Combat Team 7, captured 68 confirmed insurgents over the weekend throughout the western Al Anbar Province, Iraq.
U.S. and Iraqi forces detained the known and suspected insurgents through a series of pre-planned operations.
Iraqi police identified and detained 18 of the 38 captured insurgents in Rawah, Iraq, about 50 miles east of the Iraqi-Syrian border.
One of the suspects captured by Rawah police officers is wanted for involvement with a vehicle suicide bombing against a U.S. military check point in the region July 29. Several more captured in Rawah are involved in a recent attack on a Rawah police officer?s family. Police officers in Rawah also discovered two improvised explosive devices there Sunday.
Iraqi and U.S. soldiers captured 11 insurgents Sunday in Hit, a city of about 60,000, located approximately 70 miles northwest of Ramadi.
Through a variety of counterinsurgency operations, Iraqi soldiers and U.S. Marines captured 31 known insurgents in 3 cities. One captured insurgent was part of a 4-man insurgent cell operating in Hadithah.
U.S. Marines captured 6 more insurgents Saturday in Sa?dah, a town just east of the Iraqi-Syrian border. Marines also discovered an ordnance cache near the border on Saturday. The cache consisted of 120 mm rockets, 155 mm rockets, and 122 mm rockets.
5 TERRORISTS KILLED DURING RAID AND AIR STRIKE
BAGHDAD ? A raid early on the morning of Sept. 4 on a safe-house targeting an individual with ties to movement of terrorist finances and foreign fighters into Iraq led to 5 terrorists killed in Muqdadiyah.
As U.S. forces assaulted the target, they were immediately engaged by terrorist forces. In the ensuing firefight, 2 terrorists were killed. Additionally, a woman and her two children were with the terrorists. U.S. forces found blasting caps, improvised explosive device materials, and multiple ammunition rack systems and weapons on the objective. Both children were struck with fragmentation and one subsequently died.
As the raid progressed, 2 additional terrorists, who were both armed, were killed in the courtyard of the house.
Prior to moving to a subsequent objective where armed terrorists had been observed earlier, multiple precision fires were directed on the location to suppress the threat while minimizing collateral damage. This strike resulted in one terrorist?s death who was found carrying an assault rifle, a pistol, two ammunition racks and a ski mask.
Two individuals were then observed moving from a nearby palm grove toward the objective. U.S. forces identified they were unarmed and intercepted them without force. Upon questioning, they observed that the two men were beaten and wearing handcuffs. The men described being held hostage by up to ten foreign and Iraqi terrorists for ransom. They managed to escape when their captors fled as the raid and subsequent air strike was initiated.
For several days, multiple terrorists have been observed operating out of the safehouse throughout the day and bedding down at night in the palm grove.
COALITION FORCES FREE ANOTHER KIDNAP VICTIM, CAPTURE 3 TERRORISTS
KIRKUK, Iraq ? Bastogne Soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division freed a kidnap victim and captured three of the terrorists who had taken him hostage just outside of Kirkuk today.
An aerial reconnaissance team, flying missions near Kirkuk, spotted four men wearing black robes and wielding AK-47 rifles. The men stopped their sedan several times along one of the area?s main roads and set up illegal checkpoints at each stop. The aeriel recon team video-taped the entire action.
As coalition ground forces moved into the area, the group made their last stop, holding 10 passengers in a van at gunpoint before pulling one of the men out of the vehicle. The four then forced the man into the trunk of their car and sped away.
As Bastogne Soldiers on the ground were moving in on the vehicle, the sedan stopped, allowing one of the terrorists to get out of the vehicle. The remaining group continued to a nearby building where they jumped out of their car and ran into the building, taking their victim with them.
A team of Bastogne Soldiers air assaulted to the area and quickly moved into the building, capturing the three assailants and freeing the hostage. A careful search of the building revealed three AK-47 rifles and several magazines, as well as a barrel filled with ammunition.
This is the 3rd Iraqi citizen rescued from the hands of kidnappers by 101st Airborne Division Soldiers this month.
MARINES CAPTURE 40 INSURGENTS, KILL 3; U.S. AIR STRIKE KILLS 3-MAN INSURGENT MORTAR CREW
CAMP AL ASAD, Iraq ? U.S. Marines captured 40 insurgents yesterday throughout the Haditha Triad region in western Al Anbar Province, Iraq.
Marines from the Hawaii-based 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment, known as ?America?s Battalion,? captured the 40 insurgents during pre-planned counterinsurgency operations in the ?Triad? region.
Also, a U.S scout sniper team fired upon insurgents, which were firing upon a Marine M1A1 tank on a road in Haditha. 2 of the insurgents were killed; 1 wounded.
This follows a day after a separate scout sniper team fired at insurgents. 1 insurgent was killed while digging a hole in a spot where numerous IEDs have recently been discovered or detonated.
?The Battalion?s successes over the last several days are really the result of the anti-Iraqi forces conducting attacks out of desperation. They see the growing capability of the Iraqi Army and recent fielding of the Iraqi Police as the clear beginning to the end of their influence in the Triad,? said Lt. Col. Norm Cooling, 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment.
The Haditha Triad is a region made up of three neighboring cities ? Haditha, Barwanah and Haqlaniyah ? with a combined population of about 70,000, nestled along the Euphrates River about 160 miles northwest of Baghdad.
In Baghdad, a U.S. air strike on a building killed 3 members of a mortar crew on Friday. Some civilians may have been wounded in the bombing.
293 IRAQIS JOIN ARMY
CAMP FALLUJAH, Iraq ? Soldiers from the 1st Iraqi Army Division enlisted 293 Iraqi males from greater Fallujah and Habbaniyah as part of an al Anbar Province-wide recruiting drive Tuesday and Wednesday.
?They looked enthusiastic about doing this, and that?s a good sign,? said Maj. William Gerst, an operations officer who assisted the Iraqis in the coordination of the campaign. ?It?s a sign that they notice we?re here to help them and they are taking control of their own destiny.?
?I want to serve our country and defend Iraq,? said one recruit through an interpreter.
?Patriotism? I want to defend my country,? said another.
The recruits were then transported by Marines to a month-long boot camp in Habbaniyah staffed solely by Iraqi personnel drawn from the 1st Iraqi Army Division.
Iraq Cites Arrest of a Top Local Insurgent; Officials say he is No. 2 in Al-Qaeda Group
BAGHDA, Sept. 3 -- U.S. and Iraqi forces have captured a top al-Qaeda leader who ordered the bombing of a Shiite Muslim shrine in Samarra that triggered a wave of ferocious sectarian killings, Iraqi officials said Sunday.
The arrest of Hamed Jumaa Faris Juri al-Saeidi, the No. 2 leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, was the latest in a series of blows to the insurgent group.
"The al-Qaeda organization in Iraq has been seriously weakened and is now suffering from a leadership vacuum," Iraq's national security adviser, Mowaffak al-Rubaie. 20 Senior al-Qaeda in Iraq fighters have been captured or killed based on information from Saeidi since his arrest within the past few weeks, Iraqi officials said.
The Mujaheddin Shura Council, an insurgent coalition that includes al-Qaeda in Iraq, denied that Saeidi was a member of al-Qaeda. A leader of another group in the council, however, confirmed that Saeidi belonged to al-Qaeda.
Saeidi, an intelligence officer for Saddam, was captured within the past few weeks as he hid among women and children in a location near Baghdad. Saeidi confessed that he had joined al-Qaeda in Iraq three years ago and is being held by U.S.-led forces.
In an attempt to thrust Iraq into a full-scale civil war, Saeidi supervised Haitham al-Badri, an operative under his command, in carrying out the Feb. 22 bombing of a revered golden-domed Shiite shrine in Samarra, officials said. That attack sparked brutal reprisal killings by both Shiites and Sunnis that have left thousands of people dead.
"Why did you kill hundreds of people?" Saeidi was asked during a recent interrogation.
What do you mean 'hundreds of people?' I've killed thousands," Saeidi responded.
In other news:
MUQDADIYA - U.S. troops killed 5 men in a ground assault and air strike on what they called a "safe house", targeting a person involved in moving money and foreign fighters into Iraq. A child was also killed in the fighting in Muqdadiya, northeast of Baghdad, the U.S. military said in a statement. It said the operation freed two men who had been held hostage.
IRAQI ARMY TARGETS INSURGENTS IN MULTIPLE RAIDS
BAGHDAD ? Iraqi Army units, with Coalition Force advisers, conducted multiple raids on September 6 to capture individuals connected with insurgent activities that target Iraqi Army, Coalition Forces and Iraqi citizens.
In a raid in Habbiniyah, Iraqi Army forces captured 4 individuals engaged in insurgent activities against Iraqi and coalition forces. One individual was especially wanted as he was an improvised explosive device emplacer believed connected with multiple attacks.
In another raid in Taji, an insurgent engaged in an intimidation campaign against Iraqi citizens was captured. The insurgent had recently taken control of an insurgent cell whose previous leader had been captured by Iraqi security forces and was currently engaged in the systematic kidnapping of fellow citizens.
In an additional raid in Ramadi, a sniper and 4 others for detonating IEDs against Iraqi forces were captured. All raids occurred without further incident with no reported casualties.
U.S. SOLDIERS KILL INSURGENT AND WOUND ANOTHER
TIKRIT, Iraq ? U.S. Soldiers killed one insurgent and wounded another near Hawija, Iraq. The Soldiers from the 25th Infantry Division, spotted the insurgents placing a roadside improvised explosive device and engaged them with small arms fire.
An explosive ordinance disposal team was sent to the site and found a mortar round next to the insurgents? vehicle.
IRAQI POLICE, U.S. MPs CAPTURE 10 WEAPONS SMUGGLERS
BAGHDAD ? Iraqi police, with the assistance of Soldiers from 615th Military Police Company, 1st Armored Division, captured 10 weapons smugglers Thursday.
The 33 weapons were confiscated in addition to more than 2,000 rounds of ammunition, nine body armor vests and various bomb-making materials..
82nd Airborne Div.
1/508 Infantry
================
-
The Secret Letter From Iraq
A Marine's letter home, with its frank description of life in "Dante's inferno," has been circulating through generals' in-boxes. We publish it here with the author's approval
Posted Friday, Oct. 06, 2006
Written last month, this straightforward account of life in Iraq by a Marine officer was initially sent just to a small group of family and friends. His honest but wry narration and unusually frank dissection of the mission contrasts sharply with the story presented by both sides of the Iraq war debate, the Pentagon spin masters and fierce critics. Perhaps inevitably, the "Letter from Iraq" moved quickly beyond the small group of acquantainaces and hit the inboxes of retired generals, officers in the Pentagon, and staffers on Capitol Hill. TIME's Sally B. Donnelly first received a copy three weeks ago but only this week was able to track down the author and verify the document's authenticity. The author wishes to remain anonymous but has allowed us to publish it here ? with a few judicious omissions.
All: I haven't written very much from Iraq. There's really not much to write about. More exactly, there's not much I can write about because practically everything I do, read or hear is classified military information or is depressing to the point that I'd rather just forget about it, never mind write about it. The gaps in between all of that are filled with the pure tedium of daily life in an armed camp. So it's a bit of a struggle to think of anything to put into a letter that's worth reading. Worse, this place just consumes you. I work 18-20-hour days, every day. The quest to draw a clear picture of what the insurgents are up to never ends. Problems and frictions crop up faster than solutions. Every challenge demands a response. It's like this every day. Before I know it, I can't see straight, because it's 0400 and I've been at work for 20 hours straight, somehow missing dinner again in the process. And once again I haven't written to anyone. It starts all over again four hours later. It's not really like Ground Hog Day, it's more like a level from Dante's Inferno.
Rather than attempting to sum up the last seven months, I figured I'd just hit the record-setting highlights of 2006 in Iraq. These are among the events and experiences I'll remember best.
Worst Case of D?j? Vu ? I thought I was familiar with the feeling of d?j? vu until I arrived back here in Fallujah in February. The moment I stepped off of the helicopter, just as dawn broke, and saw the camp just as I had left it ten months before ? that was d?j? vu. Kind of unnerving. It was as if I had never left. Same work area, same busted desk, same chair, same computer, same room, same creaky rack, same... everything. Same everything for the next year. It was like entering a parallel universe. Home wasn't 10,000 miles away, it was a different lifetime.
Most Surreal Moment ? Watching Marines arrive at my detention facility and unload a truck load of flex-cuffed midgets. 26 to be exact. We had put the word out earlier in the day to the Marines in Fallujah that we were looking for Bad Guy X, who was described as a midget. Little did I know that Fallujah was home to a small community of midgets, who banded together for support since they were considered as social outcasts. The Marines were anxious to get back to the midget colony to bring in the rest of the midget suspects, but I called off the search, figuring Bad Guy X was long gone on his short legs after seeing his companions rounded up by the giant infidels.
Most Profound Man in Iraq ? an unidentified farmer in a fairly remote area who, after being asked by Reconnaissance Marines if he had seen any foreign fighters in the area replied "Yes, you."
Worst City in al-Anbar Province ? Ramadi, hands down. The provincial capital of 400,000 people. Lots and lots of insurgents killed in there since we arrived in February. Every day is a nasty gun battle. They blast us with giant bombs in the road, snipers, mortars and small arms. We blast them with tanks, attack helicopters, artillery, our snipers (much better than theirs), and every weapon that an infantryman can carry. Every day. Incredibly, I rarely see Ramadi in the news. We have as many attacks out here in the west as Baghdad. Yet, Baghdad has 7 million people, we have just 1.2 million. Per capita, al-Anbar province is the most violent place in Iraq by several orders of magnitude. I suppose it was no accident that the Marines were assigned this area in 2003.
Bravest Guy in al-Anbar Province ? Any Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technician (EOD Tech). How'd you like a job that required you to defuse bombs in a hole in the middle of the road that very likely are booby-trapped or connected by wire to a bad guy who's just waiting for you to get close to the bomb before he clicks the detonator? Every day. Sanitation workers in New York City get paid more than these guys. Talk about courage and commitment.
Second Bravest Guy in al-Anbar Province ? It's a 20,000-way tie among all these Marines and Soldiers who venture out on the highways and through the towns of al-Anbar every day, not knowing if it will be their last ? and for a couple of them, it will be.
Worst E-Mail Message ? "The Walking Blood Bank is Activated. We need blood type A+ stat." I always head down to the surgical unit as soon as I get these messages, but I never give blood ? there's always about 80 Marines in line, night or day.
Biggest Surprise ? Iraqi Police. All local guys. I never figured that we'd get a police force established in the cities in al-Anbar. I estimated that insurgents would kill the first few, scaring off the rest. Well, insurgents did kill the first few, but the cops kept on coming. The insurgents continue to target the police, killing them in their homes and on the streets, but the cops won't give up. Absolutely incredible tenacity. The insurgents know that the police are far better at finding them than we are ? and they are finding them. Now, if we could just get them out of the habit of beating prisoners to a pulp...
Greatest Vindication ? Stocking up on outrageous quantities of Diet Coke from the chow hall in spite of the derision from my men on such hoarding, then having a 122mm rocket blast apart the giant shipping container that held all of the soda for the chow hall. Yep, you can't buy experience.
Biggest Mystery ? How some people can gain weight out here. I'm down to 165 lbs. Who has time to eat?
Second Biggest Mystery ? if there's no atheists in foxholes, then why aren't there more people at Mass every Sunday?
Favorite Iraqi TV Show ? Oprah. I have no idea. They all have satellite TV.
Coolest Insurgent Act ? Stealing almost $7 million from the main bank in Ramadi in broad daylight, then, upon exiting, waving to the Marines in the combat outpost right next to the bank, who had no clue of what was going on. The Marines waved back. Too cool.
Most Memorable Scene ? In the middle of the night, on a dusty airfield, watching the better part of a battalion of Marines packed up and ready to go home after over six months in al-Anbar, the relief etched in their young faces even in the moonlight. Then watching these same Marines exchange glances with a similar number of grunts loaded down with gear file past ? their replacements. Nothing was said. Nothing needed to be said.
Highest Unit Re-enlistment Rate ? Any outfit that has been in Iraq recently. All the danger, all the hardship, all the time away from home, all the horror, all the frustrations with the fight here ? all are outweighed by the desire for young men to be part of a band of brothers who will die for one another. They found what they were looking for when they enlisted out of high school. Man for man, they now have more combat experience than any Marines in the history of our Corps.
Most Surprising Thing I Don't Miss ? Beer. Perhaps being half-stunned by lack of sleep makes up for it.
Worst Smell ? Porta-johns in 120-degree heat ? and that's 120 degrees outside of the porta-john.
Highest Temperature ? I don't know exactly, but it was in the porta-johns. Needed to re-hydrate after each trip to the loo.
Biggest Hassle ? High-ranking visitors. More disruptive to work than a rocket attack. VIPs demand briefs and "battlefield" tours (we take them to quiet sections of Fallujah, which is plenty scary for them). Our briefs and commentary seem to have no effect on their preconceived notions of what's going on in Iraq. Their trips allow them to say that they've been to Fallujah, which gives them an unfortunate degree of credibility in perpetuating their fantasies about the insurgency here.
Biggest Outrage ? Practically anything said by talking heads on TV about the war in Iraq, not that I get to watch much TV. Their thoughts are consistently both grossly simplistic and politically slanted. Biggest Offender: Bill O'Reilly.
Best Intel Work ? Finding Jill Carroll's kidnappers ? all of them. I was mighty proud of my guys that day. I figured we'd all get the Christian Science Monitor for free after this, but none have showed up yet.
Saddest Moment ? Having an infantry battalion commander hand me the dog tags of one of my Marines who had just been killed while on a mission with his unit. Hit by a 60mm mortar. He was a great Marine. I felt crushed for a long time afterward. His picture now hangs at the entrance to our section area. We'll carry it home with us when we leave in February.
Best Chuck Norris Moment ? 13 May. Bad Guys arrived at the government center in a small town to kidnap the mayor, since they have a problem with any form of government that does not include regular beheadings and women wearing burqahs. There were seven of them. As they brought the mayor out to put him in a pick-up truck to take him off to be beheaded (on video, as usual), one of the Bad Guys put down his machine gun so that he could tie the mayor's hands. The mayor took the opportunity to pick up the machine gun and drill five of the Bad Guys. The other two ran away. One of the dead Bad Guys was on our top twenty wanted list. Like they say, you can't fight City Hall.
Worst Sound ? That crack-boom off in the distance that means an IED or mine just went off. You just wonder who got it, hoping that it was a near miss rather than a direct hit. Hear it practically every day.
Second Worst Sound ? Our artillery firing without warning. The howitzers are pretty close to where I work. Believe me, outgoing sounds a lot like incoming when our guns are firing right over our heads. They'd about knock the fillings out of your teeth.
Only Thing Better in Iraq Than in the U.S. ? Sunsets. Spectacular. It's from all the dust in the air.
Proudest Moment ? It's a tie every day, watching our Marines produce phenomenal intelligence products that go pretty far in teasing apart Bad Guy operations in al-Anbar. Every night Marines and Soldiers are kicking in doors and grabbing Bad Guys based on intelligence developed by our guys. We rarely lose a Marine during these raids, they are so well-informed of the objective. A bunch of kids right out of high school shouldn't be able to work so well, but they do.
Happiest Moment ? Well, it wasn't in Iraq. There are no truly happy moments here. It was back in California when I was able to hold my family again while home on leave during July.
Most Common Thought ? Home. Always thinking of home, of my great wife and the kids. Wondering how everyone else is getting along. Regretting that I don't write more. Yep, always thinking of home.
I hope you all are doing well. If you want to do something for me, kiss a cop, flush a toilet, and drink a beer. I'll try to write again before too long ? I promise.
-
Well written and well to the point...? I was in Al Anbar province for 7 months in 2005,? as a Corpsman attached to MCD "Mine Clearing Detachment Quick Reaction Force" as well as spending countless hours attached to the Security Platoon and in the STP/BAS trying to help the wounded...? I have walked and lead many convoys around that area.? I remember one of our Iraqi troops that went home on liberty one weekend and did not return.? As the story goes, he went through a (VCP) vehicle check point and showed his ID.? He was shot on sight.? It was a false check point ran by insugents.? The Iraqi people are fighting for their freedom right along side of us and also making the ultimate sacrifices for hopes of a better future.? I have listened to many stories from the ING and ISF about their personal experiences with Saddam and it is far worse than that which is shared with the media.
I am not going to steal the thunder here but thanks for sharing and keeping it real.? I expect in time there will be a lot that comes out in the wash.? I know I have a lot that will never be discussed.....? And there are alot of videos that will never be shared for years to come.? All in due time.? What has hit the press is nothing compared to what is out there, in our troops personal collections.?
God Speed!
PS.
Not everywhere has porta Johns... In Husaybah at camp Gannon we had good old fashoined burn barrels and your shower for months came by the way of poking holes in water bottles and rinsing off. One day my Medical Officer was walking to go poop. He forgot his wet wipes (Thank God), he went back to ge them. As he was aproaching it for the second time it was blown up by a mortar round. Talk about divine intervention... LOL
If you dont laugh you cry :wink:
-
damn.....
-
"I am not going to steal the thunder here but thanks for sharing and keeping it real."
Those who have been ARE the lightening and the thunder.
-
A close friend of mine is a USMC staff sgt. He is 26 and has now spent 1 tour in afgan, one tour in iraq that was one five hours notice cut short and was sent home for a tour doing airport security. He was informed that he will be shipping out on jan 2nd and will be coming home for good in march. Then its just the uncertainty of inactive reserve. From what he has said and from what the other guys I know have said. Things are def not getting better in any way.
Greg
-
Then its just the uncertainty of inactive reserve.
The latest news I have heard, is that they are currently doing an involuntary recall, at least for the Corpsmen.? The way they are selecting them;? they are going after the guys that have been inactive for at least one year, but still have at least one year left in inactive status before their contract is up.? Im not sure about the Marines but I would suspect it is the same.
Doesn't make much sense to me...? You end your enlisted active service, decompress a bit and start getting your life together (ie job, familly, etc.), then they throw a wrench back in the mix and reactivate you???? Militarty Logic - LOL?
Also we currently have NCS "National Call to Service" Corpsmen.? They sign 2 years active duty contracts.? After boot camp, "A" school (Hospital Corps School) then FMSS (Field Medical Service School) they get sent straight to division then service 15 months with division.? They go to combat then go onto inactive status thinking all is done....? ?Psyc!? Phone rings and now you are getting sent again.? Sad part is when the recruiter signs them up as NCS they dont get the full benefits.? No Mongomery GI Bill, etc.? Just wham bam thank you ma'am.
Anyone thinking of going NCS should really look into it long and hard before signing.? (IMHO) Better off just going for the whole package.
In addition I feel it is dangerous for the well being of the Marines we serve with.? Our NCS guys get sent straight to the line companies.? With only 15 months to spend with us, there is no reason to send them for additional training or put them in a lead position (ie Senior Line Co. Corpsman, Sick Call, Admin. Training or Supply) no time to get to go to OEMS (Operational Emergency Medical Skills training or EMT school)....? Doesn't really set anyone up for success IMHO (Marines or Sailors).? In the long run, I feel we will all suffer from this program.
:-o
-
Today's WSJ:
Maliki's Moment
Iraqis have to make compromises to limit incentives to violence.
Monday, October 9, 2006 12:01 a.m. EDT
Iraq is a big issue this U.S. election season, and it deserves to be. But the debate is mostly backward looking, with arguments about whether regime change was justified, and the media focused on a new book detailing already well known divisions within the Bush Administration. What really matters at this point is supporting the Iraqi political leaders in whose hands the fate of our shared project there now rests. And despite the steady stream of bad news from Iraq, there's still everything to fight for.
It can't be denied that security in Baghdad is not improving. But neither has it grown markedly worse. And it is a matter of underestimated significance that Iraqi political leaders continue to defy pundits and choose not to lead their communities into a "civil war." They are still sitting together in a government, however imperfect.
A recent poll shows Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki with favorable ratings in the 80%-plus range, which means Iraqis of all stripes are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt. We hope Mr. Maliki appreciates the political capital he now has to forge compromises on the multitude of tough issues he faces--as well as the fact that this goodwill could evaporate rapidly if he fails to use it.
The immediate concern has to be some progress on security, and the Prime Minister deserves credit for striking an agreement last week to create pan-sectarian neighborhood security committees that could help increase Iraqis' trust in their own police. Iraqi security forces have been making progress against the al Qaeda network. And the recent agreement of leaders in Anbar province to unite against foreign terrorists is also an encouraging sign.
But the Iraqi government is falling short on the provision of security and other basic government services in part because of its lack of honest and competent officials at both ministerial and lower levels. The ministries were handed out mostly as part of a spoils system after the country's sectarian election, and within the ministries themselves there are many officials putting their own political concerns ahead of the country's. Exhibit A may be the Prime Minister's office itself, which is staffed by Dawa Party operatives of questionable competence. One way to reassure Iraqis that he is serious about governing would be for Mr. Maliki to start bringing in some better advisers--from outside the Shiite community if need be.
More importantly, Prime Minister Maliki will have to use his bully pulpit to forge the broad political compromises that are essential to long-run peace. A key issue here is what to do with Iraq's oil wealth. There has been a lot of talk about Sunni opposition to federalism, or strong regional governments. But the Sunnis are primarily worried that strong Kurdish and Shiite regions would hoard Iraq's mineral resources; Sunnis would probably appreciate some autonomy in Anbar province if they were assured they wouldn't be deprived of funds as a result.
In other words, the way to cut the Gordian Knot on federalism is to come up with an oil-sharing plan that guarantees the resource will be apportioned equally. Our favorite idea on this score is the one proposed by Ahmed Chalabi during the Constitutional debates last year, which is the establishment of an Alaska-style oil trust that would make direct payments to all Iraqi citizens.
We spoke last week with Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih and he told us the trust, or "dividend" as he called it, remains very much on the table--and is an idea he supports. He said Iraq's parties have already committed to having the oil wealth apportioned equally by the central government, but that a dispute remains over whether the central government will also have control over new exploration contracts.
This is a disagreement Prime Minister Maliki might want to spend some political capital to settle quickly. The federalism issue, and other challenges such as disarming the militias, will be easier to tackle once everyone understands they have a monetary stake in Iraq's success. Oil can be "a unifying resource, as opposed to a resource people will fight over," as Mr. Salih puts it.
Finally, a word about U.S. troop levels, which continue to be a subject of debate. We've always been skeptical that more troops are a silver bullet for Iraq's violence, much of which is about trying to influence the country's future political landscape. However, if another 10,000 or 20,000 or however many troops would reassure Iraqis in the months ahead that it's safe to make political compromises, then by all means President Bush should deploy them.
The key point is that Iraqis have to make their own political compromises to limit the incentive for violence, and sooner rather than later. The time has long since passed where the U.S. can play anything other than a supporting role in Iraq, and while the patience of the American public has been admirable it is not endless. Iraq will be what its democratically elected, constitutionally legitimate leaders now make of it. In particular, this is Nouri al-Maliki's moment.
-
Geopolitical Diary: Federalism and Factions in Iraq
Iraq's parliament approved a law on Wednesday that laid down the mechanics of establishing federal regions. The main Sunni parliamentary coalition, the Tawafoq Iraqi Front, and legislators from two major Shiite parties, the al-Sadrite Bloc and al-Fadhila, tried to prevent a vote on the bill by boycotting the session. There were still enough deputies for a quorum, however, and they unanimously approved each of the bill's 200-odd articles in individual votes.
The law establishes a system allowing provinces to come together into autonomous regions that would wield significant self-rule powers; any province interested in becoming part of a region would have to hold a referendum, provided a third of the provincial legislators agree to do so. The legislation also postpones the formation of the autonomous regions for another 18 months -- a concession designed to allay the concerns of the Sunnis, who in September agreed to allow the bill to go to a vote after reaching a deal with the Shia.
This move is not a final deal, but rather a placeholder designed to advance the federalism project so it can move toward the stage of sorting out details. The law's main proponents -- Iraq's main Shiite group, the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), and its allies in the ruling Shiite United Iraqi Alliance -- want to be able to push ahead with the creation of a Shiite federal zone, composed of nine provinces in southern Iraq, before the violence in the country gets completely out of hand. They also know that their plans will be blessed by the United States; former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker's Iraq Study Group reportedly is planning to recommend to the Bush administration that Iraq be divided into three federal zones.
For the federalist Shia, the Sunnis are not the only problem -- as is clear from the fact that the al-Sadrite Bloc and al-Fadhila sat out of Wednesday's vote. Both groups oppose the move because they are already locked in a battle with the mainstream Shiite groups, SCIRI and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's Hizb al-Dawah, for control of the Shiite south. Al-Fadhila and the movement of Muqtada al-Sadr view the creation of a federal zone as further undercutting the power they wield at the local and regional level in the southern provinces -- both in the official sense and on the street with the militias and oil mafias. This means that in addition to the problems SCIRI and its allies will face in negotiating with the Sunnis over the details of the move toward federalism, they will also have a tough time in the implementation phase, where they will have to deal with the al-Sadrites and al-Fadhila.
The Shiite federalists are to a great degree relying on U.S. military support for their plans to create an autonomous zone. Indeed, we are already seeing stepped-up operations by joint task forces composed of U.S. and Iraqi forces against al-Sadr's Mehdi Army militiamen. Incidentally, U.S. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Peter Schoomaker said Wednesday that the Pentagon is making plans on the assumption that it may have to maintain current troop levels in Iraq until at least 2010. Obviously, Washington realizes that it will be quite some time before the Shiite-dominated Iraqi forces will be able to shoulder the responsibility of security.
SCIRI is the Bush administration's key Shiite ally, so the fact that SCIRI is pushing toward a Shiite federal zone means Washington approves of this plan even before Baker's recommendation. But given the domestic pressure on U.S. President George W. Bush with regard to Iraq, and with the upcoming midterm elections in November possibly giving Democrats control of Congress, it remains an open question whether the United States will be able to continue supporting the federalism project in the long term.
-
www.stratfor.com
IRAQ: Dubai-based satellite channel Al Arabiya aired a video of Abu Osama al-Mujahid, a man claiming to be a jihadi leader in Iraq, in which he told Osama bin Laden that al Qaeda in Iraq is weakening under the leadership of Abu Ayyub al-Masri. Al-Mujahid also said the group had committed "unjustified violations," such as the killing of prominent sheikhs.
-
An Islamic site states that the following is from the UK's Telegraph:
There was a plan for Iraq - but it was torn up
(Filed: 15/10/2006)
When, in the run-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the retired US Army General Jay Garner was asked to take over the post-war humanitarian mission, he certainly possessed the credentials for the job. In 1991 he had headed Operation Provide Comfort, rescuing thousands of ethnic Kurds in northern Iraq after the first Gulf war. Who better, then, for the American Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, to appoint to the job second time round.
Garner drew up detailed plans and, at his first briefing with President Bush, outlined three essential "musts" that would, he asserted, ensure a smooth transition after the war. The first "must", he said, was that the Iraqi military should not be disbanded. The second "must" was that the 50,000-strong Ba'ath party machine that ran government services should not be broken up or its members proscribed. If either were to happen, he warned, there would be chaos compounded by thousands of unemployed, armed Iraqis running around. And the third "must", he insisted, was that an interim Iraqi leadership group, eager to help the United States administer the country in the short term, should be kept on-side.
Initially, no one disagreed, according to State of Denial, the new book by the veteran Washington reporter, Bob Woodward. But within weeks of the invasion, Garner's tenure as head of the post-war planning office was over: he was replaced by Paul Bremer, a terrorism expert and prot?g? of Henry Kissinger. Bremer immediately countermanded all three of Garner's "musts".
When, eventually, Garner confronted Rumsfeld, telling him: "There is still time to rectify this," Rumsfeld refused to do so.
-
Second post of the morning from me:
Waging War, One Police Precinct at a Time
By PHILLIP CARTER
Published: October 15, 2006
Los Angeles
THE military?s new counterinsurgency manual offers a great deal of wisdom for those who will wage the small wars of the future. Its prescriptions and paradoxes ? like the maxim that the more force used, the less effective it is ? make sense. However, having spent the last year advising a provincial police headquarters in Iraq, I know it?s far easier to write about such wars than to fight them.
The war I knew was infinitely more complex, contradictory and elusive than the one described in the network news broadcasts or envisioned in the new field manual. When I finally left Baquba, the violent capital of Iraq?s Diyala Province, I found myself questioning many aspects of our mission and our accomplishments, both in a personal search for meaning and a quest to gather lessons that might help those soldiers who will follow me.
The first question was how Iraq in September 2006 differed from that of October 2005. Our Iraqi interpreters told us things were better than last year, which in turn had been better than 2004, when American forces frequently fought pitched battles in Baquba. Yet, sometimes in the same breath, they would long for the days of stability and order under Saddam Hussein.
During my time there, the hundreds of thousands of residents of Baquba went to work or school, shopped in markets, spent time with their families and lived their lives. The vibrancy and vitality of Iraqi society was the norm, not the anarchic violence we see in the news.
And yet, the violence did exist; it was not a figment of reporters? imaginations. Gunfire frequently echoed through the streets of central Baquba, and homemade bombs often interrupted the bustling marketplace just north of our compound. This violence worsened during my time in Iraq: the Army?s PowerPoint presentations depicting attack and death statistics from across the country showed the same, steadily increasing trend lines.
Despite the trend towards consolidation of American units onto huge bases in the desert, my team remained in downtown Baquba. We shared our compound with the provincial government; it adjoined the provincial courthouse and was just 800 yards down the street from the police headquarters. This proximity made us more effective, both because it made it easier for us to talk to the Iraqi leaders with whom we worked, and because it enhanced our credibility with our Iraqi counterparts, who saw us living and working by their side.
When the power grid failed or water supply stopped working ? a daily experience during the summer ? we knew and felt it firsthand. Likewise, when explosions or firefights erupted in the city, we could judge their severity with our own senses. We learned that counterinsurgency cannot be conducted from afar.
But did we make a difference? Diyala Province has 1.4 million citizens and stretches from the northern edge of Baghdad east to the Iranian border, north to Kurdistan, and west to the Sunni heartland. My brigade commander, a sage infantryman from Colorado, called Diyala ?little Iraq,? because its mix of people, geography and conditions represented a microcosm of the torn country. As goes Diyala, so goes Iraq, he and others said.
Our mission was deceptively simple: to build the provincial police so they could provide security and the rule of law. In these areas, we observed tangible progress. My team delivered hundreds of recruits to American-financed police academies, and oversaw a local academy that retrained hundreds of officers who had served under the old regime. Our civilian advisers, American police officers who came to Iraq as State Department contractors, trained hundreds of Iraqi patrolmen in street survival and investigative skills.
We gave trucks, rifles, body armor, radios and countless other items to the police, and oversaw the construction or renovation of police stations throughout the province. With our help, the police chief, a corpulent former army officer, and his staff became better managers, and replaced many ineffective and corrupt officers. We also brought our expertise to the Iraqi jails, judges and lawyers, resulting in hundreds of innocent Iraqi detainees being released after languishing for months or years in jail.
(Page 2 of 2)
Despite these successes, I still left Iraq feeling uncertain about what we had accomplished. In theory, security should have improved with the development of capable Iraqi Army and police units. That did not happen. This is the central paradox of the Iraq war in fall 2006: we are making progress in developing the Iraqi Army and police, yet the violence gripping the country continues to worsen.
This paradox raises fundamental questions about the wisdom and efficacy of our strategy, which is to ?stand up? Iraqi security forces so we can ?stand down? American forces. Put simply, this plan is a blueprint for withdrawal, not for victory. Improving the Iraqi Army and police is necessary to prevail in Iraq; it is not sufficient.
Counterinsurgency is more like an election than a military operation; the Iraqi government must convince the Iraqi people to choose it over the alternatives offered by Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish militants. To do so, the Iraqi government and the coalition must deliver public goods ? security, public works, commerce, education and the rule of law, to name a few. The campaign must convince not just a majority or super-majority but virtually everyone, for as the noted insurgents T. E. Lawrence and Mao Zedong have noted, it takes the support of just 2 in 100 citizens to sustain an insurgency.
At this point, and with this strategy, it may not be possible to win in Iraq. America gained a spectacular victory in 2003, toppling the brutal Saddam Hussein regime. But there are limits to what military force can accomplish. You cannot plant democracy with a bayonet, nor can you force Iraqis to choose a particular path if their democracy is to mean anything at all.
Moreover, our choices in 2006 are not as good as our choices were in 2003; we cannot simply stay the course now and hope for victory. Given Iraq?s historic antipathy to invaders and the strength of today?s insurgency, I believe only a wholly unconventional approach will work. This means many more embedded advisers like myself, working in tandem with teams from the State Department and other agencies, supported by combat forces only when force is necessary.
We should strive in 2006 to build on our successes and to find a smarter way to shift the counterinsurgency effort to the Iraqis in order to secure an imperfect victory. For, as Lawrence wrote eight decades ago about helping the Arabs fight the Turks: ?Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them.?
-
www.stratfor.com
Geopolitical Diary: Considering Turkey's Interests in Iraq
Reports are circulating that jihadist groups in northern and central Iraq are in the process of creating an "emirate," an independent region in the Sunni areas. The Shia already are in effective control of their own region in the south, and the Kurds have controlled their region of northern Iraq for an extended period of time. There are ethnically diffuse and disputed areas in and around Baghdad, so this hardly solves the problem of sectarian violence, but this regional autonomy is becoming a de facto reality. We now need to start considering some aspects of a potential partition.
The most important issue here is to recognize what the Sunnis already know: a partition along ethno-sectarian lines would make the Sunni region, economically speaking, an abortion. The Shia control Iraq's southern oil fields. The Kurds control the northern oil fields. The Sunnis control nothing. If partition occurs in accordance with current boundaries, the Sunni position will deteriorate and collapse. Therefore, it is essential for all involved (given the Sunni unrest and prospects of violence) that the Sunnis have a share in Iraq's oil.
To be more precise, the Sunnis must control Kirkuk, a center of the oil industry and a city in which conflict rages for these reasons. The Kurds now hold Kirkuk; the Sunnis must take it. The Sunnis are fighting on four fronts: against the Shia, against the Kurds, against the Americans and against each other. The Kurds, on the other hand, are fighting only the Sunnis at this point. Therefore, logic would have it that the Sunnis don't stand a chance.
But another element must be added to this calculus: Turkey. Turkey has tried to keep out of the Iraq war and, so far, has done fairly well at it. But Turkey does not want to see the Kurdish autonomous region expand, let alone give rise to an independent Kurdish state. Such a state would become a focal point for Kurdish nationalism and, since the Turks would face growing breakaway tendencies in their own Kurdish region, they would not welcome this development -- particularly if Baghdad collapses as Iraq's center.
Therefore, the Turks will want to weaken the Kurds. They also will want to make sure that there is a strong buffer between them and the Iraqi Shia -- a buffer other than the Kurds. That would mean it is in Turkey's national interest to see the Sunnis strengthened right now. It should be recalled that the Turks intervened extensively in Iraq prior to 2003. They are old players in the region with ties to Sunni tribal leaders. If they are facing a Kurdish state, they might well choose to reassert themselves in the region by strengthening the Sunnis.
Now, the Turks are vehemently opposed to the jihadists, but in this they share an interest with Sunni tribal leaders, who see the jihadists as a potential threat to their own authority. While it is the jihadists who have declared an emirate, neither the Sunni leadership nor the Turks would want to see the jihadists having any role to play if independence becomes a reality. The Turks would want to weaken the Kurds; the Sunnis would want to dominate oil in the north. Alliances have been formed on less.
There are few constraints on the Turks. They do not expect to be admitted to the European Union and, given France's decision to raise the question of the Armenian holocaust, the Turks have written off accession, in the intermediate term at least. Nor do they need it. Turkey has been doing quite well -- better than France or Germany, economically. As for the Iranians, they would have no problem with seeing the Kurds seriously weakened and the Sunni jihadists undermined. So long as the Shia control the south and the Iranians have influence with the Shia in Iraq, they can live with Turkish influence among the Sunnis.
Meanwhile, the United States seems to be making plans for deploying forces in northern Iraq. Any such plan would require Turkish support, as logistical support from Kuwait makes for a long, tough line. If the United States wants a role in Iraq after redeployment, it will have to take Turkish interests into account. The United States previously has backed Kurdish interests. But the Americans need the Turks and have little to offer them. The one thing the Turks might want -- EU membership without strings -- is something Washington can't help them with.
It is now time to turn the focus from Baghdad to the north, and the political evolution there.
-
http://formerspook.blogspot.com/
Monday, October 16, 2006
Uncommon Valor
As the Battle for Baghdad rages on, casualties among U.S. troops have increased in recent months. Predictably, The New York Times has already weighed in on the subject, noting that this month may rank as one of the bloodiest months for American soldiers and Marines; so far, at least 53 U.S. military personnel have been killed in Iraq during October, and that total will certainly rise with two weeks remaining in the month.
The Times' veiled message is easy enough to decipher: efforts by the U.S. to improve security in Baghdad aren't working; violence continues to spiral out of control, resulting in more casualties among American troops, Iraqi civilians, and members of that nation's fledgling security forces.
Is that an accurate assessment? To its credit, the Times notes that a major reason for the increase in combat casualties is an increased deployment of U.S. forces in and around the Iraqi capital. With more troops battling terrorists in the heart of the insurgency, it is logical to assume that casualties will increase, at least over the short term. However, the Times fails to note that the U.S. offensive also falls during the Muslim Holy Month of Ramadan, a period that traditionally produces a major spike in terrorist attacks. In recent years, there has been a noticeable decrease in enemy strikes after Ramadan, so it seems likely that U.S. casualties will also fall in November and December--another fact ignored by the Times.
Likewise, the Newspaper of Record also ignores other trends that may not bode well for our enemies. According to data from the same web site (icasualties.org), the number of troops killed by IEDs has declined steadily over the past year, despite an increase in terrorist bomb production and implantation attempts. Since IEDs represent the insurgents's only viable tactic, a decrease in their effectiveness means trouble ahead for the terrorists. And, based on current trends, the number of U.S. troops killed in Iraq will decline again this year, for the second year in a row. Obviously, the loss of 3,000 military personnel since the launch of Operation Iraqi Freedom is a tragedy for a society that values (or should value) all human life. But those casualties should also be weighed in the context of history, and our own, collective sense of what constitutes an appropriate level of sacrifice in defense of our freedoms.
That's why Clint Eastwood's new film, Flags of Our Fathers, is being released at exactly the right moment for American audiences. Based on James Bradley's best-selling book, Flags recounts the historic flag-raising during the Battle of Iwo Jima in 1945. According to early reviews, Mr. Eastwood's film is hardly a paean to war; in fact, it is unflinching in its depiction of the carnage of battle, and the long-term effects of the Iwo campaign on the men who made it through, most notably, the three surviving flag-raisers. It's also worth noting that the current total of combat deaths in Iraq (2300) represents less than half the number of Marines and sailors who died in a single month on Iwo Jima. Marines on Iwo accounted for half of the Congressional Medals of Honor awarded to the USMC during World War II. After the battle, Admiral Chester Nimitz observed that "uncommon valor was a common virture" among the Marines who took that island.
Six decades later, the same could be said of the soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines now battling terrorists in Iraq. As they carry the fight to the enemy, we should remember their sacrifice, just as we remember the courage of the men who liberated the Pacific during World War II. We should also remember one of the enduring lessons of Iwo Jima and other past campaigns: valor, sacrifice and progress cannot be quantified in terms of a casualty counts, no matter what the NYT might believe. By their standards, Iwo was an unqualified military disaster, and I'm sure the Times's editorial board would have demanded an early withdrawal in 1945, and a courts-martial for the commanders on the scene.
-
Nine paradoxes of a lost war
By Michael Schwartz
Introduction by Tom Engelhardt
Here's how President George W Bush described the enemy in Iraq at his press conference last week. "The violence is being caused by a combination of terrorists, elements of former regime criminals and sectarian militias." That is, "bitter-enders" aka "Saddamists". The "sectarian militias" may have been a relatively recent add-on, but this is essentially the same list, the same sort of terminology the president has been using for years.
In the past two weeks, however, rumblings of discontent, the urge
for a change of course (or at least a mid-course correction) in Iraq have been persistently bubbling to the surface of already roiling Washington. Senate Armed Services Committee chairman John Warner recently returned from Iraq to rattle the Bush administration by saying that policy there was "drifting sideways" and if it didn't improve, "all options" should be on the table not long after the mid-term elections.
Suggestions are rife for dumping the president's goal of "democracy" in Iraq and swallowing a little of the hard stuff. Reports indicate that in two desperate capitals, Washington and Baghdad, rumors about possible future Iraqi coups are spinning wildly. People of import are evidently talking about the possibility of a new five-man "ruling commission", a "government of national salvation" that would "suspend parliament, declare martial law and call back some officers of the old Iraqi army". Even the name of that Central Intelligence Agency warhorse (and anti-neo-conservative candidate) Iyad Allawi, who couldn't get his party elected dogcatcher in the new Iraq, is coming up again in the context of the need for a "strongman".
This was, of course, the desire of the elder George Bush and his advisors back at the end of Gulf War I, when they hoped just such a Sunni strongman - one who could work with them - would topple a weakened Saddam Hussein. Dreams, it seems, die hard. And, as if on cue, who should appear but former secretary of state and Bush family handler James A Baker III, a Bush Elder kind of guy.
While on the talk-show circuit for his new book, he also spent last week plugging (but not revealing) the future findings of the Iraq Study Group, a bipartisan commission he co-heads whose aim is to suggest to a reluctant president new policy possibilities in Iraq. They too are putting "all" options on the table (as long as those options involve "continuing the mission in Iraq"). The group, according to some reports, has, however, ruled out the president's favorite option, "victory". One option it is apparently considering involves skipping "democracy", minimizing American casualties, and focusing "on stabilizing Baghdad, while the American Embassy should work toward political accommodation with insurgents".
A political accommodation with the insurgents? Curious how word gets around. Sometimes a small change in terminology speaks volumes for future mid-course corrections. The other day, General George Casey, commander of US troops in Iraq, gave a press briefing with Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld at the Pentagon. As part of his prepared introductory remarks (not in answer to some random question), he offered this list of "groups that are working to affect [the situation in Iraq] negatively":
"The first, the Sunni extremists, al-Qaeda, and the Iraqis that are supporting them. Second, the Shi'ite extremists, the death squads and the more militant militias. In my view, those represent the greatest current threats in Iraq. The third group is the resistance, the Sunni insurgency that sees themselves as an honorable resistance against foreign occupation in Iraq."
"The resistance"? "An honorable resistance against foreign occupation in Iraq"? Where did those bitter-enders, those anti-Iraq forces go? Take it as a small signal - noticed, as far as I could tell, by not a single reporter or pundit of things to come.
Of course, all of this has brought to the surface a lot of hopeful "withdrawal" talk in the media (and the online world), in part because the Baker group seems to have been floating "phased withdrawal" rumors. Before you think about genuine withdrawal possibilities though, note the announcement by Army Chief of Staff General Peter Schoomaker last week that he was now planning for the possibility of maintaining present force levels in Iraq (140,000+ troops) through 2010; that Casey at that press briefing left the door wide open to ask the president for even more troops after the election; and that the build-up on the ground of permanent bases (not called that) and our vast, nearly billion-dollar embassy in the heart of Baghdad is ongoing.
Below, Michael Schwartz considers the latest in military mid-course corrections and explains why such corrections can no longer hope to plug the gaping holes in Iraq's political dikes. Similarly, Warner, Baker, Casey, Senator Joe Biden (with his "three-state solution"), and so many others can all promote their own mid-course corrections, suggest them to the president, bring them to the new Congress, promote them among military figures, but as long as that embassy goes up and those bases keep getting hardened and improved, as long as the "mission continues" (in Baker's phrase), changing troop levels, tactics, even governments in Baghdad's Green Zone, not to speak of "policy options" in Washington, will solve nothing. Wherever that "table" is sooner or later all options will really have to be displayed on it.
Nine paradoxes of a lost war
By Michael Schwartz
Recently, the New York Times broke a story suggesting that the US Army and the marines were about to turn the conceptual tide of war in Iraq. The two services, reported correspondent Michael R Gordon, "were finishing work on a new counterinsurgency doctrine" that would, according to retired Lieutenant General Jack Keane, "change [the military's] entire culture as it transitions to irregular warfare".
Such strategic eureka moments have been fairly common since the Bush administration invaded Iraq in March 2003, and this one - news coverage of it died away in less than a week - will probably drop into the dustbin of history along with other times when the tactical or strategic tide of war was supposed to change. These would include the November 2004 assault on the city of Fallujah, various elections, the "standing up" of the Iraqi Army, and the trench that, it was briefly reported, the Iraqis were planning to dig around their vast capital, Baghdad.
But this plan had one ingenious section, derived from an article by four military experts published in the quasi-official Military Review and entitled "The Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency". The nine paradoxes the experts lay out are eye-catching, to say the least and so make vivid reading; but they are more than so many titillating puzzles of counterinsurgency warfare. Each of them contains an implied criticism of American strategy in Iraq. Seen in this light, they become an instructive lesson from insiders in why the American presence in that country has been such a disaster and why this (or any other) new counterinsurgency strategy has little chance of ameliorating it.
Paradox 1:
The more you protect your force, the less secure you are
The military experts offer this explanation: "[The] counterinsurgent gains ultimate success by protecting the populace, not himself." It may seem like a bland comment, but don't be fooled. It conceals a devastating criticism of the cardinal principle of the American military in Iraq: that above all else they must minimize the risk to American troops by setting rules of engagement that essentially boil down to "shoot first, make excuses later".
Applications of this principle are found in the by-now familiar policies of annihilating any car that passes the restraint line at checkpoints (because it might be a car bomber); shooting at pedestrians who get in the path of any American convoy (because they might be trying to stop the vehicles to activate an ambush); and calling in artillery or air power against any house that might be an insurgent hiding place (because the insurgents might otherwise escape and/or snipe at an American patrol).
This "shoot first" policy has guaranteed that large numbers of civilians (including a remarkable number of children) have been killed, maimed or left homeless. For most of us, killing this many innocent people would be reason enough to abandon a policy, but from a military point of view it is not in itself sufficient. These tactics only become anathema when you can no longer ignore the way they have made it ever more difficult for the occupying army to "maintain contact" with the local population in order "to obtain the intelligence to drive operations and to reinforce the connections with the people who establish legitimacy".
Paradox 2:
The more force you use, the less effective you are
Times reporter Gordon summarizes the logic here nicely: "Substantial force increases the risk of collateral damage and mistakes, and increases the opportunity for insurgent propaganda."
Considering the levels of devastation achieved in the Sunni city of Fallujah (where 70% of structures were estimated to be damaged and close to 50% destroyed in the US assault of November 2004) and in other Sunni cities (where whole neighborhoods have been devastated), or even in Shi'ite Najaf (where entire neighborhoods and major parts of its old city were destroyed in 2004), the word "substantial" has to be considered a euphemism.
And the use of the word "propaganda" betrays the bias of the military authors, since many people would consider such levels of devastation a legitimate reason for joining groups that aim to expel the occupiers.
Here again, the striking logic of the American military is at work. These levels of destruction are not, in themselves, considered a problem - at least not until someone realizes that they are facilitating recruitment by the opposition.
Paradox 3:
The more successful counterinsurgency is, the less force can be used
Though not presented this way, this paradox is actually a direct criticism of the American military strategy in the months after the fall of the Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003. In those early days, active resistance to the occupation was modest indeed, an average of only six violent engagements each day (compared to 90 three years later.)
But American military policy in the country was still based on overwhelming force. American commanders sought to deter a larger insurgency by ferociously repressing any signs of resistance. This strategy included house-to-house searches witnessed by embedded reporter Nir Rosen and described in his vivid book, In the Belly of the Green Bird.
These missions, repeated hundreds of times each day across Iraq, included home invasions of suspected insurgents, brutal treatment of their families and often their property, and the indefinite detention of men found in just about any house searched, even when US troops knew that their intelligence was unreliable.
Relatively peaceful demonstrations were forcibly suppressed, most agonizingly when, in late April 2003, American troops killed 13 demonstrators in Fallujah who were demanding that the US military vacate a school commandeered as a local headquarters. This incident became a cause celebre around which Fallujans organized themselves into a central role in the insurgency that soon was born.
The new counterinsurgency strategy acknowledges that the very idea of overwhelming demonstrations of force producing respectful obedience has backfired, producing instead an explosion of rebellion. And now that a significant majority of Iraqis are determined to expel the Americans, promises of more humane treatment next time will not get the genie of the insurgency back in the bottle.
Paradox 4:
Sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction
This paradox is, in fact, a criticism of another cardinal principle of the occupation: the application of overwhelming force in order to teach insurgents (and prospective insurgents) that opposition of any sort will not be tolerated and, in any case, is hopeless.
A typical illustration of this principle in practice was a January US military report that went in part: "An unmanned US drone detected three men digging a hole in a road in the area. Insurgents regularly bury bombs along roads in the area to target US or Iraqi convoys. The three men were tracked to a building, which US forces then hit with precision-guided munitions." As it turned out, the attack killed 12 members of a family living in that house, severely damaged six neighboring houses, and consolidated local opposition to the American presence.
-
Part Two
This example (multiplied many times over) makes it clear why, in so many instances over these past years, doing nothing might have been better: fewer enemies in the "hood". But the developers of the new military strategy have a more cold-blooded view of the issue, preferring to characterize the principle in this way: "If a careful analysis of the effects of a response reveals that more negatives than positives might result, soldiers should consider an alternative."
That is, while this incident might well be an example of a time when "doing nothing is the best reaction", the multiple civilian deaths that resulted could, under at least some circumstances, be outweighed by the "positives". Take, for a counter example, the killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the head of al-Qaeda in Iraq, in an air strike that also caused multiple civilian deaths.
Paradox 5:
The best weapons for counterinsurgency do not shoot
The Times' Gordon offers the following translation of this paradox: "Often dollars and ballots have more impact than bombs and bullets." Given the $18 billion US reconstruction budget for Iraq and the three well-attended elections since January 2005, it might seem that, in this one area, Bush administration efforts actually anticipated the new counterinsurgency doctrine.
But in their original article the military strategists were actually far more precise in describing what they meant by this - and that precision makes it clear how far from effective American "reconstruction" was. Money and elections, they claim, are not enough: "Lasting victory will come from a vibrant economy, political participation and restored hope."
As it happened, the American officials responsible for Iraq policy were only willing to deliver that vibrant economy, along with political participation and restored hope, under quite precise and narrow conditions that suited the larger fantasies of the Bush administration.
Iraq's new government was to be an American ally, hostile to that axis-of-evil regional power Iran, and it was to embrace the "opening" of the Iraqi economy to American multinationals. Given Iraqi realities and this hopeless list of priorities or day-dreams, it is not surprising that the country's economy has sunk ever deeper into depression, that elected officials have neither the power nor the inclination to deliver on their campaign promises, and that the principle hopes of the majority of Iraqis are focused on the departure of American troops because of, as one pollster concluded, "the American failure to do basically anything for Iraqis".
Paradox 6:
Baghdad doing something tolerably better than US doing it well
Here is a paradoxical principle that the occupation has sought to apply fully. The presidential slogan, "as the Iraqis stand up, we will stand down", has been an expression of Bush administration determination to transfer the front-line struggle against the insurgents - the patrols, the convoys, the home invasions, any house-to-house fighting - to Iraqi units, even if their job performance proved even less than "tolerable" compared to the rigorous execution of American troops.
It is this effort that has also proved the administration's most consistent and glaring failure. In a country where 80% of the people want the Americans to leave, it is very difficult to find soldiers willing to fight against the insurgents who are seeking to expel them.
This was evident when the first group of American-trained soldiers and police deserted the field of battle during the fights for Fallujah, Najaf, Mosul and Tal Afar in 2004. This led eventually to the current American strategy of using Shi'ite soldiers against Sunni insurgents, and utilizing Kurds against both Shi'ite and Sunni rebels. (Sunnis, by and large, have refused to fight with the Americans.) This policy, in turn, has contributed substantially to the still-escalating sectarian violence within Iraq.
Even today, after the infusion of enormous amounts of money and years of effort, a substantial proportion of newly recruited soldiers desert or mutiny when faced with the prospect of fighting against anti-American insurgents.
According to Solomon Moore and Louise Roug of the Los Angeles Times, in Anbar province, the scene of the heaviest fighting, "half the Iraqi soldiers are on leave at any given time, and many don't return to duty. In May, desertion rates in some Iraqi units reached 40%."
In September, fully three-quarters of the 4,000 Iraqi troops ordered to Baghdad to help in the American operation to reclaim the capital and suppress internecine violence there, refused deployment. American officials told the LA Times that such refusals were based on an unwillingness to fight outside their home regions and a reluctance to "be thrust into uncomfortable sectarian confrontations".
As the failed attempts to "stand up" Iraqi forces suggest, the goal of getting Iraqis to fight "tolerably" well depends on giving them a reason to fight that they actually support. As long as Iraqis are asked to fight on the side of occupation troops whose presence they despise, the US cannot expect the quality of their performance to be "tolerable" from the Bush administration point of view.
Paradox 7:
If a tactic works this week, it will not work next week
The clearest expression of this principle lies in the history of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), the anti-occupation weapon of choice among Iraqi resistance fighters.
Throughout the war, the occupation military has conducted hundreds of armed patrols each week designed to capture suspected insurgents through house-to-house searches. The insurgency, in turn, has focused on deterring and derailing these patrols, using sniper attacks, rocket propelled grenades, and IEDs.
At first, sniper attacks were the favored weapon of the insurgents, but the typical American response - artillery and air attacks - proved effective enough to set them looking for other ways to respond. IEDs then gained in popularity, since they could be detonated from a relatively safe distance. When the Americans developed devices to detect the electronic detonators, the insurgents developed a variety of non-electronic trigger devices. When the Americans upgraded their armor to resist the typical IED, the insurgents developed "shaped" charges that could pierce American armor.
And so it goes in all aspects of the war. Each move by one side triggers a response by the other. The military experts developing the new strategy can point to this dilemma, but they cannot solve it. The underlying problem for the American military is that the resistance has already reached the sort of critical mass that ensures an endless back-and-forth tactical battle.
One solution not under consideration might work very well: abandoning the military patrols themselves. But such a tactic would also require abandoning counterinsurgency and ultimately leaving Iraq.
Paradox 8:
Tactical success guarantees nothing
This point is summarized by Gordon of the Times this way: "[M]ilitary actions by themselves cannot achieve success." But this is the smallest part of the paradox. It is true enough that the insurgency in Iraq hopes to win "politically" by waiting for the American people to force the US government to withdraw, or for the cost of the war to outweigh its potential benefits, or for world pressure to make the war diplomatically unviable.
But there is a much more encompassing element to this dictum: that guerrilla fighters do not expect to win any military battles with the occupation. In the military strategists' article, they quote an interchange between American Colonel Harry Summers and his North Vietnamese counterpart after the US had withdrawn from Vietnam. When Summers said, "You know you never defeated us on the battlefield," his adversary replied, "That may be so, but it is also irrelevant."
A tactical victory occurs when the enemy is killed or retreats, leaving the battlefield to the victor. In guerrilla war, therefore, the guerrillas never win since they always melt away and leave their adversary in charge.
But in Iraq, as in other successful guerrilla wars, the occupation army cannot remain indefinitely at the scene of its tactical victories - in each community, town or city that it conquers. It must move on to quell the rebellion elsewhere. And when it does, if the guerrillas have successfully melted away, they will reoccupy the community, town, or city, thus winning a strategic victory and ruling the local area until their next tactical defeat.
If they keep this up long enough and do it in enough places, they will eventually make the war too costly to pursue - and thus conceivably win the war without winning a battle.
Paradox 9:
Most important decisions are not made by generals
Because guerrilla war is decentralized, with local bands deciding where to place IEDs, when to use snipers, and which patrols or bases to attack, the struggle in different communities, provinces, or regions takes very different forms.
Many insurgents in Fallujah chose to stand and fight, while those in Tal Afar, near the Syrian border, decided to evacuate the city with its civilian population when the American military approached in strength. In Shi'ite areas, members of Muqtada al-Sadr's Mehdi Army chose to join the local police and turn it to their purposes; but Sunni insurgents have tried, instead, to disarm the local police and then disband the force. In every city and town, the strategy of the resistance has been different.
The latest American military strategists are arguing that what they call the "mosaic nature of an insurgency" implies the necessity of giving autonomy to local American commanders to "adapt as quickly as the insurgents". But such decentralization cannot work if the local population supports the insurgent goal of expelling the occupiers.
Given autonomy under such circumstances, lower-level US military officers may decide that annihilating a home suspected of sheltering an insurgent is indeed counterproductive; such decisions, however, humane, would now come far too late to convince a local population that it should abandon its support of a campaign seen as essential to national independence.
There may have been a time, back when the invasion began, that the US could have adopted a strategy that would have made it welcome - for a time, anyway - in Iraq. Such a strategy, as the military theorists flatly state, would have had to deliver a "vibrant economy, political participation and restored hope".
Instead, the occupation delivered economic stagnation or degradation, a powerless government and the promise of endless violence. Given this reality, no new military strategy - however humane, canny or well designed - could reverse the occupation's terminal unpopularity. Only a US departure might do that.
Paradoxically, the policies these military strategists are now trying to reform have ensured that, however much most Iraqis may want such a departure, it would be, at best, bittersweet. The legacy of sectarian violence and the near-irreversible destruction wrought by the American presence make it unlikely that they would have the time or inclination to take much satisfaction in the end of the American occupation.
Michael Schwartz, professor of sociology and faculty director of the undergraduate college of global studies at Stony Brook University, has written extensively on popular protest and insurgency, as well as on American business and government dynamics. His books include Radical Protest and Social Structure, and Social Policy and the Conservative Agenda (edited, with Clarence Lo). His email address is Ms42@optonline.net.
(Copyright 2006 Michael Schwartz)
-
Geopolitical Diary: Jihadists Seize the Initiative in Iraq
A number of interesting developments have come to light in the last several days regarding Iraq's Sunni insurgency:
1. Four jihadist forces pledged allegiance to each other Oct. 13. The Mujahideen Shura Council -- a jihadist umbrella alliance composed of six groups and led by al-Qaeda -- said it had formed a "Pact of the Mutayyabin" with Jaish al-Fatihin (Army of the Conquerors), Jund al-Sahabah (Army of the Companions), Kataib Ansar al-Tawhid wa al-Sunnah (The Supporters of Monotheism and the Prophetic Tradition Brigades) and several Sunni tribal elders.
2. On Oct. 15, one of the four groups, Jaish al-Fatihin, said it had never taken the oath because it had not been informed about the pact. The Mujahideen Shura Council responded that this announcement must have come from the fifth brigade of Jaish al-Fatihin, which, unlike the organization's other four brigades, had not yet pledged allegiance to the council. The council expressed hope that it would soon do so.
3. On Oct. 16, the Mujahideen Shura Council called on Sunni nationalist groups to pledge allegiance to Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, the leader of the newly declared "Islamic State of Iraq."
Taken together, these three developments indicate that transnational jihadist elements are trying to capture political space in Sunni-dominated central Iraq. Their approach involves seizing the military and political initiative from the mainstream Sunni nationalist insurgent groups. The jihadists are trying to take advantage of the fact that the political negotiation process is reaching an impasse, the sectarian violence from Shiite death-squads is raging on, and moves are accelerating toward creating three federal autonomous zones along ethno-sectarian lines.
While the mainstream Sunnis are busy trying to counter the move toward federalism, the jihadists have accepted the idea that Iraq could be divided into three autonomous, if not independent, regions. The jihadists aim to take control of the situation. They are busy trying to make inroads into the tribal leadership and the insurgent groups by forming alliances. In other words, they are trying to portray themselves as the vanguard of the military struggle against the United States and its Shiite and Kurdish allies.
The jihadists face two major obstacles in pursuing this path.
First is that the Sunni areas of Iraq already have an existing political structure, which will not allow them to take over. There have been several reports in recent months of fighting between Sunni nationalist groups and the jihadists. But now that the jihadists are aggressively seeking the leadership of the insurgency, the Sunni nationalists can be expected to strike back hard, and soon. Neither they nor the tribal leaders want to lose their leadership position to the jihadists.
Second, the jihadists themselves are divided into two broad groups: the foreigners and the indigenous Iraqis. Both share the same transnational ideology, but they disagree on how to realize its ideals. The indigenous Iraqis do not like the way the foreigners operate -- killing not just Shia but also Sunnis who oppose them. Moreover, the Iraqi jihadists do not want to see the foreigners take over the leadership, because they know it will alienate them from the Sunni mainstream.
Despite the creation of dubious alliances and a media campaign to highlight their "achievements," al Qaeda and its jihadist allies now face problems from fellow jihadists as well as Sunni nationalists. While it might appear that this would lead to a decline in the violence, the country is now so divided that the fighting is only likely to get worse.
-
Today's numbers: 20/Oct/06
1 U.S. Soldier killed
10 terrorists killed
30 terrorists captured
(that's 40 bad guys off the streets, many of them Al Qaeda a-holes)
You won?t hear about our success on CNN or any of the other liberal media venues but the fact of the matter is we are slowly gaining a foot hold and propagating democracy. As a former Army Paratrooper Infantryman, I salute the troops and support the OIF and OEF, I will periodically share this OSINT provided by my collogue at Ft. Bragg, NC Home of the 82nd Airborne and the 1/508 PIR, my former unit, now serving in Afghanistan.
Fury from the sky!
?Dog? Dave Rothburgh
U.S. Soldier killed by roadside bomb
BAGHDAD ? A Multi-National Division ? Baghdad Soldier died at approximately 2:37 a.m. today when the vehicle he was riding in was struck by an improvised-explosive device in southwest Baghdad.
Two Terrorists captured in Raid Near
BAGHDAD ?? Iraqi Special Forces captured 2 terrorists and killed 2 others Oct. 19 during a raid near Taji.
Iraqi special forces, with Coalition advisers, conducted an air-assault raid looking for 5 Al Qaeda in Iraq linked terrorists allegedly responsible for the kidnapping and murder of Iraqi citizens and conducting improvised explosive device attacks in the Taji area.?
Iraqi forces entered the objective and immediately encountered 3 males. One man immediately complied with verbal commands and surrendered.? Another man grabbed a pistol and demonstrated hostile intent.? He was shot and killed by the assault force.? A third man, sitting behind the second man, was wounded in the exchange.? ? ?
As Iraqi forces continued to clear the objective, a second male was shot and killed after he grabbed a rifle during efforts to detain him. The 4 men were positively identified as the wanted terrorists.
Iraqi Army Captures Members of Insurgent and Murder Cells
BAGHDAD ? Iraqi Army forces conducted early-morning raids Oct. 20 in Baghdad and captured several members of insurgent and murder and kidnapping cells, including the alleged leader of an Al Qaeda in Iraq cell.
Iraqi forces arrived at 3 separate objectives and captured 8 males responsible for sectarian murders and kidnappings, as well as improvised explosive device attacks.
Iraqi Army forces, in a raid in the Adhamiyah area targeting a murder and kidnapping cell, captured 2 more terrorists responsible for sectarian attacks against Iraqi civilians.
In two other raids, Special Iraqi Army forces caught 4 terrorists involved in IED, rocket-propelled grenade and small arms fire attacks against Iraqi and U.S. forces and 2 others were arrested for sectarian attacks against Iraqi civilians.
Iraqi Police spoil terrorist attack
MOSUL, Iraq ? Iraqi police remained vigilant in the face of a complex attack in Mosul Thursday.
Al Qaeda in Iraq forces attacked the Abi Tamaam Police Station in east Mosul Thursday at approximately 7:00 a.m. with two suicide truck bombs.? The first truck bomb exploded near the station?s entry control point, blowing down protective walls and creating a sizeable crater in the road.? ?The second truck, unable to penetrate the police station?s perimeter due to the crater and debris left over from the first truck bomb detonated in the street.?
As a result of the attack, 10 Iraqi civilians and one Iraqi Policeman were killed while nine Iraqi Police were wounded.? Two Al Qaeda terrorists were killed in the attack.?
?The Iraqi police took the brunt and stood their ground,? said Col. Steve Townsend, commander, 3rd Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division.? ?We?re immensely proud of their resilience.?
Later in the morning two other SVBIEDs (suicide vehicles) targeting U.S. Forces exploded, wounding two Soldiers and causing minor damage to two Stryker vehicles.? The wounded were treated and returned to duty.? Two additional Al Qaeda terrorists were shot and killed in the second attack.?
Seven terrorists apprehended after attack
BAGHDAD, Iraq ? U.S. troops apprehended 7 terrorists Oct. 19 associated with a VBIED attack on the Khaldiyah Bridge in Habbaniyah that killed two Iraqi soldiers, wounded two other Iraqi soldiers and four civilians the day prior.
A series of operations led to the apprehension of the suspects seen at several meetings Oct. 18 with a suspected al-Qaida in Iraq leader. Credible intelligence indicates the terrorist leader coordinated the VBIED attack and is responsible for foreign fighter movements, and other attacks throughout the area.?
TWO TERRORISTs KILLED, FOUR DETAINED IN Muqdadiyah
BAGHDAD, Iraq ? U.S. troops killed 3 insurgents and captured 4 terrorists during a raid in Muqdadiyah Friday targeting a terrorist known to facilitate the movement of foreign fighters into the area.
As the U.S. soldiers approached the objective, they received fire from two armed insurgents and immediately returned fire killing both.
The soldiers captured 4 more terrorists without further incident after they secured the area.
One terrorist killed and 7 captured in Ramadi
BAGHDAD, Iraq ? Coalition Forces killed one terrorist and captured 7 other terrorists during a raid in Ramadi Saturday morning.
The targeted terrorist is a senior al-Qaeda in Iraq leader in Ramadi known for participating in operations against Iraqi and U.S. Forces.? On Oct. 18, the targeted terrorist carried out a suicide VBIED attack on the Khaldiyah Bridge in Habbaniyah that killed two Iraqi soldiers.
During the assault on the objective buildings, Coalition Forces? were engaged by and? killed a terrorist.? ?Due to the primary target?s background, and the discovery of a booby trap in the building during clearing operations, Coalition Forces suspected the presence of explosives and destroyed the building.? ?
Coalition Forces are making progress dismantling the al-Qaeda in Iraq terrorist network.? The capture of this suspected terrorist reduces the ability of the al-Qaeda in Iraq network to operate, and increases the safety of all Iraqi citizens
(Sidebar inserted by Crafty Dog: Dog Dave, if your time permits, please feel free to continue updating us on this data.)
-
Woof Guro Crafty, with pleasure, I will forward any OSINT to this forum made available to me as often as I recieve it.
FFTS, "Dog Dave
-
This has got to be the most overly-analyzed war in history! Everyone is likely partly right and partly wrong in their assessments. However, it should be remembered that a full political solution in the United States took about 20 years from the First Continental Congress to the final ratification of the Constitution by the 12th and 13th colonies. There were two failed governmental systems before the Constitution, the Continental Congress and the Articles of Confederation. Sixty-eight years after Washington began his second term as President, political factions in the South commenced another armed revolt against the central government.
Consequently, I do not understand why there is an expectation of quickly establishing a stable government, let alone a popularly elected one, in Iraq. Our own history tells us not to expect stability in Iraq until at least 2011 and a stable governmental system there until 2023.
-
Rick:
You raise a sound question.
A partial answer:
1) Things move faster now. It took a goodly amount of time for a letter to get from one state to another in those days-- today we have the internet.
2) The dynamics with neighboring countries was different--e.g. a Islamofascist whacko nuclear wannabe regime was not next door trying to steer things its way.
3) The dynamics amongst ourselves was different. We weren't death squading, kamikazi killing women and children, killing the members of the Constitutional Convention etc.
-
The Wonders of Hindsight
Looking back is a sure way to stumble.
By Victor Davis Hanson
Most of the blame game being played over the Iraqi occupation ? and always with the wisdom of hindsight ? is now irrelevant.
Should more or fewer soldiers be in Iraq?
That?s basically settled: There will be no sizable increases in our troop presence, but gradual downsizing, as more provinces must come under Iraqi control and we seek to avert Iraqi perpetual dependence. Debating how many soldiers should have been deployed in the three-week war of 2003 and its aftermath is about as helpful in the present as fighting over culpability for the surprise at the Bulge.
But who disbanded the Iraqi army?
It doesn?t matter now ? the new army is nearing 300,000 strong and growing. It will either rise to the occasion or fail. The decision of 2003 to leave it scattered is ancient history.
Still, wasn?t de-Baathification far too sweeping?
Perhaps, but three years later that?s not an issue any more either, now that former Hussein government officials have long been welcomed back into the military and civilian bureaucracy.
Weren?t we slow in turning over control to the Iraqis?
Absolutely, but now, after three elections, Iraq is autonomous, and American proconsuls are not on television hogging the news of someone else?s future.
Wasn?t it terrible that Tommy Franks left in the middle of a long theater campaign, as if he sensed that Centcom?s three-week victory might well devolve into his three-year messy aftermath?
Yes, but so what? He can no longer do a thing either to save or to lose Iraq.
It used to be blood sport to blame the supposed flawed architects and implementers of the Iraqi war and occupation ? neocon advisers to President Bush, the proconsul Paul Bremer (whose blazers were emblematic of his out-of-touch, unrealistically optimistic, rather than workable and good enough, solutions), or the nice, but deer-in-the-headlights Gen. Sanchez.
Even if these purported scapegoats have been accurately portrayed, and their mistakes account for the current pessimistic Iraqi prognosis ? neither of which I grant ? what are we to say about those currently in charge? Even critics of the war have praised the Middle Eastern Ambassador Khalizad, the savvy Gen. Petraeus, the Arab-speaking Gen. Abizaid, and the best and the brightest fighters in the field, such as a Lt. Col. Kurilla or a Col. McMaster. All of these players are not only in, or about to be back in, Iraq, but are pivotal in crafting and adapting American tactics and strategy there.
Many wars metamorphize into something they were not supposed to be. Few imagined that the Poland war of 1939 would within two years evolve into a war of annihilation involving the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, Germany, Japan, and Italy. So too with the third Iraqi war of 2003 (following the first 1991 Gulf War, and the second, subsequent 12-year no-fly zone stand-off) that has now become a fight against jihadists for the future course of the entire Middle East.
What matters now is not so much what the war was or should have been, but only what it is ? and whether we have learned from our mistakes and can still win. The answer to both questions is yes. We have the right strategy ? birthing (through three elections already) an autonomous democracy; training an army subject to a civil government; and pledging support until it can protect its own constitutional government.
Few American officers are talking about perpetual occupation or even the need for more troops, but rather about the need for a lighter footprint, bolstered by teams of Special Forces and air support, to ensure Iraqi responsibility for their own future,. And the key to success ? a diplomatic squeeze on the Sunnis to suppress terrorists in Nineveh and Anbar provinces in exchange for Shiite guarantees of more government inclusion ? is now the acknowledged goal of both the Iraqi and American governments.
Thousands in Iraq accept that they have crossed the Rubicon, and they must either make their own democracy work or suffer a fate worse than that of the boat people and the butchered in Southeast Asia when the Americans left.
As for how to ensure against this disastrous outcome, multilateral talks are no magic bullet, as we see from the failed EU3 efforts with Iran and the stalled six-party negotiations over the North Korean problem. The ?more rubble/less trouble? solution that the Russians employed against the Chechnyans in Grozny is out of the question for a humane United States. The U.N. is no answer as we have seen from serial genocides from Rwanda to the present killing in Darfur.
No, only the United States, and its superb military, can stabilize Iraq and give the Iraqis enough time and confidence to do what has not been done before, and what apparently no one any longer thinks will be done: a surviving, viable democratic government in the heart of the dictatorial Middle East. Though the necessary aims are clear, they are not quickly and easily attained. Everyone understands that there is no single military answer to Iraq, but rather that the political solution depends on soldiers providing enough security long enough for free commerce and expression to become established. So rather than agonize endlessly over past perceived errors, we must realize that such lapses are not unprecedented in our military experience and focus on whether they are still correctable.
By the standards of Grenada, Panama, and Serbia ? where few American died and some sort of tenuous consensual government emerged fairly quickly ? Iraq is indeed messy. But if we grant that the effort to replace Saddam with democracy in the heart of the ancient caliphate is a far formidable enterprise, and thus akin to the challenge, and cost, of taking an Okinawa or saving a Korea, then our losses and heartbreak so far are not extraordinary.
For all the Democrats loud criticism, if they do regain Congress, they would probably rely on the present expertise of a Khalizad, Abizaid, or Petraeus, and not the often quoted wisdom of three years past of a Gen. Shinseki or Zinni. I doubt they will bring back Gen. Wesley Clark to fix the ?mess.? They will either have to cut off funds, ensure a pull out before the end of the year, and then watch real blood sport as reformers are butchered; or they will have to trust that our present military and civilian leadership has learned the hard lessons of three years in Iraq, and can find a way to stabilize the nascent democracy.
How do we define success in Iraq, in the context of a dysfunctional Middle East where elections in Lebanon and Palestine bring turmoil, the ?correct? multilateral NATO war in Afghanistan is still raging, and we still can?t do much to find bin Laden in a ?friendly,? but nuclear and Islamic, Pakistan? No mention is necessary about an Algeria still reeling from a horrendous bloodbath in the 1990s, the nightmare that was Qadhafi?s Libya, perennial Syrian roguery, the theocratic disaster in Iran, or all the other butchery that passes for the norm in the Middle East.
We can only ask: Are the tribal leaders of the troubled Anbar province now more likely to join the government or the insurgents? Are the old controversial barometers of Iraqi wartime electrical production, GDP, and oil output currently falling or stable? Is the successful Kurdistan seceding or in fact still part of Iraq? Is the Shiite leadership now de facto a pawn of Iran, or still confident about its role in a democratic and autonomous Iraq? Do the communiqu?s and private correspondence of al Qaeda in Iraq reflect cocky triumphalism or worry over losing? Do Iraqi elected leaders praise us or damn us and ask us to leave? In a global war against Islamic jihadists, who have killed thousands of Americans here at home, should we lament that we are now fighting and killing them as they flock to distant Iraq?
As we head for the November elections, most politicians have renounced their paternity of the now-orphaned American effort in Iraq. And pundits of summer 2003 have not just had second thoughts about Iraq in the autumn of our discontent in 2006 ? but very public third thoughts about whether they ever really had their enthusiastic first ones.
The odd thing is that, for all the gloom and furor, and real blunders, nevertheless, by the historical standards of most wars, we have done well enough to win in Iraq, and still have a good shot of doing the impossible in seeing this government survive. More importantly still, worldwide we are beating the Islamic fundamentalists and their autocratic supporters. Iranian-style theocracy has not spread. For all the talk of losing Afghanistan, the Taliban are still dispersed or in hiding ? so is al Qaeda. Europe is galvanizing against Islamism in a way unimaginable just three years ago. The world is finally focusing on Iran. Hezbollah did not win the last war, but lost both prestige and billions of dollars in infrastructure, despite a lackluster effort by Israel. Elections have embarrassed a Hamas that, the global community sees, destroys most of what it touches and now must publicly confess that it will never recognize Israel. Countries like Libya are turning, and Syria is more isolated. If we keep the pressure up in Iraq and Afghanistan and work with our allies, Islamism and its facilitators will be proven bankrupt.
In contrast, if we should withdraw from Iraq right now, there will be an industry in the next decade of hindsight expos?s ? but they won?t be the gotcha ones like State of Denial or Fiasco. Instead we will revisit the 1974-5 Vietnam genre of hindsight ? of why after such heartbreak and sacrifice the United States gave up when it was so close to succeeding.
? Victor Davis Hanson is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. He is the author, most recently, of A War Like No Other. How the Athenians and Spartans Fought the Peloponnesian War.
National Review Online - http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=Nzg0MmY2YmM1YjNhODcxYWRjNzRkMWJlNzM4NWY2MGU=
-
Baghdad
Ground forces conducted a raid in Baghdad, killed 1 armed terrorist, and captured a medical doctor associated with insurgent activity. Credible intelligence sources indicated the doctor was involved with Al-Qaeda in Iraq?s medical operations and also linked to a foiled Baghdad International Zone attack exposed in late September.
Intelligence reports also linked the doctor to suicide attacks throughout the Baghdad area, and indicated he was responsible for housing and supporting foreign fighter suicide bombers. During the operation, ground forces received small arms fire from a terrorist. The forces returned fire, killed the shooter, and detained the doctor and 1 other terrorist.
On Oct 12, ground forces killed 2 terrorists and captured 5 terrorists during a raid targeting an Al-Qaeda in Iraq operative linked to attacks against innocent Iraqis. During the operation, ground forces were confronted by 2 armed men inside a building. In response, the ground forces engaged, killed both terrorists, and then captured 5 other terrorists without incident. A search of the area turned up several AK-47 assault rifles, a shotgun, and terrorist literature. Two vehicles were destroyed on site after testing positive for explosives.
Habbiniyah
Ground forces killed 4 terrorists and captured 6 others Oct. 11 during a raid on an Al-Qaeda compound northwest of Habbiniyah, Iraq. As ground forces entered the compound, a terrorist attempted to fire a handgun at the forces. The ground forces immediately engaged and killed the individual. 3 other terrorists attempted to throw grenades at the ground forces. The forces took cover, fired, and killed the terrorists.
Mahmudiyah
Ground forces killed 1 terrorist and captured 6 terrorists Oct. 12 during a raid targeting a terrorist linked to foreign fighter movement, Vehicle Borne IEDs, and suicide bomber operations. As the ground forces approached the target, two terrorists fled from a group of people sleeping outside the house. The ground forces pursued and captured the two men without incident. A third man ran into an adjacent building whereby ground forces followed and killed the terrorist when he emerged from a room with a pistol.
Tarmiya
Ground forces captured 8 terrorists and rescued a kidnapping victim during an operation targeting foreign fighters Oct. 11 in Tarmiya. During the operation, ground forces attacked a building and captured 8 terrorists without incident. After questioning them, 1 individual claimed he was kidnapped by the terrorists in Taji seven days earlier and was held for ransom. Two of the terrorists corroborated the story and admitted to the kidnapping. The ground forces discovered a ?hostage? holding room & several AK-47 assault rifles.
Tikrit
Ground forces conducted a raid Oct. 9 in Tikrit against a local hawala allegedly used by individuals and businesses to provide financial support to insurgent groups. During the raid, ground forces arrested 16 individuals. Insurgents and criminals allegedly used the hawala, a local financial system for banking and money exchange, to hide money made through illegal activity, and money illegally funneled into Iraq. Tips from local Iraqi citizens initiated the daylight raid.
ISF Capture One Terrorist in Raid Near Taji
BAGHDAD - Special Iraqi Security Forces captured a wanted terrorist involved in murders and bomb attacks during a raid Oct. 14.
Iraqi forces, with Coalition advisers, conducted an air-assault at the objective and quickly captured the terrorist without incident. The terrorist allegedly belongs to a terror cell that is kidnapping and murdering innocent Iraqis and has ties to Al Qaeda in Iraq insurgent forces.
Iraqi, U.S. troops capture 11 terrorists, seize weapons cache
BAGHDAD ? Iraqi Army and U.S. Soldiers captured 11 terrorists Oct. 12 and seized a weapons cache Oct. 13 in Baghdad.
A patrol from the 9th Iraqi Army Division, partnered with the 4th Infantry Division, found a murdered Iraqi citizen and captured the 5 terrorists who allegedly committed the murder in Saab al Bour, north of Baghdad.
In a separate incident, a patrol from the 10th Cavalry Regiment, 4th Inf. Div. reacted to a small-arms fire attack, returned fire and captured 2 terrorists, also in Saab al Bour.
In another incident Thursday, an Estonian Infantry Platoon patrol attached to 7th Sqdn., 10th Cav. Regt., returned fire when terrorists attacked them, wounding 2 terrorists and capturing 2 others. The Estonians seized a rocket-propelled grenade launcher from the terrorists.
Meanwhile, Soldiers from 2nd Battalion, 506th Regiment, 101st Airborne Division captured 2 known terrorists, one of whom had 3 complete improvised-explosive devices in his possession, while conducting combat operations in Baghdad.
Operation Dealer Discovers SVBIEDs, Large Weapons Cache in Western Ramadi, 15 Insurgents Captured
RAMADI, Iraq ? Soldiers captured 15 insurgents, discovered 2 vehicles being fitted as suicide vehicle borne improvised explosive devices, and found a significant weapons cache during Operation Dealer, 2 in western Ramadi.
Based on a tip from a local resident, Soldiers from Task Force 1-35 captured 15 individuals who were identified as terrorists. During Operation Dealer, the task force found 2 stripped-down vehicles in the process of being converted to VBIEDs. Additionally, 4 terrorists were captured in connection with the operation.
The large found weapons cache consisted of four rocket propelled grenade launchers, 34 155mm artillery shells, 13 60mm mortar rounds, eight AK-47s, a PKC machine gun, a Dragonov sniper rifle with scope, three pounds of high explosives, 400 pounds of detonation cord, 48 blasting caps, 8 radio controlled IED initiators, 4 pressure activated IED initiators and more than 600 rounds of small arms ammunition.
Iraqi Army soldiers respond to attack, kill 3 terrorists; U.S. Soldiers capture 14 terrorists
BAGHDAD ? Iraqi Security Force and U.S. Soldiers worked together to kill 3 terrorists and capture 14 other terrorists.
A combined patrol from the 9th Iraqi Army Division, and 463rd Military Police Company, 4th Infantry Division, killed 3 terrorists and captured one north of Baghdad.
After being attacked by small-arms fire, the patrol engaged the terrorists, killing 1 and wounding several others; the patrol then called for attack aviation support and continued to press the fight against the enemy forces.
U.S. Army AH-64D Apache attack helicopters from 1st Bn., 4th Aviation Regiment, 4th Inf. Div., responded to the call and engaged 2 terrorists in an open field.
In a separate incident, U.S. Soldiers from 172nd Stryker Brigade captured a terrorist cell leader and 3 of his associates on Tuesday.
A patrol, consisting of Iraqi policemen and Soldiers from 463rd Military Police Company, 4th Infantry Division, responded to a small-arms fire attack from an unknown number of terrorists, searched the area, and captured 2 terrorists near Baghdad. Soldiers from 2nd Tank Brigade, 9th Iraqi Army Division, identified the 2 terrorists as the same men who fired at them on previous days.
Insurgent mortar team destroyed
CAMP FALLUJAH - An insurgent mortar team attacked Iraqi Security Forces in Al Anbar Province Wednesday. Coalition Forces? aircraft responded by firing a missile at the mortar team?s vehicle. The vehicle was destroyed and enemy casualties cannot be confirmed at this time.
Kidnap victim and cache discovered, 2 terrorists captured
MUQDADIYA ? Iraqi Army and Coalition Force discovered a cache, freed a kidnap victim and captured two terrorists Saturday in the town of Muqdadiya.
Soldiers with the 5th Iraqi Army Division, and U.S. soldiers with the 9th Cavalry Regiment discovered the cache and the kidnap victim after a local citizen pointed to a building in the area.
IA search of the location uncovered one grenade, one stick of TNT, one flare gun, and multiple fake improvised explosive devices. The kidnap victim was found chained to a wall in the house next door. Two males were arrested from the house where the cache was found.
U.S. Soldiers discover more than 75 weapons caches
BAGHDAD ? U.S. Soldiers continue to find weapons caches for a seventh day as part of Operation Commando Hunter, a 10th Mountain Division operation intended to deny the terrorists sanctuary near Yusufiyah, south of Baghdad.
The Soldiers from 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry Regiment, 10th Mountain Division, seized 21 caches Friday, bringing the total to 78 caches seized in the area near Yusufiyah, 20 miles southwest of Baghdad.
The 21 additional weapons caches consisted of three blocks of dynamite, 21 120mm mortar rounds, five 60mm mortar rounds, 80 7.62mm rounds, an AK-47 assault rifle, three rocket-propelled grenade launchers, five RPG rounds, an improvised rocket launcher, a Meals, Ready to Eat bag with explosive materials in it, 54 20mm anti-aircraft rounds, three 105mm artillery rounds, seven 82mm mortar rounds, an improvised-explosive device air compressor, a sniper rifle, four 82mm mortar tubes, a 14.5mm receiver barrel, 17 rigged and ready to use IEDs, an anti-aircraft gun and various bomb-making materials.
More than 600 Iraqi police recruits to graduate this week; hundreds more to begin training in the Al Anbar Province
CAMP FALLUJAH ? More than 600 Iraqi police recruits are scheduled to graduate this week and four to five hundred more are due to begin training in the Al Anbar Province. Anbar province is the most restive province in Iraq and an Al Qaeda stronghold.
In February of 2006, there were 14 active police stations in 3 of 9 districts throughout the province. Those stations were manned by fewer than 3,800 policemen. Today there are 33 stations operating in 8 districts throughout province with more than 8,000 trained police officials.
Many police stations throughout the province will new equipment arriving this week in the form of 80 new Chevrolet Silverado Sport Utility Vehicles. The distinctive trucks, some of which will be equipped with protective armor, will allow police to respond to disturbances in their communities. The goal in recruiting is to have 11,330 police trained and equipped by early 2007.
CCCI convicts 65 insurgents: One sentenced to death, 8 sentenced to life imprisonment
BAGHDAD ? The Central Criminal Court of Iraq convicted 65 people from September 15 to October 4 for various crimes including possession of illegal weapons; leading, and joining armed groups; attempted use of explosives and illegal border crossing.
The trial court found one Iraqi man guilty of violating Article 4 of the Terrorist Law for joining armed groups to participate in terrorist activities and sentenced him to death. The defendant is a known member of the Al-Qaida organization.
The trial court found 4 defendants guilty of violating Article 4 of the Terrorist Law and sentenced them to life imprisonment. Coalition Force captured the defendants after observing the 4 men preparing to attack a checkpoint with an RPG and small arms. Ground force personnel began firing and the 4 defendants returned fire with AK-47s. The defendants then ran into a mosque where ground forces again came under fire from sniper fire and mortar rounds. The defendants were charged with joining armed groups to disrupt stability and security of Iraq and endangering people?s lives.
The trial court found a Saudi Arabian man, captured by Coalition Force personnel in November of 2004, guilty of violating Article 194 of the Iraqi Penal Code for organizing, heading, leading or joining armed groups and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The defendant admitted to being a foreign fighter who came to Iraq for jihad.
The trial court found two Iraqi men guilty of violating Article 345, use of an explosive, of the Iraqi Penal Code and sentenced them to life imprisonment. Coalition ground forces captured the defendants while inspecting the blast area of an IED that exploded and killed a Coalition soldier. The forces found a wire leading from the blast area to a house. The wire led to an electrical device inside the house.
The trial court found one Iraqi man guilty of organizing, heading, leading or joining armed groups in violation of Article 194 of the Iraqi Penal Code and sentenced him to life imprisonment. Coalition Forces captured the defendant in December 2005 during a targeted raid. The defendant was an active member of Ansar Al Sunna in Mosul.
Those convicted of passport violations and entering the country illegally included men from Egypt, Syria, Libya, Sudan, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and Iran. Other sentences ranged from one year to 30 years imprisonment.
Since its establishment in April 2004, the Central Criminal Court has held 1,612 trials for Coalition-apprehended insurgents. The proceedings have resulted in 1,374 convictions with sentences ranging up to death.
80 insurgents killed or arrested in operations in Iraq
BAGHDAD -- Some 80 militants have been killed or arrested in separate operations in Iraq, the U.S. military said Saturday.
A U.S. military statement said its troops had killed one and arrested six militants in an operation in southern Baghdad. Those arrested have connections to foreign fighter activities, car-bombings, and suicide attacks. During the past 24 hours Iraqi troops have killed 10 militants in Baghdad and Al-Ramadi in two separate incidents.
It added, 63 militants have been detained in Baghdad, Mosul and Kirkuk.
IRAQI SECURITY FORCES SPOIL TERRORIST ATTACK
MOSUL, Iraq ? Iraqi Security Forces defeated a complex attack in Mosul Thursday night with the aid of Coalition Forces.
U.S. Army Soldiers from the 2nd Infantry Division attacked and destroyed a terrorist mortar cell Thursday night after Forward Operating Base Marez received indirect fire. 2 terrorists were killed, 1 wounded and 1 captured in the attack. Soldiers captured a significant weapons cache in the immediate area that contained three 82-mm mortar tubes with 18 mortar rounds and a 120-mm mortar tube with multiple mortar rounds.
During the attack, U.S. Soldiers witnessed terrorists flee to a building nearby. An outer cordon was set while Soldiers from the 2nd Iraqi Army Division assaulted the building killing 2 terrorists and capturing 3 others.
In western Mosul at approximately the same time, Iraqi Security Forces together with Soldiers from the 2nd Infantry Division defeated a complex terrorist attack involving small arms and rocket propelled grenade fire. During the fighting, Iraqi Police and Soldiers from 2nd Iraqi Army Division, cordoned the area capturing several mobile weapons caches and killing and detaining numerous terrorists involved in the attacks. One Iraqi Army Soldier and 4 Iraqi Police were wounded in the fighting.
Iraqi Police Headquarters in Mosul reported between 6 p.m. and 8 p.m. Thursday they captured 39 terrorists, wounded 2 terrorists and killed 14 terrorists. They also captured several small arms weapons caches, 10 vehicles suspected of being used for terrorist activity and one large truck with weapons.
12 U.S. Soldiers were wounded in the initial mortar attack on FOB Marez East. 4 soldiers were treated and returned to duty, 5 were not seriously wounded and 3 were seriously wounded.
-
Iraq: A Sunni Shift Against the Jihad
Summary
Sunni nationalists in Iraq who recently expressed an interest in negotiating a settlement with the United States want Washington to eject transnational Islamist militants from their midst. Though mainstream Sunni elements have been exploiting jihadist activity for years, they now face a threat from the jihadists, who could try to fill a leadership vacuum as crucial negotiations with the Shia and the Kurds approach and as pressure intensifies for the Bush administration to pull troops out of Iraq. The Sunni shift against the jihadists might seem like a positive development, but given the sectarian and political complexities in the country, such a move will only lead to more violence and instability.
Analysis
Iraq's largest Sunni nationalist insurgent group, the Islamic Army of Iraq, as well as Baathists, tribal leaders and other mainstream Sunnis have recently expressed an interest in negotiating a settlement with the United States. One of their key conditions is that U.S. forces must rid central Iraq of transnational jihadists.
Stratfor recently discussed how al Qaeda's ability to penetrate Sunni areas of Iraq by forging alliances with like-minded Iraqi militant groups and tribal elders would elicit a strong reaction from mainstream Sunnis. That the Sunnis now want the United States to annihilate the jihadists shows that the anti-jihadist trend is gaining momentum. Not only do the Sunnis now feel threatened by the jihadists, but they also realize that the Bush administration is under intense pressure on the home front to pull U.S. troops out of Iraq, and that negotiations with the Shia and Kurds are reaching a key impasse.
The jihadists, already marginally useful to the Sunnis, are quickly becoming even less useful -- the latter simply does not want to share power with the former. But desiring something is one thing and actually attaining it is another. The Sunnis allowed the jihadists to operate within their midst for more than three years, which has allowed jihadists to make significant inroads in the Sunni community. Not wanting the blood of fellow Sunnis -- albeit foreigners and extremists -- on their hands, Sunni nationalists now demand that U.S. forces take the jihadists out.
Washington, the Shia and the Kurds have long waited for such a turnover, but they will not agree to the deal without exacting a price from the Sunnis -- in the form of political concessions on other issues such as federalism and the sharing of oil revenues. In return for their cooperation, the Sunnis expect security guarantees from the Shia, and these do not seem likely any time soon considering the complications involving U.S.-Iran dealings and the intra-Shiite struggle over the issue of disbanding the militias.
Regardless of how things work out in terms of a jihadist purge, one thing is clear: The country is on the cusp of yet another violent struggle.
-
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
RELEASE No. 20061026-03
Oct. 26, 2006
Iraqi forces disrupt murder, kidnapping cell operations
Multi-National Corps ? Iraq PAO
BAGHDAD ? Special Iraqi Police forces conducted an early morning raid Oct. 25 in the al Hillah area to capture members of a murder and kidnapping cell wanted by the Ministry of the Interior.
Iraqi forces, with Coalition advisers, arrived at the objective and gained entry to several locations where 11 suspected members of the cell were found and detained.
The cell was targeted for its attacks against Iraqi and Coalition forces with improvised explosive devices and mortars, and their numerous criminal activities including extortion, kidnapping, car theft, and the murder of Iraqi civilians.
Operations on the objective caused minimal damage and there were no Iraqi civilian, Iraqi forces or Coalition forces casualties.
Multi-National Corps ? Iraq
Public Affairs Office, Camp Victory
-
Air strikes thwart terrorist ambushes
Sunday, 29 October 2006
BAGHDAD, Iraq ? Coalition aircraft thwarted two separate terrorist ambushes as ground forces moved toward their objective early Sunday morning near Balad. Coalition Forces encountered terrorist activity on two separate occasions along their travel route. After positive identification of the enemy by ground forces and with assistance from Iraqi Police, coalition aircraft engaged the targets with precision fires, killing four terrorists in one engagement and in conjunction with ground forces killed an estimated 13 others in a subsequent engagement along the same route.
Armed with RPGs, machineguns and AK47?s, the terrorists were planning to ambush the Coalition ground force. The plan did not succeed. No Coalition Forces were injured during the attack.
During each of the engagements, secondary explosions were observed, indicating IEDs or other terrorist weaponry used by al-Qaeda to kill innocent Iraqis and Coalition Forces patrolling the roads.
Despite the terrorists? ambush attempts, Coalitions Forces successfully continued their operation and detained three suspected terrorists.
MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE-IRAQ
COMBINED PRESS INFORMATION CENTER
-
http://today.reuters.com/news/articlenews.aspx?type=topNews&storyID=2006-10-27T180943Z_01_N27332175_RTRUKOC_0_US-SECURITY-USA-IDEAS.xml&src=102706_1450_TOPSTORY_u.s._foes_call_for_media_war
U.S. foes ramp up media campaign in "war of ideas"
Fri Oct 27, 2006 1:10 PM ET
By Bernd Debusmann, Special Correspondent
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - As U.S. military losses mount steadily in Iraq, a document issued by a group linked to al Qaeda spells out new goals for America's most determined enemies and calls for a media war against the United States.
The document, which began circulating on the Internet this month, illustrates the techniques Washington's enemy is using in what President George W. Bush has called the "war of ideas."
"The people of jihad need to carry out a media war parallel to the military war ... because we can observe the effect that the media have on nations," said the document, signed by Najd al-Rawi of the Global Islamic Media Front, a group associated with al Qaeda.
It lists targets for a public relations campaign ranging from the obvious -- Internet chat rooms -- to the surprising -- "famous U.S. authors with e-mail addresses" and mentions New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman and the academics Noam Chomsky, Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington.
The author suggests that video of attacks on U.S. troops in Iraq could be a weapon in the media war and sway U.S. public opinion. Judging from a controversy that flared after CNN aired a video on October 18 showing insurgent snipers cutting down U.S. soldiers, such footage is considered a serious threat by some U.S. lawmakers.
The tape was tame by Internet standards: the screen went black at the moment the bullets hit, sparing viewers the most shocking images.
But it prompted Duncan Hunter, the chairman of the powerful House Armed Services Committee, and two congressional colleagues to ask Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to ban CNN reporters from traveling with U.S. units in Iraq.
The issue of U.S. military deaths has long been sensitive -- the Pentagon has banned photographers from taking pictures of flag-draped coffins arriving in the United States from Iraq or Afghanistan.
In the past, similar strategy messages from al Qaeda and other groups have often remained in the relative obscurity of password-protected Arabic-language Web sites and message boards.
By contrast, the call in the document for a parallel media war traveled from the Internet to a mention in a New York Times column, the White House briefing room and eventually Bush himself.
In his weekly radio address on October 21, Bush specifically referred to the Global Islamic Media Front and said "the terrorists are trying to influence public opinion here in the United States. They have a sophisticated propaganda strategy ... to divide America and break our will."
Experts agree on the sophistication. "They (the jihadists) are more effective than us" on the propaganda front, said Peter Bergen, a terrorism expert at the New America Foundation, a Washington think tank.
WAR OF IDEAS
To what extent gruesome images from the military fronts can affect U.S. attitudes toward an increasingly unpopular Iraq war is open to debate.
But if global public opinion polls are a gauge, the United States is losing the overall war of ideas Bush declared part of U.S. national security strategy four years ago.
Since the United States invaded Iraq in March 2003, a move hugely unpopular in much of the world, international polls such as ones conducted by the Pew Global Attitudes Project have tracked a steady rise in anti-Americanism.
America's global standing slipped despite public diplomacy efforts such as increased spending on TV and radio broadcasts to the Middle East. Experts are critical of the efforts.
"It's hard to find a person between the Atlantic and the Indian subcontinent who'd give the U.S. a hearing these days," said Paul Eedle, a London-based terrorism expert and filmmaker who has just produced a documentary on the use of videos by followers of al Qaeda.It will be aired in Britain next month.
"In most of today's Middle East, the U.S. is seen as hostile to Islam and hostile to Arabs."
But while videos showing Americans inspire the radicalized and serve as recruitment tools, Eedle says, the mass of people in the Arab world are much more influenced by what they see on their main evening news bulletins -- "most of which make them angry at America and Israel."
-
Covering Iraq:
The Modern Way of War Correspondence
(Extended Version)
By Michael Fumento
National Review, November 7, 2006
Ramadi, Iraq
Would you trust a Hurricane Katrina report datelined ?direct from Detroit?? Or coverage of the World Trade Center attack from Chicago? Why then should we believe a Time Magazine investigation of the Haditha killings that was reported not from Haditha but from Baghdad? Or a Los Angeles Times article on a purported Fallujah-like attack on Ramadi reported by four journalists in Baghdad and one in Washington? Yet we do, essentially because we have no choice. A war in a country the size of California is essentially covered from a single city. Plug the name of Iraqi cities other than Baghdad into Google News and you?ll find that time and again the reporters are in Iraq?s capital, nowhere near the scene. Capt. David Gramling, public affairs officer for the unit I?m currently embedded with, puts it nicely: ?I think it would be pretty hard to report on Baghdad from out here.? Welcome to the not-so-brave new world of Iraq war correspondence.
Vietnam was the first war to give us reporting in virtually real time. Iraq is the first to give us virtual reporting. That doesn?t necessarily make it biased against the war; it does make it biased against the truth.
During my three embeds in Iraq?s vicious Anbar Province, I?ve been mortared and sniped at, and have dodged machine-gun fire ? all of which has given me a serious contempt for the rear-echelon reporters. When I appeared on the Al Franken Show in May, after my second embed, it was with former CNN Baghdad bureau chief Jane Arraf ? who complained about the dangers of being shot down by a missile while landing in Baghdad, and the dangers of the airport road to the International Zone (IZ) . . . and how awful the Baghdad hotels were.
Descent into Hell?
Most rear-echelon reporters seem to have studied the same handbook, perhaps The Dummies? Guide to Faux Bravado. It usually begins with the horrific entry into Baghdad International Airport. Time?s Baghdad bureau chief, Aparisim Ghosh, in an August 2006 cover story, devotes five long paragraphs to the alleged horror of landing there.
It?s ?the world?s scariest landing,? he insists, as if he were an expert on all the landings of all the planes at all the world?s airports and military airfields. It?s ?a steep, corkscrewing plunge,? a ?spiraling dive, straightening up just yards from the runway. If you?re looking out the window, it can feel as if the plane is in a free fall from which it can?t possibly pull out.? Writes Ghosh, ?During one especially difficult landing in 2004, a retired American cop wouldn't stop screaming ?Oh, God! Oh, God!? I finally had to slap him on the face ? on instructions from the flight attendant.?
The Associated Press gave us a whole article on the subject, titled ?A hair-raising flight into Baghdad,? referring to ?a stomach-churning series of tight, spiraling turns that pin passengers deep in their seats.?
I?ve flown into that airport three times now; each time was in a military C-130 Hercules cargo plane, and each landing was as smooth as the proverbial baby?s behind. But Ghosh is describing a descent in a civilian Fokker F-28 jet, on which admittedly I have never flown. (It?s $900 one-way for the short hop from Amman to Baghdad, and therefore the transportation of well-heeled media people.) So I asked a reporter friend who frequently covers combat in the Mideast and Africa, and has also frequently flown into Baghdad on those Fokkers. ?The plane just banks heavily,? he said. ?It?s not a big deal.? He requested anonymity, lest he incur the wrath of other journalists for spoiling their war stories.
Moreover, you can read similar corkscrew horror stories from reporters who have flown in on C-130s. ?A C-130 deposits us onto the tarmac of Baghdad International Airport after a hair-raising corkscrew landing intended to elude incoming small arms and rocket fire,? a Greek freelance photojournalist boasted on his blog.
It?s not just experience that tells me that?s baloney. Look at a photo of a C-130; it?s a flying bathtub.
Chuck Yeager couldn?t throw it into a corkscrew and then pull out. I did ask a crewman on this last trip about deep-diving C-130s and he said that on a single flight (out of hundreds) the pilot had to plunge suddenly to avoid getting to close to another plane, but other than that ?Landing in this plane is like landing in an airliner.? Except that unlike those Fokkers there are no flight attendants.
As to the overall dangers of flying into or out of Baghdad, one civilian cargo jet was hit after takeoff with a shoulder-launched missile, but landed safely; and one Australian C-130 was hit by small-arms fire, killing one passenger. That?s it. No reporter has been injured or killed flying into or out of Baghdad International.
The Highway of Death
Then there?s the dreaded ?Highway of Death.? Here?s Ghosh again, picking up after his horrific corkscrew description. ?But the relief is temporary; most of us still have to negotiate the Highway of Death,? he writes. ?There have been hundreds of insurgent and terrorist attacks along its length since the U.S. military established its largest Iraqi base,
Camp Victory, next to the airport three years ago. Many of the attacks are directed at U.S. patrols, but they have also killed scores of Iraqi noncombatants.? Only as an afterthought does he note that ?recently the highway has become less deadly.?
And here?s an account from A. A. Gill, a reporter who accompanied another journalist, Jeremy Clarkson, in Iraq last year. He wrote, in Britain?s Sunday Times Magazine last November:
The Americans didn?t have a Black Hawk to spare for the five-minute hop into the Green Zone, so we were going to have to drive it. This is the bit Jeremy swore he?d never do. When you?re asked where you draw the line, this is the place to start drawing. Nobody drives into Baghdad if they?ve not been given a direct order. Even our minder, Wing Commander Willox, has never done it. . . . This road is code-named Route Irish. [The] Guinness [Book of] World Records has just authoritatively announced that Baghdad is the worst place in the world. . . . This 25-minute stretch of blasted tarmac from the airport to the Green Zone is, as Jeremy might say, the most dangerous drive ? in the world.
Yet just two days earlier the Washington Post headlined a piece on Route Irish as follows: ?Easy Sailing along Once-Perilous Road to Baghdad Airport.? It observed, ?Two months ago, the killings stopped. In October, one person was wounded on the road and no one was killed, according to the U.S. Army. . . . It was safe enough to stop here, to linger, to chat, and a computer screen flashed the statistical evidence. . . . In 10 months, the only enemy fire they have seen on the airport road came after one of the civilian trucks they were escorting broke down.? And two months earlier, USA Today had published a similar account, backing it up with a quote from an officer whose men patrolled the roads: ?Route Irish is definitely not the most dangerous road in Iraq any longer, and everyone who uses it knows it.? Apparently, though, the Sunday Times reporter didn?t know it ? and other Baghdad journalists still don?t know it.
In fact, only reporters call it ?The Highway of Death.? To everyone else it?s Route Irish, named after the Fighting Irish of Notre Dame (and not after an infantry regiment with strong Irish roots, as is widely believed).
Further, reporters coming into the city or the IZ often have the option of bypassing Route Irish in the aforementioned helicopter runs. Failing that, they can take the Rhino bus. The Rhino is so thickly armored that by comparison an M1 Abrams tank is made of cardboard. It?s repeatedly been hit with IEDs, causing no more discomfort to passengers than ringing ears. Basically the IED would have to be atomic to stop it. But in that case, the passengers would still be protected by soldiers on board firing through gun slits, by heavily-armed Humvees both fore and aft, and by a helicopter gunship that flies over it.
Yet reporters such as NBC News State Department Producer Libby Leist, make even the Rhino ride sound scary ? though at least she didn?t claim the bus makes a corkscrew plunge.
Telling readers that the Blackhawk intended to fly Condoleeza Rice and her entourage of aides and reporters couldn?t fly to the IZ on account of weather, Leist wrote in March 2006 (five months after the aforementioned Washington Post account, and seven months after the USA Today account), ?Now, even the hardened journalists and Rice?s well traveled aides seemed leery. We had to take ?Rhino? military vehicles out onto Baghdad?s famously dangerous airport road. The only thing we could take comfort in was that Rice?s security detail thought it was safe enough for her to do.? Leist concluded that, ?Needless to say, it was a relief to finally get into the heavily guarded secure International Zone . . . . The usually energetic press corps was silent for the entire ride from the airport ? a sign we were all anxious to get off the road.?
Chin up, Libby! Now you?ll have something to tell your grandchildren about.
Fear and Tension in the IZ
With that horrific arrival behind them, it?s time for the Baghdad reporters to settle into their lodgings. Those may be in the International Zone or just outside in places like the Al Rashid, Al Hamra, or Palestine hotels. And trust them, their trip into the IZ was stepping from the frying pan into the fire. Newsweek?s Joe Cochrane wrote a commentary about the IZ in July 2005 just two months after I first visited it. (All media must come through the IZ to get credentialed.) In other words, we both saw the same place at about the same time ? but I don?t recognize his IZ.
?I?ve always been something of an optimist, but everyone has a breaking point. Mine came on Saturday as I toured the infamous ?Green Zone? in central Baghdad,? Cochrane began. After providing his view of a mean Baghdad outside the IZ, he continued, ?The situation inside the [IZ] is scarcely better. Heavily armed troops guard government buildings and hospitals, menacingly pointing their weapons at anyone who approaches. Soldiers manning checkpoints can use deadly force against motorists who fail to heed their instructions, so the warning signs say, and I have no doubt they?d exercise that right in a heartbeat if they felt threatened. All this fear and tension, and inside a six square mile area that?s supposed to be safe.?
That?s funny, because inside my ?infamous? IZ the guards make people feel safe, not threatened. In 2005, many of them were Gurkhas ? a combination of some of the best killers on earth and the politest people you?d ever want to meet. Nobody ever menacingly pointed a weapon at me.
Cochrane was right that ?roadblocks, blast walls, and barbed wire are the most common sights in this walled-in mini-city,? but these defenses contributed to an atmosphere that to me was devoid of fear and tension. As for the idea that it?s ?supposed to be safe,? when I inquired in May 2005 I was told it had probably been months since anybody dropped in a rocket or mortar round. And ?dropped in? is probably the best term; the bad guys don?t even have the capacity to aim; they just fire and run, hoping the round actually lands somewhere within the zone. It?s rare that they actually hit near, much less kill, anybody.
-
The real IZ represents opulence in the midst of war ? with terrific chow, huge post exchanges that stock an amazing array of products, the best medical care in the country, and large, sumptuous swimming pools built for Saddam but now open to anybody who works in the zone. Nor have the grotesque exaggerations of the dangers of the IZ gone unnoticed by soldiers and their loved ones. ?Dear Chain-smoking, Unwitting Stooges,? military blogger Jason Van Steenwyk began an open letter to the Baghdad press corps. ?So how come we can get mortared several times a week out here and it never makes the news, but the pogues [rear-echelon soldiers] in the Green Zone can catch three measly mortar rounds and I get my dad emailing me asking why the Baghdad press corps is covering it like it?s the second Tet Offensive??
(Not incidentally, soldiers in the IZ also feel the need for false bravado. This past spring, on a tour of the area while waiting for my helicopter to come that night, I was accompanied by a chubby sergeant armed to the teeth including five hand grenades on his vest while soldiers I?ve gone into combat with never wear more than one. Obviously insecure about living in Iraq?s lap of luxury while other soldiers throughout the country lived in more primitive conditions and actually fought and died, he explained that the IZ can be an extremely dangerous place and that if often gets shelled. Fortunately he didn?t hear the sound of my eyes rolling.)
In any case, no reporter has been killed or injured inside the IZ.
Hotel Hell
Then you have those awful, oh just awful, hotels! CNN?s Jane Arraf dared me to visit one. I was stunned; it was as if somebody had dared me to zip my pants. Really, I thought, just how often do you get mortared while inside one of those hotels? She did point out that reporters have been killed inside Baghdad hotels. But they were not Americans and were not killed by enemy fire, but rather errant American fire during the seizure of Baghdad way back in early 2003.
I recall another reporter complaining that the hotels were so bad that you felt compelled to go out and buy your own linen. Apparently far better to bundle into or atop a sleeping bag in a cracker box at the forward operating bases I?d stayed at in Fallujah, Karma, and here in Ramadi or the 80-bed transient tent at Camp Ramadi with nothing over your head to protect you from rocket or mortar rounds but a sheet of canvas or perhaps a layer of sandbags on wood that can stop a 60 millimeter mortar but not an 81 or 120 millimeter, which the enemy greatly prefers.
Where I am right now it?s mandatory to wear body armor and helmet at all times unless in a fortified position. It?s hot and it?s a hassle. Imagine getting up in the middle of the night to relieve yourself and having to slap on clothes and armor to walk to a nasty outhouse. You may have to urinate in one place and do your other business in another, because urine interferes with the burning of the excrement.
To take your shower you get wet, turn off the water and lather up, then quickly rinse off. And no, there?s no place to plug in your hair dryer. On the other hand, in some camps I?ve stayed at there aren?t any showers so you don?t have to worry about any of this.
You?ve probably heard the Iraqi desert is made of sand; you know, like Malibu Beach. Wrong. It?s a fine dust that coats everything including the inside of your lungs. Until recently there was no store of any kind at Corregidor. A truck came once monthly and if you needed something in-between ? tough.
Even getting onto one of the nine Internet-connected computers that are somehow slower than dial-up and allocated for 500 men makes sending off dispatches ? or sending an email to your spouse to tell her you?re still okay despite the fighting in your area he or she heard about ? rather difficult.
Hiding out in Baghdad
It?s not fair to say the hotel-dwellers never leave their safe and comfy confines. ?Despite the danger, Nancy [Youssef, Knight Ridder bureau chief] and her colleagues do venture out and do find inventive ways to talk with ordinary Iraqis,? then?Knight Ridder D.C. bureau chief Clark Hoyt wrote in a column. He explained that Nancy says, ?When I go grocery shopping, I listen to people?s conversations. What are they talking about?? So this is what passes for ?war correspondence? of the Baghdad Brigade.
Even journalists sympathetic to the Baghdad press corps admit they essentially just hide out. Here?s how The New York Review of Books put it last April: ?The bitter truth is that doing any kind of work outside these American fortified zones has become so dangerous for foreigners as to be virtually suicidal. More and more journalists find themselves hunkered down inside whatever bubbles of refuge they have managed to create in order to insulate themselves from the lawlessness outside.? Unless you accept ?insulation? as a synonym for ?reporting,? this doesn?t speak well of the hotel denizens.
Other reporters have been less generous. The London Independent?s Robert Fisk has written of ?hotel journalism,? while former Washington Post Bureau Chief Rajiv Chandrasekaran has called it ?journalism by remote control.? More damningly, Maggie O?Kane of the British newspaper The Guardian said: ?We no longer know what is going on, but we are pretending we do.? Ultimately, they can?t even cover Baghdad yet they pretend they can cover Ramadi.
One way the Baghdad press corps and its allies try to steal valor is to invoke the incredibly large number of reporters killed in the war: It?s true that over 100 journalists or media assistants have been killed. Yet, with the sole exception of Steven Vincent, the only American journalists killed or even seriously injured by hostile action in Iraq have been embeds. Atlantic Monthly editor-at-large Michael Kelly (an editor of mine) drowned after his Humvee rolled into a Baghdad canal during the invasion. NBC reporter David Bloom died of a pulmonary embolism from being cramped in a Humvee, also during the invasion. Both were embedded with the 3rd Infantry Division.
CBS News cameraman Paul Douglas and freelance soundman James Brolan were blown up by an improvised explosive device (IED) while accompanying CBS correspondent Kimberly Dozier, herself critically injured. They were embedded with the 4th Infantry Division. So were ABC anchorman Bob Woodruff and his cameraman, who were critically injured by an IED. Time correspondent Michael Weisskopf had his hand blown off trying to toss a grenade out of his Humvee when he was embedded with the 1st Armored Division. These, not the hotel-bound credit-claimers, are the journalist-heroes of the Iraq War.
To Tell the Truth
Of course, there are exceptions to MSM cowardice and the false bravado that follows. The Associated Press often sends reporters into Ramadi. USA Today does likewise, actually embedding a woman blogger in the city. The Washington Post sends many fine reporters where other news bureaus fear to tread. There are surely other exceptions.
Yet the glaring gap between the reality of the Iraq war and the virtuality from the hotels and IZ is what leads embeds to go to the most dangerous places in Iraq and Afghanistan on their own dime.
One of them made this point quite forcefully in a recent column. Jerry Newberry, communications director for the Veterans of Foreign Wars and a Vietnam Army vet, wrote in a September column just before heading off for Afghanistan and then Iraq: ?For the most part, the wars being fought by our people in Afghanistan and Iraq ? their successes, heroism, and valor ? [are] reported by some overpaid, makeup-wearing talking heads, sitting on their fat rear-ends in an air-conditioned hotel. They rely on Iraqi stringers to bring the stuff to them and then call it reporting.?
Newberry?s bravery and dedication are to be saluted, but as a combat vet he has advantages. So did I, as a veteran paratrooper (on my first trip) and a combat veteran (by the end of my second). Michael Yon, famed for his blog and award-winning photos of his nine-month embed with the infantry in Iraq is a former Green Beret. Writer and historian Andrew Lubin, a Fallujah-bound embed I met while getting credentialed on this trip, is a former Marine who goes to the rifle range twice monthly.
But Patrick Dollard, with no military training, left a cushy job as Oscar-winning director Steven Soderbergh?s agent to bunk down with Marines in Ramadi for seven months to film a documentary series (still being edited) that he hopes will show the real war and the real warriors.
In February, a Humvee he was traveling in hit a massive IED, which shredded the vehicle and killed two of the three Marines aboard. Dollard was injured and hospitalized. But he had a mission, and was quickly back on the job. The next month, another IED blast injured him, less seriously. Then . . . right back to work. Dollard?s experiences alone put the Baghdad press corps to shame. But he insisted to me that exchanging Hollywood for a hellhole wasn?t as hard as you?d imagine. ?I had to feel the moral imperative to go, and clearly I did feel it,? he said.
The sad truth is that the mainstream media have no interest in covering the Iraq War for what it is, observes Dollard. He says they are interested in Iraq only so far as it is useful as a weapon against their self-imagined mortal political enemy, George W. Bush. The embeds, however, want the real picture ? and we want to tell the truth about it to the world.
Which is something their detractors simply refuse to understand. Screenwriter-director Nora Ephron says that dispatches from both soldiers and embeds are worthless, because we?re ?too close? to the war. The best ?reporting? apparently is from those most removed. (Amazingly, Ephron also believes embedding was an evil idea dreamed up for this war, even though in World War II and later wars all major news outlets had reporters with the troops on the front lines. That?s how we got the incredible dispatches of Ernie Pyle, and the wonderful Iwo Jima flag-raising photo by Joe Rosenthal.)
Sometimes you?ll hear that embeds are just shuffled around in armored vehicles. Some are, although IEDs and rocket-propelled grenades still make that less safe than manning a desk. But in my case, I?ve never been in an armored vehicle that wasn?t merely dropping us off at a remote location to engage in foot patrols. Yet Paul Rieckhoff, an anti-war vet who was hawking his boring book, Chasing Ghosts, on the same Al Franken Show Jane Arraf and I were on, commented on my disgust with hotel-bound reporters by smearing embeds. He labeled those who actually go into battle with troops as ?jock sniffers.? To him, the Ernie Pyles and Joe Rosenthals of America?s past were just a bunch of contemptible groupies.
Yet embeds perform a service beyond just their willingness to see combat, and to describe accurately the specific events they witness. ?Although some journalism professors may worry that military embedding is subverting the media, I would argue the contrary,? Robert Kaplan wrote in The Atlantic Monthly. Kaplan, who has been embedded all over the world, went on to observe, ?The Columbia Journalism Review recently ran an article about the worrisome gap between a wealthy media establishment and ordinary working Americans. One solution is embedding, which offers the media perhaps their last, best chance to reconnect with much of the society they claim to be a part of.?
The media-elite Baghdad Brigade and its stateside editors have forfeited this opportunity. It?s not just that being with the soldiers puts them at risk, but that they don?t want to be with those soldiers. They prefer the company of their fellow journalists and that, too, contributes to their unwillingness to leave their walled-in compounds.
It?s impossible to blame anyone for not wanting to report from the more dangerous parts of Iraq; over 99 percent of Americans surely would not want to. The trouble with the Baghdad press corps is that, in pretending to be war correspondents when the correspondence they engage in could just as well be done from New York or Washington, they may well be squeezing out from those positions reporters who actually want to do the job. Harry Truman?s famous words, ?If you can?t stand the heat, get out of the kitchen,? suggest wise advice to today?s journos in Baghdad: If you don?t have the guts actually to cover the war, stand aside for those who do.
Michael Fumento is a veteran of the 27th Engineer Battalion (Combat) (Airborne) and has been embedded three times in the western Iraqi region of Al Anbar. Read Michael Fumento's additional writing on the military, on Iraq, and on the media, and view his Spring 2006 Iraq photos from both the Fallujah area and Ramadi. View his 2005 Iraq photos.
http://www.fumento.com/military/brigade.html
-
Folks:
Any thoughts on our strategy at this point for Iraq?
Here Ralph Peters weighs in:
Marc
==============
LET'S FIGHT LIKE WE MEAN IT - & START BY KILLING OFF THIS LOWLIFE
By RALPH PETERS
October 26, 2006 -- IT WAS wrenching to listen to President Bush's news conference yesterday. He's struggling to do the right thing. But he's getting terrible advice.
He's still counting on a political solution in Iraq. Ain't going to happen. And you can take that to the blood bank.
Our famously loyal president has one grave flaw: He's a poor judge of character. He trusts the wrong people. Then he sticks by them.
Bush met Russia's Vladimir Putin, "looked into his soul" - and failed to recognize that the guy is an unreformed secret policeman. He stubbornly defends Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, the Pentagon's architect of failure. Now he's standing up for Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki - a man who has decided to back our enemies.
I lost faith in our engagement in Iraq last week. I can pinpoint the moment. It came when I heard that Maliki had demanded - successfully - that our military release a just-captured deputy of Muqtada al-Sadr who was running death squads.
As a former intelligence officer, that told me two things: First, Iraq's prime minister is betting on Muqtada to prevail, not us. Second, Muqtada, not the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, is now the most powerful man in Iraq.
At his news conference, Bush was asked about another statement made by Maliki just hours before. Our troops had conducted a raid in Sadr City, Muqtada's Baghdad stronghold. The Iraqi PM quickly declared that "this will not happen again." He was signaling his allegiance to Muqtada. Publicly.
Oh, Maliki realizes his government wouldn't last a week if our troops withdrew. He doesn't want us to leave yet. But he's looking ahead.
For now, Maliki and his pals are using our troops to buy time while they pocket our money, amass power and build up arms. But they've written us off for the long term.
Does that mean we should leave?
Not yet. Iraq deserves one last chance. But to make that chance even remotely viable, we'll have to take desperate measures. We need to fight. And accept the consequences.
The first thing we need to do is to kill Muqtada al-Sadr, who's now a greater threat to our strategic goals than Osama bin Laden.
We should've killed him in 2003, when he first embarked upon his murder campaign. But our leaders were afraid of provoking riots.
Back then, the tumult might've lasted a week. Now we'll face a serious uprising. So be it. When you put off paying war's price, you pay compound interest in blood.
We must kill - not capture - Muqtada, then kill every gunman who comes out in the streets to avenge him.
Our policy of all-carrots-no-sticks has failed miserably. We delivered Iraq to zealots, gangsters and terrorists. Now our only hope is to prove that we mean business - that the era of peace, love and wasting American lives is over.
And after we've killed Muqtada and destroyed his Mahdi Army, we need to go after the Sunni insurgents. If we can't leave a democracy behind, we should at least leave the corpses of our enemies.
The holier-than-thou response to this proposal is predictable: "We can't kill our way out of this situation!" Well, boo-hoo. Friendly persuasion and billions of dollars haven't done the job. Give therapeutic violence a chance.
Our soldiers and Marines are dying to protect a government whose members are scrambling to ally themselves with sectarian militias and insurgent factions. President Bush needs to face reality. The Maliki government is a failure.
There's still a chance, if a slight one, that we can achieve a few of our goals in Iraq - if we let our troops make war, not love. But if our own leaders are unwilling to fight, it's time to leave and let Iraqis fight each other.
Our president owes Iraq's treacherous prime minister nothing. Get tough, or get out.
================
Here's this from Stratfor:
U.S./IRAQ: U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld approved a proposal to increase the number of troops in Iraq and accelerate their training.
?
-
BAGHDAD ? Iraqi Army and U.S. troops captured 9 terrorists in Baghdad Oct. 26. Patrols from the 4th Iraqi Army Division, supported by Soldiers from the 4th Infantry Division, conducted combat operations, captured 6 other terrorists and seized weapons in Tarmiya, north of Baghdad, at approximately 3:30 a.m. Oct. 26.
The IA Soldiers, along with Soldiers from 1st Bn., 66th AR, searched 60 houses and a mosque. The combined forces seized three AK-47 assault rifles & a home-made grenade. The IA Soldiers entered the mosque as the U.S. Soldiers cordoned the area.
One of the terrorists carried a cellular phone with video showing attacks on the Coalition Force and was carrying $1,850.
In a separate incident, Soldiers from the 172nd Stryker Brigade captured 3 terrorists in Mansour Oct. 26.
After the Soldiers were attacked by small-arms fire from 4 terrorists, they responded and engaged the terrorists. 3 were apprehended and one attacker escaped.
In a separate incident, patrols from 7th Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 4th Inf. Div., seized weapons in Halabsa Oct. 25 while conducting combat operations. The Troop C Soldiers searched 76 houses and seized a sniper rifle and 11 AK-47 assault rifles.
ONE TERRORIST KILLED, 10 OTHERS DETAINED
BAGHDAD, Iraq ? Coalition Forces killed a terrorist Saturday morning and detained an individual responsible for the movement of foreign fighters into Iraq during a raid south of Baghdad.
Saturday?s raid was part of an ongoing effort to diminish al-Qaeda in Iraq car bombing capabilities in the Baghdad area. So far in October, Coalition Forces have captured 8 other key players and 15 known associates. This has put a serious dent in al-Qaeda it Iraq.
During the raid, 8 insurgents attempted to flee the area and ground forces were able to safely capture them. Forces arrested 2 others without incident.
The targeted terrorist was disguised as a woman in an attempt to avoid being detained.
As the Coalition Forces were preparing to depart with the detainees, they received small arms fire from a terrorist and ground forces returned fire, killing the terrorist.
U.S. Soldiers in Baghdad Eliminate Death Squad
BAGHDAD ? U.S. Soldiers wounded 3 terrorists and killed 1 other involved in death squad activity Thursday in a Baghdad neighborhood.
While conducting security patrols in the area, Soldiers from 172nd Stryker Brigade heard small-arms fire near their location and noticed 3 men, one of whom was wearing a black ski mask, running away from a building toward a getaway car.
The Soldiers immediately engaged the trio, killing one and wounded another. The third terrorist made it to the getaway vehicle, which was occupied by two suspected terrorists. The vehicle sped off in an attempt to escape capture.
The U.S. Soldiers engaged the vehicle to disable it. The driver crashed into a residential gate and the vehicle came to a halt.
The U.S. troops moved to investigate the vehicle. They captured 2 wounded terrorists and one uninjured inside and seized two pipe bombs, two hand grenades, five AK-47s, 2 PKC assault rifles and a large amount of ammunition.
Upon further investigation of the building the 3 initial suspects had fled, the Soldiers discovered the bodies of two Iraqi citizens who had been murdered. The captured terrorists will be held to account for the murders against Iraqi citizens.
Iraqi forces disrupt murder, kidnapping cell operations; 11 insurgents captured
BAGHDAD ? Special Iraqi Police forces conducted an early morning raid Oct. 25 in the al Hillah area to capture members of a murder and kidnapping cell wanted by the Ministry of the Interior.
Iraqi forces, with Coalition advisers, arrived at the objective and gained entry to several locations where 11 members of the cell were found and captured.
IPs ambushed by insurgents, IPs and CF fight back
KHAN BANI SA?AD, Iraq ? On Thursday, an Iraqi police unit came under attack by an unknown number of terrorists in the vicinity of Khan Bani Sa?ad in Diyala Province. The police under fire fought back in intense house to house fighting.
An element from the 3rd Heavy Brigade Combat Team was diverted from another mission and rapidly responded to reinforce the IPs in contact. The U.S. troopos engaged the terrorists immediately upon arrival.
The Iraqi and U.S. troops killed 18 terrorists, wound 8 and captured 27 more. Additionally, enemy weapons and ammunition were captured.
One Iraqi civilian and several Iraqi Police were killed in action. Seven IPs were wounded and transported to FOB Warhorse for medical treatment.
3 Insurgents Captured In Raid
BAGHDAD - Iraqi and U.S. forces entered an office of radical Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr in Baghdad's eastern Rusafa district on Friday during a hunt for a kidnapped U.S. soldier, the U.S. military said. Three insurgents were arrested.
16 Insurgents Killed in 2 Separate Raids
BAGHDAD - A raid backed by U.S. air strikes killed 4 insurgents in Shi'ite Sadr City district of Baghdad, the government said, in an operation the U.S. military said was targeted at death squad members.
BAGHDAD - U.S. forces killed 12 people they said were insurgents preparing to plant a roadside bomb in the western city of Ramadi, the U.S. military said on Wednesday. It said the suspected insurgents were travelling in a car that was destroyed on Tuesday with "precision munitions".
U-S forces foil insurgent ambush in Iraq
BAGHDAD, Iraq The U-S military says 17 insurgents have been killed in Iraq in a series of air and ground attacks.
Armed with RPGs, machineguns and AK47?s, the terrorists were planning to ambush the troops. The plan did not succeed. U.S. trooops were injured during the attack.
During each of the engagements, secondary explosions were observed, indicating IEDs or other terrorist weaponry used by al-Qaeda to kill innocent Iraqis and Coalition Forces patrolling the roads.
U-S troops ran into the insurgent attacks twice near Baghdad where they were preparing to ambush an American column of vehicles.
The U.S. military says that U-S warplanes killed 3 insurgents in an initial attack and 14 more in a second attack. The enemy never fired a round. They were nearly wiped out. One insurgent may have escaped. The rest were killed.
Despite the terrorists? ambush attempts, U.S. troops successfully continued their operation and captured 3 terrorists a little further down the road. They were probably the observers for the terrorists. They were found with radios in their possession.
Iraqi forces raid illegal armed group; 1 insurgent killed
BAGHDAD ? Iraqi Army forces conducted an early morning raid Oct. 25 in Khalis in eastern Diyala Province to capture the leadership of an illegal armed group responsible for attacks against Iraqi forces.
Iraqi forces, with Coalition advisors, arrived at the objective and gained entry where they were met with small arms fire from a member of the illegal armed group. Iraqi forces returned fire and killed the group member.
Iraqi Army operations capture 71 death squad members and 244 al-Qaeda members; 23 terrorists killed
Iraqi-led operations have been successful in rooting out terrorists and finding weapons caches.
From Oct. 14 to 25, Iraqi Security Forces with Coalition support conducted 26 missions against death squads, resulting in the capture of 3 death-squad cell leaders and 68 death-squad members, he said. Also, from Oct. 12 to 25, about 70 operations against al-Qaida in Iraq resulted in 18 terrorists killed and 219 terrorists captured.
Iraqi Forces recently concluded an important operation, disrupting a terrorist operational hub near Baghdad. During Operation Commando Hunter, which began Oct. 2, they found more than 130 weapons caches, killed 15 terrorists, and captured 25 terrorists. They also seized the abandoned Yusufiyah thermal power plant, which was known to be a staging area for terrorist attacks.
Operation Commando Hunter was yet another example of Iraqi Forces rooting out foreign influences and creating their own bases from which to attack terrorists.
The rules posted on the wall of the U.S. Marine Corps base in Barwana concisely summed up its predicament in Iraq:
Be polite, be professional, have a plan to kill everyone you meet.
-
An Iraqi voice unmentioned by our chattering class.
===================================
AT WAR
'My Country Needs Me'
Iraqi democrats haven't given up the fight. How can we?
BY HEATHER ROBINSON
Wednesday, November 1, 2006 12:01 a.m. EST
With the midterm elections fast approaching, the panic over Iraq seems more intense than ever. That country, the thinking goes, is a hopeless mess, and there could be a precipitous American withdrawal, especially if the Democrats win.
But doing so would leave the silent majority of Iraqis hostage to the most vicious extremists, abandoning those Iraqi leaders who have championed liberal democratic values. One of them is Mithal al-Alusi, a 53-year-old Sunni Arab who won a seat in parliament last December after having served as director general of the National Commission on de-Baathification. Mr. al-Alusi ran on a platform of religious pluralism, human rights, free markets and a free press. He calls for an alliance among democracies--including the U.S., Iraq, Israel and Turkey--to fight terrorism.
Not only does Mr. al-Alusi champion values many in the West hope will define the new Iraq, he has risked his life--and lost more than his life--for the cause. In September 2004 he attended a counterterrorism conference in Herzliya, Israel; after which insurgents threatened his family. The following February assassins opened fire on Mr. al-Alusi's car as it approached his Baghdad home. He wasn't in the vehicle, but his sons, 30-year-old Ayman and 22-year-old Gamal, were. Both were killed as their father watched. Still, Mr. al-Alusi was unbowed. "Even if these terrorists try to kill me again, peace is the only solution," he told reporters minutes after the attack. "Peace with Israel is the only solution for Iraq. Peace with everybody, but no peace for the terrorists." He continued to build his Iraqi Nation Party, which his fallen sons had helped establish, and which now has 15,000 members.
He describes his views less in ideological terms than in human ones. "An Iraqi mother, she has the right to have normal feelings for her baby. It's the same for an Israeli mother," he told me in a phone interview from Baghdad. "This is the best way to drive the world's politics. Not to make it complicated."
Mr. al-Alusi is not the only Iraqi political leader to reject ethnic and sectarian separatism. Hajim al-Hasani, a former parliament speaker, testified at a September congressional hearing. When Rep. Christopher Shays referred to him as a Sunni, Mr. al-Hasani politely corrected the congressman: "I am Iraqi." Afterwards, Mr. al-Hasani told me it is a misconception to view the violence in Iraq as the expression of popular will: "The few bad apples can rotten the rest of the apples if nobody stops them." Many of those "bad apples" aren't even grown in Iraq. Following Saddam Hussein's fall, foreign jihadists such as the Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi rushed to join former Baathists in an effort to undermine the fledgling democracy. And Mr. al-Alusi told me that "Iran is fully involved in terrorist activity in Iraq." He believes Tehran is playing both sides, backing Sunni terrorists as well as Shiite ones.
Polls suggest a majority of Americans think it was a mistake to enter Iraq. Mr. al-Alusi respectfully disagrees. "We didn't have any kind of hope, and now, even with all our difficulty, we have hope." Iraq today is a central front in a war against extremists who view the murder of civilians as political expression. "I will be killed--if not today, tomorrow," Mr. al-Alusi says. "The point is not me, but children--for a child to be a child, not a killer; for a teenager to be a teenager, not an extremist."
Mithal al-Alusi could have left Iraq for a comfortable life in exile; Mr. Shays, a friend, offered to help him relocate to the U.S. But he said no: "My country needs me."
He has not given up the fight. How can we?
Ms. Robinson is an independent journalist.
-
Geopolitical Diary: Washington vs. the Iraqi Shia?
Reuters reported Wednesday that Iraqi Shiite leaders are increasingly becoming critical of what they see as an alignment between the country's Sunni minority and the United States. The report cited several Shiite sources saying that Washington wants the Shiite militias disbanded, so that Iran will not be able to use them in a potential U.S-Iranian conflict.
We predicted in our fourth-quarter forecast that Iran might instigate militant attacks by the Iraqi Shia against U.S. troops. Recent political developments appear to be setting the stage for just such a scenario.
Washington has a lot riding on Iraq, and needs to show that it can steer the country out of its current pandemonium and toward some minimum semblance of security and stability. As recently as January, the main obstacles in the way of that goal were Sunni nationalist insurgents and al Qaeda-led transnational (Sunni) jihadists. Then came the destruction of the Shiite al-Askariyah shrine in As Samarra by suspected jihadist militants, which led to reprisals by Shiite "death squads" against Sunnis.
The anti-Sunni violence and the Shiite-Kurdish push toward federalism brought the Sunnis and the United States closer together. The Sunnis needed U.S. support to counter the political and military aggressiveness of the Shia; the Americans needed to contain the Sunni insurgency and find a way to blunt Iran's influence in Iraq. Washington made disbanding Shiite militias a top priority -- bringing it on par with the need to contain the Sunni insurgents, and perhaps even a notch higher.
All of this was bound to irritate the Shia -- which would explain the events of the past two weeks.
Abdel-Aziz al-Hakim, chief of the largest Shiite political group the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), has been aggressively calling for the creation of an autonomous Shiite federal zone composed of nine southern Iraq governorates, but U.S. President George W. Bush came out strongly against the idea Oct. 18. Meanwhile, Washington, under pressure on the domestic front, continued to press the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to disband the Shiite militias and to agree to a timetable for a U.S. troop drawdown.
Al-Maliki said in an interview published in USA Today that his government will not force militias to disarm until later this year or early next year. He also criticized a U.S. raid against a Mehdi Army stronghold in the capital -- saying he had not been consulted on the operation -- and slammed the top U.S. military and diplomatic representatives in Iraq for calling for a timetable to curb violence. On Tuesday, he ordered U.S. military checkpoints removed from Sadr City and other parts of Baghdad.
Ahmed Chalabi on Monday criticized secret talks between Sunni insurgents and U.S. officials. Chalabi -- a controversial Shiite politician who once enjoyed strong ties with the Pentagon and remains close to Tehran -- urged the United States to open talks with Iran, saying it is the only way out of the current problems.
What we have here is a conflict in the making between the United States and the Iraqi Shia. Iraqi Sunnis and the governments of other Arab states don't want to see the departure of U.S. troops from Iraq; Iran, meanwhile, has begun the mantra that the occupation must end. Given the current circumstances, Iraqi Shia agitating for a U.S. withdrawal does not seem to be beyond the pale.
-
I think the Saddam Hussein (Hanging) verdict will come down soon. IMO people should become familiar with the alleged facts before it gets tossed around as an American or Republican political stunt. Like the OJ trial, people think the Saddam trial story was about antics. The trial was about a gruesome massacre. The question is whether what is alleged is true and whether this massacre was ordered by Saddam. My understanding is that this crime was chosen for trial because easily proven facts. The actual, original order and documents were discovered because of the American-led liberation of Iraq. Supporting that guilty view is the behavior of the defense, arguing everything except the facts of the case. I posted an alleged first hand account with gruesome detail on OP (RIP) awhile back, now lost. Here is a version from the NY Times from last year:
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/03/international/middleeast/03dujail.html?pagewanted=1&ei=5090&en=788a1ef6c2e064fb&ex=1278043200&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss
A Town That Bled Under Hussein Hails His Trial
By JOHN F. BURNS
Published: July 3, 2005
DUJAIL, Iraq - The scars of what happened after an assassination attempt on Saddam Hussein, on July 8, 1982, are painfully evident in this mainly Shiite town 35 miles north of Baghdad.
People lower their voices when they speak of fathers, brothers and sons who went to the gallows, their fates unknown until Mr. Hussein's overthrow 21 years later set off the ransacking of a secret police headquarters in Baghdad that uncovered records of the executions. The landscape around Dujail is mostly barren scrubland, stark testament to the bulldozing of thousands of acres of date palms and fruit orchards after plotters fired on Mr. Hussein's convoy from thickets on the edge of town.
Now, the events at Dujail have come full cycle for Mr. Hussein.
Officials at the Iraqi Special Tribunal set up to try the former dictator and his top aides have said they expect to put him on trial by the end of the year in the deaths of nearly 160 men and boys from Dujail, all Shiites, some in their early teens. Some were shot dead in the immediate aftermath of the assassination attempt, but 143 - 9 of them ages 13 through 15 - were executed three years later by Mr. Hussein's revolutionary court. Townspeople say that many others remain missing - at least 200, by some counts - and that they hope the trial will reveal at least something of their fate.
For now, their families have only fading photographs of their lost menfolk at weddings, school graduations and summer outings, and tales of the moments they disappeared, seized on the streets or pulled from their homes by secret police squads that descended on Dujail in the days that followed the attack on Mr. Hussein.
Along the sun-blasted streets and alleyways of the town, a nondescript, impoverished sprawl of single- and double-storied concrete structures and makeshift, domeless mosques beside the main highway to Iraq's oil-rich north, the prospect of seeing Mr. Hussein, 68, facing a possible death sentence has brought relief - at least to the three-quarters of the population who are Shiites, though not to many in the Sunni Arab minority in the town, where there are still fierce loyalties to Mr. Hussein.
"Having Saddam on trial for what he did here will be good for Dujail, and for all of Iraq, because many people in this country, and in Dujail, still think of him as some kind of a god," said Ali Haj Hussein, a 37-year-old Shiite who lost seven brothers in the executions that followed the assassination attempt, including one, Hussein, 19, who confessed to his father before he died that he was one of those who had shot at the Iraqi ruler.
The visit to Dujail amounted to a venture into enemy territory for Saddam Hussein. In 1982, he was in his third year as president, still consolidating his power, and many in this town, with a population of about 75,000, despised him for starting a war with Iran, Iraq's Shiite neighbor, two years earlier. Shiites here say that Mr. Hussein had long distrusted the presence of a large Shiite enclave, including Dujail and the nearby town of Balad, deep inside Iraq's Sunni Arab heartland - and beside the main highway from Baghdad to Tikrit, Mr. Hussein's hometown.
A conservative Shiite religious party, Dawa, with an armed wing that had mounted terrorist attacks against Mr. Hussein's government, had strong support in Dujail, and saw in his visit a chance to avenge the government's killings of hundreds of Dawa leaders and sympathizers. The plotters named the mission Operation Bint Huda, after the sister of Dawa's founder, Ayatollah Muhammad Bakr al-Sadr, a prominent Shiite cleric. The two were executed in 1980.
Other crimes for which Mr. Hussein is likely to face eventual prosecution, in separate trials, include the Anfal campaign - the Arabic word means spoils - of the late 1980's, in which as many as 150,000 Kurds were killed, many shot and dumped into mass graves, others killed in poison-gas attacks; the chemical weapons attack on the Kurdish town of Halabja in March 1988 that killed about 5,000, which is likely to be treated as a separate case, like Dujail; and the repression of a Shiite rebellion in southern Iraq in 1991, in which 150,000 people are believed to have been killed. Also under investigation by the tribunal are the executions of more than 200 Baath Party leaders after Mr. Hussein seized power in 1979.
But the Dujail trial will set the pattern for the others, and lawyers for Mr. Hussein have made it clear they plan to use every legal recourse to expose the proceedings as a show trial, manipulated by the American lawyers who run the Regime Crimes Liaison Office, an American Embassy agency that has been the legal and financial mainstay of the tribunal.
On the summer afternoon 23 years ago when Mr. Hussein came to Dujail, he was greeted with gunfire from the palm groves on the north side of town, survivors say. The first to rush to the streets were the youths; they had heard rumors for days that something important was about to happen. Army helicopters had been circling near the town, and official vehicles from Baghdad had been coming and going from the Baath Party headquarters in a grim, guarded compound along the road leading into Dujail from the main north-south highway.
"It was about 2:30 p.m. when we heard people saying that Saddam had arrived, so we ran into the streets to see him, and right away his bodyguards started shooting at us, and they killed three of my friends," said Ghalib Hussein Abbas, a 42-year-old tractor driver now, then an unemployed youth of 19.
Fleeing to their homes, the townspeople saw the helicopters return, firing at villages amid the palm groves from which the plotters had attacked.
Two days later, survivors said, a 24-hour curfew was eased when loudspeakers announced that those missing relatives should go to the Baath headquarters and search among rows of bodies laid out in the building's forecourt. For some, it was a trap. According to witnesses' statements to the tribunal, four of the men set to go on trial with Mr. Hussein had gathered at the building to direct vengeance on the town: his half-brother, Barzan Ibrahim al-Tikriti, deputy head of the Mukhabarat secret police in 1982; Taha Yasin Ramadan, a deputy prime minister and later Baath Party vice chairman; and the two local Baathist officials, Abdullah al-Musheikhi and his son, Mizher al-Musheikhi. Another defendant will be Awad Hamad al-Bandr al-Sadoon, former chief judge of the revolutionary court.
In small groups at first, then in larger roundups, about 1,500 townspeople were arrested, as many as 30 from single families, and started on a journey into Mr. Hussein's gulags - first at a detention center in Tikrit, later at a secret police detention center in Baghdad, and finally, to the Nugra as-Salman prison, an old British-built fort in the desert along the Saudi Arabian border. Some survivors, who were released in 1986, say that the appalling conditions at the prison caused several dozen deaths, including women, children and nursing infants. The 143 who were hanged never got beyond detention in Baghdad, where Mr. Sadoon, the chief of the revolutionary court, sent them to the execution chambers at the Abu Ghraib prison outside Baghdad.
Accounts from local Shiites say Mr. Hussein outwitted the Dujail plotters from the start. On his entry to the town, those accounts say, tribal leaders made him a gift of a car, and marked it, in tribal tradition, with hands dipped in the blood of slaughtered sheep. Mr. Hussein, though, Shiites in Dujail say, saw the gift as a possible harbinger of assassination and returned the car, insisting that the tribal leaders and some of his aides travel in it - to their deaths, as the accounts have it, when the plotters fired on the car.
A few hours after the shooting, Mr. Hussein took to the flat roof of the town's main clinic and told a crowd that he was "not a coward who can be chased from your town," but assured his listeners there would be no reprisals. "He told us that the people who had attempted to kill him were a small band of traitors, and that we don't want to confuse them with the good people of Dujail," said Kassem Aalbuhaider, a shopkeeper now, then only 12.
But even as Mr. Hussein spoke, Mr. Aalbuhaider said, the secret police were at work. "They took whole families, even old people, women and small children," he said.
Within weeks, the razing of the palm groves and the orchards began, continuing until more than 250,000 acres had been bulldozed. In 1992, after the first Persian Gulf war, Mr. Hussein returned to Dujail for the first time, and told tribal leaders that the wastelands could be replanted, with grain crops, but not with palms and orchards. But it took 12 more years, and the overthrow of Mr. Hussein, before the town could begin in other ways to recover from what townspeople now refer to simply as "al karitha," the disaster.
Now, the plinths where Mr. Hussein's statues and portraits once stood at the town's major intersections are bare, and the streets are hung with portraits of the white-bearded clerics who are the icons of religious Shiites. The Baath Party headquarters serves now as a Shiite mosque. But the totems that seem to matter most are the date palms that some townspeople began planting discreetly in the mid-1990's as memorials to those who died.
On a recent evening, Mr. Hussein, the townsman who lost seven brothers to the gallows, led a visitor to the family's fields outside the town and through a grove of half-grown palms dedicated to them: Faleh, Hussein, Mahmud, Mohsen, Muhammad, Saad and Salim. "Here, I feel like a king," he said, smiling broadly as he reached out to touch the palm trees' drooping fronds. "Like these trees, Iraq is reborn. We are just at the beginning, but once Saddam has been tried and executed, we believe Dujail will begin to rise again."
-
FROM WND'S JERUSALEM BUREAU
Mideast terror leaders
to U.S.: Vote Democrat
Withdrawal from Iraq would embolden
jihadists to destroy Israel, America
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Posted: November 2, 2006
9:27 a.m. Eastern
By Aaron Klein
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
? 2006 WorldNetDaily.com
Sen. John Kerry, D-Mass.
JERUSALEM ? Everybody has an opinion about next Tuesday's midterm congressional election in the U.S. ? including senior terrorist leaders interviewed by WND who say they hope Americans sweep the Democrats into power because of the party's position on withdrawing from Iraq, a move, as they see it, that ensures victory for the worldwide Islamic resistance.
The terrorists told WorldNetDaily an electoral win for the Democrats would prove to them Americans are "tired."
They rejected statements from some prominent Democrats in the U.S. that a withdrawal from Iraq would end the insurgency, explaining an evacuation would prove resistance works and would compel jihadists to continue fighting until America is destroyed.
They said a withdrawal would also embolden their own terror groups to enhance "resistance" against Israel.
"Of course Americans should vote Democrat," Jihad Jaara, a senior member of the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades terror group and the infamous leader of the 2002 siege of Bethlehem's Church of the Nativity, told WND.
(Story continues below)
"This is why American Muslims will support the Democrats, because there is an atmosphere in America that encourages those who want to withdraw from Iraq. It is time that the American people support those who want to take them out of this Iraqi mud," said Jaara, speaking to WND from exile in Ireland, where he was sent as part of an internationally brokered deal that ended the church siege.
Jaara was the chief in Bethlehem of the Brigades, the declared "military wing" of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas' Fatah party.
Together with the Islamic Jihad terror group, the Brigades has taken responsibility for every suicide bombing inside Israel the past two years, including an attack in Tel Aviv in April that killed American teenager Daniel Wultz and nine Israelis.
Muhammad Saadi, a senior leader of Islamic Jihad in the northern West Bank town of Jenin, said the Democrats' talk of withdrawal from Iraq makes him feel "proud."
"As Arabs and Muslims we feel proud of this talk," he told WND. "Very proud from the great successes of the Iraqi resistance. This success that brought the big superpower of the world to discuss a possible withdrawal."
Abu Abdullah, a leader of Hamas' military wing in the Gaza Strip, said the policy of withdrawal "proves the strategy of the resistance is the right strategy against the occupation."
"We warned the Americans that this will be their end in Iraq," said Abu Abdullah, considered one of the most important operational members of Hamas' Izzedine al-Qassam Martyrs Brigades, Hamas' declared "resistance" department. "They did not succeed in stealing Iraq's oil, at least not at a level that covers their huge expenses. They did not bring stability. Their agents in the [Iraqi] regime seem to have no chance to survive if the Americans withdraw."
Abu Ayman, an Islamic Jihad leader in Jenin, said he is "emboldened" by those in America who compare the war in Iraq to Vietnam.
"[The mujahedeen fighters] brought the Americans to speak for the first time seriously and sincerely that Iraq is becoming a new Vietnam and that they should fix a schedule for their withdrawal from Iraq," boasted Abu Ayman.
The terror leaders spoke as the debate regarding the future of America's war in Iraq has perhaps become the central theme of midterm elections, with most Democrats urging a timetable for withdrawal and Republicans mostly advocating staying the course in Iraq.
President Bush has even said he would send more troops if Gen. George Casey, the top U.S. commander in Baghdad, said they are needed to stabilize the region
The debate became especially poignant following remarks by Sen. John Kerry, D-Mass., the 2004 presidential candidate who voted in support of the war in Iraq. Earlier this week he intimated American troops are uneducated, and it is the uneducated who "get stuck in Iraq."
Kerry, under intense pressure from fellow Democrats, now says his remarks were a "botched joke."
Terror leaders reject Nancy Pelosi's comments on Iraqi insurgency
Many Democratic politicians and some from the Republican Party have stated a withdrawal from Iraq would end the insurgency there.
In a recent interview with CBS's "60 Minutes," House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi, stated, "The jihadists (are) in Iraq. But that doesn't mean we stay there. They'll stay there as long as we're there."
Pelosi would become House speaker if the Democrats win the majority of seats in next week's elections.
WND read Pelosi's remarks to the terror leaders, who unanimously rejected her contention an American withdrawal would end the insurgency.
Islamic Jihad's Saadi, laughing, stated, "There is no chance that the resistance will stop."
He said an American withdrawal from Iraq would "prove the resistance is the most important tool and that this tool works. The victory of the Iraqi revolution will mark an important step in the history of the region and in the attitude regarding the United States."
Jihad Jaara said an American withdrawal would "mark the beginning of the collapse of this tyrant empire (America)."
"Therefore, a victory in Iraq would be a greater defeat for America than in Vietnam."
Jaara said vacating Iraq would also "reinforce Palestinian resistance organizations, especially from the moral point of view. But we also learn from these (insurgency) movements militarily. We look and learn from them."
Hamas' Abu Abdullah argued a withdrawal from Iraq would "convince those among the Palestinians who still have doubts in the efficiency of the resistance."
"The victory of the resistance in Iraq would prove once more that when the will and the faith are applied victory is not only a slogan. We saw that in Lebanon (during Israel's confrontation against Hezbollah there in July and August); we saw it in Gaza (after Israel withdrew from the territory last summer) and we will see it everywhere there is occupation," Abdullah said.
While the terror leaders each independently compelled American citizens to vote for Democratic candidates, not all believed the Democrats would actually carry out a withdrawal from Iraq.
Saadi stated, "Unfortunately I think those who are speaking about a withdrawal will not do so when they are in power and these promises will remain electoral slogans. It is not enough to withdraw from Iraq. They must withdraw from Afghanistan and from every Arab and Muslim land they occupy or have bases."
He called both Democrats and Republicans "agents of the Zionist lobby in the U.S."
Abu Abdullah commented once Democrats are in power "the question is whether such a courageous leadership can [withdraw]. I am afraid that even after the American people will elect those who promise to leave Iraq, the U.S. will not do so. I tell the American people vote for withdrawal. Abandon Israel if you want to save America. Now will this Happen? I do not believe it."
Still Jihad Jaara said the alternative is better than Bush's party.
"Bush is a sick person, an alcoholic person that has no control of what is going on around him. He calls to send more troops but will very soon get to the conviction that the violence and terror that his war machine is using in Iraq will never impose policies and political regimes in the Arab world."
-
Rushing for the Exit
If we leave Iraq, what happens to the supporters of democracy?
By Christopher Hitchens
Posted Monday, Oct. 30, 2006, at 6:14 PM ET
To say that "exit strategies" from Iraq have become the flavor of the month would be to exaggerate the situation to the point of absurdity. Exit strategies are not even the fall fashion. They are the regnant topic of conversation all across the political establishment and have been for some time. Even the Bush administration has some share in this discourse, having now abandoned the useless mantra of "staying the course" without quite defining what that "course" might be?or might have been. (A rule of thumb in politics is that any metaphor drawn from sporting activity is worse than useless, but at least one doesn't hear people saying that in Iraq we are "at the bottom of the ninth" or some such horse manure.)
Many of those advocating withdrawal have been "war-weary" ever since the midafternoon of Sept. 11, 2001, when it was discovered that the source of jihadist violence was U.S. foreign policy?a mentality now reinforced by the recent National Intelligence Estimate circulated by our emasculated, demoralized, and incompetent intelligence services. To this way of thinking, victory is impossible by definition, because any response other than restraint is bound to inflame the militancy of the other side. Since the jihadists, by every available account, are also inflamed and encouraged by everything from passivity to Danish cartoons, this seems to shrink the arena of possible or even thinkable combat. (Nobody ever asks what would happen if the jihadists had to start worrying about the level of casualties they were enduring, or the credit they were losing by their tactics, or the number of enemies they were making among civilized people who were prepared to take up arms to stop them. Our own masochism makes this contingency an unlikely one in any case.)
I am glad that all previous demands for withdrawal or disengagement from Iraq were unheeded, because otherwise we would not be able to celebrate the arrest and trial of Saddam Hussein; the removal from the planet of his two sadistic kids and putative successors; the certified disarmament of a former WMD- and gangster-sponsoring rogue state; the recuperation of the marshes and their ecology and society; the introduction of a convertible currency; the autonomy of Iraqi Kurdistan (currently advertising for investors and tourists on American television); the killing of al-Qaida's most dangerous and wicked leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and many of his associates; the opening of dozens of newspapers and radio and TV stations; the holding of elections for an assembly and to approve a constitution; and the introduction of the idea of federal democracy as the only solution for Iraq short of outright partition and/or civil war. If this cause is now to be considered defeated, by the sheer staggering persistence in murder and sabotage of the clerico-fascist forces and the sectarian militias, then it will always count as a noble one.
But the many disappointments and crimes and blunders (the saddest of which is the utter failure to influence Iran, and the corresponding advantage taken by Tehran-backed militias) do not relieve us of a responsibility that is either insufficiently stressed or else passed over entirely: What is to become, in the event of a withdrawal, of the many Arab and Kurdish Iraqis who do want to live in a secular and democratic and federal country? We have acquired this responsibility not since 2003, or in the sideshow debate over prewar propaganda, but over decades of intervention in Iraq's affairs, starting with the 1968 Baathist coup endorsed by the CIA, stretching through Jimmy Carter's unforgivable permission for Saddam Hussein to invade Iran, continuing through the decades of genocide in Kurdistan and the uneasy compromise that ended the Kuwait war, and extending through 12 years of sanctions and half-measures, including the "no-fly" zones and the Iraq Liberation Act, which passed the Senate without a dissenting vote. It is not a responsibility from which we can walk away when, or if, it seems to suit us.
Some time ago, I wrote rather offhandedly that the coalition forces in Iraq act as the defensive militia for those who have no militia. I get e-mails from civilians and soldiers in that country, as well as from its growing number of exiles, and this little remark generated more traffic than I have had in a while. Just look at the report in the Oct. 30 New York Times about the kidnapping of an Iraqi-American Army interpreter in the (still) relatively civilized Baghdad neighborhood of Karada. A few days earlier, according to the residents who tried with bare hands to stop the abduction, the same gang had been whipping teenage boys with cables for the crime of wearing shorts. (It is always useful to know what is on the minds of the pious.) A Sunday Washington Post headline referred to the "tipping point" in the erosion of congressional support for the Iraq intervention. Well, the "tipping point" between the grim status quo in Karada and its full-scale Talibanization is rather more acute. And does anyone want to argue that a Talibanized Iraq would not require our attention down the road if we left it behind us?
There are many different plans to reconfigure forces within Iraq and to accommodate, in one way or another, its increasingly tribal and sectarian politics. (Former Ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith's suggestion, arising from his admirable book The End of Iraq, involves a redeployment to the successful and peaceful north, with the ability to answer requests for assistance from the central government and the right to confront al-Qaida forces without notice.) But all demands for an evacuation are based on the fantasy that there is a distinction between "over there" and "over here." In a world-scale confrontation with jihadism, this distinction is idle and false. It also involves callously forgetting the people who would be the first victims but who would not by any means be the last ones.
Christopher Hitchens is a columnist for Vanity Fair. His most recent book is Thomas Jefferson: Author of America.
Article URL: http://www.slate.com/id/2152548/
-
Woof Buzwardo:
A stirring piece no doubt, but what are we to make of this post from another forum, the general tenor of which is QUITE clear that Islamofascism is a clear and present danger?
Marc
==============
I figured this was as good a place to post my take on a couple of recent conversations as any. I had two friends come back from Iraq in the last month. One is a Gunnery Sergeant and the other a First Sergeant. I know both of them well and deployed with them twice before myself.
Their opinion is that Iraq is as bad or worse than it's ever been. Apparently, it's not quite as dangerous on the Syrian border, but much more so near Baghdad. So, things sort of even out. The only bright spot seems to be the availability of electricity, but it's something of a bitter pill to swallow given the price.
Both of them are at least as conservative as your average Republican. Both of them said that they'd vote for the first person who promised to get us out as soon as possible. Specifically, "Good men are dying over there for no reason. It's ridiculous." Honestly, I would blame this on their basic frustration, not having thought through the consequenses. But, they were adamant.
In one anecdote, one of their troops is being prosecuted for killing an Iraqi. The kid was a .50 BMG gunner on a truck in a convoy. A vehicle ahead of the convoy was swerving back and forth across lanes in front of them, impeding the them. He was ordered by the Staff Sergeant in charge of the truck to fire a burst into the ground next to the car after all of the requisite warning steps had been taken. He did so. The rounds ricochetted off of the ground and killed the driver. After a short investigation, the Lieutenant in charge of the JAG investigation chose to press charges for negligent homicide. The Lance Corporal hasn't been told what the future holds for him. The command won't tell him what they plan to do. He's just in limbo. He just got back from the deployment a few weeks ago, and apparently they'll let him know if they are going to arrest him. I wouldn't be shocked if he killed himself.
When asked about his experience with Iraqi military units and their competency (the key to us leaving is their ability to run the place), the First Sergeant's answer was simple: "Who, the insurgents?" It seems that they run patrols or operations with the Iraqi Army guys one day, and arrest them the next day planting bombs next to the road. "They are using our weapons and technology to kill us."
The next gem was the incarceration system. As has been since I was there two years ago, if you can't make a Johnny Cochoran proof case against an arrested insurgent within 14 days, he's released - with $6 dollars a day of compensation (not bad pay in that part of the world). A good number of the guys they arrest have made the trip three or four times. I cringed when I heard this because it was the same story we ran into in 2004. My simple answer was to kill anyone that the ROE allowed for. There would be more than enough opportunity to interrogate people who we couldn't legally kill. However, guys are still taking chances capturing people who could simply and legally be killed in the field. Ugh.
Since the three of us come from an intel background (though both of their recent deployments have been in different types of units than we'd previously been assigned), I asked them about their take on the intel side of the war. As expected, it's essentially worthless. None of the meaningful intelligence analysis is being passed to the field. The commanders might have fabulously colorful PowerPoint briefings of the situation, but the people who are actually being shot at know nearly nothing.
This dilema was the source of a fight I'd had with my S-2 years ago when we tried to digest the intelligence doctrine. He was convinced that Intel drove Ops, and that if it'd never been done right before, by God he'd be an example of how it should work. I tried to explain to him that basic human nature would thwart him. Essentially, Intel guys are some of the biggest geeks in the Marine Corps. The units in the field are the business end of one of the most dangerous military forces on earth. There is no way that the combat leader of the uberwarrior society is going to have the biggest geek in the organization tell him what to do and when to do it. I was put in my place, but I was proven right. And, nothing has changed.
I hesitate to write this because there seem to be only two options in regards to opinions on the war: Support Bush the Second's plan, or cheer for the muslims. I'm here to tell anyone who is not clear on the issue that there are at least a couple of other realities. I have my opinion about what is actually going on over there, and what we ought to do about it. But, I hope everyone is ready to start digesting a fairly stout anti-Bush sentiment from seriously pro-American vets who are growing in number everyday.
For me, there seems nothing left to do on the matter other than to grieve for our guys who are wasting their time jeopardizing their lives so that a bunch of savages can have the right to vote to kill off the next smallest tribe.
-
It boils down to one of three scenarios for us:
1. Submit to the global jihad.
2. Remake the muslim world into something compatible with the rest of humanity.
3. Make the muslim world look like something out of the post-apocalypic scenes in the "Terminator" movies.
Act now, or let our children curse us for our weakness. By the time they are adults, France will be the next nuclear islamist state. Now is the time when we have the best advantage. As time goes on, the less advantage we will have.
-
Believe me, I understand. That said, I am reminded of what my father used to say when big plans we announced: "What do we do Monday morning at 0900?"
For example, what do we do specifically about the problem raised by this Stratfor piece?
========================
Geopolitical Diary: Iraq Without Bechtel
Bechtel Corp., a global engineering firm, announced Thursday that it is wrapping up its work in Iraq and not seeking any further contracts (its last contract expired last week). According to Cliff Mumm, who heads up Bechtel's infrastructure projects, the security situation in Iraq has deteriorated to the point where continuing is not possible. Bechtel's decision follows the decision by Kroll Security International to sell or abandon -- it was not clear which from media reports -- its operations in Iraq following the loss of some of its personnel.
When companies like Bechtel and Kroll begin to withdraw from Iraq, the situation has clearly reached a new level of instability. These firms are used to working in unstable environments, and security threats are simply a part of the business they are in. When they have to start calculating that the threat is greater than the potential profit, the situation is indeed serious.
There is a deeper aspect to this. The U.S. Army was designed, during the 1990s, to be a force that was dependent on the private sector to operate. Put another way, the standing Army was not designed to go into combat without integrating Reserve and National Guard components and without outsourcing support services to the private sector. It was not an Army that could undertake combat operations without this support.
During the 1990s, it appeared to some that the world had reached a new level of stability, and that economics had replaced geopolitics. The assumption was that there would not be extended combat. It made sense to depend on the Reserves and the National Guard for additional manpower during short combat situations, and to use contractors to provide many of the services that the military had provided for itself in the past.
The force structure was not designed for multi-year, multi-divisional combat. The Reserve and National Guard components were not expected to sustain the regular force for years. And the contractors did not expect to have to operate in a world of extreme risk.
The combat capability of the U.S. Army is therefore breaking in two ways. First, its manpower base is being exhausted through multiple deployments. Second, it is now going to find that the contracting support it relies on won't be there if the security risk becomes too extreme. Unlike combat support drawn from the ranks of the military, the contractors can't be ordered and expected to carry out their duties in high threat circumstances. But the Army is not built to operate without them.
The decision to outsource key support functions made sense in the 1990s. It shifted the cost of standby capabilities to private companies, and allowed the military to focus on its core mission. In the course of the Iraq war, the challenges have gone beyond feeding the troops to include rebuilding infrastructure, providing security to the firms doing the rebuilding, and so on. The Army could not provide security to engineering companies, so private companies like Blackwater were bought in. As the situation developed, the dependency on these contractors expanded, until the war effort -- understood in the broad sense of nation-building -- became enormously dependent on these contractors.
But they have a different appetite for risk than the military. They are free to leave, and they are leaving. It is unlikely that a decision reached by Bechtel and Kroll is so unique that others won't follow. They will. And that now poses a new problem for the U.S. effort: It does not have the military capability of filling in for the contractors. There are just not the numbers or skills. That means that if the security situation worsens, we will see a spiral in which contractors withdraw, the security situation further deteriorates and more contractors withdraw.
Given the structure of the force that has been fielded, the level of deployment cannot be controlled by the Department of Defense. When you depend on contractors looking to make money, a lot of them will bail when the risks get too great. Defense planners in the 1990s did not count on this scenario, when the enablers of the Army decide to leave the theater of operations. But it seems that that is what is happening.
-
As I mull a response to the questions Crafty has been posing this piece provides the perspective VHD is so adroit with. Indeed, as I reflect back on various American conflicts I've studied I can't think of one that didn't have its "oh my god there are no good options so we are doomed" moments. Be it global warming, the war in Iraq, or hurricaine relief, the doomsayers all tend to look for the narrowest slice of data that allows them to continue to thrum their chest. The big picture, however, usually contains its share of glimmers.
Before Iraq
The assumptions of a forgetful chattering class are badly off the mark.
By Victor Davis Hanson
What is written about Iraq now is exclusively acrimonious. The narrative is the suicide bomber and IED, never how many terrorists we have killed, how many Iraqis have been given a chance for something different than the old nightmare, or how a consensual government has withstood enemies on nearly every front.
Long forgotten is the inspired campaign that removed a vicious dictator in three weeks. Nor is much credit given to the idealistic efforts to foster democracy rather than just ignoring the chaos that follows war ? as we did after the Soviets were defeated in Afghanistan, or following our precipitous departure from Lebanon and Somalia. And we do not appreciate anymore that Syria was forced to vacate Lebanon; that Libya gave up its WMD arsenal; that Pakistan came clean about Dr. Khan; and that there have been the faint beginnings of local elections in the Gulf monarchies.
Yes, the Middle East is ?unstable,? but for the first time in memory, the usual killing, genocide, and terrorism are occurring in a scenario that offers some chance at something better. Long before we arrived in Iraq, the Assads were murdering thousands in Hama, the Husseins were gassing Kurds, and the Lebanese militias were murdering civilians. The violence is not what has changed, but rather the notion that the United States can do nothing about it; the U.S. has shown itself willing to risk much to support freedom in place of tyranny or theocracy in the region.
Instead of recalling any of this, Iraq is seen only in the hindsight of who did what wrong and when. All the great good we accomplished and the high ideals we embraced are drowned out by the present violent insurgency and the sensationalized effort to turn the mayhem into an American Antietam or Yalu River. Blame is never allotted to al Qaeda, the Sadr thugs, or the ex-Baathists, only to the United States, who should have, could have, or would have done better in stopping them, had its leadership read a particular article, fired a certain person, listened to an exceptional general, or studied a key position paper.
We also forget that Iraq, contrary to popular slander, was not ?cooked up? in Texas or at a Washington, D.C., neocon think tank. Rather, it was a reaction to two events: a decade of appeasement of Middle East tyrants and terrorists, and the disaster of September 11. If one were to go back and read the most popular accounts of the first Gulf War, The Generals? War by Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor of Cobra II fame, or Rick Atkinson?s Crusade, or research the bi-partisan arguments that raged across the opinion pages in the 1990s following the defeat and survival of Saddam Hussein, certain themes reappear constantly that surely help to explain our current presence inside Iraq.
One was shared regret that Saddam was left in power in 1991. No sooner had the war ended than George Bush Sr. appeared, not joyous in our success, but melancholy, and then distraught, once images of the butchered and refugees beamed back from our ?victory? in Iraq. Culpability for thousands of dead Shiites and Kurds, the need for no-fly zones, and worry about reconstituted WMD were the charges then leveled.
The heroes? A troubled former Pentagon official Paul Wolfowitz (read The Generals? War) who almost alone felt tactical success had not translated into strategic victory, and that we were profoundly amoral to have let a mass murderer remain in power, while thousands of brave revolutionaries were butchered just a few miles away from our forces.
We praise the first Gulf War now. Yet, almost immediately in its aftermath, critics accused us of overkill, of using too many soldiers to blast too many poor Iraqis. The charge then was not that we had too few troops, but too many; not that the Pentagon had understated the need for troops, but overstated and sent too many; not that we had too few allies, but an unwieldy coalition that hampered American options; not that the effort was too costly, but that we were too crassly commercial in forcing allies to pony up cash as if war were supposed to be a profitable enterprise.
The generic criticism in the 1990s of the United States, both here and abroad, was that America bombed from on high, and sometimes, as in Belgrade or Africa, even indiscriminately ? its only concern being fear of losses, not worry over civilian collateral damage or ending the war decisively on the ground. Indeed, in Europe there was voiced a certain cynicism that we were cowardly turning war into an antiseptic enterprise (the ?body bag syndrome?), adjudicated only by our concern not to engage with the enemy below.
There were other issues now forgotten. After the acrimony in the debate over Iraq in 1990, followed by the successful removal of Saddam Hussein, Democrats were determined never again to be on the wrong side of the national security debate. So they supported the present war because they were convinced that after Panama, Gulf War I, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, they could regain credibility by supporting muscular action that seemed to pose little risk of failure. That is why only recently have Democratic supporters of the war bailed ? and only when polls suggested that any fear of ?cut and run? or McGovernism would be outweighed by tapping into popular dissatisfaction with Iraq.
Realism is much in vogue these days, with James Baker returning as the purported fireman, and even Democrats demanding talks with horrific dictators in Iran and North Korea. That was not the mantra of the 1990s. The Reaganism that rejected Cold War realpolitik and risked brinkmanship to bring down a rotten and murderous Soviet Empire was considered both the wiser and more ethical stance, as even Democrats reformulated their opportunistic criticism after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Mutually Assured Destruction, Kissingerian tolerance for the status quo, and mere containment ? all that was scoffed at in the afterglow of Reagan?s squeeze that popped the Soviet bubble.
Not long ago, abdication ? from Rwanda or Haiti, or from the Balkans for a decade ? not intervention, was the supposed sin. There were dozens of Darfurs in the 1990s, when charges flew of moral indifference. The supposition then ? as now ? was that those who called for boots on the ground to stop a genocide would not unlikely be the first to abdicate responsibility once the coffins came home and the military was left fighting an orphaned war.
Apparently all the high-minded talk of reform ? Aristotle rightly scoffed about morality being easy in one?s sleep ? was predicated only on cost-free war from 30,000 feet. Now the wisdom is that Colin Powell ? the supposed sole sane and moral voice of the present administration ? was drowned out by shrill neocon chicken hawks. But that was not the consensus of the 1990s. In both books and journalism, he was a Hamlet-like figure who paused before striking the needed blow, and so was pilloried by the likes of a Michael Gordon or Madeline Albright for not using the full force of the American military to intervene for moral purposes. That was then, and this is now, and in-between we have a costly war in Iraq that has taken the lives of nearly 3,000 Americans.
The unexpected carnage of September 11 explains so much of our current situation. It has made the realist, neo-isolationist George Bush into an advocate for Wilsonianism abroad, but only on the calculation that the roots of Islamic fascism rested in the nexus between dictatorship and autocracy ? the former destroys prosperity and freedom, and the latter makes use of terrorists to deflect rising popular dissatisfaction against the United States.
The U.S. Senate and House voted for war in Iraq, not merely because they were deluded about the shared intelligence reports on WMD (though deluded they surely were), but also because of the 22 legitimate casus belli they added just in case. And despite the recent meae culpae, those charges remain as valid today as they were when they were approved: Saddam did try to kill a former American president; the U.N. embargo was violated, as were its inspection protocols; the 1991 accords were often ignored; the genocide of brave Kurds did happen; suicide bombers were being given bounties; terrorists, including those involved into the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, were given sanctuary by Saddam; and on and on.
So it is not those charges, but we who leveled them, that have changed. Americans? problem with the war is not that it was not moral, but that it has been deemed too costly for the perceived benefits that might accrue.
The conventional wisdom was that, after Afghanistan (7 weeks of fighting) and its postbellum stability (a government within a year), a more secular Iraq (3 weeks of fighting) would follow the same timetable. In September 2002, well after the ?miracle? in Afghanistan, I listened to a high-ranking admiral pontificate that war on the ground was essentially over in the new age of Green Berets and laptops, that after Bosnia and Afghanistan, air power and Special Forces were all that were needed.
This did not come from Rumsfeld surrogates, but was a fair enough reflection of the wild new intoxication before Iraq ? that a supposed ?revolution in military affairs? had changed the ancient rules of war, as if our technology would now give us exemption from hurt. Many of those who now most shrilly condemn the war had in fact years ago rattled their sabers for ?moral? wars to eliminate dictators ? predicated on just this foolish utopian notion that GPS bombing and laser-guided missiles had at last given us the tools needed for removing the tumors with precision and at little cost, as we conducted lifesaving moral surgery on diseased states.
No, nothing has changed about Iraq other than its tragic tab. Changes of view are fine, as long as those who now criticize the effort at least acknowledge the climate in which fighting in Iraq was born, and the real conditions under which they themselves once supported the war ? and lost heart.
? Victor Davis Hanson is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. He is the author, most recently, of A War Like No Other. How the Athenians and Spartans Fought the Peloponnesian War.
National Review Online - http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=YmJiODI2MGM3OWIxY2M0MWRhNWQwN2Y2OTBkNGVjY2Q=
-
The first thing 9am, monday. We don't quit the fight.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
http://www.strategypage.com/onpoint/articles/20030219.asp
The Formula for Hell in the 21st Century
by Austin Bay
February 12, 2003
Sept. 11 made it impossible to tolerate the wicked linkage of terrorists, rogue states and weapons of mass destruction. Terrorists plus rogue states plus WMD -- that's the formula for hell in the 21st century.
Breaking the fatal linkage -- stopping the proliferation of WMD, eliminating terrorists and reforming rogue states -- should be the civilized world's common goal. But if the goal is too difficult for a civilized world undermined by malcontents and criminal autocrats, then for the sake of a safer, more peaceful century, America must take it on alone.
The Hell Formula exploits a weakness in the nation-state system. In too many hard corners of our planet, the foundation for a modern state never formed, but the trappings -- a capital, an army, a seat in the United Nations, International Monetary Fund loans -- can be acquired.
Legitimate authority? Rule of law? Forget it. The bayonet to the throat remains the only process for establishing authority, making "sovereignty" within the hard corner's Rand McNally borders a constantly contested notion. In such tribal, feudal and anarchic quarters, lip-service may be paid to common humanity, but the implementation of laws protecting basic human rights is rare.
For centuries, the fake nation-states didn't matter too much. Tribal battles remained local horrors. Not any more. Enforcing local dictatorial control with arrows or assault rifles is one scale of horror -- but now the rogue rulers use nerve gas. With ballistic missiles at hand, with terrorists willing to fly commercial jets into skyscrapers, rogues possession and use of chemical weapons is no longer a local matter. We learned, at a terrible price, that Islamofascist plotting in Afghanistan produces terrorist crime in New York and Washington. To return to an era where distance made a difference requires ditching essential technology. Ban the Internet? Ban the 747? Ban satellite television?
Moreover, rogue states -- these criminal syndicates or tribes with flags -- tend to disdain their own people. One estimate saddles Saddam with the deaths of a million Iraqis (peace marchers take note -- that's the brute you protect). North Korea has starved two million of its citizens, as its ruling clique builds ICBMs.
Small men like Saddam and Kim Jong Il harbor large goals, and WMD are their means of escaping tinpot status. Nukes ARE different. Very small numbers can waste very large chunks of humanity. Saddam intends to "burn Israel" -- he said so in June 1990. In February 1990, he gave a speech in Amman, Jordan, where he said he intended to challenge the United States (and a fascinating speech it was). North Korea's Kim sees Los Angeles as Ground Zero for political and economic leverage. Deter these small men with huge ambitions? Blarney. The Clinton administration offered Kim Jong Il light reactors and heavy oil. Kim took the goodies and continued to build nukes.
In 1991, Saddam agreed to live with U.N. resolutions that required the elimination of his WMD. As Tony Blair said last week, every nation with an intelligence service knows Iraq has WMD. Smoking gun? It's set to blaze.
Terrorist organizations, propelled by megalomaniacal myths, are beyond deterrence. However, the description that they are "virtual organizations" is too pop. Men have to sleep, and they don't sleep in virtual space. Terrorists have to organize, train and acquire weapons. The shady financial networks that support terrorists require cooperative banks.
Rogue states are the gutters that supply and support global terrorists -- though plenty of greedy Western companies have entered the gutters. Those corporations face a terrible reckoning when Saddam falls.
Breaking down the Hell Formula will take time. The police work fundamental to counter-terror war is a painfully slow process. Curbing WMD proliferation requires cooperative diplomacy, as well as bombs. As for the rogue state component of the equation, Iraq goes first because Saddam was internationally sanctioned and the sanctions must finally be enforced. The United Nations does matter, but for a safer future it must be a United Nations with teeth. Trust North Korea will have its own moment of intense focus.
Removing Saddam begins the reconfiguration of the Middle East, a dangerous, expensive process, but one that will lay the foundation for true states where the consent of the governed creates legitimacy and where terrorists are prosecuted, not promoted.
A large order? So was World War II, when heavy history fell on The Greatest Generation. It's this generation's turn to accept the challenge or face the Hell of destructive consequences.
-
GM:
Of course I agree with the basic premise, but exactly what does that mean in Iraq right now?
Do you think that our training of the Iraqi Army is working?
Do you think that we should support the Sunnis against the Shiites? Will that drive the Shiites (futher?) into the arms of the Iranians?
Should we support the Shiites and Kurds against the Sunnis?
Should we take out Al-Sadr even though this is against the wishes of the elected sovereign government of Iraq?
If we don't, then what of the Shiite militias killings of Sunnis and what of its policies of de-Sunnification out of certain regions?
If we don't stop Shiite militias and de-Sunnification by Shiites, what about the Kurds efforts to de-Sunnify the Sunnis who were moved north by SH to de-Kurdify oil regions of the north?
Or do we say that the Sunnis deserve it for being such buttholes to the Shiites for so long, especially under SH?
But if we do so, what of incipient Arab/Sunni support for taking a hardline with Iran?
Can we fight Iran now? No? If not, what is the point of fighting in Iraq if it keeps us from stopping Iran's nuke program? Isn't stopping Iran's nukes essential? Won't we have failed if we do not?
What do we tell our troops as they go out on patrol to get sniped at and IED'd? What do we tell them that they are fighting for? Democracy in Iraq? Do you think that rings true right now? Do we tell them that we are preparing to deal with Iran? Does that ring true right now?
Is Iraq part of the strategy for Iran or is it a stand-alone theater of WW3?
After Olmert's failure to finish the job with Hamas, doesn't Iran now have a forward base from which to neuter the Israeli threat to take out Iran's nukes? In this context, is there any substance to President Bush's comments the other day that he would understand if Israel acted against Iran?
Do you think what we are doing now is working?
If not, then what should we be doing? And is there any chance at all that the American people will support what you suggest?
-
Of course I agree with the basic premise, but exactly what does that mean in Iraq right now?
Do you think that our training of the Iraqi Army is working? I wish I knew. I read different things. As I don't have "ground truth" knowledge I can't really answer this.
Do you think that we should support the Sunnis against the Shiites? Will that drive the Shiites (futher?) into the arms of the Iranians? We need to have a "sit down" with Sistani and other leaders and draw lines. Friend or foe? Choose now and live with the consequences either way.
Should we support the Shiites and Kurds against the Sunnis? We need to support the Kurds and entrench ourselves there. Iraqi Kurdistan is the one good thing we have there. The Kurds deserve our full support and protection, even if we need to let the Sunnis and Shias sort things out themselves in the usual way.
Should we take out Al-Sadr even though this is against the wishes of the elected sovereign government of Iraq? Yes. We should make it clear to everyone in that part of the world that we reserve the right to kill whomever we need to, them demonstrate it a few times. Al-Sadr should be first on the list.
If we don't, then what of the Shiite militias killings of Sunnis and what of its policies of de-Sunnification out of certain regions? If they can't accept our ultimatum, we pull out from the Sunni and Shia areas and tell them we'll be back when they are ready. Pull our forces into secure perimeters and watch the fireworks.
If we don't stop Shiite militias and de-Sunnification by Shiites, what about the Kurds efforts to de-Sunnify the Sunnis who were moved north by SH to de-Kurdify oil regions of the north? The Kurds have been our friends. We need to demonstrate loyalty and protection to our friends and Machiavellian ruthlessness to those who aren't.
Or do we say that the Sunnis deserve it for being such buttholes to the Shiites for so long, especially under SH? We make it clear, work our program fully, or we'll let them hash it out without us.
But if we do so, what of incipient Arab/Sunni support for taking a hardline with Iran? As OBL said long ago, they'll support whomever they thing is the "strong horse". Time to flex muscles and let natural consequences happen.
Can we fight Iran now? No? If not, what is the point of fighting in Iraq if it keeps us from stopping Iran's nuke program? Isn't stopping Iran's nukes essential? Won't we have failed if we do not? It's time to take out Iran's nuclear program and engage with "Unrestricted warfare". Iranian resistance gets training and support along with air support and SpecOps direct action, but no nation building. That is up to the Iranians. Killing the mullahs is crucial.
What do we tell our troops as they go out on patrol to get sniped at and IED'd? What do we tell them that they are fighting for? Democracy in Iraq? Do you think that rings true right now? Do we tell them that we are preparing to deal with Iran? Does that ring true right now? Tell them this is one round of a thirty round fight. They are prepping the battlespace for future generations.
Is Iraq part of the strategy for Iran or is it a stand-alone theater of WW3? The stakes in Iraq is Iran becoming a much larger state that they intend to span into Lebanon, under a nuclear umbrella while they wage "Unrestricted warfare" across the globe.
After Olmert's failure to finish the job with Hamas, doesn't Iran now have a forward base from which to neuter the Israeli threat to take out Iran's nukes? In this context, is there any substance to President Bush's comments the other day that he would understand if Israel acted against Iran? Both the Israeli and American leadership know what is at stake, but neither wants to be the one to cross the line, knowing what awaits.
Do you think what we are doing now is working? It's working to a degree in Iraq, but we're losing the psywar.
If not, then what should we be doing? And is there any chance at all that the American people will support what you suggest? Sadly, we'll need a nuclear 9/11 to get the majority of Americans ready to fight this war.
-
I agree about the Kurds. They have been straight with us and we should be with them. Screw the Turks if they don't like it.
But if we leave the Sunnis and Shiites to hash it out, won't the Shiites win because of numerical superiority and because of support from Iran? Combined with Hez's "success" against the Israelis with Iran's support, will this make them the strong horse of the region?
You call for taking out Iran's nuke capabilities, but from what I have seen our military doubts its ability to do so. Are you suggesting we leave Iraq , , , by rolling east? Is the US in a position world-wide to handle the economic consequences of mid-east oil being shut off which I gather Iran may do in the Straights of Hormuz-- not to mention the Chinese being pretty unhappy if their oil is shut off (I forget the numbers, but my understanding is that more mid-east oil goes to them than us)
What if Iran also counters us by unleashing Hamas for another go round?
Just armchair generaling on a Saturday morning.
-
Perle says he should not have backed Iraq war
By Peter Spiegel, Times Staff Writer
November 4, 2006
WASHINGTON ? Richard N. Perle, the former Pentagon advisor regarded as the intellectual godfather of the Iraq war, now believes he should not have backed the U.S.-led invasion, and he holds President Bush responsible for failing to make timely decisions to stem the rising violence, according to excerpts from a magazine interview.
Perle ? a leading neoconservative who chaired the Pentagon's defense advisory board for the first three years of the Bush administration ? is quoted in January's Vanity Fair as saying the U.S. might have been able to strip Saddam Hussein of his ability to build unconventional weapons "by means other than a direct military intervention."
"I think if I had been Delphic, and had seen where we are today, and people had said 'Should we go into Iraq?' I think now I probably would have said, 'No, let's consider other strategies for dealing with the thing that concerns us most, which is Saddam supplying weapons of mass destruction to terrorists,' " Perle said, according to interview excerpts released Friday by the magazine.
Perle's about-face is the latest in a series of war recriminations by neoconservatives, many of whom blame Iraq's spiraling violence on the administration's management of the postwar stabilization effort.
Others interviewed for the article included former Bush speechwriter David Frum and former Reagan administration official Kenneth L. Adelman.
Perle's prominent advocacy of invasion after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks ? and his close relationship with the war's top architects, including Paul D. Wolfowitz, then the deputy Defense secretary, and Douglas J. Feith, the former Pentagon policy chief ? makes his reversal particularly noteworthy.
Perle told Vanity Fair he did not anticipate the "depravity" currently underway in Iraq, saying, "The levels of brutality we've seen are truly horrifying."
He said "huge mistakes" had been made in the management of the war, and he blamed disloyalty among top Bush administration officials for a failure to get the policy correct.
"The decisions did not get made that should have been," he said.
He continued: "At the end of the day, you have to hold the president responsible?.
"I don't think he realized the extent of the opposition within his own administration, and the disloyalty."
Although the excerpts do not show who Perle blames for disloyalty or mismanagement, he appears to lay the blame at the feet of Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and the military leaders who put together the war plan.
"Huge mistakes were made, and I want to be very clear on this: They were not made by neoconservatives, who had almost no voice in what happened, and certainly almost no voice in what happened after the downfall of the regime in Baghdad," he said.
"I'm getting damn tired of being described as an architect of the war. I was in favor of bringing down Saddam. Nobody said, 'Go design the campaign to do that.' I had no responsibility for that."
The excerpts include quotes from other neoconservatives who have turned against the war, including Adelman, a longtime friend of Rumsfeld who has received classified Pentagon briefings on the war as recently as March, according to a recent book by journalist Bob Woodward.
Vanity Fair quotes Adelman as saying that though he still believes the reasons for going to war were right, the invasion should not have occurred because the goals were unachievable. He called Bush's national security advisors "among the most incompetent teams" in the post-World War II era, adding he was particularly let down by Rumsfeld: "I'm very, very fond of him, but I'm crushed by his performance."
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
peter.spiegel@latimes.com
-
I agree about the Kurds. They have been straight with us and we should be with them. Screw the Turks if they don't like it. **The Turks are no longer friends and should have to live with those consequences. Syria doesn't want an Iraqi Turkistan, which is one more reason to do it.**
But if we leave the Sunnis and Shiites to hash it out, won't the Shiites win because of numerical superiority and because of support from Iran? Combined with Hez's "success" against the Israelis with Iran's support, will this make them the strong horse of the region? **The greater sunii/shia fissure is a vulnerability to be exploited. We need to seal the Iraqi border. We can trade and barter with the sunnis for every Iranian and or Syrian operative they capture. Beyond the sunni/shia divide, there are regional, tribal divides to be exploited. Let them fight until they reach a clear winner. We'll work with the power structure that evolves.**
You call for taking out Iran's nuke capabilities, but from what I have seen our military doubts its ability to do so. **It's not clean and easy, it is doable though.** Are you suggesting we leave Iraq , , , by rolling east? **Mostly I prefer that US troops stop "nation building ops" and move to defensive positions while the sunnis and shias dance.** Is the US in a position world-wide to handle the economic consequences of mid-east oil being shut off which I gather Iran may do in the Straights of Hormuz-- not to mention the Chinese being pretty unhappy if their oil is shut off (I forget the numbers, but my understanding is that more mid-east oil goes to them than us)
**We have a strategic oil reserve, and we can ride this disruption much better than most. Actually, lancing this boil can place us in a much better strategic position in fighting the global jihad and dealing with China and North Korea.**
What if Iran also counters us by unleashing Hamas for another go round? **I expect they'd use Hezbollah, HAMAS and every other asset. Israel is quietly prepping for their next round right now anyway.**
Just armchair generaling on a Saturday morning.
-
http://www.newmediajournal.us/guest/lukens/10282006.htm
Folks, Let's Talk Seriously About The War
Terrorism Jeff Lukens
October 28, 2006
My 21-year-old son recently joined the Army reserves, and is now in basic training at Ft. Leonard Wood, Missouri. He writes to tell me that his drill sergeants are telling him that, reservist or not, get ready to go to Iraq.
He has no reason to doubt them. For my son, it is a reckoning he calmly accepts.
What can I say? He wants to serve his country, and I couldn't be more proud of him.
I'm just a regular guy like millions of people everywhere who love this country. I was in the Army years ago, but they never deployed me to a war zone. The thought of my son going into one sets me back a bit. When I think about the thousands of parents who have sons and daughters over there already, I get a bit choked. And when I think about those who have had their child die over there, I go beyond choked. God forbid . . . it could happen to my son too.
We've all heard fellow Americans badmouthing our country while military personnel overseas are risking their lives. They say they support the troops but they don't support the war. Well, that's baloney. It's the same thing.
They say we shouldn't question their patriotism either. Well, that's baloney too. To actively root for our side to lose just so they can further their politics is more than unpatriotic. It's criminal.
"The real reason for the Iraq invasion was that it was strategically necessary to influence the entire Middle East. The invasion was meant to show that we meant business in this war against al Qaeda."
Let's face it; many politicians, media people and others simply don't care about this country. They don't care about you or me, my son or your daughter. They're not willing to make any sacrifices.
Folks, it's us, the regular people who need to own the issue of the war on terror because we're the only ones who are serious about fighting it.
We've all witnessed the political pretenders who say they voted for the Iraq war, but then have no problem when leaked classified information is used against it. Nothing is prohibited in their two-faced attempt to gain power, even when their tactics do our nation lasting harm.
The spin is that, by fighting terrorists, we somehow are the ones creating the terrorists. That thinking harkens back to the pre-9/11 days of waiting to be attacked before responding. What these people don't understand is that our government's most sacred duty is to protect the American people.
Think about it. After 9/11, there were just a few options open to us and all involved invading somebody. The only way to fight terrorism was to go on the offense and hit them so hard that they can't hit back. And so we did. But invading Afghanistan alone was not enough to alter the root causes of terrorism.
The real reason for the Iraq invasion was that it was strategically necessary to influence the entire Middle East. The invasion was meant to show that we meant business in this war against al Qaeda.
Much complex analysis lay behind U.S. strategy, and much of its basis was too complex to present to the public. So, for right or wrong, WMD became the selling point for the invasion of Iraq.
The leaders in Iran, Syria, and Saudi Arabia have no doubt noticed the large presence of U.S. ground and air forces within easy striking distance of their countries. It no doubt is a major reason why they no longer support Al Qaeda, when they tolerated it - and even funded it - before.
So, now we have established a fledgling democracy in Iraq, and sectarian violence has become a problem. The government cannot be our ally if it is itself allied with terrorists. And terrorists are exactly what Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army are. We should've taken them out in 2004. Now we need to finish that job.
But this is a secondary issue. We cannot allow disappointments to turn to disillusionment about our reasons for engaging in this war. Poor decisions can surely make matters much worse.
Wavering members of congress have been calling for a timetable for a withdrawal from Iraq. This is all hot air in an attempt to score political points. They'll say anything to get elected. Nowhere in the history of warfare has a nation pre-announced such a timetable to their enemies. It would be disastrous.
Whether democracy succeeds in Iraq is up to the Iraqi people, not us. But they are watching our domestic politics too, and many more may decide to side with our enemies based on what the "loyal opposition" in Washington is doing to undermine the war. We cannot afford such irresponsibility.
It is naive to think that by getting out of Iraq, we can spare ourselves from the clash between radical Islam and the rest of the world. With Iran next door moving steadily toward a nuclear bomb, the question now is whether we are going to remain serious about terrorism, or frivolously pretend it is no longer important.
It's up to us, the ones with a personal stake in winning the war, to make our voices heard. We owe that to our nation's future. And we owe it to our sons and daughters who wear its uniform.
Jeff Lukens writes engaging opinion columns from a fresh, conservative point of view. He is also a Staff Writer for the New Media Alliance, Inc., a non-profit (501c3) coalition of writers and grass-roots media outlets. He can be contacted through his website at www.jefflukens.com
-
http://hotair.com/archives/2006/11/06/video-nasrallah-tells-muslims-us-will-abandon-you-just-like-they-abandoned-the-vietnamese/
-
That's an excellent find there GM.
Highly recommended viewing everyone!
-
I?ve been mulling Crafty?s question re how best to proceed in Iraq and trying to figure out how to address the question?s implicitly negative tenor. I?ve a lot of notions; indeed the hardest part about writing this sort of response is limiting the scope of the question. As such I?ve been trying to find a thesis that speaks to conditions here and now and that provides a cogent core. The following is what has emerged.
Winning a game when all the dice are rolling your way is not much a measure of skill. Superior players will find ways to win when the variables aren?t falling their way. There are many components suggesting a bleak outlook is warranted in Iraq, however those components contain momentum that could be used to ones advantage. For instance, conventional wisdom is that the Democrats will be picking up enough seats today to control the House and perhaps the Senate, thus enabling them to undercut the Iraq war effort via purse strings, impeachment efforts, investigations, and general obstructionism. The blades they?ll wield, however all have more than one edge; a fact I expect an adroit player can make use of.
My guess is that the number of seats that change hands will be well within the bounds of the average turnover during interim elections. I think the media, antiwar Democrats, and the far left fringe, however, will interpret any change that breaks their way to be a mandate that gives them license to overplay their hand. Hence if congress does indeed change hands if I were making the call I?d stand aside and let the grandstanding commence. Think the George Soros/Michael Moore/Nancy Pelosi side of the party will feel they?ve earned the right to wave the baton, the Democratic primary process is set up in such a way that the far left squeaky wheels hold undue sway, while outside of current Iraq angst the goals of the left wing of the Democratic party aren?t particularly congruent with those of most Americans. Bottom line is the stage could be set for some dramatic reversals if cards are played right.
Similarly, I think Islamo Fascists have a hard sale to make. Though they excel at finding dupes willing to blow themselves up in crowded places and are hell on wheels when it comes time to indiscriminately shoot up civilians, the 8th century product they?re selling is so inferior that even with the ardent methods described above sales generally are not forthcoming. They?ve also demonstrated a tendency to overplay their hand, have trouble maintaining coherent command and control, their major strikes against the US have proved to unify our citizens rather than fracture things further. My guess is that they?ll read predicted election results as a sign of weakness, try to find a way to step things up in advance of the next presidential election, and overplay their hand also. Should that occur we should be ready to respond.
Think the notion that the Kurds be given more rein makes sense on lots of levels. It tells the Shiites and Sunnis in southern Iraq they?d best get their poop in a group before they lose the northern third of their country (and a major oil producing region) to a unified minority. Kurds are also found in Turkey and Iran, one?s heading a fundamentalist direction, the other has a full-blown case of it, making it in our interests to have good relations with an ethnic group that spans all three areas. I hope our spooks and spec ops folks are already working the area as my impression is that Kurdish areas of Iran are already ripe for various kinds of foment. Asymmetric, low intensity warfare can be dished out as we deal with it.
There is plenty of ideological jiu-jitsu to apply, also. The mainstream, largely lukewarm liberal, media is unraveling before our eyes: circulation is plummeting for most major newspapers while network TV takes a beating, too. Alternative media outlets, particularly those with a more pro-war perspective such as talk radio and various blogs, continue to thrive. Moreover, there is a lot of cognitive dissonance on the far left side of various issues that will provide fodder for these outlets. I note, for instance that claims of voter fraud and suppression have become a staple of the Democratic side of the aisle and will likely be ballyhooed vigorously in any close election where a Republican is the victor. It?s worth noting, however, that many instances where irregularity is clearly courted?ACORN?s efforts, various Democratic city bastions with large numbers of dubious voters on the rolls, efforts to allow felons to vote, and efforts to allow voters to vote without providing any ID?all have a decidedly leftward tilt. The claiming of foul while soliciting them game if regularly exposed by alternative media won?t fare much better than John Kerry?s misspoken ?joke? did, IMO.
Indeed, the far left?s situational, identity political, fangs bared sweetness and light act is loaded with contradictions most Americans can easily wrap their heads around. The specter of ardent feminists lending aid and comfort to Islamo Fascists who would beat them into veils if they had their way can?t help but inspire quizzical looks in most. Battling race preferences by enshrining race preferences ala Affirmative Action; reducing oil dependence while resisting nuclear energy, ANWAR and off-shore drilling et al; ?fairness? and PC doctrines that stifle thought and speech; and so on all drive wedges between most Americans and the far left. Realizing this, the far left often tries to repackage its true end, and the repackaging results in its own forms of folly. In short there is no shortage of eye-popping contradictions that can be pointed out in emerging forums that traffic in the free market of ideas.
In closing I?ll note that the left end of the spectrum demands an ideological homogeneity that serves it tactically while sowing the seeds for strategic defeat. In demanding that all fellow travelers sing in unison from the same hymnal the left creates a bloc that can indeed be brought to cohesively focus on a goal, but in doing so unites a conglomeration of strange bedfellows too repugnant for much of mainstream American to endure. The right, on the other hand embraces a vigorous debate that often leave various tactical fields littered, but serves as a uniting force when big picture strategy is needed, a point Jonah Goldberg makes well here:
http://www.nationalreview.com/goldberg/goldberg200512070832.asp
Those, therefor, concerned that developments and setbacks bode poorly for the future of this country would do well to put aside tactical squabbles, fix their eyes firmly on the big picture, and devote themselves to using the resources at hand to make the best of whatever roll comes our way.
-
Very well said!
-
Back to Iraq
By George Friedman
The midterm congressional elections have given the Democrats control of the U.S. House of Representatives. It is possible -- as of this writing, on Wednesday afternoon -- that the Senate could also go to the Democrats, depending on the outcome of one extremely close race in Virginia. However it finally turns out, it is quite certain that this midterm was a national election, in the sense that the dominant issue was not a matter of the local concerns in congressional districts, but the question of U.S. policy in Iraq. What is clear is that the U.S. electorate has shifted away from supporting the Bush administration's conduct of the war. What is not clear at all is what they have shifted toward. It is impossible to discern any consensus in the country as to what ought to be done.
Far more startling than the election outcome was the sudden resignation of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. Rumsfeld had become the lightning rod for critics of the war, including many people who had supported the war but opposed the way it was executed. Extraordinarily, President George W. Bush had said last week that Rumsfeld would stay on as secretary of defense until the end of his presidential term. It is possible that Rumsfeld surprised Bush by resigning in the immediate wake of the election -- but if that were the case, Bush would not have had a replacement already lined up by the afternoon of Nov. 8. The appointment of Robert Gates as secretary of defense means two things: One is that Rumsfeld's resignation was in the works for at least a while (which makes Bush's statement last week puzzling, to say the least); the other is that a shift is under way in White House policy on the war.
Gates is close to the foreign policy team that surrounded former President George H. W. Bush. Many of those people have been critical of, or at least uneasy with, the current president's Iraq policy. Moving a man like Gates into the secretary of defense position indicates that Bush is shifting away from his administration's original team and back toward an older cadre that was not always held in high esteem by this White House.
The appointment of Gates is of particular significance because he was a member of the Iraq Study Group (ISG). The ISG has been led by another member of the Bush 41 team, former Secretary of State James Baker. The current president created the ISG as a bipartisan group whose job was to come up with new Iraq policy options for the White House. The panel consisted of people who have deep experience in foreign policy and no pressing personal political ambitions. The members included former House Foreign Relations Committee chairman Lee Hamilton, a Democrat, who co-chairs the group with Baker; former New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani, a Republican; former Clinton adviser Vernon Jordan; Leon Panetta, who served as White House chief of staff in the Clinton administration; former Clinton administration Defense Secretary William Perry; former Sen. Chuck Robb, a Democrat; Alan Simpson, a former Republican senator from Wyoming; and Edwin Meese, who served as attorney general under the Reagan administration.
Before Rumsfeld's resignation, it had not been entirely clear what significance the ISG report would have. For the Democrats -- controlling at least one chamber of Congress, and lacking any consensus themselves as to what to do about Iraq -- it had been expected that the ISG report would provide at least some platform from which to work, particularly if Bush did not embrace the panel's recommendations. And there had, in fact, been some indications from Bush that he would listen to the group's recommendations, but not necessarily implement them. Given the results of the Nov. 7 elections, it also could be surmised that the commission's report would become an internal issue for the Republican Party as well, as it looked ahead to the 2008 presidential campaign. With consensus that something must change, and no consensus as to what must change, the ISG report would be treated as a life raft for both Democrats and Republicans seeking a new strategy in the war. The resulting pressure would be difficult to resist, even for Bush. If he simply ignored the recommendations, he could lose a large part of his Republican base in Congress.
At this point, however, the question mark as to the president's response seems to have been erased, and the forthcoming ISG report soars in significance. For the administration, it would be politically unworkable to appoint a member of the panel as secretary of defense and then ignore the policies recommended.
Situation Review
It is, of course, not yet clear precisely what policy the administration will be adopting in Iraq. But to envision what sort of recommendations the ISG might deliver, we must first consider the current strategy.
Essentially, U.S. strategy in Iraq is to create an effective coalition government, consisting of all the major ethnic and sectarian groups. In order to do that, the United States has to create a security environment in which the government can function. Once this has been achieved, the Iraqi government would take over responsibility for security. The problem, however, is twofold. First, U.S. forces have not been able to create a sufficiently secure environment for the government to function. Second, there are significant elements within the coalition that the United States is trying to create who either do not want such a government to work -- and are allied with insurgents to bring about its failure -- or who want to improve their position within the coalition, using the insurgency as leverage. In other words, U.S. forces are trying to create a secure environment for a coalition whose members are actively working to undermine the effort.
The core issue is that no consensus exists among Iraqi factions as to what kind of country they want. This is not only a disagreement among Sunnis, Shia and Kurds, but also deep disagreements within these separate groups as to what a national government (or even a regional government, should Iraq be divided) should look like. It is not that the Iraqi government in Baghdad is not doing a good job, or that it is corrupt, or that it is not motivated. The problem is that there is no Iraqi government as we normally define the term: The "government" is an arena for political maneuvering by mutually incompatible groups.
Until the summer of 2006, the U.S. strategy had been to try to forge some sort of understanding among the Iraqi groups, using American military power as a goad and guarantor of any understandings. But the decision by the Shia, propelled by Iran, to intensify operations against the Sunnis represented a deliberate decision to abandon the political process. More precisely, in our view, the Iranians decided that the political weakness of George W. Bush, the military weakness of U.S. forces in Iraq, and the general international environment gave them room to reopen the question of the nature of the coalition, the type of regime that would be created and the role that Iran could play in Iraq. In other words, the balanced coalition government that the United States wanted was no longer attractive to the Iranians and Iraqi Shia. They wanted more.
The political foundation for U.S. military strategy dissolved. The possibility of creating an environment sufficiently stable for an Iraqi government to operate -- when elements of the Iraqi government were combined with Iranian influence to raise the level of instability -- obviously didn't work. The United States might have had enough force in place to support a coalition government that was actively seeking and engaged in stabilization. It did not have enough force to impose its will on multiple insurgencies that were supported by factions of the government the United States was trying to stabilize.
By the summer of 2006, the core strategy had ceased to function.
The Options
It is in this context that the ISG will issue its report. There have been hints as to what the group might recommend, but the broad options boil down to these:
1. Recommend that the United States continue with the current strategy: military operations designed to create a security environment in which an Iraqi government can function.
2. Recommend the immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces and allow the Iraqis to sort out their political problems.
3. Recommend a redeployment of forces in Iraq, based around a redefinition of the mission.
4. Recommend a redefinition of the political mission in Iraq.
We are confident that the ISG will not recommend a continuation of the first policy. James Baker has already hinted at the need for change, since it is self-evident at this point that the existing strategy isn't working. It is possible that the strategy could work eventually, but there is no logical reason to believe that this will happen anytime soon, particularly as the president has now been politically weakened. The Shia and Iranians, at this point, are even less likely to be concerned about Washington's military capability in Iraq than they were before the election. And at any rate, Baker and Hamilton didn't travel personally to Iraq only to come back and recommend the status quo.
Nor will they recommend an immediate withdrawal of troops. Apart from the personalities involved, the ISG participants are painfully aware that a unilateral withdrawal at this point, without a prior political settlement, would leave Iran as the dominant power in the region -- potentially capable of projecting military force throughout the Persian Gulf, as well as exerting political pressure through Shiite communities in Gulf states. Only the United States has enough force to limit the Iranians at this point, and an immediate withdrawal from Iraq would leave a huge power vacuum.
We do believe that the ISG will recommend a fundamental shift in the way U.S. forces are used. The troops currently are absorbing casualties without moving closer to their goal, and it is not clear that they can attain it. If U.S. forces remain in Iraq -- which will be recommended -- there will be a shift in their primary mission. Rather than trying to create a secure environment for the Iraqi government, their mission will shift to guaranteeing that Iran, and to a lesser extent Syria, do not gain further power and influence in Iraq. Nothing can be done about the influence they wield among Iraqi Shia, but the United States will oppose anything that would allow them to move from a covert to an overt presence in Iraq. U.S. forces will remain in-country but shift their focus to deterring overt foreign intrusion. That means a redeployment and a change in day-to-day responsibility. U.S. forces will be present in Iraq but not conducting continual security operations.
Two things follow from this. First, the Iraqis will be forced to reach a political accommodation with each other or engage in civil war. The United States will concede that it does not have the power to force them to agree or to prevent them from fighting. Second, the issue of Iran -- its enormous influence in Iraq -- will have to be faced directly, or else U.S. troops will be tied up there indefinitely.
It has been hinted that the ISG is thinking of recommending that Washington engage in negotiations with Iran over the future of Iraq. Tehran offered such negotiations last weekend, and this has been the Iranian position for a while. There have been numerous back-channel discussions, and some open conversations, between Washington and Tehran. The stumbling block has been that the United States has linked the possibility of these talks to discussions of Iran's nuclear policy; Iran has rejected that, always seeking talks on Iraq without linkages. If the rumors are true, and logic says they are, the ISG will suggest that Washington should delink the nuclear issue and hold talks with Iran about a political settlement over Iraq.
This is going to be the hard part for Bush. The last thing he wants is to enhance Iranian power. But the fact is that Iranian power already has been enhanced by the ability of Iraqi Shia to act with indifference to U.S. wishes. By complying with this recommendation, Washington would not be conceding much. It would be acknowledging reality. Of course, publicly acknowledging what has happened is difficult, but the alternative is a continuation of the current strategy -- also difficult. Bush has few painless choices.
What a settlement with Iran would look like is, of course, a major question. We have discussed that elsewhere. For the moment, the key issue is not what a settlement would look like but whether there can be a settlement at all with Iran -- or even direct discussions. In a sense, that is a more difficult problem than the final shape of an agreement.
We expect the ISG, therefore, to make a military and political recommendation. Militarily, the panel will argue for a halt in aggressive U.S. security operations and a redeployment of forces in Iraq, away from areas of unrest. Security will have to be worked out by the Iraqis -- or not. Politically, the ISG will argue that Washington will have to talk directly to the other major stakeholder, and power broker, in Iraq: Tehran.
In short, the group will recommend a radical change in the U.S. approach not only to Iraq, but to the Muslim world in general.
-
10 TERRORISTS CAPTURED IN EARLY MORNING RAID
BAGHDAD, Iraq ? U.S. troops captured 10 terrorists while conducting an early morning raid today in Baghdad. Credible intelligence indicates the terrorists have ties to key leaders of al-Qaeda in Iraq?s network.
It is believed they are associated with terrorists who are involved in the housing, movement and enabling of foreign fighters, to include the organization of suicide operations within Baghdad.
Although this is another significant blow to al-Qaeda in Iraq, the terrorist organization still poses a threat as its members continue to try and terrorize the Iraqi people
Iraqi Army captures 3 terrorists in search for IED supplier
BAGHDAD ? Special Iraqi Army Forces, with Coalition advisers, conducted a raid Nov. 11 in Abu Ghraib to capture a criminal who is providing supplies for improvised explosive devices to an IED cell in the area. The cell is believed to be responsible for bombings which kill and injure Iraqi civilians and security forces.
The Iraqi Force confiscated several sniper and assault rifles during the raid and captured 3 terrorists.
Special IA troops capture terrorists in search for death squad leader
BAGHDAD ? Special Iraqi Army forces, with coalition advisers, conducted a raid Nov. 10, in Sadr City to capture a top-level death squad leader who is responsible for carrying out widespread death squad activities in eastern Baghdad.
This criminal controls the actions of multiple cells, with hundreds of cell members, that conduct murder and torture, kidnappings, improvised explosive devices attacks and other attacks against civilians and Iraqi security forces.
Iraqi Army forces captured 5 terrorists during the raid and confiscated six improvised explosive devices and Iraqi military uniforms.
IA captures terrorist in search during search
BAGHDAD ? 7th Iraqi Army Division forces, with coalition advisers, conducted a raid Nov. 10 in Al Hawz near Ramadi to capture members of an insurgent cell responsible for attacks in the Ramadi area. Iraqi Army forces captured one terrorist during the raid.
Iraqi Army captures leader of insurgent cell
BAGHDAD ? 8th Iraqi Army Division forces, with coalition advisers, conducted a raid Nov. 11 near Suwayrah and captured the leader of an insurgent cell responsible for attacks. The cell leader is responsible for a car bomb attack in Suwayrah that killed at least nine Iraqi civilians.
The insurgent cell also coordinated an attack which destroyed an Iraqi Army headquarters in Suwayrah. Iraqi forces captured 4 additional terrorists during the raid.
Iraqi Army busts suspected arms ring
TIKRIT, Iraq ?Iraqi soldiers apprehended 4 anti-Iraqi forces and seized a sizeable cache Thursday in an operation southeast of Kan?an.
Iraqi soldiers with 2nd brigade, 5th Iraqi Army Division discovered the terrorists, along with a cache, while conducting an intelligence driven operation on an arms dealer and weapons cache.
During the search, Iraqi soldiers came under sporadic small arms fire as the AIF were attempting to flee the area. The Iraqi soldiers eventually captured the 4 individuals and found the sizeable cache.
The cache consisted of nearly 100 rounds of machine gun ammunition, six rocket propelled grenades, five grenades, IED making materials, anti-Iraqi propaganda and three stolen cars.
CCCI convicts 25 insurgents: Two sentenced to 30 years imprisonment, eight sentenced to 15 years imprisonment
BAGHDAD, Iraq ? The Central Criminal Court of Iraq convicted 23 individuals from Oct. 13 to 19 for various crimes including kidnapping, possession of illegal weapons, forging passports, heading, leading, joining armed groups, and illegal border crossing.
The trial court found three Iraqi men guilty of possession of illegal weapons, in violation of Order 3/2003, section 6, Paragraph 2B of the Iraqi Penal Code. The trial panel sentenced two of the men to thirty years imprisonment and the other man to ten years imprisonment
The trial court found three Iraqi men guilty of violating Article 421 of the Iraqi Penal Code, Parts G and H. When Coalition Forces stopped a suspicious vehicle, they heard a noise coming from the trunk. A search of the vehicle revealed an individual held captive in the trunk. CF also found weapons ammunition and large amounts of money in the vehicle. On October 18, the trial panel sentenced the men to fifteen years imprisonment.
The trial court found a Syrian man guilty of joining armed groups to unsettle the security and stability of Iraq and endangering lives in violation of Article 194 of the Iraqi Penal Code. On 15 October the trial panel sentenced the man to fifteen years imprisonment.
Those convicted of passport violations and entering the country illegally included four Egyptians, eight Syrians, and one each from Palestine, Yemen, Jordan and Iraq. Other sentences ranged from 18 months to 10 years imprisonment.
Since its establishment in April 2004, the Central Criminal Court has held 1,660 trials for Coalition-apprehended insurgents. The proceedings have resulted in 1,424 convictions with sentences ranging up to death.
CCCI convicts 23 insurgents; One sentenced to death, six sentenced to 30 years imprisonment
BAGHDAD, Iraq ? The Central Criminal Court of Iraq convicted 23 individuals from October 27 to November 1, for various crimes including possession of illegal weapons, possessing fake civil affair and fake military identifications, using or taking advantage of someone else?s identification, heading, leading, joining armed groups, and illegal border crossing.
The trial court found a Saudi Arabian man guilty of joining armed groups to unsettle the security and stability of Iraq and endangering people?s lives in violation of Article 4/1 of the Iraqi Penal Code of the Iraqi Penal Code. The defendant admitted to coming into Iraq illegally to fight. On November 1, the trial panel sentenced the man to the death penalty.
The trial court found four Iraqi men guilty of possession of illegal weapons in violation of Section 6, Paragraph 2B. The men where apprehended after conducting an attack on Multi-National Forces. A search of their vehicle revealed two RPG launchers, two PKM and one RPD machine guns, five AK-47s and a video camera used to film the attack. On November 1, 2006, all four defendants were sentenced to thirty years imprisonment.
The trial court found two Iraqi men guilty of possession of illegal special weapons, in violation of section 6, Paragraph 2B of the Iraqi Penal Code. The defendants were apprehended after a search of their house revealed a large cache of explosives. One of the defendants was also in possession of weapons and IED making materials. The trial panel sentenced the two men to thirty years imprisonment.
Those convicted of passport violations, forging official documents, possession of illegal weapons and entering the country illegally included three Syrians, four Iraqis, two Egyptians, two Saudi Arabians and one each from Lebanon, Yemen, France, Libya and Sudan. Other sentences ranged from 6 months to 15 years imprisonment.
Since its establishment in April 2004, the Central Criminal Court has held 1,683 trials for Coalition-apprehended insurgents. The proceedings have resulted in 1,447 convictions with sentences ranging up to death.
Nov. 11, 2006
Iraqi Police drive recruits 400 in Ramadi
RAMADI, Iraq ? Marking the largest recruiting drive in the Ramadi district history, over 409 men joined the Iraqi Police during a three-day recruiting drive here.
Becoming an Iraqi policeman offers young men an opportunity to have a
profession where they can protect their families.
?I want to join the Iraqi Police because I want to save my country from the
insurgency,? stated one police applicant who said the insurgents had killed his cousin.
?It is the duty of every Iraqi citizen to do what they can to protect our country? When I finish training and come back to [Ramadi to] serve, Ramadi will be even safer than it is now.?
According to Marine Maj. Jeff Wicker, Police Implementation Officer, ?The first
requirement is literacy, they have to be able to read and write? We?re getting a better quality recruit as the situation is improving and things become safer, [the potential recruits] feel more secure in coming to the recruiting drive.?
?I joined the IPs because I want to help save my country. I want peace in all Iraq,? said one local IP helping with the recruiting drive. He stated that he has seen an improvement in the security situation, ?I am very proud of everything we have accomplished.?
Potential recruits must be over 18 years of age, and pass a physical and medical test to identify any possible major problems that would keep them from completing the academy or hinder their duties as policemen later.
-
NINE TERRORISTS KILLED, NINE CAPTURED
BAGHDAD, IRAQ ? U.S. troops killed 9 terrorists and captured 9 more terrorists during a raid Thursday near Yusufiyah, further diminishing the al-Qaida in Iraq network. As U.S. troops approached the targeted area, they called out for people to exit the buildings. Ground forces noticed several armed individuals in a nearby wooded area maneuvering against them.
Close air support was called in to mitigate the threat to the ground team. U.S. Air Force aircraft engaged the terrorists with precision fires. Several of the terrorists killed were wearing suicide vests.This and other recent operations in the region highlight the deliberate, methodical dismantlement of the al-Qaida in Iraq network.
18 TERRORISTS CAPTURED; IED MATERIALS DESTROYED
BAGHDAD, Iraq ? U.S. troops captured 18 terrorists and destroyed a cache of improvised explosive device materials while conducting multiple raids Wednesday morning. The raids targeted individuals in the northern Baghdad region and al-Anbar Province who have direct ties to al-Qaida in Iraq terrorist cells.
Ground troops located and detonated a stockpile of automobile batteries believed to be stored for use in vehicle-borne IED attacks on innocent Iraqi civilians and Coalition Forces.The terrorists are currently being assessed for their level of involvement in terrorist activity.
The raids are part of ongoing, coordinated efforts to eliminate al-Qaida operations in the Baghdad region. Coalition Forces continue to prevent suicide bombings by killing and capturing terrorists, intercepting and destroying VBIEDs (aka car bombs) and suicide vests and continuously degrading al-Qaida cells operating within Iraq.
AIR STRIKE KILLS 3 TERRORISTS IN YUSIFIYYAH
BAGHDAD, IRAQ ? A U.S. air strike killed 3 terrorists in Yusifiyyah during an operation Monday.
U.S. troops were following the terrorists, tracking the terrorists? movement on a dirt road on the outskirts of Yusifiyya. Based on intelligence that linked the vehicle and the 3 terrorists to a local vehicle-borne improvised explosion device facilitation network, U.S. aircraft engaged and destroyed the vehicle with precision fires.
The result of this operation will significantly disrupt the VBIED production in the Baghdad region.
Iraqi Army, U.S. Soldiers seize weapons in apartment complex, 3 terrorists captured
MAHMUDIYAH, Iraq ? Iraqi Army and U.S. Soldiers seized a large weapons cache and captured 3 terrorists in an apartment complex in Mahmudiyah, south of Baghdad.
Iraqi Soldiers with the Sixth Iraqi Army Division, teamed up with the 10th Mountain Division, and conducted an operation in the apartment complex.
Three 107 mm rockets, 24 82 mm mortar rounds, 17 60 mm mortar rounds, 19 60 mm mortar fuses, 100 mortar charges, two mortar tripods and aiming devices, a rocket-propelled grenade launcher, an AK-47 assault rifle, a RPK medium machine gun, false identification cards and four license plates were seized during the operation.
The most significant find in the cache was the discovery of 25 anti-armor improvised explosive device cover plates.
The operation was delayed briefly with the discovery of a car bomb parked near the apartment complex. An explosive ordinance team was brought in to dispose of the car bomb. The bomb was detonated on site.
8 TERRORISTS KILLED; 41 CAPTURED DURING MULTIPLE RAIDS
BAGHDAD, Iraq ? U.S. troops killed 8 terrorists and captured 41 other terrorists while conducting multiple raids in the Baghdad area this morning.
During one of the raids, U.S. soldiers called for the men in a building to surrender. The terrorists began firing on the troops and attempted to flee the building. U.S. troops layed down serious fire from all weapons systems, killing 8 of the terrorists and wounding one. 16 others threw down their weapons and surrendered.
These terrorists are believed to have close ties with members of an al-Qaida in Iraq terrorist cell.
In a separate incident, U.S. Soldiers captured 3 terrorists in Baghdad?s Doura Province Nov. 13.
The Soldiers, from the 4th Infantry Division, responded to a rocket attack and observed 3 terrorists fleeing from the scene. The suspects attempted to evade the patrol, but were unsuccessful.
U.S, Iraqi forces repel attack, kill 18 terrorists, capture 14 others
KIRKUK, Iraq ? Iraqi security forces and U.S. troops came under fire when anti-Iraqi forces attacked a joint Iraqi and U.S. patrol south of Kirkuk. The enemy then fled to a compound where they were chased by the Iraqi security forces, and the fighting continued.
The fighting started during an ambush of a joint Iraqi and U.S. patrol. It is unclear how many enemy were in the area at the time of the ambush, but estimates put the number between 25-30 enemy personnel.
After contact, the insurgents split into 2 groups to try to escape. One group of enemy vehicles was tracked and attacked by Apache helicopters. The other group fled to a compound outside the town where they were chased by Iraqi troops. This group was heavily armed with machine guns, rocket propelled grenades and a large stockpile of ammunition.
The Apache attack helicopters, ground troops and close air support aircraft engaged both groups of the enemy, destroying their vehicles and hiding positions with precision fires, killing 18, capturing 14 and neutralizing various weapons and munitions.
One Iraqi Army soldier gave his life in defense of his country and three others were wounded in action.
Iraqi Army captures 2 IED makers, 7 others
BAGHDAD ? Special Iraqi Army forces conducted a raid in Baghdad and captured 2 members of an illegally armed group responsible for constructing improvised explosive devices and car bombs.
The cell also trains other cells in producing IEDs and car bombs. IA forces captured 9 other cell members during the raid and confiscated two Iraqi Army uniforms.
5 TERRORISTS KILLED, ONE CAPTURED IN BAGHDAD
BAGHDAD, Iraq ? U.S. troops killed 5 terrorists and captured one Tuesday morning during a raid in Baghdad that targeted individuals associated with a suspected senior leader of an al-Qaeda in Iraq network.
As U.S.ground forces approached the targeted building, several people ran inside. The assault force continued inside and received fire. They immediately returned fire, killing 5 terrorists armed with AK-47s. Several women and children were also in the building but they were not injured or detained. The ground forces searched the building and discovered an illegal collection of military equipment, destroying it on-site to prevent further use by al-Qaeda members. Nine weapons were also found on the scene.
This morning?s raid was conducted as a direct result of information gained when U.S. troops captured an al-Qaeda terrorist during an Oct. 28 raid in the same area. Both raids involved al-Qaeda in Iraq members who have a history of acquiring explosives and building deadly car bombs.
2 terrorists killed, 5 captured during raid in Balad
BAGHDAD, Iraq ? U.S. troops engaged and killed 2 terrorists while en route to their objective in Balad during an early morning raid.
During the mission, the soldiers observed 2 terrorists placing a roadside bomb and fleeing to an unknown location when they saw the soldiers approaching. The soldiers safely detonated the bomb and continued their mission.
While continuing their mission, the soldiers observed two other terrorists maneuvering toward their location armed with weapons, including a rocket propelled grenade, a machine gun, and grenades. The troops engaged with heavy direct fire killing the 2 terrorists.
Despite the terrorists? ambush attempts, the U.S. troops successfully continued their operation and captured 5 terrorists.
Nov. 13, 2006
Two Task Force Lightning Soldiers killed, two others wounded
TIKRIT, Iraq ? Two Soldiers assigned to 3rd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division, were killed Sunday when a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) detonated near their vehicle while conducting operations in Salah ad Din Province.
Two other Soldiers were wounded in the blast and were transported to a Coalition forces medical treatment facility.
Iraqi Army captures kidnapping, murder-cell suspects
BAGHDAD ? Forces from the 7th Iraqi Army Division, with U.S. advisors, conducted a raid Nov. 14 in Ramadi to capture members of a kidnapping and murder cell responsible for abducting, torturing and murdering Iraqi civilian and Iraqi security forces.
The cell members are also responsible for emplacing improvised explosive devices that injure and kill Iraqi police. Iraqi Army forces captured 8 terrorists during the raid.
U.S. troops capture members of insurgent cell
BAGHDAD ? U.S. troops captured 6 insurgents and detained one other suspect Nov 13. in Baghdad during a raid against an insurgent cell responsible for deadly attacks against Iraqi civilians and Iraqi Security Forces in the area.
The insurgent cell is linked to Al Qaeda in Iraq and other insurgent groups and conducts IED, rocket and mortar attacks against innocent Iraqis.
TOTALS SO FAR THIS WEEK:
45 terrorists killed, 117 captured
Of course, the American Public only knows that we've lost 45 troops die this month...not that we have taken out 162 terrorists in less than one week!
oh, by the way: CCCI convicts 13 insurgents
BAGHDAD, Iraq ? The Central Criminal Court of Iraq convicted 13 detainees from November 2 to 9, for various crimes.
The trial court found 4 Iraqi men guilty of possession of illegal special weapons and for using and forging fake identification. U.S. personnel searched two vehicles after observing the defendants throw a pistol out of one of the vehicle?s window. The search of both vehicles revealed 35 82mm mortar rounds, eight 122mm artillery rounds and one 12.7mm machine gun. The defendants were found in violation of the Iraqi Penal Code. On November 7, the trial panel sentenced one man to 42 years imprisonment and sentenced the other three men to 30 years imprisonment.
The trial court found three Iraqi men guilty of possession of illegal special weapons, in violation of the Iraqi Penal Code. The defendants surrendered to U.S. troops after the defendants fled a targeted house, engaged U.S. personnel in a firefight, and were found with one PKC machine gun, three RPG launchers, five AK-47s, and five hand grenades. On November 8, the trial panel sentenced the three men to 15 years imprisonment.
There were six men convicted of passport violations, forging official documents, possession of illegal weapons, and entering the country illegally. The sentences ranged from between six months to 10 years imprisonment. Those convicted include three Iraqis, two Saudi Arabians, and one from Egypt. (THANK YOU FOR VISITING OUR SECURITY FORCES - ENJOY YOUR STAY - FOR THE NEXT 10 YEARS)
-
Friday, November 17, 2006
The First Iraq
Although history never quite repeats itself, current events often resemble earlier occasions so closely there is a temptation to draw lessons from them. Imagine a time when America found itself in a war against a foreign foe whose strategy was to inflict a constant rate of loss on the army; invited US and British reporters to feed antiwar elements with atrocity stories; when US commanders who expected a quick war against a corrupt and oligarchic native elite found they had roused the countryside against them. Imagine a time when the issue of this war was central to an American Presidential election, caused a split in one of the major parties and planted the seeds for a world war. Not Iraq. The war was Philippine-American War and the election that of 1912.
According to the McKinley administration the enemy was not the Filipino population. It was the Spanish oppressor and later, the perfidious and parasitical indigenous landed elite. At the opposite end, "the goal, or end-state, sought by the Filipino Republic was a sovereign, independent, socially stable Philippines led by the illustrado oligarchy. ... The peasants, who provided the bulk of guerilla manpower, had interests different from their illustrado leaders." What flung the oligarchy and the peasants together momentarily was common opposition to the invading US Army. Far from being unsophisticated yokels, the strategic goal of Philippine Republic generals was to send home enough body bags to persuade the mainstream media of the day to electorally repudiate the Republican administration in Washington.
The Filipino general Francisco Makabulos described the Filipinos' war aim as, "not to vanquish the US Army but to inflict on them constant losses." They sought to initially use conventional (later guerilla) tactics and an increasing toll of US casualties to contribute to McKinley's defeat in the 1900 presidential election. Their hope was that as President the avowedly anti-imperialist William Jennings Bryan would withdraw from the Philippines.
Unfortunately for the insurrectos, the electorate of 1900 elected to "stay the course". McKinley's victory in 1900 convinced the Filipinos that the US would not soon embark upon a "responsible redeployment". Washington's stated aim was to remove the obscurantist and bloodthirsty Spanish regime from the backs of the downtrodden Islanders and give them a government better than could be provided by the landed illustrado elite. For a long time, however, the War Department publicly pursued this aim. But as armed resistance refused to end, newspapers charged the Department was in denial about the existence and scale of the insurgency against US forces, rejecting the belief that Philippine President Aguinaldo simply represented an elite faction which could never command the loyalty of the downtrodden peasantry. While General Otis maintained the problem consisted of remnants of the old regime, the mainstream media soon began to publish criticisms uttered by none other than Otis' own field commanders. General Arthur McArthur (Douglas' father) told a reporter:
When I first started in against these rebels, I believed that Aguinaldo?s troops represented only a faction. I did not like to believe that the whole population of Luzon?the native population that is?was opposed to us and our offers of aid and good government. But after having come this far, after having occupied several towns and cities in succession, and having been brought much into contact with both insurrectos and amigos, I have been reluctantly compelled to believe that the Filipino masses are loyal to Aguinaldo and the government which he heads.
Faced with a deepening quagmire in an archipelago larger than the State of California Washington agonized over which strategy to use against "a widening insurgency". Arthur McArthur believed in meeting force with ineluctable force. US forces began to take no prisoners, relocate whole towns into controllable areas and recruit indigenous troops. This met with some success and persistent efforts were crowned by a masterful operation in which the US Army captured the leader of the insurrectos in the "spider hole" of his day.
General Frederick Funston was able to use Aguinaldo's poor security against him, when Funston on March 23, 1901 in northern Luzon, faked capture with the help of some Macabebe Filipinos who had joined the Americans' side. Once Funston and his "captors" entered Aguinaldo's camp, they immediately fell upon the guards and quickly overwhelmed them and the weary Aguinaldo. On April 1, 1901, at the Malaca?ang palace in Manila Aguinaldo swore an oath accepting the authority of the United States over the Philippines and pledging his allegiance to the American government. Three weeks later he publicly called on his followers to lay down arms.
This slowed, but did not end the fighting, which spread south to involve Muslim fanatics whose ultimate weapon was the suicide kris charge. Worse, the insurgents had cleverly learned how to use the mainstream media to undermine McKinley's policy. Prior to his capture Emilio Aguinaldo had
managed to smuggle in four reporters?two English, one Canadian, and a Japanese into the Philippines. The correspondents returned to Manila to report that American captives were ?treated more like guests than prisoners,? were ?fed the best that the country affords, and everything is done to gain their favor.? The story went on to say that American prisoners were offered commissions in the Filipino army and that three had accepted. The four reporters were expelled from the Philippines as soon as their stories were printed.
The newspapers were full of allegations of the mistreatment of prisoners; of waterboarding -- the so-called water-cure -- and the cry was taken up by groups like the Anti-Imperialist League, which included politicians, media celebrities and billionaires like William Jennings Bryan, Mark Twain and Andrew Carnegie. But unexpectedly, the tide turned. The real breakthrough came when William Howard Taft, who had been appointed by McKinley to take charge of the situation on the ground, persuaded Washington to return to the spirit of the original mission: to never forget that America had gone into to the Philippines to spread democracy. Taft, who later became Chief Justice after his Presidency engineered Arthur McArthur's removal. He argued that America could not treat the Filipinos so harshly because they were "our little brown brothers". Dean Bocobo at the Philippine Commentary blog has argued that no phrase in history has been so twisted from its original context. Taft's "little brown brother" phrase is portrayed as synonymous with condescending colonialism; what is never remembered is that it was uttered in opposition to Arthur McArthur's mailed-fist approach. Taft eased McArthur from command and replaced him with a powerful weapon in the shape of an Army troopship carrying American teachers: the USS Thomas.
The Thomasites are a group of about five hundred pioneer American teachers sent by the American government to the Philippines in August 1901 to establish a public school system, to teach basic education and to train Filipino teachers, with English as the medium of instruction. The name Thomasite was derived from the transport vessel, the USS Thomas (formerly Minnewaska), that brought them to the shores of Manila Bay. Although two groups of new American graduates arrived in the Philippines before the USS Thomas, the name Thomasite became the designation of all pioneer American teachers simply because the USS Thomas had the largest contingent. Later batches of American teachers were also dubbed as the Thomasites.
It proved the decisive weapon. How decisive was illustrated 40 years later, when Filipinos would fight side by side with the US Army against the Japanese. Taft could little have imagined in 1901 that another Chief Justice, Philippine Chief Justice Jose Abad Santos, would choose in 1941 to be executed by the Japanese rather than renounce his allegiance to the American flag.
Abad Santos was captured by the Japanese near Carcar, Cebu. He was subjected to gruelling investigations for three weeks and was asked to contact General Manuel Roxas and to renounce his allegiance to the United States of America. He replied with dignity and courage: I cannot accede to the things you ask of me. To obey your commands is tantamount to being a traitor to the United States and my country. I would prefer to die rather than live in shame."
He was brought to Parang, Cotabato, and finally to Malabang, Lanao del Sur, where he was told of his impending execution. When his son learned of the verdict, he bust into tears, but Chief Justice Abad Santos confronted him, saying with sincere tenderness: "Do not cry Pepito. Show these people that you are brave. It is a rare opportunity far me to die for our country. Not everybody is given that chance."
Though Taft had won no one had realized it as yet. The attitudes engendered by the Philippine American War lingered in Washington. In 1912 Woodrow Wilson would win the Presidency with the minority of the vote against a divided Republican Party -- sundered by the schism between Taft and Theodore Roosevelt and decide to "cut and run" in a phased transition that would eventually deposit the Philippines in the hands of the illustrado elite.
Nationalist circles in the Philippines were elated over the election of Woodrow Wilson as President ... in 1912 ... Since 1900 the Democrats had voiced anti-imperialist sentiments ... To friends of insular independence, the Democratic victory raised great expectations for the success of their cause. ...
Wilson's views on the Philippine had undergone change over the years since 1898. First reportedly opposing annexation of the Islands, he later advocated a policy of American tutelage to prepare ... The 1912 Baltimore platform, although favoring retention of naval bases, had called for "an immediate declaration ... to recognize the independence of the Islands as soon as a stable government can be established."
But the downside of Wilson's policies, though well intentioned, were too subtle to be understood at the time. The effect of his Fourteen Points in raising, then dashing expectations in Germany is well known and laid the seeds for the rise of Fascism in the 1930s. Wilson's role in ending the Great War inadvertently concluded it in a way that set the stage for World War 2. Less well known are the effects of Wilson's policies in the Pacific. The effect of the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty was to destabilize the Pacific and put the Philippines behind a ring of Japanese-held islands. But its long term effect on Filipinos was to belatedly grant Aguinaldo's war aims. The illustrado elite inherited the colonial government structure while the mass of the inhabitants remained in economic, cultural and political subordination. And so it remained until the early part of the 21st century.
What finally weakened the Filipino elite was economic globalization. By the late 20th century the descendants of the illustrados had nearly run their patrimony into the ground. And to cover up their failures they resorted to the time-tested technique of scapegoating their enemies; first blaming the economic role of foreigners; then junking the American-era Constitution modeled largely after that of the US; finally in 1992 closing the last of the American bases that Wilson wanted retained. The one legacy they had not succeeded in completely dismantling was that of the Thomasites. English remained the official, though declining, medium of higher instruction until 2001 when it was finally replaced by Pilipino at all levels of education. The displacement was to last two whole years.
Even as the "nationalists" put the capstone on their decaying edifice the "peasants" were deserting their structure wholesale. By the early 21st century fully 11% of the entire Filipino population had fled to work abroad, though the percentage was probably higher. As a proportion of population it was a diaspora unprecedented in modern history. There are twelve million overseas Filipinos. By comparison there are only 35 million overseas Chinese. In 2003 the Philippine elite woke to the fact that overseas Filipinos were literally keeping their decaying kingdom afloat, providing 13.5% of total GDP, chiefly in sums sent to relatives. That year the Philippine Department of Education ordered English reinstated as the medium of instruction. Like some strange delayed explosion, the Thomasite weapon had detonated a hundred years into the future. But this time it was not the American teachers who crossed oceans to teach Philippine peasants. It was the Philippine peasants who went overseas to work and to learn.
Contemporary Manila is reeling under the impact of the Overseas Filipino revolution. Some of the changes are subtly cultural. Hundreds of thousands of Filipinos of lower-class origin return for holidays or furlough between contracts with more money than the old social elite. They often return with more sophisticated consumer tastes and better foreign language skills then their social betters, who have never been to anything other than local finishing schools. In particular, many Filipinos of lower-class origin speak American or British standard English learned by immersion overseas unselfconsciously, at a stroke removing the class stigma that often attended the use of fluent English. The ultimate testimony to the return of English has been the widespread rise of that bizarre product of globalization, the Korean-run English academy for Filipinos, pitched at the those desperate to learn enough English to go abroad for a job. One of these unusual academies is shown below beside the another compelling reason to learn English: the Internet Cafe. If anything symbolizes the Overseas Filipino revolution, it is these English academies cheek by jowl with Internet portals.
But if some changes are subtle, others are glaringly obvious. Almost overnight, the ability to stand in line at a ticket booth or at a taxi stand has become a mainstream Filipino value in a country formerly renowned for jumping queues. At a business district in mid-Manila, thousands of call-center workers -- another incentive to learn English and hook into the wider world -- stop for fast-food meals at restaurants open on a 24 hour basis before manning workstations serving every corner of the globe. Perhaps most importantly, many Filipinos no longer expect the government to do anything for them. They simply go out and do it for themselves. A country in which telephones were until recently a comparative rarity has become a hive of cell phones and the text-messaging capital of the world. Nor does anybody rely on government mail when a private courier can be used. Coup rumors which until recently have set the country on its ears are now greeted with indifference. It is the elites who are treated with a amused condescenscion, as a source of entertainment. Dean Jorge Bocobo of Philippine Commentary, to whom I am indebted for much of the information on this post, said "You have all these millions of people coming back who know what works. And they want it. It's funny how in all this discussion over the Middle East everyone in America has forgotten the First Iraq."
Update
Parenthetically, it was the Wahabi religious authorities which began its own "Thomasite" program in the 1970s as it flooded the southern Philippines and many other countries of the world with teachers and textbooks. This is now acknowledged to have greatly influenced the rise of Islamic extremism. A senior Southeast Asian official with whom I recently spoke said that Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) education officials were exploring ways to influence Imam training and texbook provision for the madrassas.
Because history never exactly repeats itself, it would be foolish to copy the Thomasite tactic of Taft. However, it reinforces the argument that the War on Terrorism is largely a war of ideas. Taft understood this. Does anyone now?
posted by wretchard at 11/17/2006 08:14:00 AM
http://fallbackbelmont.blogspot.com/2006/11/first-iraq.html
-
**This is a good analysis of the aftermath of the midterms.**
http://www.nypost.com/seven/11162006/postopinion/opedcolumnists/our_enemies_glee_opedcolumnists_amir_taheri.htm?page=0
Our Enemies' Glee
By Amir Taheri
New York Post | November 17, 2006
Radical elements across the Middle East see last Tuesday's defeat of President Bush's Republican Party as their victory.
Calling the election "the beginning of the end for Bush," Ayatollah Imami Kashani told a Friday congregation in Tehran that the Americans were learning the same lesson that last summer's war in Lebanon taught the Israelis.
Tehran decision-makers believe that the Democrats' victory will lift the pressure off the Islamic Republic with regard to its nuclear program. "It is possible that the United States will behave in a wiser manner and will not pit itself against Iran," says Ali Larijani, Tehran's chief negotiator on the nuclear issue.
His view is echoed by academics with ties to "Supreme Guide" Ali Khamenei. "The Democrats will do their best to resolve Iran's nuclear issue through negotiations, rather than resorting to threats," says Yadallah Islami, who teaches politics at Tehran University. "Bush will be forced to behave the way all U.S. presidents have behaved since Richard Nixon - that is to say, get out of wars that the American people do not want to fight."
Nasser Hadian, another academic with ties to Khamenei, goes further. "With the return of a more realistic view of the world, the United States will acknowledge the leading role that the Islamic Republic must play," he says. "There is no reason for our government to make any concessions on the nuclear issue."
Arab radical circles are even more hopeful that Bush's defeat will mark the start of an historic U.S. withdrawal from the Middle East. They draw parallels between the American election and Spain's 2004 vote, days after the Madrid terrorist attacks, which led to an unexpected change of government.
The radicals expect U.S. policies to change on three issues:
Iraq: The assumption is that America will cut and run.
Salafist groups linked to al Qaeda believe that this will mean a stampede of those Iraqis who worked with the Americans. Iraq's Shiite leaders would flee to Iran, where most had been in exile before Saddam Hussein's fall. Kurdish political and business elites will flee to the three provinces they have held since 1991. This would enable the Salafists, in alliance with the remnants of Saddam Hussein's Presidential Guards, to enter Baghdad and seize power.
Absent in that calculation is the role Iran might play: Will the mullahs sit back as Salafists and Saddamites lay the foundations of a new Arab regime that would turn against Shiite-dominated Iran?
Radical Shiites have their own vision of Iraq after the Americans have fled. They believe that, backed by Iran, they'll be able to move into the four Arab Sunni provinces that have been restive since 2004 - and crush the Saddamites and al Qaeda. This ignores the certainty that any Iranian intervention in Iraq will provoke a massive Arab reaction - with Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and even Syria (now an Iranian ally) forced to back Sunni Arabs in Iraq.
In other words, any hasty American withdrawal from Iraq could lead to either a long and bloody civil war or an even longer and bloodier regional conflict.
Iran: Radical circles are unanimous in their belief that Iran can now proceed with its nuclear program without fear of U.S. and allied retaliation. They expect Democrats to revert to Clinton-era policy and seek a "Grand Bargain" with the Islamic Republic - acknowledging Iran as the major regional power and recognizing its right to the full cycle of nuclear technology.
This perception has boosted President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's cause in next month's crucial elections. Ahmadinejad argues that Bush's defeat vindicates his own policy of "standing firm against the Great Satan he hopes to see his faction win control of the Assembly of Experts - a body that can elect and dismiss the "Supreme Guide." Ahmadinejad would thus control all levers of power in Tehran.
Yet the expected U.S. retreat on Iran may not materialize - or, if it does, produce the results Tehran desires. Why should Democrats be less worried about a rogue state armed with nuclear weapons than the vilified "neocons"?
Iran's entry into the nuclear club, even if not opposed by Washington, would provoke opposition in the region. Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and its Persian Gulf allies - all would be forced to seek nuclear weapons. And the ensuing arms race would be a heavy burden on the Islamic Republic's ailing economy.
Israel: Radical Islamists in both Iran and the Arab countries believe that the Democrats' victory indicates "growing American lassitude." They believe that, once it becomes clear that Americans don't want to fight for the Middle East, many in Israel would emigrate to America and Europe to escape the constant daily pressure from Islamist groups such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah.
In visits to more than a dozen countries in the past few months, Ahmadinejad has been vigorously promoting his "one state" formula for Israel-Palestine. He claims to have won the support of Syria's Bashar al-Assad, Venezuela's Hugo Chavez and Sudan's Gen. Hassan al-Bashir, and believes that, once it becomes clear that America wouldn't fight a war in support of Israel, most Arab states would rally along.
His "one state" plan turns on a referendum in which Palestinians, including those outside the region, will vote along with those Israelis who have chosen to stay to create a single state in which Jews and Arabs live together.
This euphoria, too, may prove problematic. There is evidence that a majority of Palestinians wish to have a state of their own as quickly as possible, and see outsiders' quest for a single state as a chimera. Nor is there any reason why many Israelis would choose to flee, as Ahmadinejad expects, rather than stay to defend their country.
Also, most Arab states remain committed to the Bush "road map," a fact underlined last week by Saudi Arabia's call for a new peace conference based on the two-state formula.
The mullahs and al Qaeda may soon find out that their celebration of "the end of Bush" was premature. Some Democrats may have promised cut-and-run. But, once in power, the party as a whole may realize (to its horror) that, this time, those from whom Americans run away will come after them.
One more fact for the mullahs and al Qaeda to take into account: Their nemesis, the reviled Bush, is around for another two years, and unlikely to dance to their tune, even if the new Congress demanded it. And two years is a long time in politics.
Amir Taheri is a member of Benador Associates.
-
Kissinger: Iraq Military Win Impossible
By TARIQ PANJA
The Associated Press
Sunday, November 19, 2006; 4:45 PM
LONDON -- Military victory is no longer possible in Iraq, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said in a television interview broadcast Sunday.
Kissinger presented a bleak vision of Iraq, saying the U.S. government must enter into dialogue with Iraq's regional neighbors _ including Iran _ if progress is to be made in the region.
"If you mean by 'military victory' an Iraqi government that can be established and whose writ runs across the whole country, that gets the civil war under control and sectarian violence under control in a time period that the political processes of the democracies will support, I don't believe that is possible," he told the British Broadcasting Corp.
But Kissinger, an architect of the Vietnam war who has advised President Bush about Iraq, warned against a rapid withdrawal of coalition troops, saying it could destabilize Iraq's neighbors and cause a long-lasting conflict.
"A dramatic collapse of Iraq _ whatever we think about how the situation was created _ would have disastrous consequences for which we would pay for many years and which would bring us back, one way or another, into the region," he said.
Kissinger, whose views have been sought by the Iraqi Study Group, led by former Secretary of State James Baker III, called for an international conference bringing together the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, Iraq's neighbors _ including Iran _ and regional powers like India and Pakistan to work out a way forward for the region.
"I think we have to redefine the course, but I don't think that the alternative is between military victory, as defined previously, or total withdrawal," he said.
-
**There is no military force capible of pushing the US out of Iraq. Putting ugly images on TV until the sheeple grow weary is their only viable strategy. Sadly, it seems to be working.**
http://www.tcsdaily.com/article.aspx?id=111706A
The Human Calculus of National Security
By Philip R. O'Connor PH.D
Following the Democratic mid-term triumph, California U.S. Senator Barbara Boxer told National Public Radio that the recent average daily loss of three military people in Iraq necessitated disengagement as soon as possible. Sen. Boxer has posed a fundamental question: What price in American lives are we prepared to pay for our national security policies?
There is a cold-blooded calculus at the heart of decisions that must be taken by the leaders we choose. No one likes to talk about it but it's the elephant in the room. Let's stipulate that every life is precious and every one of us cringes when we switch on the TV and hear casualty reports. Let's also stipulate, however, that we expect our elected leaders to make life and death decisions mindful of the interests of the broader society and of generations to come.
Any leader disposed toward treating these decisions in exclusively personal terms is unfit for leadership. But what happens if our leaders have no referent for the human calculus of preserving the nation's security? Suppose they have no idea or refuse to even consider the price they are willing for us to pay for our security. We recognize the inevitability of deaths in our police and fire services and among our utility and sanitation workers. As a society we know that, taken together, these four professions alone have an average daily duty-related death rate of about one per day. But we also appreciate the absolute importance of those jobs for our daily well being.
Let's look at the record on precisely the terms Senator Boxer suggests, the daily average rate of military fatalities. As in any analytical exercise, we must simplify as well as recognize that over the years our casualty reporting systems have become much more precise. We also need to realize that the lethality of warfare is not measured solely in those who perish but also in terms of the injuries suffered.
Over time, the ratio of wounded to dying has risen significantly, from about 1.7 to 1 in both World Wars, to 3 to 1 in Vietnam and about 7or 8 to 1 in the current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. We also must put aside the average daily death rate in the military since the post-Cold War downsizing began of about between two and three per day from training and auto accidents, disease and so forth.
Let's look then only at military fatalities from all causes during our major wars and consider those wars as part of long term national security policy strategies. And we will not treat the losses suffered by our many and varied allies over the years, including those in the current conflict. Further, the Confederate dead of our Civil War must be included. Lincoln himself would have wanted it thus.
In the full sweep of U.S history, from the commencement of the Revolution on Lexington Green in April 1775, until the sunny morning of September 11, 2001, our average daily sacrifice has been between 14 and 15 military fatalities (1,217,000 fatalities/83,461 days = 14.6/day). Since 9/11, the average daily sacrifice has been 1.7 per day (3200/1900=1.68).
From the Revolutionary War until the American entry into World War I, the average daily rate was about 11 per day (578,000/52,231=11.07). From World War I through the break up of the Soviet Union, the rate was over 16 per day (636,000/38,811=16.39). Or in our long running confrontation with Soviet communism following World War II until the collapse of the Soviet empire, the rate was over between 6 and 7 per day (112,400/16,892=6.65).
As things stand, the conflict with Islamic radicalism involves the lowest average daily military fatality rate of any long run national security era. It may worsen, it may improve. If Congress had been asked on September 12, 2001, to endorse a national defense posture against Islamic radicalism that traded up to 2 military fatalities per day over the subsequent five years in return for no additional homeland attacks, the deposing of terror friendly regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq, the ending of Libya's nuclear program, what would they have done? Would Congress accept that bargain today?
In making the national defense calculus our leaders cannot ignore parts of history they don't like and choose just the parts they want in order to pretend that national security can be achieved at little or no human cost over the long haul. We can no more remove Vietnam or Korea from the Cold War calculus than we can the Italian campaign or the re-taking of the Philippines from the World War II calculus. Those costly campaigns, seen by as some as inconclusive, misdirected or unwarranted, are part and parcel of ultimately winning strategies. Decisive engagements usually come only after many indecisive ones.
If we choose to resist Islamic radicalism and to help others, especially in the Islamic world, to resist and defeat it, and if we believe that freedom and democracy at home and abroad will certainly demand military force - then what daily military fatality rate are we willing to accept as a matter of policy?
Philip R. O'Connor is a writer in Chicago and holds a doctorate in political science from Northwestern University.
-
http://www.tcsdaily.com/article.aspx?id=111606E
What a Strange Way to Wage a War
By Josh Manchester : 16 Nov 2006
I found myself seated at a meeting the other day next to a correspondent for an influential national news outlet. The discussion turned to Iraq. Having spent several years covering the Balkans in the 1990s, my counterpart voiced his concern that he sees in Iraq now many of the same actions - forced migration, for example - that proved to be the incipient signs of ethnic cleansing and genocide in the Balkans then. Then he surprised me. He stated that his fear was that should the US leave precipitously, such atrocities would become headlines rather than speculation, and the world would have no one to blame but the United States.
Nevertheless, over the abyss we happily plunge, with sober heads nodding as Sen. Carl Levin appears on a Sunday morning talk show calling for a "phased redeployment" of US forces to begin in "four to six months."
Why not now? What does the distinguished gentleman from Michigan believe will be accomplished then that isn't already? If the entire enterprise is a miserable failure, why ask our military, whom Mr. Levin will no doubt be the first to vociferously support, to stay one day longer? What magical event will occur four months hence? An optimist might wonder whether Mr. Levin was attempting a clever bit of early April Fools' Day humor, but such levity coming from Levin seems unlikely.
Rather than concerning ourselves with April 1st, 2007, or January 1st, or July 10th, or August 4th, or Saint Swithins Day, there is but one day that should be foremost in our minds during these debates, and that is the 5th of October, 1938. On this day, Winston Churchill addressed the House of Commons, beginning "by saying the most unpopular and most unwelcome thing . . . that we have sustained a total and unmitigated defeat." Churchill was the wet blanket at the parliamentary party to celebrate Neville Chamberlain's efforts at the Munich Conference, where the Sudetenland had been ceded to Hitler. About Czechoslovakia, Churchill said, "All is over. Silent, mournful, abandoned, broken, [she] recedes into the darkness."
And so it will be in Iraq. When comparing the two, it is hard to know which is more ignoble: in one case, Britain bargained away a portion of another sovereign state; in our own, we are ready to cede a sovereign state to (insert here: Iran, Al Qaeda, or pure chaos), after having bought such real estate with the blood of thousands of our young.
Some Senators, mindful of the disaster a withdrawal will prove to be, warn against a precipitous exit. Yet precipitous or not, it is an exit that they seek. Yes, this is truly the problem. Having suffered decades ago from an affliction known as the Vietnam Syndrome, we seem forever destined to have periodic relapses, punctuated by someone offering a cure for our national hangover with a remedy called the Powell Doctrine.
It's an interesting brew, this one: it contains a dash of the idea that we should only fight wars that we know in advance that we'll win, even though no such creature exists; a bit of the notion that at the same time, we'll do so with every possible ally; and most importantly, a bit of whimsy called an "exit strategy," which in every other part of the world, where the inhabitants don't move every two years as we do, means that sooner or later the Americans will bail.
What a strange way to wage a war. It's almost as though everyone were promised . . . that they'd never really be waging one at all! Contrast that concoction with Marine Lieutenant General James Mattis, who related over the summer his reply to an Iraqi who asked when we would leave the country. "I said I am never going to leave. I told him I had found a little piece of property down on the Euphrates River and I was going to have a retirement home built there. I did that because I wanted to disabuse him of any sense that he could wait me out."
Iraq is dangerous. Progress is measured in weeks and inches, not minutes and miles. It is weakly governed when governed at all. But to leave too early will be to compound these seemingly intractable attributes with the most deadly of sins: a failure of willpower. The world will know that when Iraq becomes the next Taliban-like state, or the next Rwanda, that it was only because the United States, the most able, powerful, and wealthy nation in the history of the world, gave up. If that disturbs you, imagine how much it delights our adversaries.
When the "phased redeployment" begins, and the cries of "peace in our time" are shouted from the ramparts, the only important difference between now and 1938 will be that the British at least had a Churchill to tell them, "Thou art weighed in the balance and found wanting."
Josh Manchester is a TCSDaily contributing writer. His blog is The Adventures of Chester www.theadventuresofchester.com
-
http://www.americanthinker.com/articles.php?article_id=6055
What Do We Do With the Remains?
November 19th, 2006
Press and politicians have decided Iraq?s fate. And so we ask them: What do we do with the remains?
Remnants
Of Iraq?s 13 million aged 19 or less, how many will join Al Qaeda or other terrorist groups as America leaves? One percent is 130,000, half a percent 65,000.
What does your projection say?
Over 8,000 Iraqi soldiers and police have been killed since Saddam fell. How many more need die before all give up fighting for their country?
What then will those 300,000 US-trained fighters do?
Women now serve in the Iraqi parliament. Will they after America leaves?
Will Iraq have a parliament at all?
What do we do with the new $592 million US embassy? Will an American ambassador be welcome? If so, what will he do?
If Al Qaeda takes over Iraq, what will it teach in its schools?
What will Iraqi girls do?
Other scraps
The UN proved Iraq developed WMD and had the know-how rapidly to produce even more. How many of its scientists will Al Qaeda recruit ? willingly or not?
With America gone, will Iraqi Shias turn to Iran as their ally?
How will Israel react?
What then is the plan for dealing with Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and others in the Middle East?
Since China?s signing oil contracts around the world, how soon after America goes will they ink Iraq?
How high will gas prices rise?
Will Turkey stay an ally if Iraqi Kurds declare independence and urge Turkish Kurds to rebel?
Will Iraqis turn to Russia for tanks, planes, ships, missiles, mines, rockets, and nuclear enrichment?
Or will it be to the Chinese?
What will Saudis say?
How high will gas prices go?
More scraps
When do we cease spending billions on research to stop IEDs causing over half of American combat deaths? Since we?ll leave Afghanistan soon after abandoning Iraq, what good will anti-IED tactics do?
When do we announce the new American policy that we refuse to go anywhere IEDs are used, especially if eventually they?re chemical, biological, or dirty nuclear?
Boots
The American commander in Iraq says Iraq can protect itself by next Fall or the following Spring. Who takes over their training when the US goes? How many Iraqis will sign up then? Who?ll be in command?
Will an Iraqi general control the country if the current Iraqi government falls?
Will he be a Musharraf or a Mubarak?
As American troops withdraw, what will remaining ones do?
How will they be protected?
If by air, where based?
Will American planes still be accepted on Iraqi soil?
If not there, where?
If elsewhere in the Middle East, will Syria, Turkey, Jordan, Iran, or Saudi Arabia open its air space?
Which ports will still be open to US ships?
Other Angles
Some insist on additional US troops. Saddamists hid when they saw 140,000. Will they surface if they see more?
Will Syria and Iran offset American boosts?
Will Al Qaeda?
Time
Bill Clinton had been in office
? 13 months before the World Trade Center was bombed,
? four years when Osama Bin Laden declared war on the United States,
? six years when Al Qaeda destroyed American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania,
? eight years when the U.S.S. Cole was attacked.
How much time did he need to protect the US?
Five years ago the Twin Towers fell. How much more time does New York need to rebuild?
Iraq has had its constitution for 13 months, its prime minister less than six.
Time?s up.
?We cannot save the Iraqis from themselves,? the incoming Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee noted.
Could he tell us what we do with the remains?
Michael J. O'Shea
-
Geopolitical Diary: Dividing the Iraqi Pie
Iraq announced on Monday that President Jalal Talabani and Syrian President Bashar al Assad will travel to Iran this weekend to discuss the security situation in Iraq and its regional implications in a three-way summit with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The Iraqi government also said that Baghdad and Damascus will restore diplomatic relations during the current visit by Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Moualem.
These two events underscore the aggressive moves by Iran and (to a lesser degree) Syria to consolidate their positions ahead of their expected negotiations with the United States over the future of Iraq. Back in Washington, there is great anticipation regarding the forthcoming recommendations from the Iraq Study Group to the Bush administration in a report that is being seen as a U.S. blueprint to stabilize Iraq.
The big question on everyone's mind is this: given the deep divisions among Iraq's Shia, Sunni and Kurds, and given the divergent interests of all the parties who have a finger in the Iraqi pie, what kind of settlement can prevent the Iraqi state from imploding and creating havoc in the region? In other words, is there a formula for resolving the Iraqi crisis that is acceptable to all sides involved?
The triangular struggle within the country and the moves toward creating a federal Iraq with autonomous regions -- enshrined now in the country's constitution -- necessitate a restructuring of the Iraqi state at the subnational level. In fact, this process is already under way, with the creation of the autonomous Kurdistan region in the north and the moves by the Shia to create a similar autonomous zone in southern Iraq.
Currently, the Kurds have authority over the provinces of Arbil, Dahuk and As Sulaymaniyah, as well as de facto control over portions of Diyala, Ninawa and At Tamim provinces. The Shia envision their own future autonomous zone as comprising the governorates south of Baghdad -- Karbala, An Najaf, Al Muthanna, Basra, Dhi Qar, Maysin, Wasit, Al Qadisiyah and Babil.
What this means, however, is that the Sunni zone in central Iraq will be left with just two provinces: Anbar and Salah ad Din (with Baghdad likely being shared by all three sides). Not surprisingly, the Sunnis remain in staunch opposition to these moves because of the fear that such an arrangement leaves them politically and economically emasculated. Such a bleak prospect goes a long way toward explaining the Sunni insurgency. It is unlikely that the Sunnis can reverse the tide, however -- so if there is an agreement, it will be some permutation of federalism, and will require concessions from the Shia and the Kurds.
A potential compromise could have the Kurds giving up the provinces of Ninawa, At Tamim and Diyala. Significantly, the northern oil fields are located in the Kirkuk region in At Tamim province; the Kurds have been trying to run their independent oil operations in this area. However, it is quite possible that an agreement can be reached regarding the distribution of oil revenues, with the responsibility falling on Baghdad to make sure each community is represented. This is one issue on which the Sunni and the Shiite positions are close to one another, because both want oil to be under the control of the central government.
If that happens, the northern parts of these three provinces could merge into the Kurdish zone, while the central and southern areas could become part of the Sunni zone. Such an arrangement might be acceptable not only to the Shia, Sunnis and Kurds, but also to Iraq's neighbors, because it could keep the state from descending into anarchy. The Sunni Arab states would be relieved to see a robust Sunni zone. Turkey's concerns regarding the Kurds in the north could also be assuaged. And Iran will see the formation of the Shiite zone it is seeking in the south. Notably, none of the regional players is actually interested in a complete partition of the country, because of the threat of regional instability. The Arab states have long seen Iraq as a buffer between them and Iran, and the Iranians also want Iraq as a buffer -- but one in which they have more control than the Arab states do.
Of course, there is the question of whether such an arrangement could hold. For the moment, the various players involved in Iraq are likely to endorse such an arrangement just to back away from the precipice. They each have the option of coming back later on and subverting it when it furthers their interests to do so.
-
?
CAMP TAJI, Iraq ? A patrol from 1st Battalion, 66th Armor Regiment, 4th Infantry Division captured 2 terrorists while conducting a traffic control point operation north of Baghdad, on Nov. 18.
The Company E patrol searched a vehicle containing two suspicious occupants and found two cellular phones with text messages from wanted terrorists. The patrol arrested the terrorists.
In Baghdad, Soldiers from the 1st Squadron, 89th Calvary Regiment, 10th Mountain Division, seized a cache at approximately 9:30 a.m.
The seizure of arms and munitions consisted of three 155mm artillery rounds, a 120mm mortar round, 55 60mm mortar rounds, 37 anti-personnel RPG rounds, 32 anti-armor RPG rounds,? a hand grenade, 3 rifle scopes, a double-barrel shotgun, a crew-served weapon, a bag of blasting caps, 400 7.62mm linked rounds, 400 7.62 mm loose rounds and 200 .50 caliber rounds.
ISF, Coalition Forces find enemy cache complex
TIKRIT, Iraq ? Soldiers from 1st Brigade, 5th Iraqi Army, and paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne Division, dealt a blow to anti-Iraqi forces by killing nearly 50 insurgents and capturing 20 while uncovering a large cache complex.
During this combined operation, Soldiers from the Iraqi Army and U.S. soldiers uncovered 6 caches, many of which were buried in underground bunkers.? The caches included over 400,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition, 15,000 rounds of heavy machine gun ammunition, 5 mortars and numerous mortar rounds, 3 heavy machine guns, 3 anti-tank weapons, 2 recoilless rifles and numerous grenades, and artillery rounds.?
Additionally, the Soldiers noticed an abandoned Nissan truck with false license plates.? Upon searching the vehicle, the Soldiers uncovered a number of IED making material and anti-Iraqi forces items such as batteries, cellular phones, blasting caps, explosives, propaganda materials and a large amount of U.S. dollars.
?We made a significant impact on the enemy?s ability to conduct any type of anti-Iraqi force operations in this area,? said Lt. Col. Andrew Poppas, the paratroopers' commander.
10 TERRORISTS KILLED, 2 CAPTURED, WEAPONS CACHES DESTROYED
BAGHDAD, Iraq ? A Saturday morning raid targeting a terrorist in the Ramadi area led to 10 terrorists killed and 2 captured in separate incidents.
As U.S. forces moved toward the target building, terrorists began firing rocket-propelled grenades at them; ground forces returned fire, killing 3 terrorists. 2 terrorists were captured, one of whom had been shot during the raid.
Ground forces also received mortar fire from armed terrorists during the raid.? U.S. air support used precision fires to destroy the terrorists? vehicle, killing 5 terrorists.
After inspecting the targeted building and property, U.S. forces found multiple weapons caches, explosives, rocket-propelled grenades and small arms.
In a separate incident, U.S. forces killed two terrorists in an air strike Saturday afternoon near Baghdad. Intelligence reports indicated the terrorists were responsible for IED attacks and suicide bombing operations. U.S. aircraft engaged and destroyed the vehicle with precision fires, killing the driver and occupant.
U.S. forces conduct air strike at insurgents in Ramadi, 2 insurgents killed
RAMADI, Iraq - U.S. forces were engaged at several locations Sunday in Ramadi by a group of insurgents with small-arms fire.?
The insurgents took refuge in a nearby building and continued to engage U.S. forces. After establishing positive identification and in an effort to avoid endangering civilians, U.S. forces? conducted an air strike against the insurgents using a laser-guided missile, killing one insurgent. 3 insurgents fled the building and were engaged by U.S. forces, resulting in the death of another insurgent.
Iraqi Police deliver medical supplies in Ramadi
RAMADI, Iraq ? Iraqi Policemen with the Western Ramadi Police Sub-Station provided nearly 3,000 pounds of medical supplies to the Women?s and Children?s Hospital in Ar Ramadi Nov. 16.?
The Policemen conducted the relief operation, with assistance from Marines of 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, in response to requests from the local populace concerning a shortage in medical supplies.
The supplies, provided by the World Health Organization, are enough to support 10,000 residents for a period of three months. The supplies contain essential medicines and medical devices for primary healthcare workers with limited training.
The operation was the first step in a partnership between the hospital and Iraqi Security Forces to provide aid and basic services to the neediest citizens of Ramadi.
?This is a big and great help for us,? said Abd Alkhalq Z. Hassein, Director Assistant of the hospital. ?We are very proud that the Police of this city look after the needs of the people.?
11 TERRORISTS KILLED, 24 TERRORISTS CAPTURED
BAGHDAD, Iraq ? U.S. forces killed 11 terrorists and captured 24 other terrorists in multiple raids throughout Iraq Saturday.
During the first raid in the Tikrit area, U.S. forces captured 7 al-Qaida terrorists. After searching the targeted building, ground forces captured 5 more terrorists and discovered a cache of weapons and $20,000.? ?
U.S. forces also captured 2 terrorists and killed another terrorist in a raid east of Baqubah.? ?
In Hit, an armed terrorist threatened U.S. forces with small arms fire.? U.S. forces returned fire killing the terrorist and captured 4 other terrorists.? One of the terrorists is believed to have financed foreign fighters and is responsible for vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices and kidnappings in the Haditha and Hit regions. Weapons manuals and an overhead projector were also found in one of the rooms.
In Yusufiyah, U.S. forces were engaged by enemy forces and they returned fire, killing 9 terrorists and capturing 2 other terrorists.
A raid in Baghdad resulted in U.S. forces capturing 3 more terrorists.
Iraqi soldiers capture insurgents, find caches
TIKRIT, Iraq - Iraqi and U.S. forces captured 4 insurgents and found multiple caches during combat operations Thursday just east of Balad.
The caches included more than 30 artillery rounds, 16 mortar rounds, two machineguns, two rocket launchers, and several thousand rounds of small arms ammunition.? ?
?The discoveries of these caches put a dent in the roadside bombs in our area,? said Lt. Col Kevin Dunlop, commander of 3rd Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division.? ?This will send a message to all who plant and supply roadside bombs.?
Iraqi, US Forces Seize 2 Weapons Caches in Mansour
BAGHDAD ?U.S. Soldiers seized a weapons cache and assisted Iraqi security forces in discovering another, in the Baghdad today.
Soldiers from the 172nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team searched a residence of a terrorist and discovered a supply of weapons. They confiscated two AK-47s, six AK-47 magazines, a rifle, two hand grenades and an unknown amount of sniper ammo. In addition, the Soldiers detained a suspect for questioning.?
In a separate incident, U.S. Soldiers assisted Iraqi Army soldiers in seizing a weapons cache in the same area at approximately 3:20 p.m.
Iraqi police from the Mamun Station, with the assistance of Soldiers from 615th Military Police Company, were conducting a joint patrol when a citizen tipped the Iraqi policemen on a possible improvised explosive device in a nearby home.
When the joint patrol arrived at the suspect?s house, they discovered a cordon around it had already been set up by soldiers from the 6th Iraqi Army Division.
As a result, the U.S. forces reported that the Iraqi soldiers were able to confiscate a sniper rifle, two machineguns, a mortar tube, a rocket-propelled grenade launcher, numerous RPG rounds, and explosives and other materials used to fabricate improvised explosive devices from the residence.
Iraqi Security Forces target kidnapping cell
BAGHDAD ? Special Iraqi Security Forces, with coalition advisers, conducted a raid Nov. 18 in Sadr City, Baghdad to recover kidnapped persons and disrupt kidnapping and terror cells operating within Baghdad.? The Iraqi unit conducted an Iraqi government directed operation.
Credible intelligence indicated that an illegal armed group element held persons kidnapped from earlier this week. Documents found at the scene may lead to the whereabouts of other terrorists.
Iraqi Security Forces captures leader of a terrorist cell? ? ? ?
BAGHDAD ? Special Iraqi Security Forces, with coalition advisers, captured the leader of a terrorist cell responsible for attacks during a raid in the Arab A?Jabur area, south of Baghdad, Nov. 15.
The terrorist cell is linked to Al Qaeda in Iraq and is responsible for kidnappings; murder; home invasions; rape and car bombs.
Iraqi forces conducted a helicopter air-assault in the vicinity of the objective and captured the terrorist who had attempted to escape.
-
Here's a different take on things:
========
November 22, 2006
How Violent Is Iraq?
I've written previously on the level of violence in Iraq, comparing it to
murder rates in other times and places and to death rates that have been
experienced in actual civil wars. See here and here, for example. My
impression has been that violence in Iraq has skyrocketed since July, when I
found that the murder rate in Iraq was 140 per 100,000 (the usual way in
which murder rates are expressed). I was surprised, therefore, to learn this
morning that rate of violence has increased only slightly:
The United Nations said Wednesday that 3,709 Iraqi civilians were killed in
October, the highest monthly toll since the March 2003 U.S. invasion and
another sign of the severity of Iraq's sectarian bloodbath.
That compares to an estimated 3,500 killed in July. If 3,709 people were
murdered in October, that translates to a rate of 171 per 100,000. That is a
high rate of violent death. But, for purposes of comparison, the murder rate
in Washington, D.C. in 1991 was 80 per 100,000. So the rate of violence in
Iraq today is just over double the rate in the District during the first
Bush administration. I don't recall anyone describing conditions in
Washington in the early 90s as a "bloodbath."
I wrote in June that based on the data at that time, the murder rate in Iraq
outside of Baghdad is about the same as American cities like Chicago,
Philadelphia and Milwaukee. With the current numbers, it looks like that
would still be true.
A consensus seems to have developed that Iraq is a disaster because of
out-of-control sectarian violence. That consensus is driving proposals to
change our policy in Iraq, perhaps in the direction of a pull-out that could
lead to truly cataclysmic violence. So I think it makes sense to step back
and get a more realistic picture of the level of what is happening in Iraq:
violent? Yes. A disaster comparable to a civil war? No.
Posted by John at 11:31 AM
http://powerlineblog.com/archives/015994.php
-
Did you know that 47 countries' have reestablished their embassies in Iraq?
Did you know that the Iraqi government currently employs 1.2 million Iraqi people?
Did you know that 3100 schools have been renovated, 364 schools are under rehabilitation,
263 new schools are now under construction and 38 new schools have been completed in Iraq?
Did you know that Iraq's higher educational structure consists of 20 Universities, 46 Institutes or colleges and 4 research centers, all currently operating?
Did you know that 25 Iraq students departed for the United States in January 2005 for the re-established Fulbright program?
Did you know that the Iraqi Navy is operational? They have 5 - 100-foot patrol craft, 34 smaller vessels and a naval infantry regiment.
Did you know that Iraq's Air Force consists of three operational squadrons, which includes 9 reconnaissance and 3 US C-130 transport aircraft (under Iraqi operational control) which operate day and night, and will soon add 16 UH-1 helicopters and 4 Bell Jet Rangers?
Did you know that Iraq has a counter-terrorist unit and a Commando Battalion?
Did you know that the Iraqi Police Service has over 55,000 fully trained and equipped police officers?
Did you know that there are 5 Police Academies in Iraq
that produce over 3500 new officers each 8 weeks?
Did you know there are more than 1100 building projects going on in Iraq? They include 364 schools, 67 public clinics, 15 hospitals, 83 railroad stations,22 oil facilities, 93 water facilities and 69 electrical facilities.
Did you know that 96% of Iraqi children under the age of 5
have received the first 2 series of polio vaccinations?
Did you know that 4.3 million Iraqi children were enrolled in primary school by mid October?
Did you know that there are 1,192,000 cell phone subscribers in Iraq and phone use has gone up 158%?
Did you know that Iraq has an independent media that consists of 75 radio stations, 180 newspapers and 10 television stations?
Did you know that the Baghdad Stock Exchange opened in June of 2004?
Did you know that 2 candidates in the Iraqi presidential election had a televised debate recently?
OF COURSE WE DIDN'T KNOW!
WHY DIDN'T WE KNOW?
OUR? MEDIA WOULDN'T TELL US!
Instead of reflecting our love for our country,
we get photos of flag burning incidents at Abu Ghraib
and people throwing snowballs at the presidential motorcades.
Tragically, the lack of accentuating the positive in Iraq serves two purposes:? It is intended to undermine the world's perception of the United States thus minimizing consequent support, and it is intended to discourage American citizens.
---- Above facts are verifiable on the Department of Defense web site.
.......Pass it on!? Give it a Wide Dissemination!
-
All of this in one day's work: 21Nov06
3 TERRORISTS KILLED, 4 captured
BAGHDAD, Iraq ? U.S. troops killed 3 terrorists and captured 4 terrorists during a raid in Baghdad Tuesday.
Upon approaching a building, ground forces received small arms fire. U.S. troops returned fire killing three terrorists. During the search of the second targeted building, U.S. troops captured 4 terrorists and found 4 machine guns,
ISF targets kidnapping and murder cell, captures 7
BAGHDAD ? Special Iraqi Army Forces captured an illegal armed group kidnapping and murder cell leader during a raid Nov. 21 in Sadr City. The raid was launched to target this individual and to obtain information on the whereabouts of a kidnapped U.S. Soldier, Spec. Ahmed Al Taie, who was abducted Oct. 23. 6 additional terror cell members were captured.
4 insurgents captured, weapons cache found and 2 hostages rescued
TIKRIT, Iraq ? Soldiers from the 5th Iraqi Army Division and U.S. Soldiers from 1st Cavalry Division, captured 4 insurgents, recovered two kidnapped victims and seized a sizeable weapons cache Nov. 21 during an operation north of Muqdadiyah. The soldiers also discovered and disarmed seven IEDs near the sight.
Joint operation captures 45 south of Iraqi capital
LUTUFIYAH, Iraq ? Soldiers from the 6th Iraqi Army Division and U.S. soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division, captured 45 insurgents and terrorists Nov.21 during a combat operation in Lutufiyah, Iraq.
The brigade-size operation, Operation Silver Eagle, targeted personnel who were implicated in various crimes, terrorist activities and murders.
U.S. Marines & Iraqi Army troops rescue hostages during Operation Talon
CAMP FALLUJAH, Iraq ? Marines from Regimental Combat Team 5, operating in concert with 2nd Brigade, 1st Iraqi Army Division, rescued two hostages and captured 13 insurgents near Fallujah Nov 21.
Acting on reliable intelligence, the Coalition Forces were conducting cordon-and-search operations as part of Operation Talon when they discovered the hostages and apprehended the suspects.
In a separate incident, Marines captured 6 insurgents and various small arms near Habbaniyah today.
-
Broader in scope than the "Iraq" header, but it certainly applies.
Surrender as "Realism"
By Robert Kagan and William Kristol
Weekly Standard | November 27, 2006
Foreign policy realism is ascendant these days, we are told. This would be encouraging if true, because our foreign policy must indeed be realistic. But what passes for "realism" today has very little to do with reality. Indeed, if you look at some of the "realist" proposals on the table, "realism" has come to be a kind of code word for surrendering American interests and American allies, as well as American principles, in the Middle East.
Thus, the "realists" advise us to seek Syria's help in Iraq even as the Syrian government engages in a concerted campaign of assassinating every Lebanese political leader who opposes the return of Syrian hegemony in Lebanon. Presumably, the "realist" position is that we should give Lebanon back to Syria, or at least turn a blind eye to its murderous efforts to regain control there, as an incentive to Syria to help us in Iraq, where Syria is also engaged in supporting terrorists. "Realism" is letting dictators get away with terror and murder--and, in particular, letting them get away with the murder of our friends.
The "realists" advise seeking Iranian help in Iraq as well. They are coy about suggesting what the United States could give Tehran as an inducement for such assistance, but the implications of their position are clear. After all, the Bush administration has already offered to talk to Iran, provided the Iranians agree to suspend enrichment of uranium. That has also been the position of the Europeans. The Iranians have refused.
So the "realists" are adapting to the reality of Iranian intransigence. They are in effect suggesting that the administration drop its long-standing position and begin negotiating with Iran despite the Iranian regime's refusal to agree to the common U.S.-European demand. What the realists have in mind, then, is that the United States should turn a blind eye to Iran's nuclear weapons program, in exchange for Iran's help in easing our retreat from Iraq. Who cares if this would destroy U.S. credibility, weaken those in Europe who are trying to be strong, undermine the effort to prevent Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons, and lead to a cascade of additional nuclear states in the region? It would at least make possible further "realistic" accommodations to these new and deadly realities.
The "realists" also advise putting pressure on Israel to deal in a more forthcoming way with the Hamas-dominated Palestinian government. Israel should be induced to make concessions despite the ongoing violence and the refusal of Hamas to ratify even Yasser Arafat's acceptance of Israel's right to exist. Thus, in order to conciliate Arab dictators and radicals, Washington should retreat from long-standing principle and hand a dramatic victory to the forces of violence and extremism in Palestine.
So let's add up the "realist" proposals: We must retreat from Iraq, and thus abandon all those Iraqis--Shiite, Sunni, Kurd, and others--who have depended on the United States for safety and the promise of a better future. We must abandon our allies in Lebanon and the very idea of an independent Lebanon in order to win Syria's support for our retreat from Iraq. We must abandon our opposition to Iran's nuclear program in order to convince Iran to help us abandon Iraq. And we must pressure our ally, Israel, to accommodate a violent Hamas in order to gain radical Arab support for our retreat from Iraq.
This is what passes for realism these days. But of course this is not realism. It is capitulation. Were the United States to adopt this approach every time we faced a difficult set of problems, were we to attempt to satisfy our adversaries' every whim in order to win their acquiescence, we would rapidly cease to play any significant role in the world. We would be neither feared nor respected--nor, of course, would we be any better liked. Our retreat would win us no friends and lose us no adversaries.
What our adversaries in the Middle East want from us is very simple: They want us out. Unless we are prepared to withdraw, not just from Iraq but from the entire region, and from elsewhere as well, we had better start figuring out how to pursue effectively--realistically--our interests and goals. This is true American realism. All the rest is a fancy way of justifying surrender.
http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=25675
-
12 TERRORISTS KILLED NORTH OF BAGHDAD
BAGHDAD, Iraq ? U.S.troops killed 12 terrorists during a mission Saturday morning North of Baghdad. U.S.troops were en route to capture a terrorist associated with the manufacturing of vehicle borne improvised explosive devices. The terrorist and his associates were traveling in three vehicles.
As U.S.troops approached the vehicles, 12 armed terrorists ignored warning shots and attempted to maneuver on the ground force. U.S.troops engaged the vehicles with precision fires killing the 12 terrorists.
4 TERRORISTS KILLED, 8 CAPTURED
BAGHDAD, Iraq ? U.S.troops killed 4 terrorists and captured 8 others during a mission to disrupt an al-Qaida vehicle-borne improvised explosive device cell in Tarmiyah Friday.
As ground forces made their way toward the targeted building, they received enemy fire from the vicinity of a mosque. U.S.troops returned fire, killing 4 terrorists, and continued toward the targeted building.
At the targeted building, the ground forces captured 2 terrorists. After they left the building, they returned to the vicinity of the mosque and captured 6 more, including two wounded men.
Apache helicopter destroys rocket launcher in Sadr City, 3 terrorists killed
BAGHDAD ? A crew from an Apache attack helicopter destroyed a rocket launcher observed firing from a Sadr City neighborhood Nov. 24.
After observing the rocket fire, the air crew moved to the location where the rockets were launched and made positive identification of the 3 terrorists firing the rocket launchers. They engaged the target, killed 3 terrorists and destroyed the launchers. Insurgents six rockets prior to the U.S. intervention.
Also today, U.S. troops used precision artillery munitions to strike an explosive-laden building. Local residents tipped the U.S. troops to the building. U.S. troops intervened to diffuse the explosives. Efforts to diffuse the bombs failed and precision artillery fire was used to destroy the booby-trapped building.
10 TERRORISTS KILLED, BOMB-MAKING FACILITY DESTROYED
Baghdad, Iraq -- U.S. troops killed 10 terrorists and conducted an air strike on
an improvised explosive device factory during 3 simultaneous raids near al-Taji today. While approaching the objectives, U.S. troops encountered small arms fire and killed 10 terrorists.
During the exchange of fire, insurgents fired upon civilians. One pregnant woman and one teenaged male were injured. She and the teenage male were immediately evacuated to medical facilities. The teenage male died shortly after arriving at the hospital.
After the fighting, U.S. troops conducted a search of the area and discovered caches consisting of rocket-propelled grenades, machine guns. anti-aircraft weapons & pipe bombs. The caches were destroyed by coalition aircraft.
Joint Operation captures 10, seizes cache near Euphrates
CAMP STRIKER, Iraq - Soldiers of the 6th Iraqi Army Div., and 10th Mountain Division, captured 10 terrorists and found a cache of improvised explosive device components near al Taqa, a village on the banks of the Euphrates.
The 10 Iraqi males were caught attempting to emplace IEDs along a route which the U.S. forces were traveling. Upon questioning, the group identified a cache site. The cache contained two pressure plates, three portable phones and other explosive materiel.
Insurgent SVBIED kills two children, two others
FALLUJAH, Iraq - An insurgent suicide car-bomber murdered two children, one adult civilian, and one Coalition servicemember at a vehicle checkpoint near Khalidiyah today. Also injured in the attack were nine other civilians and another Coalition servicemember. The car-bomber was also killed in the explosion.
The nine injured civilians were taken to an Iraqi medical facility in Fallujah. ?The insurgency in Al Anbar continues to demonstrate its complete lack of concern for the people of the province,? said Marine Lieutenant Col. Bryan Salas. ?This brings the total to 10 children murdered by the insurgency in the last three months when adding the eight other children murdered during the insurgent IED attack on the soccer game on September 14 in Fallujah.?
U.S. troops conducts strike on insurgents killing 2, destroying weapons in vehicle
AR RAMADI, Iraq ? U.S. troops conducted a precision strike on insurgent forces after observing three men loading weapons from a known cache site into a vehicle in central Ramadi Nov. 26.
After establishing positive identification, U.S. troops fired precision ordnance at the vehicle, killing 2 terrorists. One terrorist was seen fleeing from the scene.
TOTAL: 32 dead terrorists, 8 captured in 3 days
-
November 29, 2006
When Killing is Enough to Defeat America
By Denis Keohane
Thanks to the development of mass media inclined to oppose the nation's efforts to obtain military victory, a new path to victory has opened up for America's enemies. Historically there have been instructive and useful criteria to gauge whether one was winning or losing a war. Most often, the tracking of such was a matter of looking at a mix of setbacks and advances, tactical or strategic. A linear path to victory or defeat is somewhat rare.
There have been, of course, exceptions. WWII France and First Gulf War Iraq fashioned an unblemished advance to utter defeat in almost record setting time. More often than not, though, the path to either victory or defeat was a mix. Our experience in the WWII Pacific theatre began with Pearl Harbor, followed by the fall of Bataan and Corregidor, and then at Midway things turned. During the Civil War, the Federal Army of the Potomac suffered defeat after defeat for two years, before achieving ultimate victory.
Yardsticks used to measure loss or gain were tangible, if not always clear to the general public as to the tactical or strategic implications. Ground seized and held was easy to see, especially if the enemy had held that ground and was forced into retreat, as with the German army's retreat from the Stalingrad. Despite the repeated failure of the Army of the Potomac to ?take Richmond', tacticians both North and South saw the slow but inexorable Union seizure of the strategic Mississippi northward from New Orleans and culminating in Grant's movements south to Vicksburg as the strategic stranglehold of the Confederacy that it was.
Then there were battles won and lost, surrenders, retreats and casualties. When one side ?quit the field' it was an easy benchmark. If the casualties taken in a battle by one side were dramatically worse than the other, as were Federal losses at Fredericksburg, it was easy to score as a defeat.
During the Vietnam War, public perceptions of what was a win or loss, strategic or tactical, began to change, and it is simply a fact that such change in perception came about through the evolution of the media. The Tet Offensive of 1968-1969 is now and belatedly admitted by virtually all sides to have been a major battlefield defeat for the communist forces, but the perception of the public in the United States was that it was a defeat for us. The communist forces made short term gains, took and held ground for a time, but were beaten back, and decisively so, suffering ten times the KIA as the US and our allied ARVN forces .
Yet Walter Cronkite took that opportunity to inform the American public that we were not winning, an idea that took hold here even though it was at odds with even the conclusion of the North Vietnamese commander, General Giap. It was a psychological victory, based on emotion, but psychological victory was and is sufficient to sap a nation's will to win.
The acceptance of a defeat when the facts said victory was in large part the result of a media onslaught on the public's emotions. There has been no battle of history, whether won or lost, for which still photos, film and impassioned reporting of tragedy and loss could not have been presented for either the victorious or losing side. Simply put, if in June of 1944, American newspaper and periodicals were flooded with photos of the torn bodies of hundreds or thousands of dead Americans littering the beaches and hedgerows of Normandy, and likewise showed images of some of the 12,000 French civilians killed during the six weeks of Operation Overlord, the nation might have seen something less than a victory and possibly something as not worth the high cost.
In all the years of the Vietnam War, US forces never lost any battle or engagement with the North Vietnamese or the Viet Cong larger than company size. No US battalions or regiments were overrun, wiped out or captured, as had happened to the French in Vietnam at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. Yet the years-long imagery of our young men wounded and dying and Vietnamese civilians suffering most certainly cemented the idea of constant loss and ultimate waste in much of the public's consciousness.
Then another crtical development occurred. The ability to kill, to kill anyone, became a credential for legitimacy and a criteria for being granted some respectability at the bargaining tables and in the media of the world. In the seventies, both the IRA and the PLO showed that murder obtained political respect and got attention.
From those events and since Iraq, there is an evolving new standard of measurement of victory or loss taking hold in our perceptions of warfare, that has serious and potentially disastrous long term implications for how we understand, if we do, the wars we are in or may be in. We are establishing a generally held war psychology whereby something like victory is granted to one side based on nothing more than that side's willingness and ability to kill, even indiscriminately kill, soldiers, non-combatants and civilians.
Almost every TV report on the War in Iraq seems to begin with something along the line of ?The killing continues in Iraq...' or ?Despite administration claims of progress in Iraq, more bombings today claimed the lives of....' Democrats and Iraq War opponents repeatedly point to the continuing, or periodically escalated spikes in, levels of violence and killing as evidence that we cannot win or are not winning. Yet the various insurgent and terrorist groups can kill our soldiers and Iraqi forces, but only in numbers that, while individually tragic and an irreplaceable loss, pale in comparison to our experiences in other wars.
When our nation's population was one tenth of what it is now, we suffered more KIA in the one day Battle of Antietam than we have suffered in both Afghanistan and Iraq combined since both wars began. On D-Day alone, the US had 1,465 KIA. We lost over 6,800 KIA in the battle for Iwo Jima. We suffered almost 54,000 deaths in Korea in just three years. In every year from 1966 through 1970 in Vietnam we suffered between 6,000 and 16,000 deaths.
We have had no bases overrun in Iraq. No unit as small as a platoon has been wiped out or captured. At Corregidor in WWII, 11,000 American troops surrendered and were taken prisoners by the Japanese, and another 15,000 were taken at the Fall of Bataan. Many thousands of those died under brutal conditions imposed by their captors. If one or two American soldiers are captured in Iraq, and we presume with cause that they will be killed, it is indeed a tragedy, but it is treated in the media as something of a cause for national trauma.
The various insurgencies and terror groups from the Sunni-Baathists to the Shia militias to the Al Qaeda affiliates can and have held ground, but as at Tal Afar, Ramadi, Fallujah and elsewhere, when pressed, cannot hold that ground. None of those groups has been able to rally enough Iraqi public sentiment to its side to be seen as anything like the popular favorite and inevitable winner in the bloody Iraqi intramural. None has the popular leader or vision of governance that is rallying ever more popular support, and each simply maintains its particular and mostly stagnant core of support. Each of those groups has taken more and more to hitting soft targets. Unable to gain even minor real tactical victories against coalition and now even Iraqi national forces, all are targeting civilians, with death squads and bombings that intentionally kill civilians in large numbers at Mosques, markets and even soccer fields.
More and more that death toll is being presented as evidence that we are not winning, and cannot win. That makes the reverse true: that if they can merely kill, even civilians, they are winning tactically and even strategically.
Merely killing a lot of civilians is not a high bar to attain, and that lesson will be learned and copied, again and again.
If we withdraw from Iraq before the country is stable, and do so on the grounds that the continuous killing of civilians and our forces at historically low levels is unacceptable, we will have taught many an able and willing student that victory in war can be had simply by slaughter, constant, repeated, indiscriminate slaughter, of anyone, including women and children.
If the ability of the enemy to kill even the unarmed is what grants victory, Iraq cannot be won. All the various insurgents need to do when any area or region becomes too hot, is go elsewhere and kill! If we seal the supply routes from Iran and Syria and deprive them of arms and weapons, just remember that in Rwanda, hundreds of thousands were killed by clubs and knives.
Success will be copied by the next determined group of murderous psychopaths and thugs, and we will have allowed it to happen by granting psychological victory fed by imagery that preys on emotions and saps our will. If we withdraw and lose this one out of a desire to stop the violence, just because we can't stop all killing while there, we will guarantee a massive amount of worldwide murder in the future!
Forget Sun Tzu, ClausEwitz or Mahan! Al-Zarqawi will posthumously be granted the distinction of having been a great military theoretician. Just kill! Anyone. Continuously.
If we do not meet murder on a horrendous scale with resolve and retribution but rather with retreat, a simple path to victory opens up for any thuggish group or regime, and the world will descend further toward a state of nature.
Page Printed from: http://www.americanthinker.com/2006/11/when_killing_is_enough_to_defe.html at November 29, 2006 - 02:42:13 PM EST
-
I'm still up in the air about civil war/not civil war in Iraq, but I'n surprised that no one seems to be looking up the actual definition of the words. So here it is:
As per Webster:
civil war
Function: noun
: a war between opposing groups of citizens of the same country
As per American Heritage dictionary:
civil war
n.
A war between factions or regions of the same country.
A state of hostility or conflict between elements within an organization.
As per Wikipedia:
A civil war is a war in which parties within the same culture, society or nationality fight for political power or control of an area. Political scientists use two criteria: the warring groups must be from the same country and fighting for control of the political center, control over a separatist state or to force a major change in policy. The second criterion is that at least 1,000 people must have been killed in total, with at least 100 from each side.
Some civil wars are also categorized as revolutions when major societal restructuring is a possible outcome of the conflict. An insurgency, whether successful or not, is likely to be classified as a civil war by some historians if, and only if, organized armies fight conventional battles. Other historians state the criterion for a civil war is that there must be prolonged violence between organized factions or defined regions of a country (conventionally fought or not).
Ultimately the distinction between a "civil war" and a "revolution" or other name is arbitrary, and determined by usage. The successful revolution of the 1640s in England which led to the (temporary) overthrow of the monarchy became known as the English Civil War. The successful insurgency of the 1770s in British colonies in America, with organized armies fighting battles, came to be known as the American Revolution. In the United States, and in American-dominated sources, the term 'the civil war' almost always means the American Civil War, with other civil wars noted or inferred from context.
Factors such as nationalism, religion, and ideology played little role in pre-modern civil wars. Modern nationalists have commonly read past revolts (such as Scotland against England or Catalonia against Spain) as early stirrings of nationalism, the truth is that these conflicts were in fact feudal or dynastic rather than national. There are some pre-modern civil wars that can be seen as fueled by religion (the Jewish Revolts against Rome), but these can also be seen as revolts by a servile people against their oppressors or uprisings by local notables in an attempt to gain independence.
-
U.S.& Iraqi Army troops kicking bad guys in the butt:
8 TERRORISTS KILLED DURING EARLY MORNING RAID NEAR BAQUBAH
BAGHDAD, IRAQ – U.S. troops killed 8 al-Qaida terrorists today in an early-morning raid near Baqubah.
Acting upon intelligence sources, U.S. troops launched an operation to detain individuals running a known terrorist cell. At the objective, U.S. troops received enemy rifle and machine gun fire. Due to the heavy volume of enemy fire, U.S. troops also engaged the terrorists by calling in airstrikes.
U.S.A.F. fighters fired rounds neutralizing the enemy threat. U.S. troops then cleared the objective of terrorists. Upon a search of the objective area, they found 2 female nationals who were killed during the firefight. U.S. troops found machine guns, AK-47s and rifles at the scene.
U.S. Troops Conducts Strike On Insurgents, Killing 2
AR RAMADI, Iraq – U.S. troops conducted a precision strike on insurgent forces after observing 3 men loading weapons from a known cache site into a vehicle in central Ramadi.
After making positive identification, U.S. troops fired precision ordnance at the vehicle, killing 2 terrorists. One terrorist was seen limping away from the scene.
U.S. Forces Engage Insurgents & Supporters In Ar Ramadi, 6 Killed
AR RAMADI, Iraq – 6 Iraqis were killed in conjunction with a firefight in the hostile Hamaniyah area in Ar Ramadi in the early hours of Nov. 28.
Prior to dawn, U.S. troops discovered an improvised explosive device in a historic IED location in Hamaniyah. The patrol spotted 2 insurgents moving away from the trigger site. The 2 men took up positions on the roof of a house and observed the U.S. troops clearing the IED.
As U.S. troops cleared the IED, the insurgents engaged the soldiers providing security with small arms fire. After establishing positive identification, U.S. troops engaged with small arms and machine gun fire. As the insurgents continued to engage the patrol, U.S. troops returned fire with M1-A1 Abrams main gun tank rounds. U.S. troops conducted an extensive search of the house and found 6 Iraqis dead.
According to local residents, the house was a known insurgent safe house. It was reported that one of the insurgents was wounded and other insurgents came to him from the house.
2 Terrorists Arrested In Funeral Procession
FORWARD OPERATING BASE MAHMUDIYAH, Iraq — Soldiers of the 6th Iraqi Army Division stopped a vehicle north of FOB Mahmudiyah Nov. 24, discovering that the driver and passenger were heavily armed.
Soldiers found an Uzi submachine gun with a silencer in the vehicle, as well as a number of hand grenades, and multiple false identification papers. The vehicle had infiltrated a funeral procession when it was stopped, but none of the people in the procession could identify the men.
The men were uncooperative during questioning by Iraqi troops and were taken to an Iraqi Army facility for further interrogation.
Special Iraqi Army Forces Captures 2 Leaders, 7 Others, of Illegal Armed Group IED Cell
BAGHDAD – Special Iraqi Army Forces, with U.S. advisors, captured 2 leaders of an illegal armed group cell during a raid Nov. 28 in Baghdad who are believed to be responsible for producing and detonating improvised explosive devices and car bombs. 7 other terrorists were captured by Iraqi forces during the raid.
Iraqi Army captures 2 in mortar attack near Taji
TAJI, Iraq – Iraqi Army Soldiers of the 9th Iraqi Army Division captured 2 insurgents here today on a motorcycle carrying 3 mortar rounds and a large sum of money.
The two men were placed into custody after allegedly firing two mortar rounds into the 2nd Iraqi Brigade’s area of operations. The insurgents were passing through an Iraqi checkpoint at the time of their capture. Iraqi Army soldiers were conducting a reconnaissance mission in the area after discovering mortar rounds had been fired in their vicinity.
Iraqi Army Troops Kill 3, Captures 28 Insurgents
BAGHDAD - Iraqi soldiers killed 3 insurgents and arrested 28 during the past 24 hours in different parts of Iraq, the Defence Ministry said.
-
EXCLUSIVE: Iranian Weapons Arm Iraqi Militia
By JONATHAN KARL AND MARTIN CLANCY
WASHINGTON, Nov. 30, 2006 — U.S. officials say they have found smoking-gun evidence of Iranian support for terrorists in Iraq: brand-new weapons fresh from Iranian factories. According to a senior defense official, coalition forces have recently seized Iranian-made weapons and munitions that bear manufacturing dates in 2006.
This suggests, say the sources, that the material is going directly from Iranian factories to Shia militias, rather than taking a roundabout path through the black market. "There is no way this could be done without (Iranian) government approval," says a senior official.
Iranian-made munitions found in Iraq include advanced IEDs designed to pierce armor and anti-tank weapons. U.S. intelligence believes the weapons have been supplied to Iraq's growing Shia militias from Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, which is also believed to be training Iraqi militia fighters in Iran.
Evidence is mounting, too, that the most powerful militia in Iraq, Moktada al-Sadr's Mahdi army, is receiving training support from the Iranian-backed terrorists of Hezbollah.
Two senior U.S. defense officials confirmed to ABC News earlier reports that fighters from the Mahdi army have traveled to Lebanon to receive training from Hezbollah.
While the New York Times reported that as many as 2,000 Iraqi militia fighters had received training in Lebanon, one of the senior officials said he believed the number was "closer to 1,000." Officials say a much smaller number of Hezbollah fighters have also traveled through Syria and into Iraq to provide training.
U.S. intelligence officials believe the number of Al-Sadr's Mahdi army now includes 40,000 fighters, making it an especially formidable force.
http://abcnews.go.com/International/IraqCoverage/story?id=2688501
-
Stratfor.com
Geopolitical Diary: Undoing De-Baathification, Maybe
Ali al-Lamy, head of Iraq's Supreme National Council for De-Baathification, said Monday that the government has drafted a law that could reinstate thousands of members of the Baath Party who were purged in the wake of the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. Al-Lamy, a Shi'i, said the move will allow many former Baathists -- but not the top 1,500 party cadres considered complicit in crimes -- "to return to their posts or get pensions." He also warned that the party will remain outlawed and that those who insist on remaining affiliated with it will be considered terrorists.
This announcement is most likely a Shiite response to reports that Washington is engaged in negotiations with Sunni insurgent groups. The Iraqi Shia and their Iranian patrons would prefer to control the magnitude and direction of any accommodation with the Sunnis themselves, and do not want to see the United States engaging in direct talks.
The decision to rehabilitate former ruling party members would also explain this weekend's offer from Tehran to consider a hypothetical U.S. offer of talks on Iraq. The Iranians realize that there is an opportunity at hand to consolidate their gains in Iraq; they also feel that they need to counter any U.S.-Sunni deals that could upset Tehran's calculations and those of its proxies within Iraq.
There has been a recent increase in tensions between the Bush administration and its erstwhile Iraqi Shiite allies, but there has been friction over Washington's desire to use the Sunnis as a lever to contain Shiite ambitions for quite some time. In fact, the de-Baathification issue came up during last year's intense negotiations over the drafting of the Iraqi Constitution. At one point, U.S. President George W. Bush personally telephoned the leader of the ruling Shiite United Iraqi Alliance, Abdel-Aziz al-Hakim -- who is also chief of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, Iran's closest ally in Iraq -- asking him to make compromises on parts of the constitution that would purge former members of Saddam Hussein's Sunni-dominated Baath Party from government jobs.
That the Shia, some 15 months later, are willing to make considerable concessions to the Sunnis on this point demonstrates that they fear direct dealings between Washington and the Sunnis can hurt the Shiite position in Iraq. This draft law is essentially a Shiite offer to the Sunnis, who have been demanding the reversal of de-Baathification in exchange for containing the insurgency.
But the Shia are also hedging their bets. They are not prepared to see the reversal of their efforts to neutralize the Baath Party. The law, at the moment, is only a draft. It will be subject to significant back-and-forth negotiations before it comes anywhere close to making it onto the books. The actual law will be a watered down version of today's generous offer.
By extending this olive branch to the Sunnis, the Shia -- who are under pressure to rein in the Shiite militias -- hope to thwart any U.S. moves and to contain the Sunni insurgency. The question now is, how will the Sunnis respond?
-
Into Every Blue Ribbon Commission a Beam of Light Must Shine
Baker/Hamilton opened a window onto Iran.
By Michael Ledeen
At first I, too, thought the Iraq Surrender Commission Report was a total downer. But I’m more and more convinced that it was a great blessing. Not that they intended it to work out this way, but the Wise Men (and the token Lady) have elevated Iran to its rightful place in our national squabble over The war: dead center.
The Surrender Commission Report underlines the basic truth about The War, which is that we cannot possibly win it by fighting defensively in Iraq alone. So long as Iran and Syria have a free shot at us and our Iraqi allies, they can trump most any military tactics we adopt, at most any imaginable level of troops. Until the publication of the report this was the dirty secret buried under years of misleading rhetoric from our leaders; now it is front and center. Either deal effectively with Iran, or suffer a humiliating defeat, repeating the terrible humiliation of Lebanon in the Eighties when Iran and Syria bombed us out of the country (thereby providing the template for the terror war in Iraq).
The Surrender Commission members do not shrink from humiliation. They want American troops out of Iraq, and therefore they advocate appeasing the Syrians and Iranians. But a considerable number of Americans don’t want to be humiliated by the clerical fascists in Tehran, and I think it’s fair to say the recommendations have largely bombed, despite the flattering photos in Vogue, and the fawning attention from the MSM, including Time’s respectful parroting of (what they must know is) mullah disinformation, and reporting, with an obvious tone of sadness, that the Baker/Hamilton call for talks is more popular in Tehran than in America.
Most Americans are disgusted at the thought of an American president kissing the Supreme Leader’s turban, as are Jim Woolsey and Jon Kyl, who put it very nicely in an open letter to President Bush. Talking to the mullahs is wrong for many reasons, they say:
First, such negotiations will legitimate that increasingly dangerous regime and reward its violent and hostile actions against us and our allies. We should rather endeavor to discredit and undermine this regime. Second, such a course will embolden our enemies who already believe they are sapping our will to resist them. Third, such an initiative would buy further time for the Iranian mullahs to obtain and prepare to wield weapons of mass destruction. Fourth, entering into negotiations with Tehran’s theocrats will create the illusion that we are taking useful steps to contend with the threat from Iran — when, in fact, we would not be. As a result, other, more effective actions — specifically, steps aimed at encouraging regime change in Iran — will not be pursued.
Notice that Woolsey and Kyl are not just talking about Iraq; they have a commendable focus on Iran itself. They call it dangerous, violent, and hostile, they want its downfall, not its good will. They want a policy to promote regime change instead of further blithering that will give the mullahs more time to rout us and our allies all over the Middle East.
Maybe the sight of the Iranian hangman is beginning to concentrate the minds of our political class. I wish other members of the Senate had had the courage and coherence of Senator Santorum, who voted against the Gates nomination because he didn’t find Gates tough enough on Iran. A big ‘no’ vote, accompanied by criticism of appeasement of Iran and Syria, would have sent a message to the entire administration. But courage and coherence are always in short supply in this town, and it’s nice to hear a broad-based Bronx cheer for the Surrender Commission.
It would be far nicer to see some real action from this administration. For starters, the president and the secretary of state should finally educate the American public about the real dimensions of the Iranian threat:
Somalia, where the Iranian-backed “Islamic courts” have seized a large part of the country and imposed the usual medieval methods made infamous in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. Notice the (Shiite) support for these Sunni fascists;
Lebanon, where Iranian-backed (indeed, Iranian-created) Hezbollah is laying siege to the freely elected government, demanding its surrender. Moreover, Iran has rearmed Hezbollah forces in the south, providing new rockets and missiles for another round of the ongoing war against Israel;
Palestine, where Iranian-backed Hamas, in open defiance of the usual calls for negotiations with Israel, has renewed its vow to never recognize the existence of the Jewish state. The most recent such proclamation came in Tehran, on the eve of a conference on the Holocaust, designed to both deny it ever happened and encourage its repetition;
Iraq, where, after three years of official denials, the U.S. has confirmed what our troops have long known, namely that the Iranian regime is manufacturing weapons and providing them to terrorists for use against our soldiers and Iraqi military and civilian personnel. And in recent days, the U.S. has finally confirmed that Hezbollah is training Shiite terrorists in Iraq.
In short, Iran is waging war against us and our allies throughout the region, and a real debate about Iran may, at long last, force us to face the real (regional) strategic problem. If that happens, we can take the Woolsey/Kyl letter as a starting point for a serious war-winning policy, which must have as its basic mission the removal of the regimes in Tehran and Damascus.
Faster, Please! Good old Jim Baker and Lee Hamilton have unexpectedly given us a window of opportunity, don’t run away from it.
— Michael Ledeen, an NRO contributing editor, is most recently the author of The War Against the Terror Masters. He is resident scholar in the Freedom Chair at the American Enterprise Institute.
National Review Online - http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=OWI0ZmY2ZWI2ZWFmNTE4MDgwNGEyNDNkYjZkMzRmM2M=
-
IRAQ: IT'S TIME TO TAKE SIDES
By RALPH PETERS
December 14, 2006 -- AMERICAN diplomats and politically correct gener als
want to be honest bro kers in the Middle East, to achieve peace through
forbearance and negotiated compromises. It may be the most-hopeless dream in
the history of foreign affairs.
The deadly hatred goes too deep between Shia and Sunni (killing Jews is just
for practice). You can't broker peace between fanatics.
East of Athens, you have to pick a side and stick to it, no matter how it
behaves toward its enemies. Restraint is viewed as weakness; olive branches
signal cowardice, and aid is seen as a bribe.
Although Israel's existence is increasingly threatened, the unavoidable
struggle is between Sunni and Shia. Transcending their internal fault lines
- for now - these two competing forms of Islam are already at war in Iraq.
It's only a matter of time until the fighting spreads.
The question isn't "How can we stop it?" We can't. Even delaying the
confrontation may come at too high a price. The right question is "How do we
make sure we're on the winning side?"
The dynamism is with the Shia. Oppressed for centuries, Arab Shia have found
their strategic footing. Tehran's backing helps, but the rise of Shia power
is not synonymous with Iranian power - unless our old-school diplomacy makes
it so.
East of Suez and west of Kabul, Sunni Arab dominance is waning. To future
historians, al Qaeda may appear little more than the death-rattle of a
collapsing order. Jordan may have a future - if that future is guaranteed by
the West - but Syria's grandiose ambitions are unsustainable, and it's
difficult to imagine the long-term survival of the decayed Saudi royal
family.
Now the Saudis are threatening us: If we turn our backs on Iraq's Sunni
Arabs, Riyadh says it will fund the insurgents.
The threat might carry more weight if Saudis weren't already funding Iraq's
Sunni butchers. And note that Saudi Arabia hasn't threatened to intervene
militarily - the playboy princes know that their incompetent armed forces
would collapse if sent to Iraq.
It's time to call Riyadh's bluff.
Having made whores of innumerable politicians on both sides of the aisle in
Washington, the Saudis still hope to steer American policy the way they did
before their citizens attacked us on 9/11.
Now they demand American protection for those Iraqis who have done their
best to kill our troops, instigate a religious civil war, slaughter the
innocent and destroy any hope Iraq has of a better future.
You bet we can always count on our Saudi pals to look out for our interests.
Perhaps we should reciprocate by threatening to fund the discontented Shia
who live atop the richest Saudi oil fields.
The Saudis could have undercut the insurgency in Iraq in 2003. Instead, they
backed it - because they refused to give up the old order in which the Sunni
Arabs - less than 20 percent of Iraq's population - ruled in Baghdad. But
Riyadh's policy of channeling funds through private donors didn't fool
anybody who didn't want to be fooled.
The Saudi (and Syrian) tactics backfired: Enraging Iraq's Shia only made the
weakness of the Sunni position obvious. Now only the presence of our troops
- whom the Sunnis continue to attack - protects Iraq's Sunnis from a
massacre. Isn't it time to stop defending those who murder our troops?
Our wrongheaded attempt to placate Iraq's Sunni Arabs failed utterly. Some
military officers suffering from client-itis argue that their Sunnis really
are on our side. But we need to face the facts: For all of Muqtada al-Sadr's
Shia shenanigans, it's the Sunni Arabs who have destroyed Iraq.
We've tried all of the politically correct negotiations-and-aid nonsense.
Now it's time to take sides.
Unfortunately, Washington's impulse will be to continue squandering the
blood of our troops to preserve the - doomed - existing order in the Middle
East, to keep borders intact and the region's miserable kings, sheikhs,
emirs and presidents-for-life in power.
Our political leaders are lazy creatures of habit who default to
yesteryear's failed theories in any crisis. New ideas just upset them.
So any attempt to disengage from our Sunni Arab enemies to back the
ascendant Shia will hit plenty of roadblocks in D.C. The slam-on-the-brakes
question will always be, "Do you want to strengthen Iran?" (Unless, of
course, you're a congressman responsible for intelligence oversight, in
which case all those pesky Sunni/Shia, Iran/Iraq details are beneath your
notice.)
Equating "Shia" with "Iran," then writing off the Shia option would be
strategic idiocy (in other words, business as usual). Instead, we need to
ask ourselves how we can wean the region's Shia - including restive young
Iranians - from Tehran's breast.
Some Iraqi Shia do feel an affinity for Iran - but many don't; Arabs find
Persians racist and condescending.
Here's the critical issue: How do we channel the unstoppable rise of Shia
power into a course that doesn't threaten us? (One answer: Don't pander to
their deadly enemies, such as Iraq's Sunni insurgents).
And if the terrified Saudis want us to rescue their nasty backsides again,
let's ask just what they plan to do for us in return - then let's see them
actually do it.
But our response to any threat from Riyadh should be a public smackdown.
Without our support, the Saudis are defenseless. Let's stop pretending we're
the ones who need help.
We have to shift onto the winning side of history. Increasingly, that
doesn't look "Sunni side up." Yes, face down Iran. But do it wisely, by
cooperating with those Shia who fear Tehran's imperial ambitions - rather
than alienating them for the sake of Jim Baker's Saudi friends.
We've tried to be fair, and we failed. Now let's concentrate on winning.
Ralph Peters' latest book is "Never Quit The Fight."
-
Neo Culpa
Please don't call them "architects of the war": Richard (Prince of Darkness) Perle, David (Axis of Evil) Frum, Kenneth (Cakewalk) Adelman, and other elite neoconservatives who pushed for the invasion of Iraq are beside themselves at the result.
by david rose january 2007
I: About That Cakewalk …
I remember sitting with Richard Perle in his suite at London's Grosvenor House hotel and receiving a private lecture on the importance of securing victory in Iraq. "Iraq is a very good candidate for democratic reform," he said. "It won't be Westminster overnight, but the great democracies of the world didn't achieve the full, rich structure of democratic governance overnight. The Iraqis have a decent chance of succeeding."
In addition to a whiff of gunpowder, Perle seemed to exude the scent of liberation—not only for Iraqis, but for all the Middle East. After the fall of Saddam Hussein, Perle suggested, Iranian reformers would feel emboldened to change their own regime, while Syria would take seriously American demands to cease its support for terrorists.
Perle had spent much of the 1990s urging the ouster of Saddam Hussein. He was aligned with the Project for the New American Century, a neoconservative think tank that agitated for Saddam's removal, and he had helped to engineer the 1998 Iraq Liberation Act, which established regime change as formal U.S. policy. After the accession of George W. Bush, in 2001, Perle was appointed chairman of the Pentagon's Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee, and at its first meeting after 9/11—attended by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld; his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz; and Rumsfeld's No. 3, Douglas Feith—Perle arranged a presentation from the exiled Iraqi dissident Ahmad Chalabi. Perle wanted to shut down terrorist havens—not only in Afghanistan but also in Iraq. When we spoke at Grosvenor House, it was late February 2003, and the culmination of all this effort—Operation Iraqi Freedom—was less than a month away.
Three years later, Perle and I meet again, at his home outside Washington, D.C. It is October 2006, the worst month for U.S. casualties in Iraq in nearly two years, and Republicans are bracing for what will prove to be sweeping losses in the upcoming midterm elections. As he looks into my eyes, speaking slowly and with obvious deliberation, Perle is unrecognizable as the confident hawk I once knew. "The levels of brutality that we've seen are truly horrifying, and I have to say, I underestimated the depravity," Perle says, adding that total defeat—an American withdrawal that leaves Iraq as an anarchic "failed state"—is not yet inevitable, but is becoming more likely. "And then," he says, "you'll get all the mayhem that the world is capable of creating."
According to Perle, who left the Defense Policy Board in 2004, this unfolding catastrophe has a central cause: devastating dysfunction within the Bush administration. The policy process has been nothing short of "disastrous," he says. "The decisions did not get made that should have been. They didn't get made in a timely fashion, and the differences were argued out endlessly. At the end of the day, you have to hold the president responsible.… I think he was led to believe that things were chugging along far more purposefully and coherently than in fact they were. I think he didn't realize the depth of the disputes underneath. I don't think he realized the extent of the opposition within his own administration, and the disloyalty."
Perle goes as far as to say that, if he had his time over, he would not advocate an invasion of Iraq: "I think if I had been delphic, and had seen where we are today, and people had said, 'Should we go into Iraq?,' I think now I probably would have said, 'No, let's consider other strategies for dealing with the thing that concerns us most, which is Saddam supplying weapons of mass destruction to terrorists.' … I don't say that because I no longer believe that Saddam had the capability to produce weapons of mass destruction, or that he was not in contact with terrorists. I believe those two premises were both correct. Could we have managed that threat by means other than a direct military intervention? Well, maybe we could have."
Having spoken with Perle, I wonder: What do the rest of the war's neoconservative proponents think? If the much-caricatured "Prince of Darkness" is now plagued with doubt, how do his comrades-in-arms feel? I am particularly interested in finding out because I interviewed some of the neocons before the invasion and, like many people, found much to admire in their vision of spreading democracy in the Middle East.
I expect to encounter disappointment. What I find instead is despair, and fury at the incompetence of the Bush administration many neocons once saw as their brightest hope.
David Frum, the former White House speechwriter who co-wrote Bush's 2002 State of the Union address, accusing Iraq of being part of an "axis of evil," says it now looks as if defeat may be inescapable, because "the insurgency has proven it can kill anyone who cooperates, and the United States and its friends have failed to prove that it can protect them. If you are your typical, human non-hero, then it's very hard at this point to justify to yourself and your family taking any risks at all on behalf of the coalition." This situation, he says, must ultimately be blamed on "failure at the center."
Kenneth Adelman famously predicted a "cakewalk" in Iraq.
Kenneth Adelman, a longtime neocon activist and Pentagon insider who has served on the Defense Policy Board, wrote a famous op-ed article in The Washington Post in February 2002, arguing, "I believe that demolishing Hussein's military power and liberating Iraq would be a cakewalk." Now he says, "I am extremely disappointed by the outcome in Iraq, because I just presumed that what I considered to be the most competent national-security team since Truman was indeed going to be competent. They turned out to be among the most incompetent teams in the postwar era. Not only did each of them, individually, have enormous flaws, but together they were deadly, dysfunctional."
Fearing that worse is still to come, Adelman believes that neoconservatism itself—what he defines as "the idea of a tough foreign policy on behalf of morality, the idea of using our power for moral good in the world"—is dead, at least for a generation. After Iraq, he says, "it's not going to sell." And if he, too, had his time over, Adelman says, "I would write an article that would be skeptical over whether there would be a performance that would be good enough to implement our policy. The policy can be absolutely right, and noble, beneficial, but if you can't execute it, it's useless, just useless. I guess that's what I would have said: that Bush's arguments are absolutely right, but you know what? You just have to put them in the drawer marked CAN'T DO. And that's very different from LET'S GO."
James Woolsey, another Defense Policy Board member, who served as director of the C.I.A. under President Clinton, lobbied for an Iraq invasion with a prodigious output of articles, speeches, and television interviews. At a public debate hosted by Vanity Fair in September 2004, he was still happy to argue for the motion that "George W. Bush has made the world a safer place." Now he draws explicit parallels between Iraq and Vietnam, aghast at what he sees as profound American errors that have ignored the lessons learned so painfully 40 years ago. He has not given up hope: "As of mid-October of '06, the outcome isn't clear yet." But if, says Woolsey, as now seems quite possible, the Iraqi adventure ends with American defeat, the consequences will be "awful, awful.… It will convince the jihadis and al-Qaeda-in-Iraq types as well as the residual Ba'thists that we are a paper tiger, and they or anybody they want to help can take us on anywhere and anytime they want and be effective, that we don't have the stomach to stay and fight."
Professor Eliot Cohen of Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, yet another Defense Policy Board member and longtime advocate of ousting Saddam Hussein, is even more pessimistic: "People sometimes ask me, 'If you knew then what you know now, would you still have been in favor of the war?' Usually they're thinking about the W.M.D. stuff. My response is that the thing I know now that I did not know then is just how incredibly incompetent we would be, which is the most sobering part of all this. I'm pretty grim. I think we're heading for a very dark world, because the long-term consequences of this are very large, not just for Iraq, not just for the region, but globally—for our reputation, for what the Iranians do, all kinds of stuff."
-
II: Let the Finger-Pointing Begin
I turn in my piece on Thursday, November 2—five days before the midterm elections. The following day, the editors phone to say that its contents—especially the comments by Perle, Adelman, and Frum—are so significant and unexpected that they have decided to post an excerpt that afternoon on the magazine's Web site, vanityfair.com.
The abridged article goes up at about 4:45 P.M., eastern standard time. Its impact is almost immediate. Within minutes, George Stephanopoulos confronts Vice President Dick Cheney with Perle's and Adelman's criticisms during an on-camera interview. Cheney blanches and declines to comment, other than to say that the administration remains committed to its Iraq policy and will continue to pursue it, "full speed ahead." By the next morning, news of the neocons' about-face has been picked up by papers, broadcasters, and blogs around the world, despite a White House spokesperson's attempt to dismiss it as "Monday-morning quarterbacking."
Some of my interviewees, Richard Perle included, protest in a forum on National Review Online that they were misled, because they believed that their words would not be published until V.F.'s January issue hit newsstands—after the midterms. Posting a preview on the Web, they say, was a "partisan" attempt to score political points. In response, the magazine issues a statement: "At a time when Vice President Dick Cheney is saying that the administration is going 'full speed ahead' with its policy in Iraq and that 'we've got the basic strategy right,' and the president is stating that Defense Secretary Rumsfeld's job is secure, we felt that it was in the public's interest to hear now, before the election, what the architects of the Iraq war are saying about its mission and execution."
Some of the neocons also claim that the Web excerpt quotes them out of context—implying, perhaps, that in other parts of their interviews they had praised the performance of Bush and his administration. That charge is untrue. Meanwhile, not all the neocons are unhappy. On Wednesday, November 8, with news of the Democratic takeover of Congress still fresh and Rumsfeld's resignation still hours away, I receive an e-mail from Adelman. "I totally agree with you," he writes. "Why keep Issue #1 behind closed doors until the American people have a chance to vote? That's why I was (among the only ones) not giving any 'rebuttal' to the [Web] release, despite being asked and pressured to do so, since I think it's just fine to get word out when it could make a difference to people.
"Plus I personally had no rebuttal. I thought the words I read from you were fair and right on target."
A cynic might argue that, since the Iraqi disaster has become so palpably overwhelming, the neocons are trashing what is left of Bush's reputation in the hope of retaining theirs. Given the outcome of the midterms, it also seems likely that these interviews are the first salvos in a battle to influence how history will judge the war. The implications will be profound—not only for American conservatism but also for the future direction and ambitions of American foreign policy. The neocons' position in this debate starts with an unprovable assertion: that when the war began, Iraq was "a doable do," to use a military planner's phrase cited by David Frum. If not for the administration's incompetence, they say, Saddam's tyranny could have been replaced with something not only better but also secure. "Huge mistakes were made," Richard Perle says, "and I want to be very clear on this: they were not made by neoconservatives, who had almost no voice in what happened, and certainly almost no voice in what happened after the downfall of the regime in Baghdad. I'm getting damn tired of being described as an architect of the war. I was in favor of bringing down Saddam. Nobody said, 'Go design the campaign to do that.' I had no responsibility for that."
Some of those who did have responsibility, and were once the most gung-ho, are also losing heart. In December 2005, I spoke with Douglas Feith, the former undersecretary of defense for policy, whose Office of Special Plans was reportedly in charge of policy planning for the invasion and its aftermath. He told me then, "I have confidence that in 20 to 30 years people will be happy we removed Saddam Hussein from power and will say we did the right thing. They will look back and say that our strategic rationale was sound, and that through doing this we won a victory in the war on terror."
When we talk again, in October 2006, Feith sounds less certain. It is beginning to seem possible that America will withdraw before Iraq achieves stability, he says, and if that happens his previous statement would no longer be justified. "There would be a lot of negative consequences," he says, adding that America's enemies, including Osama bin Laden, have attacked when they perceived weakness. Leaving Iraq as a failed state, Feith concludes, "would wind up hurting the United States and the interests of the civilized world." In 2005, Feith thought failure unimaginable. Now he broods on how it may occur, and envisions its results.
At the end of 2003, Richard Perle and David Frum published a book, An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror. Neoconservatives do not make up an organized bloc—much less a "cabal," as is sometimes alleged—but the book ends with a handy summary of their ideas. Foreign policy, write Perle and Frum, should attempt to achieve not only the realist goals of American wealth and security but also less tangible ends that benefit mankind. The neoconservative dream, they say, is similar to that which inspired the founders of the United Nations after World War II: "A world at peace; a world governed by law; a world in which all peoples are free to find their own destinies." But in Perle and Frum's view, the U.N. and similar bodies have failed, leaving "American armed might" as the only force capable of bringing this Utopian world into being. "Our vocation is to support justice with power," they write. "It is a vocation that has earned us terrible enemies. It is a vocation that has made us, at our best moments, the hope of the world."
Although Perle was one of the first to frame the case for toppling Saddam in realist terms of the threat of W.M.D.—in a letter he sent to Clinton in February 1998 whose 40 signatories included Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and Feith—he insists that the idealist values outlined in his book shaped the way he and his allies always believed the war should be fought. At the heart of their program was an insistence that, no matter how Saddam was deposed, Iraqis had to be allowed to take charge of their destiny immediately afterward.
In the 1990s, the neocons tried to secure American air and logistical support for an assault on Saddam by a "provisional government" based in Kurdistan—a plan derided by former CentCom chief General Anthony Zinni as a recipe for a "Bay of Goats." After 9/11, as America embarked on the path to war in earnest, they pushed again for the recognition of a provisional Iraqi government composed of former exiles, including Chalabi. In addition to acting as a magnet for new defectors from the Iraqi military and government, they argued, this government-in-exile could assume power as soon as Baghdad fell. The neocons, represented inside the administration by Feith and Wolfowitz, also unsuccessfully demanded the training of thousands of Iraqis to go in with coalition troops.
The failure to adopt these proposals, neocons outside the administration now say, was the first big American error, and it meant that Iraqis saw their invaders as occupiers, rather than liberators, from the outset. "Had they gone in with even just a brigade or two of well-trained Iraqis, I think things could have been a good deal different," James Woolsey tells me at his law office, in McLean, Virginia. "That should have been an Iraqi that toppled that statue of Saddam." Drawing a comparison to the liberation of France in World War II, he recalls how "we stood aside and saw the wisdom of having [the Free French leaders] de Gaulle and Leclerc lead the victory parade through Paris in the summer of '44." The coalition, he says, should have seen the symbolic value of allowing Iraqis to "take" Baghdad in 2003. He draws another historical parallel, to the U.S. campaigns against Native Americans in the 19th century, to make another point: that the absence of Iraqi auxiliaries deprived coalition soldiers of invaluable local intelligence. "Without the trained Iraqis, it was like the Seventh Cavalry going into the heart of Apache country in Arizona in the 1870s with no scouts. No Apache scouts. I mean, hello?"
If the administration loaded the dice against success with its pre-war decisions, Kenneth Adelman says, it made an even greater blunder when Saddam's regime fell. "The looting was the decisive moment," Adelman says. "The moment this administration was lost was when Donald Rumsfeld took to the podium and said, 'Stuff happens. This is what free people do.' It's not what free people do at all: it's what barbarians do. Rumsfeld said something about free people being free to make mistakes. But the Iraqis were making 'mistakes' by ruining their country while the U.S. Army stood there watching!" Once Rumsfeld and General Tommy Franks failed to order their forces to intervene—something Adelman says they could have done—several terrible consequences became inevitable. Among them, he tells me over lunch at a downtown-D.C. restaurant, was the destruction of Iraq's infrastructure, the loss of documents that might have shed light on Saddam's weapons capabilities, and the theft from Iraq's huge munitions stores of tons of explosives "that they're still using to kill our kids." The looting, he adds, "totally discredited the idea of democracy, since this 'democracy' came in tandem with chaos." Worst of all, "it demolished the sense of the invincibility of American military power. That sense of invincibility is enormously valuable when you're trying to control a country. It means, 'You fuck with this guy, you get your head blown off.' All that was destroyed when the looting began and was not stopped."
Former Bush speechwriter David Frum fears that defeat in Iraq will push the U.S. toward isolationism.
According to Frum, there was a final ingredient fueling the wildfire spread of violence in the second half of 2003: intelligence failures that were, in terms of their effects, even "grosser" than those associated with the vanishing weapons. "The failure to understand the way in which the state was held together was more total," he tells me in his office at the neoconservative think tank the American Enterprise Institute (A.E.I.). America assumed it was invading a functional, secular state, whose institutions and lines of control would carry on functioning under new leadership. Instead, partly as a result of the 1990s sanctions, it turned out to be a quasi-medieval society where Saddam had secured the loyalty of tribal sheikhs and imams with treasure and S.U.V.'s. Here, Frum says, another disadvantage of not having an Iraqi provisional government made itself felt: "There's no books, there's no treasury, and he's distributing. One guy gets a Land Rover, another guy gets five Land Rovers, somebody else gets a sack of gold.… That is information that only an Iraqi is going to have, and this is something I said at the time: that Iraq is going to be ruled either through terror or through corruption. Saddam knew how to do it through terror. Ahmad Chalabi would have known how to do it through corruption. What we are now trying to do, in the absence of the knowledge of who has to be rewarded, is to do a lot of things through force." The state had ceased to "deliver" rewards to loyalists, and in that vacuum the insurgency began to flourish.
-
III: The Trouble with Bush and Rice
As V.F. first revealed, in the May 2004 issue, Bush was talking about invading Iraq less than two weeks after 9/11, broaching the subject at a private White House dinner with British prime minister Tony Blair on September 20, 2001. With so much time to prepare, how could the aftermath have begun so badly? "People were aware in February or March of 2003 that the planning was not finished," Frum says. "There was not a coherent plan, and in the knowledge that there was not a coherent plan, there was not the decision made to wait." The emphasis here needs to be on the word "coherent." In fact, as Frum points out, there were several plans: the neocons' ideas outlined above, a British proposal to install their client Iyad Allawi, and suggestions from the State Department for a government led by the octogenarian Adnan Pachachi. To hear Frum tell it, the State Department was determined to block the neocons' anointed candidate, Ahmad Chalabi, and therefore resisted both Iraqi training and a provisional government, fearing that these measures would boost his prospects.
It would have been one thing, the neocons say, if their plan had been passed over in favor of another. But what really crippled the war effort was the administration's failure, even as its soldiers went to war, to make a decision. Less than three weeks before the invasion, Bush said in a rousing, pro-democracy speech to the A.E.I., "The United States has no intention of determining the precise form of Iraq's new government. That choice belongs to the Iraqi people." But with the administration unable to decide among Allawi, Pachachi, and Chalabi, the Iraqis ultimately were given no say. Instead, L. Paul Bremer III soon assumed almost unlimited powers as America's proconsul, assisted by a so-called Governing Council, which he was free to ignore and which, to judge by Bremer's memoir, he regarded as a contemptible irritant.
The place where such interagency disputes are meant to be resolved is the National Security Council, chaired during Bush's first term by Condoleezza Rice, who was national-security adviser at the time. A.E.I. Freedom Scholar Michael Ledeen—whose son, Gabriel, a lieutenant in the Marines, recently returned from a tour of duty in Iraq—served as a consultant to the N.S.C. under Ronald Reagan and says the council saw its role as "defining the disagreement" for the president, who would then make up his mind. "After that, we'd move on to the next fight." But Rice, says Ledeen, saw her job as "conflict resolution, so that when [then secretary of state Colin] Powell and Rumsfeld disagreed, which did happen from time to time, she would say to [then deputy national-security adviser Stephen] Hadley or whomever, 'O.K., try to find some middle ground where they can both agree.' So then it would descend at least one level in the bureaucracy, and people would be asked to draft new memos." By this process, Ledeen complains, "thousands of hours were wasted by searching for middle ground, which most of the time will not exist." Sometimes—as with the many vital questions about postwar Iraq—"it may well have been too late" by the time decisions emerged.
"The National Security Council was not serving [Bush] properly," says Richard Perle, who believes that the president failed to tackle this shortcoming because of his personal friendship with Rice. "He regarded her as part of the family." (Rice has spent weekends and holidays with the Bushes.) The best way to understand this aspect of the Bush administration, says Ledeen, is to ask, Who are the most powerful people in the White House? "They are women who are in love with the president: Laura [Bush], Condi, Harriet Miers, and Karen Hughes." He cites the peculiar comment Rice reportedly made at a dinner party in 2004, when she referred to Bush as "my husb—" before catching herself. "That's what we used to call a Freudian slip," Ledeen remarks.
Whatever the N.S.C.'s deficiencies, say the neocons, the buck has to stop with the president. "In the administration that I served," says Perle, who was an assistant secretary of defense under Reagan, there was a "one-sentence description of the decision-making process when consensus could not be reached among disputatious departments: 'The president makes the decision.'" Yet Bush "did not make decisions, in part because the machinery of government that he nominally ran was actually running him." That, I suggest, is a terrible indictment. Perle does not demur: "It is." Accepting that, he adds, is "painful," because on the occasions he got an insight into Bush's thinking Perle felt "he understood the basic issues and was pursuing policies that had a reasonable prospect of success." Somehow, those instincts did not translate into actions.
Frank Gaffney, president of the Pentagon-friendly Center for Security Policy, blames Bush for tolerating "palpable insubordination."
On the question of Bush, the judgments of some of Perle's ideological allies are harsher. Frank Gaffney also served under Reagan as an assistant secretary of defense; he is now president of the hawkish Center for Security Policy, which has close ties with the upper echelons of the Pentagon. Gaffney describes the administration as "riven," arguing that "the drift, the incoherence, the mixed signals, the failure to plan this thing [Iraq] rigorously were the end product of that internal dynamic." His greatest disappointment has been the lack of resolution displayed by Bush himself: "This president has tolerated, and the people around him have tolerated, active, ongoing, palpable insubordination and skulduggery that translates into subversion of his policies.… He doesn't in fact seem to be a man of principle who's steadfastly pursuing what he thinks is the right course," Gaffney says. "He talks about it, but the policy doesn't track with the rhetoric, and that's what creates the incoherence that causes us problems around the world and at home. It also creates the sense that you can take him on with impunity."
In 2002 and '03, Danielle Pletka, a Middle East expert at the A.E.I., arranged a series of conferences on the future of Iraq. At one I attended, in October 2002, Perle and Chalabi were on the platform, while in the audience were a Who's Who of Iraq policymakers from the Pentagon and the vice president's office. Pletka's bitterness now is unrestrained. "I think that even though the president remains rhetorically committed to the idea of what he calls his 'freedom agenda,' it's over," she says. "It turns out we stink at it. And we don't just stink at it in Iraq. We stink at it in Egypt. And in Lebanon. And in the Palestinian territories. And in Jordan. And in Yemen. And in Algeria. And everywhere else we try at it. Because, fundamentally, the message hasn't gotten out to the people on the ground.… There is no one out there saying, 'These are the marching orders. Follow them or go and find a new job.' That was what those fights were about. And the true believers lost. Now, that's not to say had they won, everything would be coming up roses. But I do think that we had a window of opportunity to avert a lot of problems that we now see."
For Kenneth Adelman, "the most dispiriting and awful moment of the whole administration was the day that Bush gave the Presidential Medal of Freedom to [former C.I.A. director] George Tenet, General Tommy Franks, and Jerry [Paul] Bremer—three of the most incompetent people who've ever served in such key spots. And they get the highest civilian honor a president can bestow on anyone! That was the day I checked out of this administration. It was then I thought, There's no seriousness here. These are not serious people. If he had been serious, the president would have realized that those three are each directly responsible for the disaster of Iraq."
The most damning assessment of all comes from David Frum: "I always believed as a speechwriter that if you could persuade the president to commit himself to certain words, he would feel himself committed to the ideas that underlay those words. And the big shock to me has been that, although the president said the words, he just did not absorb the ideas. And that is the root of, maybe, everything."
-
IV: Was Rumsfeld Lousy? You Bet!
Having started so badly, the neocons say, America's occupation of Iraq soon got worse. Michael Rubin is a speaker of Persian and Arabic who worked for Feith's Office of Special Plans and, after the invasion, for the Coalition Provisional Authority (C.P.A.), in Baghdad. Rubin, who is now back at the A.E.I., points to several developments that undermined the prospects for anything resembling democracy. First was the decision to grant vast powers to Bremer, thus depriving Iraqis of both influence and accountability. "You can't have democracy without accountability," says Rubin, and in that vital first year the only Iraqi leaders with the ability to make a difference were those who controlled armed militias.
The creation of the fortified Green Zone, says Rubin, who chose to live outside it during his year in Baghdad, was "a disaster waiting to happen." It soon became a "bubble," where Bremer and the senior C.P.A. staff were almost completely detached from the worsening realities beyond—including the swelling insurgency. "The guys outside—for example, the civil-affairs officers, some of the USAID [United States Agency for International Development] workers, and so forth—had a much better sense of what was going on outside, but weren't able to get that word inside," Rubin says. Because Bremer was their main source of information, Rumsfeld and other administration spokesmen were out of touch with reality and soon "lost way too much credibility" by repeatedly claiming that the insurgents were not a serious problem.
Meanwhile, waste, corruption, and grotesque mismanagement were rife. Perle tells me a story he heard from an Iraqi cabinet minister, about a friend who was asked to lease a warehouse in Baghdad to a contractor for the Americans in the Green Zone. It turned out they were looking for someplace to store ice for their drinks. But, the man asked, wouldn't storing ice in Iraq's hot climate be expensive? Weren't the Americans making ice as and when they needed it? Thus he learned the extraordinary truth: that the ice was trucked in from Kuwait, 300 miles away, in regular convoys. The convoys, says Perle, "came under fire all the time. So we were sending American forces in harm's way, with full combat capability to support them, helicopters overhead, to move goddamn ice from Kuwait to Baghdad."
Perle cites another example: the mishandling of a contract to build 20 health clinics. While it is certainly "a good thing for the U.S. to be building clinics, and paying for it," Perle says, "the prime contractor never left the Green Zone. So there were subcontractors, and the way in which the prime contractor superintended the project was by asking the subcontractors to take videos of their progress and send them into the Green Zone. Now, you've got to expect projects to go wrong if that's the way you manage them, and indeed they did go wrong, and they ran out of money, and the contract was canceled. A complete fiasco." He knows, he says, "dozens" of similar stories. At their root, he adds, is America's misguided policy of awarding contracts to U.S. multi-nationals instead of Iraqi companies.
To former C.I.A. director Woolsey, one of this saga's most baffling features has been the persistent use of military tactics that were discredited in Vietnam. Since 2003, U.S. forces have "fought 'search-and-destroy' instead of 'clear-and-hold,'" he says, contrasting the ineffective strategy of hunting down insurgents to the proven one of taking territory and defending it. "There's never been a successful anti-insurgency campaign that operated according to search-and-destroy, because bad guys just come back in after you've passed through and kill the people that supported you," Woolsey explains. "How the U.S. government's post-fall-of-Baghdad planning could have ignored that history of Vietnam is stunning to me." But Rumsfeld and Bush were never willing to provide the high troop levels that Woolsey says are necessary for clear-and-hold.
Adelman's dismay at the handling of the insurgency is one reason he now criticizes Rumsfeld so severely. He is also disgusted by the former defense secretary's claims that the mayhem has been exaggerated by the media, and that all the war needs is better P.R. "The problem here is not a selling job. The problem is a performance job," Adelman says. "Rumsfeld has said that the war could never be lost in Iraq; it could only be lost in Washington. I don't think that's true at all. We're losing in Iraq."
As we leave the restaurant together, Adelman points to an office on the corner of Washington's 18th Street Northwest where he and Rumsfeld first worked together, during the Nixon administration, in 1972. "I've worked with him three times in my life. I have great respect for him. I'm extremely fond of him. I've been to each of his houses, in Chicago, Taos, Santa Fe, Santo Domingo, and Las Vegas. We've spent a lot of vacations together, been around the world together, spent a week together in Vietnam. I'm very, very fond of him, but I'm crushed by his performance. Did he change, or were we wrong in the past? Or is it that he was never really challenged before? I don't know. He certainly fooled me."
-
V: "A Huge Strategic Defeat"
Though some, such as James Woolsey, still hope against hope for success in Iraq, most of the neocons I speak with are braced for defeat. Even if the worst is avoided, the outcome will bear no resemblance to the scenarios they and their friends inside the administration laid out back in the glad, confident morning of 2003. "I think we're faced with a range of pretty bad alternatives," says Eliot Cohen. "The problem you're now dealing with is sectarian violence, and a lot of Iranian activity, and those I'm not sure can be rolled back—certainly not without quite a substantial use of force that I'm not sure we have the stomach for. In any case, the things that were possible in '03, '04, are no longer possible." Cohen says his best hope now is not something on the way toward democracy but renewed dictatorship, perhaps led by a former Ba'thist: "I think probably the least bad alternative that we come to sooner or later is a government of national salvation that will be a thinly disguised coup." However, he adds, "I wouldn't be surprised if what we end up drifting toward is some sort of withdrawal on some sort of timetable and leaving the place in a pretty ghastly mess." And that, he believes, would be "about as bad an outcome as one could imagine.… Our choices now are between bad and awful."
In the short run, Cohen believes, the main beneficiary of America's intervention in Iraq is the mullahs' regime in Iran, along with its extremist president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. And far from heralding the hoped-for era of liberal Middle East reform, he says, "I do think it's going to end up encouraging various strands of Islamism, both Shia and Sunni, and probably will bring de-stabilization of some regimes of a more traditional kind, which already have their problems." The risk of terrorism on American soil may well increase, too, he fears. "The best news is that the United States remains a healthy, vibrant, vigorous society. So, in a real pinch, we can still pull ourselves together. Unfortunately, it will probably take another big hit. And a very different quality of leadership. Maybe we'll get it."
Frank Gaffney, of the Center for Security Policy, is more pessimistic. While defeat in Iraq is not certain, he regards it as increasingly likely. "It's not a perfect parallel here, but I would say it would approximate to losing the Battle of Britain in World War II," he says. "Our enemies will be emboldened and will re-double their efforts. Our friends will be demoralized and disassociate themselves from us. The delusion is to think that the war is confined to Iraq, and that America can walk away. Failure in Iraq would be a huge strategic defeat." It may already be too late to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, Gaffney says, pointing out that the Manhattan Project managed to build them in less than four years from a far smaller base of knowledge. "I would say that the likelihood of military action against Iran is 100 percent," he concludes. "I just don't know when or under what circumstances. My guess is that it will be in circumstances of their choosing and not ours."
Richard Perle is almost as apocalyptic. Without some way to turn impending defeat in Iraq to victory, "there will continue to be turbulence and instability in the region. The Sunni in the Gulf, who are already terrified of the Iranians, will become even more terrified of the Iranians. We will be less able to stop an Iranian nuclear program, or Iran's support for terrorism. The Saudis will go nuclear. They will not want to sit there with Ahmadinejad having the nuclear weapon." This is not a cheering prospect: a Sunni-Shia civil war raging in Iraq, while its Sunni and Shia neighbors face each other across the Persian Gulf armed with nukes. As for the great diplomatic hope—that the Iraq Study Group, led by George Bush Sr.'s secretary of state James Baker III, can pull off a deal with Syria and Iran to pacify Iraq—Perle is dismissive: "This is a total illusion. Total illusion. What kind of grand deal? The Iranians are not on our side. They're going to switch over and adopt our side? What can we offer them?"
If the neocon project is not quite dead, it has evidently suffered a crippling blow, from which it may not recover. After our lunch, Adelman sends me an e-mail saying that he now understands the Soviet marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, who committed suicide in the Kremlin when it became clear that the last-ditch Communist coup of 1991 was going to fail. A note he left behind stated, "Everything I have devoted my life to building is in ruins." "I do not share that level of desperation," Adelman writes. "Nevertheless, I feel that the incompetence of the Bush team means that most everything we ever stood for now also lies in ruins."
Frum admits that the optimistic vision he and Perle set out in their book will not now come to pass. "One of the things that we were talking about in that last chapter was the hope that fairly easily this world governed by law, the world of the North Atlantic, can be extended to include the Arab and Muslim Middle East," he says. "I think, coming away from Iraq, people are going to say that's not true, and that the world governed by law will be only a portion of the world. The aftermath of Iraq is that walls are going to go up, and the belief that this is a deep cultural divide is going to deepen." This is already happening in Europe, he adds, citing the British government's campaign against the wearing of veils by women and the Pope's recent critical comments about Islam. As neoconservative optimism withers, Frum fears, the only winner of the debate over Iraq will be Samuel Huntington, whose 1996 book famously forecast a "clash of civilizations" between the West and Islam.
Reading these interviews, those who always opposed the war would be justified in feeling a sense of vindication. Yet even if the future turns out to be brighter than the neocons now fear, the depth and intractability of the Iraqi quagmire allow precious little room for Schadenfreude. Besides the soldiers who continue to die, there are the Iraqis, especially the reformers, whose hopes were so cruelly raised. "Where I most blame George Bush," says the A.E.I.'s Michael Rubin, "is that, through his rhetoric, people trusted him, people believed him. Reformists came out of the woodwork and exposed themselves." By failing to match his rhetoric with action, Bush has betrayed them in a way that is "not much different from what his father did on February 15, 1991, when he called the Iraqi people to rise up, and then had second thoughts and didn't do anything once they did." Those who answered the elder Bush's call were massacred.
All the neocons are adamant that, however hard it may be, stabilizing Iraq is the only option. The consequences of a precipitous withdrawal, they say, would be far worse. Listening to them make this argument, I cannot avoid drawing a deeply disturbing conclusion. One of the reasons we are in this mess is that the neocons' gleaming pre-war promises turned out to be wrong. The truly horrifying possibility is that, this time, they may be right.
-
I loathe Sen. Hillary Evita Clinton, but this seems like a responsible piece:
===========
An Oil Trust for Iraq
By HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON and JOHN ENSIGN
December 18, 2006; Page A16
Every day, American troops in Iraq continue to sacrifice while serving bravely and magnificently under deteriorating circumstances. And every day, the Iraqi people are paying an enormous price for the future of that country as well -- a future that, by all accounts, is in jeopardy. For the sake of our soldiers and for the future of Iraq, it is time we place greater rights and responsibilities of citizenship in the hands of the Iraqi people. This includes a stake in oil revenues, which are central to political reconciliation and an end to the sectarian violence.
Recent news reports suggest that Iraqi officials are nearing a compromise on how to divide Iraq's substantial oil revenues, based on population, among the various regions in the country. As part of the final compromise regarding oil revenues, we believe that the distribution of funds should be structured in a way that helps the Iraqi people directly.
We have urged for three years that the Bush administration pursue an Iraq Oil Trust, modeled on the Alaskan Permanent Fund, guaranteeing that every individual Iraqi would share in the country's oil wealth. Oil revenues would accrue to the national government and a significant percentage of oil revenues would be divided equally among ordinary Iraqis, giving every citizen a stake in the nation's recovery and political reconciliation and instilling a sense of hope for the promise of democratic values.
The implications would be vast.
• The future of Iraq's oil reserves remains at the heart of the political crisis in Iraq, as the regional and sectarian divides in Iraq play out over the division of resources and revenues. As the Iraq Study Group writes, "The politics of oil has the potential to further damage the country's already fragile efforts to create a unified central government." An Iraq Oil Trust would chart an equitable path forward for dividing oil revenues in a way that transcends the divide among Shiites, Kurds and Sunnis.
• As report after report indicates, one of the challenges to building Iraq's oil revenues has been insurgent attacks against oil infrastructure. A distribution of revenues to all Iraqis would mean they would have a greater incentive to keep the oil flowing, help the economy grow, reject the insurgency, and commit to the future of their nation.
• While demonstrating that the U.S. is not in Iraq for oil, an Iraq Oil Trust would also inhibit corruption and the concentration of oil wealth in the hands of a privileged few.
• Finally, an Iraq Oil Trust would demonstrate the values at the heart of democratic governance: Individuals would have the rights and responsibilities of citizenship. Indeed, the study group reports, "Iraqis have not been convinced that they must take responsibility for their own future." By trusting ordinary Iraqis, ordinary Iraqis would in turn gain greater trust in the national government while seeing something positive about the future at a time when positive signs have been few and far between.
Of course, there are obstacles to putting an Iraq Oil Trust in place, from the ability to perform a census to the capacity to distribute funds. But these obstacles do not seem so daunting when compared to the implications of not taking all the steps we can to find a political solution.
There is a bipartisan consensus about the importance of placing in the hands of Iraqis greater control over their own destiny. Sadly, with Iraq riven by sectarian strife, terrorism, insurgency, corruption and day-to-day criminality and violence, the ability of Iraqis to determine their own future seems to be in jeopardy. In order to build popular support for an end to the chaos, ordinary Iraqis must believe that keeping the nation unified holds the promise of a brighter future for their families. An Iraq Oil Trust will be an important step in the right direction.
Now is the time to act. We are at a critical juncture in our nation's policy toward Iraq. In the aftermath of the Iraq Study Group report, the administration is conducting several reviews of our Iraq policy. We should seize this moment and chart a course that places greater responsibility in the leaders and citizens of Iraq. It's time to put our trust where our democratic values lie: in the Iraqi people.
Mrs. Clinton, a Democratic senator from New York, and Mr. Ensign, a Republican senator from Nevada, are members of the Senate Armed Services committee. Mrs. Clinton is the author of "It Takes a Village," rereleased last week by Simon & Shuster to mark the book's 10th anniversary.
-
Subject Iraq last week
Saturday, 16 December 2006
Commando Brigade captures 9 terrorists
Camp Striker, Iraq – Soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division captured 9 terrorists in three separate incidents, Dec. 14 -15. The soldiers captured 5 men near Yusufiyah, Iraq Dec. 14.
The Soldiers observed 3 men near a flat bed pick-up truck congregating around a pot hole in the side of the road. The men fled on foot into a house as the Soldiers approached to investigate. The Soldiers entered and cleared the house, capturing the three.
As the Soldiers searched the outlying area, they discovered 2 more men
stripping electrical wires, preparing to wire improvised explosive devices. The Soldiers arrested these two as well. Upon returning to the pothole, the Soldiers found a partially buried Improvised explosive devise.
In a separate incident, Company C, 4-31 Inf. captured 3 men wanted for their ties to al Qaeda terrorism cells.
Also on Dec 15, Soldiers from the 89th Cavalry Regiment, captured one insurgent 6 miles north of Yusufiyah for involvement in IED placement along Iraqi Highway 1. An IED exploded while the Soldiers were conducting during a route clearing mission.
The unit searched the area and encountered 2 men in a house near the
explosion site. One man implicated the other in the IED incident. The man implicated was arrested.
3 insurgents killed attempting to emplace IEDs in Ramadi
RAMADI - U.S. troops killed three insurgents with a precision munition and direct fire for hostile actions Dec. 14 in Ramadi.
U.S. troops observed one insurgent emplacing an IED. He was killed. Four more insurgents were observed emplacing another IED. U.S. troops used a precision munition to destroy a shack that insurgents were entering and exiting while emplacement was occurring. The shack was destroyed and two insurgents were killed.
4 insurgents killed attempting to emplace IEDs
FALLUJAH - 4 insurgents were killed by aviation fires after precision munitions were employed to destroy a truck used to transport improvised explosive devices in Fallujah.
Marines observed insurgents excavating IED-making material from the side of a road and loading it into a truck. The truck then proceeded to another location where the insurgents began emplacing the IEDs.
The Marines established positive identification of the insurgents and destroyed the truck with precision munitions. The 4 insurgents were killed by direct fire.
Coalition Forces kill 3 terrorists, capture 1 following gunfights
BAGHDAD – Soldiers from the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, currently attached to the 1st Cavalry Division, killed 3 terrorists and captured a 4th following two attacks on coalition forces in the capital mid-morning.
The first terrorist was killed when Soldiers spotted him on a rooftop aiming a rocket propelled grenade at the patrol in the Furat neighborhood. The second attack began with small arms fire on a coalition patrol in the Bayaa neighborhood. The patrol engaged a small group of terrorists, killing two and wounding one.
A total of 3 assault rifles and a rocket propelled grenade launcher were recovered from the two attacks.
ISF Captures Illegal Armed Group Cell Leader -
BAGHDAD – 8th Iraqi Army division forces captured the head of the Al Kut Office of the Martyr Sadr for involvement in illegal arms smuggling activities and directing attacks against Iraqi Security Forces.
He ordered his followers to conduct indirect fire attacks and place improvised explosive devices targeting Iraqi and Coalition Forces. He also took part in an ambush carried out against an Iraqi Army patrol on Sept. 11, 2006.
Iraqi Army forces cordoned and entered the buildings to arrest the leader and other cell members. The man was found along with IED making components consisting of an artillery projectile, 2 rocket propelled grenades, hand grenades and mortar rounds. Also found were 2 assault rifles, 17 rifle magazines, night vision goggles, cell phones and a hand-held two-way radio
During the operation, Iraqi Security Forces exchanged fire with hostile elements, wounding one enemy fighter. The fighter was captured along with 3 additional armed men.
Iraqi Troops Free 23 Kidnap Victims
BAGHDAD – Iraqi Soldiers found 23 hostages and arrested 6 kidnappers when conducting ongoing operations in Baghdad Dec. 11.
The 6th Iraqi Army Division team observed two vehicles that had stopped a local national bus, forcing the passengers off the bus at approximately 10:40 a.m.. The Iraqi Army Soldiers pursued the suspects who got back into the two vehicles and drove off in separate directions.
The Iraqi Army soldiers stopped one of the fleeing vehicles near an established checkpoint in the area. One kidnapper was killed and two others wounded due to the small arms fire used by the Iraqi soldiers to stop the fleeing car. In the trunk of the stopped vehicle, one kidnap victim was found.
The other car, a white Daiwoo, was also followed from the location where
passengers were forced from a bus. The Iraqi Army pursued this vehicle until it stopped in front of a house nearby. Two additional kidnap victims were freed from the trunk of the vehicle and 20 more kidnap victims were found inside the house. 6 kidnappers were captured from this incident.
After further investigation, most of the kidnapped victims are believed to be Shi’a and predominately from Ramadi. Some of the victims showed signs of
abuse; they had been badly beaten. All 23 rescued victims have been transferred to the 4/1/6 IA Headquarters and are receiving medical treatment.
The kidnappers have been identified as Sunni’s. The kidnapping cell leader, a Syrian named Abu Mousan, escaped capture.
BAGHDAD - The Iraqi army arrested 95 insurgents during the last 24 hours in different parts of Baghdad, the Defence Ministry said.
-
Thank you for that C-Stray Dog-- we certainly won't be hearing that from MSM.
====================
Geopolitical Diary: Al-Samarraie's Second Prison Break
stratfor.com
Former Iraqi Electricity Minister Ayham al-Samarraie broke out of prison the afternoon of Dec. 17, reportedly with the help of an American security company operating in Baghdad. It was al-Samarraie's second prison break from the heavily fortified Green Zone in the past two months.
Why would a U.S. security contractor help an Iraqi convict twice break out of jail? There is no clear answer, but a few conclusions can be drawn.
Al-Samarraie served as electricity minister under former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi's interim government. Before that, he worked in Chicago as a manager at KCI Engineering, where he built up strong ties to the Republican Party before returning to Iraq after the March 2003 U.S.-led invasion. The United States enlisted al-Samarraie in the fall of 2002 to help create a State Department-funded postwar strategy for Iraq.
Al-Samarraie also is a Sunni with Iraqi-U.S. citizenship who draws his roots from Anbar province, the main hotbed of Sunni insurgent violence, which made him an attractive candidate for a ministry position. He cultivated an extensive network with prominent Sunni tribe leaders in Anbar, and has worked with U.S. and Iraqi officials to co-opt Sunni nationalist insurgents into the political process.
But al-Samarraie also had dollar signs in his eyes when he took the ministry position. Despite his critical links to the Sunni nationalist insurgency, al-Samarraie was convicted on one of 13 corruption charges and sentenced to a two-year jail term in October. He still has to face an Iraqi court for the remaining 12 charges for pocketing approximately $1.5 billion from phony construction contracts, which could very well link back to his business buddies in Chicago. Al-Samarraie's contacts in Washington, however, apparently agreed to give him a "get-out-of-jail-free card" in October, when a few armed American security officials snuck al-Samarraie out of the courtroom through a tunnel from the basement of the building and into a safe house in the Green Zone. After he told Arab satellite stations that he was in U.S. custody, U.S. officials reportedly returned al-Samarraie to the Iraqi prison guards for unknown reasons.
Over the next couple months, al-Samarraie asked U.S. and Iraqi officials to release him, saying Shiite gunmen would kill him while in custody. Shiite militiamen apparently tried to kill him and Allawi, who lives next-door to al-Samarraie, in September 2005; a car bomb was found behind Allawi's house. A roadside bomb also went off in February near al-Samarraie's convoy in Baghdad, wounding three of his bodyguards. Even before he went to jail, al-Samarraie hired a private U.S. security contractor for protection.
After spending less than two months in prison, al-Samarraie's pleas for freedom were answered Dec. 17, when a group of American security officials arrived in two GMC vehicles at the jail where he was incarcerated, held jail guards at gunpoint and then whisked the convict away without firing a shot, said Judge Radhi Radhi, a senior anti-corruption official in Iraq.
Al-Samarraie is evidently still important enough for U.S. security contractors to get the go-ahead and break him out of prison once again. His prison break comes at a time when Washington is desperate for solutions to help alleviate the sectarian violence in Iraq and bring some semblance of control to a foreign policy blunder that has largely paralyzed the U.S. military and government. Al-Samarraie may be a crook, but he also is a key figure in the Sunni political bloc that could aid the Americans in getting the Sunnis on board with a deal to co-opt more Baathists into the political system.
Al-Samarraie could have been released as part of a political bargain with the Sunni political leadership, or as a means of re-enlisting him to act as a go-between for the Americans to deal with the Sunni insurgents. Either way, we cannot help but notice that Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki announced on Monday that his government has decided to welcome back former Sunni Baathists who served in the Iraqi army under Hussein's rein. The reintegration of Sunni Baathists is a major concession for the Shiite-dominated and Iranian-influenced government to make, which has a logical interest in ensuring that Sunnis are prevented from reasserting themselves politically or militarily in post-Hussein Iraq. Nonetheless, it appears that the Shia have taken a big step forward by throwing out this concession to the Sunnis. And if Washington wants this latest attempt at a political resolution to bear fruit, it will have to enlist the aid of influential Sunni mediators, such as al-Samarraie.
===============
A War That Abhors a Vacuum
By BEN CONNABLE
Ben Connable is a major in the Marine Corps.
The New York Times
December 18, 2006
Op-Ed Contributor
Washington
THE niceties are up for debate: phased or partial withdrawal from Iraq would
entail pulling troops back to their bases across the country, or
leapfrogging backward to the nearest international border, or redeploying to
bases in nearby countries.
But whatever the final prescription, the debate must include a sober look at
the street-level impact of withdrawal. What will become of Iraqi villages,
towns and cities as we pull out? Although past is not necessarily prologue,
recent experience in Anbar Province may be instructive.
American units have already withdrawn from the western Euphrates River
valley - twice, in fact. As the insurgency heated up in early 2004, the
Seventh Marine Regiment pulled up stakes and went to fight insurgents in
eastern Anbar, leaving the rest of the province in the hands of a battalion
of troops. The Marines balanced obvious risk against the possible reward of
overwhelming some of the insurgent groups in the east.
The consequences were immediate and bloody. Insurgents assumed control of
several towns and villages. They tortured and executed police officers,
local politicians, friendly tribal leaders and informants. They murdered
contractors who had worked with the Americans or the Iraqi government. They
tore down American-financed reconstruction projects and in a few cases
imposed an extreme version of Islamic law. Many Iraqi military units
collapsed in the absence of United States support.
The insurgents celebrated their self-described victory and exploited the
withdrawal for propaganda purposes. Baathist-led insurgents used the
opportunity to establish training camps and weapons caches in the farmland
and along the river banks while other groups, including Al Qaeda, smuggled
in fighters, suicide bombers and money to support operations in Ramadi,
Falluja and Baghdad. Western Iraq became a temporary haven for criminals,
terrorists and thousands of local thugs who made up de facto mini-regimes in
the absence of a stabilizing force.
When the Seventh Marines returned to western Anbar it was essentially forced
to retake some of the towns it once controlled. Many local Iraqis were
openly hostile; the battle for the hearts and minds of the population was
set back months, if not years. With the politicians murdered, local civil
administration was almost nonexistent and any influence held by the central
government was lost.
The Seventh Marine Regiment pulled up stakes again in November 2004 to join
the second fight for Falluja. Conscious of the damage done by the earlier
withdrawal, the Marines left behind more troops in an effort to stem the
inevitable surge of insurgent and criminal gangs; Iraqi forces were not yet
ready to assume control.
Despite this Marine presence, the results were similar. What had been
rebuilt in the summer crumbled in the fall.
The two withdrawals left the western Euphrates River valley in a shambles.
At the end of 2005 the Marines were forced to conduct sweep and clear
operations from Anbar's capital, Ramadi, to the Syrian border town of
Husayba. As they pushed west they uncovered hundreds of weapons caches,
elaborate insurgent propaganda centers, carefully camouflaged training
camps, suicide vehicle factories and complex criminal networks that were
feeding a steady stream of money to insurgents and terrorists across the
country. Marine units settled back in, spread out and brought attack levels
to unprecedented lows.
Since 2005, the situation in Anbar has significantly deteriorated. But as
bad as things have become, American and Iraqi forces retain some degree of
control in even the most turbulent areas. The border cities of Husayba and
Qaim are relatively stable and have effective security and government.
Falluja, also stable, is a model for Iraqi-American military cooperation.
Advisers are embedded with Iraqi units across the province.
American-supported tribes are beginning to combat Al Qaeda in Iraq in the
east. Anbar is down but not out, thanks to the American troops along the
Euphrates River.
American presence might be likened to a control rod in a nuclear reactor:
Leave it in place and the potential energy of the insurgents and criminals
is mostly kept in check; remove it and the energy becomes kinetic.
Withdrawal of United States presence from any town or city in Anbar will
almost certainly lead to the creation of safe havens for western Iraq's
impenetrable snarl of foreign fighters, nationalist insurgents and local
thugs. Many abandoned cities and towns would come to closely resemble the
Falluja of mid-2004.
If American forces conduct even a phased withdrawal before the full
certification of Iraqi Army battalions, those units incapable of sustaining
independent operations would be forced to pull back alongside their minders,
or collapse as their logistics and fire support lifelines disappeared. Most
local police forces would scatter, be co-opted or slaughtered wholesale, as
they were in 2004.
Insurgents of all stripes would make the most of the combined American and
Iraqi withdrawal, harassing the departing convoys with homemade bombs and
small-arms fire. Videos of insurgents dancing in the streets would become
prevalent on the Internet and international television. No public relations
campaign could succeed in painting an early phased withdrawal as anything
but a strategic defeat.
"Redeployed" in large bases far from the enemy centers of gravity, American
troops wouldn't be able to keep insurgent groups from forming
semi-conventional units. This pattern has repeated itself countless times
across Iraq and follows historic guerrilla-warfare models: insurgents
exploit any safe haven to strengthen and train their forces. The longer they
are left alone, the stronger they become. As our presence in the countryside
diminishes, our ability to gather intelligence and to protect valuable
infrastructure, communications lines and friendly tribal areas will
deteriorate rapidly.
Should the Iraqi Army stay in place as American units withdraw, the American
advisers embedded within these units probably would have to be removed,
leaving nobody to control air support, coordinate unit pay from Baghdad,
supervise the monthly convoys to take troops home on leave, prevent gross
violations of the Geneva Convention or shore up shaky leadership. Given
patient support, most of these units eventually will develop the capacity to
conduct independent operations. However, some adviser teams already report
that their Iraqi counterparts have said they intend to desert if the
Americans leave too soon.
Although Anbar may be the most violent province in Iraq per capita, it is
relatively free of the sectarian tensions found in Baghdad and the center.
The confusion caused by withdrawal would be compounded as religious, militia
and political loyalties divided inadequately prepared military and police
units. Full-scale ethnic killing would become a very real possibility.
For some, the collapse of Iraqi society into Hobbesian mayhem is inevitable
no matter how many American troops remain on the ground. A few argue that
disintegration of the Iraqi state actually would bring about the national
catharsis that seems so elusive today - that absolute civil war would be a
greater good.
This cold calculus ignores the very real impact of an American withdrawal on
the people we now protect. Any debate that does not consider the bloody
reality we would leave in our wake does a disservice to the people of Iraq
and the troops who have fought so hard to defend them.
-
Col. Ralph Peters has called for taking out Sadr right away. Here is a different approach offered by an ex-CIA officer in today's NY Times
In Iraq, Let’s Fight One War at a Time
By REUEL MARC GERECHT
Published: December 21, 2006
ONCE again American officials are growing dissatisfied with an Iraqi government. In Baghdad and in Washington, officials privately and the press publicly suggest that the Bush administration would prefer that Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki fell, and that Adil Abdul Mahdi, a French-educated economist who is a vice president, would replace him. Mr. Maliki is politically too dependent, the reasoning goes, on the young Shiite militia leader Moktada al-Sadr, a scion of a prestigious clerical family and the boss of a pivotal bloc of votes in Iraq’s Parliament.
Mr. Mahdi may look like a good bet for Washington. He is a far more amiable gentleman than Mr. Maliki, and doesn’t appear to be emotionally distressed when he is in the company of Americans. His group, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, was created in exile in Iran; its militia, the Badr Organization, has never had a serious clash with the United States military and is less prominent in the sectarian strife than Mr. Sadr’s followers, the Mahdi Army. In addition, the Supreme Council’s top man, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, has long dealt directly and pleasantly with American officials.
Since President Bush is now immersed in a top-to-bottom Iraq review, in which a substantial surge of American soldiers into Baghdad seems ever more likely and the Army is again seriously considering directly confronting Mr. Sadr, the appeal of Mr. Mahdi and the Supreme Council may grow in Washington and Baghdad.
If so, the administration should nip in the bud such inclinations. Changing the Shiite parts of the Iraqi government and quickly taking on Mr. Sadr would do nothing to end the Sunni insurgency and the holy war of foreign jihadists against the new Iraq.
Indeed, such a tack would not likely diminish the appeal or the power of the Mahdi Army, which is largely made up of poor, radicalized young men whose families were brutalized by Saddam Hussein and have been savaged by Sunni Arab fighters since the fall of 2003.
Nor would changing prime ministers and confronting Mr. Sadr’s militia advance the cause of reconciliation among the Sunni and Shiite Arabs and Kurds, allow the Iraqi government to operate more effectively, or let American troops leave Mesopotamia one day sooner.
In fact, attacking Mr. Sadr now and elevating the Supreme Council is likely to accomplish the exact opposite of what we want. And it shouldn’t be that hard to see why: the sine qua non for peace in Iraq, and for a democratic future for the country, has always been unity among the Shiites. Any violent struggle between the Mahdi Army and Supreme Council could provoke anarchy throughout the entire Arab Shiite zone, including Iraq’s holy cities and the oil-rich south. As bad as things seem now, such Shiite strife could impoverish all of Arab Iraq, dropping the non-Kurdish regions to an Afghan-like subsistence level.
In such a situation, we would likely see the hyper-radicalization of the Shiites, who have already become more militant owing to the tenacity and barbarism of the Sunni insurgency. In addition, whatever fraternal and nationalist bonds remain among moderate Sunni and Shiite Arabs would probably disappear in a Shiite-versus-Shiite bloodbath.
We would do well not to underestimate how these age-old familial and national ties and sympathies still diminish the sectarian strife. A genocidal Shiite-versus-Sunni conflict in Iraq — a real possibility — would be much more likely after an intra-Shiite war that destroys the traditional social and religious hierarchy that has remained vastly stronger among the Shiites than among Sunni Arabs since the American invasion.
Yes, the forces of the Supreme Council might be able to beat Mr. Sadr’s militia, the Mahdi Army. Trained by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps, the Badr Organization is a serious army that might handle Mr. Sadr’s more numerous and passionate supporters. The mullahs in Tehran, who have aided both Mr. Sadr and Mr. Hakim, would probably throw their support to the latter’s Supreme Council in the event of all-out war. Such a confrontation, beyond wrecking Iraq politically, would probably allow the worst elements in the Supreme Council — those who envision a religious dictatorship along the lines of Iran — to become more powerful within the party.
===========
Page 2 of 2)
And an American assault on Sadr City, the impoverished Baghdad stronghold of the Mahdi Army, would be militarily and politically counterproductive if undertaken before the United States launches a serious new counterinsurgency against the Sunnis.
Even with a substantial surge of soldiers along the lines recommended by Jack Keane, a retired four-star general, and the military historian Frederick Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute — approximately 35,000 more combat troops — the United States still wouldn’t have enough forces to fight a two-front war against the Sunnis and the Shiites, as it briefly did in 2004.
In Iraq, the United States is much weaker than in 2004. So is Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the moderate bulwark of the Shiite establishment — so the tentative support he gave yesterday for a plan to isolate Mr. Sadr should be taken with a grain of salt. Because of the nonstop insurgency, Shiite politics are fragile. We absolutely cannot afford to have an American effort to pacify Baghdad be seen as a “pro-Sunni” military assault on the capital’s densely populated Shiite ghetto.
If the administration first focuses militarily on the Sunni insurgency, as called for in the Keane-Kagan plan — and the press indicates Mr. Bush is taking the two men very seriously — the United States and the Iraqi government would be better able to diminish sectarian violence. With more troops, we can clear and hold Sunni areas in Baghdad and thereby prevent Shiite militias from streaming out of Sadr City to attack defenseless Sunnis.
Shiite militias are clever predators. They fear American power — the confrontation in Najaf in 2004, during which thousands from the Mahdi Army perished, taught them about the destructive capacity of the American military. If the Americans leave sufficient forces in cleared Sunni areas, they will stay away. But if we pass the holding part of counterinsurgency campaigns to ill-equipped units of the Iraqi Army and to the Iraqi police, who often aid Shiite militias, they will pounce.
Only after Baghdad’s Sunni neighborhoods are fully secured can the Americans turn their attention to the Shiite quarters, ensuring that American and reliable Iraqi forces control the streets and municipal facilities necessary to sustain city life. We may eventually have to confront militarily the Mahdi forces inside Sadr City, but we want to do this only as the last step in counterinsurgency operations in the capital.
Mr. Sadr and his radicalized followers — temperamentally, they are as much children of Saddam Hussein as are the savage Sunnis who glorify the murder of Americans and Shiite civilians — are unlikely to become peaceful players in Iraqi politics. But Mr. Sadr’s reputation can be reduced and his charisma countered if ordinary Shiites have more moderate alternatives, backed by American power, who can protect them from insurgency-loving Sunnis and death-squad Shiites.
It’s unclear how Prime Minister Maliki will react to any American effort to diminish Mr. Sadr. His party, Islamic Dawa, is a bundle of mostly militant contradictions. In the end, President Bush may have to ignore the prime minister if the latter sides with Mr. Sadr.
And some Shiites, and perhaps most Sunnis, may threaten to walk out of Iraq’s government and forsake reconciliation talks if the Americans get serious about pacifying Baghdad and the insurgency elsewhere. Let them. If the city’s and country’s Shiites, who represent about 65 percent of Iraq’s population, see that the Americans are committed to countering the insurgency, any protest from Mr. Maliki or call to arms by Mr. Sadr will have increasingly less power.
No, it won’t be easy — but with American and Iraqi troops all over Baghdad and daily life returning to some normality, the situation will certainly be more manageable than what we confront now. The politics of peaceful Shiite consensus, which is what Grand Ayatollah Sistani has tried to advance since 2003, could again rapidly gain ground.
No progress can be made in Iraq, however, if the Sunni Arabs, who have regrettably embraced the insurgency and holy war in large numbers, are allowed politically to check counterinsurgency operations.
The key for America is the same as it has been for years: to clear and hold the Sunni areas of Baghdad and the so-called Sunni triangle to the north. There will probably be no political solution among the Iraqi factions to save American troops from the bulk of this task. The sooner we start in Baghdad, the better the odds are that the radicalization of the Iraqi Shiites can be halted. As long as this community doesn’t explode into total militia war, Iraq is not lost, and neither is Mr. Bush’s presidency.
Reuel Marc Gerecht, a former Central Intelligence Agency officer, is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
-
SENIOR AL-QAIDA LEADER CAPTURED IN MOSUL
BAGHDAD, Iraq – U.S. troops captured a senior al-Qaida leader and 5 terrorists during a raid in Mosul Dec. 14.
The terrorist leader was captured when U.S. troops raided a known terrorist meeting place. The terrorist leader was attempting to flee from the location when U.S. troops chased him across a street and detained him.
As the Military Emir of Mosul in 2005, he was personally responsible for hundreds of civilian deaths, to include women and children. He housed foreign fighters to be used in suicide bombing attacks against U.S, Iraqi troops and the Iraqi people. The capture of this terrorist responsible for anti-Iraqi activity will seriously disrupt al-Qaida in Iraq operations.
Iraqi troops capture terrorist mortar team
KALSU, Iraq – Iraqi Army troops and Soldiers from the 4th Brigade (Airborne), 25th Infantry Division, captured 3 men attempting to set up a mortar tube near Al Qasim, Iraq, Dec. 20.
While conducting a routine patrol, the joint force spotted the 3 men sneaking into a wooded area. The patrol set up an observation post and called in their quick reaction force who moved in and captured the 3 terrorists. The patrol found a complete mortar system and 5 high-explosive rounds.
National Police capture 12 men at power plant facility
BAGHDAD – Elements of the 2nd Iraqi National Police Division captured 12 men involved in sectarian murders at a power plant facility in the Jazeera neighborhood Dec. 19.
The raid was the result of tips from local residents. The Iraqi national police were attacked by small arms fire, rocket-propelled grenades and improvised explosive devices during the operation. The men were surrounded and eventually surrendered after a gunfight. Two vehicles were damaged. No police officers were injured in the attack.
The 12 men are being held for further questioning regarding their roles in sectarian murders in the al-Doura area of the Iraqi capital.
2 insurgents killed by U.S. forces, 1 captured
In Fallujah today U.S. troops killed 2 insurgents who attacked the northwest Iraqi Police gate of the Government Center.
The U.S. troops observed 4 insurgents exit a parked vehicle and fire a rocket-propelled grenade and small arms fire at the Iraqi Police gate. As they attempted to fire the second RPG round, U.S. troops engaged the insurgents with small arms fire. Two insurgents were killed and one was injured. One insurgent escaped.
Paratroopers capture 18, secure cache at enemy safe house
FOB KALSU, Iraq – Paratroopers from Company A,
1st Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment (Airborne), 25th Infantry Division, captured 18 insurgents and a weapons cache while searching a house Dec 17. The cache consisted of three rifles, one scope, one sword, one pistol, assorted military uniforms, one American protective chemical suit, and a large amount of currency.
3-61st Cavalry troops foil bomb makers in, uncover and destroy IED
FOB LOYALTY, Iraq – Soldiers with the 3rd Squadron, 61st Cavalry Regiment killed one insurgent and captured 2 others after they caught them attempting to place an improvised explosive device in eastern Baghdad Dec. 16. Also recovered were 2 loaded AK-47 rifles and 8 magazines. In a separate incident, 3-61st Soldiers found and detonated an IED during a morning patrol.
Iraqi Army, Paratroopers Disrupt Terrorists in Turki
TURKI, Iraq – Iraqi Army soldiers and Paratroopers captured 5 terrorists
and seized a weapons cache Thursday during an air assault operation targeting terrorist
cells in Turki Village.
Nearly 200 soldiers from the 5th Iraqi Army Division and Paratroopers from 5th Squadron, 73rd Cavalry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division conducted the air assault.
During the mission, a U.S. air weapons team identified 2 armed terrorists and engaged them, killing both.
Continuing on patrol, the Soldiers discovered a cache containing a rocketpropelled
grenade, over 200 rounds of small-arms ammunition, material for making improvised explosive devices, and other small arms munitions.
Iraqi Army coordinates for air support to kill terrorists near Balad
TIKRIT, Iraq – Iraqi Army soldiers from the 5th Iraqi Army Division, with
support from 1st Cavalry Division, called in an air strike on a house harboring eight terrorists after receiving small-arms fire from the house Thursday while they were on patrol east of Balad.
After receiving clearance, an F-15E dropped a guided bomb on the house,
partially demolishing it. However, Iraqi Army continued to receive small-arms fire. Terrorists were observed going into the house. An air weapons team was called to assist ground forces. Terrorists engaged the IA and U.S. Soldiers from a second house. Ground forces engaged the second house killing the terrorists. The Iraqi soldiers secured the site after the house had been destroyed, discovering the bodies of the 8 terrorists with AK-47 semi-automatic machine guns.
Operations net 5 terrorists, weapons
FOB LOYALTY, Iraq – U.S. Soldiers captured 5 terrorists in two separate incidents and found weapons and other items during routine traffic checks in eastern Bagdad Dec. 16.
During one of the traffic stops, the unit found three 9mm pistols, three cell phones and a black ski mask. They arrested 3 men during this incident. The second incident netted a video camera, recorder and two more terrorists. U.S. troops use precision-guided munitions to stop enemy.
Numerous terrorists killed, 2 wounded and captured during attack
CAMP FALLUJAH, Iraq – U.S. troops were attacked by insurgents with small arms fire from a building Saturday in Ramadi. U.S. troops returned fire with small arms and machinegun fire. 4 insurgents were seen running down the road and were engaged with machinegun fire. One insurgent was killed and two more were wounded and captured.
When the enemy’s attack did not cease, U.S. troops used precision guided munitions to destroy the building being used as an insurgent fighting position. Parts of the buildings were destroyed. The enemy’s attacks stopped. The number of insurgents killed and wounded as a result of the strike is unknown at this time.
While investigating the area after the strike, U.S. troops discovered an Iraqi citizen shot by an insurgent earlier in the engagement. Insurgents had taken his vehicle to transport the body of the killed and wounded insurgents out of the area.
4 terrorists killed, 6 captured outside of Dujayl
TIKRIT, Iraq – U.S. troops killed 4 terrorists and captured 6 others near Dujayl, about 80 miles north of Baghdad, Dec. 15 after the terrorists attempted to engage a U.S. Army convoy during curfew hours.
Soldiers of the 3rd Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment, engaged the enemy after they observed the terrorists setting up ambush positions along Highway 1, the main highway between Baghdad and Mosul.
Upon further investigation, U.S. troops discovered various semi-automatic machine guns – including three AK-47s, three rocket-propelled grenade launchers, and one RPK fully-automatic machinegun.
Iraqi Army, Iraqi Police capture a document forger working for insurgent groups and a weapons smuggler
BAGHDAD – 1st Iraqi Army Division forces captured a forger during operations Dec. 17 in Fallujah who produces forged documents and false identifications for insurgents operating from Ramadi to Baghdad.
Iraqi forces captured 2 more insurgents believed to be part of an improvised explosive device cell operating in the area. Iraqi forces confiscated equipment and material used to produce false identification and documents.
In a separate operation, Iraqi Police Forces captured a weapons smuggler during an operation in Tikrit, who is supplying weapons and improvised explosive devices used in insurgent attacks against Iraqi civilians and security forces.
The weapons smuggler is an experienced IED maker and provides IEDs, small arms and heavy weapons to insurgent groups conducting attacks in the Tikrit area. Iraqi forces confiscated 3 assault rifles and a pistol.
Iraqi Army captures IED, murder leader and 7 other terrorists
BAGHDAD – Ninth Iraqi Army Division troops captured a member of an illegal armed group during operations Dec. 16 in Baghdad who is involved in attacks against Iraqi civilians and Iraqi Security Forces.
He is involved in IED attacks against civilians and security forces as well as kidnapping and murder. He is also involved in setting up illegal checkpoints to help facilitate his kidnapping and murder operations. The Iraqi Force captured seven other terrorists.
Iraqi Army, Coalition Forces Discover Cache, Kills Seven Terrorists
BAQUBAH, Iraq – Soldiers from the 5th Iraqi Army, with support from 1st Cavalry Division troops, killed 7 terrorists, captured 3 other terrorists and discovered a cache while conducting operations in Baqubah Tuesday. This terrorist cell is responsible for the kidnappings and violence throughout the Baqubah markets. They have been eliminated from further operations against U.S. and Iraqi troops and civilians.
While conducting operations to eliminate terrorists and insurgents from
the Baqubah area and provide a secure and safe environment for the people of the
region, U.S. soldiers were involved in several small arms fire attacks. Anti-Iraqi
forces killed one Iraqi Army soldier and wounded seven.
With assistance from a U.S. air weapons team, 7 terrorists were killed during the attacks and an additional 3 terrorists were captured. The troops also discovered a cache consisting of rocket propelled grenades, mortar rounds and other improvised
explosive device material.
“This operation is ongoing evidence that the 5th Iraqi Army is conducting
intelligence-driven, evidence-based operations,” a U.S. Colonel said.
Iraqi National Police prevent casualties, saved lives from car bomb
BAGHDAD – Iraqi National Police manning a security checkpoint potentially saved many Iraqi lives by thwarting a car bomb threat here Dec. 17.
The driver of a car stopped short of a checkpoint in the Al Amariya district and got out of his car. He told police officers he had been kidnapped and forced to drive to that location. The driver said he suspected his kidnappers placed an explosive device in the vehicle.
An alert Iraqi National Policeman immediately cleared the area after seeing a suspicious bag in the vehicle’s trunk. Not long afterward, the bomb detonated causing only minor damage to an adjacent car. No one was injured from the blast.
More than 500 gunmen killed, arrested in Iraq 3 weeks ago
BAGHDAD -- The Iraqi Ministry of Interior said Thursday that it killed or captured 537 gunmen 3 weeks ago.
The National Police arrested 79 gunmen while the local police arrested 403 others in scattered areas of Iraq, the ministry said in its weekly report.
10 terrorists were killed by national police forces while 45 others were killed by local forces. He added that 7 hostages were rescued and released.
The report carried on by saying that 41 policemen were killed by insurgents throughout the previous week 156 policemen were injured. The statement revealed the names of top Iraqi members of leading terrorist groups that were arrested in addition to five Egyptians and five Syrians in Dyala province near Baghdad.
Police also managed to dismantle 3 booby-trapped vehicles and seize 6,000 pieces of weapons.
In other news, Iraq's government has executed a Tunisian man, Yousri Fakher Mohammad, 30 days after being found guilty in an Iraqi court. Mohhammad was one of several people responsible for the attacks on the shrines last February. Those attacks have led to thousands more Iraqi deaths due to sectarian violence.
Iraq Executes 13 Prisoners Dec. 19, 2006
BAGHDAD, Iraq (AP) - 13 men convicted of murder, kidnapping and other crimes were hanged in a Baghdad jail on Tuesday, lining up shortly before their execution in hoods and green jumpsuits, their hands bound behind their backs.
The government executed the 13 men after an appeals court and the presidency approved the verdict, said Busho Ibrahim, undersecretary of the Justice Ministry. ``They included terrorists and other criminals convicted of abduction and murder as well as assassination plots in several provinces,'' he said.
Television footage showed the hooded men standing in a row shortly before they were hanged. Several stooped, and one man had his arm around the shoulder of another. Some images showed two men standing together on a gallows with nooses around their necks.
The footage also showed a bearded man without a hood as he listened to an official tell him that his appeal had been rejected and the sentence was death. ``OK,'' the prisoner said, impassively.
‘Cache house’ uncovered in Baghdad, huge number of weapons
FORWARD OPERATING BASE LOYALTY, Iraq – Soldiers with the 1st Bn, 26th Infantry Regiment discovered a weapons cache in a militia safe house in Baghdad Dec. 19.
While establishing a cordon around the house, the U.S. Soldiers came under small arms fire and responded by hurling a grenade, which killed an insurgent.
Once inside, the unit discovered a large cache of weapons and rounds including
30,000 rounds of ammunition, 200 mortar rounds, 1 prefabricated improvised
explosive device, 2 suicide vests, 2 suicide belts, 20 107mm rockets, 31 grenades, 10 AK-47s, 6 machine guns, 2 rocket-propelled grenade launchers, 20 propanetanks, and 4 anti-tank mines.
Also recovered were materials used to forge identification cards, and 20 walkie-talkies.
Iraqi Police recruiting drive signs up 1,115 in Al Anbar
CAMP FALLUJAH, Iraq – In one of the most successful recruiting efforts in
western Iraq to date, 1,115 Iraqi men have recently signed up to join the Police Forces in the restive Al Anbar Province.
The new recruits, mostly from the Anbar cities of Ramadi, Fallujah and Hit, will
attend a five-week training course at the Jordanian International Police Training
College. Following successful completion of the course the new officers will join the
more than 8,000 police currently serving in communities throughout Al Anbar Province.
The successful recruiting effort this month moves the Government of Iraq and
Multi-National Forces West one step closer to achieving the joint goal of ensuring
11,330 trained law enforcement officers are on the job by April 2007.
“There are no spectacular victories in a counterinsurgency, but this represents a
significant development in the fight for the people of Anbar,” said a Marine LTC.
-
Today's WSJ:
Give Sadr the Treatment
How to beat Iraq's Shiite extremists.
BY OMAR FADHIL
Tuesday, December 26, 2006 12:01 a.m. EST
BAGHDAD--Understanding the question is half of the answer: That's what we used to say back in school. Then when we became dentists and doctors, we changed that to "diagnosis is half the treatment," and it looks that's where we're standing right now.
Everyone now seems to agree that any plan to fix the situation in Iraq has to have a military component along with a political one. The latter, as I understood, is supposed to bring together or facilitate a set of compromises and mutual concessions among the political powers in Iraq in order to achieve an acceptable level of stability and allow for sustained progress.
But why has it been that difficult to advance this political path despite all the time and effort spent in this direction?
There's a problem we should address and do something about if we want a political solution to see the light, and that is that some of the key political players in Iraq who are interested in finding a solution cannot move in that direction because they have their hands tied by former deals or affiliations with current or former extremist allies of the same sect as theirs, and those extremists have taken the entire political process in Iraq hostage.
What I'm trying to say here is that the military component we need at this particular stage should be different from the routine military operations that U.S. and Iraqi military had been conducting so far.
The new military component should be designed to create a friendly climate where politicians can strike deals and reach compromise without coercion from radical extremists.
And so if more boots are to be added on the ground then the mission will have to include freeing politicians and parties such as Nouri al-Maliki and Tariq al-Hashimi (of the Dawa and the Islamic party respectively) from the ropes that bind them to Muqtada al-Sadr and harmful elements in the Sunni political scene.
Right now is a good time, perhaps the best time we have, to launch this effort since there's already a large front forming from the parties that are willing to talk against the extremists' camp.
If the way forward requires maintaining the basic course of the political process and empowering (and cleaning) the current government and its head then the only way to do this is to relieve Mr. Maliki, his party and the rest of the Shia alliance from the dominance and influence of Sadr, and there are two ways to accomplish this: either persuade Mr. Maliki and his team and promise them great support and protection from Sadr's reach, or deal a lethal blow to Sadr and his militia in order to render him unable to inflict harm on Mr. Maliki and other members of the United Iraqi Alliance.
Now really, it shouldn't be that difficult to figure out that the first way isn't working out right, what's needed now is to take the decision to try the second way and deal with the biggest threat to stability in Iraq in the way we should.
If claims that the militia is fragmented and not entirely under Sadr's control are true (and it's actually hard to believe that one man can control a militia of dozens of thousands spread over 11 provinces) then this must be an advantage for us, because if that's the case there would be little reason to believe those renegade units would fight for Sadr. Many have reached financial independence from the center leadership, and let's not forget that money and fear are the main weapons militia leaders use to expand their power and maintain control over the militia members and the population.
The members were recruited by either fear or persuasion, and these bonds that still keep some units highly loyal will fall apart once the head is taken. Ideological fighters constitute a minority in my opinion and those, along with presumed Iranian and Hezbollah fighters who are assisting Sadr will represent the bulk of the remaining actual force that U.S. and Iraqi troops would have to fight and eliminate. Those are highly organized, but they are not invincible.
Together we succeeded in reducing the threat posed by al Qaeda when it was identified as the biggest threat to Iraq's stability and security. Now together we can do the same with Sadr and other thugs. We understand the question, and we have a diagnosis that seems sound; it's time to proceed with the treatment.
Mr. Fadhil, along with his brother Mohammed, runs Iraq the Model, a blog based in Baghdad.
===============
IRAQ: An Iraqi appeals court confirmed the death sentence for former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, Iraqi National Security Adviser Mouwafak al-Rubaie said. According to Iraqi law, Hussein must be executed within 30 days.
stratfor.com
-
THE BOOM OUTSIDE BAGHDAD
New York Post
By AMIR TAHERI
December 26, 2006 -- UMQASR, IRAQ
WHILE the American political elite is using Iraq as an excuse for fighting
internal political wars, a different reality is taking shape in parts of
this war-torn nation. Wherever some measure of security is assured - that is
to say in more than 80 percent of Iraq - towns and villages long left to die
a slow death are creeping back to life.
Nowhere is this slow but steady return to life more startling than in Um
Qasr, in the southeast extremity of Iraq on the Persian Gulf. Four years
ago, this was a jumble of rusting quays, abandoned houses and gutted
buildings. By the spring of 2003, its population had dwindled to a few
dozen, along with hundreds of stray dogs. There was even talk of abandoning
it altogether.
Today, however, Um Qasr is back in business as a port with commercial and
military functions. Hundreds of families that had left after the first Gulf
War in 1991 have returned - joining many more who have come from all over
Iraq.
The boom in Um Qasr is part of a broader picture that also includes Basra
(the sprawling metropolis of southern Iraq), the Shi'ite "holy" cities of
Najaf and Karbala, Mandali on the Iranian border and much of Baghdad.
When the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank reported two years
ago that the Iraqi economy was heading for a boom, skeptics dismissed it as
misplaced optimism. Now, however, even some of those who opposed the
toppling of Saddam Hussein admit that many Iraqis share that optimism.
Newsweek has just hailed the emergence of a booming market economy in Iraq
as "the mother of all surprises," noting that "Iraqis are more optimistic
about the future than most Americans are." The reason, of course, is that
Iraqis know what is going on in their country while Americans are fed a diet
of exclusively negative reporting from Iraq.
The growing dynamism of the Iraqi economy is reflected in the steady
increase in the value of the national currency, the dinar, against the three
currencies in direct competition with it in the Iraqi marketplace: the
Iranian rial, the Kuwaiti dinar and the U.S. dollar, since January 2006.
No doubt, part of the dinar's strength reflects the rise in Iraq's income
from oil exports to almost $40 billion in 2006, an all-time record. But oil
alone does not explain all, since both Iran and Kuwait are bigger exporters
than Iraq.
The fact that civil-servant salaries have increased by almost 30 percent,
with a further 30 percent due to come into effect early next year, also has
helped boost demand.
But a good part of the boom is due to an unexpected flow of foreign capital.
This has been facilitated by the prospect of a liberal law on direct foreign
investments, which exists only in such free-trade parts of the region as
Dubai and Bahrain. None of Iraq's six neighbors offers such guarantee for
the free flow of capital to and from the country.
Since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, the number of private companies in
Iraq has increased from a mere 8,000 to more than 35,000 this year. Each
week an average of 60 new companies spring up in Iraq's booming areas. A
good part of the investment in southern Iraq, including in Um Qasr, comes
from Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates.
"Whatever happens, Iraq is Iraq," says a Kuwaiti businessman, building
hotels in the south. "Iraq will always remain the country with the world's
largest oil reserves and the Middle East's biggest resources of water."
One hears similar comments from local and foreign businessmen investing in
real estate in Najaf and Karbala. Over 200 million Shiite Muslims regard the
cities as holy. Najaf and Karbala have always been dream destinations for
pilgrims. Under Saddam Hussein, however, few foreign pilgrims were allowed.
With the despot gone, pilgrims are pouring in - and with them the fresh
money.
That good business is possible in Iraq is reflected in the performance of
new companies, most of which did not exist three years ago. One privately
owned mobile phone company is expected to report revenues of more than $500
million this year, a sevenfold increase in three years. Another private firm
marketing soft drinks has seen profits double since the end of 2003. The
number of luxury cars imported has risen from a few hundred in 2002 to more
than 20,000 this year.
But what about continued terrorist attacks? Most foreign investors coming to
make money in Iraq shrug their shoulders. "Doing business in any Arab
country is always risky," says a Turkish investor who has set up a trucking
company and a taxi service. "In some Arab countries, you risk
nationalization or straight confiscation by the ruler. In other Arab
countries, you must give a cut to one of the emirs. Here, you face possible
terrorist attacks. But such attacks are transitory."
The relatively low cost of labor is another attraction to investors. Wages
in Iraq, where unemployment is over 30 percent, are less than a quarter of
the going rates in Kuwait. Nevertheless, the Iraqi boom appears to be
attracting some Iranian laborers from areas close to the border - people who
come in for a few days to make some money before returning home.
Although Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's government has slowed down the
pace of privatization, the foundations of the command economy created by
Saddam continue to crumble.
The transition from a rentier economy - in which virtually the whole of the
population depended on government handouts - to a free-market capitalist one
entails much hardship for some segments of society. Many pensioners and some
civil servants find it hard to make ends meet as prices rise across the
board. The end of government subsidies on virtually everything - from bread
and sugar to gasoline and water - is also causing hardship.
But, judging by the talk in teahouses and the debate in Iraq's new and
pluralist media, most people welcome the switch to capitalism and regard it
as an exciting adventure.
As trucks are loaded with a variety of imports destined for Baghdad, I ask
the drivers what they think would happen if the multi-national force, led by
the United States, left Iraq soon. Most shrug their shoulders.
"Why leave?" one driver asks. "Do I abandon the goods that have come from
such a long way before they reach their destination?"
This amounts to a plea to "stay the course." The man in Um Qasr does not
know that in the United States the phrase "staying the course" drives so
many up the wall.
Amir Taheri is a member of Benador Associates.
-
Second post of the day.
====================
STRIP FOR ACTION
By RALPH PETERS
December 27, 2006 -- WITH a troop surge nearly inevitable in the new year, we still lack a strategy to win in Iraq. Radical surgery on our approach is the patient's only hope - but the policy doctors in D.C. just want to up the medication.
Washington may be the unofficial capital of the world, but it's a town that thinks small. The real-and-present danger is that a desperate administration and a nervous new Congress won't imagine genuine alternatives to losing slowly or leaving.
Is Iraq hopeless? No. But the path to a positive outcome doesn't follow the traditional wisdom about what's "doable." We must think clearly and boldly, without regard to vested interests.
One thing's clear: If we can't enforce security, nothing else matters. So the wisest course of action seems obvious - except to the Washington establishment: Return to a wartime footing.
Focus exclusively on security. Concentrate on doing one thing well. Freeze all reconstruction and aid projects. Halt every program and close every office that doesn't contribute directly to pacifying Iraq.
Empty the Green Zone. Pack off the contractors. Reduce the military's overhead to those elements essential to support combat operations. Make it clear to "our" Iraqis that it's sink-or-swim time. Remove our advisers from any Iraqi unit that can operate marginally without them (and let the Iraqis do security their way without interference).
Above all, establish unity of command: Stop pretending there's a fully functional government in Baghdad, recall our ambassador until the fighting's over and make this a purely military effort until Iraq has been pacified.
Shedding extraneous programs would allow us to withdraw some military elements, increase the impact of combat units already in Iraq and use any additional forces more efficiently.
By attempting to do far too much, we diffused our capabilities. Program after program faltered. We need to return to the principle of concentration of effort.
We tried to refashion a country and rebuild its infrastructure before we made it secure. The result has been the waste of American lives, four years and billions of taxpayer dollars.
Defying the power of inertia - a tremendous force in Washington - we need to grasp that throwing good money after bad undercuts our last, slight hope of a win.
We need an exclusive focus on the defeat of the foreign terrorists, uncooperative Sunni Arabs and Muqtada al-Sadr's Shia thugs. Our enemies control Iraq with fear. We need to make them fear us more than the population fears them.
And we must stop reciting insupportable platitudes about every element of government playing a role and the supreme power of negotiations. That's just nonsense. Contrary to pundit blustering, the overwhelming majority of insurgencies over the past 3,000 years have been defeated - by uncompromising military responses.
Contributions from government departments other than the Pentagon may be desirable in theory, but they've been AWOL in fact. You can't build an effective team if the players don't show up.
The worst failure has been that of the State Department. State couldn't get enough volunteers even for its 90-day stints in Iraq - every major program that it insisted on running failed.
Worse, military officers complain that our diplomats in Baghdad undercut their efforts. Even if State were competent, you can't have parallel chains of command in wartime. Our blundering diplos only fall prey to sharper-minded Iraqis.
As for negotiations offering the only way forward, where in the Middle East have negotiations ever produced enduring peace? All the media drooling over an expected American retreat has left all of Iraq's opposing factions calculating how they can win after we're gone.
You can't hold successful negotiations with irreconcilable, unbroken factions who have no incentive to compromise. And even when you cajole promises from one group or another in the Middle East, no party feels bound to honor its commitments.
You can only drive negotiations from a position of uncontested strength - which we threw away.
Our enemies don't believe we have the guts to pacify Iraq. They may be right.
It would be obscene to deploy more troops and further strain our military unless we're serious about winning. And all half-measures will fail.
The paradox is that beleaguered Iraqis would welcome a harsh security crackdown - our toughest obstacle would be a global media alliance already patting itself on the back for our defeat.
Of course, if we make security our sole focus, the Daddy Warbucks profiteers will howl to the congressmen they've bought; our self-adoring diplomats will spew more of their poisonous jealousy into the Potomac - and those military commanders who've lost focus will argue that bribing Iraqis with reconstruction efforts is essential to pacification.
But bought allies never stay bought. Diplomats don't disarm terrorists and militias or defuse roadside bombs. And the administration's cult-like belief in the power of outsourcing to bring peace created the mess we now face.
Iraq may never be the inclusive and just democracy we sought. Our age reflects the rise of popular power, but demotic passions do not inevitably lead to democracy. In times of widespread systemic breakdown such as these, demagogues and dictators can embody the popular will as readily as presidents or prime ministers. "People power" is here to stay, but we're far from knowing all it will produce.
But we may be certain of this: Democracy can't exist without security. All of our other ambitions for Iraq are hopeless if men and women can't walk the streets without fear. Whether or not we still can win, merely tweaking our policy promises failure.
It's time to strip for action - and fight to win.
Ralph Peters' latest book is "Never Quit The Fight."
-
Geopolitical Diary: The al-Sadr Threat to the U.S. Plan for Iraq
Although much of Wednesday's news from Iraq concerned a letter reportedly written by former President Saddam Hussein, the most important event centered on U.S. efforts against radical Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr.
The letter -- allegedly written by Hussein on Nov. 5, the day an Iraqi court sentenced him to death for crimes against humanity -- urges Iraqis to unite to fight foreign forces in the country. Following its release, a Baath Party Web site posted a statement saying American interests worldwide would be attacked if the Iraqi government executes Hussein, and that his death would make cooperation between the surviving Baathists and the U.S.-backed government in Baghdad impossible.
But, for all the drama sparked by Hussein's letter and the threats, the former president and his followers pose no real danger. The violence in Iraq will continue no matter what happens to Hussein. Given his lack of influence in the country since his ouster, and the fact that most armed groups in Iraq would string him up themselves if they could, his execution might inspire emotional outbursts and some isolated attacks but it is unlikely to be the catalyst for major violence. This is largely because Hussein loyalists are responsible for a very small part of the bloodshed; they do not have the presence or the means to significantly increase attacks, and they will probably be more concerned with staying one step ahead of the various Shiite militias and rival Sunni groups than with retaliating against coalition forces for the execution of the former president.
What is important, however, is the death of Sahib al-Ameri, al-Sadr's representative in the holy Shiite city of An Najaf and the secretary-general of the Martyrs Foundation, a pro-Sadr political organization. According to coalition forces, al-Ameri was killed Wednesday when he ran to the roof of his house as it was being raided by coalition and Iraqi troops and pointed an assault rifle at an Iraqi soldier. The raid in An Najaf was one of many in recent months targeting known associates of al-Sadr.
These raids are part of an effort to put pressure on al-Sadr, who could be a serious obstacle to any U.S. exit strategy. The Shiite leader's Mehdi Army and its associated militias are not as constrained by politics as the other major Shiite militant group, the Badr Brigades; they are less organized and their members are less integrated into the Iraqi security forces and Cabinet, which makes them more difficult to control. From its bases in Sadr City and other strongholds, the Mehdi Army constitutes a significant armed presence in many areas of Baghdad. The militias -- and their associated death squads -- present a considerable obstacle to security in the capital.
The U.S.-led coalition has been working hard to constrain al-Sadr's power in recent months, most notably by going after his allies and lieutenants and disrupting his operations in Baghdad and other cities. U.S. and Iraqi forces have conducted several raids in Sadr City since November, arresting members of the Mehdi Army believed to be linked to Shiite death squads. During one four-day period, the neighborhood was raided three times. More recently, British forces deliberately demolished the headquarters of the Iraqi police's Serious Crimes Unit in Basra after the unit, which was heavily infiltrated by the Mehdi Army, was linked to death squads and arms- and oil-smuggling rackets.
The pressure on al-Sadr makes things difficult for Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, whose coalition is nominally supported by the Shiite leader. Despite al-Maliki's protests, the United States has continued to target al-Sadr's forces -- an indication of just how important it is to Washington that al-Sadr be weakened or neutralized. Because any prospective U.S. reinforcements will not arrive in the region until January, and not in significant numbers until months later, now is al-Sadr's time to act. His best hope is to convince al-Maliki that any campaign against the Mehdi Army would be too costly for the Iraqi state to endure.
While Hussein might be urging Iraqis to carry on bravely without him, and his party is threatening terrible repercussions if he is executed, it appears that al-Sadr is the greater threat to the U.S. plan for Iraq.
stratfor.com
-
Saddam would be executed before 6 a.m. Saturday, or 10 p.m. Friday EST. The time was agreed upon during a meeting Friday between U.S. and Iraqi officials.
BAGHDAD, Iraq (Dec. 29) - The official witnesses to Saddam Hussein's impending execution gathered Friday in Baghdad's fortified Green Zone in final preparation for his hanging, as state television broadcast footage of his regime's atrocities.
Al-Maliki said opposing Saddam's execution was an insult to his victims. His office said he made the remarks in a meeting with families of people who died during Saddam's rule.
"Our respect for human rights requires us to execute him, and there will be no review or delay in carrying out the sentence," al-Maliki said.
State television ran footage of the Saddam era's atrocities, including images of uniformed men placing a bomb next to a youth's chest and blowing him up in what looked like a desert, and handcuffed men being thrown from a high building.
-
This Kuwait Times article tells a positive side of the economic story in Iraq. It starts slowly with complaints about no mainstream media coverage of progress, then gives plenty of first-hand, specific information about projects, jobs, salaries, locations, currency valuation, price of gas, etc.
http://www.kuwaittimes.net/Navariednews.asp?dismode=article&artid=1839729411
Iraq on the right path
Generally speaking, the media worldwide report predominantly about the sensational, catastrophes, deaths, controversial statements by international personalities, wars, celebrity stories, gossip, rumours and the abnormal.
News about socio-economic success, development and progress is scantily tackled. A veteran German reporter told me this kind of news is boring for media consumers. People prefer the sensational. Hence, media providers fiercely compete to get hold of dramatic events. This is the kind of news that mesmerises people to the media. Commercial media, above all TV channels rejoice in reporting about wars and killing, the sooner the better. They rush to the scene of events and report live. "Thank God! At last something sensational is happening. Now we can make money (through commercials of course)." Commercial TV owners celebrate joyfully. Sensational events overshadow normal, ordinary, effective, humane achievements.
Had Mohammed Yunus not won this year's Nobel Prize for peace, no body would have taken notice of his great Mini-Loan Bank in Bangladesh which helped eradicate poverty for seven million people. International media used to report almost only about floods and poverty from Bangladesh. Yunus's work was ignored. It was not sensational enough. Commercial media live on the sensational, the weird, the bloody, the negative, the abnormal, and the controversial.
All this seems to apply to Iraq. We only hear and read bad news from Iraq: suicide and car bombs. Random killing, sabotage, and destruction are the only news we get from Iraq. Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General describes the situation in Iraq as "worse than a civil war." Obviously he watches only CNN. But is Iraq really only killing and destruction?
An American businessman with links to major parts of Iraq told me another story of Iraq. While he admits that there is daily killing and destruction in Iraq, there is also construction, development, progress and freedom. Here are some of his facts: Slowly but steadily, "80 per cent of Iraqis are creeping (back) to (normal) life."
"Um Qasr, in the southeast extremity of Iraq on the Persian Gulf" which was deserted by the spring of 2003 is back to normal. "It is back in business as a port with commercial and military functions. "Hundreds of families have returned - joining many more who have come from all over Iraq."
"The boom in Um Qasr is part of a broader picture that also includes Basra, the sprawling metropolis of southern Iraq"
Very few media report about good news from Iraq. "Newsweek has just hailed the emergence of a booming market economy in Iraq as "the mother of all surprises," noting "Iraqis are more optimistic about the future than most Americans are." The reason, of course, is that Iraqis know what is going on in their country while Americans are fed a diet of exclusively negative reporting from Iraq."
The growing dynamism of the Iraqi economy is reflected in the steady increase in the value of the national currency, the dinar, against the three currencies in direct competition with it in the Iraqi marketplace: the Iranian rial, the Kuwaiti dinar and the US dollar, since January 2006."
"No doubt, part of the dinar's strength reflects the rise in Iraq's income from oil exports to almost $40 billion in 2006, an all-time record. But oil alone does not explain all, since both Iran and Kuwait are bigger exporters than Iraq."
"The fact that civil-servant salaries have increased by almost 30 per cent, with a further 30 per cent due to come into effect early next year, also has helped boost demand.
But a good part of the boom is due to an unexpected flow of foreign capital. This has been facilitated by the prospect of a liberal law on direct foreign investments, which exists only in such free-trade parts of the region as Dubai and Bahrain . None of Iraq 's six neighbours offers such guarantee for the free flow of capital to and from the country."
"Since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, the number of private companies in Iraq has increased from a mere 8,000 to more than 35,000 this year. Each week an average of 60 new companies spring up in Iraq 's booming areas. A good part of the investment in southern Iraq , including in Um Qasr, comes from Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates."
"Whatever happens, Iraq is Iraq ," says a Kuwaiti businessman, building hotels in the south. "Iraq will always remain the country with the world's largest oil reserves and the Middle East's biggest resources of water."
"One hears similar comments from local and foreign businessmen investing in real estate in Najaf and Karbala. Over 200 million Shiite Muslims regard the cities as holy. Najaf and Karbala have always been dream destinations for pilgrims. Under Saddam Hussein, however, few foreign pilgrims were allowed. With the despot gone, pilgrims are pouring in-and with them the fresh money."
"That good business is possible in Iraq is reflected in the performance of new companies, most of which did not exist three years ago. One privately owned mobile phone company is expected to report revenues of more than $500 million this year, a sevenfold increase in three years. Another private firm marketing soft drinks has seen profits double since the end of 2003. The number of luxury cars imported has risen from a few hundred in 2002 to more than 20,000 this year. The leading export of Iraq is producing nearly $41 billion in revenues."
But what about continued attacks of insurgents and terrorists?
"Most foreign investors coming to make money in Iraq shrug their shoulders. "Doing business in any Arab country is always risky," says a Turkish investor who has set up a trucking company and a taxi service. "In some Arab countries, you risk nationalization or straight confiscation by the ruler. In other Arab countries, you must give a cut to one of the emirs (and princes). Here, you face possible terrorist attacks. But such attacks are transitory."
"The relatively low cost of labour is another attraction to investors. Wages in Iraq , where unemployment is (still) over 30 per cent, are less than a quarter of the going rates in Kuwait . Nevertheless, the Iraqi boom appears to be attracting some Iranian labourers from areas close to the border-people who come in for a few days to make some money before returning home."
"Although Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki's government has slowed down the pace of privatisation, the foundations of the command economy created by Saddam continue to crumble."
"The transition from a rentier economy-in which virtually the whole of the population depended on government handouts-to a free-market capitalist one entails much hardship for some segments of society. Many pensioners and some civil servants find it hard to make ends meet as prices rise across the board. The end of government subsidies on virtually everything-from bread and sugar to gasoline and water-is also causing hardship."
"But, judging by the talk in teahouses and the debate in Iraq's new and pluralist media, most people welcome the switch to capitalism and regard it as an exciting adventure.
"Since 2003 the salaries of average Iraqis have risen in excess of 100 per cent. In addition the Iraqi government has slashed the income tax rates from 45 per cent to just around 15 per cent. That has resulted in the average Iraqi family being able to develop long term nest-eggs (we call them IRAs)."
"Gasoline is only .56 cents a gallon. It wouldn't be that high except that Iraq decided to payoff some of its debt to the World Bank and are using energy profits to do so.
In addition much of the formerly centralised organisation of the economy has been turned over to private sector endeavours and while some government sectors have seen a spike in unemployment, private sector unemployment is hovering around 30 per cent. High to you and me, but still better than in the Saddam era."
The more and more Iraqis are taken on the board of development, the less they would listen to warlords and terrorist groups. Insurgents are not recruited among the 70 per cent of peaceful and diligent Iraqis; they are recruited among the 30 per cent jobless and retainers of the old regime. I'm confidant and millions of Iraqis with me that the course of development will prevail.
-
Geopolitical Diary: The Surge and a Gamble
This will be the week that U.S. President George W. Bush announces a surge of troops into Iraq. The numbers appear to be locking down in the range of 15,000 to 20,000, but this is a bit misleading. In addition to more deployments into Iraq, there will probably be redeployments within the country as well, with the U.S. presence being reduced in some areas in order to bring a larger force into Baghdad. The Democratic leadership in Congress will oppose the surge, but likely to no avail. The mechanism the Democrats have for blocking the deployment is to cut off funding for the effort, and they are not going to do that. They will be on record as opposing the surge, and then let it play itself out.
The troops deploying to Baghdad will find themselves in a city with more than 5 million inhabitants -- and which, like any city, has uncharted alleys and basements. Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias are operating on their home turf there. They are surrounded by friends and family, by others who want nothing to do with the war, and by yet others who might hate the Iraqi militants but also fear them. The United States has failed to pacify Baghdad with existing forces, so what is to be expected now?
The target of all of this is the Shiite militias -- and Muqtada al-Sadr's militia, the Mehdi Army, in particular. Bush speaks publicly about Sunni insurgents, but at this point, the issue is the Shia -- and more than that, it is the Iranians who are encouraging al-Sadr and others to stand hard against the Sunnis and the Americans. Assuming that the violence in Baghdad as a whole cannot be pacified, it is possible that al-Sadr can be broken by this military surge. Possible, but far from certain or even likely.
However, neither al-Sadr nor the Iranians can be certain that it will fail. Like Bush, they are going to be gambling everything on an assumption -- in their case, that the offensive will fail. But if it succeeds, and al-Sadr's forces are decimated, an entirely new dynamic could emerge in Iraq: Shia factions that are less heavily influenced by Iran would emerge as the dominant force, the political process could be revived and the Iranians lose their historic opportunity to dominate Iraq. No one knows how a war will turn out, including the Iranians. They have in the past miscalculated on American cunning -- such as after the fall of the Shah, when the United States encouraged Iraq to attack Iran, locking down the revolution for a decade.
We suspect that what Bush is hoping for is less a military victory than a psychological one, creating a sense of profound uncertainty in Tehran and among Iraqi Shia that causes them to hedge their bets. It's not an accident, in our view, that at the same time the surge is being rolled out, the Israelis have carefully orchestrated a discussion of their options in the event that Iran approaches nuclear status. The analysis by an Israeli think-tank as to the uses of tactical nuclear weapons against Iran's nuclear facilities is the perfect counterpoint to the U.S. surge strategy. It creates two massive and vital uncertainties for the Iranians: First, their position in Iraq might not be as secure as they thought, and second, their nuclear program could suddenly evaporate. If both were to happen, Iran's position would be much worse than it has been in decades.
The United States is driving hard into the land of "if." Between Bush's announcement and the actual beginning of post-surge military operations, there will be a period of uncertainty on all sides. From the American point of view, uncertainty is a marked improvement from the sense of complete failure that had taken hold in November and December. From the position of the Iraqi Shia and the Iranians, the introduction of uncertainty marks a decline from the heady sense of near-victory during that same period.
So now the question is simply this: How confident are al-Sadr and the Iranians that the U.S. surge will fail and the Israelis won't strike? Exactly how strong are their nerves? Carefully generated perceptions of the Iranian leadership as complete fanatics masks the fact that they are shrewd and careful gamblers. Some in Tehran and Baghdad will be arguing that the U.S. surge is too little, too late and that the Israelis are bluffing. Others who have fought the Americans and know the Israelis will be more thoughtful.
Iran and al-Sadr could choose to try to close a political deal without increasing their risks. The Americans would probably deal. Or, they could go big, absorb the surge, break it and try to pick up all the chips. Plans for the U.S. surge will be set this week, but it will take weeks for forces to deploy. We are not confident in the success of this strategy, but then what we think is much less significant than what the Iranians and the Shia think. What is their appetite for risk? They may not, themselves, be sure at this moment.
But this much they know. They did not expect the United States to increase troops after the mid-term elections in November. On that they were wrong. Now they have to ask this question: Having guessed wrong once, are they feeling lucky now? We expect that forcing that question on the Iranians and Shia is the primary purpose of the surge.
-
I'm afraid the controversy around the hanging of SH and the published mobile video only shows that the patchwork democracy of Iraq is far from being what the west would expect of it. Freedom and law have become caricatured in the hand of a shiite dominated, Sadr loyal, government.
-
Speaking of the devil , , ,
http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=5c128f4eac&p=1
-
What an interesting insight into the Iraqi disputes (aside from its comedic qualities :wink:). Especially the conflict between former Saddamites (Sunnites) and Shiites, scoffed at by the Sunnites as 'Iranians', 'Persians'. Here comes the difference between Arabians (Sunnites) and Persians (Shiites) to daylight. A distinction very important for the Iraqi people, but basically neglected by the US administration. Unfortunately the Sunnites would be the lesser evil. The Iranian president can feel confident, the path through Iraq to Isreal is now paved by Shiite enclaves. I question how serious the Shiites take the Iraqi democracy and how long it'll take for them to overthrow it as soon as the US troops leave the country.
-
You may be right or may be not-- Sistani is of the quietist school of Shia and seems sincere about democracy and Ahmadinejad (sp?) et al are from the school that says that they must cleanse the world to prepare for the 12th Iman.
See my recent post on the Islam the Religion thread by a senior Bush advisor and also see my post today on the Big Picture WW3 thread by Luttwak.
-
For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
January 10, 2007
Fact Sheet: The New Way Forward in Iraq
Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review (PDF)
Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials
In Focus: Renewal in Iraq
The President's New Iraq Strategy Is Rooted In Six Fundamental Elements:
Let the Iraqis lead;
Help Iraqis protect the population;
Isolate extremists;
Create space for political progress;
Diversify political and economic efforts; and
Situate the strategy in a regional approach.
Iraq Could Not Be Graver – The War On Terror Cannot Be Won If We Fail In Iraq. Our enemies throughout the Middle East are trying to defeat us in Iraq. If we step back now, the problems in Iraq will become more lethal, and make our troops fight an uglier battle than we are seeing today.
Key Elements Of The New Approach: Security
Iraqi:
Publicly acknowledge all parties are responsible for quelling sectarian violence.
Work with additional Coalition help to regain control of the capital and protect the Iraqi population.
Deliver necessary Iraqi forces for Baghdad and protect those forces from political interference.
Commit to intensify efforts to build balanced security forces throughout the nation that provide security even-handedly for all Iraqis.
Plan and fund eventual demobilization program for militias.
Coalition:
Agree that helping Iraqis to provide population security is necessary to enable accelerated transition and political progress.
Provide additional military and civilian resources to accomplish this mission.
Increase efforts to support tribes willing to help Iraqis fight Al Qaeda in Anbar.
Accelerate and expand the embed program while minimizing risk to participants.
Both Coalition And Iraqi:
Continue counter-terror operations against Al Qaeda and insurgent organizations.
Take more vigorous action against death squad networks.
Accelerate transition to Iraqi responsibility and increase Iraqi ownership.
Increase Iraqi security force capacity – both size and effectiveness – from 10 to 13 Army divisions, 36 to 41 Army Brigades, and 112 to 132 Army Battalions.
Establish a National Operations Center, National Counterterrorism Force, and National Strike Force.
Reform the Ministry of Interior to increase transparency and accountability and transform the National Police.
Key Elements Of The New Approach: Political
Iraqi:
The Government of Iraq commits to:
Reform its cabinet to provide even-handed service delivery.
Act on promised reconciliation initiatives (oil law, de-Baathification law, Provincial elections).
Give Coalition and ISF authority to pursue ALL extremists.
All Iraqi leaders support reconciliation.
Moderate coalition emerges as strong base of support for unity government.
Coalition:
Support political moderates so they can take on the extremists.
Build and sustain strategic partnerships with moderate Shi'a, Sunnis, and Kurds.
Support the national compact and key elements of reconciliation with Iraqis in the lead.
Diversify U.S. efforts to foster political accommodation outside Baghdad (more flexibility for local commanders and civilian leaders).
Expand and increase the flexibility of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) footprint.
Focus U.S. political, security, and economic resources at local level to open space for moderates, with initial priority to Baghdad and Anbar.
Both Coalition And Iraqi:
Partnership between Prime Minister Maliki, Iraqi moderates, and the United States where all parties are clear on expectations and responsibilities.
Strengthen the rule of law and combat corruption.
Build on security gains to foster local and national political accommodations.
Make Iraqi institutions even-handed, serving all of Iraq's communities on an impartial basis.
Key Elements Of The New Approach: Economic
Iraqi:
Deliver economic resources and provide essential services to all areas and communities.
Enact hydrocarbons law to promote investment, national unity, and reconciliation.
Capitalize and execute jobs-producing programs.
Match U.S. efforts to create jobs with longer term sustainable Iraqi programs.
Focus more economic effort on relatively secure areas as a magnet for employment and growth.
Coalition:
Refocus efforts to help Iraqis build capacity in areas vital to success of the government (e.g. budget execution, key ministries).
Decentralize efforts to build Iraqi capacities outside the Green Zone.
Double the number of PRTs and civilians serving outside the Green Zone.
Establish PRT-capability within maneuver Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs).
Greater integration of economic strategy with military effort.
Joint civil-military plans devised by PRT and BCT.
Remove legal and bureaucratic barriers to maximize cooperation and flexibility.
Key Elements Of The New Approach: Regional
Iraqi:
Vigorously engage Arab states.
Take the lead in establishing a regional forum to give support and help from the neighborhood.
Counter negative foreign activity in Iraq.
Increase efforts to counter PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party).
Coalition:
Intensify efforts to counter Iranian and Syrian influence inside Iraq.
Increase military presence in the region.
Strengthen defense ties with partner states in the region.
Encourage Arab state support to Government of Iraq.
Continue efforts to help manage relations between Iraq and Turkey.
Continue to seek the region's full support in the War on Terror.
Both Coalition And Iraqi:
Focus on the International Compact.
Retain active U.N. engagement in Iraq – particularly for election support and constitutional review.
-
We live in interesting times , , ,
Geopolitical Diary: Iraq After al-Maliki
On Wednesday, the same day U.S. President George W. Bush unveiled his new plan to deal with the situation in Iraq, rumors circulated that Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki could resign in as little as four months. The leading contender to replace him is Vice President Adel Abdel Mahdi, who was al-Maliki's main rival for the position when he was elected in April 2006.
Should he leave office, al-Maliki would be the second elected Shiite prime minister in two years to have met with failure. Both al-Maliki and his predecessor, interim Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari, are members of Hizb al-Dawah (HD). They were able to take power when the other main Shiite factions -- the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and the al-Sadrite Bloc -- agreed to give HD the prime ministership, each to prevent the other from gaining power.
Al-Maliki's potential resignation is an indication that the problem is not a question of performance (or lack thereof) for any individual prime minister, but rather has to do with intra-Shiite politics. If Abdel Mahdi, the No. 2 man in SCIRI, were to become prime minister, it would upset the internal balance of power within the Shiite community and, more important, exacerbate intra-Shiite tensions, thus leading to further violence and instability within the country.
Should al-Maliki resign and Abdel Mahdi take his place, the Shia would have to agree on someone to assume the position of vice president, and the other factions would have to compensate HD in some way for the loss. This also would likely deepen tensions between the Iraqi government and the Mehdi Army, the militia loyal to radical Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr, since SCIRI is al-Sadr's main rival.
Should SCIRI take the top post, it would mean the prime ministership would be controlled by the most pro-Iranian Shiite group. This would further undermine Washington's influence in Baghdad, given that the Bush administration does not want to negotiate with Tehran over Iraq -- at least not from its current, weakened position.
Al-Maliki's resignation also could bring about the collapse of the Shiite coalition, which is currently hanging by only a thread, with deep internal differences between its members. The Shia cannot afford for their collective position to be further weakened.
Thus far, the Shia have chosen to sacrifice effective governance for the sake of unity. They will continue to do so. Therefore, it is unlikely that any new prime minister, particularly one from SCIRI, will be able to govern the country effectively.
---------------
1236 GMT -- UNITED STATES, IRAN -- U.S. troops raided an Iranian consular office in the northern Iraqi city of Arbil on Jan. 11, detaining five employees and seizing documents and computers, Iran's official news agency IRNA reported.
1230 GMT -- IRAQ -- Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki on Jan. 11 threatened Shiite militiamen with an all-out assault if they do not surrender their weapons. The announcement came hours after U.S. President George W. Bush pledged to control violence in Iraq with 21,500 additional troops and a more agressive Iraqi army. Al-Maliki had previously resisted such a move because the fighters are loyal to Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, his powerful political ally.
stratfor.com
-
stratfor.com
Geopolitical Diary: Iran's View of the Surge
U.S. forces raided an Iranian consular office on Thursday in the Iraqi city of Arbil and captured several people. This is the second operation of this kind in a month against Iranians in Iraq, but this one took place shortly after the end of U.S. President George W. Bush's speech announcing a new "surge" of troops into the country. The Iranians, obviously, objected strenuously to the raid, which they argued was carried out without the approval of the Iraqi government -- diplomatically important since it was an office of the Iranian Consulate. The United States did not comment directly, but clearly couldn't care less.
We have been talking about the psychological and political dimension of Washington's new strategy. Obviously, the increase in troops, rather than the drawdown expected after the Democratic victory and the Iraq Study Group report, was a surprise to the Iranians. It seems that the Bush administration is now trying to increase the pressure. The Israeli discussion of using nuclear weapons against Iraq, the report that the CIA has been authorized to act against Hezbollah (which is Iran's asset in Lebanon), attacks on Iranian offices in Iraq, and statements by various Bush administration officials warning Tehran, taken together, point to a concerted effort to intimidate Iran.
The question, of course, is whether Iran finds itself intimidated. Certainly, the world has changed since November 2006, when the Iranians reasonably felt they were on the verge of the strategic triumph of dominating Iraq. Washington has now taken the game to extra innings. But extra innings do not mean victory. From the Iranian point of view, it would seem, the fundamentals have not changed much. The United States is still in the game with too little, and too late; Israeli nuclear strikes would create an interesting political dynamic for Iran, even more interesting than having nukes; Hezbollah can take care of itself against the CIA; and the U.S. raids in Iraq are pinpricks.
At the same time, the Iranians are also aware of American resiliency and American deviousness. They recall how the Iraqi invasion of Iran bogged down the revolution for a decade and how the United States quietly manipulated the situation. They watched the Soviet Union collapse after the United States seemed to be a declining power in the 1970s. There are leaders in Iran who remember that the Americans have enormous reserves of power and resources and a very unpredictable political process.
Things always look better on the other side of the hill. From the Iranian point of view -- as opposed to the gloomy American view -- the United States is resourceful and treacherous. As events diverge from the expected path, the Iranians, at least some of them, have to be wondering whether they have made another major miscalculation. So, just as the Americans are gloomily trying one last gambit, the Iranians are wondering if their strategic hopes are going to fade.
There are interesting developments in Iranian politics that have been discussed here before. With Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei apparently ill, and impeachment moves in the works against President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, one wonders how much of this apparent instability is due to unease over the possibility that the Iranians are more vulnerable than they might appear. Iranian politics are opaque, and it is not clear whether any of this is serious; but still, it is there and has arisen at the same time that the United States has shifted policy and defied expectations.
Obviously, this is Bush's hope. He hopes that he can force Iran to re-evaluate its position in light of his unexpected moves. That might seem unlikely from an American point of view, but we have to wonder whether the Iranians see things as Americans do. Pessimism and exaggerated fears could well be endemic in this situation.
-
Iraqi campaign against terrorism:
http://noterror.info/
-
Iranians in Iraq: Making a Complex Insurgency Even More So
Summary
stratfor.com
The United States is in the process of interdicting the Iranian support network for Sunni insurgents in Iraq. And a strange network it is. Given that a significant portion of Sunni insurgents are Baathists and jihadists -- actors hostile to Iran -- Tehran has been careful to back only those Sunni militants who are not part of the jihadist alliance and has tried to create splinter groups by exploiting differences among jihadist factions and between jihadist and Iraqi Islamists. Iranian support of the Sunni insurgency is only making a complex insurgency even more so.
Analysis
U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad said Jan. 15 that Washington plans to "go after" what it says are networks of Iranian and Syrian agents in Iraq.
Iran's primary militant assets in Iraq are Shiite militias and unaffiliated gunmen. But Iran's support for the Iraq insurgency is not limited to its Shiite allies. Tehran also has been providing support to segments of the Sunni insurgency. Though it might sound like a contradiction for Shiite Iran to support Sunni groups in Iraq, it is not unprecedented -- and there is a certain logic behind the groups the Iranians choose to support.
Reports of Iranian support for Sunni insurgents have percolated in the media for quite some time but, given the sectarian tensions in Iraq, Iran has managed to brush off such reports. The understanding has been that Iran is not in a position to support Sunni insurgents, given the deep theological differences and divergent political objectives between the two sects. Sunni insurgents have mostly been either Iran's archenemies the Baathists, or jihadists attacking Iraqi Shia. There are also Sunni nationalists in Iraq who are trying to protect Sunni interests following the downfall of Saddam Hussein and the resulting rise of the Shia. Iran has not been able to use any of these three groups to its advantage.
But Tehran also wants to avoid overusing Shiite militants in Iraq in order to prevent a rift between Iraqi Shia and the United States; it intends to use its Arab Shiite allies as an instrument in consolidating its interests in Iraq. At the same time, the Iranians need to ensure that the Sunni insurgency would keep the United States tied down in Iraq so that U.S. forces would not be in a position to threaten Iran.
To those ends, Iran has had to gain some influence within the complex universe of Iraq's Sunni insurgency. The Iranians have backed certain elements of the insurgency -- such as Kurdish Islamist militant organization Ansar al-Sunnah -- that are Sunni Islamists, are not part of the jihadist alliance and are opposed to the U.S. occupation of Iraq. Many elements of Ansar al-Sunnah reportedly have been operating from inside Iran.
Moreover, the proliferation of both jihadist and Sunni nationalist groups in Iraq has allowed Iran to take advantage of their differences. By offering support in the form of training, weapons and logistics to these groups, Iran has been able to influence Sunni militants and encourage attacks that suit its interests. Such groups are willing to accept assistance from wherever it may come in order to enhance their own positions within the insurgent movement, and are unlikely to become Iranian proxies. They have their own agendas, which they see as being served through cooperation with Iran. Some of these groups feel that the United States is a far greater threat than Iran, while others simply want access to the sophisticated technology the Iranians have to offer.
Iran actually has a long history of supporting Sunni groups under the guise of promoting pan-Islamist causes. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and Hamas are two prime examples of Arab Sunni groups that have received Iranian assistance. In fact, PIJ's founders were heavily influenced by the 1979 Islamic revolution that brought the current Iranian regime to power.
In Iraq, Iranian support for Sunni militants will further complicate an already complex insurgency, making it all the more difficult for U.S. and Iraqi forces to contain it. It will also create suspicions and rifts among various Sunni groups that will cause intra-Sunni violence. On the other hand, the situation provides an opportunity for Washington to drive a wedge between the Iranians and their Iraqi Shiite allies by showing that Tehran has actually been backing their enemies. This is why Iran has tried to encourage the Sunni militants it supports to focus on U.S. and other non-Shiite targets.
Should the United States decide to adopt this strategy of trying to cultivate frictions between Iran and its Iraqi Shiite allies, its success will depend on how convincing the evidence is. Given the level of anti-U.S. sentiment in Iraq, Shiite acceptance of what the United States has to say will vary from group to group. But creating any rifts between Iran and the Iraqi Shia could weaken the degree of leverage Tehran seems to enjoy in the maelstrom of Iraq.
-
GEOPOLITICAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT
01.16.2007
Rhetoric and Reality: The View from Iran
By George Friedman
The Iraq war has turned into a duel between the United States and Iran. For the United States, the goal has been the creation of a generally pro-American coalition government in Baghdad -- representing Iraq's three major ethnic communities. For Iran, the goal has been the creation of either a pro-Iranian government in Baghdad or, alternatively, the division of Iraq into three regions, with Iran dominating the Shiite south.
The United States has encountered serious problems in creating the coalition government. The Iranians have been primarily responsible for that. With the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in June, when it appeared that the Sunnis would enter the political process fully, the Iranians used their influence with various Iraqi Shiite factions to disrupt that process by launching attacks on Sunnis and generally destabilizing the situation. Certainly, Sunnis contributed to this, but for much of the past year, it has been the Shia, supported by Iran, that have been the primary destabilizing force.
So long as the Iranians continue to follow this policy, the U.S. strategy cannot succeed. The difficulty of the American plan is that it requires the political participation of three main ethnic groups that are themselves politically fragmented. Virtually any substantial group can block the success of the strategy by undermining the political process. The Iranians, however, appear to be in a more powerful position than the Americans. So long as they continue to support Shiite groups within Iraq, they will be able to block the U.S. plan. Over time, the theory goes, the Americans will recognize the hopelessness of the undertaking and withdraw, leaving Iran to pick up the pieces. In the meantime, the Iranians will increasingly be able to dominate the Shiite community and consolidate their hold over southern Iraq. The game appears to go to Iran.
Americans are extremely sensitive to the difficulties the United States faces in Iraq. Every nation-state has a defining characteristic, and that of the United States is manic-depression, cycling between insanely optimistic plans and total despair. This national characteristic tends to blind Americans to the situation on the other side of the hill. Certainly, the Bush administration vastly underestimated the difficulties of occupying Iraq -- that was the manic phase. But at this point, it could be argued that the administration again is not looking over the other side of the hill at the difficulties the Iranians might be having. And it is useful to consider the world from the Iranian point of view.
The Foundation of Foreign Policy
It is important to distinguish between the rhetoric and the reality of Iranian foreign policy. As a general principle, this should be done with all countries. As in business, rhetoric is used to shape perceptions and attempt to control the behavior of others. It does not necessarily reveal one's true intentions or, more important, one's capabilities. In the classic case of U.S. foreign policy, Franklin Roosevelt publicly insisted that the United States did not intend to get into World War II while U.S. and British officials were planning to do just that. On the other side of the equation, the United States, during the 1950s, kept asserting that its goal was to liberate Eastern Europe from the Soviet Union, when in fact it had no plans, capabilities or expectations of doing so. This does not mean the claims were made frivolously -- both Roosevelt and John Foster Dulles had good reasons for posturing as they did -- but it does mean that rhetoric is not a reliable indicator of actions. Thus, the purple prose of the Iranian leadership cannot be taken at face value.
To get past the rhetoric, let's begin by considering Iran's objective geopolitical position.
Historically, Iran has faced three enemies. Its oldest enemy was to the west: the Arab/Sunni threat, against which it has struggled for millennia. Russia, to the north, emerged as a threat in the late 19th century, occupying northern Iran during and after World War II. The third enemy has worn different faces but has been a recurring threat since the time of Alexander the Great: a distant power that has intruded into Persian affairs. This distant foreign power -- which has at times been embodied by both the British and the Americans -- has posed the greatest threat to Iran. And when the element of a distant power is combined with one of the other two traditional enemies, the result is a great global or regional power whose orbit or influence Iran cannot escape. To put that into real terms, Iran can manage, for example, the chaos called Afghanistan, but it cannot manage a global power that is active in Iraq and Afghanistan simultaneously.
For the moment, Russia is contained. There is a buffer zone of states between Iran and Russia that, at present, prevents Russian probes. But what Iran fears is a united Iraq under the influence or control of a global power like the United States. In 1980, the long western border of Iran was attacked by Iraq, with only marginal support from other states, and the effect on Iran was devastating. Iran harbors a rational fear of attack from that direction, which -- if coupled with American power -- could threaten Iranian survival.
Therefore, Iran sees the American plan to create a pro-U.S. government in Baghdad as a direct threat to its national interests. Now, the Iranians supported the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003; they wanted to see their archenemy, former President Saddam Hussein, deposed. But they did not want to see him replaced by a pro-American regime. Rather, the Iranians wanted one of two outcomes: the creation of a pro-Iranian government dominated by Iraqi Shia (under Iran's control), or the fragmentation of Iraq. A fragmented Iraq would have two virtues. It would prove no danger to Iran, and Iran likely would control or heavily influence southern Iraq, thus projecting its power from there throughout the Persian Gulf.
Viewed this way, Iran's behavior in Iraq is understandable. A stable Iraq under U.S. influence represents a direct threat to Iran, while a fragmented or pro-Iranian Iraq does not. Therefore, the Iranians will do whatever they can to undermine U.S. attempts to create a government in Baghdad. Tehran can use its influence to block a government, but it cannot -- on its own -- create a pro-Iranian one. Therefore, Iran's strategy is to play spoiler and wait for the United States to tire of the unending conflict. Once the Americans leave, the Iranians can pick up the chips on the table. Whether it takes 10 years or 30, the Iranians assume that, in the end, they will win. None of the Arab countries in the region has the power to withstand Iran, and the Turks are unlikely to get into the game.
The Unknown Variables
Logic would seem to favor the Iranians. But in the past, the Iranians have tried to be clever with great powers and, rather than trapping them, have wound up being trapped themselves. Sometimes they have simply missed other dimensions of the situation. For example, when the revolutionaries overthrew the Shah and created the Islamic Republic, the Iranians focused on the threat from the Americans, and another threat from the Soviets and their covert allies in Iran. But they took their eyes off Iraq -- and that miscalculation not only cost them huge casualties and a decade of economic decay, but broke the self-confidence of the Iranian regime.
The Iranians also have miscalculated on the United States. When the Islamic Revolution occurred, the governing assumption -- not only in Iran but also in many parts of the world, including the United States -- was that the United States was a declining power. It had, after all, been defeated in Vietnam and was experiencing declining U.S. military power and severe economic problems. But the Iranians massively miscalculated with regard to the U.S. position: In the end, the United States surged and it was the Soviets who collapsed.
The Iranians do not have a sterling record in managing great powers, and especially in predicting the behavior of the United States. In large and small ways, they have miscalculated on what the United States would do and how it would do it. Therefore, like the Americans, the Iranians are deeply divided. There are those who regard the United States as a bumbling fool, all set to fail in Iraq. There are others who remember equally confident forecasts about other American disasters, and who see the United States as ruthless, cunning and utterly dangerous.
These sentiments, then, divide into two policy factions. On the one side, there are those who see Bush's surge strategy as an empty bluff. They point out that there is no surge, only a gradual buildup of troops, and that the number of troops being added is insignificant. They point to political divisions in Washington and argue that the time is ripe for Iran to go for it all. They want to force a civil war in Iraq, to at least dominate the southern region and take advantage of American weakness to project power in the Persian Gulf.
The other side wonders whether the Americans are as weak as they appear, and also argues that exploiting a success in Iraq would be more dangerous and difficult than it appears. The United States has substantial forces in Iraq, and the response to Shiite uprisings along the western shore of the Persian Gulf would be difficult to predict. The response to any probe into Saudi Arabia certainly would be violent.
We are not referring here to ideological factions, nor to radicals and moderates. Rather, these are two competing visions of the United States. One side wants to exploit American weakness; the other side argues that experience shows that American weakness can reverse itself unexpectedly and trap Iran in a difficult and painful position. It is not a debate about ends or internal dissatisfaction with the regime. Rather, it is a contest between audacity and caution.
The Historical View
Over time -- and this is not apparent from Iranian rhetoric -- caution has tended to prevail. Except during the 1980s, when they supported an aggressive Hezbollah, the Iranians have been quite measured in their international actions. Following the war with Iraq, they avoided overt moves -- and they even were circumspect after the fall of the Soviet Union, when opportunities presented themselves to Iran's north. After 9/11, the Iranians were careful not to provoke the United States: They offered landing rights for damaged U.S. aircraft and helped recruit Shiite tribes for the American effort against the Taliban. The rhetoric alternated between intense and vitriolic; the actions were more cautious. Even with the Iranian nuclear project, the rhetoric has been far more intense than the level of development seems to warrant.
Rhetoric influences perceptions, and perceptions can drive responses. Therefore, the rhetoric should not be discounted as a driving factor in the geopolitical system. But the real debate in Iran is over what to do about Iraq. No one in Iran wants a pro-U.S. government in Baghdad, and blocking the emergence of such a government has a general consensus. But how far to go in trying to divide Iraq, creating a pro-Iranian government in Baghdad and projecting power in the region is a matter of intense debate. In fact, cautious behavior combined with extreme rhetoric still appears to be the default position in Tehran, with more adventurous arguments struggling to gain acceptance.
The United States, for its part, is divided between the desire to try one more turn at the table to win it all and the fear that it is becoming hopelessly trapped. Iran is divided between a belief that the time to strike is now and a fear that counting the United States out is always premature. This is an engine that can, in due course, drive negotiations. Iran might be "evil" and the United States might be "Satan," but at the end of the day, international affairs involving major powers are governed not by rhetoric but by national interest. The common ground between the United States and Iran is that neither is certain it can achieve its real strategic interests. The Americans doubt they can create a pro-U.S. government in Baghdad, and Iran is not certain the United States is as weak as it appears to be.
Fear and uncertainty are the foundations of international agreement, while hope and confidence fuel war. In the end, a fractured Iraq -- an entity incapable of harming Iran, but still providing an effective buffer between Iran and the Arabian Peninsula -- is emerging as the most viable available option.
© Copyright 2006 Strategic Forecasting Inc. All rights reserved.
-
'The jihad now is against the Shias, not the Americans'
As 20,000 more US troops head for Iraq, Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, the only correspondent reporting regularly from behind the country's sectarian battle lines, reveals how the Sunni insurgency has changed...these are his interviews with Sunni insurgents:
One morning a few weeks ago I sat in a car talking to Rami, a thick-necked former Republican Guard commando who now procures arms for his fellow Sunni insurgents.
Rami was explaining how the insurgency had changed since the first heady days after the US invasion. "I used to attack the Americans when that was the jihad. Now there is no jihad. Go around and see in Adhamiya [the notorious Sunni insurgent area] - all the commanders are sitting sipping coffee; it's only the young kids that are fighting now, and they are not fighting Americans any more, they are just killing Shia. There are kids carrying two guns each and they roam the streets looking for their prey. They will kill for anything, for a gun, for a car and all can be dressed up as jihad."
Rami was no longer involved in fighting, he said, but made a tidy profit selling weapons and ammunition to men in his north Baghdad neighbourhood. Until the last few months, the insurgency got by with weapons and ammunition looted from former Iraqi army depots. But now that Sunnis were besieged in their neighbourhoods and fighting daily clashes with the better-equipped Shia ministry of interior forces, they needed new sources of weapons and money.
He told me that one of his main suppliers had been an interpreter working for the US army in Baghdad. "He had a deal with an American officer. We bought brand new AKs and ammunition from them." He claimed the American officer, whom he had never met but he believed was a captain serving at Baghdad airport, had even helped to divert a truckload of weapons as soon as it was driven over the border from Jordan.
These days Rami gets most of his supplies from the new American-equipped Iraqi army. "We buy ammunition from officers in charge of warehouses, a small box of AK-47 bullets is $450 (£230). If the guy sells a thousand boxes he can become rich and leave the country." But as the security situation deteriorates, Rami finds it increasingly difficult to travel across Baghdad. "Now I have to pay a Shia taxi driver to bring the ammo to me. He gets $50 for each shipment."
The box of 700 bullets that Rami buys for $450 today would have cost between $150 and $175 a year ago. The price of a Kalashnikov has risen from $300 to $400 in the same period. The inflation in arms prices reflects Iraq's plunge toward civil war but, largely unnoticed by the outside world, the Sunni insurgency has also changed. The conflict into which 20,000 more American troops will be catapulted over the next few weeks is very different to the one their comrades experienced even a year ago.
In Baghdad in late October I called a Sunni insurgent I had known for more than a year. He was the mid-level commander of a small cell, active against the Americans in Sunni villages north of Baghdad. Sectarian frontlines had been hardening in the city for months - it took us 45 minutes of haggling to agree on a meeting place which we could both get to safely. We met in a rundown workers' cafe.
Kidnapped
"Its not a good time to be a Sunni in Baghdad," Abu Omar told me in a low voice. He had been on the Americans' wanted list for three years but I had never seen him so anxious; he had trimmed his beard in the close-cropped Shia style and kept looking towards the door. His brother had been kidnapped a few days before, he told me, and he believed he was next on a Shia militia's list. He had fled his home in the north of the city and was staying with relatives in a Sunni stronghold in west Baghdad.
He was more despondent than angry. "We Sunni are to blame," he said. "In my area some ignorant al-Qaida guys have been kidnapping poor Shia farmers, killing them and throwing their bodies in the river. I told them: 'This is not jihad. You can't kill all the Shia! This is wrong! The Shia militias are like rabid dogs - why provoke them?' "
Then he said: "I am trying to talk to the Americans. I want to give them assurances that no one will attack them in our area if they stop the Shia militias from coming."
This man who had spent the last three years fighting the Americans was now willing to talk to them, not because he wanted to make peace but because he saw the Americans as the lesser of two evils. He was wrestling with the same dilemma as many Sunni insurgent leaders, beginning to doubt the wisdom of their alliance with al-Qaida extremists.
Another insurgent commander told me: "At the beginning al-Qaida had the money and the organisation, and we had nothing." But this alliance soon dragged the insurgents and then the whole Sunni community into confrontation with the Shia militias as al-Qaida and other extremists massacred thousands of Shia civilians. Insurgent commanders such as Abu Omar soon found themselves outnumbered and outgunned, fighting organised militias backed by the Shia-dominated security forces.
A week after our conversation, Abu Omar invited me to a meeting with insurgent commanders. I was asked to wait in the reception room of a certain Sunni political party. A taxi driver took me to a house in a Sunni neighbourhood that had recently been abandoned by a Shia family. The driver came in with me - he was also a commander.
The house had been abandoned in a hurry, cardboard boxes were stacked by the door, some of the furniture was covered with white cloths and a few cheap paintings were piled against a wall. The property had been expropriated by the local Sunni mujahideen and we sat on sofas in a dusty reception room.
Abu Omar had been meeting commanders of groups with names like the Fury Brigade, the Battalions of the 1920 Revolution, the Islamic Army and the Mujahideen Army, to discuss options they had for fighting both an insurgency against the Americans and an escalating civil war with the Shia.
Abu Omar had proposed encouraging young Sunni men to enlist in the army and the police to redress the sectarian balance. He suggested giving the Americans a ceasefire, in an attempt to stop ministry of interior commandos' raids on his area. Al-Qaida had said no to all these measures; now he wanted other Iraqi insurgent commanders to support him.
'Do politics'
A heated discussion was raging. One of the men, with a very thin moustache, a huge belly and a red kuffiya wrapped around his shoulder, held a copy of the Qur'an in one hand and a mobile phone in the other. I asked him what his objectives were. "We are fighting to liberate our country from the occupations of the Americans and their Iranian-Shia stooges."
"My brother, I disagree," said Abu Omar. "Look, the Americans are trying to talk to us Sunnis and we need to show them that we can do politics. We need to use the Americans to fight the Shia."
He looked nervously at them: suggestions of talking to the Americans could easily have him labelled as traitor. "Where is the jihad and the mujahideen?" he continued. "Baghdad has become a Shia town. Our brothers are being slaughtered every day! Where are these al-Qaida heroes? One neighbourhood after another will be lost if we don't work on a strategy."
The taxi driver commander, who sat cross-legged on a sofa, joined in: "If the Americans leave we will be slaughtered." A big-bellied man waved his hands dismissively: "We will massacre the Shia and show them who are the Sunnis! They couldn't have done anything without the Americans' support."
When the meeting was over the taxi driver went out to check the road, then the rest followed. "Don't look up, we could be monitored, Shia spies are everywhere," said the big man. The next day the taxi driver was arrested.
By December Abu Omar's worst fears were being realised. The Sunnis had become squeezed into a corner fighting two sides at the same time. But by then he had disappeared; his body was never found.
Baghdad was now divided: frontlines partitioned neighbourhoods into Shia and Sunni, thousands of families had been forced out of their homes. After each large-scale bomb attack on Shia civilians, scores of mutilated bodies of Sunnis were found in the streets. Patrolling militias and checkpoints meant that men with Sunni names dared not venture far outside their neighbourhoods, while certain Sunni areas came under the complete control of insurgent groups the Shura Council of the Mujahideen and the Islamic Army. The Sunni vigilante self-defence groups took shape as reserve units under the control of these insurgent groups.
Like Abu Omar before him, Abu Aisha, a mid-level Sunni commander, had come to understand that the threat from the Shia was perhaps greater than his need to fight the occupying Americans. Abu Aisha fought in Baghdad's western Sunni suburbs, he was a former NCO in the Iraqi army and followed an extreme form of Islam known as Salafism.
Jamming
Deep lines criss-crossed his narrow forehead and his eyes half closed when he tried to answer a question He seemed to evaluate every answer before he spoke. He claimed involvement in dozens of attacks on US and Iraqi troops, mostly IEDs (bombs) but also ambushes and execution of alleged Shia spies. "We have stopped using remote controls to detonate IEDs," he volunteered halfway through our conversation. "Only wires work now because the Americans are jamming the signals."
On his mobile phone he proudly showed me grainy images of dead bodies lying in the street, their hands tied behind their backs . He claimed they were Shia agents and that he had killed them. "There is a new jihad now," he said, echoing Abu Omar's warning. "The jihad now is against the Shia, not the Americans."
In Ramadi there was still jihad against the Americans because there were no Shia to fight, but in Baghdad his group only attacked the Americans if they were with Shia army forces or were coming to arrest someone.
"We have been deceived by the jihadi Arabs," he admitted, in reference to al-Qaida and foreign fighters. "They had an international agenda and we implemented it. But now all the leadership of the jihad in Iraq are Iraqis."
Abu Aisha went on to describe how the Sunnis were reorganising. After Sunni families had been expelled from mixed areas throughout Baghdad, his area in the western suburbs was prepared to defend itself against any militia attack.
"Ameriya, Jihad, Ghazaliyah," he listed, "all these areas are becoming part of the new Islamic state of Iraq, each with an emir in charge." Increasingly the Iraqi insurgency is moving away from its cellular structure and becoming organised according to neighbourhood. Local defence committees have intertwined into the insurgent movement.
"Each group is in charge of a specific street," Abu Aisha said. "We have defence lines, trenches and booby traps. When the Americans arrive we let them go through, but if they show up with Iraqi troops, then it's a fight."
A few days later Rami was telling me about the Sunni insurgents in his north Baghdad area. A network of barricades and small berms blocked the streets around the car in which we sat talking. A convoy of two cars with four men inside whizzed past. "Ah, they are brothers on a mission," Rami said.
Like every man of fighting age, Rami was required to take part in his local vigilante group, guarding the neighbourhood at night or conducting raids or mortar attacks on neighbouring Shia areas.
But he paid $30 a week to a local commander and was exempted.
According to Rami and other commanders, funding for the insurgents comes from three sources. Each family in the street pays a levy, around $8, to the local group. "And when they go through lots of ammunition because of clashes," Rami said, "they pay an extra $5." Then there are donations from rich Sunni businessmen, financiers and wealthier insurgent groups. A third source of funding was "ghaniama", loot which is rapidly becoming the main fuel of the sectarian war
'A business'
"Every time they arrest a Shia, we take their car, we sell it and use the money to fund the fighters, and jihad," said Abu Aisha. The mosque sheik or the local commander collects the money and it is distributed among the fighters; some get fixed salaries, others are paid by "operations", and the money left is used for ammunition.
"It has become a business, they give you money to kill Shia, we take their houses and sell their cars," said Rami. "The Shia are doing the same.
"Last week on the main highway in our area, they killed a Shia army officer. He had a brand new Toyota sedan. The idiots burned the car. I offered them $40,000 for it, they said no. Imagine how many jihads they could have done with 40k."
· Names have been changed in this report.
-
Petraeus Time
Bush's new Iraq strategy has a chance--but it needs revision.
BY REUEL MARC GERECHT
Sunday, January 21, 2007 12:01 a.m. EST
Can one back President Bush's new strategy in Iraq? Yes. For all its serious faults, his new approach is the first one since the fall of Baghdad to offer a chance to reverse the radicalization of Iraq. But it needs revision quickly.
Too much of this new plan leaves unchanged the disastrous approach of John Abizaid and George Casey, the two top generals on Iraq. The new offensive, assuming it doesn't peter out through a slow arrival of soldiers, or become enfeebled by "Iraqi leadership" in its execution, envisions a too-small U.S. force doing too much. Recent remarks by Defense Secretary Robert Gates--predicting troop reductions within a year, and saying that we might not need an additional five brigades in Baghdad for a successful operation--are a frightening echo of the self-defeating, undermanned optimism that came from the U.S. military under Mr. Gates's predecessor.
The good news is that by emphasizing a military, not political, strategy to diminish Iraq's debilitating violence, the president has correctly set aside one of the primary factors destroying the Shiite Arab center. While waiting for a "political solution" to the Sunni insurgency, we watched Shiite timidity and patience turn to anger--and to a revenge which now threatens the integrity of the Shiite-led Iraqi government. Gens. Abizaid and Casey had gambled that they could stand up an effective Iraqi military and police against the Sunnis before violence threatened everything in Baghdad. That bet collapsed with the destruction of the Shiite shrine in Samarra in February 2006--but the administration kept playing the same hand as if nothing had happened. The reversal of this soft-power, politics-not-troops mentality is an essential step forward.
Still, David Petraeus, who will succeed Gen. Casey as the overall boss in Iraq and who is one of America's finest, most adaptable commanders, may have to perform a miracle to compensate for this shortfall in manpower, especially if the required five brigades for Baghdad take months to arrive, and if Washington allows the offensive to move forward before he is even in charge. The president can pre-empt these lethal problems by ensuring Gen. Petraeus's rapid arrival in Iraq and by allowing him to determine how many soldiers he needs.
Nevertheless, there is a dismaying hesitancy in the military's and the White House's deliberations on this conflict. Although the president wants a new approach, the Pentagon, the State Department and even the National Security Council appear wedded to the past. The contradiction between what the president says and what his government does has never been greater. We need to move rapidly: The enemy is digging in and the drift to full-scale civil war is gaining speed.
The administration needs to rethink its understanding of Iraqi culture and politics, as the "new" strategy still contains ideas that have catastrophically guided American officials in the Green Zone ever since Sunni Arab insurgents started killing Americans in significant numbers. U.S. officials still believe they must soon see sectarian reconciliation, a reversal of de-Baathification, and a nonsectarian, equitable distribution of oil wealth.
All these achievements are meant to placate the aggrieved Sunni Arabs, who represent 15% of the population. But no one knows how many Sunni Arabs sympathize with their brethren who've been killing Shia. It certainly seemed like a very large number before the Shiites started counterattacking through their militias. The statements of Iraqi Sunni Arab organizations, the coverage of the Iraqi Sunni press and the region's Sunni Arab media, which often quotes and echoes the opinions of Iraqi Sunnis, suggest strongly that there is substantial communitarian support for both domestic and foreign suicide bombers.
For the serious ex-Baathists, Sunni supremacists and Iraqi Sunni fundamentalists--the lethal hardcore of the insurgency--it's still a good bet that they're not into democratic negotiations. They probably don't think much at all about an equitable distribution of oil revenues--or wanting their jobs back in the new army's officer corps.
De-Baathification for the Shiites and the Sunnis is really about only one thing: the army. But from the moment the U.S. started building a more representative Iraqi military in 2003, there was no way in hell the old Baathist Sunni officer corps could come back. And now, with the Shiites killing Sunnis, even the most enlightened of the proscribed Baathist officers (this isn't a large group) know that return would be suicide. No one knows how many Sunni Arabs would turn against their uncompromising, murderous brethren and align themselves with Shiites if the right "deal" were struck. It's a very good guess that such men, if they exist in any number, would get mowed down by their radical compatriots.
If the U.S. and Iraqi governments are going to bring peace to the "Sunni triangle," they must break the back of the insurgency. A minority, used to the prerogatives of a communitarian dictatorship, the Sunnis have been trying to derail the new Iraq: They must come to know that they will lose everything if they don't abandon violence as their principal political tool. They must know that if they choose to cease their violent opposition, they will not be murdered for doing so. This means, as it has always meant, a combined American and Shiite Iraqi occupation of major Sunni Arab cities. If the Sunni community hasn't hopelessly gone into a dominance-or-death opposition, then it could still come to its senses, provided the violent hardcore among them is neutralized and the Shiites and the Kurds allow them sufficient access to oil wealth. Shiite death squads have certainly taught the Sunnis of Baghdad that there are worse things than infidel U.S. troops in their neighborhoods.
Baghdad is the first step. And as retired general Jack Keane and the military historian Frederick Kagan have been pointing out, restoring security in Baghdad will take at least 18 months and all the troops the president pledged. To quote Gen. Keane: "We need all five brigades in Baghdad as soon as possible. It will take three to four months to clear neighborhoods of death squads and insurgents, and at least the rest of the year to establish proper security for the population." This is going to be a long, hard slog. And the Americans, not the Iraqis, are going to have to lead it.
The president's stated contention--that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's army and police will lead efforts to cleanse the city, while the Americans just support them--will produce dismal results. Mr. Maliki's pride doesn't win battles. George Bush has been fond of underscoring the counterinsurgency success in Tal Afar, in which the Iraqi army played an important supporting role. If Gen. Petraeus is really put into a supporting role in the Battle of Baghdad, then we've lost already.
Gen. Petraeus will have to deal with Muqtada al-Sadr. The thuggish son of Iraq's most revered clerical family, he has become for many Shiites in Baghdad a rapturously praised defender. This esteem is merited: He, not any American general, increased the security of the average Shiite in the capital. And if he is smart, he'll attack the Americans before they have the chance to deploy much new strength. If the Americans successfully down Sunni insurgents in the capital, then they will go after Mr. Sadr.
But the U.S. military should absolutely not go after Mr. Sadr first. We may barely have sufficient forces to handle a one-front war against Sunni insurgents and holy warriors. We need to show the Shiite community, which by no means has embraced Mr. Sadr's radicalism en masse, that the Battle of Baghdad's primary thrust isn't against the capital's large Shiite ghetto.
The key here is how Shiites view the first encounter. If it goes against the insurgents, then a subsequent attack on Mr. Sadr and his militia might not provoke a large-scale uprising. And he just may play along. He and his forces were mauled by the Americans in 2004. Since then they haven't been particularly bold in attacking U.S. soldiers. Mr. Sadr has recently manifested some statesmen-like behavior, and has been more correct in his behavior toward Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the spiritual guide of Iraq's Shia and a bulwark of moderation. Yet Washington ought to plan on Mr. Sadr hitting U.S. forces--another reason why Gen. Petraeus, who appears acutely sensitive to the Sadr conundrum, should be given as many brigades as the U.S. can rapidly pull together.
Wars are often decided by one battle, where the genius and resources of one commander proves decisive. We are undoubtedly at that point in Iraq. The Bush administration should ensure that Gen. Petraeus has everything he needs, and that any opposition inside the military to him and a larger, longer counterinsurgency campaign is squelched. America and Iraq probably won't get a second chance.
Mr. Gerecht is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
-
Iraq: Al-Sadr and the Shiite Understanding
Summary
U.S. and Iraqi forces arrested a key aide of radical Iraqi Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr on Jan. 19. The arrest follows a string of similar recent moves against the al-Sadrite bloc. Surprisingly, the incident did not spark the usual violent reaction from the al-Sadrite movement's militia, the Mehdi Army. The al-Sadrite bloc's tolerance for operations against it suggests Iraq's Shia might have reached an understanding aimed at strengthening the government of Nouri al-Maliki, Iraq's Shiite prime minister.
Analysis
One of radical Iraqi Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr's top aides, Sheikh Abdul-Hadi al-Darraji, was arrested from a Baghdad mosque in a pre-dawn joint operation by U.S. and Iraqi forces. Al-Darraji was the media director for the al-Sadrite bloc in Iraq's capital. His arrest is just the latest in a series of moves against the radical Shiite Islamist movement.
Even in the face of this escalation of operations against the al-Sadrite bloc, al-Sadr's Mehdi Army militia has remained unusually restrained. The group's behavior typically involves engaging in intra-Shiite fighting, clashing with U.S. and Iraqi forces, and most recently, carrying out sectarian attacks against Sunnis. The al-Sadrite bloc's newfound tolerance for operations against it suggests Iraq's Shia might have reached an understanding aimed at strengthening the government of Shiite Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.
Al-Sadr has said his militias will not fight back during the Shiite holy month of Muharram, which begins Jan. 20, since killing at this time violates Islamic teaching. He added, however, that "after Muharram, we'll see." The radical Shiite leader went on to say he fears for his own life, and has moved his family to a secure location. Al-Sadr added that he is constantly on the move as well, and has drawn up a will.
It is interesting, however, that al-Sadr has tried to explain away his restraint on the basis of the holy month of Muharram, because that month has not yet begun. Operations against his group have been ongoing for some time, including:
the Dec. 19 capture of a Mehdi Army bomb cell leader in the city of Al Kut.
reports that began surfacing Dec. 20 that Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani has tentatively approved a move to isolate extremists.
major violence that broke out Dec. 23-24 in As Samawa between the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq and al-Sadrite forces, prompting a curfew in the southern Iraqi city.
a raid by U.S. and Iraqi soldiers Dec. 27 on the family home of Sahib al-Ameri, secretary-general of the Martyrs Foundation, a pro-Sadr political foundation in the holy city of An Najaf; al-Ameri died in the raid.
the abandonment of Mehdi Army checkpoints in Baghdad that began Jan. 10; militia members have stopped wearing their uniforms, hidden their weapons, stopped communicating by cell phone and purged members suspected of disloyalty.
the Jan. 16 arrest of some 400 individuals affiliated with the al-Sadrite bloc.
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's acknowledgement for the first time Jan. 17 that his government is going after the Mehdi Army.
Prior to these developments, a number of militiamen and commanders of the Mehdi Army, to whom the al-Sadrites have referred as "rogue elements," were killed.
This all suggests that an understanding has been reached between al-Sadr and Iraq's other Shiite factions: al-Sadr has decided to allow the al-Maliki government to demonstrate that it is reining in Shiite militants, especially those from the Mehdi Army. This probably has been assisted by the Iranians, who likely have used their influence to get the Mehdi Army to lower its profile.
Such developments do not mean the Iraqi Shia and their Iranian patrons have reached a broad agreement to stabilize Iraq. Rather, the Shia are acting out of self-interest. The al-Maliki government is under intense U.S. pressure to demonstrate progress toward stability. And if the government does not meet this expectation, it could collapse.
The Iraqi Shia realize that they are the most divided of all the key communal factions in Iraq, which is why it took six months after Iraq's December 2005 elections to finalize the al-Maliki government. They are also aware that at present, the 128 Shiite seats in the parliament and their control over the Cabinet is the best that the Shia can get -- and they are at risk of losing it if they do not get their act together. Considering that al-Sadr's group forms the largest component within the Shiite alliance (at 32 seats, it controls the largest number of Shiite parliamentary positions), the radical Shiite leader cannot be eliminated from the alliance altogether. At the same time, his militia cannot be allowed to run amok.
Meanwhile, the Iranians realize that over time, exploiting intra-Shiite differences has diminishing marginal utility, and that Tehran's long-term interests are best served through Iraqi Shiite unity.
Al-Sadr himself does not want to appear to be conceding on his long-held opposition to the presence of U.S. forces in the country. But he also cannot continue business as usual.
Thus, we have a movement toward allowing the government to demonstrate it is reining in Shiite militias, the actions of which are an obstacle to containing the Sunni insurgency. At the same time, al-Sadr likely has received assurances that his political position remains secure so long as he does not block efforts to contain the militias. Whether this succeeds is something else again.
-
How would Iraqis and Americans respond if the White House proposed having Iraqis vote on becoming the 51st state?
-
6 weapons caches destroyed, 8 terrorists, 7 captured
BAGHDAD, Iraq – U.S. troops killed 8 terrorists and captured 7 terrorists during a series of raids which began Saturday and ended Monday to capture al-Qaida in Iraq leaders in the Tarmiyah area.
During the second day of the raids, U.S. troops began taking enemy fire as terrorists were attempting to remove weapons and explosives from a weapons cache on an island in the Tigris River. U.S. troops engaged, killing four terrorists.
That evening, more armed terrorists attempted to gain access to the weapons cache and began firing at a U.S. troops security detail. U.S. troops returned fire and killed an additional four terrorists.
The weapons caches, six in all, consisted of 12 AK-47s, 20 rocket-propelled grenade launchers, 20 rocket-propelled grenades, five 82 mm mortar systems, sniper rifles, armor piercing rounds, several 80 mm rocket launchers and 7 improvised explosive devices.
Clearing operations continue, 85 terrorists killed, 25 captured in 7 days in Balad Ruz
BALAD RUZ, Iraq – After seven days of combined operations south of Balad Ruz, Iraqi Army Soldiers, in partnership with the 1st Cavalry Division, continue to discover large weapons caches and destroy anti-Iraqi forces throughout the area.
The 5th Iraqi Army, with support from 3-1 Cav., has unearthed approximately 20 caches, killed more than 85 terrorists and captured 25 anti-Iraqi forces.
In fighting yesterday, CF and IA engaged eight different small enemy elements with small-arms fire, mortars, artillery, Bradley fighting vehicles and close air support, resulting in the deaths of more than two dozen insurgents.
The operation began with a combined air and ground assault. They continue to target terrorists that are believed to have tortured and executed more than 40 members of rival tribes in the area in November.
Since discovering more than 1,150 57-mm rockets Saturday, the Soldiers have uncovered several more caches containing improvised explosive device-making material, more than 1,000 rocket-propelled grenades, 13 anti-tank mines, more than 1,000 small-arms munitions, 1,050 heavy machine gun rounds, dozens of anti-tank missiles and other terrorist planning documents.
Operation seizes two bomb insurgents
MAHMUDIYAH, Iraq — Two terrorists were captured and improvised explosive device-making materials were found during a joint combat operation in southwest Mahmudiyah, Iraq Jan.7.
The operation was conducted by Soldiers of the 6th Iraqi Army Division and the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry). The operation was intended to disrupt anti-Iraqi forces activity within the area.
One of the terrorists may be linked to previous IED attacks in the area and was found with 34 doorbells, a common item used to fabricate roadside bombs.
Iraqi Army Kills 5 Insurgents and Captures Insurgent Leader, 16 Others
BAGHDAD – 5 insurgents were killed during a 5th Iraqi Army operation Jan. 7 in Tahrir village near Baqubah to detain the leader of an insurgent cell responsible for the kidnapping and murder of Iraqi civilians.
During the operation, insurgents exited a nearby mosque and began firing upon Iraqi Force members and U.S. advisors with heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades. Iraqi and U.S. troops returned fire killing 5 insurgents.
A U.S. squad observed other armed insurgents maneuvering into position to attack the ground force, and upon clearance engaged the insurgents. The targeted leader surrendered to Iraqi Army Forces.
In another operation, U.S.-backed Iraqi police captured 6 insurgents during raids in Doura in southern Baghdad. Another 10 men captured had commited sectarian murders and planted roadside bombs in Jazaar in southeast Baghdad.
6 CAPTURED IN GREATER IRBIL AREA
BAGHDAD, Iraq – U.S. troops conducted routine security operations in northern Iraq and took six individuals into custody. They were closely tied to activities targeting Iraqi and U.S. troops. This operation was part of an ongoing effort by U.S. troops targeting individuals involved in activities aimed at the killing of Iraqi citizens and Coalition forces. The suspects surrendered without incident.
Joint operation captures 10, seizes caches in Baghdad
BAGHDAD – A joint operation combining Iraqi national policemen and Coalition force members seized three weapons caches and captured 10 men who were committing sectarian murders and emplacing road-side bombs in the Jaza’r neighborhood Jan. 10.
Soldiers from the 12th Infantry regiment, together with members of 6th Iraqi National Police Brigade seized three large weapons caches containing one rifle fitted with a silencer, one machine gun, one sniper rifle, assorted small arms ammunition and bomb-making materials.
Troops capture 21 insurgents in early morning raids in Baghdad
BAGHDAD – U.S. troops captured 21 insurgents in two simultaneous raids in the early morning today. Acting on tips, Soldiers from the 1st Infantry Division, conducted two unrelated but simultaneous raids on homes in the Iraqi capital. In one raid, 9 insurgents were caught when sizable quantities of materials for making roadside bombs were found in the residence.
In a second raid, Soldiers surrounded and entered a home in southwestern Baghdad after receiving information about a possible insurgent cell operating out of the home. After entering the home, they found four pistols, three AK-47s, 12 magazines of ammunition, seven armored vests, $2000 in cash and Iraqi Dinar worth $3000. 12 more insurgents were taken into custody following this raid.
6 Terrorists captured
BAGHDAD – National police captured 6 terrorists in a joint operation conducted in the Iraqi capital.
Policemen from the 6th National Police Division and Soldiers from the 2nd Infantry Division, conducted a combined mission successfully clearing 80 houses in the al Doura district of Baghdad.
The purpose of this mission, dubbed Operation “Spartan II,” was to clear the area of weapons caches and disrupt insurgent and militia activities to provide a secure environment for Iraqi citizens.
This section of the capital, as well as surrounding neighborhoods, has been subjected recently to an increase in sectarian violence including intimidation, murders and indirect fire. As a result, six individuals were captured by the Iraqi national police force.
7 terrorists captured in joint operation
YUSUFIYAH, Iraq — The Iraqi Army captured 7 terrorists near Yusufiyah, in an air assault operation.
The purpose of the operation, conducted by Soldiers from the 6th Iraqi Army Division and the U.S. 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), was to deny enemy sanctuary within the area. The multi-company air assault resulted in the capture of 7 terrorists, two wanted by the Iraqi Army and two caught with improvised explosive-making materials in their possession. All of the individuals have been linked to IED and mortar attacks.
Iraqi Soldier Killed by 13 Year-old Bomber
CAMP FALLUJAH, Iraq – An Iraqi Soldier was killed by an improvised explosive device carried by a 13 year-old Iraqi boy in Anbar Province. Also, insurgents using a mosque as a fighting position, fired at an adjacent outpost of the Iraqi Army 1st Division, 350 meters from the site of the bombing in the town of Khalidiyah, 15 miles northwest of Fallujah.
It is not known if the boy knew he was carrying an IED. His identity is unknown at this time.
This is the second incident where a 13 year-old was used to deliver IEDs to attack security forces in Anbar Province. On November 25, 2006, Safa Husayn’s body was found in the burned wreckage of a vehicle that drove erratically before detonating near a Marine patrol just northwest of the area of yesterday’s bombing. Killed in the attack were five Iraqi civilians and a Marine.
“To dupe children to be mules, unwitting bombers, is not how honorable men behave,” said Marine Lt. Col. Bryan Salas. “The tribes in Ramadi would never stand for this type of practice.”
30 insurgents killed in fighting
BAGHDAD, Iraq - In the opening battle of a major drive to tame the violent capital, the Iraqi army killed 30 militants Saturday in a firefight in a Sunni insurgent stronghold just north of the heavily fortified Green Zone. 8 militants, including 5 Sudanese fighters, were captured in the battle near a Sunni insurgent stronghold on the west bank of the Tigris where police reported finding the bodies of 27 torture victims earlier in the day.
67 Insurgents, supporters killed, 26 captured in several operations
Iraqi forces killed 23 insurgents on Sunday in an operation in a Sunni Arab neighborhood. The ministry had already reported killing 30 insurgents on the first day of the operation in the Haifa Street area.
In another operation, an official in a tribal council in the western province of Anbar said an insurgent leader from a group called Ansar al Sunna had been captured and two of his aides, both from Yemen, were killed on Sunday near Ramadi.
In yet another operation, conducted completely by the Iraqi army, Iraqi troops killed 26 insurgents and wounded 43 others during the past 24 hours in different parts of Iraq.
In Yusufiya, U.S. and Iraqi troops rounded up 82 insurgents and insurgents supporters in raids Baghdad the U.S. military said. 21 of the captured insurgents were wounded during fighting. 16 insurgents were killed in that operation.
total insurgents/terrorists killed: 195
total insurgents/terrorists captured: 128
total taken out of action: 323 in a 5-day period
(captured includes 64 wounded) CONTINUE ...
Iraqi Police Net 301 Recruits in Fallujah, Habbaniyah
CAMP FALLUJAH, Iraq – The Fallujah Police District enlisted 102 Iraqi males and the Habbaniyah Police District enlisted 199 in recruiting drives held Jan. 10 in Fallujah and Habbaniyah, respectively.
“It was a success,” said Lt. Col. Race Roberson, the Regimental Combat Team 5 police implementation officer. “They’ll bring stability to their stations and communities. The more police we have and the more we can retain shows the citizens of their communities the police are concerned about the stability of those areas.” The Iraqi recruits will be shipped to the Jordanian International Police Training College to be schooled in the fundamentals of law enforcement during a six-week course.
When the recruits return to their home districts, they will undergo supplemental training sessions. “We are trying to establish a consistent, enhanced patrol package to build upon the basics they learn at the training academy,” Roberson said.
Marine police transition team advisors, Army advisors and international police liaison officers all contributed to the drive. “We haven’t shipped 300 since August ’06,” Roberson said.
The 301 recruits will be joined in Jordan by 550 recruits from other parts of the province. There are currently over 1,900 Iraqi Police candidates in training in Jordan who are scheduled to return to the province for duty in January and February.
Very good story:
Hundreds of Ramadi Residents Join the Police Force
AR RAMADI – Gunshots echoed in the distance as hundreds of hopeful Iraqi police recruits waited in line to join the fight against the insurgents still present within the city of Ramadi.
After three days of screening, roughly 400 Iraqi citizens out of the more than 600 applicants got their wish to become Iraqi police officers. On Jan. 8, the police recruits were transported to Jordan for the beginning of a five-week training course.
One year ago a murderous intimidation campaign prevented local Iraqis from enlisting in Ramadi. Recruiting numbers for police were insignificant.
More than 1,000 enlisted in the police force last month. Over 800 are expected to enlist in Anbar Province this month.
“The local tribes stood up to the intimidation campaign and are taking back their city from the terrorists,” said the Coalition spokesman in Ramadi Marine Maj. Riccoh Player.
“Hundreds of Iraqi Police are holding areas cleared by Iraqi and American forces in recent operation in the worst neighborhoods of Ramadi,” said Player. “Building and manning a police station in Ramadi is what progress looks like in a counterinsurgency.”
“It’s a good thing for them,” said Sgt. 1st Class Jeffrey Estes, the operations noncommissioned officer-in-charge for 2nd Battalion, 152 Infantry from Greenfield, Ind. “It’s going to better their country and that’s what we are over here for — to train them so they can start patrolling their own area and take back what was taken from them.”
Estes said that before an Iraqi police recruit can pack his bags for training camp, he must go through a screening process to determine if he is mentally and physically ready for the challenges ahead.
The Ministry of the Interior sets the standards, such as being a male between the ages of 18 and 53, while service members are here to enforce those standards, Estes said.
Throughout the day, American vehicles periodically dropped off the optimistic candidates out front of the tiny building on Camp Blue Diamond where Soldiers and Marines were busy inside doing the screenings.
The potential police officers were checked for pre-existing medical conditions prior to making their way to the physical fitness test. The recruits had to complete 10 push-ups, 20 sit-ups, and finish a 100-meter dash.
At the security station, Iraqis were asked about their education level, prior work experience, and their native tribe. The recruits were also questioned about previous arrests and had to a sign a waiver denouncing the Ba’ath Party, the political party of former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein.
Prior experiences are not necessarily a disqualifying factor, said Capt. Michael Murphy, the Iraqi Security Forces operations officer with the 1st Armored Division.
Murphy, from Bedford, Pa., said the service members do background checks on each applicant, and depending on the level of the crime, an Iraqi can still be considered for the police force.
“A guy who wants to get a job to feed his family and protect his neighborhood but maybe had some indiscretions in the past … we are giving them the opportunity now to rectify that and to come back onto the side of their people,” he said.
If an Iraqi was a former member of the Ba’ath party and can provide the paperwork proving his disassociation with the group, he may still be considered for the force, Murphy said. Yet, the troops are not taking any chances.
“If we have any recent reporting that they are corrupt or that they are insurgents, then we disqualify them,” Murphy said. “But, by and large, insurgent activity from 2003 is not a disqualifying factor.”
Something that will prevent an applicant from moving on is a failure on the literacy test, and Murphy said that it the biggest challenge so far.
To minimize this obstacle, a new three-week literacy training program is being headed at local Iraqi community centers to boost the literacy rate for those who have failed the exam.
“Although it is not going to get them to a Shakespeare literature level of literacy, they are going to be able to pass the basic literacy test for entrance into the police academy,” he said.
Iraqis turned away because of the written exam are encouraged to acquire remedial training and then return the following month.
Once recruits make it successfully through all the stations, they are shipped to Jordan to receive the fundamentals in police work. After five weeks, they return to their station and begin working side-by-side with the Police Transition Teams and the Iraqi Police Liaison Officers.
After successful completion of the academy in Jordan and 90 consecutive days of work, the IP is given a pistol in addition to his rifle. Murphy said receiving your pistol is a huge status symbol, which is important in the Iraqi culture.
Along with the pistol, the IP is granted a sizeable bonus almost the amount of a full month’s salary. “It is a pretty generous bonus given the quality of life here and cost of living,” Murphy said. None of the events that occurred over the course of the three days would have been possible without the help of the Iraqi Police and Iraqi Army, Murphy said.
“They are our greatest opportunity for advertising,” he said.
Murphy said that after the word gets out about the drive, many of the Iraqi’s have a hard time getting to the site for processing. On this particular day, troops brought in more than 40 recruits from an area that has never had any applicants before, because it was always too dangerous.
Marines traveled down the Euphrates River and safely escorted them to the screening center. Murphy said it was a fantastic sight.
“In a month and a half, they are going to man a new police station in an area where there hasn’t been a police station before,” he said. “That is the kind of stuff that we can do and the capabilities we bring to supplement the capabilities of the Iraqi Army and the Iraqi Police to make this kind of thing very successful.”
These recruiting drives are usually held on a monthly basis to help up the manning level at area IP stations.
-
I think many critics of Bush and the war overplay their case every bit as much as they say Bush did. This piece summarizes that view IMO.
--
Ten Myths of the Iraq War, http://www.strategypage.com/qnd/topten/articles/20070128.aspx
January 28, 2007: Top 10 Myths of the Iraq War. In no particular order. There are more, but ten is a manageable number.
1-No Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Several hundred chemical weapons were found, and Saddam had all his WMD scientists and technicians ready. Just end the sanctions and add money, and the weapons would be back in production within a year. At the time of the invasion, all intelligence agencies, world-wide, believed Saddam still had a functioning WMD program. Saddam had shut them down because of the cost, but created the illusion that the program was still operating in order to fool the Iranians. The Iranians wanted revenge on Saddam because of the Iraq invasion of Iran in 1980, and the eight year war that followed.
2-The 2003 Invasion was Illegal. Only according to some in the UN. By that standard, the invasion of Kosovo and bombing of Serbia in 1999 was also illegal. Saddam was already at war with the U.S. and Britain, because Iraq had not carried out the terms of the 1991 ceasefire, and was trying to shoot down coalition aircraft patrolling the no-fly zone.
3-Sanctions were working. The sanctions worked for Saddam, not for Iraq. Saddam used the sanctions as an excuse to punish the Shia majority for their 1991 uprising, and help prevent a new one. The "Oil For Food" program was corrupted with the help of bribed UN officials, and mass media outlets that believed Iraqi propaganda. Saddam was waiting out the sanctions, and bribing France, Russia and China, with promises of oil contracts and debt repayments, to convince the UN to lift the sanctions.
4-Overthrowing Saddam Only Helped Iran. Of course, and this was supposed to make Iran more approachable and open to negotiations. With the Iraqi "threat" gone, it was believed that Iran might lose its radical ways and behave. Iran got worse as a supporter of terrorism and developer of WMD. Irans clerical dictatorship did not want a democracy next door. The ancient struggle between the Iranians and Arabs was brought to the surface, and the UN became more active in dealing with problems caused by pro-terrorist government of Iran. As a result of this, the Iranian police state has faced more internal dissent. From inside Iran, Iraq does not look like an Iranian victory.
5-The Invasion Was a Failure. Saddam's police state was overthrown and a democracy established, which was the objective of the operation. Peace did not ensue because Saddam's supporters, the Sunni Arab minority, were not willing to deal with majority rule, and war crimes trials. A terror campaign followed. Few expected the Sunni Arabs to be so stupid. There's a lesson to be learned there.
6-The Invasion Helped Al Qaeda. Compared to what? Al Qaeda was a growing movement before 2003, and before 2001. But after the Iraq invasion, and especially the Sunni Arab terrorism, al Qaeda fell in popularity throughout the Moslem world. Arab countries cracked down on al Qaeda operations more than ever before. Without the Iraq invasion, al Qaeda would still have safe havens all over the Arab world.
7-Iraq Is In A State of Civil War. Then so was Britain when the IRA was active, and so is Spain today because ETA is still active. Both IRA and ETA are terrorist organizations based on ethnic identity. India also has tribal separatist rebels who are quite active. That's not considered a civil war. This is all about partisans playing with labels for political ends, not accurately describing a terror campaign.
8-Iraqis Were Better Off Under Saddam. Most Iraqis disagree. Check election results and opinion polls. Reporters tend to ask Iraqi Sunni Arabs this question, but they were the only ones who benefited from Saddams rule.
9-The Iraq War Caused Islamic Terrorism to Increase in Europe. The Moslem unrest in Europe was there before 2001, and 2003. Interviews of Islamic radicals in Europe reveals that the hatred is not motivated by Iraq, but by daily encounters with hostile natives. Blaming Islamic terrorism on Iraq is another attempt to avoid dealing with a homegrown problem.
10- The War in Iraq is Lost. By what measure? Saddam and his Baath party are out of power. There is a democratically elected government. Part of the Sunni Arab minority continues to support terror attacks, in an attempt to restore the Sunni Arab dictatorship. In response, extremist Shia Arabs formed vigilante death squads to expel all Sunni Arabs. Given the history of democracy in the Middle East, Iraq is working through its problems. Otherwise, one is to believe that the Arabs are incapable of democracy and only a tyrant like Saddam can make Iraqi "work." If democracy were easy, the Arab states would all have it. There are problems, and solutions have to be found and implemented. That takes time, but Americans have, since the 18th century, grown weary of wars after three years. If the war goes on longer, the politicians have to scramble to survive the bad press and opinion polls. Opposition politicians take advantage of the situation, but this has nothing to do with Iraq, and everything to do with local politics in the United States.
-
Doug:
Nice find! I will be spreading this one around.
Marc
==========
Here is another fine blog entry from Michael Yon:
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/wp/desolate-roads-part-2-of-2.htm
-
If this is right then , , ,
===============================
The American Iraq
By FOUAD AJAMI
January 30, 2007; Page A17
So this government in Baghdad, fighting for its life, has not mastered
even the grim science of the gallows, and has no knowledge of the "drop
charts" used for hangings around the world. The Tikritis had been much
better at this sort of thing. They had all the time in the world to perfect
the skills and techniques of terror; they had done it against the background
of relative indifference by outside powers. And they had the indulgence of
the neighboring Arabs who gave their warrant to all that played out in Iraq
under the Tikriti despotism.
Pity those men now hunkered down in Baghdad as they walk a fine, thin
line between the yearning for justice and retribution in their land, and the
scrutiny of the outside world. In the annals of Arab history, the Shia have
been strangers to power, rebels and dissidents and men on the run hunted
down by official power. Now the ground has shifted in Baghdad, and an Arab
world steeped in tyranny reproaches a Shia-led government sitting atop a
volcano. America's "regional diplomacy" -- the name for our earnest but
futile entreaties to the Arab rulers -- will not reconcile the Arab regimes
to the rise of the Shia outcasts.
In the fullness of time, the Arab order of power will have to come to
a grudging acceptance of the order sure to take hold in Baghdad. This is a
region that respects the prerogatives of power. It had once resisted the
coming to power of the Alawites in Syria and then learned to accommodate
that "heretical" minority sect and its conquest of Damascus; the Shia path
in Iraq will follow that trajectory, and its justice is infinitely greater
for it is the ascendancy of a demographic majority, through the weight of
numbers and the ballot box. Of all Arab lands, Iraq is the most checkered, a
frontier country at the crossroads of Arabia, Turkey and Persia. The Sunni
Arabs in Iraq and beyond have never accepted the diversity of that land. The
"Arabism" of the place was synonymous with their own primacy. Now a
binational state in all but name (Arab and Kurdish) has come into being in
Iraq, and the Shia underclass have stepped forth and staked a claim
commensurate with the weight of their numbers. The Sunni Arabs have recoiled
from this change in their fortunes. They have all but "Persianized" the Shia
of Iraq, branded them as a fifth column of the state next door. Contemporary
Islamism has sharpened this feud, for to the Sunni Islamists the Shia are
heretics at odds with the forbidding strictures of the Islamists' fanatical
variant of the faith.
Baghdad, a city founded by the Abbasid Caliph al-Mansour in 762, was
sacked by the Mongols in 1258: The invaders put it to the sword, and dumped
its books and libraries in the Tigris. In the (Sunni) legend, a Shia
minister by the name of Ibn Alqami had opened the gates of the city to the
invaders. History never relents here. In a commentary that followed the
execution of Saddam, a Palestinian commentator in the West Bank city of
Jenin wrote in a pan-Arab daily in London that a descendant of Ibn Alqami
(read Nouri al-Maliki) had put to death a descendant of al-Mansour.
These kinds of atavisms cannot be conciliated. The truth of Iraq will
assert itself on the ground, but the age of Sunni monopoly on power has
passed. One of Iraq's most respected scholar-diplomats, Hassan al-Alawi, has
put the matter in stark terms. It is proper, he said, to speak of an
"American Iraq" as one does of a Sumerian, a Babylonian, an Abbasid, an
Ottoman, and then a British Iraq. Where Iraq in the age of the Pax
Britannica rested on an "Anglo-Sunni" regime, this new Iraq, in the time of
the Americans, is by the logic of things an American-Shia regime. The
militant preachers railing against the fall of Baghdad to an alliance of the
"American crusaders" and the "Shia heretics" are the bearers of a dark, but
intensely felt conviction. We should not be apologetic, in Arab lands
seething with bigotry and rage, about our expedition into Iraq. We shouldn't
fall for Arab rulers who tell us that they would have had the ability to
call off the furies had we had in place a "process" for resolving the claims
of the Palestinians, and had we been able to "deliver" Israel. Those furies
have a life of their own: In truth, they are aided and abetted by these same
rulers in the hope of tranquilizing their own domains and buying off the
embittered in their midst.
The Sunni Arab regimes, it has to be noted, are not of one mind on
Iraq. Curiously, the Arab state most likely to make peace with the new
reality of Iraq is Saudi Arabia; those most hostile are the Jordanians, the
Egyptians and the Palestinians. The Saudi monarch, King Abdullah, has read
the wind with accuracy; he has a Shia minority in his domain, in the
oil-bearing lands of the Eastern Province, and he seems eager to cap the
Wahhabi volcano in the Najdi heartland of his kingdom. There is pragmatism
in that realm, and the place lives by its own coin. In contrast, Jordan and
Egypt present the odd spectacle of countries heavily invested in an
anti-Shia drive but with no Shia citizenry in their midst. The two regimes
derive a good measure of their revenues from "strategic rent" -- the aid of
foreign powers, the subsidies of Pax Americana to be exact. The threat of
Shiism is a good, and lucrative, scarecrow for the rulers in Cairo and
Amman. The promise of standing sentry in defense of the Sunni order is what
these two regimes have to offer both America and the oil states.
The Palestinians, weaker in the scale of power and with troubles of
their own, are in the end of little consequence to the strategic alignment
in the region. But to the extent that their "street" and their pundits
matter, they can be counted upon to view the rise of this new Iraq with
reserve and outright hostility. For six decades, the Palestinians have had a
virtual monopoly on pan-Arab sentiments, and the Arabic-speaking world
indulged them. Iraq -- its wounds, and the promise of its power and
resources -- has been a direct challenge to the Palestinians and to their
conception of their place in the Arab scheme of things. A seam is stitched
in Palestinian society between its Muslim majority and its minority
Christian communities. Palestinians have little by way of exposure to the
Shia. To the bitter end, the Palestinian street remained enamored of Saddam
Hussein. Iraq's Shia majority has returned the favor, and has come to view
the Palestinians and their cause with considerable suspicion.
For our part, the Pax Americana has not been at peace with the Shia
genie it had called forth. We did not know the Shia to begin with; we saw
them through the prism of our experience with Iran. Moqtada al-Sadr in
Baghdad and Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut: This was the face of the new Shiism
and we were spooked by it. And we were susceptible as well to the
representations made to us by Arab rulers about the dangers of radical
Shiism.
This was odd: We had been in the midst of a searing battle with al
Qaeda and the Taliban, zealous Sunni movements, but we were still giving
credence to the Arab warnings about the threat of Shiism. Nor were the Shia
who would finally claim power in Iraq possessed of an appreciable
understanding of American ways. Nouri al-Maliki speaks not a word of
English; with years of exile in Syria behind him, he was at considerable
disadvantage in dealing with the American presence in his country. He and
the political class around him lacked the traffic with American diplomacy
that had seasoned their counterparts in Cairo, Amman and the Arabian
Peninsula. Without that intimacy, they had been given to premonitions that
America could yet strike a bargain, at their expense, with the Sunni order
of power.
We held aloft the banner of democracy, but in recent months our faith
in democracy's possibilities in Iraq has appeared to erode, and this
unnerves the Shia political class. President Bush's setback in the
congressional elections gave the Iraqis legitimate cause for concern: Prime
Minister Maliki himself wondered aloud whether this was the beginning of a
general American retreat in Iraq. And there was that brief moment when it
seemed as though the "realists" of the James Baker variety were in the midst
of a restoration. The Shia (and the Kurds) needed no deep literacy in
strategic matters to read the mind of Mr. Baker. His brand of realism was
anathema to people who tell their history in metaphors of justice and
betrayal. He was a known entity in Iraq; he had been the steward of American
foreign policy when America walked away, in 1991, from the Kurdish and Shia
rebellions it had called for. The political class in Baghdad couldn't have
known that the Baker-Hamilton recommendations would die on the vine, and
that President Bush would pay these recommendations scant attention. The
American position was not transparent, and there were in the air rumors of
retrenchment, and thus legitimate Iraqi fears that the American presence in
Baghdad could be bartered away in some accommodation with the powers in
Iraq's neighborhood.
These fears were to be allayed, but not put to rest, by the military
"surge" that President Bush announced in recent days. More than a military
endeavor, the surge can be seen as a declaration by the president that
deliverance would be sought in Baghdad, and not in deals with the rogues
(Syria and Iran) or with the Sunni Arab states. Prime Minister Maliki and
the coalition that sustains his government could not know for certain if
this was the proverbial "extra mile" before casting them adrift, or the sure
promise that this president would stay with them for the remainder of his
time in office.
But there can be no denying that with the surge the landscape has
altered in Baghdad, and that Mr. Bush is invested in the Maliki government
as never before. Mr. Maliki's predecessor -- a man who belongs to the same
political party and hails from the same traditional Shia political class --
was forced out of office by an American veto and Mr. Maliki could be
forgiven his suspicion that the Americans might try this again. It was known
that he had never taken to the American envoy, Zalmay Khalilzad, and that he
fully understood that American officials would rather have other Shia
contenders in his post -- our old standby Ayad Allawi, the current vice
president Adel Abdul Mahdi, both more worldly men at ease with American
ways. So if this is America's extra mile in Baghdad, it has to be traversed
with a political leader whose abilities and intentions have been repeatedly
called into question by American officials.
This marriage of convenience may be the best that can be hoped for.
Mr. Maliki will not do America's bidding, and we should be grateful for his
displays of independence. He straddles the fence between the things we want
him to do -- disarming the militias, walking away from Moqtada al-Sadr --
and the requirements of political survival. We have been waiting for the
Iraqis to assume responsibility for their own affairs and we should not be
disconcerted when they take us at our word. The messages put out by American
officials now and then, that Mr. Maliki is living on borrowed time, and the
administered leaks of warnings he has been given by President Bush, serve
only to undermine whatever goals we seek in Baghdad.
With Saddam's execution, this prime minister has made himself a power
in the vast Shia mainstream. Having removed Ibrahim Jaafari from office last
year, the American regency is doomed to live with Mr. Maliki, for a policy
that attempts to unseat him is sure to strip Iraqis of any sense that they
are sovereign in their own country. He cannot be granted a blank check, but
no small measure of America's success in Iraq now depends on him. If he is
to fall, the deed must be an affair of the Iraqis, and of the broad Shia
coalition to be exact. He may now to able to strike at renegade elements of
the Mahdi Army, for that movement that once answered to Moqtada al-Sadr and
carried his banners has splintered into gangs led by bandit warlords. In our
concern with Moqtada al-Sadr and the Mahdi Army, we ought to understand the
reluctance of Mr. Maliki's ruling coalition to take on the Shia militias.
The terror inflicted on the Shia -- an unrelenting affair of the last three
years -- makes it extremely difficult for a Shia-led government to disarm
men who pose as defenders of a community still under brutal siege.
Boldness and despair may have come together to carry forward this new
drive in Baghdad. Fear of failure often concentrates the mind, and President
Bush's policy could yet find its target right as the skeptics have written
off this whole project in Baghdad. Iraq has had its way of meting out
disappointments at every turn, but the tide of events appears to be working
in the president's favor.
There is a "balance of terror" today between the Sunni and Shia
protagonists. More and more Sunni Arabs know that their old dominion is
lost, and that they had better take the offer on the table -- a share of the
oil revenues, the promise that the constitution could be amended and
reviewed, access to political power and spoils in return for reining in the
violence and banishing the Arab jihadists. The Shia, too, may have to come
to a time of reckoning. Their old tormentor was sent to the gallows, and a
kinsman of theirs did the deed with the seal of the state. From the poor
Shia slums of Baghdad, young avengers answered the Sunni campaign of terror
with brutal terror of their own. The old notion -- once dear to the Sunnis,
and to the Shia a nagging source of fear and shame -- that the Sunnis of
Iraq were a martial race while the Shia were marked for lamentations and
political quiescence has been broken for good.
The country has been fought over, and a verdict can already be
discerned -- rough balance between its erstwhile Sunni rulers and its Shia
inheritors, and a special, autonomous life for the Kurds. Against all dire
expectations, the all-important question of the distribution of oil wealth
appears close to a resolution. The design for sharing the bounty is a
"federal" one that strikes a balance between central government and regional
claimants. The nightmare of the Sunni Arabs that they would be left stranded
in regions of sand and gravel has been averted.
This is the country midwifed by American power. We were never meant to
stay there long. Iraq will never approximate the expectations we projected
onto it in more innocent times. But we should be able to grant it the gift
of acceptance, and yet another dose of patience as it works its way out of
its current torments. It is said that much of the war's nobility has drained
out of it, and that we now fight not to lose, and to keep intact our larger
position in the oil lands of the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf.
This may not be the stuff of glory, but it has power and legitimacy all its
own.
Mr. Ajami is a 2006 recipient of the Bradley Prize, teaches at Johns
Hopkins and is author of "The Foreigner's Gift: The Americans, the Arabs,
and the Iraqis in Iraq" (Free Press, 2006).
-
Second post of the day:
Geopolitical Diary: Deciphering the An Najaf Battle
An Iraqi Shiite messianic group the government has labeled a cult, and which Baghdad says fought with U.S. and Iraqi troops over the weekend near An Najaf, has issued a statement saying it was not engaged in the battle that resulted in the deaths of 250 militants and the cult's leader. Cult spokesman Abdul Imam Jaabar said the cult is peaceful, denying that it has ties to the "Soldiers of Heaven," which the Iraqi government said plotted to kill senior Shiite clerics. Jabbar said cult leader Imam Ahmed al-Hassan al-Yamani is a civil engineer who founded the group in 1999 after proclaiming he had met the messiah-like figure Mahdi, who declared him his grandson; Jabbar says al-Hassan quickly gained a following in southern Iraq of around 5,000 people.
This denial has triggered great speculation about the government's version of what actually happened. An Iraqi Defense Ministry spokesman said at least 263 Shiite fighters were killed, 502 arrested and another 210 people injured. Iraqi government officials say security forces launched the operation against the cult, which consists of fanatical Shiite and al Qaeda-linked Sunni militants, to prevent it from executing a plot to assassinate senior Shiite clerics. According to an understanding among Shiite Muslims, killing clerics is supposed to hasten the coming of Mahdi. When Iraqi forces were overwhelmed with the cult's firepower they had to call in U.S. ground support.
Not only is this perhaps the most bizarre incident in almost four years of incessant violence that has ravaged the country, the government's version of what allegedly transpired raises more questions than provides answers.
How could a cult evolve into such a major threat without getting noticed?
If this was an obscure cult, why were government forces unable to deal with it on their own?
From where did the group acquire such a large cache of weaponry?
Given the deep sectarian differences, how can extremist Shia and jihadists both be part of the group?
Why would a Shiite religious group risk alienation by engaging in the murder of the clerical hierarchy, especially during the holy month of Muharram?
These and other such questions indicate the government is withholding a lot of information. However, Stratfor has received some information that provides insight into the circumstances leading up to the battle.
We are told the al-Hawatim tribe wanted to organize its own Karbala procession during Ashurah but that a rival group with considerable influence prevented it from doing so. A number of tribesmen were killed at a checkpoint operated by this influential group, including a senior tribal sheikh. The tribe then launched a retaliatory attack that led to the battle. The fact that a large number of those arrested are women and children lends some credence to the report that the fighting was related to Ashurah ceremonies.
Given the emotionally charged atmosphere during the Muharram ceremonies commemorating the martyrdom of the grandson of the Prophet Mohammed and several other members of his family, why did this battle fail to disrupt the gatherings in An Najaf? Moreover, how was the violence contained?
Such a major battle could only be contained if it did not in fact occur in An Najaf. This raises doubts about the claims of a plot to kill senior clerics, which would require that the group be based inside the city. Additionally, a large force is not usually sent to carry out assassinations.
The report about a dispute over holding a procession suggests the group in question was engaged in a local power struggle. The Shiite establishment made up of the country's largest Shiite group, the Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution in Iraq, and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's Dawa Party, faces opposition from several groups at the provincial and district level in the Shiite south -- such as from the al-Sadrite Bloc, al-Fadhila and other smaller factions.
Regardless of its identity, the group in question likely wanted to use the occasion of Muharram to gain control over certain areas in the south. The government got wind of its plans and decided to pre-empt it. This would also explain the implausible official version, which was designed to justify the killing of fellow Shia during the holy month.
Reality notwithstanding, what is clear is that this incident proves what we have been saying about the Shiite community -- it is the most internally divided of the country's three major ethno-sectarian communities. The intra-Shiite divisions go far beyond the usual suspects -- a situation that bodes ill for the surge strategy of the Bush administration.
-
0018 GMT -- IRAQ -- Iraq has halted all flights to and from Syria for at least two weeks and closed a border crossing with Iran in preparation for a new security crackdown aimed at halting violence in Baghdad and the surrounding areas, The Associated Press reported Feb. 1, citing an unnamed parliament member and an airport official.
stratfor.com
-
14 INSURGENTS KILLED, FOREIGN FIGHTER SAFE HOUSE DESTROYED
BAGHDAD, Iraq – U.S. troops killed 14 terrorists, captured 2 terrorists and destroyed a known foreign fighter safe house during a raid south of Baqubah. Intelligence reports indicated that a foreign fighter facilitator responsible for conducting multiple attacks on Iraqi and U.S. troops was operating in the area.
As ground forces approached the objective building, several terrorists began to flee the targeted and surrounding buildings. Others were observed maneuvering against the U.S. troops.
Ground forces called for close air support resulting in 14 enemy fighters killed during the air strikes. Additionally, U.S. aircraft delivered precision munitions and destroyed the building to prevent it from further use as a terrorist safe haven.
11 insurgents killed, 10 captured during weapons distribution
FALLUJAH, Iraq –American Soldiers observed 6 insurgents unloading AK-47 rifles into a building near the gas station in Central Ramadi Jan. 23. The soldiers attacked the insurgents with grenades and gunfire killing 3 and wounding & capturing the other three.
Another U.S. post was subsequently attacked by 6 insurgents later the same morning. The U.S. Soldiers defended themselves and killed 3 of the attackers and captured the other 3 wounded insurgents.
Two hours later in the same area, the same U.S. members observed additional insurgents distributing hand grenades to approximately seven others near the same building as before. The insurgents then attacked the U.S. outpost. U.S. troops defended themselves killing 5 of the assailants and injuring 4 more.
Iraqi Police-led operation finds torture house, captures 21
CAMP FALLUJAH, Iraq – Iraqi Police and Marines completed Operation Three Swords in an area south of Fallujah. The purpose of the operation was to CAPTURE OR KILL members of murder and intimidation cells within the rural area and villages. It was led by the Iraqi Police with support from U.S. Marines
During the operation, members of the Fallujah Police Department and U.S. troops discovered a torture house and rescued 3 individuals. Two of the hostages were transported and treated at Camp Fallujah. The third hostage was transported by helicopter to Camp Taqqadum for further treatment. Torture devices were found and confiscated. The house was demolished by U.S. troops in order to remove the reminder of such violence from the landscape. Also, one of the victims asked that it be destroyed so that no one will ever be taken there and tortured like him.
Additionally, U.S. troops uncovered numerous weapons caches during the operation. Among the caches, two 14.5 mm anti-aircraft guns, high explosive mortar sights, rocket propelled grenade related materials, a sniper rifle with scope and four assault rifles. Two vehicles were also discovered in which one was rigged as a car bomb and the other with an anti-aircraft gun mounted. The explosives were destroyed on scene by U.S. troops and the weapons were returned to Camp Fallujah.
The Iraqi Police and Marines captured 21 individuals for coordinating insurgent attacks against Iraqi Security Forces or U.S. troops.
8 HOSTAGES RESCUED, 9 TERRORISTS CAPTURED IN ARAB JABOUR
BAGHDAD, Iraq – U.S. troops rescued 8 Iraqi citizens who had been tortured while being held hostage in Arab Jabour Wednesday. During the same operation, ground forces also captured 9 terrorist while conducting a raid targeting a vehicle-borne improvised explosives devices network.
According to the hostages who were tied up and hidden in an underground bunker, they were tortured, beaten, deprived of food and water and told they were being held for ransom. One of the hostages reported he had been held hostage for 50 days, and another for 47 days. Another hostage indicated the terrorists had captured other Iraqis and tortured them before receiving ransom payments.
Ground forces stated the hostages were very afraid for their safety and looked as if they had been physically abused and severely mistreated.
Military medical personnel provided on-scene first aid to the liberated hostages after which U.S. troops transported the men to a medical facility for further treatment. Seven of the men have since been released to their families; the eighth hostage, who had been held for 50 days and had to be carried out of the bunker, is currently undergoing medical treatment and will be released to his family.
While searching the scene, U.S. troops found 10 caches consisting of IED-producing materials, machine guns, military-style uniforms and boots.
13 terrorists captured in raids
BAGHDAD, Iraq – U.S. troops captured 13 terrorists during raids Thursday morning in Karmah and Mosul.
In Karmah, 12 terrorists were captured. Intelligence reports indicate the detainees have key logistical ties to the al-Qaida in Iraq network and to improvised explosive device production. Reports indicate that they are responsible for the recent increase in IED attacks in the Karmah area. During the raid, U.S. troops found several AK-47s and ammunition.
In Mosul, U.S. troops captured a foreign fighter facilitator with ties to a senior al-Qaida leader responsible for bringing large numbers of suicide bombers into Iraq.
Operation ‘Wolverine Feast’ nets 10 terrorists, 4 weapons caches
BAGHDAD — U.S. and Iraqi Army soldiers captured 10 terrorists and seized 4 caches in the Al-Doura district as part of Operation Wolverine Feast. The operation began as witnesses reported seeing several men load a mortar tube and ammunition into the trunk of a car.
The 10th Mountain Division and the 6th Iraqi Army Division were alerted and cordoned off the target area. They then conducted a systematic clearance of the area.
In the first objective they captured one wanted man with an 82mm mortar system, two AK-47 assault rifles, a 9mm pistol and two hand grenades. A sweep of a second targeted area uncovered six men with 10 120mm mortar rounds.
The third cache found contained a 60mm mortar system and various rocket-propelled grenade launchers and RPG rounds. Three men were detained at this location. The last cache contained several RPG rockets and accelerators.
3 tortured Iraqi captives freed
CAMP FALLUJAH, Iraq – As part of a planned security operation near Fallujah, U.S. troops discovered an insurgent torture house with blood-stained walls and freed three torture victims found inside.
“A lot of the insurgents are in this area,” said U.S. Army Captain Chip R. Rankin, Company B commanding officer, 2nd Battalion, 136th Infantry Regiment. “Our guys were expecting to find a torture house, but were a little shocked to find both the house and torture victims inside. There’s no doubt we saved those three individuals’ lives by getting there when we did.”
Torture devices found in and around the house included shackles, chains, syringes, rifles, knives, chord, clubs and a blow torch. The condition of the torture victims was dire.
“They looked like they hadn’t eaten or had any water in a long time,” said Rankin. “One victim had been burnt, cut and his kneecaps shattered. He was slipping into shock when we found him.”
The two victims who could walk on their own left the building thanking the U.S. troops who rescued them, Rankin added. Following the rescue of the torture victims, U.S. troops searched the area for those responsible for the torture house.
In their search, they arrested 10 individuals to add to 11 others captured earlier in the operation. Fifteen of these detainees were sent to a detention facility. 7 of those detainees were identified as known Al Qaeda operatives and the other seven were identified as known insurgents or criminals. The rescued victims identified several of the detainees as members of the torture house.
Iraqi Police Captures Leader Of Terrorist Bombing Cell, 8 others Near Haswah
BAGHDAD – Special Iraqi Police Forces captured the leader of a terrorist bombing cell during operations in northern Babil Province near Haswah. The cell leader is responsible for coordinating and carrying out improvised explosive device attacks against Iraqi civilians and security forces in the area.
The cell is suspected of being linked to al Qaeda in Iraq and facilitates AQI efforts in targeting Iraqi Security and Coalition Forces in IED and indirect fire attacks. The cell is responsible for several attacks against ISF and CF convoys in Babil Province. The cell is also suspected of murdering Iraqi civilians in sectarian attacks and ambushes. Iraqi Forces captured 8 other men in the same operation.
IA Captures a Second Leader Of Terrorist Bombing Cell in Mosul
BAGHDAD – Soldiers of the 2nd Iraqi Army Division captured another leader of a terrorist bombing cell, during operations in Mosul, who is responsible for coordinating mortar, small arms and improvised explosive device attacks against Iraqi Forces and Coalition Forces.
The cell leader was allegedly involved in an IED attack carried out against an Iraqi Police convoy in Mosul last year. He is also implicated in coordinating and conducting IED.
ISF captures 5 members of illegally armed militia
BAGHDAD – Special Iraqi Police Forces captured five members of an illegally armed militia and detained seven others during operations near Baghdad. The terrorists are allegedly responsible for coordinating and carrying out numerous improvised explosive device and other attacks against Iraqi Police, Iraqi Security Forces and Coalition Forces in the Babil Province.
IP Captures Six During Operations Near Fallujah
BAGHDAD – Iraqi Police Forces captured 6 members of an insurgent cell during operations with Coalition advisors Jan. 23 in Fuhaylat, near Fallujah. The insurgent cell is believed to be responsible for carrying out improvised explosive device attacks against Iraqi Security Forces and Coalition Forces. The insurgent cell is reportedly linked to Al Qaeda
Iraqi Army stops illegal checkpoint after tip from resident
BAGHDAD — A tip from a local citizen to an Iraqi Army unit enabled them to stop an illegal checkpoint in a western Baghdad neighborhood.
Shortly after noon, an unidentified Iraqi phoned the 4th Battalion, 1st Brigade, 6th Iraqi Army stating that a number of men had set up an illegal checkpoint in a Ghazaliyah neighborhood.
A patrol was dispatched to the area and upon arrival was engaged by AK-47 and pistol fire. The patrol returned fire but was unable to prevent the escape of the terrorists.
The patrol did confiscate a black Daewoo sedan and a motorcycle left behind when the terrorists fled.
Three Terrorists Captured During Baghdad Raid
BAGHDAD, Iraq – 3 terrorists were captured during a raid Wednesday north of Baghdad targeting an individual with ties to a senior al-Qaida leader who has executed Iraqi civilians and conducted extortion operations against the Iraqi people.
During the raid of a known terrorist safe house, Coalition Forces used a small explosives charge to gain entrance into the building. Once inside, Coalition Forces captured the targeted individual and two other terrorists.
Coalitions Forces provided immediate medical care to a 12-year old male injured during the forced entry. Coalition forces then evacuated the child to a local medical facility but he died upon arrival.
Coalition Forces regret the child’s death and strive to mitigate risks to civilians while in pursuit of terrorists. Terrorists and those who harbor terrorists continue to put innocent Iraqis in harms way. Terrorists do not hesitate to deliberately place innocent Iraqi women and children in danger by their actions and presence.
Operation continues on heated Haifa Street
BAGHDAD – Seven insurgents have been captured and a weapons cache uncovered as Iraqi Army, Iraqi national police and U.S. forces continued a security operation on Haifa Street.
Operation Tomahawk Strike 11 is a series of targeted raids to disrupt illegal militia activity and help restore Iraqi Security Forces control in the area.
As the operation commenced early this morning, U.S. and Iraqi forces were engaged by an enemy mortar team before daylight broke on Baghdad. A single mortar round was launched by U.S. forces and the insurgent mortar team dispersed.
As light broke on the city, troops met enemy resistance, including small arms fire and rocket-propelled grenades from high rise buildings.
Operation in Lutifiyah nets 8 terrorists captured, 5 killed during fighting
LUTIFIYAH, Iraq — U.S. troops and Iraq Army troops captured eight terrorists and seized weapons during a combat patrol northwest of Lutifiyah, Iraq Jan. 23.
Soldiers of the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) and the 6th Iraqi Army Division were on a combat patrol when they came under a small arms fire attack from a canal.
The troops called in for aviation support after the attack ensued. One insurgent died in the aerial attack. The remaining four insurgents tried to escape down a canal. Iraqi troops pursued, killing the four terrorists.
Following the fire fight, troops searched the area for more insurgents. They found nine Iraqis hiding in a nearby house. 8 of the nine were arrested, all wanted for terrorist acts.
The search also turned up a weapons cache consisting of three medium machine guns, two AK-47 assault rifles, a shotgun and a sniper rifle with a scope.
In other areas:
KUT - Iraqi soldiers captured two men on Tuesday on suspicion of smuggling roadside bombs, the U.S. military said on Friday.
BAGHDAD - Iraqi and U.S. forces seized a prominent follower of Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr in Baghdad. The U.S. military described the man arrested as a senior death squad leader.
RAMADI - Iraqi police shot and killed a suicide bomber after his explosive vest failed to detonate near a checkpoint in Ramadi, the U.S. military said.
SAMARRA - Iraqi police with U.S. advisers captured the suspected leader of several al Qaeda cells on Thursday in Samarra, the U.S. military said.
Terrorists/insurgents taken out of action:
31 terrorists killed
122 terrorists captured
153 terrorists killed & captured total
-
Thank you for that C-Stray Dog!
Here's some more little covered news:
IRAQ: Khadhim al-Hamadani, reportedly the head of radical Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr's political office in Iraq's Diyala province, was killed by Iraqi and U.S. forces during a raid on his home. The U.S. military said al-Hamadani was responsible for attacks against U.S. and Iraqi troops and was believed to have assisted in kidnappings, assassinations and other acts of violence.
stratfor.com
-
U.S.-Iranian Tensions and an Abduction in Baghdad
By George Friedman and Kamran Bokhari
Iraqi officials said Tuesday that gunmen wearing Iraqi army uniforms kidnapped an Iranian Embassy official in central Baghdad on Sunday. Jalal Sharafi, a second secretary at the Iranian Embassy, was abducted from the Karrada district while on his way to a ribbon cutting at a new branch of an Iranian state-owned bank.
According to witnesses and unnamed Iraqi officials, gunmen wearing uniforms of the Iraqi army's elite 36th Commando Battalion -- part of the Iraqi Special Operations Forces Brigade, an aggressive unit that specializes in counterinsurgent operations -- were involved in the snatch. They reportedly used two of their vehicles to block Sharafi's car and then seized him. During the ambush, nearby Iraqi police -- apparently suspecting a kidnapping was taking place -- opened fire on one of the vehicles and brought it to a halt. The four gunmen inside -- all with official Iraqi military identification -- were arrested.
The story did not end there, however. On Monday, individuals showing official Iraqi government badges arrived at the police station where the gunmen were being detained and claimed to have authority to transfer them to the serious crimes police unit. It was later discovered that the suspects never arrived.
Iran has accused the United States of engineering the abduction through the Sunni-controlled Defense Ministry; the U.S. military has denied any involvement in the matter.
Given the tactical details of the operation and the geopolitical backdrop, there are two possible explanations for the incident. One is that Sunni insurgents are responsible: They have the means and motivation to pull off such an operation, and any number of Sunni factions would be interested in carrying out an abduction like this. But the United States has a motive as well.
It is important to note that Sharafi's position at the embassy is the kind of diplomatic posting that frequently would be a cover for intelligence operatives. So if he were an Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security operative of some importance, kidnapping him would disrupt Iranian operations as the U.S. security offensive in Baghdad gets under way. Second, the United States has been very public in saying it intends to become more aggressive toward Iranian covert operations as part of its effort to bring pressure against Tehran. U.S. intelligence has substantially ramped up the collection of information on Iran -- a move that would serve whether the goal was to actually attack Iran, plan negotiations or just try to figure out the mind of Tehran. The snatch of a second secretary would fit into this effort.
This is not the first incident of this kind. In January, U.S. forces arrested five officials from an Iranian diplomatic office in Arbil, a northern city, and have been holding them ever since -- a maneuver that fits with the Bush administration's strategy of demonstrating that Washington has the ability to weaken the Iranian position in Iraq. In an act of apparent retaliation, Shiite militants attacked the Provincial Joint Coordination Center in the southern city of Karbala on Jan. 20, and after a 20-minute gunbattle, abducted five U.S. soldiers, who later were killed. The operatives spoke English, had U.S. military uniforms and identification cards and arrived in armored white GMC suburbans. Using their English-language skills, the gunmen were able to arm themselves at a local police station and then penetrate multiple layers of security before opening fire on a U.S. civil affairs team.
At this point, this much is clear: No matter who is actually responsible for the Sharafi abduction, it will further heighten U.S.-Iranian tensions and could force Tehran to retaliate against the pressure being generated by the United States. The Iranians will blame the Americans under any circumstances. In the logic of the region, the Iranians will reason that even if the perpetrators were Sunnis, the United States somehow manipulated them into carrying out the operation. The Iranians are now as fixated on U.S. covert operations against Iran as the United States has become on Iranian covert operations in Iraq and elsewhere against U.S. interests.
Whatever the facts of this particular case might be, the United States has been transmitting numerous signals -- official and otherwise -- that Iran is vulnerable and is placing itself at risk by opposing U.S. interests in Iraq. The Sharafi abduction seems designed to enhance Tehran's sense of vulnerability, and hence to fuel disagreements among those in Iran who feel the United States is at a weak point and those who warn that the United States is most dangerous at its weakest. The debate between these camps is about how to deal with the United States: whether to retaliate against provocations, pursue negotiations or a mix of both. This is precisely the kind of re-evaluation of its stance and options that the United States wants to see from Iran. The Americans want the Iranians to view the United States as a dangerous foe, and to moderate their appetite for power in the region. Therefore, even if the United States didn't order the Sharafi operation, it still fits into a pattern of warnings that the Americans have been issuing.
There are some factors that allow us to speculate -- and this remains speculation -- that U.S. forces working with partners within the Iraqi Defense Ministry engineered the kidnapping. More specifically, the 36th Commando Battalion, whose uniforms were worn by the gunmen in the course of the kidnapping, is known to work closely with U.S. forces. Amid efforts to quell the Sunni insurgency and contain the growth of Iranian influence in Iraq, the United States in 2005 began moving to bring the Baathists back into Iraq's political system, especially the security forces. This policy has been central to the tensions between the Americans and Iraqi Shia, but it is a tool the Bush administration is using to counter Iranian moves.
Another point to consider is that Sharafi -- as an official with diplomatic immunity -- could not be held in detention for long under normal measures. The standard procedure for dealing with foreign diplomats who are deemed undesirable is to declare them persona non grata and order them out of the country within a matter of days. This is the course of action generally pursued if the goal is to rid a country of potential intelligence operatives -- and it is a sign of escalating tension between the diplomat's home state and the host country. In Sharafi's case, expulsion would have been the prerogative of the Iraqi government. But since the Shiite-dominated government has close ties to Iran, it is hardly likely that he would have been expelled.
In this case, the objective of the United States would not be simply to secure the Iranian's expulsion, but given his position, to extract intelligence about Tehran's plans and operational networks in Iraq. Arresting him and holding him for questioning would not be possible under international law, let alone in the face of the scandal that would ensue if U.S. forces had done this. Nevertheless, an opportunity to question him would be of real value to the United States. Maintaining plausible deniability would be the key. But arranging for Sharafi's abduction by a third party would be a feasible way of obtaining the intelligence sought by the United States. It is therefore quite possible that this was a U.S.-authorized operation executed by Washington's Sunni allies.
The Sunnis in Iraq -- both the nationalists and the jihadists -- have reasons of their own to abduct an Iranian official, and hence could have seized Sharafi as part of a completely independent operation. Sunni nationalists and jihadists feel that they are more threatened by Iranian influence in Iraq than by the U.S. military presence, which most believe eventually will come to an end. The Iranian-Shiite threat, however, is a permanent feature of the region and poses long-term danger.
The Sunnis also recognize that they do not have the means to deal with Iran or its Iraqi Shiite allies by themselves -- but the United States has the power to weaken the position of Iran, and by extension, its Iraqi patrons. With tensions between Washington and Tehran at their current heights, there is an opportunity to be exploited.
The Sunnis could exacerbate those tensions further by abducting an Iranian diplomat at a time when the United States already has five Iranian officials in custody. No claims of responsibility for the operation were issued, which means Tehran's suspicions of the Americans easily could be fueled.
The timing is interesting in another way as well. In efforts to maximize its position in Iraq, Tehran has been angling for negotiations with Saudi Arabia -- and this leaves Iraqi Sunnis feeling nervous. As a minority group that occupies a region without oil, the Sunnis would be at an inherent disadvantage: No matter what kind of support Riyadh might offer them, they would find it difficult or impossible to escape the pull of Iranian and Shiite power. Neither the nationalist insurgents nor the jihadists could accept such an outcome.
On the day of Sharafi's abduction, the al Qaeda-led alliance called the "Islamic State of Iraq" issued a statement saying U.S. military action against Iran would benefit Islamist militants. Therefore, it is entirely possible that the abduction was an attempt to provoke Iran -- which already is demanding the release of the officials captured in Arbil -- into retaliation against the Americans. The jihadists' hope would be that this could provoke a wider U.S.-Iranian conflict and hence torpedo any U.S.-Iranian dealings.
The Iranians seem sincere in their conviction that the abduction was the work of the United States. Their likely reaction would be to encourage their allies within the Iraqi Shiite militias to strike at both U.S. and Sunni targets -- reminding Washington that Tehran is not without options -- while at the same time pressing ahead on the diplomatic front. In other words, the likely short-term outcome of this incident will be increased violence.
At the same time, the United States is engaged in a long-term process designed to convince the Iranians that the risks incurred in destabilizing Iraq and blocking a political settlement in Baghdad are greater than they might have imagined, and that the U.S. resolve to resist Iran is sufficient to block Tehran's ambitions. From Washington's point of view, the primary hope for any satisfactory end to the Iraq war rests in a change of policy in Tehran. Regardless of whether this abduction triggers retaliation, if Iran comes to believe that Washington is dangerous, it might come to the bargaining table or -- to be more precise -- allow its Iraqi allies to come to the table.
An action like the Sharafi abduction allows the signal to be sent, while still falling short of mounting overt military strikes against Iran -- something for which the United States currently has little appetite or resources. A covert war is within the means of the United States, and the Americans might hope that their prosecution of that war will convince Iran they are serious and to back off. Therefore, even if the kidnapping had nothing to do with the United States and Iran misreads the incident, it still could serve American interests in signaling American resolve. Given the state of the U.S. position in Iraq, the strategy well might fail -- but once again, it is one of the few cards the United States has left to play.
Contact Us
-
The Iranian Ambassador to the UN offers his take on things:
================
How Not to Inflame Iraq
E-Mail
Print
Save
Share
Digg
Facebook
Newsvine
Permalink
By JAVAD ZARIF
Published: February 8, 2007
BEFORE the United States invaded Iraq on false pretexts nearly four years ago, the overwhelming view of analysts and diplomats was that war would plunge the region and the world into greater turmoil and instability. Echoing the views of my colleagues from the region and beyond, I told the Security Council on Feb. 18, 2003, that while the ramifications of the war could go beyond anyone’s calculations, “one outcome is almost certain: extremism stands to benefit enormously from an uncalculated adventure in Iraq.”
Skip to next paragraph
Alex Nabaum
This assessment came not from any sympathy for the former Iraqi dictator or his regime. Certainly Iran — which had suffered the carnage of an eight-year war with Iraq in the 1980s, and on which Saddam Hussein unleashed chemical weapons — had no affinity for him. Rather, it was based on a sober recognition of the realities of the region and the inescapable dynamics of occupation.
Now the United States administration is — unfortunately — reaping the expected bitter fruits of its ill-conceived adventurism, taking the region and the world with it to the brink of further hostility. But rather than face these unpleasant facts, the United States administration is trying to sell an escalated version of the same failed policy. It does this by trying to make Iran its scapegoat and fabricating evidence of Iranian activities in Iraq.
The United States administration also appears to be trying to forge a regional coalition to counter Iranian influence. But even if it succeeds in doing so, such a coalition will prove practically futile, dangerous to the region as a whole and internally destabilizing for Iraq. By promoting such a policy, the United States is fanning the flames of sectarianism just when they most need to be quelled.
Coalitions of convenience like the one the United States government now contemplates were a hallmark of American policy in the region in the 1980s and 1990s, and their effect then was to contribute to the creation of monsters like Saddam Hussein, Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Short memories may be responsible for this ill-advised return to old habits.
But who can forget that Saddam Hussein used the very same scare tactic, invoking the “Iranian threat” to extort money, loyalty and military hardware from the region and the world, only to turn them later against his suppliers? Who cannot remember that to contain the supposed “Shiite Crescent” after the 1979 Iranian revolution, the extremism of the fundamentalist Salafi movement was nourished by the West — only to transform later into Al Qaeda and the Taliban? Why should the same policy in the same region produce any different result now?
There are already indications that extremists are exploiting the most emotional sectarian and ethnic divides in the region in an effort to sell possible collaboration with old and new occupiers of Arab lands to a restive, frustrated and resentful populace. Such a shortsighted campaign of hatred will compound regional problems, and it will have global implications, from the subcontinent to Europe and the United States, long after the current crisis in Iraq ends.
We need to remember that sectarian division and hatred in Iraq and the wider region was most recently instigated by none other than the leader of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. The shameful legacy of Mr. Zarqawi and his collaborators should have been buried with him. To that end, all of us in the region need to set aside shortsighted schemes and engage with the government of Iraq in a common effort to contain sectarian violence.
The Persian Gulf region is in dire need of a truly inclusive arrangement for security and cooperation. Only through such regional cooperation, with the necessary international support, can we contain the current crisis and prevent future ones. I wrote in these pages almost four years ago that the removal of Saddam Hussein provided a unique opportunity to finally realize the long sought objective of regional confidence-building and cooperation, as well as to reverse the dangerous trend of confrontation, exclusion and rivalry.
We have lost many valuable opportunities to effect this arrangement, with hundreds of thousands of innocent lives shattered in the interim. The forthcoming meeting of Iraq’s neighbors, to be held in Baghdad next month, will be a good place to begin this difficult but necessary journey toward regional security.
The American administration can also contribute to ending the current nightmare — and preventing future ones — by recognizing that occupation and the threat or use of force are not merely impermissible under international law, but indeed imprudent in purely political calculations of national interest. As authoritative studies have repeatedly shown, no initiators of war in recent history have achieved the intended results; in fact, in almost all cases, those resorting to force have ultimately undermined their own security and stature.
When 140,000 American troops could not bring stability to Iraq, and in fact achieved exactly the opposite, an additional 20,000 soldiers with a dangerous new mandate can only be expected to worsen tension and increase the possibility of unintended escalation. Only a reversal of the logic of force and occupation can dry up the hotbeds of insurgency.
Similarly, forging imaginary new threats, as the United States administration is now doing with Iran, may provide some temporary domestic cover for the failure of the administration’s Iraq policy, but it can hardly resolve problems that — as widely suggested — require prudence, dialogue and a genuine search for solutions.
We all need to learn from past mistakes and not stubbornly insist on repeating them against all advice — including the advice George Bush gave as a presidential candidate in 2000: “If we’re an arrogant nation, they’ll resent us; if we’re a humble nation, but strong, they’ll welcome us.”
Javad Zarif is the Iranian ambassador to the United Nations.
-
Stratfor.com
IRAQ: Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr's Mehdi Army will not be provoked into a confrontation with U.S. troops, despite the detention of several high-ranking loyalists during the latest security crackdowns in Baghdad, Reuters reported, citing Nasser al-Rubaie, the head of the al-Sadrite parliamentary bloc.
=================
NY Times
Published: February 9, 2007
BAGHDAD, Feb. 8 — Just past the main checkpoint into Sadr City, children kick soccer balls at goals with new green nets, on fields where mounds of trash covered the ground last summer. A few blocks away, city workers plant palm trees by the road, while men gather at a cafe nearby to chatter and laugh.
Sadr City, once infamous as a fetid slum and symbol of Shiite subjugation, is recovering, with the help of $41 million in reconstruction funds from the Shiite-led government, all of it spent since May, according to Iraqi officials, and millions more in American assistance.
But as Shiite areas like Sadr City begin to thrive as self-enclosed fiefs, middle-class Sunni enclaves are withering into abandoned ghettos, starved of government services.
Many residents credit a Shiite militia, the Mahdi Army, and its powerful political leader, the radical cleric Moktada al-Sadr, for keeping the area safe enough to allow rebuilding. Yet the Mahdi Army has also killed American troops and has been linked to death squads preying on Sunnis, making the district a potential target as American troops pour into Baghdad to enforce the new security plan.
The neighborhood, which is Baghdad’s largest Shiite area and was named in honor of Mr. Sadr’s father, is a web of contradictions, at once a test of whether its progress can be sustained, a flash point for sectarian tensions and the heart of the government’s political and military base.
“Sadr City is different because it has been left without services for 35 years,” said Hassan al-Shimmari, a Shiite member of Parliament with the Fadila Party. “And with the presence of the Mahdi Army, and its agenda against the Americans — that is what makes it disturbing.”
Over three days of interviews in homes, businesses and political offices, residents described their community as tight-knit, often abused and increasingly isolated.
Abdul Karim Kassem, the prime minister in the late 1950s and early 1960s, built the neighborhood as a public housing project for the poor. The rectangle of roughly 125,000 homes northeast of central Baghdad covered an area about half the size of Manhattan, with streets in a grid and simple brick homes of about 1,550 square feet.
These days, after decades of neglect under Saddam Hussein (though the area was once called Saddam City), many of the houses have been divided into apartments and many more are crumbling.
Sadr City officials, including Rahim al-Daraji, the elected mayor, claim that more than two million people live there, almost all Shiites but with a smattering still of Sunnis and Kurds.
If that number is correct, the district has a higher population density than Calcutta or Hong Kong, which demographers say is unlikely, given the low-rise architecture.
Undeniably, Sadr City has grown in recent months as families moved in from what Iraqis call hot zones, typically Sunni areas where violence has brought daily routines to a standstill. Schools are packed with children, rents have increased and the economy has come alive.
More surprising than the pyramids of fruit at the bustling market, near a park with new red fences, are the signs of leisure, like the new children’s bicycles with tassels on the handlebars and the silvery computer shops.
“Our neighborhood is much better than other areas,” said Hussail Allawi, 41, in a crowd of men smoking flavored tobacco, a pastime now rare in much of the city. “The people are cooperative. There are many volunteers, including the Mahdi Army, and we are doing our best.”
City officials said 16 sewer mains had been cleaned to eliminate the putrid waste that once collected in large puddles, while 22 roads are to be repaved.
Louis J. Fintor, a spokesman for the United States Embassy, said American agencies were also working on more than 35 projects, mostly in health and education. He did not identify their locations or say how much money had been spent. “Getting credit,” he said, “is not the motivating force.”
Abu Firas al-Amtari, a spokesman for the Sadr political party in Sadr City, said the American and Iraqi governments spent reconstruction money haphazardly. But he acknowledged that the neighborhood was gaining momentum.
“The situation inside is very good,” he said in an interview. “We are always afraid of what comes from other neighborhoods.”
1 2
==================
Page 2 of 2)
Bombings here have become less common than in other parts of Baghdad, though a coordinated series of explosions last fall killed 144 people. Residents and Sadr party officials said they felt more secure because the Mahdi Army kept watch. As members of the community, militiamen have an advantage.
Skip to next paragraph
Enlarge This Image
Max Becherer/Polaris, for The New York Times
Hussail Allawi, in cap, a laborer relaxing at a cafe in Sadr City, says of the Shiite district, “Our neighborhood is much better than other areas.”
The Reach of War
Go to Complete Coverage »
Multimedia
Video
A Neighborhood in Transition
Enlarge This Image
Max Becherer/Polaris, for The New York Times
Using horsepower to deliver propane power. Under the protection of the Shiite-led government and the Mahdi Army, and with aid projects by American agencies, the area has become relatively calm and safe.
“The Mahdi are more loyal because they feel they are protecting their own families,” said Ahmed Hashem, 30.
Sadr officials have seized on a simpler refrain: The Mahdi Army makes peace, not war.
Mr. Amtari described the militants as humanitarians, community volunteers and part of “a moral army” that checked vehicles and enforced the law. Naeem al-Kabbi, a deputy mayor affiliated with the Sadr party, said the battles between American troops and the militia in Najaf and Sadr City in 2004 amounted to a misunderstanding — though American troops said they had come under attack while doing little more than running patrols.
Seemingly determined to clean the tarnished Mahdi image, Sadr officials said the militia’s members would disarm temporarily during the Baghdad security plan, even if Sunnis or Americans attacked. “Whatever the provocation, with the surge against us or anything else, we will not kidnap anyone or take revenge by ourselves,” said Mr. Daraji, the mayor, who has been negotiating with American and Iraqi officials over the role of the militia. “We will leave everything to the government.”
Sunni officials said Sadr officials had calculated that if they stayed quiet for the security plan, American troops would eventually withdraw, giving Shiites even more freedom to exercise power.
Salim Abdullah, a senior Sunni member of Parliament, added that the security plan’s impact would be blunted in Sadr City because Shiite militias had infiltrated the Iraqi security forces, and could tip off Mahdi militants before raids began.
An open question is whether all the Mahdi fighters will obey orders not to fight. Some residents, who declined to give their names, described the Mahdi Army as a loose collection of often rival and rogue groups, and said arrests — on, say, an especially volatile anti-American street — could set off firefights with the arrestees’ families and neighbors, even if senior Mahdi commanders remained uninvolved.
But like the streets themselves, the community’s relationship with the militia seemed to be changing. The Sadr organization, whose members once whipped people on the streets for selling alcohol, now works out of a centrally located office that has expanded from a squat one-story building into a small campus with fresh white paint and a covered courtyard. It has the feel of an American post office.
Residents said the building reflected the move from insurgent group to established player. After winning control of six ministries and 30 seats in Parliament, residents said, the Sadrists have become a more traditionally political, less religious force, with leaders primarily interested in safety and power.
There is still a saying in Sadr City that if you anger the Mahdi, “They’ll throw you in the trunk,” a reference to their notorious gangsterism. And the American military has clearly taken a harder line. Citing evidence that militia members killed Americans and innocent civilians, American troops have arrested or killed several Mahdi commanders in recent weeks as part of their efforts to pacify the capital.
In the latest move, on Thursday, American forces raided the Health Ministry and detained a deputy minister whom they accused of ferrying weapons and militants across Sadr City in ambulances to thwart American raids.
Some residents and officials acknowledge that their sprawling neighborhood includes men who contribute to Baghdad’s cycle of violence. One resident said few people had protested the recent increase in American raids because it was clear that some members of the Mahdi Army cared less for the neighborhood than they did for killing and cash.
But in interviews, even critics of the Mahdi Army said that security and economics mattered most, and that as long as the militia kept the neighborhood safe enough to function, it could count on tacit support.
Mr. Allawi, the man smoking at the cafe, said “the people are satisfied” with the spoils of Sadr control.
Muhammad Issa Sachit, 38, a mechanic for the city government who has lived and worked in Sadr City for more than 20 years, said families received a stable fuel supply at competitive prices from the Mahdi Army, more than what most Baghdad communities could depend on.
He also said that when a Sunni neighbor died in a bombing a few months ago, the Mahdi Army rushed in to help the family. “They paid for everything — the funeral, the burial, the food,” he said.
The man’s wife and children left soon afterward. The house was still empty last week.
Mr. Sachit denied that the family’s move had anything to do with a fear of Shiites. Sitting on a green rug in his simple home, he seemed to feel that his neighbor’s death was mainly a story of Mahdi Army generosity.
-
Second post of the day:
This news from Iraq, via the Jawa Report, should be top story. But since Anna Nicole Smith died, it won't get the coverage it deserves:
Coalition forces in Iraq have delivered a series of stunning blows to al Qaeda in Iraq in the last 48 hours.
A key aide to Abu Ayyub al-Masri, the man who replaced Abu Musab al Zarqawi as the leader of al Qaeda in Iraq, has been captured south of Baghdad. As A.J. Strata notes, the trail to the al Qaeda leader is fresh: the captured aide admitted to meeting with al Masri yesterday.
Since Taji is north of Baghdad, these two al Qaeda IED cell leaders captured by the U.S. in West Taji are not the same as those above. That's four al Qaeda leaders captured.
But four is such a lonely number. A facilitator of foreign fighters was captured by the Iarqi Army on the Syrian border. And foreign fighters tend to mean al Qaeda.
Not to be outdone by the IA, the U.S. struck two houses where foreign fighters had gathered---13 jihadis dead. An "individual" associated with foreign fighter facilitation was in the targeted area.
But wait, that's not all. Coalition Forces conducted an air strike Wednesday targeting an al-Qaida in Iraq-related vehicle-borne improvised explosives devices network near Arab Jabour. Intelligence reports indicated that this network is responsible for a large and devastating number of VBIED attacks in the Baghdad area. They are also responsible for IED and sniper attacks conducted against the Iraqi people and Iraqi and Coalition Forces. Building destroyed, everyone inside presumably dead.
And another terrorist was captured in Taji. In addition to leading a bombing cell, he is also believed to be involved in taking Iraqis hostage and murdering them. Which would mean that he is either al Qaeda or one of the related organizations under the umbrella of the "Islamic State of Iraq".
So, we have 6 al Qaeda leaders captured, and possibly dozens more killed. All in the last 48 hours.
CENTCOM has details:
Coalition Forces conducted an air strike Wednesday targeting an al-Qaida in Iraq-related vehicle-borne improvised explosives devices network near Arab Jabour. Intelligence reports indicated that this network is responsible for a large and devastating number of VBIED attacks in the Baghdad area. They are also responsible for IED and sniper attacks conducted against the Iraqi people and Iraqi and Coalition Forces. As Coalition Forces approached the targeted building they came under intense enemy fire. Ground forces assessed seven suspected terrorists were in the targeted building. Coalition Forces determined the targets too hostile for ground troops and called for air support. Two precision guided munitions were dropped destroying the targeted building and an associated structure. Coalition Forces continue to tear apart the al-Qaida leadership inside Iraq. This operation significantly reduces this VBIED terrorist network's ability to operate, and increases the safety of all Iraqi citizens, Iraqi forces, and Iraq's Multi-National partners.
And more:
Coalition Forces killed an estimated 13 terrorists during an air strike Thursday morning targeting a senior foreign fighter facilitator northeast of Amiriya.
Intelligence reports indicated an individual associated with foreign fighter facilitation was in the targeted area. During the operation, Coalition Forces detained five suspected terrorists and found a cache including armor piercing ammunition. Information gained from the target area led Coalition Forces to two suspected foreign fighter safe houses where suspected terrorists were assembled. Coalition Forces observed the structures to confirm intelligence reports and engaged with precision guided munitions and rotary wing close air support, killing an estimated 13 terrorists.
Coalition Forces continue to dismantle the foreign fighter networks. This operation significantly reduces foreign fighter facilitators’ ability to operate inside Iraq.
And from MNF-I:
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE--
SUSPECTED SENIOR IED CELL LEADER DETAINED, TERRORIST SAFEHOUSE DESTROYED IN WEST TAJI
BAGHDAD, Iraq – Coalition Forces detained two suspected terrorists believed to have ties to an al-Qaida improvised explosive device cell during a raid Wednesday morning in West Taji.
Intelligence reports indicated one of the detainees has significant ties to a local IED cell and had connections to recent anti-Coalition Forces activities.
Ground forces entered the targeted building and detained the two suspected terrorists without incident. Upon searching the house, ground forces found evidence of explosives material hidden inside the building and buried around the exterior. They also found several weapons and materials commonly used to make IEDs.
In order to prevent the residence from being used for future sanctuary to terrorists, ground forces destroyed the building with strategically-placed charges. Before placing the charges, Ground forces escorted two women and nine children outside the house and to a neighbor’s home in order to ensure their safety.
ImageCoalition Forces are making progress dismantling the al-Qaida terrorist network inside Iraq. The capture of these detainees and the destruction of another terrorist sanctuary reduces the ability of the terrorist network to operate, and increases the safety of all Iraqi citizens, Iraqi forces and Iraq’s Multi-National partners
-
Although an old article, it reflects how our "feel good" culture has corrupted the ability of the US military to engage in operations that would end effectively end the Iraq war. Wars are not won by making the populace feel good about the attacking army. They are won by beating the S**** out of the opposing army and making the populace realize that resistance is hopeless. Just like what was done in Japan and Germany. Total Jacksonian warfare. Unfortunately, the US does not have the stomach for such warfare right now. I fear that it will take another successful attack on the Homeland for such attitudes of warfare to harden. Yet, even then, the do-gooders and touchy-feely types will still not get it.
The Military Doctrine of Altruism
by John Lewis (October 16, 2006)
The New York Times article recently described the military skills our soldiers will need to engage in the operations our politicians are asking them to perform ("Military Hones a New Strategy on Insurgency," October 5, 2006). The new doctrine renounces overwhelming force, focuses on reacting to insurgent attacks rather than winning offensive battles, and has a goal of protecting foreign civilians rather than defeating a hostile enemy.
Before the 2004 election, Vice-President Cheney lambasted John Kerry for wanting to fight a more "sensitive" war. But Cheney should rather have agreed, as that is exactly what we are doing. (I identified this before the election, in "President Bush's 'Sensitive' War," Capitalism Magazine, August 27, 2004.)
The Times article is right that the face of the military is changing: At military conferences, and in discussions with military officers and instructors, I repeatedly hear how we must change attitudes among a foreign population rather than use our force, and how it is preferable to let "bad guys" escape rather than to hurt civilians. The military is developing new tactics to achieve such ends.
In a visit to the military simulators at Fort Riley, Kansas, for instance, I saw a stunning array of technology. One enters a warehouse-style building, full of metal cubes with doors. Close the door, and you are in a tank: a mock-up of an M1 Abrams tank commander's display, with monitors and controls to replicate real-world conditions. Six tanks can be networked, and sent on a mission. Instructors can ambush them, engage them with fire, and monitor their actions. Afterwards, in a classroom, participants can see an overhead view of the entire operation, and evaluate every move from above. Such technology is space-age and potentially beneficial—but what of the goals to which it is being employed?
It was once the case—in a by-gone era—that our goal in war was to defeat an enemy, thereby securing our safety. This meant demonstrating to enemy leaders, fighters, and civilians that victory for them was impossible—by destroying their capacity to fight. With such a goal in mind, the regime in Iran, for instance, which is providing the Iraqi insurgency with a steady stream of personnel and of material and psychological support, would not be allowed to remain in power. Local Iraqi warlords would face overwhelming assault. Civilians would learn not to harbor our enemies and not to support a hopeless cause.
But the new doctrine has nothing to do with defeating a deadly enemy or protecting American lives. The new "wisdom" is that "the more force is used, the less effective it is." The army, it is said, must "clear, hold and build," since building things for a foreign population is more important than demanding their surrender. The enemy's safe-havens over the borders, its defiant leadership, and its sympathetic civilians, are not to be attacked. "Tactical success guarantees nothing"; the new aim is "to protect the Iraqis against intimidation." (One wonders how the police in New York could protect a grocer from the intimidation of organized gangsters without destroying the Mafia that funds them—but this, in essence, is how our military now operates.)
There is one big idea behind such thinking, one idea that establishes the political and intellectual context for the new doctrine: altruism. It is altruism ("otherism") that elevates the value of others over self. This is the core moral principle behind today's Just War Theory—which is the direct application of altruism to the question of military ethics and doctrine.
Offensive war is based on the idea that one's own citizens, and one's own cause, are more valuable than the enemy and his cause. Every soldier who shoots an enemy, and every president who issues an ultimatum to a hostile power, is presuming this principle. But this, according to altruism, is self-interested, and thereby morally tainted. The new aim of the war—taken as an unquestioned absolute—is to bring good things to the population of a hostile nation, while hoping, as a secondary goal, that it will respond by embracing democracy and thus ceasing to threaten us (as if unlimited majority rule in the Middle East were the key to our security).
It is altruism that subjects our military to the slow bleed of dead and maimed soldiers in order to avoid confronting an enemy leader or hurting a shopkeeper. It is altruism that tells our soldiers to build toilets for a hostile population rather than to defeat the deadly enemy. It is altruism that places the welfare of Iraqis over the security of Americans.
Since altruism provides no specific goals for war—it says only that, whatever our goals, they must be good for others and not self-interested—a lack of purpose is the inevitable result of the new military doctrine. The decline of civilian support in America for the Iraq war is a consequence of the inability to understand why one American should die for the Iraqis. And the contempt for America in the Middle East is the result of our unwillingness to assert ourselves or to destroy those spreading anti-American propaganda in the region. What American altruists see as virtuous deference to the needs of others, our enemies overseas take as weakness of will and submission.
Some commentators have praised this new military doctrine, while whitewashing its implications. Counter-insurgency war is not about victory or defeat, runs one argument; democracy for others is our purpose and will be the "final stage" of the war. We should fight on until the enemy establishes an electoral "Vote for Liberty!" campaign, blanking out the fact that "liberty" has a specific meaning, that people who do not understand it cannot be expected to defend it, and that any moral standard which requires us to sacrifice our liberty for theirs is a repudiation of liberty at its root.
The real problem, say others, is "leftists" who want to "cut and run"—evading the fact that the New Left political and economic agenda has been adopted lock, stock, and barrel by the New Conservatives. "Peace without Victors" was the call of liberal Woodrow Wilson in 1918 and is the call of conservatives today. Just War Theory itself is a leftist construct that has been embraced by conservative leaders, in many cases for its Christian overtones. Mr. Cheney may chide Mr. Kerry—but the Bush administration has taken the democrat's advice.
Military experts are warning that we do not have enough resources to continue "fighting" this way. Since the military's job is now to "counter" an endless "insurgency," we would need as many army squads as there are buildings and street corners in the Middle East. Proponents claim that such a war may take fifteen years for Iraq alone—without considering the support flowing in from surrounding areas or the increasing threats to America from other parts of the world. The doctrine is a prescription for a stream of American body-bags, with no end in sight because no victory is being pursued.
America's increasing technological superiority, combined with the deepening fog surrounding the moral purpose of such superiority, is a symptom of the gulf between science and the humanities that has characterized the past two hundred years. We combine soaring advancements in the capacity to control physical nature, with stagnation and regression in our understanding of man's moral nature. If we do not grasp the moral goodness of self-interested action—which in war means the pursuit of victory over our enemies—our military will continue to increase in technological efficacy only to continue sacrificing it to the bathroom needs of foreigners.
None of this will deter the advocates of this new doctrine, for they are driven by a moral ideal—altruism—that carries far more weight in their minds than the need to defend our own freedom.
Originally published at Principles in Practice. Cartoons
-
13 TERRORISTS KILLED IN AIR STRIKE NEAR AMIRIYAH, 5 CAPTURED
BAGHDAD– U.S. troops killed 13 terrorists during an air strike targeting a senior foreign fighter facilitator near Amiriya. During the operation, U.S. troops captured five terrorists and found a cache including armor piercing ammunition.
Information gained from the area led U.S. troops to two foreign fighter safe houses where terrorists were assembled. U.S. troops observed the structures to confirm intelligence reports and engaged with precision guided munitions, killing 13 terrorists.
U.S. troops stop insurgent attacks in northern Iraq, 10 insurgents killed
TIKRIT, Iraq – U.S. troops conducting routine patrols prevented several insurgent teams from emplacing roadside bombs in 2 provinces.
U.S. troops observed multiple insurgent teams planting improvised explosive devices along major roadways in the early evening hours north of Tikrit, near Bayji, in Balad and south of Baqubah. Once they were positively identified as insurgents with the intent to harm U.S. troops or other Iraqis, U.S. troops engaged the enemy.
Among the 10 insurgents killed that night, three were in Balad, four near Bayji and three near Baqubah. Two were injured just north of Tikrit.
Traffic accident leads Iraqi Army to massive weapons cache, 8 captured
MOSUL, Iraq – Soldiers from the 2nd Iraqi Army Division were on a routine patrol when they accidentally collided with a civilian vehicle. The vehicle’s occupants tried to flee the scene, but were quickly apprehended by the IA soldiers. After tactical questioning, one of the two detainees told the IA where a huge weapons cache could be found.
Utilizing the newfound intelligence, the IA conducted a raid on a house located behind a sheep market in the Nablis neighborhood of west Mosul. There they caught 6 insurgents and, upon a thorough search, found a false wall in the house.
It was behind this wall that a large stockpile of weapons was found, to include 8 AK-47s, 4 RPK machine guns, 6 rocket-propelled grenade launchers, one SVD, one SKS, 3 PKCs, 4,000 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition, 32 rocket-propelled grenade rounds, 10 grenades, 130 mortar rounds (primarily 60, 81 and 82 mm), and a fully functional improvised explosive device.
Five of the captured insurgents tested positive for plastic explosives. Additionally, the Iraqi Army conducted a second raid the following night based on intelligence gained from the first, netting three more insurgents.
8 TERRORISTS KILLED IN ARAB JABOUR
BAGHDAD – Coalition Forces conducted an air strike Thursday after receiving heavy enemy fire during a raid targeting al-Qaida in Iraq terrorists and foreign fighter facilitators.
While receiving enemy fire from several directions, ground forces called in for air support. 8 terrorists barricaded themselves inside one of the buildings and continued to fire at the ground forces. U.S. aircraft dropped precision bombs on the building, resulting in its destruction and the deaths of the 8 terrorists.
Iraqi, Coalition Forces Battle Insurgents After Investigating IED Blast, 9 Terrorists Killed
BAGHDAD – Iraqi and U.S. members fought enemy fighters in Baqubah after responding to investigate an IED attack against a U.S. convoy.
While searching for the bomber, they began to receive heavy small arms and RPG fires from enemy fighters in several buildings in the area including a mosque, later identified as an abandoned mosque from which heavy fire was directed against U.S. and Iraqi Army Soldiers.
Iraqi and U.S. members returned fires. Iraqi Army Forces entered the abandoned mosque to conduct a search for enemy fighters and weapons. Iraqi Forces confiscated 5 assault rifles, Iraqi Army uniforms and explosives and material for constructing IEDs during the search. 9 enemy fighter were killed.
Camera shop raid leads to mortar cache, insurgents
MOSUL, Iraq – Soldiers from the Iraqi army, in conjunction with U.S. soldiers from 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division conducted a raid on a photo shop in Mosul with the intent of eliminating a source of IED manufacturing as well as locating a mortar cache that information sources said was there.
Dubbed “Operation Camera Shy,” the search involved the camera shop, as well as a large field near the store. While searching the field, several marking sticks were found approximately five meters from the northeast corner of the field. Upon digging, a cache of two mortar tubes, seven 120mm rounds, two pipe bombs, a bag of fuses, two ammunition cans, and other assorted IED-making material was found.
Five males were taken into custody, with four of them testing positive for explosive residue on their person.
Iraqi Army, Cavalry take fight to the enemy…again; 2 enemy killed, 5 captured
MOSUL, Iraq – Soldiers from 2nd Battalion, 7th (2-7) Cavalry Regiment conducted a raid
on several houses in east Mosul Feb. 4, after receiving intelligence about specific high-priority targets.
Upon reaching the area, the Soldiers dismounted. As they reached the area, they began taking small-arms fire from a group of insurgents. The insurgents also began lobbing grenades at the Cavalry troops.
Regrouping back down the stairs, the “Garry Owen” troops encountered two near misses. In one instance, a grenade bounced off of two Cavalry Soldiers before exploding in the living room of the house. In a second incident, Sgt. Konyaku Kaili, an infantryman with 2-7 U.S. Cavalry, was engaged by small-arms fire and received a round into the front plate of his body armor but he was not seriously injured.
During the engagement, 1 insurgent blew himself up with an explosive vest, and another was shot and killed when reinforcement troops arrived from the Iraqi army and U.S. Cavalry, effectively sealing off the area. Simultaneously, 5 mortar rounds landed in the area and a large ammunition cache, that was stored in the house, detonated due to the fire created by the insurgent attack.
Soldiers from the Iraqi Army swept in and cleared all of the remaining houses, capturing five males in a car who were headed through the blockade, into the fight. They all had individual weapons with them as well as RPGs and launchers.
U.S. air support helps stop insurgent IED team
CAMP TAJI, Iraq – Using close air support, coalition forces engaged and disabled a man who was attempting to detonate an improvised explosive device (IED) near here.
Shortly after discovering an IED on a road they were traveling, Soldiers from the 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment reported seeing 5 men who had been standing near a wall at the site running to a vehicle to flee the area. The men were waiting for U.S. forces to drive by so they could detonate the device.
Aircraft in the area observed the men driving at a high rate of speed to a house, where 4 of the men left the vehicle and fled into the building. After pausing at the building, the driver of the vehicle sped off and continued traveling at a high rate of speed.
An aircraft engaged the vehicle. The suspect fled the vehicle, running to a field and jumping over a fence near the Nassar factory here—while still being engaged by the aircraft. The man was hit, sustaining leg injuries during the pursuit. The Cavalry Soldiers rushed to the scene and captured the insurgent.
Iraqi Army, U.S. paratroopers work in concert to capture 4 insurgents
BAGHDAD – Iraqi Army troops captured 4 insurgents near the Iraqi capital with a little help from U.S. Soldiers.
Soldiers from the 6th Iraqi Army Division acted on a tip passed to them from paratroopers of the 4th Brigade (Airborne), 25th Infantry Division, and captured the 4 men in Suyyid Jihad, south of Baghdad.
The Iraqi troops stopped the men in a sedan and found that each had three different identification cards. The men also had 4 pistols and 2 AK-47s.
3 Operations, 4 terrorist leaders captured
BAGHDAD – Soldiers of the 7th Iraqi Army Division captured a foreign fighter facilitator during operations in the Al Qaim region, near the Syrian boarder. The insurgent was gathering information about Iraqi Forces and U.S. operations and providing it to foreign fighters. The man was also harboring foreign fighters in Iraq while they carry out insurgent activities in the area.
In a 2nd operation, Soldiers of the 4th Iraqi Army Division removed another bomber from the streets of Iraq after capturing the leader of an IED cell during operations near Taji. The bomber is believed responsible for coordinating and carrying out IED attacks against Iraqi Security Forces and U.S. convoys in the area.
The man carried out an IED attack against a Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle in September which killed one U.S. Soldier. He is also implicated in a more recent IED strike that killed 3 U.S. Soldiers Jan. 27.
He was also involved in the abduction of innocent Iraqi civilians and using his residence as a place to interrogate and execute them.
In a 3rd operation, U.S. troops captured 2 terrorists with ties to an al-Qaida IED cell during a raid in West Taji. U.S. troops entered the targeted building and captured 2 terrorists without incident. Upon searching the house, U.S. troops found evidence of explosives material hidden inside the building and buried around the exterior. They also found several weapons and materials commonly used to make IEDs.
Suicide attacker detonates car bomb on ambulance, kills pregnant woman on way to hospital
MOSUL, Iraq – A suicide terrorist, driving a Blue Vargas Wagon packed with explosives at approximately 11:55 a.m., attempted to detonate his vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) in the center of the crowded Al Boursah Market on the west side of Mosul.
The attacker was heading toward his primary target, believed to be the Al Boursah Market, when he veered into the path of an Iraqi ambulance detonating his VBIED, according to witnesses.
There were three Iraqi civilians in the ambulance, two medical technicians and a pregnant woman on her way to the hospital.
All three were wounded in the explosion and the woman later died after succumbing to her injuries. The bomber was killed in the blast.
“This is a heinous act by terrorists targeting a pregnant woman in an ambulance,” said Col. Gary Patton, U.S. Army.
Iraqi Army and Marine mission captures 77 insurgents
CAMP HABBANIYAH, Iraq –Iraqi Army Soldiers and U.S. Marines wrapped up a mission which resulted in 77 insurgents captured near Habbaniyah. The mission to catch or kill members of murder and intimidation cells was a joint operation with Iraqi Forces and Marines of Regimental Combat Team 6, supported by local Iraqis focused on ridding their towns of insurgents.
During the mission, Soldiers of the 1st Iraqi Army Division and Marines from 3rd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment captured individuals who were coordinating insurgent attacks against Iraqi Security Forces and U.S. troops. Several of the insurgents were immediately identified as priority targets.
Local citizens informed Iraqi Security Forces of numerous individuals that had a connection to insurgent activity. This information ignited the Iraqi Army Soldiers and Marines to plan missions to simultaneously capture members of anti-Iraq forces.
During the mission, items found included sniper rifles, automatic weapons, RPGs & IED-making material.
One Terrorist Killed, 17 others and Senior Al-Qaida Leader Captured
BAGHDAD, Iraq –U.S. troops killed one terrorist and captured 17 terrorists during raids targeting al-Qaida networks.
In Karabilah, U.S. troops killed 1 terrorist and captured 2 terrorists while targeting a foreign fighter cell. Ground forces made repeated calls for the occupants of a building to come out. When no one responded, U.S. troops entered the building and found 3 men. The men were instructed to surrender and two complied. The third man ignored repeated commands to surrender and reached for a weapon. U.S. troops shot and killed the terrorist.
U.S. troops captured 2 terrorists near Tarmiyah associated with an al-Qaida network. 3 individuals with ties to a vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices cell operating near Karmah were captured. This cell is allegedly responsible for multiple rocket and IED attacks against U.S. forces.
During a raid in Ramadi, U.S. troops captured 6 individuals with ties to al-Qaida. Additionally, 2 others were caught in Baghdad with ties to VBIED operations. North of Tikrit, U.S. troops captured an al-Qaida in Iraq leader and one other terrorist.
Three Terrorists Killed, Al Qaida Cell Leader, 26 Others Captured
BAGHDAD, Iraq – U.S. troops killed 3 terrorists and captured 26 terrorists including an al-Qaida in Iraq cell leader during raids Monday morning targeting foreign fighter facilitator and al-Qaida in Iraq networks.
In Al Karabilah, U.S. troops raided four buildings where a foreign fighter facilitation cell was reported to be operating. During the raid, ground forces encountered three armed men who attempted to engage them. U.S. troops quickly responded killing the three terrorists. 13 others with ties to the cell were captured.
U.S. troops captured the suspected leader of an al-Qaida in Iraq cell in Mosul. The al-Qaida cell in Mosul reportedly specializes in IED attacks against U.S. troops . 3 others were captured during the raid.
In Karmah, 4 terrorists were captured with reported ties to al-Qaida in Iraq foreign fighter facilitation.
4 others were captured in Arab Jabour, with ties to vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices manufacturing. One terrorist with ties to al-Qaida was captured in Baqubah.
Key VBIED; 5 VBIED terrorists captured in Mosul, Baghdad; 1 terrorist killed
BAGHDAD, Iraq – U.S. troops disrupted explosives cells in Mosul and Baghdad during two raids, killing a key vehicle-borne improvised explosive device cell leader and capturing 5 other VBIED terrorists. The raid in Mosul targeted a terrorist who is believed responsible for the production of explosives used in attacks against U.S. troops in Mosul.
Upon entering the targeted building, U.S. troops encountered 2 terrorists. One of the terrorists ignored U.S. troops instructions and suddenly reached into his jacket. U.S. troops fired upon and killed the terrorist. The other terrorist is responsible for other attacks. Two other terrorists with ties to the Mosul VBIED network were also caught during the raid.
U.S. troops also captured 2 terrorists during a raid in Baghdad. Acting on intelligence reports, U.S. troops searched the residence of a terrorist believed to be actively planning, financing and executing of VBIED operations. During the raid, U.S. troops found more than 250 cellular phones and various types of IEDs.
OPERATIONS RESULT IN 4 AL-QAIDA TERRORISTS KILLED; 29 TERRORISTS CAUGHT
BAGHDAD, Iraq –U.S. troops killed 4 terrorists and captured 29 terrorists during raids targeting al-Qaida in Iraq.
During a raid in Fallujah, U.S. troops targeted a terrorist with known ties to a foreign fighter network. As U.S. troops approached the targeted building, 3 armed terrorists attempted to fire on them. U.S. troops killed the 3 armed terrorists and captured 10 other terrorists.
West of Tarmiyah, U.S. troops targeted terrorists with ties to the al-Qaida in Iraq network. Upon approaching the objective, one suspected terrorist began advancing towards Coalition Forces.
U.S. troops told the man to get on the ground. The man complied at first and then got back up and charged toward U.S. troops with what appeared to be a grenade. U.S. troops killed the terrorist.
U.S. troops detained eight suspected terrorists during this raid.
During an operation in Tarmiyah, 5 terrorists were captured. U.S. troops also uncovered a weapons cache consisting of numerous AK-47s, several pistols, wire spools, 60mm mortar rounds and a pressure plate.
4 terrorists operating a foreign fighter safe house were captured in Ramadi.
In Kalar, 2 terrorists were captured by U.S. troops.
THIS WEEK'S NUMBERS - Terrorists/insurgents taken out of action this week: 240
53 terrorists killed
187 terrorists captured
------------------------------------------
total 240 terrorists killed & captured
-
The Cost of Defeat in Iraq and the Cost of Victory in Iraq - 18 Points
Testimony to Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Gingrich Communications January 23 2007
Newt Gingrich
Click on the documents to the left to view the other materials provided for the Congressional Record.
Chairman Biden, Ranking Member Lugar, and members of the committee:
Thank you for allowing me to testify.
This is an extraordinarily important series of hearings on a topic of enormous national importance.
The United States finds itself in a global struggle with the forces of Islamic fascism and their dictatorial allies.
From a fanatic American near Chicago who attempted to buy hand grenades to launch a personal Jihad in a Christmas mall, to 18 Canadians arrested for terrorist plots, to the Scotland Yard disruption of a plot in Britain to destroy ten civilian airliners in one day that if successful would have shattered worldwide confidence in commercial aviation and potentially thrown the world into a deep economic contraction.
We are confronted again and again with a worldwide effort to undermine and defeat the system of law and order which has created more prosperity and more freedom for more people than any previous system.
The threats seem to come in four different forms:
First, from individuals who are often self recruited and randomly inspired through the internet, television and charismatic social and religious friendships.
Second, from organized non state systems of terror of which Al Qaeda, Hezbollah and Hamas are the most famous. Additional groups have sprung up and provide continuity, training, and support for terrorism.
Third, from dictatorships in the Middle East most notably Iran and Syria who have been consistently singled out by the State Department (including in 2006) as the largest funders of state supported terrorism in the world. These dictatorships are investing in more advanced conventional weapons and in chemical and nuclear weapons.
Fourth, from a strange assortment of anti-American dictatorships including North Korea, Venezuela and Cuba.
This coalition of the enemies of freedom has growing power around the world. Its leaders are increasingly bold in their explicit hostility to the United States.
To take just two recent examples: Ahmadinejad of Iran has said “[t]o those who doubt, to those who ask is it possible, or those who do not believe, I say accomplishment of a world without America and Israel is both possible and feasible.” He has also said that Israel should be “wiped off the map.” Chavez of Venezuela, just last week in a joint appearance with the Iranian leader in Latin America, announced a multi billion dollar fund to help countries willing to fight to end “American imperialism.”
Both of these statements were on television and are not subject to misinterpretation.
Similarly there are many web pages and other public statements in which various terrorists have described in great detail their commitment to killing millions of Americans. I described these publicly delivered threats in a speech on the fifth anniversary of 9/11 which I gave at the American Enterprise Institute. The text of this speech is attached as an appendix to this testimony.
These threats might be ignored if it were not for the consistent efforts to acquire nuclear and biological weapons by these enemies of freedom
I first wrote about the extraordinary increase in the threat to our civilization from nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists in Window of Opportunity in 1984. Attached to this testimony is a copy of the relevant pages from this book.
It is not accurate to suggest today that people were not aware of terrorism or were not warning about the threat to America’s very survival prior to 9/11.
Many sophisticated observers and professional military and intelligence officers have been issuing these warnings for two decades.
What has been amazing to watch has been the absolute inability of our system of government to analyze the problem and react effectively.
It is this collapse of capacity for effectiveness which is at the heart of our current dilemma.
The United States is now in a decaying mess in Afghanistan and an obviously unacceptable mess in Iraq.
While this language may seem harsh to defenders of the current policy, it is sadly an accurate statement of where we are.
Efforts to think through and solve the problems of Afghanistan and Iraq have to be undertaken in a context of looking at a wider range of challenges to American leadership around the world and potentially to our very survival as a country. These larger challenges are described in my attached presentation entitled “The Real World and The Real War”.
With these caveats I want to focus on the challenge of Iraq.
Two Very Hard Paths Forward in Iraq
America is faced with two very hard paths forward in Iraq.
We can accept defeat and try to rebuild our position in the region while accommodating the painful possibility that these enemies of freedom in Iraq -- evil men, vicious murderers, and sadistic inflictors of atrocities will have defeated both the millions of Iraqis who voted for legal self government and the American people and their government.
Alternatively we can insist on defeating the enemies of America and the enemies of the Iraqi people and can develop the strategies and the implementation mechanisms necessary to force victory despite the incompetence of the Iraqi government, the unreliability of Iraqi leaders, and the interference of Syria and Iran on behalf of our enemies.
Both these paths are hard. Both involve great risk. Both have unknowable difficulties and will produce surprise events.
Both will be complicated.
Yet either is preferable to continuing to accept an ineffective American implementation system while relying on the hope that the Iraqi system can be made to work in the next six months.
The Inherent Confusion in the Current Strategy
There are three fundamental weaknesses in the current strategy.
First, the strategy relies on the Iraqis somehow magically improving their performance in a very short time period. Yet the argument for staying in Iraq is that it is a vital AMERICAN interest. If we are seeking victory in Iraq because it is vital to America then we need a strategy which will win even if our Iraqi allies are inadequate. We did not rely on the Free French to defeat Nazi Germany. We did not rely on the South Koreans to stop North Korea and China during the Korean War. When it mattered to American vital interests we accepted all the help we could get but we made sure we had enough strength to win on our own if need be.
President Bush has asserted that Iraq is a vital American interest. In January 2007 alone he has said the following things:
But if we do not succeed in Iraq, we will leave behind a Middle East which will endanger America in the future.
[F]ailure in one part of the world could lead to disaster here at home. It's important for our citizens to understand that as tempting as it might be, to understand the consequences of leaving before the job is done, radical Islamic extremists would grow in strength. They would be emboldened. It would make it easier to recruit for their cause. They would be in a position to do that which they have said they want to do, which is to topple moderate governments, to spread their radical vision across an important region of the world.
If we were to leave before the job is done, if we were to fail in Iraq, Iran would be emboldened in its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Our enemies would have safe havens from which to launch attacks. People would look back at this moment in history and say, what happened to them in America? How come they couldn't see the threats to a future generation?
The consequences of failure are clear: Radical Islamic extremists would grow in strength and gain new recruits. They would be in a better position to topple moderate governments, create chaos in the region, and use oil revenues to fund their ambitions. Iran would be emboldened in its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Our enemies would have a safe haven from which to plan and launch attacks on the American people. On September the 11th, 2001, we saw what a refuge for extremists on the other side of the world could bring to the streets of our own cities. For the safety of our people, America must succeed in Iraq.
Iraq is a central component of defeating the extremists who want to establish safe haven in the Middle East, extremists who would use their safe haven from which to attack the United States, extremists and radicals who have stated that they want to topple moderate governments in order to be able to achieve assets necessary to effect their dream of spreading their totalitarian ideology as far and wide as possible.
This is really the calling of our time, that is, to defeat these extremists and radicals, and Iraq is a component part, an important part of laying the foundation for peace.
The inherent contradiction in the administration strategy is simple. If Iraq matters as much as the President says it does (and here I agree with the President on the supreme importance of victory) then the United States must not design and rely on a strategy which relies on the Iraqis to win.
On the other hand if the war is so unimportant that the fate of Iraq can be allowed to rest with the efforts of a new, weak, untested and inexperienced government then why are we risking American lives.
Both propositions cannot be true.
I accept the President’s analysis of the importance of winning in Iraq and therefore I am compelled to propose that his recently announced strategy is inadequate.
The second weakness is that the current strategy debate once again focuses too much on the military and too little on everything that has not been working. The one instrument that has been reasonably competent is the combat element of American military power. That is a very narrow definition and should not be expanded to include the non combat elements of the Department of Defense which also have a lot of difficulties in performing adequately.
The great failures in the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns have been in non-combat power. Intelligence, diplomacy, economic aid, information operations, support from the civilian elements of national power. These have been the great centers of failure in America’s recent conflicts. They are a major reason we have done so badly in Iraq.
The gap between the President’s recent proposals and the required rethinking and transforming of our non-combat instruments of power is simply breathtaking.
No military leader I have talked with believes military force is adequate to win in Iraq. Every one of them insists that the civilian instruments of power are more important than the combat elements. They all assert that they can hold the line for a while with force but that holding the line will ultimately fail if we are not using that time to achieve progress in non-military areas.
This failure of the non-combat bureaucracies cannot be solved in Iraq. The heart of the problem is in Washington and that brings us to the third weakness in the current strategy.
The third weakness in the current strategy is its inability to impose war time decision making and accountability in Washington.
The interagency process is hopelessly broken.
This is not a new phenomenon. I first wrote about it in 1984 in Window of Opportunity when I asserted:
[W]e must decide what sort of executive-branch planning and implementation system are desirable.
At a minimum, we will need closer relationships between the intelligence agencies, the diplomatic agencies, the economic agencies, the military agencies, the news media and the political structure. There has to be a synergism in which our assessment of what is happening relates to our policies as they are developed and implemented. Both analyses and implementation must be related to the new media and political system because all basic policies must have public support if they are to succeed.
Finally, once the professionals have mastered their professions and have begun to work in systems that are effective and coordinated, those professionals must teach both the news media and the elected politicians. No free society can for long accept the level of ignorance about war, history, and the nature of power which has become the norm for our news media and our elected politicians. An ignorant society is on its way to becoming an extinct society.
In 1991 my concern for replacing the broken interagency system with an integrated system of effective coordination was heightened when General Max Thurmond who had planned and led the liberation of Panama told me unequivocally that the interagency process was broken.
In 1995 that process was reinforced when General Hartzog described the failures of the interagency in trying to deal with Haiti.
As early as 2002 it was clear that the interagency had broken down in Afghanistan and I gave a very strong speech in May 2003 at the American Enterprise Institute criticizing the process.
By the summer of 2003 it was clear the interagency was failing in Iraq and by September and October 2003 we were getting consistent reports from the field of the gap between the capability of the combat forces and the failure of the civilian systems.
No senior officer in the Defense Department doubts that the current interagency cannot work at the speed of modern war. They will not engage in a fight with the National Security Council or the State Department or the various civilian agencies which fail to do their job. But in private they will assert over and over again that the interagency system is hopelessly broken.
It was very disappointing to have the President focus so much on 21, 500 more military personnel and so little on the reforms needed in all the other elements of the executive branch.
The proposals for winning in Iraq outlined below follow from this analysis.
Key Steps to Victory in Iraq
1. Place General Petraeus in charge of the Iraq campaign and establish that the Ambassador is operating in support of the military commander.
2. Since General Petraeus will now have responsibility for victory in Iraq all elements of achieving victory are within his purview and he should report daily to the White House on anything significant which is not working or is needed
3. Create a deputy chief of staff to the President and appoint a retired four star general or admiral to manage Iraq implementation for the Commander in Chief on a daily basis.
4. Establish that the second briefing (after the daily intelligence brief) the President will get every day is from his deputy chief of staff for Iraq implementation.
5. Establish a War Cabinet which will meet once a week to review metrics of implementation and resolve failures and enforce decisions. The President should chair the War Cabinet personally and his deputy chief of staff for Iraq implementation should prepare the agenda for the weekly review and meeting.
6. Establish three plans: one for achieving victory with the help of the Iraqi government, one for achieving victory with the passive acquiescence of the Iraqi government, one for achieving victory even if the current Iraqi government is unhappy. The third plan may involve very significant shifts in troops and resources away from Baghdad and a process of allowing the Iraqi central government to fend for itself if it refuses to cooperate.
7. Communicate clearly to Syria and Iran that the United States is determined to win in Iraq and that any further interference (such as the recent reports of sophisticated Iranian explosives being sent to Iraq to target Americans) will lead to direct and aggressive countermeasures.
8. Pour as many intelligence assets into the fight as needed to develop an overwhelming advantage in intelligence preparation of the battlefield.
9. Develop a commander’s capacity to spend money on local activities sufficient to enable every local American commander to have substantial leverage in dealing with local communities.
10. Establish a jobs corps or civil conservation corps of sufficient scale to bring unemployment for males under 30 below 10% (see the attached op-ed by Mayor Giuliani and myself on this topic).
11. Expand dramatically the integration of American purchasing power in buying from Iraqi firms pioneered by Assistant Secretary Paul Brinkley to maximize the rate of recovery of the Iraqi economy.
12. Expand the American Army and Marine Corps as much as needed to sustain the fights in Iraq and Afghanistan while also being prepared for other contingencies and maintaining a sustainable rhythm for the families and the force.
13. Demand a war budget for recapitalization of the military to continue modernization while defeating our enemies. The current national security budget is lower as a percentage of the economy than at any time from Pearl Harbor through the end of the Cold War. It is less than half the level Truman sustained before the Korean War.
14. The State Department is too small, too undercapitalized and too untrained for the demands of the 21st century. There should be a 50% increase in the State Department budget and a profound rethinking of the culture and systems of the State Department so it can be an operationally effective system.
15. The Agency for International Development is hopelessly unsuited to the new requirements of economic assistance and development and should be rethought from the ground up. The Marshall Plan and Point Four were as important as NATO in containing the Soviet Empire. We do not have that capability today.
16. The President should issue executive orders where possible to reform the implementation system so it works with the speed and effectiveness required by the 21st century.
17. Where legislation is needed the President should collaborate with Congress in honestly reviewing the systems that are failing and developing new metrics, new structures and new strategies.
18. Under our Constitution it is impossible to have this scale of rethinking and reform without deep support from the legislative branch. Without Republican Senator Arthur Vandenburg, Democratic President Harry Truman could never have developed the containment policies that saved freedom and ultimately defeated the Soviet Empire. The President should ask the bipartisan leaders of Congress to cooperate in establishing a joint Legislative-Executive working group on winning the war and should openly brief the legislative branch on the problems which are weakening the American system abroad. Only by educating and informing the Congress can we achieve the level of mutual understanding and mutual commitment that this long hard task will require.
Thank you for this opportunity to share these proposals.
-
Iran Sends Iraq Bomb Parts, U.S. Officer Says
By STEVEN R. HURST AP
BAGHDAD - U.S. military officials on Sunday accused the highest levels of the Iranian leadership of arming Shiite militants in Iraq with sophisticated armor-piercing roadside bombs that have killed more than 170 American forces.
The military command in Baghdad denied, however, that any newly smuggled Iranian weapons were behind the five U.S. military helicopter crashes since Jan. 20 - four that were shot out of the sky by insurgent gunfire.
A fifth crash has tentatively been blamed on mechanical failure. In the same period, two private security company helicopters also have crashed but the cause was unclear.
The deadly and highly sophisticated weapons the U.S. military said it traced to Iran are known as "explosively formed penetrators," or EFPs.
The presentation was the result of weeks of preparation and revisions as U.S. officials put together a package of material to support the Bush administration's claims of Iranian intercession on behalf of militant Iraqis fighting American forces.
Senior U.S. military officials in Baghdad said the display was prompted by the military's concern for "force protection," which, they said, was guaranteed under the United Nations resolution that authorizes American soldiers to be in Iraq.
Three senior military officials who explained the display said the "machining process" used in the construction of the deadly bombs had been traced to Iran.
The experts, who spoke to a large gathering of reporters on condition that they not be further identified, said the supply trail began with Iran's Revolutionary Guards Quds Force, which also is accused of arming the Hezbollah guerrilla army in Lebanon. The officials said the EFP weapon was first tested there.
The officials said the Revolutionary Guard and its Quds force report directly to Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
The briefing on Iran was revised heavily after officials decided it was not ready for release as planned last month.
Senior U.S. officials in Washington _ cautious after the drubbing the administration took for the faulty intelligence leading to the 2003 Iraq invasion - had held back because they were unhappy with the original presentation.
The display appeared to be part of the White House drive that has empowered U.S. forces in Iraq to use all means to curb Iranian influence in the country, including killing Iranian agents.
It included a power-point slide program and a handful of mortar shells and rocket-propelled grenades which the military officials said were made in Iran.
The centerpiece of the display, however, was a gray metal pipe about 10 inches long and 6 inches in diameter, the exterior casing of what the military said was an EFP, the roadside bomb that shoots out fist-sized wads of nearly molten copper that can penetrate the armor on an Abrams tank.
The EFPs, as well as Iranian-made mortar shells and rocket-propelled grenades, have been supplied to what the military officials termed "rogue elements" of the Mahdi Army militia of anti-American Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. He is a key backer of Shiite Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.
The U.S. officials glossed over armaments having reached the other major Shiite militia organization, the Badr Brigade. It is the military wing of Iraq's most powerful Shiite political organization, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, whose leaders also have close ties to the U.S.
Many key government figures and members of the Shiite political establishment have deep ties to Iran, having spent decades there in exile during Saddam Hussein 's rule. The Badr Brigade was formed and trained by Iran's Revolutionary Guard.
The U.S. officials said there was no evidence of Iranian-made EFPs having fallen into the hands of Sunni insurgents who operate mainly in Anbar province in the west of Iraq, Baghdad and regions surrounding the capital.
"We know more than we can show," said one of the senior officials, when pressed for tangible evidence that the EFPs were made in Iran.
An intelligence analyst in the group said Iran was working through "multiple surrogates" - mainly in the Mahdi Army - to smuggle the EFPs into Iraq. He said most of the components are entering the country at crossing points near Amarah, the Iranian border city of Meran and the Basra area of southern Iraq.
The analyst said Iraq's Shiite-led government had been briefed on Iran's involvement and Iraqi officials had asked the Iranians to stop. Al-Maliki has said he told both the U.S. and Iran that he does not want his country turned into a proxy battlefield.
Last week, U.S. officials said they were investigating allegations that Shiite lawmaker Jamal Jaafar Mohammed was a main conduit for Iranian weapons entering the country. Mohammed has believed to have fled to Iran.
U.S. officials have alleged for years that weapons were entering the country from Iran but had until Sunday stopped short of alleging involvement by top Iranian leaders.
During the briefing, a senior defense official said that one of the six Iranians detained in January in the northern city of Irbil was the operational commander of the Quds Force.
He was identified as Mohsin Chizari, who was apprehended after slipping back into Iraq after a 10-month absence, the officer said.
The Iranians were caught trying to flush documents down the toilet, he said. They had also tried to change their appearance by shaving their heads. Bags of their hair were found during the raid, he said.
The dates of manufacture on weapons found so far indicate they were made after fall of Saddam Hussein - mostly in 2006, the officials said.
In a separate briefing, Maj. Gen. Jim Simmons, deputy commander of Multinational Corps-Iraq, said that since December 2004, U.S. helicopter pilots have been shot at on average about 100 times a month and been hit on an average of 17 times in the same period.
He disclosed a previously unknown shootdown, a Blackhawk helicopter hit by small arms fire near the western city of Hit. The craft crash-landed but there were no casualties. Simmons was on board.
The major general said Iraqi militants are known to have SA-7, SA-14 and SA-16 shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles but none of the most recent five military crashes were caused by those weapons. He said some previous crashes had been a result of such missiles but would not elaborate.
As road travel has become unacceptably dangerous in Iraq, U.S. forces increasingly have turned to helicopters for transportation of troops and supplies. Simmons said U.S. helicopters were in the air for 240,000 hours in 2005 and he estimated the total figure this year would reach 400,000 hours.
North of Baghdad, a suicide truck bomber crashed into a police station, killing at least 30 policemen. A total of 73 people were killed or found dead across Iraq. The U.S. military said Sunday a soldier was shot and killed the day before in volatile Diyala province northeast of the capital.
-
Iraqi insurgents using Austrian rifles from Iran
By Thomas Harding, Defence Correspondent
Last Updated: 2:58am GMT 13/02/2007
Telegraph.co.uk
Austrian sniper rifles that were exported to Iran have been discovered in the hands of Iraqi terrorists, The Daily Telegraph has learned.
More than 100 of the.50 calibre weapons, capable of penetrating body armour, have been discovered by American troops during raids.
The Steyr HS50 is a long range, high precision rifle
The guns were part of a shipment of 800 rifles that the Austrian company, Steyr-Mannlicher, exported legally to Iran last year.
The sale was condemned in Washington and London because officials were worried that the weapons would be used by insurgents against British and American troops.
Within 45 days of the first HS50 Steyr Mannlicher rifles arriving in Iran, an American officer in an armoured vehicle was shot dead by an Iraqi insurgent using the weapon.
Over the last six months American forces have found small caches of the £10,000 rifles but in the last 24 hours a raid in Baghdad brought the total to more than 100, US defence sources reported.
advertisementThe find is the latest in a series of discoveries that indicate that Teheran is providing support to Iraq's Shia insurgents.
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the Iranian president, yesterday denied that Iran had supplied weapons to Iraqi insurgents. But on Sunday US officials in Baghdad displayed a range of weapons they claimed had originated in Iran.
They said 170 American and British soldiers had been killed by such weapons.
The discovery of the sniper rifles will further encourage those in Washington who want to see Iran's uranium-enriching facilities destroyed before a nuclear weapon is produced.
The Foreign Office expressed "serious concerns" over the sale of the rifles last year and Britain protested to the Austrian government.
A Foreign Office spokesman said last night: "Although we did make our worries known the sale unfortunately went ahead and now the potential that these weapons could fall into the wrong hands appears to have happened."
The rifle can pierce all body armour from up to a mile and penetrate armoured Humvee troop carriers.
It is highly accurate and fires a round called an armour piercing incendiary, a bullet that the Iranians manufacture.
The National Iranian Police Organisation bought the rifles allegedly to use them against drug smugglers in an £8 million order placed with Steyr in 2005.
The company was given permission to export them by the Austrian government, which is not a Nato member.
================
U.S./IRAQ: The withdrawal of U.S. troops in Iraq at the present time would only lead to more bloodshed, Organization of the Islamic Conference Secretary General Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu told Reuters. Ihsanoglu added that a full-blown civil war in Iraq would "open the doors of hell" and threaten international stability. He said cooperation between the international community and all groups in Iraq and neighboring countries is the way to find a solution to the problems in Iraq.
stratfor.com
-
From today's NY Slimes:
Skeptics Doubt U.S. Evidence on Iran Action in Iraq
E-Mail
Print
Reprints
Save
Share
Digg
Facebook
Newsvine
Permalink
By HELENE COOPER and MARK MAZZETTI
Published: February 13, 2007
WASHINGTON, Feb. 12 — Three weeks after promising it would show proof of Iranian meddling in Iraq, the Bush administration has laid out its evidence — and received in return a healthy dose of skepticism.
Skip to next paragraph
Multimedia
Graphic
Suspected Iranian Activity
Back Story With The Times’s Mark Mazzetti and Helene Cooper (mp3)
Related
Iran’s Leader Disputes U.S. Charges on Militias (February 13, 2007)
European Officials Agree to Widen Economic Sanctions Against Iran Over Nuclear Program (February 13, 2007)
U.S. Says Arms Link Iranians to Iraqi Shiites (February 12, 2007)
Deadliest Bomb in Iraq Is Made by Iran, U.S. Says (February 10, 2007) The response from Congressional and other critics speaks volumes about the current state of American credibility, four years after the intelligence controversy leading up to the Iraq war. To pre-empt accusations that the charges against Iran were politically motivated, the administration rejected the idea of a high-level presentation, relying instead on military and intelligence officers to make its case in a background briefing in Baghdad.
Even so, critics have been quick to voice doubts. Representative Silvestre Reyes of Texas, the Democratic chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, suggested that the White House was more interested in sending a message to Tehran than in backing up serious allegations with proof. And David Kay, who once led the hunt for illicit weapons in Iraq, said the grave situation in Iraq should have taught the Bush administration to put more of a premium on transparency when it comes to intelligence.
“If you want to avoid the perception that you’ve cooked the books, you come out and make the charges publicly,” Mr. Kay said.
Administration officials say their approach was carefully calibrated to focus on concerns that Iran is providing potent weapons used against American troops in Iraq, not to ignite a wider war. “We’re trying to strike the right tone here,” a senior administration official said Monday. “It would have raised the rhetoric to major decibel levels if we had had a briefing in Washington.”
At the State Department, the Pentagon and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, officials had anticipated resistance to their claims. They settled on an approach that sidelined senior officials including Zalmay Khalilzad, the American ambassador to Iraq, and John D. Negroponte, who until last week was the director of national intelligence. By doing so, they avoided the inevitable comparisons to the since-discredited presentation that Secretary of State Colin L. Powell made to the United Nations Security Council in 2003 asserting that Iraq had illicit weapons.
The White House and the State Department both made clear on Monday that they endorsed the findings presented in Baghdad. Asked for direct evidence linking Iran’s leadership to the weapons, Tony Snow, the White House spokesman, said: “Let me put it this way. There’s not a whole lot of freelancing in the Iranian government, especially when its comes to something like that.”
Sean McCormack, the State Department spokesman, said: “While they presented a circumstantial case, I would put to you that it was a very strong circumstantial case. The Iranians are up to their eyeballs in this activity, I think, very clearly based on the information that was provided over the weekend in Baghdad.”
In Australia, however, Gen. Peter Pace, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told reporters that he “would not say” that Iran’s leadership was aware of or condoned the attacks. “It is clear that Iranians are involved, and it’s clear that materials from Iran are involved, but I would not say by what I know that the Iranian government clearly knows or is complicit,” according to an account posted on the Voice of America Web site.
An Iranian government spokesman, Mohammad Ali Hosseini, has sought in denying the charges to exploit the lingering doubts about American credibility. “The United States has a long history of fabricating evidence,” Mr. Hosseini, a Foreign Ministry official, told reporters in Tehran.
The administration’s scramble over how to present its evidence started in January, after President Bush accused Iran of meddling in Iraq. Iran’s ambassador to Iraq, Hassan Kazemi Qumi, demanded that the United States present its evidence, and Mr. Khalilzad, the American ambassador in Baghdad, responded that America would “oblige him by having something done in the coming days.”
That set Bush administration officials racing to produce a briefing that would hold up to scrutiny. Military officials in Baghdad developed the first briefing, a wide-ranging dossier that contained dozens of slides about Iranian activities inside Iraq, which was then sent to Washington for review, administration officials said.
But after a careful vetting by intelligence officials, senior administration officials, including National Security Adviser Stephen J. Hadley and Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, concluded that there were aspects of the briefing that could not be supported by solid intelligence. They sent the briefing back to Baghdad to be shored up, a senior official said.
The evidence that military officials presented Sunday was a stripped-down version of the original presentation, focusing almost entirely on the weapons, known as explosively formed penetrators, and the evidence that Iran is supplying the weapons to Shiite groups.
Both Democratic and Republican officials on Capitol Hill said that while they do not doubt that the weapons are being used to attack American troops, and that some of those weapons are being shipped into Iraq from Iran, they are still uncertain whether the weapons were being shipped into Iraq on the orders of Iran’s leaders.
Several experts agreed. “I’m not doubting the provenance of the weapons, but rather, the issue of what it says about Iranian policy and whether Iran’s leaders are aware of it,” said George Perkovich, a nonproliferation specialist at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington.
Philip D. Zelikow, who until December was the top aide to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, said American politics and the increased unpopularity of the war in Iraq is obscuring the larger issue of the Iran evidence, which he described as “abundant and so multifaceted.”
“People have lost their moorings,” Mr. Zelikow said. He said the administration was trying to overcome public distrust by asking, in essence, “Don’t you trust our soldiers?”
Nazila Fathi contributed reporting from Tehran.
-
stratfor.com
Iraq: Ominous Signs of a Looming Sniper Threat
Summary
In a series of raids across Baghdad, U.S. and Iraqi forces seized more than 100 Austrian-manufactured sniper rifles in a 24-hour period Feb. 12-13. The .50-caliber weapons, which were legally exported to Iran in 2006, represent a grave danger to coalition troops.
Analysis
Over the course of the last six months, handfuls of heavy .50-caliber sniper rifles manufactured by the Austrian company Steyr-Mannlicher have been turning up in Iraq. But a series of joint U.S.-Iraqi raids Feb. 12-13 in Baghdad uncovered more than 100 Steyr "HS.50" rifles -- an unprecedented development that bodes ill for U.S. troops surging into the Iraqi capital.
In 2005, the National Iranian Police Organization placed an order for 800 Steyr HS.50s worth more than $15.5 million (nearly $20,000 per rifle). Ostensibly, the rifles were intended for use in interdicting drug smugglers. The U.S. and U.K. governments both protested the shipment in 2006, fearing the rifles would fall into the hands of Iraqi militias. A month and a half after the initial shipment, the first U.S. soldier was killed with one of these Steyr rifles.
A standard practice among Western weapons manufactures is to mark a rifle with its serial number in several locations -- not only the frame but also the bolt and barrel -- and this is the practice at Steyr-Mannlicher. Such marking is especially important for sniper rifles, which are machined to precise tolerances -- a professional would want to keep the bolt and the barrel with the original rifle. Grinding the serial numbers off would negatively affect the accuracy of the rifle.
The Steyr HS.50s found in Baghdad have been traced through Iran back to the 2005 Austrian deal with the National Iranian Police Organization, presumably by using discernable serial numbers on the weapons.
The .50-caliber round is powerful enough to punch through not only the Enhanced Small Arms Protective Inserts (E-SAPI) -- the armored plates worn by U.S. troops -- but also much of the light armor of U.S. vehicles. Iran also appears to have supplied armor-piercing incendiary rounds, which are even more destructive once they get inside the cramped compartments of vehicles. The armor-piercing incendiary rounds would also wreak havoc with a low-flying helicopter if it could actually be struck in-flight.
The Steyr HS.50 and other rifles of its kind are designed to engage targets at thousands of yards. Of course, a rifle is only as good as the marksmanship training of the person holding it. World-class snipers are the product of intensive training, something Iraqi insurgents noticeably lack (there are running jokes within U.S. military units about how terrible Iraqi marksmanship is). That said, a weapon like the Steyr HS.50 used to engage targets at 100 to 300 yards in a dense urban environment has a much larger margin of error and is devastating at such close ranges. Moreover, it is a single-shot, bolt-action rifle more accurate than the semi-automatic M82A3 Barrett .50-caliber sniper rifle used by U.S. forces. In the right hands, the HS.50 is capable of a minute of angle beyond 1,600 yards (a measurement amounting to phenomenal accuracy).
Insurgent snipers have been increasingly dangerous in the last two years. In 2003 and 2004, Iraqi sniper fire was inaccurate and sporadic. Since then, however, casualties from sniper fire have been creeping up, and turret gunners are now being taken down with head shots.
That more than 100 Steyr HS.50s were confiscated in a single 24-hour period in Baghdad suggests two things: First, that such a concentration was put in place in preparation for the building U.S. surge into the Iraqi capital and that the cache could represent the bulk of the rifles supplied to Iraqi Shia by supporters inside Iran. But if substantially larger portions of the original 800 rifles have slipped into the capital, it will be costly for both U.S. and Iraqi forces. The only question is: How many did Iran keep for itself?
The second point to consider is this: U.S. troops almost certainly acted on excellent intelligence, suggesting that if there are more large caches, they very well could be found.
Such a powerful weapon in the hands of a single, well-trained professional is trouble enough. But hundreds of these rifles supplied to a large swath of Shiite militias could exact a considerable toll on coalition forces moving into Shiite neighborhoods -- a toll the current level of force protection cannot prevent.
-
Second post of the morning:
stratfor.com
Geopolitical Diary: Al-Sadr Lies Low
Nasser al-Rubaie, the head of Iraq's Sadrite parliamentary bloc, and other supporters of Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr said on Wednesday that statements by U.S. military officials in Iraq alleging that al-Sadr has fled the country for Iran are untrue. An adviser to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki later said al-Sadr is on a brief routine visit to Iran and would be back shortly. There also are reports that first- and second-tier commanders of the Mehdi Army in Baghdad are in Iran as well in order to evade a security crackdown.
While al-Sadr has visited Iran in the past, and doing so again at this juncture would be reasonable, the leader likely remains based in Iraq -- where he is growing ever more distrustful of his fellow Shia and trying hard to maintain a low profile.
Al-Sadr has lain low, likely somewhere in the holy city of An Najaf, since remarking in January that he feared for his personal safety in the wake of U.S.-Iraqi plans to secure Baghdad and crack down on militias. Since then, he has seen the arrest and kidnappings of Iranian diplomatic officials in Iraq, which surely made him even less willing to risk travel or public appearances.
The Sadrite bloc controls the largest number of parliamentary seats in the ruling Shiite coalition -- the United Iraqi Alliance -- and has several ministers in the Cabinet. Al-Sadr is not about to abandon his movement and flee, especially as his Mehdi Army prepares to face a major government offensive. And if he did, he certainly would not go to Iran.
Contrary to popular perception, Iraq's Sadrite bloc is the Shiite group that is least friendly toward Iran. Al-Sadr cannot completely trust the Iranians, who have strong ties to his main rival, Abdel Aziz al-Hakim -- the leader of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), Iraq's most pro-Iranian Shiite party. Iran could use al-Sadr and his militia as leverage in its negotiations with the United States over Iraq; when the need arises, Iran might pull the plug on the Shiite leader as a gesture of good will toward the United States.
While al-Sadr has long been wary of the threat from SCIRI, he also does not trust Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's Hizb al-Dawah party. Until now, al-Sadr has maintained a decent working relationship with al-Maliki; however, the prime minister recently abandoned his opposition to a U.S. crackdown on Sadrite militia activities. Al-Sadr knows the Shiite-dominated government is working closely with the U.S. military, and does not want to risk further support for more U.S. operations against him. Even so, al-Sadr reportedly is on the U.S. military's "no-touch list," meaning U.S. forces will not detain him out of fear that his arrest could inflame his supporters and cause them to escalate the overall level of violence in the country.
U.S. statements regarding the Shiite leader's alleged flight to Iran likely are part of psyops designed to weaken him by convincing those within his political movement and its armed wing that he has abandoned them ahead of the impending U.S.-Iraqi crackdown. There already are some indications that al-Sadr does not have complete control over his militia. By playing up the idea that al-Sadr has fled to Tehran, the United States can sow doubts among members of the Mehdi Army before U.S. and Iraqi forces pounce. And confusion about al-Sadr's whereabouts will prove especially damaging to the Sadrite bloc, given its heavy focus on its leader and his family.
Stratfor mentioned in its annual forecast that the coming U.S. surge will focus on containing al-Sadr. For now, Iraq's political and military situation has rendered the Shiite leader quite vulnerable. Whether al-Sadr makes an appearance in order to counter U.S. attempts to paint him as a cowardly captain abandoning his ship remains to be seen.
-
Iran's Smoking Guns
Now Austrian sniper rifles show up in Iraq.
Friday, February 16, 2007 12:01 a.m. EST
Following the weekend intelligence disclosures about Iranian-supplied weapons killing GIs in Iraq, we predicted Tuesday. that "a large part of Washington will pretend the evidence doesn't exist, or suggest the intelligence isn't proven, or claim that it's all the Bush Administration's fault for 'bullying' Iran." Sure enough, President Bush faced a barrage of questions Wednesday wondering whether senior Iranian leaders were really aware of the weapons transfers, whether he was using "faulty intelligence," and whether the disclosures were part of a strategy designed to "provoke Iran."
So here is the state of our public discourse: American military officials present prima facie evidence of Iranian weapons implicated in killing 170 U.S. soldiers and wounding 600 more, and Washington's main concern is not for the GIs but in refighting the last intelligence war.
Well, here's an item that doesn't seem to have been manufactured by Dick Cheney. According to a report in Britain's Daily Telegraph, U.S. forces in Baghdad have recently discovered 100 high-powered sniper rifles made by Austrian gun-maker Steyr-Mannlicher. The .50-caliber Steyr can accurately fire an armor-piercing round at a range of 1,500 meters. The weapon is good against Humvees, helicopters and body armor.
In 2004, Iran purchased some 800 Steyrs, allegedly for use against drug traffickers. At the time, both U.S. and British officials urged the Austrian government to bar the $15 million sale, fearing the weapons would fall into enemy hands. Former Austrian Chancellor Wolfang Schüssel thought otherwise, and let the deal go forward. To better grease the skids, then-Steyr-Mannlicher CEO Wolfgang Fürlinger made the case that the weapons were basically harmless and that Tehran had signed "end-user certificates" guaranteeing they would not be re-sold, according to the German newsweekly Der Spiegel.
Today, the Austrian government pleads that the sale had been "checked very thoroughly," and that "what happened to the weapons . . . is the responsibility of the Iranians"--which prompts the question of why the Austrians would have bothered with the end-user certificates. The Bush Administration took a less cavalier view and in 2005 banned Steyr-Mannlicher from bidding for U.S. government contracts.
It remains to be confirmed whether the serial numbers on the Steyrs found in Iraq match those from the 2004 sale--if they do, it ought to prompt a top-to-bottom review of all Austrian military contracts. Meantime, is it too much to expect American journalists and Members of Congress to devote as much skepticism to Iran's motives and behavior as they do to Mr. Bush's?
WSJ
-
Why the Iraq war is turning into America's defeat
(http://www.suntimes.com/news/steyn/260810,CST-EDT-steyn18.article)
February 18, 2007
BY MARK STEYN Sun-Times Columnist
The week's news from Iraq: According to the state television network, the leader of al-Qaida in Iraq, Abu Ayyub al-Masri, was wounded in a clash with security forces just north of Baghdad. A senior deputy was killed. (Turns out this report was apparently in error.)
Meanwhile, the punk cleric Muqtada al-Sadr has decided that discretion is the better part of mullahs and has temporarily relocated to Iran. That's right: The biggest troublemaker in Iraq is no longer in Iraq. It may be that his Persian vacation is only to marry a cousin or two and consult with the A-list ayatollahs, but the Mookster has always had highly sensitive antennae when it comes to his own physical security -- he likes being the guy who urges martyrdom on others rather than being just another schmuck who takes one for the team. So the fact that urgent business requires him to be out of town for the Big Surge is revealing at the very least of how American objectives in Iraq are not at the mercy of forces beyond their control; U.S. military and political muscle can shape conditions on the ground -- if they can demonstrate they're serious about doing so.
Which these days is a pretty big "if." Reporting the sudden relocation, the New York Times decided -- in nothing flat -- that it was yet another disastrous setback. In Iraq, no news is good news, and Sadr news is badder news:
''With the new American offensive in Baghdad still in its early days, American commanders have focused operations in the eastern part of the city, a predominantly Shiite area that has long been the Mahdi Army's power base.
''If Mr. Sadr had indeed fled, his absence would create a vacuum that could allow even more radical elements of the Shiite group to take power.''
As my National Review colleague Rich Lowry marveled: ''So now we need to keep Sadr in Iraq because he's such a stabilizing influence!'' Of course! As Hillaire Belloc wrote, ''Always keep a hold of Nurse/For fear of finding something worse'' -- and, even when Nurse Sadr is blowing up the kids in the nursery every day, it's best to cling to her blood-drenched apron strings because the next nurse will be an even bigger psycho. America is a big helpless baby who's blundered into a war zone he can never hope to understand.
According to a report by the New York Sun's Eli Lake last month, Iran is supporting Shia insurgents in Iraq and Sunni insurgents in Iraq. In other words, it's on both sides in the so-called civil war. How can this be? After all, as the other wise old foreign-policy "realists" of the Iraq Study Group assured us only in December, Iran has "an interest in avoiding chaos in Iraq.''
Au contraire, the ayatollahs have concluded they have a very clear interest in fomenting chaos in Iraq. They're in favor of Sunni killing Shia, and Shia killing Sunni, and if some vacationing Basque terrorists wanted to blow up the Spanish Cultural Center in Mosul, they'd be in favor of that, too. The Iranians don't care who kills whom as long as every night when Americans turn on the evening news there's smoke over Baghdad. As I say in my book, if you happen to live in Ramadi or Basra, Iraq is about Iraq; if you live in Tehran, or Cairo, or Bei-jing, Moscow, Pyongyang or Brussels, Iraq is about America. American will. American purpose. American credibility.
There was a TV station somewhere -- was it Thunder Bay, Ontario? -- that used to show a continuous loop of a roaring fireplace all night, and thousands of viewers would supposedly sit in front of it for hours because it was such a reassuringly comforting scene. The networks could save themselves a lot of money by adopting the same approach: Run a continuous loop of a smoking building in Baghdad all night while thousands of congressmen and pundits and think-tankers and retired generals run around Washington shrieking that all is lost. America is way out of its league! A dimwitted tourist in a fearful land of strange people who don't watch "American Idol." Iraq is so culturally alien that not a single Sunni, Shia or Kurd has come forward claiming to be the father of Anna Nicole's baby!
Get a grip, chaps! In Iraq, everyone's a tourist. This al-Qaida honcho, al-Masri, is an Egyptian. His predecessor, Zarqawi, was a Jordanian. Al-Sadr is a Persian stooge. For four decades, the country was a British client. Before that, it was a Turkish province. The Middle East is a crazy place and a tough nut to crack, but the myth of the unbeatable Islamist insurgent is merely a lazy and more neurotic update of the myth of the unbeatable communist guerrilla, which delusion led to so much pre-emptive surrender in the '70s. Nevertheless, in the capital city of the most powerful nation on the planet, the political class spent last week trying to craft a bipartisan defeat strategy, and they might yet pull it off. Consider this extraordinary report from the Washington Post:
"Democratic leaders have rallied around a strategy that would fully fund the president's $100 billion request for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan but would limit his ability to use the money. . . . The plan is aimed at tamping down calls from the Democrats' liberal wing for Congress to simply end funding for the war.
"The Murtha plan, based on existing military guidelines, includes a stipulation that Army troops who have already served in Iraq must be granted two years at home before an additional deployment. . . . The idea is to slowly choke off the war by stopping the deployment of troops from units that have been badly degraded by four years of combat."
So "the Murtha plan" is to deny the president the possibility of victory while making sure Democrats don't have to share the blame for the defeat. But of course he's a great American! He's a patriot! He supports the troops! He doesn't support them in the mission, but he'd like them to continue failing at it for a couple more years. As John Kerry wondered during Vietnam, how do you ask a soldier to be the last man to die for a mistake? By nominally "fully funding" a war you don't believe in but "limiting his ability to use the money." Or as the endearingly honest anti-war group MoveCongress.org put it, in an e-mail preview of an exclusive interview with the wise old Murtha:
"Chairman Murtha will describe his strategy for not only limiting the deployment of troops to Iraq but undermining other aspects of the president's foreign and national security policy."
"Undermining"? Why not? To the Slow-Bleed Democrats, it's the Republicans' war. To an increasing number of what my radio pal Hugh Hewitt calls the White-Flag Republicans, it's Bush's war. To everyone else on the planet, it's America's war. And it will be America's defeat.
©Mark Steyn, 2007
-
stratfor.com
Geopolitical Diary: Chemical Strikes -- the Beginning of a Trend?
A chlorine-filled truck exploded outside a restaurant at a rest stop near Taji, north of Baghdad, on Tuesday. This is the second incident involving chlorine gas in only a few weeks. In Ar Ramadi, Iraq, a tank of chlorine in a garbage truck exploded Jan. 30; however, the chemical aspect of the attack went largely unnoticed because no casualties were attributed to the chlorine.
Details of Tuesday's explosion remain unclear. Iraqi authorities are speculating that the vehicle was a tanker truck rigged with explosives. They also are questioning whether it was in fact chlorine gas or combustible fuel that was used in an attempt to boost a conventional explosive. It was initially thought that it was a tanker truck filled with liquefied natural gas. The bombers could have made the same mistake.
Regardless of what was actually used, the deaths from the attack are surprisingly low. Bulk chlorine is a target of militants worldwide. It seems this attack was poorly executed, since the device probably exploded prematurely. Though it is easy to attach an explosive charge to a tanker truck, it is not easy to rupture the tank in order to maximize dispersal without burning up the chemical agent that needs to be dispersed.
That said, chlorine gas is not a weapon of mass destruction capable of taking out an entire city. Even with the most modern chemical weapon delivery systems, chlorine gas is incapable of inflicting massive casualties. These incidents are not in any way indicative of a new technical capability, merely of a new tactic. The only technical capability these attacks have demonstrated is that of placing chlorine tanks and explosives in close proximity -- and this has not been done with skill. There are several reasons the most recent attack could have failed; there perhaps were too many explosives, an insufficient concentration or quantity of chlorine and it might have occurred in a sparsely populated area.
However, a trend is starting to emerge that will only be reinforced by a psychological and human toll that insurgent operational planners will not overlook -- some 150 injuries associated with chlorine gas exposure, including respiratory irritation and vomiting, and five fatalities. And improvements in the techniques of employing even these improvised devices could nevertheless send casualty tolls much higher.
However, though chemical weapons will certainly undermine an already crumbling domestic U.S. support base, U.S. forces were not the primary target in either Tuesday's or the Jan. 30 incident.
Hardened U.S. troops are ill at ease even about chemical strikes they are trained to deal with. But such strikes are even more terrifying to Iraqi civilians with no training or equipment. If the fear of being blown up at the market turns into a fear of being subjected to a chemical attack, a new degree of hostility toward the Sunni insurgency could develop.
Meanwhile, U.S. troops could be increasingly spotted with gas masks on their left hips. With the sanitation situation as poor as it is in Iraq, chlorine will continue to be necessary, although some precautions could be taken to better protect large shipments. Ultimately, this has not yet become a meaningful opposition to the U.S. surge and it has certainly not indicated a new technical skills set. Nevertheless, the psychological impact of chemical weapons use in Iraq should not be underestimated.
-
NY Times (so read with care)
Iraq Rebel Cleric Reins In Militia; Motives at Issue
By DAMIEN CAVE
Published: February 25, 2007
BAGHDAD, Feb. 24 — Moktada al-Sadr, the radical Shiite cleric and founder of the Mahdi Army militia, discovered recently that two of his commanders had created DVDs of their men killing Sunnis in Baghdad. Documents suggested that they had received money from Iran.
So he suspended them and stripped them of power, said two Mahdi leaders in Sadr City, the heart of Mr. Sadr’s support here in the capital.
But did he do so as part of his cooperation with the new security plan for Baghdad, which aims to quell the sectarian violence tormenting the city? Because his men had been disloyal, taking orders from Iran, whose support he values but whose control he fights? Or was it just for show — the act of an image-conscious leader who grasped the risk of graphic videos and wanted to stave off direct American action against him?
Mr. Sadr has been the great destabilizer in Iraq since 2003, wielding power on the streets and in the ruling Shiite bloc, thwarting the Americans and playing out at least a temporary alliance with Iran.
With the new security plan for Iraq under way, every question about Mr. Sadr’s motives touches on a different facet of Iraq’s complicated struggle.
He now finds himself under pressure from several sources. One is his popular Shiite base, which demands protection from devastating Sunni attacks. Another is Iran, with which he has had long but difficult ties. Then there are renegade factions of his own militia that resent his move into the political mainstream.
Finally, the Americans, who have accused Iran of supplying Shiite militias, including Mr. Sadr’s, with an especially deadly roadside bomb known as an explosively formed projectile, or E.F.P, which has killed an increasing number of American soldiers.
It is not clear whether the Americans will move directly against him. The United States has demanded that the government of Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki act forcefully against the Mahdi Army; Mr. Maliki, however, owes much of his political strength in the ruling Shiite coalition to Mr. Sadr’s backing.
For now, American and Iraqi officials say Mr. Sadr seems to be cooperating with the effort to pacify Baghdad, ordering his men not to fight even as American armored vehicles roll into Mahdi strongholds in eastern Baghdad. He seems to be cleaning house of fighters who could taint him by association with Iran or with death squad killings. His aides say he has called for a sectarian truce. “Moktada al-Sadr said to protect your clerics, protect your shrines and cooperate with the government,” said Hazim al-Araji, head of the Sadr office in western Baghdad. “So no actions have been taken.”
In perhaps his boldest move yet, Mr. Sadr has assisted the joint Iraqi-American campaign against parts of his militia, signaling whom to arrest and telling others to flee, said two Mahdi commanders and a Shiite politician in Baghdad. On his own, they said, Mr. Sadr has “frozen” more than 40 commanders, including about 20 with links to Iran.
The moves are part of an organizational overhaul, the Sadr aides said. Though Mr. Sadr’s whereabouts are unknown — the Americans say he is in Iran, which his aides and Iran dispute — a new Mahdi general for all of Baghdad has been appointed for the first time, they said. Mr. Sadr has also selected new commanders for east and west Baghdad.
Some of the Sadr aides and commanders who described Mr. Sadr’s recent moves during separate interviews in Najaf and Baghdad refused to give their names, saying they had not been authorized to speak and feared reprisals from current or former members of the militia.
They said the cleric allowed the arrests of members of his own militia, or suspended them himself, because evidence showed that they had not obeyed his orders and because he wanted to show Iran, American officials and his militia that he was a strong leader who must be respected and feared.
“He wants to prove to the people that he has full control of his militia,” said a 47-year-old Mahdi commander from Sadr City who referred to himself as Jabar Abdul al-Hahdi. “He wants to show he’s in charge.”
Mr. Sadr’s conflicted relationship with Iran mirrors Iraq’s. Each country’s majority Shiites revere the other’s clerics and visit the other’s religious shrines. But they speak different languages, are dominated by different ethnic groups, and fought each other in a long war in the 1980s.
Mr. Sadr’s father, Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, became one of Iraq’s most popular Shiite clerics largely because he set himself up as the rebel alternative to Iran’s religious leadership, focusing on poor, oppressed Iraqis, not just theological debate. His mix of social and religious resistance led Saddam Hussein to order his assassination in 1999.
Moktada al-Sadr rose to prominence after the American invasion in 2003 with anti-American speeches and echoes of his father’s populism. But he was young, not yet 30, and less educated than his clerical rivals. So even as he railed against Iranian meddling, he sought money and support from Iran’s top clerics, meeting with Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme religious leader, in June 2003. It was a dramatic reversal from family tradition.
Less than a year later, he led a revolt against American troops in Najaf, and again Iran played the role of patron. On the 11th day of the revolt, with Mr. Sadr under siege, an Iranian delegation arrived in Iraq to mediate. The Iranians were joined by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iraq’s most revered Shiite cleric, who called for Shiite unity and calm.
Mr. Sadr eventually agreed to stop fighting and join the political process. The Americans let him.
His popularity rose with the speed of a pop star’s, and the Mahdi Army grew like a fan club, from a few hundred young men to thousands — including some who proved hard to control.
=======================
Page 2 of 2)
Since then, according to some Shiite officials, Iran has funneled support to his organization. What it receives, how much and how consistently, remain a mystery, but some Shiite leaders say Mr. Sadr collects less from Iran than does a rival Shiite party: the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, which was founded in Iran by Iraqi exiles in 1984.
Iran generally supports many groups simultaneously, including some Sunni ones, so that it can benefit from any eventuality, said Sami al-Askari, a Shiite member of Parliament who works closely with Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki.
“Iran intervenes in many ways, with many methods,” Mr. Askari said.
In the case of the Mahdi Army, he said, Iran has recognized its diffuse nature, sprinkling support at high and low levels. Some support comes through ties to Hezbollah, the Shiite militia in Lebanon that also receives Iranian support. Beirut now has a Sadr office, and Mahdi commanders say they have been sending fighters to Hezbollah at least since last summer, when Hezbollah battled Israel.
Iran also provides institutional assistance to Iraq, mainly to the Health Ministry, which is run by Mr. Sadr’s political bloc. Three days after bombs killed more than 140 people in Sadr City last fall, for example, 50 Iraqi ambulances carried some of the wounded to the Iranian border. They were transferred to Iranian ambulances and taken to Iranian hospitals, with much of the cost covered by organizations in Iran.
Qasim Allawi, a spokesman for the Health Ministry who described the process, said another 25 wounded men and women from the recent Sadriya market bombing in Baghdad were to head to Iran any day.
Iran’s more potent forms of aid are direct — and some goes not to Mr. Sadr, but to underlings.
“Sometimes the aid comes for the leadership, and they get to decide where it goes,” Mr. Askari said. “Sometimes it goes to the local leadership, and this encourages them to rebel.”
“Iran puts Moktada al-Sadr between two pressing sides,” he said. “On one hand, they are helping him and they have the ability to take that away. At the same time, they’re undermining him by helping people below him.”
According to Sadr aides and Mahdi commanders, Mr. Sadr’s recent purges aim to put Iran on notice that he is in charge and independent. They said he also wanted to remind members of his militia that he would use every available tool, including Iraqi and American troops, to maintain control of the militia, the source of any political power he wields.
The goal is a top-down, tightly managed operation.
“We’re going to end the decentralized system that we had before,” said one of the aides in Najaf.
If Mr. Sadr consolidates power over his unruly militia, he could be held more responsible for the actions of its members. Until now, American and Iraqi efforts against the Mahdi Army have focused on so-called rogue elements.
The 30 members of Parliament associated with the Sadr bloc have not been arrested, keeping Mr. Sadr’s legitimate influence intact. At the same time, American, Iraqi and British officials are engaged in classified negotiations with his envoys over how to address the Mahdi Army and its Sadr City stronghold, the neighborhood named for Mr. Sadr’s father.
When asked about the talks, Maj. Gen. William B. Caldwell IV, the top military spokesman in Iraq, said the meetings represented a reasonable and appropriate attempt to avoid unnecessary bloodshed.
“Anytime you can find a political solution instead of a military solution,” he said, “it’s always better.”
But can Mr. Sadr deliver what the Americans want? Are his efforts adequate? Some American military officers remain skeptical.
“You know what their intent is,” said Maj. Kevin Hosier, an intelligence officer with the Third Stryker Brigade Combat Team, as his unit prepared for sweeps through predominantly Shiite areas near Sadr City this month. “They want Baghdad. They want to make Baghdad a Shia city.”
Peter Harling, a senior analyst with the International Crisis Group, a research organization, who wrote a thorough profile of Mr. Sadr last summer, said the impact of the Mahdi purges and command restructuring would likely be short-lived.
“He has been excommunicating some of his key commanders, that’s a fact, but he has just put them in the corner,” Mr. Harling said, relying on interviews with several Mahdi commanders cited in his July profile. “Many of them, after Sadr really accused them in the harshest terms, actually came back in the movement and carried on with their careers. All this is kind of temporary.”
According to Mr. Harling, Mr. Sadr has little choice but to trim at the edges of his organization. His hold on power remains tenuous, dependent on a loose association of clients all over the country who he knows could turn on him at any moment.
“He remains in a strong position as a leader only as long as he is useful to all these smaller leaders,” Mr. Harling said. “He rules by consensus.”
Vali Nasr, a professor of national security affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School and author of “The Shia Revival,” says Mr. Sadr should be viewed as a politician who was trying to preserve his power. Poor Shiites have made him an Iraqi celebrity, a national symbol whose bearded visage graces everything from wristwatches to alarm clocks and large posters. Above all else, he will be loyal to them, Mr. Nasr said.
“Since the Samarra bombing last year, Moktada has received a lot of pressure to be tougher on the Sunnis,” he said, referring to the explosion in the northern city of Samarra last February that destroyed one of Shiite Islam’s holiest shrines. “He’s found that the tougher he’s been, the more his popularity has gone up.”
In the long run, Mr. Nasr said, “he’s not very concerned with what the Americans think of him. What matters to him is what the Shiites think.”
Reporting was contributed by Hosham Hussein, Richard A. Oppel Jr., Ali Adeeb, Khalid al-Ansary and Wisam A. Habeeb, in Baghdad, and an Iraqi employee of The New York Times in Najaf.
-
Geopolitical Diary: Emerging Strains in U.S. Partnerships
Iraqi President Jalal Talabani took ill on Sunday and was flown aboard a U.S. military C-130 aircraft from Suleimaniyah, in northern Iraq, to Amman, Jordan, for treatment. According to Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih, Talabani -- who is also chief of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) -- suffered from a drop in blood pressure, but his son, Qubad Talabani, maintains that he was hospitalized for exhaustion.
Talabani's health is worth keeping an eye on. This is not only because of his position in the Iraq government, but because he is among the most prominent of the Kurds -- the one ethnic faction in Iraq that so far has given the United States the least amount of trouble.
It is quite likely that the 74-year-old Talabani, whose health problems are not limited to poor blood pressure, will be gone from the political scene before Iraq sees any move toward a negotiated settlement. Should this happen, the presidency would be up for grabs -- and it does not simplify matters that the senior-most Kurdish leader in line behind Talabani is Masoud Barzani, head of the rival Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). With political ambitions in play, it is unlikely that the current power-sharing agreement between the PUK and KDP will hold. In short, Talabani's departure or physical incapacitation probably would ignite an intra-Kurdish struggle -- further exacerbating the myriad sectarian and communal tensions in Iraq.
Just as the story about Talabani's illness was making headlines, Oil Ministry spokesman Assem Jihad was downplaying reports that the Kurds had agreed to support a draft oil law. The draft law concerns whether there would be one authority in Baghdad to oversee all Iraqi oil contracts -- a position supported by the Sunnis and Shia -- or whether the Kurds should have an autonomous oil authority of their own. Barzani had claimed during a press conference with Talabani on Saturday that "a final agreement" had been reached and the Kurds had accepted the draft, but the spokesman for the Shiite-controlled Oil Ministry said on Sunday the negotiations were still under way. Confusion over how to share oil revenues -- the issue at the heart of the ethno-sectarian conflict in Iraq -- will only deepen if Talabani no longer is able to serve as chief of his party and president of the country.
Problems involving the Shia also cropped up on Sunday, as Muqtada al-Sadr denounced the U.S.-Iraq security plan for Baghdad. One of al-Sadr's aides read out a statement to a gathering of supporters in Baghdad's Sadr City district, in which the Shiite leader called for Iraqi security forces to come up with their own plan and to refrain from working with U.S. forces on security issues. Al-Sadr can see the rift that is emerging between the United States and his main Shiite rival, Abdel-Aziz al-Hakim -- leader of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq -- which became apparent when U.S. forces detained al-Hakim's son on Feb. 23. Clearly, al-Sadr is moving to take advantage of the situation and revive his own political fortunes.
Whether he can do so successfully and avert a crackdown against his militia, the Mehdi Army, remains to be seen. The Iranians -- who support al-Sadr to some extent, and support his rival al-Hakim even more -- are likely very pleased with the emerging tensions between Washington and mainstream Iraqi Shiite forces, as the rift will only push the Iraqi Shia further into Iran's orbit.
The tensions were made even more apparent on Sunday in a statement from Iraq's national security adviser, Muwaffaq al-Rubaie, who said, in perhaps deliberately ambiguous phrasing, "Recently the Iranians have changed their positions, and we have some evidence that they have stopped supplying arms or creating any of these shaped mines in the streets of Baghdad." It was not clear whether al-Rubaie -- a leading independent within the ruling Shiite coalition in Baghdad -- was referring to the government in Tehran. He went on to say he had no doubt that over the past few weeks the Iranians had "changed their position and stopped a lot of their tactics and interference in Iraq's internal affairs."
It is important to note that the Iraqi Shia, whom Washington identified as its chief partner in Iraq even prior to the March 2003 invasion, actually are closer to Tehran than they are to the Bush administration. Therefore, the tensions with the Shia -- combined with the potential for internal problems among the Kurds -- should be watched closely, as these are the United States' two principal means for dealing with Sunni unrest in Iraq.
stratfor.com
-
Geopolitical Diary: Iraqi Oil Law Legislation Approved
stratfor.com
The Iraqi Cabinet approved draft legislation on Monday for a new oil law, giving the United States a new claim to success in its nation-building efforts for Iraq. The division of oil revenues between Iraq's Kurdish and Shiite factions is critical to the formation of a comprehensive political resolution in the country. Though the legislation is certainly a step in the right direction, a closer look at the details reveals it is more of a time bomb than a functional agreement.
The legislation was approved nearly two months after a self-imposed deadline by the Iraqi government to enact an oil law. With Iraq's oil wealth concentrated in the Kurdish-dominated north and Shiite-dominated south, the Sunni population in western and central Iraq is left with little more than improvised explosive devices to negotiate for its share. Meanwhile, the Kurds, who already have a well-established regional government to manage oil contracts in Iraq's relatively stable north, have resisted efforts to give the central government in Baghdad more control over the oil revenues that fall under their domain. It comes as little surprise that the United States played a large part in rushing the negotiations over the oil legislation in an attempt to force a compromise among Iraq's rival factions; it is hoping the legislation will help improve security in the country.
The negotiations evidently got pretty tense over the weekend, when U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad met with Kurdish leaders Jalal Talabani, Iraq's president, and Massoud Barzani, the president of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in Sulaymaniyah, Iraq. The day after the meeting, Talabani was rushed to a hospital in Amman, Jordan, where his doctors said he was recovering from dehydration and extreme fatigue because of a heavy workload. The negotiations apparently took their toll on the aging Kurdish president, but it looks like the Kurds might have ended up with a favorable compromise for the time being.
In a nutshell, the new oil law would empower the central government to allocate oil revenues to Iraq's 18 provinces on the basis of population (a concession for the Sunnis) while leaving the responsibility for negotiating existing and future oil deals with the regional governments (a concession for the Kurds). This is an incremental step in the effort to adopt an oil law, but it is hardly the end of the story.
Under the existing draft the regional governments are pledged to pay their oil revenues into a central depository, and an independent panel of experts will review any contracts negotiated by the KRG. However, the central government has not yet pledged to pay them out in any organized way.
So far there is no mechanism to decide on which oil fields will be managed by the national, regional or private oil firms. This allocation of specific territories and oil fields is referred to as the annexes -- a rather thorny issue that was left out of the existing oil draft in the rush of the negotiations.
The draft leaves open the issue of the disputed oil-rich territory of Kirkuk until a referendum is held on whether Kirkuk should join the Kurdistan Regional Confederacy (the united administration of Arbil, Dohuk and Sulaymaniyah provinces).
The draft is contingent upon all three factions supporting it when the Iraqi parliament meets (likely in March or April). Before that happens, the factions will have to agree on the remaining annexes and revenue-sharing law.
In other words, there is an oil law, but the issues of who controls the oil and the money remain unclear. Put another way, the agreement is a done deal -- so long as the stickiest issues that have held up Iraqi development for the past four years get resolved in the following two months. The survival of this oil deal will heavily revolve around what the Kurds get in return for allowing the legislation to move forward.
It is likely no coincidence that the same day the Cabinet approved the oil legislation, both Talabani and Barzani decided to make nice with Turkey. During a broadcast interview, Barzani said he is ready to discuss operations against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), the most active Kurdish militant group in Turkey, with his Turkish counterparts. Talabani also said Monday during a press conference that Iraq's leading Kurdish parties have never supported the PKK, and stressed that Iraqi Kurds want good relations with Turkey.
Iraq's Kurdish leadership does not see eye to eye on a number of issues with the PKK, but realizes the leverage it gains against Turkey by providing limited support to PKK fighters in the mountainous regions of northern Iraq. Though the PKK is of major concern to Ankara's security interests, the bigger issue for Turkey involves Kirkuk. The oil-rich city is home to roughly 600,000 people -- approximately half of them Kurdish, a third Turkmen and the rest Arab. Under Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution, a referendum is to be held by December this year to decide whether Kirkuk should become part of the Kurdistan Regional Confederacy. With a flood of Kurds moving back to the city to reverse Saddam Hussein's Arabization demographic project, the Kurds have every reason to demand the referendum take place on schedule.
Turkey, on the other hand, does not want to see Iraq's Kurdistan region annex Kirkuk, and has signaled to Washington and Baghdad the military consequences of holding the referendum by threatening cross-border military incursions to ostensibly root-out PKK strongholds in Iraq. The Kurdish annexation of Kirkuk would greatly empower Iraq's Kurdish faction and enhance Ankara's fears of a future independent Kurdistan, which Turkey sees as a threat to its own territorial integrity. This is why Turkey has very vocally resisted any U.S. redeployment plans to station a large number of U.S. troops in northern Iraq that would block any Turkish military operations in the region. Iraq's Sunni and Shiite factions also will resist any decision for Kirkuk to fall under Kurdish control in order to deprive the Kurds of an incentive to further distance themselves from the central government.
Barzani and Talabani's cooperative statements toward Turkey came just two days after Barzani said he would not allow any country to attack PKK fighters stationed in northern Iraq. The about-face by Iraq's Kurdish leadership could very well have stemmed from a guarantee the two leaders received from Washington to have the Kirkuk referendum take place as planned. But there is no telling how long this guarantee would hold.
The Kurds have more or less stayed out of the fray as Iraq's Shiite and Sunni factions have engaged in all-out war. But as the oil negotiations proceed, the Kirkuk referendum issue heats up and more of Iraq's Kurdish forces are sent to Baghdad as part of the new security plan, Iraqi Kurds will soon find themselves playing a bigger part in Iraq's bloody power struggle. The new oil draft legislation looks good on paper, but it is only delaying the inevitable battle.
-
Iraq: A Delicate and Inevitable Move into Sadr City
Summary
The inevitable push by the U.S. military and Iraqi security forces into Sadr City -- the product of negotiations between Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki -- is about to begin. The operation certainly will not bring peace and order to Baghdad, but it can help stabilize the capital in preparation for a more solid resolution mediated by Washington and Tehran.
Analysis
U.S. and Iraqi security forces will push into Baghdad's Sadr City area in the next few days. Troops will set up checkpoints, conduct large-scale door-to-door searches and establish a permanent presence -- the first in this Shiite and Mehdi Army stronghold since the U.S. invasion in 2003. A delicate political move, the operation is the product of extensive negotiations between Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.
The operation has been in the planning stages for some time; there just never have been enough coalition boots on the ground to make it a feasible option. Now, with the U.S. surge strategy and a new Baghdad security plan in place, the operation has become an inevitable step toward stemming sectarian violence in the Iraqi capital. With U.S. military and Iraqi army and police numbers in Baghdad approaching 100,000, a defiant al-Sadr faces devastating losses to his militia, if not defeat.
Al-Maliki's government needs to secure Sadr City now. If the Baghdad security plan cannot restore a semblance of order to the Iraqi capital, his government will continue to crumble. Al-Maliki is under pressure to show that his government has writ in all parts of the capital -- especially areas controlled by fellow Shia in the al-Sadrite Bloc. But he cannot overtly and directly challenge the Mehdi Army; he depends on the al-Sadrites, who hold a majority of the ruling Shiite coalition's seats in parliament, for the continuing existence of his government, and al-Sadr cannot be wiped out militarily without an unacceptable number of casualties.
The al-Sadrites worry that the new security plan is actually an invasion of their turf by rival Shiite factions. The Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq and its Badr Organization have infiltrated the Iraqi security apparatus much more effectively than al-Sadr's Mehdi Army, which has been branded a rogue militia group. So far, the al-Sadrite bloc of the Iraqi parliament has been able to wield its substantial influence over al-Maliki's fragile government and prevent U.S. and Iraqi forces from operating in Sadr City in any meaningful way. While there have certainly been targeted raids, no permanent coalition presence has been established in the area.
Now the al-Sadrites face a choice: a destructive clash with a determined and reinforced U.S. military, or accommodation.
Despite al-Sadr's continued absence from the country, Sheikh Raheem al-Darruji, the mayor of Sadr City's 2 million impoverished Shia, has said he will give the security operation a chance to succeed, although he warned that if effective protection is not provided, his people will defend themselves. The delay in the U.S. push into Sadr City -- it has been weeks since the Baghdad security plan was initiated -- has given al-Sadr more than enough time to secure his assets, in terms both of manpower and materiel. This delay is an important demonstration of cooperation between al-Sadr and the al-Maliki government.
Al-Sadr also has been assured that his organization's interests will be secure so long as it allows Iraqi forces to demonstrate that they have control over Sadr City. That al-Sadr and his commanders are out of sight underscores this understanding. Because al-Sadr's only alternative is destruction, al-Maliki also is operating from a position of power. Al-Sadr and al-Maliki have agreed to allow each other to exist because they need one another.
There will, of course, be clashes; practice is much messier than theory, and in no place is this more true than in Baghdad. Eventually, though, the Sadr City operation will end and the al-Sadrites will have to work out an arrangement with Iraqi security forces. But indications are that al-Sadr has -- for now -- chosen accommodation over destruction. There certainly will be clashes, but by challenging the U.S. military and Iraqi security forces, members of al-Sadr's militia will identify themselves as rogue elements. And if they do not heed his commands and are engaged and destroyed by coalition forces, all the better for al-Sadr as he strives to control his organization.
But the Sadr City operation will not bring true security to Baghdad. Only successful negotiations between the United States and Iran can do that. Iranian assistance is absolutely essential for a lasting solution. What al-Maliki can accomplish with the success of the Baghdad security plan is a consolidated Iraqi capital. The rest hinges on Washington and Tehran.
stratfor.com
-
Second post of the day. This does not sound good for the Kurds , , ,
stratfor.com
Iran: A Strong Stance Against Separatists Spells Trouble for Kurds
Summary
Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is prepared to pursue its enemies across Iran's borders, IRGC commander-in-chief Maj. Gen. Yahya Rahim Safavi said Feb. 28. The general's statement that his forces will chase separatist groups into neighboring countries comes at a time of increased internal instability in Iran, in line with the U.S. campaign to destabilize the clerical regime. Kurdish ambitions in Iraq are likely to be affected as Iran and Turkey work together to quell the common threat they face from Kurdish rebel groups.
Analysis
Commander-in-chief of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Maj. Gen. Yahya Rahim Safavi, said Feb. 28 that the United States and Israel are directly funding armed anti-Iranian groups in the Islamic republic, and that the IRGC "is prepared to chase and disband the enemies even beyond Iran's borders in a bid to defend the country."
Safavi's warnings come after several weeks of growing security threats from Iran's ethnic minority groups, which make up nearly half of its population of 80 million. The IRGC is in the midst of a crackdown to contain these groups; in the latest offensive, announced Feb. 28, the IRGC said it killed 17 rebels in the heavily Kurdish-populated West Azerbaijan province. This offensive was prompted by a Feb. 24 Iranian military helicopter crash near the Turkish border, which killed 14 Iranian soldiers. The Party of Free Life of Kurdistan (PJAK), a group linked to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in Turkey, claimed it shot down the helicopter with an SA-7, a portable surface-to-air missile that has found its way into the hands of several Iraqi insurgent groups.
While the Kurdish groups are keeping the IRGC busy in the northwest, Baloch rebel groups in the southwest province of Sistan-Balochistan, along the Iranian, Pakistani and Afghan border, have staged a number of attacks in recent weeks against Iranian security forces. Iran also faces a threat in the oil-rich southwestern province of Khuzestan, on the Iranian-Iraqi border, where Arab rebel groups have carried out several bombings over the past two years.
Iran says these uprisings are all part of a U.S.-British-Israeli campaign to undermine its clerical regime. Safavi said that Washington is projecting its problems into Iran "now that their policies have ended in failure in Afghanistan and Iraq." To further its claim that a foreign hand is involved in the recent attacks, Tehran recently released a number of photographs of ammunition boxes with large "USA" labels circled. The photographs quite obviously were doctored as part of an Iranian propaganda campaign constructed as a lever to use against the United States and the West in negotiations over Iraq. That said, it is not hard to believe Western intelligence agencies might be supporting these armed rebellions in Iran.
The United States has much to gain by sparking internal frictions in Iran. While Washington is not interested in a direct military confrontation with Tehran, it would very much like to show the Iranian government that it can dish out what it is receiving in Iraq. The larger aim of this covert campaign would be to use Iran's oppressed minorities to destabilize the Islamic republic along its restive borders in order to make it too costly for Iran to remain the primary obstruction to a U.S. exit strategy for Iraq.
In reference to the attacks in Sistan-Balochistan province, in a sermon March 2, Iranian cleric Hojatoleslam Ahmad Khatami accused Pakistan of "losing its neighborly manners" by working with the United States to instigate the Baloch uprisings. Pakistan, which faces its own Baloch rebel threat, is unlikely to be providing direct support to the Baloch minority in Iran. But, given its complex relationship with the United States in combating al Qaeda and Taliban forces in the region, Islamabad likely has worked out a deal in which it receives some slack in exchange for turning a blind eye to U.S. operations against Iran along the border.
Iran has expressed its alarm over the recent rebel activity and has reportedly spent the past month building a 10-foot-high fence along the Iranian-Pakistani border to prevent illegal border crossings. The IRGC has even issued a direct threat to pursue members of PJAK into neighboring Iraq, using the "practical measures that had been taken during Saddam's reign" to contain the Kurdish uprisings.
The U.S. interest in destabilizing Iran gives the PJAK a useful tool to further its resistance campaign against Iran: a relatively unobstructed base of operations in Iraqi Kurdistan. Iraq's Kurdish president, Jalal Talabani, made it clear in a September 2006 interview with National Public Radio that Iraq can "make trouble" for both Iran and Turkey should either country attempt to interfere in the affairs of the Iraqi Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). (His comments followed a Kurdish rebel attack in Maku, Iran, that destroyed nearly 75 yards of an Iranian-Turkish gas pipeline.)
Though the Iraqi Kurds can see the usefulness of highlighting their links to Kurdish separatists in Turkey and Iran to help achieve their goal of annexing the oil-rich city of Kirkuk, a significant uptick in Kurdish rebel attacks in Iraq's neighboring countries could complicate things. Iran and Turkey have cooperated before to counter Kurdish operations through cross-border military operations. The last thing the KRG wants is a direct military confrontation with either Iran or Turkey while the Kirkuk referendum issue is heating up.
During a March 1 phone conversation, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahamdinejad vowed to work together to maintain Iraq's territorial integrity. It does not take much of an imagination to guess what else Ankara and Tehran might be planning in light of these recent attacks.
-
The Four Unspeakable Truths
What politicians won't admit about Iraq.
By Jacob Weisberg
Posted Wednesday, March 7, 2007, at 3:33 PM ET
When it comes to Iraq, there are two kinds of presidential candidates. The disciplined ones, like Hillary Clinton, carefully avoid acknowledging reality. The more candid, like John McCain and Barack Obama, sometimes blurt out the truth, but quickly apologize.
For many presidential aspirants, the first unspeakable truth is simply that the war was a mistake. This issue came to a head recently with Hillary Clinton's obstinate refusal to acknowledge that voting to give President Bush the authority to invade Iraq was the wrong thing to do. Though fellow Democrats John Edwards and Christopher Dodd have managed to say they erred in voting for the 2002 war resolution, Clinton is joined by Joe Biden and a full roster of Republicans in her inability to disgorge the M-word. Perhaps most absurdly, Chuck Hagel has called Bush's 21,500-troop "surge" the biggest blunder since Vietnam without ever saying that the war itself was the big blunder and that he favored it.
Reasons for refusing to admit that the war itself was a mistake are surprisingly similar across party lines. It is seldom easy to admit you were wrong—so let me repeat what I first acknowledged in Slate in January 2004, that I am sorry to have given even qualified support to the war. But what is awkward for columnists is nearly impossible for self-justifying politicians, who resist acknowledging error at a glandular level. Specific political calculations help to explain their individual decisions. Hillary, for instance, worries that confessing her failure will make it easier for hawks to savage her if she gets the nomination. But at bottom, the impulse is always the same. Politicians are stubborn, afraid of looking weak, and fearful that any admission of error will be cast as flip-flopping and inconsistency.
A second truth universally unacknowledged is that American soldiers being killed, grotesquely maimed, and then treated like whining freeloaders at Walter Reed Hospital are victims as much as "heroes." John Kerry was the first to violate this taboo when he was still a potential candidate last year. Kerry appeared to tell a group of California college students that it sucks to go and fight in Iraq. A variety of conservative goons instantly denounced Kerry for disrespecting the troops. An advanced sufferer of Senatorial Infallibility Syndrome, Kerry resisted retracting his comment for a while, but eventually regretted what he called a "botched joke" about President Bush.
Lost in the debate about whether Kerry meant what came out of his mouth was the fact that what he said was largely true. Americans who attend college and have good employment options after graduation are unlikely to sign up for free tours of the Sunni Triangle. People join the military for a variety of reasons, of course, but since the Iraq war turned ugly, the all-volunteer Army has been lowering educational standards, raising enlistment bonuses, and looking past criminal records. The lack of better choices is a larger and larger factor in the choice of military service. Our troops in Iraq may not see themselves as cannon fodder or victims of presidential misjudgments, but that doesn't mean they're not.
Reality No. 3, closely related to No. 2 and following directly from No. 1, is that the American lives lost in Iraq have been lives wasted. Barack Obama crossed this boundary on his first trip to Iowa as an announced candidate when he declared at a rally, "We ended up launching a war that should have never been authorized and should have never been waged and to which we have now spent $400 billion and have seen over 3,000 lives of the bravest young Americans wasted." With lightning speed, Obama said he had misspoken and apologized to military families.
John McCain used the same proscribed term when he announced his candidacy on Late Night With David Letterman last week. "We've wasted a lot of our most precious treasure, which is American lives." This was a strange admission, given McCain's advocacy of a surge bigger than Bush's. In any case, McCain followed Obama by promptly regretting his choice of words. (The patriotically correct term for losing parts of your body in a pointless war in Mesopotamia is, of course, "sacrifice.") These episodes all followed Kinsley's law of gaffes. The mistake Kerry, Obama, and McCain made was telling the truth before retreating to the approved banality and euphemism
A fourth and final near-certainty, which is in some ways the hardest for politicians to admit, is that America is losing or has already lost the Iraq war. The United States is the strongest nation in the history of the world and does not think of itself as coming in second in two-way contests. When it does so, it is slow to accept that it has been beaten. American political and military leaders were reluctant to acknowledge or utter that they had miscalculated and wasted tens of thousands of lives in Vietnam, many of them after failure and withdrawal were assured. Even today, American politicians tend not to describe Vietnam as a straightforward defeat. Something similar is happening in Iraq, where the most that leaders typically say is that we "risk" losing and must not do so.
Democrats avoid the truth about the tragedy in Iraq for fear of being labeled unpatriotic or unsupportive of the troops. Republicans avoid it for fear of being blamed for the disaster or losing defense and patriotism as cards to play against Democrats. Politicians on both sides believe that acknowledging the unpleasant truth will weaken them and undermine those still attempting to persevere on our behalf. But nations and individuals do not grow weaker by confronting the truth. They grow weaker by avoiding it and coming to believe their own evasions.
Jacob Weisberg is editor of Slate and co-author, with Robert E. Rubin, of In an Uncertain World.
-
stratfor.com
1212 GMT -- IRAQ -- U.S. forces in Iraq captured 16 suspected al Qaeda militants who allegedly were responsible for numerous suicide bombings, kidnappings and beheadings, the U.S. military said March 9. Six insurgents, including an al Qaeda leader known as "the Butcher" because of his involvement in beheadings, were captured and one was killed in an early morning raid in the northern city of Mosul. Two more were captured in Al Fallujah and eight were apprehended near Karmah.
-
Joint operations nab 50 terrorists
TIKRIT, Iraq – Soldiers from Task Force 1-319 and the 4th Iraqi Army Division captured more than 50 insurgents during 3 days of operations focused on terrorist cells near Tikrit in Salah ad Din.
Paratroopers from 2nd Bn, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division, captured more than 40 terrorists in the Abu Ajeel area with assistance from the Iraqi army. The operation disrupted an Improvised Explosive Device Cell that has been operating in the area as well as delivering an insurgent cell leader who has been spearheading attacks against security forces in recent months.
U.S. soldiers also captured more than 10 insurgents involved with financing and executing attacks on forces in Owja. During the raids, members of Battery B engaged numerous insurgents killing three who were poised to conduct a deadly roadside ambush on coalition forces during the operation.
Iraqi Police Captures 3 Members of Insurgent Network During Raid
Baghdad – Fallujah, Iraqi Police captured 3 members of an Al Qaeda in Iraq linked insurgent network during operations in Fallujah. One is involved and participated in a recent attack on the Saqlawiyah Police station. The others are implicated in recording insurgent attacks against U.S. Forces on video and selling them to an Iraqi television station.
AIR STRIKES TARGET AL QAEDA TERRORISTS WEST OF TAJI
BAGHDAD – U.S. troops targeted members of an al-Qaeda network Friday during an air strike operation west of Taji. This network is responsible for threats to U.S. aircraft. U.S. troops believe key terrorists were killed during the air strike. Results are still being assessed at this time.
Several members of the cell, as well as vehicles with anti-aircraft artillery weapons and rounds, were gathered at an area known for terrorist activities. The coordinated air strike at the targeted location resulted in the destruction of the vehicles as well as the anti-aircraft artillery.
During the operation, U.S. troops also targeted another vehicle mounted with anti-aircraft artillery. The strike resulted in the destruction of the vehicle as well as the structure it was parked beside.
AIR STRIKE TARGETS VBIED CELL NEAR ARAB JABOUR
BAGHDAD, Iraq – U.S. troops targeted an al-Qaeda in Iraq related vehicle-borne improvised explosives devices cell Saturday during an air strike operation near Arab Jabour. This cell is responsible for a large and devastating number of VBIED attacks in the Baghdad area.
During an operation in the area, U.S. troops began receiving small arms fire from several armed men across the Tigris River. U.S. troops called for an air strike to eliminate the threat.
U.S. troops used two precision guided bombs in the strike destroying a small structure and killing 7 terrorists hiding inside. A large secondary explosion was noted after the initial bombs were dropped on the target, indicating the presence of explosive material within the structure.
Dozens of Iraqi Militants and Foreign Terrorists Killed
BAGHDAD, 2 March 2007 — Iraqi security forces killed dozens of Al-Qaeda militants who attacked a village in Anbar province on Wednesday, during fierce clashes that lasted much of the day, police officials said. Sunni tribal leaders are involved in an escalating power struggle with Sunni Al-Qaeda for control of Anbar, a vast desert province that is the heart of the Sunni Arab insurgency in Iraq.
A spokesman said foreign Arabs and Afghanis were among some 80 militants killed and 50 captured in the clashes in al-Fallujah, a village where local tribes had opposed Al-Qaeda. Police in the area put the number of militants killed at 70, with three policemen killed.
In other operations, Iraqi and U.S.army troops killed 10 insurgents, captured 5 others and seized four weapons caches during an operation on Monday in the town of Muqdadiya, 50 miles northeast of Baghdad, the U.S. military said. U.S. troops also said they killed 2 insurgents and captured 6 near Ramadi in western Iraq.
In the recent Baghdad security operations, In the first two weeks of the security effort, Iraqi authorities said, 70 militants were killed, and 450 known militants were arrested along with 370 supporters. The effort also has resulted in the rescue and release of 17 kidnapping victims, they said.
U.S. and Iraqi forces found a weapons cache near Mosul, that including 194 mortar rounds, 14 mortar tubes, 18 rocket-propelled grenade launchers, 160 rockets, a suicide vest and other gear for making bombs, the U.S. military said.
Also, U.S. forces killed 8 insurgents and captured 11 others during operations targeting foreign fighters and al-Qaeda in Iraq near Taji, 9 miles north of Baghdad.
8 TERRORISTS KILLED DURING SALMAN PAK RAID
BAGHDAD, Iraq – U.S. troops killed 8 terrorists during a raid Thursday targeting al-Qaeda in Iraq operating in the Salman Pak region. Intelligence reports indicate a significant number of individuals involved with the AQIZ terrorist network currently operating in the area. During the raid, in which U.S. troops were repeatedly confronted by small arms and mortar fires, U.S. troops identified three armed terrorists maneuvering toward them with hostile intent. Ground forces engaged the enemy, killing the three terrorists.
Twenty minutes later, U.S. troops were again confronted by terrorists who began firing upon them. U.S. troops returned fire, killing 8 terrorists. Another four fled the area & escaped
U.S. troops also witnessed armed terrorists in a vehicle who were accessing a weapons cache and removing small arms. U.S. troops engaged, killing 1 terrorist. Two terrorists were wounded and fled. U.S. troops recovered several sniper rifles, AK-47s and rocket-propelled launchers from one of the engagement sites
2 men captured while emplacing IED
CAMP STRIKER, Iraq — Two men were captured while attempting to emplace an improvised explosive device on a major Iraqi highway near Camp Striker, Iraq.
Soldiers of the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) were patrolling Route Tampa, the main highway from Baghdad when they spotted two men crawling in a canal. The troops stopped the men and searched them, discovering that they had a U.S.-made night-vision tool. A further search of the area revealed an IED ready to be emplaced.
The IED consisted of six 57mm rounds in a white bag about 200 meters from the road, as well as a video camera, a washing-machine timer, a pressure plate and a blasting cap.
SENIOR AL-QAEDA LEADER, 5 MORE CAPTURED IN MOSUL, 3 TERRORISTS KILLED
BAGHDAD, Iraq – U.S. troops killed 2 terrorists and captured a senior al-Qaida leader during a raid in Mosul. While approaching the first building, U.S. troops began receiving enemy fire from an adjacent building. U.S. troops fired back, killing one terrorist.
Upon entering the adjacent building, U.S. troops were confronted by an armed terrorist. U.S. troops killed the armed terrorist. During the raid, U.S. troops captured 6 terrorists, including the targeted individual, a senior al-Qaeda in Iraq leader operating a terrorist cell in Mosul.
12 Al Qaeda terrorists captured
BAGHDAD, Iraq – U.S. troops captured 12 terrorists during raids Saturday morning targeting foreign fighter facilitators and the al-Qaeda in Iraq network. In Fallujah, U.S. troops captured three terrorists with ties to a cell. Intelligence reports indicated the terrorists were associated with senior-level foreign fighters in the local area.
U.S. troops captured the leader of an al-Qaeda in Iraq cell in Mosul. The al-Qaeda cell in Mosul finances transactions in Iraq and neighboring countries. 4 others were caught during the raid.
Another raid in Mosul netted a terrorist with financial ties to al-Qaeda in Iraq. During the raid U.S. troops discovered a large amount of Egyptian and Syrian money and false passports and identification cards.
North of Amiriyah, 3 terrorists were captured including the alleged leader of a local vehicle-borne improvised explosive device cell.
3 TERRORISTS KILLED, 16 OTHERS DETAINED IN OPERATIONS
BAGHDAD, Iraq – U.S. troops killed three terrorists and captured 16 terrorists during operations Thursday morning targeting al-Qaeda in Iraq.
During an operation west of Ramadi, U.S. troops killed two terrorists and captured 6 terrorists with ties to foreign fighter facilitation.
South of Baghdad, U.S. troops killed one armed terrorist who charged at them as they entered a targeted building.
Six terrorists associated with al-Qaeda in Iraq were captured in operations in Bayji, and four others with ties to foreign fighter facilitation were also captured in Ramadi.
-
Iraqi Police Detains 6 during Raid against AQI in Karma
Baghdad – Fallujah Iraqi Police captured 6 insurgents during operations in Karma targeting al Qaeda in Iraq facilitators.
Iraqi Police were targeting several insurgents responsible for providing funds, weapons and transportation to al Qaeda in Iraq terrorists and insurgents conducting attacks
Iraqi Police captures 4 during operations against IED cell near Samarra
BAGHDAD – Samarra Iraqi Police and U.S. troops captured an insurgent bomber during operations near Samarra.
The man was captured during operations targeting an insurgent improvised explosive device cell conducting attacks against U.S. troops and Iraqi Security Forces. The cell is responsible for emplacing IEDs targeting U.S. troops and Iraqi Security Forces. 3 other insurgents were also captured by Iraqi Police.
Iraqi Army Capture 5 During Operations Against IED Builder
BAGHDAD – Special Iraqi Army forces captured 5 insurgents during operations in Baghdad, targeting an improvised explosive device builder.
During operations, as U.S. troops over-watch element observed a man armed with an assault rifle moving from roof top to roof top appearing to track Iraqi Forces and U.S. troops on the ground. The man positioned himself in a vantage point where he had a clear sight of the ground forces. The suspect was then observed raising his weapon and aiming it in the direction of Iraqi Forces and U.S. troops members, posing an immediate threat to them. The U.S. troops shot the man neutralizing the threat.
U.S. troops and Iraqi Army medics rendered immediate aid to the gunman to help stabilize him for movement to a hospital. The man died before he was able to be transported.
Hostages freed by paratroopers, weapons cache secured
KALSU, Iraq – Paratroopers located an insurgent safe house uncovering a weapons cache and freeing two hostages south of Baghdad Feb. 26. Paratroopers from 2nd Battalion, 377th Parachute Field Artillery Regiment, 4th Brigade (Airborne), located the safe house, where they found the two hostages and a weapons cache near Mahmudiyah.
The cache contained three AK-47s, 14 30-round magazines, one 100-round magazine drum & two fragmentary grenades.
EIGHT TERRORISTS KILLED, SIX DETAINED IN RAIDS
BAGHDAD –U.S. troops killed 8 terrorists and captured 6 during operations Wednesday morning targeting foreign fighter facilitators and the al-Qaeda in Iraq network. Intelligence reports indicated terrorists associated with small arms and rocket attacks against U.S. troops were operating northeast of Taji.
As U.S. troops approached the targeted area, they noticed several armed men maneuvering toward them in a nearby palm grove. U.S. troops called in close air support to eliminate the threat. Rotary-wing and fixed-wing aircraft used precision fires killing eight armed terrorists. Two terrorists were detained.
U.S. troops also captured 2 terrorists in Amiriyah and 2 more in Baghdad with alleged ties to the al-Qaeda in Iraq network.
Iraqi Army troops catch 5 insurgents with paratroopers in support
An Iraqi battalion conducted a raid with U.S. troops supporting to curb sectarian violence south of Baghdad, capturing 5 insurgents.
Soldiers from the 6th Iraqi Army Division with support from paratroopers of 4th Brigade (Airborne), 25th Infantry Division, raided buildings in Hawr Rajab, capturing the 5 insurgents.
The raid was part of Operation Lion’s Roar which was an effort to curb sectarian violence south of Baghdad. This was the second successful raid in Hawr Rejab in the last two weeks.
Iraqi swat team captures 11 Mahdawiyah insurgent group members
BAGHDAD – Al Hillah Iraqi Special Weapons and Tactics personnel captured 11 members of the Mahdawiyah insurgent group during operations in Al Hillah. The men were involved in attacks against Iraqi Security Forces and civilians in the area.
They were part of the insurgent group that fought against U.S. and Iraqi Security Forces in Najaf. They were also threatening the lives of persons within the leadership of Iraqi Security Forces in Babil Province.
Iraqi Army capturs 16 insurgents during operations
BAGHDAD, Iraq – Special Iraqi Army Forces captured 16 militiamen during operations in Sadr City targeting the leadership of several rogue Jaysh Al-Mahdi cells operating against Iraqi civilians.
Iraqi forces targeted several individuals who allegedly control multiple rogue JAM cells and illegally direct and perpetrate sectarian murder, torture and kidnapping. The wanted individuals are reported to operate out of Sadr City and are linked to attacks on Coalition Forces
AL-QAEDA EMIR, ELEVEN OTHERS DETAINED IN RAIDS THROUGHOUT IRAQ
BAGHDAD, Iraq – U.S. troops captured 12 suspected terrorists including an Al-Qaeda in Iraq emir during raids Tuesday morning targeting foreign fighter facilitators and the al-Qaeda in Iraq network.
During an operation in Baghdad, U.S. troops captured a suspected al-Qaeda in Iraq emir and three of his associates. Based on intelligence reports, these suspects are allegedly involved in the production of improvised explosive devices.
Also in Baghdad, U.S. troops captured 2 terrorists who have alleged ties to al-Qaeda in Iraq and anti-Coalition Forces activities. Two suspected terrorists were detained during a raid in Mosul. Intelligence reports indicate the suspected terrorists have ties with an al-Qaeda terrorist who has coordinated attacks against Iraqi security and U.S. military personnel.Another suspected terrorist was detained in Fallujah during a raid targeting foreign fighter facilitators. U.S. troops captured 2 terrorists in Tikrit who are believed to have links with terrorists involved in explosives shipments from other countries and facilitating the production of vehicle-borne IEDs.
In Ramadi, U.S. troops netted a terrorist who is allegedly involved in courier activities for al-Qaeda terrorists in Iraq.
Three-day Operation Leads to 15 Terrorists Killed, IED Factory Destroyed
During a recent three-day operation in Salman Pak targeting al-Qaida in Iraq terrorists, U.S. troops killed 15 terrorists involved in an improvised explosives device cell, destroyed an IED factory and thwarted two explosives emplacements.
On Feb. 14, U.S. troops began receiving enemy contact on the ground from a fortified building in the area. Determining the targets too hostile for ground troops, U.S. troops called for close air support. Fixed wing aircraft used precision fires to destroy the building killing 5 terrorists and wounding 4 terrorists.
Also during this raid, U.S. troops disrupted two separate groups of terrorists who were in the process of emplacing IEDs alongside a road. Due to the high level of danger, fixed wing aircraft were used to destroy the IEDs. 10 terrorists were killed as a result.
U.S. troops continued their raid the following day and found a male Iraqi citizen shackled in one of the rooms of a targeted building. Ground forces captured four males who were hiding near the building. During a search, U.S. troops found the hostage’s cell phone on one of the detainees.
According to the hostage, he was tied up with a hood over his head for three days. He said he prayed and fasted during his captivity because he believed his captors were going to execute him. He was transported to a nearby military medical facility for an examination.
On the third and final day of the operation, U.S. troops performed a controlled detonation destroying an IED factory. During a search of the targeted building, ground forces found a large amount of IED-making material including 1,000 pounds of various types of explosives, including nitric acid.
An explosives ordnance disposal team determined the material was too unstable to move. Ground forces cordoned off the area and ensured local citizens were moved to a safe distance during the controlled detonation. The IED-making materials and building were destroyed to prevent future use by terrorists.
A total of 13 terrorists were detained during the three-day operation.
Iraqi national police hold off attack at checkpoint, 2 terrorists killed
Camp Striker, Iraq — Iraqi national police killed at least two terrorists during a coordinated attack on a national police checkpoint along an Iraqi highway two miles south of the Baghdad International Airport. 8 national policemen were killed in the defense of the checkpoint.
Witnesses described the attack as two vehicles driving towards the checkpoint at a high rate of speed. 8 - 10 gunmen exited the lead vehicle, firing assault rifles and throwing hand grenades at the policemen. A firefight ensued. The second vehicle was forced into a ditch. It was cordoned off as a possible vehicle-borne improvised explosive device.
Elements of the 1st Squadron, 89th Cavalry Regiment, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) responded to the sound of the attack, attempting to intervene. Upon receiving gunfire from the attackers, the Soldiers called in aviation support.
After securing the area, 1-89 rendered medical aid to the two wounded national policemen and evacuated them to a nearby combat support hospital. The MiTT members identified two dead attackers.
Four terrorists convicted in Turki Village case
BALAD RUZ, Iraq – Last week, a three-judge panel with the Central Criminal Court of Iraq, convicted four terrorists detained during November’s operations in Turki Village, Iraq, of possession of illegal weapons. The panel sentenced them to 30 years imprisonment.
“This is a just verdict. It is significant because it is an Iraqi panel dispensing justice to Iraqi defendants,” said Maj. Paul T. Brooks, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division’s effects coordinator.
The defendants were detained Nov. 15, 2006, after a small-arms engagement with a group of Coalition Forces. This engagement resulted in one U.S. Soldier’s death. During the engagement, Coalition Forces killed the triggerman responsible for the death.
When Coalition Forces detained the individuals, they discovered several small-arms munitions and hand grenades.
“My Soldiers now have clarity concerning the Iraqi justice system. Equally important, these criminals are no longer able to spread their hatred amongst the Iraqi people,” said Col. David W. Sutherland, 3-1 Cav. commander and the senior U.S. Army officer in Diyala province. During November’s operation, Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces unearthed more than five weapons caches,
killed more than 60 anti-Iraqi forces and detained more than 10 suspected terrorists.
CCCI convicts 10 insurgents
One sentenced to 30 years, three sentenced to 15 years imprisonment
BAGHDAD, Iraq – The Central Criminal Court of Iraq convicted 10 security detainees from Feb. 18 - 22, for various crimes including possession of illegal weapons, possessing fake identification, use of explosives, passport violations and illegal border crossing.
The trial court found an Iraqi man guilty of illegal possession of special category weapons in violation of Order 3/2003 Section 6, Paragraph 2B. On Jan. 19, 2005, MNF conducted a raid on several houses in Taji searching for the defendant and several other individuals. The defendant’s brother led MNF to the defendant’s house. Inside they found a locked door that the defendant said was empty and the temperature change had swelled the door shut. MNF broke down the door and inside they found: one RPK machine gun, one AK-47, a pistol, one G3 assault rifle, Iraqi and CIA intelligence manuals and documents as well as many fake identification documents and photographs. The defendant admitted to MNF that he was once an Iraqi intelligence officer. MNF then searched outside the house using metal detectors and found more buried weapons and ammunition. Some of the ammunition was found in American ammunition boxes with serial numbers that matched the serial numbers of ammunition boxes taken from Humvees which had recently been destroyed by IEDs’ in which two American Soldiers died. On Feb. 18 the trial panel found the defendant guilty and sentenced him to 30 years imprisonment.
The trial court found an Iraqi man guilty of illegal possession of special category weapons in violation of Order 3/2003 Section 6, Paragraph 2B. On Dec. 25, 2006, MNF conducted a targeted raid to capture the defendant. The defendant is a weapons dealer and has sold weapons to various groups on many occasions. At the point of capture, MNF found an AK-47, a sniper rifle, a PKC machine gun, an RPG, two pistols, a rifle and assorted ammunition. At the time of capture the defendant also had fake identification with him. On Feb. 19 the trial panel found the defendant guilty and sentenced him to 15 years imprisonment.
The trial court found two Iraqi men guilty of illegal possession of special category weapons in violation of Order 3/2003 Section 6, Paragraph 2B. On Nov. 11, 2006, MNF were conducting census operations near Fallujah. MNF entered one defendant’s home and noticed both defendants acting nervous. Because of their behavior, MNF began a search of their home. MNF first discovered one loaded AK-47 magazine under a mattress on the second floor of the home. MNF continued their search and discovered the following weapons: two AK-47’s, seven AK-47 loaded magazines, four fan switches, two 9mm pistols, one blasting cap, one RPG trigger assembly, anti-MNF propaganda and numerous types of ammunition. At the hearing MNF presented two eye witnesses, photographs and a sketch. On Feb. 20 the trial panel found the defendants guilty and sentenced them each to 15 years imprisonment.
Those convicted of immigration violations, taking advantage of someone else’s legal documents, use of explosives and illegal possession of special category weapons were sentenced from one to 30 years imprisonment. Those convicted totaled nine Iraqis and one Palestinian.
Since its reorganization, under an amendment to CPA order 13, in April 2004, the Central Criminal Court has held 1,902 trials for Coalition-apprehended insurgents. The proceedings have resulted in the conviction of 1,640 individuals with sentences ranging up to death.
-
I'm not exactly sure how the surrender resolution debate in Washington relates to Iraq, but I'll post this here anyway:
“There was the Biden resolution, then there was the Levin Resolution, then there was the Reid-Pelosi Resolution, the Murtha Plan, the Biden-Levin Resolution, the funding cut, the waiver plan, the Feingold Plan, an Obama Resolution, a Clinton Resolution, a Dodd Resolution, a Kennedy Resolution, a Feinstein Resolution, a Byrd Resolution, a Kerry Resolution, and today would make number 17."
- Sen. Mitch McConnell in objection
Maybe the pathetic posturing of the fractured Democratic "leadership" in congress will help illustrate why the framers in their wisdom named only one person at a time to be Commander in Chief.
-
Monday, 12 March 2007
Iraqi Army captures four suspects during operations against
rogue elements of JAM
Multi-National Corps – Iraq PAO
Baghdad – Soldiers of the 4th Iraqi Army Division captured four suspects during
operations with Coalition advisors March 11 in Balad, targeting rogue elements of Jaysh
Al-Mahdi. The suspects are allegedly involved in carrying out sectarian attacks against
Iraqi civilians in the area.
The suspects are implicated in supplying weapons used by rogue elements to
commit violence and other criminal activities.
Iraqi Forces detained five additional suspects for questioning.
Minimal damage was done to the objective. There were no Iraqi civilians, Iraqi
Forces or Coalition Forces casualties.
March 12, 2007
COALITION FORCES CAPTURE 22 SUSPECTED TERRORISTS IN IRAQ
BAGHDAD, Iraq –Coalition Forces captured 22 suspected terrorists during operations Monday morning targeting al-Qaeda and foreign fighter facilitators.
During operations in Mosul, Coalition Forces captured four suspected terrorists allegedly involved in the planning of improvised explosive devices attacks on friendly forces.
A senior foreign fighter facilitator was captured north of Habbaniyah, and two suspects who are reportedly involved in weapons facilitation were detained in Baghdad.
Northeast of Tarmiyah, Coalition Forces captured thirteen suspected terrorists with alleged involved in weapons movement and foreign fighter facilitation.
South of Amiriyah, two suspected terrorists with alleged ties to foreign fighter facilitation and weapons movement were also detained.
“Coalition Forces will continue deliberate and methodical operations in order to pursue, capture or kill terrorists trying to prevent a peaceful and stable Iraq," said Lt. Col. Christopher Garver, MNF-I spokesperson.
-
"The only constituency House Speaker Nancy Pelosi ignored in her plan for amending President Bush's supplemental war funding bill are the people of the country that U.S. troops are fighting to stabilize. The Democratic proposal doesn't attempt to answer the question of why August 2008 is the right moment for the Iraqi government to lose all support from U.S. combat units... But aggressive oversight is quite different from mandating military steps according to an inflexible timetable conforming to the need to capture votes in Congress or at the 2008 polls. Ms. Pelosi's strategy leads not toward a responsible withdrawal from Iraq but to a constitutional power struggle with Mr. Bush, who has already said he will veto the legislation. Such a struggle would serve the interests of neither the Democrats nor the country" -- Washington Post editorial.
-
Anatomy of Iraq
How did we get to this baffling scenario?
By Victor Davis Hanson
It’s make it or break it in Iraq in 2007. Or so we are told, as America nears four years of costly efforts in Iraq. But how did we get to this situation, to this fury over a war once supported by 70 percent of the public and a majority of Congress, but now orphaned by both?
How did a serious country, one that endured Antietam, sent a million doughboys to Europe in a mere year, survived Pearl Harbor, Monte Cassino, Anzio, the Bulge, Tarawa, Iwo and Okinawa, the Yalu, Choisun, Hue and Tet, come to the conclusion — between the news alerts about Britney Spears’ shaved head and fights over Anna Nicole Smith’s remains — that Iraq, in the words of historically minded Democratic senators, was the “worst” and the “greatest” “blunder,” “disaster,” and “catastrophe” in our “entire” history?
Even with all the tragic suffering, our losses, by the standard of past American wars, have not been unprecedented, especially given the magnitude of the undertaking — namely, traveling 7,000 miles to remove a dictator and foster democracy in the heart of the ancient caliphate. This was not a 1953 overthrow of an Iranian parliamentarian. Nor was it a calculated 1991 decision to let the Shiite and Kurdish revolts be crushed by Saddam. And it was most certainly not a cynical ploy to pit Baathist Iraq against theocratic Iran. Instead, it was an effort to allow an electorate to replace a madman.
There were always potential landmines that could go off, here and abroad, if the news from the battlefield proved to be dispiriting.
First, George Bush ran for president as a realist, who turned Wilsonian only after 9/11, in the belief that removing Saddam and leaving democracy in his wake could break up the nexus between Middle Eastern terrorism and autocracy.
But his conservative base was always skeptical of anything even approaching internationalist activism. And his Democratic opponents were not about to concede his idealism. So when times got tough, the president’s chief reservoir of diehard supporters proved to be principled Lieberman Democrats and McCain Republicans — neither group a natural majority nor, after 2000, with any natural affinity for the president.
Second, after the relatively easy victories in Grenada, Panama, the Gulf War, Serbia, and Afghanistan, the American public became accustomed to removing thugs in weeks and mostly by air and light ground-support. All during the 1990s, the more we made use of the military the more we cut it, until things came to a head in Iraq in a postwar effort that has been both long and confined largely to the ground.
Since the most recent conflicts had been a far cry from the mess of Vietnam, Democrats saw that the upside of regaining lost stature on national security outweighed the dangers of being charged with war-mongering from hard-core leftists. And so they outdid themselves and the president in loudly voting for Iraq — but apparently only as long as casualties were to be minimal and public and media support steadfast and overwhelming.
There were numerous reasons to remove Saddam — 23, according to the Congress that authorized the war — but the administration privileged just one, the sensible fear of weapons of mass destruction. That was legitimate and understandable, and would prove effective so long as either a postwar weapons-trove turned up or the war and its aftermath finished without a hitch.
Unfortunately neither proved to be the case. So with that prime rationale discredited, the partisan Congress suddenly reinvented itself in protesting that it had really voted for war on only one cause, not 23. And when the news and evidence both went bad, that lone reason was now pronounced null and void and hardly a basis for war.
Third, Afghanistan also loomed large. Right after 9/11, Afghanistan, rather than secular and once-defeated Iraq, was seen as the tougher nut to crack, that warlords’ mountainous graveyard of British and Russian imperial troops. But when the Taliban fell in eight weeks, and a consensual government was in place within a year, then by that optimistic arithmetic, the three weeks it took to remove Saddam might mean less than six months before new elections could be held there. Suddenly the old prewar warnings of thousands of Americans dead were forgotten, as the public apparently assumed the peace in Iraq would ensue in half the time it took in Afghanistan. This analogy has proven inapt.
Fourth, this war was debated through one election and fought through two. Given the prewar furor over Iraq, the miraculous three-week victory over Saddam lent itself to a natural tendency afterwards to be conservative, hoarding hard-won — but easily lost — political capital.
So, with each new challenge — the looting, the first pullback from Fallujah, the reprieve given Sadr — the administration hesitated. Understandably it was afraid to lose broad public support for the conflict, or to restart a war already won, since that would only incite an inherently hostile media that had been temporarily muzzled, but not defanged, by an astounding victory.
Apparently, after the announcement of “Mission Accomplished,” and leading up to the 2004 elections, no one wanted CNN broadcasting live footage from a new siege of Hue in Fallujah. In the process, public support for the war was insidiously and slowly lost, by an Abu Ghraib or a grotesque televised beheading unanswered by a tough American retaliation against the militias. The terrorists learned from our own domestic calculus that each month of televised IEDs was worth one or two U.S. senators suddenly dropping their support for the war.
Fifth, the Sunni border-nations wanted Saddam defanged, but never removed entirely. Muslim lamentations for Saddam’s slaughter of his own were always trumped by his usefulness in keeping down the Shiite fanatics, both in Iran and at home. But the enemy of my enemy in the Middle East is not always my friend, so the Shiites did not instinctively thank the Americans who removed Saddam, or who gave them the franchise.
The result was Orwellian: We allowed the downtrodden Shiite majority one person / one vote, and in exchange Sadr and his epigones were freed to kill us; we championed Sunni minority-rights and got in exchange Sunni tolerance for Baathist and al Qaeda killers.
Through it all, competent and professional American diplomats and soldiers who sought peace for both were libeled by both. Islamists, taking their talking points from the American and European Left, complained about conspiracies and expropriations on the part of those who had in fact ensured that Iraqi petroleum would, for the first time, be subject to public transparency and autonomy.
Sixth, Europeans who profited from Saddam probably wanted Saddam gone, but wanted the U.S. to do it. In the same manner they profit from Iran, yet want Iran quieted and the U.S. to do it. In the same manner they want terrorists rounded up, jailed, and renditioned, but the U.S. to do it.
All the while a Chirac abroad was whipping up the Arab Street, or a Schroeder was awarding financial credits to Germans doing business with the Iranian theocracy, or a Spain or an Italy or a Germany was indicting the very American military and intelligence officers who protected them.
The European philosophy on the Iraq war was to play the anti-American card to envious European crowds all the way up to that delicate point of irrevocably offending the United States. Then, but only then, pull back abruptly with whimpers about NATO, the Atlantic relationship, and Western solidarity, just before a riled America gets wise and itself pulls away from these ingrates for good.
Somehow a war to remove a mass-murdering psychopath — a psychopath with his hands on a trillion-dollars worth of petroleum reserves, with a long record of attacking four of his neighbors and of harboring and subsidizing terrorists — who, once removed, would be replaced with the first truly consensual government in the history of the Arab Middle East, ended up being perceived, for all the reasons cited above, as something it was not.
But if we have an orphaned war that is dubbed lost, it nevertheless can still be won. None of our mistakes has been fatal; none is of a magnitude unprecedented in past wars; all have been cataloged; and few are now being repeated. We now understand the politics of our Iraqi odyssey, with all its triangulations, and the ruthlessness of our enemies.
Not arguments, rhetoric, pleading, or money right now can save the democracy in Iraq. The U.S. military alone, in the very little remaining time of this spring and summer, can give Iraqis the necessary window of security and confidence to govern and protect themselves, and thereby to allow the donors, peacekeepers, compromises, and conferences to follow.
If General Petraeus can bring a quiet to Baghdad, then all the contradictions, mistakes, cheap rhetoric, and politicking of the bleak past will mean nothing in a brighter future.
National Review Online - http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=MjdkOTA2NmUxYzkwY2U4NzcyYTYwN2VhZDdmMTkxOWQ=
-
Organization Makes Progress Defeating IEDs
Mar 06, 2007
BY Jim Garamone
WASHINGTON (Army News Service, March 6, 2007) - Improvised explosive devices are to the war in Iraq what artillery and mortars were to World War II, Korea and Vietnam - the main troop killers, a retired general working to defeat the deadly devices said here yesterday.
Retired Army Gen. Montgomery Meigs, head of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, briefed media on progress in countering IEDs in Iraq and Afghanistan.
"IEDs are hybrid, idiosyncratic things that go off in surprising ways," Meigs said. "But all they are, are the enemy's fire system. The question is, 'How do we deal with this fire system?' And we spend a lot of time on that."
In previous wars, the enemy delivered artillery shells through guns. In Iraq, the enemy delivers the ordnance "through the labyrinth of structures in that society," Meigs said.
But the coalition is making progress against the improvised weapons. "We have gotten better at it, (and we) know more what our enemies are doing," Meigs said.
He added that his organization also has done a better job of finding appropriate technologies to counter these weapons.
Car bombs and IEDs are responsible for about 65 percent of the coalition casualties in Iraq, he said. More than 2,500 Americans have died as a result of hostile fire in Iraq, according to DoD officials.
But advances in defending against these weapons are working. The ratio of wounded to killed in Iraq is 9 to 1, Meigs said. In Vietnam, that ratio was 2 to 1, and in Korea it was 2.5 to 1.
Progress is also shown in the number of IEDs found and disarmed and the number of IEDs that go off but have no effect. The number of Americans being killed and wounded by the weapons has remained about the same, even though the enemy is planting far more of them, Meigs said. "The enemy is putting out four to five times the number of IEDs to cause one casualty that they did three and a half years ago," he said.
The number of attacks is going up because the opportunity is there. "It's very easy for a young, unemployed, angry male to collect $300 for setting out an IED and (video)taping it," Meigs said. "There's a lot of money on the street, so market factors also play a part."
Terrorists have built Internet sites that give step-by-step instructions in how to build and plant IEDs. Saddam Hussein bought millions of tons of ammunition and stashed it all over the country. All this makes it easy for enemies to "weaponize leftover ammunition," Meigs said.
The general said the best strategy is to attack the IED network. His organization helps fund that effort. Thirteen percent of the organization's $3.5 billion fiscal 2006 budget was dedicated to offensive operations. That number jumped to 31 percent of the budget in fiscal 2007, he said.
Meigs would not get specific about offensive actions his organization is funding. "It's the most sensitive part of what we do, and saying that would give (the enemy) an idea into our thinking, and they could counter it," he said.
Improving defensive capacity is also important. The Joint IED Defeat Organization is working on improvements to armor, hardening targets, and so on. The budget for defensive operations went from 78 percent in 2006 to 62 percent of the Joint IED Defeat Organization's budget in 2007.
Intelligence is at the heart of defeating the IED threat, and the Iraqi people are coming forward and giving intelligence on bomb makers in their neighborhoods. "My gut says more people are tired of the craziness and want to stop it," Meigs said.
The trend line in tips is very important, and it has constantly moved up. In September 2006, there were 4,250 tips. In October, that number rose to 7,467. In January 2007, 10,070 tips came in. "If that was a stock, you'd want to be in it," Meigs said.
The general said his organization is working to get ahead of the enemy's tactics. He said his analysts are able to look at intelligence on the bombs and see what is new and different and quickly get that information back to the war zone. His organization can recommend changes to tactics, techniques and procedures, but the ultimate decision on those has to come from the services' training centers. "But we are wired into that," he said.
The organization will continue to work on defeating roadside bombs and will continue to refine intelligence collection and information distribution, Meigs said.
"If you want to stop artillery, you don't try to stop the artillery coming out of the sky, you go after the fires system," he said. "In conventional warfare during the Cold War, one of the advantages you wanted to take away from the enemy was the overbearing artillery advantage they had.
"The same is alive and well in this kind of warfare," he continued. "You have to go after the networks that make (and fund) this stuff."
(Jim Garamone writes for the American Forces Press Service.)
-
Iraqi Energy: What Might Work
Summary
A newly announced Royal Dutch/Shell consortium is likely to launch Iraq's first post-Hussein energy project.
Analysis
Energy supermajor Royal Dutch/Shell announced March 14 that it has formed a consortium with a number of Turkish energy firms to bid on natural gas projects in Iraq, with the intent of building a natural gas line from Iraqi Kurdistan to Turkey's Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. With Iraq's new oil law edging toward realization, this Shell consortium will likely be the first to launch a successful major energy project in post-Hussein Iraq.
Of the many obstacles to an Iraqi energy renaissance, the most significant are:
The ongoing insurgency that attacks petroleum infrastructure. In the north those attacks cluster around the Sunni Arab city of Baiji, through which all energy output for the Kurdish regions flows.
Turkish opposition to anything that grants the Kurds additional power. Turkey fears that an economically viable, politically coherent Iraqi Kurdistan could spark separatist tendencies among its own -- and far larger -- Kurdish population.
The unwillingness of the world's supermajors to jump into an insurgent-wracked, politically shattered Iraq, where investment would exist in a legal vacuum.
Because it avoids two of these problems, the new consortium will most likely prove to be the first big success project.
First, the project does not aim to tap existing infrastructure but instead export natural gas -- not oil -- north to Turkey. Though the new pipeline will parallel the often-bombed Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline, it will only do so for the length that runs on Turkish territory. Shell and its partners will construct the line to avoid Baiji and take a more direct route to the Turkish border that runs exclusively through insurgent-free, and relatively well-patrolled, Iraqi Kurdistan. Incidentally, Saddam Hussein built the oil pipeline through Baiji specifically to frustrate any Kurdish efforts to attain autonomy.
Second, the Turks are involved from the get-go and at a state level. Turkey's energy minister himself has hinted that he has taken part in the negotiations and the most likely partners for Shell are two state companies: oil company Turkiye Petrolleri and pipeline firm Botas. This deal explicitly has involved Ankara directly in the decision making. Additionally, the natural gas will be flowing to Turkey directly, so not only will Turkey be economically benefiting from the deal, it will have legal, economic, political and geographic control over its success. Turkey might still consider grinding the Kurds into dust to be the best option, but barring that, full control over the Kurds' economic fortunes is a close second. Ironically, the deal paves the way for an awkward codependence between the Turks (who will use the natural gas) and the Kurds (who will sell it).
That just leaves the issue of supermajor tentativeness. With the first two issues addressed, Shell seems far more willing to take the plunge, and it certainly sports the technology, experience and capital to make the deal successful. Now the only obstacle remaining is for the Kurds and the rest of the Iraqis to hammer out a final oil law. Though that task is both gargantuan and complex and is not to be belittled, it does not diminish the likelihood that the Shell-led consortium will be Iraq's best bet for a successful and substantial energy project.
stratfor.com
-
2 terrorists killed as charge explodes in Diala
Baaquba- 2 Iraqi terrorists blew themselves up as they were planting an explosive charge on one of the main highways in Muqdadiya, a police source said.
"Two men blew themselves up as they were planting an explosive device on one of the main highways in Muqdadiya district", the source, who asked not to be named, told the independent news agency.
Troops score small victories
A battalion hits the streets, befriends Iraqis who help nab suspects
Combat Outpost War Eagle, Iraq — The high-value target was shacked up with a prostitute.
That, at least, was the story provided by an Iraqi man who approached this combat outpost dug into the muddy east bank of the Tigris River in Baghdad. The target was Usama Kokez, a Sunni accused of leading a kidnapping ring that had executed several Shiite civilians.
The tip sent airborne soldiers through the dark streets of Baghdad, their night-vision goggles on and their headlights off. For a battalion of 82nd Airborne paratroopers that is part of the "surge" of 21,500 troops being dispatched to stabilize Baghdad and Al Anbar province, the Kokez tip was one small return on an investment.
Kokez was a prized quarry. According to battalion officers, he had joined Al Qaeda against his father's wishes. Either he or his brother Amar, also an alleged Al Qaeda member, killed the father in order to join, the officers said.
A phalanx of Humvees carrying 58 soldiers sped through the streets, deserted because of the city's overnight curfew. In the back of one Humvee sat the Iraqi informant, his face masked. Next to him was a masked interpreter nicknamed Bob.
The assault team, in full combat armor with automatic rifles and shotguns, burst from their vehicles. The assault team crashed through the front gate and door. In the half-lighted living room were three frightened women and two squalling infants. Questioned by Spc. Andrea Pierce, 21, an intelligence soldier, the women at first said they had never heard of Usama Kokez.
"Stop lying to me!" Pierce yelled, her face flushed beneath her helmet.
Ultimately, the women admitted that Kokez lived there. In fact, they were hardly prostitutes. They were Kokez's wife, sister and mother.
Pierce hauled Kokez's wife, Rhagad, 22, into a side room and strip-searched her. The woman was wearing two bras. Tucked inside were two 9-millimeter pistol ammunition magazines and a cellphone. Inside her panties was a second cellphone, Pierce said.
In the alley behind the house, barely visible in the shadows, Sgt. Billy Davidson's Humvee formed part of the security cordon. A barefoot man in a dark tracksuit tumbled over a wall and landed next to the vehicle.
Davidson and two other soldiers piled out and pointed their M-4 automatic rifles at him. The man said something in Arabic. Davidson told him in English to shut up and get on his belly.
"He was crying like a baby," Davidson said later.
In the man's pocket was an ID card. It was Usama Kokez.
Kokez, 29, lean and curly-haired, was cuffed and blindfolded. The cellphones and ammo clips were later put inside plastic bags and strung around his neck to be photographed as evidence.
1 insurgent killed, 53 captured in operations
TAJI - U.S. forces killed one insurgent and arrested 18 in Taji, north of Baghdad. Also, Iraqi Army forces captured 31 insurgents in Baghdad on Friday. Iraqi Police captured 4 al Qaeda militants in Ramadi.
Iraqi soldiers captured 6 "rogue" militiamen involved in "death squad" activities in Baghdad's Sadr City. And a senior figure of an al Qaeda-led militant group was also arrested on Friday .
FOREIGN TERRORISTS CAPTURED IN IRAQ RAIDS
BAGHDAD, Iraq – U.S. troops captured 15 terrorists during operations Sunday targeting al-Qaida in Iraq.
Early morning operations conducted by U.S. troops led to the capture of a foreign terrorist leader and one of his associates.
4 terrorists were captured near Karmah and 3 terrorists were captured in Fallujah, all with ties to al-Qaeda in Iraq. 3 al-Qaeda terrorists were captured in Al Asad with 7 more terrorists captured in Taji.
Iraqi Army, attack helicopters capture 32 Insurgents
OPERATIONS BASE SPEICHER, Iraq – Iraqi soldiers from the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 4th Division completed operations today in Duluiyah where they captured 8 terrorists. U.S. Soldiers from Company A, 3rd Bn, 8th Cavalry, and attack helicopters assisted the Iraqi-led operations.
In Bayji more than 400 Iraqi army soldiers from the 2nd Brigade captured more than 24 terrorists during operations. Paratroopers from the 1st Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division, provided quick reaction assets.
“The Iraqis are taking great strides in leading and planning operations,” said Bryan Owens, commander of the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division.
Iraqi Forces target insurgent training network, capture 9
Baghdad – Special Iraqi Army Forces captured 9 insurgents during operations March 11 in Abaychi.
The operation targeted an insurgent network. The network reportedly trains insurgents and terrorists from Ansar al Sunna, Al Qaeda in Iraq and other insurgent groups. The network reportedly provides training on using and employing the SA-7 antiaircraft missile.
Iraqi Forces captured 9 additional insurgent supporters for further questioning. Iraqi Forces captured the suspects during multiple, simultaneous raids.
During entry into one objective, ground forces came under small arms fire from
the roof-top of a nearby building. Iraqi Forces identified one hostile fighter firing at
ground forces and engaged the threat with well-aimed fire, killing the gunman. Another hostile fighter firing at ground forces was wounded by Iraqi Forces.
During movement to another objective, a group of terrorists established a possible ambush position. The group remained in position, displaying clear hostile intent against ground forces. The group, an immediate threat to ground forces, was engaged by a U.S. fighter, resulting in 6 killed.
Iraqi Police capture 7 insurgents during operations near Fallujah
Baghdad – Iraqi Police Forces captured 7 insurgents during operations
March 11 near Fallujah.
The suspects are allegedly responsible for conducting kidnappings and murders
of Iraqi civilians they believe are working with Coalition force members. The insurgents are also implicated in hijacking and robbing Iraqi civilians in order to help finance their violent and criminal activities.
One terrorist killed, another wounded while emplacing explosives
TIKRIT, Iraq – One terrorist was killed and another seriously wounded near Balad, Iraq, when an IED they were attempting to emplace detonated on them Saturday.
U.S. troops capture man, weapons after taking fire
RADWANIYAH, Iraq — U.S. Soldiers arrested a man and confiscated a weapons cache in a house near here March 10.
Soldiers of the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) received fire from a house. They searched the house and found a cache.
Among the weapons found were a Mauser rifle, 38 rounds for the Mauser, four
AK-47 fully loaded magazines, 300 loose AK-47 rounds, and copper wire (typically used to trigger improvised explosive devices). The Soldiers detained the resident of the house.
27 TERRORISTS CAPTURED THROUGHOUT IRAQ
BAGHDAD, Iraq – U.S. troops killed one terrorist and captured 27 terrorists during operations targeting foreign fighters and al-Qaeda in Iraq networks.
Operations in the vicinity of Taji on Saturday led to one terrorist killed and 18 terrorists captured including an alleged member of the al-Qaeda associated Islamic State of Iraq. The terrorist was killed after he began firing on ground forces.
During a raid Friday night in Mosul, U.S. troops captured 3 terrorists involved in foreign fighter facilitation and possible involvement in the recent Badush prison break.
U.S. troops also conducted several raids Saturday morning in Mosul. 3 terrorists were captured in this raid. Another raid led to the detention of 2 more terrorists. U.S. troops also conducted a raid in Ramadi Saturday morning, capturing 1 terrorist.
Iraqi Army stops car bomb from entering Sadr City
BAGHDAD – Iraqi army soldiers successfully aided in stopping a vehicle-borne
explosive device from entering Sadr City, March 10.
A vehicle attempting to maneuver through an Iraqi army checkpoint just south of
the Sadr City security district was halted by soldiers manning a checkpoint from 1st
Battalion, 1st Brigade, 9th Iraqi Army Division.
After stopping, the explosives in the vehicle were detonated by the suicide bomber. Iraqi army soldiers manning the checkpoint reported 6 Iraqi Army soldiers were killed.
Iraqi Army captures 10 and secures weapons, ammunition
KALSU, Iraq – Iraqi Army Soldiers with the support of U.S. paratroopers conducted an operation that resulted in 10 terrorists captured and the discovery of a weapons cache in Baghdad.
Soldiers of the 6th Iraqi Army Division with support from 4th Brigade Combat Team (Airborne), 25th Infantry Division captured 10 insurgents near Arab Jabour.
The cache consisted of six AK-47s, 13 AK-47 ammunition magazines, one rifle, U.S. $600, three motorcycles, and 13 cellular phones. This was the third raid in one month lead by these Iraqi Army personnel as the main effort and coalition forces in support.
Iraqi Security Forces Captures 3 Members of IED Cell During Raid
Baghdad – Special Iraqi Security Forces captured 3 members of an
improvised explosive device cell during air assault operations north of Baghdad. The suspects are allegedly responsible for IED and car bombing attacks in the area.
The cell members are implicated in detonating a car bomb near a water factory in Tarmiyah, and for targeting an Iraqi police station two weeks ago. They were also involved in emplacing IEDs against convoys in the area.
Insurgent cell leader captured
KIRKUK, Iraq – U.S. troops captured a financier of insurgent activities in
the Kirkuk province during an operation March 7.
Soldiers from the 25th Infantry Division conducted the morning mission and captured an indvidual responsible for collecting and distributing funds to support insurgent attacks against security forces and U.S. troops.
Suspected AQ Media Emir, alleged "Butcher", 15 others captured in raids
BAGHDAD, Iraq – U.S. troops killed one terrorist and captured 16 terrorists including an alleged al-Qaeda media emir during raids Friday morning throughout Iraq.
In Mosul, U.S. troops captured an al-Qaeda related suspect known as “The Butcher” who is allegedly responsible for numerous kidnappings, beheadings, and suicide operations in the Ramadi and Mosul areas. U.S. troops captured five other terrorists and killed one terrorist during the raid.
During operations in Fallujah, U.S. troops captured two terrorists with ties to al-Qaeda.
Northeast of Karmah, an al-Qaeda media emir was captured along with seven others. They are believed to be part of an al-Qaeda courier network.
U.S. Soldiers Foil Roadside Bomb Emplacement
CAMP TAJI, Iraq – U.S. Soldiers foiled an attempt by insurgents to emplace an improvised explosive device March 7 near Taji market.
Several insurgents were spotted and engaged by Camp Taji tower guards as the terrorists low-crawled to an area on a major highway where they could emplace the roadside bomb.
Once fired upon, the insurgents fled before they had time to fully emplace the explosive device.
Soldiers from the 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment quickly arrived at the site and secured the area, found and recovered two 130 millimeter rounds, which were later disposed of by explosives experts.
Apaches engage, kill 2 dozen terrorists
CAMP STRIKER, Iraq – A combined operation between ground forces and Apache attack helicopters engaged and killed a platoon-sized element of enemy fighters west of the Baghdad Airport on Iraqi Highway 1.
A patrol from the 10th Mountain Division reported enemy tracer fire in the area. As they moved toward the firing, they detected armed insurgents in an ambush position along both sides of a canal road. A truck was parked nearby.
After clearing the area of friendly forces, the patrol called for close air support from nearby AH-64 Apache attack aircraft. The helicopter engaged the enemy fighters, killing 32 and destroying the truck, which had an anti-aircraft heavy machine gun mounted in the bed.
Seven terrorists killed during raid on suspected VBIED cell
BAGHDAD, Iraq – U.S. troops killed 7 terrorists during an operation Wednesday and captured 6 others today while targeting al-Qaeda in Iraq.
U.S. troops approaching the targeted area by helicopter received enemy fire from several vehicles. U.S. troops returned fire from the helicopter, killing 5 terrorists.
U.S. troops continued their mission and searched the targeted buildings and found a rocket-propelled grenade launcher, RPG rounds, and assault weapon magazines. They destroyed the weapons cache on the site to prevent further use by terrorists.
After clearing the targeted buildings, ground forces began receiving sniper and machine gun fire from another building. Ground forces returned fire killing 2 terrorists.
Today, 4 terrorists with alleged ties to IED attacks were captured in an operation northeast of Karmah. 2 more were captured near Al Qa’im in an operation targeting an al-Qaeda in Iraq associated weapons dealer.
24 terrorists captured throughout Iraq
BAGHDAD, Iraq – U.S. troops captured 24 terrorists during raids Wednesday morning targeting al-Qaeda in Iraq networks.
Ground forces caught 8 terrorists during a raid in Baghdad when they targeted a group involved in emplacement of vehicle-borne IEDs .
During a raid in Rutbah, U.S. troops caught 5 terrorists while targeting a weapons dealer who is known for providing IED–making material.
U.S. troops also captured 2 suspected terrorists in Samarra. Northeast of Karmah, U.S. troops captured 9 terrorists with ties to senior al-Qaeda in Iraq leadership.
Operation White Rockets nets two caches, two insurgents near Baghdad
KALSU, Iraq – Iraqi Army troops and U.S. paratroopers worked together to successfully complete “Operation White Rockets” March 6, finding two ammunition caches and capturing 2 insurgents.
Soldiers of the 6th Iraqi Army Division and U.S. paratroopers dismounted to clear out areas south of Baghdad.
The caches consisted of various amounts of homemade explosives, one 50-pound sack filled with a fine gray powder, one 15-foot length of pipe, two mortar sights, three bags of detonation cord and 100 rounds of 7.62 mm ammunition.
While clearing buildings, two insurgents were captured.
Strykers capture 22, secure ammunition and explosives
KALSU, Iraq – U.S. Soldiers captured 22 insurgent suspects and secured weapon and ammunition caches south of Baghdad. Soldiers of the 2nd Infantry Division conducted raids to capture known terrorists near Jabella, Iraq.
Besides the 22 men taken into custody, several caches were found. The caches consisted of one 60mm mortar round, two sticks of dynamite, nine feet of detonation cord, one set of desert camouflage uniform, three AK-47 ammunition magazines, three passports, one box of primers, two AK-47s, one 8mm round, two 8mm mortar fuses, and one rocket-propelled grenade.
One terrorist killed, two wounded south of Tikrit
TIKRIT, Iraq – One terrorist was killed and two were wounded by helicopters, just south of Tikrit when they were found removing munitions from a cache site.
Paratroopers were immediately dispatched to search the area. More than 600 mortar rounds and anti-tank mines with fuses were discovered. An explosive ordnance detachment conducted a controlled detonation of the munitions at the site.
Iraqi Army captures roadside bombers
KALSU, Iraq – Iraqi Army troops captured 3 men found with bomb-making
materials south of Baghdad Sunday.
Soldiers of the 6th Iraqi Army Division who work as partners with 4th Brigade (Airborne), 25th Infantry Divisioncaptured the 3 insurgents during a security patrol.
U.S. scout platoon defeats IED cell
SADR AL-YUSUFIYAH, Iraq — U.S. Soldiers killed 4 terrorists planting improvised explosive devices at a village near the banks of the Euphrates River.
The Scout Platoon of the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), discovered 5 terrorists emplacing IEDs and engaged them with small arms fire, killing
four of them. Two AK-47 assault rifles were recovered following the fire fight. The fifth member of the terrorist team fled.
-
GENERAL SEEKS ANOTHER BRIGADE IN IRAQ: The top US commander in Iraq has requested another Army brigade, in addition to five already on the way, as part of the controversial "surge" of American troops designed to clamp down on sectarian violence and insurgent groups, senior Pentagon officials said yesterday.
LBN
-
stratfor.com
Iraq: Al Qaeda's Desperate Moves
In a new video posted March 22 on the Internet, al Qaeda leader Abu Yahia al-Libi called for an end to the schisms between Iraqi Sunni Islamist insurgents and jihadists in Iraq, and for Iraq's Sunnis to reject any Saudi involvement in the conflict. The release is a clear effort by the jihadist network to mend fences with the Sunni insurgents. Significantly, it also demonstrates an al Qaeda attempt to raise al-Libi's public profile in preparation for him to assume a greater role among the network's next generation of leaders.
This release, by al Qaeda's As-Sahab media branch, marks the ninth time al-Libi has appeared in an al Qaeda video statement since February 2006. Only al Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri has appeared in more new videos, with a total of 12 over the same time period. The charismatic al-Libi, who has strong jihadist credentials, would indeed be a good choice to take on a more prominent role in al Qaeda. As an accomplished preacher, he has eulogized fallen jihadist leaders and called on jihadists to attack such prominent targets as the White House. In addition, he is a veteran of the war in Afghanistan, and was one of four prominent al Qaeda fighters who escaped U.S. custody while imprisoned at Bagram Air Base in July 2005.
In his latest statement, al-Libi specifically called on militant groups Ansar al-Sunnah Army, the Islamic Army in Iraq and the Army of the Mujahideen to put aside their differences with the other Sunni insurgent groups in the country. This call for unity comes amid open conflict between Sunni tribes and al Qaeda in Iraq, as demonstrated by the March 23 attack against the Sunni deputy prime minister in Baghdad and the attacks against civilians involving chlorine gas in predominantly Sunni Anbar province.
Al Qaeda, which is facing a significant threat from Iraq's Sunni nationalist and Islamist militant groups, is trying to achieve three goals: First, to maintain its parallel power structure in the Sunni areas; second, to emerge as the vanguard of the Sunni resistance to the United States and the Shiite-dominated Iraqi government at a time when Sunni political leaders are cutting deals; and finally, to embarrass the Iraqi Islamist militant groups by arguing that they are not following true Islamic teachings.
The latest attack against a moderate Sunni -- likely carried out by the jihadists -- clearly suggests these transnational elements are attempting to discourage Sunni leaders from following a moderate path and cooperating with the Iraqi government, or from accepting help from Saudi Arabia. Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Salam Zikam Ali al-Zubaie was wounded in the suicide bombing attack, which occurred during Friday prayers at a hall near Baghdad's Foreign Ministry. A week earlier, suspected jihadist insurgents detonated three vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices packed with chlorine west of Baghdad in Anbar province, including one near a prayer hall used by a Sunni cleric who had spoken out against al Qaeda.
These attacks and al-Libi's appeal are signs of desperation on the part of the jihadists in Iraq. Al Qaeda realizes its influence in the country is waning and is appealing to Iraqi and foreign jihadists to concentrate their efforts on the common enemy, rather than on one another. That al-Libi made an appeal that normally would have come from al-Zawahiri or Osama bin Laden suggests he is being groomed to take on a more important role in al Qaeda.
-
Second post of the evening:
Iran, Iraq: Tehran's Power Play on the Water
Summary
Iranian forces reportedly operating in Iraqi waters captured 15 sailors and members of the British marines on March 23 in the Persian Gulf. This incident comes as the U.N. Security Council is preparing to vote on a new resolution imposing additional sanctions on Iran for refusing to halt its controversial nuclear activities -- meaning it likely represents an Iranian attempt to underscore its resolve in the face of mounting international pressure. It also could complicate U.S.-Iranian negotiations on Iraq.
Analysis
Iranian forces reportedly operating in Iraqi waters captured 15 sailors and British marines on March 23. The British personnel reportedly had completed a successful inspection of a merchant ship around 10:30 a.m. local time when they and their two boats were surrounded and escorted by Iranian vessels into Iranian territorial waters.
The capture comes as the U.N. Security Council prepares to vote on a new resolution imposing sanctions on Iran for refusing to halt its controversial nuclear activities -- meaning it probably represents an Iranian attempt to underscore its resolve in the face of mounting international pressure. The incident also could complicate U.S.-Iranian negotiations on Iraq.
By capturing the British personnel, the Iranians are likely signaling that they are not about to be intimidated by the impending resolution the U.N. Security Council regarding Tehran's nuclear activities. The international body will vote March 24 on the resolution, which would slap additional sanctions on Iran, and is expected to pass.
The precise location of the incident remains unclear, though some reports indicate it may have taken place on the Shatt al Arab, a narrow waterway that empties into the Persian Gulf. The HMS Cornwall, the British navy frigate from which the British marines operated, would most likely have been too far away to intervene if the inspection actually took place in the waterway.
The Shatt al Arab lies between Iraq and Iran; its boundaries are often disputed by both countries. During the operation, the Cornwall would have been keeping tabs on every vessel in the vicinity. At the first sign of trouble, it would have sought to aid the boarding party. The Cornwall would have not been able to intervene in the narrow, shallow waters of the Shatt al Arab, however. Similarly, its Sea King helicopter would not have been able to do much more than observe as the Iranians escorted the British boats to Iranian territory.
This incident is similar to one in June 2004, when the Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in the Shatt al Arab seized eight British personnel and three British patrol boats being delivered to Iraqi forces. Iran claimed the boats were operating on its side of the waterway. The British personnel were released after four days, but Iran confiscated the patrol boats.
The capture of the British soldiers comes within days of the latest Iranian naval exercises in the Persian Gulf. It also comes as concerns mount in Tehran regarding U.S. moves to separate the nuclear and Iraq issues, leaving Tehran's unable to use the nuclear controversy as a bargaining chip in talks on Iraq. This, combined with concerns over developments in Iraq affecting Tehran's Iraqi Shiite allies likely pressed the clerical regime to escalate matters. Iran is also concerned that the United States is supplying Saudi Arabia with state-of-the-art naval military equipment. Meanwhile, the Arab states of the Persian Gulf said March 20 that they are planning to build two oil pipelines bypassing the Strait of Hormuz, thus depriving Iran of a chokehold on global oil shipments.
The Iranians have tried to demonstrate their ability to interdict traffic in the Persian Gulf. Just March 23, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said his country would use all its power to strike back at states threatening Iran. His remarks referred not just to physical attacks on Iran, but to efforts to isolate Iran politically and economically, too.
Most tellingly, former Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani's Friday sermon said that while the West can slap on additional sanctions, Iran will stand its ground. Rafsanjani, the No. 2 man in the Iranian government, generally has advised Tehran to exercise caution on both the nuclear and the Iraqi fronts. He also warned Washington that "In case the Americans enter a new scene, they will create a basic problem for themselves, for our country and for the entire region and I am confident that after some time following a tyrannical act, they will start analyzing and thinking as to where they have made a mistake."
Rafsanjani's hardened posture suggests Tehran wants to maintain its ability to exploit the nuclear card and block the U.S. move to separate the Iraqi and nuclear issues. While there has been first contact in terms of official and public dialogue between Washington and Tehran, it will be a long time before the two sides move toward some sort of accommodation on the issue, something which also explains Rafsanjani's tougher tone.
While Iran has much to gain in Iraq, it is also concerned by the splintering away of the Basra-based Fadhila party from the ruling Shiite coalition, the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA). The fracturing of the Shiite alliance hampers Tehran's ability to do business in Iraq, and Iran suspects the British, who are based in Basra, may be behind Fadhila's parting with the UIA. Going after British forces represents a low-cost operation in that the Iranians are unlikely to face any serious reprisal. And while the Iranians eventually will release the 15 British personnel, they will only do so after ensuring Tehran's message has been relayed.
stratfor.com
-
SAUDI KING SLAMS 'ILLEGITIMATE OCCUPATION' OF IRAQ: Saudi King Abdullah, whose country is a close US ally, on Wednesday slammed the "illegitimate foreign occupation" of Iraq in an opening speech to the annual Arab summit in Riyadh. "In beloved Iraq, blood is being shed among brothers in the shadow of an illegitimate foreign occupation, and ugly sectarianism threatens civil war," Abdullah said.
LBN
-
I asked about leaving Iraq, and here are two articles that I found today along with a synopsis. Haven't had a chance to read them yet, but I figured I'd post them.
SYNOPSIS
Two Ways Out
Iraq plans Bush won't consider, but his successor should.
By Fred Kaplan
Posted Monday, April 9, 2007, at 6:22 PM ET
Two new essays on how to disengage from Iraq are making the rounds, and though they hail from very different quarters (one, by Steven Simon, is published by the Council on Foreign Relations; the other, by Juan Cole, appears in the Nation), their conclusions are strikingly similar.
They both reject the Bush administration's stay-the-course surge and the congressional Democrats' insistence on a fixed timetable for withdrawal.
And they're also both utterly unlikely to receive the slightest attention from President George W. Bush.
In short, it seems, we're all stuck in a holding pattern, doomed to mere "muddling through," until somebody else sets up shop in the White House on Jan. 20, 2009—an unbelievable 651 days of mayhem to go.
The showdown over the emergency-spending bill—to which the House and Senate have attached requirements for troop withdrawals—isn't likely to settle matters. Bush's recent recess appointments of nominees that the Senate had been on the verge of rejecting—most notably Sam Fox, who heavily funded the Swift Boat Veterans in the 2004 presidential elections, as the new ambassador to Belgium—is a blatant signal that he has no interest in compromising with what he and Vice President Dick Cheney see as interlopers of executive authority. And over the weekend, key Democrats conceded that if Bush vetoed the bill, they'd drop their withdrawal clause rather than let the money for troops run out. (The concession merely acknowledged reality, but conceding so quickly surrenders whatever bargaining power they might have possessed.)
So, the $93 billion in emergency spending for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan will likely go forth with no strings attached.
The vast majority of Congress doesn't really want to impose a strict deadline for withdrawing most of the troops; the Democratic leadership went that route because it conformed to the one power that Congress has in these matters, the power of the purse. Most Democrats were trying to pressure the president into recognizing that his strategy isn't working and to link America's military commitment to some set of political benchmarks or conditions on the part of the Iraqis.
But George W. Bush has said over and over—and it's past time people realize that he generally does believe what he says—that he's not interested in attaching any conditions to his military commitment. (In the minds of Bush and Cheney, when it comes to war powers, the president is America.) He knows that he's right on Iraq, that History is on his side—end of discussion.
So, let's turn to the two withdrawal proposals with the longer-term aim of encouraging Bush's aspiring successors to look them over and think about adopting them as policy immediately upon entering the Oval Office.
Simon, a Middle East specialist and former National Security Council official, and Cole, professor of Middle East studies at the University of Michigan, have three common premises. First, the surge and the new counterinsurgency strategy almost certainly won't work, in part because the war is not just an insurgency war but also a civil war involving three sects (and divisions within those sects) against one another. Second, the U.S. occupation strengthens the insurgents and broadens their support at least as much as it weakens or isolates them.
However, third, they also emphasize that real hell would break out if U.S. forces suddenly or arbitrarily withdrew. Cole, while fiercely critical of Bush's policies on Iraq and much else, has long been adamant on this point—that there are degrees of civil war and Iraq hasn't begun to approach the full boil that an unconditional pullout might ignite.
Simon and Cole agree that the United States' main goals, at this point, should be to limit the effects of the civil war (which is already well in progress) and to keep the conflagration from spreading across the region.
It may seem paradoxical at first glance, but the best way to accomplish both goals may be to declare that we are leaving—that we're doing so on a timetable to be negotiated with the Iraqi government and in tandem with a separate, broader negotiation to end the civil war, but we are getting out.
The impending departure of U.S. troops may impel mainstream Sunni insurgents to turn against the jihadists. It may also compel the Sunni Arabs to take part in the negotiations on some national accord, knowing that American troops will not be there to protect them against Shiite or Kurdish reprisals. Cole further recommends holding new provincial elections so that the elected Sunni Arab representatives could stand in for guerrilla groups in the national talks, as Sinn Fein did in Northern Ireland.
However, both Simon and Cole emphasize, this step must be linked to active engagement with all of Iraq's neighbors. Cole lays out a scenario in which the United States and Britain work with the United Nations or the Organization of the Islamic Conference on this task, citing as a model the Bonn conference of December 2001 that helped install a unity government in Afghanistan. He envisions the Iraqi government arranging formal security commitments with the foreign ministers of Iran, Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. He also suggests inviting Saudi Arabia to reprise the role it played in brokering an end to the Lebanese civil war in 1989, noting the credibility that King Abdullah has with the Sunni Arabs—though he notes, in that case, the Iranians will have to play a similar role in helping to shut down the Shiite militias, especially Muqtada Sadr's Mahdi army.
Under this scheme, the United States would negotiate a phased withdrawal in tandem with these political settlements. Simon notes that some U.S. troops should stay—to secure Baghdad International Airport, the Green Zone, and access routes in between. He also urges a stepped-up U.S. military presence elsewhere in the Persian Gulf. Cole is not in favor of a total U.S. pullout, either. (Nor, it should be noted, are the House or Senate Democrats, who, in their bills, provide continued funding for troops involved in counterterrorism, training Iraqi security forces, and protecting U.S. personnel.)
Short of a transformation akin to that of Paul on the road to Damascus, it's hard to imagine George W. Bush even beginning to take these ideas seriously. That would entail admitting that victory isn't possible, legitimizing certain factions of the insurgency, and—most revolting of all—negotiating with Iran and Syria. Add them together, and it's just too many hurdles to leap.
If the next president puts something like these plans in motion, will they amount to anything? Neither Simon nor Cole is naive on this score. Both admit their proposals are gambles. For my own part, I doubt that the Iranians have a deep interest in a stable Iraq and wonder, with trepidation, what price they'd demand in exchange for helping to build one.
Still, as Cole puts it, "A withdrawal is risky, but on the evidence so far, for the U.S. military to remain in Iraq is a sure recipe for disaster."
Fred Kaplan writes the "War Stories" column for Slate
JUAN COLE ARTICLE
How to Get Out of Iraq
by JUAN COLE
[from the April 23, 2007 issue]
Both houses of Congress have now backed a timeline for withdrawal of US combat troops from Iraq in 2008, which George W. Bush has vowed to veto. He gives two major rationales for rejecting withdrawal. At times he has warned that Iraq could become an Al Qaeda stronghold, at others that "a contagion of violence could spill out across the country--and in time, the entire region could be drawn into the conflict." These are bogeymen with which Bush has attempted to frighten the public. Regarding the first, Turkey, Jordan and Iran are not going to put up with an Al Qaeda stronghold on their borders; nor would Shiite and Kurdish Iraqis. Most Sunni Iraqis are relatively secular, and there are only an estimated 1,000 foreign jihadis in Iraq, who would be forced to return home if the Americans left.
Bush's ineptitude has made a regional proxy war a real possibility, so the question is how to avoid it. One Saudi official admitted that if the United States withdrew and Iraq's Sunnis seemed in danger, Riyadh would likely intervene. Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul has threatened to invade if Iraq's Kurds declare independence. And Iran would surely try to rescue Iraqi Shiites if they seemed on the verge of being massacred.
But Bush is profoundly in error to think that continued US military occupation can forestall further warfare. Sunni Arabs perceive the Americans to have tortured them, destroyed several of their cities and to be keeping them under siege at the behest of the joint Shiite-Kurdish government of Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki. American missteps have steadily driven more and more Sunnis to violence and the support of violence. The Pentagon's own polling shows that between 2003 and 2006 the percentage of Sunni Arabs who thought attacking US troops was legitimate grew from 14 to more than 70.
The US repression of Sunnis has allowed Shiites and Kurds to avoid compromise. The Sunnis in Parliament have demanded that the excesses of de-Baathification be reversed (thousands of Sunnis have been fired from jobs just because they belonged to the Baath Party). They have been rebuffed. Sunnis rejected the formation of a Shiite super-province in the south. Shiites nevertheless pushed it through Parliament. The Kurdish leadership has also dismissed Sunni objections to their plans to annex the oil-rich province of Kirkuk, which has a significant Arab population.
The key to preventing an intensified civil war is US withdrawal from the equation so as to force the parties to an accommodation. Therefore, the United States should announce its intention to withdraw its military forces from Iraq, which will bring Sunnis to the negotiating table and put pressure on Kurds and Shiites to seek a compromise with them. But a simple US departure would not be enough; the civil war must be negotiated to a settlement, on the model of the conflicts in Northern Ireland and Lebanon.
Talks require a negotiating partner. The first step in Iraq must therefore be holding provincial elections. In the first and only such elections, held in January 2005, the Sunni Arab parties declined to participate. Provincial governments in Sunni-majority provinces are thus uniformly unrepresentative, and sometimes in the hands of fundamentalist Shiites, as in Diyala. A newly elected provincial Sunni Arab political class could stand in for the guerrilla groups in talks, just as Sinn Fein, the political wing of the Irish Republican Army, did in Northern Ireland.
The United States took a step in the right direction by attending the March Baghdad summit of Iraq's neighbors and speaking directly to Iran and Syria about Iraqi security. Now the United States and Britain should work with the United Nations or the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) to call a six-plus-two meeting on the model of the generally successful December 2001 Bonn conference on Afghanistan. The Iraqi government, including the president and both vice presidents, would meet directly with the foreign ministers of Iran, Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to discuss the ways regional actors could help end the war as the United States and Britain prepare to depart. Unlike the Baghdad summit, this conference would have to issue a formal set of plans and commitments. Recent Saudi consultations with Iranian leaders should be extended.
The Saudi government should then be invited to reprise the role it played in brokering an end to the Lebanese civil war at Taif in 1989, at which communal leaders hammered out a new national compact, which involved political power-sharing and demobilization of most militias. At Taif II, the elected provincial governors of Iraq and leaders of the major parliamentary blocs should be brought together. Along with the US and British ambassadors to Baghdad and representatives of the UN and the OIC, observers from Iraq's six neighbors should also be there.
Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah has credibility with Iraq's Sunnis, especially now that he has denounced the US occupation as illegitimate. They could trust his representations, which would include Saudi development aid in places like Anbar province. Since the Sunnis are the main drivers of violence in Iraq, it is they who must be mollified, bribed, cajoled and threatened into a settlement. The Shiites will have to demobilize the Mahdi Army and Badr Organization as well, and Iran will have to commit to working with the Maliki government to make that happen. A UN peacekeeping force, perhaps with the OIC (where Malaysia recently proffered troops), would be part of the solution.
On the basis of a settlement at Taif II, the US military should then negotiate with provincial authorities a phased withdrawal from the Sunni Arab provinces. The Sunnis will have to understand that this departure is a double-edged sword, since if they continued their guerrilla war, the United States could not protect them from Kurdish or Shiite reprisals. Any UN or OIC presence would be for peacekeeping and could not be depended on for active peace-enforcing. The rewards from neighbors promised at Taif II should be granted in a phased fashion and made dependent on good-faith follow-through by Iraqi leaders.
From all this the Sunni Arabs would get an end to the US occupation--among their main demands--as well as an end to de-Baathification and political marginalization. They would have an important place in the new order and be guaranteed their fair share of the national wealth. Shiites and Kurds would get an end to a debilitating civil war, even if they have to give up some of their maximal demands. The neighbors would avoid a reprise of the destructive Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, which killed perhaps a million people and deeply damaged regional economies. And by ending its occupation, the United States would go a long way toward repairing its relations with the Arab and Muslim world and thus eliminate one of Al Qaeda's chief recruiting tools. A withdrawal is risky, but on the evidence so far, for the US military to remain in Iraq is a sure recipe for disaster.
LINK TO STEVEN SIMON ARTICLE (47 pages)
http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/IraqCSR23.pdf
-
SB:
Ya shoulda read them first :lol: Although not devoid of lucid points, there a plenty of places where these pieces come up short e.g. the complete absence of any consideration of Iran and its nuke program.
=========
stratfor.com
Geopolitical Diary: A Snub and a Warning from Iran
Iran denied passage through its airspace to Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki while he was en route to Japan, members of al-Maliki's entourage disclosed on Sunday. Al-Maliki's aircraft had to be diverted to Dubai, where he waited at the airport for three hours for refueling and a new flight plan. On the same day, Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki warned Iraq that failure to secure the release of five of Iranian consular officials arrested in January in the northern Iraqi town of Arbil would adversely impact relations between the two neighbors.
While the Iranians appear to be directing their ire against Iraq's Shiite-dominated government, the intended recipient of these diplomatic signals is the U.S. government. Tehran knows that Washington, and not Baghdad, is really calling the shots in Iraq and is employing a two-pronged strategy. The United States is pressing ahead on the military front, not just with its surge policy but also with operations in Iraq's Shiite south. On the diplomatic front, Washington wants a second public meeting involving U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Mottaki to take place early next month. In fact, Rice last week openly said that she would want to engage in bilateral talks with her Iranian counterpart.
Given Washington's bi-level strategy, Tehran has to operate in a more or less reciprocal fashion. This would explain the move against al-Maliki, which was designed to send a message to Washington that Tehran is not intimidated by the U.S. success in getting al-Maliki to crack down against Shiite militias. In fact, the Iranians are likely signaling that the United States should not view al-Maliki's decision to assist with the U.S. plan as much of a victory. By forcing the diversion of the prime minister's aircraft, Tehran sends the message that Washington is betting on a weak horse.
The Iranians can afford to use al-Maliki in such a way. Pro-Iranian Iraqi Shia constitute the largest group within the Iraqi government. It is not as if al-Maliki and his faction, Hizb al-Dawah, have the freedom to assume an anti-Iranian posture. Al-Maliki is indeed a weak prime minister and is not really the head of his party -- which in any case does not enjoy the kind of influence within the Iraqi Shiite community as either Iran's main ally, the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, or the al-Sadrite Bloc. The party's rival faction -- Hizb al-Dawah Tandheem al-Iraq, which controls the national security, trade, and education ministries as opposed to the single Cabinet position held by al-Maliki's faction -- is also much closer to Tehran.
More importantly, the decision to snub al-Maliki allows the Iranians to underscore their own unpredictability and willingness to do the unexpected, in order to throw a monkey-wrench into the American plan for Iraq.
It is therefore not a coincidence that radical Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr -- currently residing in Iran -- issued a call for his Mehdi Army to target U.S. forces instead of fighting Iraqi security forces. He also urged the security forces to disassociate themselves from U.S. troops. The Iranians, having released the British naval personnel they captured in March, now want to see the return of their own five consular officials detained by U.S. forces in January. This is all the more important because Tehran also wants to see next month's meeting with Rice take place -- which becomes difficult to do without securing the release of the five detained officials.
Tehran is reminding the United States that it has the ability to badly mess up the Iraqi chessboard. In saying this, Iran hopes not only to get Washington to release its officials, but also to get the Bush administration to back off from trying to weaken Iran's position in Iraq. The question now is what the American response will be.
-
Juan Cole is a Saudi funded jihad apologist disguised as an academic. No credibility in my book.
-
From today's WSJ:
Iraq in the Balance
In Washington, panic. In Baghdad, cautious optimism.
BY FOUAD AJAMI
Wednesday, April 11, 2007 12:01 a.m. EDT
BAGHDAD--For 35 years the sun did not shine here," said a man on the grounds of the great Shia shrine of al-Kadhimiyyah, on the outskirts of Baghdad. I had come to the shrine at night, in the company of the Shia politician Ahmed Chalabi.
We had driven in an armed convoy, and our presence had drawn a crowd. The place was bathed with light, framed by multiple minarets--a huge rectangular structure, its beauty and dereliction side by side. The tile work was exquisite, there were deep Persian carpets everywhere, the gifts of benefactors, rulers and merchants, drawn from the world of Shi'ism.
It was a cool spring night, and beguilingly tranquil. (There were the echoes of a firefight across the river, from the Sunni neighborhood of al-Adhamiyyah, but it was background noise and oddly easy to ignore.) A keeper of the shrine had been showing us the place, and he was proud of its doors made of teak from Burma--a kind of wood, he said, that resisted rain, wind and sun. It was to that description that the quiet man on the edge of this gathering had offered the thought that the sun had not risen during the long night of Baathist despotism.
A traveler who moves between Baghdad and Washington is struck by the gloomy despair in Washington and the cautious sense of optimism in Baghdad. Baghdad has not been prettified; its streets remain a sore to the eye, its government still hunkered down in the Green Zone, and violence is never far. But the sense of deliverance, and the hopes invested in this new security plan, are palpable. I crisscrossed the city--always with armed protection--making my way to Sunni and Shia politicians and clerics alike. The Sunni and Shia versions of political things--of reality itself--remain at odds. But there can be discerned, through the acrimony, the emergence of a fragile consensus.
Some months back, the Bush administration had called into question both the intentions and capabilities of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. But this modest and earnest man, born in 1950, a child of the Shia mainstream in the Middle Euphrates, has come into his own. He had not been a figure of the American regency in Baghdad. Steeped entirely in the Arabic language and culture, he had a been a stranger to the Americans; fate cast him on the scene when the Americans pushed aside Mr. Maliki's colleague in the Daawa Party, Prime Minister Ibrahim Jaafari.
There had been rumors that the Americans could strike again in their search for a leader who would give the American presence better cover. There had been steady talk that the old CIA standby, former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, could make his way back to power. Mr. Allawi himself had fed these speculations, but this is fantasy. Mr. Allawi circles Arab capitals and is rarely at home in his country. Mr. Maliki meanwhile has settled into his role.
In retrospect, the defining moment for Mr. Maliki had been those early hours of Dec. 30, when Saddam Hussein was sent to the gallows. He had not flinched, the decision was his, and he assumed it. Beyond the sound and fury of the controversy that greeted the execution, Mr. Maliki had taken the execution as a warrant for a new accommodation with the Sunni political class. A lifelong opponent of the Baath, he had come to the judgment that the back of the apparatus of the old regime had been broken, and that the time had come for an olive branch to those ready to accept the new political rules.
When I called on Mr. Maliki at his residence, a law offering pensions to the former officers of the Iraqi army had been readied and was soon put into effect. That decision had been supported by the head of the de-Baathification commission, Ahmed Chalabi. A proposal for a deeper reversal of the de-Baathification process was in the works, and would be announced days later by Mr. Maliki and President Jalal Talabani. This was in truth Zalmay Khalilzad's doing, his attempt to bury the entire de-Baathification effort as his tenure drew to a close.
This was more than the political traffic in the Shia community could bear. Few were ready to accept the return of old Baathists to government service. The victims of the old terror were appalled at a piece of this legislation, giving them a period of only three months to bring charges against their former tormentors. This had not been Mr. Maliki's choice--for his animus toward the Baath has been the driving force of his political life. It was known that he trusted that the religious hierarchy in Najaf, and the forces within the Shia alliance, would rein in this drive toward rehabilitating the remnants of the old regime.
Power and experience have clearly changed Mr. Maliki as he makes his way between the Shia coalition that sustains him on the one hand, and the American presence on the other. By all accounts, he is increasingly independent of the diehards in his own coalition--another dividend of the high-profile executions of Saddam Hussein and three of the tyrant's principal lieutenants. He is surrounded by old associates drawn from the Daawa Party, but keeps his own counsel.
There is a built-in tension between a prime minister keen to press for his own prerogatives and an American military presence that underpins the security of this new order. Mr. Maliki does not have the access to American military arms he would like; he does not have control over an Iraqi special-forces brigade that the Americans had trained and nurtured. His police forces remain poorly equipped. The levers of power are not fully his, and he knows it. Not a student of American ways--he spent his years of exile mostly in Syria--he is fully aware of the American exhaustion with Iraq as leading American politicians have come his way often.
The nightmare of this government is that of a precipitous American withdrawal. Six months ago, the British quit the southern city of Amarrah, the capital of the Maysan Province. It had been, by Iraqi accounts, a precipitous British decision, and the forces of Moqtada al-Sadr had rushed into the void; they had looted the barracks and overpowered the police. Amarrah haunts the Iraqis in the circle of power--the prospect of Americans leaving this government to fend for itself.
In the long scheme of history, the Shia Arabs had never governed--and Mr. Maliki and the coalition arrayed around him know their isolation in the region. This Iraqi state of which they had become the principal inheritors will have to make its way in a hostile regional landscape. Set aside Turkey's Islamist government, with its avowedly Sunni mindset and its sense of itself as a claimant to an older Ottoman tradition; the Arab order of power is yet to make room for this Iraqi state. Mr. Maliki's first trip beyond Iraq's borders had been to Saudi Arabia. He had meant that visit as a message that Iraq's "Arab identity" will trump all other orientations. It had been a message that the Arab world's Shia stepchildren were ready to come into the fold. But a huge historical contest had erupted in Baghdad, the seat of the Abbasid caliphate had fallen to new Shia inheritors, and the custodians of Arab power were not yet ready for this new history.
For one, the "Sunni street"--the Islamists, the pan-Arabists who hid their anti-Shia animus underneath a secular cover, the intellectual class that had been invested in the ideology of the Baath party--remained unalterably opposed to this new Iraq. The Shia could offer the Arab rulers the promise that their new state would refrain from regional adventures, but it would not be easy for these rulers to come to this accommodation.
A worldly Shia cleric, the legislator Humam Hamoudi who had headed the constitutional drafting committee, told me that he had laid out to interlocutors from the House of Saud the case that this new Iraqi state would be a better neighbor than the Sunni-based state of Saddam Hussein had been. "We would not be given to military adventures beyond our borders, what wealth we have at our disposal would have to go to repairing our homeland, for you we would be easier to fend off for we are Shiites and would be cognizant and respectful of the differences between us," Mr. Hamoudi had said. "You had a fellow Sunni in Baghdad for more than three decades, and look what terrible harvest, what wreckage, he left behind." This sort of appeal is yet to be heard, for this change in Baghdad is a break with a long millennium of Sunni Arab primacy.
The blunt truth of this new phase in the fight for Iraq is that the Sunnis have lost the battle for Baghdad. The great flight from Baghdad to Jordan, to Syria, to other Arab destinations, has been the flight of Baghdad's Sunni middle-class. It is they who had the means of escape, and the savings.
Whole mixed districts in the city--Rasafa, Karkh--have been emptied of their Sunni populations. Even the old Sunni neighborhood of Adhamiyyah is embattled and besieged. What remains for the Sunnis are the western outskirts. This was the tragic logic of the campaign of terror waged by the Baathists and the jihadists against the Shia; this was what played out in the terrible year that followed the attack on the Askariya shrine of Samarra in February 2006. Possessed of an old notion of their own dominion, and of Shia passivity and quiescence, the Sunni Arabs waged a war they were destined to lose.
No one knows with any precision the sectarian composition of today's Baghdad, but there are estimates that the Sunnis may now account for 15% of the city's population. Behind closed doors, Sunni leaders speak of the great calamity that befell their community. They admit to a great disappointment in the Arab states that fed the flames but could never alter the contest on the ground in Iraq. No Arab cavalry had ridden, or was ever going to ride, to the rescue of the Sunnis of Iraq.
A cultured member of the (Sunni) Association of Muslim Scholars in Baghdad, a younger man of deep moderation, likened the dilemma of his community to that of the Palestinian Arabs since 1948. "They waited for deliverance that never came," he said. "Like them, we placed our hopes in Arab leaders who have their own concerns. We fell for those Arab satellite channels, we believed that Arab brigades would turn up in Anbar and Baghdad. We made room for al Qaeda only to have them turn on us in Anbar." There had once been a Sunni maxim in Iraq, "for us ruling and power, for you self-flagellation," that branded the Shia as a people of sorrow and quietism. Now the ground has shifted, and among the Sunnis there is a widespread sentiment of disinheritance and loss.
The Mahdi Army, more precisely the underclass of Sadr City, had won the fight for Baghdad. This Shia underclass had been hurled into the city from its ancestral lands in the Marshes and the Middle Euphrates. In a cruel twist of irony, Baathist terror had driven these people into the slums of Baghdad. The Baathist tyranny had cut down the palm trees in the south, burned the reed beds of the Marshes. Then the campaign of terror that Sunni society sheltered and abetted in the aftermath of the despot's fall gave the Mahdi Army its cause and its power.
"The Mahdi Army protected us and our lands, our homes, and our honor," said a tribal Shia notable in a meeting in Baghdad, acknowledging that it was perhaps time for the boys of Moqtada al-Sadr to step aside in favor of the government forces. He laid bare, as he spoke, the terrible complications of this country; six of his sisters, he said, were married to Sunnis, countless nephews of his were Sunni. Violence had hacked away at this pluralism; no one could be certain when, and if, the place could mend.
In their grief, the Sunni Arabs have fallen back on the most unexpected of hopes; having warred against the Americans, they now see them as redeemers. "This government is an American creation," a powerful Sunni legislator, Saleh al-Mutlak, said. "It is up to the Americans to replace it, change the constitution that was imposed on us, replace this incompetent, sectarian government with a government of national unity, a cabinet of technocrats." Shrewd and alert to the ways of the world (he has a Ph.D. in soil science from a university in the U.K.) Mr. Mutlak gave voice to a wider Sunni conviction that this order in Baghdad is but an American puppet. America and Iran may be at odds in the region, but the Sunni Arabs see an American-Persian conspiracy that had robbed them of their patrimony.
They had made their own bed, the Sunni Arabs, but old habits of dominion die hard, and save but for a few, there is precious little acknowledgment of the wages of the terror that the Shia had been subjected to in the years that followed the American invasion. As matters stand, the Sunni Arabs are in desperate need of leaders who can call off the violence, cut a favorable deal for their community, and distance that community form the temptations and the ruin of the insurgency. It is late in the hour, but there is still eagerness in the Maliki government to conciliate the Sunnis, if only to give the country a chance at normalcy.
The Shia have come into their own, but there still hovers over them their old history of dispossession; there still trails shadows of doubt about their hold on power, about conspiracies hatched against them in neighboring Arab lands.
The Americans have given birth to this new Shia primacy, but there lingers a fear, in the inner circles of the Shia coalition, that the Americans have in mind a Sunni-based army, of the Pakistani and Turkish mold, that would upend the democratic, majoritarian bases of power on which Shia primacy rests. They are keenly aware, these new Shia men of power in Baghdad, that the Pax Americana in the region is based on an alliance of long standing with the Sunni regimes. They are under no illusions about their own access to Washington when compared with that of Cairo, Riyadh, Amman and the smaller principalities of the Persian Gulf. This suspicion is in the nature of things; it is the way of once marginal men who had come into an unexpected triumph.
In truth, it is not only the Arab order of power that remains ill at ease with the rise of the Shia of Iraq. The (Shia) genie that came out of the bottle was not fully to America's liking. Indeed, the U.S. strategy in Iraq had tried to sidestep the history that America itself had given birth to. There had been the disastrous regency of Paul Bremer. It had been followed by the attempt to create a national security state under Ayad Allawi. Then there had come the strategy of the American envoy, Zalmay Khalilzad, that aimed to bring the Sunni leadership into the political process and wean them away from the terror and the insurgency.
Mr. Khalilzad had become, in his own sense of himself, something of a High Commissioner in Iraq, and his strategy had ended in failure; the Sunni leaders never broke with the insurgency. Their sobriety of late has been a function of the defeat their cause has suffered on the ground; all the inducements had not worked.
We are now in a new, and fourth, phase of this American presence. We should not try to "cheat" in the region, conceal what we had done, or apologize for it, by floating an Arab-Israeli peace process to the liking of the "Sunni street."
The Arabs have an unerring feel for the ways of strangers who venture into their lands. Deep down, the Sunni Arabs know what the fight for Baghdad is all about--oil wealth and power, the balance between the Sunni edifice of material and moral power and the claims of the Shia stepchildren. To this fight, Iran is a newcomer, an outlier. This is an old Arab account, the fight between the order of merchants and rulers and establishment jurists on the one side, and the righteous (Shia) oppositionists on the other. How apt it is that the struggle that had been fought on the plains of Karbala in southern Iraq so long ago has now returned, full circle, to Iraq.
For our part, we can't give full credence to the Sunni representations of things. We can cushion the Sunni defeat but can't reverse it. Our soldiers have not waged wars in Afghanistan and Iraq against Sunni extremists to fall for the fear of some imagined "Shia crescent" peddled by Sunni rulers and preachers. To that atavistic fight between Sunni and Shia, we ought to remain decent and discerning arbiters. To be sure, in Iraq itself we can't give a blank check to Shia maximalism. On its own, mainstream Shi'ism is eager to rein in its own diehards and self-anointed avengers.
There is a growing Shia unease with the Mahdi Army--and with the venality and incompetence of the Sadrists represented in the cabinet--and an increasing faith that the government and its instruments of order are the surer bet. The crackdown on the Mahdi Army that the new American commander, Gen. David Petraeus, has launched has the backing of the ruling Shia coalition. Iraqi police and army units have taken to the field against elements of the Mahdi army. In recent days, in the southern city of Diwaniyya, American and Iraqi forces have together battled the forces of Moqtada al-Sadr. To the extent that the Shia now see Iraq as their own country, their tolerance for mayhem and chaos has receded. Sadr may damn the American occupiers, but ordinary Shia men and women know that the liberty that came their way had been a gift of the Americans.
The young men of little education--earnest displaced villagers with the ways of the countryside showing through their features and dialect and shiny suits--who guarded me through Baghdad, spoke of old terrors, and of the joy and dignity of this new order. Children and nephews and younger brothers of men lost to the terror of the Baath, they are done with the old servitude. They behold the Americans keeping the peace of their troubled land with undisguised gratitude. It hasn't been always brilliant, this campaign waged in Iraq. But its mistakes can never smother its honor, and no apology for it is due the Arab autocrats who had averted their gaze from Iraq's long night of terror under the Baath.
One can never reconcile the beneficiaries of illegitimate, abnormal power to the end of their dominion. But this current re-alignment in Iraq carries with it a gift for the possible redemption of modern Islam among the Arabs. Hitherto Sunni Islam had taken its hegemony for granted and extremist strands within it have shown a refusal to accept "the other." Conversely, Shia history has been distorted by weakness and exclusion and by a concomitant abdication of responsibility.
A Shia-led state in Baghdad--with a strong Kurdish presence in it and a big niche for the Sunnis--can go a long way toward changing the region's terrible habits and expectations of authority and command. The Sunnis would still be hegemonic in the Arab councils of power beyond Iraq, but their monopoly would yield to the pluralism and complexity of that region.
"Watch your adjectives" is the admonition given American officers by Gen. Petraeus. In Baghdad, Americans and Iraqis alike know that this big endeavor has entered its final, decisive phase. Iraq has surprised and disappointed us before, but as they and we watch our adjectives there can be discerned the shape of a new country, a rough balance of forces commensurate with the demography of the place and with the outcome of a war that its erstwhile Sunni rulers had launched and lost. We made this history and should now make our peace with it.
Mr. Ajami, a 2006 recipient of the Bradley Prize, teaches at Johns Hopkins and is author of "The Foreigner's Gift: The Americans, the Arabs, and the Iraqis in Iraq" (Free Press, 2006).
-
Thanks for the heads up. I dumped the articles just before rushing out for a meeting.
-
***Juan Cole is President of MESA***
http://www.jihadwatch.org/archives/004791.php
Jihad Watch Board Vice President Hugh Fitzgerald introduces you to the Middle East Studies Association:
"Mesa" or "MESA" is the acronym of the Middle East Studies Association, the professional group of those who at American universities and colleges are charged with the responsibility of teaching the American young, those trusting, innocent, infinitely malleable young, with learning about the Middle East -- which is to say, about Islam.
As an organization, MESA has over the past two decades slowly but surely been taken over by apologists for Islam. Many of these are Muslims, and many are non-Muslims. The latter includes quite a few people who are married to Muslims, or who, to get along with their colleagues (and remember, the most political place in the entire universe is a university faculty, and that institution which, alas, Randall Jarrell failed to immortalize (if memory serves), the Departmental Meeting. Junior faculty owe everything to, and therefore must curry favor with, senior faculty. If that means signing an anti-divestment petition that has the mighty empire of Israel, fons et origo of everything that has ever gone wrong with the Muslim and Arab states and peoples, then so be it. Funny thing about being a trimmer, however, is that the mere act of signing something you really don't believe helps to convince you that you really do believe it, otherwise you would have to come to terms with your own cravenness, your own pusillanimity. And no one wants to do that.
The method of apologetics is simple: concentrate on Israel, or the more tendentious reification of an alternative state, "Israel/Palestine," keep clear of such topics as land ownership under the Ottoman Empire, the actual demographics of the Ottoman vilayets and sanjak that made up what became Mandatory Palestine, don't even whisper that more than half of the Jews in Israel had never left the Middle East but lived as dhimmis in the Yemen (virtual chattel slaves), in Iraq, in North Africa, in Syria and Egypt -- because officially, all Israeli Jews are "European colonialists"; finally, do not under any conditions mention that a goodly number of the ancient "Palestinian people" (invented post-1967) are the descendants of Arabs and Berbers who were veterans of Abd el-Kader's campaign, Egyptians who came with Mehmet Ali, Muslims from the Balkans and Bulgaria and other Ottoman territories in Europe who were transferred, en masse, by the Turkish government as the high tide of Islam receded -- for that area (a/k/a in the West as "Palestine") was by far the most desolate and under-populated in the Ottoman Empire, always excepting the Empty Quarter of Arabia).
The apologetics consists in hardly ever discussing Jihad, dhimmitude, or indeed even introducing the students to Qur'an, Hadith, and Sira. Sometimes an expurgated version -- the Michael Sells horror -- is assigned to students The Hadith and Sira are never mentioned. Books on the level of Armstrong and Esposito are assigned, and feelgood nonsense like Maria Rosa Menocal's The Ornament of the World.
But not everyone who is a member of MESA is completely awful. There are a few reasonable people, some of the Ottomanists and suchlike. MESA is a little like the Soviet Union of Writers, which had thousands of members and hardly a real writer. When one considers Michael Cook, Patricia Crone, Bernard Lewis, and a few others, on one scale, and the assorted Khalidis and Dabashis and Massads and Bahranis in the other, you can guess which side kicks the beam. No member of MESA has done as much to make available to a wide public important new work on Muhammad, on the origins of the Qur'an, and on the history of early Islam, as that lone wolf, Ibn Warraq. No one has done such work on the institution of the dhimmi as that lone louve, Bat Ye'or. It is an astounding situation, where much of the most important work is not being done in universities, because many university centers have been seized by a kind of Islamintern International. Willy Munzenberg could have learned a lot from Edward Said, who was only begetter, with his Orientalism for a good deal of this "post-colonial hegemonic discourse" stuff that permanently stunts the mental growth.
Recent presidents of MESA have included Lisa Anderson, the well-versed and compleat academic (and beyond, what with the Councils on this and the Committees on that, all very impressive if you are impressed with that sort of thing) operator, Dean of the School of International Blah, and Joel Beinin and Laurie Brand, about whom you may google, and Rashid Khalidi, and -- has Juan Cole served his term, or is that coming up? Well, you get the dreary picture
In any case, even MESA has its constraints. For example a few years ago it had to award, it could not avoid awarding, a prize for the best book of the year to Michael Cook for his 720-page Commanding Right and Prohibiting Wrong in Islam, even though Cook is suspiciously learned and has written a book, perhaps too warily not permitted to be reprinted, with Patricia Crone (who herself is very good, but also, at times, as in her treatment of Christoph Luxenberg, not quite as brave as she should be).
Why do I refer to MESA as "Mesa Nostra"? Because it is a kind of "Our Thing" conspiracy, but not nearly as appealing, as folkloric, as the Mafia, or the 'ndrangheta, or the camorra, for in Italy the malavita has three main components. Everyone knows everyone else; the maneuvering, the politicking, the fear that the hot breath of Campus Watch, and perhaps even Congress, will take away all that government money that the Khalidis and the Dabashis et al. wanted to use to spread their anti-Israel anti-American and "why-do-they-hate-us?" and "it is only a handful-of-extremists" message, and how can that mean old U.S. government not want to fund that, huh?
"Mesa Nostra" is my little invention. It communicates the doubtfulness, and more, of the enterprise. It has nothing to do with real scholarship. Ask yourself this: could Joseph Schacht, the great authority on Mohammedan law, or Arthur Jeffery, an authority on Islam, on Muhammad, even on aspects of the lexicon of the early Qur'an, both of them once stars in Columbia's middle-eastern firmament, have been hired today -- at Columbia, or indeed, anywhere that the plotters of Mesa Nostra rule the roost?
The Arabs have poured money into various Georgetown Centers for this and that (because that's where the power is, that's where the foreign service officers are trained, that's where Peter Bechtold, who gave a cheerleading address to the last meeting of Mesa, heads the "Foreign Policy Institute" and was so instrumental in drawing up that farcical list for General Vines). They have also bought up chairs: the nice "Guardian of the Two Holy Places" professorship of law that Frank Vogel holds, and a King Abdul Aziz Thisorthat, and so on. Oh, they get their money's worth. They do, indeed they do.
So that's why I call it "Mesa Nostra." Everybody should.
-
http://hotair.com/archives/2007/04/12/the-troops-in-fallujah-speak/
Hear it from the Marines....
-
Geopolitical Diary: Iraq's Worsening Crisis of Governance
The al Qaeda-claimed suicide bombing in the Iraqi parliament cafeteria on Thursday killed three members of parliament -- two Sunnis and a Kurd -- and wounded numerous others, including several Shiite parliament members.
By targeting the parliament building, which is located in the maximum-security Green Zone in Baghdad, the jihadists are trying to prove that the United States is unable to provide protection to any of the three principal ethno-sectarian groups in Iraq. Given the pressure on the Bush administration to withdraw troops from Iraq and the dire need of each communal group for U.S. protection, this attack was well timed. Moreover, it makes a mockery of the U.S. surge policy and the Baghdad Security Plan.
But though critically timed, the attack should not be viewed as evidence of jihadist dominance in Iraq. In fact, the militants are trying to counter the threats from the mainstream Sunni community and nationalist insurgent groups that have turned against them. The militants also are keeping an eye on the intensifying U.S.-Iranian back-channel negotiations because they fear the discussion will move toward a settlement on Iraq.
Al Qaeda realizes the only way it can block such a settlement is to create a crisis of governance, which could be realized if a large number of parliamentarians were eliminated. The jihadists know all too well the vulnerabilities within the fledgling Iraqi political system because they have seen how difficult it has been to establish the legislature and the Cabinet.
The deaths of a large number of parliamentarians would divert the attention of the Iraqi government and the United States toward filling the political vacuum -- a process that would only further exacerbate existing political tensions within the country.
Iraq's largest Sunni political bloc already is threatening to leave the government because it feels the Baghdad Security Plan has not contained Shiite militias. And the Sunnis believe they have upheld their end of the bargain by going after the jihadists operating within their midst.
However, the Shia, especially the radical al-Sadrite bloc, also are threatening to leave the coalition government unless their demand for a U.S. troop withdrawal timetable is met. It is no secret that the Shia are perhaps the most internally divided of all of Iraq's communal groups, which is why Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's government has been unable to make much progress with plans to disband Shiite militias -- a key prerequisite in containing the Sunni insurgency.
Meanwhile, another complex communal fault line is emerging in the northern Kurdish territory over the future of Kirkuk, where Shiite and Sunni Arabs could end up facing off with the increasingly assertive Kurdish community. Further complicating the situation in northern Iraq is the aggressive posture toward Turkey of Kurdistan Regional Government leader Massoud Barzani. Barzani has issued more than one statement warning Ankara that if it tries to intervene in northern Iraq in an effort to go after Turkish Kurdish separatist groups that Iraqi Kurds will cause trouble in Turkey's southeastern Kurdish areas.
On Thursday Turkey's military chief announced a major offensive against Kurds within Turkish borders and asked the government for permission to send troops into northern Iraq. Barzani's warnings and the resulting escalation of tensions has fellow Kurdish leader and Iraqi President Jalal Talabani worried, which would explain why he has tried to placate Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, saying he regrets Barzani's comments.
Talabani's reaction to Barzani's statements is indicative of the rivalry between the two principal Kurdish leaders and their respective groups. Barzani knows that Talabani will not be around for long because of his advanced age and declining health, and is angling to emerge as the top leader of Iraqi Kurds -- moves that will only exacerbate intra-Kurdish struggles.
Given the various moving parts that form Iraq and the multilevel conflicts in which they are engaged, it must be questioned how much stability can be derived from a U.S.-Iranian accommodation on Iraq, which is another messy affair altogether.
stratfor.com
-
A discouraging piece from today's NY Times-- an often suspect source:
Attacks Surge as Iraq Militants Overshadow City
By RICHARD A. OPPEL Jr.
Published: April 16, 2007
BAQUBA, Iraq — They maneuver in squads, like the American infantrymen they try to kill. One squad fires furiously so another can attack from a better position. They operate in bad weather, knowing American helicopters and surveillance drones are grounded. Some carry G.P.S. receivers so mortar teams can calculate the coordinates of American armored vehicles. They kidnap and massacre police officers.
The New York Times
The Sunni guerrillas and extremists who now overshadow this city demonstrate a sophistication and lethality born of years of confronting American military tactics. While the “surge” plays out in Baghdad just 35 miles to the south, Baquba has emerged as a magnet for insurgents from around the country and, perhaps, the next major headache for the American military.
Some insurgents have moved into Baquba to escape the escalation in Baghdad. But the city has been attracting insurgents for years, particularly after American officials in Baghdad proclaimed it and surrounding Diyala Province relatively pacified over a year ago and drew down their troop presence.
When 70 insurgents broke out of a Mosul jail in March, for example, escapees from Chad, Yemen, Syria and Afghanistan were apprehended here, the Iraqi police said. And Sunni fighters continue to heed calls by insurgent leaders to converge here.
It is impossible to say how many insurgents are in Baquba now. Using a broad definition that comprises not just those who actively fight, but also those who place bombs and others paid by insurgents, some military officials put the number around 2,000. It is a nasty stew that includes former members of the Saddam Hussein army and paramilitary forces, the Fedayeen; angry and impoverished Sunni men; criminal gangs; Wahhabi Islamists; and foreigners.
While most insurgents here are not as hardened, that is similar to the numbers in Falluja in 2004, before a bloody Marine offensive to retake the city, said Lt. Col. Scott Jackson, deputy head of the provincial reconstruction team in Diyala, who fought in Falluja.
As the insurgent ranks have swelled, attacks on American troops have soared. The 5,000-member brigade that patrols Diyala Province has had 44 soldiers killed in five months, more than twice the number who died in the preceding year.
On the ground in Baquba, it is not hard to see why. Despite recent seizures of stockpiles, the insurgents have a ready supply of artillery shells and material to make bombs, the biggest killer of American troops here. Some bombs destroy American vehicles. Some are used to booby-trap houses to crash down on Americans. Some are used in larger battle plans: Before overrunning an Iraqi Army outpost south of Baquba, guerrillas laid bombs on the road that Iraqi and American forces would later use to try to rescue the outpost. The minefield blocked the reinforcements, and the Iraqi soldiers at the outpost fled.
The guerrillas seem increasingly well organized and trained. An insurgent force trying to overrun an American outpost in southern Baquba was repelled only after American soldiers fired more than 2,000 Coke-bottle-size rounds from Bradley fighting vehicles and 13,000 rounds from M-240 machine guns.
“They were firing from every direction, trying to get us to concentrate on one spot while the other guys were maneuvering,” said Cpl. Bill McGrath, who said the M-240 barrels glowed cherry red and had to be swapped out a half-dozen times. “These were well-trained military types, not like the guys who shoot tanks with AK-47s. A lot of these guys we never saw. We’d just see muzzle flashes.”
The tactics reflect the skill and resolve of the insurgency here, soldiers say. “To say the guys we are fighting are any less smarter than me, that would be crazy,” said Lt. Col. Morris Goins, commander of the 1-12 Combined Arms Battalion.
The Sunni groups seem to be cooperating like mob families, with ever-shifting alliances. Colonel Goins likens it to the HBO series “The Sopranos.” “We’ll work together today, but when they are no longer of any value,” he said, they part company.
They are capable of disciplined and sustained operations. In early March, a guerrilla force chased a four-man American sniper team through palm groves around the Diyala River for more than two hours, after cutting off the Americans’ escape routes. The snipers were cornered in a sharp bend of the river, officers said, before helicopters finally flew in to rescue them.
=========
Some are purely fanatical. American forces on the main road in western Baquba reported their astonishment during a night in which, over the course of an hour and 15 minutes, they gunned down four teams of guerrillas trying one after the other to plant a bomb in the same spot.
There are many reasons for the mayhem. Diyala and Baquba had significant Shiite and Sunni populations. Shiite-dominated security forces in the city inflamed tensions by persecuting Sunnis, but remain ill prepared to fight the insurgents without support of American forces. Basic government services like food and fuel deliveries have collapsed.
Sunni extremists operate with an extraordinary ruthlessness that terrorizes residents into submission. And Baquba has always had a heavy population of former Baathists and Fedayeen, providing a sympathetic backdrop for the insurgency. Some fighters still wear black Fedayeen uniforms, American officers say.
“Our city has become ruins, even its people,” said one Baquba resident, Mohammed al-Zaidi, 34. “We have no hope to live for.”
Colonel Jackson said he believed that the largest portion of insurgents were disgruntled men or others who just needed money. The rest are homegrown Sunni insurgents, Wahhabis, foreigners and their rivals, Shiite militiamen. Falluja, he said, had a significantly higher proportion of hardened and skilled fighters.
However, he added, “the core of the insurgents in Baquba are as well trained as they were in Falluja.”
Fighters from the Mahdi Army, the Shiite militia largely loyal to Moktada al-Sadr, the anti-American cleric, have also flooded north from Baghdad and now control villages west of Baquba and north of Sadr City. The police chief of Khalis, a city controlled by the Mahdi Army, was arrested by American forces in March for sectarian wrongdoing.
Thousands of Shiites have been killed or displaced in Baquba. But the roots of the gruesome toll that Sunni killers have taken here is partly a consequence of Shiite aggression in Baghdad, where Shiite death squads drove Sunnis out. Many angry Sunnis sought refuge in Baquba, and helped fuel the insurgency.
The human disaster that unfolded in Baquba was a mirror image of much of Baghdad — Sunni death squads wiping out Shiite families. The Shiite-dominated central government in Baghdad responded by sending a new Iraqi Army commander who arrested Sunnis with no evidence, while the recently fired provincial police chief stocked his ranks with Shiite Mahdi militiamen.
American soldiers cited repeated instances of Iraqi troops or police officers terrorizing Sunnis in Diyala. The Iraqi forces’ conduct induced some Sunnis to turn to the insurgency for protection, American officers said. Iraqi lawmakers in Baghdad continue to block provincial elections that would give Sunni Arabs — a majority in Diyala, but one that largely boycotted the last provincial elections — a real stake in government.
As the insurgency has swelled in Baquba, many soldiers here described an American force spread astonishingly thin. The 5,000-member Third Brigade Combat Team of the First Cavalry Division is based in Baquba. But its forces have responsibility over a wide region in Diyala, which is about the size of Maryland, and parts of neighboring Salahuddin Province.
American commanders began a strategy here similar to the new security plan in Baghdad, pushing soldiers into small forward bases deep in insurgent territory.
The troops say that before reinforcements arrived it had essentially been left up to a few dozen foot soldiers and a few tanks from Company B of the 1-12 Battalion to patrol from eastern Baquba to Zaganiya — an insurgent-dominated region of hundreds of thousands of people. “The takeaway was that we had freakin’ next to nothing” for an area with many terrorists, said Capt. Pete Chapman, the company commander.
With areas like Zaganiya receiving little attention, insurgent ranks grew unchecked. Eight of the 300 soldiers in the Fifth Squadron of the 73rd Cavalry Regiment have been killed near Zaganiya since they arrived in March to secure the village. The squadron has been sweeping the area northeast of Baquba, while the Fifth Battalion of the 20th Infantry Regiment rushed north from Taji in March to reinforce Baquba.
==============
(Page 3 of 3)
A number of officers said additional battalions were still needed for new patrol bases and operations. None would speak for the record. The senior American commander in Diyala, Col. David Sutherland, said he believed there were enough troops in Baquba now.
The Iraqi Insurgency At one newly built outpost in Baquba, nicknamed Disneyland, soldiers staff lookouts and sniper posts and sleep on cots. They say they control little outside the tall concrete barriers. “You see anybody out there with binoculars, you light them up!” Sgt. Gary Rojas barked on a radio to American snipers one recent afternoon, after an Iraqi insurgent bullet struck the second floor.
Later, Iraqi and American troops walked out of Disneyland, sprinted alongside a wall on the deserted street and then broke into a house 200 yards away. They found the sniper’s nest on the second floor, along with a shell casing. A perfect spot for a sniper, Sergeant Rojas said. The unit climbed into a Bradley to go search another nearby house. First Lt. Karim Branford ordered a move back to the outpost, fearing a trap, before they had gone two blocks from it. “I’m not going to take guys into a baited ambush,” he said.
The Americans said the Iraqis performed well. But the Iraqi soldiers said that most Iraqis assigned to the outpost had fled, kicking back some of their pay to commanders to avoid punishment. Colonel Sutherland said the Iraqi troops were accounted for.
The Iraqi soldiers fretted that the insurgents had better equipment compared with their two clips and rickety Kalashnikov rifles. Like Baquba’s residents, they are intimidated. An Iraqi, Sgt. Raad Rashid, said his countrymen would flee if Americans abandoned the outpost. “Twenty minutes later we’d be gone,” he said. “They would surround this place and kill us.”
The insurgency’s remarkable ability to terrorize residents, killing those who help Americans while coercing others, is undeniably one of its biggest weapons. It appears to be well financed, too.
“Some guys will give you $300 to put this in a hole in the ground and attach a wire,” said John M. Jones, head of the provincial reconstruction team in Diyala, explaining how insurgents recruit bomb emplacers. “Where are the other incentives?”
With the combination of threats and money, Mr. Jones said, the insurgents’ offers are hard for residents to refuse. “You might not agree with the philosophy of what he’s saying, but he’s got the big guns, and they live in the same neighborhood. It’s you, your wife and kids. What can you do?”
Such intimidation makes progress impossible. “We are not able to make even baby steps,” he said. “I hope we’re laying the framework for future baby steps. Right now, I’d say we are pretty much frustrated.”
An Iraqi reporter for The New York Times contributed to this report. (Marc: Does this mean the NY Times never left the Green Zone?)
-
Crafty,
I'm sure that's exactly what that means.
-
Which is why Michael Yon et al are so important: http://dogbrothers.com/phpBB2/index.php?topic=1168.0
-
Second post of the day:
stratfor.com
----------
Iraq: Tehran's Shiite Housekeeping and U.S. Talks
Summary
Hours after six ministers belonging to radical Iraqi Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr's bloc pulled out of the government April 16, protesters in the oil-rich southern city of Basra led by al-Sadr's followers demanded the dismissal of the city's governor. These latest developments reveal a strategy by Iran to restore order in the Iraqi Shiite house to better manage its dealings with the United States regarding Iraq.
Analysis
Radical Iraqi Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr pulled six ministers out of the government led by Iraqi Shiite Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki on April 16, ostensibly in protest of al-Maliki's inability to set a timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. troops. Meanwhile, protesters in Basra led by al-Sadr's followers demanded the removal of the southern city's governor.
The events expose Tehran's efforts to regain control over the Iraqi Shia as it seeks leverage in its negotiations with Washington over Iraq.
Though calling for the "U.S. occupiers" to leave Iraq is a popular nationalist move, the reasons behind al-Sadr's political ploy run much deeper. Al-Sadr tried this gambit before in November 2006, when his followers boycotted parliament and ministries, also demanding a U.S. troop withdrawal. At the time, al-Sadr was focused on how to pressure al-Maliki to keep U.S. forces at bay ahead of an aggressive security crackdown targeting members of his Mehdi Army. After holding out for two months, al-Sadr realized there was nothing stopping the crackdown once Washington singled out his movement as the biggest obstacle to Iraq's stability and that he was better off preserving his political position while his militia faced the prospect of a destructive clash in Sadr City.
The U.S.-led security crackdown placed al-Sadr on the defensive, leaving the rebel leader with little choice but to flee to Iran for his own safety. While in Iran, the chinks in al-Sadr's armor were exposed as several of his commanders failed to heed his calls to stand-down, and engaged in violent clashes with U.S. forces. Al-Sadr was also forced to fire two senior lawmakers from his party when he learned the two met with Gen. David Petraeus, the commander of U.S. military forces in Iraq, during a dinner gathering. His distrust for his own party members was only enhanced when he had to ask al-Maliki on April 5 to suspend two members from his bloc after they backed a plan for the northern oil-rich city of Kirkuk that likely will see the city turned over to Kurdish control.
In an attempt to counter the unraveling of his movement, al-Sadr is now taking a calculated risk by threatening to break the already deeply fractured United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), the ruling Shiite Islamist coalition led by al-Maliki. Al-Sadr's 32 seats in parliament allow him to hold a majority in this coalition, giving him substantial bargaining power. The fourth-largest component of this coalition, the Fadhila party, recently left the UIA government, making al-Maliki all the more dependent on al-Sadrite parliamentarians. Though al-Sadr has only pulled out his ministers in this latest move, he is signaling he could just as easily withdraw completely from the government, depriving al-Maliki of his ruling coalition. Al-Sadr expects that the ruling Iraqi Shiite bloc will have little choice but to appease the rebel leader and allow his loyalists a more prominent role in the state security apparatus such that al-Sadr can preserve the Mehdi Army.
Al-Sadr's strategy is likely heavily influenced by his protectors in Iran. Al-Sadr does not see eye to eye on a number of issues with his Shiite brethren in Tehran, who have strong ties to his main rival, Abdel Aziz al-Hakim -- the leader of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), Iraq's most pro-Iranian Shiite party. But the Iranians shrewdly took advantage of al-Sadr's compromised position by acting quickly to provide sanctuary for the rebel leader when the U.S. crackdown intensified in Baghdad. Al-Sadr's increased dependence on the Iranian government adds to Tehran's leverage in its negotiations with the United States over Iraq in a variety of ways.
By demonstrating Iranian control over al-Sadr, Iran can make an offer to the United States to put a lid on al-Sadr and his militia as a gesture of goodwill when the time comes for Iran to offer a substantial concession to the Americans. Forging stronger ties with al-Sadr also works in Iranian interests to weed out the troublemakers within Iraq's severely fractured Shiite bloc -- one of the key obstacles to Iran's ability to consolidate its influence in Iraq.
Iran is fully aware that throughout Iraq's history, the Iraqi Shia have never managed to use their demographic majority to their advantage to dominate the Sunni faction. Under Sunni rule, the Iraqi Shia were largely shut out from government and security positions, and thus made up most of the business community in Iraq. The flow of money from commercial enterprises and oil smuggling in the south drove Iraqi Shiite interests, and created a highly self-interested, divided and competitive Shiite bloc.
In order for Iran to harness the strength of Iraq's Shiite majority, it first has to clean house. A big part of this Iranian campaign is to weaken the anti-Iranian Fadhila party, the dominant Shiite power in the oil-rich southern city of Basra. Fadhila, an offshoot of the al-Sadr movement, dominates Iraq's organized crime network in the south and has emerged from the post-Hussein anarchy as a strong player among Iraqi Shia. Fadhila members have grown accustomed to their control over Iraq's southern oil wealth, and will violently resist any Iranian attempt to take over these oil assets.
It comes as little surprise, then, that just hours after al-Sadr's ministers left the government, thousands of his followers carried out large-scale protests in Basra to demand the resignation of Basra Gov. Mohammed Mosbeh al-Waeli, a Fadhila member. The protesters also included SCIRI members, Fadhila's biggest opponent. The head of Fadhila, Member of Parliament Hussein al-Shimari, said he had seen government intelligence reports that revealed a scheme to assassinate al-Waeli and all of his family April 16. Al-Shimari on April 15 appealed to al-Sadr's followers to prevent these violent outbreaks as a show of good faith, and said the demonstration only aimed to contribute to the overall chaos in Basra by calling for raids on the local council and important buildings, such as banks and the South Oil Co. Fadhila party members have good reason to worry about the death threats against the Basra governor. Losing control over Basra would cripple Fadhila politically and financially, leaving Iran's proxies free to firm up their control over Iraq's oil assets in the south.
The recent behavior of al-Sadr's movement reveals three major points behind Iran's strategy for Iraq:
1. By unleashing the al-Sadrites against Fadhila, Iran aims to weaken its potential foes in the oil-rich south and create enough of a power vacuum that it can insert its more loyal allies.
2. The resignation of the six al-Sadrite ministers sends a wake-up call to Iraq's Shiite bloc to pull itself together and work out an effective power-sharing agreement, or else the U.S. hints of re-inserting a Sunni-dominated government in Iraq could become a reality.
3. The added instability in the south, combined with al-Sadr's move to give up his six ministry positions, allows the Iranians to signal to Washington that Tehran has the pieces in place to make it virtually impossible for the United States to reach a political accommodation in Baghdad that would allow for a U.S. exit strategy from Iraq.
Restoring order in the Iraqi Shiite house is a primary objective for the Iranians to centralize Shiite control across its western border. Until that happens, no major leaps will be taken in its negotiations with the United States over Iraq.
-
stratfor.com
Geopolitical Diary: U.S., Iran Lose from Major Changes in Baghdad
The al-Sadrite bloc pulled out of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's coalition government on Monday. This move is a function of intra-Shiite wrangling at the tactical level. The development also affects U.S.-Iranian relations and the stabilization of Iraq, but the question is whether it has brought the United States and Iran closer to a deal on Iraq or has had the opposite effect.
The biggest problem for the United States in Iraq remains radical Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr's movement. In 2004 al-Sadr's Mehdi Army fought battles with U.S. and Iraqi forces to gain recognition as a major Shiite political force and to establish a political presence in Baghdad.
Once in government, and after the eruption of Shiite sectarian attacks against Sunnis following the destruction of the Al Askariyah shrine in As Samarra in February 2006, the al-Sadrites became the major obstacle to containing the Sunni insurgency because of their hyper-indulgence in sectarian killings of Sunnis. And though it already was having trouble in trying to contain this Sunni insurgency, Washington faced an even bigger challenge when Mehdi Army attacks against Sunnis torpedoed negotiations with Sunni political principals.
Since many observers see the al-Sadrites as a major obstacle to U.S. efforts to stabilize Iraq, and are aware of the hostility between Washington and Tehran, most wrongly infer that the radical Iraqi Shiite Islamist movement is Iran's main proxy in Iraq. The reality is that al-Sadr also has been a problem for the Iranians. Because of its Arab/Iraqi nationalist tendencies and its rivalry with the most pro-Iranian Iraqi Shiite group -- the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) -- Iran has had a difficult time utilizing the al-Sadrite movement for its own goal of securing influence in Iraq.
To realize this goal, Iran knows it must either attain its objective through a Shiite-dominated strong central government in Baghdad or through an autonomous Shiite federal zone in southern Iraq that would be similar to the Kurdistan Regional Government in the north. The al-Sadrites pose a problem to both scenarios.
The establishment of an autonomous southern Shiite zone involves the creation of regional government that would be dominated by the SCIRI since it has a far better organizational setup in the nine Shiite majority governorates in the south. The al-Sadrite power base, on the other hand, would get divided between pockets in the south and in Baghdad -- which is why the al-Sadrites oppose this idea. But even under current arrangements, the al-Sadrites have been the key obstacle in preventing the ruling Shiite coalition, the United Iraqi Alliance, from emerging as a coherent Shiite political bloc -- a medium the Iranians need to pursue their agenda in Iraq.
Though Iran has indeed obtained short-term tactical benefits by playing the various Shiite factions against each other and by causing inter-faction rifts, a factionalized Iraqi Shiite community is a liability to Iranian interests. The al-Sadrites left the Cabinet to secure their own partisan goals, likely with Tehran's blessing. Iran needed this to happen in order to counter U.S. moves against the clerical regime. But eventually Iran must get al-Sadr to stop being a maverick and fall in line with the Iraqi Shiite establishment because instability within this community is dangerous for Tehran.
This is the point at which U.S. and Iranian interests begin to converge; both Washington and Tehran cannot afford to see the collapse of the current political arrangement. The Bush administration can no longer afford to start from scratch in forming a new coalition government. As for the Iranians, the current arrangement is the best it can expect from a Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad. It cannot get any better for Tehran but it can certainly get worse.
Therefore, Cabinet reshuffles in keeping with the current power-sharing mechanism are tolerable, but any changes to the basic political formula brought about by the withdrawal of one or more factions from the Cabinet and/or parliamentary coalition could be detrimental to both Washington and Tehran.
-
Today's LA Times:
THE CONFLICT IN IRAQ: A COUNCIL OF SHEIKS
Iraqi tribal chiefs forming an anti-insurgent party
The Sunni sheiks aim to set up a council and enter elections. They also seek to enhance U.S. troops' image.
By Chris Kraul, Times Staff Writer
April 20, 2007
RAMADI, IRAQ — A group of Sunni tribal leaders in beleaguered Al Anbar province said Thursday that it intended to form a national party to oppose insurgents such as Al Qaeda in Iraq and reengage with Iraq's political process.
The announcement came after 200 sheiks said to represent 50 tribes met here and agreed to form a provincial sheiks council and hold the first convention in May of their new party, called Iraq Awakening. Sheiks from three other provinces will attend, organizers said.
The driving force behind the new party, Sheik Abdul-Sattar abu Risha, said in an interview that the tribal leaders would be pushing a slate of candidates in Al Anbar provincial elections later this year, as well as in the next round of national parliamentary balloting, scheduled for 2009.
One purpose of the party, Sattar said, is to promote a better image of American-led forces "to the Iraqis here." He added that the tribes also would participate in a U.S.-backed effort to reestablish a court system in Ramadi, the provincial capital.
The sheik is a leader of the Abu Risha tribe that is part of the larger Dulaimi tribal confederation in Al Anbar. His grab for power has been resented by some. His base of support remains around Ramadi, although he has been trying to reach out to other branches of the Dulaimi tribe around the province. Still, his history remains the subject of speculation, and others are wary of him, even though they may seek nominal affiliation with his movement as tribal leaders move to battle Al Qaeda in Iraq and its affiliates.
U.S. military leaders here said they were cheered by the announcement because cooperation from sheiks in Al Anbar in recent months had contributed to a rise in Iraqi police and army recruitment and a sharp reduction in insurgent attacks on U.S. troops and their Iraqi allies.
After remaining neutral or in favor of the insurgency that followed the U.S.-led invasion in 2003, many Al Anbar sheiks eventually grew disenchanted due to the brutality of foreign-led militants. Sattar said he began organizing sheiks in September after his father and three brothers were killed by insurgents.
"The terrorists destroyed the network of people and how they communicate, and the new sheiks council is here to bring it back and fight the insurgents until they are out of the country," Sattar said.
Improved security in Al Anbar, for which the U.S. military gives strong credit to the evolving views of the region's sheiks, has been something of a bright spot in Iraq in recent months.
The sheiks, who have long served as cultural leaders here, felt marginalized by the political system imposed after the 2003 invasion. Some U.S. occupation officials viewed the sheiks and their hold over extended families as undemocratic.
Al Anbar Gov. Mamoun Sami Rasheed said Thursday that the sheiks marginalized themselves by refusing to participate in Iraq's 2005 elections and, in some cases, supporting the Al Qaeda in Iraq organization.
The sheiks in turn have mocked some of the provincial representatives for being absentee politicians with no local track record.
But some sheiks in Ramadi and other parts of Al Anbar have established closer links with U.S. armed forces since last year, when they began speaking out against the insurgency and Al Qaeda in Iraq.
With the sheiks' encouragement, Al Anbar tribes have contributed thousands of recruits to Iraq's security forces in recent months, enabling U.S.-led troops to hold and pacify parts of the restive province.
The number of insurgent attacks in Ramadi and its outlying areas has fallen to a fraction of what it was a year ago, said U.S. Army Col. John Charlton, commander of the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, who is overall military commander in the Ramadi area.
Sattar said the sheiks council would offer "full accountability for anyone in his tribe. Also they will know of any strangers — man, woman or child — who try to mix in their neighborhoods."
Analysts who lauded the sheiks' announcement as well as U.S. efforts to work with them cautioned that the political situation remained fluid.
"It's only now that the United States appears convinced of the need to build up local support against Al Qaeda," said Joost Hiltermann, a consultant with the International Crisis Group in Amman, the capital of Jordan. "What these people want is a restoration of Sunni power, or a preservation of certain privileges, or more simply, protection of their community from the Shiite majority and Iran."
Vali Nasr, a Middle East expert at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif., said the "most important result may not be in the battlefield but in producing new Sunni voices that Shiites and Kurds can negotiate with."
Michael O'Hanlon of the Brookings Institution in Washington said that improving U.S. relations with Sunni sheiks made "eminent sense" but that officials needed to be thinking about the "next step."
"We need better contacts among Sunnis for the purposes of negotiating an end to the civil war," he said, "and this could create an opportunity to create partners in the larger project while also serving an immediate need."
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
chris.kraul@latimes.com
Times staff writer Ned Parker in Los Angeles contributed to this report.
-
"Against [the] historical backdrop, two facts stand out about our collection of enemies in Iraq, with a particular focus on the ex-Ba'athists and the terrorists who produced the bulk of the violence over the conflict's first three years. First, they are a small group relative to the population within which they are found. And second, even by the standards of our nation's past enemies, they are a despicable lot... National pride should not of course keep us in a war we have indeed lost. But we should give the surge a chance, and consider a number of 'Plan Bs' if it fails, before giving up this important fight to this heinous foe in this crucial part of the world" -- Michael O'Hanlon, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, writing in the Washington Times.
-
1108 GMT -- IRAQ -- The body of Mohammad al-Issawi, a top al Qaeda leader in Iraq, has been identified by Multinational Forces (MNF) officials, the MNF said in an April 25 statement. Al-Issawi, who was known to have supplied weapons to insurgents and support an Iraqi car bombing network, was killed in a raid against insurgents April 20.
stratfor.com
-
NYTimes
By JAMES GLANZ
Published: April 29, 2007
In a troubling sign for the American-financed rebuilding program in Iraq, inspectors for a federal oversight agency have found that in a sampling of eight projects that the United States had declared successes, seven were no longer operating as designed because of plumbing and electrical failures, lack of proper maintenance, apparent looting and expensive equipment that lay idle.
The United States has previously admitted, sometimes under pressure from federal inspectors, that some of its reconstruction projects have been abandoned, delayed or poorly constructed. But this is the first time inspectors have found that projects officially declared a success — in some cases, as little as six months before the latest inspections — were no longer working properly.
The inspections ranged geographically from northern to southern Iraq and covered projects as varied as a maternity hospital, barracks for an Iraqi special forces unit and a power station for Baghdad International Airport.
At the airport, crucially important for the functioning of the country, inspectors found that while $11.8 million had been spent on new electrical generators, $8.6 million worth were no longer functioning.
At the maternity hospital, a rehabilitation project in the northern city of Erbil, an expensive incinerator for medical waste was padlocked — Iraqis at the hospital could not find the key when inspectors asked to see the equipment — and partly as a result, medical waste including syringes, used bandages and empty drug vials were clogging the sewage system and probably contaminating the water system.
The newly built water purification system was not functioning either.
Officials at the oversight agency, the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, said they had made an effort to sample different regions and various types of projects, but that they were constrained from taking a true random sample in part because many projects were in areas too unsafe to visit. So, they said, the initial set of eight projects — which cost a total of about $150 million — cannot be seen as a true statistical measure of the thousands of projects in the roughly $30 billion American rebuilding program.
But the officials said the initial findings raised serious new concerns about the effort.
The reconstruction effort was originally designed as nearly equal to the military push to stabilize Iraq, allow the government to function and business to flourish, and promote good will toward the United States.
“These first inspections indicate that the concerns that we and others have had about the Iraqis sustaining our investments in these projects are valid,” Stuart W. Bowen Jr., who leads the office of the special inspector general, said in an interview on Friday.
The conclusions will be summarized in the latest quarterly report by Mr. Bowen’s office on Monday. Individual reports on each of the projects were released on Thursday and Friday.
Mr. Bowen said that because he suspected that completed projects were not being maintained, he had ordered his inspectors to undertake a wider program of returning to examine projects that had been completed for at least six months, a phase known as sustainment.
Exactly who is to blame for the poor record on sustainment for the first sample of eight projects was not laid out in the report, but the American reconstruction program has been repeatedly criticized for not including in its rebuilding budget enough of the costs for spare parts, training, stronger construction and other elements that would enable projects continue to function once they have been built.
The new reports provide some support for that position: a sophisticated system for distributing oxygen throughout the Erbil hospital had been ignored by medical staff members, who told inspectors that they distrusted the new equipment and had gone back to using tried-and-true oxygen tanks — which were stored unsafely throughout the building.
The Iraqis themselves appear to share responsibility for the latest problems, which cropped up after the United States turned the projects over to the Iraqi government. Still, the new findings show that the enormous American investment in the reconstruction program is at risk, Mr. Bowen said.
-----------
Page 2 of 2)
Besides the airport, hospital and special forces barracks, places where inspectors found serious problems included two projects at a military base near Nasiriya and one at a military recruiting center in Hilla — both cities in the south — and a police station in Mosul, a northern city. A second police station in Mosul was found to be in good condition.
Skip to next paragraph
Reach of War
Go to Complete Coverage » The dates when the projects were completed and deemed successful ranged from six months to almost a year and a half before the latest inspections. But those inspections found numerous instances of power generators that no longer operated; sewage systems that had clogged and overflowed, damaging sections of buildings; electrical systems that had been jury-rigged or stripped of components; floors that had buckled; concrete that had crumbled; and expensive equipment that was simply not in use.
Curiously, most of the problems seemed unrelated to sabotage stemming from Iraq’s parlous security situation, but instead were the product of poor initial construction, petty looting, a lack of any maintenance and simple neglect.
A case in point was the $5.2 million project undertaken by the United States Army Corps of Engineers to build the special forces barracks in Baghdad. The project was completed in September 2005, but by the time inspectors visited last month, there were numerous problems caused by faulty plumbing throughout the buildings, and four large electrical generators, each costing $50,000, were no longer operating.
The problems with the generators were seemingly minor: missing batteries, a failure to maintain adequate oil levels in the engines, fuel lines that had been pilfered or broken. That kind of neglect is typical of rebuilding programs in developing countries when local nationals are not closely involved in planning efforts, said Rick Barton, co-director of the postconflict reconstruction project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a research organization in Washington.
“What ultimately makes any project sustainable is local ownership from the beginning in designing the project, establishing the priorities,” Mr. Barton said. “If you don’t have those elements it’s an extension of colonialism and generally it’s resented.”
Mr. Barton, who has closely monitored reconstruction efforts in Iraq and other countries, said the American rebuilding program had too often created that resentment by imposing projects on Iraqis or relying solely on the advice of a local tribal chief or some “self-appointed representative” of local Iraqis.
The new findings come after years of insistence by American officials in Baghdad that too much attention has been paid to the failures in Iraq and not enough to the successes.
Brig. Gen. Michael Walsh, commander of the Gulf Region Division of the Army Corps, told a news conference in Baghdad late last month that with so much coverage of violence in Iraq “what you don’t see are the successes in the reconstruction program, how reconstruction is making a difference in the lives of everyday Iraqi people.”
And those declared successes are heavily promoted by the United States government. A 2006 news release by the Army Corps, titled “Erbil Maternity and Pediatric Hospital — not just bricks and mortar!” praises both the new water purification system and the incinerator. The incinerator, the release said, would “keep medical waste from entering into the solid waste and water systems.”
But when Mr. Bowen’s office presented the Army Corps with the finding that neither system was working at the struggling hospital and recommended a training program so that Iraqis could properly operate the equipment, General Walsh tersely disagreed with the recommendation in a letter appended to the report, which also noted that the building had suffered damage because workers used excess amounts of water to clean the floors.
The bureau within the United States Embassy in Baghdad that oversees reconstruction in Iraq was even more dismissive, disagreeing with all four of the inspector general’s recommendations, including those suggesting that the United States should lend advice on disposing of the waste and maintaining the floors.
“Recommendations such as how much water to use in cleaning floors or disposal of medical waste could be deemed as an intrusion on, or attempt to micromanage operations of an Iraqi entity that we have no controlling interest over,” wrote William Lynch, acting director of the embassy bureau, called the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office.
-
Second post of the morning, also from the NYTimes:
===========
RAMADI, Iraq — Anbar Province, long the lawless heartland of the tenacious Sunni Arab resistance, is undergoing a surprising transformation. Violence is ebbing in many areas, shops and schools are reopening, police forces are growing and the insurgency appears to be in retreat.
Eros Hoagland for The New York Times
ON THE JOB TOGETHER Iraqi policemen and American troops patrol near Ramadi in Anbar. Ramadi’s police force has sharply increased in the past year.
“Many people are challenging the insurgents,” said the governor of Anbar, Maamoon S. Rahid, though he quickly added, “We know we haven’t eliminated the threat 100 percent.”
Many Sunni tribal leaders, once openly hostile to the American presence, have formed a united front with American and Iraqi government forces against Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia. With the tribal leaders’ encouragement, thousands of local residents have joined the police force. About 10,000 police officers are now in Anbar, up from several thousand a year ago. During the same period, the police force here in Ramadi, the provincial capital, has grown from fewer than 200 to about 4,500, American military officials say.
At the same time, American and Iraqi forces have been conducting sweeps of insurgent strongholds, particularly in and around Ramadi, leaving behind a network of police stations and military garrisons, a strategy that is also being used in Baghdad, Iraq’s capital, as part of its new security plan.
Yet for all the indications of a heartening turnaround in Anbar, the situation, as it appeared during more than a week spent with American troops in Ramadi and Falluja in early April, is at best uneasy and fragile.
Municipal services remain a wreck; local governments, while reviving, are still barely functioning; and years of fighting have damaged much of Ramadi.
The insurgency in Anbar — a mix of Islamic militants, former Baathists and recalcitrant tribesmen — still thrives among the province’s overwhelmingly Sunni population, killing American and Iraqi security forces and civilians alike. [This was underscored by three suicide car-bomb attacks in Ramadi on Monday and Tuesday, in which at least 15 people were killed and 47 were wounded, American officials said. Eight American service members — five marines and three soldiers — were killed in two attacks on Thursday and Friday in Anbar, the American military said.]
Furthermore, some American officials readily acknowledge that they have entered an uncertain marriage of convenience with the tribes, some of whom were themselves involved in the insurgency, to one extent or another. American officials are also negotiating with elements of the 1920 Revolution Brigades, a leading insurgent group in Anbar, to join their fight against Al Qaeda.
These sudden changes have raised questions about the ultimate loyalties of the United States’ new allies. “One day they’re laying I.E.D.’s, the next they’re police collecting a pay check,” said Lt. Thomas R. Mackesy, an adviser to an Iraqi Army unit in Juwayba, east of Ramadi, referring to improvised explosive devices.
And it remains unclear whether any of the gains in Anbar will transfer to other troubled areas of Iraq — like Baghdad, Diyala Province, Mosul and Kirkuk, where violence rages and the ethnic and sectarian landscape is far more complicated.
Still, the progress has inspired an optimism in the American command that, among some officials, borders on giddiness. It comes after years of fruitless efforts to drive a wedge between moderate resistance fighters and those, like Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, who seem beyond compromise.
“There are some people who would say we’ve won the war out here,” said Col. John. A. Koenig, a planning officer for the Marines who oversees governing and economic development issues in Anbar. “I’m cautiously optimistic as we’re going forward.”
A New Calm
For most of the past few years, the Government Center in downtown Ramadi, the seat of the provincial government, was under near-continual siege by insurgents, who reduced it to little more than a bullet-ridden bunker of broken concrete, sandbags and trapped marines. Entering meant sprinting from an armored vehicle to the front door of the building to evade snipers’ bullets.
Now, however, the compound and nearby buildings are being renovated to create offices for the provincial administration, council and governor. Hotels are being built next door for the waves of visitors the government expects once it is back in business.
========
Page 2 of 4)
On the roof of the main building, Capt. Jason Arthaud, commander of Company B, First Battalion, Sixth Marines, said the building had taken no sniper fire since November. “Just hours of peace and quiet,” he deadpanned. “And boredom.”
Marriage of Convenience With the encouragement of Sunni tribal leaders in Anbar Province, many local residents have joined the police force in cities like Ramadi. American and Iraqi forces also work with auxiliary police forces, above, mainly local tribesmen, who often wear scarves or balaclavas to conceal their identities.
Eros Hoagland for The New York Times
A NEW DYNAMIC American officers with leaders from Anbar, including Sheik Tahir Sabbar Badawie, second from right.
Violence has fallen swiftly throughout Ramadi and its sprawling rural environs, residents and American and Iraqi officials said. Last summer, the American military recorded as many as 25 violent acts a day in the Ramadi region, ranging from shootings and kidnappings to roadside bombs and suicide attacks. In the past several weeks, the average has dropped to four acts of violence a day, American military officials said.
On a recent morning, American and Iraqi troops, accompanied by several police officers, went on a foot patrol through a market in the Malaab neighborhood of Ramadi. Only a couple of months ago, American and Iraqi forces would enter the area only in armored vehicles. People stopped and stared. The sight of police and military forces in the area, particularly on foot, was still novel.
The new calm is eerie and unsettling, particularly for anyone who knew the city even several months ago.
“The complete change from night to day gives me pause,” said Capt. Brice Cooper, 26, executive officer of Company B, First Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment, First Infantry Division, which has been stationed in the city and its outskirts since last summer. “A month and a half ago we were getting shot up. Now we’re doing civil affairs work.”
A Moderate Front
The turnabout began last September, when a federation of tribes in the Ramadi area came together as the Anbar Salvation Council to oppose the fundamentalist militants of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia.
Among the council’s founders were members of the Abu Ali Jassem tribe, based in a rural area of northern Ramadi. The tribe’s leader, Sheik Tahir Sabbar Badawie, said in a recent interview that members of his tribe had fought in the insurgency that kept the Americans pinned down on their bases in Anbar for most of the last four years.
“If your country was occupied by Iraq, would you fight?” he asked. “Enough said.”
But while the anti-American sheiks in Anbar and Al Qaeda both opposed the Americans, their goals were different. The sheiks were part of a relatively moderate front that sought to drive the Americans out of Iraq; some were also fighting to restore Sunni Arab power. But Al Qaeda wanted to go even further and impose a fundamentalist Islamic state in Anbar, a plan that many of the sheiks did not share.
Al Qaeda’s fighters began to use killing, intimidation and financial coercion to divide the tribes and win support for their agenda. They killed about 210 people in the Abu Ali Jassem tribe alone and kidnapped others, demanding ransoms as high as $65,000 per person, Sheik Badawie said.
For all the sheiks’ hostility toward the Americans, they realized that they had a bigger enemy, or at least one that needed to be fought first, as a matter of survival.
The council sought financial and military support from the Iraqi and American governments. In return the sheiks volunteered hundreds of tribesmen for duty as police officers and agreed to allow the construction of joint American-Iraqi police and military outposts throughout their tribal territories.
A similar dynamic is playing out elsewhere in Anbar, a desert region the size of New York State that stretches west of Baghdad to the Syrian and Jordanian borders. Tribal cooperation with the American and Iraqi commands has led to expanded police forces in the cities of Husayba, Hit, Rutba, Baghdadi and Falluja, officials say.
With the help of the Anbar sheiks, the military equation immediately became simpler for the Americans in Ramadi. The number of enemies they faced suddenly diminished, American and Iraqi officials said. They were able to move more freely through large areas. With the addition of the tribal recruits, the Americans had enough troops to build and operate garrisons in areas they cleared, many of which had never seen any government security presence before.
And the Americans were now fighting alongside people with a deep knowledge of the local population and terrain, and with a sense of duty, vengeance and righteousness.
=============
Page 3 of 4)
“We know this area, we know the best way to talk to the people and get information from them,” said Capt. Hussein Abd Nusaif, a police commander in a neighborhood in western Ramadi, who carries a Kalashnikov with an Al Capone-style “snail drum” magazine. “We are not afraid of Al Qaeda. We will fight them anywhere and anytime.”
Ramadi Beginning last summer and continuing through March, the American-led joint forces pressed into the city, block by block, and swept the farmlands on its outskirts. In many places the troops met fierce resistance. Scores of American and Iraqi security troops were killed or wounded.
The Ramadi region is essentially a police state now, with some 6,000 American troops, 4,000 Iraqi soldiers and 4,500 Iraqi police officers, including an auxiliary police force of about 2,000, all local tribesmen, known as the Provincial Security Force. The security forces are garrisoned in more than 65 police stations, military bases and joint American-Iraqi combat outposts, up from no more than 10 a year ago. The population of the city is officially about 400,000, though the current number appears to be much lower.
To help control the flow of traffic and forestall attacks, the American military has installed an elaborate system of barricades and checkpoints. In some of the enclaves created by this system, which American commanders frequently call “gated communities,” no vehicles except bicycles and pushcarts are allowed for fear of car bombs.
American commanders see the progress in Anbar as a bellwether for the rest of country. “One of the things I worry about in Baghdad is we won’t have the time to do the same kind of thing,” Lt. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, commander of day-to-day war operations in Iraq, said in an interview here.
Yet the fact that Anbar is almost entirely Sunni and not riven by the same sectarian feuds as other violent places, like Baghdad and Diyala Province, has helped to establish order. Elsewhere, security forces are largely Shiite and are perceived by many Sunnis as part of the problem. In Anbar, however, the new police force reflects the homogeneous face of the province and appears to enjoy the support of the people.
A Growing Police Force
Military commanders say they cannot completely account for the whereabouts of the insurgency. They say they believe that many guerrillas have been killed, while others have gone underground, laid down their arms or migrated to other parts of Anbar, particularly the corridor between Ramadi and Falluja, the town of Karma north of Falluja and the sprawling rural zones around Falluja, including Zaidon and Amariyat al-Falluja on the banks of the Euphrates River. American forces come under attack in these areas every day.
Still other guerrillas, the commanders acknowledge, have joined the police force, sneaking through a vetting procedure that is set up to catch only known suspects. Many insurgents “are fighting for a different side now,” said Brig. Gen. Mark Gurganus, commander of ground forces in Anbar. “I think that’s where the majority have gone.”
But American commanders say they are not particularly worried about infiltrators among the new recruits. Many of the former insurgents now in the police, they say, were probably low-level operatives who were mainly in it for the money and did relatively menial tasks, like planting roadside bombs.
The speed of the buildup has led to other problems. Hiring has outpaced the building of police academies, meaning that many new officers have been deployed with little or no training. Without enough uniforms, many new officers patrol in civilian clothes, some with their heads wrapped in scarves or covered in balaclavas to conceal their identities. They look no different than the insurgents shown in mujahedeen videos.
Commanders seem to regard these issues as a necessary cost of quickly building a police force in a political environment that is, in the words of Colonel Koenig, “sort of like looking through smoke.” The police force, they say, has been the most critical component of the new security plan in Anbar.
=========
Page 4 of 4)
Yet, oversight of the police forces by American forces and the central Iraqi government is weak, leaving open the possibility that some local leaders are using newly armed tribal members as their personal death squads to settle old scores.
Ramadi Several American officers who work with the Iraqi police said a lot of police work was conducted out of their view, particularly at night. “It’s like the Mafia,” one American soldier in Juwayba said.
General Odierno said, “We have to watch them very closely to make sure we’re not forming militias.”
But there is a new sense of commitment by the police, American and Iraqi officials say, in part because they are patrolling their own neighborhoods. Many were motivated to join after they or their communities were attacked by Al Qaeda, and their successes have made them an even greater target of insurgent car bombs and suicide attacks.
Abd Muhammad Khalaf, 28, a policeman in the Jazeera district on Ramadi’s northern edge, is typical. He joined the police after Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia killed two of his brothers, he said. “I will die when God wills it,” he said. “But before I die, I will support my friends and kill some terrorists.”
The Tasks Ahead
Some tribal leaders now working with the Americans say they harbor deep resentment toward the Shiite-led administration of Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, accusing it of pursuing a sectarian agenda. Yet they also say they are invested in the democratic process now.
After boycotting the national elections in 2005, many are now planning to participate in the next round of provincial elections, which have yet to be scheduled, as a way to build on the political and military gains they have made in recent months.
“Since I was a little boy, I have seen nothing but warfare — against the Kurds, Iranians, Kuwait, the Americans,” Sheik Badawie said. “We are tired of war. We are going to fight through the ballot box.”
Already, tribal leaders are participating in local councils that have been formed recently throughout the Ramadi area under the guidance of the American military.
Iraqi and American officials say the sheiks’ embrace of representative government reflects the new realities of power in Anbar. “Out here it’s been, ‘Who can defend his people?’ ” said Brig. Gen. John R. Allen, deputy commanding general of coalition forces in Anbar. “After the war it’s, ‘Who was able to reconstruct?’ ”
Indeed, American and Iraqi officials say that to hold on to the security gains and the public’s support, they must provide services to residents in areas they have tamed.
But successful development, they argue, will depend on closing the divide between the Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad, which has long ignored the province, and the local leadership in Anbar, which has long tried to remain independent from the capital. If that fails, they say, the Iraqi and American governments may have helped to organize and arm a potent enemy.
-
An Appeal for Courage
by Lt. Jason Nichols
Posted: 04/30/2007
Recently a reporter for the San Francisco Chronicle called me here in Baghdad and asked why the active duty military wasn’t opposing the war in Iraq in numbers similar to those that opposed the war in Vietnam. Not surprisingly, he didn’t print my answer.
He was asking my opinion as a co-founder of AppealForCourage.org, an ongoing effort to allow currently serving military personnel to send a message to Congress asking them to support victory in Iraq. I do not speak as a representative of the Defense Department or the Navy but simply as an individual and on behalf of the signers of the Appeal with respect to the wording of the Appeal. Nevertheless my answer was a military answer. It was a ‘root cause’; a term the military commonly uses to describe the source of an event, a foundation that must be identified before further action is taken. My answer was that the military overwhelmingly wants to win the war, and believes we can. Hence we don’t oppose it.
The primary reason we support the war is because we believe it is just and right, and we were given a mission to win it. The mission was clearly stated: overthrow Saddam and install an independent, stable, democratic government in Iraq. The military necessity was obvious after 9/11, the President said it was required and the Congress voted overwhelmingly in favor of it. We were given a mission and the means to carry it out. The military is highly mission-oriented. It is ingrained in us during our training that excuses and rationalizing failure are not ‘the military way’. We must face reality and accomplish the mission within that framework.
Iraqi democracy is a mission we know we can accomplish, given time. The honest reality is that we are winning the war in Iraq. Both militarily and politically we are progressing at the pace expected, though not as well as the most idealistic hopes of a cakewalk nor as badly as the most dire predictions of quagmire. al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) is terrified of a democratic country in their midst, and is still brutally attacking Iraqi civilians. But we are implementing a steady buildup of Iraqi military and police and seeing the rewards of having worked with the Iraqis in a cooperative way, often at increased risked to our soldiers. Simultaneously the extremists are learning the consequences of having bombed the Iraqi civilians for the past 4 years. Sunni Sheiks are joining together to fight them, proving AQI’s strategy is a short term one that is unsustainable during years of political progress.
It is a mentality of mission accomplishment that has spurred the Appeal for Courage effort. Just as victory in Iraq seems likely, defeat back home has begun to loom as a real possibility. Vietnam-era Defense Secretary Melvin Laird’s words in Foreign Affairs are a call to action for the modern military:
“The truth about Vietnam that revisionist historians conveniently forget is that the United States had not lost when we withdrew in 1973. In fact, we grabbed defeat from the jaws of victory two years later when Congress cut off the funding for South Vietnam that had allowed it to continue to fight on its own”.
Members of the military have a duty to ensure this mistake is not repeated. We have a responsibility to complete the mission. If that requires us to educate others on the reasons for staying in Iraq, so be it. Yes it’s outside our normal duties and professionally risky. Should we be unwilling to take professional risks while we ask junior soldiers to risk their lives?
The American public is not tired of the war; they are tired of believing that they are losing. They are tired of the daily drumbeat of pessimism and defeat promoted daily by our media and by some in our Congress. They don’t understand that building a democracy is a slow process that takes years, that victory in Iraq will be more like the fall of communism than like VE day in 1945. Like it or not, it is incumbent upon us in the military to correct this misrepresentation of our efforts. We have a duty to convince the American public why we must stay and finish the mission. Should we have to? Did we sign up to do that? The answers are no and yes, respectively. No we shouldn’t have to ask to be allowed to win a war, but yes we signed up to complete a mission. No whining allowed.
The response to the Appeal For Courage seems to suggest that much of the military agrees. It is a large and growing number of service members with over 2,600 signatories, encompassing a broad cross section of the military; both officer and enlisted, deployed and at home. They have signed a message to Congress respectfully asking them to support our mission. There is much more that we can do. We must educate ourselves on why we’re winning and what victory -- i.e. a stable, democratic Iraq -- will look like. We must then tell our families and friends that victory is possible and what is required. From there we should do whatever is in our power to legally accomplish, within military regulations.
It is not enough that we are making progress here in Iraq. We must make progress at home as well to ensure we are given the funds, support and time needed to finish the job. There is no doubt that we can create a stable democracy in Iraq -- if we have courage enough to do so.
Lt. Jason Nichols is an officer in the US Navy stationed in Iraq. SSG Dave Thul is co-founder of AppealforCourage.org
-
"As to why some of Capitol Hill's would-be war managers can't name more than a single Iraqi province, officers and journalists offer all kinds of theories.... But, then, expertise may be beside the point. Obliviousness, after all, has its uses.... Where all this leads is clear. Piece together a string of demonstrably false 'facts on the ground' from a suitably safe remove, and you're left with a scenario where we can walk away from Iraq without condition and regardless of consequence. You don't need to watch terrified Iraqis pleading for American forces to stay put in their neighborhoods. You don't need to read the latest National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, which anticipates that a precipitous U.S. withdrawal will end in catastrophe. Why, in the serene conviction that things are the other way around, you don't even need to read at all. Chances are, your congressman doesn't either" -- Lawrence Kaplan, writing in the New Republic, on the basic ignorance about Iraq displayed by Nancy Pelosi, Harry Reid, John Murtha and other Democratic leaders.
-
WSJ
advertisement
TODAY'S MOST POPULAR
1. Special Issues Arise When Buying a Laptop
2. Why What You Have Is Never Enough
3. Battle for ABN Hits Legal Snag
4. Ohio Town Plans for Population Decline
5. Obama Runs Into Dust-Up on MySpace
MORE
Personalized Home Page Setup
Put headlines on your homepage about the companies, industries and topics that interest you most.
What's Going Right in Iraq
By JOHN D. NEGROPONTE
May 4, 2007; Page A15
By now it goes without saying that sectarian conflict and extremism in Iraq cannot be solved by military means alone -- it will take national reconciliation, economic reform and development, and international support as well. And as a former ambassador to Iraq, I know how difficult it is to create an alternative to coercive violence in a country that has lived under these conditions for decades.
In 2004 the U.N. Security Council laid out an arduous agenda for Iraq when it regained its sovereignty. This included setting up an interim government and electing a transitional government, writing and adopting a constitution, electing a permanent government, and developing national reconciliation based on the rule of law, tolerance and pluralism.
Despite horrific violence, much of that agenda has been implemented, though not national reconciliation. Nonetheless, the Iraqis have come a long way in what has been a short time for them. Pressing them to continue moving ahead on national reconciliation and reform is well-justified. But imposing fixed deadlines would be ill-advised.
Fixed deadlines would empower the obstructionists, stiffening their resolve to resist and delay by showing them where to concentrate their efforts. It would also weaken the moderates who -- forced to face a near-term future without us -- would hedge their bets and be less willing to broker hard political compromises. This could provoke even greater violence and insecurity, the opposite effect of that presumably intended by those advocating deadlines. That is why President Bush just issued only the second veto of his administration.
The fact is that critically important economic, political and diplomatic progress is being made; we must not allow the fog of war to obscure major developments that are fundamental to stability in Iraq and the region. These developments are more powerful than bombs -- they are the stuff of which modern nation states are made and the basis upon which they survive and thrive.
The U.S. has spent more than 84% of its major reconstruction appropriation in 11 sectors. Despite some missteps, inevitable given the chaotic conditions, these projects have brought significant benefits to the Iraqi people and will continue to do so for decades.
Now we are shifting toward increasing the capacity of Iraqis to meet their own needs. This is critical to Iraq's prospects for effective self-governance. In 2006 we began a ministerial capacity development program and completed the initial rollout of our Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) program. We're on track to double the number of PRTs from 10 to 20, deploying specialists to support moderates in local government, civil society and business.
Without question, oil is the most important and contentious economic sector. The Iraqis are making progress on a legislative package that is extremely important for national reconciliation. That this will prompt a great deal of debate should surprise no one. Such debate is healthy. Politically and economically, the stakes are high.
Iraq's financial position is improving, and the government is making budget execution a priority for 2007. The $1 billion that the Ministry of Finance released upon enactment of the budget has been delivered. Thus far, 94 of 128 spending units have opened the capital expenditure accounts needed for the full Iraqi budget to be disbursed. Some key ministries like Oil have not performed well. Others -- such as Communications, which has allocated 90% of its capital budget already -- are making good headway.
The International Compact with Iraq -- a road map for what Iraq will need to do over the next five years to achieve economic self-sufficiency -- is another step forward. Iraq has produced this credible package of economic reforms in 10 short months. There's no package like this anywhere else in the region.
Another positive development is that the IMF Board of Directors has approved the combined third and fourth reviews of Iraq's Stand-By Arrangement, keeping Iraq on track for the final 20% of Paris Club debt relief due in 2008. As part of this arrangement, Iraq has cut fuel subsidies, increased hard currency reserves to $18 billion, and mitigated inflationary pressure by appreciating the Iraqi dinar against the U.S. dollar and raising interest rates. These are tough measures. Countries less troubled than Iraq have balked or failed when trying to take similar steps.
Iraq's national reconciliation, reconstruction and stability depend not only on its internal policies but also on its relations with its neighbors. The Neighbors Conference being held this week in Sharm el-Sheikh is giving Iraq an important opportunity to improve those relations. We strongly support this effort.
As Gen. Petraeus explained last week, security is a necessary condition for sustained progress in the political, economic and diplomatic dimensions. By the same token, political, economic and diplomatic progress is necessary for achieving improved security. The two go hand-in-hand.
When I was ambassador to Iraq two years ago, the country had no permanent government, no Council of Representatives, no constitution, no IMF Stand-By Arrangement, no hydrocarbon laws in draft or otherwise, no willingness to cut subsidies, no International Compact with Iraq, and no forum for constructive dialogue with its neighbors and international community leaders. Now all that exists. It is what the Iraqis and we are fighting for, and what the terrorists and extremists are fighting against.
Mr. Negroponte is the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State.
-
Second post of the morning:
By Hoshyar Zebari
Friday, May 4, 2007; A23
Last weekend a traffic jam several miles long snaked out of the Mansour district in western Baghdad. The delay stemmed not from a car bomb closing the road but from a queue to enter the city's central amusement park. The line became so long some families left their cars and walked to enjoy picnics, fairground rides and soccer, the Iraqi national obsession.
Across the city, restaurants are slowly filling and shops are reopening. The streets are busy. Iraqis are not cowering indoors. The appalling death tolls from suicide attacks are often high because of crowding at markets. These days you are as likely to hear complaints about traffic congestion as about the security situation. Across Baghdad there is a cacophony of sirens from ambulances, firefighters and police providing public services. You cannot even escape the curse of traffic wardens ticketing illegally parked cars.
These small but significant snippets of normality are overshadowed by acts of gross violence, which fuel the opinion of some that Iraq is in a downward spiral. The Iraqi people are indeed suffering tremendous hardships and making grave sacrifices -- but daily life goes on for 7 million Baghdadis struggling to take back their capital and country.
Today, at an international summit on the future of Iraq in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, my government will ask the international community to maintain its engagement in our country to help us achieve our goals of security and stability. We recognize that our request conflicts with a plethora of voices decrying the situation in Iraq and those in the British and American publics who seek an expeditious withdrawal from a war they claim is all but lost.
So why should the world remain engaged in Iraq?
There is no denying the difficulties Iraq faces, and no amount of good news can obscure the demons of terrorism and sectarianism that have risen in my country. But there is too much at stake to risk failure, and everything to gain by helping us protect our hard-won democratic achievements and emerge as a stable, self-sustaining country.
We remain determined in spite of our losses. Spectacular attacks may dominate foreign headlines, but they cannot change the reality that Iraq has made steady political, economic and social progress over the past four years. We continue to strengthen our nascent democratic institutions, pursue national reconciliation and expand Iraqi security forces. The Baghdad security plan was conceived to give us breathing space to expedite political and economic development by "securing and holding" neighborhoods across the capital. There is no quick fix, but there have been real results: Winning public confidence has led to a spike in intelligence, a disruption of terrorist networks and the capture of key leaders, as well as the discovery of weapons caches. In Anbar province, Sunni sheikhs and insurgents have turned against al-Qaeda and to the side of Iraqi security forces. This would have been unthinkable even six months ago.
Contrary to popular belief, most government ministries are located outside the Green Zone, and employees drive to work every day despite death threats and attacks on colleagues and families. We government ministers are always at risk of assassination. When a suicide bomber attacked parliament last month, the legislators sat in defiance in an extraordinary session the following day. I am particularly inspired by the commitment of the young diplomats in the Foreign Ministry, a diverse mix of Sunni, Shiite, Christian, Arab and Kurdish men and women who serve their country without subscribing to religious or sectarian divisions.
Iraqis are standing up every day, and we persevere because there is no other option. We will not surrender our country to terrorists. They have failed to cripple the elected government, and they have failed to intimidate us into submission. Iraqis reject their vision of a future whose hallmarks are bloodshed and hatred.
Those calling for withdrawal may think it is the least painful option, but its benefits would be short-lived. The fate of the region and the world is linked with ours. Leaving a broken Iraq in the Middle East would offer international terrorism a haven and ensure a legacy of chaos for future generations. Furthermore, the sacrifices of all the young men and women who stood up here would have been in vain.
Iraqis, for all our determination and courage, cannot succeed alone. We need a healthy and supportive regional environment. We will not allow our country to be a battleground for settling scores in regional and international conflicts that adversely affect stability inside our borders. Only with continued international commitment and deeper engagement from our neighbors can we establish a stable democratic, federal and united Iraq. The world should not abandon us.
The writer is foreign minister of Iraq.
-
Soldiers in Iraq do the State Department's job.
Missing in Action
by Lawrence F. Kaplan
Only at TNR Online | Post date 02.20.07 Discuss this article (26)
Printer friendly
E-mail this article
world away, the Senate was bracing for a solemn debate over whether to debate the war in Iraq. But, in Iraq the place, the soldiers of the Tenth Mountain Division's Second Brigade Combat Team (2-10 Mtn.) had a slightly more pressing concern. The sectarian mix in 2-10 Mtn.'s area of operations--which runs from the Shia-dominated city of Mahmudiyah south of Baghdad to the Sunni areas bordering Anbar Province to the west--offers a microcosm of Iraq and all of its problems. Not the least of these is that, until recently, Mahmudiyah's mayor--a plump Shia who favors Western attire and socialist literature--refused to talk to the Sunni sheiks who lord over the city's western outskirts. 2-10 Mtn.'s Captain Palmer Phillips, a young company commander who doubles as a liaison to the sheiks, had spent the better part of a month arranging for the mayor to visit with his Sunni counterparts. "Then the sheiks got upset," Phillips recounts, "and chaos ensued."
The mayor, too, had second thoughts about the meeting, informing the U.S. battalion commander in Mahmudiyah that he had other plans. The officer replied that his boss, 2-10 Mtn. commander Colonel Michael Kershaw, would be displeased. To bolster the point, Kershaw rolled up behind the mayor on the highway, and had his soldiers escort the mayor directly to the sheiks. The meeting proved to be a modest success. But what really made it notable was, first, that it happened at all and, second, the occupation of the men who arranged it--all of them soldiers, none of them diplomats.
Tribal diplomacy is very much the business of civilian agencies that operate, or ought to operate, in Iraq. In the five months that 2-10 Mtn. has been maneuvering in and around Mahmudiyah, however, diplomatic officials from the nearest provincial reconstruction team (PRT)--housed in Baghdad's Green Zone--have shown up once. Which is more than in some places. In a counterinsurgency whose main thrust ought to be nonmilitary, the full force and expertise of the U.S. government is nowhere to be seen in Iraq. Were the combined resources of the State Department, the Justice Department, and other government agencies actually brought to bear in this war, things in Iraq might have turned out much differently. Instead, we have in Iraq an answer to the old question: What if they threw a war and nobody came?
he spectacle of young Army captains cajoling and corralling sheiks three times their age is an everyday staple in Iraq. Over the years, I've watched the same scene unfold at mosques and homes in Baghdad, Mosul, Ramadi, Tall Afar, and Sinjar. Typically, it unfolds well. The sheiks and the captains often develop close friendships (at a memorial service a couple of months ago for Captain Travis Patriquin--a young officer-cum-tribal diplomat in Ramadi--nearly every sheik in the city turned up). Tribal leaders know that, despite their age, their U.S. interlocutors can generate funds, infrastructure projects, bureaucratic shortcuts, firepower, and just about anything else. They know, too, that their own government cannot procure any of these things. For their part, the young American officers tend to be skilled professionals, well-versed in the techniques of warfare and much else besides.
But they are, first and last, military professionals. Few of the officers engaged in tribal diplomacy have the benefit of any formal training; most aren't even civil affairs officers. The best ones rely on their wits, but not every young officer boasts the wits of a Phillips or a Patriquin. Hence, the logic of the civilian-led PRTs--unveiled in 2005 to, in the words of a State Department cable, "assist Iraq's provincial government with developing a transparent and sustained capability to govern ... promoting political and economic development, and providing the provincial administration necessary to meet the basic needs of the population." That the PRTs have accomplished none of these things owes something to former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who initially objected to the military's role on the teams. But the Pentagon long ago reversed course--to the point that the Army now supplies most of the manpower for the PRTs. Persuading their civilian counterparts to show up is another matter.
Six months after they were unveiled, the PRTs had attracted all of twelve job applicants from the State Department, according to The Washington Post, and only one of those was qualified. Despite a flurry of memos pleading for recruits, guarantees of salary and career boosts, and a consensus about the importance of the teams that ran from the Iraq Study Group down to platoon leaders in Iraq, civilian agencies have declined to revive the Vietnam-era practice of compulsory war-zone assignments. According to The New York Times, federal employees have flatly refused requests that they go to Iraq. Others have been swayed by inducements yet have demanded that they be posted in the Green Zone. Outside Baghdad, "attracting civilians to serve at the PRTs in austere and dangerous locations has proved even more difficult," in the words of a report by the Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction.
o understand what a pitiful contribution civilian agencies have made in Iraq, just consider the prototype the PRTs were meant to replicate, the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program in Vietnam. With the same mandate assigned the PRTs in Iraq, CORDS director Robert Komer (the president's special assistant for pacification, a title that came with ambassadorial rank) dispatched nearly 8,000 civilian and military advisers to fan out across South Vietnam's provinces. Extrapolating from U.S. Census Bureau abstracts, one of every 25 State Department/USAID employees was deployed to Vietnam as part of CORDS, versus roughly one out of every 300 today in the Iraqi PRTs. According to its program reports from the era, USAID alone had nearly 2,000 of its civilian employees working in South Vietnam, where they served 12-18 month tours. Until recently, civilian agencies couldn't muster a fraction of that to serve 3-6 month tours in Iraq. Relative to the size of the Iraqi and Vietnamese populations, the U.S. government sent more than twenty times as many civilian federal employees to assist in the reconstruction of Vietnam as it fields today in Iraq.
The hallmarks of the civilian contribution to the CORDS program were, in the words of a U.S. Army Center for Military History study, "aggressive leadership, bureaucratic skill, real and perceived Presidential interest, and a degree of cooperation and tolerance that was remarkable among disparate U.S. foreign policy agencies." The hallmarks of the PRT program have been exactly the reverse. Nor, contrary to Condoleezza Rice's recent assertion that that the State Department was "ready to strengthen, indeed to 'surge,' our civilian efforts," has this latest commitment been matched by anything more than the usual disconnect between empty words and actual deeds. No sooner, indeed, had Rice issued the pledge than she reversed herself, telling congress that more than 40 percent of the State Department posts to be created as part of the surge would have to be staffed by military personnel. Never mind the government's well-chronicled failure to mobilize the public for war. The government can't even mobilize itself.
Lawrence F. Kaplan is a senior editor at The New Republic.
-
stratfor.com
Iraq: Transforming Iran's Shiite Proxy, Assisting the United States
Summary
Iran's main Iraqi Shiite proxy announced May 11 it is about to undergo a process of "Iraqization." The move is part of Tehran's detailed offer to assist the United States in stabilizing Iraq. A fresh power-sharing agreement likely will emerge out of this process -- one that will lead to an increase in the Sunni share of the Iraqi political pie, but could upset the Kurds.
Analysis
Officials from Iraq's largest and most pro-Iranian Shiite party, the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), on May 11 said the group will make significant changes to its platform. These include seeking greater guidance from the country's top cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. This is a symbolic shift from SCIRI's current platform, under which the group primarily seeks guidance from the Velayat-e-Faqih, led by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Iran.
Following the conclusion of a two-day meeting in Baghdad, an unnamed senior SCIRI official described the move as the "Iraqization" of the country's Shiite Islamist groups. The official added that "significant decisions" pertaining to domestic, regional and international issues were agreed upon during the meeting and will be announced May 12. Among the changes to the group will be changing its name to Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council -- removing the word "revolution" because of the negative connotations it entails, such as the Iranian connection. "There will be a change in two aspects -- the structure of the group and also in its political language, taking into consideration the political facts on the ground," another official said.
Given SCIRI's close alignment with Iran, this move likely has Iran's blessings, and does not represent a real split between SCIRI and its patrons in Tehran. In fact, these details very likely were finalized during Iranian national security chief Ali Larijani's April 30-May 2 visit to Iraq, during which he met with al-Sistani on May 1. Through this overhaul of SCIRI, Tehran and its main Iraqi Shiite proxy are trying to placate the Iraqi Sunnis, who have been clamoring that they have begun the purge of transnational jihadist allies and are worried about the attachment of the Iraqi Shia to Iran. The move to repackage SCIRI will likely be instrumental in steps toward a fresh power-sharing agreement. This will involve the Sunnis acquiring a larger stake in the political system, as is obvious from Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi's May 10 remarks that he is encouraged by recent developments -- just a few days after he threatened to pull out of the government.
But such a fresh social contract will not necessarily lead to security and stability in Iraq -- at least not any time soon. This is mainly because the move to reshape SCIRI is just one part of a much more detailed Iranian offer to work with the United States to stabilize Iraq. For example, though Abbas Araghchi, Iran's deputy foreign minister for legal and international affairs, says he has been misquoted, he has not denied saying Tehran is willing to assist Washington achieve an "honorable" exit from Iraq. It is this U.S.-Iranian cooperation that has the Iraqi Sunnis and their allies among the Arab states (especially Saudi Arabia) worried that even after making concessions to the Sunnis, Iraq will be dominated by Shia -- and, by extension, Iran.
According to the May 5 issue of the Saudi-owned Arabic daily Al Hayat, during the May 4 international meeting on Iraq in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki put forward a preliminary proposal on how to put Iraq back together. In this proposal, the Iranians for the first time offered to use their influence to rein in Shiite militia activity, a key Sunni demand. But in return, the Iranians have demanded that once the Iraqi military takes over security from U.S. forces, it should not be given any weapons affording it offensive capabilities -- an issue noted with great alarm in the May 10 issue of Al Hayat.
The Iranians also are in favor of constitutional amendments that would increase the Sunni share in government to as much as 40 percent while retaining 60 percent for the Shia. Furthermore, Tehran has expressed its willingness to hold fresh parliamentary elections. In other words, it has signaled a willingness to go beyond a mere Cabinet reshuffle, agreeing to alterations to the Iraqi state's current structure in order to accommodate the Sunnis -- which likely will upset the Kurdish side of the triangular ethno-sectarian arrangement.
Here again, the Iranians are motivated by their own interests. It is true that the current Iraqi state based on the constitution ratified Oct. 15, 2005, and the subsequent Dec. 15, 2005, elections did not produce the desired results from the Bush administration's viewpoint. And the outcome of the vote and the government did not jibe with Iranian expectations either. Iran knew it could bargain for more, hence it did not settle for the June 2006 deal under which Iraq's security ministries were finalized.
Another key aspect on which the Iranians are prepared to compromise is the future of the Baathists. This a sticking point for the Sunnis because the elements of the former regime constitute a significant portion of the Sunni insurgency and are the teeth of the Sunni community. Tehran is willing to allow a review of the de-Baathification law, but does not want to see a Baathist assume the premiership.
Here, Baathist does not just mean a Sunni political figure, because former President Saddam Hussein's ousted regime had no shortage of Shiite officials, and the Iranians remember how the Iraqi Shia fought against the Iranian army during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war. Moreover, by using the word Baathist, the Iranians are saying they do not want any Shi'i to emerge as prime minister who is not a pro-Iranian Islamist because the Shiite south is replete with such individuals. This would explain the attempts at a SCIRI makeover.
In essence, the Iranians are prepared to make all these concessions to satisfy the Sunnis, and more important the United States, because the Iranians also relayed at Sharm el-Sheikh that it is in their interest to see a planned U.S. exit from Iraq as opposed to a rush job. Tehran knows that an abrupt U.S. departure from Iraq could spoil its gains there because Iran would be left to clean up the mess afterward.
-
WSJ
Surging Ahead in Iraq
The new strategy can work. But Washington has to give it time.
BY MAX BOOT
Tuesday, May 15, 2007 12:01 a.m. EDT
There is a serious and widening disconnect between the timetables that commanders are using to guide their actions in Iraq and those being demanded by politicians in Washington. Gen. David Petraeus and Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno, the senior U.S. commanders in Iraq, are quite properly planning for the troop "surge" to extend well into next year. That's why the Pentagon has alerted 10 combat brigades with some 40,000 soldiers to get ready to deploy in August. They will be needed to replace troops rotating home.
Back home, however, politicians are demanding results in the next few months--or else. And not just Democrats. House Minority Leader John Boehner has said that if they don't see progress by the fall, even House Republicans will start demanding a Plan B for Iraq, which would presumably involve pulling troops out, not sending more. That message was reinforced by the group of 11 House Republicans who visited the White House last week.
Gen. Petraeus has promised to report back to Congress by September on what kind of progress he is making, but don't expect a definitive answer. He is unlikely to say "the surge has worked" or "the surge has failed." He will instead probably point to a variety of indicators, some of which will be positive, others negative. It will be left to the American people and their leaders to interpret these results as they see fit.
Inevitably, since suicide attacks will still be occurring in Iraq in September, many commentators and politicians will write off the surge as a failure. Many are already doing so, even though the Baghdad Security Plan is barely three months old and the fourth extra U.S. brigade has only recently arrived. The fifth and final one won't be in place until June. It will take many months after that to see whether security conditions are improving--and even if they are (perhaps especially if they are) it would be the height of folly to then start withdrawing U.S. troops, something that Secretary of Defense Bob Gates has indicated might happen.
An article in USA Today reported on a Pentagon-funded study which confirms what military historians already know--an average insurgency can run for a decade, but most fail in the end. Translation: If we're going to be successful in Iraq, we're going to have to make a long-term commitment. That doesn't mean 170,000 U.S. combat troops stationed there for 10 years, but it does mean a substantial force--tens of thousands of soldiers--will be needed for many years to come. If we're planning to start withdrawing in September 2007--or even September 2008--we might as well run up the white flag now and let the great Iraqi civil war unfold in all its horror.
Most Americans seem resigned to that fate. In fact many think that the civil war has already begun, and we can't or shouldn't do anything about it. We hear all the time that "we have no business getting into the middle of someone else's civil war"--often from the very same people who in the 1990s were (rightly) urging that we get involved in the civil wars of the former Yugoslavia or who today (rightly) urge us to get involved in the civil war in Sudan.
The reality is that Iraq has been experiencing a fairly low-grade civil war until now--one that has been contained by the presence of U.S. troops. While the troop surge in Baghdad hasn't yet decreased the overall level of violence--suicide bombings, which are notoriously difficult to stop, remain undiminished--the presence of more Iraqi and American troops on the streets has managed to reduce sectarian murders by two-thirds since January. Sunni fanatics are still able to set off their car bombs, but Shiite fanatics are not able to respond in kind by torturing to death 100 Sunnis a night. In other words, the surge is containing the results of the suicide bombings, slowing the cycle of violence that last year was leading Iraq to the brink of the abyss.
If U.S. troops were to pull out anytime in the foreseeable future, the probable result would not be (as so many advocates of withdrawal claim) that Iraqis would "get their act together" and take care of their problems themselves. The far more likely consequence would be an all-out civil war. Not only would this be a humanitarian tragedy for which the U.S. would bear indirect responsibility, but it would also be a catastrophe for American interests in the region. If we are seen as the losers in Iraq, al Qaeda would be seen as the winner. The perception of American weakness fed by a pullout would lead to increased terrorism against the U.S. and our allies, just as occurred following our withdrawal from Somalia in 1993 and from Beirut in 1983.
In the ensuing chaos, it is quite possible that al Qaeda terrorists would succeed in turning western Iraq into a Taliban-style base for international terrorism. Although the momentum at the moment is running against al Qaeda in Anbar Province, the tribal forces who are now cooperating with the Iraqi government would be incapable of defeating al Qaeda on their own. If the U.S. were to pull out, the tribes would likely go back to cooperating with al Qaeda for the sake of self-preservation. And a handful of American Special Operations Forces operating from far-off bases would be helpless to stop the terrorists because they would lack the kind of human intelligence now generated by U.S. troops on the ground.
That is only one of many possible effects of an Iraqi civil war that we need to contemplate before making the fateful decision to give up the fight. Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack of the Brookings Institution, two serious Democratic analysts, issued a sobering study in January called "Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover From an Iraqi Civil War" that should be required reading for anyone calling for a pullout. Messrs. Byman and Pollack studied a number of civil wars stretching back to the 1970s in countries from Congo to Lebanon, and found that they are never confined within the borders drawn neatly on maps.
Civil wars export refugees, terrorists, militant ideologies and economic woes that destabilize neighboring states, and those states in turn usually intervene to try to limit the fallout or to expand their sphere of influence. "We found that 'spillover' is common in massive civil wars; that while its intensity can vary considerably, at its worst it can have truly catastrophic effects; and that Iraq has all the earmarks of creating quite severe spillover problems," they write. No surprise: After all, Iraq, with its oil wealth, has far more to fight over than Congo or Lebanon or Chechnya.
While a civil war is the most likely outcome in Iraq, it is not inevitable. Contrary to the common myth, Iraqi Shiites and Sunnis have not been at daggers drawn since the dawn of time. Until fairly recently, they lived peaceably side by side; intermarriage was common and major tribes still have both Sunni and Shiite components. The slide toward civil war occurred because of an implosion of central authority and a breakdown of law and order that allowed demagogues on both sides--the likes of Moqtada al Sadr and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi--to posture as the defenders of their sectarian groups. That dynamic, while strong, could still be reversed if the Iraqi government, with American support, were able to offer ordinary people what they most ardently desire--security.
With U.S. and Iraqi forces now on the offensive, there have been some encouraging signs of responsible leaders on both sides pulling back from the brink. Sunni tribal chiefs have organized themselves into the Anbar Salvation Council to try to work with the U.S. and the government of Iraq, and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has made some important gestures toward the Sunnis, such as his support for an equitable oil-revenue sharing law (which hasn't yet passed parliament).
Slow progress toward an acceptable modus vivendi may still be possible as long as the U.S. doesn't insist on artificial timetables to resolve complex and emotional issues. What incentive do Iraqi politicians have to make compromises if they think that American troops are heading out the door? If that's the case, Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds would be well advised to avoid making any concessions that would strengthen their mortal enemies. Thus all the talk in Washington about troop withdrawals has the opposite effect from what is intended. Instead of spurring Iraqi politicians to compromise, it leads them to be more obdurate.
It's still possible to stave off catastrophic defeat in Iraq. But the only way to do it is to give Gen. Petraeus and his troops more time--at least another year--to try to change the dynamics on the ground. The surge strategy may be a long shot but every alternative is even worse.
Mr. Boot is a senior fellow in national security studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and author of "War Made New: Technology, Warfare, and the Course of History, 1500 to Today" (Gotham Books, 2006).
-
Iraq Facing `Many' Civil Wars, Country `Fractured,' Report Says
By Robin Stringer
May 17 (Bloomberg) -- Iraq is facing several civil wars between a number of rival communities struggling for power and has ``fractured'' into regional power bases, a report by an adviser to the U.K. government said.
There are ``many civil wars and insurgencies,'' and the Middle Eastern country has fractured into ``regions dominated by sectarian, ethnic or tribal political groupings,'' said a report released today by Chatham House, a London-based international affairs organization which advises European governments, including Britain.
Iraq's ethnic and sectarian communities include minority Sunni Muslims, majority Shiites, Kurds and Turkmen. Some 1,500 civilians were killed in April, the report said, citing official Iraqi statistics. The U.S. military is deploying about 30,000 additional forces to Baghdad and surrounding areas in an attempt to quell rampant violence in the country.
This year will be ``a particularly crucial period,'' as many of the ``most destabilizing issues,'' including an oil revenue sharing law, federalism and the territorial borders of the autonomous Kurdish region in the north of the country, are due to be resolved, said the report, titled ``Accepting Realities in Iraq.''
The U.S. and U.K., the main military partners in a coalition that invaded Iraq in March 2003, ``continue to struggle'' in their analysis of the country's political and social structures, said Gareth Stansfield, author of the report.
``This analytical failing has led to the pursuit of strategies that suit ideal depictions of how Iraq should look, but are often unrepresentative of the current situation,'' Stansfield said in the report.
Control of the State
In Baghdad, Sunni and Shiite groups are fighting for control of the state. There is a ``rapidly emerging conflict'' between Kurds and non-Kurds in the northern oil hub of Kirkuk, where the majority of the population is Kurdish, Stansfield said.
Tribal Sunni groups are clashing with fighters loyal to al- Qaeda in the western province of al-Anbar. In the south, Shiite groups are fighting for control over Basra, the oil-rich city near the Iranian border, Stansfield said. Anti-U.S. Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army militia, which is Iraqi nationalist and opposed to federalism, is coming into conflict with other Shiite groups, such as the Badr militia, that have close ties with Iran.
In addition, Sunni insurgents are fighting U.S. forces in the country's north and center, and Shiite militiamen are attacking U.K. forces in the south of the country around Basra, the report said.
Civilian Deaths
At least 63,000 civilians have been killed in Iraq since the U.S.-led invasion, according to the Iraqi Body Count Web site, which tracks media reports of civilian deaths. This may be a conservative total; the United Nations said in January that at least 34,000 civilians were killed around the country last year alone.
U.S. military deaths have risen every month since the intensified security efforts began in February. At least 49 U.S. soldiers have been killed this month, according to Department of Defense statistics. Some 148 U.K. service members have been killed since the invasion.
Stansfield recommends the better inclusion of Sunni representatives and al-Sadr, who has widespread support in the south and Baghdad, in the political process, and backing for Kurdish hopes of a formally autonomous state in the north of the country.
``Iraq must become federal if it is to survive, quite simply because there is no other way to ensure that the Kurds will peacefully remain within the state,'' Stansfield said.
A centralized Iraqi government has resulted in a ``zero-sum competition for power'' and the country instead needs regional arrangements, the report said.
To contact the reporter on this story: Robin Stringer in London at rstringer@bloomberg.net .
Last Updated: May 16, 2007 19:34 EDT
-
Battling al Qaeda in Iraq
The Iraqi Army is stepping up the fight against terror. On Saturday, I saw the terrorists strike back.
BY MELIK KAYLAN
Monday, May 21, 2007 12:01 a.m. EDT
Diyala Province, Iraq--Saturday I witnessed a violent and dramatic illustration of how the Iraqi Army has, in places, begun to work effectively with tribesmen against determined al Qaeda insurgents.
The incident occurred some 50 miles north of Baghdad at a remote dusty village in Diyala province, which is now a kind of frontline between the two sides. We were there in the punishing noonday heat, with a rustic crowd on hand, to witness an emotional meeting between tribal chiefs in long robes and a lone, clean-shaven figure in a suit and tie--Ahmed Chalabi. Mr. Chalabi, the elite Shiite politician and former exile, a controversial figure in the U.S., came to thank the elders for their courage and sacrifice.
Until recently, Sunnis and Shiites had tilled the land together for miles around, intermarried and mutually inhabited a checkerboard of villages. A year ago, al Qaeda had forced its strategy of sectarian hatred on the area, purging the Shiites while executing Sunnis who resisted their authority. It remains one of Iraq's most volatile zones. Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, the sanguinary leader of al Qaeda in Iraq, had his headquarters in the area and was ultimately killed less than 20 miles away.
Suddenly hefty explosions shook the ground while automatic gunfire rent the air. We were under attack, and al Qaeda had chosen a perfect moment to ignite disaster. All their local opponents were there, plus Mr. Chalabi, a top Iraqi government figure known around the world.
Mr. Chalabi lives outside the security of the Baghdad's Green Zone, albeit in a well-defended series of cul-de-sacs. One of his official functions requires him to raise public support for Baghdad's security plan, so he likes to be mobile and takes risks to stay in touch with things. Abroad, he has been accused of everything from luring the U.S. and other allies into toppling Saddam to passing sensitive information to Iran. Among Iraqis he is highly respected.
At about 10 a.m. on Saturday, we had taken off across Baghdad in a convoy of a dozen white pickups and SUVs, some with mounted machine guns, on our way to Diyala. We passed through notorious neighborhoods: one infamous for kidnapping, another where street battles have been fought between Shiites and Palestinian gangs. Often there were miles of static cars queuing for gasoline. We passed by the old U.N. High Commission building, truck-bombed in 2003, now empty. We passed Saddam's giant, turquoise, egg-shaped "Monument to the Martyrs" of the Iran-Iraq war, a bright contrast to the faded saffron brick of Baghdad's peeling facades. Suddenly a sharp explosive sound went off nearby and Ali, the security chief shouted "go, go, go" into the intercom. Our convoy raced off.
Out in the country, cracked dry earth and chalky bare scrubland stretched away. An hour out, the convoy slowed almost to standstill and stayed that way. Never a good thing. Al Qaeda had blown up all the bridges linking Baghdad to Iran, and a mile or more of trucks waited to cross a makeshift mud-and-stone bridge across the Diyala river. A bulldozer helped us jump the queue by carving an improvised path. We passed some miles of mud-brick dwellings and arrived at a village square encircled by earthen ramparts with a T-55 tank, a cannon and a bunker embedded along it. We had arrived at the front line in the village of Dafaa. Nearby stood a long, low reception hall, and, just in front, a large tent with long tables for the tribal buffet lunch.
Mr. Chalabi entered the building followed by Al-Iraqiyya TV crews. An aging sheik, in black-checkered headdress and sheer ochre robe--said to be the richest landowner--came in and sat beside him. Much of his property lay fallow out in no man's land. He'd lost seven sons and grandsons to the conflict there. "We've had no support from the government since the fighting started," he said, "no one has visited us or asked what we need. We've been on our own fighting al Qaeda which gets money and arms from around the world. Only recently, the Iraqi Army has given us some soldiers and weapons, and that has helped very much, but we need more, much more help, money, arms, provisions. We ask that you pass this on to the government." Above his head hung a moonlit poster of the Shiite martyr Imam Ali on a white horse crossing a river. One sheik after another came in and repeated the same concerns.
Dafaa has perforce become an exclusively Shiite village, an international force of militant Sunnis having occupied the villages roundabout. They are led, according to locals, by Afghans who have forced farmers to give them their daughters in marriage and "made everyone look Afghani like them, with long beards." They decapitate doubters and float them down the river to Dafaa village. "No fish anymore," say the locals.
In wider Diyala province, wedged strategically between Iran and Baghdad, many of the Sunnis were in Saddam's security forces, and for a while the al Qaeda leader was a former Saddam army colonel, according to Mr. Chalabi. They consider themselves a last line of resistance to the Shiite continuum between Iran and Iraqi Shiites to the south, so they accommodate foreign Sunni fighters more readily than, say, the Sunni tribes in Anbar province who feel more secure.
In the last year, al Qaeda rolled up the front until Dafaa village lay exposed like an arrowhead surrounded on three sides. It served as the final redoubt protecting the last bridge open to vital goods from the north directly supplying Baghdad. Finally, some months ago, a small contingent of 15 Iraqi Army troops moved in with high-caliber armor and stabilized the front. "That's all it took," said the young lieutenant in charge as he showed us and the 20-foot earthen ramparts, "because we fight alongside the people." Listening to anecdotes and viewing bullet marks from snipers, we stood outlined on the ridge squinting across empty cracked fields. The nearest village shaded by date trees sat a mere 900 meters away. Our self-exposure proved foolhardy in short order.
As the buffet lunch got going, a soldier ran over and reported two pickups racing across no man's land towards us. He was told to report developments. He raced back saying that they seemed to be unloading mortars. This time, he was told to repel them. The opposition had no doubt seen all the ridge-top activity, the civilians, camera crews, berobed sheiks--and responded briskly. The first high-explosive shell, later identified as launched from an 82mm heavy mortar, must have landed to the left of the village. It shook everything and blurred my sight. Our side opened fire with Kalashnikovs, perhaps some 30 fighters in all slithering up the slope, one standing on the skyline with a full machine gun while being fed the magazine-belt by his friend. The tank too thundered away. Then the APC cannon.
I lost my head somewhat and ran at the rampart to look over the top but was thankfully tackled and stopped. The visiting sheiks crowded into the community hall. Mr. Chalabi never ceased talking to the TV camera, demanding help for the village. The second shell landed closer and behind us and fine yellow earth-dust floated over us. The sheiks were herded outside as a direct hit would have killed them all. It seemed the enemy had hit the structure before, maybe even had its GPS coordinates. The chaos intensified, the fighters now ducking from incoming fire. It was frustrating not to see the full picture. Two U.S. choppers flew overhead toward the opposition. The third mortar detonated, quite close this time, perhaps some 30 yards to the left, behind shuddering mud-brick structures, making my clothing flicker in the blast and my breath drop out. The tank fired again. The sheiks ran around ascending their SUVs with help from villagers. I counted three shells in all but some say six landed. It was hard to tell in the confusion. Suddenly a shout rose up and the fighters danced up and down below the ridge and came running down to us laughing. They'd destroyed one of the targets, it seemed.
What about the other? "It's OK, it's OK," someone shouted to me, and everyone began firing into the air to the great anger of a visiting army officer. They could scarcely afford the ammunition. We later found out, though, that the combined sound of gunfire, added to by bodyguards, had impressed the attackers--they apparently feared the presence of a much bigger force. They stopped, at least for now, which gave us the chance to leap into our vehicles, with Mr. Chalabi in his blue Parisian suit and poplin shirt pleading to the last in front of the cameras, before being bundled off to safety.
As we drove away from the village along the raised earth road, I looked back to see perhaps a hundred SUVs, a mile long, belting along behind carrying the elders. An Iraqi Army Humvee with mounted machine gun charged past us to the front. They'd been helping to guard the last bridge to Baghdad. But now, one felt, the villagers could guard it handily. They no longer felt isolated and forgotten by the world, as the television sets showed this night all over the Mideast.
Mr. Kaylan is an Istanbul-born writer based in New York.
WSJ
-
My understanding is that The Guardian is quite the leftist publication. Nonetheless, a depressing piece-- especially the comment on our political will here at home.
=====================
Iran's secret plan for summer offensive to force US out of Iraq
Simon Tisdall
Tuesday May 22, 2007
The Guardian
US soldiers visit an Iraqi army base in Amiriya, a Sunni neighbourhood in west Baghdad. Photograph: Sean Smith
Iran is secretly forging ties with al-Qaida elements and Sunni Arab militias in Iraq in preparation for a summer showdown with coalition forces intended to tip a wavering US Congress into voting for full military withdrawal, US officials say.
"Iran is fighting a proxy war in Iraq and it's a very dangerous course for them to be following. They are already committing daily acts of war against US and British forces," a senior US official in Baghdad warned. "They [Iran] are behind a lot of high-profile attacks meant to undermine US will and British will, such as the rocket attacks on Basra palace and the Green Zone [in Baghdad]. The attacks are directed by the Revolutionary Guard who are connected right to the top [of the Iranian government]."
Article continues
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The official said US commanders were bracing for a nationwide, Iranian-orchestrated summer offensive, linking al-Qaida and Sunni insurgents to Tehran's Shia militia allies, that Iran hoped would trigger a political mutiny in Washington and a US retreat. "We expect that al-Qaida and Iran will both attempt to increase the propaganda and increase the violence prior to Petraeus's report in September [when the US commander General David Petraeus will report to Congress on President George Bush's controversial, six-month security "surge" of 30,000 troop reinforcements]," the official said.
"Certainly it [the violence] is going to pick up from their side. There is significant latent capability in Iraq, especially Iranian-sponsored capability. They can turn it up whenever they want. You can see that from the pre-positioning that's been going on and the huge stockpiles of Iranian weapons that we've turned up in the last couple of months. The relationships between Iran and groups like al-Qaida are very fluid," the official said.
"It often comes down to individuals, and people constantly move around. For instance, the Sunni Arab so-called resistance groups use Salafi jihadist ideology for their own purposes. But the whole Iran- al-Qaida linkup is very sinister."
Iran has maintained close links to Iraq's Shia political parties and militias but has previously eschewed collaboration with al-Qaida and Sunni insurgents.
US officials now say they have firm evidence that Tehran has switched tack as it senses a chance of victory in Iraq. In a parallel development, they say they also have proof that Iran has reversed its previous policy in Afghanistan and is now supporting and supplying the Taliban's campaign against US, British and other Nato forces.
Tehran's strategy to discredit the US surge and foment a decisive congressional revolt against Mr Bush is national in scope and not confined to the Shia south, its traditional sphere of influence, the senior official in Baghdad said. It included stepped-up coordination with Shia militias such as Moqtada al-Sadr's Jaish al-Mahdi as well as Syrian-backed Sunni Arab groups and al-Qaida in Mesopotamia, he added. Iran was also expanding contacts across the board with paramilitary forces and political groups, including Kurdish parties such as the PUK, a US ally.
"Their strategy takes into account all these various parties. Iran is playing all these different factions to maximise its future control and maximise US and British difficulties. Their co-conspirator is Syria which is allowing the takfirists [fundamentalist Salafi jihadis] to come across the border," the official said.
Any US decision to retaliate against Iran on its own territory could be taken only at the highest political level in Washington, the official said. But he indicated that American patience was wearing thin.
Warning that the US was "absolutely determined" to hit back hard wherever it was challenged by Iranian proxies or agents inside Iraq, he cited the case of five alleged members of the Revolutionary Guard's al-Quds force detained in Irbil in January. Despite strenuous protests from Tehran, which claims the men are diplomats, they have still not been released.
"Tehran is behaving like a racecourse gambler. They're betting on all the horses in the race, even on people they fundamentally don't trust," a senior administration official in Washington said. "They don't know what the outcome will be in Iraq. So they're hedging their bets."
The administration official also claimed that notwithstanding recent US and British overtures, Syria was still collaborating closely with Iran's strategy in Iraq.
"80% to 90%" of the foreign jihadis entering Iraq were doing so from Syrian territory, he said.
Despite recent diplomatic contacts, and an agreement to hold bilateral talks at ambassadorial level in Baghdad next week, US officials say there has been no let-up in hostile Iranian activities, including continuing support for violence, weapons smuggling and training.
"Iran is perpetuating the cycle of sectarian violence through support for extra-judicial killing and murder cells. They bring Iraqi militia members and insurgent groups into Iran for training and then help infiltrate them back into the country. We have plenty of evidence from a variety of sources. There's no argument about that. That's just a fact," the senior official in Baghdad said.
In trying to force an American retreat, Iran's hardline leadership also hoped to bring about a humiliating political and diplomatic defeat for the US that would reduce Washington's regional influence while increasing Tehran's own.
But if Iran succeeded in "prematurely" driving US and British forces out of Iraq, the likely result would be a "colossal humanitarian disaster" and possible regional war drawing in the Sunni Arab Gulf states, Syria and Turkey, he said.
Despite such concerns, or because of them, the US welcomed the chance to talk to Iran, the senior administration official said. "Our agenda starts with force protection in Iraq," he said. But there were many other Iraq-related issues to be discussed. Recent pressure had shown that Iran's behaviour could be modified, the official claimed: "Last winter they were literally getting away with murder."
But tougher action by security forces in Iraq against Iranian agents and networks, the dispatch of an additional aircraft carrier group to the Gulf and UN security council resolutions imposing sanctions had given Tehran pause, he said.
Washington analysts and commentators predict that Gen Petraeus's report to the White House and Congress in early September will be a pivotal moment in the history of the four-and-a-half-year war - and a decision to begin a troop drawdown or continue with the surge policy will hinge on the outcome. Most Democrats and many Republicans in Congress believe Iraq is in the grip of a civil war and that there is little that a continuing military presence can achieve. "Political will has already failed. It's over," a former Bush administration official said.
A senior adviser to Gen Petraeus reported this month that the surge had reduced violence, especially sectarian killings, in the Baghdad area and Sunni-dominated Anbar province. But the adviser admitted that much of the trouble had merely moved elsewhere, "resulting in spikes of activity in Diyala [to the north] and some areas to the south of the capital". "Overall violence is at about the same level [as when the surge began in February]."
Iranian officials flatly deny US and British allegations of involvement in internal violence in Iraq or in attacks on coalition forces. Interviewed in Tehran recently, Mohammad Reza Bagheri, deputy foreign minister for Arab affairs with primary responsibility for Iran's policy in Iraq, said: "We believe it would be to the benefit of both the occupiers and the Iraqi people that they [the coalition forces] withdraw immediately."
-
WSJ
The Left's Iraq Muddle
Yes, it is central to the fight against Islamic radicalism.
BY BOB KERREY
Tuesday, May 22, 2007 12:01 a.m. EDT
At this year's graduation celebration at The New School in New York, Iranian lawyer, human-rights activist and Nobel laureate Shirin Ebadi delivered our commencement address. This brave woman, who has been imprisoned for her criticism of the Iranian government, had many good and wise things to say to our graduates, which earned their applause.
But one applause line troubled me. Ms. Ebadi said: "Democracy cannot be imposed with military force."
What troubled me about this statement--a commonly heard criticism of U.S. involvement in Iraq--is that those who say such things seem to forget the good U.S. arms have done in imposing democracy on countries like Japan and Germany, or Bosnia more recently.
Let me restate the case for this Iraq war from the U.S. point of view. The U.S. led an invasion to overthrow Saddam Hussein because Iraq was rightly seen as a threat following Sept. 11, 2001. For two decades we had suffered attacks by radical Islamic groups but were lulled into a false sense of complacency because all previous attacks were "over there." It was our nation and our people who had been identified by Osama bin Laden as the "head of the snake." But suddenly Middle Eastern radicals had demonstrated extraordinary capacity to reach our shores.
As for Saddam, he had refused to comply with numerous U.N. Security Council resolutions outlining specific requirements related to disclosure of his weapons programs. He could have complied with the Security Council resolutions with the greatest of ease. He chose not to because he was stealing and extorting billions of dollars from the U.N. Oil for Food program.
No matter how incompetent the Bush administration and no matter how poorly they chose their words to describe themselves and their political opponents, Iraq was a larger national security risk after Sept. 11 than it was before. And no matter how much we might want to turn the clock back and either avoid the invasion itself or the blunders that followed, we cannot. The war to overthrow Saddam Hussein is over. What remains is a war to overthrow the government of Iraq.
Some who have been critical of this effort from the beginning have consistently based their opposition on their preference for a dictator we can control or contain at a much lower cost. From the start they said the price tag for creating an environment where democracy could take root in Iraq would be high. Those critics can go to sleep at night knowing they were right.
The critics who bother me the most are those who ordinarily would not be on the side of supporting dictatorships, who are arguing today that only military intervention can prevent the genocide of Darfur, or who argued yesterday for military intervention in Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda to ease the sectarian violence that was tearing those places apart.
Suppose we had not invaded Iraq and Hussein had been overthrown by Shiite and Kurdish insurgents. Suppose al Qaeda then undermined their new democracy and inflamed sectarian tensions to the same level of violence we are seeing today. Wouldn't you expect the same people who are urging a unilateral and immediate withdrawal to be urging military intervention to end this carnage? I would.
American liberals need to face these truths: The demand for self-government was and remains strong in Iraq despite all our mistakes and the violent efforts of al Qaeda, Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias to disrupt it. Al Qaeda in particular has targeted for abduction and murder those who are essential to a functioning democracy: school teachers, aid workers, private contractors working to rebuild Iraq's infrastructure, police officers and anyone who cooperates with the Iraqi government. Much of Iraq's middle class has fled the country in fear.
With these facts on the scales, what does your conscience tell you to do? If the answer is nothing, that it is not our responsibility or that this is all about oil, then no wonder today we Democrats are not trusted with the reins of power. American lawmakers who are watching public opinion tell them to move away from Iraq as quickly as possible should remember this: Concessions will not work with either al Qaeda or other foreign fighters who will not rest until they have killed or driven into exile the last remaining Iraqi who favors democracy.
The key question for Congress is whether or not Iraq has become the primary battleground against the same radical Islamists who declared war on the U.S. in the 1990s and who have carried out a series of terrorist operations including 9/11. The answer is emphatically "yes."
This does not mean that Saddam Hussein was responsible for 9/11; he was not. Nor does it mean that the war to overthrow him was justified--though I believe it was. It only means that a unilateral withdrawal from Iraq would hand Osama bin Laden a substantial psychological victory.
Those who argue that radical Islamic terrorism has arrived in Iraq because of the U.S.-led invasion are right. But they are right because radical Islam opposes democracy in Iraq. If our purpose had been to substitute a dictator who was more cooperative and supportive of the West, these groups wouldn't have lasted a week.
Finally, Jim Webb said something during his campaign for the Senate that should be emblazoned on the desks of all 535 members of Congress: You do not have to occupy a country in order to fight the terrorists who are inside it. Upon that truth I believe it is possible to build what doesn't exist today in Washington: a bipartisan strategy to deal with the long-term threat of terrorism.
The American people will need that consensus regardless of when, and under what circumstances, we withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq. We must not allow terrorist sanctuaries to develop any place on earth. Whether these fighters are finding refuge in Syria, Iran, Pakistan or elsewhere, we cannot afford diplomatic or political excuses to prevent us from using military force to eliminate them.
Mr. Kerrey, a former Democratic senator from Nebraska and member of the 9/11 Commission, is president of The New School.
-
White House Is Said to Debate ’08 Cut in Iraq Troops by 50%
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/26/washington/26strategy.html?th&emc=th
By DAVID E. SANGER and DAVID S. CLOUD
Published: May 26, 2007
WASHINGTON, May 25 — The Bush administration is developing what are described as concepts for reducing American combat forces in Iraq by as much as half next year, according to senior administration officials in the midst of the internal debate.
It is the first indication that growing political pressure is forcing the White House to turn its attention to what happens after the current troop increase runs its course.
The concepts call for a reduction in forces that could lower troop levels by the midst of the 2008 presidential election to roughly 100,000, from about 146,000, the latest available figure, which the military reported on May 1. They would also greatly scale back the mission that President Bush set for the American military when he ordered it in January to win back control of Baghdad and Anbar Province.
The mission would instead focus on the training of Iraqi troops and fighting Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, while removing Americans from many of the counterinsurgency efforts inside Baghdad.
Still, there is no indication that Mr. Bush is preparing to call an early end to the current troop increase, and one reason officials are talking about their long-range strategy may be to blunt pressure from members of Congress, including some Republicans, who are pushing for a more rapid troop reduction.
The officials declined to be quoted for attribution because they were discussing internal deliberations that they expected to evolve over several months.
Officials say proponents of reducing the troops and scaling back their mission next year appear to include Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. They have been joined by generals at the Pentagon and elsewhere who have long been skeptical that the Iraqi government would use the opportunity created by the troop increase to reach genuine political accommodations.
So far, the concepts are entirely a creation of Washington and have been developed without the involvement of the top commanders in Iraq, Gen. David H. Petraeus and Lt. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, both of whom have been enthusiastic supporters of the troop increase.
Those generals and other commanders have made it clear that they are operating on a significantly slower clock than officials in Washington, who are eager for significant withdrawals before the president leaves office in January 2009.
In an interview in Baghdad on Thursday, General Odierno, the senior United States ground commander, said any withdrawal of American troops was not advisable until December, “at a minimum.”
Even then, he said, redeployments should be carried out slowly, to avoid jeopardizing security gains.
General Odierno, who has pushed for extending the troop increase into next year, noted that units were in place or available to continue that effort through next April.
But the ideas under discussion, from the National Security Council to the Pentagon, envision reductions beginning well before then. The last time American troop levels in Iraq were anywhere near 100,000 was in January 2004, when they fell briefly to about 108,000.
One of the ideas, officials say, would be to reduce the current 20 American combat brigades to about 10, which would be completed between the spring of 2008 and the end of the year.
Several administration officials said they hoped that if such a reduction were under way in the midst of the presidential campaign, it would shift the debate from whether American forces should be pulled out by a specific deadline — the current argument consuming Washington — to what kind of long-term presence the United States should have in Iraq.
“It stems from a recognition that the current level of forces aren’t sustainable in Iraq, they aren’t sustainable in the region, and they will be increasingly unsustainable here at home,” said one administration official who has taken part in the closed-door discussions.
But other officials in Washington cautioned that any drawdown could be jeopardized by a major outbreak of new violence. Vice President Dick Cheney and others might argue that even beginning a withdrawal would embolden elements of Al Qaeda and the Shiite militias that have recently appeared to go underground.
Missing from much of the current discussion is talk about the success of democracy in Iraq, officials say, or even of the passage of reconciliation measures that Mr. Bush said in January that the troop increase would allow to take place. In interviews, many senior administration and military officials said they now doubted that those political gains, even if achieved, would significantly reduce the violence.
The officials cautioned that no firm plans have emerged from the discussions. But they said the proposals being developed envision a far smaller but long-term American presence, centering on three or four large bases around Iraq. Mr. Bush has told recent visitors to the White House that he was seeking a model similar to the American presence in South Korea.
Both Mr. Bush and Secretary Gates appeared to allude to the new ideas at separate news conferences on Thursday, though they were careful not to be specific about how or when what they are terming the post-surge phase would begin.
Mr. Gates described the administration’s goal of eventually shifting the mission in Iraq to one that is “more to train, equip, continue to go after Al Qaeda and provide support.” Such a mission, he noted, “clearly would involve fewer forces than we have now.”
Any change of course “is going to be the president’s decision,” Mr. Gates said, but one greatly influenced by assessments from General Petraeus and the new American ambassador to Iraq, Ryan C. Crocker, who are to provide an assessment of the situation in September. Mr. Gates also referred to “the possible need for some kind of residual force in Iraq for some protracted period of time.”
A rapid transfer of responsibility to Iraqi forces and withdrawal to large bases was attempted in 2005 and 2006, with disastrous results when the Iraqi units proved incapable of halting major attacks, and sectarian violence worsened.
“We’ve been here before,” General Odierno said in the interview, referring to the decisions that are coming up on how quickly to hand over authority to Iraqi units. “We’ve rushed the transition and soon lost many areas that we had before. This time it’s about having enough combat power to stay.”
But what is different now is the political environment in the United States. While Democrats in Congress relented this week and dropped demands to attach a schedule for withdrawal to a bill to finance military efforts in Iraq, White House officials concede that they have bought a few months, at best.
By the fall, they say, they are likely to lose several Republican senators and many members of the House who voted with Mr. Bush in recent weeks.
During his own news conference, Mr. Bush referred on four separate occasions to the report of the Iraq Study Group, headed by the former Secretary of State James A. Baker III and the former Congressman Lee H. Hamilton.
That report, about which Mr. Bush appeared distinctly unenthusiastic when it was issued in December, called for the withdrawal of all American combat troops by the end of March 2008. Mr. Gates was a member of the study group, though he resigned to take up his current post before the report was written.
David E. Sanger reported from Washington and David S. Cloud from Baghda
-
Geopolitical Diary: Keeping U.S. Troops in Iraq
The White House on Wednesday compared the future U.S. troop presence in Iraq to that in South Korea. This is not so much an announcement of a plan to create a specific force structure or basing arrangement as it is a statement about the length and character of Washington's commitment to Baghdad. The real underlying significance of the announcement is simple: the United States is not leaving Iraq any time soon.
While perhaps at first indistinguishable from the Bush administration's well-rehearsed company line -- that the United States is committed to Iraq -- White House Press Secretary Tony Snow's choice of analogies comes amid the first public negotiations between Washington and Tehran on Iraq's stability. These negotiations themselves are the product of years of behind-the-scenes discussions aimed at finding a way to reconcile nearly incompatible national interests. Nevertheless, the very existence of public negotiations on the subject suggests substantial progress has been made from the impasse that existed earlier in the year.
The South Korea analogy is thus no small statement, no accident and no coincidence. This was not the standard "we stand by Iraq" press conference; the White House appears to have made an assertion that reflects a much deeper agreement with Tehran. Washington could well be positioning itself to garner domestic and Iraqi support for a U.S. military presence in Iraq that will continue for the foreseeable future (significantly, while reassuring Sunni allies in Iraq they will not be abandoned).
That presence, of course, will shift dramatically from the current arrangement. This is consistent with some changes already in the cards: a reduced U.S. troop presence and operational tempo, a shift from combat to advising and support, and a withdrawal from day-to-day security operations. The exact basing configuration and force structure are mere details, yet to be decided and -- especially in the case of Iraqi Kurdistan -- up for negotiation. But at the end of the day, a significant U.S. military presence will remain in Iraq.
That presence ultimately will mean the same thing for Iraq that it has meant for South Korea: an attack on Iraq is the same as an attack on the United States.
This position, whether official or unstated, has little to do with Iraq's internal sectarian strife. Rather, it creates a strategic tripwire in the region: the U.S. military physically interposes itself between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and gives Washington enough sway in Baghdad to provide a counterweight to Tehran's very real influence there. If the public talks continue to progress, Iraq could become the next nation to have its security (at least in terms of border integrity, if not internal stability) guaranteed by the United States -- a commitment from Washington that has rarely proven to be short-lived.
But first, of course, there are the negotiations. For Iran, a large U.S. military presence in Iraq would be little better than a U.S.-backed Sunni puppet government in Baghdad (which is Tehran's worst fear, whether or not Washington thinks it is attainable). Thus, if the Iranians have truly agreed to this arrangement -- and that is an exceedingly large "if" -- serious U.S. concessions will be forthcoming.
High on Iran's list of priorities, for example, is a significant role for Tehran in training (and thus influencing and controlling) Iraqi security forces. With a continued but more isolated U.S. military presence in the country, Iran needs a counterbalance. The trick, of course, is that these very security forces have been Washington's own counterbalance to Tehran's power over the Shiite militias -- and U.S. influence over the security apparatus will become increasingly important as the U.S. military draws back from day-to-day security operations.
In other words, Washington appears poised to set up a long-term presence in Iraq that is very nearly unacceptable for Tehran. If a deal is to proceed, Washington will have to reciprocate in kind with an equally unappetizing and nearly unacceptable concession, like sharing influence and perhaps even military participation in Iraq's security apparatus. It is a concession Washington could have a difficult time living with, even if the White House's representatives have agreed to it in principle.
The ability of the two sides to put this prospective compromise into practice is therefore far from certain. The situation is extremely fragile. Elections are looming in the United States and crucial power brokers in Iraq and Iran are falling ill. With both sides walking so close to the line, either could renege at the slightest provocation or the merest perceived shift in national interest.
Complicating matters further, any long-term U.S. military presence in Iraq will have to be worked out with the Iraqi government itself. Even after reaching this compromise with Washington, Tehran will need to convince its Shiite allies in Iraq to play ball -- and, through them, it will need to compel a controlling share of all Iraqi Shia to go along.
The Sunnis, and especially the Kurds, can probably follow suit. However, the Shiite and Sunni landscapes in Iraq are both highly fractured and dominated by Islamist forces, which will oppose a long-term U.S. military presence on Iraqi soil.
Should all go incredibly well -- should the various pieces of the puzzle not only fit into place but also hold their positions -- there will be a long-term U.S. military presence in Iraq. But while this might serve Washington's interests in part by providing a bulwark against jihadists, it also will fuel the jihadist fire. It is worth remembering that the origins of al Qaeda trace back to a single issue: the long-term U.S. military presence in nearby Saudi Arabia.
stratfor.com
-
AT WAR
Realists on Iraq
Democratic presidential candidates should listen to the "experts" they so often cite.
BY DAN SENOR
WSJ
Tuesday, June 5, 2007 12:01 a.m. EDT
During Sunday night's Democratic presidential debate, the candidates cited an oft-repeated source of the mess in Iraq: The White House's refusal to heed knowledgeable advice.
Indeed, it has often been said that the president got into Iraq because he disregarded advice from the true regional experts: foreign-policy "realists" who put together the Gulf War I coalition and counseled President George H.W. Bush against regime change; "moderate" Sunni Arab Governments; and the U.S. intelligence community.
But what if today these groups were actually advising against an American withdrawal?
Consider Brent Scowcroft, dean of the Realist School, who openly opposed the war from the outset and was a lead skeptic of the president's democracy-building agenda. In a recent Financial Times interview, he succinctly summed up the implication of withdrawal: "The costs of staying are visible; the costs of getting out are almost never discussed. If we get out before Iraq is stable, the entire Middle East region might start to resemble Iraq today. Getting out is not a solution."
And here is retired Marine Gen. Anthony Zinni, former Centcom Commander and a vociferous critic of the what he sees as the administration's naive and one-sided policy in Iraq and the broader Middle East: "When we are in Iraq we are in many ways containing the violence. If we back off we give it more room to breathe, and it may metastasize in some way and become a regional problem. We don't have to be there at the same force level, but it is a five- to seven-year process to get any reasonable stability in Iraq."
A number of Iraq's Sunni Arab neighbors also opposed the war as well as the U.S. push for liberalizing the region's authoritarian governments. Yet they now backchannel the same two priorities to Washington: Do not let Iran acquire nukes, and do not withdraw from Iraq.
A senior Gulf Cooperation Council official told me that "If America leaves Iraq, America will have to return. Soon. It will not be a clean break. It will not be a permanent goodbye. And by the time America returns, we will have all been drawn in. America will have to stabilize more than just Iraq. The warfare will have spread to other countries, governments will be overthrown. America's military is barely holding on in Iraq today. How will it stabilize 'Iraq Plus'?" (Iraq Plus is the term that some leaders in Arab capitals use to describe the region following a U.S. withdrawal.)
I heard similar warnings made repeatedly on a recent trip to almost every capital in the Persian Gulf--to some of America's closest allies and hosts of our military.
Likewise, withdrawal proponents cite career U.S. intelligence professionals as war skeptics, and not without basis. Yet here is what the U.S. intelligence community predicted in its National Intelligence Estimate early this year: "Coalition capabilities, including force levels, resources, and operations, remain an essential stabilizing element in Iraq. If Coalition forces were withdrawn rapidly during the term of this Estimate, we judge that this almost certainly would lead to a significant increase in the scale and scope of sectarian conflict in Iraq. . . .
"If such a rapid withdrawal were to take place, we judge that the Iraqi Security Forces would be unlikely to survive as a non-sectarian national institution: neighboring countries--invited by Iraqi factions or unilaterally--might intervene openly in the conflict; massive civilian casualties and forced population displacement would be probable; al Qaida in Iraq would attempt to use parts of the country--particularly al-Anbar province--to plan increased attacks in and outside of Iraq; and spiraling violence and disarray in Iraq, along with Kurdish moves to control Kirkuk and strengthen autonomy, could prompt Turkey to launch a military incursion."
If the presidential candidates go on a listening tour, it's important to consider one additional group: A number of Western reporters who have spent the past few years in Iraq.
The White House has actually been inviting Baghdad bureau reporters to the Oval Office--however belatedly--so the president can hear their observations. One of them is John Burns of the New York Times. He won Pulitzers for his coverage in Bosnia and Afghanistan before throwing himself full-bore into Iraq. This is how he described the stakes of withdrawal on "The Charlie Rose Show" recently:
"Friends of mine who are Iraqis--Shiite, Sunni, Kurd--all foresee a civil war on a scale with bloodshed that will absolutely dwarf what we're seeing now. It's really difficult to imagine that that would happen . . . without Iran becoming involved from the east, without the Saudis, who have already said in that situation that they would move in to help protect the Sunni minority in Iraq.
"It's difficult to see how this could go anywhere but into a much wider conflagration, with all kinds of implications for the world's flow of oil, for the state of Israel. What happens to King Abdullah in Jordan if there's complete chaos in the region? . . . It just seems to me that the consequences are endless, endless."
Earlier on the same program, Mr. Burns laid out his own version of Iraq Plus. "If you pull out now, and catastrophe ensues, then it is very likely that the United States would have to come back in circumstances which, of course, would be even less favorable, one might imagine, than the ones that now confront American troops here."
It would be one thing if only the architects of the Bush policy and their die-hard supporters opposed withdrawal. But four separate groups of knowledgeable critics--three of whom opposed going into Iraq--now describe the possible costs of withdrawal as very high.
If the Realists, neighboring Arab regimes, our intelligence community and some of the most knowledgeable reporters all say such a course could be disastrous, on what basis are the withdrawal advocates taking their position?
The American people are understandably frustrated with Iraq. But this does not mean they will be satisfied with politicians who support a path that could make matters much worse.
Mr. Senor, a former foreign policy advisor to the Bush administration, was based in Baghdad from April 2003 through June 2004. He is a founding partner of Rosemont Capital.
-
Iraq's Dangerous Diyala Province
Unknown gunmen attacked the home of the police chief in Baqubah, Iraq, on June 8, killing the man's wife and 11 guards, and kidnapping three of his grown children. The chief, Col. Ali Dilayan al-Jorani, was not at home at the time of the attack.
Diyala province, the capital of which is Baqubah, is now the site of some of the worst violence in Iraq, in part because the foreign jihadists and the Sunnis have turned on one another there. However, the fighting, which pits the jihadists against Sunni tribes and Sunni nationalist militants, also is going on in the other central Iraqi provinces of Anbar and Babil, as well as in the country's capital, Baghdad. Meanwhile, the other conflicts that have been raging for years -- between coalition forces and jihadists, Shia and jihadists, and Sunnis and Shia -- continue unabated. Jihadists also are increasingly attacking Iraqi Kurds in the North.
Anbar province was once a haven for foreign jihadists and a major point on the so-called "rat line" used by the jihadists to enter Iraq from Saudi Arabia, Syria and Jordan. Coalition troops, in fact, engaged in frequent pitched battles with insurgents in Anbar's cites of Al Fallujah and Ar Ramadi, though they failed to permanently drive out the jihadists. Around October 2005, however, the Sunni tribes in Anbar turned on the jihadists, and the fighting between the two groups is now in full swing. The jihadists have struck back by attacking the tribes with suicide bombs, truck bombs and bombs laced with chlorine in an effort to coerce the tribes to fall back in line.
It does not appear to be working.
U.S. forces, however, enlisted the support of Sunni tribal leaders in Anbar, as well as leaders who have sought refuge in Jordan and Syria but retain influence at home. This has led to a major reduction in the number of foreign jihadists in Anbar. The tribal leaders started coming on board after the jihadists began attacking their tribes and disrespecting their culture in an effort to coerce them to cooperate. Once the tribal leaders started to ally themselves with U.S. and Iraqi security forces, young tribesmen joined the Iraqi army, police and provincial security units (PSU) that patrol the province. These recruits have been critical to the coalition's success in Anbar. The tribesmen in the PSUs have been especially vital to this effort because they know who belongs and who does not, leaving the jihadists with little sanctuary.
The situation in Anbar in recent months, along with the surge in U.S. security operations in Baghdad, has compelled the jihadists to regroup in Diyala province, where they historically have had some level of influence. In fact, slain al Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was seeking refuge in Diyala when he was betrayed by Sunni tribes.
The situation in Diyala, however, differs from that in Anbar as regards the number of actors involved. In Diyala, the jihadists are encountering the Sunni nationalist militias, Sunni tribes (though the tribes are not as fully engaged as in Anbar), Shiite militias and increasing numbers of U.S. troops who are being steadily shifted from other provinces. Also contributing to the level of violence in Diyala are the Kurds, who want the province incorporated into a Kurdish autonomous region; the Iranians just over the border, who are supporting different factions in this fight; and the Shiite-on-Sunni fighting.
As a result of all this, Diyala has seen a significant rise in attacks since February -- and has now become one of the most dangerous provinces in Iraq for U.S. and Iraqi troops, their foes and civilians.
Violence also is increasing in Babil province, which lies on a fault line between the Sunni and Shiite areas. Not only has Babil witnessed some of the most devastating attacks against Shiite targets in the war, but the jihadists in Babil also have been fighting Sunni tribes as they try to maintain their position in the province.
This trend of Sunni nationalist-jihadist fighting reflects the growing momentum of political negotiations between Iran, the United States and the various Iraqi factions to reach a political resolution in Iraq. For the Shiite and Sunni factions to get on board with the deal, each side will have to deliver on its end of the bargain. For the Shia, it means reining in the militias -- a process that appears to be under way. For the Sunnis, this means wiping out the jihadists.
stratfor.com
-
Al Gore in 1992 on Iraq:
http://www.breitbart.tv/html/1602.html
-
The Prime Minister of Iraq wrote an op-ed published yesterday in the WSJ, posted below. Very worthwhile read IMO. First my comments on the previous 2 posts here.
My conclusion from the Strat piece, if they are correct, is that the Americans are now allied with the Sunni, Shia and Kurd political leaders and populations along with the Iraqi government and the Iraqi security forces, and are fighting against mainly foreign jihadists and Shia militias. Sounds like the political side is going well but violence continues because the enemy believes that continuing war is their victory.
The Gore video is amazing. He strongly attacks Bush I for being soft on Saddam in years prior. It is perhaps easier to understand as a 1992 Clinton attack piece in the general campaign with the VP candidate with his 'hawk' credentials delivering the attack. Amazingly they weakened Bush for raising taxes when they would raise them more and for being soft on tyrants when they would be softer. Masterful political selling if deception is your product.
Here is the Prime Minister of Iraq from yesterday:
http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110010203
Our Common Struggle
America had its civil war. Why expect freedom to come easy to Iraq?
BY NOURI AL-MALIKI
Wednesday, June 13, 2007
BAGHDAD, Iraq--Americans keen to understand the ongoing struggle for a new Iraq can be guided by the example of their own history. In the 1860s, your country fought a great struggle of its own, a civil war that took hundreds of thousands of lives but ended in the triumph of freedom and the birth of a great power. Abraham Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation signaled the destruction of the terrible institution of slavery, and the rise of a country dedicated, more than any other in the world of nation-states then and hence, to the principle of human liberty.
Our struggle in Iraq is similar to the great American quest, and is perhaps even more complicated. As your country was fighting that great contest over its unity and future, Iraq was a province of an Ottoman empire steeped in backwardness and ignorance. A half a century later, the British began an occupation of Iraq and drew the borders of contemporary Iraq as we know them today. Independence brought no relief to the people of our land. They were not given the means of political expression, nor were they to know political arrangements that respected their varied communities.
Under the Baath tyranny, Iraqis were to endure a brutal regime the likes of which they had never known before. Countless people were put to death on the smallest measure of suspicion. Wars were waged by that regime and our national treasure was squandered without the consent of a population that was herded into costly and brutal military campaigns. Today when I hear the continuous American debate about the struggle raging in Iraq, I can only recall with great sorrow the silence which attended the former dictator's wars.
It is perhaps true that only people who are denied the gift of liberty can truly appreciate its full meaning and bounty. I look with admiration at the American debate surrounding the Iraq war, and I admire even those opinions that differ from my own. As prime minister of Iraq I have been subjected to my share of criticism in that American debate, but I harbor no resentment and fully understand that the basic concerns of Americans are the safety of their young people fighting in our country and the national interests of their society. As this American debate goes on, I am guided and consoled by the sacred place of freedom and liberty in the American creed and in America's notion of itself.
War being what it is, the images of Iraq that come America's way are of car bombs and daily explosions. Missing from the coverage are the great, subtle changes our country is undergoing, the birth of new national ideas and values which will in the end impose themselves despite the death and destruction that the terrorists have been hell-bent on inflicting on us. Those who endured the brutality of the former regime, those who saw the outside world avert its gaze from their troubles, know the magnitude of the change that has come to Iraq. A fundamental struggle is being fought on Iraqi soil between those who believe that Iraqis, after a long nightmare, can retrieve their dignity and freedom, and others who think that oppression is the order of things and that Iraqis are doomed to a political culture of terror, prisons and mass graves. Some of our neighbors have made this struggle more lethal still, they have placed their bets on the forces of terror in pursuit of their own interests.
When I became prime minister a year and a half ago, my appointment emerged out of a political process unique in our neighborhood: Some 12 million voters took part in our parliamentary elections. They gave voice to their belief in freedom and open politics and their trust imposed heavy burdens on all of us in political life. Our enemies grew determined to drown that political process in indiscriminate violence, to divert attention from the spectacle of old men and women casting their vote, for the first time, to choose those who would govern in their name. You may take this right for granted in America, but for us this was a tantalizing dream during the decades of dictatorship and repression.
Before us lies a difficult road--the imperative of national reconciliation, the drafting of a new social contract that acknowledges the diversity of our country. It was in that spirit that those who drafted our constitution made provisions for amending it. The opponents of the constitution were a minority, but we sought for our new political life the widest possible measure of consensus. From the outset, I committed myself to the principle of reconciliation, pledged myself to its success. I was determined to review and amend many provisions and laws passed in the aftermath of the fall of the old regime, among them the law governing de-Baathification. I aimed to find the proper balance between those who opposed the decrees on de-Baathification and others who had been victims of the Baath Party. This has not been easy, but we have stuck to that difficult task.
Iraq is well on its way to passing a new oil law that would divide the national treasure among our provinces and cities, based on their share of the population. This was intended to reassure those provinces without oil that they will not be left behind and consigned to poverty. The goal is to repair our oil sector, open the door for new investments and raise the standard of living of Iraqi families. Our national budget this year is the largest in Iraq's history, its bulk dedicated to our most neglected provinces and to improving the service sector in the country as a whole. Our path has been made difficult by the saboteurs and the terrorists who target our infrastructure and our people, but we have persevered, even though our progress has been obscured by the scenes of death and destruction.
Daily we still fight the battle for our security. We lose policemen and soldiers to the violence, as do the multinational forces fighting along our side. We are training and equipping a modern force, a truly national and neutral force, aided by our allies. This is against the stream of history here, where the armed forces have traditionally been drawn into political conflicts and struggles. What gives us sustenance and hope is an increase in the numbers of those who volunteer for our armed forces, which we see as proof of the devotion of our people to the stability and success of our national government.
We have entered into a war, I want it known, against militias that had preyed upon the weakness of the national government and in the absence of law and order in some of our cities, even in some of the districts in Baghdad, imposed their own private laws--laws usually driven by extremism and a spirit of vengeance. Some of these militias presented themselves as defenders of their own respective communities against other militias. We believe that the best way to defeat these militias is to build and enhance the capabilities of our government as a defender of the rights of our citizens. A stable government cannot coexist with these militias.
Our conflict, it should be emphasized time and again, has been fueled by regional powers that have reached into our affairs. Iraq itself is eager to build decent relations with its neighbors. We don't wish to enter into regional entanglements. Our principle concern is to heal our country. We have reached out to those among our neighbors who are worried about the success and example of our democratic experiment, and to others who seem interested in enhancing their regional influence.
Our message has been the same to one and all: We will not permit Iraq to be a battleground for other powers. In the contests and ambitions swirling around Iraq, we are neutral and dedicated to our country's right to prosperity and a new life, inspired by a memory of a time when Baghdad was--as Washington is today--a beacon of enlightenment on which others gazed with admiration. We have come to believe, as Americans who founded your country once believed, that freedom is a precious inheritance. It is never cheap but the price is worth paying if we are to rescue our country.
Mr. Maliki is prime minister of Iraq.
-
What I Saw in Iraq
Iran remains a problem, but Anbar has joined the fight against terror.
BY JOSEPH LIEBERMAN
Friday, June 15, 2007 12:01 a.m. EDT
I recently returned from Iraq and four other countries in the Middle East, my first trip to the region since December. In the intervening five months, almost everything about the American war effort in Baghdad has changed, with a new coalition military commander, Gen. David Petraeus; a new U.S. ambassador, Ryan Crocker; the introduction, at last, of new troops; and most important of all, a bold, new counterinsurgency strategy.
The question of course is--is it working? Here in Washington, advocates of retreat insist with absolute certainty that it is not, seizing upon every suicide bombing and American casualty as proof positive that the U.S. has failed in Iraq, and that it is time to get out.
In Baghdad, however, discussions with the talented Americans responsible for leading this fight are more balanced, more hopeful and, above all, more strategic in their focus--fixated not just on the headline or loss of the day, but on the larger stakes in this struggle, beginning with who our enemies are in Iraq. The officials I met in Baghdad said that 90% of suicide bombings in Iraq today are the work of non-Iraqi, al Qaeda terrorists. In fact, al Qaeda's leaders have repeatedly said that Iraq is the central front of their global war against us. That is why it is nonsensical for anyone to claim that the war in Iraq can be separated from the war against al Qaeda--and why a U.S. pullout, under fire, would represent an epic victory for al Qaeda, as significant as their attacks on 9/11.
Some of my colleagues in Washington claim we can fight al Qaeda in Iraq while disengaging from the sectarian violence there. Not so, say our commanders in Baghdad, who point out that the crux of al Qaeda's strategy is to spark Iraqi civil war.
Al Qaeda is launching spectacular terrorist bombings in Iraq, such as the despicable attack on the Golden Mosque in Samarra this week, to try to provoke sectarian violence. Its obvious aim is to use Sunni-Shia bloodshed to collapse the Iraqi government and create a failed state in the heart of the Middle East, radicalizing the region and providing a base from which to launch terrorist attacks against the West.
Facts on the ground also compel us to recognize that Iran is doing everything in its power to drive us out of Iraq, including providing substantive support, training and sophisticated explosive devices to insurgents who are murdering American soldiers. Iran has initiated a deadly military confrontation with us, from bases in Iran, which we ignore at our peril, and at the peril of our allies throughout the Middle East.
The precipitous withdrawal of U.S. forces would not only throw open large parts of Iraq to domination by the radical regime in Tehran, it would also send an unmistakable message to the entire Middle East--from Lebanon to Gaza to the Persian Gulf where Iranian agents are threatening our allies--that Iran is ascendant there, and America is in retreat. One Arab leader told me during my trip that he is extremely concerned about Tehran's nuclear ambitions, but that he doubted America's staying power in the region and our political will to protect his country from Iranian retaliation over the long term. Abandoning Iraq now would substantiate precisely these gathering fears across the Middle East that the U.S. is becoming an unreliable ally.
That is why--as terrible as the continuing human cost of fighting this war in Iraq is--the human cost of losing it would be even greater.
Gen. Petraeus and other U.S. officials in Iraq emphasize that it is still too soon to draw hard judgments about the success of our new security strategy--but during my visit I saw hopeful signs of progress. Consider Anbar province, Iraq's heart of darkness for most of the past four years. When I last visited Anbar in December, the U.S. military would not allow me to visit the provincial capital, Ramadi, because it was too dangerous. Anbar was one of al Qaeda's major strongholds in Iraq and the region where the majority of American casualties were occurring. A few months earlier, the Marine Corps chief of intelligence in Iraq had written off the entire province as "lost," while the Iraq Study Group described the situation there as "deteriorating."
When I returned to Anbar on this trip, however, the security environment had undergone a dramatic reversal. Attacks on U.S. troops there have dropped from an average of 30 to 35 a day a few months ago to less than one a day now, according to Col. John Charlton, commander of the 1st Brigade of the 3rd Infantry Division, headquartered in Ramadi. Whereas six months ago only half of Ramadi's 23 tribes were cooperating with the coalition, all have now been persuaded to join an anti-al Qaeda alliance. One of Ramadi's leading sheikhs told me: "A rifle pointed at an American soldier is a rifle pointed at an Iraqi."
The recent U.S. experience in Anbar also rebuts the bromide that the new security plan is doomed to fail because there is no "military" solution for Iraq. In fact, no one believes there is a purely "military" solution for Iraq. But the presence of U.S. forces is critical not just to ensuring basic security, but to a much broader spectrum of diplomatic, political and economic missions--which are being carried out today in Iraq under Gen. Petraeus's counterinsurgency strategy.
In Anbar, for example, the U.S. military has been essential to the formation and survival of the tribal alliance against al Qaeda, simultaneously holding together an otherwise fractious group of Sunni Arab leaders through deft diplomacy, while establishing a political bridge between them and the Shia-dominated government in Baghdad. "This is a continuous effort," Col. Charlton said. "We meet with the sheikhs every single day and at every single level."
In Baghdad, U.S. forces have cut in half the number of Iraqi deaths from sectarian violence since the surge began in February. They have also been making critical improvements in governance, basic services and commercial activity at the grassroots level.
On Haifa Street, for instance, where there was bloody fighting not so long ago, the 2nd "Black Jack" Brigade of our First Cavalry Division, under the command of a typically impressive American colonel, Bryan Roberts, has not only retaken the neighborhood from insurgents, but is working with the local population to revamp the electrical grid and sewer system, renovate schools and clinics, and create an "economic safe zone" where businesses can reopen. Indeed, of the brigade's five "lines of operations," only one is strictly military. That Iraq reality makes pure fiction of the argument heard in Washington that the surge will fail because it is only "military."
Some argue that the new strategy is failing because, despite gains in Baghdad and Anbar, violence has increased elsewhere in the country, such as Diyala province. This gets things backwards: Our troops have succeeded in improving security conditions in precisely those parts of Iraq where the "surge" has focused. Al Qaeda has shifted its operations to places like Diyala in large measure because we have made progress in pushing them out of Anbar and Baghdad. The question now is, do we consolidate and build on the successes that the new strategy has achieved, keeping al Qaeda on the run, or do we abandon them?
To be sure, there are still daunting challenges ahead. Iraqi political leaders, in particular, need to step forward and urgently work through difficult political questions, whose resolution is necessary for national reconciliation and, as I told them, continuing American support.
These necessary legislative compromises would be difficult to accomplish in any political system, including peaceful, long-established democracies--as the recent performance of our own Congress reminds us. Nonetheless, Iraqi leaders are struggling against enormous odds to make progress, and told me they expect to pass at least some of the key benchmark bills this summer. It is critical that they do so.
Here, too, however, a little perspective is useful. While benchmarks are critically important, American soldiers are not fighting in Iraq today only so that Iraqis can pass a law to share oil revenues. They are fighting because a failed state in the heart of the Middle East, overrun by al Qaeda and Iran, would be a catastrophe for American national security and our safety here at home. They are fighting al Qaeda and agents of Iran in order to create the stability in Iraq that will allow its government to take over, to achieve the national reconciliation that will enable them to pass the oil law and other benchmark legislation.
I returned from Iraq grateful for the progress I saw and painfully aware of the difficult problems that remain ahead. But I also returned with a renewed understanding of how important it is that we not abandon Iraq to al Qaeda and Iran, so long as victory there is still possible.
And I conclude from my visit that victory is still possible in Iraq--thanks to the Iraqi majority that desperately wants a better life, and because of the courage, compassion and competence of the extraordinary soldiers and statesmen who are carrying the fight there, starting with Gen. Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker. The question now is, will we politicians in Washington rise to match their leadership, sacrifices and understanding of what is on the line for us in Iraq--or will we betray them, and along with them, America's future security?
Mr. Lieberman is an Independent Democratic senator from Connecticut.
-
The Baghdad Bar
American lawyers more interested in helping terrorists than their own beleaguered colleagues in Iraq.
WSJ
BY MELANIE KIRKPATRICK
Sunday, June 17, 2007 12:01 a.m. EDT
At last count, 46 lawyers have been assassinated in Iraq since the summer of 2003, according to a grim tally compiled by the Iraqi Bar Association. Some of the victims were kidnapped before being murdered; others were gunned down in the street or caught in crossfire. A recent casualty is Abdul-Sahib Abdulla al-Kanani, who was killed on his way to the grocery store in Baghdad on May 20. He leaves behind a wife and five children.
Aswad al-Minshidi, president of the Iraqi Bar Association, recounted this story in a phone call from Baghdad the other day. He is anguished at his association's scant ability to help the murdered lawyers' families, who often have no means of support. "Dear Miss Melanie," he says, "I know when a journalist is killed in Iraq, his or her colleagues around the world provide support and raise their voices in outrage. But where are the voices of outrage of lawyers in other countries when a lawyer is killed for doing his job?"
Where, indeed? Here in the U.S., it would be nice to think that part of the answer is that the lawyers, law firms and legal associations that might provide assistance are ignorant of the need. But part of the answer lies, too, in the different priorities many attorneys have set for themselves. Bar associations churn out papers on Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib and the execution of Saddam Hussein. Law firms line up to provide legal services to detainees. Cully Stimson, a deputy assistant secretary of defense, lost his job earlier this year for criticizing American lawyers for such work. The legal establishment's outrage against Mr. Stimson would have been easier to take had it been working even half as hard to help re-establish the rule of law in Iraq.
The legal profession "is the pillar on which any society is built," says Feisal al-Istrabadi, Iraq's deputy permanent representative to the United Nations. "Clearly the insurgents are trying to disrupt our society at every level." The rule of law is a primary target -- and the killings include judges, police officers and recruits, as well as ordinary lawyers. Mr. Minshidi says he and his family have been threatened.
The Iraqi legal system is based on the Napoleonic Code, and in the first half of the 20th century it served as a model for other countries in the region. Mr. Istrabadi, a U.S.-trained attorney who practiced law in Indiana and Illinois from 1988 until 2004, says that after decades of operating under totalitarian rule, the Iraqi legal system is much stronger than he had anticipated. After Saddam's ouster, "we expected to find that judicial system and the legal profession had been politically corrupted by the previous regime . . . but that was not the fact."
Saddam created an alternative judicial system, where political crimes were tried. The code of ethics among the Iraqi bar was so strong, Mr. Istrabadi says, that "Saddam was unable to corrupt the judicial system and was therefore forced to create an extra-judicial system." Iraq has a cadre of "world-class" judges and professors educated in the 1950s and 1960s, he says, but "young law professors have been cut off from the world for two decades or more" and younger attorneys need help.
So far the assistance has been meager. While the American Bar Association and the International Bar Association have operated programs, the focus has been on training judges and prosecutors, and most or all of their efforts have been funded by the U.S. and other governments. A program to refurbish Iraqi law schools, operated by DePaul University College of Law, lost its U.S. AID funding after one year. Mr. Minshidi of the Iraqi Bar Association says he is unaware of any efforts to date by U.S. bar associations, law schools or other non-governmental organizations to help, though he notes that the ABA has invited him to attend its annual meeting in August and the Federalist Society will host a small conference for Iraqi bar leaders this fall.
"There is much to do to establish the rule of law," he says. "So far it has mostly been training judges and prosecutors. Little has been done for law students and lawyers." (A model here could be the Afghan Women Leaders Connect, founded by American businesswomen to assist Afghan women, including lawyers and judges.)
"Where are the great associations of law we hear about?" asks Mr. Minshidi. "Where are the great law firms? . . . Where are the law schools? . . . The help we need is not only the help of the government. We need the help of our brothers in the law."
Ms. Kirkpatrick is a deputy editor of the Journal's editorial page.
-
Gen. David Petraeus with Chris Wallace on Sunday. It was too long to post, but here is the link:
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/06/petraeus_on_iraq_panel_on_immi.html
I found it relevant and helpful. To me, he seems like a straight shooter giving the good and the bad as he sees it. Unlike a post I just read, I'm pulling for the coalition government, supported by the Americans, to win the war, and to win the peace.
-
Thanks for that Doug.
Here's Stratfor's assessment:
Iraq: Sectarian Concerns and the High-Stake U.S.-Iranian Talks
June 18, 2007 19 00 GMT
Summary
Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has criticized the U.S. backing of Sunni militias engaged in fighting jihadists. Al-Maliki's comments highlight the concerns that the Iraqi Shia and Iran have about the Sunnis' potential empowerment as an outcome of the ongoing U.S.-Iranian talks on Iraq. However, these concerns are unlikely to derail the talks, given what is at stake for all the players involved.
Analysis
Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki said Baghdad disagrees with Washington's moves to arm and equip Sunni tribal militias engaged in fighting al Qaeda. In an interview published in the June 17-23 issue of Newsweek, al-Maliki said the Iraqi government is not against backing tribes in the fight against al Qaeda and its allies, but that Baghdad wants assurances about the tribal elements' credentials before such support is granted. Al-Maliki added that certain U.S. commanders are making mistakes because they do not know the tribes' backgrounds and are contributing to the proliferation of militias in the country.
Around the time of the May 4 meeting in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, the Iranians and Americans reached an understanding that Tehran would take responsibility for cleaning up the state of affairs within the Iraqi Shiite community while the United States would do the same with the Sunnis. The Iranians have moved to rein in radical Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr's Mehdi Army movement and "Iraqize" Tehran's main Iraqi Shiite proxy, the Iraqi Islamic Supreme Council, led by Abdel Aziz al-Hakim.
All this is meant to prepare the Sunnis, the Shia, Washington and Tehran for a final deal. But the Iranians do not like the idea of U.S. unilateral actions in their area of responsibility, especially regarding the Mehdi Army. Tehran also does not want to let the Bush administration dominate the process of cleaning out Sunnidom, because Tehran knows Washington is interested not only in neutralizing the jihadists but also in building a robust Sunni community to counterbalance the Shia (and, by extension, Iran).
Al-Maliki's remarks constitute a diplomatic and politically correct way for the Iraqi Shia and their Persian patrons to let Washington know they are displeased with the U.S. approach to preparing the Sunnis for a deal that will eventually emerge from the now-public U.S.-Iranian negotiations. The Shia realize that Sunni political and militant actors must be brought into the mainstream in order to contain the insurgency and give the Shiite-dominated government stability, but they want to retain political oversight over -- and military superiority in -- the process so the Shia will be able to approve of the Sunnis that enter the mainstream. In fact, the Shia also would prefer greater authority in dealing with jihadists and Baathists.
Al-Maliki is correct in saying the Bush administration's actions will increase the number of armed groups in an already militia-rich environment, particularly since the United States has added an armed group to the Sunni side of the equation, where the number of militant groups already is growing. For the Shia, who already are trying to limit the number of former regime elements (i.e., Baathists) being brought back into the system by the Bush administration, the U.S. actions are a major problem. Not only does U.S. backing improve the Sunnis' military capabilities, but it also could improve the Sunnis' collective bargaining position against the Shia. The Shia would love to see jihadist war-making capabilities destroyed, but not if it means empowering mainstream Sunnis.
Incidentally, the Iranians are not alone in their concern about the U.S. backing of tribal militias. Many Sunni political actors have expressed their reservations as well. These include Sunni nationalist insurgent groups, the main Sunni political blocs in parliament and the Sunni religious establishment. These groups fear they will lose power to tribal leaders who have agreed to fight the jihadists in return for a seat at the table. In other words, the U.S. move has created problems both between Sunnis and Shia and within the Sunni community itself, even though the intent is to get the two sectarian communities to agree on a power-sharing mechanism.
Meanwhile, the Kurds are highly concerned about the prospect of a Shiite-Sunni accommodation because this would translate into a unified Arab position against them and threaten Kurdish interests -- particularly their bid for maximum regional autonomy.
That said, these problems will not derail the U.S.-Iranian negotiations or those at the intra-Iraqi level, because both the United States and Iran are playing with busted flushes and, for the Iraqis, it is an existential issue.
-
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/06/25/070625fa_fact_hersh
The General’s Report
How Antonio Taguba, who investigated the Abu Ghraib scandal, became one of its casualties.
by Seymour M. Hersh June 25, 2007
[Kind of long, so I didn't post it all here. But well worth reading.]
-
Iraq: A New Offensive in Diyala
Summary
In one of the largest operations since the Iraq war began in 2003, the U.S. military led some 10,000 coalition troops into Diyala province June 19 as part of an offensive against al Qaeda. Building on successes in Anbar province, the United States is attempting to take the fight to the jihadists. But, like the U.S. troop surge, this offensive will not be short-lived, and success is far from assured.
Analysis
Operation Arrowhead Ripper, led by the U.S. Army's third Stryker Brigade Combat Team of the 2nd Infantry Division, began early June 19 in Diyala province. Some 10,000 coalition troops are involved in the offensive against al Qaeda, other foreign jihadist groups and their local supporters. The focus of the operation is the city of Baqubah, where Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was killed in a U.S. airstrike in June 2006, and which is home to all the major sectarian groups in Iraq. The operation will attempt to shut down jihadist operations there and establish some semblance of security. But the United States still cannot impose a military solution in Iraq; it can only attempt to make the security landscape conducive to political negotiations on the litany of Iraq's intractable issues.
During the last six months, many militant elements have been driven into Diyala, and U.S. fatalities in the province have seen a very distinct increase since January. Coalition efforts to talk with Sunni tribal leaders in Anbar province -- the traditional support base of al Qaeda in Iraq and Sunni jihadist elements -- have seen recent success. Sunni tribal militias' opposition to al Qaeda has been building for some time, but struggles within the larger Sunni camp and pressure from security operations in Baghdad proper have gradually pushed the jihadists from Anbar province into Diyala. Coalition troops have simply followed the jihadists; a U.S. Stryker battalion has been operating in eastern Baqubah for several months, and more than 2,000 Kurdish peshmerga fighters were deployed to Baqubah the week of June 10 to assist with U.S. security operations already under way.
Though the coalition met with some success in working with Anbar's Sunni tribal leaders against jihadists, Diyala's population -- 40 percent Sunni Arab, 35 percent Shiite Arab and 20 percent Kurdish -- is much more diverse than Anbar's. Diyala is one of three provinces that will be heavily contested in the Kirkuk referendum, which -- according to Iraq's constitution -- is to take place before the end of 2007. However, volatile resistance from Iraq's Sunni and Shiite factions likely will scupper the timeline. In the midst of these delicate sectarian tensions, however, last week's peshmerga deployment was particularly unsettling for Diyala's Arab population, since it gives the Kurds more armed influence in the province just as the United States attempts to deal with Shiite extremism within the leadership of Diyala's Iraqi National Police units (a move that was key to successes in Anbar province and Tal Afar). But given the influence of both Kurds and Shia in Diyala right now, the province's Sunni factions will be more difficult to split from their well-armed al Qaeda allies than the Sunnis in Anbar.
However, the U.S. ability to shift 10,000 coalition soldiers into a major operation outside Baghdad in the midst of a major security crackdown is the mark of significant operational flexibility. This flexibility will allow the United States to keep pressure on the jihadists and thus (it is hoped) impede their ability to plan complex operations and maintain the supply lines necessary to build explosives, such as those used in the recent spate of bridge bombings. Thus far, neither the recent bridge bombings nor jihadists' attempts to supplement their bombs with chlorine gas have proven particularly effective. However, the latest bombing of the revered Shiite al-Askariyah shrine June 13 and the June 19 bombing of the Khillani mosque in Baghdad serve as reminders that al Qaeda is still capable of stoking the fire of sectarian tension in Iraq.
In Diyala, however, both the foreign jihadists and their domestic allies are beginning to feel cornered, with few places left to hide. They face hostile Kurdish majorities to the north in As Sulaymaniyah, Iranian and Iraqi Shiite majorities to the east and south (especially in Wasit, where they have been unable to establish a long-term presence), growing Sunni nationalist and tribal hostility to the west in Salah ad Din and Anbar and a strong-handed security operation in Baghdad. Meanwhile, the coalition is turning up the heat elsewhere; elements of the U.S. Army's 3rd Infantry Division began sweeping through other Sunni strongholds south of Baghdad in Babil province the weekend of June 16-17.
Of course, the jihadists in Iraq are not going to simply go away. They have proven to be a resilient and innovative opponent for Iraq's government and the U.S. military, and some will escape the latest coalition operation. The United States will attempt to impede the most destabilizing and violent jihadist attacks. Meanwhile, Washington's negotiations with Tehran will continue, and Iraq will remain fragile.
stratfor.com
-
Reactionary Amnesia
The good ole’ days in the Middle East.
By Victor Davis Hanson
“Mess,” “fiasco,” “disaster,” “blunder,” and “catastrophe.”
Fill in the blanks with almost any stock noun of gloom these days when speaking about Iraq.
For finger-in-the-wind politicians, writing off Iraq is mere throat-clearing before moving on to any discussion of immigration reform or taxes. For ahead-of-the-curve pundits, starting out with “The failure in Iraq” is like opening their browser before daily pontificating. No need of explanation or empiricism, one just gets things out of the way at the very beginning with our new postmodern ritual.
Usually the more vehemently one used to clamor for the idea of removing Saddam Hussein — such as a Sen. Harry Reid or an Andrew Sullivan — the more now they are likely to use superlatives in damning the enterprise.
That there are 160, 000 Americans — at the moment in an enormous offensive against al Qaeda — fighting to save Iraqi democracy means little, as evocation of pullouts, withdrawals, and timetables is mixed in with the language of defeat, despair, and finger-pointing.
That the war has morphed once again into one largely against al Qaeda and Islamic terrorists is lost on critics. All the old bogeymen — Ashcroft, Bremmer, Feith, Libby, Pearl, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz — are gone. But the media and opposition searches for new ones to blame for a policy they largely once endorsed. Witness the new slurring of the Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Pace as incompetent and Gen. Petraeus — our most innovative commander in a generation — as less than candid and not in touch with operations under his command.
But then few have offered any consistent policy of what we are to do after Iraq. Once again generalities — best mouthed by John Edwards — about multilateralism, restoring American popularity abroad, working with allies — are thrown out, as if the world will be safer and more harmonious once we return to some mythical Democratic past. By default that could only mean something akin to the foreign policy of our last two such presidents, Messrs. Carter and Clinton.
Have we gone mad in our amnesia about that awful past? The epithet “the Great Satan” was coined out of hatred for the diplomatic efforts of Jimmy Carter. Do we want Andrew Young back praising the humanitarianism of Khomeini?
Bin Laden started out his 1996 promise to slaughter Americans with the warning to a sober and judicious Secretary of Defense Perry “I say to you William…” — in furor over the basing of American troops in Saudi Arabia.
Al Gore weighed in on the aftermath of the Gulf War by damning the senior Bush — but for doing too little, allowing Saddam to stay in power, and proceed to acquire nuclear technology and weapons of mass destruction.
Just as journalists, generals, and politicians rush to get into print another tell-all, I-know-the-answers book about the “disaster” in Iraq, so too in the 1990s the mini-Middle East publishing industry used to be devoted to equally furious attacks on realism, neo-isolation, and cynicism of Republicans and conservatives for an array of sins — sacrificing the Kurds and Shiites, not supporting Democratic reformers abroad, leaving Saddam in power, failing to prod Gulf sheikdoms to liberalize, cynically prodding on the Iran-Iraq war, etc.
What is lost, then, in the present pre-election hysteria and the repositioning on Iraq, is that there were never any good American choices in the Middle East. The present ones in Iraq and Afghanistan came about only from 9/11 and a general consensus that the failures of the past had led to that mass murder — and thus a new course of action was needed to replace both the liberal appeasement and conservative realism that had worked in the interest of bin Ladenism.
Legitimate debate is necessary about the mistakes in Iraq, as it is about the blunders of every war. But before writing off Iraq as lost, unnecessary, or a result of some such conspiracy, we had better ask ourselves whether a return to the sermonizing of Carterism or Clintonian diplomacy by focus group and straw polls — or even cynical horse-trading of Jim Baker — is what we really want.
So here are questions to ponder as reactionaries yearn for a pre-Bush past. Imagine: One of the various foiled terrorist plots — a Fort Dix slaughter, a JFK airport attack, or the suicide teams ABC news claims are headed our way from Afghanistan — succeed after 2008. Thousands of Americans die.
What does President Clinton or Obama do? Draft a tough federal indictment? Ask for a U.N. resolution condemning such violence? Count on a unified response with NATO, battle-seasoned after its heroic offensives in Afghanistan? Hope for help from the EU rapid-response force? Bomb the source where the jihadists trained (Gaza?, Pakistan? Syria? Iran?) — but only from 30,000 feet, and, as in 1998, without U.N. or congressional approval? Work with the Saudis and Egyptians and Mr. Abbas to curb such atypical zealots? Have John Edwards globe-trot the globe to use his courtroom flair to win over allies?
Or imagine that Iran announces that it is going to set off a bomb in its desert. Do we resurrect the EU3? Ask Hans Blix to return as nuclear inspector with Mr. El-Baradei and others to assure us the test was genuine? Send Jimmy Carter to Teheran (or better, find an aged Ramsey Clark to return as a special envoy as in 1979?). Or maybe beseech the new U.N. head, Mr. Ki-Moon who just enlightened us that global warming (read the U.S.) — not Islamic Jihadism and age-old sub-Saharan thuggery — caused Darfur?
Or imagine the very real possibility of an Islamic takeover of Pakistan, in which a theocratic nuclear jihadist government becomes a Sunni version of Iran and begins to send tens of thousands of jihadists into Afghanistan. What to do? Put our eye back on the ball? Bomb whom and what?
The point is twofold. Our present policy, however poorly managed in postbellum Iraq, arose as a reaction both to the do-nothingism of past administrations, which, by general consensus, had emboldened al Qaeda to up its ante on 9/11, and the decades of amoral realism that propped up thugs and dictators who ruined their societies but blamed the ensuing mess on Americans and Jews.
After 9/11, we did not, as alleged, invade countries serially, but removed only two fascistic governments, the worst in the Middle East — both with a record of supporting enemies of the United States, and both of whom we had bombed or sent missiles against in the very recent past.
We did not leave after such punitive measures because we felt that the last time we did that, whether in Afghanistan in the 1980s, or Iraq in 1991, or Lebanon, or Somalia, things only got worse — and after 9/11 they might well get much worse. And unlike the bombing of 1998 in the Balkans, both operations in Afghanistan and Iraq were sanctioned by the U.S. Congress, discussed at the U.N., and widely supported by the American people.
Removing the Taliban and Saddam, and promoting constitutional governments in their places, were not the only options after 9/11, but they were good choices — if the desire was to address comprehensively a quarter-century of terrorism that was insidiously escalating both in frequency and vehemence.
If both governments can be stabilized even at this late date, the landscape in the Middle East from Lebanon to the West Bank will be much improved; if not, much worse. For those who wish to give up the struggle in Iraq, go home, and stay clear of the Middle East, a final question: What would Mr. Assad in Syria, al Qaeda in Iraq, President Ahmadinejad in Iran, or Hamas and Hezbollah wish us to do — and why?
And what in turn would Mr. Karzai, Mr. Maliki, the women educators of Iraq, the Lebanese democrats, the Syrian exiles, and the Iranian dissidents prefer? And which group should we in turn enlist as friends and which accept are our enemies?
It would be nice to go back to our pre-9/11 past, just as in a bloody 1944 the calm of 1937 looked to many of the starry-eyed far preferable, just as in the midst of the nuclear stand-off of 1962 we lamented the loss of the old “friendly” Russia and China of 1945.
But while our ancestors engaged in the same despair, the same blame-gaming that we so enjoy, they at least were not stupid enough to lose those far more deadly and dangerous wars. We can win like they did as well, but only if we face the future with confidence, and not pine for the return of a mythical past that never was.
National Review Online - http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=NzAyMGQ2ODcxMTM2MTcxNzE4Njg3Y2E4OTcxYzZhZDg=
-
stratfor.com
TURKEY: Turkey is prepared to attack Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq, Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul said. Gul said Turkey has comprehensive plans to invade northern Iraq, but will not occupy foreign territory. Gul added that an army invasion of Iraq would require parliamentary approval, but said airstrikes against Kurdish rebel positions in Iraq would not.
-
stratfor.com
TURKEY/U.S.: Turkey will not seek U.S. permission to invade Iraq should it consider its national security at risk, Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul said in an interview with Today's Zaman. Gul added it is the responsibility of the United States to rein in the Kurdistan Workers' Party in Iraq. Turkey will not seek to delay its national elections even if it does get drawn into a war, Gul said.
-
From today's NY Times-- what are the implications here?
===============
BAGHDAD, July 2 — Agents of Iran helped plan a January raid in Shiite holy city of Karbala in Iraq in which five American soldiers were killed by Islamic militants, an American military spokesman said Monday. The charge was the most specific allegation of Iranian involvement in an attack that killed American troops, at a time of rising tensions with Iran over its role in Iraq and its nuclear program.
Brig. Gen. Kevin J. Bergner, the military spokesman here, said an elite unit of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, a force under the control of Iran’s most powerful religious leaders, had used veterans of the Lebanese Islamic militia group Hezbollah as a “proxy” to train, arm and plan attacks by an array of Shiite militant cells in Iraq.
One high-ranking Hezbollah commander from Lebanon was captured in Basra in March, and after weeks of pretending that he could not hear or speak, he gave American interrogators details of the Iranian role, the general said.
Earlier briefings by the American command on accusations about an Iranian role focused on technical analyses of arms said to have been supplied by Iran to Shiite militias in Iraq, including explosively formed penetrators, an exceptionally lethal form of bomb responsible for killing 170 American soldiers as of February and a substantial number since.
But some critics said the evidence was circumstantial and charged that the Americans appeared to be offering a new rationale for maintaining or increasing the military commitment in Iraq.
The briefings on Monday shifted the focus from the weapons to what General Bergner described as a network of secret militant cells armed, financed and directed by the Iranians. He said the information was drawn from interrogations of three men captured in a raid in Basra on May 20, and from documents found with them.
He identified the three men by name and said one was a Lebanese Hezbollah agent and two were Iraqi Shiites working as agents for the Quds Force, the elite Iranian unit. He did not present transcripts of the interrogations or the seized documents for inspection. The general said the captured men had been deeply involved in organizing Iranian-backed militia cells, including the one that killed the Americans.
It was the first time that the United States had charged that Iranian officials had helped plan operations against American troops in Iraq and had advance knowledge of a specific attack that led to the death of American soldiers. In effect, the United States is charging that Iran has been engaged in a proxy war against American, British and Iraqi forces here in an effort to shore up Iranian Shiite militant allies in Iraq and to raise the cost of the American military presence here.
General Bergner, seemingly keen to avoid a renewal of the criticism that the American command has used the allegations of Iranian interference here to lend momentum to the Bush administration’s war policy, declined to draw any broader political implications, although he did say that American intelligence indicated that “the senior leadership in Iran is aware of this activity.”
A statement by the Iranian Foreign Ministry rejected the American claims, describing them as “fabricated and ridiculous.”
Much of the briefing centered on the captured Hezbollah agent, known to the American command as “Hamid the Mute” because Hamid was part of the false name he gave after his capture and because of the weeks he spent after his capture pretending that he could not speak or hear. The man, identified as Ali Musa Daqduq, was said by General Bergner to be a Lebanese citizen with a 24-year history in Hezbollah, the Shiite militant group based in southern Lebanon.
General Bergner said Mr. Daqduq had previously commanded a Hezbollah special operations unit and “coordinated protection” for Sheik Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s leader. The general said Mr. Daqduq had been sent by Hezbollah to Iran in 2005 with orders to work with the Quds Force, an elite unit of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, to train “Iraqi extremists.”
In the past year, the general said, Mr. Daqduq made four trips to Iraq, to report on the training and operations of underground militia cells, and to organize them in ways that mirrored Hezbollah’s structure.
“He also helped the Quds Force in training Iraqis inside Iran,” the general said, taking groups of 20 to 60 Iraqis at a time to three camps in the vicinity of Tehran and instructing them in the use of shaped charges, mortars, rockets and “intelligence, sniper and kidnapping operations.”
Page 2 of 2)
The general said the cells had been responsible for much violence. “I think the reality of this is that they’re killing American forces, they’re killing Iraqis, they’re killing Iraqi security forces, and they are disrupting the stability in Iraq,” he said.
Another senior American official said Mr. Daqduq had pretended to be unable to hear or speak, probably to disguise his Lebanese-accented Arabic. Later, the official said, he admitted in notes to his interrogators that he could hear. Finally, he passed a note saying that he could speak but that he would not do so until May 1. Presumably, the temporary silence was intended to give others a chance to get away. On that day, the official said, “he did talk, and he’s been quite talkative ever since.”
The official said the shift had been achieved without harming Mr. Daqduq. “We don’t torture,” the official said. “We follow scrupulously the interrogation techniques in the Army’s new field manual, which forbids torture, and has the force of law.”
The Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman, Mohammad Hosseini Ali Hosseini, said the American attempt to blame the Quds Force for instigating violence in Iraq was part of a wider pattern of baseless allegations. “It has been four and a half years that U.S. officials have sought to cover up the dreadful situation in Iraq, which is a result of their mistakes and wrong strategies, by denigration and blaming others,” he said.
When the Karbala attack was carried out on Jan. 20, American and Iraqi officials said it had been meticulously planned. The attackers carried forged identity cards, wore American-style uniforms and drove vehicles of a kind used by Americans here. One American was killed at the start of the raid, and the other Americans were captured, then shot to death and dumped beside the road.
Some officials speculated at the time that the goal of the raid might have been to exchange the Americans for Iranian officials American forces had seized in Iraq and identified as members of the Quds Force, not diplomats as the Iranians claimed. General Bergner said the evidence of Iranian involvement in the Karbala killings came from interrogations of Qais Khazali, an Iraqi Shiite who oversaw operations of the Iranian-supported cells in Iraq that were under the direction of Mr. Daqduq, and who was seized in the same raid, along with another militant, Laith Khazali, his brother.
Along with the three men, the Americans also seized a 22-page document they had on the Karbala attack, General Bergner said. That document, he said, showed that the Quds Force had gathered detailed information on the activities of American soldiers in Karbala, including shift changes and the defenses at the site where they were seized. The general said other information about attacks by the Iranian-supported groups came from Mr. Daqduq’s personal journal and other documents.
“Both Ali Musa Daqduq and Qais Khazali state that senior leadership within the Quds Force knew of and supported planning for the eventual Karbala attack that killed five coalition soldiers,” General Bergner said.
American officials said one reason for holding the briefing nearly 15 weeks after capturing the three Quds Force agents was that Shiite officials in Baghdad, reluctant to inflame relations with Iran’s ruling Shiite clergy, had resisted having the case against Iran made so publicly. At the same time, a senior American official said, Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki and other Shiites in the government seemed to have been shaken by the evidence of “the nefarious and lethal” Iranian role the American command had uncovered.
General Bergner said much of the Iranian activity had centered on ties with groups linked to the Mahdi Army, a Shiite militia in Iraq that has mounted countless attacks on Americans and has killed thousands of Iraqi Sunnis. The Shiite cleric who founded the Mahdi Army, Moktada al-Sadr, has longstanding ties with Iran and spent months there this year, apparently fearful of arrest, American commanders have said.
The American command has long said that much of the worst violence by Mahdi Army groups appears to have been carried out by “rogue” groups that Mr. Sadr does not control. General Bergner said the groups under the Quds Force seemed to be in that category.
Another high-ranking American official said that Iranian financing for the Tehran-linked militias — said by General Bergner to amount to $750,000 to $3 million a month — had long been channeled through Mr. Sadr, and that American intelligence was not clear on whether some or all the money was still to him.
“One of the big questions is, ‘Who controls the secret cells, if anyone does?’ ” the official said. “The fact is, it’s hard to tell where the militias end and the secret cells begin. There is a pre-existing relationship between Sadr and the Iranians, but I think the answer is that some of them are out of control.”
-
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070703/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iraq;_ylt=AvZZb1UYa2BpUVp2qHm27VXMWM0F
Iraqi oil bill heads to parliament
By QASSIM ABDUL-ZAHRA, Associated Press Writer 48 minutes ago
The Iraqi Cabinet signed off Tuesday on a revised bill to regulate the country's oil industry and sent it to parliament — a major step in reaching a long-delayed benchmark sought by the U.S. to promote reconciliation between Iraq's Sunnis and Shiites.
Within hours of the announcement, however, the legislation hit a snag — the Kurds said they had neither seen nor approved the final text and might oppose it.
American officials are hoping that passage of the oil bill and companion legislation to distribute oil revenues will help rally Sunni support for the government and reduce backing for the insurgents.
In the latest violence, a car bomb exploded late Tuesday at an outdoor market in the Shaab area of northeast Baghdad, killing 18 people and wounding 35, a police officer said on condition of anonymity because he was not supposed to release the information.
The market is in a Shiite neighborhood frequently target by Sunni bombers.
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki told reporters his Cabinet had unanimously approved the oil draft and that the parliament would begin discussing it the following day. He called the bill "the most important law in Iraq."
The Cabinet endorsed one version of the legislation last February. But the Kurds protested that that measure was unconstitutional because it gave too much power to a yet-to-be-established national oil company in managing the country's oil fields.
Government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh did not release the bill's final version.
In a statement posted on its Web site, the Kurdistan Regional Government said it would reject the latest text if it made "material and substantive changes" to the outline agreed upon during weeks of protracted negotiations.
"We have not seen the final text of the law that the Iraqi Cabinet says it will put to parliament," the statement said. "We hope that the Cabinet is not approving a text with which the (Kurdish administration) disagrees because this would violate the constitutional rights of the Kurdistan region."
The Kurds control 53 of the 275 seats — not enough to defeat the measure on its own but enough to stall approval.
Only 24 of the Cabinet's 37 members were present for the vote because of boycotts by ministers from the Sunni Iraqi Accordance Front and the Shiite bloc local to anti-American cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. Both groups have separate political disputes with al-Maliki.
Nevertheless, government officials expressed confidence that parliament would approve the measure.
Al-Dabbagh said Cabinet approval came after amendments prompted by the Accordance Front, but he gave no details.
The bill is part of a package of legislation that would establish rules for exploiting Iraq's vast oil wealth and provide a formula for distributing revenues among the 18 provinces. Iraq's proven oil reserves have been estimated at 115 billion barrels — second largest in OPEC after Saudi Arabia.
Some petroleum experts believe the real figure is even higher because Iraq lagged behind other countries in using modern surveying technology during the years of international sanctions under Saddam Hussein.
Production has fallen from 3.5 million barrels a day to 2 million since the U.S. invasion because of security problems, especially in the northern fields. The bill is aimed at encouraging international investments to modernize the fields.
The issue of oil distribution is a top concern of Iraq's Sunni Arab minority, which is centered in regions of the country with little proven reserves. The 2005 constitution gave regional administrations considerable powers in managing oil resources in their areas.
Most of Iraq's known reserves lie in the Kurdish north and the Shiite south. Sunnis feared the Shiites and Kurds — who now dominate the government — would monopolize profits from the industry.
U.S. officials are hoping that passage of an oil bill will help rally Sunni support for the government and the political process and reduce backing for insurgents.
Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish officials agreed last month on the distribution of revenues, with the northern Kurdish autonomous region getting 17 percent of the net revenues each month, after deducting federal government expenditures.
Kurds make up about 20 percent of the population nationwide. The rest of the revenues will be divided among the other provinces according to population.
If parliament approves the bill, it would be the first of a series of benchmark legislation to be enacted. The Iraqis pledged to meet the benchmarks by the end of last year but failed due to political haggling and the security crisis.
President Bush has pressed al-Maliki to take a series of other political steps aimed at bringing Sunni Arabs into the political process. Such measures include opening jobs to Sunnis who supported Saddam, amending the constitution to satisfy Sunni aspirations and holding local elections.
Al-Dabbagh said the Cabinet could take up the draft bill on restoring government jobs to many former Saddam loyalists on Thursday.
With support for the war at an all-time low in the United States, those measures would also help convince the U.S. public and Congress that Iraqi leaders are doing what is needed to halt the violence.
Bush ordered 28,000 more U.S. troops to Iraq this year to try to reduce the violence and encourage the Iraqis to reach political agreements among Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds.
The offensive in Baghdad and areas to the north and south has boosted American casualties, although the number of bombings and shootings has fallen in the capital in recent days.
In June, Iraqi civilian deaths dropped to their lowest monthly level since the start of the Baghdad security operation, according to the Interior Ministry. Iraqi officials attribute the decline to the offensive, which has put pressure on insurgents.
Nevertheless, violence continued.
The U.S. command said American troops fought a large battle with gunmen near the western Sunni city of Ramadi over the weekend, in fighting that left 23 insurgents dead. The insurgents had massed on Donkey Island, a patch of land in a canal outside the city, and opened fire on U.S. troops, prompting the gunbattle Saturday.
Troops found caches of weapons, explosives and suicide vests, the military said.
Also Tuesday, the command said insurgents forced down a U.S. military Kiowa helicopter south of Baghdad the day before. An Apache helicopter rescued the two pilots, who were slightly hurt, it said.
In Baghdad, an Iraqi army lieutenant colonel and an Interior Ministry intelligence officer were killed in separate drive-by shootings Tuesday, police said. A car bomb hit the convoy of an Iraqi police colonel in the northern city of Kirkuk, killing two passers-by and wounding 17, though the colonel survived, police in the city said. Police in both cities spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not supposed to release such information.
-
From the article posted above:
The bill is aimed at encouraging international investments to modernize the fields.
Yeah, I like how this is mentioned in passing, as though it were of only minor significance. Not too difficult to guess who these "investors" are.
-
Ooh! Ooh! May I guess?
Is it the same folks who made Saudi Arabia fabulously wealthy? :lol:
-
Ooh! Ooh! May I guess?
Is it the same folks who made Saudi Arabia fabulously wealthy? :lol:
Only if by "Saudi Arabia" you mean the royal family. :lol:
-
Move to strike your honor as non-responsive to the point being made. :-P
-
It's a perfectly valid response. When you say Saudi Arabia is a "fabulously wealthy" country, you're only talking about a small group of people that's enjoying the wealth.
To the extent that any of this "international investment" would make Iraq a wealthier country, they didn't ask for it. You're not stupid, so you know as well as I do that the Iraqis are not free to simply reject the investment if they choose.
-
"It's a perfectly valid response. When you say Saudi Arabia is a "fabulously wealthy" country, you're only talking about a small group of people that's enjoying the wealth."
The point of your original comment seemed to be directed at the "investors", not the recipients of the investment. My point was, and is, that the recipients of the investment have benefitted extraordinarily. About SA's income distribution of wealth numbers I haven't a clue. I am under the impression that most folks don't have to exert themselves very much.
"To the extent that any of this "international investment" would make Iraq a wealthier country, they didn't ask for it. You're not stupid, so you know as well as I do that the Iraqis are not free to simply reject the investment if they choose."
OK, I'll bite. Why can't they reject the investment if they choose?
-
NY Times
GIs Forge Sunni Ties
BAQUBA, Iraq, June 30 — Capt. Ben Richards had been battling insurgents from Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia for three weeks when he received an unexpected visitor.
Former Insurgents Aid U.S. Soldiers Abu Ali walked into the Americans’ battle-scarred combat outpost with an unusual proposal: the community leader was worried about the insurgents, and wanted the soldiers’ help in taking them on.
The April 7 meeting was the beginning of a new alliance and, American commanders hope, a portent of what is to come in the bitterly contested Diyala Province.
Using his Iraqi partners to pick out the insurgents and uncover the bombs they had seeded along the cratered roads, Captain Richards’s soldiers soon apprehended more than 100 militants, including several low-level emirs. The Iraqis called themselves the Local Committee; Captain Richards dubbed them the Kit Carson scouts.
“It is the only way that we can keep Al Qaeda out,” said Captain Richards, who operates from a former Iraqi police station in the Buhritz sector of the city that still bears the sooty streaks from the day militants set it aflame last year.
The American military has struggled for more than four years to train and equip the Iraqi Army. But here the local Sunni residents, including a number of former insurgents from the 1920s Revolution Brigades, have emerged as a linchpin of the American strategy.
The new coalition reflects some hard-headed calculations on both sides. Eager for intelligence on their elusive foes, American officers have been willing to overlook the past of some of their newfound allies.
Many Sunnis, for their part, are less inclined to see the soldiers as occupiers now that it is clear that American troop reductions are all but inevitable, and they are more concerned with strengthening their ability to fend off threats from Sunni jihadists and Shiite militias. In a surprising twist, the jihadists — the Americans’ most ardent foes — made the new strategy possible. Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, a predominantly Iraqi organization with a small but significant foreign component, severely overplayed its hand, spawning resentment by many residents and other insurgent groups.
Imposing a severe version of Islamic law, the group installed its own clerics, established an Islamic court and banned the sale of cigarettes, which even this week were nowhere to be found in the humble shops in western Baquba to the consternation of patrolling Iraqi troops.
The fighters raised funds by kidnapping local Iraqis, found accommodations by evicting some residents from their homes and killed with abandon when anyone got in their way, residents say. A small group of bearded black-clad militants took down the Iraqi flag and raised the banner of their self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq.
“They used religion as a ploy to get in and exploit people’s passions,” said one member of the Kit Carson scouts, who gave his name as Haidar. “They were Iraqis and other Arabs from Syria, Afghanistan, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. They started kicking people out of their houses and getting ransom from rich people. They would shoot people in front of their houses to scare the others.”
Collaborations like the one with the scouts in Baquba are slowly beginning to emerge in other parts of Iraq. In Baquba they face some notable obstacles, primarily from the Shiite-dominated provincial and Baghdad ministries that are worried about American efforts to rally the Sunnis and institutionalize them as a security force.
But with Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki’s government showing scant progress toward political reconciliation and the American military eager to achieve a measure of stability before its elevated troop levels begin to shrink, American commanders appear determined to proceed with this more decentralized strategy — one that relies less on initiatives taken by Iraqi leaders in Baghdad and more on newly forged coalitions with local Iraqis.
A West Point graduate, Idaho native and former Mormon missionary who worked for two years with Chinese immigrants in Canada, Captain Richards commands Bronco Troop, First Squadron, 14th Cavalry Regiment. When the 31-year-old officer was first sent to Buhritz in mid-March as part of a battalion-size task force, he encountered a deeply entrenched foe who numbered in the thousands.
=============
Page 2 of 2)
Many of the members of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia were ensconced in a sprawling palm grove-laden sanctuary south of Baquba and east of the Diyala River. The area, which is still under the group’s control, is still so replete with arms caches, insurgent leaders, fighters and their supporters that American soldiers have taken to calling it the Al Qaeda Fob, or forward operating base in American military jargon.
Former Insurgents Aid U.S. Soldiers The insurgents also had a firm grip on the city, the provincial capital of Diyala, which Abu Musab al-Zarqawi made the center of his self-styled Islamic caliphate before he was killed in an airstrike near Baquba last year. The key supply and communications lines between the insurgents’ rural staging area and the city ran through the Buhritz, making it vital ground for Al Qaeda.
The militants’ hold on the region was facilitated, senior American officers now acknowledge, by American commanders’ decision to draw down forces in the province in 2005 in the hopes of shifting most of the responsibility for securing the region onto the Iraqis. That strategy backfired when the Iraqi authorities appointed overly sectarian Shiite army and police regional commanders, alienating the largely Sunni population, and otherwise showed themselves unable to safeguard the area.
“Up until Captain Richards went in and met the 1920s guys, we fought,” recalled Lt. Col. Mo Goins, the commander of the First Battalion, 12th Infantry Regiment, which held the line in Baquba until reinforcements began to arrive in March. “That is what we did. Small arms. Mortars. I.E.D’s.”
Captain Richards’s soldiers arrived in Buhritz in mid-March as part of a battalion-sized operation. Unlike many earlier operations, the Americans showed up in force and did not quickly withdraw. The residents saw an opportunity to challenge Al Qaeda, and for a week, the two sides battled it out in the streets.
Initially, the Americans stood on the sidelines, concerned that they might be witnessing a turf fight among insurgents and militias. “We were not sure what was going on,” Captain Richards recalled. “We were not sure we could trust the people not to turn on us afterwards.”
But after the militants gained the upper hand and more than 1,000 residents began to flee on foot, the Americans moved to prevent the militants from establishing their control throughout the neighborhood. The soldiers called in an airstrike, which demolished a local militant headquarters.
The meeting between the residents and the Americans was Abu Ali’s initiative. The locals wanted ammunition to carry on their fight. Captain Richards had another proposal: the residents should tip off the Americans on which Iraqis belonged to Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia and where they had buried their bombs.
At first, no more than a dozen of the several hundred Sunnis who were taking on the militants served as Kit Carson scouts, but they made a vital difference. Unlike Anbar Province, where the American military has formed similar alliances, Diyala lacks a cohesive tribal structure. Nor did another Sunni insurgent group, the 1920s Revolution Brigades, deliver fighters en masse.
Even so, some of the main obstacles that the Americans have faced in institutionalizing the arrangement with the scouts have come from the United States’ ostensible allies in the Iraqi government. According to Captain Richards, the provincial police chief, Maj. Gen. Ghanen al-Kureshi, repeatedly resisted efforts to hire the local Sunnis.
Captain Richards rejected a group of Shiite police recruits from Baghdad, fearing they might be penetrated by Shiite militias. Determined to get his scouts hired, he loaded 50 scouts and other residents on his Stryker vehicles and drove them to the provincial headquarters over the insurgent-threatened roads.
Today, the police number only 170, a fraction of the police force in adjoining areas. The small police force, made up of scouts and Sunni residents, was provided with only two trucks, seven radios and a paltry supply of ammunition that the Sunni residents have managed to supplement by buying ammunition on the black market from corrupt Interior Ministry officials in Baghdad. Another 150 scouts participate as unpaid monitors in a neighborhood watch program to guard key routes in and out of the area that Captain Richards oversees.
“The people in the community think that he is actively trying to prevent the Buhritz police from establishing themselves because the Shia government does not want a legitimate Sunni security force in Diyala Province,” Captain Richards said, referring to General Ghanen, the provincial police chief.
Colonel Goins had a more charitable view of the provincial chief’s actions, saying that he was coping with personnel and weapons shortages, as well as Interior Ministry guidance to build up the force in other areas. “Right now, his resources are extremely limited,” Colonel Goins said.
The new police and neighborhood watch monitors appear to work well with the local Iraqi Army unit and police officials. But a local Iraqi Army commander expressed doubts that the scouts, in uniform or not, amounted to a disciplined, military unit that could take and hold ground.
During a quick visit to two villages, Guam and Abu Faad, the Americans and their Iraqi allies tried to persuade welcoming but still wary residents that they needed to overcome their fears of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia and provide tips for their own security.
The American military is trying to expand the alliance into the western sector of the city, which a Stryker brigade recently wrested back from Qaeda militants. During the recent American assault in the western sector, soldiers from Blackhawk Company got a glimpse of an alliance the Americans hope to see. An Iraqi seemingly emerged from nowhere, announced himself as a member of the 1920s Revolution Brigades and warned the soldiers that insurgents could be found on the far side of a sand berm around the corner. The tip was accurate.
-
Survivor
One of Iraq's most controversial politicians offers thoughts on the "surge," Iran and where we go from here.
WSJ
BY MELIK KAYLAN
Saturday, July 7, 2007 12:01 a.m. EDT
BAGHDAD--"these people need help. The army must help them more. The government must help them more. They have been fighting alone against a vicious enemy, fighting for all of us to make our country safe."
I'm in Diyala province, watching Ahmed Chalabi shouting into a TV camera over the sound of mortar shells. He's imploring the Iraqi state to support tribesmen fighting off al Qaeda attacks such as the one we're now experiencing.
In the end our entourage, which had driven from Baghdad for lunch with local leaders, escaped unharmed. But the episode showed--as so many events in his turbulent past few years have--that Mr. Chalabi is hardly the transient opportunist that his detractors at the State Department, CIA and on the antiwar left once made him out to be. He's still in Iraq, despite long ago losing whatever American support he once had and failing to win a seat in the last parliamentary election. (He was deputy prime minister in Iraq's first elected government.) And almost alone among the Iraqi political figures, he not only lives but travels widely outside the Green Zone.
Last month, I spent some days in Mr. Chalabi's company in and out of the capital, and at his residence in a well-fortified warren of cul-de-sacs in the wealthy, but dangerous, Mansour district. Though he's not in the current Maliki government, he is still courted by the state and given key appointments. He heads up the De-Baathification program and the Committee for Public Support of the "surge," which engages in reconciliation activities like reopening Sunni mosques in Shiite neighborhoods. Community leaders from all sides troop through his doors daily.
Returning residents back to their purged neighborhoods, Mr. Chalabi says, "is a slow process because people have to learn to trust each other all over again. . . . They're often glad to see their old neighbor again, and it can be very emotional and moving. But underneath it you can't be sure because, after all, they've had brothers or fathers killed, perhaps by people in their neighborhood--reconciliation takes time."
On one occasion, in the post-prayer evening hours, we visited the football-field sized mosque complex of Khadimiya in Baghdad. It is one of Iraq's top Shiite holy sites decorated intricately with floral tiling and cut-mirror facades. Wearing his trademark suit and tie, Mr. Chalabi was continuously mobbed by crowds of women and children, astonished and delighted that a famous official should appear in public and lend an ear to their complaints. Not an hour before, a motorbike-borne suicide bomber had been disarmed nearby.
Mr. Chalabi would appear to be the nearest thing Iraqis currently possess to a genuine walk-and-talk democratic politician, one who will risk life and limb to embody the principle personally. In fact, the U.S.'s main error in Iraq, according to Mr. Chalabi, has been trying to micromanage the development of Iraqi politics. "The U.S. should make a choice," he says, "either to accept full democracy and live with the consequences or undertake full control. They keep trying to 'give local initiatives a boost' instead of letting Iraqi democracy succeed on its own. When you make your own mistakes, you learn. When outsiders make them, unfortunately, they get treated as the enemy."
His recounting of post-war Iraqi history--which began with the high-handed regency of L. Paul Bremer and then the appointed Iraqi government of Ayad Allawi--returns again and again to this point.
"The problems began when the U.S. declared an official occupation," he says. "We told the U.S. not to have an occupation, that it would be a disaster. We never intended that. We wanted the Iraqis to run their own affairs, but we were not trusted to do that. Two years ahead of time, we asked [the U.S.] for a 10,000 man multiethnic military police force of Iraqis to be trained. . . . We were refused."
Mr. Chalabi continues: "We could have prevented the looting and the disbanding of the army. We planned to deploy in front of the army barracks, to disarm the soldiers and keep them in their barracks and tell them 'we are your brothers. Help us run the country, keep order and have democracy.' We intended to pay them, and absorb them selectively into our ranks. We had good intelligence. We knew who was who. Look at it now. The U.S. has had six intelligence chiefs since the war started. They keep changing. Do the allies get any useful intelligence?"
With such views, Mr. Chalabi quickly added parts of the Bush administration to his enemies on the antiwar left. Relations became so strained during the Bremer-era that on May 20, 2004, U.S. soldiers raided his offices in Baghdad. He was also accused of leaking intelligence to Iranian operatives inside Iraq to the effect that the U.S. had broken their communication codes. From Mr. Chalabi's side the accusation meets with a ready dismissal: "It's strange that the Iranians then used the same code to inform Tehran of the fact."
But Mr. Chalabi remains unrepentant in his criticism of what he calls "elementary mistakes" by the U.S., which he believes would not have happened if Iraqis had run things from the start. "We always said, keep the allied military here for a while, but not as part of an occupation government--that was the point. . . . When the president said 'Mission Accomplished' he should have followed through and handed civilian government over to Iraqis, as was originally agreed."
So much for the past. Does he think the "surge" will succeed? "Not if it's just a military action," he says. "It's intended as a political initiative backed by military force. It creates the opportunity for political initiatives to work but they must be pursued. It won't work forever without underlying political agreements. If Sadr City stayed quiet for some months, it's because there was a political rapprochement and Moqtada al Sadr agreed to rein in his militia. But paradoxically, the overall political scene may not clarify while the U.S. is too engaged--all sides are waiting for the real Iraq to emerge from underneath the U.S. shadow. Only when they have to face each other directly will Iraqis make their deals."
Mr. Chalabi's hardheaded views on the allied occupation have an implicit flipside: that some beneficent outcome can still be shaped from the chaos, and that Iraq can gain stability even (or especially) without U.S. ballast. Doesn't he think, as most outside commentators do, that a U.S. withdrawal will create an all-out regional conflict, sucking in nearby countries? "I'd say it's possible but not probable. Look at everyone who works for me, from all sides of Iraqi society. People want peace. They want to go back to their homes. If the U.S. leaves, the present government will fall and there will be elections quickly." To Mr. Chalabi's thinking, this will improve things because Iraqis will choose their real leaders, and they will be accountable to the electorate for delivering peace and practical benefits such as electricity and water.
"Still, in the end," he says, "U.S. policy in Iraq will not be determined by the interests of Iraqis but by U.S. strategic interests and by U.S. domestic pressures. The Iraqi conflict's domestic unpopularity will drive America's decisions on its presence here. In my view, being constructive in preventing conflict is the surest way for the U.S. to exercise positive influence in the region. Iraq is a very strategic country. It borders six countries including the Gulf, so it's in U.S. interests to keep it stable and to keep influence in it."
After listening to Mr. Chalabi over time, one learns how to hear the meaning in his more cautious phrases. By the "real Iraq" he likely means the majority, Shiite-dominated Iraq. He talks about how "the Sunnis have lost the battle for Baghdad," and that the Arab states, having incited them to fight, ultimately abandoned them in ways comparable to the Palestinian conflicts with Israel. He believes that the Sunnis will ultimately face reality and make accommodation with fellow Iraqis once they accept that they are an even smaller minority than previously thought--some 80% Shiite to 20% Sunni in Baghdad by his estimates.
This perhaps is what Mr. Chalabi means by "letting Iraqi democracy succeed"--that is, letting the sheer weight of numbers dictate. "Being constructive in preventing conflict" likely refers to the U.S. reining in Arab support of Sunni Baathists and al Qaeda in Iraq.
Mr. Chalabi has had a lifelong feud with Baathists and one feels that he regards their car bombs as more dangerous and destructive to Iraq's future than the Shiite militias. Still, he defends his position as evenhanded. "With Baathists, it's more complicated than Sunni vs. Shiite," he says. "There were more Shiite than Sunni Baathists. The Shiites hate them, whereas in Sunni areas they're quite popular." In his de-Baathification program, he has, he says, returned most of the Baathists either to their jobs or pensions. "There were some 1.2 million party members, and we have reintegrated all but some 30,000, and those are the hardcore ones, and only 6,000 of those don't have their pensions. [The U.S.] now wants us to return all the Baathists to their former positions or comparable ones, but with the old military and security personnel, that's impossible. They're too hated. We just can't do it."
It's dangerous, Mr. Chalabi believes, even to return Sunni Baathists to certain key strategic posts such as those responsible for guarding electricity plants. He draws a rough 'S'-shaped diagram and says, "Saddam positioned electric plants around Baghdad in that configuration. The very people he put in charge of protecting them are now wrecking them to choke the city. That's one reason why we don't have electricity."
Most interesting perhaps are Mr. Chalabi's views on Iran, which differ substantially from the alarm expressed by many of his current and former American backers. "The influence of Iran on Iraq is inevitable," he says. "It's been there for centuries. They supported the anti-Saddam resistance for years. They were the first to accept trade agreements, transit rights, electricity linkups and the like with the new Iraqi government. Some 90% of Iraq's population lives within 100 miles of Iran. We have an enormous land border in common and it's the only country that ships goods to us unhindered."
"I understand the U.S. has worries about Iranian power so here's a solution," he continues. "Let us quantify and monitor the amount of Iranian influence: Let's make an agreement on how much trade, how much electricity, how many trucks and so on can come through. Iraq needs as many friends as possible and nobody wants to be dependent on one source of help. Everything can be worked out. We will have to in the end anyway. What choice is there?"
Mr. Kaylan is a writer living in New York.
-
Official: Iraq Gov't Missed All Targets
Jul 9, 9:45 PM (ET)
By ANNE FLAHERTY and ANNE GEARAN
WASHINGTON (AP) - A progress report on Iraq will conclude that the U.S.-backed government in Baghdad has not met any of its targets for political, economic and other reform, speeding up the Bush administration's reckoning on what to do next, a U.S. official said Monday.
One likely result of the report will be a vastly accelerated debate among President Bush's top aides on withdrawing troops and scaling back the U.S. presence in Iraq.
The "pivot point" for addressing the matter will no longer be Sept. 15, as initially envisioned, when a full report on Bush's so-called "surge" plan is due, but instead will come this week when the interim mid-July assessment is released, the official said.
"The facts are not in question," the official told The Associated Press, speaking on condition of anonymity because the draft is still under discussion. "The real question is how the White House proceeds with a post-surge strategy in light of the report."
The report, required by law, is expected to be delivered to Capitol Hill by Thursday or Friday, as the Senate takes up a $649 billion defense policy bill and votes on a Democratic amendment ordering troop withdrawals to begin in 120 days.
Also being drafted are several Republican-backed proposals that would force a new course in Iraq, including one by Sens. Susan Collins, R-Maine, and Ben Nelson, D-Neb., that would require U.S. troops to abandon combat missions. Collins and Nelson say their binding amendment would order the U.S. mission to focus on training the Iraqi security forces, targeting al-Qaida members and protecting Iraq's borders.
"My goal is to redefine the mission and set the stage for a significant but gradual drawdown of our troops next year," said Collins.
GOP support for the war has eroded steadily since Bush's decision in January to send some 30,000 additional troops to Iraq. At the time, Bush said the Iraqis agreed to meet certain benchmarks, such as enacting a law to divide the nation's oil reserves.
This spring, Congress agreed to continue funding the war through September but demanded that Bush certify on July 15 and again on Sept. 15 that the Iraqis were living up to their political promises or forgo U.S. aid dollars.
The official said it is highly unlikely that Bush will withhold or suspend aid to the Iraqis based on the report.
A draft version of the administration's progress report circulated among various government agencies in Washington on Monday.
White House Press Secretary Tony Snow on Monday tried to lower expectations on the report, contending that all of the additional troops had just gotten in place and it would be unrealistic to expect major progress by now.
"You are not going to expect all the benchmarks to be met at the beginning of something," Snow said. "I'm not sure everyone's going to get an 'A' on the first report."
In recent weeks, the White House has tried to shore up eroding GOP support for the war.
Collins and five other GOP senators - Lamar Alexander of Tennessee, Judd Gregg of New Hampshire, Robert Bennett of Utah, John Sununu of New Hampshire and Pete Domenici of New Mexico - support separate legislation calling on Bush to adopt as U.S. policy recommendations by the Iraq Study Group, which identified a potential redeployment date of spring 2008.
Other prominent Republican senators, including Richard Lugar of Indiana, George Voinovich of Ohio, Chuck Hagel of Nebraska and Olympia Snowe of Maine, also say the U.S. should begin redeployments.
Several GOP stalwarts, including Sens. Ted Stevens of Alaska, Christopher Bond of Missouri, Jon Kyl of Arizona and James Inhofe of Oklahoma, said they still support Bush's Iraq strategy.
Kyl said he would try to focus this week's debate on preserving vital anti-terrorism programs, including the detention of terror suspects at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba. The defense bill is on track to expand the legal rights of those held at the military prison, and many Democrats want to propose legislation that would shut the facility.
"If Democrats use the defense authorization bill to pander to the far left at the expense of our national security, they should expect serious opposition from Republicans," Kyl said.
As the Senate debate began, the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee arranged to run television commercials in four states, beginning Tuesday, to pressure Republicans on the war.
The ads are to run in Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota and New Hampshire, according to knowledgeable officials, but the DSCC so far has committed to spending a relatively small amount of money, less than $100,000 in all. Barring a change in plans that means the ads would not be seen widely in any of the four states.
The targets include Sens. Norm Coleman of Minnesota, Collins of Maine, Sununu of New Hampshire and the Republican leader, Mitch McConnell of Kentucky. All face re-election next year.
The boost in troop levels in Iraq has increased the cost of war there and in Afghanistan to $12 billion a month, with the overall tally for Iraq alone nearing a half-trillion dollars, according to the nonpartisan Congressional Research Service, which provides research and analysis to lawmakers.
The figures call into question the Pentagon's estimate that the increase in troop strength and intensifying pace of operations in Baghdad and Anbar province would cost $5.6 billion through the end of September.
-
Who is "a US official" and why is he trying to frame the debate before the report is actually written and released? :x
The Surge has just finally reached full force, yet the same Congress that voted support for Gen. Petraeus has been yapping for months about how we have already "lost" (e.g. Sen. Harry Reid). How on earth can Iraqis be expected to commit to working with the US when the Congress makes it clear every day that the big bug out is coming?!? :x :x :x Frankly I find this to be a despicable display of p*ss-poor partisanship, political cowardice and in many cases an profound absence of patriotic feeling. Do these people not realize that Tehran TV broadcasts what they say?!?
It is no coincidence that the stampede of the weak horses of Washington coincides with Syria predicting the outbreak of war in Lebanon in the next couple of weeks and Turkey lining up on the border of Kurdistan with a massive amount of troops and open declarations of intent to cross the border.
The things these people say and do in Washington have real consequences and cost real lives-- shame!!! :x :x :x
Gen Petraeus and President Bush asked for a chance with the Surge until mid-September. This was and is a reasonable request and should be granted.
==============
NY Times
BAGHDAD, July 9 — As the Senate prepares to begin a new debate this week on proposals for a withdrawal from Iraq, the United States ambassador and the Iraqi foreign minister are warning that the departure of American troops could lead to sharply increased violence, the deaths of thousands and a regional conflict that could draw in Iraq’s neighbors.
Two months before a pivotal assessment of progress in the war that he and the overall American military commander in Iraq are to make to the White House and Congress in September, Ryan C. Crocker, the ambassador, laid out a grim forecast of what could happen if the policy debate in Washington led to a significant pullback or even withdrawal of American forces, perhaps to bases outside the major cities.
“You can’t build a whole policy on a fear of a negative, but, boy, you’ve really got to account for it,” Mr. Crocker said Saturday in an interview at his office in Saddam Hussein’s old Republican Palace, now the seat of American power here. Setting out what he said was not a policy prescription but a review of issues that needed to be weighed, the ambassador compared Iraq’s current violence to the early scenes of a gruesome movie.
“In the States, it’s like we’re in the last half of the third reel of a three-reel movie, and all we have to do is decide we’re done here, and the credits come up, and the lights come on, and we leave the theater and go on to something else,” he said. “Whereas out here, you’re just getting into the first reel of five reels,” he added, “and as ugly as the first reel has been, the other four and a half are going to be way, way worse.”
Hoshyar Zebari, the foreign minister, sounded a similar warning at a Baghdad news conference on Monday. “The dangers vary from civil war to dividing the country or maybe to regional wars,” he said, referring to an American withdrawal. “In our estimation the danger is huge. Until the Iraqi forces and institutions complete their readiness, there is a responsibility on the U.S. and other countries to stand by the Iraqi government and the Iraqi people to help build up their capabilities.”
Fearing that the last pillars of Republican support for the war were eroding, the White House invited Senators John W. Warner, Republican of Virginia, who has been critical of the administration’s war policy, and Jon Kyl, Republican of Arizona, a supporter of the American troop presence, to the White House to ask them to delay votes on withdrawal until the administration delivers an interim progress report on the war, due in September.
Administration officials say Mr. Bush is considering a news conference on Iraq this week and is also likely to talk about it Tuesday during a trip to Cleveland that was intended to focus on his domestic agenda.
Although Senator Warner said he was inclined to heed the president’s request to delay a vote, the Democratic leader, Senator Harry Reid, of Nevada, said Monday afternoon that he would not wait. Indeed, hours later, the Senate began debate on the National Defense Authorization Act, the main military spending bill for the next budget year — and a vehicle for trying to force the administration to change its policy.
The bill calls for the military to balance the amount of time American troops spend overseas and on American soil, a measure that would limit troop deployments to Iraq.
While Senators Richard G. Lugar, of Indiana, and Pete V. Domenici, of New Mexico, and other Republicans have publicly urged a change of course, the Senate debate is testing party alliances. Mr. Warner and Senator Carl Levin, Democrat of Michigan, are set to speak Tuesday morning at a rare bipartisan meeting to discuss Iraq. And Senator Olympia J. Snowe, a Maine Republican, said she was strongly supporting for the first time a bill with a specific timetable to remove troops from Iraq.
But the White House insisted Monday that Mr. Bush did not intend to change gears. “Don’t expect us to lift a veil and have a whole different strategy,” the spokesman, Tony Snow, said. “We’re not going to have a strategy jumping out of a cake.”
Mr. Crocker’s remarks echoed warnings that have been made for months by President Bush and other administration officials. But Mr. Crocker, a career diplomat,, seemed eager to emphasize that the report he and Gen. David H. Petraeus are to make in September — an event Mr. Bush and his war critics have presented as a watershed moment — would represent their professional judgment, unburdened by any reflex to back administration policy.
In the interview, which was requested by The New York Times, he said, “We’ll give the best assessment we can, and the most honest.” Unusually for American officials here, who have generally avoided any comparisons between the situation in Iraq and the war in Vietnam, he compared the task that he and General Petraeus face in reporting back in September to the one faced by Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker and Gen. Creighton W. Abrams Jr., the two top Americans in Vietnam when the decisions that led to the American withdrawal there were made nearly 40 years ago.
General Petraeus, too, has warned in recent months that while there is a high price for staying in Iraq, including mounting American casualties, the price for leaving could be higher than many war critics have acknowledged. Some opponents of the war have argued the contrary, saying that keeping American troops in Iraq provokes much of the violence and that withdrawing could force Iraq’s feuding politicians into burying their sectarian differences.
------
(Page 2 of 2)
In the interview, Mr. Crocker said he based his warning about what might happen if American troops left on the realities he has seen in the four months since he took up the Baghdad post, a knowledge of Iraq and its violent history dating back to a previous Baghdad posting more than 25 years ago, and lessons learned during an assignment in Beirut in the early 1980s. Then, he said, a “failure of imagination” made it impossible to foresee the extreme violence that enveloped Lebanon as it descended into civil war. He added, “And I’m sure what will happen here exceeds my imagination.”
On the potential for worsening violence after an American withdrawal from Iraq, he said: “You have to look at what the consequences would be, and you look at those who say we could have bases elsewhere in the country. Well yes, we could, but we would have the prospect of American forces looking on while civilians by the thousands were slaughtered. Not a pretty prospect.”
In setting out what he called “the kind of things you have to think about” before an American troop withdrawal, the ambassador cited several possibilities. He said these included a resurgence by the insurgent group Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, which he said had been “pretty hard-pressed of late” by the additional 30,000 troops Mr. Bush ordered deployed here this year; the risk that Iraq’s 350,000-strong security forces would “completely collapse” under sectarian pressures, disintegrating into militias; and the specter of interference by Iran, neighboring Sunni Arab states and Turkey.
The ambassador also suggested what is likely to be another core element of the approach that he and General Petraeus will take to the September report: that the so-called benchmarks for Iraqi government performance set by Congress in a defense authorization bill this spring may not be the best way of assessing whether the United States has a partner in the Baghdad government that warrants continued American military backing. “The longer I’m here, the more I’m persuaded that Iraq cannot be analyzed by these kind of discrete benchmarks,” he said.
After the Iraqi government drew up the first list of benchmarks last year, American officials used them as their yardstick, frequently faulting the Iraqis for failure to act on them, especially on three items the Americans identified as priorities: a new oil law sharing revenue between Iraq’s main population groups; a new “de-Baathification” law widening access to government jobs to members of Saddam Hussein’s former ruling party; and a law scheduling provincial elections to choose representative governments in areas where Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds are competing for power.
But Mr. Crocker said there were better ways to measure progress, including the levels of security across Iraq, progress in delivering basic services like electricity to the population, and steps by Iraqi leaders from rival groups to work more collaboratively.
Measured solely by the legislative benchmarks, he said, “you could not achieve any of them, and still have a situation where arguably the country is moving in the right direction. And conversely, I think you could achieve them all and still not be heading towards stability, security and overall success for Iraq.”
-
Gen Petraeus and President Bush asked for a chance with the Surge until mid-September. This was and is a reasonable request and should be granted.
No doubt. Amazing how politics and polls sway our elected officials. Makes you wonder how the government would work if polls didn't exist.
I worry about what happens if things don't pan out by mid-September? I'm still waiting for someone, ANYONE, to offer a viable, realistic strategy in case the surge doesn't work.
I sure as heck can't figure one out.
-
1. Stay in the fight. It isn't over until we say it's over.
2. Secure Kurdistan and the borders. No jihadis get in or out.
There is no "Gordian knot" solution waiting, at least not that I can see, but giving a win to al qaeda and Iran isn't smart.
-
Not a critique, just questions:
1. Stay in the fight.
Which fight? Against the terrorists? Against the insurgents? At this point can we tell the difference?
It isn't over until we say it's over.
Does anyone actually see an Iraq that has the ability to fend for itself? At what point do we go from being attackers (anti-terrorist/insurgent) to defenders (backing up IDF only when absolutely necessary)? And when is the friggin' Iraqi government going to step up to the plate?
2. Secure Kurdistan and the borders. No jihadis get in or out.
Is this realistic? We have problems securing our own border in peacetime. How do we protect the borders in a country ruled by chaos?
I guess I've just burned out from hearing rhetoric from politicians on both sides who are more interested in keeping their jobs than actually "getting the job done".
Sorry, I'm just frustrated by a perceived lack of progress... :x
-
Moving Forward in Iraq
The "surge" is working. Will Washington allow the current progress to continue?
BY KIMBERLY KAGAN
Wednesday, July 11, 2007 12:01 a.m. EDT
In Washington perception is often mistaken for reality. And as Congress prepares for a fresh debate on Iraq, the perception many members have is that the new strategy has already failed.
This isn't an accurate reflection of what is happening on the ground, as I saw during my visit to Iraq in May. Reports from the field show that remarkable progress is being made. Violence in Baghdad and Anbar Province is down dramatically, grassroots political movements have begun in the Sunni Arab community, and American and Iraqi forces are clearing al Qaeda fighters and Shiite militias out of long-established bases around the country.
This is remarkable because the military operation that is making these changes possible only began in full strength on June 15. To say that the surge is failing is absurd. Instead Congress should be asking this question: Can the current progress continue?
From 2004 to 2006, al Qaeda established safe havens, transport routes, vehicle-bomb factories and training camps in the rural areas surrounding Baghdad, where U.S. forces had little or no footprint. Al Qaeda used these bases to conduct bombings in Baghdad, to displace Shia and Sunni from local towns by sparking sectarian killings, and to force Iraqis to comply with the group's interpretation of Islamic law. Shiite death squads roamed freely around Baghdad and the countryside. The number of execution-style killings rose monthly after the Samarra mosque bombing of February 2006, reaching a high in December 2006. Iranian special operations groups moved weapons across the borders and into Iraq along major highways and rivers. U.S. forces, engaged primarily in training Iraqis, did little to disrupt this movement.
Today, Iraq is a different place from what it was six months ago. U.S. and Iraqi forces began their counterinsurgency campaign in Baghdad in February. They moved into the neighborhoods and worked side-by-side with Baghdadis. As a result, sectarian violence is down. The counterinsurgency strategy has dramatically decreased Shiite death squad activity in the capital. Furthermore, U.S. and Iraqi special forces have removed many rogue militia leaders and Iranian advisers from Sadr City and other locations, reducing the power of militias.
As a consequence, execution-style killings, the hallmark of Shiite militias, have fallen to the lowest level in a year; some Iranian- and militia-backed mortar teams firing on the Green Zone have been destroyed. Equally important, U.S. and Iraqi forces have restricted al Qaeda's bases to ever smaller areas of the city, so that reinforcements cannot flow easily from one neighborhood to another.
Many in Washington say the Baghdad Security Plan has just pushed the enemy to other locations in Iraq. Though some of the enemy certainly left Baghdad when the security plan began, this metaphor is inaccurate. The enemy has long been located outside of Baghdad and was causing violence from suburban bases. What has changed is the disposition of U.S. forces, which are now actively working to expel the enemy from its safe havens rather than ignoring them.
To accomplish this, Gens. David Petraeus and Raymond Odierno have encircled Baghdad with a double cordon of U.S. and Iraqi forces. They have been preparing the cordons patiently since February, as the new "surge" units arrived. The surge was completed only in mid-June, and the first phase of the large-scale operations it was intended to support began only on June 15. Since then, U.S. forces have begun blocking major road, river, and transportation route around Baghdad. They are also deployed in critical neighborhoods around outskirts and the interior of the city.
On June 15, Gens. Petraeus and Odierno launched a major offensive against al Qaeda strongholds all around Baghdad. "Phantom Thunder" is the largest operation in Iraq since 2003, and a milestone in the counterinsurgency strategy. For the first time, U.S. forces are working systematically throughout central Iraq to secure Baghdad by clearing its rural "belts" and its interior, so that the enemy cannot move from one safe haven to another. Together, the operations in Baghdad and the "belts" are increasing security in and around the capital.
U.S. and Iraqi forces are thereby attacking enemy strongholds and cutting supply routes all around the city, along which fighters and weapons moved freely in 2006. Coordinated operations south and east of Baghdad are at last interdicting the supply of weapons moving along the Tigris River to the capital. U.S. and Iraqi forces are operating east of Baghdad for the first time in years, disrupting al Qaeda's movement between bases on the Tigris and in Sadr City, a frequent target of its car bombs. North of Baghdad, U.S. forces recently cleared al Qaeda from the city of Baqubah, from which terrorists flowed into Baghdad. They are clearing al Qaeda's car bomb factories from Karmah, northwest of Baghdad, and its sanctuaries toward Lake Tharthar. These operations are supported by counterinsurgency operations west of the capital, from Fallujah to Abu Ghraib. U.S. forces are now, for the first time, fighting the enemy in the entire ring of cities and villages around Baghdad.
This is the Baghdad Security Plan, and its mission is to secure the people of Baghdad. Even so, commanders are not ignoring the outlying areas of Iraq. U.S. forces have killed or captured many important al Qaeda leaders in Mosul recently, and destroyed safe havens throughout northern Iraq. Troops are conducting counterinsurgency operations in Bayji, north of Tikrit. And Iraqi forces have "stepped up" to secure some southern cities. The Eighth Iraqi Army Division has been fighting Shiite militias in Diwaniyah, an important city halfway between Basrah and Baghdad. As commanders stabilize central Iraq, they will undoubtedly conduct successive operations in outlying regions to follow up on their successes and make them lasting.
The larger aim of the new strategy is creating an opportunity for Iraq's leaders to negotiate a political settlement. These negotiations are underway. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is attempting to form a political coalition with Amar al-Hakim and Kurdish political leaders, but excluding Moqtada al-Sadr, and has invited Sunnis to participate. He has confronted Moqtada al-Sadr for promoting illegal militia activity, and has apparently prompted this so-called Iraqi nationalist to leave for Iran for the second time since January.
Provincial and local government is growing stronger. Local and tribal leaders in Anbar, Diyala, Salah ad-Din, North Babil and even Baghdad have agreed to fight insurgents and terrorists as U.S. forces have moved in to secure the population alongside their Iraqi partners. As a result, the number of Iraqis recruited for the police forces, in particular, has risen exponentially since 2006.
This is war, and the enemy is reacting. The enemy uses suicide bombs, car bombs and brutal executions to break our will and that of our Iraqi allies. American casualties often increase as troops move into areas that the enemy has fortified; these casualties will start to fall again once the enemy positions are destroyed. Al Qaeda will manage to get some car and truck bombs through, particularly in areas well-removed from the capital and its belts.
But we should not allow individual atrocities to obscure the larger picture. A new campaign has just begun, it is already yielding important results, and its effects are increasing daily. Demands for withdrawal are no longer demands to pull out of a deteriorating situation with little hope; they are now demands to end a new approach to this conflict that shows every sign of succeeding.
Ms. Kagan, an affiliate of Harvard's John M. Olin Institute of Strategic Studies, is executive director of the Institute for the Study of War in Washington.
-
Not a critique, just questions:
1. Stay in the fight.
Which fight? Against the terrorists? Against the insurgents? At this point can we tell the difference?
****Sure, in fact many Iraqis have turned against the foreign jihadists.****
It isn't over until we say it's over.
Does anyone actually see an Iraq that has the ability to fend for itself? At what point do we go from being attackers (anti-terrorist/insurgent) to defenders (backing up IDF only when absolutely necessary)? And when is the friggin' Iraqi government going to step up to the plate?
****I share your frustration. I don't have a good answer.****
2. Secure Kurdistan and the borders. No jihadis get in or out.
Is this realistic? We have problems securing our own border in peacetime. How do we protect the borders in a country ruled by chaos?
****We can secure our borders, we haven't chosen to do so. The Army and Marines can secure the border (Either ours or Iraq's).****
I guess I've just burned out from hearing rhetoric from politicians on both sides who are more interested in keeping their jobs than actually "getting the job done".
Sorry, I'm just frustrated by a perceived lack of progress... :x
****I think everyone feels the same, however our enemies understand that our culture is one of instant gratification while they plan on winning over the centuries.****
-
****This is what we need to be shutting down.****
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070711/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iraq&printer=1;_ylt=A0WTUeFOKZZG3zoAyg0UewgF
200 explosive belts seized in Iraq
By ROBERT H. REID, Associated Press Writer
Wed Jul 11, 2:29 PM ET
Iraqi security forces seized 200 explosive belts along the Syrian border Wednesday, a police spokesman said, reinforcing Baghdad's claims that its western neighbor isn't doing enough to stop the flow of fighters and weapons to al-Qaida in Iraq.
The belts were found during a search of a truck that had crossed into Iraq from Syria at the Waleed border station, Interior Ministry spokesman Maj. Gen. Abdul-Karim Khalaf said.
"When the truck was searched, 200 explosives belts were found in it," the general said. He said the driver was detained but he would not give his name or nationality.
Iraqi and U.S. authorities have long complained that Syria is not doing enough to stem the flow of weapons, ammunition and foreign fighters into Iraq. Syria insists it is trying to stop the flow but that it is impossible to seal off the long desert border.
But U.S. military spokesman Brig. Gen. Kevin Bergner told reporters that 60 to 80 foreign fighters enter Iraq "in any given month" — 70 percent of them through Syria. He said up to 90 percent of the suicide attacks in Iraq were carried out by "foreign-born al-Qaida terrorists."
Bergner did not offer detailed evidence to support the claim.
However, he cited the July 1 suicide attack that collapsed part of a major bridge across the Euphrates River north of Ramadi. A second bomber was supposed to have attacked the bridge but backed out and was captured, Bergner said.
The surviving attacker told interrogators he had been recruited by al-Qaida in his home country, flown to Syria and smuggled across the border to Ramadi, where he stayed for about 10 days before the attack.
Bergner would not give the would-be attacker's nationality, but other military officials said he was a Saudi. They spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not supposed to release the information.
Bergner said the U.S. command expected al-Qaida in Iraq fighters "to lash out and stage spectacular attacks to reassert themselves" after U.S. troops' gains in their stronghold of Baqouba, located northeast of Baghdad.
A number of private security analysts have questioned the U.S. military's emphasis on al-Qaida in Iraq, saying it is one of many Sunni and Shiite groups threatening Iraq's stability. Some have suggested that the emphasis on al-Qaida is to link the fight in Iraq to the Sept. 11, 2001 terror attacks in the U.S. at a time when the American public is turning against the conflict.
But Bergner insisted al-Qaida in Iraq and its allies were the main focus because they were the "main accelerant in sectarian violence and the greatest source of these spectacular" suicide attacks "that are killing Iraqis in such large numbers."
U.S. officials maintain that violence in Anbar province, long the focal point of the Sunni insurgency, dropped by 50 percent after local Sunni tribes joined U.S. and Iraqi forces in fighting al-Qaida last year.
That has led to a series of reprisal attacks by al-Qaida, a Sunni terror group, against Sunnis in Anbar and elsewhere who have abandoned the insurgency.
On Wednesday, insurgents drove to a house in the Anbar town of Karmah, locked the occupants inside, and blew up the house, Iraqi police and U.S. military officials said. Eleven people were killed.
The house was owned by a member of the Provincial Security Forces organized to protect towns and villages against extremists, the U.S. military said.
Early Wednesday, U.S. and Iraqi forces drove out dozens of insurgents who had attacked and seized control of a remote village northeast of Baghdad. Residents of Sherween had telephoned Iraqi officials a day earlier pleading for help, saying armed villagers were trying to defend themselves against the attackers.
The U.S.-Iraqi forces killed 20 militants and captured 20 others in the battle overnight, the U.S. military said.
Lt. Col. Fred Johnson said the attackers had fled Baqouba, focus of the U.S. offensive north of the capital, and had attacked Sherween 35 miles to the northeast in an attempt to "raise the morale" of their fighters.
In the city of Samarra — a region 60 miles north of Baghdad that has seen frequent insurgent attacks — U.S. troops uncovered 12 bodies this week, according to Iraqi police and AP Television News footage of the bodies. The bodies were partially decomposed, and it was not known who killed them or when.
Also Wednesday, a U.S. soldier died of an unspecified "non-battle related cause," the U.S. military said without elaborating.
A German woman who was kidnapped in Iraq was freed after 155 days in captivity, but her son is still being held. Hannelore Krause, 62, told Al-Arabiya television that her adult son, Sinan, would be killed if German troops do not leave Afghanistan.
"They kidnapped me and my son and we are German citizens," she said, speaking in German with Arabic voice-over. "I call on the Germans to leave Afghanistan and that the Germany army withdraw from Afghanistan. If they don't respond to this demand, my son will be slaughtered."
The mother and son, who disappeared Feb. 6, were shown twice in videos released by an insurgent group calling itself "Arrows of Righteousness." The group threatened to kill the hostages if Germany did not begin withdrawing its troops from Afghanistan within 10 days.
An Anglican priest who may have received a cryptic warning of recent failed car bombings in London and Glasgow has fled Iraq after threats against his life, an associate said.
Canon Andrew White, a British national who ran Iraq's only Anglican church, left Tuesday and returned to Britain, the associate said on condition of anonymity, saying the British Foreign Office had asked that it be the only source of information on the case.
The associate refused to elaborate on the threats. But the British Broadcasting Corp. Web site said pamphlets dropped in Shiite areas of Baghdad branded the vicar as "no more than a spy."
White had been working to secure the release of five British hostages who were seized at the Iraqi Finance Ministry on May 29 by gunmen wearing police uniforms.
White told The Associated Press that while in Amman, Jordan, in April, he had met a man identified by religious leaders as an al-Qaida leader. The man told him "Those who cure you will kill you."
White said in retrospect that may have been a warning of last month's failed plot to blow up car bombs in London and Scotland. Nearly all the suspects worked in medical professions.
-
The "Quit Iraq" Caucus
By Ralph Peters
New York Post | July 12, 2007
Even as our troops make serious progress against al-Qaeda-in-Iraq and other extremists, Congress - including Republican members - is sending the terrorists a message: "Don't lose heart, we'll save you!"
Iraq's a mess. Got it. The Bush administration has made so many mistakes I stopped counting a year ago. But we've finally got a general in Baghdad - Dave Petraeus - who's doing things right. Iraqi politicians are still disgracing themselves, but our troops are killing America's enemies - with the help of our former enemies.
Al-Qaeda-in-Iraq is suffering a humiliating defeat, as fellow Sunni Muslims turn against the fanatics and help them find the martyrdom they advertise.
Yet for purely political reasons - next year's elections - cowards on Capitol Hill are spurning the courage of our troops on the ground.
The frantic political gamesmanship in Congress would nauseate a ghoul. Pols desperate for any cover and concealment they can get have dragged the Iraq Study Group plan from the grave.
Masterminded by former Secretary of State Jim "Have Your Hugged Your Saudi Prince Today?" Baker, the report is a blueprint for a return to yesteryear's dictator-smooching policy (which helped create al Qaeda - thanks, Jimbo!).
That Baker report reminds me of cheap horror films where the zombies just keep coming back - except that zombies retain a measure of integrity.
But if Republicans are rushing to desert our troops and spit on the graves of heroes, the Democratic Party at least has been consistent - they've supported our enemies from the start, undercutting our troops and refusing to explain in detail what happens if we flee Iraq.
So I'll tell you what happens: massacres. And while I have nothing against Shia militiamen and Sunni insurgents killing each other 24/7, the overwhelming number of victims will be innocent women, children and the elderly.
Bosnia? That was just rough-necking at recess compared to what Islamist fanatics and ethnic beasts will do. Given that Senate Majority Misleader Harry Reid and Commissar of the House Nancy Pelosi won't tell us what they foresee after we quit, let me lay it out:
* After suffering a strategic defeat, al-Qaeda-in-Iraq comes back from the dead (those zombies again . . .) and gets to declare a strategic victory over the Great Satan.
* Iran establishes hegemony over Iraq's southern oil fields and menaces the other Persian Gulf producers. (Sorry, Comrade Gore, even that Toyota Prius needs some gasoline . . . )
* Our troops will have died in vain. Of course, that doesn't really matter to much of anyone in Washington, Democrat or Republican. So we'll just write off those young Americans stupid enough to join the military when they could've ducked out the way most members of Congress did.
* A slaughter of the innocents - so many dead, the bodies will never be counted.
But I hope somebody tries to count the dead after our Congress kills them. As for those on the left who sanctimoniously set out rows of shabby combat boots to "teach" the rest of us the cost of war, I fully expect them to put out displays of women's slippers and children's shoes to show the world how many innocents died when they "brought our troops home now." (Note to the demonstrators - better start bulk-ordering those slippers and booties now.)
I hate the long-mismanaged mess in Iraq. I wish there were a sensible, decent way to get out that wouldn't undercut our security and produce massive innocent casualties. But there isn't. Not now. And, like it or not, we have a moral responsibility as well as practical interests in refusing to surrender to the butchers in Iraq.
This has been the Bush-Cheney War. But it will only be fair to call the carnage after we run away the "Reid-Pelosi Massacres."
Ralph Peters' new book, "Wars of Blood and Faith," goes on sale next week
-
The Surge Is Working
By OMAR FADHIL
July 13, 2007; Page A13
Baghdad
For nearly three-and-a-half years, the two most dangerous enemies of the American mission in Iraq -- and of the majority of Iraqis who want to build a stable democracy -- had been growing in terms of their capacity to inflict damage. This despite the losses they suffered in battles with Iraqi and American security forces.
Moqtada al-Sadr, on the one hand, grew from a small annoyance as a gang leader in Najaf in April 2003 to become the leader of a monstrous militia that, with the spark al Qaeda provided by bombing the Askari shrine in Samarra, created the sectarian bloodbath we witnessed throughout 2006.
On the other side, al Qaeda's network in Iraq grew from a few dozen infiltrators, supported by disgruntled locals, to an entity that was until recently bragging about establishing Islamic rule on the soil of at least two Iraqi provinces east and west of Baghdad.
And so this country was going through the worst times ever as we moved towards the end of 2006. Iraq was being torn apart by these two terror networks and Iraq was said to be on the verge of "civil war," if it wasn't actually there already.
But the situation looks quite different now.
Last year's crisis made Washington and Baghdad realize that urgent measures needed to be taken to stop the deterioration, and ultimately reverse it. So Washington decided to send in thousands of additional troops. And Baghdad agreed to move its lazy bones and mobilize more Iraqi troops to the capital and coordinate a joint crackdown with the American forces on all outlaw groups, Sunni and Shiite alike.
The big question these days is, did it actually work? Even partially?
First I think we need to remember that states and their traditional armies need to be judged by different metrics than gangs and terror organizations. The latter don't need to win the majority of their battles with American and Iraqi forces. The strength of terrorists and militias is simply their ability to subjugate the civilian populace with fear.
Here is exactly where the American surge and Iraqi plan have proven effective in Baghdad.
The combined use of security walls, the heavy security-force presence in the streets, and an overwhelming number of checkpoints have highly restricted the movement of terrorists and militias inside Baghdad and led to separation. Not a separation of ordinary Sunnis from ordinary Shiites but a separation of both Sunni and Shiite terrorists from their respective priority targets, i.e., civilians of the other sect.
With their movement restricted and their ability to perform operations reduced, they had to look for other targets that are easier to reach. After all, when the goal is to defeat America in Iraq and undermine the democratic political process any target is a good target.
Just look at the difference between the aftermath of the first Samarra bombing in February of 2006 and that of the second bombing in June of 2007. Days after the 2006 bombing more than a hundred Sunni mosques were hit in retaliatory attacks, and thousands of Sunnis were executed by militias in the months that followed. This time only four or five mosques were attacked, none of them in Baghdad proper that I know of.
Sadr's militias have moved the main battlefield south to cities like Samawah, Nasiriyah and Diwaniyah where there's no American surge of troops, and from which many Iraqi troops were recalled to serve in Baghdad. But over there, too, the Iraqi security forces and local administrations did not show the weakness that Sadr was hoping to see. As a result, Sadr's representatives have been forced to accept "truces."
I know this may make things sound as if Sadr has the upper hand, that he can force a truce on the state. But the fact that is missing from news reports is that, with each new eruption of clashes, Sadr's position becomes weaker as tribes and local administrations join forces to confront his outlaw militias.
Al Qaeda hasn't been any luckier than Sadr, and the tide began to turn even before the surge was announced. The change came from the most unlikely city and unlikely people, Ramadi and its Sunni tribes.
In Baghdad the results have been just as spectacular so far. The district where al Qaeda claimed to have established its Islamic emirate is exactly where al Qaeda is losing big now, and at the hands of its former allies who have turned on al Qaeda and are slowly reaching out to the government.
While al Qaeda and Sadr are by no means finished off militarily, what has changed is that both of them are fighting their former public base of support. That course can't lead them to success in fomenting the sectarian war they had bet their money on.
It would be unrealistic to expect political progress to take place along the same timeline as this military progress. The obvious reason is that Iraqi politics tend to be affected by developments on the battlefield. Anyone familiar with the basics of negotiations should understand this.
First things first. Let's allow our troops to finish their job. And when that is done nation-building will follow, and that's where diplomats and politicians will have to do the fighting in their own way while American soldiers can finally enjoy a well-deserved rest.
Backing off now is not an option. The light at the end of the tunnel faded for a whole dark year, but we can see it again now and it's getting brighter. It's our duty to keep walking towards it.
Mr. Fadhil co-writes a blog, IraqTheModel.com, from Baghdad.
WSJ
-
http://www.city-journal.org/html/eon2007-07-12vdh.html
Victor Davis Hanson
The New York Times Surrenders
A monument to defeatism on the editorial page
12 July 2007
On July 8, the New York Times ran an historic editorial entitled “The Road Home,” demanding an immediate American withdrawal from Iraq. It is rare that an editorial gets almost everything wrong, but “The Road Home” pulls it off. Consider, point by point, its confused—and immoral—defeatism.
1. “It is time for the United States to leave Iraq, without any more delay than the Pentagon needs to organize an orderly exit.”
Rarely in military history has an “orderly” withdrawal followed a theater-sized defeat and the flight of several divisions. Abruptly leaving Iraq would be a logistical and humanitarian catastrophe. And when scenes of carnage begin appearing on TV screens here about latte time, will the Times then call for “humanitarian” action?
2. “Like many Americans, we have put off that conclusion, waiting for a sign that President Bush was seriously trying to dig the United States out of the disaster he created by invading Iraq without sufficient cause, in the face of global opposition, and without a plan to stabilize the country afterward.”
We’ll get to the war’s “sufficient cause,” but first let’s address the other two charges that the Times levels here against President Bush. Both houses of Congress voted for 23 writs authorizing the war with Iraq—a post-9/11 confirmation of the official policy of regime change in Iraq that President Clinton originated. Supporters of the war included 70 percent of the American public in April 2003; the majority of NATO members; a coalition with more participants than the United Nations alliance had in the Korean War; and a host of politicians and pundits as diverse as Joe Biden, William F. Buckley, Wesley Clark, Hillary Clinton, Francis Fukuyama, Kenneth Pollack, Harry Reid, Andrew Sullivan, Thomas Friedman, and George Will.
And there was a Pentagon postwar plan to stabilize the country, but it assumed a decisive defeat and elimination of enemy forces, not a three-week war in which the majority of Baathists and their terrorist allies fled into the shadows to await a more opportune time to reemerge, under quite different rules of engagement.
3. “While Mr. Bush scorns deadlines, he kept promising breakthroughs—after elections, after a constitution, after sending in thousands more troops. But those milestones came and went without any progress toward a stable, democratic Iraq or a path for withdrawal. It is frighteningly clear that Mr. Bush’s plan is to stay the course as long as he is president and dump the mess on his successor. Whatever his cause was, it is lost.”
Of course there were breakthroughs: most notably, millions of Iraqis’ risking their lives to vote. An elected government remains in power, under a constitution far more liberal than any other in the Arab Middle East. In the region at large, Libya, following the war, gave up its advanced arsenal of weapons of mass destruction; Syria fled Lebanon; A.Q. Khan’s nuclear ring was shut down. And despite the efforts of Iran, Syria, and Sunni extremists in Jordan and Saudi Arabia, a plurality of Iraqis still prefer the chaotic and dangerous present to the sure methodical slaughter of their recent Saddamite past.
The Times wonders what Bush’s cause was. Easy to explain, if not easy to achieve: to help foster a constitutional government in the place of a genocidal regime that had engaged in a de facto war with the United States since 1991, and harbored or subsidized terrorists like Abu Nidal, Abu Abbas, at least one plotter of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, al-Qaida affiliates in Kurdistan, and suicide bombers in Gaza and the West Bank. It was a bold attempt to break with the West’s previous practices, both liberal (appeasement of terrorists) and conservative (doing business with Saddam, selling arms to Iran, and overlooking the House of Saud’s funding of terrorists).
Is that cause in fact “lost”? The vast majority of 160,000 troops in harm’s way don’t think so—despite a home front where U.S. senators have publicly compared them with Nazis, Stalinists, Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge, and Saddam Hussein’s jailers, and where the media’s Iraqi narrative has focused obsessively on Abu Ghraib, Guantánamo, and serial leaks of classified information, with little interest in the horrific nature of the Islamists in Iraq or the courageous efforts of many Iraqis to stop them.
4. “Continuing to sacrifice the lives and limbs of American soldiers is wrong. The war is sapping the strength of the nation’s alliances and its military forces. It is a dangerous diversion from the life-and-death struggle against terrorists. It is an increasing burden on American taxpayers, and it is a betrayal of a world that needs the wise application of American power and principles.”
The military is stretched, but hardly broken, despite having tens of thousands of troops stationed in Japan, Korea, the Balkans, Germany, and Italy, years—and decades—after we removed dictatorships by force and began efforts to establish democracies in those once-frightening places. As for whether Iraq is a diversion from the war on terror: al-Qaida bigwig Ayman al-Zawahiri, like George W. Bush, has said that Iraq is the primary front in his efforts to attack the United States and its interests—and he often despairs about the progress of jihad there. Our enemies, like al-Qaida, Iran, and Syria, as well as opportunistic neutrals like China and Russia, are watching closely to see whether America will betray its principles in Iraq.
5. “Americans must be clear that Iraq, and the region around it, could be even bloodier and more chaotic after Americans leave. There could be reprisals against those who worked with American forces, further ethnic cleansing, even genocide. Potentially destabilizing refugee flows could hit Jordan and Syria. Iran and Turkey could be tempted to make power grabs.”
The Times should abandon the subjunctive mood. The catastrophes that it matter-of-factly suggests have ample precedents in Vietnam. Apparently, we should abandon millions of Iraqis to the jihadists (whether Wahhabis or Khomeinites), expect mass murders in the wake of our flight—“even genocide”—and then chalk up the slaughter to Bush’s folly. And if that seems crazy, consider what follows, an Orwellian account of the mechanics of our flight:
6. “The main road south to Kuwait is notoriously vulnerable to roadside bomb attacks. Soldiers, weapons and vehicles will need to be deployed to secure bases while airlift and sealift operations are organized. Withdrawal routes will have to be guarded. The exit must be everything the invasion was not: based on reality and backed by adequate resources.
“The United States should explore using Kurdish territory in the north of Iraq as a secure staging area. Being able to use bases and ports in Turkey would also make withdrawal faster and safer. Turkey has been an inconsistent ally in this war, but like other nations, it should realize that shouldering part of the burden of the aftermath is in its own interest.”
This insistence on planned defeat, following incessant criticism of potential victory, is lunatic. The Times’s frustration with Turkey and other “inconsistent” allies won’t end with our withdrawal and defeat. Like everyone in the region, the Turks want to ally with winners and distance themselves from losers—and care little about sermons from the likes of the Times editors. The ideas about Kurdish territory and Turkey are simply cover for the likely consequences of defeat: once we are gone and a federated Iraq is finished, Kurdistan’s democratic success is fair game for Turkey, which—with the assent of opportunistic allies—will move to end it by crushing our Kurdish friends.
7. “Despite President Bush’s repeated claims, Al Qaeda had no significant foothold in Iraq before the invasion, which gave it new base camps, new recruits and new prestige.
“This war diverted Pentagon resources from Afghanistan, where the military had a real chance to hunt down Al Qaeda’s leaders. It alienated essential allies in the war against terrorism. It drained the strength and readiness of American troops.”
The Times raises the old charge that if we weren’t in Iraq, neither would be al-Qaida—more of whose members we have killed in Iraq than anywhere else. In 1944, Japan had relatively few soldiers in Okinawa; when the Japanese learned that we planned to invade in 1945, they increased their forces there. Did the subsequent carnage—four times the number of U.S. dead as in Iraq, by the way, in one-sixteenth the time—prove our actions ill considered? Likewise, no Soviets were in Eastern Europe until we moved to attack and destroy Hitler, who had kept communists out. Did the resulting Iron Curtain mean that it was a mistake to deter German aggression?
And if the Times sees the war in Afghanistan as so important, why didn’t it support an all-out war against the Taliban and al-Qaida, as it apparently does now, when we were solely in Afghanistan?
8. “Iraq may fragment into separate Kurdish, Sunni and Shiite republics, and American troops are not going to stop that from happening. . . . To start, Washington must turn to the United Nations, which Mr. Bush spurned and ridiculed as a preface to war.”
But Bush did go to the United Nations, which, had it enforced its own resolutions, might have prevented the war. In fact, the Bush administration’s engagement with the UN contrasts sharply with President Clinton’s snub of that organization during the U.S.-led bombing of the Balkans—unleashed, unlike Iraq, without Congressional approval. The Times also neglects to mention that the UN was knee-deep in the mess of its cash cow Iraq, from its appeasement of the genocidal Hussein regime to its graft-ridden, $50 billion oil-for-food scandal, reaching the highest echelons of Kofi Annan’s UN administration.
9. “Washington also has to mend fences with allies. There are new governments in Britain, France and Germany that did not participate in the fight over starting this war and are eager to get beyond it. But that will still require a measure of humility and a commitment to multilateral action that this administration has never shown. And, however angry they were with President Bush for creating this mess, those nations should see that they cannot walk away from the consequences.”
New governments in France and Germany are more pro-American than those of the past that tried to thwart us in Iraq. The Times surely knows of the Chirac administration’s lucrative relationships with Saddam Hussein, and of the German contracts to supply sophisticated tools and expertise that enabled the Baathist nightmare. Tony Blair will enjoy a far more principled and reputable retirement than will Jacques Chirac or Gerhard Schroeder, who did their best to destroy the Atlantic Alliance for cheap partisan advantage at home and global benefit abroad.
Nations like France and Germany won’t “walk away” from Iraq, since they were never there in the first place. They never involve themselves in such dangerous situations—just look at the rules of engagement of French and German troops in Afghanistan. Their foreign policy centers instead on commerce, suitably dressed up with fashionable elite outrage against the United States.
10. “For this effort to have any remote chance, Mr. Bush must drop his resistance to talking with both Iran and Syria. Britain, France, Russia, China and other nations with influence have a responsibility to help. Civil war in Iraq is a threat to everyone, especially if it spills across Iraq’s borders.”
China and Russia, seeing only oil and petrodollars, will take no responsibility to help. Both will welcome a U.S. retreat. Yes, “civil war” will spill over the borders, but not until the U.S. precipitously withdraws. Iran and Syria—serial assassins of democrats from Lebanon to Iraq—are hoping for realization of the Times’s scenario, and would be willing to talk with us only to facilitate our flight, with the expectation that Iraq would become wide open for their ambitions. In their view, a U.S. that fails in Iraq surely cannot thwart an Iranian bomb, the Syrian reabsorption of Lebanese democracy, attacks on Israel, or increased funding and sanctuary for global terrorism.
11. “President Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney have used demagoguery and fear to quell Americans’ demands for an end to this war. They say withdrawing will create bloodshed and chaos and encourage terrorists. Actually, all of that has already happened—the result of this unnecessary invasion and the incompetent management of this war.”
But as the Times itself acknowledges, what has happened in the past only previews what is in store if we precipitously withdraw. And this will prove the case not only in Iraq, but elsewhere in the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, Taiwan, and Korea. Once the U.S. demonstrates that it cannot honor its commitments, those dependent upon it must make the necessary adjustments. Ironically, while the Times urges acceptance of defeat, Sunni tribesmen at last are coming forward to fight terrorists, and regional neighbors are gradually accepting the truth that their opportunistic assistance to jihadists is only threatening their own regimes.
We promised General Petraeus a hearing in September; it would be the height of folly to preempt that agreement by giving in to our summer of panic and despair. Critics called for the resignation of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, a change in command in Iraq and at Centcom, new strategies, and more troops. But now that we have a new secretary, a new command in Iraq and at Centcom, new strategies, and more troops, suddenly we have a renewed demand for withdrawal before the agreed-upon September accounting—suggesting that the only constant in such harping was the assumption that Iraq was either hopeless or not worth the effort.
The truth is that Iraq has upped the ante in the war against terrorists. Our enemies’ worst nightmare is a constitutional government in the heart of the ancient caliphate, surrounded by consensual rule in Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Turkey; ours is a new terror heaven, but with oil, a strategic location, and the zeal born of a humiliating defeat of the United States on a theater scale. The Islamists believe we can’t win; so does the New York Times. But it falls to the American people to decide the issue.
-
VDH is always a good read GM.
=============
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/art..._petraeus.html
July 13, 2007
Deserting Petraeus
By Charles Krauthammer
"The key to turning [Anbar] around was the shift in allegiance by tribal sheiks. But the sheiks turned only after a prolonged offensive by American and Iraqi forces, starting in November, that put al-Qaeda groups on the run."
-- The New York Times, July 8
Finally, after four terribly long years, we know what works. Or what can work. A year ago, a confidential Marine intelligence report declared Anbar province (which comprises about a third of Iraq's territory) lost to al-Qaeda. Now, in what the Times's John Burns calls an " astonishing success," the tribal sheiks have joined our side and committed large numbers of fighters that, in concert with American and Iraqi forces, have largely driven out al-Qaeda and turned its former stronghold of Ramadi into one of most secure cities in Iraq.
GA_googleFillSlot("RCP_Article_Middle_300x250");
It began with a U.S.-led offensive that killed or wounded more than 200 enemy fighters and captured 600. Most important was the follow-up. Not a retreat back to American bases but the setting up of small posts within the population that, together with the Iraqi national and tribal forces, have brought relative stability to Anbar.
The same has started happening in many of the Sunni areas around Baghdad, including Diyala province -- just a year ago considered as lost as Anbar -- where, for example, the Sunni insurgent 1920 Revolution Brigades has turned against al-Qaeda and joined the fight on the side of U.S. and Iraqi government forces.
We don't yet know if this strategy will work in mixed Sunni-Shiite neighborhoods. Nor can we be certain that this cooperation between essentially Sunni tribal forces and an essentially Shiite central government can endure. But what cannot be said -- although it is now heard daily in Washington -- is that the surge, which is shorthand for Gen. David Petraeus's new counterinsurgency strategy, has failed. The tragedy is that, just as a working strategy has been found, some Republicans in the Senate have lost heart and want to pull the plug.
It is understandable that Sens. Lugar, Voinovich, Domenici, Snowe and Warner may no longer trust President Bush's judgment when he tells them to wait until Petraeus reports in September. What is not understandable is the vote of no confidence they are passing on Petraeus. These are the same senators who sent him back to Iraq by an 81 to 0 vote to institute his new counterinsurgency strategy.
A month ago, Petraeus was asked whether we could still win in Iraq. The general, who had recently attended two memorial services for soldiers lost under his command, replied that if he thought he could not succeed he would not be risking the life of a single soldier.
Just this week, Petraeus said that the one thing he needs more than anything else is time. To cut off Petraeus's plan just as it is beginning -- the last surge troops arrived only last month -- on the assumption that we cannot succeed is to declare Petraeus either deluded or dishonorable. Deluded in that, as the best-positioned American in Baghdad, he still believes we can succeed. Or dishonorable in pretending to believe in victory and sending soldiers to die in what he really knows is an already failed strategy.
That's the logic of the wobbly Republicans' position. But rather than lay it on Petraeus, they prefer to lay it on Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and point out his government's inability to meet the required political "benchmarks." As a longtime critic of the Maliki government, I agree that it has proved itself incapable of passing laws important for long-term national reconciliation.
But first comes the short term. And right now we have the chance to continue to isolate al-Qaeda and, province by province, deny it the Sunni sea in which it swims. A year ago, it appeared that the only way to win back the Sunnis and neutralize the extremists was with great national compacts about oil and power sharing. But Anbar has unexpectedly shown that even without these constitutional settlements, the insurgency can be neutralized and al-Qaeda defeated at the local and provincial levels with a new and robust counterinsurgency strategy.
The costs are heartbreakingly high -- increased American casualties as the enemy is engaged and spectacular suicide bombings designed to terrify Iraqis and demoralize Americans. But the stakes are extremely high as well.
In the long run, agreements on oil, federalism and de-Baathification are crucial for stabilizing Iraq. But their absence at this moment is not a reason to give up in despair, now that we finally have a counterinsurgency strategy in place that is showing success against the one enemy -- al-Qaeda -- that both critics and supporters of the war maintain must be fought everywhere and at all cost.
__________________
==============
None of that surprises me. I knew Ramadi was winnable last November. I posted this on another thread at that time.
http://www.fumento.com/military/ramadireturn.html
Excerpts from a long report:
Nobody pretends the Iraqi Army will ever approach the U.S. military in its willingness and ability to fight; but in fairness, how many armies do? Further, it's not as if the anti-Iraqi forces' abilities will ever approach those of the Viet Cong. It's considered remarkable when the enemy is so much as able to coordinate an attack, rather than just tossing a bunch of untrained men at an objective. The Iraqi Army units in Ramadi are capable of defending themselves and going on the attack with just a couple of American advisers. That's real progress. Unfortunately, these units are almost exclusively Shiite at the enlisted level, with Sunni officers, which is not ideal for this Sunni region. But still they have the ability to speak with and relate to Iraqis of any sectarian persuasion better than Americans ever will.
Historically, successful counterinsurgency efforts have involved pacifying areas by plopping small garrisons with interlocking communications into enemy territory and sending out patrols to gather information and engage the enemy. Perhaps the most famous example of such garrison use was that of King Edward I of England (yes, the guy who had Braveheart drawn and quartered), who used castles to consolidate his hold on a conquered but restive Wales. More recently U.S. Army Special Forces established Civilian Irregular Defense Group camps in South Vietnam, manned primarily by indigenous tribes or South Vietnamese with a core of Special Forces soldiers. Such camps are considered one of the most effective strategies of that war. Certainly they were far more useful than the "search and destroy" missions sent out from huge base camps.
The military refers to COP use as "the inkblot strategy." One dot spreads into a bigger spot. Further, the troops are practically forced to work with the locals. That means building up networks of indigenous people who know the terrain, culture, and other people better than any forces – even one from the same country but another province – ever could. This also allows for more direct contact between the leader of the military force and the local leadership. All of this creates a force multiplier. Since the Bush administration appears unlikely to increase troop strength significantly, this ability to make better use of troops without weakening the forward operating bases from which they're drawn is vital.
Another value of the Ramadi COPs over the FOBs and Camp Ramadi is that we're fighting an enemy that relies primarily on roadway bombs – whether IEDS, vehicle-borne IEDs, or suicide-vehicle borne IEDs (driven vehicles) – to inflict casualties and damage, with the potential for greatly restricting movement. But missions from COPs are inherently short-range; you're always almost there. That's less road to be on and hence fewer explosives and ambushes to worry about. Even COPs operating at half strength have no chance of being overrun both because of the inability of the enemy to fight skillfully or mass in large numbers and because of the multilayered defenses.
View from Anvil showing its excellent clear-kill zones. The short-looking tubes are HESCO baskets connected to form an impregnable wall.
An observer atop COP Anvil takes aim.
Sapp showed me the impact of the Combat Operation Post system in Ramadi (Fallujah also has some) on a map. The foreign fighters who come into this area do so along the main highway from the Syrian border to the west. It's a mini-Ho Chi Minh Trail, so to speak. From this road the terrorists used to fan out in the area where the COPs have been inserted. "In the last four months, we've kept pushing them right around here," Sapp indicated, with his finger moving in a counter-clockwise pattern. "Initially we wouldn't go anywhere in this area with anything less than a platoon and sometimes even armor," he said. "But now I allow them to enter with just squads." The only part of the fan still remaining abuts the Euphrates. "We give the terrorists a place to focus here," Sapp says of that last slice. "This gives them somewhere to go and I'd rather they go there where my men can deal with them than have them setting up IEDs thickly throughout the area they used to control."
At Anvil almost all missions are on foot and off the trails. That's part of the beauty of the COP system; you can go almost anywhere you need to on foot without alerting enemy sentinels – which are probably nothing more than some guy paid a few bucks a night to keep watch. The night I was there we set off to grab some of bin Laden's buddies.
Put it all together – the Forward Observation Bases, new Combat Operation Posts, new Observation Posts, tribal cooperation, ever more Iraqi army and police, better intelligence, and public works projects. There's no "stay the course" strategy here; the course changes as necessary and it's continually changed for the better. I believe we are winning the Battle of Ramadi. And if the enemy can be beaten here, he can be beaten anywhere.
-
Bush links Al Qaeda in Iraq to 9/11; critics reject connection
By Michael R. Gordon and Jim Rutenberg
Published: July 13, 2007
International Herald Tribune
BAGHDAD: In rebuffing calls to bring troops home from Iraq, President George W. Bush employed a stark and ominous defense. "The same folks that are bombing innocent people in Iraq," he said, "were the ones who attacked us in America on September the 11th, and that's why what happens in Iraq matters to the security here at home."
It is an argument that Bush has been making with heavy frequency in the past few months, as the challenges to the continuation of the war have grown. On Thursday alone, he referred at least 30 times to Al Qaeda or its presence in Iraq.
But his references to Al Qaeda in Iraq, and his assertions that it is the same group that attacked the United States in 2001, have greatly oversimplified the nature of the insurgency in Iraq and its relationship with the Qaeda leadership. Bush's critics say that he has overstated the Qaeda connection in an attempt to exploit the same kinds of post-Sept. 11 emotions that helped him win support for the invasion in the first place.
Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia did not exist before the Sept. 11 attacks, and it has thrived as a magnet for recruiting and a force for violence largely because of the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, which brought an American occupying force of more than 100,000 troops to the heart of the Middle East.
The American military and American intelligence agencies characterize Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia as a ruthless, foreign-led group that is responsible for a disproportionately large share of the suicide car bomb attacks that have stoked sectarian violence. General David Petraeus, the senior American commander in Iraq, said in an interview that he considered the group to be "the principal short-term threat to Iraq."
But while American intelligence agencies have pointed to links between Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia leaders and the top Qaeda leadership, the militant group is in many respects an Iraqi phenomenon. They believe the membership of the group is overwhelmingly Iraqi. Its financing is derived indigenously from kidnappings and other criminal activities. And many of its most ardent foes are close at home, namely the Shiite militias and the Iranians who are thought to support them.
"The president wants to play on Al Qaeda because he thinks Americans understand the threat Al Qaeda poses," said Bruce Riedel, a expert for the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institute, and a former CIA official. "But what I don't think he demonstrates is that fighting Al Qaeda in Iraq precludes Al Qaeda from attacking America here tomorrow. Al Qaeda, both in Iraq and globally, thrives on the American occupation."
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian who became the leader of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, came to Iraq in 2002 when Saddam Hussein was still in power, but there is no evidence that Saddam's government provided support for Zarqawi and his followers. Zarqawi did have support from senior Qaeda leaders, American intelligence agencies believe, and his organization grew in the chaos of post-Saddam Iraq.
"There has been an intimate relationship between them from the beginning," Riedel said of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia and the senior Qaeda leaders.
But the precise relationship between the Qaeda of Osama bin Laden and other groups that claim inspiration or affiliation with it is opaque. It is unclear whether there is any direct operational connection between the group in Iraq and bin Laden.
While the groups share a common ideology, the Iraq-based group has enjoyed considerable autonomy. Ayman al-Zawahiri, bin Laden's top deputy, questioned Zarqawi's strategy of organizing attacks against Shiites, according to captured materials. But Zarqawi clung to his strategy of mounting sectarian attacks in an effort to foment a civil war and make the American occupation untenable.
The precise size of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia is not known. Estimates are that it might have up to 5,000 fighters and perhaps twice as many supporters. While the membership of the group is mostly Iraqi, the role that foreigners play is crucial.
Abu Ayyub al-Masri is an Egyptian militant who emerged as the successor of Zarqawi, who was killed near Baquba in an American airstrike last year. Masri's relationship to Al Qaeda is unclear.
American military officials have said that 60 to 80 foreign fighters come to Iraq each month to fight for the group, and that 80 to 90 percent of suicide attacks in Iraq have been conducted by foreign-born operatives of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia.
At first, Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia received financing from the broader Qaeda organization, American intelligence agencies have concluded. Now, however, the Iraqi-based group sustains itself through kidnapping, smuggling, criminal activities and some foreign contributions.
With the Shiite militias taking a lower profile since the troop increase began, and with Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia embarking on its own sort of countersurge, a main focus of the ongoing American military operation is to deprive the group of its strongholds in the areas surrounding Baghdad - and thus curtail its ability to carry out spectacular attacks with heavy casualties.
The heated debate over Iraq has spilled over to Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia as well. Bush has played up the group, talking about it as if it is on a par with the perpetrators of the Sept. 11 attacks. War critics have often played down the significance of the group despite its gruesome record of suicide attacks and its widely suspected role in destroying a Shiite shrine in Samarra in February 2006 that set Iraq on the road to civil war.
Just last week, Zawahiri called on Muslims to travel to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia to carry out their fight against the Americans and appealed for Muslims to support the Islamic State in Iraq, an umbrella group that Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia has established to attract broader Sunni support.
The broader issue is whether Iraq is a central front in the war against Al Qaeda, as Bush maintains, or a distraction that has diverted the United States from focusing on the Al Qaeda sanctuaries in Pakistan while providing Qaeda leaders with a cause for rallying support.
Military intelligence officials said that Al Qaeda of Mesopotamia's leaders wanted to expand their attacks to other countries. They noted that Zarqawi claimed a role in a 2005 terrorist attack in Jordan. But Bruce Hoffman, a terrorism expert at Georgetown University, said that if American forces were to withdraw from Iraq the vast majority of the group's members would be more focused on battling Shiite militias in the struggle for dominance in Iraq than on trying to follow the Americans home.
"Al-Masri may have more grandiose expectations, but that does not mean he could turn Al Qaeda of Iraq into a transnational terrorist entity," he said.
-
http://www.fas.org/irp/news/1998/11/98110602_nlt.html
4. Al Qaeda also forged alliances with the National Islamic Front in
the Sudan and with the government of Iran and its associated terrorist
group Hezballah for the purpose of working together against their
perceived common enemies in the West, particularly the United States.
In addition, al Qaeda reached an understanding with the government of
Iraq that al Qaeda would not work against that government and that on
particular projects, specifically including weapons development, al
Qaeda would work cooperatively with the Government of Iraq.
This indictment was issued in 1999, by the US Attorney's Office, Southern District of New York. Janet Reno's DOJ.
-
TURKEY/IRAQ: Turkey will be making a "strategic mistake" if it launches a cross-border operation against Kurdish separatists in northern Iraq, said Abdul Rahman Chaderchi, a senior Kurdistan Workers' Party official. Chaderchi also renewed calls for a cease-fire between the two sides. He said a Turkish incursion into Iraq would unite Kurds on both sides of the Iraqi-Turkish border, as well as U.S. forces, against Turkey.
stratfor.com
-
BAGHDAD, July 18 — After months of lying low, the anti-American Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr has re-emerged with a shrewd strategy that reaches out to Iraqis on the street while distancing himself from the increasingly unpopular government.
Sunni Arab snipers shot Shiites in line at this gas station on the border of Baghdad’s Amil neighborhood. The shooting has decreased since the increase in American troops. The U.S. sent Kurds to stabilize the situation.
Mr. Sadr and his political allies have largely disengaged from government, contributing to the political paralysis noted in a White House report last week. That outsider status has enhanced Mr. Sadr’s appeal to Iraqis, who consider politics less and less relevant to their daily lives.
Mr. Sadr has been working tirelessly to build support at the grass-roots level, opening storefront offices across Baghdad and southern Iraq that dispense services that are not being provided by the government. In this he seems to be following the model established by Hezbollah, the radical Lebanese Shiite group, as well as Hamas in Gaza, with entwined social and military wings that serve as a parallel government.
He has also extended the reach of his militia, the Mahdi Army, one of the armed groups that the White House report acknowledged remain entrenched in Iraq. The militia has effectively taken over vast swaths of the capital and is fighting government troops in several southern provinces. Although the militia sometimes uses brutal tactics, including death squads, many vulnerable Shiites are grateful for the protection it affords.
At the same time, the Mahdi Army is not entirely under Mr. Sadr’s control, and he publicly denounces the most notorious killers fighting in his name. That frees him to extend an olive branch to Sunni Arabs and Christians, while championing the Shiite identity of his political base.
On May 25, in his first public Friday Prayer in months, he explicitly forbade sectarian attacks.
“It is prohibited to spill the blood of Sunnis and Iraqi Christians,” he told Shiites in a much publicized sermon. “They are our brothers, either in religion or in the homeland.”
Almost from the day American troops entered Iraq, the mercurial Mr. Sadr has confounded American and Iraqi politicians alike. He quickly rallied impoverished Shiites in peaceful displays of Shiite strength, as had his father, a prominent cleric. When the Sunni Arab insurgency gained momentum, he raised a Shiite insurgency in direct opposition to the American-backed Iraqi government that had excluded him.
His basic tenets are widely shared. Like most Iraqis, he opposes the American military presence and wants a timetable for departure — if only to attain some certainty that the Americans will leave eventually. He wants the country to stay unified and opposes the efforts of those Shiites who have had close ties to Iran to create a semiautonomous Shiite region in southern Iraq.
After his Mahdi militia was defeated in a bloody battle against American forces in Najaf in 2004, Mr. Sadr established himself as a political player, using the votes of loyal Parliament members to give Nuri Kamal al-Maliki the margin needed to win the post of prime minister.
Now that the leadership is in poor repute, Mr. Sadr has shifted once again. The six ministers in the cabinet and 30 lawmakers in Parliament allied to him have been boycotting sessions. They returned Tuesday, but it is not clear they will stay long.
The mainstream political parties in Iraq realize that Mr. Sadr is growing more influential, but appear to be flummoxed over how to deal with him. They see him as unpredictable and manipulative, but too politically and militarily important to ignore.
“He’s powerful,” said Jaber Habeeb, an independent Shiite member of Parliament and political science professor at Baghdad University. “This is a fact you have to accept, even if you don’t like it.”
The latest stance by the more conventional political parties is to keep him at arm’s length. The two major Shiite parties, Dawa and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, along with the two Kurdish parties, have been negotiating to form a new moderate coalition.
Mr. Sadr’s political leaders were told he was welcome to join, but the invitation came belatedly, after the other groups had all but completed their discussions. Mr. Sadr’s lieutenants announced that he had no interest in joining.
Experts in Shiite politics believe that efforts to isolate Mr. Sadr are bound to fail.
“Sadr holds the political center in Iraq,” said Joost Hiltermann, the director of the International Crisis Group’s office in Amman, Jordan. “They are nationalist, they want to hold the country together and they are the only political organization that has popular support among the Shias. If you try to exclude him from any alliance, well, it’s a nutty idea, it’s unwise.”
The mainstream parties talk about Mr. Sadr carefully. Some never mention his followers or the Mahdi militia by name, but speak elliptically of “armed groups.” Others acknowledge his position but are reserved on the challenge he poses.
Page 2 of 2)
“Moktada Sadr is one of the political leaders of this country,” Adel Abdul-Mahdi, one of Iraq’s two vice presidents, said in a recent interview. “We disagree on some things, we have differences. We have to work to solve our differences.”
Rahman al-Mussawi, 38, says he is proud that he still has Sunni Arab neighbors on his block, even though Sunni insurgents most likely killed his three younger brothers. A picture of them hangs in his living room.
The Sadrists exhibit a quiet confidence, and are pulling ever more supporters into their ranks. “The Sadr movement cannot be marginalized; it is the popular base,” said Sheik Salah al-Obaidi, the chief spokesman and a senior strategist for Mr. Sadr’s movement in Najaf. “We will not be affected by efforts to push us to one side because we are the people. We feel the people’s day-to-day sufferings.”
A number of working-class Shiites reflected that sentiment in conversations about the Mahdi militia and Mr. Sadr. Their relatives and neighbors work both for the Sadr offices and for the militia, blurring the line between social programs and paramilitary activity.
Mr. Sadr’s offices are accessible storefronts that dispense a little bit of everything: food, money, clothes, medicine and information. From just one office in Baghdad and one in Najaf in 2003, the Sadr operation has ballooned. It now has full-service offices in most provinces and nine in Baghdad, as well as several additional storefront centers. In some neighborhoods, the militiamen come around once a month to charge a nominal fee — about 5,000 Iraqi dinars, or $4 — for protection. In others, they control the fuel supply, and in some, where sectarian killings have gone on, they control the real estate market for empty houses.
The Mahdi militia is deeply involved in that sectarian killing. In a vicious campaign in the Amil neighborhood in western Baghdad, once a mixed working-class neighborhood of Shiites and Sunni Arabs, it has driven out many Sunnis and isolated others in a few enclaves.
Young men, said by residents to be part of the Mahdi militia, check every car coming into the Shiite section of the neighborhood. And many mornings, the bodies of several Sunni Arabs are dumped in a brick-strewn lot near the neighborhood’s entrance. Local Shiites routinely claim that the bodies are of foreign terrorists.
However, each community insists that it is the victim of the other. A sniper in the Sunni Arab area shoots at Shiites lined up to buy at a gasoline station that straddles the two communities. That, in turn, is used to justify retaliatory attacks on Sunni Arabs.
Among Shiites, the militia is viewed as their best form of protection from Sunni Arab insurgents. “This is the Mahdi Army standing in our streets,” said Rahman al-Mussawi, 38, a community leader who says he is proud that he still has Sunni Arab neighbors on his block, even though Sunni insurgents almost certainly killed his three younger brothers. They disappeared along a deadly stretch of road south of Baghdad where Shiites have been victims of Sunni extremists.
Mr. Mussawi gestured to the end of the block, where young Mahdi guards in T-shirts checked cars entering the neighborhood: “The Americans chase them away. If the Americans just would leave, then the neighborhood would be quiet.”
The Mahdi Army’s darker side is rarely discussed in Shiite neighborhoods. In Amil, some people fiercely reject any suggestion that the group runs death squads. Others might admit to some problems, but dismiss them as the excesses of a few bad apples.
“Of course there are some wrongdoings done by renegades in the Mahdi Army who deviated from the good and honorable line of the army,” said Mohammed Abu Ali, 55, a mechanical engineer who helps out in the Sadr office in Amil. “We do not approve these wrongdoings and we try to rid of elements in the Mahdi Army.”
Mr. Sadr began his most recent ascent after the bombing of the golden dome of the Askariya shrine in Samarra, sacred to Shiites, in February 2006. It was one of a string of assaults by Sunni Arab insurgents on Shiites that had gone on for more than two years.
Mr. Sadr’s militia began to strike back, supported by Shiites who felt it was their only protection.
Iraqi politicians say Mr. Sadr made another smart move this spring, when he pulled out of the government to protest its refusal to set a timetable for the withdrawal of American troops. Stymied by infighting, Mr. Maliki has yet to fill the posts.
Shortly after a second bombing in Samarra this June, Mr. Sadr called for a mass Shiite pilgrimage to the Sunni Arab city to honor an imam whose body lies in the ruined shrine. Government officials had to plead with him to cancel it to avoid violence. He eventually did, but not until he had made his point: he was a power to be reckoned with.
Qassim Daoud, a secular Shiite lawmaker, says Mr. Sadr has figured out the alchemy to playing the outsider, but having just enough of a place in the government to have leverage.
“He is one of those people who has two legs, one inside the political process and one outside the political process,” Mr. Daoud said. “So, he uses both to attack the process.”
-
Second post of the morning:
1145 GMT -- TURKEY, IRAQ -- Turkey's army shelled Kurdish targets inside northern Iraq, near the town of Zakho, on July 18, a Kurdish official said July 19. The Turkish military recently raised its troop levels at the Iraqi border and has asked the government for guidelines for an offensive against Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) militants in northern Iraq. The military accuses the PKK of preparing attacks against Turkish targets.
-
I heard General Petraeus interviewed on the radio yesterday and found it to be a worthwhile listen or read for what is happening there right now.
Audio link (34 minutes)here: http://www.townhall.com/talkradio/Show.aspx?RadioShowID=5
Transcript: http://hughhewitt.townhall.com/Transcript_Page.aspx?ContentGuid=484182dc-bf7c-42a7-ac74-9e270a9ef0f2
-
I highly recommend listening to Charlie Rose interviewing NY Time Baghdad Bureau Chief John Burns on Tues. July 17: http://www.charlierose.com/schedule/ Sorry I can't find a transcript. Burns argues very persuasively that American military forces are an inhibitor, not a provocateur of the violence in Iraq and that there will be a cataclysmic escalation of violence if the Americans forces leave. He acknowledges there is also enormous cost and makes no judgment on the issue of withdrawal. He says: " After all, I'm a reporter." He calls the issue in congress an agonizing, agonizing decision.
-
Doug, I tried but couldn't get it to play for me.
Anyway, here's this:
=========
http://www.weeklystandard.com/weblog...bes_turn_o.asp
Iraq Report: Taji Tribes Turn on Mahdi Army and al Qaeda
Operation Phantom Thunder and the Baghdad Security Plan continue to place pressure on al Qaeda in Iraq, allied Sunni insurgent groups, the Mahdi Army and the Iranian-backed Special Group. In Baghdad, junior al Qaeda in Iraq operatives are reportedly cooperating with Coalition forces and a series of car bombs hit a Shia area of the capital. In the Belts, U.S. and Iraqi forces maintain aggressive operations against al Qaeda and insurgent cells as both Sunni and Shia tribal leaders in and around Taji have banded together to fight the Mahdi Army and al Qaeda. Meanwhile, the U.S. captured two more members of the Special Group and have indicated that Iran is now smuggling Chinese made weapons into Iraq.
A Soldier from the 1st Cavalry Division clears
an al Qaeda prison camp south of Baqubah, Iraq.
Baghdad
The London Times reported that junior al Qaeda in Iraq foot soldiers are turning on their leaders and acting as informants in the Baghdad district of Doura. "The ground-breaking move in Doura is part of a wider trend that has started in other al-Qaeda hotspots across the country and in which Sunni insurgent groups and tribal sheiks have stood together with the coalition against the extremist movement," the Times said. The low level operatives have become disgusted with al Qaeda's tactics of brutality.
A series of four bombings over the past two days resulted in 14 killed and 37 wounded. Sunday's attack near the al-Khilani square in central Baghdad consisted of a motorcycle bomb; two were killed and 18 wounded in the strike. Three car bombs ripped through Shia neighborhood in Karradah. One bomb was aimed at a police patrol and another hit an outdoor market. Twelve were killed and 19 wounded in the attacks.
Salahadin
penetrated a meeting of th
U.S. forces continue the process of turning tribal leaders and Sunni insurgent groups against al Qaeda in Iraq. The latest success came in Salahadin province, where 25 Sunni and Shia tribes in and around the city of Taji banded together to fight both al Qaeda in Iraq and the Mahdi Army. Taji is just 12 miles north of Baghdad and sits along the strategic supply lines to the northern provinces.
Salahadin tribes formed the Salahadin Awakening in late May, and al Qaeda in Iraq has targeted the group in an effort to destroy disrupt its activities. Yesterday, five senior tribal leaders were killed and 12 wounded when a suicide bomber e Taji council. The Mahdi Army has attacked family members of the group as well.
Iraqi army forces are targeting al Qaeda's network in the Taji region. Iraqi troops conducted an air assault northwest of Taji on July 20. The target was "a suspected Al Qaeda in Iraq leader suspected of numerous crimes including a recent attack that destroyed a bridge on a primary Iraqi transportation route" in the Habbaniyah area in Anbar province.
"He is also allegedly responsible for facilitating foreign fighters and the planning and execution of multiple improvised explosive device attacks in Ramadi and other areas. The insurgent leader and his cell are also suspected of murdering and intimidating Iraqi citizens, conducting oil smuggling operations, and committing a string of highway robberies in an effort to fund al Qaeda activities."
U.S. soldiers also freed three Iraqis being held hostage at an insurgent safe house south of Samarra. Four insurgents were captured during the raid.
Diyala, Babil and Anbar
Operations against al Qaeda in Iraq and allied insurgent groups are ongoing in the belts of Diyala, Northern Babil and Anbar province. In the city of Miqdadiyah in Diyala, Coalition forces killed nine insurgents and captured eight during a series of raids and patrols. An insurgent safe house and several weapons caches were also found in the region.
In northern Babil province, the recently launched Operation Marne Avalanche in the Iskandariyah region has resulted in four insurgents killed and 37 captured over the course of four days. In a separate operation Iraqi soldiers arrested a member of an al Qaeda kidnapping ring on July 18.
In Anbar province, tribal leaders in the city of Zaidon have turned on al Qaeda and established local security forces.
Iranian-backed Special Group
The Iranian-backed, Qods Force-directed Special Group continues to remain a high priority for Coalition and Iraqi forces. On Sunday, Coalition forces captured "two suspected terrorists that may be affiliated with the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) from Iran in a raid Sunday near the Iranian border East of Baghdad," Multinational Forces Iraq said. "The suspects may be associated with a network of terrorists that have been smuggling Explosively Formed Projectiles (EFPs), other weapons, personnel and money from Iran into Iraq."
On July 22, U.S. troops found a cache that contained an explosively formed penetrator and parts to make more, along with home made explosives, in the West Rashid district in Baghdad. Also, Iran is believed to be smuggling Chinese made rockets into Iraq, Admiral Mark Fox said in a recent briefing.
Al Qaeda
The daily raids against al Qaeda’s leadership and facilitator cells resulted in one al Qaeda operative killed and 26 captured over the past two days. Sunday's operations in Baghdad, Mosul, Fallujah, and Yusifiyah resulted in one al Qaeda operative killed and 14 captured. Twelve al Qaeda operatives were captured on Monday during raids in Mosul, Baghdad, Yusifiyah, and Tarmiyah.
-
Sunday July 15, 2007
Guardian Unlimited
Violence ebbing. Wealth returning. Can this be Iraq?
The clamour is growing in America and Britain for troops to be brought home. Violence grips large parts of the country. But elsewhere the green shoots of recovery are showing through the rubble
Peter Beaumont in Iraq
An Iraqi youth sells kites. Photograph: Ahmad al-Rubaye/AFP/Getty
The cycle of murder and vengeance grinds quickly in Iraq. Last week, in the western city of Tal Afar, it was all over in 10 minutes.
No one saw how Jamil Salem Jamil, aged 19, arrived. If he was driven to his target, then the car stayed out of sight. A slim Sunni youth, with a thick crop of black hair above his elongated features, he walked down the alley to the house where Khosheed Abbas, a policeman, his fiancee, Mariam Azzideen, and their families, all Shias, were sitting down to a simple wedding feast.
When Jamil tried to force his way into courtyard of the house, Khosheed bundled him away, saving his fiancee and several dozen family members. But not himself. As Jamil staggered back he detonated his suicide vest, cutting down four of the family, including two young children, one of them, Bushyr, a girl aged six.
And in an Iraq still gripped by sectarian violence these things are not so easily concluded.
As Jamil and his victims died, another family in this mixed Shia-Sunni neighbourhood was also sitting down to eat. They were Sunnis this time, living 100 metres distant, the family of Jihan Salah, also 19, who was standing in her family's courtyard behind locked metal doors.
When Khosheed's father came looking for someone to shoot - came looking for a Sunni - that person was Jihan.
So Jamil's limbs, yellow and waxy, were gathered like branches and tossed into a gutter, and the bodies of the others taken to the morgue. It is one defining image of Iraq, horrible and too familiar. Yet it is not the only one.
For there are two Iraqs in evidence these days: not just the one where weddings are bombed and young women murdered in reply. The other Iraq is harder to dramatise but it is equally real. It is a place where boring, ordinary things take place. And in taking place become extraordinary in the context of conflict.
Last week it was the opening of a new $20 million government centre next to Tal Afar's ancient ruined fort. The day before Jamil detonated his explosives' belt, the sheiks and dignitaries came in and crowded through the building's corridors, muttering approvingly as they examined its new painted walls, the photocopiers, printers and computers - some of them still wrapped in plastic - sitting on the brand new desks.
Last week the debate over whether to pull out of Iraq took on an urgent new intensity as the struggle between the Democrat-led Congress and the White House of President George W Bush finally reached a head.
Driven by a presidential election cycle, six years of building animosity in US politics has finally been focused on the lightning rod that is Iraq. After four years of war, perhaps more than 650,000 Iraqi dead, it has finally come to a single question of accounting: which of the two Iraqs is winning, the Iraq of death or an Iraq that looks to peace?
It is a false dichotomy. For the two Iraqs - for now at least - are co-existent. It is a dangerous one too. For the expectation that America may be crumbling over Iraq - and may leave soon - has acted as an accelerant where the violence is worst, leading General David Petraeus, US commander in Iraq, to warn that in the worst areas the summer may see a mini-Tet offensive designed to push US politics over the brink.
In practical terms there is a gulf between the politics in Washington and the views of the generals on the ground. For while the Democrats are pushing for rapid withdrawal that would see most US troops out by April next year, the commander of the forces in the country's north, General Benjamin Mixon, has made clear that it would take 18 months to safely reduce just half of his forces. However, he believes Nineveh could be handed over by this autumn.
In his office in the northern city of Mosul, Mixon's deputy, General Frank Wiercinski, is convinced that, in his divisional area at least - if not in Baghdad - a long sought-for stabilisation is finally occurring. 'There is a line I think that separates the areas that are becoming more secure from those where there is still heavy fighting. And I think that line is moving slowly south now through Diyala.'
'In my personal opinion it is not the time to pull out. We are at the apex. The war out there that is going on is with Iraqis in the lead and I don't feel we can just say: "See you!"'
And while in Iraq it has usually been the best policy to deal with officials with a strong dose of scepticism following the years of pronouncements of victory around the corner, for now at least there appears to be corroborating evidence that in the north, the war may be drawing, ever so slowly, towards some kind of close.
In Mosul, which once hosted 21,000 US soldiers in the city, now only a single battalion, in the mid-hundreds, remains inside the city, matched by an equivalent drop in attacks. And it is not only in Mosul that security is improving. The sense that things are getting better is reflected in Nineveh Province. In two years US troop levels around Tal Afar, once the heartland of al-Qaeda, have been reduced from 6,000 to 1,200.
The general trend for acts of violence - despite some spikes - also has been steadily decreasing. Indeed, until Jamil Salem Jamil detonated his human bomb there had not been a suicide vest attack in Tal Afar since 14 January.
And there are other striking indicators. The last time that I flew across this area, two years ago, what agriculture there was was sporadic. Now it has turned golden with a vast expanse of freshly cut wheat fields that have turned the flat plains that touch the Kurdish foothills into a vast prairie, using almost every patch of viable land.
But the other Iraq lingers here strongly too. Despite two years of effort, organised destabilising violence still exists, largely displaced out of the urban centres to the villages of Nineveh's plain. From their hideouts there, insurgents have turned their attention to hitting infrastructure, attacking roads, bridges and power lines with the aim of separating its rival population groups.
But ask Iraqis or Americans what the biggest problem is in both Tal Afar and Mosul and they will mention the government of Iraq. All of which raises two critical questions: whether what has happened in Iraq's north can be sustained, and whether - with the same time available - it is applicable elsewhere.
'It would be the easiest thing,' says Lt Col Malcolm Frost, the squadron commander of 3/4th US Cavalry in Tal Afar, 'to put a stake in the ground and declare victory here in Nineveh. But there are three or four things needed for the conditions to be set for a withdrawal. And my biggest problem is to get support and linkages from the central Iraqi government. So far we have not seen a single dollar from the 2007 budget get down to this level.'
Tal Afar too has struggled to get deliveries of food, propane and gas. And Frost is cautious about extrapolating the advances made by applying 'clear, hold, build' in Tal Afar, where it was pioneered over two years, to Baghdad.
'There is an order of magnitude at work here. Tal Afar measures 3km by 3km and has a population of 200,000. I don't know the precise troop and force configuration in Baghdad and whether it can work. But the holding is the difficult part. And in Baghdad you have to hold everywhere at once.'
It is 1am in Zafraniya, a Shia stronghold in southern Baghdad. When the men of the 2/17 Field Artillery rush into the Salah household, it is quickly clear something is wrong. The tip-off says there are injured senior members of Moqtadr al-Sadr's Shia militia - the Jaish al Mahdi - hiding here. The men are anxious, shouting at the family. The address and the family name are right, but everything else seems wrong.
Crucifixes hanging on the wall and devotional prints; photographs of christenings and first communions. Later after the apologies have been delivered, one of the men speculates on the reason for the false tip. Sectarian malice, perhaps, could be a motive against a middle-class Christian family - to unsettle them and force them out.
More worrying is the feeling that it is a ruse perpetrated by the Jaish al-Mahdi itself to test the response time of the soldiers for a future ambush, of the kind that is becoming increasingly more common. If Tal Afar was bad and now improving, then Zafraniya is its mirror opposite, one of the successes of the Baghdad surge that is turning corrosively dangerous again.
For if there is renewed violence in Zafraniya, then some of it at least is paradoxically a direct consequence of the surge's earlier gains. Then - in February and March - Moqtadr al-Sadr ordered the withdrawal of the leadership of his organisation to put them out of the way of the US surge. Other leaders who remained in the Jaish al-Mahdi's second most powerful base inside Baghdad were detained, weakening the organisation until Sadr ordered the renewal of hostilities with US forces to re-establish his own power.
In the sometimes lethal power struggle that followed in the organisation, the violence has been directed increasingly at US forces by aspirant new leaders keen to demonstrate through violence their claim to authority.
It is a crucially important point. For in the glib parsing of Iraq into broad ideological themes and targets and benchmarks, something of the nature of the country's chaotic violence has been lost. How often, when you peel away the nature of each killing it is so often motivated by family and tribe and sect - by malice and greed. How it is personal.
By Friday the same question was being asked about Jamil Salem Jamil. 'Clearly he was a member of al-Qaeda,' says General Qais Kalaf of the Iraqi Army in Tal Afar. 'He had a suicide vest. But it seems he was known in neighbourhood. He chose that family. There was some personal grudge at work.'
In the end it is no consolation of the relatives of last week's dead, including the family of Jihan Salah. 'What did this have to do with us?' asked Maha Mohammed, the mother of Jihan. 'What did we do? We were only trying to eat our meal.'
So the two Iraqs continue to collide.
-
Woof, Who was Zarqawi before we invaded Iraq? Who was Sadr before we invaded Iraq? Bush has no substance to his argument.
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070724/ap_on_go_pr_wh/bush
Bush warns anew of terror threat By BEN FELLER, Associated Press Writer
1 hour, 37 minutes ago
CHARLESTON, S.C. - President Bush, trying to justify the Iraq war, cited intelligence reports Tuesday he said showed a link between al-Qaida's operation in Iraq and the terror group that attacked the United States on Sept. 11, 2001. Democrats dismissed Bush's argument.
"The merger between al-Qaida and its Iraqi affiliate is an alliance of killers and that is why the finest military in the world is on their trail," Bush said at Charleston Air Force Base, a launching point for cargo and military personnel headed to Iraq.
Citing security details he declassified for his speech, Bush described al-Qaida's burgeoning operation in Iraq as a direct threat to the United States. Bush accused critics in Congress of misleading the American public by suggesting otherwise.
"That's like watching a man walk into a bank with a mask and a gun and saying, 'He's probably just there to cash a check,'" Bush told troops at Charleston Air Force Base.
Bush is up against highly skeptical audiences with 18 months left in office. The public has largely lost faith in the war, Congress is weighing ways to end it, and international partners have fading memories of the 2001 attacks against the U.S. Six years later, terrorist leader Osama bin Laden remains at large.
"The president's claim that the war in Iraq is protecting us from al-Qaida is as misguided and dangerous as the conclusions that drove us to Iraq in the first place," said Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid. "The fact is that our continued flawed strategy in Iraq is emboldening and unifying al-Qaida, both in that country and elsewhere."
Sen. John Kerry, D-Mass., said Bush "is trying to scare the American people into believing that al-Qaida is the rationale for continuing the war in Iraq." But Kerry said Bush presented no new evidence to back that up, and added: "The president is picking the wrong rationale for this war. Al-Qaida is not the principal killer of American forces in Iraq."
In broad strokes, Bush linked the Iraq war to an event that Americans remember deeply — the Sept. 11 attacks, not the sectarian strife among Iraqis, which has caused some to question U.S. military involvement.
Al-Qaida, led by Osama bin Laden, orchestrated the terrorist strikes on the United States by turning hijacked airplanes into killing machines. Now a fresh intelligence estimate warns that the United States is in a heightened threat environment, mainly from al-Qaida. The terror group is seizing upon its affiliate, al-Qaida in Iraq, to recruit members and organize attacks, the report found.
"I've presented intelligence that clearly establishes this connection," Bush said after spelling out details of foreign ties and leadership of al-Qaida in Iraq.
Al-Qaida had no active cells in Iraq when the U.S. invaded in March 2003, and its operation there is much larger now than before the war, U.S. intelligence officers say. The war itself has turned into a valuable recruiting tool for al-Qaida, senior intelligence officials concede. Bush denied that the war triggered al-Qaida's operations in Iraq.
Bush cited intelligence that:
_Al-Qaida in Iraq was founded not by an Iraqi but by Jordanian-born Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who had deep relations with al-Qaida leaders. The president said Zarqawi, who was killed by U.S. forces last year, set up operations with terrorist associates in Iraq long before U.S.-led forces arrived, and that in the violence and instability following Saddam Hussein's fall, was able to expand the "size, scope and lethality" of his operation. Zarqawi formally joined al-Qaida in 2004 and pledged allegiance to bin Laden, he said.
_The merger gave al-Qaida senior leadership "a foothold in Iraq to extend its geographic presence and to plot external operations and to tout the centrality of the jihad in Iraq to solicit direct monetary support elsewhere."
-
CD: "Doug, I tried but couldn't get it to play for me." (Charlie Rose interview of NY Time Baghdad Bureau Chief)
Here's how I got there: go to: http://www.charlierose.com/schedule/ click on July 17, and click on the photo and the interview started. I think it uses adobe flash 9.
-
July 18, 2007
Who is the enemy?
Who exactly the United States is fighting in Iraq and why it matters.
By Jason Stahl
everal interesting reports came out this week regarding the nature of exactly who the United States is currently fighting in Iraq. We learned first that CIA director Michael Hayden classified the "main sources of violence in this order: the insurgency, sectarian strife, criminality, general anarchy and, lastly, al-Qaida." In the first of these two groups, the Mahdi Army (a homegrown Shiite Muslim group, which is seeking to end the U.S. occupation and cleanse Iraq of rival Sunni Muslims) is, according to another report, "Enemy No. 1" and the primary source of "brazen attacks" against U.S. troops.
As for foreign fighters, they are active in Iraq, but make up a small portion of what is largely a homegrown insurgency. According to a recent Los Angeles Times report, only "an estimated 60 to 80 foreign fighters cross into Iraq each month." Not an insignificant number, but still small compared to the overall size of those committing violence. The same report also details that "about 45 percent of all foreign militants targeting U.S. troops and Iraqi civilians and security forces are from Saudi Arabia; 15 percent are from Syria and Lebanon; and 10 percent are from North Africa" and that "nearly half of the 135 foreigners in U.S. detention facilities in Iraq are Saudis." Fully 50 percent of these Saudis come to Iraq to commit suicide bombings.
Why do I present such a lengthy recitation of these facts? Many would argue that the makeup of the violence in Iraq does not matter - all that matters is that violence is occurring. I would argue, however, that the makeup of the violence does matter in the context of two debates now occurring: whether the U.S. should withdraw from Iraq and whether the "War on Terror" should be widened to a third front in Iran.
Those who want the United States to stay in Iraq indefinitely and those who want to widen the war into Iran (usually the same people) clearly understand this, which is why they constantly are trying to obscure the nature of the violence in Iraq. Foremost among this crew of charlatans is President George W. Bush who (along with members of his administration) runs around telling the American public that the United States is primarily fighting al-Qaida, or, as Bush put it in a recent press conference, "the same folks that are bombing innocent people in Iraq were the ones who attacked us in America on September the 11th." This is an absurd statement for multiple reasons: It ignores the true nature of the violence (as I just described), it implies that Iraq attacked the U.S. on 9-11 (it didn't) and it implies that al-Qaida was in Iraq before the U.S. invasion (it wasn't). Nevertheless, it is used by war supporters to try and trump up support for staying in Iraq permanently.
But even more disturbing is those who are misleading about the nature of the foreign fighters in Iraq in order to widen the war into Iran (apparently one quagmire isn't enough). Senator Joseph Lieberman (I-CT) is the leader of this group who is doing all they can to squeeze one final war out of the Bush crew by implying massive Iranian involvement in Iraq - evidence be damned. Recently Lieberman said, "I think we have to be prepared to take aggressive military action against the Iranians to stop them from killing Americans in Iraq."
Simply put, in order to stop a widening of the war and in order to extract ourselves from Iraq, we must insist that Lieberman, Bush and all their allies stop misleading about the nature of the violence in Iraq. Such misleading got us into this mess and we can't let it dig us deeper into it.
http://www.mndaily.com/articles/2007/07/18/72084
-
Geopolitical Diary: Progress on Iraq
stratfor.com
In a meeting preceded by the diplomatic equivalent of a handful of cayenne pepper to the eye, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker met for seven hours on Tuesday with his Iranian counterpart, Hassan Kazemi Qomi, and an Iraqi delegation in Baghdad's Green Zone. This is the second round of direct public U.S.-Iranian talks over Iraq following a May 27 meeting, which also was held in the Iraqi capital.
Crocker astutely laid the groundwork for good relations ahead of the meeting, accusing the Iranians of increasing their backing of Shiite militia death squads, while the Iranian Foreign Ministry issued similarly warm statements lambasting the United States for using "psychological warfare."
Remember when Stratfor said that both sides ultimately want to bury the hatchet in order to prevent an Iraqi nightmare, but that they cannot do so until they have prepped their respective publics for regular contact with "the enemy"? Obviously, we are not there yet.
Luckily, the cayenne cloud was largely a smokescreen for what appears to be some real progress in the "full and frank" negotiations. While the talks theoretically were limited to Iraq, they quickly expanded to include other "bilateral issues" -- code for Iran's nuclear program, which Tehran hopes to use as a trump card for extracting concessions from Washington in Iraq.
Meanwhile, Iran separately -- and simultaneously -- agreed to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to send nuclear inspectors by the end of July to Iran's heavy-water reactor site in Arak. This kind of reactor is valued primarily for its ability to quickly produce large amounts of plutonium, an element that is critical to the production of mushroom clouds. It is no coincidence that Iran is putting up a cooperative front on the nuclear issue just as the Iraq talks move forward.
More important, Iran and the United States now appear to have made enough progress to begin implementing agreements from the May meeting. After the second round of talks, Crocker said the U.S., Iraqi and Iranian governments plan to create a security committee to discuss containing violence in Iraq, addressing everything from "support for violent militias" to al Qaeda to border security.
Translation: The two countries will create a purge committee; the United States will kill any Iraqi Sunnis who do not cooperate, while the Iranians do the same to rebellious Iraqi Shia.
Now that the expectations have been set, the coming days will give us an idea of who will sit on this committee and when it will begin operations. But there is still one large task at hand. After all, though Washington clearly has more cards to play with the Sunnis, and the Iranians pull substantial weight among the Shia, this does not mean compliance will come easily. We use the words "purge" and "kill" for good reason; there are many in (and beyond) Iraq who are terrified of any U.S.-Iranian detente.
Directly after Tuesday's meeting in Baghdad, Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari telephoned his Syrian counterpart, Walid al-Moualem, to brief him on the talks and set up a working meeting with Iraq's regional neighbors to coordinate security. At the very least, this development suggests that Damascus is interested in helping out (for its own reasons, of course) -- and having that particular loose end tied up means the Iraq security plan might actually have better than a snowball's chance in hell of working.
-
Woof, I thought that, we don't negotiate with terrorists. :-D
TG
-
These are governments. :wink:
-
Regarding the MN Daily piece "Who is the enemy" from my alma mater, the student newspaper at the U. of MN, that assessment doesn't match what Gen. Petraeus said last week. I see from Bob Woodward's column that the Michael Hayden report was from Nov. 2006, probably the lowest point in the war. Petraeus this year makes a very different analysis.
Seems to me the question of 'who is the enemy' is different from the question of where is violence coming from. That distinction is lost in the piece. If we are fighting against Sunnis, Shia (and Kurds?) then all is obviously lost. The other theory is that the public for the most part and most leaders of Sunni, Shia and Kurd groups as well as the central government are with us wanting security, stability, peace and political settlement. If that is true then an insurgency can be defeated, but only with a determined fight over a long period of time.
ps. I see war opponents quick to quote CIA information when negative but aren't previous CIA errors also the centerpiece of what has gone wrong so far?
-
Woof, Since the WMD thingy is no longer a viable reason for our "regime change" in Iraq. I have often heard said that Iraq/Sadaam Hussien was a state sponsor of terror. How much more can this claim be made to IRAN.
Besides that how much cooperation has Iran given regrading their nuke program?
This sounds an aweful lot like What Sadaam did.........
OH yea can you say " :wink:Wipe Israel off the map" other than that yea I guess we could also make the claim we are negotiating with "governments" Or are they sending troops...insurgents or foriegn fighters and weapons into Iraq? :roll:.........Nope just a friendly gov. we should be negotiating with concering Iraq. :|
Doug..... Can you tell me who is heading up your so called insurgency? Thats all I was looking for when I came upon the article.
It woould be nice to know WHO we are fighting in Iraq......care to name a name?
TG
-
Tom, For me, the 'WMD thingy' and ties to terrorism argument still holds. Also to me, success in Iraq now is closely related to success in Iran later. And so is failure.
"Doug..... Can you tell me who is heading up your so called insurgency? Thats all I was looking for when I came upon the article. It would be nice to know WHO we are fighting in Iraq......care to name a name?"
I should disclose I am a civilian sitting in a secure, Midwest living room. The closest I've come to seeing a real battle lately was the Nidal-Federer match. Hope I didn't pretend to know more than I do. I know that author and the MN Daily are among the furthest left in the nation, criticizing Michael Moore for his conservatism. Their view of a good outcome and lasting peace isn't likely to be similar to mine, though facts can be stubborn. Their headline says they address your question. My point is that they don't. From what I gather our enemy is now primarily groups like al Qaida in Iraq which are not necessarily top-down organizations with easy to identify leaders and headquarters. I have no way of knowing if former Ba'athists creating havoc play a bigger or smaller role than the foreign fighters. I have seen names of former insurgent Sunni leaders as they come to the table and I have names of enemy leaders like Zarqawi at their death, but I certainly don't know the names you are looking for, insurgency commanders. I'm not sure what you are getting at by asking. I think one reason the US didn't make a headline battle out of the hunt for OBL is that the battles would not end with the ousting of one man.
-
Woof Doug, If you want to hold on to the WMD thingy I also got a hand full of air for you...with about as much substance. Proof is in the pudding,so they say....as for the ties to terrorism.......don't suppose you could name any for instances could you? I mean actual for instances...not just accusational or theory ones.
Anyway for the record I voted for Bush twice and also was a supporter on the removal of Sadaam Hussein from power and the installation of a free and demcratic government in Iraq.......you know the one that was going to be a model for all the mideast? Seems that has gotten quite skewed over the last several years. :|
The thing that got me going here on Iraq was GM putting out that popular catch phrase "the global war on terror" and Jihad as if it somehow applied to Iraq.
The onely Jihad in Iraq is the one we started, or at the very least drew into Iraq by our presence there.
We may have removed Sadaam Husien from power , but we also raised up people like Zarqawi and Sadr.
Our installation of a free and democratic Iraq has dwindled to instilling enough peace with whoever maybe in control to get our troops out of Iraq and save enough face to not make our military look like a loser.
Thats pretty much why were resolved to negotiate with our old buddies in Iran wouldn't you say? and by so doing we may very well be giving over Iraq to someone who will be a puppet to Iran, like our good friend Sadr.
So in the end what has happend? WE have gained nothing in Iraq but f'd up a country and killed, maimed and wounded a lot of people, and the leadership may very well be worse than it was under Sadaam Husien. Certainly no friends of ours.
Back to the post at hand.....Are you saying that the CIA Is wrong with their view on the whos who and players in Iraq.....or did the MN Daily merly lie about the story?
The reason why I'am looking for who the fighters are in Iraq is because it all ties back in my opinon to the struggle for power in Iraq and its leadership.......I simply refuse to beleive that all these so called jihadis merly came on their own, unorganized and do their damage and thats it.
I feel there is a heiarchy of power and if you can interupt that leadership the mindless soldiers will flouder around and be of no effect.
I also beleive that we know who they are but are unwilling to go after them, thus making this global war on terror and the war in Iraq a huge mess/joke that is acomplishing nothing more than killing people and costing the U.S. a lot of money.
One of those players is obviously Sadr yet we allow him to do his thing and hes been doing it for quite some time....why?
If you rememeber back a couple of years we had him cornered and supposidly wounded.
We allowed him to live and escape and invited him into the political arena....this has continued to come back to bite us in the ass and yet we continually allow him to do this......How can one say the are serious about the Iraq war and the global war on terror when these kind of things are going on right in front of our very eyes.
You may poo-poo the hunt for Bin Laden but I must assert his capture/death would be encouragement to the American people and a detriment to those who may follow in his footsteps........by not capturing and killing him just the opposite is occuring IMHO.
Sorry to ramble......... TG
By the way.....we know where the real terrorists are but refuse to go after them......that being Pakistan
-
http://www.husseinandterror.com/
Since Saddam's support of terror has been forgotten by some people....
-
Woof GM, IMHO kinda weak when compaired to the rest of the mideast and North Africa.........Why pick Iraq?
Now according to Crafty's Stratfor were negotiating with Iran over Iraq? :|
TG
-
Of course we're negotiating with Iran on Iraq!!! --AND their nuke/death wish as well. The two are quite interwoven and there are many other areas of mutual interest.
In fact there are many ways in which a "grand compromise" could serve the purposes of both sides.
-
Tom,
Saddam was a bad guy that needed to be taken out. The Clinton administration feared he'd give WMD to al qaeda and other groups but could only do token cruise missile strikes occasionally. If you'll look at Iraq and Afghanistan, what nation is bracketed between them? A free and fuctional Iraq might shift the tide in the middle east. That certainly was the hope anyway.
-
If you read my posts you will see that I supported the removal of Sadamm from power. I served in the USN from 1979-1986. I also have grown up with a bad taste for SH so I bought the hype like most. I understand he was a bad guy....trust me I understand.
Since the intial invasion of Iraq there has just been one cluster "F" after another we tried to play the politcal nice guy and fight a war at the same time.
Now we are reduced to negotiating with our enemy over the very country we invaded.....are you telling me this will be a victory?
I do like the fact that you said a free and functional Iraq WAS the hope anyway.....
So we are now admitting thats a slim possibility. What becomes of Iran and their Nuke program........I bet the farm the go nuke with out interuption......
Crafty says there are many other areas of mutual intrest.......I haven't see any of yet that would benifit the U.S. or make Iraq any better off than it was before we removed SH......
Please tell me how negotiating with Iran over Iraq is good for us and Iraq........
I'am all ears.
I'am not by the way trying to be an ASS.....just hoping that eventually we start smelling the Roses....
I also thiink we need to fix Iraq since we broke it......though I don't know how thats done.
TG
-
Tom,
I think any negotiation with Iran should be terms of surrender on their part. The current administration is making a grave error in not hammering the mullahs now. We'll live to regret not acting sooner.
-
Woof GM, What I see about to happen or in the works, or merly a figment of my imagination esp with regard to Iran negotiating over Iraq is eventaully Sadr will take power in Iraq.
Would you agree that at this time he is the most powerful, influential man in Iraq?
Myself I see no reason to negoiate with Iran. I merly feel their word is worthless and at the end of the day we get stabbed in the back.
TG
-
I suspect the trade will be that they trade up getting nukes in return for some accomodation on Iraq that puts them at rest that they will not be have to war again with Iraq.
This is not an irrational concern. Remember that we backed SH against them in a war where Iran lost something like 900,000 people IIRC. Wasn't it , , , hmmmm, , , lets see if I remember now , , ,Donald Rumsfeld who was foto op'ed with SH in the mid 80s? Didn't we give advanced intel to him to ensure that he wouldn't lose?
As for areas on mutual interest, remember that Iran was very helpful in our overthrow of the Taliban. They gave us overflight, (the right to pick up downed pilots too IIRC) and other things. It was fresh after that that Bush called them part of the "Axis of Evil"-- no doubt a bit of a WTF moment for them-- but the point is this: they helped us against Sunni Al Aqaeda when we went after AQ/the Taliban.
From a geopolitical POV is it a terrible thing if they get influence over southern Iraq? For regional balance of power reasons, does this not serve our purpose against AQ? Would not the House of Saud be reminded whose protection they need , , , again? In exchange for hardening against AQ in SA-- this hardening aleady under way of its own accord because AQ undermines the House of Saud?
What about the Arab League being in Israel today? What is THAT about? Very interesting! Why would this happen after the division of "Palestine" into Gaza and the West Bank? What is going on with Turkey and the Kurds? If Turkey does an incursion, where does that leave us-- and Iran?
IF IF IF in return we get them to not go nukes (not their Word, but IN FACT) then , , ,Did you notice that today the Russians said that they were discontinuing work on Iran's nuke program for arrears in payments? Didn't we hear this before? Hmmmm-- maybe that is a diplomatic cover for Iran, who is now offering renewed inspection access, to dance with the US towards a deal?
This also suggests that the Russians are going to want something too-- perhaps less support from us for the Ukraine? Backing off on Star Wars against Iran positioned in East Europe? Watch for hints of this.
Look, I'm not advocating this, I am trying to assess. Iran is led by religious fascists who are a serious danger who cannot be permitted to go nuke! What are our options?!?
These whackos are also fcuking the Iranian economy something fierce. Iran cannot even keep its people in gasoline! If we can get the Euros mind right to where we can genuinely bring eco pressure to bear, then collapse from within might be in play. My readings tell us that the majority of real people in Iran like the US/the west.
The weakest link in President Bush's hand is that we the American people have persuaded the enemy that our will is used up.
Yes, yes, Bush/Rumbo have made huge mistakes and did bring to bear all that should have been brought for such a primally important play. This has created a situation where for American political reasons as well as the failure to upgrade the military for what the President has been, is, and will be asking for it to do that our military threat to Iran is doubted.
This I suspect is why the recent leaked balloon from American military figures about continuing The Surge further.
The Adventure continues!
-
Woof Guro Crafty, I was wondering how long, or what I would have to do to provoke a honest response. :-D
You are alright with Iran getting nukes? Seems not that long ago you were against this? As for me, I don't think there is any stopping it.
It is fine that they will help us against sunni AQ.....But the reason I keep brinigng up Sadr is because I know he has close Iranian ties....and if they go for the whole of Iraq?
As for the American resolve, I guess I fit into that category, simply because in Iraq specificly other than an election of "limpness" the American people can see no real improvement there....and in fact what they have to look at is an escalation of troops, that are already very battle weary.
One would think, that after what 5 years? There would be something better to offer the American people by way of hope other than escalation in troops.
I think the American people have the right to grumble.......I understand patience and the idea these things take time, and I also think the American people understand this as well.....but they as do I need some positives along the way.......Oh yea the Iraqi gov. took the month off :|......(sarcasm)
If one were to look at Afghanastan (be glad most people don't) theres not a very bright picture there either......
TG
One thing that most likely will be a detriment to our mideast efforts will undoubtably be the next presidential elections. In other words, I feel time is running out.
-
"You are alright with Iran getting nukes?"
NO!!! PLEASE READ MY POST AGAIN!!!
As best as I can tell, the first plan to stop Iranian nukes is via true economic pressure. THIS HAS NOT BEEN TRIED YET due in part to Euro weenyhood, but maybe they are starting to come round. Best military option I can see is via naval based action. As best as I can tell, Bush has been pre-positioning for this. We may need to give the Russians something they want in East Europe to get them to stop sabotaging things via their enablement of Iranian nukes, providing AA misslies and the like. Fundamental is that Iran sees that we are not going to be run out of Iraq without a deal. If we continue are growing alliance of convenience with Sunni Iraq, and they see Sunni countries planning to go nuke to counter Iranian nukes, then maybe, just maybe some sort of deal can be made.
-
"Doug, If you want to hold on to the WMD thingy I also got a hand full of air for you...with about as much substance."
Didn't appreciate the ridicule. My reasons follow; you are welcome to discount each piece as you see fit. IMO the 'Bush lied' crowd is over-hyping their hand more than Bush, Blair, Powell, Cheney did.
Nuclear: Israel struck the Osirak facility in 1981 and the Americans finished it off in 1991. Best information I know of concludes that Saddam was working on nuclear capabilities. Even Joe Wilson's original report said he was trying to buy yellow cake in Niger.
He gassed his own people, right? Evidence: witnesses and mass graves. The Downing Street memos said the Brits feared he would use WMD Bio and/or Chem against the liberators. To not find stockpiles after giving a year to hide, move, transfer or destroy doesn't prove anything to me. I think the 'lies' (exaggerations) about WMD capabilities came from Saddam's inner circle. A bad move for him in hindsight. I'll tack on further WMD info at the end of the post.
"Proof is in the pudding,so they say....as for the ties to terrorism.......don't suppose you could name any for instances could you? I mean actual for instances...not just accusational or theory ones."
Sorry I don't know where your distinction between actual and accusatory lies. I'm only telling you why I believe what I do, not trying to change your mind or 'prove' you wrong. 1) Saddam's regime provided major financial support for suicide bombers; I didn't know that was still in dispute. 2) Saddam's Iraq was tied to the first WTC bombing in 1993. 3) Actively shooting at US planes doing their lawful UN enforcement routes. 4) Gassed his own people. Terror, right? 5) Terror inside Iraq such as the story of Dujaille. Have you read the story that led to his death sentence and just hanging. Certainly it was all about using terror to hold on to power. How else did he win 99.9$ of the vote? 5) Attempted Assassination of President Bush by Iraqi Agents, April 14, 1993. I don't b elieve you have to be the target's son for a sitting President to take that act personally. 6) Ties to al Qaida. Iraq Study group concluded: NO COLLABORATIVE, OPERATIONAL RELATIONSHIP. I find that more parsed than Clinton pondering the meaning of what is is. They didn't say no relationship. They didn't say no meetings. The didn't say no harboring or training camps. And they didn't say no common enemy as a motive. Remember the action in Iraq was not to avenge 9/11, it was to preempt future attacks.
A bizarre story always stuck in my mind that no one else seems to care about. I'm happy to post here if it wasn't covered back then. Saddam's state newspaper named the targets than bin Laden would hit 2 MONTHS before 9/11. It was subtle and in the floweriest of terms and had no real meaning without hindsight, then became prescient. On July 21, 2001 [less than two months prior to 911] the Iraqi state-controlled newspaper "Al-Nasiriya" predicted that bin Laden would attack the U.S. "with the seriousness of the Bedouin of the desert about the way he will try to bomb the Pentagon after he destroys the White House." The same state-approved column also insisted that bin Laden "will strike America on the arm that is already hurting," and that the U.S. "will curse the memory of Frank Sinatra every time he hears his songs" - an apparent reference to the Sinatra classic, "New York, New York." This was entered into the Congressional Record on Sept.12 2002 by Sen. Fritz Hollings (D-SC). http://www.uscg.mil/Legal/Homeland_legislation/Text/091202%20Homeland%20Security.txt http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getpage.cgi?position=all&page=S8526&dbname=2002_record
--
WMD programs and capabilities continued:
Nuclear
* Acquired nuclear material for small civilian nuclear program during the Atoms for Peace program in the mid-1950s.
* Nuclear weapons program began in mid 1970s as a response to a perceived Israeli nuclear weapons program.
* 1976, a $300 million deal completed between the French and the Iraqis for two nuclear reactors: a 40MW(th) reactor that the French dubbed "Osirak," and an 800kW(th) reactor called Isis. The Iraqis called the reactors Tammuz-1 and Tammuz-2.
* Osirak (Tammuz-1) was destroyed by an Israeli aerial bombing campaign in June, 1981.
* In 1990, Iraq launched a crash program to divert reactor fuel under IAEA safeguards to produce nuclear weapons.
* Iraq considered two delivery options for nuclear weapons: either using unmodified al-Hussein ballistic missile with 300km range, or producing Al-Hussein derivative with 650km range.
* Until 1991, Iraq had a nuclear weapon development program that involved 10,000 personnel, and had a multi-year budget totaling approximately $10 billion.
* After the Gulf War of 1991, the Iraqi nuclear weapons program progressively decayed due to Coalition bombing and UNSCOM disarmament efforts.
* April 1991, UNSC Resolution 687 adopted enabling the IAEA to carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq's nuclear capabilities and carry out a plan for the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of prohibited items.
* August 1991, UNSC Resolution 707 adopted demanding Iraq "halt all nuclear activities of any kind, except for use of isotopes for medical, agricultural, or industrial purposes."
* Saddam retained intellectual capital (scientists) for the possibility for restarting a nuclear program post 1991.
* November 15th, 1991, the first removal of highly enriched uranium from Iraq. An IAEA cargo flight carrying 42 fresh fuel elements from the IRT-5000 5 megawatt light water research reactor at Al Tuwaitha, and 6.6 kilograms of uranium-235 left Baghdad for Moscow.
* Iraq Survey Group's (ISG) inquiry found Iraq concealed elements of its nuclear program from inspectors after 1991, including the hiding of documents, technology, and attempting to maintain the brain trust of scientists who had earlier worked on the nuclear program; this conclusion echoes the statements made by Hussein Kamel upon his defection in 1995.
* In 2004 Jafar Dhia Jafar, former head of Iraq's nuclear agency, announces all weapons programs had been destroyed after 1991, at which point they had been 2-3 years away from producing a nuclear weapon (2006-2007).
Biological
* Signed the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention in 1972. The Convention prohibited development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons.
* The Iraqi Ministry of Defense published a manual in 1987 entitled Principles of Using Chemical and Biological Agents in Warfare, including a section on military use of biological agents with instruction for small attacks and sabotage operations before a general offensive begins.
* The timing of the publications suggests the use of such tactics in the Iran-Iraq war.
* Iraq authorized use of BW against Israel, Saudi Arabia and US forces prior to the 1991 Gulf war, should the need arise.
* Post 1991, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 687, authorizing UNSCOM and the IAEA to implement on-site inspections of the facilities in Iraq believed to be related to WMD production.
* Resolution 687 required Iraq to declare and destroy all holdings of biological weapons.
* Upon commencement of the inspections, Iraq declared despite a biological weapons research and design program for defense purposes, no offensive biological weapons (BW) program existed.
* Ratified the BTWC on 4/18/91, as required by the Gulf War cease-fire agreement.
* 1995, Saddam's son-in-law and advisor General Hussein Kamel defected and admitted to destroying all weapons programs, including biological, though research and design elements were preserved.
* Iraq acknowledged open-air testing of biological agents between March 1988 and January 1991 including Bacillus anthracis, Bacillus subtilis, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin, and ricin at facilities such as al-Muhammadiyat, Khan Bani Saad, Jurf al-Sakr Firing Range, and the Abu Obeydi Airfield.
* Conducted research on BW dissemination using unmanned aerial vehicles.
Chemical
* Established Chemical Corps in the mid-1960s, foundation of the future CW program. The Corps were tasked with the nuclear, biological and chemical protection of Iraqi troops and civilians.
* Mid 1970s, the Corps developed a laboratory-scale facility which later synthesized chemical warfare agents and evaluated their properties.
* Repeatedly used CW against Iraqi Kurds in 1988 and against Iran in 1983-1988 during the Iran-Iraq war.
* Due to CW success in the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam viewed this type of warfare as efficient and necessary in defensive and offensive strategy.
* Saddam considered his chemical weapons program to be a deterrent to Coalition forces moving toward Baghdad in 1991.
* ISG found all CW holdings had been destroyed in 1991 after the Gulf War as a result of Saddam's desire to have sanctions lifted.
* Throughout the 1990s, Iraq maintained a trust of scientists that had worked on the previous CW program.
* Chemical programs were reinstituted in the mid-1990s due to a brief period of economic recovery.
* An extensive CW arsenal–including 38,537 munitions, 690 tons of CW agents, and over 3,000 tons of CW precursor chemicals–was destroyed by UNSCOM prior to the inspectors' withdrawal in 1998.
-
General Pleads for Time to Secure Iraq
Associated Press | July 20, 2007
BAGHDAD - If the U.S. troop buildup in Iraq is reversed before the summer of 2008, the military will risk giving up the security gains it has achieved at a cost of hundreds of American lives over the past six months, the commander of U.S. forces south of Baghdad said Friday.
Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch, commander of the 3rd Infantry Division, mentioned none of the proposals in Congress for beginning to withdraw U.S. troops as soon as this fall. But he made clear in an interview that in his area of responsibility south of Baghdad, it will take many more months to consolidate recent gains.
"It's going to take through (this) summer, into the fall, to defeat the extremists in my battle space, and it's going to take me into next spring and summer to generate this sustained security presence," he said, referring to an Iraqi capability to hold gains made by U.S. forces.
Lynch said he had projected in March, when he arrived as part of the troop buildup, that it would take him about 15 months to accomplish his mission, which would be summer 2008.
He expressed concern at the growing pressure in Washington to decide by September whether the troop buildup is working and to plan for an early start to withdrawing all combat troops.
Under Lynch's command are two of the five Army brigades that President Bush ordered to the Baghdad area in January as part of a revised counterinsurgency strategy. As part of that "surge" of forces, Lynch's command was created in order to put added focus on stopping the flow of weaponry and insurgents into the capital from contentious areas to the south.
The three other brigades are in Baghdad and a volatile province northeast of the capital with the purpose of securing the civilian population in hopes that reduced levels of sectarian violence will give Sunni and Shiite leaders an opportunity to create a government of true national unity and to pass legislation designed to promote reconciliation.
Lynch said that Iraqi security forces are not close to being ready to take over for the American troops. So if the extra troops that were brought in this year are to be sent home in coming months, the insurgents - both Sunni and Shiite extremist groups - will regain control, he said.
"To me, it would be wrong to take ground from the enemy at a cost - I've lost 80 soldiers under my command - 56 of those since the fourth of April - it would be wrong to have fought and won that terrain, only to turn around and give it back," he said in an interview with two reporters who traveled with him by helicopter to visit troops south and west of Baghdad.
He said there is a substantial risk that al-Qaida in Iraq, a mostly Iraqi Sunni extremist group, will try to launch a mass-casualty attack on one of the 29 small U.S. patrol bases south of Baghdad in hopes of influencing the political debate in Washington on ending the war.
Lynch visited one of those outposts Friday, near the village of Jurfassakhar along the Euphrates River. He was told by the officer in charge, Lt. Col. Robert Balcavage, that the camp was in "the deepest bad-guy country around," with threats from multiple insurgent groups.
Near Jurfassakhar, just west of the larger town of Iskandariyah, al-Qaida elements have recently been fighting another Sunni extremist group but could be preparing to resume attacks on U.S. and Iraqi forces.
"And that's why we've got to continue offensive operations," he said. "I worry about this talk about reducing or terminating the surge," using the military's term of deploying the five extra combat brigades to the Baghdad area, as well as extra Marines to Anbar province west of the capital.
"We've got him on the run," Lynch said, referring to the insurgents. "Some people say we've got him on the ropes. I don't believe that. But I believe we've got him on the run."
Lynch said he thinks too much focus is being placed on the military part of the solution to Iraq's problems and too little on the need to promote progress toward a functional central government.
Lynch said he thinks too much focus in being placed on the military part of the solution to Iraq's problems and too little on the need to promote progress toward a functional central government.
"We can continue to secure the population here and secure terrain, but until you get a government (that) is of the people, for the people and by the people, and you have an economy where people actually have employment, this place is going to continue to struggle," he said.
Lynch also said the Iraqi government needs to put about seven more Iraqi army battalions and about five more Iraqi police battalions in his area in order to provide the security now provided by U.S. forces.
In a reference to the sectarian tensions that have stalled progress toward stability in Iraq, the general said he has submitted to the Shiite-dominated national government a list of about 3,000 names of Sunnis who have volunteered to join the government security forces south of Baghdad. None of the 3,000 has been approved for addition to the government payroll.
"If they (the central government) just say `No, we ain't gonna do it,' then we've got a problem because (then) we've got nothing but locals who want to secure their area," he said, adding later that this would amount to a "Band-aid" fix rather than a lasting solution.
Ultimately, Lynch said, success or failure will be determined by the Iraqis themselves, and the outcome will not come quickly.
"This is Iraq. Everything takes time," he said.
-
Doug Mac, Iam not trying to ridicule you. Its just THERE WERE NO WEAPONS OF MASS DESCTRUCTION when we invaded Iraq.
Simple as that. There fore the excuse for going into Iraq due to the fact theres was no WMD just dosen't fly.....my refrence to a hand full of air is prety much the same as the substance or lack of it....when it comes to the WMD "THINGY"
If you read my posts you'll see where I have stated several times my support for the Iraq war and I voted for Bush twice....Ia'm no Bush lied person...........Iam one who at least can admit we F'D that one WAY UP.
Its nice you know the past histroy of Iraq and Sadaam Husien.......notice I said PAST history......not applicable to this situation :|.
Anyway............with reagrd to the "global war on terror" I think NOW that we could have been, and could be doing a lot better.
I'am at least willing to take responsiblity for my mistake.....I voted. :roll:
TG
-
Quoting Tom:"THERE WERE NO WEAPONS OF MASS DESCTRUCTION when we invaded Iraq.
Simple as that. There fore the excuse for going into Iraq due to the fact theres was no WMD just dosen't fly..."
All the best intelligence in the world said there was and the burden of proof was on him . There is no do-over. All the best intelligence still says he maintained everything necessary to re-constitute his 'past' programs. Are you now saying his shell game compliance was sufficient or that his previous surrender agreement was not binding?
"Ia'm no Bush lied person" - ok, but you wrote recently: "my opinon a personal vendetta by Bush", that's a pretty fine distinction IMO.
"If you read my posts you'll see where I have stated several times my support for the Iraq war and I voted for Bush twice...Iam one who at least can admit we F'D that one WAY UP."
That you have changed your view doesn't mean for certain that you are correct now. :) - Doug
-
Doug Mac, The onley thing I'am saying is he had no WMD, and that was the big selling point on the war.
I still believe Bush had a specific hard on for Sadaam Husien, because of his dad(Bush's)and all the bad blood there. Thats just a personal opinon.
I think we could have picked other ,better places to go after terrorists, rather than Iraq.Do you agree or not?
I in fact now beleive there are more terrorists in Iraq now than there was before we invaded it.......and I don't beleive that they were all terrorists before we invaded Iraq. In other words I beleive weve created some.
Here is why I think I'am right, The original object was to take out Sadaam and est.a free and democratic Gov. that would be a model for the mideast. I was hopeful for this.
Now my hope is that we don't bail out and leave the country in someones hands who ends up being worse than Sadaam or that Iran ends up with a puppet as leader of Iraq like Sadr.
I see no real progress being made in the war......in fact weve escalated troop involvement. Cite progress in the last 5 years if you dispute this.....I mean something with substance.
All that needs to happen for Iraq to crumble is for time to pass.....Remember we have an election comming up and most likely the American people will vote in someone who will pull out the troops....which will be a shame....because we broke Iraq, its our responsbility to fix it.....but I certainly don't know how that happens....Do you?
Which brings me to my final point.....even if we get reletive peace in Iraq, I feel it onley holds as long as we hold it there...and thats a big If....and how long are you willing to send our kids over there to die for a country that really dosen't want to change.
Afghanastan is the same way....if we ever leave it...the Taliban is right back in there
Strictly , this post is just my opinon.
TG
If you disagree......tell me in your opinon how we fix Iraq so that we can get out.
-
The WMD thing has been hashed and rehashed endlessly. I think Doug does a very good job but would like to add one point to the mix. I am currently reading "Cobra ll" (its in the truck, so I don't have authors' names in front of me, but one is a general) I am about 3/5 of the way through it. It is an outstanding history of how we got into the Iraq War and how we waged it. The heavy emphasis is on the military side of things. Concerning WMD, the book helped me understand just how much SH was trying to play it both ways viz WMD-- "proving"/claiming he didn't have them while at the same time leaving enough doubt to cause his mortal enemies the Iranians to hesitate.
In other words, SH gave good reason to Bush and everyone else to doubt the veracity of his assertion that he had coughed up the WMD.
Tom, I encourage you to read the various relevant threads on this forum closely for many of them will flesh out the ignorant, distorted, often dishonest and sometimes disloyal campaign waged by President Bush's opposition via the media. If you read MSM only, you will be persuaded that the sky is falling. It may be, and it may not-- but what certainly seriously undercuts our efforts is when Gen. Petraeus's surge is declared "Defeat" by the Senate Majority Leader Harry Byrd, House Leader Nancy Pelosi and the rest of their ilk even before the troops for the surge are in place. Despicable! If you were an Iraqi would this not give you pause before betting your life on the Americans having what it takes to see the job through?!?
Democracy in Iraq, apart from its merits on its own, I believe also was intended to be part of the struggle with the Iranian Islamic fascist leadership and I offer for your consideration that you remember that this struggle continues. Do you want these people to have nukes?!?
As for fixing Iraq, things are not a lost cause-- e.g. have you read any of the Michael Yon posts cited in the Milblog thread?
From my place so very low on the food chain, it looks to me like we are positioning ourselves to balance the Sunni world against the Shia world-- see d.g. this morning report that Bush wants to sell $20 billion in arms to SA-- and note that this follows the Arab League's visit to Israel (!!!) just a few days ago.
SecDef Rumbo made many mistakes which were affirmed by President Bush, who added some of his own-- but I think if you go back to the history of WW2 you will see many terrible mistakes made there too-- e.g. did you know that the legendary Gen Douglas MacArthur let the the US airforce in the Philippines get caught on the ground nearly 24 hours after Pearl Harbor? But what matters now is that we not panic or caught off our national nose to spite President Bush's face.
-
Woof, I understand Sadaams smoke and mirrors for the WMD and his reason for it. I understand also that this issue has been beat to death and by no means am I trying to go over this again.
I'am onley asserting that in a physical real life sense, that there were in reality no wmd's, there fore we can no longer use it as excuse for going to war with Sadaam Husien.
Correctly we must now say.....We THOUGHT he had WMD so we invaded and took him out.........Which when you read it for what it REALLY is kinda sucks.
I suppose we could also say that Sadaam Husien fooled us into believing he had WMD and we invaded and took him out.....but then that makes us look even more stupid.....either way IMHO theres no REAL way of saying it to justify the means.
There again lets stop trying to justify our actions for something, that in actuality did not exsist.
As for the rest, I agree depending on what news article you care to read you'll get that opinion slanted in that direction, though it does go both ways.
I try as much as possible to take the middle of the road :-D.
I also try to take things at face value and not put too much into speculation or hypothetical or IF situations.
I really don't think America has the reslove to continue seeing our kids killed for the next20 years, and because we elect a new president every four years. I think this war is on borrowed time.
I also think that the global war on terror as we know it is on borrowed time. Simply because I think there are lots of people politicians alike who don't think there is such a thing.....and that they will elect a president who thinks in like manner.
I partially blame Bush for this, because of how he and company mis-managed the war in Iraq, and the hunt for bin laden, or lack of it.
I think that bringing people to justice like Bin Laden and ALzawari are important to keeping the American people focused on the task at hand, plus showing some real success.
The average Joe dosen't want to read statistics, theory or anything else......they just want cold hard real facts, esp the kind you can see or touch.
Just my opinon.......... TG
-
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/30/opinion/30pollack.html?_r=2&oref=slogin&pagewanted=print&oref=slogin
A War We Just Might Win
By MICHAEL E. O’HANLON and KENNETH M. POLLACK
VIEWED from Iraq, where we just spent eight days meeting with American and Iraqi military and civilian personnel, the political debate in Washington is surreal. The Bush administration has over four years lost essentially all credibility. Yet now the administration’s critics, in part as a result, seem unaware of the significant changes taking place.
Here is the most important thing Americans need to understand: We are finally getting somewhere in Iraq, at least in military terms. As two analysts who have harshly criticized the Bush administration’s miserable handling of Iraq, we were surprised by the gains we saw and the potential to produce not necessarily “victory” but a sustainable stability that both we and the Iraqis could live with.
After the furnace-like heat, the first thing you notice when you land in Baghdad is the morale of our troops. In previous trips to Iraq we often found American troops angry and frustrated — many sensed they had the wrong strategy, were using the wrong tactics and were risking their lives in pursuit of an approach that could not work.
Today, morale is high. The soldiers and marines told us they feel that they now have a superb commander in Gen. David Petraeus; they are confident in his strategy, they see real results, and they feel now they have the numbers needed to make a real difference.
Everywhere, Army and Marine units were focused on securing the Iraqi population, working with Iraqi security units, creating new political and economic arrangements at the local level and providing basic services — electricity, fuel, clean water and sanitation — to the people. Yet in each place, operations had been appropriately tailored to the specific needs of the community. As a result, civilian fatality rates are down roughly a third since the surge began — though they remain very high, underscoring how much more still needs to be done.
In Ramadi, for example, we talked with an outstanding Marine captain whose company was living in harmony in a complex with a (largely Sunni) Iraqi police company and a (largely Shiite) Iraqi Army unit. He and his men had built an Arab-style living room, where he met with the local Sunni sheiks — all formerly allies of Al Qaeda and other jihadist groups — who were now competing to secure his friendship.
In Baghdad’s Ghazaliya neighborhood, which has seen some of the worst sectarian combat, we walked a street slowly coming back to life with stores and shoppers. The Sunni residents were unhappy with the nearby police checkpoint, where Shiite officers reportedly abused them, but they seemed genuinely happy with the American soldiers and a mostly Kurdish Iraqi Army company patrolling the street. The local Sunni militia even had agreed to confine itself to its compound once the Americans and Iraqi units arrived.
We traveled to the northern cities of Tal Afar and Mosul. This is an ethnically rich area, with large numbers of Sunni Arabs, Kurds and Turkmens. American troop levels in both cities now number only in the hundreds because the Iraqis have stepped up to the plate. Reliable police officers man the checkpoints in the cities, while Iraqi Army troops cover the countryside. A local mayor told us his greatest fear was an overly rapid American departure from Iraq. All across the country, the dependability of Iraqi security forces over the long term remains a major question mark.
But for now, things look much better than before. American advisers told us that many of the corrupt and sectarian Iraqi commanders who once infested the force have been removed. The American high command assesses that more than three-quarters of the Iraqi Army battalion commanders in Baghdad are now reliable partners (at least for as long as American forces remain in Iraq).
In addition, far more Iraqi units are well integrated in terms of ethnicity and religion. The Iraqi Army’s highly effective Third Infantry Division started out as overwhelmingly Kurdish in 2005. Today, it is 45 percent Shiite, 28 percent Kurdish, and 27 percent Sunni Arab.
In the past, few Iraqi units could do more than provide a few “jundis” (soldiers) to put a thin Iraqi face on largely American operations. Today, in only a few sectors did we find American commanders complaining that their Iraqi formations were useless — something that was the rule, not the exception, on a previous trip to Iraq in late 2005.
The additional American military formations brought in as part of the surge, General Petraeus’s determination to hold areas until they are truly secure before redeploying units, and the increasing competence of the Iraqis has had another critical effect: no more whack-a-mole, with insurgents popping back up after the Americans leave.
In war, sometimes it’s important to pick the right adversary, and in Iraq we seem to have done so. A major factor in the sudden change in American fortunes has been the outpouring of popular animus against Al Qaeda and other Salafist groups, as well as (to a lesser extent) against Moktada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army.
These groups have tried to impose Shariah law, brutalized average Iraqis to keep them in line, killed important local leaders and seized young women to marry off to their loyalists. The result has been that in the last six months Iraqis have begun to turn on the extremists and turn to the Americans for security and help. The most important and best-known example of this is in Anbar Province, which in less than six months has gone from the worst part of Iraq to the best (outside the Kurdish areas). Today the Sunni sheiks there are close to crippling Al Qaeda and its Salafist allies. Just a few months ago, American marines were fighting for every yard of Ramadi; last week we strolled down its streets without body armor.
Another surprise was how well the coalition’s new Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams are working. Wherever we found a fully staffed team, we also found local Iraqi leaders and businessmen cooperating with it to revive the local economy and build new political structures. Although much more needs to be done to create jobs, a new emphasis on microloans and small-scale projects was having some success where the previous aid programs often built white elephants.
In some places where we have failed to provide the civilian manpower to fill out the reconstruction teams, the surge has still allowed the military to fashion its own advisory groups from battalion, brigade and division staffs. We talked to dozens of military officers who before the war had known little about governance or business but were now ably immersing themselves in projects to provide the average Iraqi with a decent life.
Outside Baghdad, one of the biggest factors in the progress so far has been the efforts to decentralize power to the provinces and local governments. But more must be done. For example, the Iraqi National Police, which are controlled by the Interior Ministry, remain mostly a disaster. In response, many towns and neighborhoods are standing up local police forces, which generally prove more effective, less corrupt and less sectarian. The coalition has to force the warlords in Baghdad to allow the creation of neutral security forces beyond their control.
In the end, the situation in Iraq remains grave. In particular, we still face huge hurdles on the political front. Iraqi politicians of all stripes continue to dawdle and maneuver for position against one another when major steps towards reconciliation — or at least accommodation — are needed. This cannot continue indefinitely. Otherwise, once we begin to downsize, important communities may not feel committed to the status quo, and Iraqi security forces may splinter along ethnic and religious lines.
How much longer should American troops keep fighting and dying to build a new Iraq while Iraqi leaders fail to do their part? And how much longer can we wear down our forces in this mission? These haunting questions underscore the reality that the surge cannot go on forever. But there is enough good happening on the battlefields of Iraq today that Congress should plan on sustaining the effort at least into 2008.
Michael E. O’Hanlon is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. Kenneth M. Pollack is the director of research at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings.
-
An interesting interview with the NY Times man in Iraq
http://hughhewitt.townhall.com/Transcript_Page.aspx?ContentGuid=5bdb3520-d829-4fdb-a2bc-6611d80faba4
-
Turning Point?
An op-ed and a war.
An NRO Symposium
The New York Times ran a piece Monday by two non-“neoconservatives” — Michael O’Hanlon and Kenneth Pollack — arguing that the war in Iraq can be won. Is this indicative of some kind of mood change afoot? Could we really win this war? Could the rhetoric in Washington really change? National Review Online asked a group of experts.
Frank J. Gaffney Jr.
What are we to make of the fact that two of the Democratic party’s most knowledgeable critics of President Bush’s campaign to stabilize and democratize post-Saddam Iraq, Michael O’Hanlon and Robert Pollack, have publicly rejected the defeatists and called for a sustained U.S. effort there into 2008? The short answer is that they have the wit to recognize mistaken claims that all is lost in Iraq when they hear them — and the courage to say so.
This assessment is remarkable, of course, not only for the fact that its authors are breaking ranks with nearly all of the rest of the Democrats’ foreign-policy establishment. It is also noteworthy for being the latest and, arguably, most objective indicator that the situation on the ground in Iraq is, indeed, changing for the better.
As such, the O’Hanlon-Pollack report makes plain one other truth: Those who persist in denying that General David Petraeus’s counterinsurgency strategy is having the desired, salutary effect and who insist that our defeat is inevitable are promoting a self-fulfilling prophesy. They are so determined to score domestic political points by unilaterally ending the conflict in Iraq that they are prepared to surrender the country to al Qaeda and various Shiite militias and their respective Saudi, Iranian and Syrian enablers.
Public-opinion polling and anecdotal evidence suggests that Americans are beginning to appreciate the true nature — and potentially enormous costs — of the surrender in Iraq being advocated by many Democrats and a few Republicans. The O’Hanlon-Pollack op-ed may reflect that reality as much as shape it. Either way, its authors deserve our thanks.
— Frank J. Gaffney Jr. is president of the Center for Security Policy.
Victor Davis Hanson
What is interesting about the essay is that both scholars were early supporters of the war to remove Saddam Hussein, then constant critics of the acknowledged mistakes of the occupation, and now somewhat confident that Gen. Petraeus can still salvage a victory. In two regards, they reflect somewhat the vast majority of the American people who approved the war, slowly soured on the peace — but now have yet to be won over again by the surge to renew their erstwhile support.
We are witnessing two phenomena. First, after four years of misery the Iraqis themselves are tiring of war, have grasped what al Qaeda et al. do when in local control, realize the U.S. wants to leave only after establishing a constitutional state, not steal its oil, sense that the United States may well win — and are slowly making adjustments to hedge their bets.
In a wider sense, the war is as most wars: an evolution from blunders to wisdom, the side that makes the fewest and learns from them the most eventually winning. Al Qaeda and the insurgents in 2004-6 developed the means, both tactical and strategic, to thwart the reconstruction, but we, not they, have since learned the more and evolved.
As in the Civil War, WWI, and WWII, the present American military — which has committed far less mistakes than past American forces — has shifted tactics, redefined strategy, and found the right field commanders. We forget that the U.S. Army and Marines, far from being broken, now have the most experienced and wizened officers in the world. Like Summer 1864, Summer 1918, and in the Pacific 1944-5, the key is the support of a weary public for an ever improving military that must nevertheless endure a final storm before breaking the enemy.
The irony is that should President Bush endure the hysteria and furor and prove able to give the gifted Gen. Petraeus the necessary time — and I think he will — his presidency could still turn out to be Trumanesque, once we digest the changes in Europe, the progress on North Korea, the end of both the Taliban and Saddam, and the prevention of another 9/11 attack. How odd that all the insider advice to triangulate — big spending, new programs, uninspired appointments, liberal immigration reform — have nearly wrecked the administration, and what were once considered its liabilities — foreign policy, the war on terror and Iraq — may still save it.
— Victor Davis Hanson is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. He is the author, most recently, of A War Like No Other. How the Athenians and Spartans Fought the Peloponnesian War.
Clifford D. May
Yes, Virginia, there are some rational, reasoning liberals. Michael O’Hanlon and Ken Pollack have long been among them. They are serious students of national security. They are Democrats but not hyper-partisans. They are not so willfully self-deluded as to believe that America’s defeat in Iraq would be a problem only for President Bush and those pesky neocons. They understand that America’s defeat in Iraq — at the hands of al Qaeda and Iranian-backed militias — would be hugely consequential for America.
What O’Hanlon and Pollack conclude — “There is enough good happening on the battlefields of Iraq today that Congress should plan on sustaining the effort at least into 2008” — is not exactly breaking news to those who read NRO, The Weekly Standard, and the Wall Street Journal’s editorial pages. It is not news to anyone who has been carefully following developments in Iraq since Gen. David Petraeus was confirmed as the American commander in that theater.
But most Americans have heard only the drumbeat of the antiwar Left. The Left has been banging out the message that the Petraeus mission has failed — since before the Petraeus mission was fully underway. And most of the mainstream media have been unwilling even to suggest an alternative narrative. (A notable exception is the Times’ own John Burns, a reporter who is apparently not read by Times editorial writers.)
So the O’Hanlon/Pollack op-ed is important. It forces the conversation to re-open. Even such media outlets as CNN now have to discuss the possibility that the war in Iraq might yet be won. That may at least give pause to rattled Republicans as well as to rational, reasoning Democrats.
Yes, Virginia, there are such Democrats.
— Clifford D. May, a former New York Times foreign correspondent, is the president of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies , a policy institute focusing on terrorism.
Senator John McCain
Michael O’Hanlon and Kenneth Pollack have uncovered a truth that seems to escape congressional Democrats: General Petraeus’s new strategy has shown remarkable progress. Earlier this month, on my sixth trip to Iraq, it was evident that our military is making dramatic achievements throughout the country.
Despite this progress, Democrats today advocate a precipitous withdrawal of American forces from Iraq. They are wrong, and their approach portends catastrophe for both Iraq and the United States. To fail in Iraq risks creating a sanctuary for al Qaeda, sparking a full scale civil war, genocide, and violence that could spread far beyond Iraq’s borders. To leave prematurely is to ensure just one thing: that we will be back, in more dangerous and difficult circumstances. We cannot and must not lose this war.
We must prevail. General Petraeus and his troops have asked Congress for just two things: the time and support they need to carry out their mission. They must have both, however much the congressional Democrats seek to withhold them. That is why I will keep fighting to ensure that our commanders have what they need to win this war.
I cannot guarantee success. But I do guarantee that, should Congress fail to sustain the effort, and should it pay no heed to the lessons drawn by Mr. Pollack and Mr. O’Hanlon, then America will face a historic and terrible defeat. Such a defeat, with its enormous human and strategic costs, will unfold unless we do all in our power to prevent it. I, for one, will continue to do just that.
— John McCain is senior United States senator from Arizona and a candidate for the Republican nomination for president.
Mackubin Thomas Owens
What is most interesting about this article is not what it says, but who is saying it. If a conservative were to write such an article, the skeptics most assuredly would immediately dismiss it as repeating White House talking points. But the fact that two severe critics of the Bush administration’s management of the war — from a think tank usually described as liberal to boot — have published such a piece in the New York Times of all places might, under normal circumstances, give opponents of the war pause.
The security situation in Iraq is clearly improving. The worn-out cliché that an insurgency cannot be defeated by military means alone is true as far as it goes, but security is sine qua non of stability in a counterinsurgency. The fact that the Sunni sheiks have been turning against al Qaeda and the other Salafi groups and the Shia have, to a lesser extent, rejected Sadr’s Mahdi army bodes well for security in the long run.
But does it matter at this point? Time is running out, not in Iraq but in Washington, D.C., where, as more than one commentator has pointed out, the Democratic majority in Congress and the party’s presidential candidates all seem to have opted for defeat and disgrace. Thanks to these geniuses and the Republicans who enable them, we may be on the verge of snatching defeat from the jaws of victory.
— Mackubin Thomas Owens is an associate dean of academics and a professor of national-security affairs at the Naval War College in Newport, R.I. He is writing a history of U.S. civil-military relations.
-
James S. Robbins
There is no question that on the ground the war is being won. Baghdad is becoming more secure. Iraqi tribal leaders and even some insurgent groups are turning against al Qaeda in Iraq and other outsiders who are pursuing their own violent agenda and who care nothing for the people of Iraq. The activities of Iran, Syria, and other counties supporting the insurgency are coming under increasing scrutiny and public censure. Iraqi military and police forces are fielding thousands of new, trained recruits every month. The government of Iraq may not be addressing all of the legislative initiatives we would like them to, such as the energy law and sorting out power sharing in their federal structure; but it took our country 75 years to come to grips with the contradictions inherent in our Constitution, and with a great deal more violence. We can give them time.
The weak link in the war effort is in the U.S. Congress. Politically driven assessments that downplay the progress of the war, pandering to antiwar groups, and a public that has tuned out, add up to grave difficulties in sustaining the war effort. Given more time, the progress in Iraq will become so clear as to be undeniable, and the troop drawdown could commence on more favorable terms. There is a significant difference between withdrawal in the face of adversity and redeployment after meeting our stated objectives. It is the difference between defeat and victory.
— James S. Robbins is the director of the Intelligence Center at Trinity Washington University and author of Last in Their Class: Custer, Picket and the Goats of West Point. Robbins is also an NRO contributor.
Peter W. Rodman
No one should underestimate the power of boredom as a determinant of journalistic opinion: When doomsaying becomes commonplace, the novelty factor works in favor of optimism. Objective reality is a necessary condition for today’s more hopeful assessments in Iraq, but it is never sufficient. It has been apparent for a while that the president’s “surge” is helping stabilize the military situation. That analysts like Michael O’Hanlon and Kenneth Pollack are prepared to affirm it clearly after visiting Iraq is to their great credit. Journalists not driven by anti-Bush animus may now want to herd in the more positive direction.
The next question is how our domestic politics will absorb this new perception. On its face, it strengthens the President and complicates the Democrats’ internal divisions. Doomsayers will zero in on Iraqi failures in the political dimension; these failures, I hope, reflect only a time lag before improved security conditions boost the self-confidence and political strength of Iraqi moderates. Those in this country determined on abandoning Iraq will always find excuses. But, finally, the improved mood — and reality — should embolden Republicans to help the president hold the line through the (totally artificial) interim reckoning scheduled for September.
— Peter W. Rodman, a former NR senior editor, is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. He served until recently as assistant secretary of Defense for international-security affairs.
Joseph Morrison Skelly
The answer to all three questions posed by this timely symposium is, I believe, a qualified “yes.” With regard to the first query — is there “some kind of mood change afoot?” — it is important to distinguish between the war’s harshest critics, its wavering skeptics, and its steadfast supporters. There has not been a mood change among the war’s vehement antagonists, but the essay by Michael O’Hanlon and Kenneth Pollack is indicative of a begrudging acceptance of the tentative progress in Iraq by some of the war’s agnostics. While the war’s critics will, alas, never accept the new facts on the ground nor will their demeanor change under any circumstances, something akin to a mood swing among the war’s skeptics will follow continued improvement in Iraq. As this scenario unfolds it is likely that they will catch up with the war’s stalwart supporters, whose faith, long tested by the tough going and long derided by the war’s critics, is now being vindicated.
“Could we really can win this war?” Yes, with victory defined not as perfection, but as a stable Iraq at peace with itself, respectful of its neighbors, and an ally in the War against Islamic Terrorism. After several years of searching for a viable strategy, the United States military, its Coalition allies and its Iraqi counterparts are now waging a campaign based upon some of the tried and tested principles of counterinsurgency warfare that have been newly updated for the twenty-first century. The battle plan is encapsulated in the U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, which was drafted by a team led by General David Petraeus and is now being published by the University of Chicago Press. Kudos must also go to defense analysts who laid out the theoretical basis for the surge, including Fred Kagan, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, a former professor of military history at West Point, and the author of an important new book on this subject, Finding the Target. Most of all, it is the soldiers on the ground who are turning the tide in Iraq. Michael Yon is detailing their success in Operation Arrowhead Ripper in Diyala in a series of compelling dispatches. Further west, the accomplishments of the Marines in Anbar province, with Army and Air Force support, has been remarkable; when the story of this war is written, their victory will loom large.
The momentum on the battlefield means that it is now likely that Operation Iraqi Freedom will be won or lost on the home front in America, thus lending immediacy to the question “Could the rhetoric in Washington really change?” The answer: perhaps. The critics of this war will never alter their tune, since they have so much invested in failure. But the rhetoric of the skeptics may change gradually. Like the national mood, it will be influenced by events on the ground. Should progress continue, people will wish to be associated with it. We will thus witness the truth inherent in the well known adage, “Victory has a hundred fathers, but defeat is an orphan.” Count Galeazzo Ciano, Mussolini’s foreign minister, first used this formula in 1942 as World War II inexorably shifted against the Fascists, and President John F. Kennedy paraphrased it in 1961 after the Bay of Pigs debacle, increasing the number of fathers to one thousand. During the trying times of the past several years, President Bush has often stood alone in Washington, the orphaned architect of what many critics assumed to be a certain defeat, but perhaps he will soon be joined by the city’s skeptics, whose rhetoric will improve as they align themselves with the vast majority of Americans who already believe we can win. Some may view their reaction as cynical, and to a certain extent this is true, but it is also natural, people wish to be linked with success. Welcome the skeptics aboard. What matters in the long run is that we win. When that happens, victory in Mesopotamia will have not one hundred or one thousand, but millions of fathers, American and Iraqi alike, all of whom can take pride in what they have achieved.
— Joseph Morrison Skelly is an academic fellow with the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies in Washington, D.C.
Michael Yon
I am in broad agreement with most of the article by O’Hanlon and Pollack and, in fact, have been reporting in writing, on national radio, and most recently on Good Morning America that I have been seeing remarkable positive changes in Iraq.
I asked General Petraeus last night for his opinion of the current situation. General Petraeus responded with: “Our assessment at this point is that we have begun to achieve a degree of momentum on the ground in going after AQI sanctuaries and in disrupting the activities of some of the militia extremists; however, AQI continues to try to reignite ethno-sectarian violence and clearly still has the capability to carry out sensational attacks that cause substantial civilian loss of life. And the militia elements certainly continue to pursue sectarian displacement in certain fault-line areas and to cause trouble in some Shia provinces as well. So there’s clearly considerable work to be done by Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces. Beyond that, the spread of Sunni Arab rejection of AQI is very important and is a development on which we are still trying to capitalize beyond Anbar Province, where the effects are already very clear.”
In fact, I have had the feeling for more than a month that top U.S. leadership in Iraq has been being cautious not to show too much optimism at this time. However, I have seen changes with my own eyes in Nineveh, Anbar, and Diyala that are more fundamental than just winning battles. In Nineveh, the enemies of a united Iraq are still strong and vibrant, but the Iraqi army and police in Nineveh clearly are improving faster than the enemy is improving. In other words, the Iraqi Security Forces are winning that particular race. Out in Anbar, the shift actually began to occur last year while Special Forces and other less-than-visible operators, along with conventional forces such as the Marines, began harnessing the mood-shift of the tribes. Whereas in Nineveh the fight has been more like a race and test of endurance, in Anbar the outcome was more like an avalanche. Parts of Diyala, such as Baqubah, witnessed avalanche-like positive changes beginning on June 19 with Operation Arrowhead Ripper. I witnessed the operation and was given full access. However, other areas in Diyala remain serious problems. I have seen firsthand many sectarian issues. There remains civil war in parts of Diyala (largely thanks to AQI). Down in Basra, a completely different problem-set faces the British who themselves are facing tough choices.
Skipping past the blow-by-blow and getting to the bottom line: I sense there has been a fundamental shift in Iraq. One officer called it a “change in the seas,” and I believe his words were accurate. Something has changed. The change is fundamental, and for once seems positive. And so, back to the O’Hanlon-Pollack story in the New York Times, “A War We Just Might Win,” I agree.
— Michael Yon is an independent writer, photographer, and former Green Beret who was embedded in Iraq for nine months in 2005. He has returned to Iraq for 2007 to continue reporting on the war. He is entirely reader supported and publishes his work at www.michaelyon-online.com.
National Review Online - http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=YWQ5NDkwMDNiMzZhODNlNjdhN2JiM2EyMjQ1N2ZmMWQ=
-
Geopolitical Diary: Beyond Borders
Iraq really looks like a mess.
Factions within Prime Minster Nouri al-Maliki's party are challenging his position, to the point that his Shiite allies are even reaching out to rival Sunni and Kurdish parties in an effort to depose him. Some Shia in the south -- in a move unrelated to al-Maliki's problems -- have formed a "semi-official" autonomous government that will "at the present time" continue to follow the Iraqi Constitution. Washington is leaking reports that a Turkish invasion of northern Iraq in order to root out Kurdish insurgents is nearly inevitable. And the chief of staff of Iraq's armed forces, Gen. Babaker Zibari, tendered his resignation on Tuesday in protest of what he called consistent political interference in his duties.
Normally, when a country faces a rebellion against its prime minister, the formation of a de facto separatist government, the threat of invasion and resignation of its military chief -- simultaneously, no less -- Stratfor considers it a failed state. But Iraq is a bit of a different animal (and has been a failed state for years) so our assessment is different.
Believe it or not, all of this is actually good news.
Iraq's future is not going to be settled by Iraq's various Sunni, Shiite or Kurdish factions unless outside actors choose to empower them (and even that would be no small task). The locals are all too weak, too fractured and too fratricidal to be able to establish internal control without a huge amount of outside help -- and this assessment extends to the "national" government of al-Maliki as well.
Which means that if Iraq is to have a future, it will be determined either by the independent or collaborative actions of the major outside powers -- the United States and Iran. For the past five years those two states have been at odds over Iraq, but over the past several months fleeting clandestine negotiations have turned public and become substantial. Task lists have been drawn up and implemented, with benchmarks established to demonstrate trust and progress.
Among those tasks and benchmarks is achieving the buy-in of the various Iraqi factions -- by force if necessary -- with the Iranians responsible for the Shia and the Americans responsible for the Sunnis and Kurds. But not everyone likes what Tehran and Washington are cooking up -- and this leads to various, shall we say, objections. Some powers object by challenging the prime minister, others by threatening secession, yet others by backing Kurdish militants or interfering with military operations. The jihadists object by blowing up cheering soccer fans.
Chaos in Iraq is to be expected -- not because it is a failed state (although it is) but because everything is up in the air and a new political and military reality is being imposed by outsiders. Rebellion, violence, institutional failure and confusion are all natural byproducts.
Which means that "progress" -- such as it is in Iraq -- is now not only largely out of the hands of the Iraqis, but also largely outside of Iraq itself. The country's future no longer can be ascertained by reading the local smoke signals, but only by looking at the wider region. It is not so important that some southern Iraq Shia are threatening to break away, but it is critical that the United States is dumping a few tens of billion of dollars in weapons on the region's Sunni states in order to ensure their agreement in Iraq. It is now a side note that the Kurds might shelter Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) rebels from Turkey, and far more critical that Washington might give Ankara a green light to invade northern Iraq to root out the PKK in order to demonstrate to Iran that the United States still has some cards to play.
stratfor.com
-
Woof, In the spirit of keeping it real..... Since we no longer have a military presence in Saudi Arabia(to my knowledge) Which by the way was the goal of Bin Laden.
Is it not our underlying goal.....that is not told to the American people.....That we want to establish a long term military strong hold in Iraq....so that by our presence in Iraq/the mideast....we can readily impose our will whenever necassary :wink:. OR PROTECT OIL......or whatever :lol:
Why do you suppose this is not also communicated to the American people? Just keepin it real :-D
TG
-
Woof Guro Crafty, I just read your post on the members forum.....after making my previous post. :|
Believe it or not........ TG
-
Woof Tom:
All this is a tad confusing. Are you referring to post #967, 971, 974 or 975 and now that you have read it/them, how does affect what you are saying?
-
Woof Guro Crafty, Iam talking about post 975.
TG
-
Concerning whether we are fighting AQ in Iraq, see the following piece from the Left Angeles Times today:
==============
Aided by U.S., militants widen reach
A Sunni group, partners in the fight against Al Qaeda in Iraq, is becoming more ambitious. Some fear it can't be trusted.
By Molly Hennessy-Fiske, Times Staff Writer
August 4, 2007
‘Goldmine of Information'
click to enlargeBAGHDAD — The leader of the Revolutionaries of Amiriya sits in his headquarters in an abandoned high school here, explaining the militant group's latest mission: policing and rebuilding Sunni Muslim neighborhoods.
"We need to return the services to the neighborhoods. Al Qaeda destroyed streets, schools, electricity, even mobile phone towers," said the man known as Abu Abed, or Saif. "They made the people here desperate."
Since partnering with U.S. forces in May to fight Al Qaeda in Iraq in the walled, middle-class west Baghdad neighborhood of Amiriya, the Sunni militant group has broadened its reach to overseeing city services. And it is pushing ambitious plans to police a few other Sunni neighborhoods, against the wishes of the Iraqi army and government, some Sunni leaders and U.S. soldiers, who say the militants can't be trusted.
U.S. military leaders, who have used the same tactic in Al Anbar province, say their goal is to turn the fighters into Iraqi police in areas where the Shiite-dominated security forces aren't trusted, or can't go.
Military commanders acknowledge that there's a risk that the Sunni fighters they're attempting to co-opt could betray them or fuel the country's civil war by turning their arms on Shiite militias such as Al Mahdi army and Badr Organization. But U.S. strategists are betting that giving the Sunni Arab groups a stake in a stable Iraq, and paying them a monthly salary, will quell violence and help U.S. forces repel Al Qaeda in Iraq, one of several high-profile Sunni Arab groups in the insurgency against U.S. and Iraqi forces.
"You make them dependent on you for a paycheck, you take their biometrics; you've got their names, you know where they go for work every day because they work for you," a U.S. diplomat said of the experiment.
"You have got commanders over them. This is a much safer place to be than having these guys out in the wilderness fighting you."
Analysts say the experiment is risky at best.
"They may be infiltrated by the unturned insurgents like Al Qaeda in Iraq and use knowledge gained about American forces and positions to abet attacks on our troops," said Bruce Riedel, a senior fellow in foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution in Washington. "Most of all, their loyalty to the central government is questionable at best, so you are creating even more warlords and militias in an already confused and volatile situation."
Already, U.S. commanders have begun reining in their new allies.
"You can watch your own neighborhoods, but you can't watch somebody else's neighborhood," U.S. Army Gen. David H. Petraeus, commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, said he has told tribal leaders in the Taji area north of the capital, where Sunni militias have been enlisted in policing roles.
Saif, the Amiriya Revolutionaries commander, is becoming a power broker of sorts between U.S. forces and Sunni groups eager to assume the same roles in Khadra, Shurta overpass, Haifa Street and Bakriya, and in more mixed neighborhoods such as Adhamiya, Bab al Muadam and Fadil.
"All I need and ask of the U.S. is protection for me and my fighters," he said. "We still apply the law."
'Going undercover'
Last month, the militants, clad in T-shirts and tracksuits and openly toting AK-47 assault rifles, greeted U.S. soldiers visiting the group's headquarters in the former high school.
Saif, 35, looked more like a police detective than a militant, in pressed slacks and a button-down plaid shirt, a gold Iraq pin on his lapel and a black pistol strapped to his right thigh.
Capt. Dustin Mitchell, 30, who serves as a liaison with the group, said he was impressed by their ability to find weapons stockpiles, roadside bombs and Al Qaeda in Iraq leaders.
"It's like going undercover in the police, in civilian clothing. And that's kind of something we can't do as white boys in the U.S. Army," Mitchell said. "It's just a goldmine of information that you ain't going to find anywhere else."
Saif, a former member of Saddam Hussein's military, said many in his group had been members of the 1920 Revolution Brigade and Islamic Army, groups that have fought U.S. forces, Al Qaeda in Iraq and Shiite militias.
Asked whether his men had fought U.S. troops, Saif, with soldiers looking on, smiled.
----------
"If the door gets broken down and my family is inside, I'm going to defend myself, I'm going to defend my family," he said. "Then I discover he's my friend, that he came from a faraway country to give me freedom."
Saif claims to have killed 22 Al Qaeda in Iraq operatives during two months of working with U.S. forces.
"We are the sons of this neighborhood, of the streets," Saif said. Residents trust them "because they know what kind of morals we have."
Reviews are mixed from U.S. soldiers who have worked with the Revolutionaries of Amiriya.
Sgt. Joe Frye, 31, of Panama City, Panama, has watched them search homes, nimbly traversing streets laced with roadside bombs with a speed and stealth that can't be matched by armored U.S. convoys.
"We've accomplished more in the few weeks working with these guys than in the nine months we've been here," Frye said.
But Lt. Brendan Griswold, 24, says he's seen members of the group, who often patrol in black ski masks, confiscate cars with little cause, a common complaint among Amiriya residents. Other soldiers reported seeing the militants beat suspects with rifle butts during raids.
"I don't like going out with them. I don't trust them," Griswold said during a patrol in Amiriya. "They get a little bit out of control."
Plan is paying off
U.S. Army Lt. Col. Dale Kuehl, a West Point graduate whose 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, has provided supplies, ammunition and other aid to the militants, said the partnership was paying off. U.S. and Iraqi casualties, explosions and shootings in Amiriya have dropped in the last three months, military records show, and U.S. and Iraqi troops have detained more suspects, defused more bombs and seized more weapons.
"Even with [the] surge, you can't put a soldier on every street corner," he said. "That's the value of what they do."
Kuehl is trying to persuade Iraqi army leaders to support the group, but those commanders remain critical of the fighters.
"We've been in government four years, and we're not giving weapons to anyone who comes," Defense Ministry spokesman Mohammed Askari said. "If we don't control those people, they will use their arms against us."
Kuehl acknowledges that as the Revolutionaries of Amiriya grows, the group may abandon plans to join the Iraqi police and become a Sunni counterpoint to the Shiite militias they have long fought.
"The challenge will be trying to keep it under control," Kuehl said of the group. "We do not want this to become another sectarian militia."
The U.S. military collects identifying information from the members, including fingerprints and retina scans, but the fighters are not screened or supervised.
"You don't know how far you can trust them a few months from now," said Sgt. David Alexander, 24, of Amarillo, Texas, stationed in a bombed-out bunker near the group's office. "They're with us now because we have a common goal. But what happens when we kill all the Al Qaeda guys? … If they want to go out and capture somebody for revenge, there's nobody to prevent them from doing that."
Saif seemed to confirm those fears, saying that even as his men become Iraqi police officers, they will continue to go after Shiite militias to avenge dead comrades, including his brothers.
"It is our nature as Iraqis," he said. "We have revenge issues."
-
For me there was never a question of fighting A'Q in Iraq.
My question was/is at what percentage are we fighting A'Q and what percentage are we figinting Sunni's, Shites and whoever else wants to take a shot at the great Satan.
The subject of the article admitted to figthing American troops.....and even mentioned the fact of defending his home when some one kicks down his door......I'am sure we would all do the same.
Guro Crafty are you for using Milita's like this?
Seems as though there was more than a little concern, by the American counterparts.
Where you encouraged by this story?
TG
-
http://www.nydailynews.com/opinions/2007/08/05/2007-08-05_i_have_seen_the_horror-2.html?print=1
I have seen the horror
Al Qaeda is guilty of monstrosities in Iraq - no matter what anyone says
MICHAEL YON
Sunday, August 5th 2007, 4:00 AM
Amid all this talk of timetables for the War in Iraq, blurred as they are by a strange lemming-like compulsion to declare the "surge" strategy a failure almost before it actually began, one deadline looms larger with each passing day: It's time for a reckoning with the truth.
The problem is that almost none of those who have cast themselves as truth-tellers have the requisite credibility for the job. The one man who does was told he had only until September to evaluate progress.
I'm not suggesting that I make a worthy substitute for the commanding general, David Petraeus, on this or any subject, but since December of 2004, I have spent roughly a 1½ years on the battlefields of Iraq.
I've traveled alongside American Army and Marines and British forces, from Basra to Mosul and just about anywhere of note in between.
When it comes to Iraq, being there matters because of the massive disconnect between what most Americans think they know about Iraq, and what is actually going on there.
The current controversy about the extent to which Al Qaeda is a threat to peace in Iraq is a case in point. Questions about which group calling itself an offshoot of Al Qaeda is really an offshoot of Al Qaeda is a distraction masquerading as a debate.
Al Qaeda is in Iraq, intentionally inflaming sectarian hostilities, deliberately pushing for full scale civil war. They do this by launching attacks against Shia, Sunni, Kurds and coalition forces. To ensure the attacks provoke counterattacks, they make them particularly gruesome.
Five weeks ago, I came into a village near Baqubah with American and Iraqi soldiers. Al Qaeda had openly stated Baqubah was their worldwide headquarters — indeed, Al Qaeda leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was killed just a short drive away.
Behind the village was a palm grove. I stood there, amid the crushing stench of death, and photographed the remains of decapitated children and murdered adults. I can still smell the rotting corpses of those children.
Clearly, not every terrorist in Iraq is Al Qaeda, but it is Al Qaeda that has been intentionally, openly, brazenly trying to stoke a civil war. As Al Qaeda is now being chased out of regions it once held without serious challenge, their tactics are tinged with desperation.
This may be the greatest miscalculation they've made in their otherwise sophisticated battle for the hearts and minds of locals, and it is one we must exploit.
In fact, some Sunni insurgents who formerly were allies of Al Qaeda have turned on them simply because Al Qaeda has proven it will murder anyone — and in the most horrible ways. One of these groups is called the 1920 Revolution Brigade, which turned on Al Qaeda and joined forces with the U.S.
On July 16, I was with American Army forces, Iraqi Army forces and 1920 fighters when together they went off to hunt Al Qaeda. The 1920s guys were in front of us. They got hit by a bomb that was almost certainly planted by terrorists. A major gunfight ensued.
Anyone who says Al Qaeda is not one of the primary problems in Iraq is simply ignorant of the facts.
I, like everyone else, will have to wait for September's report from Gen. Petraeus before making more definitive judgments. But I know for certain that three things are different in Iraq now from any other time I've seen it.
1. Iraqis are uniting across sectarian lines to drive Al Qaeda in all its disguises out of Iraq, and they are empowered by the success they are having, each one creating a ripple effect of active citizenship.
2. The Iraqi Army is much more capable now than it was in 2005. It is not ready to go it alone, but if we keep working, that day will come.
3. Gen. Petraeus is running the show. Petraeus may well prove to be to counterinsurgency warfare what Patton was to tank battles with Rommel, or what Churchill was to the Nazis.
And yes, in case there is any room for question, Al Qaeda still is a serious problem in Iraq, one that can be defeated. Until we do, real and lasting security will elude both the Iraqis and us.
Yon is a former Special Forces soldier who later became a writer and a photographer. His work appears in the Weekly Standard, the National Review and on www.michaelyon-online.com .
-
Geopolitical Diary: A Well-Timed Announcement on Iraq
U.S. forces in Iraq said on Sunday they killed the planner of two attacks against the Shiite al-Asakariyah shrine complex during an air strike east of As Samarra on Aug. 2. A U.S. military spokesman identified the top jihadist operative as Haitham Sabah Shaker Mohammed al-Badri, al Qaeda in Iraq's leader in Salahuddin province. Al-Badri is believed to have masterminded the February 2006 attack against the shrine -- which triggered a massive Shiite backlash against Sunnis -- and another attack June 13 that destroyed the shrine's two minarets.
The timing of this announcement is quite telling. It came a day before the third round of direct public U.S.-Iranian talks are set to take place in Baghdad. This round is expected to focus on the composition and agenda of a tripartite security committee created during the second round of talks July 24. At the upcoming meeting, representatives will decide which security officials will represent Washington, Tehran and Baghdad on the committee and how it will accomplish its Herculean tasks. One of these will be to divvy out responsibility for working with those who oppose a U.S.-Iranian settlement. Each side will attempt to rein in the group with which it has the most influence: Iran will take the Shia and the Americans the Sunnis.
Though public distrust has marred past rounds of negotiations, this time might be different -- and not just in its atmospherics. The Americans now are figuratively dropping a head on the table as a token of sincerity. One of the few groups al Qaeda hates more than the Americans is the Shia, who they see as heretics; the Iranians are Shia, and al-Badri was one of the most active al Qaeda operatives working against the sect.
No matter what happens during the Aug. 6 meeting, the Iranians are very interested in ensuring that Sunni political power in Baghdad is limited; even more than they want to eliminate the jihadists, they do not want to see the return of a Saddam Hussein-like figure. That means the Iranians want to make sure the Iraqi military remains a nonoffensive force. This is why the Iranians likely are carefully studying remarks made Sunday by Iraqi air force commander Lt. Gen. Kamal al-Barzanji.
Speaking at a press briefing in Baghdad, al-Barzanji expressed hope that Iran will return some of the scores of Iraqi warplanes that flew to the country ahead of the 1991 Gulf War, meanwhile acknowledging that many of them are probably beyond repair. He added that the Iraqi air force, which has been built up from scratch since 2004, currently has only 45 aircraft -- for transport and reconnaissance -- and helicopters. Additionally, U.S. Brig. Gen. Bob Allardice, commander of the air force transition team, said a program to train new aviators has begun, and that the new air force currently has no offensive capability.
The two most critical issues concerning the Iranians in terms of the future of Iraq are the role of the Baathists and the nature of the Iraqi armed forces -- both of which relate to Iran's national security interests and Tehran's expectation of being able to use Iraq as a launch pad to project its power into the region and beyond in the future. Therefore, the statements from the Iraqi and U.S. air force commanders were hardly a coincidence. On the contrary, they were arranged to coincide with the upcoming talks -- reminding the Iranians that while Washington is willing to offer up mutual enemies as a gesture of trust, it is not without options in Iraq, and it is Tehran's turn to deliver. stratfor.com
-
Here's some more from Stat. Worth reading both.
U.S.: The Delicate Diplomatic Dance with Iran
Summary
The United States and Iran held a third round of direct public-level talks Aug. 6 to discuss ways to reach their agreed-upon goals for stability in Iraq. Motivated by the threats to their national interests, both sides are moving forward in their negotiations, but Washington and Tehran must still overcome many hurdles before implementing their plans to establish security and stability in Iraq. Since the United States is representing the Sunnis in these talks, it will have to balance various Sunni factions' demands as it proceeds to deal with Iran.
Analysis
Iranian, Iraqi and U.S. security officials Aug. 6 held the first meeting of a tripartite security committee looking to ease the insurgency in Iraq. The U.S. delegation was led by Marcie Ries, minister-counselor for political and military affairs, and the Iranian delegation was headed by the Foreign Ministry point man on Iraq, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian. Officials from all three sides described the talks -- which were held in Baghdad and lasted about four hours -- as positive. The same day, Iranian Ambassador to Iraq Hassan Kazemi Qomi and his U.S. counterpart, Ryan Crocker, met in the presence of Iraqi National Security Adviser Muwaffaq al-Rubaie in his office. Meanwhile, the secular noncommunal Iraqiya List parliamentary bloc, led by former interim Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, temporarily suspended the participation of five of its ministers in the Cabinet. The bloc controls 40 parliamentary seats.
The United States and Iran are making significant progress in their strategic dialogue, as evidenced by the speed of their follow-up meetings since they first participated in the multilateral regional meeting on Iraq's future in Baghdad on March 10. The two sides participated in a second follow-up regional meeting May 4 in Egypt and two ambassadorial-level meetings in Baghdad on May 28 and July 24, and additional meetings are expected.
But when it comes to actually implementing their agreed-upon plans, Iran and the United States continue to face multiple obstacles. The five Iraqiya List ministers' temporary boycott of the Cabinet, which came a few days after six ministers from the main Sunni parliamentary bloc resigned from the Cabinet, symbolizes those obstacles. The Iranians face difficulties in getting the Iraqi Shia to agree to a deal with the United States, because the Iraqi Shia are the most divided communal group in the country.
But the United States, representing Sunni interests -- both those of the Iraqi Sunnis and of the Arab Sunni states in the region -- faces its own set of quandaries because its engagement with the minority community has led to the proliferation of actors in the Sunni political landscape.
That said, the challenges Washington faces from within the Sunni community are not so severe that the Bush administration is forced to pause in its dealings with Iran to address the Sunni concerns. This is because a sufficient number of Sunni players support the United States' efforts -- despite the politicians resigning from the al-Maliki administration. These actors include tribal leaders, Sunni nationalist insurgent elements and senior Sunnis within the security and intelligence apparatuses. In fact, for the purposes of the current stage of talks with Iran, this group of Sunnis is sufficient because the immediate task is to bring security to Iraq. Moreover, the Tawafoq Iraqi Front, the Sunni parliamentary bloc that quit the Cabinet, enjoys some influence among the Sunni insurgents.
Additionally, Iraqi Sunnis and their allies among the Sunni Arab states are not completely comfortable with the United States' taking the lead on dealing with Iran (and, by extension, the Iraqi Shia) on their behalf. Indeed, the Sunnis would like to play a greater role in the tripartite U.S.-Iranian-Iraqi security committee talks to ensure their interests are being addressed. This is why different Sunni actors are reacting differently to Washington and Tehran's progress. One example of this is the incident reported Aug. 6, in which Iraqi Shiite pilgrims with ties to senior officials in Baghdad were beaten by Saudi religious police in Mecca. The Saudis are trying to subvert the U.S.-Iranian talks by creating tensions between Iraq's Shia and Sunnis, but the Saudis do not have the leverage to damage the process extensively.
For now, the United States can afford to move ahead with the Iranians regarding the security talks. Soon, however, Washington will have to attend to the Sunni political principals' grievances. Iran and its Arab Shiite allies in Iraq will change the political situation in Iraq in a bid to limit the political concessions being given to the Sunnis, especially regarding the Sunni demand for a reversal of the de-Baathification policy.
Many Sunni insurgents will not want to silence their guns until they see some progress on the de-Baathification issue. This means Washington will have to get Tehran and its Iraqi Shiite allies to agree to concessions -- a move that is expected to slow the current pace of U.S.-Iranian talks. In the end, each side knows that if there is to be a deal, there will have to be a simultaneous give-and-take between the Shia and the Sunnis involving political and security guarantees.
-
The Major Diplomatic and Strategic Evolution in Iraq
By George Friedman
U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker met Aug. 6 with Iranian Ambassador to Iraq Hassan Kazemi Qomi and Iraqi National Security Adviser Muwaffaq al-Rubaie. Separately, a committee of Iranian, Iraqi and U.S. officials held its first meeting on Iraqi security, following up on an agreement reached at a July ambassadorial-level meeting.
The U.S. team was headed by Marcie Ries, counselor for political and military affairs at the embassy in Baghdad. Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, who handles Iraq for the Iranian Foreign Ministry, led the Iranian team. A U.S. Embassy spokesman described the talks as "frank and serious," saying they "focused, as agreed, on security problems in Iraq." Generally, "frank and serious" means nasty, though they probably did get down to the heart of the matter. The participants agreed to hold a second meeting, which means this one didn't blow up.
Longtime Stratfor readers will recall that we have been tracing these Iranian-American talks from the back-channel negotiations to the high-level publicly announced talks, and now to this working group on security. A multilateral regional meeting on Iraq's future was held March 10 in Baghdad, followed by a regional meeting May 4 in Egypt. Then there were ambassadorial-level meetings in Baghdad on May 28 and July 24. Now, not quite two weeks later, the three sides have met again.
That the discussions were frank and serious shouldn't surprise anyone. That they continue in spite of obvious deep tensions between the parties is, in our view, extremely significant. The prior ambassadorial talk lasted about seven hours. The Aug. 6 working group session lasted about four hours. These are not simply courtesy calls. The parties are spending a great deal of time talking about something.
This is not some sort of public relations stunt either. First, neither Washington nor Tehran would bother to help the other's public image. Second, neither side's public image is much helped by these talks anyway. This is the "Great Satan" talking to one-half of what is left of the "Axis of Evil." If ever there were two countries that have reason not to let the world know they are meeting, it is these two. Yet, they are meeting, and they have made the fact public.
The U.S. media have not ignored these meetings, but they have not treated them as what they actually are -- an extraordinary diplomatic and strategic evolution in Iraq. Part of the reason is that the media take their cues from the administration about diplomatic processes. If the administration makes a big deal out of the visit of the Icelandic fisheries minister to Washington, the media will treat it as such. If the administration treats multilevel meetings between Iran and the United States on the future of Iraq in a low-key way, then low-key it is. The same is true for the Iranians, whose media are more directly managed. Iran does not want to make a big deal out of these meetings, and therefore they are not portrayed as significant.
It is understandable that neither Washington nor Tehran would want to draw undue attention to the talks. The people of each country view the other with intense hostility. We are reminded of the political problems faced by Chinese Premier Chou En-lai and U.S. President Richard Nixon when their diplomatic opening became public. The announcement of Nixon's visit to China was psychologically stunning in the United States; it was less so in China only because the Chinese controlled the emphasis placed on the announcement. Both sides had to explain to their publics why they were talking to the mad dogs.
In the end, contrary to conventional wisdom, perception is not reality. The fact that the Americans and the Iranians are downplaying the talks, and that newspapers are not printing banner headlines about them, does not mean the meetings are not vitally important. It simply means that the conventional wisdom, guided by the lack of official exuberance, doesn't know what to make of these talks.
There are three major powers with intense interest in the future of Iraq: the United States, Iran and Saudi Arabia. The United States, having toppled Saddam Hussein, has completely mismanaged the war. Nevertheless, a unilateral withdrawal would create an unacceptable situation in which Iran, possibly competing with Turkey in the North, would become the dominant military power in the region and would be in a position to impose itself at least on southern Iraq -- and potentially all of it. Certainly there would be resistance, but Iran has a large military (even if it is poorly equipped), giving it a decided advantage in controlling a country such as Iraq.
In addition, Iran is not nearly as casualty-averse as the United States. Iran fought a war with Iraq in the 1980s that cost it about a million casualties. The longtime Iranian fear has been that the United States will somehow create a pro-American regime in Baghdad, rearm the Iraqis and thus pose for Iran round two of what was its national nightmare. It is no accident that the day before these meetings, U.S. sources speculated about the possible return of the Iraqi air force to the Iraqis. Washington was playing on Tehran's worst nightmare.
Saudi Arabia's worst nightmare would be watching Iran become the dominant power in Iraq or southern Iraq. It cannot defend itself against Iran, nor does it want to be defended by U.S. troops on Saudi soil. The Saudis want Iraq as a buffer zone between Iran and their oil fields. They opposed the original invasion, fearing just this outcome, but now that the invasion has taken place, they don't want Iran as the ultimate victor. The Saudis, therefore, are playing a complex game, both supporting Sunni co-religionists and criticizing the American presence as an occupation -- yet urgently wanting U.S. troops to remain.
The United States wants to withdraw, though it doesn't see a way out because an outright unilateral withdrawal would set the stage for Iranian domination. At the same time, the United States must have an endgame -- something the next U.S. president will have to deal with.
The Iranians no longer believe the United States is capable of creating a stable, anti-Iranian, pro-American government in Baghdad. Instead, they are terrified the United States will spoil their plans to consolidate influence within Iraq. So, while they are doing everything they can to destabilize the regime, they are negotiating with Washington. The report that three-quarters of U.S. casualties in recent weeks were caused by "rogue" Shiite militia sounds plausible. The United States has reached a level of understanding with some nonjihadist Sunni insurgent groups, many of them Baathist. The Iranians do not want to see this spread -- at least not unless the United States first deals with Tehran. The jihadists, calling themselves al Qaeda in Iraq, do not want this either, and so they have carried out a wave of assassinations of those Sunnis who have aligned with the United States, and they have killed four key aides to Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, a key Shiite figure.
If this sounds complicated, it is. The United States is fighting Sunnis and Shia, making peace with some Sunnis and encouraging some Shia to split off -- all the time waging an offensive against most everyone. The Iranians support many, but not all, of the Shiite groups in Iraq. In fact, many of the Iraqi Shia have grown quite wary of the Iranians. And for their part, the Saudis are condemning the Americans while hoping they stay -- and supporting Sunnis who might or might not be fighting the Americans.
The situation not only is totally out of hand, but the chance that anyone will come out of it with what they really want is slim. The United States probably will not get a pro-American government and the Iranians probably will not get to impose their will on all or part of Iraq. The Saudis, meanwhile, are feeling themselves being sucked into the Sunni quagmire.
This situation is one of the factors driving the talks.
By no means out of any friendliness, a mutual need is emerging. No one is in control of the situation. No one is likely to get control of the situation in any long-term serious way. It is in the interests of the United States, Iran and Saudi Arabia that the Iraq situation stabilize, simply because they cannot predict the outcome -- and the worst-case scenario for each is too frightening to contemplate.
None of the three powers can bring the situation under control. Even by working together, the three will be unable to completely stabilize Iraq and end the violence. But by working together they can increase security to the point that none of their nightmare scenarios comes true. In return, the United States will have to do without a pro-American government in Baghdad and the Iranians will have to forgo having an Iraqi satellite.
Hence, we see a four-hour meeting of Iranian and U.S. security experts on stabilizing the situation in Iraq. Given the little good will between the two countries, defining roles and missions in a stabilization program will require frank and serious talks indeed. Ultimately, however, there is sufficient convergence of interests that holding these talks makes sense.
The missions are clear. The Iranian task will be to suppress the Shiite militias that are unwilling to abide by an agreement -- or any that oppose Iranian domination. Their intelligence in this area is superb and their intelligence and special operations teams have little compunction as to how they act. The Saudi mission will be to underwrite the cost of Sunni acceptance of a political compromise, as well as a Sunni war against the jihadists. Saudi intelligence in this area is pretty good and, while the Saudis do have compunctions, they will gladly give the intelligence to the Americans to work out the problem. The U.S. role will be to impose a government in Baghdad that meets Iran's basic requirements, and to use its forces to grind down the major insurgent and militia groups. This will be a cooperative effort -- meaning whacking Saudi and Iranian friends will be off the table.
No one power can resolve the security crisis in Iraq -- as four years of U.S. efforts there clearly demonstrate. But if the United States and Iran, plus Saudi Arabia, work together -- with no one providing cover for or supplies to targeted groups -- the situation can be brought under what passes for reasonable control in Iraq. More important for the three powers, the United States could draw down its troops to minimal levels much more quickly than is currently being discussed, the Iranians would have a neutral, nonaggressive Iraq on their western border and the Saudis would have a buffer zone from the Iranians. The buffer zone is the key, because what happens in the buffer zone stays in the buffer zone.
The talks in Baghdad are about determining whether there is a way for the United States and Iran to achieve their new mutual goal. The question is whether their fear of the worst-case scenario outweighs their distrust of each other. Then there is the matter of agreeing on the details -- determining the nature of the government in Baghdad, which groups to protect and which to target, how to deal with intelligence sharing and so on.
These talks can fail in any number of ways. More and more, however, the United States and Iran are unable to tolerate their failure. The tremendous complexity of the situation has precluded either side from achieving a successful outcome. They now have to craft the minimal level of failure they can mutually accept.
These talks not only are enormously important but they also are, in some ways, more important than the daily reports on combat and terrorism. If this war ends, it will end because of negotiations like these.
stratfor.com
-
My comments on the latest Stratfor Iraq post regarding talks between the US, Iran and Saudi: First, I always find them well-informed and insightful. They are certainly correct in pointing out the complexities.
I know they are trying to take a different angle, but it hard to read an analysis in Aug 2007 that doesn't contain the word 'surge'. Also hard to understand how the Saudi Kingdom is a major player when Strat concedes they are no miliatary match for Iran. Also they might have been the next annexed 'province' of Saddam in 1990-1991 if not for the military of the U.S. Remember "Desert Shield"?
Quoting the last sentence / conclusion of Stratfor: "These talks not only are enormously important but they also are, in some ways, more important than the daily reports on combat and terrorism. If this war ends, it will end because of negotiations like these."
IMO, yes and no. The 'talks' will succeed only as Iran sees us 'winning' on the ground, not because of mutual interests. Nothing (again IMO) favors Iran more than a widely publicized and humiliating American defeat next door. Specifically, the perception of American quagmire in Iraq is what gives Iran the freedom to speak of wiping Israel off the map and to pursue banned weapons programs without consequence.
-
Fighting the "Real" Fight
Foolish myths about al-Qaida in Mesopotamia.
By Christopher Hitchens
Posted Monday, Aug. 13, 2007, at 12:02 PM ET
Over the past few months, I have been debating Roman Catholics who differ from their Eastern Orthodox brethren on the nature of the Trinity, Protestants who are willing to quarrel bitterly with one another about election and predestination, with Jews who cannot concur about a covenant with God, and with Muslims who harbor bitter disagreements over the discrepant interpretations of the Quran. Arcane as these disputes may seem, and much as I relish seeing the faithful fight among themselves, the believers are models of lucidity when compared to the hair-splitting secularists who cannot accept that al-Qaida in Mesopotamia is a branch of al-Qaida itself.
Objections to this self-evident fact take one of two forms. It is argued, first, that there was no such organization before the coalition intervention in Iraq. It is argued, second, that the character of the gang itself is somewhat autonomous from, and even independent of, the original group proclaimed by Osama Bin Laden. These objections sometimes, but not always, amount to the suggestion that the "real" fight against al-Qaida is, or should be, not in Iraq but in Afghanistan. (I say "not always," because many of those who argue the difference are openly hostile to the presence of NATO forces in Afghanistan as well as to the presence of coalition soldiers in Iraq.)
The facts as we have them are not at all friendly to this view of the situation, whether it be the "hard" view that al-Qaida terrorism is a "resistance" to Western imperialism or the "soft" view that we have only created the monster in Iraq by intervening there.
The founder of al-Qaida in Mesopotamia was Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who we can now gratefully describe as "the late." The first thing to notice about him is that he was in Iraq before we were. The second thing to notice is that he fled to Iraq only because he, and many others like him, had been driven out of Afghanistan. Thus, by the logic of those who say that Afghanistan is the "real" war, he would have been better left as he was. Without the overthrow of the Taliban, he and his collaborators would not have moved to take advantage of the next failed/rogue state. I hope you can spot the simple error of reasoning that is involved in this belief. It also involves the defeatist suggestion—which was very salient in the opposition to the intervention in Afghanistan—that it's pointless to try to crush such people because "others will spring up in their place." Those who take this view should have the courage to stand by it and not invent a straw-man argument.
As it happens, we also know that Zarqawi—who probably considered himself a rival to Bin Laden as well as an ally—wrote from Iraq to Bin Laden and to his henchman Ayman al-Zawahiri and asked for the local "franchise" to call himself the leader of AQM. This dubious honor he was duly awarded. We further know that he authored a plan for the wrecking of the new Iraq: a simple strategy to incite civil murder between Sunni and Shiite Muslims. The incredible evil of this proposal, which involved the blowing up of holy places and the assassination of pilgrims, was endorsed from whatever filthy cave these deliberations are conducted in. As a matter of fact, we even know that Zawahiri and his boss once or twice counseled Zarqawi to hold it down a bit, especially on the video-butchery and the excessive zeal in the murder of Shiites. Thus, if there is any distinction to be made between the apple and the tree, it would involve saying that AQM is, if anything, even more virulent and sadistic and nihilistic than its parent body.
And this very observation leads to a second one, which has been well-reported and observed by journalists who are highly skeptical about the invasion. In provinces like Anbar, and in areas of Baghdad, even Sunni militants have turned away in disgust and fear from the AQM forces. It's not difficult to imagine why this is: Try imagining life for a day under the village rule of such depraved and fanatical elements.
To say that the attempt to Talibanize Iraq would not be happening at all if coalition forces were not present is to make two unsafe assumptions and one possibly suicidal one. The first assumption is that the vultures would never have gathered to feast on the decaying cadaver of the Saddamist state, a state that was in a process of implosion well before 2003. All our experience of countries like Somalia and Sudan, and indeed of Afghanistan, argues that such an assumption is idiotic. It is in the absence of international attention that such nightmarish abnormalities flourish. The second assumption is that the harder we fight them, the more such cancers metastasize. This appears to be contradicted by all the experience of Iraq. Fallujah or Baqubah might already have become the centers of an ultra-Taliban ministate, as they at one time threatened to do, whereas now not only have thousands of AQM goons been killed but local opinion appears to have shifted decisively against them and their methods.
The third assumption, deriving from the first two, would be that if coalition forces withdrew, the AQM gangsters would lose their raison d'être and have nothing left to fight for. I think I shall just leave that assumption lying where it belongs: on the damp floor of whatever asylum it is where foolish and wishful opinions find their eventual home.
If I am right about this, an enormous prize is within our reach. We can not only deny the clones of Bin Ladenism a military victory in Iraq, we can also discredit them in the process and in the eyes (and with the help) of a Muslim people who have seen them up close. We can do this, moreover, in a keystone state of the Arab world that guards a chokepoint—the Gulf—in the global economy. As with the case of Afghanistan—where several provinces are currently on a knife-edge between an elected government that at least tries for schools and vaccinations, and the forces of uttermost darkness that seek to negate such things—the struggle will take all our nerve and all our intelligence. But who can argue that it is not the same battle in both cases, and who dares to say that it is not worth fighting?
Christopher Hitchens is a columnist for Vanity Fair and the author of God Is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything.
-
The Surge's Short Shelf Life By BOBBY GHOSH
Wed Aug 15, 1:45 PM ET
http://news.yahoo.com/s/time/20070815/wl_time/thesurgesshortshelflife
Hospital officials in northwestern Iraq have told TIME that the death toll from Tuesday's blasts in Qahataniya may exceed 300, making the multiple suicide bombings the deadliest terrorist operation in the country since the fall of Saddam Hussein. One hospital is saying that there are at least 500 bodies and that 375 people are injured. That report, however, cannot yet be verified. The only previous occasion when the toll from concerted attacks has exceeded 200 was last November, when six car-bombs in Baghdad's Sadr City killed 215 people. If the toll in the Qataniya incident grows, it could become the worst terrorist incident since al-Qaeda's September 11, 2001 attack on the U.S. (The Beslan massacre in Russia in September 2004 came to approximately 330, about half of the total children).
ADVERTISEMENT
Since then, the massive "surge" of U.S. and Iraqi troops in and around Baghdad has made the Iraqi capital safer than before from such bombings - but terrorist groups have stepped up attacks elsewhere. There have been a number of attacks in northern Iraq, which had enjoyed a long spell of peace before the start of the "surge."
Tuesday's bombings were also a reminder that even successful U.S. military operations can have a short shelf life - a sobering thought for Bush Administration officials and independent analysts who have recently been talking up the successes of the "surge." After all, the area around Qahataniya was the scene of a major anti-insurgent operation barely two years ago. In the fall of 2005, some 8,000 American and Iraqi troops flushed a terrorist group out of the nearby town of Tal Afar in an operation that was a precursor to the "clear, hold and build" strategy that underpins the current "surge." A few months later, President Bush cited Tal Afar as a success story for the U.S. enterprise in Iraq.
There have been several attacks in and around Tal Afar since then; last March, two truck bombs killed more than 100 people in a Shi'ite neighborhood in the town. The bombings in Qahataniya were a deadly reminder that the terrorists have not gone very far away.
The U.S. military said al-Qaeda was the prime suspect; some Iraqi government officials fingered Ansar al-Sunnah, which has links to al-Qaeda and has long been active in northern Iraq. Early reports suggest the majority of the victims were Yazidis, a pre-Islamic sect in Syria and northern Iraq.
Throughout history, Yazidis have faced persecution because an archangel they worship as a representative of God is often identified by Muslims (and some Christians) as Satan. Branded as devil worshipers, they are detested by extremists on both sides of Iraq's sectarian divide.
The Yazidis have their own extremists: earlier this year, members of the community stoned to death a young woman they accused of converting to Sunni Islam to marry her lover. A widely distributed video of the stoning inflamed Sunni sentiments; in retaliation, insurgents executed 23 Yazidi factory workers near Mosul. With reporting by Andrew Lee Butters
-
Tom:
I think this exposition of the why of our strategy is sound.
==========
The World in a nutshell
This is a presentation by Herbert Meyer. He was the first senior U.S. Government official to forecast the Soviet Union's collapse. For this, he awarded the U.S. National Intelligence Distinguished Service Medal, the highest honor that can be received from within intelligence community. This presentation was made to a symposium of Chief Executive Officers of several large international corporations, and as such, is directed at questions and answers for business. However, the points he makes are very much in tune with the points being made in many other discussions in the international political arena, and has some impact on the Shaping and IW issues. The business and demographic sections are pretty good.
U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Futures Lab
Subject: Four Major Transformations
"Currently, there are four major transformations that are shaping political, economic and world events. These transformations have profound implications for American business owners, our culture and our way of LIFE. "
1. The War in Iraq
There are three major monotheistic religions in the world: Christianity, Judaism and Islam. In the 16th century, Judaism and Christianity reconciled with the modern world. The rabbis, priests and scholars found a way to settle up and pave the way forward. Religion remained at the center of life, church and state became separate. Rule of law, idea of economic liberty, individual rights, human rights all these are defining points of modern Western civilization. These concepts started with the Greeks but didn't take off until the 15th and 16th century when Judaism and Christianity found a way to reconcile with the modern world. When that happened, it unleashed the scientific revolution and the greatest outpouring of art, literature and music the world has ever known.
Islam, which developed in the 7th century, counts millions of Moslems around the world who are normal people. However, there is a radical streak within Islam. When the radicals are in charge, Islam attacks Western civilization. Islam first attacked Western civilization in the 7th century, and later in the 16th and 17th centuries.
By 1683, the Moslems (Turks from the Ottoman Empire) were literally at the gates of Vienna. It was in Vienna that the climatic battle between Islam and Western civilization took place. The West won and went forward. Islam lost and went backward. Interestingly, the date of that battle was September 11. Since them, Islam has not found a way to reconcile with the modern world.
Today, terrorism is the third attack on Western civilization by radical Islam. To deal with terrorism, the U.S. is doing two things. First, units of our armed forces are in 30 countries around the world hunting down terrorist groups and dealing with them. This gets very little publicity. Second we are taking military action in Afghanistan and Iraq. These are covered relentlessly by the media. People can argue about whether the war in Iraq country-region is right or wrong.
However, the underlying strategy behind the war is to use our military to remove the radicals from power and give the moderates a chance. Our hope is that, over time, the moderates will find a way to bring Islam forward into the 21st century. That's what our involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan i all about.
The lesson of 9/11 is that we live in a world where a small number of people can kill a large number of people very quickly. They can use airplanes, bombs, anthrax, chemical weapons or dirty bombs. Even with a first-rate intelligence service (which the U.S. does not have), you can't stop every attack. That means our tolerance for political horseplay has dropped to zero. No longer will we play games with terrorists or weapons of mass destruction.
Most of the instability and horseplay is coming from the Middle East. That's why we have thought that if we could knock out the radicals and give the moderates a chance to hold power; they might find a way to reconcile Islam with the modern world. So when looking at Afghanistan or Iraq, it's important to look for any signs that they are modernizing. For example, women being brought into the workforce and colleges in Afghanistan is good. The Iraqis stumbling toward a constitution is good. People can argue about what the U.S. is doing and how we're doing it, but anything that suggests Islam is finding its way forward is good.
, , ,
Implications Of The Four Transformations:
1. The War in Iraq
In some ways, the war is going very well. Afghanistan and Iraq have the ' start' of a modern government, which is a huge step forward. The Saudis are starting to talk about some good things, while Egypt and Lebanon are beginning to move in a good direction.
A series of revolutions have taken place in countries like Ukraine and Georgia. There will be more of these revolutions for an interesting reason. In every revolution, there comes a point where the dictator turns to the general and says, "Fire into the crowd." If the general fires into the crowd, it stops the revolution. If the general says "No," the revolution is over. Increasingly, the generals are saying "No" because their kids are in the crowd.
Thanks to TV and the Internet, the average 18-year old outside the U.S. is very savvy about what is going on in the world, especially in terms of popular culture. There is a huge global consciousness, and young people around the world want to be a part of it. It is increasingly apparent to them that the miserable government where they live is the only thing standing in their way. More and more, it is the well-educated kids, the children of the generals and the elite, who are leading the revolutions.
At the same time, not all is well with the war. The level of violence in Iraq is much worse and doesn't appear to be improving. It's possible that we're asking too much of Islam all at one time. We're trying to jolt them from the 7th century to the 21st century all at once, which may be further than they can go. They might make it and they might not. Nobody knows for sure. The point is, we don't know how the war will turn out. Anyone who says they know is just guessing.
The real place to watch is Iran. If they actually obtain nuclear weapons it will be a terrible situation. There are two ways to deal with it. The first is a military strike, which will be very difficult. The Iranians have dispersed their nuclear development facilities and put them underground. The U.S. has nuclear weapons that can go under the earth and take out those facilities, but we don't want to do that.
The other way is to separate the radical mullahs from the government, which is the most likely course of action.
Seventy percent of the Iranian population is under 30. They are Moslem but not Arab. They are mostly pro-Western. Many experts think the U.S. should have dealt with Iran before going to war with Iraq. The problem isn't so much the weapons; it's the people who control them. If Iran has a moderate government, the weapons become less of a concern.
We don't know if we will win the war in Iraq. We could lose or win. What we are looking for is any indicator that Islam is moving into the 21st century and stabilizing.
-
I have no problem corupting Islam. I do however feel that radical Islam is more main stream than most care to believe.
I also think we can corrupt a religon just as easy without killing people as we can by killing people(bring in western culture and apeal to the "flesh")
However I have no problem with killing bad guys or radical mullahs or whom ever.
Thats why I think selective targeting would be more effective than flattening countries, like were doing in Iraq.
Two main problems that I have with our "strategy" One is in Iraq......I have no clue what our strategy there is. Petraoues(sp) is already planning a troop drawdown for next year......yet the "surge has just begun :?......Mahliki is hanging out in Iran? I thought he was our guy?
My point is I have no idea what our strategy in Iraq is.
Second in our global war on terror.....we don't go after enough of the big fish hard enough, but we sure make a big deal about taking out low level A'Q.......The old saying cut off the head and the body dies....I think applies well here.
Theres lots of bodys to fill in for the ones were killing now.......I think it better to get the boss/bosses
TG
-
Tom:
What is the basis for your claim that we are flattening Iraq?
As for what our strategy is, what did you think of the content of my previous post?
-
Guro Crafty, Ok maybe flattening was a bad choice of words, I know we are not carpet bomboing the place,....but every tme we light off a tank or shoot a missle from a helo or any such thing, we are doing some damage to the country and its supporting buildings, homes ect..... let not be naive and say we have'nt left our share of rubble.
Not to mention all the bombs the bad guys are unleashing....like the massive ones that went off this week ....did you see the craters they left? We didn't do that I know......but that was not happening until we got there.
We made Iraq the war zone it is today.....I'am willing to admit that are you?
As for the article yes I think it has merit and good substance.
I'am skeptical about our resolve to see it through, esp in light of our ever changing government, I think Hilllary for exmaple would extend a hug......
I also think the corrupting of Islam if I may call it such, will take a long long time and there will always be the Bin Ladens.
I have said this before. I prefer a more secretive, covert, dirty war.....Its cheaper, quieter and much more out of the public eye.
Plus taking out high value targets I think would result in quicker more favorable results.
Then thats just my opinon....
TG
-
Tom , You explained it as well as I think was possible. I was going to answer Crafty that opponents count Al Qaida and insurgent bombings in the damage 'caused' by America. I frankly don't think that's fair, and I don't believe that any Kurd gassed by Saddam or any Shite 'detainee' from al-Dujaile (http://iraqiholocaust.blogspot.com/2004/07/al-dujail.html), for examples, would agree with the premise that Iraq was a peaceful place before the 'liberators' arrived.
One account of one massacre from the link (This was later proven in court and Saddam was hanged):
-"Al-Dujaile is my home town, I always looked at it as god's heaven on earth, it's about 60 kilometers to the north of Baghdad, on the bank of al Ishaki river (a branch of Tigris), inhabited by few thousands, most of whom are farmers, our village is well known by its date palms and grapes, a fascinating nature that takes your breath away, its people are related by strong tribal relations that keep them as one large family.
- Date: 7/8/1982, Saddam decides to visit the village, the Ba’ath party in the region prepared the people to make a big reception, they took us out of the schools(I was 7 years old). They made us line in a row on both sides of the road to wave for him and cheer his name. It never occurred to me that it would be my last day in the childhood world. I was forced to skip that period of my life with such cruelty that I can not explain.
-17 of the finest young men in the village had decided to put an end to the tyrant's life at that day, they had the courage to face him, we didn't know about their intention.
The brave men set an ambush among the palm trees, they couldn't tell which car was his, there were dozens of cars, all identical in model and color.
-The attack starts, the brave young men open fire from their simple weapons, some of the body guards get killed, others wounded, the tyrant get panicked, imagine that (Saddam is afraid) the man who enjoyed terrorizing people lives a moment of fear with all its details, he was so close to death this time.
8 of the attackers were killed, the rest fled out of the country.
(Woe to the sinners) who dared to make him scared, you should fear his revenge, you should learn the lesson so that it won't happen again, you should bow more and more and fear more and more, you should be scared to death so that you don't dare even to think of harming him; the shadow of god on earth.
-The answer was fast, one hour after the escape of the tyrant, we had to face his anger, I heard the sound of helicopters over our heads wreaking their vengeance upon our small village, backed later with shovels that leveled the trees with the ground, the order was clear(the terror should be great) so that the others would learn.
I ran away to my home into my mothers' lap, my younger brother and sisters gathered around me, I realized something huge has happened and anticipated the eminent evil. it didn't take long for the security to get to our house, we were taken to the unknown, me, my mother(who was 4 months pregnant), my sisters Einas(5 years), Zeina(3 years)and my brother Mohammed(1 year).
-The first station in our long journey was Al-Hakimiyah prison that belongs to the intelligence, I found hundreds of my village people, old, young, men, women and children, we were 480 there. Out of whom 80 were relatives of mine.
It was enough to say the word Hakimiyah for any Iraqi to be completely paralyzed(the one who gets in is a missing-the one who gets out is reborn-this was what we used to say about this prison, the walls of which tell thousands of horror stories that you refuse to believe.
I was too young to know why we were treated like that, but I sure knew the meaning of being scared to death. The sound of foot steps that stops by the door was enough for every one to freeze, as after that the door would be opened, a name of one of the men would be announced and he would be dragged to the interrogation room to return few hours later unconscious, covered by blood, wrapped in a blanket, and would be thrown on us.
The women and children had their share, and this is what saw: extraction of nails and teeth, electric shocks, whipping with lashes, using razors to tear the skin into shreds, my aunt was left hanging from the roof after her clothes had been wrapped of her in front of her brothers to force them to talk. Do you know how much pain we suffered? Can you imagine? I doubt it.
We stayed at Al-Hakimiyah for one month, the space was too small for all of us to sleep, some of us had to stay on their feet so that the others could sleep.
-After that we were transferred to Abu-Ghraib prison, where we met the men for the last time, after that, the 143 men separated from us and then transferred to another place, as for the rest of us, we were kept in Abu-Ghraib prison for six months, during that time, the day for my mother to deliver her baby came, she had complications and they didn't take her to the hospital until it was too late, the baby died. my mother never if it was a boy or a girl.
In the prison, 4 people died, my grandfather(Yousif Ya'koob), my uncles wife(Noofa Hasan), the old man(Abdul Wahab Ja'far) and his wife (Sabreya), after that we were transferred to a camp in the desert, near the Iraqi-Saudi borders, 400 kilometers south-west to Baghdad(Leeah camp).
We spent four years there.
Four years in hell, we were isolated from the world, all we could do is stay alive and pray for the men whom their destiny was unknown to us.
We were released in 1986, only for another journey of pain and suffering. We had to start a new life as all our properties were confiscated and we still don’t know anything about the men.
The other good people in our village helped us, offered us jobs in their lands and a place to stay in. I had to work -with my little brother and sisters- to earn our living and to continue with our study. Farming is too hard a job for children of our age, but we had already passed that stage.
It’s hard to explain what life is when you're a suspect with the eyes of security agents following you, stifling your breath, making your life even harder and harder, we had to give them all the pennies we could save to get some information about the missing ones, and they always promised us good news, and that our beloved ones were alive and being treated well. we didn't believe that, but what is life without hope!?
-Sixteen years later...October/2002. I finished medical school and started to practice my job as a doctor in Baghdad. The same year, Saddam suffers a hard time, the USA and the allies tighten the circle around him, he decides to set all prisoners free, including the political. That was what he said, the fact; he released only the murderers and the thieves.
Our cries lost their way trying to find our relatives among the thousands of faces, each time they reassure us that there would be another group to be released the next day, but all our efforts were in vain, we had no one but god to pray to and seek his help to show us the way.
Date: 4/9/2003, I can’t believe it, the tyrant falls, is it a dream?
Does it mean no more fear, no more terror, and no more death? We jumped into the streets wreaking our vengeance on his pictures and statues that surrounded the village he raped in a dark night.
The towns and villages expelled him and expelled his name……..WE WERE SAVED.
I took a deep breath, the air had the scent of freedom, nothing can be more beautiful, it’s difficult to describe, but we were overwhelmed by happiness, with only one distress: where had our beloved ones gone?
We started to search the security departments in Baghdad,- like thousands of Iraqis- looking for a trace, I didn’t take a long time, we found what we were looking for. The documents of the crime, I read with tears in my eyes; the presidency order dated: 7 /23 /1985, signed by the tyrant, ordering the execution of 143 men from Al-Dujaile, the youngest one (Najeeb Abd Kadim) 11 years old. Among these, 35 were relatives of mine.
God bless your souls martyrs, may you have peace in heaven, if it wasn’t your courage and blood we wouldn’t be proud.
This is the story behind these photos, my friend. It’s time they have a decent funeral. We haven’t found their remains yet, but they will always remain in our hearts”
My friend surprised me saying” we don’t regret what happened, and yesterday, when the nine remaining heroes returned to Iraq, we met them with flowers, as the heroes of all the Iraqis, and we will never blame them, as they’re the ones who kept our chins up.”
-
"We made Iraq the war zone it is today.....I'am willing to admit that are you?"
ABSOLUTELY NOT!!! IMHO the thought process that comes up with that conclusion is quite unsound.
-
C'mon guys, The Kurd massacares happend 20 years ago. THese things were not going on when we went into Iraq to "liberate" the people.
We brought the war to Iraq.
Lets try to keep it in context with a dash of reality ok.
Besides that Sadaams end of it is done and the death toll is -------- you fill in the blank I have no Idea.
However our death toll is still ongoing with no real end in sight.
I'am not sure Guro Crafty how you view my thought process as unsound.
I think its pretty simple.......Before we went into Iraq no war there.....after we went in and ever since the country is a ongoing war zone.
Whats unsound about that?
TG
-
this seems to be a well written piece......Comments?
http://www.ocnus.net/artman2/publish/Analyses_12/America_s_Illusory_Strategy_in_Iraq.shtml
America's Illusory Strategy in Iraq
By David Gardner, Financial Times 9/8/07
Aug 13, 2007 - 8:49:51 AM
Email this article
Printer friendly page
They will savour the solipsism of a Paul Bremer, the US viceroy whose disbandment of the Iraqi army left 400,000 men destitute and bitter, but armed, trained and prey to the insurgency then taking shape - but whose memoir paints him as a MacArthur of Mesopotamia.
They will be awed by the arrogance and fecklessness of a Donald Rumsfeld, defence secretary and theorist of known unknowns, who summed up the descent into anarchy and looting in the hours after Baghdad fell (when, very possibly, Iraq was lost) - "Stuff happens".
But their research will be greatly assisted by the diligence of the Government Accountability Office, the investigative arm of the US Congress, which keeps on unearthing the bottomless depths of incompetence behind the Bush administration's misconceived adventure in Iraq.
This week, the GAO reported that the Pentagon cannot account for 110,000 AK-47 assault rifles and 80,000 pistols supposedly supplied to Iraqi security forces - adding to well-founded suspicions that insurgents are using US-supplied arms to attack American and British troops.
This discovery might be considered the mother of all known unknowns, were it not that in March this year the GAO published a drily damning report on the coalition's failure to secure scores upon scores of arms dumps abandoned by the Iraqi army after the 2003 invasion - and that by October last year it had still failed to secure this giant toolbox that keeps the daily slaughter going in Iraq.
That carnage continues, barely moderated by the "surge" of troops that this week raised US forces to their peak level in Iraq of 162,000 - a last heave that looks destined to be the prelude to withdrawal.
As a policy it is hard to see how any surge can fix an Iraq so traumatised by tyranny and war and then broken by invasion and occupation. It takes place as an already indecipherable ethnic and sectarian patchwork is being pulled bloodily to pieces. Iraq has reached advanced societal breakdown. Ethnic cleansing proceeds regionally, through neighbourhoods, even street by street.
There has been a mass exodus of teachers and doctors, civil servants and entrepreneurs, a haemorrhage of Iraq's future. Nearly 4m Iraqis have been uprooted by this cataclysm. Instead of bringing democracy to Iraq and the Arabs, the 2003 invasion has scattered Iraqis across the Middle East - as well as creating laboratory conditions for the urban warfare urged on jihadis by Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda's strategist. The time to have surged is long since past.
Politically, there are no institutions, there is no national narrative. Ministries are sectarian booty and factional bastions. The interior ministry, headquarters for several death squads, is, according to the Los Angeles Times, partitioned into factional fiefs on each of its 11 floors - with the seventh floor split between the armed wings of two US-allied groups.
Two ostensibly benign by-products of the US invading Iraq were: the empowerment of the Shia majority there, giving the sect, a dispossessed minority within Islam, rights denied for centuries; and the welcome panic of an ossified Sunni Arab order based on a toxic mix of despotism and social inequity that incubated extremism. But Iraq's Shia politicians seem unwilling to put state above sect. Such is the Sunni, jihadi-abetted backlash, and the intra-Shia fight over the spoils, that the Shia have not so much come into their inheritance as entered a new circle of hell.
The Shia-led government of prime minister Nouri al-Maliki has ceased to pursue even a communalist agenda, preferring the narrower sectarian interest of his faction of the Da'wa party. With the withdrawal of 17 of 38 members of Mr Maliki's cabinet - including all the Sunnis and two big Shia factions - government has for most practical purposes ceased.
To believe any policy might work in these circumstances - let alone a slow-motion surge - requires heroic optimism. Some of that was placed in Gen David Petraeus, US commander in Iraq. At least until this week.
It turns out those Kalashnikovs went missing on his previous watch, as trainer-in-chief of the still barely existent Iraqi army. Gen Petraeus, a student of counterinsurgency with a PhD from Princeton and a gift for PR, had been lionised for his command of the 101st Airborne division in 2003-04, and especially his "hearts and minds" campaign in the north. After his withdrawal, however, two-thirds of Mosul's security forces defected to the insurgency and the rest went down like fairground ducks. His forces appear not to have noticed, moreover, that Saudi-inspired jihadis had established a bridgehead in Mosul before the war had even started.
But US commanders seem to have no trouble detecting the hand of Tehran everywhere. This largely evidence-free blaming of serial setbacks on Iranian forces is a bad case of denial. First, the insurgency is overwhelmingly Iraqi and Sunni, built around a new generation of jihadis created by the US invasion. Second, to the extent foreign fighters are involved these have come mostly from US-allied and Sunni Saudi Arabia, not Shia Iran. Third, the lethal roadside bombs with shaped charges that US officials have coated with a spurious veneer of sophistication to prove Iranian provenance are mostly made by Iraqi army-trained engineers - from high explosive looted from those unsecured arms dumps.
Shia Iran has backed a lot of horses in Iraq. If it wished to bring what remains of the country down around US ears it could. It has not done so. The plain fact is that Tehran's main clients in Iraq are the same as Washington's: Mr Maliki's Da'wa and the Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq led by Abdelaziz al-Hakim. Iran has bet less on the unpredictable Moqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi army, which has, in any case, largely stood aside during the present troop surge.
So, in sum. Having upturned the Sunni order in Iraq and the Arab world, and hugely enlarged the Shia Islamist power emanating from Iran, the US finds itself dependent on Tehran-aligned forces in Baghdad, yet unable to dismantle the Sunni jihadistan it has created in central and western Iraq. Ignoring its Iraqi allies it is arming Sunni insurgents to fight al-Qaeda. And, by selling them arms rather than settling Palestine it is trying to put together an Arab Sunni alliance (Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia) with Israel against Iran. All clear? How can anyone keep a straight face and call this a strategy?
-
Tom:
My apologies for not having time at the moment to offer a full reply. Perhaps tomorrow or Monday.
Marc
-
How Not to Get Out of Iraq
Max Boot
September 2007
The current build-up of American forces in Iraq—universally known as the “surge”—was unveiled by President Bush on January 10. The earliest units shipped out in the middle of February, and the full complement of roughly 160,000 troops arrived only in June. Yet, by then, a vociferous chorus of voices back home—consisting mainly of Democrats but also of a growing number of middle-of-the-road Republicans—was already pronouncing the entire operation a failure and demanding a “change of course,” a “new strategy,” a “Plan B.”
Such a new strategy would of course involve not more troops on the ground but fewer, in response to the overwhelming impetus of public opinion to start bringing soldiers home. Nevertheless, while increasingly eager for an end to American involvement in the Iraq war, most legislators have continued to endorse what Senator Richard Lugar, in a much-heralded June speech, declared to be “four primary objectives” in Iraq. These are: “preventing Iraq or any piece of its territory from being used as a safe haven or training ground for terrorists or as a repository or assembly point for weapons of mass destruction”; “preventing the disorder and sectarian violence in Iraq from upsetting wider regional stability”; “preventing Iranian domination of the region”; and “limiting the loss of U.S. credibility.”
That is a very tall order. And so, all summer long, and even as reports surfaced attesting to initial successes of the surge, the search has been on for a plan that could accomplish these goals with a smaller commitment of resources. Does such a plan exist? It is worth surveying the major proposals to see if any of them offers a credible way forward.
_____________
The most dramatic option is simply to leave Iraq—i.e., to bring all the troops home as soon as possible. This is the course advocated by, for example, the New York Times and Democratic presidential candidate Bill Richardson. But even the Times admits that the consequences would likely be unpleasant:
Iraq, and the region around it, could be even bloodier and more chaotic after Americans leave. There could be reprisals against those who worked with American forces, further ethnic cleansing, even genocide. Potentially destabilizing refugee flows could hit Jordan and Syria. Iran and Turkey could be tempted to make power grabs. Perhaps most important, the [American] invasion has created a new stronghold from which terrorist activity could proliferate.
In any case, there is no simple or safe way rapidly to remove 160,000 troops, 64,000 foreign contractors, 45,000 vehicles, and millions of tons of equipment from a war zone. Estimates from within the American military suggest that an orderly departure would take, at a minimum, 12 to 20 months to accomplish. (In Vietnam, our withdrawal was conducted over four years.) To leave faster than that would require a precipitous abandonment of allies and equipment. U.S. forces would have to fight their way out of the country along Route Tampa, the main supply line to the south, with insurgents determined at every inch of the way to inflict a final humiliation on the defeated superpower. The pell-mell scramble would likely produce traumatic images akin to those of the last helicopter lifting off from a Saigon rooftop in 1975.
In light of this grisly prospect, most advocates of withdrawal suggest a timeline that, they hope, would make our retreat somewhat more orderly. The leading legislation along these lines, co-sponsored by Carl Levin and Jack Reed in the Senate and Ike Skelton in the House, would begin troop withdrawals within 120 days of passage and complete the process by next April. This legislation passed the House in July but was blocked in the Senate by Republicans seeking to give the administration, and General David Petraeus, time to meet the September 15 deadline for an assessment of the surge’s progress.
Under the terms of the Levin-Reed bill, the President would still have the option, even after April 2008, to retain a “limited presence” of troops for various missions yet to be specified. In this, the legislation’s sponsors were following the work of the Iraq Study Group (ISG), whose December 2006 report has become a touchstone for many critics of the war. The ISG, too, called for a general pullout, to culminate if possible by next spring. But even after the withdrawal of “all combat brigades not necessary for force protection,” other U.S. forces, according to the ISG, could be deployed “in units embedded with Iraqi forces, in rapid-reaction and special-operations teams, and in training, equipping, advising, force protection, and search-and-rescue.”
The ISG made no attempt to estimate how many soldiers would be required to carry out all of the missions in this long wish-list. Neither have most of the politicians who have embraced the ISG’s recommendations. These include Senators Ken Salazar and Lamar Alexander, who have sponsored legislation to implement the findings of the ISG report; two leading Democratic presidential candidates, Senators Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama; and numerous others, among them centrist Republicans like Senators Olympia Snowe, Pete Domenici, and George Voinovich. The Democrats, in particular, even while assuring their supporters that they will “end the war,” have left themselves wiggle room to keep some troops behind.
Some politicians and analysts have proposed another use for American forces beyond the advisory and commando functions envisioned by the ISG. This is to safeguard Iraq’s borders in the likely event that a civil war erupts following a U.S. withdrawal. As part of such a containment policy, Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack of the Brookings Institution have suggested stationing 50,000 to 70,000 troops on Iraq’s borders. A version of their idea has been endorsed by retired generals Anthony Zinni of the Marine Corps and Charles Wald of the Air Force—and reportedly even by former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in a leaked memorandum that he wrote before leaving office.
_____________
Aside from leaving behind an unspecified number of troops, most advocates of a U.S. drawdown want to find some diplomatic or political means of lessening the shock of transition. Here again many follow the ISG, which urged the United States to undertake a “new diplomatic offensive” in partnership with a “support group” made up of other states and the United Nations. Senator Hagel, for one, would appoint a UN special envoy to mediate among contending Iraqi factions—advice that the administration is acting upon. Others place the emphasis on reaching an accommodation with neighboring states, especially Syria and Iran. Wesley Clark, the retired general and former Democratic presidential candidate, suggests this could be done by our renouncing the idea of “regime change” in the Middle East.
In the realm of political solutions, a commonly voiced opinion is that Iraq should no longer be conceived of as a single country but partitioned into three entities reflecting Iraqi ethnic divisions: a Kurdish north, a Shiite south, and a Sunni middle. A plan along these lines has been developed by Senator Joseph Biden and Leslie Gelb, president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations, and has been backed with various qualifications by Senators Sam Brownback, Barbara Boxer, and Kay Bailey Hutchison, as well as by commentators like Michael O’Hanlon, Peter Galbraith, and David Brooks.
Further political recommendations have issued from sources associated primarily but not exclusively with the “realist” school of foreign policy. The Middle East scholar Daniel Pipes, Time columnist Joe Klein, former Israeli intelligence officer Yossi Alpher, and a few others have proposed ending our support for the current democratically elected government in Baghdad and backing a strongman or junta instead. The strategic analyst Edward Luttwak has suggested that, rather than continuing to police Iraq, we should stand back and allow it to have its civil war, as a necessary and unavoidable prelude to future peace. In order to exercise some influence on the outcome of that struggle, Nikolas Gvosdev, the editor of the National Interest, and Ray Takeyh of the Council on Foreign Relations have advocated that we side openly with the Shiites, “the party that is likely to win the civil war.”
_____________
For the most part, these “ways forward” are not mutually exclusive. All are predicated on a substantial reduction in American troop levels. In evaluating which, if any, is likely to work, we may begin in reverse order by looking at the proposed diplomatic solutions, since they are among the most popular.
It is easy to see why. Who could be against diplomacy and dialogue, as compared with roadside explosions and body bags? Unfortunately, however, even the world’s greatest negotiator would be hard-pressed to resolve the internal conflicts that beset Iraq today. Simply finding interlocutors who can reliably deliver on their promises has been, so far, beyond the capabilities of our most experienced diplomats.
Among Iraq’s major groups, only the Kurds are relatively united, with two major political parties that have been able to work closely together. The Shiites, by contrast, have three major parties that are often at odds (and each of which has its own mutually suspicious factions), while among the Sunnis’ three “moderate” parties and numerous radical groupings, none possesses true credibility as a communal representative. Moreover, even if some kind of deal to end the fighting could be reached with the various leaders in Baghdad, many armed groups operating around the country would almost certainly refuse to abide by its terms.
As if Iraq’s internal divisions were not bad enough, the country’s neighbors, in particular Iran and Syria, have contributed greatly to the current unrest. This is the challenge that the ISG’s “diplomatic offensive” proposes to meet. But how? Iran, according to the ISG report, “should stem the flow of arms and training to Iraq, respect Iraq’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and use its influence over Iraqi Shiite groups to encourage national reconciliation.” Syria, for its part, “should control its border with Iraq to stem the flow of funding, insurgents, and terrorists in and out of Iraq.”
Well, all that would surely be nice. But how exactly are we to convince Syria and Iran that they should do what the Iraq Study Group thinks they should do? The “United States,” says the ISG somewhat redundantly, “should engage directly with Iran and Syria.” There is, however, little reason to think that such talks would yield progress in the desired direction.
In the Iranian case, one indicator of interest—or, more accurately, lack of interest—in negotiations is that on May 28, even as talks were in fact being held in Baghdad between the American and Iranian ambassadors, the Tehran regime was detaining four Iranian-Americans on fabricated charges. Another is that the Iranians have been stepping up the flow of funds, munitions, and trainers to support terrorism in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Both Syria and Iran are also deeply complicit in backing Hamas, Hizballah, and other radical groups working to undermine two other democracies in the Middle East: namely, Israel and Lebanon.
The ISG report suggests that Syria and Iran have an interest in an “Iraq that does not disintegrate and destabilize its neighbors and the region.” That may be so—but not if it means that Iraq emerges as a democratic ally of the United States and an active partner in the war against terrorism. For a terrorism-sponsoring Iranian regime, that would be the worst outcome imaginable. Much better, from the strategic perspective of both Syria and Iran, to continue fomenting chaos in Iraq so as to prevent the emergence of a unified state capable of threatening them.
Syria and especially Iran have been waging a proxy war against the United States in Iraq that could well end with Iran as the dominant player in most of the country. By means of the Jaish al Mahdi and other front groups, Tehran is doing in Iraq what it has already done with Hizballah in Lebanon: expanding its sphere of influence. Why should Ayatollah Khameini and his inner circle voluntarily put a stop to a policy that appears to be achieving their objectives at relatively low cost?
Tehran might veer from its belligerent course if it feared serious military and economic retaliation, ranging from an embargo on refined-petroleum imports to air strikes against the ayatollahs’ nuclear installations. But with a few brave and prophetic exceptions like Senator Joseph Lieberman, who has continued to call attention to Iranian aggression, there is scant political support in the United States for such a tough policy, however justified it may be.
Nor, for that matter, is there significant support for the opposite policy—that is, in paying the substantial bribes that might induce Iran and Syria to change their behavior. That would probably involve, at a minimum, giving the Syrians a free hand to dominate Lebanon and the Iranians a free hand to develop nuclear weapons. The ISG report shied away from recommending such unpalatable concessions. Instead, it proposed a number of incentives that were either insufficient (increased trade and diplomatic relations with the U.S., which Tehran has shown no interest in pursuing) or unobtainable (the unilateral return of the Golan Heights to Syria, which the Israeli government has shown no interest in granting).
The kind of negotiated solution with Iraq’s neighbors envisioned by the ISG and by political figures like Senators Lugar and Clinton would depend on a combination of very enticing carrots and very big sticks. Neither is in the offing.
_____________
-
What about partitioning Iraq, either into three separate states or into some sort of confederation of regional authorities? Does that offer a better solution?
A degree of federalism in Iraq is obviously a good idea, and one that has been embraced by almost everyone involved in the debate over the war. But the status quo already gives virtually complete autonomy to the Kurdish region and a lesser but still significant amount of autonomy to other provinces. Going significantly beyond this would create major problems, some of which were aptly summarized by the ISG:
Because Iraq’s population is not neatly separated, regional boundaries cannot be easily drawn. All eighteen Iraqi provinces have mixed populations, as do Baghdad and most other major cities in Iraq. A rapid devolution could result in mass population movements, collapse of the Iraqi security forces, strengthening of militias, ethnic cleansing, destabilization of neighboring states, or attempts by neighboring states to dominate Iraqi regions.
To these well-founded warnings, two points should be added. First, most Iraqis do not support partition: in an April poll, only 36 percent said they believed the country would be better off if divided into three or more separate entities. Not unexpectedly, the strongest support for the idea comes from the Kurdish region, while among Iraq’s Arab population there is a countervailing desire to keep the country whole. Even proposals for greater regional autonomy meet a mixed response, with some Shiites in favor but many joining the Sunnis in opposition. It would be hard to impose on Iraqis a solution they do not themselves favor.
Furthermore, even if we could somehow partition Iraq—and no one has put forth a credible plan for splitting up multi-sectarian metropolises like Baghdad and Mosul—it is not at all clear that the resulting mini-states would be any more peaceful or stable than today’s (nominally) unitary polity. At present, there is considerable turmoil in southern and western Iraq even though the former region is almost exclusively Shiite and the latter almost exclusively Sunni. We could expect even tougher struggles for power within individually constituted “Iraqistans,” not to speak of war among the three mini-states themselves. To cite just one potential source of discord: absent some kind of ironclad outside guarantee, no Sunni state, lacking its own natural resources, could possibly trust a Shiite-dominated government to share its oil wealth equitably.
There is one set of conditions under which a partition might indeed make sense and even be stable: if it were to come about as a result of negotiations among the major participants, and if it were enforced by a sizable foreign-troop contingent. The model is Bosnia. But the Dayton Accords ending that conflict were struck only after years of terrible bloodletting that exhausted all of the parties, and even so the agreement depended on a NATO troop presence and a quasi-colonial structure of international governance that are still in place over a decade later.
We are nowhere near such a solution in Iraq, and even if it could be struck it would not accomplish what most advocates of partition want, which is a withdrawal of American troops. On the contrary, a serious partition plan of this kind would require an indefinite, long-term presence by our forces—at least 450,000 soldiers, if we are to have the same troop-to-civilian ratio as in Bosnia. Despite claims to the contrary by Henry Kissinger and others, it is hard to imagine that nations like India or Indonesia would volunteer sizable numbers of their own troops to lessen our burden. They certainly have not done so in the past, notwithstanding considerable American pleading and arm-twisting. Yet without such outside supervision, any de-facto partition would result not in less violence but in a great deal more, at least in the short run.
_____________
What about a new strongman in Baghdad? In the abstract, such a proposal—call it Saddam Lite—cannot be ruled out on moral grounds: a soft authoritarianism would be preferable to today’s violent chaos. But it hardly seems practicable. By definition, a dictator requires the support of a strong army and police force. The Iraqi Security Forces, however, are too weak and too divided to control the country even on behalf of a representative government. Would they be more effective fighting on behalf of a dictator drawn from a single one of Iraq’s sectarian communities? And how would such a strongman gain their allegiance?
The one candidate who has been mentioned for this position is Ayad Allawi, who in 2004-2005 served as Iraq’s (appointed) prime minister. But Allawi appears to enjoy greater support among neighboring Sunni states than in Iraq itself, and there are no grounds for supposing he would be able to win the loyalty of the Iraqi Security Forces, much less use them to impose his diktat on the rest of the country. However ineffectual the Maliki government may be, we would be foolish to repeat the mistake we made in South Vietnam, where the American-sanctioned overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963 resulted in a succession of rulers who proved even less satisfactory.
Then there is the more cold-blooded approach: accepting that nothing can prevent a civil war after most of our troops are gone and, instead of trying to limit the carnage, simply picking a side in the hope that it will prevail. This is indeed practicable, though many Americans might find the consequences hard to stomach. One need only recall the Sunni captives who in 2005 were allegedly tortured in the basement of Iraq’s interior ministry before being rescued by U.S. and Iraqi troops. In a real civil war, such stories would multiply a thousandfold, except that there would be no hope of rescue for those who fell into the hands of sectarian foes. If the U.S. were to back the more numerous Shiites—which in practice would mean backing not only the government but also militias like the Jaish al Mahdi and the Badr Brigade—we would assume a measure of moral complicity in whatever atrocities they might commit.
Moreover, even if the Shiites were to win decisively and rapidly, the outcome, at least in the short term, would likely empower the most radical elements among them, men of the gun like Moqtada al Sadr rather than men of peace like Ayatollah Ali Sistani. It would also signal a major increase in Iranian influence.
But in any case there can be no guarantee of a rapid and decisive victory. As I mentioned earlier, the Shiites, numerous though they are, are split among competing factions that may not cooperate effectively even against a common foe like the Sunnis. For their part, Iraq’s Sunnis possess great skill at unconventional warfare—as we have seen over the past four years—and would enjoy virtually unlimited access to arms and financing from neighboring Sunni states intent on blocking a Shiite takeover.
_____________
A cynical decision to throw in our lot with the Shiites might thus eventuate in a civil conflict that could drag on for years without resolution, and that would have dire consequences for the entire region. In their Brookings study, Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack surveyed three decades’ worth of recent civil wars from Congo to Lebanon. None, they found, was confined within the borders drawn neatly on maps. Such wars export refugees, terrorists, militant ideologies, and economic woes. This fallout destabilizes neighboring states, which in turn usually intervene to limit the damage or to expand their own spheres of influence. In the worst case, Byman and Pollack conclude, such spillover “can have truly catastrophic effects,” and in their opinion Iraq has “all the earmarks” of a worst case. That is easy enough to understand: with its vast oil wealth, there is far more to fight over in Iraq than in Congo or Chechnya.
Instead of backing one side in a civil war, Byman and Pollack therefore advocate a containment approach, to be effectuated by stationing forces along Iraq’s borders. This would presumably be a means of limiting American casualties while still averting the worst consequences of the carnage to come.
But this approach, too, has problems. Even if U.S. troops moved to the periphery, they would have to maintain logistical links to the outside world and undertake patrolling around their bases. Both activities would leave them vulnerable to insurgent attacks. And, as we have seen in the Green Zone in Baghdad, insurgents are becoming adept at “indirect fire”—mortars and rockets—that can surmount the highest walls. As long as U.S. troops remained in Iraq, they would continue to suffer casualties.
If the downside of the containment scenario is clear, its potential benefits are murky. Can we really expect sizable numbers of U.S. troops to remain in Iraq and do nothing while, a few miles away, ethnic cleansing and possibly even genocide are occurring? The “CNN effect”—the impact of lurid pictures of violence being broadcast continually around the world—could be devastating both for the morale of our armed forces and for Americans at home, to say nothing of what it would do to our international standing. In the Islamic world, it would only further reinforce the impression that we care nothing for Muslim lives and that we invaded Iraq only for its oil—the same myths that have fed terrorist recruiting.
A second problem concerns what exactly our troops would do to contain the civil war. Of course they could keep neighboring states from sending conventional troop formations into Iraq. But that is not very likely to happen in any case. Much harder to handle would be the kind of infiltration that already occurs, disguised as part of the normal commercial and tourist traffic in and out of Iraq. If we have not succeeded in stopping terrorists from entering the country today, or from leaving it to train in Iran and then return, smaller troop contingents would have a commensurately smaller chance of success.
And how would this rump U.S. force deal with massive refugee flows? Would it actively intervene to prevent Iraqi civilians from exiting to safety? If not, nearby states—including such American allies as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Jordan—could be swamped with “displaced persons.” But if we stop Iraqis at the border, we would be assuming responsibility for their fate. If we intend to avoid a Srebrenica-style horror, we would have to set up, administer, and protect giant refugee camps—what Byman and Pollack call “catch basins.” Such camps tend to become breeding grounds of extremism and terror. How would our forces react to attempts to organize terrorist groups in them? Would we police the camps from within even while protecting them from without? In that case, we would be forced to undertake exactly the same kind of urban counterinsurgency in which our combat forces are engaged today, from Baquba to Baghdad.
_____________
-
Finally, there is the ISG’s plan, incorporated in the proposed legislation before the Senate, to use a scaled-down U.S. force for counterterrorist and training missions. As I noted at the outset, advocates of this approach rarely come up with a figure, and when they do it tends to be very small—5,000, 20,000, possibly as many as 40,000 troops. But if such a strategy is to amount to more than a tissue-thin rhetorical cover for a rush to the exits, implementing it would require a much more substantial commitment.
The Center for a New American Security, a centrist Democratic think tank, has released a “phased transition plan” by James Miller and Shawn Brimley that calls for 60,000 troops to remain in Iraq at the end of 2008 to carry out the tasks in question over the next three or four years. The figure would reflect a big decrease in combat strength and a big increase in adviser strength, with the latter climbing from today’s level of fewer than 5,000 embedded advisers to 20,000 or so.
Creating that many advisers would require breaking up at least eight Brigade Combat Teams (out of the Army’s total of 43) in order to make use of their officers and NCO’s—something that cannot be done while the surge is going on and every available brigade is needed in Iraq or Afghanistan. Those advisers, in turn, would need a substantial support structure to keep them fed and supplied; aircraft to provide firepower as well as a means of transportation, surveillance, and medical evacuation; doctors and nurses to tend to their injuries; and Quick Reaction Forces to bail them out of trouble. The figure of 60,000 personnel would thus appear to be a very bare-bones estimate indeed.
Bing West and Owen West, a father-son team of distinguished Marine veterans, have come out with their own, slightly more robust version of this plan. They write in Slate:
A full-fledged Plan B would leave about 80,000 U.S. troops in Iraq in 2009, about half as many as will be in-country at the height of the surge. The adviser corps would nearly quadruple, to 20,000 troops, with another 25,000 in four combat brigades and special-forces units, plus 30,000 logistics troops. Another 5,000 Americans will live on the grounds of the new U.S. embassy in Baghdad, where they will rarely venture out. A comparative handful of American diplomats, called Provincial Reconstruction Teams, currently live with U.S. brigades. Far more are needed. Another 15,000 American contractors would provide security and training functions, up from 10,000 today. In addition, the number of foreign contractors who provide food and logistics to the U.S. military would remain steady at 90,000, or drop.
The Wests propose to maintain this deployment for at least a decade.
The West plan assuredly provides a greater margin of safety than the proposal from the Center for a New American Security. But it also dramatically underlines the fact that a realistic Plan B focused on counter-terrorism and advising cannot at the same time achieve the departure of “all” or “almost all” or perhaps even “most” U.S. troops any time soon, as is demanded by a large section of the American public.
Even if implemented along the Wests’ tough lines, moreover, such a strategy would remain a very iffy proposition in Iraq’s current security environment. Rapidly downsizing from today’s 160,000 troops to 80,000 or fewer would risk a collapse of the Iraqi Security Forces and indeed of the country’s entire government. Over the past several years, in one form or another, we repeatedly tried to implement a strategy of “as the Iraqis stand up, we will stand down,” and just as repeatedly we learned that the Iraqis on their own were incapable of standing up. Even with advisers to help them, they found themselves hopelessly outmatched by the world’s most deadly and depraved terrorists. That is why in 2006, before the surge, Iraq was on the brink of all-out civil war.
Adviser strategies work best in countries, like El Salvador in the 1980’s or the Philippines in the 1950’s, where longstanding and robust military services already exist. That has not been the case in Iraq ever since we demolished the Iraqi security infrastructure in 2003. In such a situation, leaving behind a small number of American advisers would place both them and the Iraqis in real jeopardy, no matter how many Quick Reaction Forces were standing by. Advisers, after all, would not be able to stay on giant bases. To do their job properly, they would have to operate alongside Iraqi troops in the field. Casualties would be inevitable, perhaps even as many as we are suffering today.
The use of Special Operations Forces (SOF) under these conditions—included in the ISG plan and vigorously advocated by Congressman Jack Murtha and others—would also run high risks, again with uncertain payoffs. Such forces have had little enough success against terrorists in unfriendly states like Iran and Syria, or even in politically ambivalent states like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. In order to be effective, special operators must have access to good intelligence that can only be generated on the ground. They also need a permissive political climate, allowing them to swoop in without worrying about diplomatic ramifications, plus a relatively high degree of assurance that substantial rescue forces are available to bail them out of a jam.
All of those fortuitous conditions exist today in Iraq, allowing our SOF raiders to roll up more jihadist desperados there than anywhere else in the world. But even so there are heavy limitations on what the most skilled special operators can accomplish. The presence in Iraq of the Joint Special Operations Command—comprising Delta Force, SEAL’s, and other “Tier 1” operators—has not prevented terrorists at various times from turning cities like Falluja and Baquba into redoubts of horror.
A recent Los Angeles Times article summarizes what U.S. troops found in Baquba when our forces finally stormed the city:
For more than a year, hundreds of masked gunmen loyal to al Qaeda cruised this capital of their self-declared state, hauling Shiite Muslims from their homes and leaving bodies in the dusty, trash-strewn streets.
They set up a religious court and prisons, aid stations and food stores. And they imposed their fundamentalist interpretation of Islam on a population that was mostly too poor to flee and too terrified to resist.
If Special Operations Forces could not prevent the establishment under their noses of a Taliban-style “Islamic state” in Baquba during the past year, how much luck would they have operating from Kuwait or the Kurdish region, as suggested by proponents of this approach? It would be like trying to police Boston from Washington, D.C.
_____________
If none of these strategies holds out a serious hope of success, what, then, does? Time and again in Iraq, we have seen that substantial ground forces, if properly employed, can indeed rout terrorists. Consider the success of offensives since 2004 in Falluja, Najaf, Tal Afar, Qaim, Hit, Ramadi, and Baquba. In the past, the problem with many of these operations was that we lacked enough troops to sustain a long-term presence after taking the city. Now, as a combined result of the surge, greater cooperation from Iraqi tribes, and more effective Iraqi fighting forces, we may finally have gathered enough strength to execute, at least in some critical locales, all phases of the “clear, hold, and build” approach that is at the heart of successful counterinsurgency warfare.
It would be extremely short-sighted if, as a result of war-weariness, we were to abort this classic strategy before it has had a chance to be fully implemented. As I noted at the outset, early signs have been positive: U.S. and Iraqi troops have been reducing violence in Baghdad and surrounding areas. In late July, returning from an eight-day visit to the front lines, Kenneth Pollack and his Brookings colleague Michael O’Hanlon, both of whom have been harshly critical of the administration’s “miserable handling of Iraq,” reported in a widely cited New York Times op-ed that they were “surprised by the gains” being made. “We are finally getting somewhere in Iraq, at least in military terms,” they wrote.
But counterinsurgency operations cannot be concluded as swiftly as an armored blitzkrieg. This is not a three-day or three-week or three-month offensive. It will take up to a year to see if current operations are bearing fruit.
The strain on U.S. forces, especially the army, is great. Nevertheless, the current force level can be maintained through at least the spring of next year. Thereafter, we could begin to draw down troops at the rate of one brigade a month until August, when we would be down to a pre-surge force of 15 Brigade Combat Teams or about 140,000 troops. This, assuming we stick with the current schedule of 15-month tours of duty, could then be maintained through 2009, with adjustments up or down at the recommendation of General Petraeus.
While soldiers in Iraq naturally yearn for home, morale remains high, reenlistment rates are at record levels, and troops in the field often express to visitors their desire to “finish the job.” Advocates of withdrawal who claim to speak for the men and women in camouflage are not listening to what most of them actually say. Nor do they consider the implications of pulling them out in defeat. Coming on the heels of so many years of hard work and sacrifice, a political decision to give up the fight would have a devastating impact on morale in the armed forces, no doubt leading, as it did after the Vietnam war, to an exodus of veteran NCO’s and junior officers. That could negate one of the supposed benefits of withdrawal—namely, an immediate improvement in our military readiness to deal with other crises around the world.
_____________
This is not an argument for staying in Iraq at current levels indefinitely. Sooner or later, we will have to draw down our forces. It therefore makes sense to undertake now the kind of detailed planning that will be needed to effect a transition to a smaller force, perhaps 80,000 to 100,000 strong. Assuming sufficient political support at home—and that is by no means inconceivable, if the situation on the ground continues to improve— such a force could remain in Iraq for many years, focusing, as the ISG proposed, on tasks like advising local security forces and hunting down terrorists. But while the ISG approach makes sense in the long term, moving to a smaller force right now, as so many critics of the administration urge, would constitute an unacceptable risk.
The more security that our “surge” forces create and consolidate today, the greater the probability that a transition will work tomorrow. If we start withdrawing troops regardless of the consequences, we will not only put our remaining soldiers at greater risk but, as things inevitably turn nastier, imperil public support for any level of commitment, whether at 160,000 or 60,000.
Notwithstanding some positive preliminary results, the surge might still fail in the long run if Iraqis prove incapable of reaching political compromises even in a more secure environment. But, for all its faults and weaknesses, the surge is the least bad option we have. Its opponents, by contrast, have been loudly trying to beat something with nothing. If they do not like President Bush’s chosen strategy, the onus is on them to propose a credible alternative that could avert what would in all probability be the most serious military defeat in our history. So far, they have come up empty.
—August 8, 2007
http://www.commentarymagazine.com/cm/main/viewArticle.html?id=10920&page=all
-
Replying to the David Gardner piece - since you asked for comments :), I found it loaded with bias and sloppy with facts. For example, quoting Gardner: "After his (Petraeus) withdrawal, however,two-thirds of Mosul's security forces defected to the insurgency and the rest went down like fairground ducks. His forces appear not to have noticed, moreover, that Saudi-inspired jihadis had established a bridgehead in Mosul before the war had even started." Sounds a bit overstated and I thought there was no foreign fighter or jihad movement in Iraq before America broke the 'peace'. The same people also criticize us when former insurgents join the security forces. He rips Rumsfeld, Bremer, Maliki and Petraeus. Really everyone it seems except terrorists and suicide bombers.
When I smell bias like that I look for other writings. What Israel built on Israeli land he called illegal settlements. He says Hizbollah was born to parents of Israel and US for our sponsorship of their aggression and that Arafat led a cause of terror because he "felt swindled" in Oslo: http://www.christusrex.org/www1/news/ft-8-6-06a.html
-
Doug, Thanks for your response. I honsetly know nothing of this writer and happend upon this piece while searching for articles concerning our strategy in Iraq.
Bias I can deal with. You have to admit a lot of articles posted here are loaded with bias.
What you don't seem to do is argue that at least in some context this mans article is for the most part true....even if it is "overstated or sloppy with the facts"
I mean you didn't argue any part of this article to be a lie or do you?
See.....We accuse the liberal media of onley reporting on the negatives of the war......but yet their stories are also true, something we seem to have a hard time accepting.
How about those 110,000 ak47's and the 80,000 pistols that we lost....
There in lies my biggest gripe about the war in Iraq.....incompitance and a resolve to win.....
My idea of how we should have proceeded with this war is.......Since we opted to go in, in mass we should have put that country in lock down and slowley opened it up as peace was restored.....this we should have done from the start we never did and even with the TOO LATE surge were still not committed to a total war.
You can't fight a war onley going half way and expect to win.
I think we could have won....or could win....but we would have to get real mean and bloody....and we are not willing to do this.....so we will lose.
In closing let me ask you a question........after 4years or however long weve been in Iraq.....Are you satisfied with how things have gone and are going....and do you think its been worth the money, the lives of both American and Iraqi's and the cost thats yet to be paid....in additional lives and the rebuilding of Iraq aftter this is someday over?
Let me additionally ask you what is considered a victory in Iraq? TG
-
Tom, Results out of Iraq are mixed and changing. Yes, I meant bias in the context that we all have some. The difference in my mind is that most proponents don't intentionally tout successes or justifications without acknowledging the enormous costs, risks, sacrifices and setbacks. Admittedly, they sometimes go unspoken. I get the impression from writers like this that we are the purveyors of evil or just bumbling idiots.
Anyway, I would look to critics and opponents for details on alternative strategies; Buzz's post above is a great example. Details on our actual, current strategies are harder to get accurately because they can't tell us everything without also telling everyone else. Still I find recent posts with Petraeus in his own words helpful as well as accounts from certain reporters who are close to the commanders and the battles.
Do I agree "at least in some context this mans article is for the most part true"? - No, I certainly don't think he made his case that Petraeus is either incompetent or lacks the will to win or that someone else could easily do better what Maliki is trying to do. We were wrong to think this would be easier.
"you didn't argue any part of this article to be a lie or do you? See...We accuse the liberal media of only reporting on the negatives of the war." - No, not lies, just not telling a big enough picture to give an accurate picture. He seems unaware of recent progress or recent strategies though he is no doubt more informed than I am about mistakes made by Rumsfeld etc. in the past, in hindsight. I resent the attack on Bremer. I agree putting an American in charge was a mistake. I agree Bremer made mistakes, in hindsight. Those were tough decisions with compelling reasons on both sides. Far as I know he was a brave, tough American who did his best and risked his life when asked to serve.
I really don't appreciate the slam on Petraeus while he commands troops in harm's way. If this author is correct and Petraeus is later determined to be a bum, then I guess the author will have bragging rights. In the meantime, who knows what harm that does. My guess is that the negativity plays a role in the suicides and helps keep up the spirits of the surviving enemy who is also having a long, tough war. If this mission were viewed as worthwhile and heroic these soldiers might be better able to live with the gruesome details they experience.
"How about those 110,000 ak47's and the 80,000 pistols that we lost...." - The wording doesn't sound like it came from someone who knows exactly what happened. Not long ago I twice drove over an 8-lane, 2000 ft. bridge within 3 hours of it tumbling into the Mississippi. The next evening I walked into a dinner by chance with the Republican leader of the statehouse who said off the record that the recently turned down state gas tax increase would now be a reality because of this (in addition to a likely Federal increase) even though no proposed repair or replacement was turned down for lack of funding and even though we don't even yet know the cause of the collapse. Tom, I don't know what happened to the guns. Unless it's an accounting error, it's a potentially negative development (understatement). If your question is whether I think this negative development, if true, bolsters the case for the other, all-negative conclusions - I would have to say no.
-
Doug, One mans terrorist is another mans patriot. I'am sure there are many in Iraq who view Bush as a terrorist. Certainly many here in the U.S. view him as a bumbling idiot.
concerning your 2nd paragragh and strategy,also going along with the questions I asked you at the end of my last post.....how do you feel about our strategy over the last 4 years? Past history is ussally quite telling(generally speaking)
As far as Paterous and doing better....I have full confidence in his ability, although I also beleive his power is limited and just another Washington yes man......Mahliki is showing signs of being a back stabber....certainly hes proven to be impotent at the very least with stronger ties to tribe than country.....lets not forget hes got no Sunni's in his gov. at this time.
I'am not about slamming our military or its leaders certainly not the troops nor am I about undermining them in anyway.
They perform briliantly when allowed to perform.....
As for the 110,000 ak 47's and the 80,000 pistols....I think we both know that its not an accounting error, and we both know that weve failed to secure weapons dumps in the past......I'am not looking to bolster any negative conclusions.....just as to weather it happend or not and where the weapons went.
Evidently there must be some substance to it.
I think neither you nor I know what the strategy in Iraq is.....you made evident of it by stating that we are not told everything so that our enemy dosen't find it out also :wink:
I onley hope that somebody does know what it is. :-D
You also did not answer my question as to what would be considered a"victory" in Iraq.
I guess we can say we got Saddam.....thats a good thing.....
I guess by some reports we did draw in lots of AQ into the country to kill.....though I'am not totally sure how we identify dead as AQ.....since we are the onley ones in uniform.......do they have AQ ID cards?
I still have to scratch my head in confusion since we wrong in our reasons for going into Iraq.....at least the ones stated to the American people.....no I'am not dragging up WMD again.....but that was the reason...and its pretty evident that a free and democratic society is pretty much out the window.......
We spoke about the Sadaam/Kurd thing yesterday as I stated that was at least twenty years past history.
I just sit here and try to think why we are really in Iraq....going back to prior to our invasion.......I don't think we can justify that Iraq was a state sponser of terror....cause we could do that with most of the mideast. Certainly thats not grounds for a all out invvasion of country and over thorw of its government
I guess I kinda got a problem with expending our military our money and resources and the damage weve done to Iraq and its people....just to take Saddaam from power........Oh yea and all the low level AQ weve killed as well as Sunni's and Shittes.....speaking of which do you think that some of those(Sunni's and Shittes) that we kill would be considered patriots by some of thier own people.....? How about Sadr.....terrorist or patriot?
Hopefully we can pull something good out of this Iraq thingy.....at this point I have to say it just has not been worth it.
Do you think its been worth it so far.....I think I asked you this also in my last post.
TG
-
I have been trying to stimulate some conversation from some of the "hawks" that fly this forum....so far not much has transpired....I do thank Doug for engaging me....with practical reasoning.
While I await his response from my previous post I did a little googling over this missing weapons supplied by us to the Iraqis.....
A little googling was all that was needed evidently this is more widley known than I thought.
Heres what I found.....missing 110,000 ak47's from a190,000 supplied by us to train Iraqi troops, also missing 80,000 pistols 80,000 pieces of body armor and 25,000 helmets.
Who got them? apparently troops we trained who defected to the other side.....there in lies the problem in Iraq. We are trying to help people who don't like us(understatement) or even want our help....
I think we have little to complain about when it comes to Iran supplying arms to Iraqi's when weve lost the numbers of military hardware thats been reported.....forget what we don't know to be missing. :-P
Heres another intresting piece of info I found out......GENERAL PATREOUS was leading the security training when these weapons came up missing.......good to know hes now leading the whole show. :roll:
Will wonders never cease.
If your a military carreer guy I guess its a good for business to train those who want to kill you.....guess the deal would be don't teach them toooo much. :-o
WHO ARE WE FIGHTING AGAIN? :| TG
-
http://www.military.com/NewsContent/...146880,00.html
An Iraqi man saved the lives of four U.S. Soldiers and eight civilians when he intercepted a suicide bomber during a Concerned Citizens meeting in the town of al-Arafia Aug. 18.
The incident occurred while Soldiers from 3rd Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, were talking with members of the al-Arafia Concerned Citizens, a volunteer community group, at a member’s house.
"I was about 12 feet away when the bomber came around the corner," said Staff Sgt. Sean Kane, of Los Altos, Calif., acting platoon sergeant of Troop B, 3-1 Cav. "I was about to engage when he jumped in front of us and intercepted the bomber as he ran toward us. As he pushed him away, the bomb went off."
The citizen’s actions saved the lives of four U.S. Soldiers and eight civilians.
Kane felt the loss personally because he had met and interacted with his rescuer many times before the incident.
"He was high-spirited and really believed what the group (Concerned Citizens) was doing," Kane said. "I have no doubt the bomber was trying to kill American Soldiers. It was very calculated the way the bomber tried to do it. If he hadn’t intercepted him, there is no telling how bad it could have been."
Kane believes the citizen is a hero.
"He could have run behind us or away from us, but he made the decision to sacrifice himself to protect everyone. Having talked with his father, I was told that even if he would have known the outcome before hand, he wouldn’t have acted differently."
Capt. Brian Gilbert, of Boise, Idaho, the commander of Company D, 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry Regiment, currently attached to 3-1 Cavalry, echoed Kane’s sentiment.
"I spoke with the father," Gilbert said. "He said he has no remorse in his son’s death because he died saving American Soldiers."
Later that night, the Concerned Citizens group contacted the local National Police director, Lt. Col. Samir, with the location of the al-Qaeda cell believed to be responsible for the attack. The National Police immediately conducted a raid that resulted in four arrests.
Despite the citizen’s death, Gilbert is encouraged by the cooperation between citizens and the Iraqi National Police.
"The effort of the Concerned Citizens group has made the area much safer," he said. "They are proud of who they are and their area, and want to get rid of the terrorists in their area."
Gilbert also praised the Iraqi National Police’s role in eliminating insurgents in the area.
"The cooperation between them and the Concerned Citizens has been key," Gilbert said. "The NP has done a great job of responding to the tips they have been given by the group."
Gilbert said he believes the area is improving because of the efforts of local citizens. The death, while unfortunate, demonstrated how close many in the area have become with the American Soldiers operating there.
"I consider many in the town friends, and I know they feel the same," Gilbert said. "This is a tough situation, but we’ll move on and try to prevent things like this from happening again. I’ve talked with his family and told them how brave their son was. This is a huge loss for everyone involved."
-
Powerhouse GOP firm working to undermine Iraqi PM
By Ed Henry
CNN White House Correspondent
CRAWFORD, Texas (CNN) -- A powerhouse Republican lobbying firm with close ties to the White House has begun a public campaign to undermine the government of Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, CNN has confirmed.
This comes as President Bush is publicly taking great pains to reiterate his support for the embattled Iraqi leader.
Al-Maliki's government has come under sharp criticism and scrutiny from Washington lawmakers and officials, as reflected in Thursday's National Intelligence Estimate.
A senior Bush administration official told CNN the White House is aware of the lobbying campaign by Barbour Griffith & Rogers because the firm is "blasting e-mails all over town" criticizing al-Maliki and promoting the firm's client, former interim Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, as an alternative to al-Maliki.
But the senior administration official insisted that White House officials have "absolutely no involvement" in the campaign to remove al-Maliki, nor have they given it their blessing.
"There's just no connection whatsoever," the official said. "There's absolutely no involvement."
When asked whether the White House will ask the prominent Republican lobbying firm to stop lashing out at al-Maliki, the official said, "I don't rule it out."
Pressed on why allies of the White House would be contradicting the president publicly, the senior administration official said of the lobbyists, "They're making a lot of money."
And National Security Council spokesman Gordon Johndroe told CNN the Bush administration continues to support al-Maliki and the Iraqi Presidency Council, "and we'll continue to work with them on the best way forward in Iraq."
"I don't think they asked the White House before they signed their contract with Mr. Allawi," he said.
Asked earlier why Republican lobbyists would want to undercut the administration's public statements, Johndroe said, "Maybe it's a really good contract."
The lobbying firm boasts the services of two onetime foreign policy hands of President Bush: Ambassador Robert Blackwill, the former deputy national security adviser who was Bush's envoy to Iraq and helped form Allawi's interim government in 2004, and Philip Zelikow, former counselor to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.
Ingrid Henick, a vice president for Barbour Griffith & Rogers, confirmed the firm has signed a contract to "provide strategic counsel for and on behalf of Dr. Allawi."
Henick refused to comment on why such a prominent Republican firm would work to hurt al-Maliki, whom President Bush has repeatedly backed as the best hope for forging political reconciliation in Iraq.
According to an e-mail obtained by CNN, Barbour Griffith & Rogers sent a mass message Tuesday to congressional staffers with the subject line, "A New Leader in Iraq," promoting Allawi as a potential successor to al-Maliki.
"Please see today's news items regarding the increased skepticism of the Maliki government in The New York Times (embedded), The Washington Post and The Wall Street Journal (attached), along with a joint statement made by Sens. Carl Levin and John Warner," the e-mail said.
A second e-mail from the lobbying firm sent congressional staffers a copy of a recent Washington Post op-ed column by Allawi that said Iraq will fall apart unless al-Maliki is forced out of power.
The outlines of the lobbying campaign were first reported by the news blog Iraqslogger.com.
The lobbying e-mails were sent Tuesday, the day after Levin called for the ouster of al-Maliki upon returning from an official trip to Iraq with Warner. Also on Tuesday, Bush appeared to be softening his support for al-Maliki at a news conference by expressing frustration with the pace of progress by the Iraqi government.
But on Wednesday, upset by media reports asserting he was backing away from the Iraqi leader, Bush clarified in a speech, "Prime Minister Maliki is a good guy, a good man with a difficult job, and I support him."
The e-mails to congressional staffers came from the e-mail address DrAyadAllawi@Allawi-for-Iraq.com.
But the bottom of the e-mail added this note of disclosure to congressional aides: "Barbour Griffith & Rogers, LLC has filed registration statements under the Foreign Agents Registration Act with regard to its representation and dissemination of information on behalf of Dr. Ayad Allawi."
"Yes, in fact, we recently filed forms with FARA," Henick told CNN.
But she would not provide details of the filing, which will reveal how much money the firm is making on the account and other details, because the Justice Department has not yet made the documents public.
Henick added that beyond the e-mails, the firm will also be directly lobbying members of the "U.S. government, Congress, the media and opinion leaders" on behalf of Allawi.
One Republican congressional aide who received the e-mails this week expressed surprise that a lobbying firm with such close ties to the White House would attack al-Maliki at such a pivotal time on the debate over the war, just weeks before Bush provides a progress report to the nation.
The lobbying firm was founded by conservative stalwarts Haley Barbour, the former Republican National Committee chairman and current governor of Mississippi; Lanny Griffith, who worked for the administration of former President George H.W. Bush; and Ed Rogers, an aide to former Presidents Ronald Reagan and Bush.
The official from the current Bush administration dismissed the effort, saying that there's a "lot of lobbying" on various issues and that the campaign against al-Maliki is just a "bunch of noise in Washington, D.C."
-
Sen. Warner: Iraq pullout should start in weeks
WASHINGTON (CNN) -- The influential former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee has called on President Bush to start the process of bringing U.S. troops home from Iraq in September.
Sen. John Warner, a Virginia Republican, said Thursday that a pullout was needed to spur Iraqi leaders to action.
He has recommended Bush announce the beginning of a U.S. withdrawal in mid-September, after a report is released from the top U.S. officials in Iraq, and that those troops should be back in the United States by Christmas.
"In my humble judgment, that would get everyone's attention -- the attention that is not being paid at this time," Warner said.
He added: "I really, firmly believe the Iraqi government, under the leadership of Prime Minister [Nuri] al-Maliki, let our troops down." VideoWatch Warner say he wants Bush to send a 'sharp' message »
In Texas, where Bush is on vacation, National Security Council spokesman Gordon Johndroe said the White House appreciated Warner's advice. But he said the president would wait for the recommendations of Gen. David Petraeus, the U.S. commander in Iraq, and the American ambassador in Baghdad, Ryan Crocker, before making any decisions.
"That will be the time, in September, to hear these reports and then make decisions about the way ahead," Johndroe said.
But he added, "I don't think that the president feels any differently about setting a specific timetable for withdrawal."
Warner opposed Bush's January decision to send nearly 30,000 additional U.S. troops to Iraq. But he has so far also opposed Democratic efforts to force Bush to start bringing U.S. troops home.
The "surge" campaign was aimed at buying time for Iraq's government to reach a political solution to the sectarian and insurgent warfare that has racked the country since the U.S. invasion in 2003.
The U.S. intelligence community's latest report on Iraq, released Thursday, found "measurable but uneven improvements" in security in recent months. However, it concluded that Iraq's political leaders "remain unable to govern effectively."
But Johndroe said the report also found that U.S. troops have "really helped to improve the security situation on the ground."
"If they were to leave anytime soon, those security gains could be lost," he said.
Democrats have tried to wind down the war since taking over Congress in January, but Senate Republicans have used filibuster tactics to stymie those efforts.
After Thursday's report, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid called on Republican senators to join Democrats to force Bush to change course -- and a senior Democratic leadership aide urged Warner to add his vote to those efforts.
"Will he [Warner] vote with us on anything? That is still the open and most important question," the aide said. "A recommendation to the president is different than voting for binding legislative language compelling the president to act."
Warner is one of the most respected voices in the Senate on military and national security issues.
Besides being a former Armed Services chairman, he was a secretary of the Navy in the 1970s. Warner served in the Navy in World War II and in the Marine Corps during the Korean War. He has been in the Senate for five consecutive terms.
He and the current Armed Services chairman, Michigan Democrat Carl Levin, recently returned from a visit to Baghdad with harsh words for the al-Maliki government.
Levin said Monday that Iraq's parliament should throw al-Maliki out of office and replace his government.
Warner said he would not join that call. "But in no way do I criticize it," he added.
Warner met at the White House earlier Thursday with Lt. Gen. Douglas Lute, the White House official responsible for coordinating Iraq issues.
Warner said the president and other leading Bush administration officials have repeatedly said the American commitment to Iraq was not open-ended.
"The time has come to put some meaningful teeth into those comments -- to back them up with some clear, decisive action," the senator said.
-
As far as I know, Warner is a relatively responsible and informed man, but unless this is some part of a polyrhythmic dance, the score of which we are unknowing, I have a visceral discomfort with the idea of the Commander in Chief being 535 Congressmen and Senators.
Also, as superficially appealing as this "put pressure on Malicki" argument may seem to be:
1) It often seems to be put forth by people whose true intention is for us to declare defeat and leave
2) It does not take into account what I believe to be the true direction of causality: Polticians do not lead, they follow. The reality on the ground will determine their behavior, and the reality on the ground will be described to us by General Petraeus in September. As best as I can tell, and this forum attests to my intense interest in all this I think, we can and are starting to make good things happen-- on the ground up, where our fellow Americans who have stepped forward, day by day show the Truth of what we are about and what we are up to.
In conclusion, my general attitude is that Congress, as it should have but has not done since it unanimously affirmed Petraeus, should STFU!!!
-
Tom,
Coulda, woulda, shoulda..... How will giving Al Qaeda and Iran both a big win by cutting and running help secure our country in this global war?
-
As readers of this forum know, I have high regard for Stratfor and intellectual honesty requires that I post the following piece, with which I disagree in important part because I think continued improvement on the ground can create political changes-- see "2)" of my previous post-- this of course leaves out the military issue of strain on our forces, which is real and which has been created by President Bush's obtuse denials of what was going on in 2003, 2004, 2005, and through November of 2006 and concommitant denial of the need to expand the size of our military. This is a point I have made several times around here-- Bush could have found it easy in political terms during the Presidential campaign to call for an increase because even Senator Kerry was calling for an increase of 40,000 or so, yet he did not. In 2004 it would have been MUCH easier to recruit than now!-- yes the President did not do so until after Republican loss of the House in November 2006.
Anyway, here is the Stratfor piece:
========================
Geopolitical Diary: Rethinking the Mission in Iraq
A new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq was issued Thursday. It made grim reading. It asserted that "Iraqi political leaders remain unable to govern effectively," and said that this is unlikely to change in the future. It did say that there had been measurable improvements in security, but that these were uneven and that they had not curtailed the general ability of insurgents to carry out attacks.
The report traced the problem back to its obvious roots. The Shia want to retain political dominance, while the Sunnis are not prepared to take a secondary role. The report also said that while security initiatives among the Sunnis represent the best hope for improving security, "we judge these initiatives will only translate into widespread accommodation and enduring stability if the Iraqi government accepts and supports them."
The strategy of the United States has been to use its forces to create a security environment in which a stable, pro-American government could be created in Baghdad and assume the responsibility for internal security using Iraqi forces under its command. The NIE is essentially stating that that strategy has been a failure. The improvements in the security environment are insufficient to create a stable Iraqi government and there is no motivation among Sunnis and Shia to create one anyway. It is simply not apparent that there is a solution.
It is hard to imagine that the much-awaited report from Gen. David Petraeus, scheduled to be released Sept. 15, is going to read much different. If it does, it will create an interesting situation in which the military and the intelligence community are deeply split. If that happens, the situation will be even more troubling. Fighting a war with a split like that would boggle the mind. We suspect that Petraeus will emphasize the improving security situation, concede that there is much to be done, but stay away from questions like political progress in Baghdad. If he is more optimistic, which we doubt, the difference between his report and the NIE will be one of focus or degree.
And that will pose the fundamental question for the United States: What is to be done? Maintaining the current strategy will have been rejected. Maintaining the same strategy with fewer troops makes even less sense. A slow withdrawal -- seemingly a reasonable choice -- makes the least sense. A staged pullout with U.S. forces continuing the same mission of aggressive security patrolling would eliminate any chance of success while incurring increased risk for the diminished force remaining.
The other alternative is a rapid and complete withdrawal. You can argue that this would leave it to the Iraqis to solve the problem. But that also is illusory. The most likely outcome of a rapid withdrawal would be a massive increase in Iranian influence and presence in Iraq, including the substantial possibility of Iranian forces entering Iraq and moving toward the Saudi border. With U.S. forces withdrawn, and some remaining in Kuwait, it would raise the serious question of the future of the Arabian Peninsula. Withdrawal would accept the rise of an Iranian regional power that would threaten to redefine the shape of the region. It is hard to see how any American president, no matter how badly he or she wanted out of Iraq, could live with the geopolitical and political consequences of Iran in a dominant regional role.
All three choices -- staying the course, slow withdrawal, quick withdrawal -- seem either to be unworkable or to have unacceptable consequences. That leaves remaining in Iraq but redefining the mission. The mission to date has failed. A new mission could be protecting the Arabian Peninsula from Iranian domination. This would end U.S. attempts to secure inhabited areas, and focus instead on becoming a blocking force to prevent Iran moving toward the south. In other words, withdraw to the south and west of the Euphrates and let the rest of Iraq go as it will.
This is not a new proposal from us. However, the NIE report, which makes it clear that the current strategy has failed, obviously raises the question of what is to be done. The two withdrawal strategies are each deeply flawed. That leaves the fourth strategy, the only contender, unless the United States is prepared to maintain its current posture indefinitely. As that isn't an option politically, we suspect that the blocking force concept will begin to emerge as a viable alternative.
-
GM, If you read my posts concerning Iraq, you will see my gripe is on strategy/ doing what it takes to win the war and the will to stick to it or adapt.
Like Crafty said in his Stratfor post Bush has sat on strategy since 2003 not made neccassary changes,and worn the tolerance of the American people,the American people have
had enough andregardless of what transpires in the surge.....It may already be too late.....
That also will affect our global war on terror in the next presidential election....Becuase if the American people want us out of Iraq bad enough they will be sure to elect someone who will get it done.....of course that will probably also translate to someone who is soft on the war on terror.
Cut and Run.....nah I'am not for that......though I may also be willing to conceed this war is lost.....esp if we dont change our ways and get real serious about what were doing.(I don't see that happening)
My view on the surge is that its a dog and pony show...with no real sustained effort and already talk of discontinueing it.....not sure whats the point of a two week surge(sarcasm).
I just don't think were willing to do what it takes to win in Iraq......and possibly the whole of the globe war on terror.
My opinon were fighting half assed.......
That I have some difficulty supporting.
TG
-
WSJ
Another Vietnam?
President Bush's analogy to Iraq is not inaccurate, just incomplete.
BY MAX BOOT
Friday, August 24, 2007 12:01 a.m. EDT
Ever since the mid-1970s, critics of American military involvement have warned that any decision to deploy armed forces abroad--in Lebanon and El Salvador in the 1980s, in Kuwait, Somalia, and Kosovo in the 1990s, and more recently in Iraq and Afghanistan--would result in "another Vietnam." Conversely, supporters of those interventions have adamantly resisted any Vietnam comparisons.
President George W. Bush boldly abandoned that template with his speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars on Wednesday. In a skillful bit of political jujitsu, he cited Vietnam not as evidence that the Iraq War is unwinnable, but to argue that the costs of giving up the fight would be catastrophic--just as they were in Southeast Asia.
This has met with predictable and angry denunciations from antiwar advocates who argue that the consequences of defeat in Vietnam weren't so grave. After all, isn't Vietnam today an emerging economic power that is cultivating friendly ties with the U.S.?
True, but that's 30 years after the fact. In the short-term, the costs of defeat were indeed heavy. More than a million people perished in the killing fields of Cambodia, while in Vietnam, those who worked with American forces were consigned, as Mr. Bush noted, to prison camps "where tens of thousands perished." Many more fled as "boat people," he continued, "many of them going to their graves in the South China Sea."
That assessment actually understates the terrible repercussions from the American defeat, whose ripples spread around the world. In the late 1970s, America's enemies seized power in countries from Mozambique to Iran to Nicaragua. American hostages were seized aboard the SS Mayaguez (off Cambodia) and in Tehran. The Red Army invaded Afghanistan. It is impossible to prove the connection with the Vietnam War, but there is little doubt that the enfeeblement of a superpower encouraged our enemies to undertake acts of aggression that they might otherwise have shied away from. Indeed, as Mr. Bush noted, jihadists still gain hope from what Ayman al Zawahiri accurately describes as "the aftermath of the collapse of the American power in Vietnam and how they ran and left their agents."
The problem with Mr. Bush's Vietnam analogy is not that it is inaccurate, but that it is incomplete. As he noted, "The tragedy of Vietnam is too large to be contained in one speech." If he chooses to return to the subject in future speeches, there are some other parallels he could invoke:
• The danger of prematurely dumping allied leaders. A chorus of voices in Washington, led by Sens. Carl Levin and Hillary Clinton, is calling on Iraqis to replace Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki. Even Mr. Bush and his ambassador to Baghdad, Ryan Crocker, have expressed disappointment with Mr. Maliki. They have been careful, however, to refrain from any calls for his ouster. That's wise, because we know from our experience in Vietnam the dangers of switching allied leaders in wartime.
In the early 1960s, American officials were frustrated with Ngo Dinh Diem, and in 1963 the Kennedy administration sanctioned a coup against him, in the hope of installing more effective leadership in Saigon. The result was the opposite: a succession of weak leaders who spent most of their time plotting to stay in power. In retrospect it's obvious that, for all his faults, we should have stuck with Diem.
Today we should stick with Mr. Maliki, imperfect as he is. He took office little more than a year ago after his predecessor, Ibraham al Jaffari, was forced out by American pressure for being ineffectual. The fact that we are bemoaning the same shortcomings in both Messrs. Jaffari and Maliki suggests that the problems are not merely personal but institutional. The Iraqi constitution, written at American instigation, gives little power to the prime minister. The understandable desire was to ward off another dictator, but we shouldn't now be complaining that the prime minister isn't able to exercise as much authority as we would like.
The only hope for long-term political progress is to limit the power of the militias--the real powers--which must start by curbing the violence which gives them much of their raison d'être. That is what the forces under Gen. David Petraeus's command are now doing. We'll need considerably more progress on the security front before we can expect any substantial political progress at the national level. In the meantime, we shouldn't hold Mr. Maliki to unrealistic expectations as we did with Diem.
• The danger of winning militarily and losing politically. In 1968, after Gen. Creighton Abrams took over as the senior U.S. military commander in South Vietnam, he began to change the emphasis from the kind of big-unit search-and-destroy tactics that Gen. William Westmoreland had favored, to the sort of population-protection strategy more appropriate for a counterinsurgency. Over the next four years, even as the total number of American combat troops declined, the communists lost ground.
By 1972 most of the south was judged secure and the South Vietnamese armed forces were able to throw back the Easter Offensive with help from lots of American aircraft but few American soldiers. If the U.S. had continued to support Saigon with a small troop presence and substantial supplies, there is every reason to believe that South Vietnam could have survived. It was no less viable than South Korea, another artificial state kept in existence by force of arms over many decades. But after the signing of the 1973 Paris Peace Accords, we all but cut off South Vietnam, even while its enemies across the borders continued to be resupplied by their patrons in Moscow and Beijing.
Following in Abrams's footsteps, Gen. Petraeus is belatedly pursuing classic counterinsurgency strategies that are paying off. The danger is that American politicians will prematurely pull the plug in Iraq as they did in Vietnam. If they do so, the consequences will be even worse, since Iraq is much more important strategically than Vietnam ever was.
• The danger of allowing enemy sanctuaries across the border. This a parallel that Mr. Bush might not be so eager to cite, because in many ways he is repeating the mistakes of Lyndon Johnson, who allowed communist forces to use safe rear areas in Cambodia, Laos, and North Vietnam to stage attacks into South Vietnam. No matter how much success American and South Vietnamese forces had, there were always fresh troops and supplies being smuggled over the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
Something similar is happening today in Iraq. Dozens of Sunni jihadists are entering Iraq from Syria every month. While not huge in absolute numbers, they are estimated to account for 80% to 90% of suicide attacks. The National Intelligence Estimate released yesterday finds that "Damascus is providing support" to various groups in Iraq "in a bid to increase Syrian influence." Meanwhile, the NIE notes, Iran "has been intensifying" its support for Shiite extremists, leading to a dramatic rise in attacks using explosively formed penetrators that can punch through any armor in the American arsenal.
The Bush administration has cajoled and threatened these states to stop their interference in Iraqi affairs, but their pleas have largely fallen on deaf ears. For all of Mr. Bush's reputed bellicosity, he has backed away from taking the kind of actions that might cause Syria and Iran to mend their ways. He has not, for instance, authorized "hot pursuit" of terrorists by American forces over the Iraqi border. Until the U.S. does more to cut off support for extremists within Iraq, it will be very difficult to get a grip on the security situation.
• The danger of not making plans for refugees. One of the great stains on American honor in Indochina was the horrible fate suffered by so many Vietnamese, Cambodians and Laotians who put their trust in us. When the end came we left far too many of them in the lurch, consigning them to prison, death or desperate attempts to escape.
There are many Iraqis who would be left in equally dire straits should the U.S. pull all or even a substantial portion of its forces out of the country. Tens of thousands of Iraqis have worked closely with our forces, whether as translators, security guards, police officers, civil servants or cabinet ministers. Many have already been targeted for death, and need to flee for their lives. Yet so far we have been accepting only a trickle of Iraqi refugees to our shores--a mere 200 in the first six months of this year.
We should take steps now to assure all those Iraqis who cooperate with us that visas and means of evacuation will be available to them if necessary. The U.S. government has been reluctant to do this for fear of admitting the possibility of failure, and perhaps facilitating an even greater "brain drain" from Iraq. But it would actually be easier for many to stay and serve in Iraq if they know that they and their families have a personal "exit strategy."
This does not, of course, exhaust the possible analogies between Iraq and Vietnam. Nor is it meant to suggest the parallels are exact; there are in fact substantial differences. Any historical comparison has to be handled with care and not swallowed whole. But there are important lessons to be learned from our Vietnam experience, and as President Bush noted, they are not necessarily the ones drawn by the doves who have made Vietnam "their" war.
Mr. Boot is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and author of "War Made New: Weapons, Warriors and the Making of the Modern World" (Gotham Books), just out in paperback.
-
Here is a Film looking into the bang up job that is being done in Iraq
http://noendinsightmovie.com/
If you ever needed a piece of media to explain to all the other morons out there how the U.S. funked up the whole occupation of Iraq, who was responsible, and all the mistakes, blunders, and broken promises, this is that movie.
The amount of utter ignorance, hubris, pride, and sheer gall on the behalf of some of the people in our government is appalling. And to think the country voted this guy back into office for another term.
Just so you know, this movie isn't some Michael Moore kind of movie, or a partisan film to discredit one side or the other. It's honest, on the level, and if you really want to know why things in Iraq are so fucked up today, this is what you need to see. It's actually kind of sad at some points, really, because when the movie is funny, it's usually about something that you have to laugh about because it's so absurd, sad, or just plain insane.
One interesting fact from the film: when the National Intelligence Council came out with their first National Intelligence Estimate (sometime after 2004, if I'm right), they created a summary and, to make sure that the president would read it, whittled it down to a special 1-page Executive Summary of their analysis.
Just one god damned page.
The president never read it.
Trust me, SEE THIS FILM. You owe it to yourself as an American.
-
Heard an NPR story on No End In Sight and it seems like an interesting watch. However, I have to admit that a truly objective film on the subject matter seems like an impossibility at this point in the game.
-
If National People's Radio is covering it, then I know what the film's agenda is..... :roll:
-
What ever the agenda is there is no hiding the fact that the Global war on Terror is not working and Iraq is now a death trap.
All those billions of dollars spent that Health care and Education will never see but thank god we are in a Country that hates us.
-
It's not so simple, Maxx,
Cutting and running gives both al qaeda and Iran a huge win, it also dooms those brave Iraqis that stood along side us and their families to horrific deaths. What lesson do you want to teach the world? Put enough bloody images on CNN and the left will undercut the American will to win. Just like in Vietnam, we'll abandon our allies to the tender mercies of our enemies. Is this good foreign policy? Is this the right thing to do?
If we throw our allies into the bloody jaws of the global jihad, do you really think it'll curl up and go to sleep? Forget we exist?
-
http://mypetjawa.mu.nu/archives/189136.php
Reality check on why we fight.
http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=2cd_1187778888
-
Who said anything about cutting and running? I served with 10th mountain over seas in AssCrackistan after 9/11 and I saw the reason's on why we fight and what we are fighting about.
A couple of my good friends had to stand out in the open to guard Some Pipelines..We thought they were gas lines and then found out they were Oil..Hmm Go figure.
Simple..There is nothing simple about sending your troops into a warzone on bad preperation and bad intell...Making up reasons to invade a country are not the ways to go about things and then coming back with the "Oh man..Our bad but since we are there" is not a vaild excuse.
Offering 20k to new recruits is they leave in a month to their new home in Iraq is also not a good way to treat our desperate youth..
Why we fight? A 5 year old boy was put on fire? While that is tragic and painfull..I don't feel that it is worth the lives of Anymore Americans. We have those problems going on here on our soil...MS 13 gangs running riot and other countless Gangs running riot and killing Americans BUT we should fight over seas to help a 5 year old boy? No..I just don't see it that way..Now this is just a Random example of problems on American soil..
I never said cut and run but I think the way we handled things and still going about things is wrong and over...
Now to Vietnam...58,000 Americans Died there...I foget the wounded and The not counted number of VN vets who killed themselves though Drugs or Booze down the line..And for what , Another countries problem on how they were treating another countrymen and we still had Segregation, Whites Hated Black, Blacks Hated whites, Browns hated both...The cops were running riot and the KKK was still hanging people from trees..But yet 58,000 PLUS americans needed to give their life to another country when those lives could have been put to better use here..On our soil..
All those Lives Wiped out..Potential doctors, Scientist, Teachers, Husbands, Kids...All these lives that could have been used to make our Country better and not the Countries of a other nation...
We are worried about Aids in Africa..What about Aids here..We are worried about Starving ppl in god knows where, where we have straving ppl here..We are worried about aid to Countries that are flooding when we couldnt even get water to our own ppl in New-O when it flooded...And we allow Movie Stars and Rich Americans to Adopt Chinese babies and other Types of Babies and Kids when we have millions of Homeless, Orphan American Kids that could use homes....
I belive some where in your post GM you talk about being Native American( I could be Wrong)..I happen to also be Part Native American...America is worried about how Africans live in Slums and our sick...Have your ever been to the some of the reservations? They look below 3rd world nations..Some look great and some look like crap. The Reservation by Ft. lewis is a GIANT ghetto...And one of Reservations where my Grandmother took me in New Mexico is something out of Black Hawk down but it's important that we care about how other countries are run but getting aid and medical care to other peoples while Native Americans get cheap booze and smokes..Ya, I see the fair trade.
I think I went over board and ranted..Sorry..Something heat me up..
-
Who said anything about cutting and running? I served with 10th mountain over seas in AssCrackistan after 9/11 and I saw the reason's on why we fight and what we are fighting about.
A couple of my good friends had to stand out in the open to guard Some Pipelines..We thought they were gas lines and then found out they were Oil..Hmm Go figure.
****Does this mean that we fought in Afghanistan for oil?****
Simple..There is nothing simple about sending your troops into a warzone on bad preperation and bad intell...Making up reasons to invade a country are not the ways to go about things and then coming back with the "Oh man..Our bad but since we are there" is not a vaild excuse.
Offering 20k to new recruits is they leave in a month to their new home in Iraq is also not a good way to treat our desperate youth..
****The average U.S. serviceman/woman is better educated than the average U.S. citizen. The "poor waifs" arguement doesn't hold water. The US military today is better trained, better educated and better equipped than any military in human history.****
Why we fight? A 5 year old boy was put on fire? While that is tragic and painfull..I don't feel that it is worth the lives of Anymore Americans. We have those problems going on here on our soil...MS 13 gangs running riot and other countless Gangs running riot and killing Americans BUT we should fight over seas to help a 5 year old boy? No..I just don't see it that way..Now this is just a Random example of problems on American soil..
****I've spent most all of my adult life in law enforcement. I'm quite aware of the issues with gangs, crime and social decay. That's irrelevant to the global war for survival we find ourselves in. Some sort of neo-isolationism isn't the answer to domestic issues.****
I never said cut and run but I think the way we handled things and still going about things is wrong and over...
Now to Vietnam...58,000 Americans Died there...I foget the wounded and The not counted number of VN vets who killed themselves though Drugs or Booze down the line..And for what , Another countries problem on how they were treating another countrymen and we still had Segregation, Whites Hated Black, Blacks Hated whites, Browns hated both...The cops were running riot and the KKK was still hanging people from trees..But yet 58,000 PLUS americans needed to give their life to another country when those lives could have been put to better use here..On our soil..
****Are you suggesting some sort of martial law as a remedy for the 60's urban unrest?****
All those Lives Wiped out..Potential doctors, Scientist, Teachers, Husbands, Kids...All these lives that could have been used to make our Country better and not the Countries of a other nation...
****My dad served in 'Nam from '65 to '68, became a teacher afterwards. Despite the media hype, most veterans of all wars return to citizen life without becoming violent drunks.****
We are worried about Aids in Africa..What about Aids here..
****As HIV is usually spread by consensual sex or infected needles in the US, what policy do you suggest that hasn't already been implimented?****
We are worried about Starving ppl in god knows where, where we have straving ppl here..
****When was the last time an American starved to death? Outside of an abused child or neglected elder, i'm not aware of it happening in my lifetime. In fact the poorest Americans are far more likely to suffer health problems related to obesity rather than anything akin to starvation. Again, short of creating a national "diet police" i'm not sure what you'd suggest we do.****
We are worried about aid to Countries that are flooding when we couldnt even get water to our own ppl in New-O when it flooded..
****Funny enough, Wal-Mart and other scary corporations the left loves to demonize did a better job responding to Katrina than did the democrat mayor and the democrat governor, who have yet to take any responsibility for their inept and corrupt municipal and state governments.****
.And we allow Movie Stars and Rich Americans to Adopt Chinese babies and other Types of Babies and Kids when we have millions of Homeless, Orphan American Kids that could use homes....
****Please cite the source of you statistics for "Millions of homeless, orphan American kids".****
I belive some where in your post GM you talk about being Native American( I could be Wrong).
****I'm an enrolled member of a federally recognized Indian tribe.****
.I happen to also be Part Native American...America is worried about how Africans live in Slums and our sick...Have your ever been to the some of the reservations?
****I grew up right next to one, got my healthcare growing up at an Indian Health Service clinic. My first fulltime job in law enforcement was as a Tribal Police Officer.****
They look below 3rd world nations..Some look great and some look like crap. The Reservation by Ft. lewis is a GIANT ghetto...And one of Reservations where my Grandmother took me in New Mexico is something out of Black Hawk down but it's important that we care about how other countries are run but getting aid and medical care to other peoples while Native Americans get cheap booze and smokes..Ya, I see the fair trade.
****Uncle Sam has dumped billions, if not trillions into tribal entities in recent times. Much like the "war on poverty" gov't aid did more harm than help. Again, the solution isn't more gov't aid to address the social problems on the various reservations.****
I think I went over board and ranted..Sorry..Something heat me up..
****You have the right to rant, just as I have the right to reply.****
-
If Iraq Falls
By JOSEF JOFFE
August 27, 2007; Page A11
In contrast to President Bush's dark comparison between Iraq and the bloody aftermath of the Vietnam War last week, there is another, comforting version of the Vietnam analogy that's gained currency among policy makers and pundits. It goes something like this:
After that last helicopter took off from the U.S. embassy in Saigon 32 years ago, the nasty strategic consequences then predicted did not in fact materialize. The "dominoes" did not fall, the Russians and Chinese did not take over, and America remained No. 1 in Southeast Asia and in the world.
But alas, cut-and-run from Iraq will not have the same serendipitous aftermath, because Iraq is not at all like Vietnam.
Unlike Iraq, Vietnam was a peripheral arena of the Cold War. Strategic resources like oil were not at stake, and neither were bases (OK, Moscow obtained access to Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay for a while). In the global hierarchy of power, Vietnam was a pawn, not a pillar, and the decisive battle lines at the time were drawn in Europe, not in Southeast Asia.
The Middle East, by contrast, was always the "elephant path of history," as Israel's fabled defense minister, Moshe Dayan, put it. Legions of conquerors have marched up and down the Levant, and from Alexander's Macedonia all the way to India. Other prominent visitors were Julius Caesar, Napoleon and the German Wehrmacht.
This is not just ancient history. Today, the Greater Middle East is a cauldron even Macbeth's witches would be terrified to touch. The world's worst political and religious pathologies combine with oil and gas, terrorism and nuclear ambitions.
In short, unlike yesterday's Vietnam, the Greater Middle East (including Turkey) is the central strategic arena of the 21st century, as Europe was in the 20th. This is where three continents -- Europe, Asia, and Africa -- are joined. So let's take a moment to think about what would happen once that last Blackhawk took off from Baghdad International.
Here is a short list. Iran advances to No. 1, completing its nuclear-arms program undeterred and unhindered. America's cowed Sunni allies -- Saudi-Arabia, Jordan, the oil-rich "Gulfies" -- are drawn into the Khomeinist orbit.
You might ask: Wouldn't they converge in a mighty anti-Tehran alliance instead? Think again. The local players have never managed to establish a regional balance of power; it was always outsiders -- first Britain, then the U.S. -- who chastened the malfeasants and blocked anti-Western intruders like Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia.
With the U.S. gone from Iraq, emboldened jihadi forces shift to Afghanistan and turn it again into a bastion of Terror International. Syria reclaims Lebanon, which it has always labeled as a part of "Great Syria." Hezbollah and Hamas, both funded and equipped by Tehran, resume their war against Israel. Russia, extruded from the Middle East by adroit Kissingerian diplomacy in the 1970s, rebuilds its anti-Western alliances. In Iraq, the war escalates, unleashing even more torrents of refugees and provoking outside intervention, if not partition.
Now, let's look beyond the region. The Europeans will be the first to revise their romantic notions of multipolarity, or world governance by committee. For worse than an overbearing, in-your-face America is a weakened and demoralized one. Shall Vladimir Putin's Russia acquire a controlling stake? This ruthlessly revisionist power wants revenge for its post-Gorbachev humiliation, not responsibility.
China with its fabulous riches? The Middle Kingdom is still happily counting its currency surpluses as it pretties up its act for the 2008 Olympics, but watch its next play if the U.S. quits the highest stakes game in Iraq. The message from Beijing might well read: "Move over America, the Western Pacific, as you call it, is our lake."
Europe? It is wealthy, populous and well-ordered. But strategic players those 27 member-states of the E.U. are not. They cannot pacify the Middle East, stop the Iranian bomb or keep Mr. Putin from wielding gas pipelines as tools of "persuasion." When the Europeans did wade into the fray, as in the Balkan wars of the 1990s, they let the U.S. Air Force go first.
Now to the upside. The U.S. may have spent piles of chips foolishly, but it is still the richest player at the global gaming table. In the Bush years, the U.S. may have squandered tons of political capital, but then the rest of the world is not exactly making up for the shortfall.
Nor has the U.S. become a "dispensable nation." That is the most remarkable truth in these trying times. Its enemies from al Qaeda to Iran -- and its rivals from Russia to China -- can disrupt and defy, but they cannot build and lead.
For all the damage to Washington's reputation, nothing of great import can be achieved without, let alone against, the U.S. Can Moscow and Beijing bring peace to Palestine? Or mend a global financial system battered by the subprime crisis? Where are the central banks of Russia and China?
The Bush presidency will soon be on the way out, but America is not. This truth has recently begun to sink in among the major Democratic contenders. Listen to Hillary Clinton, who would leave "residual forces" to fight terrorism. Or to Barack Obama, who would stay in Iraq with an as-yet-unspecified force. Even the most leftish of them all, John Edwards, would keep troops around to stop genocide in Iraq or to prevent violence from spilling over into the neighborhood. And no wonder, for it might be one of them who will have to deal with the bitter aftermath if the U.S. slinks out of Iraq.
These realists have it right. Withdrawal cannot serve America's interests on the day after tomorrow. Friends and foes will ask: If this superpower doesn't care about the world's central and most dangerous stage -- what will it care about?
America's allies will look for insurance elsewhere. And the others will muse: If the police won't stay in this most critical of neighborhoods, why not break a few windows, or just take over? The U.S. as "Gulliver Unbound" may have stumbled during its "unipolar" moment. But as giant with feet of clay, it will do worse: and so will the rest of the world.
Mr. Joffe is publisher-editor of Die Zeit, the German weekly and will be teaching foreign policy at Stanford University this fall. His latest book is "Überpower: The Imperial Temptation of America." (Norton, 2006).
-
http://www.nypost.com/php/pfriendly/print.php?url=http://www.nypost.com/seven/08272007/news/columnists/how_marines_pulled_fallujah_ou.htm
HOW MARINES PULLED FALLUJAH OUT OF HELL
By RALPH PETERS
August 27, 2007 -- FALLUJAH, Iraq - Fallujah and the Marines have some history. In 2004, one savage battle ended when the Marines were pulled out for political reasons. Later that year, they had to finish the job.
And they did. They took down the terrorists' stronghold in a week of fury.
With a fundamentalist tradition, Fallujah seemed to fit al Qaeda perfectly. Robbed of their Saddam-era privileges and out for revenge, even secular locals had aligned with the terrorists. Despite the Marine victory, violence simmered on.
The extremists and insurgents believed they could wear America down. But between 2004 and 2007, two things happened: We wore them down - and al Qaeda wore them out.
With foreign fanatics butchering the innocent and enforcing prison-yard "Islamic laws" that far exceeded the Koran's demands, it belatedly dawned on the insurgents that, while we intended to leave eventually - on our own terms - al Qaeda meant to stay.
A wave of suicide bombings earlier this year, culminating in a massive attack on a funeral procession, made the population snap. The people of Fallujah may never love us, but they hate al Qaeda with the rage of a betrayed lover.
Since May, the change has been stunning. When the 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines were last in Fallujah, in 2006, they took casualties from snipers and roadside bombs. The city was violent, bankrupt and partly in ruins.
Now the battalion's back. And welcome. Marines banter with the locals where, six months ago, it was risky to ride in an armored vehicle.
Paradoxically, the violence of the past set the only possible conditions for the sudden reconciliation. The Iraqis had to grasp that we meant business. Now the 1st Platoon of the battalion's Fox Company lives and works in the Hadari Precinct with the Iraqi police.
The new police are recruited from vetted locals, and the policy has paid huge dividends. The locals know who doesn't fit, and they've got an immediate interest in their neighborhood's safety. Most encouragingly, the reformed police are popular.
Fallujah still isn't a place to buy retirement property, but it was encouraging to sit down with 1st Platoon's commander, 2nd Lt. Nick DeLonga, and his Iraqi counterpart, 1st Lt. Mohammed.
DeLonga joined the Marines immediately after 9/11, because "I didn't want to just sit and vote while others were dying." Now he's the sheriff of a sprawling neighborhood in a war-torn city.
FIRST Lt. Mohammed's fa ther is a sheik, giving him a brand of authority - and insight - an outsider could never attain. DeLonga has the firepower (if ever needed) and the resources, while Mohammed has the pull. It works.
We went for a stroll in the streets. The Marines still wear full combat gear: Despite security measures, a sniper might still sneak into the city. But there was no threat from the locals in the market. The worst mood the Marines encountered was aloofness. More often, they were welcomed with a polite greeting.
People are relieved that their streets are safe again. And the kids are out in regiments, surrounding the Marines in hope of candy or just a bit of attention.
For the Iraqi police lieutenant, our patrol was a triumphal procession. DeLonga let Mohammed have center stage as citizens came out to complain about lagging utilities or, in one striking case, to protest that, as former residents of Baghdad, they had come to Fallujah to be safe, but were being charged exorbitant rents. A ward pol as well as a cop, Mohammed told his aides to write it all down.
Mohammed is effective, but he might jar anyone with unrealistic expectations. In our one-on-one meeting, he quoted Saddam: "You must be sharp as a sword with civilians - and as soft as perfume." But he's no hard-core Ba'athist: You have to remember that Saddam shaped every Iraqi's life for more than three decades.
Anyway, men such as Lt. Mohammed have figured out that nostalgia solves nothing. And thanks to al Qaeda's blood orgy, the old Middle Eastern dictum applies: The enemy of my enemy is my friend. In a sense, al Qaeda set us up for success.
BUT there's more to it. Much more. The Marines and the Iraqi police find they get along surprisingly well. The Americans realize that the Iraqis know the buttons to press to get things done, while the Iraqis learn from the Marines' professionalism.
I laughed to see Iraqi cops marveling at a Marine's, uh, interesting tattoos, while the Marines are still surprised that the environment has gone "nonkinetic" so fast.
And we're truly winning over some Iraqis. "Crash," is a Basra-born interpreter (a "terp") who, more than anything else in the world, wants to become a U.S. Marine. He lives and works with the Marines, studies their rituals, works out with them - and carries himself like a Marine. Crash also carries a weapon for self-defense - a right he earned after pulling wounded Marines to safety in combat.
"His" Marines are doing all they can to help him enlist.
Fallujah? Some districts have ugly stretches of ruins, while others are largely intact. The population has returned. And there's a construction boom. Meanwhile, the Marines have repaired generators, turned trash lots into parks and created hundreds of jobs. Suddenly, the city's movers and shakers want to work with the Marines.
Oh, and the mullah of the city's strictest mosque just sat down for the first time with Lt. DeLonga. They got along fine.
Had I been asked three years ago if we'd ever be welcome in Fallujah, I would've called it wrong. Not that the Iraqis want us to stay forever, but they'd rather cooperate than fight at this point. Given Fallujah's past, that's no small thing.
And the locals are out in front of us in the fight against al Qaeda. Which is a big thing.
I was in the city during one of the last phases of Operation Alljah, which has been bringing the rule of law back to the city's precincts, one by one. In the hours of darkness, Marine engineers swept in and blocked the roads in and out of one of the last un-purged districts with Jersey barriers. The police moved in to bust suspected terrorists and kick out hoodlums who don't have local roots.
In a "swarm," identification cards are provided to all, beginning with the local movers and shakers. Volunteers are vetted to join the police or armed neighborhood-watch groups. And revitalization programs go into gear.
Capt. Mason Harlow, the Fox Company commander, was wounded by shrapnel two years ago. In Fallujah. Now he's back, overseeing the Hadari District and two others. His Marines haven't been attacked for months. And his former enemies are doing his work for him.
Capt. Harlow didn't think he'd live to see the day.
Ralph Peters is reporting from Iraq. His new book is "Wars of Blood and Faith."
-
I don't like this piece, but it comes from Stratfor and I search for Truth:
-------------------
Endgame: American Options in Iraq
The latest National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) summarizing the U.S. intelligence community's view of Iraq contains two critical findings: First, the Iraqi government is not jelling into an effective entity. Iraq's leaders, according to the NIE, neither can nor want to create an effective coalition government. Second, U.S. military operations under the surge have improved security in some areas, but on the whole have failed to change the underlying strategic situation. Both Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias remain armed, motivated and operational.
Since the Iraq insurgency began in 2003, the United States has had a clear strategic goal: to create a pro-American coalition government in Baghdad. The means for achieving this was the creation of a degree of security through the use of U.S. troops. In this more secure environment, then, a government would form, create its own security and military forces, with the aid of the United States, and prosecute the war with diminishing American support. This government would complete the defeat of the insurgents and would then govern Iraq democratically.
What the NIE is saying is that, more than four years after the war began, the strategic goal has not been achieved -- and there is little evidence that it will be achieved. Security has not increased significantly in Iraq, despite some localized improvement. In other words, the NIE is saying that the United States has failed and there is no strong evidence that it will succeed in the future.
We must be careful with pronouncements from the U.S. intelligence community, but in this case it appears to be stating the obvious. Moreover, given past accusations of skewed intelligence to suit the administration, it is hard to imagine many in the intelligence community risking their reputations and careers to distort findings in favor of an administration with 18 months to go. We think the NIE is reasonable. Therefore, the question is: What is to be done?
For a long time, we have seen U.S.-Iranian negotiations on Iraq as a viable and even likely endgame. We no longer believe that to be the case. For these negotiations to have been successful, each side needed to fear a certain outcome. The Americans had to fear that an ongoing war would drain U.S. resources indefinitely. The Iranians had to fear that the United States would be able to create a viable coalition government in Baghdad or impose a U.S.-backed regime dominated by their historical Sunni rivals.
Following the Republican defeat in Congress in November, U.S. President George W. Bush surprised Iran by increasing U.S. forces in Iraq rather than beginning withdrawals. This created a window of a few months during which Tehran, weighing the risks and rewards, was sufficiently uncertain that it might have opted for an agreement thrusting the Shiites behind a coalition government. That moment has passed. As the NIE points out, the probability of forming any viable government in Baghdad is extremely low. Iran no longer is facing its worst-case scenario. It has no motivation to bail the United States out.
What, then, is the United States to do? In general, three options are available. The first is to maintain the current strategy. This is the administration's point of view. The second is to start a phased withdrawal, beginning sometime in the next few months and concluding when circumstances allow. This is the consensus among most centrist Democrats and a growing number of Republicans. The third is a rapid withdrawal of forces, a position held by a fairly small group mostly but not exclusively on the left. All three conventional options, however, suffer from fatal defects.
Bush's plan to stay the course would appear to make relatively little sense. Having pursued a strategic goal with relatively fixed means for more than four years, it is unclear what would be achieved in years five or six. As the old saw goes, the definition of insanity is doing the same thing repeatedly, expecting a different outcome. Unless Bush seriously disagrees with the NIE, it is difficult to make a case for continuing the current course.
Looking at it differently, however, there are these arguments to be made for maintaining the current strategy: Whatever mistakes might have been made in the past, the current reality is that any withdrawal from Iraq would create a vacuum, which would rapidly be filled by Iran. Alternatively, Iraq could become a jihadist haven, focusing attention not only on Iraq but also on targets outside Iraq. After all, a jihadist safe-haven with abundant resources in the heart of the Arab world outweighs the strategic locale of Afghanistan. Therefore, continuing the U.S. presence in Iraq, at the cost of 1,000-2,000 American lives a year, prevents both outcomes, even if Washington no longer has any hope of achieving the original goal.
In other words, the argument is that the operation should continue indefinitely in order to prevent a more dangerous outcome. The problem with this reasoning, as we have said, is that it consumes available ground forces, leaving the United States at risk in other parts of the world. The cost of this decision would be a massive increase of the U.S. Army and Marines, by several divisions at least. This would take several years to achieve and might not be attainable without a draft. In addition, it assumes the insurgents and militias will not themselves grow in size and sophistication, imposing greater and greater casualties on the Americans. The weakness of this argument is that it assumes the United States already is facing the worst its enemies can dish out. The cost could rapidly grow to more than a couple of thousand dead a year.
The second strategy is a phased withdrawal. That appears to be one of the most reasonable, moderate proposals. But consider this: If the mission remains the same -- fight the jihadists and militias in order to increase security -- then a phased withdrawal puts U.S. forces in the position of carrying out the same mission with fewer troops. If the withdrawal is phased over a year or more, as most proposals suggest, it creates a situation in which U.S. forces are fighting an undiminished enemy with a diminished force, without any hope of achieving the strategic goal.
The staged withdrawal would appear to be the worst of all worlds. It continues the war while reducing the already slim chance of success and subjects U.S. forces to increasingly unfavorable correlations of forces. Phased withdrawal would make sense in the context of increasingly effective Iraqi forces under a functional Iraqi government, but that assumes either of these things exists. It assumes the NIE is wrong.
The only context in which phased withdrawal makes sense is with a redefined strategic goal. If the United States begins withdrawing forces, it must accept that the goal of a pro-American government is not going to be reached. Therefore, the troops must have a mission. And the weakness of the phased withdrawal proposals is that they each extend the period of time of the withdrawal without clearly defining the mission of the remaining forces. Without a redefinition, troop levels are reduced over time, but the fighters who remain still are targets -- and still take casualties. The moderate case, then, is the least defensible.
The third option is an immediate withdrawal. Immediate withdrawal is a relative concept, of course, since it is impossible to withdraw 150,000 troops at once. Still, what this would consist of is an immediate cessation of offensive operations and the rapid withdrawal of personnel and equipment. Theoretically, it would be possible to pull out the troops but leave the equipment behind. In practical terms, the process would take about three to six months from the date the order was given.
If withdrawal is the plan, this scenario is more attractive than the phased process. It might increase the level of chaos in Iraq, but that is not certain, nor is it clear whether that is any longer an issue involving the U.S. national interest. Its virtue is that it leads to the same end as phased withdrawal without the continued loss of American lives.
The weakness of this strategy is that it opens the door for Iran to dominate Iraq. Unless the Turks wanted to fight the Iranians, there is no regional force that could stop Iran from moving in, whether covertly, through the infiltration of forces, or overtly. Remember that Iran and Iraq fought a long, vicious war -- in which Iran suffered about a million casualties. This, then, simply would be the culmination of that war in some ways. Certainly the Iranians would face bitter resistance from the Sunnis and Kurds, and even from some Shia. But the Iranians have much higher stakes in this game than the Americans, and they are far less casualty-averse, as the Iran-Iraq war demonstrated. Their pain threshold is set much higher than the Americans' and their willingness to brutally suppress their enemies also is greater.
The fate of Iraq would not be the most important issue. Rather, it would be the future of the Arabian Peninsula. If Iran were to dominate Iraq, its forces could deploy along the Saudi border. With the United States withdrawn from the region -- and only a residual U.S. force remaining in Kuwait -- the United States would have few ways to protect the Saudis, and a limited appetite for more war. Also, the Saudis themselves would not want to come under U.S. protection. Most important, all of the forces in the Arabian Peninsula could not match the Iranian force.
The Iranians would be facing an extraordinary opportunity. At the very least, they could dominate their historical enemy, Iraq. At the next level, they could force the Saudis into a political relationship in which the Saudis had to follow the Iranian lead -- in a way, become a junior partner to Iran. At the next level, the Iranians could seize the Saudi oil fields. And at the most extreme level, the Iranians could conquer Mecca and Medina for the Shia. If the United States has simply withdrawn from the region, these are not farfetched ideas. Who is to stop the Iranians if not the United States? Certainly no native power could do so. And if the United States were to intervene in Saudi Arabia, then what was the point of withdrawal in the first place?
All three conventional options, therefore, contain serious flaws. Continuing the current strategy pursues an unattainable goal. Staged withdrawal exposes fewer U.S. troops to more aggressive enemy action. Rapid withdrawal quickly opens the door for possible Iranian hegemony -- and lays a large part of the world's oil reserves at Iran's feet.
The solution is to be found in redefining the mission, the strategic goal. If the goal of creating a stable, pro-American Iraq no longer is possible, then what is the U.S. national interest? That national interest is to limit the expansion of Iranian power, particularly the Iranian threat to the Arabian Peninsula. This war was not about oil, as some have claimed, although a war in Saudi Arabia certainly would be about oil. At the extreme, the conquest of the Arabian Peninsula by Iran would give Iran control of a huge portion of global energy reserves. That would be a much more potent threat than Iranian nuclear weapons ever could be.
The new U.S. mission, therefore, must be to block Iran in the aftermath of the Iraq war. The United States cannot impose a government on Iraq; the fate of Iraq's heavily populated regions cannot be controlled by the United States. But the United States remains an outstanding military force, particularly against conventional forces. It is not very good at counterinsurgency and never has been. The threat to the Arabian Peninsula from Iran would be primarily a conventional threat -- supplemented possibly by instability among Shia on the peninsula.
The mission would be to position forces in such a way that Iran could not think of moving south into Saudi Arabia. There are a number of ways to achieve this. The United States could base a major force in Kuwait, threatening the flanks of any Iranian force moving south. Alternatively, it could create a series of bases in Iraq, in the largely uninhabited regions south and west of the Euphrates. With air power and cruise missiles, coupled with a force about the size of the U.S. force in South Korea, the United States could pose a devastating threat to any Iranian adventure to the south. Iran would be the dominant power in Baghdad, but the Arabian Peninsula would be protected.
This goal could be achieved through a phased withdrawal from Iraq, along with a rapid withdrawal from the populated areas and an immediate cessation of aggressive operations against jihadists and militia. It would concede what the NIE says is unattainable without conceding to Iran the role of regional hegemon. It would reduce forces in Iraq rapidly, while giving the remaining forces a mission they were designed to fight -- conventional war. And it would rapidly reduce the number of casualties. Most important, it would allow the United States to rebuild its reserves of strategic forces in the event of threats elsewhere in the world.
This is not meant as a policy prescription. Rather, we see it as the likely evolution of U.S. strategic thinking on Iraq. Since negotiation is unlikely, and the three conventional options are each defective in their own way, we see this redeployment as a reasonable alternative that meets the basic requirements. It ends the war in Iraq in terms of casualties, it reduces the force, it contains Iran and it frees most of the force for other missions. Whether Bush or his successor is the decision-maker, we think this is where it must wind up.
-
OTOH perhaps the NIE assessment which affects Stratfor's thinking so much is wide of the mark-- it certainly wouldn't be for the first time our intel has been slow to realize changes on the ground:
This Isn't Civil War
By CARTER ANDRESS
August 28, 2007; Page A13
Baghdad
We are winning this war. I write those words from my desk in the Red Zone in downtown Baghdad as hundreds of Iraqis working with my company -- Shia and Sunni, Arab and Kurd -- execute security, construction and logistics missions throughout the capital and Sunni Triangle. We have been here now over three years.
American-Iraqi Solutions Group, which I helped co-found in March 2004, has been intimately involved with creating the new Iraqi security services. Our principal business as a U.S. Department of Defense contractor is to build bases for the Iraqi army and police and then supply them with water, food, fuel and maintenance services. We are on the cutting edge of the exit strategy for the U.S. military: Stand up an effective Iraqi security structure and then we can bring our troops home.
We are not out of the Iraqi desert yet. But the primary problems we now face on the ground are controllable, given a strong American military presence through 2008. These problems include the involvement of Iran in fueling Shia militancy, the British failure to uphold their security obligations in the south and the tumultuous nature of a new democracy.
Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker recently said the one word he would choose to describe the feelings of the Iraqi people was "fear." A bad choice, from my observation.
That's not the prevailing state of mind, except maybe for those sheltered souls in the Green Zone who are getting hit on a regular basis for the first time in more than a year by primarily Iranian-supplied rockets and mortars. What I see on the faces of the thousands of Iraqis working with us, including our subcontractors and suppliers as well as on the faces of the Iraqi army and police, patrolling and manning the checkpoints and assisting U.S. soldiers in searching for the insurgents is grim determination to get the job done.
I also see exhaustion -- exhaustion with the insurgency, whether it be al Qaeda, neo-Saddamist, or Jaish al Mahdi (JAM), or the Shia militia of Moqtada al-Sadr. The exhaustion is real, and the evidence of the falling support among the Iraqi people for the insurgency in its various guises is inescapable -- unless you are deliberately looking the other way.
A large proportion of our thousand-man work force -- of which 90% are Iraqi citizens -- comes from Sadr City, the Shia slum in east Baghdad. Many carry weapons. These Shia warriors have emphasized in the past several months that they and their neighbors are tired of conflict and only want to feed their families.
You only have to note the lack of U.S. casualties in the ongoing surge to clear JAM out of the highly dangerous urban terrain of Sadr City to realize that the people there do not want to fight us. They are sick of fighting.
As for Sunni resistance, I recently visited the boot camp we operate for the Iraqi army at Habbaniyah in Al Anbar, former heartland of the insurgency. For the first time we are seeing entire Sunni Arab recruiting cohorts at the camp, where before we only saw Shia from outside the province.
The Sunnis of Al Anbar -- finally tired of al Qaeda assassinating their sheikhs when they disagreed with the terrorists -- have committed their children to the security services of a government dominated by the majority Shias, and paid for and run by the Americans. With such a development, you have real progress in integrating the diverse elements in Iraq.
Slowly but surely, Iraqi security services are building up. You only have to travel outside the Green Zone to see them undertaking heroic risks as they work to control the streets in growing numbers and with growing professionalism. In the past couple of months, the Ministry of the Interior established an operations center for all of Baghdad that effectively coordinates nonmilitary logistics movements throughout the capital -- a function previously only undertaken by a coalition contractor. From chaos has come order and in turn, step by step, the Iraqi military is becoming a truly national, not sectarian, force.
I see no civil war between the Shias and Sunnis as I travel practically every day on the roads of Iraq with my Arab and Kurdish security team. The potential for renewed internecine warfare faded earlier this year, when al Qaeda failed to reignite the waning sectarian struggle the second time around with another attack on the Golden Mosque in Samarra.
The perfect storm at the beginning of 2007 created the necessity of reconciliation. The Sunni Arabs who had used al Qaeda as leverage in the political struggle to re-establish their minority rule faced genocide in Baghdad from the Shia death squads. With pressure from the new Democratic majority in Congress, the Shia government of Nouri al-Maliki realized that time was running out for a dominant American presence in Iraq and finally allowed the U.S. military to clean up Sadr City, thus alleviating the death-squad activities.
Both the Sunni and Shia Arab sides of the Iraqi political equation (the Kurds have sided with us from the beginning) now see that there is no alternative to American protection. As a result, Sadr's people and the Sunnis have both returned to parliament. As always, democracy is messy, but it is working. We have to be patient, particularly because this nascent reconciliation has left al Qaeda as the odd man out.
Just as the rockets landing in the Green Zone are from a foreign source -- Iran -- the jihadis who destroy themselves in explosions aimed primarily at mass killings of Shia civilians are almost all foreigners. This is al Qaeda, not Iraq.
Even more to the point: The Iraqis basically ignore the al Qaeda car bombs, mourn the dead and then go to work, to school, join and continue to serve in the military and police -- and life goes on. There is no terror if no one is terrorized.
Let us, the American people, not be terrorized into retreating before our enemy -- al Qaeda -- just when they have begun to stand alone, stripped of allies, in a country beginning to enjoy the fruits of a democracy we have sacrificed much blood to help create.
Mr. Andress, CEO and principal owner of American-Iraqi Solutions Group, is author of "Contractor Combatants: Tales of an Imbedded Capitalist" (Thomas Nelson, 2007).
===============
Stratfor.com
IRAN: Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said his country is ready to fill the power vacuum in Iraq. Addressing a press conference in Tehran, Ahmadinejad said the United States' power there is collapsing and that Iran will fill the resulting vacuum "with the help of neighbors and regional friends like Saudi Arabia, and with the help of the Iraqi nation."
-
Which Iraq War Do You Want To End?
We're fighting at least three of them.
By Christopher Hitchens
Posted Monday, Aug. 27, 2007, at 4:56 PM ET
When people say that they want to end the war in Iraq, I always want to ask them which war they mean. There are currently at least three wars, along with several subconflicts, being fought on Iraqi soil. The first, tragically, is the battle for mastery between Sunni and Shiite. The second is the campaign to isolate and defeat al-Qaida in Mesopotamia. The third is the struggle of Iraq's Kurdish minority to defend and consolidate its regional government in the north.
Taking these in reverse order, we can point to Kurdistan as the most outstanding success of the past four years, with its economically flourishing provinces run along broadly secular lines, and with the old Kurd-on-Kurd civil war now in real abeyance for almost a decade (which shows that people can and do come to their senses). The Kurds are also active in the center of the country; their ministers of foreign affairs and water are universally regarded as the most capable and intelligent, and they have also been secure enough to lend units of their own peshmerga forces to the coalition's efforts in Baghdad, Fallujah, and elsewhere. The forces of AQM do not care to tackle this real people's army, preferring to concentrate their attacks on the defenseless, and although there have been truck-bomb attacks in the Kurdish capital of Erbil and in the still-disputed city of Kirkuk, these are so far pinprick events. (Appalling to record, though, a recent and much-disputed incident near Erbil airport has led to a temporary suspension of some international flights to Kurdistan.)
On the second front, everything I hear by e-mail from soldiers in Anbar province and some well-attested other reports suggest (see my Slate column of Aug. 13) that the venomous rabble of foreign murderers and local psychopaths that goes to make up AQM has insanely overplayed its hand, lost all hope of local support, and is becoming even more vicious as its cadres are defeated. This means that there is also political separation and polarization within the Sunni Arab community. A recent wire-service report even suggested that the underground remnant of the Baath Party has broken off relations with AQM. It must say something when even Saddam's old goons find themselves repelled by anybody's tactics. One must not declare victory too soon, but if the United States has in fact succeeded in not only smashing but discrediting al-Qaida in a major Arab and Muslim country, that must count as a historic achievement.
The third area of combat is the most depressing. The Maliki government, in my opinion, showed its irredeemably sectarian character a long time ago by the dirty manner in which it carried out the execution of Saddam Hussein. Maliki himself has recently attacked the coalition forces for carrying out raids in Shiite districts of Baghdad. Perhaps he ought to be told that he is not being lent our armed forces for the purpose of installing Shiite power. The secular parties have walked out of his shaky Cabinet, and it is on these forces that our moral support should be concentrated. Let's put it like this: An American family that lost a son or a daughter in the defense of free Kurdistan or in the struggle against AQM could console itself that the death was in a worthwhile cause. The same could not be said for a soldier who fell in some murky street engagement, shot in the back by a uniformed policeman who was doing double duty as a member of a theocratic Shiite militia.
In Basra and elsewhere, these Shiite militias replicate the division among the Sunnis by fighting among themselves and by the degree to which they do or do not reflect the interference of Iran in Iraqi affairs. This subconflict—or these subconflicts—makes it hard to accept the proposal made by some U.S. politicians and pundits to the effect that the country should be partitioned along ethnic and religious lines. In that event, we would quite probably not end up with three neatly demarcated mini-states, one each in a three-way split among Sunni Arab, Shiite, and Kurd. Instead, there could be partitions within the partition, with Iran and Saudi Arabia becoming patrons of their favorite proxies and, in the meantime, a huge impetus given to the "cleansing" of hitherto-mixed cities and provinces. (This, by the way, as I never tire of saying, is what would have happened to Iraq when Saddam's regime collapsed and the country became prey to neighboring states and to the consequences of 30 years of "divide and rule" politics.)
The ability to distinguish among these different definitions of the "war" is what ought to define the difference between a serious politician and a political opportunist, both in Iraq and in America. The obliteration of political life and civil society by Saddam Hussein's fascism has meant that most of the successor political figures are paltry (and the Kurdish exception to this exactly proves the point: Kurdistan escaped from Baathist control a full decade before the rest of Iraq did). It will take a good while before any plausible nonsectarian figures can emerge from the wasteland and also brave the climate of murder and intimidation that the forces of the last dictatorship, and the would-be enforcers of an even worse future one, have created. Meanwhile, it is all very well for Sens. Clinton and Levin to denounce the Maliki government and to say that he and his Dawa Party colleagues are not worth fighting for. But what do they say about the other two wars? Sen. Clinton in particular has said several times in the past that we cannot, for example, abandon the Kurds as we once did before. Should she not be asked if this is still her view? And did I miss what Sen. Levin had to say about the battle against AQM? The next election is rightly going to be fought, to a considerable extent, over the question of Iraq. Answers to these questions about that question are a test of seriousness that all voters should be keeping in mind.
Christopher Hitchens is a columnist for Vanity Fair
-
Iraq: Iran Versus Saudi Arabia, Minus the United States?
Summary
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on Aug. 28 warned that a power vacuum is imminent in Iraq and said Iran is ready to help fill the gap. This statement represents the shift Stratfor was expecting in Iranian behavior toward Iraq, wherein Tehran is no longer interested in negotiating with the United States because it expects Washington to withdraw from the country. This does not mean the road to Baghdad is clear for the Iranians, which explains why they have said they would work with regional Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia.
Analysis
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said Aug. 28 that his country is ready to fill the power vacuum in Iraq. Addressing a press conference in Tehran, Ahmadinejad said, "The political power of the occupiers is collapsing rapidly. Soon, we will see a huge power vacuum in the region. Of course, we are prepared to fill the gap, with the help of neighbors and regional friends like Saudi Arabia, and with the help of the Iraqi nation."
The Iranians are reacting to the emerging situation in Washington, which is leading the United States to effect a military drawdown of sorts in Iraq. As we have said, this leaves the Iranians with no incentive to negotiate with Washington over the future of Iraq. Instead, Iran is moving to take advantage of the expected security vacuum in Iraq and consolidate itself as the major power broker there.
But the Iranians are well aware that such a move will not be easy to pull off and will require Saudi cooperation. The Iranians intend to secure the Arab states' acknowledgement of Tehran's dominant role in Iraq -- a goal that will not come easily, to say the very least. Moreover, the United States is not about to allow Iran the space it needs to secure its interests in Iraq, as evidenced in the Bush administration's evolving Iraq policy, which we see shifting to a military strategy that will leave a residual force focused primarily on countering Iranian expansion in Iraq. Ahmadinejad's message to the Saudis is essentially stating that the inevitable U.S. withdrawal from Iraq will leave the Iranians in a prime position to dominate the country, and that their historical Arab/Sunni rivals in Riyadh will have no choice but to sue for peace -- on Tehran's terms.
Essentially, we are looking at the beginning of a full-scale and direct geopolitical struggle between Tehran and Riyadh over Baghdad as the United States redefines its mission in Iraq.
-
IMHO, the Saudis have been running a covert nuclear aquisition program, which is now probably in overdrive due to Iran's pending rise.
-
From 4/9/2006
Saudi Arabia may join nuclear club
DOHA, Qatar, April 9 (UPI) -- Kuwaiti researcher Abdullah al-Nufaisi told a seminar in Doha, Qatar, that Saudi Arabia is preparing a nuclear program, the Middle East Newsline reported.
He said Saudi scientists were urging the government to launch a nuclear project, but had not yet received approval from the ruling family.
Riyadh denies any intention to establish a nuclear energy program, but Gulf sources told the Middle East Newsline Saudi officials have been discussing a nuclear research and development program -- and that the program would be aided by Pakistan and other Riyadh allies.
"Saudi Arabia will not watch as its neighbors develop nuclear weapons," a Gulf source said. "It's a matter of time until a Saudi nuclear program begins."
-
Wonder what is behind this?
==============
Sadr set to 'rebuild' Mehdi Army
The Mehdi Army is believed to have some 60,000 fighters
The radical Iraqi Shia cleric, Moqtada Sadr, has announced the "rebuilding" of his Mehdi Army militia over a maximum period of six months.
He called on all its offices to co-operate with the security forces and exercise "self-control", in a statement issued by his office in Najaf.
The order was read out at a conference in Karbala, where fierce fighting on Tuesday killed more than 50 people.
Police blamed the Mehdi Army for the violence, but it denied involvement.
The militia is strongly opposed to the US presence in Iraq and took part in two uprisings against US-led forces in 2004.
It has also been linked to many sectarian attacks on Iraq's Sunni Arabs and on UK forces in the south of the country.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/h...st/6968720.stm
-
August 29, 2007
The Left Loses the Vietnam War
By Robert Tracinski
In political battles--and all too frequently in war itself--victories are rarely complete, defeats are rarely final, and the real significance of a battle is often not evident for years, even decades afterward.
America's defeat in Vietnam, for example, was seemingly a triumph for the anti-war left, which had long proclaimed the war to be unwinnable quagmire. Yet the years following that defeat--the era of American retreat and "national malaise"--proved so traumatic that the American people have never wanted to repeat them. Thus, what the anti-war radicals regarded as a vindication ended up discrediting the left on foreign policy for a generation. You could say that they won the political battle over the war--but they lost the peace.
Today, we may be seeing the final chapter of that process. The left is losing the Vietnam War itself--losing Vietnam, that is, as a rhetorical high ground from which to pillory any advocate of vigorous American military action overseas.
In a speech last week, President Bush surprised everyone by citing Vietnam as an analogy to Iraq. Just as we paid a "price in American credibility" for our abandonment of Vietnam, he argued, so we will suffer an even worse blow to the credibility of American threats and American friendship if we retreat from Iraq.
The New York Times, borrowing "military parlance," described this as Bush's attempt at "preparing the battlefield--in this case for the series of reports and hearings scheduled on Capitol Hill next month." The military terminology is appropriate, since this war will not be won or lost only on the battlefield in Iraq; it will be won or lost in the political battles that will be fought in Washington, DC. And Bush's invocation of Vietnam may turn out to be a brilliant rhetorical flanking maneuver. In one stroke, he has unexpectedly turned the political battle over withdrawal from Iraq into the last battle of the Vietnam War. The effect on the right has been electrifying. One conservative newspaper, the New York Sun, has even taken the step--inconceivable a year ago--of dedicating a page of its website to parallels between Iraq and Vietnam.
This certainly has caught the left by surprise, since the history of the Vietnam War is territory they thought they owned and controlled, which is why they have attempted to fit every conflict since 1975 into the Vietnam template. An editorial cartoon published early during the invasion of Iraq aptly depicted the Washington press corps as unruly children in the backseat of the family car, pestering the driver with the question, "Is it Vietnam yet? Is it Vietnam yet?" They assumed that if Iraq was Vietnam--if it fit into their Vietnam story line about dishonest leaders starting a war of imperialist aggression that was doomed by incompetent leadership and tainted by American "war crimes"--then it was guaranteed to be a humiliating defeat for their political adversaries.
Yet while the left complacently trotted out its same old Vietnam story line, a few historians have been busy revising and correcting the conventional history of the war. The leading work of this school is Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954-1965, by Mark Moyar. What makes Moyar's argument interesting is that he had access to facts that the conventional history of Vietnam, written in the 1970s and 1980s, could not have taken into account: the archives in Hanoi and Moscow, which reveal what our enemies regarded as our victories, our weaknesses, and our worst mistakes. Here is how Thomas MacKubin Owens describes Moyar's findings in his review of the book:
Moyar's thesis is that the American defeat was not inevitable: The United States had ample opportunities to ensure the survival of South Vietnam, but it failed to develop the proper strategy to do so. And by far our greatest mistake was to acquiesce in the November 1963 coup that deposed and killed [South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh] Diem, a decision that "forfeited the tremendous gains of the preceding nine years and plunged the country into an extended period of instability and weakness."
Not surprisingly, Vietnamese Communists exploited that post-Diem instability and adopted a more aggressive and ambitious stance. Moyar argues that President Lyndon Johnson rejected several aggressive strategic options available to him, options that would have permitted South Vietnam to continue the war, either without the employment of US ground forces or by a limited deployment of US forces in strategically advantageous positions in the southern part of North Vietnam or in Laos. The rejection of these options meant that Johnson was left with the choice of abandoning South Vietnam, a step fraught with grave international consequences, or fighting a defensive war within South Vietnam at a serious strategic disadvantage.
As for the eventual fall of South Vietnam--to be covered by Moyar in a planned second volume of his history--according to the New York Sun, "Mr. Moyar said the North Vietnamese only attempted their 1975 attack when convinced that America would not counter this violation of the Paris Agreement." And what gave the North this confidence? The Sun recounts the history: "Between 1972 and 1975, America's Congress passed a series of pieces of legislation that strangled the Republic of South Vietnam of resources and blocked any hope of an American air campaign.... These included the Second Supplemental Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1973, which blocked funding to 'support directly or indirectly combat activities in or over Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam or South Vietnam'; the Continuing Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1974, and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, which went so far as to prevent third-party countries from assisting the South Vietnamese so long as they received American aid."
This new view of how the Vietnam War ended is summed up by Max Boot:
By 1972 most of the south was judged secure and the South Vietnamese armed forces were able to throw back the Easter Offensive with help from lots of American aircraft but few American soldiers. If the US had continued to support Saigon with a small troop presence and substantial supplies, there is every reason to believe that South Vietnam could have survived.... But after the signing of the 1973 Paris Peace Accords, we all but cut off South Vietnam, even while its enemies across the borders continued to be resupplied by their patrons in Moscow and Beijing.
This thesis is still somewhat new and controversial--but there is enough truth to it that it is beginning to stick. Whatever the failures of American strategy in Vietnam, there is no doubt that the anti-war left pushed for American failure and accomplished it by persistent and vigorous legislation. And that is the crucial issue. If the architects of the Vietnam War in the Johnson administration can be criticized (as Moyar does) for not doing enough to win the war, the later anti-war left actively pursued American defeat and humiliation as their goal. They didn't merely want us to withdraw; they wanted us to lose, and they did whatever was necessary to make sure that happened.
So instead of being a story of the failure of imperialist, war-mongering Republicans, the Vietnam War was the story of two separate failures by Democrats. The Democrats who started the war held back from using the force necessary to win it--and the Democrats who ended the war deliberately knocked all of the remaining props out from under the South Vietnamese government to ensure the defeat of an American ally.
This is the wider Vietnam story that the left has never understood. They have always regarded Vietnam and Watergate as the glory days they long to relive. It was a time in which their political faction was temporarily triumphant, hounding two hated presidents out of office in disgrace.
But for everyone else, those events and their aftermath--the whole "national malaise" of the 1970s--was a painful period of national humiliation, for which we are still paying the price. The collapse of American power and credibility, combined with the "Vietnam Syndrome" that enshrined timidity as the cornerstone of American foreign policy, emboldened the Soviet Union and encouraged its invasion of Afghanistan--which gave birth to the "mujahadeen," the movement that gave Osama bin Laden his start and established his reputation. It also led to President Carter's withdrawal of support for the shah of Iran, which assured the success of the Ayatollah Khomeini's Islamic Revolution.
So the twin pillars of the contemporary Islamist threat--al-Qaeda and the Islamic Republic of Iran--owe their origins to the collapse of American power in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. What new disasters wait to be spawned in the aftermath of a self-imposed defeat in Iraq?
Samuel Johnson is supposed to have said that nothing concentrates the mind like the prospect of a hanging. What will the American people do when they are required to meditate seriously, for the first time, on the full, concrete ramifications of a defeat in Iraq? What will they think when they hear Mahmoud Ahmadinejad boasting of Iran's eagerness to fill the "power vacuum" that will open up in Iraq after the "collapse" of "the political power of the occupiers"?
Will the American people--offered even the glimmer of a possible victory by the success of the "surge"--decline to repeat the painful history of Vietnam?
If they do, then the left will finally have lost the Vietnam War.
Robert Tracinski writes daily commentary at TIADaily.com. He is the editor of The Intellectual Activist and TIADaily.com.
Page Printed from: http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/08/the_left_loses_the_vietnam_war.html at August 29, 2007 - 08:43:02 AM CDT
-
A slightly different version of Crafty's previous post........This one openly talks about Sadrs Milita attacking U.S. troops ect.
I view Sadr as being a huge part of the Problem andhes done this before onely to come back and cause more carnage.....I just can't understand why we allow him to continue......He's a huge reason why I have a probelm with how we are fighting a "war" in Iraq.
What ever happend to Sistani(sp) I thought he was Sadr's superior? :|
TG
Primary Navigation
HomeU.S.BusinessWorldEntertainmentSportsTechPoliticsElectionsScienceHealthMost Popular
Secondary Navigation
World Video Middle East Europe Latin America Africa Asia Canada Australia/Antarctica Kevin Sites Search: All News Yahoo! News Only News Photos Video/Audio Advanced
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Al-Sadr suspends militia activity in Iraq By DAVID RISING, Associated Press Writer
21 minutes ago
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070829/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iraq
BAGHDAD - Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr has ordered a six-month suspension of activities by his Mahdi Army militia in order to reorganize the force, and it will no longer attack U.S. and coalition troops, aides said Wednesday.
ADVERTISEMENT
The aide, Sheik Hazim al-Araji, said on Iraqi state television that the goal was to "rehabilitate" the organization, which has reportedly broken into factions, some of which the U.S. maintains are trained and supplied by Iran.
"We declare the freezing of the Mahdi Army without exception in order to rehabilitate it in a way that will safeguard its ideological image within a maximum period of six months starting from the day this statement is issued," al-Araji said, reading from a statement by al-Sadr.
In Najaf, al-Sadr's spokesman said the order also means the Mahdi Army will no longer launch attacks against U.S. and other coalition forces.
"It also includes suspending the taking up of arms against occupiers as well as others," Ahmed al-Shaibani told reporters.
Asked if Mahdi militiamen would defend themselves against provocations, he replied: "We will deal with it when it happens."
T
-
I have imprecise memory of the early days of the war when we chickened out of arresting him on some murder warrants.
Anyway, today's report is most interesting-- could this indicate some shift in the correlation of forces? :?
-
This story from Sunday came and went by quietly as I hear both sides of the American aisle say that no political progress is being made in Iraq. http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20070826/wl_nm/iraq_dc
Iraq's leaders agree on key benchmarks
By Waleed Ibrahim and Wisam Mohammed Sun Aug 26, 6:27 PM ET
BAGHDAD (Reuters) - Iraq's top Shi'ite, Sunni Arab and Kurdish political leaders announced on Sunday they had reached consensus on some key measures seen as vital to fostering national reconciliation.
The agreement by the five leaders was one of the most significant political developments in Iraq for months and was quickly welcomed by the United States, which hopes such moves will ease sectarian violence that has killed tens of thousands.
But skeptics will be watching for action amid growing frustration in Washington over the political paralysis that has gripped the government of Shi'ite Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki.
White House spokeswoman Emily Lawrimore congratulated Iraq's leaders on the accord, hailing it in a statement as "an important symbol of their commitment to work together for the benefit of all Iraqis."
The apparent breakthrough comes two weeks before U.S. President George W. Bush's top officials in Iraq present a report that could have a major influence on future American policy in Iraq.
"I hope that this agreement will help Iraq move beyond the political impasse," Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih told Reuters. "The five leaders representing Iraq's major political communities .... affirmed the principle of collective leadership to help deal with the many challenges faced by Iraq."
Maliki's appearance on Iraqi television with the four other leaders at a brief news conference was a rare show of public unity.
The other officials present were President Jalal Talabani, a Kurd; Sunni Vice President Tareq al-Hashemi; Shi'ite Vice President Adel Abdul-Mahdi, and Masoud Barzani, president of the semi-autonomous Kurdistan region.
Iraqi officials said the five leaders had agreed on draft legislation that would ease curbs on former members of Saddam Hussein's Baath party joining the civil service and military.
Consensus was also reached on a law governing provincial powers as well as setting up a mechanism to release some detainees held without charge, a key demand of Sunni Arabs since the majority being held are Sunnis.
The laws need to be passed by Iraq's fractious parliament, which has yet to receive any of the drafts.
OIL LAW
Yasin Majid, a media adviser to Maliki, told Reuters the leaders also endorsed a draft oil law, which has already been agreed by the cabinet but has not yet gone to parliament.
But a statement from Talabani's office said more discussions were needed on the draft oil law and constitutional reforms. Committees had also been formed to try to ensure a "balance" of Shi'ites, Sunni Arabs and Kurds in government.
The oil law is seen as the most important in a package of measures stalled by political infighting in Maliki's government.
The lack of action has frustrated Washington, which has been urging more political progress before the pivotal report on Iraq is presented to the U.S. Congress around September 11.
The report by the U.S. military commander in Iraq, General David Petraeus, and ambassador Ryan Crocker, is seen as a watershed moment in the unpopular four-year-old war, with Democrats likely to use the negligible political progress to press their case for troops to begin pulling out soon.
Bush is pleading for patience, pointing to the military's apparent success in reducing levels of violence between majority Shi'ite Muslims and minority Sunni Arabs.
The White House's Lawrimore said in her statement that the United States would "continue to support these brave leaders and all the Iraqi people in their efforts to overcome the forces of terror who seek to overwhelm Iraq's democracy.
"The President also welcomes the desire of the Iraqi leadership to develop a strategic partnership with the United States based on common interests."
But Democrats are not convinced, and presidential hopeful Senator Hillary Clinton and fellow Senator Carl Levin have called for Maliki to be replaced.
Maliki hit back on Sunday, saying: "There are American officials who consider Iraq as if it were one of their villages, for example Hillary Clinton and Carl Levin."
"This is severe interference in our domestic affairs. Carl Levin and Hillary Clinton are from the Democratic Party and they must demonstrate democracy," he said. "I ask them to come to their senses and to talk in a respectful way about Iraq."
-
Sadr's surprising move of yesterday is explained in this NY Times piece:
==============
BAGHDAD, Aug. 29 — The radical Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr said Wednesday that he was suspending for six months his Mahdi Army militia’s operations, including attacks on American troops, only hours after his fighters waged running street battles with Iraqi government forces for control of Karbala, one of Iraq’s holiest cities.
The surprise declaration was widely taken as a tacit acknowledgment of the damage done to his movement’s reputation by two days of Shiite-on-Shiite in-fighting, which killed 52 people, wounded 279 and forced thousands of pilgrims to flee birthday celebrations for the Mahdi, one of Shiite Islam’s most revered medieval saints.
Mr. Sadr’s aides declared an unequivocal end to all militia operations. Ahmed al-Shaibani, the chief of Mr. Sadr’s media office in Najaf, confirmed that this “includes suspending the taking up of arms against occupiers,” a reference to American-led coalition troops.
But Mr. Shaibani, who was one of the major commanders in the Mahdi Army’s August 2004 battle with American troops in Najaf, another Shiite holy city, left open the possibility that militiamen would react if provoked, saying only, “We will deal with it when it happens.”
It is also unclear whether the widely feared group will continue to exert its powerful hold over the black market distribution of everyday necessities in Iraq, including gas, diesel, cooking fuel and other utilities.
Mr. Sadr’s officials claimed that the freeze was intended to isolate and eliminate “rogue” elements of the Mahdi Army that no longer responded to Mr. Sadr’s orders.
American and British commanders have frequently made accusations in recent months that some Mahdi Army fighters have slipped out of Mr. Sadr’s control, operating as criminal gangs or receiving financing and training from Iran to carry out attacks on American and Iraqi security forces. One possible impact of the freeze would be to enlist the help of American forces to weed out rogue elements for Mr. Sadr’s group. In effect, Mr. Sadr was saying, anyone who attacks Americans is by definition violating the freeze and laying himself open to retaliatory attacks.
A statement signed by Mr. Sadr said the six-month suspension of the militia’s activities was intended to “rehabilitate it in a way that will safeguard its ideological image.”
“This decision will have great advantage,” Mr. Shaibani said. “It will distinguish and isolate those who claim to be working for JAM and who are actually not part of it.” He was using the acronym for the Mahdi Army’s Arabic name, Jaish al-Mahdi.
“JAM is a huge and active body in Iraq, but there are some intruders who want to create rifts. We don’t have masked men working with us.”
Many Iraqis said the announcement had more to do with the national backlash created by the television images of thousands of pilgrims who were celebrating the birth of the Mahdi, a revered ninth-century imam, on Tuesday being forced to flee machine gun fire and rocket-propelled grenade exchanges between Mahdi Army fighters and the security forces of Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki’s government.
The government forces are dominated by the Sadrists’ main political rivals, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council and its armed Badr movement. Many fear the Karbala clashes were simply the most public sign of Shiite rivalries between the powerful Sadr and Badr movements, who are vying for power in Shiite southern Iraq.
Iraq’s national security adviser, Mowaffak al-Rubaie, said he welcomed the suspension order but, like many, said it remained to be seen if it would be carried out on the ground. “If it happens it will reduce the violence in the country by a great deal,” he told CNN.
Politicians and analysts said that Mr. Sadr’s action on Wednesday showed that he realized he had overplayed his hand by taking on the security forces and exposing internal Shiite rivalries and that he was now reining in the more extreme elements in his movement.
“This announcement has been triggered by what happened in Karbala,” said Mahmoud Othman, an independent Kurdish lawmaker. “Everybody is blaming JAM. Karbala was the signal that enough is enough and that they have to purge the people who are not really true JAM.”
But while he said that the discomfiture of Mr. Sadr, one of Mr. Maliki’s harshest critics, could strengthen the prime minister, there was little sign that Mr. Sadr was making overtures to rejoin the government. Sadrist ministers resigned from the cabinet earlier this year because Mr. Maliki refused to set a deadline for the withdrawal of American troops.
“We have to wait and see how they proceed and what they actually do,” Mr. Othman cautioned.
Mariam Reyes, an adviser to Mr. Maliki, said it was a “step in the right direction” and would stabilize the security situation. “It will unveil the components that have penetrated JAM and carry out military activities against the police and army,” she said. Visiting Karbala on Wednesday, Mr. Maliki contended that a curfew had restored order to the streets and blamed “outlawed armed criminal gangs from the remnants of the buried Saddam regime” for the violence of the previous two days. He also removed from command the army general in charge of the Karbala command center.
Mr. Shaibani accused the security forces of causing the trouble by opening fire on pilgrims and Sadrists.
But many in Karbala blame the Mahdi Army for the street battles. Abu Ahmad, a 58-year-old Karbala businessman, said: “We have a proverb which says, if there are a lot of captains on board a ship, it will sink. This is what happened in Iraq. The illegal possession of weapons by the Mahdi Army and Badr, in addition to ignorance, led to the destruction of the city.
“The Mahdi’s birthday is a cheerful event, but it turned into a tragedy,” he continued. He said that Sadr supporters on the City Council had encouraged the conflict and that a weak provincial governor had been unable to deal with the problem.
One Iraqi Army captain in the town, who spoke on the condition of anonymity for fear of reprisals, said: “The crisis started with a fight between Mahdi people carrying weapons and the guards of the shrine. All of a sudden we saw JAM snipers on rooftops of the nearby hotels, and weapons in the hands of pilgrims. It seemed as if they deliberately started the fight to attack the security forces.”
Ali Adeeb contributed reporting from Baghdad, and Iraqi employees of The New York Times from Karbala, Najaf and Hilla.
-
Geopolitical Diary: Bush's Trip to Iraq
U.S. President George W. Bush stopped in Iraq on Monday on his way to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation conference in Australia. Bush has traveled to Iraq on several occasions, each time arriving without warning, for obvious reasons. In that sense, there was nothing particularly important about his trip. But there were some potentially significant parts to it.
First, the location; he went to Anbar province, not Baghdad. Anbar province had been one of the most restive regions of Iraq, with Sunni guerrillas continually operating against Americans and others. One of the successes of the surge has been the reduction of insurgent activity in Anbar. The president's trip there, then, there was designed to underline one of the successes of the surge strategy.
Part of the success has to do with military operations. But guerrillas, by their nature, go to ground when major enemy units start to operate in their area. When they leave to pacify another area, the guerrillas resume operations. Therefore, the presence of some Sunni tribal leaders was significant. That is a tremendous evolution over the past year. Sunnis willing to be seen with the president are Sunnis who have confidence that they won't be killed. And that means these are both powerful Sunnis and Sunni leaders who have made political deals with the United States.
Bush was flaunting his political rapprochement with the Sunnis. Its broadness is unclear, but he clearly was pushing Iran's buttons. Tehran's fear is the restoration of the Sunni regime in Baghdad, backed by the U.S. Army. That is easier said than done, but Bush wanted to signal the Iranians that the United States is developing political options among Iran's enemies in Iraq. Under any circumstance it is interesting because jihadists operate in the region as well. The Sunnis are either remarkably brave or feel that the jihadists are under control.
While the Iranians were one audience for the trip, another audience is Washington. Gen. David Petraeus is issuing his report in less than two weeks. From interviews he's given, it appears that it will state that violence has been reduced. That is far from the only benchmark he must discuss and in some ways it is not the most important. Violence might decline during the surge, but what happens when troops are withdrawn? Nevertheless, Bush wanted to demonstrate one success in Anbar. Then when the inevitable fighting breaks out in Washington over what Petraeus has really said, the image of Bush in Anbar with Sunnis will frame the debate. Or so the president hopes.
Bush also threw out another option, new for him. He said that it might now be possible to start reducing troops in Iraq. This is critical for him, because more than any other benchmark, the ability to reduce troops in Iraq is going to be the test of the president's progress. Bush needed to say that and he did. What it means is far from clear, of course, and possibly Bush himself doesn't yet know what is possible. But he has thrown in with those Republicans, such as Sen. John Warner, who have come out in favor of a drawdown.
Our own view of a drawdown is that it is the worst of all worlds -- an unchanged mission with fewer troops. But regardless of our views, the fact is that Bush is being flexible in anticipation of the Petraeus report. He is preparing the way for some serious battling, with both Congress and Iran. Right now it would appear that Bush is playing to Congress and goading the Iranians.
stratfor.com
-----------
WSJ
The Tide Is Turning in Iraq
By KIMBERLY KAGAN
September 4, 2007; Page A17
The initial concept of the "surge" strategy in Iraq was to secure Baghdad and its immediate environs, which is why its proper name was the "Baghdad Security Plan." But as President Bush pointed out during his surprise trip to Iraq, operations and events on the ground are already showing successes well beyond Baghdad in Anbar, Diyala and Salahaddin provinces -- formerly al Qaeda strongholds and hotbeds of the Sunni insurgency.
Considering the speed with which these successes have developed, and the rapidly growing grass-roots movement among Iraqis to support the effort, there is every reason to be optimistic about the prospects for establishing security in Iraq, and every reason to continue supporting the current strategy.
The first major combat operation of the surge, Operation Phantom Thunder, began on June 15 and accomplished its primary objectives. American troops and Iraqi Security Forces eliminated all of al Qaeda's sanctuaries in the Baghdad belts, including its urban stronghold in Baqubah. U.S. forces cleared Dora, al Qaeda's stronghold in western Baghdad. They established an extensive net of outposts in former enemy safe havens, degraded the capabilities of Shiite militias, and dramatically reduced sectarian violence and spectacular attacks in and around the capital.
Phantom Thunder was the first coherent campaign aimed at all of the major al Qaeda strongholds at once. As a result, terrorists could not move from one safe haven to another. Iraqi and Coalition forces killed, wounded and captured thousands of them.
Six months ago, insurgents operated freely around Baghdad's belts. Now U.S. and Iraqi forces limit them to discrete areas, more distant from urban centers, where they cannot easily defend themselves, or support one another or their vehicle-bomb network.
Smaller groups who escaped from their safe havens during combat operations generally fled along the Tigris and Diyala River valleys. The remnants of al Qaeda in western Baghdad can no longer quickly reinforce their positions from outside or within the city.
Gens. David Petraeus and Raymond Odierno followed up Phantom Thunder with Phantom Strike. The new campaign, launched on Aug. 13, aims to prevent terrorists and militias from reconstituting their forces in Baghdad, its belts or elsewhere. U.S. and Iraqi forces are moving along the river valleys to destroy the remnants of enemy groups and eliminate any new safe havens they try to establish. Their operations are also preventing Shiite militias from taking over territory al Qaeda once controlled.
Phantom Strike involves Coalition and Iraqi forces throughout central Iraq. U.S. forces are clearing a wedge of terrain between the Tigris and Diyala Rivers north of Baghdad and holding those river lines. Operation Lightning Hammer, part of Phantom Strike, cleared 50 villages in the palm groves of the Diyala River valley, permitting U.S. and Iraqi forces to establish a combat outpost 15 miles northeast of Baqubah to secure the area. U.S. and Iraqi forces have captured Iranian-supported extremist leaders on the Tigris River's east bank, and they are striking al Qaeda in Balad, Samarra and Tikrit.
Meanwhile, Phantom Strike has dismantled a vehicle-bomb network in central Baghdad. And to the south of the city U.S. forces are destroying remnants of al Qaeda in Arab Jabour and Salman Pak -- both al Qaeda safe havens just months ago.
Skillful combat -- and skillful negotiation -- have transformed the area formerly known as "the triangle of death" into a region of dawning, if precarious, stability. As Coalition forces consolidate their gains in these areas, they are also striking Shiite militia sanctuaries east of Baghdad and further south and east along the Tigris River valley. Gen. Odierno and his division commanders cleared territory gradually throughout Phantom Thunder and Phantom Strike, so that they could hold it after clearing operations.
The tribal movement begun in Anbar has spread throughout central Iraq, as thousands of Sunnis have either volunteered to join the Iraqi Security Forces or formed local defense groups under Iraqi government and Coalition auspices. These "concerned citizens" groups springing up throughout central Iraq have not been previously observed on this scale in the country. They permit U.S. and Iraqi forces to hold territory they have cleared more effectively. The volunteers who make up these groups, recruited and deployed in their own neighborhoods, have incentives to protect their families and communities. They are not independent militias, however. They are partnered with Iraqi Security Forces and Coalition forces.
The Baqubah Guardians, one such group, recently helped the Iraqi police in that city fight off al Qaeda insurgents until Coalition helicopters arrived. The Taji Neighborhood Watch association searched hundreds of homes for weapons caches. Iraq has hitherto lacked a local policing initiative, relying instead on national and regional models. The concerned-citizen groups are filling this gap while the U.S. and the Iraqi governments work to expand and improve the Iraqi Security Forces that many of these volunteers hope to join.
There is every prospect of extending this movement further. Residents of freshly cleared Arab Jabour have volunteered to join the Iraqi Security Forces, indicating that the population there feels increasingly secure from terrorists. Tribal leaders in the Diyala River valley, many of whom have fought with one another since 2006, met immediately after Operation Lightning Hammer ended and swore to fight terrorism and work together as a single tribe.
Tribal leaders encourage local citizens to join the Iraqi Security Forces, working as volunteers before they are accepted into the police or army to identify weapons caches and terrorists to Iraqi or Coalition forces. U.S. commanders hold tribal leaders accountable when they fail to secure their area properly. U.S. forces take fingerprints and retina scans and record the serial numbers of the weapons of citizen-group members. This helps them vet the groups for dangerous insurgents and hold accountable anyone who turns against the Coalition.
The Iraqi government determines whether or not the volunteers are accepted into the security forces. In mid-August, the government enrolled 1,700 new Iraqi policemen from the mostly Sunni former insurgent enclave of Abu Ghraib.
The destruction of al Qaeda sanctuaries has permitted Coalition forces to focus more on the violent Shiite militia groups funded by Iran. These groups are responsible for kidnapping numerous Iraqi government officials, running sectarian death squads and conducting mortar and rocket attacks against the Green Zone.
The Iranian Revolutionary Guard's elite Quds Force and Hezbollah have organized, trained and funded this network of Iraqi special groups, which could not sustain themselves without foreign support. Offensive operations targeting these groups have intensified, a development also made possible by the increasing cooperation of the Maliki government. Coalition and Iraqi forces have been redeployed to disrupt the groups' communication and supply routes east and south of Baghdad. A multi-phase campaign to capture or kill secret cell leaders is also underway across central and southern Iraq and in Baghdad.
In short, American forces are in the midst of a large, complex campaign to defeat al Qaeda, dismantle Iranian-backed Shiite criminal militias, support a growing grass-roots movement in the Sunni population, and create space for political progress at the national level. Al Qaeda is not defunct by any means. It continues to fight and is trying to re-establish itself. It will certainly try to conduct a large-scale terror campaign to coincide with Gen. Petraeus's report to Americans later this month on the progress of the surge.
The Shiite militias seem more daunted. Moqtada al Sadr has ordered his Mahdi Army fighters to cease operations against U.S. and Iraqi forces -- from his refuge in Iran.
Significant challenges remain in establishing security, building up Iraqi forces capable of maintaining it and helping the Iraqi government achieve reconciliation and unity. But few expected the progress made so far. The tide in Iraq is clearly turning, as the Iraqi people are voting with their lives to fight with us against terrorists and militias. Now is not the time to give up the fight.
Ms. Kagan is an affiliate of Harvard's John M. Olin Institute of Strategic Studies and the president of the Institute for the Study of War in Washington.
-
Second post of the AM:
MISSION AMENDED
U.S. Shifts Iraq Focus
As Local Tactics Gain
Central Government
Loses Clout to Regions;
Bush Skips Baghdad
By YOCHI J. DREAZEN and PHILIP SHISHKIN in Iraq, and GREG JAFFE in Washington
September 4, 2007; Page A1
The Bush administration is quietly moving toward a major shift in Iraq policy, driven by successes in formerly intractable insurgent strongholds combined with dispiriting failures at fostering national reconciliation.
After almost four years of trying to build Iraq's central government in Baghdad, the U.S. has found that what appears to work best in the divided country is just the opposite. So senior military officials are increasingly working to strengthen local players who are bringing some measure of stability to their communities. The new approach bears some striking similarities to the "soft partition" strategy pushed by senior Democrats, and suggests that despite the often bitter debate in Washington on Iraq policy, a broad consensus on how to move ahead in the war-torn country may be forming.
President Bush yesterday made a surprise trip to Iraq in advance of an upcoming congressional debate on the war. In a symbolic nod to the emerging administration strategy, it was his first trip to the country that didn't involve a stop in the capital of Baghdad. Instead he visited the former Sunni-insurgent stronghold of Anbar province, where he met with local sheiks who have received tens of millions of dollars in cash as well as training to help fight al Qaeda insurgents in Iraq.
The sheiks "told me that the kind of bottom-up progress that your efforts are bringing to Anbar is vital to the success and stability of a free Iraq," Mr. Bush told a crowd of about 750 soldiers and Marines. Mr. Bush yesterday suggested that if the local gains the U.S. is making continue to hold it could begin to reduce U.S. troop levels by the end of the year.
Senior Bush administration officials, including the president, still talk about the importance of national reconciliation between the three main sectarian and ethnic groups often at war with each other: the minority Sunnis who ruled under Saddam Hussein, the long-oppressed Shiite majority, and northern Iraq's Kurds. Indeed most of the 18 benchmarks drawn up by Congress earlier this year focus on key national reconciliation goals, such as a compact to share oil revenues and loosening draconian laws that had been aimed at purging from power any Sunnis with even a distant affiliation with Mr. Hussein's Baath Party. According to several high-level U.S. reports, the Iraqi government in Baghdad is failing in almost all of those endeavors.
When Gen. David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker deliver their much-anticipated report to Congress next week they are likely to acknowledge little progress toward achieving these goals which had been central to President Bush's Iraq strategy. But they are also certain to point to big gains at the local level, in places like Anbar province, where violence has plummeted. At Gen. Petraeus's urging, Mr. Bush is also expected to announce a new infusion of aid to the Sunni Arab regions. The aid, which comes on top of $125 million pumped into the province so far this year, would be given directly to local leaders, instead of passing through the central government in Baghdad.
FIGHT FOR IRAQ
See continuing coverage of developments in Iraq, including an interactive map of day-to-day events in Iraq and a tally of military deaths.
• Washington Wire: Bush trips up press corps againGen. Petraeus also is expected to assert next week that sectarian killings have fallen by more than half in Baghdad due to the increased presence of troops on the street.
Increasingly commanders in Iraq say that their pessimism and frustration with the current Iraqi government, under the leadership of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, have led them to focus more intensely on efforts to build up local security forces and funnel reconstruction projects through local sheiks. "The problems in Iraq are going to be stopped from the ground up, not from the top down," says Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch, who commands U.S. forces in the mixed Sunni-Shiite area south of Baghdad. "At the national level you still get sectarian decisions being made, so you work on building capacity from the ground up."
The new approach was born last winter in Sunni-dominated Anbar province, where senior Marine officials courted local sheiks with millions of dollars in cash for reconstruction projects and help training their men to fight radical Sunni terrorists. Since then it has spread through large swaths of Iraq as commanders elsewhere have followed the Marines' lead.
In Baghdad, the U.S. military is training and paying Sunni "neighborhood watch" groups to guard their homes.
In the latest move in the strategy, American commanders are trying to export recent success co-opting Sunni sheiks to the much more strategically important Shiite tribes. American commanders for the first time are pushing these leaders to turn against extremists from their own sect, much like U.S. officers have convinced Sunni chiefs to turn against Sunni extremists in places like Anbar. Among the Shiite tribes south of Baghdad, the Americans' weapon of choice has become the "concerned citizens" agreement. A typical deal involves the U.S. forking over a monthly payment of $350 per tribal guard willing to fight. The money is channeled through local sheiks who in return promise to keep their areas safe from attacks against Americans.
Conversely, senior military officials are worrying less about the dysfunctional central government that has been the focus of so much effort in the U.S. military and political strategy over the last three years. The change is the simple outgrowth of what the summer surge of more than 30,000 troops into Iraq has wrought. The U.S. has been most successful in areas where it has taken an intensely local approach, working with local leaders who share U.S. goals.
The logical result of the new policy is a profound shift away from the Bush administration's original goal of building a multisectarian democracy in the heart of the Middle East. Instead, the new strategy seems likely to lead to an Iraq with a very weak central government and largely self-governing and homogenous regions. Over the long term the goal is to connect these local leaders to the central government by making them dependent on Baghdad for funds. To qualify for U.S. assistance, local groups must pledge loyalty to the central government, though many Sunni leaders who are working with the U.S. complain the Shiite dominated government is illegitimate.
Some military officials say the local focus seems to be leading to an outcome that looks similar to the "soft partition" or federalism approach advocated by a growing number of Democrats, including Joseph Biden of Delaware, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a longshot candidate for president. Senior Bush administration officials, of course, have never used the phrase "soft partition." Instead President Bush and Defense Secretary Robert Gates often refer to the new approach as "bottom-up reconciliation." Yesterday the president expressed hope that the military successes would "pave the way for political reconciliation."
Gen. Petraeus, the top commander in Iraq, often refers to the need for "accommodation." He argues it is unrealistic to think Iraqis will reconcile any time soon. But maybe they can "accommodate" each other. Whether it's called "accommodation," "bottom-up reconciliation" or "soft partition," U.S. officials quietly acknowledge that they are basically talking about a strategy focused on strengthening local leaders to make them more self-sufficient and less reliant on the central government. "If the central government doesn't want to take control, maybe the locals will," said one senior U.S. commander who has played a key role in crafting the new approach. "It is too early to tell. We are riding a tiger. It may take us where we want to go."
To be sure, this approach has problems of its own. In some cases, Mr. Maliki's weak government has fought the U.S. efforts to build local Sunni-dominated security forces. The government in Baghdad, which is dominated by Shiites, worries that these troops could some day turn on it. In other cases, the government in Baghdad seems to fear a loss of power and resources. "If the government of Iraq does not buy into these local accommodations and deals, the progress will be transitory," said one senior Army officer who advises Gen. Petraeus.
Mr. Maliki has repeatedly denied that either he or his weak ruling coalition has a sectarian agenda. He also recently voiced support for a draft of a new law that would ease the ban on former members of Mr. Hussein's Baathist party, who were largely Sunni. That law must still be approved by parliament.
The potential -- and the limits -- of the current U.S. approach are evident in the northern Iraqi city of Mosul, which was once one of Iraq's most violent cities.
Today, Mosul is in the midst of a remarkable turnaround. There hasn't been a car bomb or large-scale attack there since early May, and U.S. commanders say the number of attacks in Mosul has dropped by half. No Americans have been killed there this year. U.S. commanders give most of the credit to local Iraqi security commanders like Col. Qader Saleem Qader, an intelligence officer who tracked and killed two key insurgent leaders in recent weeks, and to his boss, Gen. Jassim Habib Moutaa.
Mr. Maliki's government hasn't rewarded Gen. Moutaa and Col. Qader for their successes, however. Instead, U.S. officers say the Ministry of Defense in Baghdad has refused to promote either of the men, pay their salaries on time, or give the division its proper allotment of uniforms, weapons and other equipment.
"My Iraqi counterparts used to tell me that the entire government in Baghdad was controlled by Iran, and I didn't believe them," said Col. Christopher Mitchell, who commands a U.S. military advisory team that works with the division. "Now I'm not so sure," he added, referring to widespread suspicions that the Shiite government in Tehran is undermining any signs of success by the rival Sunnis or Kurds. The Iraqi government vehemently denies its policies are being influenced by Iran.
Another barrier could be the Iraqis themselves. Shiite leaders, who represent the majority of Iraqis, aren't eager to cede power to Sunnis. It isn't clear either that Sunnis will be willing to settle for a vast swath of land with few oil resources leaving them dependent on the Shiites for future revenue. "I don't think any of Iraq's communities would be happy with a soft partition type of solution," said one adviser to Gen. Petraeus.
The new approach also has shown uneven results in Shiite areas and may even be fueling some Shiite-on-Shiite violence in the south as various tribal and militia groups try to consolidate political and economic control over provinces and towns. Shiite Arabs make up some 60% of Iraq's population. U.S. officials say extremist Shiite militias constitute one of the biggest challenges to stability across the country.
"Any kind of Shia effort to come back to the center would be decisive," says U.S. Army Maj. Craig Whiteside, stationed south of Baghdad in Iskandariyah.
For now, getting Shiite tribal elders to resist extreme militias is proving more difficult in many cases than winning over Sunni sheiks, who saw many of the extremist Sunni elements as outsiders to their tribal ways. The Shiite militias, by contrast, are often viewed by the locals as a necessary, if violent, defense against Sunni extremists.
For example, in a cluster of Shiite villages called Jiff Jaffa, an American effort to co-opt local villagers away from Shiite militias, shows how difficult it can be to break the hold of Shiite militias. A year ago, the Americans helped the villagers set up an agricultural union, donating fertilizer and several tractors. Then, about a month ago, the Americans decided to broaden their alliance with Jiff Jaffa and offered the villagers a "concerned citizens' deal." Several U.S. soldiers had been killed on roads skirting the area by "explosively formed penetrators," a particularly deadly type of a roadside bomb favored by extreme Shiite militias. The U.S. troops wanted those routes secured. The Jiff Jaffa leaders embraced the idea and promised to come up with a list of 150 tribal guards.
The list took a long time to draft. The Americans assumed Jiff Jaffa's elders simply couldn't agree which tribesmen should get the job, a typical holdup. But a more disturbing picture soon emerged. Village elders had arranged a meeting with Shiite militants in a local mosque and asked for permission to cooperate with the Americans.
"We negotiated with [Shiite militants] for 10 days," recalls a local farmer who would only introduce himself as Abu Ahmed out of fear of retribution. "They said you are not allowed to work for the coalition forces."
Like many moderate Shiites, the farmer is chafing under the militants' intimidation and attempts to impose strict Islamism on the villagers. He complained about militant bans on alcohol and told stories of a relative smuggling booze in the tires of his car. "In three months, I'm going to Syria to drink some beers and relax," he said.
Shiite militants took root in Jiff Jaffa in part because Sunni extremists in a neighboring area waged war on the Shiite tribes. Over time, the Shiite militias' defensive moves against the Sunni incursions have helped entrench them in many Shiite communities. "Sunnis have a problem with al Qaeda, but Shiites don't have the same problem with their militias, at least not yet," says Sabah al-Khafaji, a local sheik of a large Shiite tribe.
Despite these reservations, village elders finally signed the deal with the Americans over the weekend. It's too early to tell how effective the deal will be.
It's also too early to tell how the mosaic of local deals will play out at the national level. Mr. Bush was met in Anbar province, the former heartland of the Sunni insurgency, by Mr. Maliki, the Shiite prime minister who rarely visits the province. In recent weeks Bush administration officials along with Democratic lawmakers have criticized Mr. Maliki for moving too slowly to reconcile with Sunnis.
Mr. Maliki's presence was clearly intended to show that national reconciliation is still a long-term goal. But some U.S. officials worry that the local deals may actually be impeding the Bush administration's policy aims. The deals are made with groups that are almost entirely Sunni or Shiite. "This works against national level accommodation because it politicizes sectarian identity," said one military strategist in the region.
-
IRAQ: "Foreign factions" have infiltrated the leadership of radical Iraqi Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr's Mehdi Army in an attempt to expand their control in Iraq, Al-Hayat reported, citing unnamed sources within the movement. The factions reportedly provide monetary support, moral support, weapons and training. The infiltrated elements no longer obeyed al-Sadr's commands and instead targeted Shia and Sunnis without coordination with the al-Sadr movement.
IRAQ: Sheikh Abu Zeinab, spokesman for Iraqi Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr's Mehdi Army, threatened political and military reprisals if the Iraqi government does not release arrested Mehdi Army members, Al-Hayat reported. Five-hundred movement members and 12 leaders of the Mehdi Army were arrested recently. Al-Sadr's movement also called for the dismantling of the holy site protection force in Karbala, claiming the protection group instigated recent violence there.
IRAQ: Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki met with Shiite leader Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani to discuss the ongoing crisis in which Iraq's Cabinet has quit. Al-Maliki told reporters after the meeting that he came to hear al-Sistani's advice on filling Cabinet vacancies or forming an entirely new government. Neither al-Maliki's nor al-Sistani's office reported on how the meeting went.
stratfor.com
-
stratfor.com
IRAQ, U.S.: U.S. and Iraqi troops have intensified military operations against al Qaeda in northern Iraq with the late Sept. 5 launch of a new operation, a statement from the multinational forces said. Approximately 12,000 U.S. troops and 14,000 Iraqi troops participated in the operation, which is considered the largest to be carried out in Diyala province.
IRAQ: Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki pledged during a meeting with top Shiite cleric in Iraq Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani to purge shrines in An Najaf and Karbala of radical Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr's armed supporters, Azzaman reported, citing unnamed sources in al-Maliki's Hizb al-Dawah party. The sources added that al-Maliki is considering a plan to "uproot" al-Sadr supporters in a fashion similar to de-Baathification, which barred supporters of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's regime from holding government positions.
-
IRAQ: Former Iraqi interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi said in an interview aired on Al Arabiya that he arranged meetings between representatives of the banned Baath Party and senior U.S. officials. The meetings reportedly took place at the request of the United States and included representatives of Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, who has a $10 million U.S. bounty on his head. The meetings were aimed at relaxing the ban on former senior- and middle-ranking Baathists from taking government jobs. Al Arabiya said it will broadcast the full interview with Allawi later in the day.
stratfor
-
1133 GMT -- UNITED STATES, IRAQ -- The Pentagon is planning to establish the first military base and multiple fortified checkpoints near the Iraq-Iran border in an effort to thwart the flow of Iranian weapons into Iraq, the Wall Street Journal reported Sept. 10, citing Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch, commander of the U.S. Army's 3rd Infantry Division. The United States recently accused Iran of supporting Iraq's Shiite militias with weapons, though Tehran denies the claim.
1127 GMT-- IRAQ -- Civil war has been prevented in Iraq and violence has dropped 75 percent in Baghdad and Anbar provinces since the latest surge in the number of U.S. troops, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki told the Iraqi parliament Sept. 10. Al-Maliki's comments came just hours before top U.S. military chief in Iraq Gen. David Petraeus is due to deliver his Iraq assessment to the U.S. Congress. Al-Maliki defended his performance as prime minister in the wake of calls in the United States for his replacement.
strafor.com
============
Concerning the first of these: It has been a mystery to me why we have not controlled border movements with Iran, SA, Syria et al for a long time now , , , :x
-
I don't know what the reason in Iraq would be, but this administration seems to have a problem with controlling any borders.
-
The truth of that is both funny and tragic.
-
I know. Build a fence and dig a ditch! That'll work.
-
Good razor wire fences, mine fields, Predator drones and Marine fire teams make for good neighbors.
-
WE're drifting a bit far afield here. If you want to address these matters, the Mexico-US thread or the Immigration thread are the places for it.
-
By Bush's Own Standard, Surge Has Failed
By George Will
Before Gen. David Petraeus' report, and to give it a context of optimism, the president visited Iraq's Anbar province to underscore the success of the surge in making some hitherto anarchic areas less so. More significant, however, was the fact that the president did not visit Baghdad. This underscored the fact that the surge has failed, as measured by the president's and Petraeus' standards of success.
Those who today stridently insist that the surge has succeeded also say they are especially supportive of the president, Petraeus and the military generally. But at the beginning of the surge, both Petraeus and the president defined success in a way that took the achievement of success out of America's hands.
The purpose of the surge, they said, is to buy time -- "breathing space," the president says -- for Iraqi political reconciliation. Because progress toward that has been negligible, there is no satisfactory answer to this question: What is the U.S. military mission in Iraq?
Many of those who insist that the surge is a harbinger of U.S. victory in Iraq are making the same mistake they made in 1991 when they urged an advance on Baghdad, and in 2003 when they underestimated the challenge of building democracy there. The mistake is exaggerating the relevance of U.S. military power to achieve political progress in a society riven by ethnic and sectarian hatreds. America's military leaders, who are professional realists, do not make this mistake.
The progress that Petraeus reports in improving security in portions of Iraq is real. It might, however, have two sinister aspects.
First, measuring sectarian violence is problematic: The Washington Post reports that a body with a bullet hole in the front of the skull is considered a victim of criminality; a hole in the back of the skull is evidence of sectarian violence. But even if violence is declining, that might be partly because violent sectarian cleansing has separated Sunni and Shiite communities. This homogenization of hostile factions -- trained and armed by U.S. forces -- may bear poisonous fruit in a full-blown civil war.
Second, brutalities by al-Qaeda in Iraq have indeed provoked some Sunni leaders to collaborate with U.S. forces. But these alliances of convenience might be inconvenient when Shiites again become the Sunnis' principal enemy.
Congressional Democrats should accept Petraeus' report as a reason to declare a victory, one that might make this fact somewhat palatable: Substantial numbers of U.S. forces will be in Iraq when the next president is inaugurated. The Democrats' "victory" -- a chimera but a useful one -- is that Petraeus indicates there soon can be a small reduction of U.S. forces.
To declare this a substantial victory won by them requires Democrats to do two things. They must make a mountain out of a molehill (Petraeus suggests withdrawal of only a few thousand troops). And they must spuriously claim credit for the mountain. Actually, senior military officers have been saying that a large drawdown is inevitable, given the toll taken on the forces by the tempo of operations for more than four years.
But Democrats cannot advertise a small withdrawal as a victory without further infuriating their party's base, the source of energy and money. The base is incandescent because there are more troops in Iraq today than there were on Election Day 2006, when Democratic activists and donors thought, not without reason, that congressional Democrats acquired the power to end U.S. involvement in Iraq.
A democracy, wrote the diplomat and scholar George Kennan, "fights for the very reason that it was forced to go to war. It fights to punish the power that was rash enough and hostile enough to provoke it -- to teach that power a lesson it will not forget, to prevent the thing from happening again. Such a war must be carried to the bitter end." Which is why "unconditional surrender" was a natural U.S. goal in World War II, and why Americans were so uncomfortable with three "wars of choice" since then -- in Korea, Vietnam and Iraq.
What "forced" America to go to war in 2003 -- the "gathering danger" of weapons of mass destruction -- was fictitious. That is one reason why this war will not be fought, at least not by Americans, to the bitter end. The end of the war will, however, be bitter for Americans, partly because the president's decision to visit Iraq without visiting its capital confirmed the flimsiness of the fallback rationale for the war -- the creation of a unified, pluralist Iraq.
After more than four years of war, two questions persist: Is there an Iraq? Are there Iraqis?
-
George Will is not a stupid man, nor a mindlessly negative one. That said, this piece for me misses quite a bit of the forest. First and foremost, it does not address Iraq in the larger context of the world wide war with Islamic Fascism (both Sunni and Shiite). It does not address the issue of Iran and its ambitions, both nuclear and regional. I do not follow his point when he writes "But these alliances of convenience might be inconvenient when Shiites again become the Sunnis' principal enemy." He does not address the implications of Mooky Sadr pulling his forces from the field of battle in Baghdad. And a bright guy like GW surely knows the WMD was only one of the reasons for the war-- and the one chosen to justify it to the UN. Go back to President Bush's speeches before we went to the UN and you will find much more than that.
The Sunnis are now with us due to a) they had their fill of AQ b) they are worried about the Shia and Iran.
It is quite an accomplishment for our policy, no less real for the failure of GW and the rest of the chattering class to notice it, that the Arab/Muslim world sees the Iraqi Sunnis turn on AQ. With that step accomplished and with Mooky Sadr, at least momentarily on the sidelines, can we accomplish something similar with the Shia? What of the implications of our recent moves with the British to interdict Iran's supplies to its agents in the south? Can we begin to strangle the nuts/agents of Iran amongst the Iraqi Shia in the south?
I DON'T KNOW-- but I think that in this piece at this moment GW is simply another member of the chattering class of Washington who thinks himself profound because he cleverly filters the intellectual detrius of vapors of our nation's capital.
I close with this from Michael Yon in Iraq. I have the highest respect for MY and support his presence their financially:
Greetings:
Successes are occurring, and accruing, in Iraq. Al Qaeda is still a powerful enemy, but they cannot be happy with their Iraqi franchise this summer.
Readers of my dispatches have gotten first hand reports of the kinds of positive indicators that General David Petraeus described in his progress report.
The atmosphere is changing in Iraq and I've been posting dispatches and videos that illustrate just how profound this change is in some cases.
I was the first to say Iraq was in civil war, and many readers were angry to hear me say it. Well, I'll be the first to say that I predict some sort of milestone for the war in Iraq will occur early in the next year. It's dangerous to predict like this, but something fundamental has changed in Iraq.
There is one important qualifier: this will only happen if General David Petraeus is supported by our elected officials to implement his proposed plan, without meddling from those same elected officials. Oversight and accountability are not the same thing as backseat driving after siphoning out half of the gas tank.
Please read: Hunting Al Qaeda http://www.michaelyon-online.com/wp/hunting-al-qaeda-part-i-of-iii.htm
v/r
Michael
-
Following up on my previous post, the WSJ says it better than I do:
-----------
Petraeus Takes the Beltway
Political progress--in Iraq and the U.S--follows military success.
Wednesday, September 12, 2007 12:01 a.m. EDT
So the two men best qualified to give an honest and comprehensive account of events in Iraq have marched through Congress to say--and show--that the surge is working and America's goals are still within reach. Yet it's a sign of the U.S. political debate that their evidence of progress seemed to make the headlines in none of our leading news sources yesterday.
Instead, the "news" seems to be that General David Petraeus has recommended that some 5,000 U.S. troops can rotate out of Iraq by the end of this year, and that U.S. forces might be able to return to pre-surge levels by next July if progress continues. That's no small matter, but it obscures the larger message of the testimony by the General and Ambassador Ryan Crocker. To wit: The U.S. is gaining ground in Iraq--often in the least expected of ways.
Consider some excerpts from Mr. Crocker's testimony. The Iraqi government puts its cell phone spectrum up for auction: It nets a better-than-expected sum of nearly $4 billion. At a recent conference in Dubai, "hundreds of Iraqi businessmen met an equal number of foreign investors newly interested in acquiring shares of business in Iraq." Iraqi oil is now flowing out of the country via Turkish pipelines, and the International Monetary Fund predicts economic growth for Iraq of 6% this year.
In the vicinity of Abu Ghraib, 1,700 men--many of them former Sunni insurgents--have joined the Shiite-dominated Iraqi Security Forces. The Iraqi government is quietly offering jobs or retirement packages to thousands of former soldiers, many of them one-time members of the Baath Party. Significantly, it is doing so without taking the politically sensitive steps of declaring a general amnesty or enacting legislation on de-Baathification.
As Mr. Crocker notes, these developments "are neither measured in benchmarks nor visible to those far from Baghdad." It's a point that seems to have been missed by Democrats on the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees, as well as by such Republicans as John Warner and Dick Lugar. Their collective view seems to be that Iraq is a lost cause because the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has failed to achieve "national reconciliation," on the grounds that a series of legislative benchmarks have still not been met.
We don't know anyone who opposes "national reconciliation," though perhaps only on Capitol Hill would it be measured by the quantity of legislation passed rather than the quality of life for ordinary Iraqis. (In the U.S., these measures tend to be inversely correlated.) Yet "reconciliation" isn't something that precedes basic security. It follows from it.
In his testimony, General Petraeus noted that violent civilian deaths have declined by 45% in Iraq and 70% in Baghdad. Car and suicide bombings are down by nearly 50% since March, another astonishing turnabout. Here, too, the good news comes from the least expected of places: Anbar province, where Sunni tribal leaders and many former insurgents have realized their best interests lie with the U.S. and a democratic Iraqi government in which they have a say, and not with al Qaeda. Critics claim this realization has nothing to do with the surge, but surely the tribal sheikhs would not risk fighting al Qaeda unless they believed the U.S. and Iraqi government had shown the will to stay and prevail.
Progress in Anbar would also have been harder had Mr. Maliki not agreed to allow the arming of Sunni tribal leaders, despite the danger that could pose to Shiite power. Mr. Maliki has also shown political courage by allowing the U.S. to go after the Mahdi Army of Moqtada al-Sadr, who only last year helped the prime minister get his job. Mr. Sadr recently agreed to a unilateral ceasefire after some of his men attacked Shiite worshippers in Karbala. Like al Qaeda in Iraq, he too may have overplayed his hand, and one reason for the surge to continue is to give General Petraeus time to further degrade Mahdi elements. This will leave the Iraqi Security Force in a stronger position to keep order after the surge.
One element that's still missing is the non-interference of Iraq's neighbors in its affairs. With Democratic Presidential hopeful Dennis Kucinich paying court this week in Damascus, it was especially useful to hear General Petraeus describe Syria's role in Iraq as "malign" and provide specific details of Iran's killing of U.S. soldiers and Iraqi government leaders. Our own sources say Iranian-backed forces are now responsible for 70% of U.S. casualties. The problem of Iran in Iraq is worth another editorial, but as the surge continues President Bush is going to have to get far more serious about proving to Tehran that there really are "consequences" for killing Americans. So far Mr. Bush has shown the opposite.
As for U.S. politics, the lesson of the last few months is that the way to gain ground on Capitol Hill is not with the promise of troop withdrawals. As our experience in Vietnam showed, such withdrawals quickly become a Congressional addiction. All Americans want fewer troops in Iraq; most Americans also want that drawdown to be honorable and victorious. The way to stop, or slow, the calls for too-rapid withdrawal is to succeed in making further military and political progress in Iraq.
The success of the surge so far has bought Mr. Bush more time and support to press the initiative in Baghdad and the larger Middle East. He owes it to General Petraeus and U.S. troops to exploit this opening on every front--including Syria and Iran.
-
Crafty,
I find that so much of what is written today is, for lack of a better word, "fractured". Bits and pieces of ideas, without any concrete backing or a broad view of the problems that we face. If only we could put together some of these bits and pieces and come up with a cohesive plan/foreign policy that could be digested by the public.
You mention two items which I find of interest:
It does not address Iraq in the larger context of the world wide war with Islamic Fascism (both Sunni and Shiite).
It does not address the issue of Iran and its ambitions, both nuclear and regional.
I have been doing a lot of thinking recently as to why we as a country have been so unable to wrap our heads around the "larger context". Unfortunately, I have not had the time or energy to formulate a good rant as the school year is fast approaching and the slumbering beast known as "the faculty" is starting to crawl out of its cave and sniff around campus.
However, IMHO the main failure of this administration at this point in time, is its inability to stress the importance of the danger that we as a society face from Islamic Fascism. We were able to do it with the Nazis. We were able to do it with Communism. Why are we so incapable in the face of this new threat? I think much of it has to do with "fractured" thought. We see Iraq only in the context of Iraq. We see Iran only as it relates to the US and not the other countries in the region.
What do we need to do in order to broaden the scope of our vision? How do we impress upon our population the importance of our fight, not against "terrorists" (which I find to be such a blanket term nowadays that it seems to have lost its punch), but against a culture and way of thought that is fundamentally bent on our destruction? And at what point did we allow ourselves to become blind to the danger with which we are faced?
Anyway, I hope to get back to this topic in the near future, when I have some more time to flesh it out. Until then, I hope that someone out there can throw back some responses.
Miguel
-
Although this piece is from today's NY Slimes, the thoughts of men such as Gen Abizaid are worth knowing.
A thought: I find it hard to think that I am the only person to think of this, but in that much of the Shiite-Sunni problem has its roots in the acts of Sunnis when they supported AQ and the acts of AQ against Shiites, doesn't it make sense to say that the Sunnis turning on AQ, (besides being a powerful message throughout the Arab and Muslim world- which seems to me super important) is a pre-requisite for and lays the foundation for Sunnis and Shiia being able to work things out?
================
Why Officers Differ on Troop Reduction
By DAVID S. CLOUD
Published: September 14, 2007
WASHINGTON, Sept. 13 — The view of the way forward in Iraq that President Bush articulated on Thursday night was the same one that Gen. David H. Petraeus, the top American commander in Iraq, has outlined in Washington all week.
The Reach of War
» It holds that the military effort there is showing signs of success, that too fast a withdrawal would be foolhardy, and that while the future will be difficult and full of setbacks, it is possible to envision that the American strategy will pay off in the future.
But that vision, which defers a firm decision on steeper reductions in the force, remains deeply unpopular to some current and retired officers, who say the White House and its battlefield commander are continuing to strain the troops, with little prospect of long-term success.
It is the second time in 10 months that Mr. Bush has opted for higher troop levels in Iraq than are favored by some of his senior military advisers. Among those who supported a smaller troop increase than the one Mr. Bush ordered last January were members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Now, some of his advisers would prefer setting a faster timetable for drawing the force back down.
Some even suggest that Mr. Bush’s portrayal of the strategy as relying heavily on recommendations from General Petraeus has been more than a little disingenuous, given that it was unlikely that a battlefield commander would repudiate his own plans.
“This approach can work for brief periods in many places, but it’s not a good long-term solution,” said Douglas A. Macgregor, a retired Army colonel and a critic of the Bush administration’s handling of Iraq. He called General Petraeus’s testimony “another deceitful attempt on the part of the generals and their political masters to extend our stay in the country long enough until Bush leaves office.”
General Petraeus told lawmakers during two days of Congressional testimony this week that his plan for reducing the American presence in Iraq by five combat brigades through mid-July was “fully supported” by Adm. William J. Fallon, the chief of Central Command and the senior American commander in the Middle East, as well as by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The general said, “There has been no recommendation I am aware of that would have laid out by any of those individuals a more rapid withdrawal.”
He acknowledged though that he and other top-ranking officers had begun “discussions about the pace of the mission transition,” a debate that remains unresolved and is likely to flare up again early next year, during a promised further review of additional troop cuts.
Among active-duty officers, the voices of skepticism about Mr. Bush’s approach have been more muted, but they have been significant. The officers who have pushed for deeper cuts have questioned whether his timetable — a drawdown to 15 combat brigades next July, from 20 now — would allow the Army to meet its minimum goal of giving soldiers at least a year at home for every year they are deployed.
Even before General Petraeus appeared before Congress this week, Gen. George W. Casey Jr., the Army chief of staff, last week questioned the significance of what his colleague had achieved.
General Casey, who was General Petraeus’s predecessor as the top commander in Iraq, said that while the decision to send additional forces had produced a “tactical effect” and brought “a temporary and local impact on the security situation,” the “$64,000 question” was “whether the opportunities created by the military could be taken advantage of by the Iraqi political leadership.”
“I think a smaller force will cause Iraqis to do more faster,” General Casey added, speaking at a breakfast sponsored by Government Executive magazine.
Advisers close to General Petraeus say General Casey’s comments were hardly those of a disinterested observer, given that he was effectively dismissed from his post in Iraq as conditions worsened during his tenure.
But his critique goes beyond deeper. He and others on the Joint Chiefs of Staff contend that the current force levels in Iraq cannot be sustained, given the current size of the Army.
Among Mr. Bush’s other senior military advisers, differences about how deep the cuts should go appeared to have been set aside with the decision to postpone further decisions until next spring.
Admiral Fallon was said by some officers to believe that only by giving the Iraqi government a clearer sense that the American troop commitment was limited would the Iraqis take steps aimed at achieving reconciliation.
He also worries about having enough forces in reserve to handle contingencies outside Iraq and in Afghanistan.
Adm. Michael G. Mullen, the current chief of naval operations, who takes over as chairman of the Joint Chiefs next month, has also raised concerns about force levels, though he also cautions against a withdrawal before the current strategy is allowed to work.
The deeper doubts voiced by General Casey about the prospects for Iraqi reconciliation are shared by the retired general John P. Abizaid, who led the Central Command until January.
“It was clear that putting additional troops in would gain temporary security,” General Abizaid said in a rare interview on Tuesday with The Associated Press.
“What was not clear to me was what we were going to do diplomatically, economically, politically and informationally to make sure that we moved forward in a way that wasn’t just temporary.”
-
U.S./IRAQ: The Iraqi government said it is canceling U.S. security firm Blackwater's license to operate in the country. The decision came after security contractors believed to be working for the company allegedly opened fire on civilians during an attack against a U.S. State Department motorcade in Baghdad on Sept. 16. The Iraqi Interior Ministry, noting that eight civilians were killed and 13 wounded in the exchange, said it would prosecute any foreign contractors that were deemed to have used excessive force in the shooting.
IRAQ: The United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), the Shiite bloc that leads the Iraqi government, called for Muqtada al-Sadr's political movement to change its decision to pull out of the alliance, saying the withdrawal jeopardizes national unity. The pullout leaves the UIA with 32 fewer seats in parliament, giving Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's government only 136 of 275 seats it can count on, including 53 seats from two Kurdish groups.
stratfor.com
-
It would be nice to see the Sunnis and Shias find some ability to co-exist in Iraq, but that would mean being able to move past a lot of ugly history.
-
Well, now that the Sunnis are opposing AQ instead of in bed with it, IMHO one cornerstone of a foundation for some sort of working relationship has been laid. Of course by itself, this may not suffice.
Anyway, the Adventure continues. Here's this from Stratfor on the expulsion of Blackwater:
=======
Iraq: The Possible Repercussions of the Blackwater Suspension
The Iraqi Interior Ministry suspended the operating license of private U.S. security contractor Blackwater on Sept. 17, citing a shootout between a Blackwater security team and insurgents a day earlier that resulted in the death of a least eight Iraqi civilians. The ministry also threatened to prosecute anyone deemed to have used excessive force in the shooting.
Removing Blackwater from Iraq's security equation opens the door to other contractors -- though filling the void left by Blackwater could come at a much higher price. The suspension also could result in more attacks against security contractors by insurgents aiming to increase tensions, further destabilize the security environment in Baghdad and complicate the political process.
The insurgent attack began about midday Sept. 16 as a six-vehicle U.S. State Department convoy returned to the fortified Green Zone through central Baghdad's predominantly Sunni Mansour district. According to reports, an improvised explosive device detonated as the convoy passed through Nisoor Square. The insurgents then attacked the convoy with small arms, sparking a 20-minute firefight with the convoy's Blackwater escorts. Helicopters owned by Blackwater fired into the street in an attempt to provide cover to the security team on the ground, though at least one vehicle in the convoy was disabled during the attack.
The estimated 30,000 security contractors in Iraq -- from the United States and many other countries -- are an integral part of Iraq's security environment. Blackwater, with approximately 1,500 employees in the country, specializes in guarding high-value targets (HVTs) and is contracted to the U.S. State Department to protect convoys transporting diplomats and other personnel. A convoy escorted by Blackwater, with its distinctive vehicles and helicopter support, is easily recognizable -- and likely to contain HVTs.
When a convoy is attacked, the contractor's first priority is to get its charges out of the area as quickly as possible. The long duration of the firefight suggests that the attackers were able to block the escape route or keep the convoy pinned down with heavy direct fire. This suggests the ambush was complex, well planned and well executed. When the shooting was over, at least eight civilians lay dead.
Convoys are vulnerable, especially in Iraq's urban battlefields. Although the State Department sets the training requirements for security contractors it employs, private contractors have been known to respond to an attack with overwhelming force -- mainly because they lack the large support structure that military units can count on when they get into a tight spot. In this case, the Iraqi government indeed claimed that the Blackwater specialists used excessive force in responding to the attack. However, a 20-minute firefight involving automatic weapons can expend a great deal of ammunition and cause a tremendous amount of damage. A shootout that results in only eight noncombatant fatalities suggests the Blackwater security specialists employed a fair degree of control and discipline.
The U.S. government is investigating the incident, and the State Department could convene an accountability review board to determine whether the Blackwater team acted appropriately. In order to maintain the Iraqi government's appearance of sovereignty, the State Department could cancel its Iraq contract with Blackwater. Should it do so, there are two competing private security contractors -- DynCorp and Triple Canopy -- that are eligible fill the void. Neither of these contractors, however, has as many properly vetted U.S. security specialists in Iraq as Blackwater -- and the State Department will want properly vetted U.S. citizens on its HVT protection details. In order to make up the shortfall, the other companies might have to offer large bonuses to prospective replacements, increasing the cost of the original contract dramatically. Many of these replacements could come straight from Blackwater.
This incident and the strong Iraqi and U.S. reaction could cause an escalation in attacks against contractor-escorted convoys and contractor-guarded facilities by groups looking to increase tensions. Should this occur, it could further destabilize the security environment in Baghdad, and complicate the political process. In addition, security contractors are foundational to security in the country and the Green Zone. They protect many VIPs, HVTs, and logistics convoys. If a precedent is set here, attacking contractors and getting them kicked out of the country will prove an effective way to attack the U.S. foundational security and logistics base.
-
That's not a good development. :|
-
Pardon the late followup to this "blast from the past". :)
Who said anything about cutting and running? I served with 10th mountain over seas in AssCrackistan after 9/11 and I saw the reason's on why we fight and what we are fighting about.
A couple of my good friends had to stand out in the open to guard Some Pipelines..We thought they were gas lines and then found out they were Oil..Hmm Go figure.
****Does this mean that we fought in Afghanistan for oil?****
Are you saying that oil is not a serious consideration for us in both Iraq and Afghanistan?
****The average U.S. serviceman/woman is better educated than the average U.S. citizen. The "poor waifs" arguement doesn't hold water. The US military today is better trained, better educated and better equipped than any military in human history.****
Maybe so, but what we're seeing today is that some problems can't be solved with military force.
Rog
-
In the larger global strategic sense, protecting Saudia Arabia and the straits of Hormuz are about oil. A stable Iraq producing oil is in our best interest, but we aren't getting any revenue from Iraq today. If Iraq was just about access to Iraq's oil, we could have cut a backroom deal with Saddam in exchange for our dropping sanctions without a shot being fired.
Afghanistan has 1 location producing oil today, if I recall correctly. I don't see Afghanistan attracting many investors, even if some Saudi sized oil field were discovered.
-
Woof, It was reported on the 6 oclock news that Condi Rice, apologised for Blackwaters actions in an effort to smooth things over. :|
Even though the convoy was attacked? Am I the onley one who finds this odd?
I think this incident will be telling, of how good our relationship with the Iraqi government is.
Apparently by Condi kissing some Butt, its not REALLY that good.
I wonder how well our diplomats and higher powers will get around without the Blackwater escourts........I think this story will be very intresting to watch.
TG
Will our Gov. sell out Blackwater?
-
Woof GM,
In the larger global strategic sense, protecting Saudia Arabia and the straits of Hormuz are about oil. A stable Iraq producing oil is in our best interest, but we aren't getting any revenue from Iraq today.
Above you list three major oil-producing countries. One is the country of origin of 14-15 of the 19 9/11 hijackers. One we're at war with now. One we're threatening to go to war with. In all seriousness (not in a "no blood for oil!" sloganeering sense) would you agree that oil is the main reason why we even care about what happens in the Middle East?
If Iraq was just about access to Iraq's oil, we could have cut a backroom deal with Saddam in exchange for our dropping sanctions without a shot being fired.
Agreed. At the same time I would argue that if it were just about terrorism, we'd be doing a whole bunch of other things differently.
Afghanistan has 1 location producing oil today, if I recall correctly. I don't see Afghanistan attracting many investors, even if some Saudi sized oil field were discovered.
Again, agreed.
I seem to remember a lot of discussion during the 1990s about readying the US military to fight wars on multiple fronts simultaneously. You might know more details about this than me. In any case, it seems like they've gotten the chance to try it out and are no doubt very concerned about the results.
-
Tom:
This may answer some of your questions.
Marc
==================================
Iraq: Coming Down on the Contractors
September 17, 2007 17 36 GMT
Summary
The Iraqi Interior Ministry said it suspended Blackwater USA's license to operate in the country Sept. 17 following an incident in Baghdad that left at least eight civilians dead. Whatever Blackwater's fate, security contractors will remain essential to the U.S. effort in Iraq. But the move bodes ill for the security contractors, both in Baghdad and Washington.
Analysis
Security contractor Blackwater USA reportedly had its license to operate in Iraq suspended after an incident involving the deaths of at least eight civilians in the Mansour district of Baghdad, an Interior Ministry spokesman said Sept. 17. The U.S. contractor recently has been involved in a standoff with Iraqi troops.
Incidents of security contractors using excessive force are nothing new in Iraq. But this latest incident could represent a turning point for the issue -- both in Baghdad and Washington.
Some 30,000 security contractors in Iraq provide everything from mundane perimeter security at key infrastructure sites to personal security details for high-value targets like Gen. David Petraeus, who normally would be protected by U.S. military personnel. (In peacetime, Delta soldiers would be covering Petraeus). With the U.S. military stretched as thin as it is, security contractors of all types help keep U.S. troops free for frontline military operations.
Blackwater has profited greatly from this situation. Its business model has allowed it to offer volume pricing to the CIA and the State Department because of its ability to recruit and train large numbers of employees to fill demand for security contractor services.
Despite increased attention from the Iraqi government, a complete withdrawal of security contractors from Iraq is simply not in the cards, especially given U.S. moves to begin drawing down troops levels later in 2007. Though the fortunes of specific companies in Iraq could rise and fall, security contractors will continue to be needed in Iraq as long as U.S. troops remain in the country.
But the contractors' working environment could soon become much less comfortable. The timing of this most recent incident comes at a crucial juncture for the Bush administration. The turning of the tide -- both in Iraq and the United States -- might now provide an impetus for enforcing standards of conduct on the contractors. This has previously been legislated and mandated, but never enforced. Who will do the monitoring and enforcing remains an open question, however. Given how thin U.S. agencies are stretched, no one in Iraq really has the bandwidth to monitor -- much less enforce -- any kind of standards of conduct on security contractors.
And in addition to laying another mission at the feet of the U.S. military or another agency with its hands already too full in Iraq, any attempt to move toward monitoring and enforcement inevitably will churn up past incidents -- and there are plenty to look back on. In two days in late May, for instance, Blackwater contractors killed a civilian driver (the contractors might have used appropriate escalation of force) in a contentious incident and also saw the contractors wind up in a standoff with Iraqi security forces. A U.S. military convoy had to intervene to settle the incident. This dredging process will become ugly.
Iraqi civilians universally revile the force and aggression these firms often use, since they most often bear the brunt of it. Regardless of whether the latest grievance is legitimate, the history of animosity is there. Though hardly all security contractors have used excessive force, this largely is beside the point. The abuses of some security contractors mean no Iraqi politician or government agency is going to stand up for them. They are a particularly unpopular element of an already painfully unpopular war.
For Iraq's political leadership -- whether Sunni or Shiite -- going after the contactors represents a means of publicly challenging the occupation and appearing to address an issue that transcends sectarian divisions without touching on the issue of foreign military forces.
On the other side of the world, security contractors will not be easy to defend politically. Indeed, as the White House attempts to distance itself from Blackwater due to investigations into financial misconduct, security contractors could find themselves without a political ally -- making them easy prey for a Democratic Party trying to walk a fine line between opposing the war in Iraq while supporting U.S. troops and appearing tough on defense.
But even if the party as a whole does not aggressively pursue the issue, the issue offers individual senators and representatives -- Democratic and Republican alike -- in trouble with their constituencies to come down hard on the war. The Democrats, already on thin ice with the party's large anti-war constituency, in particular will not rein in these individual members of Congress. For security contractors, the streets of Washington could soon become as unfriendly as the streets of Baghdad.
stratfor.
-
Sorry to dump so much reading on everyone so fast, but sometimes life is like that:
Geopolitical Diary: A Shift in Iran's Calculus?
September 18, 2007 02 00 GMT
Paris added some oomph into a U.S. campaign against Iran on Monday when French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner said the world must prepare for war over Iran's nuclear policies. Kouchner's remarks triggered a fiery statement from Tehran, which brandished the new French presidency as a U.S. copycat bent on impressing the White House. As the Iranians rather cheekily put it, "the French people will never forget the era when a non-European moved into the Elysee."
In the last few days a number of European states have taken a far firmer position against things Iranian -- in particular Iran's nuclear program -- than ever before. Under pro-American Nicolas Sarkozy, France -- once the bastion of pro-Iranian sentiment in Europe under Jacques Chirac -- has openly warned of war as the logical consequence of the Iranian program should circumstances not change. On Monday the Netherlands threw its support behind a growing movement in the European Union for sanctions, specifically noting that should the United Nations prove unable to enact them, the European Union is morally obligated to.
The only notable European state that so far has held back from threatening war against the Iranians is Germany, which holds the lion's share of European investment into and trade with Iran. But even there the situation is starkly different from two years ago, when Gerhard Schroeder ruled. Not only is Angela Merkel's Germany far more willing to consider Washington's point of view, European sanctions against Iran would censure Iran's primary nuclear supplier -- Russia -- in a way that would likely avoid a major dust up. As Germany (gently) reasserts its supremacy in Europe, such fights without pain are an excellent means of garnering credibility and momentum.
With all this war and sanctions talk circulating on the European continent, Iran is longing for the early days of the Iraq war, when it could adroitly manipulate the divide between the United States and Europe. Back then, when the Iran-EU-3 talks were still in play, Iran used the nuclear negotiations a way to buy time to further its nuclear program and bargain with the United States over political concessions it was seeking in Iraq.
But with Europe shifting its mood and the United States using every opportunity to remind Tehran that a military option is still on the table, the Iranians are now looking at a very uncertain future. At this time, it would be useful to re-examine Iran's Iraq policy moving forward.
Before the delivery of Gen. David Petraeus' Iraq report, the expectation was that U.S. President George W. Bush had lost his fighting power against Congress, and that a withdrawal was all but imminent. The celebrations in Tehran could be heard across the Atlantic as Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced to the world that Iran was preparing to fill the vacuum in Iraq.
And then came the buzz kill.
Despite repeated declarations that Iraq had barely reached one out of 18 political and security benchmarks, Bush responded to Petraeus' surprisingly optimistic report by declaring that the United States would remain committed to Iraq (Iraq's Sunni community in particular.) Troop levels would gradually decrease, but Iran would be staring at U.S. forces across the border for a long, long time. In short, Bush was setting an Iraq agenda for a long-term, robust troop presence that would extend well beyond his own presidency.
Iran now has loads to reconsider. A long-term troop presence in Iraq and continued U.S. support for Iraq's Sunni community not only complicates Iran's plans to consolidate its gains in Iraq, but also puts Iran in a very uncomfortable situation in which it faces a constant security threat from the United States across its border. Moreover, the nuclear dossier can be seized by Washington (as well as the Europeans) at any time to make a case for military action against Iran. Tehran might be feeling confident that the United States lacks the bandwidth to carry out an attack against Iran now, but give it two, three years, and Tehran's clerical regime will be living in a cloud of uncertainty while being boxed in by the United States on both its western and eastern borders in Iraq and Afghanistan, respectively.
Now Tehran must decide whether it is still worth its while to negotiate an Iraq settlement with the United States, bet that it will not underestimate the U.S. a third time, and wager that enough pain can be inflicted on U.S. troops and enough chaos can perpetuate in Baghdad to force the United States into leaving the region. The Iranians still have a number of options at hand moving forward, but the decision-making process just got a lot trickier.
-
Woof, Everyone here knows who make up Blackwater(Ex military elite), and evidently our top brass,military, diplomats and all others, feel that these are the guys to escourt and guard them.
Yet, when attacked....It appears the time has come to stab a brother in the back.......I understand that civilians were killed and the firfight was sustained....for me a 20 minute firefight does seem lengthy........Yet, the scenario I've heard described seems (at least to me) that Blackwater was within their rights in defending the convoy of diplomats.
If this does pan out to be an abandonment of our Gov. of these guys.....I think it quite wrong and am not sure I would want to put my trust in them covering my back(our Gov.)....when I was covering theirs with my life.
Hope this makes sense......Bottom line.......I'am refering to what sounds like a huge back stabbing in the making. plain and simple......
TG
-
Woof GM,
In the larger global strategic sense, protecting Saudia Arabia and the straits of Hormuz are about oil. A stable Iraq producing oil is in our best interest, but we aren't getting any revenue from Iraq today.
Above you list three major oil-producing countries. One is the country of origin of 14-15 of the 19 9/11 hijackers. One we're at war with now. One we're threatening to go to war with. In all seriousness (not in a "no blood for oil!" sloganeering sense) would you agree that oil is the main reason why we even care about what happens in the Middle East?
***It's why everyone on the planet, unless you are a hunter-gatherer has to be concerned about the middle east. Better believe China, India and many other countries have military contingency plans to secure access to oil. Saudi Arabia is the evil jihadist twin stuck to our abdomen. Read up on their history and you'll see how they made themselves invaluable to us while at the same time funding the global jihad. In my opinion, Saudi Arabia is the center of gravity for the sunni side of the global jihad. I dream of the day when another source of energy can make oil obsolete and the Saudis can go back to gathering dates on camelback.***
If Iraq was just about access to Iraq's oil, we could have cut a backroom deal with Saddam in exchange for our dropping sanctions without a shot being fired.
Agreed. At the same time I would argue that if it were just about terrorism, we'd be doing a whole bunch of other things differently.
***What things?***
Afghanistan has 1 location producing oil today, if I recall correctly. I don't see Afghanistan attracting many investors, even if some Saudi sized oil field were discovered.
Again, agreed.
I seem to remember a lot of discussion during the 1990s about readying the US military to fight wars on multiple fronts simultaneously. You might know more details about this than me. In any case, it seems like they've gotten the chance to try it out and are no doubt very concerned about the results.
***Yeah, historically under the Reagan administration up to Clinton, the US military was structured to be able to fight two major fronts and a regional conflict all that the same time (In WWII, most resources went to the war in europe, the war against Japan was deemed secondary in importance). Under Clinton, we enjoyed the "Peace dividend". The US military was downsized dramatically. It's a good excuse for the current administration if we were in 2003. Here we are in 2007 and we haven't built back up to pre-Clinton levels. A serious mistake in my book. The rebuilding should have started 9/12/2001.***
-
I share this criticism of President Bush. His failure (via Rumbo) to listen to his generals who told him they would need more boots on the ground was foolish. His failure to respond to the facts on the ground as they developed was either arrogant-- or fear of the political consequences. Even Sen. Kerry was calling for an increase of 40,000 for the Army during the 2004 elections, but Bush kept saying everything was hunky dory. A HUGE ERROR, the consequences of which are documented daily on this forum.
-
C'mon guys...."We seek truth" and I had to go back 3 pages of posts to find anything on Iraq and my Yahoo home page has this story on its front page :|
Am I the onley one who thinks tis a big deal?
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070918/ap_on_re_us/us_iraq_embassy
HomeU.S.BusinessWorldEntertainmentSportsTechPoliticsElectionsScienceHealthMost Popular
Secondary Navigation
U.S. Video Local News Education Religion Politics Crimes and Trials Search: All News Yahoo! News Only News Photos Video/Audio Advanced
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
WASHINGTON - The United States on Tuesday suspended all land travel by U.S. diplomats and other civilian officials throughout Iraq, except in Baghdad's heavily fortified Green Zone. The move follows a weekend incident involving private security guards protecting a diplomatic convoy in which a number of Iraqi civilians were killed.
In a notice sent to Americans in Iraq, the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad said it had taken the step to review the security of its personnel and possible increased threats to those leaving the Green Zone while accompanied by such security details.
"In light of a serious security incident involving a U.S. embassy protective detail in the Mansour District of Baghdad, the embassy has suspended official U.S. government civilian ground movements outside the International Zone (IZ) and throughout Iraq," the notice said.
"This suspension is in effect in order to assess mission security and procedures, as well as a possible increased threat to personnel traveling with security details outside the International Zone," said the notice, a copy of which was provided to The Associated Press by the State Department in Washington.
The notice did not say when the suspension would expire.
The move came amid uncertainty over the status of the security contractor, Blackwater USA, which was involved in Sunday's incident in which at least 11 people died and provides the bulk of security for U.S. diplomats in Iraq.
Iraqi officials have said they revoked the operating license of the firm but both the company and the State Department say they have received no formal notice of such a step.
State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said Tuesday that officials from the agency's Bureau of Diplomatic Security are cooperating with Iraqi authorities in investigating the incident, which has fueled popular Iraqi anger at the private security firms often perceived as operating outside the law.
-
http://hotair.com/archives/2007/09/18/video-christians-pray-for-and-with-burned-iraqi-boy-in-california/
CNN worth watching.
-
Woof GM, :? I don't get it. What are you getting at on your Yousef/CNN post?
TG
-
Tom,
I has posted on this story earlier. As far as the Blackwater story goes, it's a non-story in the big picture.
-
GM, Blackwater a non story in the big picture?
Please expound on your statement...... Non stroy/big picture leaves much to the immagination.
I wouldn't want to interpret it wrongly.
TG
-
Contractors probably won't be going anywhere and much of the story is media hype.
-
Tom:
"C'mon guys...."We seek truth" and I had to go back 3 pages of posts to find anything on Iraq and my Yahoo home page has this story on its front page"
WTF? Is there an inference here?
BTW did you not notice my post #339 in this thread? :? It was directed to you personally , , ,
-
Woof Guro Crafty, Not at all an inference...........sorry.....I just want to hear you guys thoughts on this story.
I would have thought to read posts from yuor sources......just a little disappointed there wasn't anything up on the forum concering this.
I think the revoking of Blackwaters license and the fact that diplomatice travel has been suspended more than just media hype.
I also think the attack on the convoy near the green zone to be some what significant, at least as far as security purposes go.
Maye Iam wrong.
I really hope that we don't count Blackwater expendable in light of the big picture.
TG
-
I'm cheating a bit by reading posts on a forum where lots of contractors post. They don't seem to give it much weight.
-
Tom:
I am still confused. Post #339 is from me and is directed specfically to you. Have you read it?
-
Woof Guro Crafty, Yes I did read it. Thank you for posting it. Sorry again for the remark.
Do you have any personal thoughts on the incident?
GM, says the contratctors aren't concerned........
Being ex military.....I still don't hold that confidence........expendable keeps comming to mind.
TG
-
Tom:
I forget where I read it, (but I have it mentally filed under "reliable source") but my understanding is that the known facts strongly suggest that BW was in the right in this case. My readings over time resonate with what Strat says about contractors frequently being reviled as mercenaries and that there may be stories of some getting carried away or trigger happy. Given the circs in which they operate this may as understandable as predictable that rumors can and will get things badly distorted. Add in that the enemy will foment these rumors with lies and we have situation where you and I really are in a poor position to assess.
I also think that Maliki's response can be explained by political criteria and so can our government's response.
Bottom line: I read the story with interest, but lack the basis for an opinion.
-
http://hotair.com/archives/2007/09/18/the-blackwater-affair-licenses-who-needs-licenses/?print=1
The Blackwater affair: Licenses? Who needs licenses?
posted at 10:41 pm on September 18, 2007 by Bryan
If you spend any amount of time at all in Iraq — and I mean that literally, any time at all — you’ll soon observe corruption. Iraq is a country that spent 35 years in survival mode, under the boot heel of a man who admired both Hitler and Stalin and who sought to combine the brutality of both on his way to becoming the next Nebuchadnezzar. The society was traumatized, and its people evidently learned to live by a police state version of the Wimpy rule: I’ll gladly pay you Tuesday for what I’m swiping from you today, and mostly because by Tuesday the Mukhabarrat may have swiped me, myself and I, never to be seen again. I’ll be tortured and probably killed, but at least I won’t be out the couple of dinars I would have paid you.
I give you that as a preamble to the latest story about the Blackwater affair because it’s important to understanding how things work in Iraq. You’ve probably heard by now, that the North Carolina-based Blackwater security company is in hot water with Iraq’s Interior Ministry over an incident in which “innocent Iraqis” were killed. I added the scare quotes because the term “innocent” means different things to different people, and it’s not at all clear yet that whoever was killed in that incident was innocent in any way that we would commonly use the term. It’s not clear yet that they weren’t innocent either, or that at least some of them weren’t. It’s all under investigation, but the Interior Ministry has pulled a Murtha and gone ahead and convicted Blackwater anyway. The consequences of said conviction include revoking Blackwater’s license. It’s at this point that someone needs to cue up the laugh track while someone else pops up on camera and says “Licenses? We don’t need no steenkin’ licenses!”
Private security contractors in Iraq say most expatriate companies in the country operate without licenses because corrupt government officials who issue them demand bribes of up to $1 million.
“A couple of companies tried to get licenses, but no one has licenses because the bribes they were asking were too big, up to $1 million,” said a member of the elite Blackwater USA security company which has been ordered by Iraqi authorities to halt its operations.
Yes, we’re talking about the same Ministry that’s accusing Blackwater of crimes. It’s a Ministry run by bribes, that answers in part to the very paragon of virtue himself, the so-called “Mullah Atari,” Moqtada al-Sadr.
Exploiting that anger, anti-American cleric Muqtada al-Sadr demanded the government ban all 48,000 foreign security contractors, whom Iraqis have long viewed as mercenaries, the Associated Press reported.
If nothing else, that’s another reason that we should have taken Mookie out a long time ago.
So if just about every private contractor in Iraq operates without licenses, what’s really going on with Blackwater?
Well, internal politics seem to have a lot to do with it: We could be looking at a shakedown to make up for the bribes that Blackwater presumably didn’t pay. We could be looking at an attempt to weaken the US position in Iraq overall, since Blackwater and similar security companies have about 48,000 personnel on the scene engaged in various security duties. (Do ya think Mookie wouldn’t like to see 48,000 guns that ultimately answer to the US taken out of the game?) And like everything else in Iraq, putting a fixed number on it reduces its actual complexity by several orders of magnitude. A drive through the base complex around the Baghdad airport, for instance, will take you through private security guards from enough different continents and countries that you’d swear you were cruising through a muddy UN session: Nigerians man this gate, Brazilians man that post over there, and Peruvians are running that street from there to there, but beyond them, it’s the South Africans or someone else who will ask to see your papers, please.
I’ll hazard a guess that all the companies hiring and supporting all those nationalities probably aren’t licensed to the nth degree. They’re probably sufficiently paid up on their bribes, though.
Back to the incident that started the current row:
The incident, which left eight Iraqi civilians dead by most accounts, occurred Sunday when Blackwater was escorting a convoy through one of Baghdad’s Sunni neighborhoods.
According to the North Carolina-based company, the convoy was attacked by armed insurgents using small-arms fire. The U.S. contractors returned fire to get their clients out of the area safely.
“By doctrine, you return fire — that’s how you stay alive,” said the Blackwater contractor, who spoke on the condition that he not be identified. “They killed who they needed to kill to get out of there. The teams that try to be all nicey-nicey, guess what? Their guys get kidnapped,” he said.
Several expatriate security contractors who did not open fire have been taken hostage while protecting their clients in western Iraq near Ramadi and in Baghdad.
Along with the bewildering corruption, that’s another reality in Iraq: At times, it’s a kill or be killed kind of place. The fate of those Blackwater contractors killed in Fallujah in 2004 surely informs decisions made in real time today. Undoubtedly most would take condemnation from the Interior Ministry over having their corpses rhetorically spat upon by the likes of Kos after thugs have killed and mutilated them.
I’m loath to predict how the Blackwater affair will turn out, but it is hard to imagine the military or State Dept (especially the State Dept) getting much done without Blackwater’s guys and guns around doing the jobs they’ve been doing for four years now. It probably will blow over. But the corruption is probably there to stay.
Today, the Iraqi government appeared to back down from statements Monday that it had revoked Blackwater’s license and would order its 1,000 personnel to leave the country, Associated Press said. It is not clear whether Blackwater was operating under an active license.
The special operations contractor, who has been in Iraq for four years, said he had seen the Ministry of Interior (MOI) demand bribes of security companies in three different contracts.
“You would apply for a license and it would stall, then someone from the MOI would show up and say that the license application was sitting in a box and that for a certain fee it could be pushed through,” said the contractor, also asking that his name not be used.
The size of the bribe depended on the size of the company, he said, starting in the area of $100,000 and up.
That all sounds hopelessly corrupt, but honestly, quite a bit of Europe doesn’t operate much more clean than that. Of course, Europeans don’t have Sadrist death squads lurking in the background to enforce and collect on the bribes.
-
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070919/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iraq
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Iraqi leader disputes Blackwater account By ROBERT H. REID, Associated Press Writer
15 minutes ago
BAGHDAD - Iraq's prime minister Wednesday disputed Blackwater USA's version of a weekend shooting that left at least 11 people dead, saying he cannot tolerate "the killing of our citizens in cold blood."
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki suggested that the U.S. Embassy should find another company to protect its diplomats.
Blackwater, which provides security for American diplomats and other civilian officials in Iraq, insisted its contractors were responding to gunfire from insurgents.
But more witnesses came forward saying they saw Blackwater security guards firing at civilians in the Mansour district of western Baghdad on Sunday. Two witnesses recalled hearing an explosion before the gunfire, suggesting a bomb may have targeted the American convoy, prompting the guards to start shooting.
American and Iraqi officials announced they would form a joint committee to try to reconcile widely differing versions of Sunday's incident. Conflicting accounts were circulating among Iraqi officials themselves.
Land travel by U.S. diplomats and other civilian officials outside the fortified Green Zone remained suspended for a second day after Iraqi authorities ordered Blackwater to stop working as a separate Iraqi investigation continues.
The Moyock, N.C.-based firm is the main provider of bodyguards and armed escorts for American government civilian employees in Iraq.
U.S. Embassy spokeswoman Mirembe Nantongo refused to offer any version of what happened Sunday at busy Nisoor Square. She told reporters the contractors involved in the incident were still in Iraq.
But al-Maliki spoke out sharply against Blackwater, saying the shooting was "the seventh of its kind" involving the company, "and these violations should be dealt with."
"We will not tolerate the killing of our citizens in cold blood," al-Maliki told reporters. "The work of this company has been stopped in order to know the reasons."
Al-Maliki said the shootings had generated such "widespread anger and hatred" that it would be "in everyone's interest if the embassy used another company while the company is suspended."
Blackwater spokeswoman Anne E. Tyrrell said in a statement late Monday that its employees acted "lawfully and appropriately" in response to an armed attack against a State Department convoy.
"The `civilians' reportedly fired upon by Blackwater professionals were in fact armed enemies and Blackwater personnel returned defensive fire," she said. "Blackwater regrets any loss of life but this convoy was violently attacked by armed insurgents, not civilians, and our people did their job to defend human life."
But al-Maliki said Blackwater's version "is not accurate" and that the company "should be held accountable for such a violation."
Iraqi officials offered several versions of what happened. One official said the Blackwater convoy got stuck in traffic and the guards began firing and throwing stun grenades to clear the vehicles.
Another official said men in a passing car shot at the convoy and the Blackwater guards responded with heavy fire, hitting civilians. Others said a car bomb exploded and the guards opened fire.
All the officials spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not supposed to release the information. Some accounts spoke of a child being killed, others that the infant was wounded.
Two Iraqi witnesses said they saw only Blackwater firing, although U.S. officials said Monday that gunfire had disabled one of the American vehicles.
"Several SUVs were passing from Nisoor Square when an explosion took place. I couldn't tell whether it was a roadside bomb or a car bomb," said Imad Mansour Abid, 35. "This was followed by heavy fire by guards of the security vehicles."
He said the shots were fired "at streets in the area where civilians and passers-by were moving. The firing lasted about 10 to 20 minutes."
Suhard Mirza, a hairdresser who works in the area, said she heard a "distant explosion" and raced outside to see what was happening.
"I saw four-wheel-drive vehicles opening fire randomly on people and civilian cars in the area," she said. "After five minutes police and ambulances reached the area to evacuate casualties."
Eager to contain the crisis, the State Department said Wednesday a joint U.S.-Iraqi commission will be formed.
The size and composition of the commission have yet to be determined but its members are charged with assessing the results of both U.S. and Iraqi investigations of Sunday's incident, reaching a common conclusion about what happened and recommending possible changes to the way in which the embassy and its contractors handle security, the State Department said.
Also Wednesday, the U.S. military said an American soldier was killed the day before in an attack in southern Baghdad. Another soldier died Wednesday of non-battle related causes in Salahuddin province, the military said.
The Iraqi Cabinet decided Tuesday to review the status of all foreign security companies in the wake of the Mansour shooting.
The Interior Ministry had said Monday it had lifted Blackwater's license and ordered its 1,000 employees to leave the country. The next day, Iraqi officials said Blackwater's operations were merely suspended pending an investigation.
Some Iraqi officials said privately that it would be difficult to order Blackwater out of the country because the Americans rely so heavily on it.
Iraqis have long resented the presence of thousands of armed foreign security guards, whose numbers swelled after violence escalated in late 2003 months after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime.
With too few U.S. and coalition forces available to maintain order, governments and private companies hired thousands of security guards to protect their operations from Sunni and Shiite extremists and criminal gangs.
Blackwater, whose convoys of SUVs careen through the streets with weapons displayed, has been singled out for much of the criticism — in part because of its high profile operations.
"Blackwater has a reputation," said James Sammons, a former Australian Special Air Service commander who now works for the British-based AKE Group, which also provides security in Iraq.
"If you want over-over-the-top, gun-toting security with high profile and all the bells and whistles," he said, "Blackwater are the people you are going to go with."
-
I would ask: is Iraq a sovereign nation or isn't it? I'd say their "sovereignty" is pretty much a joke if this y'know, mercenary group is allowed to operate throughout the country with immunity from prosecution by any Iraqi authorities.
-
I'm sure (I'm too lazy to look it up right now) that the Blackwater and other companies that are working for the state department are covered under diplomatic immunity. As an example, that would be why SFPD couldn't ticket a vehicle illegally parked that belonged to the PRC's consulate.
-
From what I understand, BW is not operating under "diplomatic immunity" as the term is understood under international law, but under this "Order 17" that was adopted by the Coalition Provisional Authority back in the early days of our occupation:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Order_17
"CPA Order 17 granted all foreign contractors operating in Iraq immunity from "Iraqi legal process," effectively granting immunity from any kind of suit, civil or criminal, for actions the contractors engaged in within Iraq."
So it's not clear what (if any) legal recourse the Iraqi government has if Bush decides that BW should stay there.
The Iraqi government still wouldn't be able to criminally charge any members of BW if they were operating under diplomatic immunity, but they would at least be able to order them expelled from the country.
-
My concern in the Black water issue is: Maliki is seeking to show his fellow countrymen that he's the boss in Iraq.
Bush and company are eager to also see this happen.
Enter Blackwater.....Sacrifical lamb for "the cause".
I would really be dissmayed to see this happen.......I think for the most part these guys have provided a service and done a job for us bled and died.....I think it would be A shame to cut thier throats for "the cause" (But think it VERY possible to see happen)
If they have to go let them go on good terms.
Not with a boot up the arse kicked to the curb.......
I agree Guro Crafty, this is a hard one to read....things are sketchy and pretty grey......
TG
-
Woof Tom,
I may disagree with the war itself, but the members of the US military fighting over there are getting paid regular military salaries and can be said to be (whatever the term means to the individual) "serving their country". They (at least nominally) have to respect whatever US military code of conduct there is and international law that applies to members of a nation's military.
OTOH, BW is essentially a mercenary force of guys risking their necks solely for profit (presumably they're getting paid a LOT more than they would be getting from Uncle Sam) and (I'm guessing) is not bound by many of the restraints (again, at least nominally) to which US troops are subject.
I'm not saying that BW "contractors" don't become just as dead as US troops when they get shot, or that them getting killed is a good thing, but I have a hard time having any real sympathy for them. In short, IMHO "support the troops" does not apply to BW.
Rog
-
Rog, Its really simple. Money paid for services rendered.
I agree....they are not"the troops" Though in my opinon they are good employees and do thier job.
Bear in mind they guard all the "Big shots" Both political and military. Seems that alone should earn them some credibility and respect.
Thats why, I think if they have to go they should be retired....and not fired....and esp not a ploitical pawn or sacrifical lamb.
Also as far as the troops go.....lets not forget these guys are former mil. elite......
Surely you can't blame them for getting out of the military and doing similar work for 10x's the pay......
TG
-
Blackwater and other companies (Blackwater is the biggest, but far from the only) still fall under US legal jurisdiction. You can be prosecuted for acts far outside America's borders in federal court. Most American contractors would not consider themselves "mercenaries", as they aren't selling their skills to the highest bidder but would only work for the US State department or other USG entities in Iraq/Afghanistan.
-
http://pajamasmedia.com/2007/09/cia_shut_down_in_iraq.php
CIA Shut Down in Iraq
September 19, 2007 11:58 AM
A perfect storm set to roil Blackwater?
According to exclusive information obtained by Pajamas Media’s Washington editor Richard Miniter, the movement of key CIA station personnel in Baghdad has been all but shut down. Are we witnessing Iran’s counter-strike to the surge?
Support Pajamas Media; Visit Our Advertisers
By Richard Miniter, PJM Washington Editor
Movements of key CIA station personnel in Baghdad—along with most State department diplomats and teams building police stations and schools—have been frozen for the second day in a row, according to a State department source who spoke on the condition of anonymity.
Essentially, the CIA, State department and government contractors are stuck inside the International Zone, also known as “the Green Zone,” in Central Baghdad. Even travel inside that walled enclave is somewhat restricted.
Pajamas Media is the first to report that the CIA station is all but motionless—as meetings with informants and Iraqi government officials have been hastily cancelled.
What caused the shut down? Following a firefight between Iraqi insurgents and a Blackwater USA protection detail on Sunday (12:08 PM Baghdad time), Iraqi officials suspended the operating license of the North Carolina-based government contractor. While the Iraqi government is yet to hold a formal hearing on the matter, Blackwater and all it protects remain frozen.
“By jamming up Blackwater, they shut down the movements of the embassy and the [CIA] station,” a State department source told Pajamas Media. He is not cleared to talk to the press.
Blackwater provides Personnel Security Details—or PSDs—for most CIA, State department, and U.S. Agency of International Development officers. In addition, Blackwater’s special-forces veterans guard many of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams—or PRTs—that build schools, clinics, police and fire stations and other structures that house essential Iraqi government services. Work on these vital “hearts and minds” projects has all but stopped across Iraq.
The State department has long insisted on using Blackwater and other private security firms so that its convoys and legations would not be controlled by the Defense department.
There are now more private contractors working in Iraq than U.S. soldiers serving there. Many are not U.S. citizens. Triple Canopy, another private firm, usually hires Peruvians to man the checkpoints inside the International Zone and Ugandans to guard distant airbases. The Peruvians, known as “incas” among Americans there, usually do not speak English or Arabic—a persistent source of complaint by Iraqi politicians who speak one or both languages.
At least eight Iraqis are reported dead after the Sunday shoot out and some press reports refer to the local casualties as “civilians.”
“Initial press accounts were inaccurate,” said Blackwater USA spokeswoman Anne Tyrell. “The ‘civilians’ reportedly fired upon by Blackwater professionals were in fact armed enemies and Blackwater personnel returned defensive fire. Blackwater regrets any loss of life but this convoy was violently attacked by armed insurgents, not civilians, and our people did their job to defend human life.”
“Blackwater professionals heroically defended American lives in a war zone on Sunday and Blackwater will cooperate with any inquiry into this matter.”
It’s well known in Iraq that dead insurgents become “civilians” as soon as their comrades carry away their AK-47s and spare magazines. Captured al Qaeda manuals detail how militants should use deaths as a propaganda tool.
TIME magazine received a partial copy of the official incident report.
According to the incident report, the skirmish occurred at 12:08 p.m. on Sunday when, “the motorcade was engaged with small arms fire from several locations” as it moved through a neighborhood of west Baghdad. “The team returned fire to several identified targets” before leaving the area. One vehicle engine was hit and disabled by bullets and had to be towed away. A separate convoy arriving to help was “blocked/surrounded by several Iraqi police and Iraqi national guard vehicles and armed personnel,” the report says. Then an American helicopter hovered over the traffic circle, as the U.S. convoy departed without casualties. Some reports have said the helicopter also opened fire on Iraqis, but a Blackwater official told TIME that no shots were fired from the air.
By apparently lifting Blackwater’s license, the democratically elected Iraq government may stall the forward progress created by the Gen. Petraeus’ surge and change in counterinsurgency tactics.
Indeed, some contend that the actions of Iraq’s Ministry of Interior, which supervises police and some intelligence functions, may be influenced by insurgents or even by Iran.
The staffing and internal rules of the Interior ministry were set up by Biyat Jabr, an affable and charming Shia Muslim who once worked for Saddam Hussein. (He was never a member of the Ba’ath party and thus survived de-Ba’athification with ease.)
Jabr is widely believed to be in the pay of Iranian intelligence services, although U.S. officials caution that there is no firm evidence of this charge. Jabr left the ministry in August 2006 and is now Finance Minister, but before he exited he salted the ranks with people loyal to Iran and hostile to the U.S. “Innocents dying [in the Sunday gun battle with Blackwater] is just a pretext,” the same State department source said.
Enemies of the U.S. inside the Interior ministry have been looking to shut down Blackwater for some time.
Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki has adopted the same hard line against the American company. “This company should be punished. We are not going to allow it to kill Iraqis in cold blood. We have frozen all its activities and a joint panel has been formed to investigate the incident,” the prime minister told wire-service reporters.
“For their own interests, the Americans should hire a new company to protect their people so they can move freely.”
Both the State department and the Congress have signaled that investigations in to Blackwater will begin soon.
The State department hopes to shift blame onto Blackwater’s low-level “trigger pullers,” says the State department source, while Rep. Henry Waxman’s committee is expected to target senior executives at Blackwater and top Bush Administration officials. A perfect storm is set to roil Blackwater.
If Blackwater and other private contractors are shut out of Iraq, Democrats in Congress and Iranian intelligence operatives may have stumbled on a way to end the Iraq War—less than a week after Gen. Petraeus testified that the U.S. is turning the corner.
-
Blackwater and other companies (Blackwater is the biggest, but far from the only) still fall under US legal jurisdiction. You can be prosecuted for acts far outside America's borders in federal court. Most American contractors would not consider themselves "mercenaries", as they aren't selling their skills to the highest bidder but would only work for the US State department or other USG entities in Iraq/Afghanistan.
Good point. I would agree that this is an important distinction.
-
I had the opportunity to do some contracting work in Iraq in 2003/2004. It's a good thing that I didn't as the company I was looking at turned out to be scammers that did lots of stupid things and went out of business after burning lots of people. I believe the US DOJ is investigating them these days.
Depending on how things go, I am considering taking a police trainer position in Iraq/Afghanistan in 2009. Depending on if we are even in Iraq in 2009 and if the major attacks CONUS happen, as I anticipate.
-
U.S.-hired guards operate in a legal limbo in Iraq
By John M. Broder and James Risen
Thursday, September 20, 2007
WASHINGTON: The shooting involving private security guards in Baghdad that left at least eight Iraqi civilians dead has illuminated large gaps in laws applying to such armed contractors.
Early in the period when Iraq was still under American administration, the U.S. government unilaterally exempted its employees and contractors from Iraqi law. Last year, Congress instructed the Defense Department to draw up rules to bring the tens of thousands of contractors in Iraq under the U.S. laws that apply to the military, but the Pentagon has not acted. Thus the thousands of heavily armed private soldiers in Iraq operate with virtual immunity from Iraqi or American law.
There have been numerous incidents of killings or injuries of Iraqi civilians by employees of Blackwater USA, the company involved in the incident Sunday, and other private military contractors.
The most egregious recent episode came in December when a Blackwater gunman was reported, during an argument, to have killed a bodyguard for Vice President Adel Abdul-Mahdi. He was whisked out of Iraq and has not been charged with any crime, said Peter Singer, a Brookings Institution scholar who has written extensively about contractors in Iraq.
On Wednesday, Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki complained of killings of Iraqis "in cold blood" by U.S. contractors. He said the shooting Sunday was the seventh such case involving Blackwater. The government is now threatening to throw Blackwater out of Iraq, a move that would have a dramatic impact on U.S. operations there.
The Bush administration has not said how it would respond if the Maliki government tried to carry out its threat to evict Blackwater. But administration officials and executives in the security contracting industry said Wednesday that they believed that the White House and the State Department would support Blackwater and would seek to block any move to force the company out.
The issue has led to tensions, and any effort by the United States to force Iraq to keep Blackwater could make the Maliki government appear to be a puppet.
Government officials and members of Congress have debated for years what has become in Iraq the most extensive use of private contractors on the battlefield since Renaissance princes hired private armies to fight their battles. The debate flares up after each lethal incident in Iraq, but there has been no agreement on how to police the private soldiers in American employ.
Since the war began, congressional attention and action on the contracting issue have been intermittent at best.
The Blackwater incident, which Iraqi officials have branded "a crime," has led the U.S. authorities to suspend temporarily most uses of private contractors as traveling bodyguards, and it has put the issue of the contractors back on the front burner in Washington.
A Blackwater spokeswoman declined to comment Wednesday, but in an earlier statement the company said its employees "responded legally and appropriately to an attack by armed insurgents."
Several members of Congress and analysts outside the government said that the oversight of thousands of private military personnel is plainly inadequate, and they are urging the passage of new laws governing contractors, particularly those carrying weapons.
Senators John Kerry, Democrat of Massachusetts, and Lindsey Graham, Republican of South Carolina, successfully sponsored an amendment to a Pentagon budget bill last year to bring all military contractors in Iraq under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
The bill did not include State Department contractors, like the Blackwater employees involved in the incident Sunday, but Graham said Wednesday that he intended to try to extend its reach to all civilian contractors in Iraq and other war zones. While contractors are not subject to the military code, some argue they could be prosecuted for crimes abroad under civilian law, but in the case of Iraq, that has not been tested.
"If we go to war with this number of contractors in the war zone, thousands of them armed, you need application of UCMJ to maintain good order and discipline," said Graham, who serves in the air force reserve judge advocate general corps, referring to the Uniform Code of Military Justice. He added: "This is a real gap in discipline. These people are on a legal island."
In the House, Representative Jack Murtha, Democrat of Pennsylvania and chairman of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, is pushing legislation that would require the secretary of defense to set new personnel standards for contractors and to establish clear rules of engagement for security contractors operating in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Murtha's panel said that "the oversight and administration of contracted security services is woefully inadequate."
Even the trade association representing armed contractors called for new regulations to rein in contractors who abuse Iraqi civilians or violate the terms of their U.S. government contracts.
"If you're going to be outsourcing this much of our war-fighting capability, you have to have appropriate oversight," said Doug Brooks, president of the International Peace Operations Association, which represents private military contractors, including Blackwater.
From 20,000 to 30,000 civilians work for the United States in Iraq as private military contractors, part of a civilian workforce that equals or exceeds the 160,000-person military force there.
The State Department employs about 2,500 personnel, chiefly to guard U.S. diplomats and sensitive facilities. The three prime security contractors for the State Department are Blackwater, DynCorp International and Triple Canopy. Many of their workers are former military special forces troops, like Navy Seals and members of the U.S. Army's elite Delta Force.
Officials with other security companies said Wednesday that Blackwater now is the dominant contractor for State Department diplomatic security in Iraq, making it all but impossible for the department to operate without the company, at least in the short term.
For the moment, the military will provide any security needed by the State Department in Iraq. But officials at other firms said that the State Department has in recent weeks awarded Blackwater another major contract, for helicopter-related services, a strong signal of the close relationship between the State Department and Blackwater.
"If all Blackwater personnel had to leave the country, there would be no one to provide security for the diplomatic mission in Baghdad, except the U.S. Army," said an executive at another security firm, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss a competitor.
-
1133 GMT -- RUSSIA, IRAQ -- Iraq could offer significant incentives to Russian oil and gas firms to operate in Iraq and expects Russia to write off 80 percent of Baghdad's Soviet-era debt of $13 billion in return, Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari said Sept. 21 in Moscow. The incentives could be granted before Iraqi energy legislation is approved, Zebari said.
stratfor.com
-
Feds target Blackwater in weapons probe By MATTHEW LEE, Associated Press Writer
26 minutes ago
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070922/ap_on_go_co/us_blackwater_probe
WASHINGTON - Federal prosecutors are investigating whether employees of the private security firm Blackwater USA illegally smuggled into Iraq weapons that may have been sold on the black market and ended up in the hands of a U.S.-designated terrorist organization, officials said Friday.
ADVERTISEMENT
The U.S. Attorney's Office in Raleigh, N.C., is handling the investigation with help from Pentagon and State Department auditors, who have concluded there is enough evidence to file charges, the officials told The Associated Press. Blackwater is based in Moyock, N.C.
The U.S. attorney for the eastern district of North Carolina, George Holding, and a spokeswoman for Blackwater did not return calls seeking comment Friday. Pentagon and State Department spokesmen declined to comment.
Officials with knowledge of the case said it is active, although at an early stage. They spoke on condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of the matter, which has heightened since 11 Iraqis were killed Sunday in a shooting involving Blackwater contractors protecting a U.S. diplomatic convoy in Baghdad.
The officials could not say whether the investigation would result in indictments, how many Blackwater employees are involved or if the company itself, which has won hundreds of millions of dollars in government security contracts since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, is under scrutiny.
In Saturday's editions, The News & Observer of Raleigh reported that two former Blackwater employees — Kenneth Wayne Cashwell of Virginia Beach, Va., and William Ellsworth "Max" Grumiaux of Clemmons, N.C. — are cooperating with federal investigators.
Cashwell and Grumiaux pleaded guilty in early 2007 to possession of stolen firearms that had been shipped in interstate or foreign commerce, and aided and abetted another in doing so, according to court papers viewed by The Associated Press. In their plea agreements, which call for a maximum sentence of 10 years in prison and a $250,000 fine, the men agreed to testify in any future proceedings.
Calls to defense attorneys were not immediately returned Friday evening, and calls to the telephone listings for both men also were not returned.
The News & Observer, citing unidentified sources, reported that the probe was looking at whether Blackwater had shipped unlicensed automatic weapons and military goods to Iraq without a license.
The paper's report that the company itself was under investigation could not be confirmed by the AP.
Meanwhile, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice ordered a review of security practices for U.S. diplomats in Iraq following a deadly incident involving Blackwater USA guards protecting an embassy convoy.
Rice's announcement came as the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad resumed limited diplomatic convoys under the protection of Blackwater outside the heavily fortified Green Zone after a suspension because of the weekend incident in that city.
In the United States, officials in Washington said the smuggling investigation grew from internal Pentagon and State Department inquiries into U.S. weapons that had gone missing in Iraq. It gained steam after Turkish authorities protested to the U.S. in July that they had seized American arms from the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK, rebels.
The Turks provided serial numbers of the weapons to U.S. investigators, said a Turkish official.
The Pentagon said in late July it was looking into the Turkish complaints and a U.S. official said FBI agents had traveled to Turkey in recent months to look into cases of missing U.S. weapons in Iraq.
Investigators are determining whether the alleged Blackwater weapons match those taken from the PKK.
It was not clear if Blackwater employees suspected of selling to the black market knew the weapons they allegedly sold to middlemen might wind up with the PKK. If they did, possible charges against them could be more serious than theft or illegal weapons sales, officials said.
The PKK, which is fighting for an independent Kurdistan, is banned in Turkey, which has a restive Kurdish population and is considered a "foreign terrorist organization" by the State Department. That designation bars U.S. citizens or those in U.S. jurisdictions from supporting the group in any way.
The North Carolina investigation was first brought to light by State Department Inspector General Howard Krongard, who mentioned it, perhaps inadvertently, this week while denying he had improperly blocked fraud and corruption probes in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Krongard was accused in a letter by Rep. Henry Waxman, D-Calif., chairman of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, of politically motivated malfeasance, including refusing to cooperate with an investigation into alleged weapons smuggling by a large, unidentified State Department contractor.
In response, Krongard said in a written statement that he "made one of my best investigators available to help Assistant U.S. Attorneys in North Carolina in their investigation into alleged smuggling of weapons into Iraq by a contractor."
His statement went further than Waxman's letter because it identified the state in which the investigation was taking place. Blackwater is the biggest of the State Department's three private security contractors.
The other two, Dyncorp and Triple Canopy, are based in Washington's northern Virginias suburbs, outside the jurisdiction of the North Carolina's attorneys.
-
Wow. This could get very interesting.
-
The NY Times weighs in on Blackwater:
WASHINGTON, Sept. 26 — The American security contractor Blackwater USA has been involved in a far higher rate of shootings while guarding American diplomats in Iraq than other security firms providing similar services to the State Department, according to Bush administration officials and industry officials.
Blackwater is now the focus of investigations in both Baghdad and Washington over a Sept. 16 shooting in which at least 11 Iraqis were killed. Beyond that episode, the company has been involved in cases in which its personnel fired weapons while guarding State Department officials in Iraq at least twice as often per convoy mission as security guards working for other American security firms, the officials said.
The disclosure came as the Pentagon said Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates had sent a team of officials to Iraq to get answers to questions about the use of American security contractors there.
The State Department keeps reports on each case in which weapons were fired by security personnel guarding American diplomats in Iraq. Officials familiar with the internal State Department reports would not provide the actual statistics, but they indicated that the records showed that Blackwater personnel were involved in dozens of episodes in which they had resorted to force.
The officials said that Blackwater’s incident rate was at least twice that recorded by employees of DynCorp International and Triple Canopy, the two other United States-based security firms that have been contracted by the State Department to provide security for diplomats and other senior civilians in Iraq.
The State Department would not comment on most matters relating to Blackwater, citing the current investigation. But Sean McCormack, the department’s spokesman, said that of 1,800 escort missions by Blackwater this year, there had been “only a very small fraction, very small fraction, that have involved any sort of use of force.”
In 2005, DynCorp reported 32 shootings during about 3,200 convoy missions, and in 2006 that company reported 10 episodes during about 1,500 convoy missions. While comparable Blackwater statistics were not available, government officials said the firm’s rate per convoy mission was about twice DynCorp’s.
The State Department’s incident reports have not been made public, and Blackwater refused to provide its own data on cases in which its personnel used their weapons while guarding American diplomats. The State Department is in the process of providing at least some of the data to Congress. The administration and industry officials who agreed to discuss the broad rate of Blackwater’s involvement in violent events would not disclose the specific numbers.
“The incident rate for Blackwater is higher, there is a distinction,” said a senior American government official who insisted on anonymity in order to discuss a delicate, continuing investigation. “The real question that is open for discussion is why.”
A Blackwater spokeswoman declined to comment.
Blackwater, based in North Carolina, has gained a reputation among Iraqis and even among American military personnel serving in Iraq as a company that flaunts an aggressive, quick-draw image that leads its security personnel to take excessively violent actions to protect the people they are paid to guard. After the latest shooting, the Iraqi government demanded that the company be banned from operating in the country.
“You can find any number of people, particularly in uniform, who will tell you that they do see Blackwater as a company that promotes a much more aggressive response to things than other main contractors do,” a senior American official said.
Today, Blackwater operates in the most violent parts of Iraq and guards the most prominent American diplomats, which some American government officials say explains why it is involved in more shootings than its competitors. The shootings included in the reports include all cases in which weapons are fired, including those meant as warning shots. Others add that Blackwater’s aggressive posture in guarding diplomats reflects the wishes of its client, the State Department’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security.
Still, other government officials say that Blackwater’s corporate culture seems to encourage excessive behavior. “Is it the operating environment or something specific about Blackwater?” asked one government official. “My best guess is that it is both.”
========
Page 2 of 2)
Blackwater was founded in 1997 by Erik Prince, a former member of the Navy Seals, and is privately owned. Most of its nearly 1,000 people in Iraq are independent contractors, rather than employees of the company, according to a spokeswoman, Anne Tyrrell. Blackwater has a total of about 550 full-time employees, the she said.
Its diplomatic security contract with the State Department is now the company’s largest, Ms. Tyrrell said, while declining to provide the dollar amount. The company also provides security for the State Department in Afghanistan, where it also has counternarcotics-related contracts.
In addition to the Sept. 16 shooting in the Nisour area of Baghdad, Iraqi officials said Blackwater employees had been involved in six other episodes under investigation. Those episodes left a total of 10 Iraqis dead and 15 wounded, they said.
Many American officials now share the view that Blackwater’s behavior is increasingly stoking resentment among Iraqis and is proving counterproductive to American efforts to gain support for its military efforts in Iraq.
“They’re repeat offenders, and yet they continue to prosper in Iraq,” said Representative Jan Schakowsky, an Illinois Democrat who has been broadly critical of the role of contractors in Iraq. “It’s really affecting attitudes toward the United States when you have these cowboy guys out there. These guys represent the U.S. to them and there are no rules of the game for them.”
Despite the growing criticism of Blackwater and its tactics, the company still enjoys an unusually close relationship with the Bush administration, and with the State Department and Pentagon in particular. It has received government contracts worth more than $1 billion since 2002, with most coming under the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, according to the independent budget monitoring group OMB Watch.
Last year, the State Department gave Blackwater the lead role in diplomatic security in Iraq, reducing the roles of DynCorp and Triple Canopy.
The company employs about 850 workers in Iraq under its diplomatic security contract, about three-quarters of them Americans, according to the State Department and the Congressional Research Service. DynCorp has 157 security guards in Iraq; Triple Canopy has about 250. The figures compiled by the State Department track the number of shootings per convoy mission, rather than measuring against the number of employees.
Just in recent weeks, Blackwater has also been awarded another large State Department contract to provide helicopter services in Iraq.
The company’s close ties to the Bush administration have raised questions about the political clout of Mr. Prince, Blackwater’s founder and owner. He is the scion of a wealthy Michigan family that is active in Republican politics. He and the family have given more than $325,000 in political donations over the past 10 years, the vast majority to Republican candidates and party committees, according to federal campaign finance reports.
Mr. Prince has helped cement his ties to the government by hiring prominent officials. J. Cofer Black, the former counterterrorism chief at the C.I.A. and State Department, is a vice chairman at Blackwater. Mr. Black is also now a senior adviser on counterterrorism and national security issues to the Republican presidential campaign of Mitt Romney.
Joseph E. Schmitz, the former inspector general at the Pentagon, now is chief operating officer and general counsel for Blackwater’s parent company, the Prince Group. Officials at other firms in the contracting industry said that Mr. Prince sometimes met with government contracting officers, which they say is an unusual step for the chief executive of a corporation.
No Blackwater employees, or any other contractors, have been charged with crimes related to the shootings in Iraq, although there are a number of American laws governing actions overseas and in wartime that could be applied, according to experts in international law. In addition, a measure enacted last year calls for the Pentagon to bring contractors in Iraq under the jurisdiction of American military law, but the Defense Department has not yet put into effect the rules needed to do so.
Separately, American officials specifically exempted all United States personnel from Iraqi law under an order signed in 2004 by L.Paul Bremer III, then the top official of the American occupation authority. The Sept. 16 shootings have so angered Iraqis, however, that the Iraqi government is proposing a measure that would overturn the American rule and subject Western private security companies to Iraqi law. The proposal requires the approval of the Iraqi Parliament.
In a sign of the Pentagon’s concern over private security contractors, Mr. Gates last Sunday sent a five-person team to Iraq to discuss with Gen. David H. Petraeus, the top American commander in Iraq, the rules governing contractors. “He has some real concerns about oversight of contractors in Iraq and he is looking for ways to sort of make sure we do a better job on that front,” Geoff Morrell, Mr. Gates’s spokesman, told reporters at the Pentagon on Wednesday.
On Tuesday night, Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England sent a three-page memorandum to senior Defense Department officials and top commanders around the world ordering them to ensure that contractors in the field were operating under rules of engagement consistent with the military’s.
-
Why We're Winning Now in Iraq
Anbar's citizens needed protection before they would give their "hearts and minds."
BY FREDERICK W. KAGAN
Friday, September 28, 2007 12:01 a.m. EDT
Many politicians and pundits in Washington have ignored perhaps the most important point made by Gen. David Petraeus in his recent congressional testimony: The defeat of al Qaeda in Iraq requires a combination of conventional forces, special forces and local forces. This realization has profound implications not only for American strategy in Iraq, but also for the future of the war on terror.
As Gen. Petraeus made clear, the adoption of a true counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq in January 2007 has led to unprecedented progress in the struggle against al Qaeda in Iraq, by protecting Sunni Arabs who reject the terrorists among them from the vicious retribution of those terrorists. In his address to the United Nations General Assembly Wednesday, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki also touted the effectiveness of this strategy while at the same time warning of al Qaeda in Iraq's continued threat to his government and indeed the entire region.
Yet despite the undeniable successes the new strategy has achieved against al Qaeda in Iraq, many in Congress are still pushing to change the mission of U.S. forces back to a counterterrorism role relying on special forces and precision munitions to conduct targeted attacks on terrorist leaders. This change would bring us back to the traditional, consensus strategy for dealing with cellular terrorist groups like al Qaeda--a strategy that has consistently failed in Iraq.
Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the consensus of American strategists has been that the best way to fight a cellular terrorist organization like al Qaeda is through a combination of targeted strikes against key leaders and efforts to discredit al Qaeda's takfiri ideology in the Muslim community. Precision-guided munitions and special forces have been touted as the ideal weapons against this sort of group, because they require a minimal presence on the ground and therefore do not create the image of American invasion or occupation of a Muslim country.
A correlative assumption has often been that the visible presence of Western troops in Muslim lands creates more terrorists than it eliminates. The American attack on the Taliban in 2001 is often held up now--as it was at the time--as an exemplar of the right way to do things in this war: Small numbers of special forces worked with indigenous Afghan resistance fighters to defeat the Taliban and drive out al Qaeda without the infusion of large numbers of American ground forces. For many, Afghanistan is the virtuous war (contrasting with Iraq) not only because it was fought against the group that planned the 9/11 attacks, but also because it was fought in accord with accepted theories of fighting cellular terrorist organizations.
This strategy failed in Iraq for four years--skilled U.S. special-forces teams killed a succession of al Qaeda in Iraq leaders, but the organization was able to replace them faster than we could kill them. A counterterrorism strategy that did not secure the population from terrorist attacks led to consistent increases in terrorist violence and exposed Sunni leaders disenchanted with the terrorists to brutal death whenever they tried to resist. It emerged that "winning the hearts and minds" of the local population is not enough when the terrorists are able to torture and kill anyone who tries to stand up against them.
Despite an extremely aggressive counterterrorism campaign, by the end of 2006, al Qaeda in Iraq had heavily fortified strongholds equipped with media centers, torture chambers, weapons depots and training areas throughout Anbar province; in Baghdad; in Baqubah and other parts of Diyala province; in Arab Jabour and other villages south of Baghdad; and in various parts of Salah-ad-Din province north of the capital. Al Qaeda in Iraq was blending with the Sunni Arab insurgency in a relationship of mutual support. It was able to conduct scores of devastating, spectacular attacks against Shiite and other targets. Killing al Qaeda leaders in targeted raids had failed utterly either to prevent al Qaeda in Iraq from establishing safe havens throughout Iraq or to control the terrorist violence.
The Sunni Arabs in Iraq lost their enthusiasm for al Qaeda very quickly after their initial embrace of the movement. By 2005, currents of resistance had begun to flow in Anbar, expanding in 2006. Al Qaeda responded to this rising resistance with unspeakable brutality--beheading young children, executing Sunni leaders and preventing their bodies from being buried within the time required by Muslim law, torturing resisters by gouging out their eyes, electrocuting them, crushing their heads in vices, and so on. This brutality naturally inflamed the desire to resist in the Sunni Arab community--but actual resistance in 2006 remained fitful and ineffective. There was no power in Anbar or anywhere that could protect the resisters against al Qaeda retribution, and so al Qaeda continued to maintain its position by force among a population that had initially welcomed it willingly.
The proof? In all of 2006, there were only 1,000 volunteers to join the Iraqi Security Forces in Anbar, despite rising resentment against al Qaeda. Voluntarism was kept down by al Qaeda attacks against ISF recruiting stations and targeted attacks on the families of volunteers. Although tribal leaders had begun to turn against the terrorists, American forces remained under siege in the provincial capital of Ramadi--they ultimately had to level all of the buildings around their headquarters to secure it from constant attack. An initial clearing operation conducted by Col. Sean MacFarland established forward positions in Ramadi with tremendous difficulty and at great cost, but the city was not cleared; attacks on American forces remained extremely high; and the terrorist safe-havens in the province were largely intact.
This year has been a different story in Anbar, and elsewhere in Iraq. The influx of American forces in support of a counterinsurgency strategy--more than 4,000 went into Anbar--allowed U.S. commanders to take hold of the local resentment against al Qaeda by promising to protect those who resisted the terrorists. When American forces entered al Qaeda strongholds like Arab Jabour, the first question the locals asked is: Are you going to stay this time? They wanted to know if the U.S. would commit to protecting them against al Qaeda retribution. U.S. soldiers have done so, in Anbar, Baghdad, Baqubah, Arab Jabour and elsewhere. They have established joint security stations with Iraqi soldiers and police throughout urban areas and in villages. They have worked with former insurgents and local people to form "concerned citizens" groups to protect their own neighborhoods. Their presence among the people has generated confidence that al Qaeda will be defeated, resulting in increased information about the movements of al Qaeda operatives and local support for capturing or killing them.
The result was a dramatic turnabout in Anbar itself--in contrast to the 1,000 recruits of last year, there have already been more than 12,000 this year. Insurgent groups like the 1920s Revolution Brigades that had been fighting alongside al Qaeda in 2006 have fractured, with many coming over to fight with the coalition against the terrorists--more than 30,000 Iraq-wide, by some estimates. The tribal movement in Anbar both solidified and spread--there are now counter-al Qaeda movements throughout Central Iraq, including Diyala, Baghdad, Salah-ad-Din, Babil and Ninewah. Only recently an "awakening council" was formed in Mosul, Ninewah's capital, modeled on the Anbar pattern.
A targeted raid killed Abu Musaab al Zarqawi, founder of al Qaeda in Iraq, near Baqubah in June 2006. After that raid, al Qaeda's grip on Baqubah and throughout Diyala only grew stronger. But skillful clearing operations conducted by American forces, augmented by the surge, have driven al Qaeda out of Baqubah almost entirely. The "Baqubah Guardians" now protect that provincial capital against al Qaeda fighters who previously used it as a major base of operations. The old strategy of targeted raids failed in Diyala, as in Anbar and elsewhere throughout Iraq. The new strategy of protecting the population, in combination with targeted raids, has succeeded so well that al Qaeda in Iraq now holds no major urban sanctuary.
This turnabout coincided with an increase in American forces in Iraq and a change in their mission to securing the population. Not only were more American troops moving about the country, but they were much more visible as they established positions spread out among urban populations. According to all the principles of the consensus counterterrorism strategy, the effect of this surge should have been to generate more terrorists and more terrorism. Instead, it enabled the Iraqi people to throw off the terrorists whose ideas they had already rejected, confident that they would be protected from horrible reprisals. It proved that, at least in this case, conventional forces in significant numbers conducting a traditional counterinsurgency mission were absolutely essential to defeating this cellular terrorist group.
What lessons does this example hold for future fights in the War on Terror? First, defeating al Qaeda in Iraq requires continuing an effective counterinsurgency strategy that involves American conventional forces helping Iraqi Security Forces to protect the population in conjunction with targeted strikes. Reverting to a strategy relying only on targeted raids will allow al Qaeda to re-establish itself in Iraq and begin once again to gain strength. In the longer term, we must fundamentally re-evaluate the consensus strategy for fighting the war on terror. Success against al Qaeda in Iraq obviously does not show that the solution to problems in Waziristan, Baluchistan or elsewhere lies in an American-led invasion. Each situation is unique, each al-Qaeda franchise is unique, and responses must be tailored appropriately.
But one thing is clear from the Iraqi experience. It is not enough to persuade a Muslim population to reject al Qaeda's ideology and practice. Someone must also be willing and able to protect that population against the terrorists they had been harboring, something that special forces and long-range missiles alone can't do.
Mr. Kagan is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and the author most recently of "No Middle Way: The Challenge of Exit Strategies from Iraq." (AEI, 2007).
-
Geopolitical Diary: The Kurdish Oil Reality
Iraq's Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) said on Tuesday that it is moving ahead with oil development in its region, independent of Baghdad's oil policies. To be more precise, since the Baghdad government hasn't passed laws enabling an oil policy, the Kurds have decided to take steps on their own. For its part, Iraq's Oil Ministry said any oil deals signed by the KRG would be "ignored or considered illegal." The KRG denies that it has violated any law -- since, after all, there isn't one. Deals have been struck for production-sharing agreements with a number of companies, including Canadian and American companies such as Texas-based Hunt Oil Co.
There are many symbolic moves toward separatism in Iraq, but this is the heart of the matter in the most practical sense. Whoever is able to make deals over extracting oil from Iraq can define who gets the money from those deals. That is where the power lies, and that is where the money comes from. Once these deals are struck and the money begins to flow into Kurdish hands, the Kurds will have the wherewithal to resist Baghdad's demands. It won't simply be a matter of money. The oil companies they are signing deals with will have a major stake in preserving the status quo. Therefore, those companies' governments will come under pressure to support increased autonomy for the Kurds.
That will put the United States in a difficult position. Officially, the U.S. policy is to supported a united, federated Iraq with a coalition government that will define both oil policy and the extent to which the Kurds (or others) have the right to determine whom they will do business with. But the Kurds are now moving to create a new reality on the ground -- and at least some oil companies are prepared to bet that the deal they are making with the Kurds will be upheld in whatever Iraqi oil agreement is finally signed.
Washington has had a special relationship with the Iraqi Kurds since the early 1990s. It helped the Kurds against the Saddam Hussein regime. The United States also does not mind seeing American oil companies benefit from deals with the Kurds, since it is still unclear what kind of oil policy will eventually come out of Baghdad. The special relationship also, we would imagine, gives the United States leverage with the Kurds. We suspect the Americans could have blocked the deals if they wanted to. But they haven't.
Part of the reason could have to do with a U.S. desire to force the Iraqis to create oil legislation. The fact that the northern deposits are going to be controlled by the Kurds -- and that the United States is going to allow it to happen -- is sure to cause more than a little consternation in Baghdad, particularly among the Sunnis. The Sunnis have no oil of their own -- they either get a share of the revenue from the central government, get a piece of the northern fields, or wind up with nothing. So this could be directed against them. But the Sunnis are not, at the moment, Washington's main problem. That is the Shia -- who control the southern oil fields and are ambivalent on the whole issue. This could simply encourage them to accelerate their unilateral exploitation of their own oil reserves.
It could, in other words, lead to the de facto division of Iraq into three regions -- with the Sunnis the odd man out -- faster than any other process. This might be what the United States is thinking. But there are complicating factors. An autonomous Kurdish region is not something that Turkey wants to see, and the United States would then be following a policy in direct opposition to Turkey's interests. At the moment, the American dance card is already filled with Muslim enemies. We doubt that it wants another one in Turkey.
Most important, we find it hard to imagine that the United States really wants to see a tripartite division of Iraq. That would leave southern Iraq, and the border with Saudi Arabia, in Shiite hands -- and therefore, in all likelihood, in the hands of a regional government with close ties to Iran. That would give the Iranians strategic opportunities Washington clearly doesn't want to give them. In some ways, Iranian domination of southern Iraq would be better for Tehran than dominating all of Iraq. Less fuss and bother, and a clear road into the Arabian Peninsula.
Too much should not be made of these contracts, nor of the unwillingness or inability of the United States to block these deals. But there is a tendency developing now to impose realities on the ground, regardless of Baghdad's position, and oil is what will impose realities most effectively. Kurdish oil policy will be one of the best indicators of where this is all going.
stratfor
-
IRAQ: Every Arab who wishes to leave the northern Iraqi province of Kirkuk is being paid about $16,500, Gulf News reported, citing Abdul Rahman Mustafa, governor of the Kirkuk province. An article in the Iraqi Constitution states that Shiite and Sunni Arabs in Kirkuk will be paid in order to facilitate their return to their native provinces.
stratfor
-
Second (or third?) post of the day:
Iraq: Increasing Frictions Between Baghdad and Arbil
Summary
Iraqi Oil Minister Hussein Shahristani said Oct. 5 that oil companies that sign contracts with Iraq's Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) will be blacklisted and prevented from working in Iraq. At the same time, Arab newspapers are reporting that the KRG is actively reversing the demographics in Iraq's oil-rich city of Kirkuk by monetarily compensating Arab families to relocate. The tug-of-war over Kirkuk carries significant implications for foreign companies with investments in northern Iraq, and the struggle will escalate in the coming months.
Analysis
Arab newspapers report that Kurdish parties in Iraq are working to reverse the demographics of Kirkuk by paying Arabs to relocate. Arabs leaving Kirkuk are being paid approximately $16,248 per family to leave the city, according to Dubai-based Gulf News.
The process of "Kurdifying" the ancient, multiethnic and oil-rich city of Kirkuk has been going on for awhile and is, for Iraqi Kurds, a vital step toward financial independence. Turkey, Iran, Syria and Iraq's Sunni and Shiite factions all have a vested interest in making sure Kirkuk's oil wealth does not officially fall under the Kurds' control, however, and are actively working to settle more Arabs in the city in order to shift the demographics back in their favor.
This tug-of-war over Kirkuk will intensify in the coming months as the constitutional deadline approaches. Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution stipulates that the final status of Kirkuk and other disputed areas is supposed to be settled in a local referendum by the end of 2007. For the referendum to take place, Kirkuk must first be demographically "normalized" and a census must be conducted. But Iraq's central government has put enough obstacles in place to prevent the census from being taken.
Despite rhetoric to the contrary, Iraqi Kurdish officials have privately resigned themselves to the fact that the referendum very likely will not be held by the end of the year. Holding the referendum would lead to a nightmarish security situation, including the potential for a Turkish military intervention in northern Iraq. Jihadist attacks in northern Iraq also have increased over the past year, and as the Kirkuk issue flares up, militant activity in the North will escalate and will likely have the support of Iraq's neighbors. And the United States is simply unwilling to further destabilize its relations with Ankara and its delicate negotiations with Iraq's Sunni and Shiite factions by meeting Kurdish demands to hold the referendum.
But the Kurds have other means to secure the oil-rich city. Kurdish officials are stepping up efforts to both hand out compensation checks to Arab families to leave and bring more Kurdish families back to the city. Data on how many Arabs have accepted compensation and left Kirkuk vary wildly; Arab estimates show that more than 1,000 families have relocated, while Kurdish figures put the number at 9,450. That these families have actually left cannot be confirmed, but if the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) can make enough progress in the Kirkuk normalization process, it can attempt to proceed with the referendum when it feels the timing is appropriate.
The failure to hold the Kirkuk referendum by year's end would carry significant implications for energy investment in northern Iraq. Breaking Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution would undermine the constitution's validity in the eyes of Kurdish officials, particularly when they face resistance over the signing of energy contracts without central government approval. In other words, if a constitutionally mandated referendum cannot take place, why should the constitution restrict the KRG's energy deals with foreign companies?
While Baghdad has been boiling, the KRG has been signing oil contracts with foreign energy companies, including Norway's DNO, Texas-based Hunt Oil Co., Canada's Heritage Oil Corp. and France's Perenco, as well as two other international oil companies whose names will be revealed in approximately two weeks by the KRG.
The Iraqi central government is fighting back against the KRG, however. Iraqi Oil Minister Hussein Shahristani, a Shi'i with close ties to Tehran, said Oct. 5 that any oil companies that sign contracts with the KRG will be blacklisted and prevented from working in Iraq. The oil companies with contracts in the North do not currently have projects elsewhere in Iraq, but this is a dangerous escalation between Arbil -- the seat of the KRG -- and Baghdad. Foreign oil majors will now have to think twice before pursuing lucrative energy investments in Iraq's most stable region in the North, especially when they consider that Iraq's southern -- albeit insurgent-wracked -- region has three times as much oil waiting to be extracted.
Foreign oil companies in Iraq also will have to grapple with the fact that, even if they invest in energy exploration and production in the North, the KRG will still need permission from Baghdad to transport oil out of the country. The oil extracted in the short term can supply domestic consumption in the North, but anything beyond that also will involve the good graces of Ankara, which will be difficult to come by since Turkey has its own incentives to keep the Kurds contained and strapped for cash. Iran also has demonstrated the ease with which it can constrain the Kurds by closing its border in the North.
The KRG already has given up on holding the Kirkuk referendum on time, in the interest of maintaining stability in the region and safeguarding foreign investment in Iraqi Kurdistan. But with the Kurds' rivals holding a number of potent levers to keep them constrained, the foreign investment the KRG has strived to protect also runs the risk of coming under attack.
stratfor
-
Al Qaeda's War of Villages
Signs that the terrorists are losing in Iraq.
BY OMAR FADHIL
Monday, October 8, 2007 12:01 a.m. EDT
BAGHDAD--The latest chapter in al Qaeda's war manual in their war against the Iraqi people and the Coalition is this: raiding remote peaceful villages, burning down homes and slaughtering both man and beast. It's a campaign of self destruction.
For about a year al Qaeda has been trying to build a so called Islamic State in Iraq. On several occasions al Qaeda has even declared parts of Baghdad or other places in other provinces the capital of this Islamic State.
But now that they are losing one base after another, their objective seems to have changed from adding more towns and villages to the "state" to destroying the very same towns and villages. Obviously, it's all about making headlines regardless of the means to do that.
This change in plans began to take shape with the battle between al Qaeda and the joint forces on Sept. 6 and 7 in Hor Rijab and then the massacre that followed in the same spot a week later and finally the attacks on other villages north, south and east of Baghdad in the last week or so.
Actually first I'd like to recommend reading a good post by Jules Crittenden about the flawed timing of this "Little Tet.
Anyway, our interest today is more about the field situation and strategy than about timing since the latter seems to be not so friendly to al Qaeda. Well, actually timing is very important here too but at a rather different level. In my opinion al Qaeda found itself forced to start this villages war. It wasn't a choice as much as a last resort because villages are among the few fighting spaces that al Qaeda can still utilize as large cities become increasingly difficult for them to operate in. They know that without engaging the enemy--that's us by the way--their existence and influence would end and I'm almost positive that they feel bitter about having to fight this way.
In order to fight a "good" guerilla war one has to stay in fluid state, have no permanent bases or barracks, no distinguishable uniform and above all one should be able to always have civilians around so as to deter the enemy--that's again us--from attacking out of concern about collateral damages and casualties among innocent civilians. No one questions the fact that no army in the Middle East, and I doubt there are any elsewhere, that can engage and defeat the U.S. military power in open terrain, in other words in a case of two traditional armies fighting on traditional battlefield.
The last factor is exactly what al Qaeda is sacrificing by waging this war on villages. But how can we make advantage of this situation? The greatest challenge I guess would be to have an alarm and information system through which the nearest available troops could be notified when an attack begins so they could interfere and repel the attack. This might be logistically difficult to establish in a short time since villages are usually far from the cities. In fact I worked in some such villages and I know that most of them are outside the administrative divisions or "civil planning" of provinces therefore they lack their own government offices and departments which means the nearest hospital, fire department, even phone and above all police station could be many miles away.
But even then if the troops fail to arrive in time to intercept the attack, which would be truly sad, the long distance that al Qaeda fighters would have to travel to go back to their base would require them to lose precious time since they have to rely only on ground transport on mostly exposed terrain while the troops very often have the advantage of the much faster air transport.
In the worst case scenario what's left of a village if the attack is not intercepted would be only al Qaeda fighters and the remains of what used to be a village. Now isn't that the perfect target for the countless aggressive fire units of the U.S. military?
Now please let's put emotions aside for a while because this is war we're talking about and if sacrifices cannot be avoided we should make sure the enemy pays the heaviest price possible. If reaction is quick enough--and timing here is of crucial importance--the hunt would be great and the results would be spectacular.
Again, of course it would be much more pleasant if the attacks can be prevented or repelled but since I doubt there's such an alarm system we could at least make benefit of the gap in time that immediately follows the action of the attackers taking advantage of faster transportation means and the old principle in combat that says the enemy can be best attacked immediately after he makes his move.
For the duration of the war on al Qaeda in Iraq so far, the most frustrating fact for soldiers and military commanders has been that they were asked to identify terrorists who move like ghosts, separate them from civilians and kill or capture them and that's a truly difficult mission. That's partly because a soldier would have to be careful when and where each bullet he fires would hit. But when the ghosts are identified, isolated and far from any friendly objects/personnel a pilot could attack with assurance of not hurting a friend.
That's why I think the troops should seize each and every such opportunity (which are technically moments during which the crippling rule of engagement become much more flexible) and strike as hard as they can once they are sure the battlefield falls in the category we just described.
Mr. Fadhil and his brother Mohammed write a blog, Iraq the Model, from Baghdad.
WSJ
-
http://victordavishanson.pajamasmedia.com/2007/10/06/observations_about_the_war.php
Observations about the war, from Victor Davis Hanson
Last week’s quiet
I just returned to Kuwait, and have been in Iraq visiting forward operating bases in Anbar and Diyala provinces, as well as suburbs of Baghdad the last week, hence the recent silence on this blog given sporadic internet facilities in Iraq. I hope to post a series of observations. But for now here are a few initials impressions from my second visit to the country. (Please excuse the typos, writing in haste from Kuwait City)
Better News?
Almost all the Marines and Army units I visited from Ramadi to Taji to various hot spots in Baghdad and Diyala believe there has been a sudden shift in the pulse of battlefield. Sometimes without much warning thousands of once disgruntled Sunni have turned on al Qaeda, ceased resistance, and are flocking to join government security forces and begging the Americans to stop both al Qaeda and Shiite militias.
Commanders in the field are cautious. They know that if the Shiite dominated government in Baghdad stays vengeful for decades of past suffering at the hands of Sunni Baathists, the reconciliation will fail. So thousands of American officers are desperately pressuring ministries to start distributing the vast wealth of Iraq’s $80 a barrel oil revenues to Anbar and Diyala before the Sunni revert back to insurgency.
The U.S. military
The brilliance of U.S. army and marines officers has not been fully appreciated. I met scores with PhDs and MAs, from Majors to Colonels, who are literally all at once trying to defeat al Qaeda gangs and Shiite militias, rebuild government facilities, arbitrate tribal feuds, repair utilities and train Iraqi army and police. As was true of the last trip to Iraq, I am left with three general impressions about the military.
(1) Our army and marines are far too few and overextended. The United States must either radically increase the size of these traditional ground units or scale back its commitments in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.
Through constant rotations, we are literally burning out gifted officers and lifetime professionals— and will lose their priceless expertise if they begin, as I fear, retiring en masse due to the sheer exhaustion.
(2) There is more optimism about success among the battlefield soldiers than present with analysts in Baghdad. The sudden decrease in violence has left many units stunned that Iraqis who used to try to kill them are suddenly volunteering information about terrorists and landmines, and clamoring to join the joint security force. Usually those behind the desk are the optimists, the soldiers who die the pessimists. But instead there is genuine feeling on the front that after four frustrating years of ordeal, at last there are tangible signs of real, often radical improvement.
(3) As a supporter of some four years of the now unpopular effort to remove Saddam and leave a democracy in his place, I continue to have only one reservation, albeit a major one. The U.S. soldier in the field is so unusually competent and heroic that one comes to despair at the very thought of losing even one of them. As a military historian I know that an army that can’t take casualties can’t win, but I confess after spending 16-hour days with our soldiers in impossible conditions one wonders whether the entire country of Iraq is worth the loss of just of these unusual Americans. I understand both the lack of logic and perhaps amorality in such a sweeping statement, but feel it nonetheless out here.
The complexity of the effort
The military is pulling out all the stops. Some examples. They have flown Vietnam-era veterans to lecture on counter-insurgency in their school at Taji, in addition to clinic psychologists and veterans of recent wars from Panama to Afghanistan. The problem is now not too few interpreters, but too many trying to join us. Some of the best are Iraqi-Americans, who know American idiom and deeply appreciate being an American.
Hundreds are working on IEDs, not just counter-technologies and aerial surveillance, but sophisticated methods of learning how they are made, how the bombers function, and how they are paid and maintained. Thousands of other reserve and retired engineers have come to Iraq to build and advise Iraqi contractors. I met a fascinating engineer in his mid-fifties who volunteered to return to the Marines and is now supervising the reconstruction of the governmental center in Ramadi.
Again, they are trying not just to defeat the insurgency, but to literally take Iraq from its primordial past to the twenty-first century within four years. A Herculean Task.
Mythologies
A common slur is that Halliburton is looting the treasury and contractors in Iraq are greedy profiteers. I again found the opposite to be true. Thousands of construction personnel build bases, road, and Iraqi facilities, sometimes under fire, but living with the notion of shelling or shooting any minute. I consider them more likely under- rather than overpaid.
Iraq is not a poor country. Flying over the Tigris-Euphrates valley (I speak now a farmer) is unlike anything in Kuwait or Saudi Arabia. The soil is rich, the water plentiful and the dry climate perfect for intensive agriculture. That the country in theory within a year or two could pump well over three million barrels of petroleum a day, gives some indication of just how badly Iraq has been run the last forty years to screw up such natural bounty of a country—the Baathist-terror state, the attack on Iran, the massacres of Kurdish and Shiite innocents, the 1991 Gulf War, the no-fly zones and UN embargo, et al.
Next posting…
Hope to leave Kuwait tonight and post more on Iraq—some thoughts on our chances of winning, the nature of our colonels in the field, an interview with General Petraeus, the real Al Qaeda (or what Sunnis who once joined them now say about them) and other observations. .. Again, excuse the typos, since I write in haste.
Postscript
Hope to post tomorrow. One final thought. I must emphasize that we as a country have to support those in the field of fire. They believe not just that we can win by securing Iraq, but that they are doing a moral good by giving millions a chance of something quite different. Whatever one’s views on the war are, it seems to me morally reprehensible that anyone would slander an American soldier, whether comparing them to terrorists or their General to a betrayer. We have a very rare precious resource in today’s military that really does represent the moral upper crust of American society, and as long as it is engaged, we need to support it. We may come to the day that the military itself thinks victory is beyond our resources or not worth the cost, but from what I saw this week, as in 2006, we are not there at that day yet by a long shot.
-
Ok, Rogt. Please explain how removing a nightmarish tyrant and trying to rebuild a shattened nation is "bullying".
-
More on point for me wojuld be be to explain how a bullying friend getting his comeuppance and getting killed are indistinguishable, , ,
-
Crafty, are you saying that a US withdrawal from Iraq will somehow result in the "death" of the US?
GM, you know as well as I do that Saddam was just as much a "nightmarish tyrant" during the time when we supported him as he was when we removed him from power, and that there are plenty of other "shattered nations" we could care less about rebuilding. So these simply cannot be the real reasons we're in Iraq, although they sound good to people who like the idea of the war and/or don't particularly care why we're there.
The "bullying" I see is us telling Iraqis to run their country the way we want or continue to live under the effective rule of the US military.
And please, can we all just agree that none of us wants to see more troops killed?
Nor does any of us think "the troops" are stupid or incompetent. This elevation of the US military command to the status of virtual god-kings (a la that VDH article) and the assumption that the interests of the generals and the foot soldiers are synonymous are both fairly new phenomena that the typical WW2 soldier would likely find laughable.
-
"Crafty, are you saying that a US withdrawal from Iraq will somehow result in the "death" of the US?"
Although I do think that being driven out of Iraq, as vs. leaving upon enabling a stable situation, would hasten and increase attacks upon the American homeland, that is not my point here. My point here is that IMHO you analogy is inapt, because here our soldiers die when they get the comeuppance you seem to think the US deserves.
"The "bullying" I see is us telling Iraqis to run their country the way we want or continue to live under the effective rule of the US military."
No, the bullying is AQ, the Sadr hit squads, the other Shiite hit squads, etc killing the millions of Iraqis who, enabled by American blood, sweat and tears, voted three times in election to choose their government. AQ has specifically stated that democracy is anti-Islamic and are determined to stop it by any means necessary-- THAT is the bullying.
"And please, can we all just agree that none of us wants to see more troops killed?"
Actually, NO. In war more people on one side die when that one side loses than when it wins. You have plainly stated that you "oppose" (your repeated choice of word) our succcess. To me the syllogism adds up to more American deaths.
"Nor does any of us think "the troops" are stupid or incompetent. This elevation of the US military command to the status of virtual god-kings (a la that VDH article) and the assumption that the interests of the generals and the foot soldiers are synonymous are both fairly new phenomena that the typical WW2 soldier would likely find laughable."
The WW2 Army was a draft military. This is a professional military and frankly there really are some really impressive people in it.
Marc
-
"Crafty, are you saying that a US withdrawal from Iraq will somehow result in the "death" of the US?"
Although I do think that being driven out of Iraq, as vs. leaving upon enabling a stable situation, would hasten and increase attacks upon the American homeland, that is not my point here. My point here is that IMHO you analogy is inapt, because here our soldiers die when they get the comeuppance you seem to think the US deserves.
The US military being overrun and slaughtered by enemy forces in Iraq is NOT the same as us acknowledging that there's no point in continuing the war there. There is pretty much zero chance of the former happening, and the latter is the "defeat" I think should happen. We are literally the only force keeping the war going at this point.
"The "bullying" I see is us telling Iraqis to run their country the way we want or continue to live under the effective rule of the US military."
No, the bullying is AQ, the Sadr hit squads, the other Shiite hit squads, etc killing the millions of Iraqis who, enabled by American blood, sweat and tears, voted three times in election to choose their government. AQ has specifically stated that democracy is anti-Islamic and are determined to stop it by any means necessary-- THAT is the bullying.
The Iraqis don't seem to see it that way. How else do you explain polls showing 70%+ Iraqis in favor of immediate US withdrawal, and 50% or so who now consider armed attacks on US forces to be justified?
"And please, can we all just agree that none of us wants to see more troops killed?"
Actually, NO. In war more people on one side die when that one side loses than when it wins. You have plainly stated that you "oppose" (your repeated choice of word) our succcess. To me the syllogism adds up to more American deaths.
The total US casualty count is now around 3,800, while the Iraqi death toll is estimated at somewhere near 1,000,000. Even if that number were only 100,000 that's still an order-of-magnitude difference. So if my position means I want more US troops dead, the same logic would mean you must want an Iraqi holocaust. Obviously I know you don't, so why we just end this silly pissing contest now?
"Nor does any of us think "the troops" are stupid or incompetent. This elevation of the US military command to the status of virtual god-kings (a la that VDH article) and the assumption that the interests of the generals and the foot soldiers are synonymous are both fairly new phenomena that the typical WW2 soldier would likely find laughable."
The WW2 Army was a draft military. This is a professional military and frankly there really are some really impressive people in it.
I'm sure there are, but at what point did it become political heresy to criticize the military? During WW2 we had generals being called idiots right to their faces on the Senate floor and nobody barked about how "unpatriotic" those senators were. George Patton slapped two soldiers suffering from "shell-shock" for what he considered cowardly behavior and was almost sent home in disgrace, which many newspapers demanded at the time.
Another big difference I see between WW2 and the current Iraq war is that WW2 had a lot of public support. Seems like the less public support a war has, the more important it becomes to brand any criticism of it as unpatriotic or downright treasonous.
-
Casualties
Iraqi combatant dead
(during invasion period before Baathist government fell):
7,600 to 10,800
Insurgents dead
(After Saddam Hussein's Baathist government fell):
13,509 listed on
a representative list of reports 19,429 According to U.S. military
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Detainees (held by Coalition): 23,000
Detainees (held by Iraq): 37,000
Iraqi Security Forces (After Saddam. Allied with Coalition). Total police and military killed: 7,479
Coalition dead (3,814 US, 170 UK, 131 other): 4,115
Coalition missing or captured (US): 4
Coalition wounded: 28,009 US, 300 UK.
Coalition injured, diseased, or other medical: 28,645 US, 1,155 UK.
Contractors dead (US 231): 1,003
Contractors missing or captured (US 9): 17
Contractors wounded & injured: 10,569
All Iraqi violent deaths, Opinion Research Business. As of August 2007: 1,220,580 (range of 733,158 to 1,446,063). Causes were gunshots (48%), car bombs (20%), aerial bombing (9%), accidents (6%), another blast/ordnance (6%).
Total deaths (all excess deaths) Johns Hopkins (Lancet) - As of June 2006: 654,965 (range of 392,979 to 942,636). 601,027 were violent deaths (31% attributed to Coalition, 24% to others, 46% unknown)
War-related & criminal violence deaths (all Iraqis) Iraq Health Minister. Through early November 2006: 100,000-150,000
War-related & criminal violence deaths (civilians) Iraq Body Count - : 69,045-75,495
-------------------------------------------
Here is also a link to a Wiki of the Casualites of War not to mention the Thousands of Americans that have suffered wounds were they would be better off dead then to suffer what they are suffering.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Casualties_of_the_conflict_in_Iraq_since_2003
-
Rog:
To my sense of the meaning of words, there is a helluva big difference betweeen "there's no point in continuing the war there" and "I oppose our victory." I am quite glad to see the change in your position.
I disagree with you about how things are going there, and point you to the Michael Yon blog as one source of many to understand why.
Do you have citation for any of your numbers? Max has provided citation (thank you Max) and I note the 1,000,000 figure comes from Lancet, which as you and I have discussed previously, IMHO has substantial problems and thus I appreciate your apparent acknowledgement of the softness of the number. In that vein I note that on the Wiki page cited by Max it says
"Los Angeles Times: "At least 50,000 Iraqis have died violently"—as of June 2006. "Many more Iraqis are believed to have been killed but not counted because of serious lapses in recording deaths."
There is a helluva difference between "well over 50,000" and "1,000,00". I also place a lot less credence in the numbers thrown out by Iraqi ministries. Is the ministry under the control of the Sadr brigades or some other , , , "interested" party?
Also, your numbers about the percentages who want us to leave right away (as vs. eventually) want us killed etc are at variance with what I read.
Marc
-
Woof All:
We search for Truth.
Marc
==============================
http://www.d-n-i.net/lind/lind_10_10_07.htm
On War #236
October 9, 2007
Not so fast, John
William S. Lind
[The views expressed in this article are those of Mr. Lind, writing in his personal capacity. They do not reflect the opinions or policy positions of the Free Congress Foundation, its officers, board or employees, or those of Kettle Creek Corporation.]
Major General John Kelly is one of the Marine Corps' most thoughtful and most able leaders. Many who hope to see the Marine Corps' doctrine of Maneuver Warfare someday become real instead of just words on paper pray he has a bright future. When, as a major, he was commander of Infantry Officers’ Course at Quantico, he did what every Marine school director should do: he hauled all the old, Second Generation lesson plans out into the courtyard, poured gasoline on them and burned them. I have known him since that time, and I regard him as a personal friend.
In late September, speaking to the San Diego Military Advisory Council, General Kelly said:
I left Iraq three years ago last month. I returned a week ago after a two week visit of getting the lay of the land for my upcoming deployment. It is still a dangerous and foreboding land, but what I experienced personally was amazing and remarkable -- we are winning, we are really winning. No one told me to say that, I saw it for myself.
I have to reply, not so fast, John. I have no doubt the situation General Kelly found in Anbar Province is much quieter than it was just a short time ago. That means fewer casualties, for which we are all thankful. But in the inherent complexity of a Fourth Generation situation, it does not mean we are winning. If we put the improved situation in Anbar in context, we quickly see there is less to it than first meets the eye.
That context begins with the fact that Anbar is quieter primarily because of what al Qaeda did, namely alienating its base, not what we did. We enabled the local Sunnis to turn on al Qaeda by ceasing or at least diminishing our attacks on the local population. But if al Qaeda had not blundered, the situation would be about what it had been since the real war started. We have not found a silver bullet for 4GW.
Nor is the war in Iraq a binary conflict, America vs. al Qaeda, although, that is how Washington now portrays it. Al Qaeda is only one of a vast array of non-state actors, fighting for many different kinds of goals. If al Qaeda in Iraq disappeared tomorrow, Iraq would remain chaotic.
The fact that some Sunni tribes have turned on al Qaeda does not mean they like us. It just means we have for the moment become the #2 enemy instead of #1, or perhaps #3, with the Shiites ranking ahead of us. Some think the Sunnis are just getting whatever they can from us as they prepare for another, more bitter round of the Sunni vs. Shiite civil war.
But the biggest reason for saying "not so fast" is that the reduction of violence in Anbar does not necessary point toward the rise of a state in the now-stateless region of Mesopotamia. As I have argued repeatedly in this column and elsewhere, we can only win in Iraq if a new state emerges there. Far from pointing toward that, our new working relationship with some Sunni sheiks points away from it.
The sheiks represent local, feudal power, not a state. We are working with them precisely because there is no Iraqi state to work with (the Maliki government is a polite fiction). From a practical standpoint, there is nothing else we can do to get any results. But our alliances with Sunni sheiks in effect represents our acceptance, de facto if not de jure, of the reality that there is no state.
The sheiks, we must recognize, do not accept the Shiite puppet government in Baghdad (nothing illustrates its puppet nature better than its inability to expel Blackwater) or its armed forces, which are mostly Shiite militias who get government paychecks. The Baghdad government recognizes this fact. A story in the October 1 Cleveland Plain Dealer quotes Prime Minister al-Maliki's United Iraqi Alliance (Shiite) as condemning
"authorizing the (Sunni tribal) groups to conduct security acts away from the jurisdiction of the government and without its knowledge."
The statement went on: "We demand that the American administration stop this adventure, which is rejected by all the sons of the people and its national political powers."
Rightly, the ruling Shiites fear that what we are actually creating is new Sunni militias, which will fight the Shiite militias.
Finally, as if all this did not throw enough cold water on any notion that we are winning, just as the Marines are ramping down our war with the Iraqi Sunnis, in Anbar, the U.S. Army is ramping up a war with the Shiite population. Almost every day we read about another raid on the Shiite, all too often one where we have called in airstrikes on populated Shiite neighborhoods. A story in the October 6 Plain Dealer, U.S. raid north of Baghdad kills 25," was typical:
An Iraqi army official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said U.S. aircraft bombed the neighborhood repeatedly and he claimed civilians, including seven children, were among those killed.
He said the civilians had rushed out to help those hurt in the initial bombing…
…the town's top official said U. S. forces targeted areas built up by the locals to protect their Shiite neighborhoods against attacks by al-Qaida gunmen.
If we have not enjoyed fighting the 20% of the Iraqi population that is Sunni, how much pleasure will we find in fighting the 60% that is Shiite? Of course, an American attack on Iran will only intensify our war with Iraq's Shiites.
So no, we are not winning in Iraq. The only meaningful definition of "winning" is seeing the re-emergence of a real Iraqi state, and by that standard we are no closer to victory than we ever were. Nor can I see anything on the horizon that could move us closer to such a victory, other than a complete American withdrawal, which begins to look as unlikely under Hillary as under George. All we see on the horizon of Anbar province, sadly, is another mirage.
William S. Lind, expressing his own personal opinion, is Director for the Center for Cultural Conservatism for the Free Congress Foundation.
__________________
-
Iraq strike 'kills 15 civilians'
The US military in Iraq says 15 women and children were killed in an operation north of Baghdad in which 19 suspected insurgents also died.
It is thought to be one of the biggest losses of civilian life in a single US-led operation since the war began.
The US said it regretted the loss of innocent life, but said it acted in self-defense and blamed insurgents for putting the civilians in danger.
A child was also killed on Friday by explosives hidden in a sweets trolley.
An official statement from the US military said Thursday's loss of life occurred during an air and ground assault aimed at senior leaders of al-Qaeda thought to be meeting in the Lake Tharthar region, 120km (75 miles) north of the capital.
An initial air raid killed four rebels and then more air strikes were launched to back up US ground troops, a statement from the coalition said.
The coalition said that after the first air raid suspects were observed fleeing to an area south of the man-made lake.
Ground forces attacked a building in which insurgents were believed to be hiding and were engaged by small-arms fire, the statement said. Further air strikes were then called in.
After securing the area, the troops found 15 dead suspected insurgents along with six women and nine children, the statement added.
Two suspected militants, one woman and three children were wounded and another suspect was detained, the statement said.
'Deliberate danger'
Maj Brad Leighton, a Multi-National Force-Iraq spokesman, said: "We regret that civilians are hurt or killed while coalition forces search to rid Iraq of terrorism.
"These terrorists chose to deliberately place innocent Iraqi women and children in danger by their actions and presence."
The BBC's Justin Webb in Washington says the United Nations mission in Iraq has previously expressed concern about civilian deaths during air strikes by US-led forces.
Some 88 civilians were reportedly killed during air raids in the early part of this year, according to the UN.
On Friday, a bomber hid explosives in a trolley full of sweets that he was pushing in a playground in the northern Iraqi town of Tuz, where families were celebrating the Islamic festival of Eid.
A child was killed and at least 13 other people were wounded, police said.
-
Commentary: An Open Letter to Code Pink
By Richard Lund (10-02-07)
While the protest that you staged in front of my office on Wednesday, Sept. 26th, was an exercise of your constitutional rights, the messages that you left behind were insulting, untrue, and ultimately misdirected. Additionally, from the comments quoted in the Berkeley Daily Planet article, it is clear that you have no idea what it is that I do here. Given that I was unaware of your planned protest, I was unable to contest your claims in person, so I will therefore address them here.
First, a little bit about who I am: I am a Marine captain with over eight years of service as a commissioned officer. I flew transport helicopters for most of my time in the Marine Corps before requesting orders to come here. Currently, I am the officer selection officer for the northern Bay Area. My job is to recruit, interview, screen, and evaluate college students and college graduates that show an interest in becoming officers in the Marine Corps. Once they’ve committed to pursuing this program, I help them apply, and if selected, I help them prepare for the rigors of Officer Candidate School and for the challenges of life as a Marine officer. To be eligible for my programs, you have to be either a full-time college student or a college graduate. I don’t pull anyone out of school, and high school students are not eligible.
I moved my office to Berkeley in December of last year. Previously, it was located in an old federal building in Alameda. That building was due to be torn down and I had to find a new location. I choose our new site because of its proximity to UC Berkeley and to the BART station. Most of the candidates in my program either go to Cal or to one of the schools in San Francisco, the East Bay, or the North Bay. Logistically, the Shattuck Square location was the most convenient for them.
Next, you claim that I lie. I have never, and will never, lie to any individual that shows an interest in my programs. I am upfront with everything that is involved at every step of the way and I go out of my way to ensure that they know what to expect when they apply. I tell them that this is not an easy path. I tell them that leading Marines requires a great deal of self-sacrifice. I tell them that, should they succeed in their quest to become a Marine officer, they will almost certainly go to Iraq. In the future, if you plan to attack my integrity, please have the courtesy to explain to me specifically the instances in which you think that I lied.
Next, scrawled across the doorway to my office, you wrote, “Recruiters are Traitors.” Please explain this one. How exactly am I a traitor? Was I a traitor when I joined the Marine Corps all those years ago? Is every Marine, therefore, a traitor? Was I a traitor during my two stints in Iraq? Was I a traitor when I was delivering humanitarian aid to the victims of the tsunami in Sumatra? Or do you only consider me a traitor while I am on this job? The fact is, recruitment is and always has been a part of maintaining any military organization. In fact, recruitment is a necessity of any large organization. Large corporations have employees that recruit full-time. Even you, I’m sure, must expend some effort to recruit for Code Pink. So what, exactly, is it that makes me a traitor?
The fact is this: any independent nation must maintain a military (or be allied with those who do) to ensure the safety and security of its citizens. Regardless of what your opinions are of the current administration or the current conflict in Iraq, the U.S. military will be needed again in the future. If your counter-recruitment efforts are ultimately successful, who will defend us if we are directly attacked again as we were at Pearl Harbor? Who would respond if a future terrorist attack targets the Golden Gate Bridge, the BART system, or the UC Berkeley clock tower? And, to address the most hypocritical stance that your organization takes on its website, where would the peace keeping force come from that you advocate sending to Darfur?
Finally, I believe that your efforts in protesting my office are misdirected. I agree that your stated goals of peace and social justice are worthy ones. War is a terrible thing that should only be undertaken in the most dire, extreme, and necessary of circumstances. However, war is made by politicians. The conflict in Iraq was ordered by the president and authorized by Congress. They are the ones who have the power to change the policy in Iraq, not members of the military. We execute policy to the best of our ability and to the best of our human capacity. Protesting in front of my office may be an easy way to get your organization in the headlines of local papers, but it doesn’t further any of your stated goals.
To conclude, I don’t consider myself a “recruiter.” I am a Marine who happens to be on recruiting duty. As such, I conduct myself in accordance with our core values of honor, courage, and commitment. I will never sacrifice my honor by lying to anyone that walks into my office. I will never forsake the courage that it takes to restrain myself in the face of insulting and libelous labels like liar and traitor. And, most importantly, I will never waver from my commitment to helping individuals who desire to serve their country as officers in the Marine Corps.
Captain Richard Lund is the United States Marine Corps’ officer selection officer for the northern Bay Area.
-
stratfor:
IRAQ: Shiite Islamist parties are forcing Iraqis in the country's South to adhere to strict Islamic rules and are using armed militias to spread fear, Reuters reported, citing four unnamed tribal Shiite leaders.
========
Could this lay the foundation a dynamic similar to what happened to AQ in Anbar?
-
Geopolitical Diary: The Iranian Goal of Sunni-Shiite Relations in Iraq
Ammar al-Hakim, the son of the leader of Iraq's most powerful and pro-Iranian Shiite party, visited the Sunni province of Anbar on Oct. 14. Al-Hakim, who is being groomed to succeed Abdel Aziz al-Hakim as head of the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (SIIC), met with Ahmed Abu Risha, who leads the anti-jihadist Sunni tribal force, the Anbar Salvation Council.
In an Eid prayer sermon Oct. 13, the younger al-Hakim called for the complete withdrawal of foreign troops from Iraq and rejected the possibility of permanent foreign (read U.S.) military bases, stressing the need for the creation of autonomous regions there. These comments and the visit to the Sunni heartland occurred a few days after the ailing senior al-Hakim returned from a long stay in Iran.
The SIIC and its Iranian patrons are the architects of the call for the creation of the self-governing Shiite region in southern Iraq, which they have been pushing for several years. What is new, however, is the rejection of bases, which fits with Iranian plans to fill the vacuum created by a withdrawal of U.S. forces. It should be noted that this call is not coming from the maverick Muqtada al-Sadr, but from the Shiite establishment and the party that also happens to be the main working partner of the United States.
Even more significant is the visit to Sunni central Iraq and the meeting with a Sunni group that is aligned with the United States in the fight against al Qaeda and its jihadist allies. The Iranians and their Iraqi Shiite proxies abhor U.S. dealings with the Sunni forces independent of Baghdad and have long demanded that Washington try stabilizing Iraq as part of a broad comprehensive arrangement with Tehran.
But from the U.S. viewpoint, its relationship with certain elements among Iraq's Sunni community is beneficial. First, it allows Washington to undercut the Sunni insurgency, especially its jihadist component. Second and more important, a relationship with the Sunnis could help the United States counter Iranian influence in Iraq.
The Iranians realize this but thus far have lacked the means to counteract U.S. moves, largely because they lack a liaison within the Sunni community with which they could establish a working relationship. Al-Hakim's meeting with the Sunni tribal chieftain indicates that Iran might have finally found a way to get around the problem.
Abu Risha's council and the Shia both view the jihadists as their enemy, which could become a good starting point for a future relationship. The Sunni tribal force also is competing with fellow Sunni political, religious and insurgent groups, which further works to the advantage of the Iranians since it could allow Tehran to divide the Sunni community in order to contain the Baathists, whom the Shia and Iranians view as the real threat among the Sunnis. However, a successful Sunni-Shiite relationship would be hard for Iran to achieve for numerous reasons -- the ethnic and sectarian divide in Iraq being one of the biggest obstacles to overcome.
Forging ties with certain Sunnis certainly has its long-term advantages for the Shia regarding their ability to maintain their domination in Baghdad. But more immediate is the Iranian need to counter U.S. moves to undercut its influence in Iraq. Sunnis closely aligned with the United States and open to working with pro-Iranian Shia could go a long way in helping the Persian ayatollahs achieve this objective.
stratfor
-
1133 GMT -- IRAQ -- The Iraqi government plans to award $1.1 billion in contracts to Iranian and Chinese companies to build two power plants in the country, The New York Times reported Oct. 18, citing Iraqi Electricity Minister Karim Wahid. He said the Iranian project would be built in Baghdad's Sadr City area and the Chinese project would be built in Wasit. Iran also has agreed to provide cheap electricity from its own grid to southern Iraq, and to build a large power plant essentially free of charge in an area between the two southern Shiite holy cities of Karbala and An Najaf, the Times reported.
Stratfor
-
Iraq: The Latest Turkish Incursion
Reports of a Turkish military operation in northern Iraq emerged Oct. 24. Supposedly, between Oct. 21 and Oct. 23, some 300 Turkish troops moved as far as six miles into Iraq before withdrawing while artillery and airstrikes were conducted. Sources in Turkey have said that more than 30 Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) fighters were killed.
For weeks, Turkey has been positioning itself for a major incursion into northern Iraq to confront the PKK, which has been using the area as a safe-haven from which to operate. Indeed, Turkish special forces already operate extensively in northern Iraq, and cross-border shelling is hardly uncommon. But the last several days appear to have included overt strikes inside Iraq by F-16s (reportedly flying out of Diyarbakir, a major eastern Turkish air base) and AH-1 Cobra attack helicopters, as well as at least one incident of "hot pursuit" by uniformed Turkish forces following PKK fighters across the border.
Tensions spiked Oct. 21, when the PKK killed 12 Turkish soldiers in an attack inside Turkey; the PKK reportedly has captured more Turkish troops since. The recent operation could have been a reprisal for that attack or an attempt to rescue captured soldiers. But the operation Ankara is preparing for is far larger in scale and scope. Historically, these operations have involved as many as 50,000 troops and lasted more than a month. (Though past major operations were concluded by this time of year; winter is fast approaching in the mountainous border region, and the optimal weather for an extensive incursion has passed.)
Meanwhile, the public revelation of this most recent incursion was quickly followed by an official statement from the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) requesting restraint from both Ankara and the PKK. KRG President Massoud Barzani for the first time called on the PKK to end its rebellion, and Iraqi President Jalal Talabani indicated he is willing to hand over PKK fighters to Turkey. Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan visited Baghdad at the same time Washington implied that it might be willing to strike at the PKK militarily -- a noteworthy confluence of events.
The KRG has its own issues with Ankara, as well as with Baghdad, where the fate of Kirkuk and the oil issue still hang in the balance. Ongoing internal Kurdish rivalries will rage. Turkish military positioning, including the expansion of buffer zones -- at least inside Turkey proper -- will continue.
For Turkey especially, a momentary resolution on the PKK issue does not solve the underlying issue of the strongest Kurdish presence it has ever seen -- one with an autonomy Ankara opposes not only in Turkey (where half the Kurdish population lives) but also in Iraq, Iran or elsewhere. The PKK offers the proximate cause and the justification, but Turkey is likely also now repositioning its forces to confront the long-term reality of a semiautonomous Kurdish state on its border.
stratfor
-
WSJ
Oh, the Humanity!
A report from the Integrated Regional Information Networks of the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs brings what sounds like good news from Baghdad:
Iraqis are breathing a sigh of relief as violence in their war-torn country is ebbing and the number of violence-related victims has dropped sharply since the beginning of this year, according to statistics compiled by the country's interior, defence and health ministries.
"Violence-related deaths in September dropped remarkably to levels not seen in more than a year as the number [of violence-related deaths] stood at 290 while in September 2006 the number was about 1,400," Adel Muhsin, the health ministry's inspector-general, told IRIN in a phone interview.
But relief from violence is not without cost, IRIN notes:
Taxi driver Ahmed Khalil Baqir used to station himself outside Baghdad's main morgue, waiting for grieving families who went there to claim their relatives' dead bodies.
"I was totally dependent on them for my living," Baqir, a 44-year-old father of four, said." I never thought about picking up people in the street as I was being hired five to eight times a day by these families. But now it is a waste of time to wait there and these days I wait only for about three hours in the morning and I continue my work picking up passengers in the street."
And to make matters worse, he has to face competition from all those out-of-work hearse drivers.
Translate This
From NBC News:
In a development experts call a significant shift, Iraqi insurgent groups are speaking out against al-Qaida and its brutally violent tactics.
Last week, two groups, Asaeb al-Iraq al-Jihadiya (aka "the Iraqi Jihad Union") and a splinter faction of the 1920 Revolution Brigades called "Hamas in Iraq" issued statements accusing al-Qaida's Iraq wing, al-Qaida in Iraq, of brutally killing their fighters and commanders, as well as women and children.
We'd love to see what the New York Times's editors would do to that second paragraph.
It's About the Children!
-
On the other hand , , , This from the WSJ:
Fighting Within Sects
Complicates U.S. Iraq Plans
Partition Strategy
Falters as Militias
Jockey for Influence
By YOCHI J. DREAZEN
October 25, 2007; Page A12
BAGHDAD -- While fighting between Iraq's Sunnis and Shiites has begun to ebb, fighting within the sects has increased, as rival groups jockey for power, influence and money.
The trend may complicate efforts to promote a partition of the country along sectarian lines, an idea gaining traction among U.S. lawmakers seeking a politically palatable exit strategy.
THE ENEMY WITHIN
• The Shift: The violence in Iraq is changing from a low-grade civil war between Shiites and Sunnis to internecine fighting within each community.
• The Background: Rival groups, likened by one U.S. commander to organized-crime families, are battling for power, influence, and money. Some U.S. commanders believe the groups are jockeying to be in dominant positions if Iraq is partitioned into three homogenous ministates.
• What's Next: U.S. military commanders are trying to decide whether to intervene in the fighting, a move that could boost the forces friendliest to American interests but also runs the risk of inflaming the Iraqi population.Proponents, such as Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Joseph Biden (D., Del.), say they believe that creating ministates populated exclusively by Shiites, Sunnis or Kurds offers the best chance of gradually pacifying Iraq. Late last month, the Senate overwhelmingly endorsed a nonbinding partition plan.
But the internecine strife suggests that dividing the country into three autonomous regions might present new problems, as armed groups within each sectarian community pursue control over their newly created ministates.
"People think that all of the violence in Iraq is Sunni on Shia or Shia on Sunni, but it's not," said Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch, who commands the army's Third Infantry Division, in an interview in Iraq last month. "It's guys from the same communities fighting each other for power, money and influence."
Gen. Lynch likens the strife to the fights among organized-crime families. "I tell my guys, the best way they can prepare before they come out here is to watch 'The Sopranos,'" he said, referring to the popular U.S. television mob drama.
U.S. commanders also stress that sectarian violence continues in areas such as in the ethnically mixed neighborhoods of Baghdad and other major cities.
Iraq's overall level of bloodshed has been steadily declining, in part because of the U.S. "surge" policy of sending more U.S. troops into the country. The number of Americans killed in Iraq fell from 84 in August to 63 in September and, according to the Iraqi government, Iraqi civilian fatalities fell by nearly half. Twenty-nine U.S. soldiers had been killed in October, as of yesterday.
Another reason for the drop, U.S. commanders suggested, stems from the evolving nature of the fighting here. They said the conflict was beginning to shift from open warfare between Shiite and Sunni militias -- which often targeted civilians from the other sect -- to battles within the communities themselves. That has resulted in fewer casualties.
FIGHT FOR IRAQ
See continuing coverage of developments in Iraq, including an interactive map of day-to-day events in Iraq and a tally of military deaths.Several U.S. commanders based in different parts of Iraq said they saw the internecine violence as a sign that Iraq's major sects were preparing for when, in the near future, they are expected to work out a viable power-sharing arrangement for the country.
The commanders said rival players within each sect were jockeying now to ensure that they are seen as spokesmen for their community in any future negotiations.
"These internal struggles are all about securing your position relative to the other guys," Lt. Col. David Oclander, executive officer of the 82nd Airborne Division's 2nd Brigade Combat Team, said last month.
The intrasectarian violence has been particularly acute in Shiite areas of Baghdad and oil-rich southern Iraq, where cleric Muqtada al Sadr's Mahdi Army and Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council leader Abdul-Aziz al Hakim's Badr Corps have been battling over oil, smuggling routes and patronage jobs.
"For a guy like Sadr, the goal is to maneuver and maneuver so that when things begin to shake themselves out, he can say, 'I speak for the Shia,'" said Col. Oclander.
In the past two months, the Shiite governors of Muthanna and Qadariyah provinces, both loyal to Mr. Hakim, were assassinated in attacks attributed to fighters loyal to Mr. Sadr. Gun battles between the two militias left more than 50 dead during a Shiite pilgrimage in Karbala.
Messrs. Sadr and Hakim issued a joint declaration in early October calling for a cease-fire between their groups. But Mr. Sadr has struggled to control his militia in the past, and several U.S. commanders said they were unsure whether the agreement would endure.
The struggle between the competing Shiite factions is posing policy dilemmas for U.S. commanders. They are trying to decide whether to back Mr. Hakim's fighters, who are seen as being relatively more friendly to U.S. interests in the country, or whether it would be too dangerous to intervene.
In Sunni areas, the U.S. is already involved, funneling money and other supplies to Sunni tribal militias that have been battling al Qaeda in Iraq and other Sunni religious militants. Commanders said these alliances have contributed to a steep decline in violence in once-restive parts of Iraq, such as Anbar Province.
U.S. commanders hope to build similar relationships with Shiite tribal leaders. U.S. officers said growing numbers of Shiite sheiks, alarmed by Mr. Sadr's radicalism and the continuing intra-Shiite bloodshed, are beginning to share intelligence tips and discuss more formal alliances with the U.S forces.
Many U.S. commanders remain divided over whether to intervene directly in the infighting between the Mahdi Army and the Badr Corps, given the possibility that such a move could inflame large portions of Iraq's Shiite majority.
In an interview last month, Lt. Col. Peter Andrysiak, then-deputy commander of the 1st Cavalry Division's 1st Brigade Combat Team, said the U.S. "can and should" support the Badr Corps in its fight with the Mahdi Army. He argued that Mr. Hakim's militia is broadly supportive of the Iraqi government while Mr. Sadr's forces aren't.
"Badr is reconcilable, and we can win them over. JAM is not," he said, using the military's acronym for the Arabic name of Mr. Sadr's forces, the Jaish al-Mahdi.
Other senior officers disagreed. "It's a dangerous thought process, once you start down that path," Gen. Lynch said.
Write to Yochi J. Dreazen at yochi.dreazen@wsj.com
-
The Middle East War thread today has analysis on the Kurds, US, and Turkey. This NY Times piece focuses on the Kurds.
=======
By SABRINA TAVERNISE
Published: October 29, 2007
RANIYA, Iraq, Oct. 27 — A low-slung concrete building off a steep mountain road marks the beginning of rebel territory in this remote corner of northern Iraq. The fighters based here, Kurdish militants fighting Turkey, fly their own flag, and despite urgent international calls to curb them, they operate freely, receiving supplies in beat-up pickup trucks less than 10 miles from a government checkpoint.
Skip to next paragraph
The New York Times
Multimedia
Map
Hiding in Rugged Terrain
Related
Turkey Attacks Kurdish Rebel Positions (October 29, 2007)
Petraeus Says U.S. Seeking Calm in North (October 29, 2007) “Our condition is good,” said one fighter, putting a heaping spoonful of sugar into his steaming tea. “How about yours?” A giant face of the rebels’ leader — Abdullah Ocalan, now in a Turkish prison — has been painted on a nearby slope.
The rebel group, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or P.K.K., is at the center of a crisis between Turkey and Iraq that began when the group’s fighters killed 12 Turkish soldiers on Oct. 21, prompting Turkey, a NATO member, to threaten an invasion.
But the P.K.K. continues to operate casually here, in full view of Iraqi authorities. The P.K.K.’s impunity is rooted in the complex web of relationships and ambitions that began with the American-led invasion of Iraq more than four years ago, and has frustrated others with an interest in resolving the crisis — the Turks, Iraqis and the Bush administration.
The United States responded to the P.K.K. raid by putting intense pressure on Iraq’s Kurdish leaders who control the northern area where the rebels hide, with a senior State Department official delivering a rare rebuke last week over their “lack of action” in curbing the P.K.K.
But even with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice scheduled to visit Istanbul this week, Kurdish political leaders seemed in no hurry to act.
An all-out battle is out of the question, they argue, because the rugged terrain makes it impossible to dislodge them.
“Closing the camps means war and fighting,” said Azad Jindyany, a senior Kurdish official in Sulaimaniya, a regional capital. “We don’t have the army to do that. We did it in the past, and we failed.”
But even logistical flows remain uninterrupted, despite the fact that Iraqi Kurdish leaders have some of the most precise and extensive intelligence networks in the country. As the war has worsened, the United States has come to depend increasingly on the Kurds as partners in running Iraq and as overseers of the one part of the country where some of their original aspirations are actually being met.
Iraqi Kurdish officials, for their part, appear to be politely ignoring American calls for action, saying the only serious solution is political, not military. They have taken their own path, allowing the guerrillas to exist on their territory, while at the same time quietly trying to persuade them to stop attacks.
“They have allowed the P.K.K. to be up there,” said Mark Parris, a former American ambassador to Turkey who is now at the Brookings Institution. “That couldn’t have happened without their permitting them to be there. That’s their turf. It’s as simple as that.”
The situation poses a puzzle to the United States, which badly wants to avert a new front in the war, but finds itself forced to choose between two trusted allies — Turkey, a NATO member whose territory is the transit area for most of its air cargo to Iraq, and the Kurds, their closest partners in Iraq.
The United States “is like a man with two wives,” said one Iraqi Kurd in Sulaimaniya. “They quarrel, but he doesn’t want to lose either of them.”
Kurds are one of the world’s largest ethnic groups without a state, numbering more than 25 million, spread across Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria.
Most live in Turkey, which has curtailed their rights, fearing secession. The P.K.K. wants an autonomous Kurdish area in eastern Turkey, and has repeatedly attacked the Turkish military, and sometimes the civilian population, since the 1980s, in a conflict that has left more than 30,000 dead.
In this small town a short drive from the edge of rebel territory, and in Sulaimaniya, 55 miles to the south, it is business as usual. A political party affiliated with the rebel group is open and holding meetings. Pickup trucks zip in and out of the group’s territory, and a government checkpoint a short drive away from the area acts as a friendly tour guide. Its soldiers said they had waved through eight cars of journalists on one day last week.
Mala Bakhtyar, a senior member in the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, the party that governs this northeastern region, said there had been no explicit orders from Baghdad to limit the P.K.K., and scoffed at last week’s statement by the Iraqi prime minister, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, that Iraq would close the P.K.K.’s offices, saying they had already been shut long ago.
“They are guests, but they are making their living by themselves,” Mr. Bakhtyar said. “We don’t support them.”
He added: “We don’t agree with them. We don’t like to make a fight with Turkey.”
--------------
Fayeq Mohamed Goppy, a leader in the Kurdistan Democratic Solution Party, an offshoot of the P.K.K. that still operates freely, argues that Iraqi Kurdish leaders are only paying lip service to wanting the P.K.K. to leave. In reality, the politicians want the separatists around as protection against Sunni Arab extremists, who most Iraqi Kurds believe will move in if the P.K.K. leaves the mountains.
Skip to next paragraph
Multimedia
Map
Hiding in Rugged Terrain
Related
Turkey Attacks Kurdish Rebel Positions (October 29, 2007)
Petraeus Says U.S. Seeking Calm in North (October 29, 2007) Noshirwan Mustafa, a prominent Kurdish leader, said the area was as impenetrable as the mountains in Pakistan where leaders of Al Qaeda and the Taliban are thought to be hiding. “For me, the P.K.K. is better than the Taliban,” he said.
Local Kurdish authorities have asked Mr. Goppy to keep a low profile, including canceling a planned conference in Erbil, he said, but otherwise have not limited his activities.
“They really don’t want P.K.K. to go,” he said in an interview in his home in Sulaimaniya. If the group is eliminated, the Iraqi Kurdish area “is a really small piece for eating, very easy to swallow.”
Mr. Parris argues that the Kurdish leader of northern Iraq, Massoud Barzani, ever astute, is holding onto the P.K.K. as a future bargaining chip with Turkey, and will not use it until he absolutely has to.
“The single most important piece of negotiating capital may very well be his ability to take care of the P.K.K.,” he said.
Mr. Jindyany said local authorities would be happy to get rid of them if they could, calling the situation a sword of Damocles for Iraqi Kurds.
Throughout its history in northern Iraq, which dates back to the early 1980s, under an agreement with Mr. Barzani, the P.K.K. has had contentious relations with Iraqi Kurdish leaders. It fought in their civil wars, against Mr. Barzani in 1997, and three years later, against Jalal Talabani, a powerful Kurd who is now the president of Iraq.
But since the American invasion in 2003, the political landscape has changed. Iraqi Kurds, emboldened by their secure position, have stopped fighting each other and turned their attentions to other threats like Turkey, a state that has long oppressed its Kurdish population, and Islamic extremism from Baghdad.
This area of northern Iraq, which Iraqis call Kurdistan, in some ways eclipsed the P.K.K.’s struggle for an autonomous Kurdish area, Iraqi Kurds said.
“They were jealous of our autonomy,” said Goran Kader, a Communist Party leader in Sulaimaniya. “They wanted to do the same thing in Turkey.”
At the same time, the P.K.K. was reorganizing, after its leader, Mr. Ocalan, was captured in 1999, and a skilled group of military commanders took over day-to-day operations, said Aliza Marcus, the author of “Blood and Belief: The P.K.K. and the Kurdish Fight for Independence.”
The commanders were intent on military escalation, she said, and stepped up attacks, under Mr. Ocalan’s jailhouse orders, in part to remain relevant.
“They don’t want to be sidelined,” Ms. Marcus said. “That’s really what’s driven them since 2004,” when attacks resumed after a five-year cease-fire. “They want to say, ‘Turkish Kurds are important too — don’t think the Kurdish problem has been solved.’ ”
The ambush of Turkish soldiers on Oct. 21, which took place just a few miles from the Iraqi border, served the purpose perfectly.
Public sympathy in Raniya and Sulaimaniya is enormous, and the fighters procure supplies and health care here with ease. Fighters do not go to hospitals, for fear of standing out — the ones from Turkey speak a different Kurdish dialect — but are treated in doctors’ homes, said one former fighter, an Iraqi Kurd who was recruited at age 14.
“Their organization is everywhere,” said the fighter, who now works as a police officer for the main political party, after surrendering to local authorities in 2003. “Their members are everywhere.”
To Iraqi Kurds, Turkey’s approach is pure politics. There is no military solution to the problem of the P.K.K., they say, because the terrain would never permit victory, and Turkey’s leaders know that.
The solution, Mr. Mustafa argued, lies with moderates in Turkey, who must push for an amnesty for the rebels. Militant Kurds, for their part, should take advantage of the political opening in Turkey — 20 Kurdish deputies are now serving in Parliament there.
“When you have the door to the Parliament open, why are you going to the caves?” he said.
To that aim, talks were held with intermediaries for the P.K.K., Mr. Bakhtyar said. Since then, the rebels have not attacked, and officials and security analysts say that if the quiet holds until Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, meets with Ms. Rice on Friday and with President Bush three days later, he might not be pressured into military action.
“Soon there will be snow,” Mr. Kader said. “The roads will be blocked. That will be that until next year.”
-
U.S.: U.S. State Department investigators have offered immunity deals to the Blackwater security guards who were involved in a Sept. 16 shootout in Baghdad, Agence France-Presse reported, citing The New York Times and The Washington Post. The State Department officials reportedly do not have the authority to grant immunity, and the FBI officials who took over the investigation of Blackwater cannot use information obtained by the State Department to prosecute the guards.
IRAQ, U.S.: A delegation of Iraqi tribal leaders plans to visit Washington to propose to U.S. officials that former officers from the disbanded Iraqi army be reinstated, IraqSlogger.com reported, citing Al-Malaf Press. Tribal leader Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha reportedly said the delegation will discuss ways to help Iraqi security forces become self-sufficient and face foreign challenges. He added that former Iraqi army officers can offer expertise in defending Iraq's borders.
IRAQ: The Iraqi Cabinet approved a draft law to end foreign security contractors' immunity from prosecution. The bill follows the Blackwater shooting incident on Sept. 16, when 17 Iraqis were killed, though the U.S. firm has said its guards acted lawfully. The legislation places foreign firms and those they employ under Iraqi law, an Iraqi government spokesman told Reuters. It also suggests requiring foreign security firms to register and apply for licenses to work in Iraq and proposes that all guards have weapons permits. Under the law, contractors with identity cards from the U.S. Defense Department would have to apply for entry visas. Further, it has been proposed that guards and the convoys they protect be subject to searches at Iraqi security checkpoints.
stratfor
-
Iraq, U.S.: A Sunni Signal to Iran
October 30, 2007 17 44 GMT
A delegation of Iraq's anti-jihadist Sunni tribal sheikhs is planning to visit Washington to meet with senior officials including U.S. President George W. Bush, Iraq's Al Malaf news agency reported Oct. 30. The tribal chiefs will discuss, among other issues, ways of improving security. They also will propose the reinstatement of high-ranking Iraqi officers from the disbanded army of the ousted Baathist regime. Ahmed Abu Risha, the head of the Anbar-based Iraq Awakening Movement, said he will call on the Bush administration "to support the Iraqi security forces to become self-sufficient in addressing any foreign challenge, and to stamp out the intelligence role that neighboring countries, and its (sic) influence on the security and political situation in Iraq." The report adds that the idea was to benefit from the accumulated battlefield expertise of the former officers' expertise in defending the borders of Iraq from external forces.
Considering that these are Sunni tribal elements with ties to the now-defunct Baath Party, the unnamed foreign power with whom they have experience fighting is Iran. These Sunni elements have despised the takeover of the country's security and intelligence apparatus by Iraqi Shia and their Iranian patrons. Abu Risha and his allies are trying to take advantage of the recent rise in U.S.-Iranian tensions over Iraq and align with Washington in the Sunni bid to combat Iranian domination of Iraq. Conversely, the United States also benefits immensely from the move because it signals to the Iranians that they either cut a deal with the United States instead of aligning with Russia or face the prospect of the revival of the Baathist military structure -- the only force capable of mucking up Iranian plans to dominate Iraq.
We fully expect the Iranians will get the message, and that they will be more than a little concerned. But we do not expect them to yield on the issue. Instead, they probably will try to counter the U.S. moves. This will manifest itself as the Iraqi Shia backing away from the review of the de-Baathification law. The Iranians want in on all U.S.-Sunni dealings, but they are not going to come to the table easily.
stratfor
-
In Baghdad Neighborhood,
A Tale of Shifting Fortunes
By PHILIP SHISHKIN
October 31, 2007; Page A1
BAGHDAD -- In many neighborhoods across the Iraqi capital, Shiite Muslims have defeated their Sunni cousins in the civil war that's raged here over the past two years.
Shiites, marginalized under Saddam Hussein, have been able to seize real estate, businesses and municipal services from Sunnis. A mafia-like network of Shiite militias has engineered the takeover of entire neighborhoods. Of the 51 members on Baghdad's City Council, only one is Sunni; the police are almost entirely Shia.
Riyad Obaidi, center, standing next to policeman in blue cap, in Sayidia.
The central government here says the violence is winding down, and the U.S. military points out that civilian deaths have declined recently. But a new, quieter chapter of the civil war is unfolding. Shiite groups are trying to consolidate their on-the-ground gains and push into neighborhoods that have so far eluded their control. The Sunnis, pressed into a corner, are looking for new ways to fight back. In some cases, they've joined their former American enemies as allies.
Nowhere is this dynamic more evident than in the city's Sayidia section, a majority-Sunni enclave where Sunnis and Shiites had lived in relative peace. While other pockets of Sunni resistance remain, this district of 30,000 has emerged as the biggest theater in the battle against Shiite militants.
In February, a white sedan swerved and flipped over in front of Riyad Obaidi's home in Sayidia. The passengers clambered out and ran. Hearing a tapping sound, Mr. Obaidi approached the car and opened the trunk. A hog-tied and terrified elderly Sunni man tumbled out.
Shiite gunmen had just killed the man's son, the captive said, and packed the father off for a bumpy ride to an almost-certain death. Mr. Obaidi, a Sunni himself, had just fled to Sayidia after Shiite militias overran his old neighborhood. Shocked by the man's story, he decided to join a local band of Sunni fighters.
"When Sunnis were displaced from other areas, Sayidia became the most important place for us," he says.
Shiite forces now control more than half of Baghdad's neighborhoods. Shiite Arabs comprise roughly 60% of Iraq's total population; the remaining 40% are split between Sunni Arabs and Kurds, plus a few smaller minority groups.
Under Saddam Hussein, Sayidia, almost 70% Sunni, was home to many ranking military officers and educated elite. Well-off professionals lived here, too. Its shopping streets were among the best in the capital. "You used to see castles, not just houses, with swimming pools. It was a very rich area," says Abu Ibrahim, a dentist who used to live there.
Karim Obaidi, Riyad Obaidi's brother and a colonel in Mr. Hussein's air force, remembers the 2003 fall of Baghdad with remorse. "It was the first time in my life that I cried," Karim recalls. The Americans disbanded the Iraqi army, and the veteran fighter pilot took off his uniform, came back home to Sayidia and joined the anti-American resistance.
Other unemployed military officers from the area joined the insurgency, but the neighborhood itself remained relatively peaceful. Sayidia still held traces of its old affluence as late as last October. Shops were open, people were trimming hedges in front of their homes, and trash was collected on time.
But all around the district, other neighborhoods were falling under the sway of Shiite militants. The broader municipal area that includes Sayidia, known as West Rashid, is home to some 800,000 residents, or about one-fifth of Baghdad's total population. American officers stationed here have watched as Shiite militias made steady inroads. "Within West Rashid, the Shia have gained a lot of neighborhoods that weren't Shia in 2003," says U.S. Army Maj. John Cross.
Reconciliation is crucial to making Iraq a functioning state -- and a key condition for the eventual withdrawal of U.S. troops. But as Baghdad's few mixed areas yield to Shiite forces, that goal becomes harder to achieve. "If communities and their leaders can come together in mixed neighborhoods and hammer out some understandings, that's critical," says Ryan Crocker, the U.S. ambassador to Iraq.
Riyad Obaidi used to manage some 200 small shops in a mixed neighborhood next to Sayidia. Shopkeepers paid him rent. But when his leases came up for renewal, local Shiite militants muscled him out and told him to leave the area, he says. Around the same time, another Obaidi brother who ran a parking lot nearby was strangled with a rubber cord. Mr. Obaidi got the message and fled to Sayidia, where his brother, the colonel, lived. It was fast becoming the only safe haven for Sunnis in West Rashid.
Things weren't that way for long. Shiite militants started infiltrating Sayidia from adjacent areas under their control. According to U.S. military officials, their movements were often aided by the Shiite-dominated Iraqi police. "We were surrounded," says Omar Mohammed, a local Sunni resident.
Late last year, the Iraqi police started setting up a maze of checkpoints throughout Sayidia. Shiite militants would often be lurking nearby. Reports of kidnappings of Sunnis in the vicinity of checkpoints started piling up in the spring, according to U.S. officers and local Sunni activists.
In one recent incident, plainclothes gunmen ambushed a car carrying two Sunni political activists after police pulled them over at a checkpoint. The gunmen shot at the ground and then aimed their fire at the two Sunnis, according to an American account of the incident. The two men managed to get away with minor gunshot wounds.
Gen. Abdul-Karim Khalaf, a spokesman for the Interior Ministry, says the accusations that the police are working with Shiite militants are unsubstantiated. "The police forces represent the government, and the government doesn't support one side against the other," he says.
Shiite forces also targeted basic services in the neighborhood, according to U.S. military officials. Electricity lines were cut. Water delivery became erratic. Trash collectors were murdered.
Sunni shop owners were ordered to close down. Shiite gunmen raided Sunni mosques. Last month, only one of 11 mosques remained open. Sunnis started to leave Sayidia. House rents, once among the highest in Baghdad, plummeted.
But some Sunni residents also started fighting back. Mr. Obaidi, the air force colonel, joined a ragtag Sunni militia that started challenging Shiite gunmen, battling it out with them in the streets. His brother Riyad, shocked by the man he found in the trunk of the car, joined him.
"Almost every night we fought," says Riyad. Gunfire became so frequent and indiscriminate that local resident Abu Hassan observed that fronds of a palm tree in front of his house had become shredded by bullets.
Still, Shiite militants gained ground, and a new band of combatants entered the fray early this year: extremist fighters from al-Qaeda in Iraq, a fundamentalist Sunni group known for slaughtering Shiites. Al-Qaeda fighters trickled into Sayidia through a neighboring enclave called Dora.
Just east of Sayidia, Dora is one of the last exclusively Sunni parts of Baghdad, and it opens out onto Sunni-controlled belts that wind along the outskirts of the Iraqi capital. Dora is home to battle-hardened Sunni militants, and gunfire aimed at American patrols crackles throughout the sprawling district.
Sayidia's desperate Sunnis were initially happy to see the new fighters, hoping they would help fend off the Shiite onslaught. "The Sunnis had no choice but to receive al-Qaeda, because nobody else was protecting them" says Mr. Ibrahim, the Sayidia dentist.
Instead, the Sunni extremists embarked on a simple but brutal strategy: kill any Shiite they could get their hands on. A peaceful Shiite population had always resided in the neighborhood. They were now targets.
Ali al-Ameri, a Shiite, lost two brothers in Sayidia's increasingly chaotic clashes. One worked as a carpenter and was gunned down in his shop. The other went to check on a malfunctioning electricity generator and disappeared. The murder rate in Sayidia went through the roof.
Sayidia's Sunnis, who initially tolerated al-Qaeda, soon realized the group had no interest in protecting them -- only a desire to kill Shiites. Far from being any sort of ally, al-Qaeda was living up to its reputation for inciting violence.
Sayidia's Sunni residents regrouped. Recruited by a major Sunni political party, some 300 Sunni fighters joined an ad-hoc police unit that would provide a counterweight to the neighborhood's Shiite-dominated cops. The Americans patrolling Sayidia, desperate for a solution, went along with the plan. They screened applicants and helped finance the unit, paying between $300 to $450 a month to each volunteer. Both Obaidi brothers passed muster and joined the force.
One morning last month, a dozen Sunni volunteers, including the Obaidi brothers, shared a checkpoint with a regular police unit. The joint watch was tense, with the Shiite police heckling the Sunni outfit. "Make sure you shave your beards, so you look like soldiers, not like men from a mosque," a Shiite officer teased a huddle of Sunni volunteers, most of whom were clean-shaven.
Local Sunnis -- who had grown so terrified of the checkpoints that many procured fake IDs with Shia-sounding names -- were happy to see Sunni volunteers on the streets.
The new Sunni presence enraged Nahil al-Musawi, a prominent Shiite cleric and a member of the Baghdad City Council. He's not originally from Sayidia but chose to rent a house in the neighborhood, and he started leading prayers at a local Shiite mosque.
Mr. al-Musawi and his supporters accused the Sunni volunteers of burning Shia shops and houses, and complained to the central government. The Americans, who closely monitor the new force, say they have no evidence the Sunni guards have done anything improper.
Early this month, the Iraqi government issued an order banning the Sunni battalion from the streets. "It was like a punch in the gut to get that order," says Maj. Cross.
Shiite militants, with their sophisticated roadside bombs, pose as much of a threat to American lives as the most battle-hardened Sunni insurgents.
Under pressure from the Iraqi government, the U.S. is now trying to recruit some Shia volunteers into the force, so that it can be allowed back on the streets. Mr. al-Musawi is insisting that the group include Shiites, not just Sunnis.
But the Americans scored their own small victory. They've repeatedly complained to the Iraqi government that Sayidia's official, Shia-dominated police unit has been harassing local Sunnis. Last month, the government replaced the unit with an Iraqi army battalion. Though also almost exclusively Shia, it is far less sectarian than the old guard, according to local residents and U.S. troops in the area.
Mr. al-Musawi, the Shiite cleric, has pushed the transformation of Sayidia in other ways. In early September, he convened a meeting of what he said were displaced Sayidia residents at the local police headquarters. He told American military officials that his meeting was an attempt at reconciliation between Sunnis and Shiites.
The room that day was filled with over a hundred people. But American officers who attended noticed there were almost no Sunnis in the room, a fact Mr. al-Musawi doesn't deny. A few days later, workmen lifted concrete barriers from an approach road to a residential block in the neighborhood, and two dozen Shiite families who had attended the meeting drove through the breach.
Panic spread among Sunni residents as plainclothes gunmen went door to door, ordering Sunnis to vacate their houses. U.S. officers rushed to the scene. Most of the new Shia arrivals couldn't produce titles to homes they claimed were theirs, so the Americans turned them back.
Fingering red prayer beads on a recent day, the black-turbaned Mr. al-Musawi says that Sayidia had always been a majority-Shia area. "Most people who suffered in Sayidia are Shia," he says.
Write to Philip Shishkin at philip.shishkin@wsj.com
-
A long and thoughtful piece from Col. Ralph Peters
http://armedforcesjournal.com/2007/10/3026423
-
Inspiring!
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/wp/thanks-and-praise.htm
-
OMG! :wink: This from the NY Times-- I bet it hurt them to have to write it:
===========
BAGHDAD, Nov. 19 — Five months ago, Suhaila al-Aasan lived in an oxygen tank factory with her husband and two sons, convinced that they would never go back to their apartment in Dora, a middle-class neighborhood in southern Baghdad.
Today she is home again, cooking by a sunlit window, sleeping beneath her favorite wedding picture. And yet, she and her family are remarkably alone. The half-dozen other apartments in her building echo with emptiness and, on most days, Iraqi soldiers are the only neighbors she sees.
“I feel happy,” she said, standing in her bedroom, between a flowered bedspread and a bullet hole in the wall. “But my happiness is not complete. We need more people to come back. We need more people to feel safe.”
Mrs. Aasan, 45, a Shiite librarian with an easy laugh, is living at the far end of Baghdad’s tentative recovery. She is one of many Iraqis who in recent weeks have begun to test where they can go and what they can do when fear no longer controls their every move.
The security improvements in most neighborhoods are real. Days now pass without a car bomb, after a high of 44 in the city in February. The number of bodies appearing on Baghdad’s streets has plummeted to about 5 a day, from as many as 35 eight months ago, and suicide bombings across Iraq fell to 16 in October, half the number of last summer and down sharply from a recent peak of 59 in March, the American military says.
As a result, for the first time in nearly two years, people are moving with freedom around much of this city. In more than 50 interviews across Baghdad, it became clear that while there were still no-go zones, more Iraqis now drive between Sunni and Shiite areas for work, shopping or school, a few even after dark. In the most stable neighborhoods of Baghdad, some secular women are also dressing as they wish. Wedding bands are playing in public again, and at a handful of once shuttered liquor stores customers now line up outside in a collective rebuke to religious vigilantes from the Shiite Mahdi Army.
Iraqis are clearly surprised and relieved to see commerce and movement finally increase, five months after an extra 30,000 American troops arrived in the country. But the depth and sustainability of the changes remain open to question.
By one revealing measure of security — whether people who fled their home have returned — the gains are still limited. About 20,000 Iraqis have gone back to their Baghdad homes, a fraction of the more than 4 million who fled nationwide, and the 1.4 million people in Baghdad who are still internally displaced, according to a recent Iraqi Red Crescent Society survey.
Iraqis sound uncertain about the future, but defiantly optimistic. Many Baghdad residents seem to be willing themselves to normalcy, ignoring risks and suppressing fears to reclaim their lives. Pushing past boundaries of sect and neighborhood, they said they were often pleasantly surprised and kept going; in other instances, traumatic memories or a dark look from a stranger were enough to tug them back behind closed doors.
Mrs. Aasan’s experience, as a member of the brave minority of Iraqis who have returned home, shows both the extent of the improvements and their limits.
She works at an oasis of calm: a small library in eastern Baghdad, where on several recent afternoons, about a dozen children bounced through the rooms, reading, laughing, learning English and playing music on a Yamaha keyboard.
Brightly colored artwork hangs on the walls: images of gardens, green and lush; Iraqi soldiers smiling; and Arabs holding hands with Kurds.
It is all deliberately idyllic. Mrs. Aasan and the other two women at the library have banned violent images, guiding the children toward portraits of hope. The children are also not allowed to discuss the violence they have witnessed.
“Our aim is to fight terrorism,” Mrs. Aasan said. “We want them to overcome their personal experiences.”
The library closed last year because parents would not let their children out of sight. Now, most of the children walk on their own from homes nearby — another sign of the city’s improved ease of movement.
But there are scars in the voice of a ponytailed little girl who said she had less time for fun since her father was incapacitated by a bomb. (“We try to make him feel better and feel less pain,” she said.) And pain still lingers in the silence of Mrs. Aasan’s 10-year-old son, Abather, who accompanies her wherever she goes.
==========
Page 2 of 2)
One day five months ago, when they still lived in Dora, Mrs. Aasan sent Abather to get water from a tank below their apartment. Delaying as boys will do, he followed his soccer ball into the street, where he discovered two dead bodies with their eyeballs torn out. It was not the first corpse he had seen, but for Mrs. Aasan that was enough. “I grabbed him, we got in the car and we drove away,” she said.
After they heard on an Iraqi news program that her section of Dora had improved, she and her husband explored a potential return. They visited and found little damage, except for a bullet hole in their microwave.
Two weeks ago, they moved back to the neighborhood where they had lived since 2003.
“It’s just a rental,” Mrs. Aasan said, as if embarrassed at her connection to such a humble place. “But after all, it’s home.”
In interviews, she and her husband said they felt emboldened by the decline in violence citywide and the visible presence of Iraqi soldiers at a checkpoint a few blocks away.
Still, it was a brave decision, one her immediate neighbors have not yet felt bold enough to make. Mrs. Aasan’s portion of Dora still looks as desolate as a condemned tenement. The trunk of a palm tree covers a section of road where Sunni gunmen once dumped a severed head, and about 200 yards to the right of her building concrete Jersey barriers block a section of homes believed to be booby-trapped with explosives.
“On this street,” she said, standing on her balcony, “many of my neighbors lost relatives.” Then she rushed inside.
Her husband, Fadhel A. Yassen, 49, explained that they had seen several friends killed while they sat outside in the past. He insisted that being back in the apartment was “a victory over fear, a victory over terrorism.”
Yet the achievement remains rare. Many Iraqis say they would still rather leave the country than go home. In Baghdad there are far more families like the Nidhals. The father, who would only identify himself as Abu Nebras (father of Nebras), is Sunni; Hanan, his wife, is a Shiite from Najaf, the center of Shiite religious learning in Iraq. They lived for 17 years in Ghazaliya in western Baghdad until four gunmen from Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, the homegrown Sunni extremist group that American intelligence agencies say is led by foreigners, showed up at his door last December.
“My sons were armed and they went away but after that, we knew we had only a few hours,” Abu Nebras said. “We were displaced because I was secular and Al Qaeda didn’t like that.”
They took refuge in the middle-class Palestine Street area in the northeastern part of Baghdad, a relatively stable enclave with an atmosphere of tolerance for their mixed marriage. Now with the situation improving across the city, the Nidhal family longs to return to their former home, but they have no idea when, or if, it will be possible.
Another family now lives in their house — the situation faced by about a third of all displaced Iraqis, according to the International Organization for Migration — and it is not clear whether the fragile peace will last. Abu Nebras tested the waters recently, going back to talk with neighbors on his old street for the first time.
He said the Shiites in the northern part of Ghazaliya had told him that the American military’s payments to local Sunni volunteers in the southern, Sunni part of the neighborhood amounted to arming one side.
The Americans describe the volunteers as heroes, part of a larger nationwide campaign known as the Sunni Awakening. But Abu Nebras said he did not trust them. “Some of the Awakening members are just Al Qaeda who have joined them,” he said. “I know them from before.”
With the additional American troops scheduled to depart, the Nidhal family said, Baghdad would be truly safe only when the Iraqi forces were mixed with Sunnis and Shiites operating checkpoints side by side — otherwise the city would remain a patchwork of Sunni and Shiite enclaves. “The police, the army, it has to be Sunni next to Shiite next to Sunni next to Shiite,” Abu Nebras said.
They and other Iraqis also said the government must aggressively help people return to their homes, perhaps by supervising returns block by block. The Nidhal family said they feared the displaced Sunnis in their neighborhood who were furious that Shiites chased them from their houses. “They are so angry, they will kill anyone,” Abu Nebras said.
For now, though, they are trying to enjoy what may be only a temporary respite from violence. One of their sons recently returned to his veterinary studies at a university in Baghdad, and their daughter will start college this winter.
Laughter is also more common now in the Nidhal household — even on once upsetting subjects. At midday, Hanan’s sister, who teaches in a local high school, came home and threw up her hands in exasperation. She had asked her Islamic studies class to bring in something that showed an aspect of Islamic culture. “Two boys told me, ‘I’m going to bring in a portrait of Moktada al-Sadr,’” she said.
She shook her head and chuckled. Mr. Sadr is an anti-American cleric whose militia, the Mahdi Army, has been accused of carrying out much of the displacement and killings of Sunnis in Baghdad. They can joke because they no longer fear that the violence will engulf them.
In longer interviews across Baghdad, the pattern was repeated. Iraqis acknowledged how far their country still needed to go before a return to normalcy, but they also expressed amazement at even the most embryonic signs of recovery.
Mrs. Aasan said she was thrilled and relieved just a few days ago, when her college-aged son got stuck at work after dark and his father managed to pick him up and drive home without being killed.
“Before, when we lived in Dora, after 4 p.m., I wouldn’t let anyone out of the house,” she said.
“They drove back to Dora at 8!” she added, glancing at her husband, who beamed, chest out, like a mountaineer who had scaled Mount Everest. “We really felt that it was a big difference.”
-
Caveat Lector: NY Times
BAGHDAD, Nov. 29 — As Iraqi refugees begin to stream back to Baghdad, American military officials say the Iraqi government has yet to develop a plan to absorb the influx and prevent it from setting off a new round of sectarian violence.
Skip to next paragraph
Multimedia
Graphic
A New, Sectarian Map
Enlarge This Image
Michael Kamber for The New York Times
A mother led her daughter to a car waiting in Baghdad’s Mansour neighborhood Sunday after arriving from Damascus, Syria.
The Iraqi government lacks a mechanism to settle property disputes if former residents return to Baghdad only to find their homes occupied, the officials said. Nor has the Iraqi government come forward with a detailed plan to provide aid, shelter and other essential services to the thousands of Iraqis who might return. American commanders caution that if the return is not carefully managed, there is a risk of undermining the recent security gains.
“All these guys coming back are probably going to find somebody else living in their house,” said Col. William Rapp, a senior aide to Gen. David H. Petraeus, the top American commander in Iraq, speaking at a two-day military briefing on measuring military trends for a small group of American reporters in Baghdad.
“We have been asking, pleading with the government of Iraq, to come up with a policy so that it is not put upon our battalion commanders and the I.S.F. battalion commanders to figure it out on the ground,” he added, referring to the American and Iraqi security force commanders.
When sectarian violence soared in 2006, hundreds of thousands of Iraqis fled to Syria and Jordan, or moved to safer areas in Iraq. But now that the American troop reinforcement plan and a new counterinsurgency strategy have helped reverse a rising tide of car bombings and sectarian killings, there are signs that Iraqis are starting to return.
Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki has hailed the development as an indication that security is beginning to improve. As if to underscore Mr. Maliki’s point, 375 Iraqi refugees arrived Thursday in a convoy of buses from Damascus, Syria, escorted by heavily armed policemen. After the lengthy journey, the tired Iraqis were ushered into the white marble affluence of the Mansour Melia Hotel in Baghdad to receive a promised government payout to people returning to the capital.
Many neighborhoods in Baghdad have become largely Shiite or Sunni, as one group drove the other out in calculated sectarian cleansing. Sunnis have moved into Shiite homes, and Shiites into Sunni ones. This segregation has contributed to the decline in violence. But what would happen if the original residents insisted on moving back into their homes?
Ahmad Chalabi, a Shiite politician and former Iraqi exile who made common cause with the Americans against Saddam Hussein, has been charged with developing a plan to provide services.
American officers discussed estimates of the displaced Iraqis at a seminar here on the military’s metrics of assessing violence in Iraq held at Camp Victory.
Recent American military data indicates that for the fourth week in a row, the nationwide weekly number of attacks is at its lowest level since January 2006. The number of civilians killed, as measured by the American and Iraqi governments, continued to decline in November. The number of weekly casualties, wounded as well as killed, suffered by Iraqi civilians, Iraqi forces and American forces, increased last week by 56 percent but was still below the level for most of 2006 and 2007.
The military also lowered its tally of how many Iraqis had joined neighborhood watch groups. The new figure for Concerned Local Citizens, as the military calls the volunteers, is 60,321. The previous estimate of 77,000 erroneously combined the number of volunteers who are currently serving with those who had expressed a willingness to join.
Col. Martin Stanton, who oversaw the count, said he told General Petraeus about the new figures this week.
Military officials said that they were seeking to make greater use of some Iraqi government data to provide a more comprehensive portrayal of the situation in Iraq. Though there are concerns about the reliability of some Iraqi reports, American military data generally understates Iraqi civilian deaths, since American units only report what they observe, officials said. At General Petraeus’s recommendation, the Pentagon is expected for the first time to include the Iraqi government data on civilian deaths in its report next month on security trends in Iraq.
While there is no question that large numbers of Iraqis have left their homes, American officials said that the exact number is not available. The International Organization for Migration has reported that the number of internally “displaced” Iraqis — those who have fled their homes but still live in Iraq — has grown to more than one million since the February 2006 bombing of a Shiite shrine in Samarra. Among those displaced Iraqis, more than 350,000 live in Baghdad Province, according to estimates by humanitarian organizations.
==========
Estimates by the Iraqi Red Crescent of the number of displaced Iraqis run much higher, but are marred by the double and triple counting of Iraqis who move from one area to another, American officials say. One difficulty in fixing an accurate count is that many displaced Iraqis do not register their migrant status with Iraqi authorities, American officials said.
Skip to next paragraph
Multimedia
Graphic
A New, Sectarian Map In addition, more than two million Iraqis are also estimated to have left Iraq altogether for neighboring counties like Syria and Jordan and other nations.
Col. Cheryl L. Smart, who tracks the data on displaced Iraqis for General Petraeus’s command, said that the American military had been “very vocal” with the Iraqi government about the need to establish a system to adjudicate claims about property rights and to avoid using Iraqi troops to carry out “forced evictions.”
Colonel Rapp voiced the hope that confrontations might be avoided by building new homes for returning Iraqis instead of forcing all of the squatters to leave. “It is probably going to be resolved with new housing construction as opposed to wholesale evictions and resettlement,” he said.
“Whether they will remix is probably a multiyear, decade kind of issue,” he added, referring to the possibility of sectarian reintegration.
“The immediate return of I.D.P.’s will create tensions in that system, and we are concerned about it,” he said, referring to the internally displaced people in Iraq.
A senior Sunni official said that the government was not doing nearly enough. “There are many missing links,” said an Iraqi vice president, Tariq al-Hashimi, a Sunni. “We don’t have a comprehensive plan. We have a ministry of migration, but the problem is the bureaucracy.”
Speaking at his home in the Huriya neighborhood in northwest Baghdad, Mr. Chalabi said he was aware of the issue of returnees’ lingering fears. “I don’t think that people who have committed crimes or transgressions against their fellows in those areas would come back,” Mr. Chalabi said. “But the fear of, for example, the Sunnis here, is that the people who did the transgressions on the other side continue to be here and that they may threaten them.”
He said that he had put forward proposals for large-scale new housing developments, but that they should not be on a sectarian basis. “Baghdad is an integrated city and we should try to get it back to an integrated city,” he said.
Col. J. B. Burton, commander of the Second Brigade Combat Team of the First Infantry Division, which controlled northwest Baghdad until this month, said that some neighborhood leaders had made efforts to allow displaced Iraqis to return to their residences, but that their programs were hampered by the lack of a national plan.
“Displacement is a national issue,” Colonel Burton said Thursday in an e-mail exchange. “The government has got to establish policies which are not focused on sects.”
Most of the Iraqis who returned to the Mansour Melia Hotel on Thursday said they were returning voluntarily after hearing reports that the security situation had improved, but some said they had been forced to return because they had no jobs or money in Syria.
Some said their houses were long ago destroyed by Shiite militias or Sunni insurgents, or still occupied by people on the other side of the sectarian divide. Others said that it was still too unsafe to go back to areas like Dora, Jihad and Mansour, and that they would have to stay with relatives.
Abdul Kadim Mohammed, 58, a Shiite from Abu Ghraib, said he would be staying with relatives for now. “I feel more comfortable in Baghdad but still can’t go to Abu Ghraib, which is not completely good,” he said. “The next step that the government needs to work on is how to get back to our homes.”
-
Subject: Fw: CO, 1/7 Battalion Task Force, USMC Reports
Saturday, October 20, 2007 6:40 PM
Subject: Report from USMC - Al Anbar Province, Iraq
From: Dill LtCol Jeffrey J ( 1/7 Bn Co )
Sent: Friday, October 05, 2007 3:45 PM
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Family, friends, and Fellow Marines,
As promised, here is my first 'update' from this tour in Iraq . I will try and get one of these out about every month. I hope this finds you all doing well. It has been a very fast moving month and a half as we moved the 1,000+ Marines from 1/7 and literally tons of equipment and material half way around the world through Kuwait and eventually into Iraq . We have inventoried and signed for well over a hundred p ieces of rolling stock, thousands of pieces of electronic equipment and computers, joined a few hundred more reinforcements to 1/7 (making us now 'Task Force 1/7') and then we put everyone in their new positions, spreading us out over 500 square kilometers. Needless to say, the Marines of the First Team have been busy!
Here is the million dollar question I have been asked repeatedly since I have arrived, 'How is it compared to the last time you were in Iraq ?' Well, I was in Hit, the main city within our AO, last October and daytime operations were limited to tanks and BFVs driving around the outskirts of the city because to venture inside meant a certain attack by an IED, RPG, small arms, or all of the above. Recently, I went on a 3 hour dismounted patrol through town in the middle of the afternoon, and my biggest worry was h aving enough candy for all the children that came up to me to say hello and shake my hand.
I stopped in stores and talked to the merchants to see how business is doing. They told me business is good and improving everyday. I even went to a few shops to look for a carpet for my office and enjoyed myself as I tried to get the price lowered from 'rich'
American prices to normal Iraqi prices. I wasn't successful but will keep trying!
I stopped in one of the police stations in the city so I could make plans with the Station Chief to remove a number of the cement barriers on the street in order to open traffic back up. Those barriers were a must before as there was a constant threat of a suicide vehicle ramming into the station in an attempt to kill as many of th e police
officers as possible. While that threat still exists, the security provided by the police and my Marines has allowed us to take risks in certain areas as we try and balance security needs and normalcy.
I spend many hours working with the numerous city counsels and Mayors in my AO to address and solve many issues, problems, and to plan for the future. A year ago, the city councils would not show up to work because if they did, they were killed as they were seen as 'agents' of the Americans by AQI. Now, they look forward to my arrival so issues
like schools, rubble removal, water treatment plants, sewage repairs, repairs of the electrical grids, infrastructure modernization, and an assortment of other issues can be worked out, prioritized, and assets allocated for them to begin work.
; ; I also spend a great deal of time with the major Sheiks in my AO. They are some of the most gracious hosts you have ever met. My Marines and I are treated liked royalty every time we arrive. Delicious lamb, goat, sheep, kabobs, fresh fruits and vegetables are served in amounts we could never finish, and we always eat first and get the seats of honor closest to the Sheik. We then adjourn for Chi tea and discuss issues that require my attention such as security, economic stimulation, tribal reconciliation, local government issues, and of course stories of past battles and fights...all embellished but they
make great stories anyway.
Three brothers in the town of Baghdadi , one of whom who happens to be the Police Chief and is known as the 'Lion of Al Anbar', are particularly gracious hosts. They were some of the first to&nbs p; sta nd up against AQI and to stand with the Marines. They have suffered greatly for choosing to fight AQI and for freedom. The Police Chief, Colonel
Shab'an , has had no less then 7 direct assassination attempts against him. I was here last year and saw him after one attack against him was nearly successful. One of his brothers was killed, a brother-in-law was tortured and beheaded, and one of his younger brothers lost his legs in a mortar attack. Yet, he remains committed to a free and independent
Iraq . His talks to me about freedom, democracy, and his loyalty to Iraq and justice are inspiring.
Colonel Shab'an has become a sort of folk hero to his community, and his willingness to stand up for their freedom and safety has inspired thousands of Iraqis. His two brothers, one a Sheik and the other a local businessman, are also serv ants t o their community. The Sheik is the City Council Chairman and has almost single handedly
reorganized the local government from a board of obstructionists to a functioning and effective governing body who work almost non-stop to improve the lives of the people within their area.
The other brother is a very successful businessman who has donated tens of thousands of dollars to fix water treatment plants, to pay of the salaries of the police before the national government could or would, and his source network has led to the successful capture of many terrorists and criminals. The nights in their neighborhood are
particularly enjoyable as we sit outside to eat, and the children in the neighborhood run around, laughing, and sneaking up to listen to me talk or to try and get some more candy from me. They are so proud of the security they have established for th eir fa milies, their tribe, and the people in their community. I am proud just to be considered their friend.
Overall, the folks I have met are good people who want to raise their families, farm their land, and just have the ability to choose their own future for one of the few times in their country's history. Their admiration and appreciation to us and to the American people for the opportunity we have offered them is genuine and heartfelt.
While there has been a great deal of progress, there is still much to do. While most of the terrorists have been forced from the population centers, there are still secret cells. We have found and been attacked by a number of IEDs already. We have found a good number of buried caches along the river banks that were planted there for future
use again st us. Iraq is far from a peaceful land; there are many political issues above my level that must be worked out. The rifts between the religious sects are as tough a problem to figure out as anything else ever has been...think Catholics and Protestants in
Northern Ireland .
The bottom line is this...we are winning the counter-insurgency fight here in Al Anbar . We are winning as a result of the past 5 years of work by thousands of Marines, Sailors, and Soldiers who worked tirelessly to get us where we are today. This didn't happen overnight, and we lost many good men and women to achieve it. We have put the enemy on the run, and we are not letting the pressure off. We continue to hunt him down and provide him no rest. My Marines, actually your Marines, are patrolling in the cities, in the desert, and on the river to find the enemy and destro y him. And the Marines do not patrol alone. Almost every operation we do has Iraqi Police, Army, or both with the
Marines. They are brave, committed to winning, and they try as hard as they can to emulate the Marines they are serving with. At the same time we continue to build our relationships with the local leaders, Sheiks, and most importantly the Iraq people. I am optimistic that, if given the time and support of the American people, we can help create a country whose vast natural resources and potential will make it one of the strongest and most powerful nations in the region.
Iraq will be our Ally, and they will not forget the sacrifices the American people have made on their behalf. I realize and understand that many back home are tired of this conflict and want it to end. I will not provide any argument there, but I will offer that&n bsp; ' wishing' away this problem is not reality. The Islamic extremists that wish to destroy us are not going away; they cannot be 'talked' to, and they will not negotiate.
I have been here three years in a row now, and I can see the progress. I can see the improvement in the capabilities and potential in the Iraqi Security Forces, I can see the willingness and desire of civic and local leaders to build a better future for their people, and I can see that most of the civilian population has turned its back on AQI because of their empty promises. I can see hope, a hope that many Iraqis have never known before, and a hope they do not want to lose. Your Marines are doing exceptionally well. They are focused, they are disciplined, and they continue to attack each day with vigor and enthusiasm. I am continually inspired by their courage, dedication, and w illing ness to sacrifice for others. I am truly blessed for the privilege to lead them.
I would like to thank all of you for your continued prayers and support. It means the world to us to know you are all still behind us and that you want us to successfully complete this mission. Please remember all the 1/7 families and all the families of those serving here in Iraq that have been left behind in your prayers as well.
Semper Fidelis and God Bless,
JJ
LtCol JJ Dill, Commanding Officer
Task Force 1/7
Hit , Iraq
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
-
Al Qaeda No. 2 blasts 'traitors'
(CNN) -- Osama bin Laden's top lieutenant warned in a video statement released Sunday that Iraqi tribal leaders who side with U.S. troops against al Qaeda fighters would face reprisals when Americans leave Iraq.
An image of al-Zawahiri taken from an earlier videotape.
"I warn those individuals from among the armed factions who have been involved in cooperation against the Mujahedeen that history is recording everything, and that they will lose both their religion and life," Ayman al-Zawahiri said.
"The Americans will soon be departing, God permitting, and won't keep defending them forever. And let them look at the fate of America's agents in Vietnam and the fate of the Shah of Iran. Intelligent is he who learns from other's mistakes," he added.
Al Qaeda's No. 2 called such Iraqi leaders "traitors" and "scum."
http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/...deo/index.html
======================
So what happened to the mighty Iraqi army standing on its own?
Iraq sees need for foreign troops for 10 years
1 hour, 28 minutes ago
Iraq will need foreign troops to help defend it for another 10 years, but will not accept U.S. bases indefinitely, government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh said.
"Of course we need international support. We have security problems. For 10 years our army will not be able to defend Iraq," Dabbagh told the state-run al-Iraqiya television in an interview broadcast late on Sunday.
"I do not think that there is a threat of an invasion of Iraq, or getting involved in a war. (But) to protect Iraqi sovereignty there must be an army to defend Iraq for the next 10 years," he said.
"But on the other hand, does Iraq accept the permanent existence of U.S. bases, for instance? Absolutely no. There is no Iraqi who would accept the existence of a foreign army in this country," he said. "America is America and Iraq is Iraq."
The United States now has about 155,000 troops in Iraq, formally operating under a U.N. Security Council mandate enacted after the U.S.-led invasion in 2003.
Iraq has asked the Security Council to extend the mandate for what it says will be a final year to the end of 2008, and conditions for U.S. troops to stay on beyond that date are to be negotiated in the next few months.
Violence has subsided after the United States dispatched 30,000 additional troops to Iraq this year, and Washington now says it will bring about 20,000 home by mid-2008. Troop levels for the second half of the year are to be decided in March.
(Writing by Peter Graff; Editing by Janet Lawrence)
__________________
-
This article indicates that Kurd-Sunni live and let live may be a while off , , ,
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200801/goldberg-mideast
Omar was a Sunni Arab from a village outside Mosul; he was a short and weedy man, roughly 30 years old, who radiated a pure animal anger. He was also a relentless jabberer; he did not shut up from the moment we were introduced. I met him in an unventilated interrogation room that smelled of bleach and paint. He was handcuffed, and he cursed steadily, making appalling accusations about the sexual practices of the interrogator’s mother. He cursed the Kurds, in general, as pig-eaters, blasphemers, and American lackeys. As Omar ranted, the interrogator smiled. “I told you the Arabs don’t like the Kurds,” he said. I’ve known the interrogator for a while, and this is his perpetual theme: close proximity to Arabs has sabotaged Kurdish happiness.
Omar, the Kurds claim, was once an inconsequential deputy to the now-deceased terrorist chieftain Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Omar disputed this characterization. By his own telling, he accomplished prodigies of terror against the pro-American Kurdish forces in the northern provinces of Iraq. “You are worse than the Americans,” he told his Kurdish interrogator. “You are the enemy of the Muslim nation. You are enemies of God.” The interrogator—I will not name him here, for reasons that will become apparent in a moment—sat sturdily opposite Omar, absorbing his invective for several minutes, absentmindedly paging through a copy of the Koran.
During a break in the tirade, the interrogator asked Omar, for my benefit, to rehearse his biography. Omar’s life was undistinguished. His father was a one-donkey farmer; Omar was educated in Saddam’s school system, which is to say he was hardly educated; he joined the army, and then Ansar al-Islam, the al-Qaeda–affiliated terrorist group that operates along the Iranian frontier. And then, on the blackest of days, as he described it, he fell prisoner to the Kurds.
The interrogator asked me if I had any questions for Omar. Yes, I said: Have you been tortured in this prison?
“No,” he said.
“What would you do if you were to be released from prison right now?”
“I would get a knife and cut your head off,” he said.
At this, the interrogator smacked Omar across the face with the Koran.
Omar yelped in shock. The interrogator said: “Don’t talk that way to a guest!”
Now, Omar rounded the bend. A bolus of spit flew from his mouth as he screamed. The interrogator taunted Omar further. “This book of yours,” he said, waving the Koran. “‘Cut off their heads! Cut off their heads!’ That’s the answer for everything!” Omar cursed the interrogator’s mother once again; the interrogator trumped him by cursing the Prophet Muhammad’s mother.
The meeting was then adjourned.
In the hallway, I asked the interrogator, “Aren’t you Muslim?”
“Of course,” he said.
“But you’re not a big believer in the Koran?”
“The Koran’s OK,” he said. “I don’t have any criticism of Muhammad’s mother. I just say that to get him mad.”
He went on, “The Koran wasn’t written by God, you know. It was written by Arabs. The Arabs were imperialists, and they forced it on us.” This is a common belief among negligibly religious Kurds, of whom there are many millions.
“That’s your problem, then,” I said. “Arabs.”
“Of course,” he replied. “The Arabs are responsible for all our misfortunes.”
-
http://www.powerlineblog.com/archives2/2008/01/019623.php
...through the FBI interrogator who debriefed him for seven months, George Piro. Piro has been interviewed by 60 Minutes; the interview will air on Sunday. This preview is interesting, but not surprising.
As many have believed, Saddam misjudged the Bush administration. He expected another "four-day bombardment," which he was willing to wait out. At some point, though, it became apparent that an invasion was inevitable. Why didn't Saddam come clean and admit that he had run out of WMDs? Piro says that Saddam told him he didn't dare let the world know that his WMDs were gone, because he would then be unable to deter an Iranian attack:
Saddam still wouldn't admit he had no weapons of mass destruction, even when it was obvious there would be military action against him because of the perception he did. Because, says Piro, "For him, it was critical that he was seen as still the strong, defiant Saddam. He thought that [faking having the weapons] would prevent the Iranians from reinvading Iraq," he tells Pelley.
Of course, there was something else going on too: Saddam had been telling the world for years that Iraq had no WMDs, and no one believed him. In fact, Saddam didn't want to be believed; he wanted the world (particularly Iran) to take his obvious non-cooperation with U.N. inspectors as evidence that he was concealing active biological and chemical programs. So Saddam would have been in the position of saying, "No, no--I really mean it this time!" It's doubtful whether anyone would have believed him.
Piro reinforces another point that was emphasized in the Duelfer report; that is, that Saddam was biding his time, and had the personnel and resources he needed to restart his weapons programs when the time was right:
He also intended and had the wherewithal to restart the weapons program. "Saddam still had the engineers. The folks that he needed to reconstitute his program are still there," says Piro. "He wanted to pursue all of WMD…to reconstitute his entire WMD program." This included chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, Piro says.
Putting it all together, it appears that liberals should adopt a new slogan: "Saddam lied, people died!"
-
Exactly so Doug!
I would add that the French/Chirac were telling him that they would keep us muzzled and leashed in the UN and that this too explains his behavior.
-
Woof,
Yeah Iraq, whatever happened to Iraq, do we still have troops there? I haven't heard anything in the news lately but I did hear that Brittany Spears farted. :-D
P.C.
-
Don't Short-Circuit the Surge
By KIMBERLY KAGAN
January 26, 2008; Page A11
The Iraq debate in 2007 focused on whether the new strategy and troop increase could stem violence in Iraq. It did. The Iraq debate in 2008 will probably focus on how much the United States can reduce force levels in Iraq this year in the wake of its success.
Many in these discussions give troop numbers and brigade counts almost casually, without ever explaining how they derive the figures. That's a problem. Any realistic evaluation suggests that returning to pre-surge levels by July 2008, as some are suggesting, carries considerable risk.
Ethno-sectarian attacks and deaths in Baghdad security districts decreased more than 90% from January to December 2007. Iraqi civilian casualties have dropped 75% from their peak, and the number of IED attacks has fallen to the lowest level since October 2004. One brigade of U.S. troops returned home in December without replacement. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates believes that Gen. David Petraeus will recommend continuing the drawdown to 15 brigades.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, CENTCOM commander Adm. William Fallon, and Gen. Petraeus are now assessing whether to recommend in March a further reduction in troop levels later in 2008. Mr. Gates stated recently that he hopes conditions will permit the U.S. to reduce its combat forces in Iraq by a brigade a month from August to December 2008, leaving a footprint of 10 brigades at the end of the president's term -- the lowest American force level in the country since the 2003 invasion.
In contrast, Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno, who commands combat forces for Gen. Petraeus, has stated that he is uncomfortable committing to any further reductions below 15 brigades before commanders can assess the effect of the decrease to that force-size. Gen. Petraeus recently said that March 2008 might be too soon to make that determination. War critics have insisted on reductions to 100,000 troops or fewer.
The brigade combat team, commanded by a colonel and consisting of around 3,500 soldiers (5,000 or so counting the support elements that normally deploy with it) is the building block of the U. S. Army (its equivalent, the Regimental Combat Team, is the building block of the Marine Corps). There are currently 42 BCTs in the active force. Those who speak of an absolute number of troops that they desire in Iraq show their ignorance of the military planning process.
American brigades in Iraq oversee combat, training, and governance missions in their sector, whether a quadrant of Baghdad or an entire outlying province. Each brigade oversees an area with hundreds of thousands of inhabitants. Brigades plan and execute military operations that prevent extremists from returning to cleared areas. They also gather intelligence about enemy groups in their areas of operations, and thus determine where new threats are emerging.
Since the end of 2006, brigades have overseen the Military Transition Teams that train and advise the Iraqi security forces operating in their area, dramatically improving the coordination of Iraqi and American forces. Now, most American brigade headquarters are partnered with an Iraqi division headquarters, helping the Iraqis to plan and sustain increasingly complex operations.
Since spring 2007, the brigades have housed the Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams that have jumpstarted local and provincial Iraqi government. The brigade helps these teams move through the area. The brigades have been instrumental in the Iraqi population's rejection of al Qaeda. Brigade commanders and their staffs and subordinates have negotiated ceasefires with leaders of tribes, villages and urban neighborhoods; identified Concerned Local Citizens; and integrated these Iraqi civilians with the Iraqi Security Forces. Brigade commanders in 2008 may distribute their own troops between combat and training missions, rather than relying on a centrally-directed policy untailored to local circumstances.
The brigade has thus become much more than a fighting unit. The development of the Iraqi Security Forces and Iraqi civilian institutions, which has been a hallmark of Gen. Petraeus's counterinsurgency strategy and a pillar of its success in 2007, rests upon the American brigade headquarters. Maintaining security essential to drawing down the American force levels requires the presence in Iraq of enough brigade headquarters to conduct the combat, training and governance missions essential to success.
The way to determine the number of brigade headquarters suitable for Iraq is by determining the number of brigade-sized missions in the country. This is a challenging but not insuperable task.
There were too few brigades in 2006 to monitor the enemy and oversee the new government institutions in poor security situations. There were enough brigades by mid- 2007 to perform those tasks, although not equally in all areas. The "surge" was never intended to secure all of Iraq -- only to stabilize Baghdad and Anbar. Its unexpected success has also placed unanticipated strains on U.S. forces. We won more than we had hoped, and now we may need to defend it more than we had planned.
The "surge" posture from June through December 2007 included five BCTs in Baghdad; four in the southern "belt" (from Mahmudiyah on the Euphrates to Nahrawan east of the capital); three in Anbar (including 2 Marine Regiments); four in the northern belt (Taji; Tarmiyah; and Diyala, where a Quick Reaction Force spent much of the summer along with the dedicated brigade); and one each in Salah-ad-Din, Kirkuk, Ninevah, and on convoy protection duty.
Gen. Odierno recently shifted two brigades within Iraq to conduct his third major offensive against al Qaeda, Operation Phantom Phoenix, to disrupt and pursue the enemy in northern Iraq. The December reduction to 19 BCTs has left only one brigade headquarters in Diyala. General Odierno intends to thin the headquarters and the troops on the ground in Anbar and Baghdad in order to achieve the remaining four-brigade reduction back to pre-surge levels by July.
The decision to draw down the surge is predicated not only on current security gains, but on the assumption that security will continue to improve in areas where the reductions are programmed to occur. Gen. Petraeus, testifying before Congress in September, attributed the downturn in violence, then 12 weeks old, to three factors: the summer offensives against al Qaeda and militias, the Iraqi population's rejection of extremists, and the slowly increasing capabilities of the Iraqi security forces.
"Based on all this and the further progress we believe we can achieve over the next few months, I believe that we will be able to reduce our forces to the pre-surge level of brigade combat teams by next summer, withdrawing one quarter of our combat brigades by that time without jeopardizing the security gains that we have fought so hard to achieve." Gen. Odierno confirmed in a November press conference that he had recommended that Gen. Petraeus reduce the force to 15 brigades by July, "because I believe that we will be able to continue to move forward with the progress."
Achieving the complement of 15 brigades by summer rests upon Gen. Odierno's judgment that he can withdraw not only the headquarters from Diyala, but also others from Anbar and parts of Baghdad this spring. His assumption is that security will continue to improve at about the rate our commanders think is feasible between now and July, and that the Iraqi Army will grow as predicted.
There is considerable risk in this assumption. Coalition and Iraqi forces have not finished clearing Ninevah province, Salah ad-Din and parts of Babil. Major operations continue against al Qaeda remnants in Ninevah, Salah-ad-Din, Diyala, Kirkuk and Wasit provinces. Fighting between Iraqi Security Forces (aided by coalition special forces and our Georgian, Polish and British allies) and Mahdi Army militias continues in the south.
The withdrawal to 15 brigades already assumes that these operations will be successful. It provides no cushion for unexpected developments or unforeseen enemy responses. There is thus no military basis at all at the present time to recommend additional reductions in 2008.
One year ago, Gen. Petraeus testified before Congress: "I was assured . . . by the secretary of Defense . . . that if we need additional assets, my job is to ask for them. If they're not provided in some case, my job is to tell my boss the risk involved in accomplishing the mission without the assets that are required. And at some point, of course, you may have to go back and say that you cannot accomplish the mission because of the assets that have not been provided."
By the best estimates now available, 15 brigades is the absolute minimum force required to accomplish the mission that has brought us success in 2007. Any further reductions -- even by a single brigade -- may make that mission impossible.
Ms. Kagan is an affiliate of Harvard's John M. Olin Institute of Strategic Studies and the president of the Institute for the Study of War in Washington.
WSJ
-
I am usually skeptical of celebrities who speak out about foreign affairs but I have to say that Jolie has won me over with this piece. I wonder if she wrote it or had someone else write it but I guess it doesn't matter since it is her name on it.
It certainly speaks of the insanity it would be for the US to pull out immediately or in any short time frame:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/27/AR2008022702217_pf.html
-
What a pleasant surprise!
In case the WP takes it down, I print it here:
]Staying to Help in Iraq
We have finally reached a point where humanitarian assistance, from us and others, can have an impact.
By Angelina Jolie
Thursday, February 28, 2008; 1:15 PM
The request is familiar to American ears: "Bring them home."
But in Iraq, where I've just met with American and Iraqi leaders, the phrase carries a different meaning. It does not refer to the departure of U.S. troops, but to the return of the millions of innocent Iraqis who have been driven out of their homes and, in many cases, out of the country.
In the six months since my previous visit to Iraq with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, this humanitarian crisis has not improved. However, during the last week, the United States, UNHCR and the Iraqi government have begun to work together in new and important ways.
We still don't know exactly how many Iraqis have fled their homes, where they've all gone, or how they're managing to survive. Here is what we do know: More than 2 million people are refugees inside their own country -- without homes, jobs and, to a terrible degree, without medicine, food or clean water. Ethnic cleansing and other acts of unspeakable violence have driven them into a vast and very dangerous no-man's land. Many of the survivors huddle in mosques, in abandoned buildings with no electricity, in tents or in one-room huts made of straw and mud. Fifty-eight percent of these internally displaced people are younger than 12 years old.
An additional 2.5 million Iraqis have sought refuge outside Iraq, mainly in Syria and Jordan. But those host countries have reached their limits. Overwhelmed by the refugees they already have, these countries have essentially closed their borders until the international community provides support.
I'm not a security expert, but it doesn't take one to see that Syria and Jordan are carrying an unsustainable burden. They have been excellent hosts, but we can't expect them to care for millions of poor Iraqis indefinitely and without assistance from the U.S. or others. One-sixth of Jordan's population today is Iraqi refugees. The large burden is already causing tension internally.
The Iraqi families I've met on my trips to the region are proud and resilient. They don't want anything from us other than the chance to return to their homes -- or, where those homes have been bombed to the ground or occupied by squatters, to build new ones and get back to their lives. One thing is certain: It will be quite a while before Iraq is ready to absorb more than 4 million refugees and displaced people. But it is not too early to start working on solutions. And last week, there were signs of progress.
In Baghdad, I spoke with Army Gen. David Petraeus about UNHCR's need for security information and protection for its staff as they re-enter Iraq, and I am pleased that he has offered that support. General Petraeus also told me he would support new efforts to address the humanitarian crisis "to the maximum extent possible" -- which leaves me hopeful that more progress can be made.
UNHCR is certainly committed to that. Last week while in Iraq, High Commissioner António Guterres pledged to increase UNHCR's presence there and to work closely with the Iraqi government, both in assessing the conditions required for return and in providing humanitarian relief.
During my trip I also met with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who has announced the creation of a new committee to oversee issues related to internally displaced people, and a pledge of $40 million to support the effort.
My visit left me even more deeply convinced that we not only have a moral obligation to help displaced Iraqi families, but also a serious, long-term, national security interest in ending this crisis.
Today's humanitarian crisis in Iraq -- and the potential consequences for our national security -- are great. Can the United States afford to gamble that 4 million or more poor and displaced people, in the heart of Middle East, won't explode in violent desperation, sending the whole region into further disorder?
What we cannot afford, in my view, is to squander the progress that has been made. In fact, we should step up our financial and material assistance. UNHCR has appealed for $261 million this year to provide for refugees and internally displaced persons. That is not a small amount of money -- but it is less than the U.S. spends each day to fight the war in Iraq. I would like to call on each of the presidential candidates and congressional leaders to announce a comprehensive refugee plan with a specific timeline and budget as part of their Iraq strategy.
As for the question of whether the surge is working, I can only state what I witnessed: U.N. staff and those of non-governmental organizations seem to feel they have the right set of circumstances to attempt to scale up their programs. And when I asked the troops if they wanted to go home as soon as possible, they said that they miss home but feel invested in Iraq. They have lost many friends and want to be a part of the humanitarian progress they now feel is possible.
It seems to me that now is the moment to address the humanitarian side of this situation. Without the right support, we could miss an opportunity to do some of the good we always stated we intended to do.
Angelina Jolie, an actor, is a UNHCR goodwill ambassador.
-
Iraq: The Long-Term al-Sadrite Threat
Stratfor Today » March 10, 2008 | 1848 GMT
AHMAD AL-RUBAYE/AFP/Getty Images
Iraqi Shia carry a poster of Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr during a rallySummary
Rumors surfaced over the weekend of March 8-9 that radical Iraqi Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr is comatose in an Iranian hospital. While the sources for this information are dubious and the rumors have not been verified, the announcement comes as al-Sadr’s movement is under pressure to demonstrate its cohesion. If al-Sadr were to die, the repercussions for his movement — and for the United States — would be tremendous.
Analysis
Rumors surfaced over the weekend of March 8-9 that radical Iraqi Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr is in a coma in an Iranian hospital after consuming poisoned food. The sources for this information are dubious and Stratfor has not yet found any evidence to support these claims. Meanwhile, there have been a number of mainstream media reports citing top al-Sadr aides as saying that the maverick Shite leader is still very much in charge of his movement despite a sabbatical in Iran, where he is trying to shore up his religious credentials, and an acknowledgement that many of his erstwhile followers had gone rogue.
Clearly, al-Sadr’s movement is under immense pressure to demonstrate that it is very much a cohesive force despite the massive internal problems in the past couple of years. Al-Sadr has seen many commanders and fighters from within his militia, the Mehdi Army, go rogue and many political figures from within his al-Sadrite bloc also break orbit in the wake of U.S. and Iranian attempts to control the movement. Indeed, since the rise of the al-Sadrite movement after the regime change in Baghdad in 2003, both Washington and Tehran have also encouraged factionalization within the movement, in keeping with their respective objectives.
At the same time, the group needs to compete with rival Shiite groups — especially Iran’s principal proxy, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) led by Abdel Aziz al-Hakim; Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s Dawah party; and al-Fadhila, an al-Sadrite offshoot. Its opponents have always tried to marginalize the al-Sadrite movement, calling it politically and religiously amateurish. Considering how rival Iraqi Shiite groups accuse one another of being Iranian agents, al-Sadr’s spending a disproportionate amount of time in Iran is hurting the credibility of his group, which has actually tried to promote itself as an Iraqi/Arab nationalist movement to differentiate itself from most of its rivals, who spent a great deal of time in Iran after Iraq’s Baathist regime fell.
More recently, the United States showered praise on al-Sadr and his group in exchange for his commitment to ending violence. While this gives the group much-needed recognition, it also hurts the al-Sadrites’ credibility. The move to transform his group from a rejectionist group to a mainstream political movement in order to better compete with the ISCI and its Badr Brigades has further weakened al-Sadr. Therefore, al-Sadr’s movement and the Iraqi Shiite community are the intended audience for the recent statements attributed to al-Sadr and those from his key associates that counter perceptions that al-Sadr has surrendered his movement to a U.S.-Iranian arrangement.
Regardless of the al-Sadrites’ current condition, the far more important matter is that of the future of the movement in case of al-Sadr’s death. About a year ago Stratfor discussed how the al-Sadrite movement is in the process of imploding in spite of al-Sadr’s charismatic leadership. However, should al-Sadr die of either natural or malicious causes, the geopolitical and security implications — for Iraq, the United States and Iran — would be massive.
The al-Sadrite group is a family/clan-based movement, and al-Sadr is the only surviving male member of the clan of any worth. His exit from the scene could aggravate the ongoing internal schism within the group and lead to its disintegration. Rival factions would try to take advantage of the vacuum, which would lead to infighting and then to a major shake-up of the Iraqi Shiite political landscape.
Of course, it would be a very important opportunity for al-Hakim’s ISCI to seize upon in order to realize its objective of establishing a virtual monopoly over the Iraqi Shia. But the fragmentation of the al-Sadrite movement would also create security problems and lead to intra-Shia and even Shia-Sunni violence. The Iranians — like their proxy in Iraq — could exploit a fragmented al-Sadrite movement and use it against the United States, but they would have their hands full in trying to maintain control.
For the United States, the repercussions would be the most severe, considering how long and hard Washington has been trying to stabilize Iraq. An al-Sadrite movement without an al-Sadr at the helm could reverse the gains Washington has made during the past year, which has seen significant drops in violence. Given its size, its capability to engage in violence and the fragile nature of its leadership, the al-Sadrite movement is a ticking bomb.
stratfor
-
Hard to decide which thread for this piece-- here it is:
The Pentagon vs. Petraeus
March 12, 2008; Page A20
Yesterday's resignation of Admiral William Fallon as Centcom Commander is being portrayed as a dispute over Iran. Our own sense is that the admiral has made more than enough dissenting statements about Iraq, Iran and other things to warrant his dismissal as much as early retirement. But his departure will be especially good news if it means that President Bush is beginning to pay attention to the internal Pentagon dispute over Iraq.
A fateful debate is now taking place at the Pentagon that will determine the pace of U.S. military withdrawals for what remains of President Bush's term. Senior Pentagon officials -- including, we hear, Defense Secretary Robert Gates, Joint Chiefs Chairman Mike Mullen, Army Chief of Staff George Casey and Admiral Fallon -- have been urging deeper troop cuts in Iraq beyond the five "surge" combat brigades already scheduled for redeployment this summer.
AP
Adm. William Fallon, during testimony on Capitol Hill in May, 2007.
Last month Mr. Gates agreed to a pause in these withdrawals, so that General David Petraeus could assess whether the impressive security gains achieved by the surge can be maintained with fewer troops. But now the Pentagon seems to be pushing for a pause of no more than four to six weeks before the drawdowns resume.
It's possible the surge has so degraded the insurgency -- both of the al Qaeda and Shiite varieties -- that the U.S. can reduce its troop presence to some undetermined level without inviting precisely the conditions that led to the surge in the first place. The withdrawal of one combat brigade from Iraq in December hasn't affected the stunning declines in insurgent attacks and Iraqi civilian deaths over the past year.
Then again, a spate of recent attacks -- including a suicide bombing Monday that left five GIs dead in Baghdad and a roadside bombing yesterday that killed 16 Iraqis -- is a reminder that the insurgency remains capable of doing great damage. An overly hasty withdrawal of U.S. forces would give it more opportunities to do so. It could also demoralize Iraq forces just when they are gaining confidence and need our help to "hold" the areas gained by the "clear, hold and build" strategy of the surge.
This ought to be apparent to Pentagon generals. Yet their rationale for troop withdrawals seems to have less to do with conditions in Iraq and more with fear that the war is putting a strain on the military as an institution. These are valid concerns. Lengthy and repeated combat deployments have imposed extraordinary burdens on service members and their families. The war in Iraq has also diverted scarce funds to combat operations rather than investment -- much of it long overdue -- in military modernization.
But these concerns are best dealt with by enlarging the size of the Army and Marine Corps and increasing spending on defense to between 5% and 6% of gross domestic product from the current 4.5% -- about where it was at the end of the Cold War. By contrast, we can think of few things that would "break" the military more completely -- in readiness, morale and deterrent power -- than to leave Iraq in defeat, or in conditions that would soon lead to a replay of what happened in Vietnam.
This Pentagon pressure also does little to help General Petraeus. The general is supposed to be fighting a frontal war against Islamist militants, not a rearguard action with Pentagon officials. We understand there is a chain of command in the military, and General Petraeus is precisely the kind of team player who would respect it.
That's why as Commander in Chief, Mr. Bush has a particular obligation to engage in this Pentagon debate so that General Petraeus can make his troop recommendations based on the facts in Iraq, not on pressure from Washington. It was Mr. Bush's excessive deference to the Army's pecking order that put lackluster generals such as Ricardo Sanchez in charge when the insurgency was forming, and that prevented General Petraeus from assuming command in Iraq until it was nearly too late. Having successfully resisted pressure from Congressional Democrats for premature troop withdrawals, it would be strange indeed for Mr. Bush to cave in to identical pressure from his own bureaucracies.
As a political matter, an overly rapid drawdown would also only complicate the choices the next President will have to make about troop levels, whether that's John McCain or one of the Democratic contenders. Mr. Bush owes it to his successor to bequeath not only a stable Iraq, but also policy options that don't tempt disaster. Preserving a troop cushion that allows for future withdrawals without jeopardizing current gains would do just that.
That's a decision that rests with Mr. Bush alone, who in seven years as President has often proved more adept and determined in fighting enemies abroad than imposing discipline on his own, so often wayward, Administration.
WSJ
-
http://news.yahoo.com/s/mcclatchy/20080312/wl_mcclatchy/2877385_1&printer=1
Severed fingers of 5 hostages delivered to U.S. officials in Iraq
By Hannah Allam, McClatchy Newspapers
Wed Mar 12, 5:46 PM ET
BAGHDAD _U.S. authorities in Baghdad have received five severed fingers belonging to four Americans and an Austrian who were taken hostage more than a year ago in Iraq , U.S. officials said Wednesday.
The FBI is investigating the grisly development, and the families of the five kidnapped contractors have been notified, American officials said on condition of anonymity because they weren't authorized to discuss the case publicly.
Authorities confirmed that the fingers belonged to hostages Jonathon Cote , of Gainesville, Fla. ; Joshua Munns , of Redding, Calif. ; Paul Johnson Reuben , of Buffalo, Minn. ; Bert Nussbaumer of Vienna, Austria ; and Ronald J. Withrow , an American who was kidnapped separately from the others.
No information was available on when or how the fingers were delivered to U.S. authorities. Some relatives of the missing men said that they'd heard weeks ago that the DNA of the hostages had been obtained, but they'd been given no details.
The first four men were security contractors with Kuwait -based Crescent Security and were captured in a brazen ambush of their 43-truck supply convoy in the southern Iraqi town of Safwan, near the Kuwaiti border, on Nov. 16, 2006 .
There was no word on a fifth contractor who was seized with them, John Young , of Kansas City . Contrary to Austrian news reports, none of the fingers belonged to him, authorities said.
"The government is in touch with us, but they said nothing has been verified yet," said Sharon DeBrabander , Young's mother. "I certainly don't understand why my son's wasn't found. What does that mean?"
Withrow, a computer specialist who worked for JPI Worldwide, was kidnapped separately at a phony checkpoint near the southern Iraqi city of Basra on Jan. 5, 2007 , according to news reports. Very little information is publicly available about his abduction; the bodies of his Iraqi translator and driver were discovered the next day. His employer is a Las Vegas -based company that provides Internet and technological support to remote or war-torn areas around the globe, according to the company's Web site.
The Austrian weekly magazine News first reported the delivery of the five fingers in Wednesday's edition, citing unnamed authorities working on the case.
Austrian officials said at a news conference in Vienna that U.S. officials had provided information about "fingerprints and DNA traces that were positively matched to Nussbaumer," the Austrian hostage. They didn't confirm that the sample was a severed finger.
Relatives of the American hostages said they received phone calls from U.S. authorities early Wednesday, though initially they were told only that fingerprints or DNA had been obtained. Later, at least one father said he'd been notified that his son's finger had been delivered by the hostage-takers, but there still was confusion among the relatives about the development.
"All we have right now is prayers," said Mark Munns , the father of former Marine Joshua Munns , 25, who has spent his past two birthdays in captivity. "I don't know how to make head or tails of what's going on. Are they still alive? A whole bunch of stuff goes through your head."
State Department representatives check in with the families in a telephone conference call every Monday, though several relatives have complained that they're being kept in the dark about the investigation. The FBI has told them that the information is classified to preserve the integrity of the investigation— little solace for families who've gone 18 months with scant news.
"I know we're in a war on terror, but to not tell the families anything and let us sit out here for 18 months just isn't right," Mark Munns said.
The Crescent contractors appeared in two hostage videos released in December 2006 and January 2007 in which they pleaded for the United States to withdraw troops from Iraq and to free all Iraqi prisoners. In the videos, they appeared in good condition and said that they were being treated well.
No financial demand has been made public, and it's unclear what group is holding the men. All of the hostages were seized in southern Iraq , where powerful Shiite Muslim militias operate with relative freedom.
"I'm hoping this may be a sign that the hostage-takers sent the fingers to prove they have the guys and may want to deal. I'm trying to look at the positive of this," said Mark Koscielski , a Minnesotan who is in close contact with the families of the hostages and maintains a Web site, www.Save5.net, dedicated to the abducted men. One of the hostages, Reuben, is a former Minneapolis police officer.
READ EARLIER STORIES ABOUT THE HOSTAGES:
Abducted contractors appear in videotape: http://www.mcclatchydc.com/staff/Hannah(underscore)allam/story/15282.html
Coalition forces launch search for missing security contractors: http://www.mcclatchydc.com/staff/Hannah(underscore)allam/story/15043.html
-
http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/quran/008.qmt.html#008.012
008.012
YUSUFALI: Remember thy Lord inspired the angels (with the message): "I am with you: give firmness to the Believers: I will instil terror into the hearts of the Unbelievers: smite ye above their necks and smite all their finger-tips off them."
PICKTHAL: When thy Lord inspired the angels, (saying): I am with you. So make those who believe stand firm. I will throw fear into the hearts of those who disbelieve. Then smite the necks and smite of them each finger.
SHAKIR: When your Lord revealed to the angels: I am with you, therefore make firm those who believe. I will cast terror into the hearts of those who disbelieve. Therefore strike off their heads and strike off every fingertip of them.
-
http://hotair.com/archives/2008/03/14/saddam-supported-at-least-two-al-qaeda-groups-pentagon/
Saddam supported at least two al-Qaeda groups: Pentagon Update: What it means
POSTED AT 8:15 AM ON MARCH 14, 2008 BY ED MORRISSEY
Earlier this week, the Pentagon announced that an investigation into over 600,000 documents captured at the end of the invasion of Iraq showed no operational links to al-Qaeda — or at least, that’s how the media reported it. After a strange few days in which the Pentagon delayed the report, it finally hit the internet last night — and it’s clear that the analysis done by the media was superficial at best. If no operational “smoking gun” could be found, the report still shows that Saddam Hussein had plenty of ties to all sorts of terrorist groups, including radical Islamist jihadis.
For instance, how about their support for The Army of Muhammad, a known al-Qaeda subsidiary operating in Bahrain? On pages 34-35 of the report, we find communications between their Bahrain agent and IIS headquarters confirming Army of Mohammad’s loyalty to Osama bin Laden. What is the response from Baghdad?
The agent reports (Extract 25) that The Army of Muhammad is working with Osama bin Laden. …
A later memorandum from the same collection to the Director of the IIS reports that the Army of Muhammad is endeavoring to receive assistance [from Iraq] to implement its objectives, and that the local IIS station has been told to deal with them in accordance with priorities previously established. The IIS agent goes on to inform the Director that “this organization is an offshoot of bin Laden, but that their objectives are similar but with different names that can be a way of camouflaging the organization.”
AoM had ambitious plans — including attacks on American interests. On page 35, the Iraqis list their aims as attacking Jewish and American interests anywhere in the world, attacking American embassies, disrupting American oil supplies and tankers, and attacking the American military bases in the Middle East. The Iraqi support for AoM may not be an operational link, but it’s certainly a financial link that goes right to Osama bin Laden. The Iraqis certainly understood that much, and hoped to keep it quiet.
Nor was that Saddam’s only support for an AQ subsidiary. Saddam put money into Egypt’s Islamic Jihad. The IJ opposes the Hosni Mubarak regime for a number of reasons, but primarily because of Egypt’s shaky diplomatic relations with Israel. One leader of IJ that Westerners can easily name was Ayman al-Zawahiri, who became Osama’s chief deputy and primary mouthpiece to the world.
Even when working separately, the report notes that Saddam and Osama worked to develop the same terrorist pool from which they would draw support and operational agents. Put simply, Saddam’s more secular aims and Osama’s drive for an Islamic Caliphate worked in tandem to increase the threat of terrorism. Saddam endeavored to create a “business model” for terrorism, especially when it could assist in his own pan-Arab vision. He funded and trained terrorists of all stripes in Iraq, from secular Arab Marxists to radical jihadists (page 41-42).
The media also skipped over the conclusion of the study, which begins thusly:
One question remains regarding Iraq’s terrorism capability: Is there anything in the captured archives to indicate that Saddam had the will to use his terrorist capabilities directly against United States? Judging from examples of Saddam’s statements (Extract 34) before the 1991 Gulf War with the United tates, the answer is yes.
In the years between the two Gulf Wars, UN sanctions reduced Saddam’s ability to shape regional and world events, steadily draining his military, economic, and military powers. The rise of Islamist fundamentalism in the region gave Saddam the opportunity to make terrorism, one of the few tools remaining in Saddam’s “coercion” toolbox, not only cost effective but a formal instrument of state power. Saddam nurtured this capability with an infrastructure supporting (1) his own particular brand of state terrorism against internal and external threats, (2) the state sponsorship of suicide operations, and (3) organizational relationships and “outreach programs” for terrorist groups. Evidence that was uncovered and analyzed attests to the existence of a terrorist capability and a willingness to use it until the day Saddam was forced to flee Baghdad by Coalition forces.
So we have Saddam supporting at least two AQ subsidiaries, one of which had open aspirations to attack American interests, and evidence from these captured materials that Saddam planned to use his terrorist capabilities to conduct war on the United States. Perhaps in the world of the mainstream media the big news from this would be “no smoking gun” connection to an actual attack, but for the rest of us, it shows that Saddam needed to go — and the sooner, the better. (via the Weekly Standard)
Update and Bump: Several points need to be made more clear. First, it’s pretty apparent that the vast bulk of the reporting on this paper has come from leaks within the Pentagon, and not from a read of the paper itself. Stephen Hayes more generously attributes it to a shortsighted focus on the executive summary, but even that makes clear that Saddam used Islamist radical terrorist groups to his advantage, and that state support of terrorism grew so large as to require an expansion of government bureaucracy to manage it. Anyone who reads the executive summary would be compelled to look for the support within the body of the document.
Furthermore, one has to remember the purpose and structure of al-Qaeda. It is not a top-down hierarchical organization like the PLO. Rather, it serves as a framework for a web of affiliated terrorist organizations, both for funding and for inspiration. AQ’s leadership structure maintains communications and coordination with these groups, which often merge with and split into other organizations. The report itself tries to remind readers of this, and sees Saddam and Osama as using essentially the same network for the same ends, when their interests overlap. That’s why Iraq’s IIS winds up funding the Army of Mohammad and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad — both of which are authentically AQ, and in the case of AoM, Iraq funded it specifically because of its goals of attacking American interests.
Reader Sam Pender points out that Egyptian Islamic Jihad actually has more significance than most in the AQ network. EIJ at one time provided the lion’s share of AQ’s leadership, including Ayman al-Zawahiri, and certainly that was true in the period between 1991 and 2003. Saddam’s support for EIJ shows a more direct connection to AQ leadership than anyone had predicted before the capture of the documents on which this report is based.
Update: The FBI’s Deputy Director for counterterrorism testified before Congress about the connection between AQ and EIJ on December 18, 2001:
Although Al-Qaeda functions independently of other terrorist organizations, it also functions through some of the terrorist organizations that operate under its umbrella or with its support, including: the Al-Jihad, the Al-Gamma Al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group - led by Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman and later by Ahmed Refai Taha, a/k/a “Abu Yasser al Masri,”), Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and a number of jihad groups in other countries, including the Sudan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Somalia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bosnia, Croatia, Albania, Algeria, Tunisia, Lebanon, the Philippines, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, the Kashmiri region of India, and the Chechen region of Russia. Al-Qaeda also maintained cells and personnel in a number of countries to facilitate its activities, including in Kenya, Tanzania, the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States. By banding together, Al-Qaeda proposed to work together against the perceived common enemies in the West - particularly the United States which Al-Qaeda regards as an “infidel” state which provides essential support for other “infidel” governments.
Saddam Hussein provided funding for EIJ for the same reasons. And when one starts to consider the differences between Afghanistan’s Taliban after 9/11 and Saddam, the gaps narrows considerably. The Taliban gave AQ shelter while probably not realizing the extent to which it made them a target; Saddam funded their main leadership source and at least one of their subsidiaries in order to help them succeed in their mission against the US. That’s at least arguably an act of war, attempting to use terrorists as a proxy to fight it — and it very clearly fell within the post-9/11 Bush doctrine.
Update: Eli Lake at the New York Sun gets the story correct: “Report Details Saddam’s Terrorist Ties”. I guess this means he actually read the report.
-
Report Details Saddam's Terrorist Ties
BY ELI LAKE - Staff Reporter of the Sun
March 14, 2008
URL: http://www.nysun.com/article/72906
WASHINGTON — A Pentagon review of about 600,000 documents captured in the Iraq war attests to Saddam Hussein's willingness to use terrorism to target Americans and work closely with jihadist organizations throughout the Middle East.
The report, released this week by the Institute for Defense Analyses, says it found no "smoking gun" linking Iraq operationally to Al Qaeda. But it does say Saddam collaborated with known Al Qaeda affiliates and a wider constellation of Islamist terror groups.
The report, titled "Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights from Captured Iraqi Documents," finds that:
• The Iraqi Intelligence Service in a 1993 memo to Saddam agreed on a plan to train commandos from Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the group that assassinated Anwar Sadat and was founded by Al Qaeda's second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahiri.
• In the same year, Saddam ordered his intelligence service to "form a group to start hunting Americans present on Arab soil; especially Somalia." At the time, Al Qaeda was working with warlords against American forces there.
• Saddam's intelligence services maintained extensive support networks for a wide range of Palestinian Arab terrorist organizations, including but not limited to Hamas. Among the other Palestinian groups Saddam supported at the time was Force 17, the private army loyal to Yasser Arafat.
• Beginning in 1999, Iraq's intelligence service began providing "financial and moral support" for a small radical Islamist Kurdish sect the report does not name. A Kurdish Islamist group called Ansar al Islam in 2002 would try to assassinate the regional prime minister in the eastern Kurdish region, Barham Salih.
• In 2001, Saddam's intelligence service drafted a manual titled "Lessons in Secret Organization and Jihad Work—How to Organize and Overthrow the Saudi Royal Family." In the same year, his intelligence service submitted names of 10 volunteer "martyrs" for operations inside the Kingdom.
• In 2000, Iraq sent a suicide bomber through Northern Iraq who intended to travel to London to assassinate Ahmad Chalabi, at the time an Iraqi opposition leader who would later go on to be an Iraqi deputy prime minister. The mission was aborted after the bomber could not obtain a visa to enter the United Kingdom.
The report finds that Abdul Rahman Yasin, who is wanted by the FBI for mixing the chemicals for the 1993 World Center Attack, was a prisoner, and not a guest, in Iraq. An audio file of Saddam cited by the report indicates that the Iraqi dictator did not trust him and at one point said that he thought his testimony was too "organized." Saddam said on an audio file cited by the report that he suspected that the first attack could be the work of either Israel or American intelligence, or perhaps a Saudi or Egyptian faction.
The report also undercuts the claim made by many on the left and many at the CIA that Saddam, as a national socialist, was incapable of supporting or collaborating with the Islamist al Qaeda. The report concludes that instead Iraq's relationship with Osama bin Laden's organization was similar to the relationship between the rival Colombian cocaine cartels in the 1990s. Both were rivals in some sense for market share, but also allies when it came to expanding the size of the overall market.
The Pentagon study finds, "Recognizing Iraq as a second, or parallel, 'terror cartel' that was simultaneously threatened by and somewhat aligned with its rival helps to explain the evidence emerging from the detritus of Saddam's regime."
A long time skeptic of the connection between al Qaeda and Iraq and a former CIA senior Iraq analyst, Judith Yaphe yesterday said, "I think the report indicates that Saddam was willing to work with almost any group be it nationalist or Islamic, that was willing to work for his objectives. But in the long term he did not trust many of the Islamist groups, especially those linked to Saudi Arabia or Iran." She added, "He really did want to get anti-American operations going. The fact that they had little success shows in part their incompetence and unwilling surrogates."
A former Bush administration official who was a member of the counter-terrorism evaluation group that analyzed terror networks and links between terrorists and states, David Wurmser, said he felt the report began to vindicate his point of view.
"This is the beginning of the process of exposing Saddam's involvement in Islamic terror. But it is only the beginning. Time and declassification I'm sure will reveal yet more," he said. "Even so, this report is damning to those who doubted Saddam Hussein's involvement with Jihadist terrorist groups. It devastates one of the central myths plaguing our government prior to 9-11, that a Jihadist group would not cooperate with a secular regime and vice versa."
The report concludes that Saddam until the final months of his regime was willing to attack America. Its conclusion asks "Is there anything in the captured archives to indicate that Saddam had the will to use his terrorist capabilities directly against the United States?" It goes on, "Judging from Saddam's statements before the 1991 Gulf War with the United States, the answer is yes." As for after the Gulf War, the report states, "The rise of Islamist fundamentalism in the region gave Saddam the opportunity to make terrorism, one of the few tools remaining in Saddam's 'coercion' tool box." It goes on, "Evidence that was uncovered and analyzed attests to the existence of a terrorist capability and a willingness to use it until the day Saddam was forced to flee Baghdad by Coalition forces." The report does note that it is unclear whether Saddam would have authorized terrorism against American targets in the final months of his regime before Operation Iraqi Freedom five years ago. "The answer to the question of Saddam's will in the final months in power remains elusive," it says.
March 14, 2008 Edition > Section: Foreign > Printer-Friendly Version
-
5 years later, the NY Times gives some of the players a chance to reflect:
===========
Where Was the Plan?
By L. PAUL BREMER III
Published: March 16, 2008
FIFTEEN months before the 9/11 attacks, the bipartisan National Commission on Terrorism, on which I served as chairman, reported to the president and the American people that we faced a new and terrible threat: the nexus between states that supported terrorism and killers who wanted to murder Americans by the thousands and were prepared to die doing it.
For decades, American administrations from both parties had designated Saddam Hussein’s Iraq a terrorist state. He supported and lauded Palestinian terrorists. He had developed, and used, weapons of mass destruction against his own citizens. He had contemptuously refused to comply with 17 Security Council resolutions demanding he come clean on those programs.
Our soldiers were magnificent in liberating Iraq. But after arriving in the country, I saw that the American government was not adequately prepared to deal with the growing security threats. Looting raged unchecked in major cities. By late 2003, as the insurgency and terrorism grew, it became clear that the coalition also lacked an effective counterinsurgency strategy.
Our troops on the ground were valiant and selfless, but prewar planning provided for fewer than half the number of troops that independent studies suggested would be needed in Iraq. And we did not have a plan to provide the most basic function of any government — security for the population. Terrorists, insurgents, criminals and the Iraqi people got the impression that the coalition would not, or could not, protect civilians.
I should have pushed sooner for a more effective military strategy, because from 2004 to the end of 2007, Al Qaeda took advantage of this gap, using indiscriminate killings that provoked Shiite militias to respond in kind. The vicious spiral was finally reversed by the change in strategy the president put in place a year ago.
L. Paul Bremer III is a former presidential envoy to Iraq.
=======================
Too Heavy a Hand
By RICHARD PERLE
Published: March 16, 2008
AFTER defeating the Taliban dictatorship in Afghanistan and replacing it with a fledgling democracy, the Bush administration turned its attention to the risk that Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was thought to pose to a nation still reeling from the attacks of 9/11.
I shared the administration’s belief that Iraq not only possessed the capacity to produce weapons of mass destruction, it also had a hidden stockpile of them. Responsible for two wars with more than a million dead, involved for decades with terrorist groups, routinely rewarding suicide bombers with cash, unwilling to document the disposition of chemical and biological weapons ( some of which he had actually used), Saddam Hussein forced the question: Should we leave him in place and hope for the best, or destroy his regime in a lightning strike and thereby end the risk that he might collaborate with terrorists to enable an attack even more devastating than 9/11?
The right decision was made, and Baghdad fell in 21 days with few casualties on either side. Twenty-five million Iraqis had been liberated and the menace of Saddam’s monstrous regime eliminated.
Then the trouble began. Rather than turn Iraq over to Iraqis to begin the daunting process of nation building, a group including Secretary of State Colin Powell; the national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice; and the director of central intelligence, George Tenet — with President Bush’s approval — reversed a plan to do that.
Instead, we blundered into an ill-conceived occupation that would facilitate a deadly insurgency from which we, and the Iraqis, are only now emerging. With misplaced confidence that we knew better than the Iraqis, we sent an American to govern Iraq. L. Paul Bremer underestimated the task, but did his best to make a foolish policy work. I had badly underestimated the administration’s capacity to mess things up.
I did not believe the American-led coalition could prudently leave Iraq the day Baghdad fell. Coalition troops were essential to support a new Iraqi government. But I was astonished (and dismayed) that we did not turn to well-established and broadly representative opponents of Saddam Hussein’s regime to assume the responsibilities of an interim government while preparing for elections. Our troops could have remained, under the terms of a transparently negotiated agreement, to help the people of Iraq build their own society, something we didn’t know how to do and should never have tried. After five years of terrible losses, they may now be getting that chance.
Richard Perle was an assistant secretary of defense in the Reagan administration. He is a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
================
Das Loot
By ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER
Published: March 16, 2008
IN April 2003, just after American troops secured Baghdad, Iraqis looted the Iraqi national museum. American soldiers nearby made no effort to stop them, much less provide a guard. We either did not have enough soldiers to protect the museum, or we did not care enough to try.
This failure was simply a “matter of priorities,” according to Gen. Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld thought it was a “stretch” to attribute the theft and destruction of priceless Mesopotamian artifacts to “any defect in the war plan.”
Our government knew how to destroy but not how to build. We had toppled a regime, and in coming months we would dismantle Saddam Hussein’s bureaucracy and disband his army. But we did so with absolutely no understanding of how to build a liberal democracy, or even a stable, rights-regarding government with broad popular support.
Such a government requires a prosperous economy, a secure society and sufficient cultural unity to allow everyday interaction among different ethnic groups in workplaces, schools, hospitals, the army and the police. Protecting the symbols of a common and proud heritage is Democracy Building 101 — at least for anyone who understood anything about Iraqi history and culture.
Americans are still living with the aftermath of this ignorance, and we will be for decades to come. In 2003 and 2004, experts debated whether it would take one year or three to rebuild Iraq. Now we debate whether it will take 10 to 15 years or whether it can be done at all.
Those broken and stolen statues from the museum are the enduring symbols of what has gone so wrong. They were easy to smash, so hard to repair.
Anne-Marie Slaughter is the dean of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton.
===============
So Much for Good Intentions
By KENNETH M. POLLACK
Published: March 16, 2008
WHAT matters most now is not how we entered Iraq, but how we leave it. If we leave behind an Iraq more stable and less threatening to its neighbors than the one we toppled, I think the intelligence community’s (and my own) mistakes about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, the Bush administration’s exaggerations of that threat and its baseless insistence on links between Iraq and Al Qaeda will all lose their edge — even though they will not, and should not, be forgotten.
If we leave behind a raging civil war in which the Iraqi people are incomprehensibly worse off than they had been under Saddam Hussein and the Middle East more threatened by the chaos spilling over from Iraq than they ever were by the dictator’s arms, then no one will care how well-intentioned our motives.
For that reason, what I most wish I had understood before the invasion was the reckless arrogance of the Bush administration. I had inklings of it to be sure, and warned of the inadequacy of some of what I saw. But I did not realize that as skillfully, cautiously and patiently as George H. W. Bush’s administration had handled its Iraq war, that was how clumsy, careless and rash George W. Bush’s administration would treat its own.
Kenneth M. Pollack was a former director of Persian Gulf affairs at the National Security Council. He is a fellow at the Brookings Institution.
==============
There is No Freedom Gene
By DANIELLE PLETKA
Published: March 16, 2008
THE mantra of the antiwar left — “Bush lied, people died” — so dominates the debate about the run-up to the Iraq war that it has obscured real issues that deserve examination. After all, for those of us who supported the war, rebutting arguments about weapons of mass destruction has become reflexive. We point to all the United Nations Security Council resolutions, the International Atomic Energy Agency statements, the C.I.A. analyses, the Silberman-Robb report, the Senate Intelligence Committee findings — if we were wrong, we were in good and honest company.
But what about the mistaken assumptions that remain unexamined? Looking back, I felt secure in the knowledge that all who yearn for freedom, once free, would use it well. I was wrong. There is no freedom gene, no inner guide that understands the virtues of civil society, of secret ballots, of political parties. And it turns out that living under Saddam Hussein’s tyranny for decades conditioned Iraqis to accept unearned leadership, to embrace sect and tribe over ideas, and to tolerate unbridled corruption.
Some have used Iraq’s political immaturity as further proof the war was wrong, as if somehow those less politically evolved don’t merit freedoms they are ill equipped to make use of. We would be better served to understand how the free world can foster appreciation of the building blocks of civil society in order to help other victims of tyranny when it is their turn.
Danielle Pletka is the vice president for foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute.
===========
Worries over being Slimed
By NATHANIEL FICK
Published: March 16, 2008
OUR Marine platoon stayed up late to listen on a hand-cranked shortwave radio as Colin Powell testified before the United Nations about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. It was February 2003, and we were camped in the northern Kuwaiti desert, awaiting orders to invade Iraq.
The prospect of being “slimed” — and having to battle through a chemical attack — dominated every part of our planning. We wore heavy charcoal suits to protect us from chemicals, taped nerve-agent-detection paper to the windshields of our vehicles, and practiced jabbing antidote needles into our thighs.
We made bets not on whether it would happen, but when. We didn’t know what line we had to cross to provoke Saddam Hussein into using weapons of mass destruction — maybe the border, the Euphrates, the Tigris or the doorway to his presidential palace — and so the overriding objective was speed: get to Baghdad and cut the head off the snake.
Our conviction was strengthened on the second day of the war, when we interrogated an Iraqi officer found carrying a gas mask, rubber gloves and nerve agent antidotes. Did he really believe we would use chemical weapons against Iraq? No, he replied, but he expected that Saddam Hussein would use them against us, and his unit would be caught in the cross-fire.
This deception twisted our priorities dangerously out of whack. Methodically clearing areas of enemy fighters, and then securing them to protect the populace, seemed like a risky luxury in March and April. By August, with the insurgency in bloom, it had become a colossal missed opportunity.
The weapons, we now know, were some combination of relic, bluster and ruse. We focused on the nerve-agent feint, and got roundhoused by the insurgent hook. I wish we could all go back to those nights in the Kuwaiti desert, when a more sober assessment could have changed the way we fought, and maybe lessened the likelihood that we’d still be fighting five years later.
Nathaniel Fick is a fellow at the Center for a New American Security and the author of “One Bullet Away: The Making of a Marine Officer.”
================
Congress in Recess
By PAUL D. EATON
Published: March 16, 2008
MY greatest surprise was the failure on the part of Congress to assert itself before the executive branch. That failure assured continued problems for the military in the face of a secretary of defense who proved incompetent at fighting war.
Had Congress defended the welfare of our armed forces by challenging the concentration of power in the hands of the president, the vice president and the secretary of defense, our Army and Marine Corps would not be in the difficult position we find them in today.
The Republican-dominated Congress failed us by refusing to hold the necessary hearings and investigations the Army desperately needed. Without hearings, the Army could not advance its case for increasing the number of troops and rearming the force. The result is an Army and Marine Corps on the ropes, acres and acres of broken equipment, and tour lengths of 15 months because we have too few troops for the tasks at hand.
Paul D. Eaton is a retired Army major general who was in charge of training the Iraqi military from 2003 to 2004. He is an adviser to the presidential campaign of Hillary Clinton.
==============
The Army grew into the job
FREDERICK KAGAN
Published: March 16, 2008
FROM the moment the Bush administration took office, I argued against its apparent preference for high-tech, small-footprint wars, which continued a decade of movement in that direction by senior military leaders and civilian experts. In 2002, I questioned the common triumphalism about American operations in Afghanistan, and particularly the notion of applying the “Afghanistan model” of low-manpower, high-precision operations in Iraq. I supported the 2003 invasion despite misgivings about how it would be executed, and those misgivings proved accurate.
However, the most surprising phenomenon of the war has been the transformation of the United States military into the most discriminate and effective counterinsurgency force the world has ever seen, skillfully blending the most advanced technology with human interactions between soldiers and the Iraqi people. Precision-guided weapons allowed our soldiers and marines to minimize collateral damage while using our advantages in firepower to the full.
Once we pushed most of our combat forces into close interactions with the Iraqi people, the information they obtained ensured that the targets they hit were the right ones. Above all, the compassion and concern our soldiers have consistently shown to civilians and even to defeated and captured enemies have turned the tide of Iraqi opinion.
Within a year, our forces went from imminent defeat to creating the prospect of success, using a great deal of firepower, killing and capturing many enemies, but binding the local population to us at the same time. The intellectual framework came from Gens. David Petraeus and Ray Odierno and their advisers. But the deep understanding, skill and compassion that made it work came from service members and the many civilians who put their lives at risk for the benefit of their country and Iraq.
Frederick Kagan is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.
============
Worse than LBJ's Team
ANTHONY D. CORDESMAN
Published: March 16, 2008
IN fairness to the Bush administration, I did not expect that we would discover no meaningful activity in rebuilding Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and no Iraqi ties to Al Qaeda. I also never predicted, after the insurgency began, that the extremists in Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia would so alienate Sunnis and tribes in western Iraq that a combination of the “surge, win and hold” military tactics, American-led nation-building efforts that focused on local and provincial needs, and the cease-fire declared by Moktada al-Sadr could create today’s new opportunity for “victory.”
In balance, however, the most serious surprise was that what appeared to be the American A-Team in national security ignored years of planning and months of interagency activity before the war, and the United States had no meaningful plan for stability operations and nation building after the defeat of Saddam Hussein’s armed forces. Relying on sectarian exiles with strong ties to Iran, disbanding the security forces and starting the process of de-Baathification were all obvious disasters, as were the creation of closed-list national elections and the failure to quickly hold local and provincial elections.
It was even more of a surprise to watch the Bush administration fail, from 2003 to 2006, to come to grips with creating effective counterinsurgency programs, focused aid and development efforts, political accommodation and effective Iraqi forces. As a Republican, I would never have believed that President Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld would waste so many opportunities and so much of America’s reputation that they would rival Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara and McGeorge Bundy for the worst wartime national security team in United States history.
Anthony D. Cordesman is a fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
-
America and Iraq
March 20, 2008; Page A18
Five years after U.S. and coalition forces began rolling into Iraq on their way to Baghdad, it's easy to lament the war's mistakes.
The Bush Administration underestimated the war's cost -- in treasure, and most painfully in lives. The CIA and every other Western intelligence agency was wrong about Saddam's weapons of mass destruction. The U.S. failed to anticipate the insurgency and was almost fatally late in implementing a counterinsurgency. It allowed the U.N. to design a system of proportional electoral representation that has encouraged its sectarian political divisions. And so on.
These columns have often discussed these and other blunders. But we have always done so while supporting the larger war effort and with a goal of victory that would be worthy of the sacrifice. Five years on, and thanks to the troop "surge" and strategy change of the last year, many of the goals that motivated the original invasion are once again within reach if we see the effort through.
* * *
No one should forget that the invasion toppled a dictator who had already terrorized the region and would sooner or later have threatened American interests. This by itself was no small achievement. Saddam's trial was a teaching moment for that part of the Arab world that used to cheer him; his hanging, however crudely carried out, was a warning to dictators everywhere.
Iraq may not have had WMD, but Saddam admitted to American interrogators that he planned to reconstitute his WMD effort once U.N. sanctions collapsed. The capture of Saddam persuaded Libya's Moammar Gadhafi to abandon his nuclear program and seek a reconciliation with the U.S. This in turn led to the rolling up of Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan's proliferation network, whose arms extended to Iran and North Korea.
Strategically, Iraq has gone from being one of America's two principal enemies (with Iran) in the region to one of its two principal allies (with Israel). Iraq's government, for all of its shortcomings, demonstrates that a Shiite-led government need not be a theocracy. The invasion did prompt thousands of jihadis to emerge from places like Saudi Arabia and Morocco to fight the "crusaders and infidels." Thousands of them are now dead or in prison, however, and the radical corners of the Arab world have learned that America cannot be defeated by a strategy of car bombs and assassination.
The strategic case for toppling Saddam also rested in part on the idea that a free Iraq would provide a strategic counterweight to Iran and Syria, as well as an ideological counterexample for a region where autocracy is the norm. The potency of that combination has been demonstrated by Sunni Arab hostility to the new Iraqi government; by Iran, Syria and al Qaeda efforts to destabilize it; and by those in the West who have sought to denigrate the effort as a way to diminish U.S. power.
Today, those efforts have largely failed. A new generation of European leaders has no interest in humiliating the U.S. and understands the danger of a chaotic Iraq. Al Qaeda has been nearly destroyed as a fighting force in Iraq and has lost support in the Arab Street with its brutality against Iraq's Sunni Arabs. Saudi Arabia, Egypt and other Sunni states are belatedly coming to terms with the new Iraq as they conclude that the U.S. won't leave in defeat.
The Iraqi government is also at last beginning to meet its most important political commitments. Yesterday, Iraq's presidency council agreed to a law on provincial elections to go forward after a month's delay. The central government has passed a budget, approved a detainee amnesty, enlisted 425,000 men in its security forces and increased oil production to 2.4 million barrels a day while funneling $100 million a year to its provinces. This is happening while the number of daily insurgent attacks has been cut by about two-thirds, with commensurate declines in civilian and military casualties.
Where do we go from here? Iraq's transition to self-government remains fragile enough that U.S. forces will need to remain there in some numbers for years to come. The two countries will have to strike a long-term U.S.-Iraq military agreement, which would serve the interests of both countries. For Iraq, it would show America's continuing commitment in a rough neighborhood. And for the U.S., it would make the job of containing Iran easier. President Bush can best serve his Presidential successor by leaving enough troops on the ground to give him or her some strategic flexibility.
It is therefore unfortunate, and dangerous, that both Democratic candidates have backed themselves into a corner by endorsing rapid withdrawal from Iraq. In a speech yesterday in North Carolina, Barack Obama called for an almost complete U.S. withdrawal in 16 months. He continues to endorse the illusion that defeat in Iraq will help us prevail in Afghanistan; the opposite is closer to the truth. We will never maintain the support, either at home or abroad, to prevail in Afghanistan if we show we can be driven from the more vital strategic prize of Iraq.
* * *
In our March 18, 2003 editorial on the eve of Iraq's liberation, we supported the war while noting that "toppling Saddam is a long-term undertaking" and "the U.S. has never been good at nation-building." We wish we had been wrong on both counts, but our view has always been that nations shouldn't begin wars they don't intend to win. And newspapers don't endorse wars only to walk away when the fighting gets difficult. The U.S. sacrifice in Iraq has been honorable, our soldiers have fought superbly, and the best way -- the only way -- to honor both is to leave Iraq in victory.
See all of today's editorials and op-eds, plus video commentary, on Opinion Journal.
-
I appreciate hearing from the generals on the ground. This was Gen. Odierno speaking about a week ago. One excerpt from the pre-surge portion:
"it is important that I mention one other factor that informed our planning and decision-making process. On December 19, 2006, we captured some mid-level al-Qaeda leaders just north of Baghdad. Upon them was a map that clearly depicted al-Qaeda's strategy for the total and unyielding dominance of Baghdad, betting that control of Iraq's capital and its millions of citizens would give them free rein to export their twisted ideology and terror."
http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/hl1068.cfm
The Surge in Iraq: One Year Later
by Lt. Gen. Raymond T Odierno
Heritage Lecture #1068
I returned from Iraq a little over two weeks ago, and trust me, it's great to be in Washington and in your company today. After nearly 15 months in Iraq--mostly spent focusing on where we are and where we're going--it's a pleasure to step back and reflect a bit about where we've been. I'd like to speak with you about Iraq in 2007, to include the surge, its implementation, and my assessment of its impact.
Baghdad: Before the Surge
As I prepared to depart Fort Hood, Texas, for Baghdad in late November 2006, the Coalition effort in Iraq was at a crossroads. The United States had just held mid-term elections; a new Secretary of Defense had been appointed; and the long-awaited recommendations of the Iraq Study Group were about to be published.
Stories in the press described the situation in Iraq as spiraling out of control. One Los Angeles Times article discussed the rising level of sectarian violence in Baghdad and how this violence seemed to feed on itself. Placing his account in context, the writer mentioned that al-Qaeda had detonated a bomb in the Shia neighborhood of Sadr City the previous week, killing over 200 people. This was the latest in a steady run of high-profile attacks since the Golden Mosque bombing of February 2006 in Samarra. And for at least one Shiite living in Baghdad, it was the last straw.
After months of standing apprehensively on the sidelines, the 27-year-old shopkeeper signed up with Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army, feeling obligated to do so for his own family's protection. Illustrating how violence was increasingly consuming the capital city, the article also told of a 33-year-old Sunni Arab who decided to join a militia ostensibly for the same reason, to protect his community. In reality though, thousands of fighters in Baghdad took an expansive view of their role as "protectors," and their actions consequently fueled the cycle of violence.
Taking the offensive against Iraqi civilians on the other side of the sectarian divide, many launched attacks that elicited retaliation, which, as the situation deteriorated, only provided justification for the next round of brutal reprisals. Sunni and Shia alike tolerated the extremists in their midst because the Iraqi Army and Police, in some cases, could not be trusted and, in most cases, lacked the capacity to protect the population.
The activities of militias and death squads helped to sustain the cycle of violence in the capital city, and their continued growth stemmed--most fundamentally--from an absence of security. With the violence came fear. Attitudes hardened as survival became the one imperative; allegiances formed along sectarian lines; and civilian deaths accumulated. Close to 2,000 Iraqis lost their lives as a result of ethno-sectarian violence in November 2006 alone, and the count exceeded this grim benchmark the following month. Corpses were found in trash heaps and along Baghdad's side streets by the dozens each day.
Al-Anbar: Before the Surge
In al-Anbar province, things were actually getting better, but the positive signs had not yet become evident. Also in late November, The Washington Post ran a story entitled "Anbar Picture Grows Clearer...and Bleaker." The article discussed the findings of an assessment that characterized the province as lost--with al-Qaeda in Iraq exerting control over the daily lives of Anbaris more so than any other political or military organization.
The Post summarized a Marine intelligence report, stating "Between AQI's [al-Qaeda in Iraq's] violence, Iran's influence, and an expected U.S. drawdown, the...situation has deteriorated to a point that U.S. and Iraqi troops are no longer capable of...defeating the insurgency in al-Anbar."
In fact, the province's tribes had already begun to turn against AQI. Nonetheless, the broad sentiment among the Sunni was that their worst fears of being marginalized--even subjugated--in a Shia-dominated Iraq were coming to fruition. Many commentators at the time used the term "civil war" to describe the conflict. Given the situation in Baghdad and Anbar, it was hard to dismiss this as careless exaggeration.
When I arrived in Iraq, General George Casey, then the Multinational Force commander, challenged me to break the cycle of sectarian violence. Breaking the cycle and reducing the violence required securing the population and stopping accelerants, our term for those carrying out the attacks and thus triggering the subsequent reprisals. We had made efforts in Baghdad along these lines before, but not to the point where they had yielded any significant or lasting gains.
Establishing Basic Security: Late 2006
Coalition forces could concentrate on selected areas and clear them of extremists. But when these areas transitioned to Iraqi control as our units moved on to other parts of the city, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) left behind were incapable of "holding" the ground we had won. The challenges involved with securing the population were simply too great for the ISF at the time.
In some cases, the ISF itself was complicit in attacks against the civilians its units were charged to protect. Another obstacle to solidifying security gains was political in nature. Then, as now, sustainable security demanded a political solution, with the chief feature being a government of Iraq (GOI) commitment to national reconciliation. Still today, we see some GOI intransigence, but they are making progress.
In late 2006, the progress we can observe now was unthinkable. In short, we could hardly expect successful transition or meaningful reconciliation without basic security. Establishing security for the population was a prerequisite for further progress. It was essential. And to make a decisive impact, we needed more combat power and a change in approach.
However, it is important that I mention one other factor that informed our planning and decision-making process. On December 19, 2006, we captured some mid-level al-Qaeda leaders just north of Baghdad. Upon them was a map that clearly depicted al-Qaeda's strategy for the total and unyielding dominance of Baghdad, betting that control of Iraq's capital and its millions of citizens would give them free rein to export their twisted ideology and terror.
Indeed, al-Qaeda did operate with impunity in several areas surrounding the capital that we call the "Baghdad Belts," using these sanctuaries to introduce accelerants of violence. This strategy was similar to the way in which Saddam Hussein employed his elite Republican Guard forces to control the city. It was clear to us that Coalition forces would need to clear AQI from these belts and deny these enemies safe havens in order to control Baghdad.
Offensive Operations: Early 2007
From January to June 2007, the surge forces deployed gradually to Iraq, but we adjusted our strategy even before the first additional Brigade Combat Team arrived. Implementing the surge involved much more than throwing extra resources at a problem. It meant committing ourselves to protecting the Iraqi populace--with a priority to Baghdad--while exploiting what appeared to be nascent progress against AQI in Anbar.
It meant changing our mindset as we secured the people where they worked and slept and where their children played. It meant developing new tactics, techniques, and procedures in order to implement this concept. We began to establish Joint Security Stations and Combat Outposts throughout Baghdad. We erected protective barriers and established checkpoints to create "safe neighborhoods" and "safe markets," improving security for Iraqis as they went about their daily lives.
Changing our approach also meant introducing more balance in our targeting by going after both Sunni and Shia extremists. I should point out that this modification required the government of Iraq's cooperation, and it is significant to note that we got it. Shia militia leaders conducting extra-judicial killings would no longer get a free pass.
Changing our approach meant reinvigorating our partnership with the Iraqi Security Forces and improving their capacity. It meant improving our ability to integrate our military efforts with the expertise of other government agencies--largely through Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams. Finally, it meant determining where best to employ the surge forces in and around Baghdad and Anbar and sequencing their employment so that they had the greatest impact.
Many have discussed how we implemented this change in strategy - building up forces and capability through the spring of 2007; launching Phantom Thunder--a set of simultaneous operations across Baghdad and its surrounding belt areas; and quickly following up that with Phantom Strike in order to keep extremists off balance.
Results: A Change in Attack Trends
Throughout these offensive operations, we maintained constant focus on job one--protecting the population. By November, we could claim that attacks had dropped to their lowest levels since 2004-2005. There were 30 attacks in al-Anbar province during the last week in October. One year prior, there had been over 300. Today there are under 20 incidents per week in all of Anbar.
The change in attack trends in Baghdad was also dramatic; it reflected a marked reduction of nearly 60 percent. In 2006, civilian deaths throughout Iraq were over 3,000 in the month of December. In less than a year, they had plummeted by 70 percent. In the Baghdad Security Districts specifically, ethno-sectarian attacks and deaths decreased by 90 percent over the course of 2007.
Obviously, it's entirely too early to declare victory and go home, but I think it's safe to say that the surge of Coalition forces--and how we employed those forces--have broken the cycle of sectarian violence in Iraq. We are in the process of exploiting that success.
Explaining the reduction in violence and its strategic significance has been the subject of much debate. It's tempting for those of us personally connected to the events to exaggerate the effects of the surge. By the same token, it's a gross oversimplification to say, as some commentators have, that the positive trends we're observing have come about because we paid off the Sunni insurgents or because Muqtada al-Sadr simply decided to announce a ceasefire. These assertions ignore the key variable in the equation--the Coalition's change in strategy and our employment of the surge forces.
Suggesting that the reduction in violence resulted merely from bribing our enemies to stop fighting us is uninformed and an oversimplification. It overlooks our significant offensive push in the last half of 2007 and our rise in casualties in May and June as we began to take back neighborhoods. It overlooks the salient point that many who reconciled with us did so from a position of weakness, rather than strength. The truth is that the improvement in security and stability is the result of a number of factors, and what Coalition forces did throughout 2007 ranks among the most significant.
In December 2006, the number of American fighting battalions in the Baghdad Security Districts was 13. By the following summer, there were 25 conducting operations from dozens of Joint Security Stations and Combat Outposts in the heart of the city. Throughout Baghdad and the surrounding belts, Coalition forces were not only attacking the enemy, they were establishing and maintaining a presence in places that had long been sanctuaries of al-Qaeda.
At the same time, we were going after Shia extremists--those responsible for the displacement of Sunni families, sectarian-motivated executions, and intimidating the populace in general. We launched precise, targeted raids repeatedly against the worst offenders. Given additional troops, the Coalition employed them to protect the population. This commitment to the people of Iraq made a difference both directly and indirectly.
Successful Partnerships: Police and Citizens
Partnered with the Iraqi Security Forces, our operations fragmented what were once well-established AQI support zones, disrupted the network's operations, and forced its leaders (those who survived) to shift their bases elsewhere--in many cases, out of reach of Baghdad. Likewise, Coalition forces knocked Shia extremists off balance and drove many away from the capital. I believe our operations injected a healthy dose of confusion into the Mahdi Army's ranks, caused many intermediate- and lower-level leaders to overreact, and ultimately prompted Muqtada al-Sadr to call for a ceasefire to restore order and to recast the image of his organization as a humanitarian rather than a military one. No doubt, our efforts to disrupt Mahdi Army leadership figured significantly in Sadr's decision.
The surge of Coalition forces also helped bring about a surge in Iraqi Security Force capacity. More U.S. brigade combat teams meant more partnered units for the Iraqi Army and National Police. When it comes to developing the ISF, there is simply no substitute for partnership.
Embracing and enabling the concept of protecting the population also built momentum for bottom-up reconciliation, allowing this process to expand beyond Anbar into other provinces. Enhanced security and persistent Coalition force presence encouraged Iraqis who wanted to stand up and reject AQI to do so without fear of retaliation. Joint Security Stations and Combat Outposts had a clear, noticeable effect on the Iraqi people not only physically, but more importantly, psychologically.
So, what did we do with these citizens that made the choice to reject al-Qaeda and extremism? Acknowledging the potential risks of dealing with former adversaries, our commanders seized upon the opportunity and hired them to assist in local security where Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police were lacking. Initially known as Concerned Local Citizens, but now called the Sons of Iraq, a grassroots movement sprung up akin to neighborhood watches. Mainly Sunni at the beginning and wary of the Shia-led government, these groups turned to the coalition and offered their services to provide protection for the population.
In so doing, we were able to keep young Sunni men away from extremism, provide jobs and income, and gain valuable intelligence on the insurgency, improvised explosive devices, and caches. But they were also looking for legitimacy. The impact of the Sons of Iraq went beyond security and paved the way for improvements in basic services, economic progress, and local governance. As word of their success spread, so did the program--and it continues today. Only paying them meager wages and not providing weapons and ammunition, the program has been an unqualified success.
Additionally, there is a second-order effect in that every dollar paid to the Sons of Iraq gets spent at least two additional times as they provide for their families and then local markets buy wholesale goods to stock their stands. In places where we have employed the Sons of Iraq, we average a ten-fold increase in the markets, for example going from 40 to 400 stands. Finally, the Sons of Iraq are now branching out across Iraq and increasingly include Shia groups and, in some cases, mixed sect groups.
Setting the Stage for Hope
Generally speaking, when security conditions improve, a narrow focus on survival opens up and makes room for hope. Hope provides an opportunity to pursue improvements in quality of life. Along these lines, the surge helped set the stage for progress in governance and economic development. In a very real way and at the local level, this subtle shift in attitude reinforced our security gains--allowing Coalition and Iraqi forces to hold the hard-earned ground we had wrested from the enemy while continuing to pursue extremists as they struggle to regroup elsewhere.
In Baghdad, al-Anbar, and in many other areas of Iraq, the story in early 2008 is about improving people's lives and building government capacity, and about their expectations regarding the future. For the government of Iraq, the surge has provided a window of opportunity. This window will not remain open forever.
To capitalize on the reduction of violence in 2007, Iraqi leaders must make deliberate choices to secure lasting strategic gains through reconciliation and political progress. This set of choices and their collective effect will be decisive, I think. This view puts things in context.
The future of Iraq belongs to the Iraqis. The improved security conditions resulting in part from the surge of 2007 have given the Iraqis an opportunity to choose a better way. In the last week, several major pieces of legislation have been passed by the Iraqi parliament: accountability and justice, provincial powers, and amnesty law.
Conclusion
Let me close by emphasizing that there was much sacrifice to achieve these gains. Let us all never forget those whose lives have been changed forever because of injuries and those who gave their lives fighting for the ideals of liberty as well as their loved ones. Their sacrifices were and are not in vain, and because of them the Iraqis have the right to choose their own destiny.
The gates of freedom remain open today because of our fallen comrades: noble and gallant warriors who gave everything so others can enjoy life, liberty, and happiness. We will honor their memory and remain dedicated to ensuring their sacrifices are never forgotten.
I am honored to serve in the greatest Armed Forces in the world, and I'm proud of what it stands for. We have not finished our mission, but we have proven our mettle. Thank you for giving me the opportunity to talk to you this morning, and God Bless America.
Lieutenant General Raymond T. Odierno is the Commanding General of U.S. III Corps.
-
Saddam's Terror Links
March 24, 2008; Page A14
Five years on, few Iraq myths are as persistent as the notion that the Bush Administration invented a connection between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda. Yet a new Pentagon report suggests that Iraq's links to world-wide terror networks, including al Qaeda, were far more extensive than previously understood.
Naturally, it's getting little or no attention. Press accounts have been misleading or outright distortions, while the Bush Administration seems indifferent. Even John McCain has let the study's revelations float by. But that doesn't make the facts any less notable or true.
The redacted version of "Saddam and Terrorism" is the most definitive public assessment to date from the Harmony program, the trove of "exploitable" documents, audio and video records, and computer files captured in Iraq. On the basis of about 600,000 items, the report lays out Saddam's willingness to use terrorism against American and other international targets, as well as his larger state sponsorship of terror, which included harboring, training and equipping jihadis throughout the Middle East.
"The rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the region gave Saddam the opportunity to make terrorism, one of the few tools remaining in Saddam's 'coercion' toolbox, not only cost effective but a formal instrument of state power," the authors conclude. Throughout the 1990s, the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) cooperated with Hamas; the Palestine Liberation Front, which maintained a Baghdad office; Force 17, Yasser Arafat's private army; and others. The IIS gave commando training for members of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the organization that assassinated Anwar Sadat and whose "emir" was Ayman al-Zawahiri, who became Osama bin Laden's second-in-command when the group merged with al Qaeda in 1998.
At the very least the report should dispel the notion that outwardly "secular" Saddam would never consort with religious types like al Qaeda. A pan-Arab nationalist, Saddam viewed radical Islamists as potential allies, and they likewise. According to a 1993 memo, Saddam decided to "form a group to start hunting Americans present on Arab soil; especially Somalia," where al Qaeda was then working with warlords against U.S. humanitarian forces. Saddam also trained Sudanese fighters in Iraq.
The Pentagon report cites this as "a tactical example" of their cooperation. When Saddam "was ordering action in Somalia aimed at the American presence, Osama bin Laden was doing the same thing." Saddam took an interest in "far-flung terrorist groups . . . to locate any organization whose services he might use in the future." The Harmony documents "reveal that the regime was willing to co-opt or support organizations it knew to be part of al Qaeda -- as long as that organization's near-term goals supported Saddam's long-term version."
For 20 years, such "support" included using Fedayeen Saddam training camps to school terrorists, especially Palestinians but also non-Iraqis "directly associated" with al Qaeda, continuing up to the fall of Baghdad. Saddam also provided financial support and weapons, amounting to "a state-directed program of significant scale." In July 2001, the regime began patronizing a terror cartel in Bahrain calling itself the Army of Muhammad, which, according to an Iraqi memo, "is under the wings of bin Laden."
It's true that the Pentagon report found no "smoking gun," i.e., a direct connection on a joint Iraq-al Qaeda operation. Supposedly this vindicates the view that Iraq's liberation was launched on false premises. But the Administration was always cautious, with Colin Powell alleging merely a "sinister nexus" in his 2003 U.N. speech. If anything, sinister is an understatement. The main Iraq intelligence failure was over WMD, but the report indicates that the CIA also underestimated Saddam's ties to global terror cartels.
The Administration has always maintained that Iraq is just one front in the war on terror; and the report offers "evidence of logistical preparation for terrorist operations in other nations, including those in the West." In 2002, an IIS memo explained to Saddam that Iraqi embassies were stockpiling weapons, while many of the terrorists trained in Fedayeen camps were dispatched to London with counterfeit documents, where they circulated throughout Europe.
Around the same time, the IIS began to manufacture better improvised explosive devices "designed to be used in civilian areas," and the regime bureaucratized suicide operations, with local Baath Party leaders competing to provide recruits for Saddam as part of a "Martyrdom Project."
All of these are inconvenient facts for those who want to assert that somehow Saddam could have been easily contained and presented no threat to the U.S. The Harmony files buttress the case that the decision to oust Saddam was the right one -- which makes it all the more puzzling that the Bush Administration is mum. It isn't the first time the White House has ceded the Iraq debate to its opponents.
-
Ah, the standard Bush administration lack of communication.
If there has ever been an administration more inept at making it's own case to the public, i'm not aware of it.
-
New York Post
March 20, 2008
Shock And Awful
Iraq: Justifiable War, Plagued By DC Incompetence
By Ralph Peters
ON the fifth anniversary of our campaign to remove Saddam Hussein's
monstrous regime from power, it's hard not to despair - not because of the
situation in Iraq, which has improved remarkably, but because so few
American politicians in either party appear to have drawn the right
lessons from our experience.
For the record, I still believe that deposing Saddam was justified and
useful. He was a Hitler, and he was our enemy. But I'm still reeling from
the snotty incompetence with which the Bush administration acted. Above
all, I'm ashamed that I trusted President Bush and his circle to have a plan
for the day after Baghdad fell.
All of our other failures in Iraq stemmed from this fundamental neglect
of a basic requirement: Our soldiers and Marines reached Baghdad without orders
or strategic guidance. We became the dog that caught the fire truck. The
tragedy is that it didn't have to be that way: One thing our military
knows how to do is plan.
But the relevant staffs were prevented from doing so. Ideologues and
avaricious friends of the administration wanted the war for their own
reasons, and they didn't intend to alarm Congress with high cost
estimates. So they trusted the perfumed tales of a convicted criminal, Ahmad Chalabi,
rather than the professional views of the last honorable generals
then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld had not yet removed.
Even on the purely military side, the White House put its faith in
hopeless gimmicks, such as "Shock and Awe," convincing itself that ground troops
were an afterthought. Of course, it was the old-fashioned grunts, tankers,
gunners and supply sergeants who had to get us to Baghdad.
Iraq just didn't have to be this hard. We made it immeasurably more
difficult by trying to make war on the cheap, then turning the war's
aftermath into a looting orgy for well-connected contractors.
The fundamental requirement to provide security for the population - a
troop-intensive endeavor - went ignored, while grandiose reconstruction
projects drained the pockets of American taxpayers, only to come to
nothing. Our troops and their battlefield leaders did all they could under
Rumsfeld's yes-man generals, but every other branch of our government ducked. The
"interagency effort" was a joke.
Back home, Congress indulged in cheap partisanship. The State Department
concentrated on building the world's largest and most-expensive embassy -
a project worthy of Saddam himself - and let the spectacularly incompetent
Ambassador L. Paul Bremer wreck what little hope of maintaining peace
remained.
The administration's solution to worsening conditions was to send more
compliant generals, to continue listening to think-tank "experts" who had
never served in uniform, to keep cutting fat checks for contractors and to
let our troops bleed between photo ops.
None of us should mistake the fundamental truth: The only reason our
efforts in Iraq have not failed completely has been the sustained valor and
commitment of those in uniform. Our military was the only government
entity that did its job. Its thanks have been betrayal by the political
opposition at home, a rash of movies portraying our troops as psychotics and
crocodile tears from protesters who secretly delight in US casualties.
In 2007, after four bloody years of denial, a desperate administration
finally got serious about military requirements, sending the additional
troops (now weary) who should have been deployed in 2003. With the
wetched Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld headed out the door, the president
also permitted a serious soldier, Gen. David Petraeus, to take charge in Iraq.
We got lucky, too. Our global enemies in al Qaeda alienated Iraq's Sunni
Arabs in record time, indulging in grotesque forms of oppression and
terror even Saddam and his sons had never dared to inflict. Those who recently
had sided with al Qaeda against us found that we were their only hope to be
rid of al Qaeda. The Sunni-Arab flip in Iraq has been a great strategic
victory that resounds throughout the Muslim world.
The troop surge also had a powerful psychological effect, convincing
enemies, fence-sitters and local allies alike that we weren't quitting -
despite the results of the US midterm elections. And the Iraqi people were
just sick of the violence. By 2007, most had gotten the worst bile out of
their systems and wanted normal lives.
Even the often chaotic, corruption-addled Iraqi legislature managed to
pass more major bills in 2007 than the US Congress sent to the president's
desk.
The situation in Iraq is improving, as I've seen with my own eyes. Despite
our cavalcade of errors, there's hope (no audacity required) for a
reasonable outcome: an Iraq that treats its citizens decently and that
neither harbors terrorists nor menaces its neighbors.
We'll need to sustain a longer commitment than would have been the case
had the administration's know-it-alls not regarded our best generals as fools
back in 2003. The administration's disgraceful treatment of then-Army
Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki was paradigmatic of its arrogance.
Meanwhile, those who held power over our military and misused it so
disgracefully will never suffer as our military casualties and their
families will for the rest of their lives. At most, those privileged men
will experience disappointing sales of their self-serving memoirs. Cowards
sent heroes to die.
I cannot help repeating the heartbreaking truth that it didn't have to be
this hard, this bloody, or this expensive. This is what happens when war
is made by amateurs. Has anyone in Washington learned that lesson?
It's a lesson that the left, as well as the right, needs to take to heart.
While the Bush administration deserves every lash it gets, domestic
opponents of the war have been hypocritical, dishonest and destructive. As
this column long has maintained, had President Bill Clinton sent our
troops to depose Saddam Hussein, Democrats would have celebrated him as the
greatest liberator since Abraham Lincoln.
The problem for the left wasn't really what was done, but who did it. And
hatred of Bush actually empowered him - the administration had no
incentive to reach out to those who wouldn't reach back, so it just did as it
pleased. Today's "antiwar" left also contains plenty of politicians who backed
interventions in the Balkans and Somalia, who would be glad to send
American troops to Darfur today and who voted for war in Iraq.
Both parties are quick to employ our military. It's the only
foreign-policy tool we have that works. Neither party is a peace party - each just wants
to pick its own wars. The hypocrisy in Washington is as astonishing as the
dishonesty about security needs.
Through it all, amazingly, our young men and women in uniform continue to
serve honorably and skillfully, holding together not just Iraq but a
fractured world. We whine and bicker. They re-enlist and go back to Iraq
and Afghanistan. Where they're targets of scorn for our elitist media.
Given all our mistakes and partisan agendas, it's amazing Iraq is going as
well as it is today. The improved conditions in Baghdad and most of the
provinces verge on the miraculous, given the situation a year ago. But
we've paid a needlessly high price.
As for President Bush, let's face it: He's been our most-inept wartime
leader since James Madison fled the White House, leaving his wife behind
to save what she could before the British troops arrived with torches.
That said, Bush has displayed one single worthy characteristic (one he
shares, oddly enough, with Madison): He won't surrender.
As horribly as Bush performed for our first four years in Iraq, it's still
possible to do worse. Both of the Democratic Party's presidential
aspirants believe that the answer is to flee, handing the terrorists we've defeated
a strategic victory, inviting a genocidal civil war, further destabilizing
the Middle East, and sending the message to the world that Americans lack the
courage and staying power of our enemies.
Declaring failure isn't the correct response to failure narrowly avoided.
Both Sens. Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton would kill a struggling
convalescent. Bush's shambles would become the next administration's
catastrophe. As president, Obama or Clinton would finish with far more
blood on his or her hands than President Bush has on his.
Was deposing Saddam Hussein a good idea? Yes. I still believe that. It was
an act of vision and virtue. It's only a shame we didn't do it competently.
-
Anatomy of the Surge
By PETER D. FEAVER
March 26, 2008
Over the past 16 months, the United States has altered its trajectory in Iraq. We are no longer headed toward a catastrophic defeat and may be on the path to a remarkable victory. As a result, the next president, Democrat or Republican, may well find it easier to adopt the broad contours of this administration's current strategy than to jeopardize progress by changing course abruptly.
That would be an ironic, but satisfying, outcome to the tortuous journey on which the Bush administration's policy toward Iraq, and this nation's views of Iraq, have been traveling over the past three years.
The administration's description of the long-term American goal--a democratic Iraq that can defend itself, govern itself and sustain itself, and will be an ally in the war on terror--has remained consistent from the time the war was launched in 2003 until now. What has shifted, due to sobering experience, is its sense of how long it might take to achieve this goal: a time frame that has stretched from months, to years, and even to decades.
I witnessed the shift firsthand. For two years, from June 2005 to July 2007, I left my teaching position at Duke to join the National Security Council staff as a special adviser for strategic planning, and in that capacity I worked closely on Iraq policy. By the middle of 2005, it was painfully obvious to everyone involved that the only decisive outcome that could be achieved during President Bush's tenure was the triumph of our enemies, America's withdrawal, and Iraq's descent into a hellish chaos as yet undreamed of.
The challenge, therefore, was to develop and implement a workable strategy that could be handed over to Mr. Bush's successor. Although important progress could be made on that strategy during Mr. Bush's watch, ultimately it would be carried through by the next president. This was the reality behind the course followed by the administration in 2005-06, and it remains the reality behind the new and different course the administration has been following since 2007.
This new and different strategy, now called the "surge" but at one point called by insiders the "bridge," emerged out of a growing recognition over 2006 that our critics were right about one thing: Our Iraq policy was not working. At the same time, however, and whether knowingly or ignorantly, many of those same critics were insisting that the answer lay in pursuing precisely the same strategy we already had in place. That is, they were telling us that we needed (a) to push Iraqi government officials to come together politically and (b) to train Iraqi troops so that they could take over from American forces. We had been doing exactly these things for a year, and we had been driven to the brink.
This was no solution at all. The results on the ground in Iraq made it clear that without a dramatic change, the president would be leaving his successor with an untenable mess, if not the prospect of a catastrophic American rout. A review of administration policy was therefore launched that led to the dramatic course revision we have seen unfolding over the past year-and-a-half.
Next month, the military leader of the surge, Gen. David Petraeus, and America's chief diplomat in Iraq, Ambassador Ryan Crocker, will present their second report to Congress on the surge and its effects. Prudent and circumspect men, they will surely not advance bold claims on behalf of the policy the United States has been following under their leadership. But I expect they will speak more optimistically about the future than many thought possible eighteen months ago. Their testimony will demonstrate that, at last, the United States has a sustainable strategy for Iraq with a reasonable chance of success, and one that George W. Bush will be able to turn over with confidence to the next incumbent of the White House.
How we got here is a story in itself.
* * *
In the summer of 2005, Gen. George Casey, the theater commander in Iraq, was pressing a military campaign whose primary goal was the training and maturing of Iraqi security forces. At the same time, Iraqis had designed a national constitution that would be the subject of a countrywide referendum in October, to be followed (assuming the constitution's ratification) by national elections in December.
Here at home, administration policy was inundated by criticisms on every front. Much of it was reckless, but not all of it. From "skeptical supporters" of the war like Sen. John McCain and the military analyst Fred Kagan came the charge that the number of American "boots on the ground" was far from sufficient to accomplish the mission. Although our military commanders in Iraq kept assuring the White House that this was not the case, the criticism flitted like Banquo's ghost in the background of every internal discussion about the war.
Some Democrats in the "loyal opposition"--i.e., those who were not simply advocating an irresponsible strategy of defeat and withdrawal--made the same point, but more often they took a different tack. Charging that the administration had no strategy beyond "staying the course," they proposed instead that the United States pressure the Iraqis to bring the sullen and disaffected Sunni minority into the political sphere. This would siphon support from the insurgency. In addition, the Pentagon needed to accelerate the training of Iraqi security forces to handle more of the load against the enemies of the new Iraq. And the State Department had to lean on Iraq's neighbors to do more to help.
This counsel seemed maddeningly sensible to us. It was, to the letter, the administration's strategy at that very moment. Still, exasperating though it may have been to be told that we should do what we were actually doing, this line of criticism also seemed to contain potentially good news. Perhaps, we thought, we could find common ground with these Democratic critics--their number included Sens. Hillary Clinton, Joseph Biden and Carl Levin--and forge a consensus on how to move forward.
That was the background to a decision in the fall of 2005 to release an unclassified version of Gen. Casey's campaign plan, along with a document explaining how all elements of American power were being mobilized to assist in its realization. The full document was called the National Strategy for Supporting Iraq, the name of which changed somewhere along the way to the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, or NSVI. There was nothing new here. The release of the NSVI, bolstered by a series of frank presidential addresses, was simply an attempt to make public a number of details about our approach and offer a reasonable response to our reasonable critics.
The effort was doomed. It was overtaken by political events or, rather, by one specific event: a press conference, on Nov. 17, 2005, by John Murtha, a Democratic congressman from Pennsylvania.
Mr. Murtha was a veteran of the Vietnam War and a hawk on defense spending--someone generally thought to be at home with the old "Scoop" Jackson wing of the Democratic party. When it came to Iraq, he turned out to be something else. "Our military has accomplished its mission and done its duty," Mr. Murtha summarily declared at his press conference, and now it was time to bring the troops home--as soon as possible, but no later than in six months.
Mr. Murtha was not calling for a gradual transition to Iraqi control. To the contrary, he was advocating the wholesale abandonment of Iraq. As he well knew, moreover, six months would be the fastest possible withdrawal under the most optimistic timetable, with our forces working 24 hours a day, seven days a week, to pull out all of the equipment and matériel we had brought in over the previous three years. This was not a brief for haste but rather a recipe for panic.
Unlike those critics who lambasted our policy and then commended it to our attention, Mr. Murtha was presenting an unambiguous alternative. The left wing of the Democratic :arty and its supporters in MoveOn.org had finally found a spokesman with credentials on national security to make the most extreme case for the war's end.
The media lauded the Murtha plan, but they did not examine it closely. I spent hours with reporters in a futile effort to persuade them to show Mr. Murtha the respect of subjecting his scheme--including his bizarre notion of redeploying troops 5,000 miles away on the island of Okinawa in the Sea of Japan--to the same level of scrutiny they lavished upon administration policy. One key reporter told me, "We don't scrutinize Murtha's plan because none of us takes it seriously."
Inside the White House, we joked bitterly that the only way we could get people to see the flaws in Murtha's proposal would be to offer it as our own.
* * *
In the end, however, even if we had managed to secure some kind of bipartisan support for our strategy, it would have made little difference. Over the course of 2006, the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq collapsed.
We had assumed that steady political movement would drain Sunni support for the insurgency by giving Sunnis a stake in the new Iraq--and that such political progress could be completed before the safety of the Iraqi population had been secured. Alas, the stunningly successful constitutional referendum of October 2005 and the national election two months later were followed by a dreadful stalemate. It took Sunnis nearly six weeks to acknowledge that the vote had been free and fair, and then squabbling within the Shiite community paralyzed its politicians in turn. Month after month, the nascent Iraqi political class found itself unable to form and seat a government. Almost a half-year of political momentum was forgone.
No less worrisome was the discovery that the Iraqi security forces were not yet in any condition to shoulder an increasing portion of the burden--to "stand up" so that coalition forces could "stand down." At the same time, the security challenge became far grimmer. In February, al Qaeda terrorists blew up the Golden Dome mosque in Samarra, one of the holiest Shiite shrines in Iraq. Shiite militia groups responded just as the terrorists had hoped, launching retaliatory strikes against Sunni citizens. A bloody pattern--sectarian atrocity, sectarian reprisal, sectarian counter-reprisal--took hold. Each week, attack levels reached new heights. Since even the vastly more capable U.S. forces seemed unable to tamp down the violence, there was no chance that fledgling Iraqi security forces might do so any time soon.
With the situation deteriorating throughout the spring, the administration might have begun the full-fledged reconsideration of the National Strategy for Victory that it would conduct later in the year. But suddenly the existing strategy appeared to receive a boost. After months of wrangling, the Iraqis finally installed a unity government under the leadership of the little-known Nouri al-Maliki. And U.S. special forces killed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the charismatic leader of al Qaeda in Iraq and the mastermind behind its strategy of fomenting civil war between Sunnis and Shiites. Hope rekindled that the chaos could be brought under control.
But the boost proved illusory. Gen. Casey launched a new effort to regain control of the capital, but within weeks it foundered when several of the Iraqi units on which it depended simply failed to show up for the fight. A revised version of the Casey plan likewise came a cropper when the new Maliki government interfered with efforts to go after rogue Shiite militias that were now rivaling al Qaeda in Iraq in wreaking havoc.
Over the summer, doubts began to grow among White House officials working on Iraq; by September the NSC staff initiated a quiet but thorough review of strategy with an eye to developing a new way forward. The review, which soon expanded beyond the confines of the National Security Council, became a matter of public knowledge after Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's departure in November, the day after the landslide Democratic victory in the midterm elections. The election underscored the fact that, at a minimum, the administration would have to reposition the Iraq mission in the minds of the American people. Our review confirmed that it would take more than a change of face to rescue the possibility of victory--it would take an entirely new strategy.
The idea was for our proposed change in course to be completed in time to take advantage of the release of another document. This was the much-awaited report of the Iraq Study Group, a bipartisan commission co-chaired by former Secretary of State James Baker and former Congressman Lee Hamilton. Inside the White House, we hoped that the report's recommendations would be palatable enough to blend with whatever new approach the president decided to adopt. The long-sought holy grail--a bipartisan consensus on the way forward in Iraq--seemed again within reach.
* * *
It was not to be. While sharply criticizing the lack of progress thus far, the Baker-Hamilton commission essentially recommended back to us an accelerated version of the strategy envisioned by the NSVI: stand them up so we can stand down. While there was still some support inside the administration for continuing on that path, the interagency team on which I served was of a different mind. The situation in Iraq had eroded beyond the point envisioned by the Baker-Hamilton report; under the horrific conditions now at play, we concluded, Iraq's security forces were far more likely to crack under the strain than to "stand up." And those forces were the essential glue of a stable, unified future. If they went the way of Humpty Dumpty, neither they nor the new Iraq could ever be put back together again.
The Baker-Hamilton report did offer theoretical support for a short-term surge of military forces--something the president and the interagency team were also looking at very closely--but this was mentioned only in a brief passage and was far from the document's central thrust. The White House never succeeded in shifting the conventional wisdom in Washington that Baker-Hamilton provided an alternative to current policy. Nor, unfortunately, were we ready with our own genuine alternative when the Baker-Hamilton report was released on Dec. 6, 2006. That put paid to the idea that we could use the occasion as a means of securing bipartisan support for a new approach. By the time the president announced the surge in January, the climate had turned frostier still.
-
By then, the leadership of the newly triumphant Democrats on Capitol Hill had already determined that the war was irretrievably lost and that the only responsible course was to get out as quickly as possible. Signaling the emphasis the Democrats meant to place on ending our involvement in Iraq quickly, Nancy Pelosi, the new speaker of the House, sought to make Jack Murtha her principal deputy.
As for the president's new strategy, the Democrats labeled it "an escalation"--no doubt because polls and focus groups showed that this would make it seem least palatable to the American public. The administration countered with the proposition that we were sending "reinforcements." The media settled on "surge." Each of these labels had the unfortunate side-effect of obscuring the many other changes contained in the new strategy and focusing attention exclusively on the increase in military troops--certainly the gutsiest element in terms of our domestic politics but by no means the only important one.
Week after week, the Democrats attempted to use their control of Congress to suffocate the surge in its cradle. Various proposals were advanced to hobble Gen. Petraeus and render implementation impossible. In April, just as the 30,000 new surge troops were entering the country, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid declared peremptorily: "This war is lost, and this surge is not accomplishing anything."
Mr. Reid was wrong. While the political standoff in Washington worsened, the situation in Iraq began to improve. Not right away or all at once, of course. In fact, to judge by the measures of greatest salience to the American media, the situation only eroded in the first half of 2007. Attacks rose in number, as did American fatalities. But Gen. Petraeus was steadily refining and adapting the new strategy, and his efforts became especially productive after the full complement of new forces was on the ground and the "surge in operations" could begin in earnest by the beginning of June.
By September 2007, when Gen. Petraeus and Mr. Crocker gave their first report to Congress, the trend line toward success was discernible. Still, the matter remained debatable--to the point where Sen. Clinton felt confident enough to inform Gen. Petraeus and Mr. Crocker on national television that "the reports you provided to us require the willing suspension of disbelief" and to characterize the two men as "the de facto spokesmen of what many of us consider to be a failed policy."
A few months after that showdown, however, the progress was all but indisputable. By now, indeed, we can see that the surge has bought precious time for the United States and the nascent Iraqi state to progress meaningfully toward five specific objectives.
First is extirpating the inciters of sectarian violence: al Qaeda in Iraq among the Sunnis and the rogue militias among the Shiites. Second is building up a larger, more capable, and more integrated Iraqi Security Force than existed in 2006.
At the same time, Iraqis are being given the opportunity to create the means of political accommodation locally and from the "bottom up," in ways that reflect the realities of life inside the highly complex mosaic of their country. The achievement of this third goal is the precursor to the fourth, which is to make the central, "top down" government in Baghdad more responsive to the nation's 18 provinces by opening its pocketbook for projects that will improve the economic and living conditions of the country's citizenry at large.
The final goal is, perhaps, the trickiest: pushing Iraqi politicians to pass legislation on a number of important measures, including the sharing of oil revenues, the funding of infrastructure projects, the reform of de-Baathification laws, and the like. These are the notorious "benchmarks" mentioned by the president in his January 2007 speech and subjected to much derision by skeptics.
A year after Mr. Bush first announced the new strategy, progress on the first three objectives has exceeded everyone's expectations, even those who helped design the surge. Al Qaeda in Iraq has been gravely wounded. The rogue elements within the Shiite militias are being pruned away. The Iraq Security Force is growing in size and reliability. And, following the decision of Sunni tribes to turn on al Qaeda and throw in their lot with the United States and the new Iraq, local political accommodation is proceeding at a remarkable pace.
There has also been some movement toward linking the Iraqi Parliament's spending to the needs of localities, but so far this is less impressive. As for the benchmarks on political reconciliation from the top down, it is useful to recall that we once thought such political change should precede everything else. That approach did not work. Our new strategy was based on the contrary assumption that security came first, and that parliamentary progress would lag significantly behind other elements. Of course, this has hardly prevented the president's critics from seizing on the failure of the Iraqi government to have completed all of it benchmarks as putative evidence of the surge's overall failure. Even here, however, there has been a measure of progress on the ground: in February, for example, the Iraqi Parliament passed legislation addressing several key benchmarks, notably including de-Baathification reform and the facilitation of provincial elections as well as of better relations between the provinces and the central government.
* * *
The Petraeus-Crocker report to Congress will no doubt offer further evidence that the new approach is working but is far from having completed its assigned task. No fair-minded observer could conclude otherwise. Gen. Petraeus has already indicated that the central military element of the surge--the increase of 30,000 troops--will end by summer 2008. At that point, U.S. forces in Iraq are set to decline to pre-surge levels, roughly 130,000. The question Gen. Petraeus will now have to answer is: how long will troop levels need to stay there, and when can they start moving down?
What Gen. Petraeus must have uppermost in his mind is the record compiled by his predecessors in trying to produce results with just enough troops to come close but not enough to succeed. A premature drawdown would, by definition, cause the forfeiture of his hard-won gains. And the political reality is that once those troops left Iraq, they would not be coming back.
In a slide presentation that accompanied his September 2007 testimony to Congress, Gen. Petraeus gave a picture of what he considered an appropriate drawdown. In his reckoning, after remaining at 130,000 for some time, American troops could decline in number to approximately 115,000, then by slow and measured steps to around 100,000, then perhaps to 85,000, and so onward. The closer the troop levels came to 100,000 (or fewer) the more manageable the deployment would be militarily. At those levels, our ground forces would be able to return to a peacetime rotation schedule, which would put far less strain on the all-volunteer force.
In other words, a substantial American presence in Iraq is sustainable militarily over the long term. The great unknown is whether such a commitment would be sustainable politically here at home.
The evidence of the past 16 months is that the American people are likely to support, or at least tolerate, a reduction in American numbers gradual enough to preserve the gains of the surge. A President McCain, for example, would probably have no trouble taking advantage of this sustainable strategy and bringing our mission in Iraq to the most successful end achievable.
What of a President Barack Obama or a President Hillary Clinton? If one were to attempt an answer to this question from the two candidates' words and conduct during the long primary season, one would have reason to conclude that both, in promising a rapid "end" to the war with an equally rapid withdrawal of American forces, are bound and determined to snatch defeat from the jaws of at least partial victory.
But it is not impossible to imagine that these vital matters would appear differently to a Democratic president considering Iraq's and America's future from a seat at the desk in the Oval Office rather than from the stage of a college gymnasium filled with delirious Democratic primary voters. One might even permit oneself to hope that, while continuing to speak derogatorily of George Bush's years as the shepherd of our Iraq policy, such a president would come to know, privately and in time, that he or she had been bequeathed something very different from a fiasco: the promise of a better outcome for Iraq, for the Middle East, and for the American people.
Mr. Feaver is the Alexander F. Hehmeyer professor of political science and public policy at Duke University and director of the Triangle Institute for Security Studies. He is a co-author of "Getting the Best Out of College," to be published by Ten Speed Press in June. This article appears in the April issue of Commentary.
-
March 31, 2008
Maverick Iraqi Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr on Sunday ordered his followers to end fighting with the country’s Shiite-dominated security forces. In a statement issued by his office in the Shiite holy city of An Najaf, al-Sadr explained that in the interest of peace and stability, “We have decided to withdraw from the streets of Basra and all other provinces,” and that his movement would “cooperate with the government to achieve security.” The move stems from an agreement with the government, under which Baghdad has promised to stop randomly arresting members of al-Sadr’s group. The agreement does not require al-Sadr’s movement to relinquish its weapons, though al-Sadr said, “Anyone carrying a weapon and targeting government institutions will not be one of us.”
There have been signs for several months now that the al-Sadrite militia, the Mehdi Army, is moving away from its original role as a renegade outfit. Sunday’s move by al-Sadr in the wake of the Iraqi military’s Basra operation, however, is the strongest indication to date that the al-Sadrite movement no longer will be challenging the writ of the Iraqi central government dominated by its Shiite rivals. The silencing of the al-Sadrite guns required Iranian acquiescence.
Two key Shiite parliament members — Hadi al-Amri from the Badr Organization (affiliated with the movement led by Iraq’s most powerful and most pro-Iranian politician Abdel-Aziz al-Hakim) and Ali al-Adeeb (deputy leader of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s Dawah party) — traveled to Tehran to get the Iranians to pressure al-Sadr. It is quite interesting that al-Sadr’s announcement comes a little over a month after Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadineajd’s trip to Baghdad. There are reports that during that trip, in a secret meeting with U.S. officials, Ahmadinejad offered to finally help Washington stabilize Iraq in exchange for security guarantees for Tehran. It is unclear to what extent the Iranians and Americans agreed to cooperate on Iraqi security, but the Basra security operation did not emerge in a vacuum.
The Basra operation was a way for the Shiite-dominated Iraqi government to extend its writ to one of the last remaining and critical outposts in the Shiite south — the oil-rich Basra region. While there are other Shiite factions and oil syndicates in the area targeted by the operation, the main target was the al-Sadrite militia. It also should be noted that the operation was not limited to Basra; it targeted other al-Sadrite strongholds in the Shiite south and Baghdad.
The Iranians have realized that they no longer can use the Shiite militia threat against the United States to force Washington’s hand on Iraq without jeopardizing their own interests. Thus far, Tehran had allowed intra-Shiite conflicts to persist in the hopes of using violence perpetrated by Shiite militants to pressure the United States into accepting Iranian terms for stabilizing Iraq. More recently, though, Iran had a rude awakening when the U.S. military began cultivating its own direct relations with members of al-Sadr’s movement. This demonstrated that Washington was not beholden to Iranian goodwill to stabilize Iraq and that all roads to Baghdad did not go through Tehran.
It was not just the threat of unilateral moves on the part of the Americans that forced the Iranians into a course correction. The Iranians were also terrified that the schisms within the Iraqi Shiite landscape have deteriorated so badly over the past five years that unless Tehran acted soon, any hope that its Shiite proxies would be able to dominate Iraq would evaporate into thin air. In other words, reining in the al-Sadrites was no longer something that was purely a U.S. interest; it was a necessity from the Iranian point of view.
Iran expects that al-Sadr’s backing down can help get the Iraqi Shiite house in order. After all, as long as the Shia (who, despite being the majority, have never ruled Iraq) are at war with themselves, they have no chance of standing up to the Sunnis, much less dominating Iraq. Iran, at a bare minimum, wants an Iraq that can never again threaten its national security, and it needs cohesion among the Shia for that purpose.
Just how much cohesion the Iraqi Shia are capable of will become apparent in the coming months.
-
Probably written before the preceding post:
WSJ
Maliki's Mettle
March 31, 2008; Page A18
Among the worst mistakes of the Iraq war has been starting battles we weren't prepared to finish. Think Fallujah in 2004. We hope Iraq Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki absorbed that lesson before he began his campaign last week to defeat rogue militias in Basra.
Yesterday's political maneuvering amid a new cease-fire offer by radical cleric Moqtada al-Sadr is hard to read from afar. "Anyone carrying a weapon and targeting government institutions will not be one of us," Mr. Sadr said. The government welcomed the offer while saying it would continue its Basra campaign, and it wasn't clear how many in the Mahdi Army and its offshoots would even heed Mr. Sadr. There were also conflicting reports of whether the militias would give up their weapons.
The worst outcome would be for Iraqis to conclude that Mr. Maliki and the Iraqi Security Forces are backing down amid more resistance than they expected. This would be a blow to the morale of the fledgling army just when it has been gaining confidence, and it would damage Mr. Maliki's own credibility with the Iraqi public. To adapt Napoleon's famous admonition, if you decide to take Basra -- take Basra.
It isn't clear why Mr. Maliki chose to act now against the militias, though he had to do so eventually. The presence of private militias makes political compromise that much harder to achieve, and it increases the prospect of greater violence after the U.S. departs. Iran is also assisting some elements of the Mahdi Army in order to expand Tehran's influence in the Shiite-dominated south and parts of Baghdad.
Naturally, the war's American critics are saying this is proof that General David Petraeus's "surge" has failed. Yet Basra is one part of Iraq where the surge has never been tried. British troops have been the coalition leaders in southern Iraq, and they long ago gave up any attempt at a Petraeus-like counterinsurgency. They mainly stay in their garrisons, much as U.S. troops did pre-surge, and much as the two Democratic Presidential candidates want U.S. troops to do now on their way out of the country.
This British strategy has allowed militias to fill the security vacuum, especially as Iraq forces have been preoccupied with holding territory in Baghdad and parts of the Sunni Triangle once they have been cleared of al Qaeda. It's a sign of how well those operations are going that Iraqi forces feel confident enough to take on the added challenge of Basra. This is precisely the kind of independent operation that U.S. training is supposed to make possible, and it is something the war's critics have said couldn't be achieved as long as American forces stay in Iraq. Apparently it is possible.
Mr. Maliki's decision is also a show of political independence. The Prime Minister is a Shiite from the Dawa party and has been criticized as beholden to Mr. Sadr because he became Prime Minister with his political support. But Mr. Maliki is now willing to use force against militias aligned with Mr. Sadr. The Basra offensive also gives the lie once again to the claim that a Shiite government in Baghdad will be purely sectarian. The battle for Basra is about a Shiite-led but multiethnic central government challenging rogue Shiite militias.
All of this won't mean much, however, unless Mr. Maliki's offensive ends in what Iraqis perceive to be a victory for their national forces. In the fog of journalism last week, it looked as if the Sadrists fought back harder than the government expected. Elements of the Mahdi Army opened counterattacks in Baghdad and elsewhere, seeming to catch Iraqi generals by surprise. U.S. air strikes and Army Stryker units had to be called in for support.
Battles rarely go as planned, and what matters in the end is who is seen to have emerged with a victory. Too many times since 2003, Iraqi and U.S. officials have fought Mr. Sadr's forces, only to let them slip away or give him a pass in some political compromise. A signal mistake in the war was failing to arrest and try him in the immediate aftermath of the 2003 invasion. How to handle Mr. Sadr now is a decision for the Maliki government, but it cannot allow the Mahdi Army and especially its Iranian-backed "special groups" to operate with impunity.
Some Americans -- including more than a few in the U.S. military -- think the U.S. has little stake in the Basra fight. But President Bush clearly isn't one of them. "Any government that presumes to represent the majority of people must confront criminal elements or people who think they can live outside the law," Mr. Bush said at the White House on Friday. "And that's what's taking place in Basra and in other parts of Iraq. I would say this is a defining moment in the history of a free Iraq."
Unlike Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas, who has failed to suppress terrorist elements, Mr. Maliki understands that his government must establish a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Now he and his army have to win the battle they started.
See all of today's op-eds and editorials, plus video commentary, on Opinion Journal.
-
The Petraeus Effect
April 8, 2008; Page A20
As General David Petraeus briefs Congress this week on Iraq, it's clear his surge has achieved remarkable results. The most crucial is that the U.S. can no longer be defeated militarily in Iraq, which could not be said a year ago. The question now is whether Washington will squander these gains by withdrawing so quickly that we could still lose politically.
Sixteen months after President Bush ordered the change in strategy, the surge has earned a place among the most important counteroffensives in U.S. military annals. When it began, al Qaeda dominated large swaths of central Iraq, Baghdad was a killing zone, Sunni and Shiites were heading toward civil war, and the Iraqi government was seen as a failure.
AP
A U.S. soldier on patrol in Mosul, northwest of Baghdad.
The Washington consensus – as promoted by the James Baker-Lee Hamilton Iraq Study Group – portrayed retreat as the only option. "This war is lost," declared Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid in April, thus telling U.S. soldiers they were risking their lives for nothing. As late as September, Hillary Clinton had the nerve to lecture General Petraeus in a Senate hearing that "the reports that you provide to us really require the willing suspension of disbelief."
Today, al Qaeda has been cleared from all but the northern reaches of Anbar and Diyala Provinces, Iraqis feel safe enough to resume normal lives, Sunni sheikhs are working with coalition forces, and the long process of Sunni-Shiite political reconciliation has begun. The surge seized the offensive from the enemy so rapidly that it deserves to be studied for years as an example of effective counterinsurgency.
Yes, this progress has also required some luck and Iraqi help. Al Qaeda in Iraq overplayed its hand with a brutality that turned the Sunnis against them. Four years of war had made Iraqis tired of violence, and Sunnis began to understand that they couldn't win a civil war against the Shiites but could use the Americans as leverage to negotiate a better bargain. Some 90,000 Sunnis are now working with the U.S. as part of the "Sons of Iraq" movement.
None of this would have been possible, however, if Iraqis had not seen that the U.S. was committed to protect them. General Petraeus and his chief deputy, Lieutenant General Ray Odierno, pursued a strategy that secured the population while going on offense against al Qaeda. U.S. and Iraqi troops moved into neighborhoods and lived among Iraqis, who in turn began to supply valuable intelligence about the terrorists. Faster than even the surge's architects hoped, the strategy led to far less violence.
While Democrats still claim political progress is possible only if the U.S. leaves Iraq, the surge has proved the opposite. Better security required a larger U.S. presence, which in turn has made Iraqis feel more secure about compromise. The political progress has been especially significant at the local level, with greater cooperation from tribal leaders and local councils, most Sunnis saying they'll participate in provincial elections this fall, and more oil money flowing to the provinces from Baghdad.
Much remains to be done, of course, and a premature U.S. withdrawal would put these gains at risk. Al Qaeda must still be swept from Mosul and upper Diyala, with the same U.S.-Iraqi troop strategy that worked in Baghdad. Terrorist entry routes West of Mosul from Syria also need to be stopped. And as we've learned in the last two weeks, Iraq Security Forces aren't able by themselves to impose a monopoly of force on Basra and the Shiite South.
Iraqi troops have made progress as a fighting force, but they still require U.S. help for the toughest operations. Though poorly planned, the Basra offensive showed that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is finally willing to fight Shiite gangs. The U.S. media have portrayed the battle mainly as an intra-Shiite feud and thus another example of budding "civil war." But the fight is also about Iran's attempts to stir trouble and weaken the Maliki government in favor of Iran's allies.
The U.S. has been reluctant to help in Basra, which has been British turf as part of the coalition. But the U.S. has a national interest in resisting Iranian influence, and Basra is a crucial front in that effort. As for the Brits, their failure to engage in counterinsurgency has left the Basra vacuum to be filled by Iranian-backed "special groups." The British made the same strategic mistake that former U.S. Iraq commanders George Casey and John Abizaid made in 2006 in Baghdad. The U.S. will have to deploy one or more brigades to Basra to help the Maliki government assert its control.
* * *
The five U.S. surge brigades are scheduled to return home in July, and one question Congress should ask General Petraeus is whether that pace makes him uneasy. He's under enormous Pentagon pressure, especially from the Army, to send those troops home. But if, say, three brigades could help solidify the surge's gains by staying another few months, the General should say so. One of Mr. Bush's mistakes in this war has been deferring too much to Pentagon brass who have always had one eye on the Iraq exit.
Americans are understandably impatient with the war, but we have sacrificed too much, and made too much progress in the last year, not to finish the task. The surge has prevented a humiliating military defeat, and now is the time to sustain that commitment to achieve a political victory.
-
The Sergeant Solution
By ROBERT H. SCALES
April 8, 2008; Page A21
Today Gen. David Petraeus testifies in front of Congress. He will note the progress being made in Iraq thanks to his new counterinsurgency strategy and the "surge." He will also remind everyone that much remains to be done, as the recent battle in Basra demonstrated.
But no matter what he says, it is clear that the writing is on the wall. The bulk of American ground forces will be leaving Iraq. The only question is how many and how fast.
AP
The first group of soldiers from the new Iraqi army prepare to graduate in 2003.
After we leave, the Iraqis will have to shoulder the burden of maintaining stability in their country. How well prepared they are for this task will depend on how strong the Iraqi army's noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps is when we leave. NCOs, sergeants and corporals, provide a center of gravity for effective fighting forces and often lead small units. They will be vital to sustaining the Iraqi army through the battles ahead.
As a flurry of facts and figures buzz through the air on Capitol Hill today, keep in mind the Army adage that armies are best built from the bottom up, squad by squad, platoon by platoon. Winning wars is not a test of numbers or materiel so much as it is a test of will. The side that wins is the side that wants most to win, and has young soldiers willing to die to secure victory. In good armies, the will to win is set by example, by junior leaders, sergeants and lieutenants, who lead from the front.
The most encouraging news from the battlefield recently is that Iraqi leadership at the small unit level is improving. Sadly, finding effective young officers in wartime is a brutal process, as it requires testing them in action. The American Army in the Civil War experienced a similar baptism of fire, at a cost of more than half a million dead.
NCOs are the backbone of the American Army. But strong NCOs, who take a leadership role, are an alien concept in areas of the world ruled by strict hierarchies. The Iraqi army is no exception.
In Saddam's military, sergeants were only expected to hold formations, account for equipment and march soldiers from one place to another. Officers made all of the decisions. That's why Saddam had so many of them – and why his army was not as flexible as it needed to be. Gen. Petraeus is trying to change the old-Iraqi-army culture, and he must if the Iraqis are to have a robust military with depth and staying power on the battlefield.
At Gen. Petraeus's urging, last year the Iraqis started divisional schools for NCOs. About 10% of each basic training class is sent to three additional weeks of instruction to learn to be corporals, the first rung of the NCO leadership ladder. Successful corporals attend a five-week course, where they learn how to take care of soldiers and the details of leading small units in close combat.
The most senior course teaches sergeants to lead platoons, learning skills formerly reserved for captains and majors. Many newly minted NCOs depart from these schools directly into combat, where they learn to get better in the harsh classroom of real war.
This process of "on the job training" among small units in combat has been made more efficient with the addition of American military training teams. These are squad-sized units embedded in Iraqi combat battalions and brigades.
Experience has shown that the surest way to quickly increase the competency of small unit leaders and their men is to have direct, hands-on instruction in the field by American NCOs. In such a setting, our NCOs demonstrate professionalism and a "take charge" attitude while fighting side by side with their Iraqi counterparts. Our NCOs teach by doing.
Today there are only 5,000 of these embedded trainers in the field. As the Iraqis head into combat without American partner units, they will probably need more training teams to embed with them. How many? That is a decision that has not yet been made. But a consensus among senior officers engaged in this program suggests that the number of trainers must be doubled, perhaps even tripled if the new Iraqi army is to be successful.
The postsurge strategy should not be focused solely on creating an Iraqi army in the image of our own. The Iraqis only have to be better than their enemies. And there is a danger in committing the blood, treasure and time necessary to train and a large Iraqi army. Wars are not won by the bigger force, but by intangibles. Leadership, courage, adaptability, integrity, intellectual agility and allegiance ultimately determine who wins wars.
Major Gen. Scales (Ret.), a former commandant of the Army War College, is president of Colgen Inc., a defense consulting firm.
-
John Burns and Dexter Filkins of the NY Times were on the Charlie Rose show tonight. (I should put this under media issues as it is newsworthy just to get honest reporting and discussion from that organization.) I have posted John Burns previously for what I found to be excellent, firsthand war coverage and analysis. I saw only part of this show. I will give you the link but as I post it says video not yet available. Give it a moment or two and then take a look if you are interested. Very worthwhile IMO. They are probably back in the US because of the Petraeus hearings, also today was the anniversary of the fall of the Saddam regime. Probably a full hour is required to watch. http://www.charlierose.com/shows/2008/04/09/1/a-conversation-with-john-burns-and-dexter-filkins
Many, many serious points covered. And small things that might surprise you like that fact that they now have bicycle races in Ramadi and Haditha.
Tomorrow, for another view, they have George Soros on the program.
-
Bicycle races? Those small details can be so telling , , ,
And here's the Iraqi ambassador in today's WSJ on the big picture:
Iraq's National Identity Is Alive and Growing
By SAMIR SUMAIDA'IE
April 10, 2008
Five years after Saddam Hussein was toppled from power, Iraq and the U.S. face important choices for their future relationship – choices that will have profound long-term ramifications for both countries.
Iraq, freed from a ruthless dictatorship, has chosen plurality, democracy and federalism as a system of government. It is struggling to implement them against a formidable set of internal and external challenges. The leaders of the new Iraq must further demonstrate resolve to defend their choices and rise above parochial interests.
Having intervened and committed itself so deeply, the U.S. is debating the level and cost of its engagement. I submit that it cannot afford to lose this fight to its enemies. The destinies of the U.S. and Iraq have become intertwined and their national interests very closely linked.
The big test for Iraq is to find the necessary internal accommodations between competing political interests, enabling the country to keep outside interference at bay and ensure its internal cohesion and national unity. The big test for the U.S. is to maintain its resolve while adjusting its tactics and policies to achieve success in Iraq.
Those who see only serious problems within the Iraqi government and society miss the point. Iraqis are the first to admit to their shortcomings. What is important is that they are determined to overcome them. They also know it will be a long and painful process of incremental progress, punctuated by setbacks.
Those who argue that Iraq is fractured and hopelessly broken – a Humpty Dumpty that can never be put together again – are wrong. Many countries have experienced great difficulties and emerged united and strong. Iraqi national identity has been weakened, but it is alive and kicking, and will embarrass all of those who rushed to write its obituary.
A year ago some people were convinced that Iraq was sliding into a civil war. It was precisely the sense of Iraqi national identity that helped to avert it.
Others considered Iraq lost to terrorists and militias. Again, it was the sense of national identity, as well as a tradition of tolerance, that made the communities in Al Anbar and elsewhere rise up against al Qaeda. This same sense of national identity was behind the widespread rejection of proposals to carve up the country into federal regions on a sectarian basis.
The convulsions of a society battered by decades of brutality and deprivation are all too evident. But the resilience, tenacity and commitment to national unity are no less evident. The glass may be half-empty, but it is also half full and filling up. Slowly perhaps, but surely. The achievements which Iraqis have accomplished under fire spanning the security, economic and political spheres stand as a testimony to their determination to succeed.
Yet the challenges the Iraqi government still faces are daunting. In addition to fighting terrorists and extremists, the government needs to reform its security forces and bureaucracy, purging them of sectarian discrimination and debilitating corruption. Only by doing this will it be able to deliver better services to its citizens and obtain full legitimacy.
Today, the world is facing a new and dangerous threat of international extremism and terrorism. The epicenter of this confrontation is Iraq. The new enemy is harder to defeat because it is not confined to a state, though some states are involved in its creation and promotion. It is diffused throughout many societies. But this enemy can and must be defeated. As the struggles of the last century shaped our world, this struggle will shape the world for generations to come.
This is not to say that this struggle is simple: the good versus the bad. It is complex. In Iraq, there are many layers of competing visions, interests and political objectives existing simultaneously. The people of Iraq were traumatized for decades. They are as vulnerable to the worst elements among them as they are to external forces. But there are enough of them with the will to fight for their future and their country.
This was demonstrated by the recent events in Basra, where the Iraqi government decided to pursue outlaws and armed militias engaged in criminal activities and the terrorizing of communities. It was a brave attempt given the circumstances, and was supported by all the political groups in Iraq except for the Sadrists. This was Round One. The fight will continue.
The salvation of Iraqis and the interests of the U.S. coincide. They lie in the defeat of the terrorists and extremists, and the frustration of the ambitions of all those who want this joint American-Iraqi endeavor to fail. This endeavor is costly, in every sense. But failure would be immeasurably costlier. That is why we need to build a long-term strategic alliance, and to make it work. It is in this context that we must look at the current negotiations between the U.S. and Iraq to reach a Status of Forces Agreement and a Strategic Framework Agreement.
After a bumpy learning curve, the U.S. has started to do things better in Iraq. The surge, applying the counterinsurgency principles of Gen. David Petraeus, has produced tangible results. It is not time to give up.
Mr. Sumaida'ie is Iraq's ambassador to the United States.
-
Let's 'Surge' Some More
By MICHAEL YON
April 11, 2008; Page A17
It is said that generals always fight the last war. But when David Petraeus came to town it was senators – on both sides of the aisle – who battled over the Iraq war of 2004-2006. That war has little in common with the war we are fighting today.
I may well have spent more time embedded with combat units in Iraq than any other journalist alive. I have seen this war – and our part in it – at its brutal worst. And I say the transformation over the last 14 months is little short of miraculous.
The change goes far beyond the statistical decline in casualties or incidents of violence. A young Iraqi translator, wounded in battle and fearing death, asked an American commander to bury his heart in America. Iraqi special forces units took to the streets to track down terrorists who killed American soldiers. The U.S. military is the most respected institution in Iraq, and many Iraqi boys dream of becoming American soldiers. Yes, young Iraqi boys know about "GoArmy.com."
As the outrages of Abu Ghraib faded in memory – and paled in comparison to al Qaeda's brutalities – and our soldiers under the Petraeus strategy got off their big bases and out of their tanks and deeper into the neighborhoods, American values began to win the war.
Iraqis came to respect American soldiers as warriors who would protect them from terror gangs. But Iraqis also discovered that these great warriors are even happier helping rebuild a clinic, school or a neighborhood. They learned that the American soldier is not only the most dangerous enemy in the world, but one of the best friends a neighborhood can have.
Some people charge that we have merely "rented" the Sunni tribesmen, the former insurgents who now fight by our side. This implies that because we pay these people, their loyalty must be for sale to the highest bidder. But as Gen. Petraeus demonstrated in Nineveh province in 2003 to 2004, many of the Iraqis who filled the ranks of the Sunni insurgency from 2003 into 2007 could have been working with us all along, had we treated them intelligently and respectfully. In Nineveh in 2003, under then Maj. Gen. Petraeus's leadership, these men – many of them veterans of the Iraqi army – played a crucial role in restoring civil order. Yet due to excessive de-Baathification and the administration's attempt to marginalize powerful tribal sheiks in Anbar and other provinces – including men even Saddam dared not ignore – we transformed potential partners into dreaded enemies in less than a year.
Then al Qaeda in Iraq, which helped fund and tried to control the Sunni insurgency for its own ends, raped too many women and boys, cut off too many heads, and brought drugs into too many neighborhoods. By outraging the tribes, it gave birth to the Sunni "awakening." We – and Iraq – got a second chance. Powerful tribes in Anbar province cooperate with us now because they came to see al Qaeda for what it is – and to see Americans for what we truly are.
Soldiers everywhere are paid, and good generals know it is dangerous to mess with a soldier's money. The shoeless heroes who froze at Valley Forge were paid, and when their pay did not come they threatened to leave – and some did. Soldiers have families and will not fight for a nation that allows their families to starve. But to say that the tribes who fight with us are "rented" is perhaps as vile a slander as to say that George Washington's men would have left him if the British offered a better deal.
Equally misguided were some senators' attempts to use Gen. Petraeus's statement, that there could be no purely military solution in Iraq, to dismiss our soldiers' achievements as "merely" military. In a successful counterinsurgency it is impossible to separate military and political success. The Sunni "awakening" was not primarily a military event any more than it was "bribery." It was a political event with enormous military benefits.
The huge drop in roadside bombings is also a political success – because the bombings were political events. It is not possible to bury a tank-busting 1,500-pound bomb in a neighborhood street without the neighbors noticing. Since the military cannot watch every road during every hour of the day (that would be a purely military solution), whether the bomb kills soldiers depends on whether the neighbors warn the soldiers or cover for the terrorists. Once they mostly stood silent; today they tend to pick up their cell phones and call the Americans. Even in big "kinetic" military operations like the taking of Baqubah in June 2007, politics was crucial. Casualties were a fraction of what we expected because, block-by-block, the citizens told our guys where to find the bad guys. I was there; I saw it.
The Iraqi central government is unsatisfactory at best. But the grass-roots political progress of the past year has been extraordinary – and is directly measurable in the drop in casualties.
This leads us to the most out-of-date aspect of the Senate debate: the argument about the pace of troop withdrawals. Precisely because we have made so much political progress in the past year, rather than talking about force reduction, Congress should be figuring ways and means to increase troop levels. For all our successes, we still do not have enough troops. This makes the fight longer and more lethal for the troops who are fighting. To give one example, I just returned this week from Nineveh province, where I have spent probably eight months between 2005 to 2008, and it is clear that we remain stretched very thin from the Syrian border and through Mosul. Vast swaths of Nineveh are patrolled mostly by occasional overflights.
We know now that we can pull off a successful counterinsurgency in Iraq. We know that we are working with an increasingly willing citizenry. But counterinsurgency, like community policing, requires lots of boots on the ground. You can't do it from inside a jet or a tank.
Over the past 15 months, we have proved that we can win this war. We stand now at the moment of truth. Victory – and a democracy in the Arab world – is within our grasp. But it could yet slip away if our leaders remain transfixed by the war we almost lost, rather than focusing on the war we are winning today.
Mr. Yon is author of the just-published "Moment of Truth in Iraq" (Richard Vigilante Books). He has been reporting from Iraq and Afghanistan since December 2004.
-
British Commanders: Iraqi Army's attempt to retake Basra was 'complete disaster'
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Battle to retake Basra was 'complete disaster'
By Sean Rayment, Defence Correspondent
Last Updated: 2:41pm BST 20/04/2008
The British-trained Iraqi Army's attempt to retake Basra from militiamen was an "unmitigated disaster at every level", British commanders have disclosed.
Senior sources have said that the mission was undermined by incompetent officers and untrained troops who were sent into battle with inadequate supplies of food, water and ammunition.
They said the failure had delayed the British withdrawal by "many months".
Their comments came as the Iraqi army, this time directly supported by American and British forces, began a second operation in Basra in an attempt to find insurgent weapons caches.
The push, which was met with fierce resistance, took place in the Hayania district of the city, where there were clashes two weeks ago.
In the first operation, it is understood that one Iraqi brigade became a "busted flush" after 1,200 of its soldiers deserted.
At one stage during the battle, stories were circulating at the British headquarters that Iraqi troops were demanding food and water from coalition forces at gunpoint. "It was an unmitigated disaster at every level," an officer said.
Gen Mohan Furayji, the Iraqi commander who was in charge of troops during the operation, was described by a senior British staff officer as a "dangerous lunatic" who "ignored" advice.
The British officer, who is based at the coalition headquarters at Basra Air Station, said that the decision to allow Nouri al-Maliki, the prime minister of Iraq, to run the operation had been a "disaster which felt as though an amateur was in charge".
More than 15,000 Iraqi troops were ordered to seize control of the city last month following an uprising by the Mehdi Army, the powerful militia group which is largely trained and financed by Iran.
President George W Bush described the battle for Basra as a "defining moment" for Iraq, while British officials at the time praised the professionalism of the Iraqi army.
However, the operation ended in a stalemate, with the Iraqi government agreeing to a ceasefire.
Criticism of Britain's involvement in Basra resurfaced last week during Gordon Brown's visit to America.
The New York Times reported, incorrectly, that British troops were refusing to help the Iraqi army, which the newspaper said was "deeply embarrassing for Britain".
In a devastating critique of the Iraqi military, British commanders have disclosed that "chaos ruled" the operation to retake Basra.
One officer said the Iraqi army's 14th Division had only 26 per cent of the equipment necessary to take part in combat operations.
He said: "There were literally thousands of troops arriving in Basra from all over Iraq. But they had no idea why they were there or what they were supposed to do. It was madness and to cap it all they had insufficient supplies of food, water and ammunition.
"One of the newly formed brigades was ordered into battle and suffered around 1,200 desertions within the first couple of hours - it was painful to watch.
"They had to be pulled out because they were a busted flush. The Iraqi police were next to useless. There were supposed to be 1,300 ready to deploy into the city, but they refused to do so. The situation deteriorated to the extent where we [the British Army] were forced to stage a major resupply operation in order to stave off disaster.
"The net effect of all of this is that the British Army will be forced to remain here for many months longer."
The Sunday Telegraph has also learnt that British commanders had devised a plan for Gen Mohan. The plan came with the caveat that it should not be started until mid-July because Iraqi troops were not ready. But the officer said that the Iraqi general had ignored the advice.
He said that a British liaison team was sent to the Iraqi army headquarters during the battle. "They were greeted by a group of Iraqi generals sitting around a large desk, shouting into their mobiles without a map in sight. Chaos ruled."
Basra was handed back to Iraqi control last year after the Army withdrew from its last military base in the city.
The Ministry of Defence had hoped to reduce the number of troops serving in southern Iraq to about 2,000 this spring, but that plan has been shelved and British troops are once again patrolling the city's streets.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main...-mostviewedbox
-
http://www.newsmax.com/timmerman/kur.../17/88735.html
Ken Timmerman
Kurds Provide Safe Haven for Christians
Thursday, April 17, 2008 9:03 AM
By: Kenneth R. Timmerman Article Font Size
The Kurdish regional government in Northern Iraq is providing a safe haven to several thousand Iraqi Christians who have fled persecution in other parts of the country, government officials and local pastors told Newsmax.
Unlike refugee camps set up for some 100,000 Shia Muslims fleeing attacks from Sunnis, which are closely monitored by Kurdish security forces, Christians have been encouraged to live anywhere.
“Christians in Iraq need special attention, because they’ve been suffering because they are Christians,” Deputy Prime Minister Omar Fattah told Newsmax in an exclusive interview in Erbil. “Maybe we give some instructions to others where they can go, but to Christians, never, because we are not afraid they will be terrorists.”
Some have been given government land and building materials to construct a house. Others have rented homes from friends, or are being put up in temporary shelters thanks to local churches and international donors.
“Those people are our citizens, and when they are coming to Kurdistan they are most welcome, and we will provide them with all possible assistance,” the Kurdish deputy premier said.
Since U.S.-led forces toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime in April 2003, around 2,000 Christian families have moved into Ainkawa, a historic Christian town on the outskirts of the Kurdish capital, Erbil.
“Most people came when the terrorists told them they must pay the jizya or they will be killed,” Ainkawa mayor, Fahmi Mehti Soltaqi, told Newsmax, referring to a "protection tax" levied on non-Muslims according to Shari'a law.
Scores of refugees interviewed by Newsmax here and in Amman, Jordan, told harrowing stories of receiving death threats from al-Qaida thugs delivered to their homes in Baghdad.
The terrorists told them that as Christians, they had no right to remain in a Muslim land without submitting to Muslim rule. To escape the jizya, some Christian refugees said they were told they must marry one of their daughters to a Muslim. Instead, when they could, they fled.
Tragedy lurks just beneath the surface, even in this peaceful part of Iraq.
Mayor Soltaqi’s new office assistant, Eghraa Ramzi, is an example. She fled with her daughter from her home in the Karrada district of Baghdad in June 2007, after Islamic terrorists said they would kill them if they didn’t pay the jizya. Now she handles computer services for the municipality.
Rita Yuel is another. If you met her on the street, you would think she was just an attractive 23-year-old university student. But when you talk to her and learn her story, unmistakeable sadness emerges.
Rita used to live in Daura, a Christian neighborhood of Baghdad, until the Muslim terrorists drove her and her sisters and others to flee in August 2006. “The terrorists were torturing people in the house next door,” she said.
Her father stayed behind to work and guard the house. Last April, he promised to join his family in the north for the Easter holidays, but he never arrived.
Rita and her mother learned later that he and two other Christians had been abducted at gunpoint by masked men at a roadside teahouse on the outskirts of Baiji, midway between Baghdad and the north. “He was kidnapped one year and eight days ago, and we don’t know where he is or if he is still alive. We hope that he will return,” she said.
The governor of Irbil Province, Nawzad Hadi Mawlood, recalls the heady days just after the liberation of Iraq in 2003, when Iraqis from all ethnic backgrounds were suddenly free from decades of darkness.
“The terrorists destroyed the dream of the Iraqi people,” Governor Mawlood told Newsmax. “Christians had no militia to protect themselves. They were easy targets,” he explained. “Today, for them, Kurdistan is an option.”
His government has opened special schools to meet the needs of Christian refugees who speak Arabic and not Kurdish, the official language here. “We have done everything we can to integrate Christians into Kurdish society,” he said.
“We are not going to refuse them. They are Iraqi. We know what they are running from.”
On Sundays, the many Christian churches in Ainkawa — some of them dating from the 9th century — are packed with worshippers. Families walk the streets without fear. Restaurants and shops are open. Even more importantly, it is the only place in Iraq where Muslims can adopt the Christian faith without fear, pastors and government officials tell Newsmax.
“All Iraq should be like Ainkawa,” said William Warda, the president of the Hammurabi Organization for Human Rights, an Iraqi group advocating for Christian political rights. But even in this safe haven, once darkness falls, metal barriers block the streets, guards with AK-47s emerge to protect the churches, and Kurdish security police control traffic trying to enter the area.
Asked about this, Deputy Prime Minister Fattah was resigned. “We are afraid of the terrorists, too.”
Terrorist groups are constantly probing the layered security of the Kurdish region to find weak points, he explained. “If they see a church in a Christian area, they see that it is a peaceful area and perhaps they will attack.”
One former Royal Marine, Dan F., who manages a local security company that caters to expatriates visiting or working in the area, lives in a heavily guarded compound in Ainkawa.
Jersey barriers, gates, barbed wire, and armed guards posted at regular intervals impede access to his compound. And yet, despite the precautions, Dan wears a Glock 9 millimeter at all times and refuses to walk the streets. "If you want to walk around, wait a few weeks then go home, and you’ll have a 100 percent chance of nothing happening to you,” he says.
For all the problems and the tenuous security situation, no one here in the Kurdish north has any regrets about the U.S.-led invasion. “I’ve never been to paradise,” said Fattah, “but the difference between today and Saddam’s time is heaven and hell.”
Fattah’s only fear is that American troops will leave too early, before the work is done. “Mr. Bush has not only helped Iraq, he has helped the American people as well,” he said. “He took the fight against terrorism from inside America, to outside the country. If he hadn’t done that, terrorist attacks would have continued inside America.”
U.S. troops must stay in Iraq until they reach the goal of helping Iraqis achieve a democratic federal state. “We believe Iraq can become a base for democracy in the region,” he said.
In Washington and in much of the U.S. media, such dreams are derided as the fantasies of neo-conservatives.
But here on the ground in Kurdistan, which even today commemorates the 21st anniversary of a chemical weapons attack by Saddam Hussein that massacred thousands of Kurds, this hope remains alive.
-
The Truth About Iraq's Casualty Count
By MAX BOOT
May 3, 2008; Page A11
The newspapers are predictably filled with articles about how 52 U.S. soldiers died in Iraq last month – the highest toll since September. Iraqi civilian casualties are also said to be at the highest level since August. These losses are being used to cast aspersions on claims of progress in Iraq.
Even one death is too many and 52 deaths is tragedy multiplied 52-fold. But let's keep some perspective. As the icasualties.org website makes clear, for better or worse, April was still one of the lighter-casualty months during the long war in Iraq.
More important, casualties cannot be looked at in a vacuum. A spike in casualties could be a sign that the enemy is gaining strength. Or it could be a sign that tough combat is under way that will lead to the enemy's defeat and the creation of a more peaceful environment in the future.
The latter was certainly the case with the casualty spike during the summer of 2007. (More than a hundred soldiers died each month in April, May and June.) Those losses were widely denounced as evidence that the surge wasn't working, but in fact they were proof of the opposite.
At the time, troops were engaged in hard fighting as part of Operation Phantom Thunder that eventually cleared most terrorists out of Anbar, Baghdad, Diyala, Babil and other provinces, leading to dramatic reductions in violence over the last year (more than 80% before the recent fighting).
The latest increase in casualties is the result of another coalition offensive: Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's decision to break the grip of militias in Basra. At first the results did not look promising: Iraqi troops were rushed in without adequate preparation, and shortly after the March 25 offensive began appeared stymied in their battles against the Mahdist Army. Mr. Maliki seemed to agree to an Iranian-brokered cease-fire with Moqtada al Sadr that left the Mahdists in control of much of the city. But as April progressed it became clear that the results of the initial clashes were more beneficial than most (including me) had initially suspected.
Iraqi security forces have not suspended their operations in Basra. In fact, since the "cease-fire," they have continued to increase their area of control. An April 25 article by a London Times correspondent who visited Basra finds: "Raids are continuing in a few remaining strongholds but the Iraqi commander in charge of the unprecedented operation is confident that his forces will soon achieve something that the British military could not – a city free from rogue gunmen."
The political repercussions in Baghdad have been just as positive and just as unexpected. First, by taking on Shiite militias, Mr. Maliki has gained new-found respect from Kurds and Sunnis who had viewed him as a hopeless Shiite sectarian. Not coincidentally, the main Sunni party has now announced plans to rejoin the cabinet.
Second, Mr. Maliki has managed to mobilize the other Shiite parties into an anti-Mahdist bloc, demanding that Moqtada al Sadr disarm his militia if his party expects to wield political power. Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the senior Shiite cleric in Iraq, has backed that demand.
Mr. Sadr has so far refused to comply, but nor has he staged a major uprising across the country, probably because he knows it would not succeed. His plan to hold a "million man" anti-American protest in Baghdad on April 5 fizzled out at the last moment. Mr. Sadr appears increasingly isolated – as symbolized by the fact that he chooses to remain in Iran.
Finally, by exposing Iranian machinations in Basra, the recent offensive has sparked an anti-Iranian backlash even among Shiite politicians with longstanding links to Tehran. Thus a high-level Shiite delegation has gone to Iran to present the Iranian leadership with evidence of the nefarious activities of their Quds Force (as if they don't already know!) and to demand that they knock it off.
The Iranian answer, notwithstanding some soothing words about wanting stability in Iraq, is coming in the shelling and rocketing of the Green Zone and other Iraqi and American bases. The Iranians have been providing longer-range rockets to their allies in the Special Groups and the Mahdist Army.
U.S. and Iraqi troops have been forced to push deeper into Sadr City than they have previously gone in order to take away launching sites. The Mahdists have had years to prepare defenses, and the subsequent battles account for much of the increase in casualties among Americans (and Iraqis) that have so disturbed the press.
The ongoing operations could still fail. But if they succeed, the result would be greater fracturing of the Mahdist forces and more government control of Sadr City, an area of some two million people that has been effectively run by the Sadrists since 2003.
This would represent a major achievement, because, as al Qaeda in Iraq has lost strength in the past year (thanks in large part to the surge), the Shiite extremists have become the major remaining threat. Unfortunate as the latest deaths are, they are in all likelihood a sign of things getting worse before they get better.
Mr. Boot is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and author most recently of "War Made New: Weapons, Warriors, and the Making of the Modern World" (Gotham, 2006).
-
I have just ordered this book and recommend it most highly.
http://www.amazon.com/review/product/0980076323/ref=dp_top_cm_cr_acr_txt?%5Fencoding=UTF8&showViewpoints=1
-
NY Times
BASRA, Iraq — Three hundred miles south of Baghdad, the oil-saturated city of Basra has been transformed by its own surge, now seven weeks old.
The Quietening of Basra In a rare success, forces loyal to Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki have largely quieted the city, to the initial surprise and growing delight of many inhabitants who only a month ago shuddered under deadly clashes between Iraqi troops and Shiite militias.
Just as in Baghdad, Iraqi and Western officials emphasize that the gains here are “fragile,” like the newly planted roadside saplings that fail to conceal mounds of garbage and pools of foul-smelling water in the historic port city’s slums.
Among the many uncertainties are whether the government, criticized for incompetence at the start of the operation, can maintain the high level of troops here. But in interviews across Basra, residents overwhelmingly reported a substantial improvement in their everyday lives.
“The circle of fear is broken,” said Shaker, owner of a floating restaurant on Basra’s famed Corniche promenade, who, although optimistic, was still afraid to give his full name, as were many of those interviewed.
Hopes for a similar outcome in Baghdad’s Sadr City district were undercut when an Iraqi armored unit was struck by three roadside bombs on Sunday, one day after a cease-fire there was negotiated.
The principal factor for improvement that people in Basra cite is the deployment of 33,000 members of the Iraqi security forces after the March 24 start of operations, which allowed the government to blanket the city with checkpoints on every major intersection and highway.
Borrowing tactics from the troop increase in Baghdad, the Iraqi forces raided militia strongholds and arrested hundreds of suspects. They also seized weapons including mortars, rocket-propelled grenades and sophisticated roadside bombs that officials say were used by Iranian-backed groups responsible for much of the violence.
Government forces have now taken over Islamic militants’ headquarters and halted the death squads and “vice ‘enforcers’ ” who attacked women, Christians, musicians, alcohol sellers and anyone suspected of collaborating with Westerners.
Shaker’s floating restaurant stands as one emblem of the change since then.
Just two months ago, he said, masked men in military uniforms walked into the packed dining room and abducted a businessman at gunpoint. The man was never seen again, and the restaurant closed.
Now, however, customers who fled that evening are pressing the 34-year-old owner to stay open later at night, so they can enjoy their unaccustomed freedom from the gangs, which once banned the loud Arabic pop music now blaring from Shaker’s loudspeakers.
“Now it is very different,” he said. “After we heard that the lawless people have been arrested or killed, we have a kind of courage.”
Even alcohol, once banned by the extremists, is discreetly on sale again in some areas.
Nevertheless, few Basra residents trust that the change is permanent or that the death squads have been vanquished.
Asked how long it would take for Basra to slip back into lawlessness if the army departed, Afrah, a 20-year-old theater student at Basra’s College of Fine Arts, replied, “One day.”
Capturing a mood that flits between bad recent memories, giddy relief and brittle future expectations, she added, “It is over, but it could come back any moment, because the people who are doing the intimidation on the streets, sometimes they are your neighbor and you trust them.”
Mr. Maliki’s hastily begun operation to rein in the extremists did not start with great promise.
The offensive, grandly named Charge of the Knights, was widely criticized for being poorly planned and ill-coordinated. It was derided as the Charge of the Mice by followers of the radical Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr after more than 1,000 soldiers deserted in the face of heavy resistance from his Mahdi Army and other extremist groups. The fierce early clashes halted only after a pro-government delegation went to Iran and struck a deal with the Sadrists.
An overwhelmingly Shiite city of more than three million people, Basra sits atop huge oil reserves, which, Western officials say, provide 40 percent of Iraq’s annual oil revenue of $38 billion.
====
Page 2 of 3)
Thus, stability in a city that could be Iraq’s economic engine room is a major priority for the Shiite-led government. However, the Basra experience may not translate to other cities like Mosul or Kirkuk in the north, with a much more complicated religious and ethnic mix.
The Quietening of Basra The push into Basra succeeded in part because people here were exhausted with the violence and in part because Mr. Maliki received crucial help from the American and British military.
British forces, who headed the coalition military forces in Basra beginning in 2003, handed security control to the Iraqis six months ago. But a British military spokesman said British and American forces were providing fighter jets, helicopters, surveillance and logistical support for the government operation.
In addition to the 4,000 British troops in Basra, he said, the Americans sent 800 people, including surveillance experts and around 200 transition team “advisers” embedded with Iraqi troops.
An American military spokesman in Baghdad confirmed that one American had been killed and eight wounded in the Basra operation but said the United States had not had “conventional ground forces in direct support of combat operations.”
Iraqi commanders acknowledge that the American and British support helped them wrest control of Mahdi Army strongholds like Hayyaniyah — a slum that is Basra’s equivalent of Sadr City — and other poor districts that are fertile recruiting grounds for militias.
But a majority of the military presence on the streets is Iraqi.
From the moment motorists drive through the huge arch at the city’s northern entrance, they are confronted with a ragtag but daunting collection of armored police vehicles, Iraqi Army Humvees, cold war-era tanks, pickup trucks with turret-mounted machine guns and bullet-riddled personnel carriers.
Canal bridges are guarded by head-high steel pyramids, from which soldiers observe bustling markets through a bulletproof window.
Maj. Tom Holloway, a British military spokesman, conceded that the Iraqis would have “struggled” without the warplanes available to coalition forces. But he said: “I don’t think it’s a crutch. I think they would have tackled it in their own way and possibly, probably, achieved the same result.”
And the result, whoever is ultimately responsible, is in many ways remarkable.
At the College of Fine Arts, female students said they felt more, but not entirely, free to wear the clothes they liked.
“I used to be challenged for what I wear,” said Athari, a 19-year-old student wearing heavy makeup and a bright orange headscarf pushed high back on her head in the liberal fashion disapproved of by Islamic radicals. “Makeup was forbidden; short skirts were forbidden. I will not mention their name, but they were extremists. They are still here, but quieter now.”
Qais, a music student, spoke of his relief at no longer having to hide his violin in a sack of rice in his trunk.
Most of the students were Shiite, but one youth named Alaa said that he was a Sunni and that 95 percent of his relatives had fled Basra after sectarian killings, including that of his uncle. “I want to thank Mr. Nuri al-Maliki, because he cleaned Basra of murderers, hijackers and thieves,” Alaa said.
It was not an uncommon sentiment. In his city center office, Yahya, a wealthy businessman said he had just begun going onto the streets without his customary 10 bodyguards. Insisting that he was not a political supporter of the prime minister, he said he was nevertheless so grateful for the security improvements that he and colleagues had downloaded Mr. Maliki’s face onto their mobile telephones as screensavers.
But as with the American-led surge in Baghdad, there are abiding uncertainties.
These center on how long such a heavy military presence can be sustained on urban streets, and what happens when it departs.
Gen. Mohan al-Freiji, the Iraqi commander in Basra, said the city was “75 percent” under control. He said the principal threat stemmed from rogue elements of the Mahdi Army and factions like the Iraqi Hezbollah (Party of God), Thairallah (Revenge of God) and Fadhila (Virtue).
======
(Page 3 of 3)
Emphasizing the urgent need to address decades of poverty and neglect, he said the government had to provide jobs and investment to convert short-term military gains into long-term political and economic ones.
The Quietening of Basra “This is a city which sits on top of oil, but its young people are unemployed,” he said.
Sadrists protest that the Basra operation is a cynical exercise to weaken Mr. Maliki’s Shiite rivals ahead of provincial elections in the fall.
At Friday prayers in Kufa last week, the Sadrist preacher, Sheik Abdul Hadi al-Muhamadawi, said, “There is a large-scale conspiracy to remove the Sadr movement from the government’s way by all means, because it refuses the presence of the occupier in Iraq.”
Such words underscore the widespread belief here that the Mahdi army has its own reasons for lying low and is by no means eliminated.
During one Iraqi Army patrol in Hayyaniyah at dusk, the soldiers, elsewhere relaxed, became jittery. Belying the local commander’s insistence that the Sadrist stronghold was “90 percent or more secure,” some pulled up face masks that they had not worn in other districts. They also fired bullets into the air at the slightest delay in traffic, an aggression unlikely to endear them in an area that, although calm, was noticeably less welcoming.
Haider, a policeman at a checkpoint outside the Sadrists’ former headquarters, said his family had been threatened, even at his home in the capital.
“I have spent 60 days in Basra and haven’t been home to Baghdad,” he said. “I will be killed if I go now. My family have received dozens of fliers with threats from the Mahdi Army.”
Nevertheless he, like many others, said the evacuation of the factions from their once-untouchable headquarters had brought about a psychological shift. Outside the Sadr office, Iraqi soldiers now sit atop the roof, their tripod-mounted machine guns overlooking the tin-roofed Sadrist prayer hall, which lies half-demolished.
“The Mahdi Army used to use this office like the Baathists when they were The Party,” Haider said. “They were ruling like the government of a state. They stopped police doing their duty, from implementing the law.”
Noting that the Baath Party of Saddam Hussein, once much stronger than the Mahdi Army, had been routed, he said, “The Mahdi Army will meet the same fate exactly, and worse.”
Yet traces of the old order remain. One wall in central Basra still bore the unsigned scrawl: “We warn girls not to put on makeup and to wear scarves. Anyone who does not follow these orders will be killed.”
-
When Lt. Col. Michael Zacchea left Iraq in 2005, he was torn. His yearlong mission to train an Iraqi Army battalion had left him wounded and emotionally drained, and he was eager to go. But leaving Iraq also meant leaving Jack, his Iraqi interpreter, to face an insurgency that has made a point of brutalizing those who help the Americans.
In their year together the two had, among other things, thwarted an assassination plot and survived the second battle of Falluja. Even before he departed, Colonel Zacchea began working to ensure that Jack would not be left.
“Once the insurgents get a hold of your name, they never let up until they get you,” Colonel Zacchea said.
It took two years for Jack to get a visa. He is one of the very few to succeed among thousands who have worked as interpreters for the United States military.
To many veterans that is not an acceptable rate, given the risks the interpreters took, and Colonel Zacchea and others are taking up the cause.
They have created a growing network of aid groups, spending countless hours navigating a byzantine immigration system that they feel unnecessarily keeps their allies in harm’s way. There is, they say, a debt that must be repaid to the Iraqis who helped the most. To them it is an obligation both moral and pragmatic.
“It’s like this disjointed underground railroad that exists,” said Paul Rieckhoff, who served with the Army in Iraq as a first lieutenant in 2003 and 2004. Mr. Rieckhoff is now executive director of Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans of America, which has more than 85,000 members and a Web site at www.iava.org.
Leaving an interpreter behind, Mr. Rieckhoff said, is “like leaving one of your soldiers back in Iraq and saying, ‘Good luck, son.’ ”
A Perilous Job
The risk taken by interpreters in Iraq is considerable and widely documented. Those who work for the Americans are often accused of being apostates and traitors. Their homes are bombed. Death threats are wrapped around blood-soaked bullets and left outside their homes. Their relatives are abducted and killed because of their work. And of the interpreters themselves, hundreds have been killed.
But many work in spite of the repercussions, and that dedication resonates clearly for many American soldiers and marines.
While there is no detailed tracking of the total number of Iraqis who have worked as interpreters, their advocates estimate that more than 20,000 people have filled such roles since 2003. In the last quarter of 2007 alone, 5,490 Iraqis were employed by the multinational force as interpreters, according to the Department of Defense.
Nearly 2,000 interpreters in Iraq and Afghanistan have applied to the State Department for a special immigrant visa, which was begun in 2006 as a last resort for those fearing for their lives. So far 1,735 cases have been approved, though it is unclear how many interpreters have come to the United States.
In its first year the visa program for interpreters was limited to only 50 spots. Since then it has expanded to 500 spots a year.
But the numbers tell only part of the difficulty. The program does little to minimize the visa bureaucracy. The process, complicated for anyone, is especially hard for interpreters.
They are considered refugees, and refugees cannot apply from their native countries, in this case Iraq. But Jordan and Syria have closed their borders to the flood of Iraqi refugees. Passports issued by the government of Saddam Hussein are not valid, often making it impossible to cross borders legally.
Among service members who have served in Iraq, there is no dispute that the number of interpreters in danger is far greater than the number of those who have won visas. Many veterans are angry about the bureaucratic hurdles faced by the Iraqis who often came to work with a price on their heads. Many others have for years expressed frustration with the Bush administration for not doing more to help Iraqis who aid American forces, even as other advocates criticize the overall low numbers of Iraqis generally granted visas to the United States.
Gordon D. Johndroe, a White House spokesman, said the government’s hands were initially tied by the lack of federal legislation allowing special visas for interpreters. Now that more visas have been made available, he said, President Bush has directed Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and the homeland security secretary, Michael Chertoff, to “make sure the visa process for translators and others moves as quickly as possible.”
Helping Their Own
Lt. Col. Steven Miska, an Army infantry officer, has had more than 50 interpreters work for him during his years in Iraq. After looking into the visa process, he decided that “no Iraqi would ever figure that thing out,” and set his staff members to establish a network. They pair Iraqis with American veterans who help shepherd them out of Iraq, through Jordan and Syria and into the United States.
“Not only is it the right thing to do from a moral perspective, it’s the way to win,” Colonel Miska said, stressing that the assistance will help reassure Iraqis that they can trust Americans despite the risk in helping them.
============
Page 2 of 2)
Jason Faler, 30, a captain with the Oregon National Guard, was an intelligence liaison officer embedded in the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. After returning from Iraq in 2006 and learning that the lives of two interpreters he had worked with were in danger, Mr. Faler got involved, paying their visa application fees.
To broaden assistance to other interpreters, Mr. Faler established the Checkpoint One Foundation, based in Salem, Ore. The group, whose Web site is at www.cponefoundation.org, has helped two Iraqi families and one Afghan couple make it to the United States, spending most of the $25,000 it has raised. Even Mr. Faler’s parents have lent a hand, housing both Iraqi families for several weeks.
The foundation has become a second job that at times takes him away from work and family, Mr. Faler said. But he is unwavering in his support of interpreters. “There is a sense of loyalty that is almost impossible for me to articulate,” he said.
Will Bardenwerper, a 31-year-old Princeton graduate, was an Army captain responsible for reconstruction projects in Anbar Province from 2006 to 2007. His interpreter, whom he called Jeff, became a friend and adviser.
Mr. Bardenwerper was so struck by the danger Jeff faced that he began the visa application process for him even before returning to the United States last year. Like others, Mr. Bardenwerper ran into a thicket of red tape. He was particularly frustrated by the requirement that interpreters produce a letter from a general on their behalf. This, he said, was like a junior associate at a Fortune 500 company asking the chief executive for a letter of recommendation.
“Over the course of a year, I might have met two generals,” Mr. Bardenwerper said. “I mean, we were out in a wasteland in Anbar.”
But after a year of follow-up, Mr. Bardenwerper and Jeff finally had a breakthrough. Jeff arrived in America in March and has gotten to visit with Mr. Bardenwerper and other service members who took up his cause.
An Incomplete Ending
Although some veterans have succeeded in bringing their interpreters safely to the United States, the experience of Colonel Zacchea and Jack shows that a visa, while a substantial advantage, does not guarantee a happy ending to a war story.
Colonel Zacchea, who served with the Marines, said he spotted Jack immediately. Jack studied diligently and absorbed the complexities of military translation quickly. An enduring friendship grew around the training regimen and the combat missions. When the sun set each day, they drank chai, or tea, and often talked for hours.
In 2005, after the Colonel Zacchea left Iraq, Jack applied for a Fulbright scholarship. He had been a physics tutor before the war and wanted to teach high school students in the United States, but he did not qualify.
Within a week of the Fulbright rejection, Colonel Zacchea heard about the start of the special visa program. He wrote a recommendation for Jack, who also had a petition filed on his behalf by his American supervisors. But Jack was not accepted.
In March 2006, Colonel Zacchea learned that Arkan, another translator who had worked with them, was killed by insurgents. Two previous attempts on his life had failed, but not the third. Colonel Zacchea kept pushing, and he resubmitted Jack’s paperwork. He stayed in constant contact with Jack, hoping to make sure he did not share Arkan’s fate. After nearly two more years, Jack’s application made it through, and in September 2007 he landed at Newark Liberty International Airport.
But Jack struggled in the United States. The only safety net he had was the one Colonel Zacchea had created. Jack lived in the basement of his home and spent his days searching for work, but satisfaction was elusive. He worked at Macy’s briefly, then in the maintenance department of a hotel.
But because Jack was an Arabic speaker who had been vetted by the military and the Department of Homeland Security, both men held out hope for more — for a career as an interpreter or teacher in the United States. When Jack finally got a job offer, in April, it was one he felt he could not refuse — even though it meant going back to Iraq. The military offered him a one-year contract, loaded with incentives, to return and work as an interpreter again.
After one year, he could return to the foundations he and Colonel Zacchea had laid in Connecticut — all with no change in his visa status. The decision was wrenching: roll the dice in Iraq one more time for a life-changing payout, or continue foundering here.
Reluctantly, and against the advice of people close to him, Jack took the offer. On a rainy night in April they drove to a hotel at the airport in Hartford. Jack’s flight was early the next morning.
Over dinner, Jack tried to explain why he could not stay. “If I had found a job here, a good job when I came, I would, probably,” Jack said, searching for the right words. “I would not go back.”
Six hours later, Jack’s bags were checked and his ticket was in his hand. He and Colonel Zacchea exchanged a few words of farewell, hugged and then parted ways.
-
Maliki's Victory
May 14, 2008; Page A20
When Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki ordered a military offensive against rogue Shiite militias in March, it was widely panned as a failure that was one more reason the U.S. needed to abandon Iraqis to their own "civil war." Well, several weeks later the battle for Basra and Baghdad against Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army looks to be both a military and political success.
Mr. Maliki took a big risk when he decided to move against his fellow Shiites to reclaim Basra for the government. Iraqi troops were untested for such a complex, divisional-level operation and, in hindsight, their battle plans were too hastily drawn. The early setbacks might easily have emboldened Mr. Sadr, caused the Iraqi army to crumble and led to the end of Mr. Maliki's government.
Instead, Mr. Maliki and Iraqi forces persevered. And two months later, hundreds of Mahdi Army fighters have been arrested and weapons caches found. Following the model of the U.S. surge in Baghdad, Basra's streets are far safer thanks to the visible presence of 33,000 Iraqi troops. The Mahdi vice squads that terrorized the city's population are gone. The U.S. and Britain provided air support during the early stages of the operation, and continue to provide advisory support. But the Basra operation has clearly been an Iraqi success.
Something similar also seems to be happening in Baghdad's Sadr City neighborhood, long a stronghold for the Mahdi Army. Initial press reports have suggested the battle has mostly come out a draw. But a 14-point "truce" between the government and the Mahdists (brokered last week by Iran) suggests otherwise. Among other details reported in the press, the agreement requires the Mahdi Army to abandon its heavy and medium weapons, end its shelling of Baghdad's Green Zone, shut down its kangaroo courts and recognize the authority of Iraqi law. In exchange, the government seems to have promised mainly that it would not arrest lower-level militia members.
If the truce holds, it would bring to an end weeks of fighting that has killed hundreds of Mr. Sadr's militant followers. The agreement doesn't take account of the Iranian "special groups" that are operating alongside the Mahdi Army, which can be activated to target Iraqi and American troops at any time. But the fact that Iran arranged the truce (and so far has made it stick) exposes the pretense that Tehran is an innocent bystander in the war for Iraq.
The truce suggests, instead, that Iran has grudgingly come to respect Mr. Maliki as a serious opponent. Having invested itself so heavily in Mr. Sadr's success, Tehran had little reason to suddenly lend its diplomatic offices unless it felt the Mahdi Army was on the verge of defeat. Last week's truce may have postponed that moment, but there's little doubt Mr. Sadr's movement has suffered an embarrassing defeat.
However fitfully it began, the Basra campaign is a sign that Iraqis are in fact "standing up" for their own security. It is also a personal vindication for Mr. Maliki, who recognized to his credit that his government had to have a monopoly on violence in Shiite neighborhoods as much as in Sunni enclaves.
In the last year we were told first that the surge was a military failure, and later that it was a military success but that Iraq's political class had not lived up to its end of the bargain. In fact, just as surge supporters said, the Iraqis have become more confident and effective the more they have become convinced that the U.S. was not going to cut and run.
See all of today's editorials and op-eds, plus video commentary, on Opinion Journal.
-
It must pain the NY Times to write this :lol:
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/21/world/middleeast/21sadr.html?th&emc=th
Iraqi tanks and personnel carriers crossed into the militia-held section of Sadr City at dawn Tuesday, and met no opposition.
By MICHAEL R. GORDON and ALISSA J. RUBIN
Published: May 21, 2008
BAGHDAD — Iraqi forces rolled unopposed through the huge Shiite enclave of Sadr City on Tuesday, a dramatic turnaround from the bitter fighting that has plagued the Baghdad neighborhood for two months, and a qualified success for Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki.
Map
Targets of the Operation
Back Story With The Times’s Stephen Farrell (mp3)
Robert Nickelsberg/Getty Images, for The New York Times
Iraqi soldiers prepared Tuesday to enter northern Sadr City, which Shiite militias had used to fire rockets at the Green Zone.
As it did in the southern city of Basra last month, the Iraqi government advanced its goal of establishing sovereignty and curtailing the powers of the militias.
This was a hopeful accomplishment, but one that came with caveats: In both cities, the militias eventually melted away in the face of Iraqi troops backed by American firepower. Thus nobody can say just where the militias might re-emerge or when Iraqi and American forces might need to fight them again.
By late Tuesday, Iraqi troops had pushed deep into the district and set up positions around hospitals and police stations, which the Iraqi government was seeking to bring under its control.
The main military question now is whether Iraqi soldiers can solidify their hold over Sadr City in the coming days. And the main political one is whether the Maliki government will cement its gains by carrying out its long-promised, multimillion-dollar program of economic assistance and job creation to win over a still wary population and erode the militias’ base of support.
Sadr City has long been a simmering trouble spot, a haven for Shiite militias and a conduit for what American commanders say are Iranian-supplied arms, including explosively formed penetrators, a particularly lethal type of roadside bomb.
In the past two months, it has also become a test of the government’s ability to find its footing in the slippery terrain of Middle Eastern Shiite politics and internal divisions among Iraq’s governing Shiite parties.
The recent fighting flared up in late March after Mr. Maliki sent troops to gain control of the port city of Basra. Shiite militants responded by taking over Iraqi Army checkpoints on the outskirts of Sadr City and using the neighborhood as a launching pad to fire rockets at the Green Zone, the seat of the Iraqi government and site of the United States Embassy.
American and Iraqi forces had little choice but to fight their way in to suppress the rocket fire. They pushed their way to Al Quds Street, which gave them a measure of control over the southern quarter of Sadr City. A massive concrete wall was erected along the thoroughfare to try to keep the militants out.
But that still left most of Sadr City in the hands of Shiite militias, which continued to lob rockets at the Green Zone and attack the Iraqi and American troops in the neighborhood’s southern tier.
Mr. Maliki had responded to a challenge from Shiite militias in Basra by mounting a hasty operation. The military campaign caught American officials by surprise and appeared to sputter at the start as the Iraqi forces faced logistical problems and more than 1,000 desertions.
But as the Basra operation proceeded and Iraqi troops began to pour into the city, militia commanders drifted away. Mr. Maliki was strengthened politically in his drive to shape an image as a strong and decisive leader, the kind of leader many Iraqis, Sunni and Shiite, think is needed to control the country.
Emboldened by the outcome in Basra, the prime minister wanted to act quickly against the militias in Sadr City as well, according to American and Iraqi officials. He was inclined to see the struggle as a test of wills, which he could win by striking a decisive blow, the officials said.
Iraqi and Americans commanders, chastened by the stumbling first week of the Basra operation, favored a more deliberate approach. Sadr City is densely populated, with more than two million people, a bastion of support for Moktada al-Sadr, the radical cleric, and a neighborhood with a resilient collection of militia cells adept at hiding among the populace. With operations in Basra, Mosul and other parts of Iraq, the Iraqi military was stretched.
Additional forces were brought in, including the Third Brigade of the First Iraqi Army Division, a quick reaction force from Anbar Province. Lt. Gen. Abud Qanbar, the commander of Iraqi forces in Baghdad, developed a plan to advance north into the heart of Sadr City.
The military preparations appeared to be serious, a fact that loomed large for leaders of Mr. Sadr’s militia, the Mahdi Army, who told one reporter last week that the militia was convinced that military operations were imminent.
Maj. Gen. Mizher al-Azawi, the commander of the 11th Iraqi Army Division, said that the operation would be carried out by Iraqi ground forces with the support of American airpower.
But for all the talk by Iraqi government officials about breaking the back of the militias, and the militants’ bluster about defending their turf, it was clear that the two sides had much to lose if they were unable to reach an accommodation, however temporary or expedient.
==========
Page 2 of 2)
Had it come to an urban battle in the Shiite enclave, the Iraqi government, backed by American force, would probably have prevailed. But Iraqi troops would have suffered casualties. Shiite civilians would have been caught in the cross-fire and further alienated from the government. And eventually the Shiite militias, which had already suffered considerable losses, would have been further depleted.
Certainly, a military offensive would not have been a simple operation. The militias had been significantly weakened over the previous two months of fighting. Col. John Hort, the commander of the Third Brigade Combat Team, Fourth Infantry Division, estimated that some 700 militia fighters had been killed by air and ground fire since fighting erupted in late March.
“It is pretty safe to say that we have killed the equivalent of a U.S. battalion,” he said in a recent interview.
Some Mahdi Army leaders put the death toll slightly higher. When a truce was first announced, they threatened to refuse Mr. Sadr’s order to stand down. “What about the martyrs?” a Mahdi battalion leader recently told a reporter. “A thousand martyrs, what did they die for?”
Still, the area directly north of Al Quds Street was believed to have had a heavy concentration of roadside bombs, presenting a substantial challenge for an Iraqi force. Combat engineers and explosive ordnance disposal teams are in short supply in the Iraqi military, which relies heavily on using sappers to cut the wires rigged to explosives.
A Sadr City battle would also have sent Iraqi forces into one of the most heavily populated sections of Baghdad, where there were ample opportunities for ambushes. Militia snipers have already taken a toll on Iraqi troops with powerful .50-caliber rifles.
There were other threats, as well. In one instance not previously disclosed, an American M1 tank was damaged by an RPG-29, an advanced anti-tank weapon. Even less powerful types of rocket-propelled grenades could pose a threat to some Iraqi vehicles, which are generally less heavily armored than those employed by the Americans.
While the planning continued, American military officials cited reports that Mahdi Army and Iranian-backed commanders were sneaking out of Sadr City and perhaps even Iraq. People close to Mahdi leaders in Sadr City said they knew some who were leaving for Lebanon by way of Iran.
“We have seen a lot of indications that some of the senior leaders within JAM and the special groups are preparing to leave or have already left Sadr City,” Colonel Hort said last week, referring to Jaysh al Mahdi, as the Mahdi Army is known, and the Iranian-backed militias the military refers to as special groups.
Iran, according to some Western analysts, was also focusing on developments in Lebanon, where it has been supporting the militant group Hezbollah, and seemed interested in an arrangement in which the groups it backed in Sadr City would withdraw to fight another day.
With the emergence of a political accord, the Iraqi military began to develop a new plan, which American officers learned about late last week. It assumed that Iraqi troops would be welcomed, or at least tolerated, by the residents. Instead of an assault through the roadside bombs, six battalions would drive in on parallel streets and set up checkpoints and search for weapons.
That plan was carried out on Tuesday and was uncontested.
So far, the Iraqi Army has been a winner. Iraqi commanders received, and sometimes rejected, advice from the American military. But in the end they were able to execute a plan that was very much their own.
Only two dozen or so roadside bombs were reported found, however, raising a question of whether others had been hidden by the militias for another day. Nor is it clear how energetic Iraqi soldiers will be in carrying out searches in a Mahdi Army stronghold.
Brig. Gen. Daniel B. Allyn, the chief of staff for the Multinational Corps in Iraq, said the Iraqi government had considered various factors.
“When you exert lethal actions against Sadr City, you are de facto going against a fairly poor sector of the Shia populace,” he said. “So that is a dynamic that the government of Iraq has to keep in their analysis about what is the right way to deal with this, and we believe a measured approach is appropriate.”
-
You may have missed it due to the nearly non-existant MSM covnerage yesterday, but "Iraqi Violence at a 4 year low, US says. The Military gives credit to crackdowns launched my Maliki in the last two months." (buried in yesterday's LA Times)
-
I'm sure there was wailing and the gnashing of teeth just to contemplate good news from Iraq in America's newsrooms.....
-
And more in the same vein:
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-mahdi27-2008may27,0,2392748.story
Iraqis losing patience with Sadr's militiamen
-
http://hotair.com/archives/2008/05/28/al-qaeda-wonders-how-it-lost-iraq/
Al Qaeda wonders how it lost Iraq
POSTED AT 9:00 AM ON MAY 28, 2008 BY ED MORRISSEY
Perhaps these might just come from the terrorists’ versions of Harry Reid, but Strategy Page reports that al-Qaeda websites have begun postmortems on their mission in Iraq. Given their belief that Allah has handed AQ a mandate to re-establish the Caliphate in a greater ummah, the network has to explain how they managed to lose the country set square in the middle of southwest Asia. Their explanations don’t differ much from ours, actually:
Al Qaeda web sites are making a lot of noise about “why we lost in Iraq.” Western intelligence agencies are fascinated by the statistics being posted in several of these Arab language sites. Not the kind of stuff you read about in the Western media. According to al Qaeda, their collapse in Iraq was steep and catastrophic. According to their stats, in late 2006, al Qaeda was responsible for 60 percent of the terrorist attacks, and nearly all the ones that involved killing a lot of civilians. The rest of the violence was carried out by Iraqi Sunni Arab groups, who were trying in vain to scare the Americans out of the country.
Today, al Qaeda has been shattered, with most of its leadership and foot soldiers dead, captured or moved from Iraq. As a result, al Qaeda attacks have declined more than 90 percent. Worse, most of their Iraqi Sunni Arab allies have turned on them, or simply quit. This “betrayal” is handled carefully on the terrorist web sites, for it is seen as both shameful, and perhaps recoverable.
Recovery looks increasingly unlikely. With the Iraqi Army now conducting operations throughout Iraq and the Americans able to focus on logistical support, the terrorists have fewer infidels to target. The Iraqis see the Americans as less of a threat than the lunatic jihadists who created tens of thousands of “involuntary martyrs”.
In this case, the arrogance of proclaiming the Caliphate under Osama’s leadership played a key role in the “betrayal” by Iraqi Sunni insurgents. Most of them fought to regain control over Iraq from the Shi’ites liberated from Sunni oppression with the fall of Saddam Hussein. The proclamation of the Caliphate under a foreign leader angered them, and as AQI proved itself inept against the counterinsurgency operations of General David Petraeus, it became a joke. It exposed AQ and AQI as pretenders, lunatic-fringe radicals who had no concept of governance other than through rape and murder.
Now AQ has a major public-relations and recruiting problem on its hands. As long as the network scored victories against the West, more radical Muslims could entertain the fantasy that Osama had that mandate from Allah to establish the supremacy of Islam. Now that Osama has lost Iraq, that fantasy has been dashed — and Osama exposed as just another pretender, with AQ as his butcher squad, one that kills many more Muslims than infidels. Their defeat shows that the violent jihad strategy fails when superior force gets brought to bear against it, which hardly points to a mandate from heaven.
That defeat will resonate throughout the Islamic world. The victory of rationality and democracy in Iraq cannot be denied, even by AQ itself.
-
http://www.nypost.com/seven/05292008/postopinion/opedcolumnists/the_quit_iraq_time_travelers_112963.htm?page=0
THE QUIT-IRAQ TIME-TRAVELERS
Sadr: Lost big to forces of Iraqi democracy.
May 29, 2008 --
WHENEVER retreat-now activists or their favored presidential aspirant are confronted with our progress in Iraq, their stock reply is, "Al Qaeda wasn't in Iraq in 2003."
Well, I happen to agree with Sen. Barack Obama and his supporters on that count: At most, the terrorists had a tenuous connection with Saddam's regime. But it's 2008, not 2003. And our next president will take office in 2009. It's today's reality that matters.
It's as if, in June 1944, critics had argued from facts frozen in June 1939. ("Why invade Normandy? Hitler's content with Czechoslovakia.")
In the course of a war - any war - the situation changes, enemies evolve and goals shift. A war to preserve the Union becomes a war to end slavery; a war to defeat one set of totalitarian systems empowers a new network of tyrannies. It's a rare war whose end can be forecast neatly at its outset.
And you don't get any do-overs.
To date, not one "mainstream media" journalist has pressed the leading advocates of unconditional surrender to describe in detail what might happen after we "bring the troops home now."
There's plenty of unchallenged sloganeering, but no serious debate. This selective political softball and pep-rally journalism serves neither our country nor our political process well.
So, let's bring those quit-Iraq time-travelers back to mid-2008 and fill them in on what's happened since they were ideologically stranded five years ago:
* After our troops reached Baghdad, al Qaeda's leaders made a colossal strategic miscalculation and publicly declared that Iraq was now the central front in their jihad against us. Matter of record, in the enemy's own words.
* Some Iraqi Sunni Arabs, lamenting the national pre-eminence they'd lost, rallied to the terrorists.
* Al Qaeda in Iraq and its affiliates then embarked on a campaign of widespread atrocities: videotaped beheadings, mass bombings of civilians, assassinations, widespread rape (of boys and girls, as well as of women), kidnappings and brutal efforts to dictate the intimate details of Iraqi lives.
* Al Qaeda's savagery alienated the Sunni Arab masses in record time. Suddenly, those American "occupiers" looked like saviors.
* By the millions, Sunni Muslims turned against al Qaeda and turned to the US military, inflicting a catastrophic propaganda defeat on the terrorists.
* Supported by the population, US and Iraqi forces inflicted a massive military defeat on al Qaeda. At present, the terror organization's own Web masters admit that al Qaeda is nearing final collapse in Iraq.
Those are facts.
If we nonetheless quit Iraq in 2009, the defeated remnants of al Qaeda will be able to declare victory, after all. The organization will be able to re-launch itself as the great Muslim victor over the Great Satan. We'll have thrown away a potentially decisive triumph and revived the fortunes of the fanatics who brought us 9/11.
And the above only detailed the defeat of al Qaeda. Far more is happening in Iraq, all of it good: Muqtada al-Sadr and his thugs have suffered a series of lopsided defeats; Muqtada's hiding in Iran, afraid to return; a democratically elected government has finally taken charge in Baghdad - and gained enormously in popularity.
Iraqis look forward to the next round of elections (to the dismay of every Persian Gulf autocracy). Crucial legislation has been refined, passed and implemented. Iraq's economy is booming - and its government has begun paying its own way.
Want more good news? Iran has failed in its bid to take control of Iraq. And our military leaders are drawing down our troop levels according to a sensible plan, with the prospect of more troop cuts to come.
What don't the critics like? Democracy? The defeat of al Qaeda? Muslims turning to the US military for help? Troop cuts? The dramatically improved human-rights situation? What's the problem here?
The answer's simple: Admitting that they've been mistaken about Iraq guts the left's argument for political entitlement. If the otherwise deplorable Bush administration somehow got this one right, it means the left got another big one wrong.
So be prepared for frequent time-machine trips until November. The encouraging reality of today's Iraq will go ignored in favor of an endless mantra of "Al Qaeda wasn't there in 2003 . . ."
The bottom line? Al Qaeda let the war's opponents down.
Ralph Peters' new book, "Looking For Trouble: Adventures in a Broken World," hits stores on July 4.
-
Iraq hits milestones on U.S. troop deaths, oil
Sun Jun 1, 2008 12:22pm EDT
* U.S. monthly death toll drops to new low
* Iraq says oil production at post-war high
* Australia pulls out combat troops
By Ross Colvin
BAGHDAD, June 1 (Reuters) - U.S. troop deaths in Iraq fell to their lowest level last month since the 2003 invasion and officials said on Sunday improved security also helped the country boost oil production in May to a post-war high.
U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Iraq's oil minister credited better security for the two milestones, which illustrated a dramatic turnabout in the fortunes of a country on the brink of all-out sectarian civil war just 12 months ago.
"We've still got a distance to go but I think lower casualty rates are a reflection of some real progress," Gates told reporters in Singapore. "The key will be to continue to sustain the progress we have seen."
American generals have stressed that the security gains are both fragile and reversible. That was shown in March, when an Iraqi government offensive against Shi'ite militias in southern Basra sparked a surge in violence in the capital and other cities, catching U.S. and Iraqi officials off guard.
The U.S. military said 19 soldiers died in May, the lowest monthly death toll in a five-year-old war that has so far claimed the lives of more than 4,000 American soldiers.
Oil Minister Hussein al-Shahristani told Reuters in an interview that the improved security had helped Iraq, which has the world's third-largest oil reserves, raise oil production to a post-war high of 2.5 million barrels per day in May.
Iraq's oil industry, hit by decades of sanctions, war and neglect, was a vulnerable target for saboteurs after the U.S. invasion. Attacks on pipelines quickly destroyed any hopes of using Iraq's vast oil reserves to fund its reconstruction.
The military says violence in Iraq is now at a four-year low following crackdowns by U.S. and Iraqi forces on Shi'ite militias in southern Basra and Baghdad and on al Qaeda in the northern city of Mosul, its last major urban stronghold.
"In May we have exceeded for the first time a 2 million barrels per day export rate. In production we have exceeded 2.5 million bpd," Shahristani said.
The number of Iraqi civilians killed in May also fell, to 505, after reaching a seven-month high of 968 in April, figures compiled by the interior, defence and health ministries showed.
SUICIDE BOMBING
U.S. officials credit the turnaround in security to President George W. Bush's decision to send 30,000 extra troops to Iraq, a rebellion by Sunni tribal leaders against al Qaeda, and a ceasefire by anti-American Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr.
But a suicide bombing in the town of Hit in western Anbar province on Saturday night that killed the local police chief underscored the fragility of Iraq's improved security.
Police said a suicide bomber blew himself up at a checkpoint, killing police chief Lieutenant-Colonel Khalil Ibrahim al-Jazzaa, eight other policemen and four civilians.
In Iraq's more stable south, about 500 Australian troops pulled out of their base in the city of Nassiriya, signalling an end to Australia's combat mission in the country.
Australia, a close U.S. ally, was one of the first countries to commit troops to the Iraq invasion, but Prime Minister Kevin Rudd and his Labour party won election last November largely on Rudd's campaign promise to bring the troops home this year.
The war is also a big issue in the U.S. presidential election, with Republican nominee John McCain vowing not to withdraw troops until the war is won, and his Democratic opponents Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton promising to bring them home as soon as possible.
Baghdad and the United States are negotiating a new deal that will provide a legal basis for U.S. troops in Iraq when their United Nations mandate expires at the end of the year.
Iraqi government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh said in a rare statement on the talks that they were at their early stages, but he acknowledged there were differences between Iraq and the United States over what should be included in the agreement.
"The Iraqi side has a vision and their draft differs from the American side and their vision," he said.
The talks have angered many Iraqis who suspect the United States of wanting to keep a permanent presence in Iraq, and on Friday thousands of Iraqis answered a call by Moqtada al-Sadr to protest against the negotiations.
Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki meanwhile asked France to supply sophisticated weaponry during a visit by French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner on Sunday. (Additional reporting by Haider al-Nasrallah in Nassiriya, Ammar al-Awani in Ramadi, Adrian Croft, Ahmed Rasheed, Michael Georgy and Aws Qusay in Baghdad and Andrew Gray in Singapore; Editing by Charles Dick)
__________________
-
Iraq and the Election
June 6, 2008; Page A14
This spring, the Iraqi army routed insurgents in three of their most important urban strongholds. These gains follow the success of the surge in crushing al Qaeda in the Sunni triangle, meaning that we are at last on the verge of winning in Iraq and securing a strategic victory in the Middle East. Question: Is this emerging victory – achieved at a cost of more than 4,000 American lives – something we are prepared to abandon after November?
* * *
The good news in Iraq is increasingly undeniable, even to the media. In March, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki ordered Iraqi troops to retake the southern Shiite city of Basra from Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army. After a shaky start, the city has now been liberated from Sadrist goon squads, and it is mostly peaceful. "The presence of the Iraqi army has made people safe, not 100%, but 90%," a Basra barber told the Washington Post. The army is pursuing the Sadrists in their last redoubt, Amarah, while other radicals have followed Moqtada to Iran.
Mr. Maliki then repeated the exercise in Sadr City, the Mahdi Army's Baghdad stronghold. Mr. Sadr backed down from a full-scale confrontation, following an Iranian-brokered "truce" that had all the hallmarks of a de facto surrender. Meanwhile, Iraqi army operations in the northern city of Mosul recently netted more than 1,000 suspected Sunni insurgents in al Qaeda's last major urban sanctuary. The remaining terrorists were forced to scatter to the countryside or flee for Syria. "They've never been closer to defeat than they are now," says U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker, who is not given to claims of premature progress.
For three consecutive weeks, the number of violent incidents have been at their lowest level since the spring of 2004. The number of U.S. combat fatalities last month, 19, was the lowest of the entire war, and Iraqi military and civilian deaths are also sharply down. In the first five months of this year, 4,500 insurgent weapons caches were found, compared to 6,900 for all of 2007. These numbers have sometimes moved in the wrong direction and may do so again, particularly during major combat operations. But the trend is unmistakably positive.
The military gains have, in turn, had salutary political consequences. Mr. Maliki's decision to take Basra forced Iraq's political class to take sides – either with the government, or the Sadrist militias. All but the Sadrists chose Mr. Maliki, even some who had thought of trying to topple the government. The prime minister has emerged stronger and with more support from all ethnic groups, not merely from fellow Shiites. Insofar as "political reconciliation" is supposed to be the acid test of progress in Iraq, it is happening.
The Iraqi military is also improving, partly from the confidence gained from its recent successes. The government now counts more than half a million men under arms, and the army is emerging as a reliable and multiethnic national institution. The lead division that took Basra in March was largely led by Sunni officers, who were nonetheless welcomed by the city's Shiites.
All of this means that it is now possible to foresee not merely a stable Iraq, but also one that can achieve our original strategic goals in the region. The strategist Frederick Kagan – an architect of the surge – makes the analogy to West Germany during the Cold War. A secure and pro-American Iraq would be crucial to expanding U.S. influence in the Arab heart of the Middle East, and especially to containing Iran. A democratic Iraq can serve as an alternative pole of Shiite power in the region, as well as an alternative political model to theocratic, radical Tehran.
All of this depends, however, on securing the progress of the last 18 months, and this means not departing too soon. The gains of recent weeks mean that the five surge brigades can return home this summer without sacrificing security. But both al Qaeda and Iranian-backed Special Groups are likely to stage some kind of offensive in the fall – not least to influence the Iraqi provincial and U.S. elections.
The insurgents know they've lost militarily, so their goal will be to make enough violent noise to prevail politically. Inside Iraq, the Sadrists will try to intimidate Iraqis from supporting competing Shiite groups. But the bigger immediate prize will be in the U.S., where they hope that a President Barack Obama would follow through on his pledge to abandon Iraq.
That kind of withdrawal is the only way we can now lose in Iraq. The minute it is announced, the Iraqis who have allied themselves with us would have to recalculate their prospects in a post-U.S. era. Iran and its proxies would immediately leap in influence – precisely the kind of outcome that Mr. Obama now claims to want to prevent. Progress toward political reconciliation might well stop, as the various Iraq factions worry about their own security without America's mediating presence.
* * *
By contrast, a permanent U.S. military presence – albeit one reduced over time – would give Iraqis the confidence to continue their political maturation. Another Iraq national election is scheduled for next year, and it is an opportunity for democracy to put down even deeper roots. It's crucial for Americans to understand that, apart from the Sadrists, all factions of Iraqi politics now support some kind of U.S.-Iraq status of forces agreement to succeed the U.N. mandate that expires later this year.
We are winning in Iraq. Indeed, we can now say with certainty that we will win, as long as we don't repeat our earlier mistakes and seek to draw down too soon. This is the improving Iraq that the next U.S. President will inherit, and it is the heart of the Iraq debate Americans should have in November.
-
How Prime Minister Maliki Pacified Iraq
By KIMBERLY KAGAN and FREDERICK W. KAGAN
June 10, 2008
America is very close to succeeding in Iraq. The "near-strategic defeat" of al Qaeda in Iraq described by CIA Director Michael Hayden last month in the Washington Post has been followed by the victory of the Iraqi government's security forces over illegal Shiite militias, including Iranian-backed Special Groups. The enemies of Iraq and America now cling desperately to their last bastions, while the political process builds momentum.
Reuters
Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki presses the flesh in Basra, March 29, 2008.
These tremendous gains remain fragile and could be lost to skillful enemy action, or errors in Baghdad or Washington. But where the U.S. was unequivocally losing in Iraq at the end of 2006, we are just as unequivocally winning today.
By February 2008, America and its partners accomplished a series of tasks thought to be impossible. The Sunni Arab insurgency and al Qaeda in Iraq were defeated in Anbar, Diyala and Baghdad provinces, and the remaining leaders and fighters clung to their last urban outpost in Mosul. The Iraqi government passed all but one of the "benchmark" laws (the hydrocarbon law being the exception, but its purpose is now largely accomplished through the budget) and was integrating grass-roots reconciliation with central political progress. The sectarian civil war had ended.
Meanwhile, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), swelled by 100,000 new recruits in 2007, was fighting hard and skillfully throughout Iraq. The Shiite-led government was showing an increasing willingness to use its forces even against Shiite militias. The announcement that provincial elections would be held by year's end galvanized political movements across the country, focusing Iraq's leaders on the need to get more votes rather than more guns.
Three main challenges to security and political progress remained: clearing al Qaeda out of Mosul; bringing Basra under the Iraqi government's control; and eliminating the Special Groups safe havens in Sadr City. It seemed then that these tasks would require enormous effort, entail great loss of life, and take the rest of the year or more. Instead, the Iraqi government accomplished them within a few months.
- Mosul: After losing in central Iraq, remnants of al Qaeda and Baathist insurgents were driven north. These groups started to reconstitute in Mosul as the last large urban area open to them. Mosul also contained financial networks that had funded the insurgency, was a waypoint for foreign fighters infiltrating from Syria, and has ethno-sectarian fault lines that al Qaeda sought to exploit.
The Iraqi government responded by forming the Ninewah Operations Command early in 2008, concentrating forces around Mosul, and preparing for a major clearing operation. In February, the ISF cleared the neighborhoods of Palestine and Sumer, two key al Qaeda safe havens.
In the meantime, American forces conducted numerous raids against the terrorist network, netting hundreds of key individuals. The ISF launched Operation Lion's Roar on May 10. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki visited Mosul on May 14, and the ISF began Operation Mother of Two Springs shortly thereafter.
The results have been dramatic. Enemy attacks fell from an average of 40 per day in the first week of May to between four and six per day in the following two weeks. Coalition forces have captured or killed the al-Qaeda emirs of Mosul, Southeast Mosul, Ninewah Province and much of their networks.
Mr. Maliki announced a $100 million reconstruction package for Mosul on May 17 and dispatched an envoy on May 29 to oversee the distribution of funds. Security progress was made possible in part by the enrollment of 1,000 former members of the Iraqi Army. They were part of the revision of the de-Baathification policy legislated by the Iraqi Parliament earlier in the year.
- Basra: Al Qaeda's defeat in 2007 exposed Iranian-backed Special Groups and Shiite militias as the most important sources of violence and casualties. The Maliki government had shown its willingness to target Sunni insurgents, but many feared it would not challenge Iran's proxies and the Sadrist militias within which they functioned. Basra, in particular, seemed an almost insurmountable problem following the withdrawal of British combat forces from the city. This left Iraq's second-largest city (and only port) in the hands of rival militias.
Iraqi and American commanders began planning for a gradual effort to retake the city. Mr. Maliki decided not to wait. He ordered clearing operations to begin on March 22, sent reinforcements to support those operations, and accompanied the first of those reinforcements to Basra on March 24.
Operation Knight's Charge started on March 25, as Iraqi Security Forces moved into Mahdi Army (JAM) safe havens throughout the city. Initial operations were not promising – some 1,000 ISF personnel deserted or refused to fight, most of them from the newly formed 14th Iraqi Army Division. Nevertheless, the Iraqi Army seized control of the port.
Initial setbacks did not deter Mr. Maliki, who continued to send in reinforcements, including Iraqi Special Forces, Iraqi helicopters and the Quick Reaction Force of the 1st Iraqi Army Division from Anbar. Negotiations between Iraqi leaders and Iranian Brig. Gen. Ghassem Soleimani, commander of the Iranian Quds Force, produced a "cease-fire" on March 30.
But operations continued, and after two weeks the ISF, with American advisers and aviation but no American combat units, launched clearing operations throughout the city on April 12. By mid-May, the ISF controlled Basra's neighborhoods, and drove JAM and Special Groups fighters out of their safe havens, pursuing them north and south of the city.
Mr. Maliki had authorized the recruitment of 2,500 local security volunteers and begun negotiating with their tribal leaders for their incorporation into the ISF. The establishment of Iraqi government control in Basra was symbolized by the recapture of state buildings and open areas that had been occupied by various Sadrist and other insurgent groups, and by the seizure of enormous weapons caches.
- Sadr City: The Special Groups had been preparing for an offensive of their own in the first months of 2008, stockpiling arms and moving trained fighters into and around the country. Mr. Maliki's move into Basra led them to begin their offensive prematurely, including the launching of heavy rocket and mortar attacks against the Green Zone from their bases in Sadr City. Iraqi Security Forces crushed these attacks in central Iraq and, with American assistance, in most of Baghdad.
The rocketing of the Green Zone, however, convinced American and Iraqi leaders to cordon off Sadr City, and to clear the two southernmost neighborhoods from which most of the rockets were coming. The government and U.S. commanders moved reinforcements toward Sadr City and began planning for a clearing operation. In the meantime, Iraqi officials began negotiating with Sadr City leaders, as U.S. forces erected a wall to separate the cleared neighborhoods from the rest of Sadr City.
On May 20, the ISF, supported by U.S. airpower and advisers, moved rapidly into the remainder of Sadr City. They received help from the local population in identifying IED locations and enemy safe houses, and destroyed enemy leadership centers. By the end of May, most of the Special Groups and hard-core Sadrist fighters had been killed, captured or driven off.
At present, al Qaeda is left with a tenuous foothold in Ninewah and a scattered presence throughout the rest of Sunni Iraq. Special Groups leaders who survived have mostly fled to Iran, while hard-core Sadrist fighters have fallen back to Maysan Province, whose capital, Amarah, has become their last urban sanctuary. All of Iraq's other major population centers are controlled by the ISF, which can now move freely throughout the country as never before.
The war is not over. Enemy groups are reforming, rearming and preparing new attacks. Al Qaeda in Iraq will conduct spectacular attacks in 2008 wherever it can. Special Groups and their JAM affiliates will probably reconstitute within a few months and launch new offensives timed to influence both the American and Iraqi elections in the fall.
And for all its progress and success, the ISF is not yet able to stand on its own. Coalition forces continue to play key support roles, maintaining stability and security in cleared but threatened areas, and serving as impartial and honest brokers between Iraqi groups working toward reconciliation.
But success is in sight. Compared with the seemingly insurmountable obstacles already overcome, the remaining challenges in Iraq are eminently solvable – if we continue to pursue a determined strategy that builds on success rather than throwing our accomplishments away. No one in December 2006 could have imagined how far we would have come in 18 months. Having come this far, we must see this critical effort through to the end.
Ms. Kagan is president of the Institute for the Study of War in Washington, D.C., and author of "The Surge: A Military History," forthcoming from Encounter Books. Mr. Kagan is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.
-
Sunnis to Baghdad
June 13, 2008
You can tell security is improving fast in Iraq because even some neighboring Arab countries are deciding to send envoys back to Baghdad. The United Arab Emirates announced plans last week to appoint an ambassador, and Bahrain and Jordan have since said they plan to do the same.
The Sunni-led Arab autocrats in the region have long been cool to Iraq's new government, not least because it is Shiite-led and democratically elected. In withdrawing their ambassadors, or staffing their embassies with junior-level diplomats since 2003, these countries could also point to security concerns. One of the insurgency's first car-bomb targets was the Jordanian embassy in August 2003, and terrorists later killed, wounded or kidnapped officials from Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Morocco, Sudan and the UAE.
But with violence markedly declining, the security justification is increasingly implausible. As UAE Foreign Minister Sheik Abdullah bin Zayed al-Nahyan recently explained, "the regional countries needed some time to understand the new Iraq, which has undergone a big change."
One Arab neighbor is notably absent from the list of returning Sunni nations. Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal promised in September to open an embassy in Baghdad "soon," but the Saudis have made no visible progress. Numerous U.S. officials have asked the Saudis to do so, and last week Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker told us that he and General David Petraeus "spoke to the King [Abdullah] to stress the important changes in Iraq and the parallel importance of Arabs recognizing that change by re-establishing their diplomatic presence." The Saudis, Mr. Crocker added, expressed concern about Iranian influence in Baghdad, despite his argument that a Saudi presence would in that case be "a good antidote."
It's about time the Saudis began to play a role in Iraq other than as a recruiting ground for suicide bombers. The Wahhabis in Riyadh may not prefer a Shiite regime in Baghdad, but the government of Nouri al-Maliki has shown it is willing to oppose both Shiite and Sunni extremists. The Sunni insurgency in Anbar Province is dying, and a stable Iraq with a U.S. presence would be the best protection Saudi Arabia could have against Iran's regional adventurism.
The Saudis love to back a winner, and that is what the new Iraq increasingly looks like. As for the risks to the House of Saud from Iraq's democratic example, there's always the option of learning from it.
-
Greetings,
The trend lines are clear. Iraq war seems to be winding-down. At this rate it is entirely conceivable that at the end of 2008 we will be able to say, in good conscience, that the Iraq war has ended.
Of course this is speculation.
Grabbing headlines today is the news that Australia is drawing down it’s forces from Iraq. The Australian military is comprised of some of the finest soldiers in the world. Yet the Australian government’s commitment to the war in Iraq has been militarily insignificant. The loss of the Australian military contingent is strategically irrelevant.
I’m in constant communications with forces on the ground in Iraq. al-Qaeda continues to be hammered into the dirt. The Iraq Army has demonstrated great competence in Sadr City. They are at the fore front of destroying al-Qaeda in Nineveh province.
Washington Post reports growing success in Basra by the Iraq security forces. Violence in Iraq is reaching an all time low, perhaps lower than at anytime in several decades. But make no mistake Iraq and it’s people have been ravaged by decades of war. Finally they are getting their chance at freedom thanks to the sacrifice of the men and women who have set them free from tyrants. With any luck, on my next trip to Iraq I will see little to no combat.
There are several new dispatches on the website. Free copies of Moment of Truth in Iraq are available with a one year subscription to Town Hall Magazine.
V/R
Michael
-
Why Iraqis Back McCain
June 17, 2008; Page A21
However it turns out for John McCain this fall -- and so far he's running his general election campaign the way Gen. Ricardo Sanchez ran counterinsurgency ops -- the Arizona Republican is sure to carry at least one battleground state by a landslide. That state is called Iraq.
Last week, the Pew Research Center released the results of a survey of more than 24,000 people in 24 countries. Result: From Japan to Tanzania to Germany to Russia, the world has "more confidence" in Barack Obama than in his Republican rival to "do the right thing regarding world affairs."
But Pew did not poll Iraqis, whose opinions about the choice America makes should weigh at least as heavily with us as the collective wisdom of, say, Brazil. Whom would they prefer as the next U.S. president?
Associated Press
Constraints of time and money being what they are, I have not gotten round to phoning 1,000 Iraqis to get their views on Obama-McCain. But I did sit down last week with four key provincial Iraqi leaders, Sunnis and Shiites, who -- without actually endorsing Mr. McCain -- made their views abundantly clear.
"The Iraqis are really fearful about some of the positions the Democratic Party has adopted," says Sheik Ahmed Abu Rishah. "If the Democrats win, they will be withdrawing their forces in a very rapid manner."
Mamoun Sami Rashid al-Alawi, the governor of Anbar province, agrees. "We have over a million casualties, thousands of houses destroyed," he says. "Are we going to tell [Iraqis] that the game is over? That the Americans are pulling out?"
Messrs. Abu Rishah and Awani, both Sunni, have possibly the toughest political jobs on the planet. Sheik Abu Rishah inherited the leadership of the Iraq Awakening movement when his brother was killed by al Qaeda last September. Gov. Awani's immediate predecessor was kidnapped and killed by insurgents, and he has survived more than a score of assassination attempts.
Today, the governor speaks with a mixture of confidence and foreboding. He insists al Qaeda has been vanquished. But, he adds, "Iraq is in a strategic location and has huge resources. There are a lot of eyes on Iraq." Later in the conversation, he makes his point more precisely. "Liberating Iraq is a very good dish. And now you are going to hand it over to Iran?"
A sense of incredulity hangs over the way Iraqis see the U.S. political debate taking shape. The governor tells a moving story about their visit to Walter Reed hospital, where they were surprised to find smiles on the faces of GIs who had lost limbs. "The smile is because they feel they have accomplished something for the American people."
But the Iraqis came away with a different impression in Chicago, where they had hoped to meet with Mr. Obama but ended up talking to a staff aide. "We noticed there was a concentration on the negatives," the governor recalls. "The Democrat kept saying that Americans have committed a lot of mistakes. Yes, that's true, but why don't you concentrate on what the Americans have achieved in Iraq?"
The Iraqis are even more incredulous about Mr. Obama's willingness to negotiate with Iran, which they see as a predatory regime. "Do you Americans forget what the Iranians did to your embassy?" asks the governor. "Don't you know that Ahmadinejad was one of [the hostage takers]?"
Here Hussein Ali al-Shalan, a Shiite from Diwaniyah in southern Iraq, offers a view. "For a long time, Iran has felt like Iraq is theirs. Our fear [about U.S. negotiations with Iran] is, you will be giving them something that we believe would prolong our agony. We are not against Iran. We have to coexist and work toward our mutual interests. The question is, is this possible at this stage? That's why we need the army to give a final push so the Iraqis can feel the fruits of our democracy."
It's not just Iran. "There is no other country that supports us," says Gov. Awani. "What is happening in Iraq scares everyone," by which he means the neighboring autocracies that have something to fear from a successful democratic model in their midst.
That only makes America's ambivalence toward its democratic creation that much stranger to the Iraqis. Will the next administration abandon both its principles and its friends in the region? For what?
The administration and the Iraqi government are now wrangling over a status-of-forces agreement -- evidence that Iraq has reached a point where it can once again act like a sovereign nation. But the Iraqis leave no doubt that they want a deal, not least "so Iraq would be able to protect U.S. interests in the region," as Sheik Abu Rishah puts it. Having lost 4,100 Americans for Iraq, the Iraqis are offering to return the sacrifice -- assuming only that the alliance endures.
Throughout our interview, the men did not stop fingering their prayer beads, as if their future hinges on their ability to make their case to the American public. They're right: It does. Which is why Iraq, all but alone among the nations, will be praying for a McCain victory on the first Tuesday in November.
Write to bstephens@wsj.com
-
OMG! Can this be the NYTimes? :lol:
BAGHDAD — What’s going right? And can it last?
Violence in all of Iraq is the lowest since March 2004. The two largest cities, Baghdad and Basra, are calmer than they have been for years. The third largest, Mosul, is in the midst of a major security operation. On Thursday, Iraqi forces swept unopposed through the southern city of Amara, which has been controlled by Shiite militias. There is a sense that Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki’s government has more political traction than any of its predecessors.
Consider the latest caricatures of Mr. Maliki put up on posters by the followers of Moktada al-Sadr, the fiery cleric who commands deep loyalty among poor Shiites. They show the prime minister’s face split in two — half his own, half Saddam Hussein’s. The comparison is, of course, intended as a searing criticism. But only three months ago the same Sadr City pamphleteers were lampooning Mr. Maliki as half-man, half-parrot, merely echoing the words of his more powerful Shiite and American backers. It is a notable swing from mocking an opponent perceived to be weak to denouncing one feared to be strong.
For Hatem al-Bachary, a Basra businessman, the turnabout has been “a miracle,” the first tentative signs of a normal life.
“I don’t think the militias have disappeared, and maybe there are sleeper cells which will try to revive themselves again,” he said. “But the first time they try to come back they will have to show themselves, and the government, army and police are doing very well.”
While the increase in American troops and their support behind the scenes in the recent operations has helped tamp down the violence, there are signs that both the Iraqi security forces and the Iraqi government are making strides. There are simply more Iraqi troops for the government to deploy, partly because fewer are needed to fight the Sunni insurgents, who have defected to the Sunni Awakening movement. They are paid to keep the peace.
Mr. Maliki’s moves against Shiite militias have built some trust with wary Sunnis, offering the potential for political reconciliation. High oil prices are filling Iraqi government coffers. But even these successes contain the seeds of vulnerability. The government victories in Basra, Sadr City and Amara were essentially negotiated, so the militias are lying low but undefeated and seething with resentment. Mr. Maliki may be raising expectations among Sunnis that he cannot fulfill, and the Sunni Awakening forces in many cases are loyal to their American paymasters, not the Shiite government. Restive Iraqis want to see the government spend money to improve services. Attacks like the bombing that killed 63 people in Baghdad’s Huriya neighborhood on Tuesday showed that opponents can continue to inflict carnage.
Perhaps most worrisome, more than five years after the American invasion, which knocked Mr. Hussein from power but set off great chaos, Iraq still lacks the formal rules to divide the power and spoils of an oil-rich nation among ethnic, religious and tribal groups and unite them under one stable idea of Iraq. The improvements are fragile.
The changes are already affecting Iraq’s complicated relationship with America. In the presidential campaign, a debate is rising about whether the quiet means American soldiers can leave.
Iraqi Officials Gain Confidence
American military commanders are seeing a new confidence among Iraqi leaders. They said they believed that the success of the recent military operations had played a role in the Iraqi government’s firm rebuff of American negotiators over a new long-term security pact to govern the United States military presence after the end of this year.
“They are feeling very strong right now, after Basra, Mosul and Sadr City,” said one senior American official.
The most obvious but often overlooked reason for the recent military success has been an increase in the number of trained Iraqi troops.
The quality of the recruits and leadership has often been poor, even in recent months. In Baghdad’s Sadr City, one Iraqi company abandoned its position in April, forcing American and Iraqi commanders to fill the gap with hastily summoned reinforcements. In Basra, more than 1,000 recently qualified soldiers deserted rather than obey orders to fight against Mr. Sadr’s Mahdi Army. One senior Iraqi government official conceded that the deserters simply “felt that the other side was too strong.”
But sheer numbers have helped to overcome the shortcomings. After the embarrassing setback in Basra, Mr. Maliki was able to pull units from elsewhere to provide reinforcements and saturate the city with checkpoints and patrols, restoring a measure of order after years of domination by Islamist militias and oil-smuggling mafias.
American officials said 50,000 members of Iraqi security forces took part in the Basra campaign, 45,000 in Mosul, and 10,000 in Sadr City — troops that would not have been available to Mr. Maliki’s predecessors. The Iraqis had by far the largest numbers of troops, although American and other coalition troops provided crucial air power, reconnaissance, logistics, medical support and even expertise in psychological operations.
--------------
One key source of that manpower has been training: Over the past year the Iraqi Army has added 52,000 soldiers; the Iraqi police and the national police have added 59,000; and Iraq special operations forces have added 1,400 troops, Lt. Gen. James M. Dubik, chief of the American security training and equipping mission, said last month. Yet another reason was that many troops were not tied down fighting Sunni insurgents in places like Anbar Province. That is thanks to the Sunni Awakening, and a related program in which the American military has paid thousands of former insurgents and militia fighters and made them neighborhood guards.
“Our successes reduced the pressure on the Iraqi security forces by more than 50 percent,” said Sheik Hussain Abaid, the leader of one such pro-American group south of Baghdad.
Ali Hatem al-Suleiman, an Awakening leader in Anbar, said an entire Army regiment of Anbari tribesmen was sent to fight in Mosul, while a division based in Anbar was rushed to Basra after commanders decided that a more stable security situation in Anbar meant the troops could be freed to fight elsewhere. Even Shiite government officials, long suspicious of the Awakening because it employs insurgents responsible for the deaths of Shiites, agreed. “Before, there was a security void in their areas, but they were able to fill it,” said Ali Adeeb, a senior official in the Dawa party and a close ally of Mr. Maliki.
Defining a Military Victory
But the government’s successes in Basra and Sadr City were not so much victories as heavy fighting followed by truces that allowed the militias to melt away with their weapons. “We may have wasted an opportunity in Basra to kill those that needed to be killed,” said one American defense official, who would speak candidly about the issue only if he was granted anonymity.
And in Mosul, the celebrations over the performance of the Iraqis who fought there have glossed over the tremendous — but hidden — role played by American Special Operations forces to clear out the toughest enemy fighters before the Iraqi soldiers arrived in full. “It is underreported how much the secret guys did to set the conditions for the Iraqi Army to go in and do what they did,” the official said.
What remains to be seen is whether the Iraqi government can capitalize on the operational successes with concrete steps that improve the lives of people in the three areas, like basic municipal services and economic opportunities. “The fear is unrealistic expectations,” the American defense official said. “Services do take time.”
Failure to follow through could wipe out many of the gains in places like Hayaniya, one of Basra’s most deprived areas and a Sadrist stronghold, where residents already grumble that they have seen little evidence of improvement. “They said they will repair schools and roads — but when and where?” said Ali Alwan, 45. “It is only talk. We suffered during the military operation, but what is the reward?” Mr. Maliki’s operations against fellow Shiites in Basra and Sadr City have bought at least temporary political good will from Sunnis who long saw his Shiite-dominated government as the enemy. Interviews with three dozen Sunni merchants, academics, teachers, laborers, government officials and office workers in former insurgent strongholds like Falluja, Tikrit, and Baghdad’s Adhamiya, Amiriya and Fadhil neighborhoods suggested that the prime minister had gained some ground with a group whose loyalty is essential in building a unified and stable state.
Abdul Hadi Jasim, a barber from Adhamiya, said, “Now, after one of the biggest Shiite militias that ravaged Basra was targeted, I think there is a sense of justice and fairness.” But old suspicions linger, and Sunnis remember the slaughter inflicted by Shiite militias from 2004 to 2007, and how Shiite death squads were protected by Iraqi security forces. In addition to the Mahdi Army, many Sunnis fear the Badr organization, the armed wing of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, a close ally of Mr. Maliki’s Dawa Party. Badr forces dominate some Iraqi security force units.
“Maliki’s war was a selective one,” says Falah Muhammad Abdullah, 46, an engineer from Falluja. “Why does Maliki’s government hunt down the Mahdi militia while it neglects Badr?”
Sunni Skepticism Remains
----------------
Many Sunnis are convinced that Mr. Maliki is trying to serve other masters: Iran, the Americans, or his own Dawa Party and the Islamic Supreme Council. Both face a serious challenge from the Sadrists in provincial elections later this year.
Mowafaq Abu Omar, a 52-year-old street merchant in Adhamiya, voiced a common suspicion — that the true aims of the Basra operation were to seize control of Iraq’s only significant port and to advance the creation of a large, autonomous and oil-rich Shiite super-province in the south.
There is also less enthusiasm for the recent operation in western Mosul, which is largely Sunni. Eman al-Hayali, a teacher in Amiriya, praised Mr. Maliki for weakening Mr. Sadr’s Mahdi Army but said she feared the Mosul operation was intended to satisfy the Maliki government’s patrons in Iran and telegraph a message to Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad: “Do not worry, your excellency, we are also killing Sunnis.’ ”
With such suspicions just below the surface, stability would be jeopardized if former insurgents serving in the Awakening forces come to believe that they are being used by the Shiite-led government while getting little in return.
“We are pleased with the government only regarding the war against the Shiite militias,” says Khalid al-Summaraie, a Sunni militia leader in Baghdad’s Fadhil neighborhood. He added pointedly, “They haven’t done anything for us that will give us a better standard of living.”
Another important factor buoying Mr. Maliki has been the sharp rise in oil prices, which, among other things, has allowed the Iraqi central bank to buy back its currency at a feverish pace, forcing the value of the Iraqi dinar higher and limiting increases in consumer prices. Driven by higher food costs, inflation stood last month at the rate of 16 percent, up from 11 percent in January.
But that rate might be a good deal higher without the central bank’s aggressive policies. The bank spends $1 billion to $1.5 billion every month in oil revenue to buy Iraqi dinars on the open market, said Mudher M. Salih Kasim, senior adviser to the bank. This is the main lever for controlling consumer prices, said Mr. Kasim, who noted that the value of the dinar had risen about 20 percent against the dollar. An oil price crash, he added, would be “a disaster.”
The government is also trying to funnel money to placate Iraqis who endured the military operations in Sadr City, Mosul and Basra and cement their loyalty. Tahseen al-Sheikhly, a spokesman for the Baghdad security plan, said $100 million would go to Sadr City to upgrade economic and social conditions there in the wake of the two-month military operation, which left buildings shattered and markets destroyed. Dr. Safaa al-Deen al-Safi, who is charged with carrying out development and reconstruction activities, said another $100 million would be spent on areas like health and education.
Reversible Gains
The anti-government and anti-occupation forces have also stumbled. The Islamist Sunni insurgents alienated many Iraqis with a trail of blood and bans on alcohol and smoking. And as attacks on Shiite areas by Sunni insurgents dropped, Shiites who had looked to the Mahdi Army for self-defense were less willing to put up with abuses.
But the improvements in Iraq face an array of destabilizing provincial, national and regional forces. The Sunni insurgency — now in many places operating as pro-American Awakening groups — continues to wait to see whether the government makes good on promises of jobs and a less sectarian administration of security and public services and infrastructure.
The Sadrists remain powerful and may not forgive what many consider a betrayal by Mr. Maliki, who could not have become prime minister two years ago without their blessing. Mohanned al-Gharrawi, a senior Sadrist cleric in Baghdad, said, “We feel like a bridge that they used to reach their aims and goals, and then they left us behind.”
Despite their newfound confidence, some senior Iraqi officials close to Mr. Maliki said that without an American military safety net they are vulnerable to threats from outside and inside their borders. One important but less-noticed element of the security negotiations has been Iraq’s effort to extract an American pledge to defend the government against foreign or domestic aggression. Mr. Adeeb, the top Maliki adviser, said officials wanted the Americans to protect the Iraqi government against anything the government viewed as a threat — not just what the Americans saw as a threat.
“Our political system is weak, the terrorists and former regime members are sparing no effort to overthrow the system, and neighboring countries have their own ambitions,” Mr. Adeeb said. “Our army is not qualified to defend Iraq yet.”
-
Summary
U.S. troops will formally hand over security responsibility for Iraq’s largest Sunni province, Anbar, to Iraqi security forces June 28, according to a June 23 Reuters report. Despite real and impressive security gains in the last year because of sectarian conflict and strong intra-Sunni contentions in Anbar, the move is problematic at best. How the security handover plays out in Anbar could prove the most critical indicator of the future position of Sunnis in a Shiite-dominated Baghdad, which in turn is the key element in the U.S.-Iranian struggle for Iraq.
Analysis
Related Special Topic Page
Iraq, Iran and the Shia
Gov. Mamun Sami Rasheed of Anbar province, Iraq’s largest Sunni province, said the U.S. military will transfer control of the province’s security to Iraqi forces June 28, Reuters reported June 23. U.S.-led coalition forces have so far transferred security control for three Kurdish provinces in the north and six Shiite provinces in the south. Though Anbar will be the 10th of Iraq’s 18 provinces returned to Iraqi security control since the U.S.-led invasion in 2003, it will thus be the first predominantly Sunni region handed back to Iraqi government control.
While the performance of Iraqi government security forces has been mixed, they have begun to demonstrate a limited capability to stand on their own. In Anbar, these forces will meet Sunni forces known as the Awakening Council that have imposed a tribal-controlled peace on the province. The meeting of these Sunni elements and government forces will serve as a key litmus test for Iraq’s emerging post-Baathist security establishment.
As late as 2006, chronic tensions between local Sunni police forces and Shiite-dominated national police and army units in Anbar province were palpable, occasionally even breaking out into isolated gunbattles.
These tensions arose because Iraq’s police and army are dominated by Shia while Anbar — the country’s largest province in terms of land area — until late 2006 was a major insurgent theater for both Sunni nationalist and jihadist groups. Intra-Sunni rivalries in the western province will play a key role in assisting the Shia to take control. This could lead to a resumption of violence in Anbar as various groups seek to take advantage of the new security environment.
Anbar’s size makes it key to the future Sunni entry into a Shiite-dominated political system, explaining why the United States has given the province a disproportionate amount of attention. Much of this attention was spent on assisting in the formation of an 80,000-strong tribal force known as the Awakening Councils. Not only were these groups instrumental in controlling the Sunni nationalist insurgency, they turned their guns against al Qaeda-led jihadists. It is these fighters, currently on the Pentagon’s payroll and backed by Saudi Arabia, that have both the Iraqi Shia as well as their Iranian patrons extremely concerned. Under the Awakening Councils’ tenure, Anbar has gone from one of the deadliest provinces in Iraq to one of the safest.
Tehran already has warned of a major uprising if the ongoing talks between the al-Maliki and Bush administrations on a future U.S. military presence in Iraq lead to a long-term U.S. presence in Iraq, especially one conferring significant security powers on the United States. Meanwhile, the Shiite-dominated Iraqi government has been blocking any progress on the re-Baathification process, which is supposed to oversee the return of Sunnis in the country’s civil and military bureaucracy, even when the Shia agree to it in principal. Therefore, the Iranians and their Iraqi Shiite allies view the transfer of Anbar’s security as an opportunity to check the Sunni resurgence in the new Iraqi republic.
Coalition and Iraqi commanders want to transition about 20 percent of the Awakening Councils fighters — or about 15,000 out of the total of 80,000 Sunni tribal militiamen — to the Iraqi Security Forces, which comprises the army, national police and Iraqi police. Most of these fighters would be inducted into the national police, which is recruited and deployed locally, giving the Awakening Councils some degree of official influence at the local level. Shiite-dominated Baghdad sees the 15 percent figure as sufficient, but it falls far below the expectations of the Anbar’s Sunnis.
Awakening Councils also are in the process of transitioning from a militia into a political movement, and hope to take advantage of provincial elections slated in the fall to consolidate their de facto gains into formal political power. The Iraqi Sunnis know that a demographic-based constitution severely limits their share of power in the central government, so the Sunni’s best bet is to entrench themselves in their region (comprising Anbar, Salah ad Din, At Tamim, and Ninawa provinces, and to lesser degree, Baghdad, Diyala and Babil provinces) as much as possible.
But at the local level, intra-Sunni rivalries between those Sunnis who are already part of the state (such as Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi’s Tawafoq Iraqi Front, the largest Sunni bloc in parliament) and those who initially shunned the post-2003 political system (e.g., Awakening Councils, the Sunni religious establishment, various tribal elements, Islamist insurgents, and Baathists) will prevent the Sunnis from consolidating their power. The internal problems of the Sunnis could thus give the Shiite-dominated security forces a tactical advantage in establishing their control in Anbar.
Sectarian and intra-Sunni dynamics have the potential to recreate security problems in Anbar as Iraqi forces assume responsibility for security. Ultimately, an Iraqi state imposing its writ on its territory will require a U.S.-Iranian understanding establishing an ethno-sectarian balance of power in Iraq. But before that can happen, a balance of power has to be achieved within both Shiite and Sunni communities. The outcome of the coming provincial polls will to a great degree settle the internal balance within Iraq’s Shia and Sunnis, thereby preparing the two sides for and ultimate face off.
Back to top
-
A response to the preceding article from another forum:
======================================
Great article Crafty Dog. This is all pretty real for me, I will celebrate one year since the day I left Anbar on July 14th, in Camden no less.
there have been great gains in Anbar. I had the privelige of spending 16 1/2 months there in 2006 and 2007. When we got there, we were told Anbar is lost, don't try to save it, just try to keep it from getting any worse. I am most familiar with the Fallujah, Lake Habbiniyah, Habbiniyah, RTE Lyman/Michigan AO. So I can't speak for Ramadi or along the border. But 3 months before we left, SECDEF came and gave a speech and Camp Fallujah and praised Anbar for the gains the province had made. I didn't get to see it, somebody had to keep Abdullah and Achmed from dropping a mortar on him from down by the river.
Anywhoo, when we got there we hadn't even seen IA or IP, not even recruiting posters, some of the people hadn't heard of them. When We left they were directing traffic on Michigan on the other side of the bridge in Fallujah. They were running their own COPs on Lyman doing checkpoints over the bridge(the bridge blew up a months after they took over, but baby steps). That tribal shit was just starting when we left as well.
I don't miss Anbar in particular, it is a cruel unforgiving place. I miss certain things about war a bit, but I am glad to hear that things are still improving there.
-
Iraq seeks ban on religious imagery in elections
Ammar Awad / Reuters
POPULAR: A street vendor in Najaf sells posters of Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani in 2004. His image was used widely by Shiite parties in the 2005 vote. This year he has prohibited them from doing so.
The government calls for parties to avoid using images of religious leaders. The proposed election law changes also include allowing voters to choose individuals rather than entire lists.
By Doug Smith and Saif Hameed, Los Angeles Times Staff Writers
July 4, 2008
BAGHDAD -- In a move to separate mosque and state, the Iraqi government said Thursday that Islamic houses of worship should be off limits for campaigning in provincial elections scheduled for the fall.
Government spokesman Ali Dabbagh also said that photos of anyone but the candidates would be banned from campaign advertising.
Prime Minister Nouri Maliki's administration issued the recommendations in the hope of preventing a repetition of the use made of the country's revered religious figures in the 2005 election campaign.
Shiite Muslim political slates plastered their campaign literature with images of Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, Iraq's most influential religious leader, and some mosques sent out cars with loudspeakers promoting candidates.
Dabbagh announced several other recommendations Thursday, including the use of an open slate that would allow voters to pick individual candidates, rather than vote for entire slates as in 2005.
To deflect concerns that the measure would reduce the chances of women being elected, Dabbagh said, there should be at least one woman in the first three spots on each slate.
The open slate was proposed as an improvement over the unpopular system used in 2005, but it also has critics who say it will be so confusing that the votes won't be counted properly.
Parliament may try to draft a hybrid when it takes up the election law. However, there appears to be a majority in favor of banning the use of religious images, said Usama Najafi, a lawmaker from the secular Iraqi National List slate headed by former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi.
"Referring to religious symbols in campaigning is against the constitution," Najafi said. "It is deceiving people that the religious figure supports a given slate, and this is not right."
Even before the announcement, Iraq's religious leaders appeared to be voluntarily backing away from the practice. Sistani this week prohibited the use of his name or image by any groups.
A spokesman for anti-U.S. cleric Muqtada Sadr, whose larger-than-life image is routinely posted in heavily Shiite areas, said his group would not use religious imagery. Sadr's image will not be used in campaigning because "it would decrease the majesty and eminence of such religious symbols," Salah Ubaidi said.
The Sadr movement isn't fielding its own slate but will support individuals, said Ghufran Saidi, a pro-Sadr lawmaker.
Dabbagh, the government spokesman, also said Thursday that Jordan's King Abdullah would soon visit Iraq to meet with Maliki.
Meanwhile, a car bomb went off near Yarmouk Hospital in west Baghdad, killing five people and injuring 10, police said. In Hillah, 60 miles south of Baghdad, a bomb exploded in a cafe late Wednesday, killing four, police said.
doug.smith@latimes.com
Times staff writer Saif Rasheed in Baghdad and a special correspondent in Najaf contributed to this report.
-
http://hotair.com/archives/2008/07/05/quote-of-the-day-306/
“If you are fighting to install sharia [Islamic law] on this country, you are going to have to be killed"
**Ah, if only europeans had this resolve....**
-
Maliki's Withdrawal Card
July 9, 2008; Page A14
A year ago, the conventional Beltway wisdom had it that Iraq was a failed state. Today, the same wisdom holds that it is less chaotic but still fragile, dependent entirely on a U.S. presence to survive. But judging by recent comments from Nouri al-Maliki, even this view may be out of date.
Addressing Arab ambassadors in Abu Dhabi on Monday, the Iraqi prime minister made headlines by saying his government was "looking at the necessity of terminating the foreign presence on Iraqi lands and restoring full sovereignty." Mr. Maliki has also been playing hardball with the Bush Administration in concluding a status-of-forces agreement by the end of the year, when the current U.N. mandate authorizing the U.S. presence in Iraq expires.
Mr. Maliki's comments are an assertion of confidence in his country's stability – and not without cause. Fully nine of Iraq's 18 provinces are now under domestic security control. Al Qaeda is being smoked out of its last urban refuge in Mosul. The Iraqi army has performed with increasing skill and confidence against Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army, which has also been ousted from its urban strongholds. Iraq will take in some $70 billion in oil revenue this year. T. Boone Pickens, the Texas oil magnate, told us yesterday that Iraq could double its current production, to five million barrels a day, in coming years.
More important, Iraq seems to have been able to consolidate the security gains achieved by the surge, even as the last of the surge brigades deployed in 2007 are now returning to the U.S. That makes further reductions in U.S. force levels look increasingly plausible, a further validation of President Bush's "return on success" strategy.
Mr. Maliki's comments were also designed for domestic Iraqi political consumption – another sign of that country's robust democratic debate. With elections scheduled for the autumn, Mr. Maliki wants to show he's nobody's pawn, especially not America's. The Sadrists continue to play the nationalist card, even as they are themselves pawns of Iran. The rise of Iraqi nationalism is inevitable and largely welcome as a unifying national force. Remember all of those who said an Iraqi Shiite government would merely be a tool of Iran?
The Prime Minister is also making it clear to his Arab neighbors that his government is not about to collapse. Apparently, they believe him: Jordan, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates have announced plans to break the Arab diplomatic embargo of Iraq and return their ambassadors to Baghdad; the UAE has also forgiven $7 billion of Iraqi debt. Perhaps Saudi Arabia and Egypt will follow.
The significant question now is the pace and extent of any U.S. withdrawal, and the nature of any long-term U.S. military presence. Despite Mr. Maliki's comments, Iraqi National Security Adviser Mowaffak al-Rubaie was quick to add that the call for a timetable for U.S. withdrawal was "conditioned on the ability of Iraqi forces to provide security," according to the Associated Press. In other words, Mr. Maliki is not endorsing the Barack Obama agenda of immediate U.S. withdrawal starting on January 20.
Our view is that Iraq and Mr. Maliki would benefit from striking a security agreement this year while Mr. Bush is still in office. Despite Iraq's impressive security gains, Iran can still do plenty of mischief through its "special group" surrogates. The U.S. can help deter Iranian trouble, especially with Iraq elections scheduled for this year and next.
Inside Iraq, a significant long-term U.S. presence would also increase the confidence of Iraq's various factions to make political compromises. And outside, it would improve regional stability by giving the U.S. a presence in the heart of the Middle East that would deter foreign adventurism. This is the kind of strategic benefit that the next Administration should try to consolidate in Iraq after the hard-earned progress of the last year.
Our sense is that, with the exception of the Sadrists, all of Iraq's main political factions want the U.S. to remain in some significant force. Iraq is now a democracy, however, and perhaps as their confidence grows the Maliki government and Iraq public opinion will think differently. But that kind of withdrawal timetable should be mutual – and not imposed by a new U.S. President acting as if the Iraq he'll inherit in 2009 is the same as the Iraq of 2006. That would mean U.S. forces could be withdrawn with honor, and in victory.
See all of today's editorials and op-eds, plus video commentary, on Opinion Journal.
-
http://www.commentarymagazine.com/viewarticle.cfm/is-the-war-over--11599
Over?
-
From The Man himself:
We have won the war in Iraq. By "we" I mean the Coalition and the Iraqis. Unless there is some unexpected reversal, what lays ahead is the challenge of building a better Iraq. There is still violence. We have lost four soldiers to combat this month, but there were times when we lost that many on an average day. There still are attacks, though we have finally reached the point where all that's left are truly "dead-enders." Al Qaeda is still a problem, but their numbers are decreasing in Iraq. The Iraqi people are sick of the violence. The Iraqi Army is filled with courageous soldiers who can fight. It is possible that by the end of the year we can really say, "Mission Accomplished," except for the continued support that Iraq will need.
Personally, my optimism has never been higher for Iraq.
Please click for some statistics.
Very Respectfully,
Michael Yon
-
**Even the "Associated with terrorists Press" has to agree**
Iraq's al-Qaeda fighters now ‘furtive terrorists’
Article posted July 17, 2008 - 04:10 PM
COMBAT OUTPOST COPPER, Iraq - It's quiet around here in farm country, south of Baghdad where al-Qaeda once held sway. Just months ago US foot patrols through the wheat fields nearby would regularly draw fire — if the soldiers managed first to elude al-Qaeda-planted roadside bombs.
"The difference is night and day," says Capt. George Morris, 26. He and his soldiers in Bravo Company, 2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division walked the area this week to visit a handful of farm families five miles east of the town of Latifiyah, not far from the Tigris River.
And it's not just here. Throughout the country, al-Qaeda in Iraq, an insurgent organization thought to be affiliated with the global terrorist network but comprised mainly of Iraqis, has lost so much clout it is close to becoming irrelevant to the outcome of the war. The group has not been eliminated, however, leaving open the possibility of resurgence if the Iraqi government fails to follow up the military gains with civilian services like the irrigation that's badly needed here.
When President Bush announced in January 2007 that he was sending more than 21,000 extra US combat troops to Iraq — mostly to the Baghdad area — as part of a new approach to fighting the insurgency, commanders said their No. 1 focus was degrading al-Qaeda's ability to foment sectarian violence.
In the Latifiyah area, it's not hard to see that goal appears to have been achieved — an accomplishment that adds to the expectation that Bush will be able to further reduce US troop levels this fall.
Iraqi Army Capt. Jassim Hussein al-Shamari, whose men were part of Morris' foot patrol, has one explanation for al-Qaeda's fall.
"The people themselves will turn over the terrorists" if they show themselves, says al-Shamari. He's speaking through an interpreter to Brig. Gen. Jeffrey Buchanan, a deputy commander of U.S. forces in the swath of once-violent territory stretching south of Baghdad from the Iranian border to Anbar province.
Buchanan sees it much the same way.
"The people are fed up with what they experienced under (al-Qaeda's) presence," Buchanan said, adding that the key to keeping the terrorist group down is having the government in Baghdad step in and provide more essential services, like the irrigation that farmers in the Latifiyah area find in short supply.
And there is a troubling disconnect between the central government and local leaders.
"The link to the government of Iraq is almost nonexistent here," Morris said.
So it remains an open question: Once US combat forces depart, whenever that may be, will al-Qaeda find an avenue for resurgence? It is generally accepted among US officers and intelligence specialists that despite its decline, al-Qaeda will remain in Iraq at some level long after the Americans are gone. The group had no meaningful foothold in the country before US forces invaded in March 2003.
There is no available official estimate of the number of al-Qaeda fighters in Iraq. A US intelligence estimate early this year put it at a maximum of 6,000, although it probably has fallen far lower recently. Perhaps more importantly, US officers said in a series of Associated Press interviews over the past 10 days that so many al-Qaeda leaders have been captured or killed that its remnants are ineffective.
Col. Al Batschelet, chief of staff for the US command overseeing military operations in the Baghdad area, said that once the leadership began disappearing, lower-level technicians were pressed into duty.
That had the effect of accelerating the group's decline: the technical experts were not as good at organizing and executing attacks, and by taking the lead they exposed themselves to being captured or killed. That, in turn, has left even less-technically skilled fighters to perform the specialized work of assembling bombs like al-Qaeda's signature weapon, the vehicle-borne improvised explosive device, officers said.
The triggering mechanisms of al-Qaeda's bombs have become less sophisticated and less effective, Batschelet said. Also, vehicle-borne IEDs used to contain hundreds of pounds of explosives, but they now typically are only 25 pounds.
"They just can't get the material any more to do what they want to do," Batschelet said. "But they still try. So we are unable to say that we've defeated their will" to continue their acts of violence.
Col. Bill Hickman, commander of 2nd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, sees much the same thing in the neighborhoods of northwest Baghdad where his soldiers have witnessed a dramatic decline in violence this year.
"There are still disrupted cells of al-Qaeda in our area," he said in an interview. "So they're active, but they're not as effective as they used to be. And their IEDs are small IEDs now."
As for eliminating al-Qaeda entirely in Iraq, "That's probably not achievable," said Batschelet.
Although US and Iraqi forces have put enormous pressure on al-Qaeda by pursuing its leaders with relentless raids informed by improved intelligence this year, an even more important factor, arguably, was the decision by Sunni Arabs who had opposed the US occupation to ally with the Americans against al-Qaeda.
Whether those newfound allies — dubbed Sons of Iraq by their Americans benefactors — remain in opposition to the Sunni extremists, or decide to switch sides again, will tell much about al-Qaeda's future in Iraq.
Either way, however, the moment seems to have passed when al-Qaeda could prevail in this conflict. It has been forced out of its original strongholds in Anbar province, and more recently it has lost Baghdad and the northern city of Mosul, although it still can pull off a deadly attack there and elsewhere.
Stephen Biddle, an Iraq watcher in Washington at the Council on Foreign Relations, said in an interview that without an urban hideout, al-Qaeda is reduced to the role of being "furtive terrorists."
"If they don't have an urban area with a friendly population that can enable them to operate" — and from which to recruit fighters — "then they're going to be isolated terrorist actors," Biddle said. Thus, eliminating them entirely need not be the goal of US commanders and the Iraqi government.
"That's not central to the outcome of the war," Biddle said. - AP
-
http://hotair.com/archives/2008/07/17/iraqis-torn-on-troop-withdrawal/
Iraqis torn on troop withdrawal
POSTED AT 11:15 AM ON JULY 17, 2008 BY ED MORRISSEY
The New York Times has a balanced and interesting article on how Iraqis view proposals to get American troops out of Iraq. Most of them would like to see American combat troops out of the country, but many of those fear a too-rapid withdrawal and the chaos that would follow. And while Iraqis see Barack Obama as a breath of fresh air, they don’t appear to like his military strategy anywhere near as much:
A tough Iraqi general, a former special operations officer with a baritone voice and a barrel chest, melted into smiles when asked about Senator Barack Obama.
“Everyone in Iraq likes him,” said the general, Nassir al-Hiti. “I like him. He’s young. Very active. We would be very happy if he was elected president.”
But mention Mr. Obama’s plan for withdrawing American soldiers, and the general stiffens.
“Very difficult,” he said, shaking his head. “Any army would love to work without any help, but let me be honest: for now, we don’t have that ability.”
Thus in a few brisk sentences, the general summed up the conflicting emotions about Mr. Obama in Iraq, the place outside America with perhaps the most riding on its relationship with him.
Withdrawal itself is not unpopular among Iraqis; a lot of them would like Americans to leave. Most of them recognize, though, that the Iraqi Army won’t be ready to replace US troops for quite some time. In some Sunni neighborhoods, the mainly Shi’ite IA can’t or won’t patrol to avoid provocations. And while the numbers of IA troops have grown significantly, most of them need a lot of training and seasoning before they can operate completely independently of American leadership and logistics — and the Iraqis have no air power at all.
What they do not want to do is to provide an opening for al-Qaeda or militias to start another round of violence. Another Golden Mosque bombing could touch off more sectarian and tribal feuding, and without the American troops nearby, the IA would still be unlikely to contain it. As General Hiti understands, the nation needs stability for the next several years while all of the elements of security get developed to independent status, including air and naval power, both of which the Iraqis have had to postpone in order to get its army and police reconstituted. Otherwise, all of the gains made in the last year will evaporate, and the Iraqis will have to go back to a bunker existence.
The article doesn’t break new ground as much as it gives background for the question which will remain primary in the upcoming American and Iraqi elections. When can the Americans end its combat stance in Iraq, and what comes afterwards? Even the Iraqis have no clear conception of the answers, but as one said, the Americans have a moral obligation to finish what we started and make sure the job gets done right.
-
I'm curious, since Iraq seems to clearly and unequivocally wants us out, be it
14 months or 16 months (BO's timetable) and that day comes and Iraq's government
says, "please leave, begin now to withdraw all your troops immediately",
however the U.S. commander's on the ground say this is a big mistake,
do we immediately obey the Iraqi government and leave?
McCain, who might be President at that time, seems to give credence to the opinion of the
U.S. commander's on the ground, however it seems to me that it is the Iraqi's country, their choice
as to when we leave - whether we are ready or not or whether we think it is
appropriate is not relevant; it's their country - their sole decision.
I don't get the debate.
-
Where do you get the idea that the Iraqis clearly and unequivocally want us out?
-
Where do you get the idea that the Iraqis clearly and unequivocally want us out?
Ahhhh I think it was the Iraqi Parliament over one year ago that clearly stated they
wanted a timetable for withdrawal - the sooner the better. And of course this
past week, Maliki jumped on board and clearly (before the spin) stated he
wanted a timetable for our withdrawl within the next two years. Elections are
in the fall, the people of Iraqi want our withdrawal; they simply want "termination
of foreign presence on Iraqi lands and to restore full sovereignty". Either Maliki
gets on board or he might be out. Similar to President Johnson; he too may finally bow
to the people and leave office.
It's not the U.S. commander's on the ground's decision; they don't get a vote. The
vote belongs to the Iraqi people. It's their country; we are merely a visitor. Like the
analogy I gave above, visitors are great, but they can overstay their welcome. Sometimes,
they need to be sent packing.
McCain never seems to address the issue of the Iraqi people's desire. His only concern
seems to be with the U.S. commander's opinion and us saving face. But it is the people's
choice, we finally got out of Vietnam (what a mess) because the people demanded it.
Now it seems the American people and the Iraqi people are demanding the same.
My question below was do you think McCain will comply if the Iraqi government demands
a short term withdrawal plan regardless of U.S. commander's opinion on the ground?
Whose country is it?
-
JDN:
It is long standing US policy that if the people/govt of Iraq says we should go that we go. That has never been in question and I think your concern, though understandable, to be misplaced.
Nor has it been in doubt that many factions there would like us to go, BUT ONE THE WHOLE EVEN THOSE WHO WANT US TO GO WANT US TO DO SO ONLY WHEN THE IRAQ GOVT IS CAPABLE OF MAINTAINING STABILITY.
If I were President, I certainly would want to know my generals' thoughts on where the Iraq govt and people are in that process-- this certainly would be of help in reading the cacaphony of noise coming out of the beginnings of a democracy that we have enabled there with our blood, sweat, and tears.
McC is quite right: it is worth noting fully that BO took his position is one formed before he ever went there and spoke to anyone there-- either our generals or the Iraqi leaders. While this speaks to BO's order of priorities as a CIC (e.g. getting elected/domestic politics first) it is not the central point: The problem with BO's timeline is that it IS a timeline.
I don't know if you have any experience translating from one language to another for accuracy and nuance. My experience is limited to translating judicial decisions and lawyer letters from Spanish to English. This I found to be a pretty good trick, and it was far less nuanced than the subject matter here. Furthermore Spanish-English translation is relatively easy compared to Arabic-German, let alone adding the additional layer of then going to English. As I read it (and I do think the MSM spins these things heavily, whereas you seem to take its presentation here as honest/accurate, so here we disagree) Maliki's comment was that he thought it would take about as long as BO's timeline. THIS DOES NOT MEAN HE FAVORS A TIMELINE.
You seem to take at face value the MSM assertion that Maliki's comments are post-fact spin. Of course this is possible, but also possible is that someone didn't get it quite right (either by accident or on purpose) and that given the political coup that the original and misleading translation seemed to provide BO, the MSM continues to spin and s*ck BO's d*ck by denying Maliki's complaint of mistranslation by spinning it as trying to cover up his moment of honesty. As covered in the Media threads and the BO Phenomena threads, its not like this is not going on in a massive way across the board anyway!!! :x
Without MSM trying to spin this BO's way, Mailiki's statement IMHO is properly read as an Arab politician trying to surf his way through the competing tensions of several audiences and possibilities:
a) His Shia base
b) the Sunnis
c) the Kurds
d) the possiblity that BO wins
e) the possibility that McC wins
f) Iran
In this context, especially a) and d), it makes sense for him to want to sound relatively specific and able to work with BO should he win, but as a practical matter to really have our exit defined by the reality on the ground-- which is exactly what he says he said!!! This is NOT what the original German article said, and Maliki is right to have complained.
We also need to remember that the make-up of the current government was defined by elections in which the Sunnis did not really participate to the benefit of the Shia, and that , , , ahem , , , once the current government defines certain matters concerning the next elections (the date of which keeps getting postponed :wink: ) the make-up of the next government will include a lot more Sunnis-- who on the whole look quite a bit more favorably on our sticking around and guaranteeing their safety than do the Shia who support Maliki.
TAC,
Marc
-
Marc,
Frankly, I have not read it so clearly put that our longstanding and official policy was that if the people/gov't of Iraq says that we should go, then we should go. That is reassuring.
As for McCain, he does raise some good points. And, I think he definitely has more experience in foreign matters especially as it relates to military actions. But I think America is tired; like Vietnam, they simply want out albeit with some honor.
As for translations, I have done a little, and have a friend who is an expert (Caucasian guy (PhD. Yale) doing Chinese and Japanese) doing mostly legal work. He finds the nuances frustrating/challenging and needs a rest every thirty minutes during depositions because he is exhausted concentrating so much. That being said, this subject matter was not scientific or legal; rather it was straightforward and the German Magazine has confirmed that they will stand by their article and translation. I think the "spin" came after.
And yes, I agree the Sunnis hope/pray we remain. Yet I find it odd, a few years ago the Sunnis were our enemies. Now of course we worry about the Shia. Sometimes I think we replaced one bad apple with another. I am not sure which apple is more rotten. I always thought there was some truth to the comment, "sure he's a dictator, but he's our dictator." I worry that in 5-10 years the Shia will only be worse and Iraq in general will suffer more than they ever did before.
james
-
**A bit of historical perspective on how the dems are the best friends are enemies could ever ask for.**
Al-Qaeda's No. 2 Applauds Democrat War Bill
By Amanda B. Carpenter (more by this author)
Human Events
Posted 05/08/2007 ET
Updated 05/08/2007 ET
Over the weekend, the second-highest ranking member of al Qaeda called Democrat-led initiatives to end the war symbols of American defeat in Iraq.
In a 67-minute interview released on May 5, known terrorist Shaykh Ayman al-Zawahiri said legislation to tie war funding with a timetable for withdrawal, “reflects American failure and frustration.”
Last week, President Bush vetoed a bill delivered to him from the Democrat Congress that did this. Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s (D.-Calif.) House has since failed to overturn his veto and now negotiations to proceed appear to be in a stalemate.
Zawahiri lamented that “this bill will deprive us of the opportunity to destroy the American forces which we have caught in this historic trap” but said it proved jihad “is moving from the stage of defeat of the Crusader invaders and their traitorous underlings to the stage of consolidating Mujahid Islamic Emirate.”
Zawahiri said the withdrawal legislation helped to “raise the banner of Jihad as it makes its way through a rugged path of sacrifice.”
A senior government official said it was “stunning” that Zawahiri was watching Congress so closely.
The video was likely encouraged by comments from Democrat leadership. In an April 19 press conference Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D.-Nev.) told media, “This war is lost.”
Two days later, in a statement issued from the Islamic State of Iraq, al Qaeda used Reid’s declaration as evidence of their success. “In the past few days it became clear to every watcher and observer the magnitude of damage that hits the American administration and the defeated declarations of its leaders about the situation in the field in Iraq,” it said. “A serious statement came from ‘Harry Reid’ the Democrat majority leader in the Congress who said: "'the war is in Iraq is hopeless and that the situation in Iraq is similar to Vietnam War.'”
The Vietnam War was ended with the 1973 Foreign Assistance Act that cut funding for operations in the region. The end effect of the Foreign Assistance Act was best captured in a photograph taken by Hubert Van Es that showed hundreds of Vietnamese civilians queuing up for the last American helicopter out of Saigon. Soon, without American troops or any resources to protect the Vietnamese, the Communists took over South Vietnam and millions were killed by the Khmer Rouge communist regime in the power vacuum left by American withdrawal.
Similar actions could be taken by al Qaeda forces, who have failed to hold territory in Iraq and Afghanistan or disrupt American-led political processes there, should U.S. troops withdraw from the region.
Throughout the 2004 presidential election, Democrat candidate Sen. John Kerry (D.-Mass.) was also quoted by name in communications from Osama bin Laden and Zawahiri.
Miss Carpenter is congressional correspondent & assistant editor for HUMAN EVENTS. She is the author of "The Vast Right-Wing Conspiracy's Dossier on Hillary Rodham Clinton," published by Regnery (a HUMAN EVENTS sister company).
-
**A bit of historical perspective on how the dems are the best friends are enemies could ever ask for.**
Al-Qaeda's No. 2 Applauds Democrat War Bill
By Amanda B. Carpenter (more by this author)
Human Events
Posted 05/08/2007 ET
Updated 05/08/2007 ET
Over the weekend, the second-highest ranking member of al Qaeda called Democrat-led initiatives to end the war symbols of American defeat in Iraq.
In a 67-minute interview released on May 5, known terrorist Shaykh Ayman al-Zawahiri said legislation to tie war funding with a timetable for withdrawal, “reflects American failure and frustration.”
Last week, President Bush vetoed a bill delivered to him from the Democrat Congress that did this. Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s (D.-Calif.) House has since failed to overturn his veto and now negotiations to proceed appear to be in a stalemate.
Zawahiri lamented that “this bill will deprive us of the opportunity to destroy the American forces which we have caught in this historic trap” but said it proved jihad “is moving from the stage of defeat of the Crusader invaders and their traitorous underlings to the stage of consolidating Mujahid Islamic Emirate.”
Zawahiri said the withdrawal legislation helped to “raise the banner of Jihad as it makes its way through a rugged path of sacrifice.”
A senior government official said it was “stunning” that Zawahiri was watching Congress so closely.
The video was likely encouraged by comments from Democrat leadership. In an April 19 press conference Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D.-Nev.) told media, “This war is lost.”
Two days later, in a statement issued from the Islamic State of Iraq, al Qaeda used Reid’s declaration as evidence of their success. “In the past few days it became clear to every watcher and observer the magnitude of damage that hits the American administration and the defeated declarations of its leaders about the situation in the field in Iraq,” it said. “A serious statement came from ‘Harry Reid’ the Democrat majority leader in the Congress who said: "'the war is in Iraq is hopeless and that the situation in Iraq is similar to Vietnam War.'”
The Vietnam War was ended with the 1973 Foreign Assistance Act that cut funding for operations in the region. The end effect of the Foreign Assistance Act was best captured in a photograph taken by Hubert Van Es that showed hundreds of Vietnamese civilians queuing up for the last American helicopter out of Saigon. Soon, without American troops or any resources to protect the Vietnamese, the Communists took over South Vietnam and millions were killed by the Khmer Rouge communist regime in the power vacuum left by American withdrawal.
Similar actions could be taken by al Qaeda forces, who have failed to hold territory in Iraq and Afghanistan or disrupt American-led political processes there, should U.S. troops withdraw from the region.
Throughout the 2004 presidential election, Democrat candidate Sen. John Kerry (D.-Mass.) was also quoted by name in communications from Osama bin Laden and Zawahiri.
Miss Carpenter is congressional correspondent & assistant editor for HUMAN EVENTS. She is the author of "The Vast Right-Wing Conspiracy's Dossier on Hillary Rodham Clinton," published by Regnery (a HUMAN EVENTS sister company).
As we appropriately leave it to the people/gov't of Iraq to decide their fate, I think one should remember that so too was the Vietnam War left to the people. The American people voted overwhelmingly to get out of Vietnam. It was democracy in action. Of course we have a right to speak and to disagree with policy - that's what people do in a democracy.
As for the Khmer Rouge reference, I am a bit confused. The Khmer Rouge were in Cambodia, not Vietnam. They never killed Vietnamese and no "power vacuum" was left in Cambodia since we had no power in Cambodia. No doubt the Khmer Rouge were terrible; but note it was the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (the same army we fought) in 1979 who attacked and destroyed the Khmer Rouge; let's be fair; it was the Vietnamese were the saviors of Cambodia, not the U.S.
-
Yes we can debate in this democratic republic of ours, but those in opposition should think of the consequences of what they say and how they say it-- AND they can and should be held accountable for those consequences. In my considered opinion, substantial elements of the Democratic opposition and the media have acted with despicable disregard for the consequences of their lies, distortions, hatred of Bush, and lust for power.
Here's one perspective on the ongoing negotiations with Iraq-- IMHO this is the sort of person BO should be talking to BEFORE forming an opinion.
July 20, 2008
Op-Ed Contributor
Surge Protector
By WILLIAM J. FALLON
Washington
THE prospect of a long-term security arrangement between the United States and Iraq has become a lightning rod for criticism. Yet such an agreement — which the White House believes could be completed this month now that the two countries have agreed to set a “general time horizon” for reducing the number of American troops in Iraq — would be in the best interests of the governments of both countries, and of the people who live in a region of the world that urgently needs stability.
The United Nations Security Council resolution that authorizes coalition operations in Iraq expires at the end of this year. But the calendar is not the most important reason for the United States to enter into a long-term pact with Iraq. The opportunity presented by the improved situation on the ground begs to be exploited lest it disappear in the ever-shifting sands of Middle East strife.
Are the desires of the American people and the Iraqi people different? I don’t think so. During my year in command of all American forces in the Middle East, I met often with Iraqis of all walks of life. Discussions with people — from Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki to clerics, governors and generals to men in the streets of Baghdad and towns and cities throughout the country — left me with several strong impressions. The top objective of both countries is security and stability in the region. Letting Iraq’s security forces assume responsibility for their country is another mutual goal. Withdrawing the vast majority of American and coalition troops from Iraq as soon as possible is a clear priority.
Why is achieving these aims so difficult? The most significant obstacle is war weariness. The war has dragged on so long that people are fixated on yesterday’s many negative aspects and are not aware of the profoundly different and improved situation in Iraq today — which is very different from only a few months ago.
Another major challenge is the continuing tendency to view anything to do with Iraq in the polarizing terms of yes or no, in or out. The prudent and rational approach is more nuanced, and more likely to achieve both countries’ mutual goals.
There are two key aspects of the bilateral security accord that has been proposed. The first is a status of forces agreement, which is a detailed compilation of the procedures and legal protections that govern the presence of foreign troops in another country. The second element is a higher-level strategic framework agreement, in which the two parties agree on the principles that will guide their mutual actions to create long-term security in Iraq. This more important part of the accord focuses on major policy issues like the roles and missions for each country’s military, the control of forces in various security situations, procedures for detainees, and the transition of responsibility.
Objections and objectors to the agreement are numerous. From the American side, we hear that it would tie us to an open-ended commitment to defend Iraq from external threats; that it would continue to drain resources from a faltering domestic economy; and that it violates Congressional prerogatives enshrined in the Constitution.
Some Iraqis, meanwhile, complain that any continued American presence in their country perpetuates what they see as an occupation and an infringement of their national sovereignty. They and other skeptics in the region object to the potential for long-term military bases, and they denounce America’s alleged hegemonic intentions.
And Iran objects to every aspect of continued American-Iraqi cooperation while promoting instability and supporting attacks on coalition forces in Iraq by providing arms and training to Shiite extremists and criminals.
These objections are obscuring what may be a one-time opportunity to achieve the goals so keenly desired by the majority of Americans and Iraqis, who care about peace and stability in the world. Most of the concerns involve worst-case possibilities that play to the fears of the poorly informed. For example, the security accord would define future commitments rather than perpetuate the perception of an “open-ended” engagement. The United States needs access to bases in Iraq to support the current level of operations. As responsibility for security passes to Iraqi forces, the need for bases will diminish.
Negotiators can sort through the issues. Given their recent history in Iraq, contractors and their rights and protections are a controversial topic. But civilian contractors perform a wide range of essential tasks, and the terms of their future service needs to be included in the agreement. Control of Iraqi airspace is another important component that will require clearheaded negotiations to preserve our military’s ability to ensure the safety of the many airplanes flying over Iraq and the timeliness of combat air support for troops on the ground.
The benefits that could be achieved are considerable. The agreement could reap dividends similar to those gained over the past year through the sacrifice and efforts of so many who have carried out an enlightened counterinsurgency strategy.
The number of incidents of violence nationwide in Iraq is less than a tenth of what we were experiencing in the spring of 2007. The casualty rate among American troops is the lowest in more than four years and continues to improve. Ethnic and sectarian violence among the Iraqi population has declined to levels not seen since the early days of the war.
Iraq’s security forces, with only modest coalition support, have demonstrated unprecedented initiative by taking control and assuming security of previously insurgent-dominated areas like Amara, Basra, Diwaniya and Sadr City. These actions signal a more confident and capable Iraqi leadership and military.
The government of Prime Minister Maliki has assumed an increasingly large share of the cost of Iraqi security, paying $3 for each American dollar contributed, and is on track to assume near total responsibility next year as revenues from oil exports continue to rise. Economic activity in Iraq is accelerating. Major oil companies are signing development contracts to improve the infrastructure.
The government of Iraq is eager to exert its sovereignty, but its leaders also recognize that it will be some time before Iraq can take full control of security. They are acutely aware of Iran’s behavior and of the need for continued cooperation with the United States.
This is a pivotal time. The aspirations of the hopeful could come to fruition: a stable Iraq, with a modern oil industry and substantially increased export capacity, that is part of the growing regional economic and political cooperation in the Middle East. This is not wishful dreaming but a very real possibility.
But it will happen only if security in Iraq is maintained. And a long-term arrangement with the United States is key to Iraq’s future security.
Reasonable objectors to the security pact, in both countries, must jettison the rhetorical and emotional baggage of the recent past. Forget the errors and bad decisions and deal with the present. Real progress has been made, and this positive momentum must be maintained.
Compromise, of course, will be essential. But confidence will be, too. The Americans need to trust Iraq’s security forces, and the Iraqis need to trust America’s intentions. The United States must give the Iraqi government an opportunity to demonstrate sovereignty over its territory while the government of Iraq must recognize its continued, if diminishing, reliance on the American military.
But the political posturing in pursuit of short-term gains must cease. All interested parties should cooperate for the general good.
We have come a long way in Iraq. It is in the mutual interest of the United States and Iraq to continue the transition to Iraqi forces and the drawdown of American troops in circumstances most likely to provide for stability. Certainly there is some risk involved. But the opportunity is unprecedented and the potential vast.
William J. Fallon, a retired admiral and a fellow at the M.I.T. Center for International Studies, was commander of the United States Central Command from 2007 to 2008.
-
As we appropriately leave it to the people/gov't of Iraq to decide their fate, I think one should remember that so too was the Vietnam War left to the people. The American people voted overwhelmingly to get out of Vietnam.
**After having been throughly mislead by the MSM and the "peace" movement, i'd cite the misreporting of the Tet offensive as a perfect example, the public opinion was affected by the psyops. It's the same steady drumbeat of doom that was tried to undercut this war. Do you really think the public would have supported cutting off aid to South Vietnam if they knew the horrors that would follow?**
It was democracy in action. Of course we have a right to speak and to disagree with policy - that's what people do in a democracy.
As for the Khmer Rouge reference, I am a bit confused. The Khmer Rouge were in Cambodia, not Vietnam. They never killed Vietnamese and no "power vacuum" was left in Cambodia since we had no power in Cambodia. No doubt the Khmer Rouge were terrible; but note it was the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (the same army we fought) in 1979 who attacked and destroyed the Khmer Rouge; let's be fair; it was the Vietnamese were the saviors of Cambodia, not the U.S.
**After the democrats cut off funding and support to Lon Nol's forces in Cambodia and South Vietnam the communists began the mass murders that were warned about.**
-
Admiral Fallon is truly a diamond in the rough; you might remember he was an advocate of a speedier withdrawal of
troops from Iraq in contrast to Bush and General Petraeus and that Admiral Fallon finally resigned in protest over the Bush's Iran policy? I fully agree, BO would do well to listen to his advice. Admiral Fallon is a man of experience and an individual willing to stand up and express an opinion against the norm.
Marc, perhaps I don't fully understand your point opening point. Yes, our country is a democracy, a republic, and our cornerstone is the Bill of Rights; we are truly blessed. Therefore of course we can say whatever we want to say; the Supreme Court has held that the right of free speech is an basic right and rarely can it be abridged.
Two people, two parties can disagree. Vietnam War protesters truly thought they were doing the right thing; maybe they were, maybe they weren't, but they changed history. Some conservatives wanted to invade North Vietnam and bring China into the fight. Again, maybe they were right, maybe they were wrong. But their voice was drowned out by the majority - the people who opposed the war in Vietnam. In a democracy as ours people are entitled, they are encouraged to speak out and express their opinion. And there is nothing wrong with expressing an opinion or criticism diametrically opposed to our President, our Congress, or our Military's thoughts. They exist to serve the American people. Perhaps these individuals are "despicable" only because you disagree with them??? However, in contrast to your opinion, I think they cannot and should not be held accountable for expressing their right to free speech. It the end, I truly believe it is what has made our country special and unique. Try "free speech" in China, N. Korea, Russia........
I do think lies are wrong, distortions are subjective, hatred of Bush is wrong (I don't agree with him, but like Bush, I have many conservative friends with whom I disagree and yet I still respect. Further he is our President; the Office as well deserves respect)
and lust for power - well that has been going on by politicians and individuals for hundreds of years; hard to stop.
-
**After having been throughly mislead by the MSM and the "peace" movement, i'd cite the misreporting of the Tet offensive as a perfect example, the public opinion was affected by the psyops. It's the same steady drumbeat of doom that was tried to undercut this war. Do you really think the public would have supported cutting off aid to South Vietnam if they knew the horrors that would follow?**
Sadly, yes, I do think the public would have still supported cutting off aid to South Vietnam. Nobody here cared/cares about the "masses of brown people" (your words) or black people (see Darfur).
-
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-06-25-charitable_N.htm
Americans give record $295B to charity
NEW YORK (AP) — Americans gave nearly $300 billion to charitable causes last year, setting a record and besting the 2005 total that had been boosted by a surge in aid to victims of hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma and the Asian tsunami.
Donors contributed an estimated $295.02 billion in 2006, a 1% increase when adjusted for inflation, up from $283.05 billion in 2005. Excluding donations for disaster relief, the total rose 3.2%, inflation-adjusted, according to an annual report released Monday by the Giving USA Foundation at Indiana University's Center on Philanthropy.
Giving historically tracks the health of the overall economy, with the rise amounting to about one-third the rise in the stock market, according to Giving USA. Last year was right on target, with a 3.2% rise as stocks rose more than 10% on an inflation-adjusted basis.
"What people find especially interesting about this, and it's true year after year, that such a high percentage comes from individual donors," Giving USA Chairman Richard Jolly said.
Individuals gave a combined 75.6% of the total. With bequests, that rises to 83.4%.
The biggest chunk of the donations, $96.82 billion or 32.8%, went to religious organizations. The second largest slice, $40.98 billion or 13.9%, went to education, including gifts to colleges, universities and libraries.
About 65% of households with incomes less than $100,000 give to charity, the report showed.
"It tells you something about American culture that is unlike any other country," said Claire Gaudiani, a professor at NYU's Heyman Center for Philanthropy and author of The Greater Good: How Philanthropy Drives the American Economy and Can Save Capitalism. Gaudiani said the willingness of Americans to give cuts across income levels, and their investments go to developing ideas, inventions and people to the benefit of the overall economy.
Gaudiani said Americans give twice as much as the next most charitable country, according to a November 2006 comparison done by the Charities Aid Foundation. In philanthropic giving as a percentage of gross domestic product, the U.S. ranked first at 1.7%. No. 2 Britain gave 0.73%, while France, with a 0.14% rate, trailed such countries as South Africa, Singapore, Turkey and Germany.
Mega-gifts, which Giving USA considers to be donations of $1 billion or more, tend to get the most attention, and that was true last year especially.
Investment superstar Warren Buffett announced in June 2006 that he would give $30 billion over 20 years to the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. Of that total, $1.9 billion was given in 2006, which helped push the year's total higher.
Gaudiani said that gift reflects a growing focus on using donated money efficiently and effectively.
"I think it's also a strategic commitment to upward mobility exported to other countries, in the form of improved health and stronger civil societies," she said.
The Gates Foundation has focused on reducing hunger and fighting disease in developing countries as well as improving education in the U.S. Without Buffett's pledge, it had an endowment of $29.2 billion as of the end of 2005.
Meanwhile, companies and their foundations gave less in 2006, dropping 10.5% to $12.72 billion. Jolly said corporate giving fell because companies had been so generous in response to the natural disasters and because profits overall were less strong in 2006 over the year before.
The Giving USA report counts money given to foundations as well as grants the foundations make to non-profits and other groups, since foundations typically give out only income earned without spending the original donations.
-
Who Really Cares?
By Jamie Glazov
FrontPageMagazine.com | 1/2/2007
Frontpage Interview’s guest today is Arthur C. Brooks, Professor of Public Administration and Director of the Nonprofit Studies Program at Syracuse University 's Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs. In 2007, he will be a Visiting Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. Brooks earned his PhD in Public Policy Analysis from the Rand Graduate School in 1998, and also holds an MA and BA in economics. He is a regular contributor to The Wall Street Journal's editorial page. His latest book is Who Really Cares: The Surprising Truth About Compassionate Conservatism.
FP: Arthur C. Brooks, welcome to Frontpage Interview.
Brooks: Thanks very much. It's a pleasure to be with you.
FP: What inspired you to write this book?
Brooks: For years I did research on the economics of charity and philanthropy, looking at important -- but fairly dry -- topics like tax deductibility. The trouble was, I always felt I was missing the real story about why people give. When I discussed giving with donors, they never talked about their taxes; they talked about their values. I saw that I needed to investigate giving as a cultural issue, and that's what this book does. It asks who is really giving in America , and why. As a result of what I found, my views on charity have changed a lot.
FP: So how do myths about charity in America differ from reality?
Brooks: The biggest myth about charity today stems from the stereotype that conservatives are less compassionate than liberals. Here in Syracuse , New York , the most popular campaign sign before the 2004 presidential election proclaimed, "Bush Must Go! Human Need, not Corporate Greed." Now, keep in mind that New York was not a state in play in the election (Bush lost the state by more than a million votes), so this was nothing more than a moral statement about Bush and his supposedly-selfish supporters.
Conservatives are less supportive than liberals of government income redistribution, which is typically how progressives define economic compassion. (Conservatives, we should note, often argue that redistribution is not compassionate when it leads to dependency by recipients, but that's another story.) But another -- perhaps more obvious -- measure of compassion is private, voluntary sacrifice: charity. And conservatives tend to give more, not less, than liberals and moderates. For example, one major survey from the year 2000 showed that the average conservative-headed household in America gave 30% more money to charity than the average liberal household, despite earning, on average, 6% less in income.
This said, the evidence shows that the charity gap between conservatives and liberals is not a function of politics per se -- being a conservative by itself doesn't make somebody virtuous -- it is the values and culture typically associated with a conservative worldview: especially religion and attitudes about the government's role in our lives.
FP: I have always noticed that leftists like to talk a lot about the importance of the redistribution of wealth but that they themselves have a big problem redistributing their own wealth. Can you talk a bit about the pathology that lurks between the discrepancy between leftists' social criticism and the ingredients of their private lives?
Brooks: The data do in fact show that people who think the government should redistribute income and wealth give a lot less, privately, than do people who not believe this. For example, in 1996, people who said the government should not take greater measures than at present to reduce income inequality gave, on average, four times as much money to charity each year as those who believed the government should equalize incomes more.
I think this charity gap comes down to a difference in how the two groups see the rights and responsibilities of individuals. Conservatives believe that everything starts with individual behavior; liberals often view large groups as the only effective vehicle for meaningful social progress. Sometimes, this translates into a neglect for private voluntary action on the left, and a focus instead on laws and regulations which apply to huge groups.
There is an old joke, that a socialist is a man who loves humanity in groups of one million and above. That's unfairly harsh, of course -- there are lots and lots of charitable liberals out there. But it's pretty amusing nonetheless.
FP: Absolutely, the Left depersonalizes real people and individuals. It pretends it loves humanity as a whole, but when it comes to really caring for and loving the individual up close, leftists are, in my own personal experience, frighteningly callous and indifferent.
So, in other words, Conservatives believe more in the value of personal generosity, correct? Because they believe in big government and little (or no) individual responsibility, leftists are more prone to seeing human suffering and getting upset that something isn’t being done by someone else (i.e. the government) about it, rather than doing something themselves as individuals about it.
And, let’s be honest, socialism is based on theft anyway. The people who believe in stealing from others who have earned wealth to give it to those who haven’t aren’t really going to be the kind of people who are symbols of personal generosity.
Just provoking a bit of discussion here to get some more wisdom from you. What do you say?
Brooks: I think many conservatives simply find it easier than liberals to give privately because they have more opportunities to give in their daily lives, and have had the importance of charity wired into them throughout their lives. I'm talking about religion, of course: Conservatives are much likelier to practice a religion than liberals are, and this gap is widening, not narrowing. (Presently, there are about three times more religious conservatives in America than there are religious liberals.) Houses of worship are great for stimulating both the supply and demand for charity -- and not just religious charity; secular charity as well. Religious folks -- irrespective of the actual religion, incidentally -- give far more time and money than secularists to all kinds of charities, including to totally secular causes like the United Way or the PTA. The data on this point are just stunning.
And as we have discussed, it is also true that conservatives generally have a more individualistic worldview than most liberals do, which is good for stimulating private service to others. (Incidentally, I'm working on a new book right now on happiness. It appears that this individualistic worldview is quite important for life satisfaction, and part of the reason conservatives tend to be happier than liberals.)
None of this is destiny, of course. Many liberals -- especially religious liberals -- take individual responsibility very seriously and give as much as religious conservatives do. In addition, there are plenty of conservatives who, despite the giving culture, are not generous. In fact, the least charitable group in America today is made up of secular conservatives, although this fact doesn't hurt the overall conservative giving stats much because this group is relatively small. But in general, the biggest giving challenge is on the political left today, in my view -- particularly as the left continues to secularize and advocate government income redistribution. This is something progressive leaders need to take very seriously if they wish to avoid a widening (and unnecessary) political charity gap.
FP: Why does it matter whether Americans give to charity or not?
Brooks: One of the most exciting areas of research in economics and psychology looks at the benefits of giving to givers themselves, as well as their communities and our nation as a whole. There is strong evidence -- detailed in my book -- that these benefits are just enormous. In a nutshell, giving makes us richer, happier, and healthier than we would be if we didn't give. Givers are more effective in their jobs after they give; they are happier and feel more in control; they are better citizens; they even suffer less from physical and psychological ailments. In point of fact, voluntary charity is a major source of American strength and vitality. Giving is not just about the time and money charities get -- it is also crucially about what we all get because we and our neighbors are givers.
This has big implications. For example, we displace privately-funded charities with government programs at our peril. Not that there is no role for government spending on certain activities, but private giving has no substitute, and we need to protect and nurture it. Ralph Nader once said, "A society that has a more justice is a society that needs less charity." This stems from the common misconception that charity is just about cash, so the government might as well just raise taxes and pay for everything.
FP: Is it worth it in academia to write a book that is "subversive"?
Brooks: I've been told that this book is a bit subversive indeed. But I think it's part of my job, especially as a full professor with tenure, to question assumptions and follow the evidence where I believe it leads. When academics don't question our assumptions, we are doing society a tremendous disservice. We are a privileged, protected class of professional thinkers. This system can be abused, as we all know, but it can also be used for good, when we try and uncover hard truths in the data, and carry knowledge forward.
Of course, there is a prevailing political and social ideology in academia that we all know about, and doing research that goes against the established dogma can sometimes be a little disconcerting. It doesn't necessarily provoke a lot of high-fives around the office. But honest inquiry and academic freedom are not about being part of the academic amen corner.
FP: I can tell you that when I was doing my doctorate in academia I was quite open about being a Conservative and the fact that Ronald Reagan was my favorite president.
You can just imagine the reception I received.
I was, to put it mildly, shunned, ostracized and made into a non-person by many in the academic establishment. Not that I cared in the least, because those aren’t the friends I seek anyway. But that was the reality.
In my own experience, leftists make friends according to how people fit into the structure of their ideas, not according to what they like about people themselves. Look at the long list of ex-leftists who were abandoned by their communities after they changed their politics.
What is your experience? Do you think you might lose some friends over this? Might you be hurt in some other way in academia?
Brooks: The book is brand new, so the full effect remains to be seen. Wish me luck! The Wall Street Journal called it a "tidy time-bomb of a book," which I loved, but which made me think I had best run away before it blows up.
Seriously, though, I have no doubt I'll be harangued here and there. I've already had the experience of showing up to give a scholarly talk at a university, and finding a few folks looking for a fight before I even open my mouth because I'm supposedly a right-winger. But that sort of thing is simply a cost of doing business if I want to do work that has an impact on the national conversation.
I'm lucky to be stationed at a university where the leadership is supportive of my work. Also, I sit in a school of public policy, which tends to be a less ideologically-rigid environment than many other parts of academia. In fact, most of today's top policy schools are making noises about taking all reasonable worldviews more seriously -- even those of conservatives and religious people. We haven't achieved anything like "balance" yet, but I think it is probably getting less scary for grad students and junior faculty to do policy-oriented research that doesn't support a particular political or social agenda. Academic entrepreneurs and sincere scholars on both the left and right need to push this progress along, and to help it spread around the academy.
FP: What do you hope this book will achieve?
Brooks: I really hope this book will do two things. First, I hope people will read it, examine their own giving, and give more as a result -- for everyone's good, including their own. Second, I hope researchers will see this book as a conversation-starter and undertake new work on charity. This book is not the last word on these issues by any means; there is a lot more research to be done. Some of that might come to different conclusions than mine, and that's fine. We need more thinking about charity from all perspectives.
FP: Arthur Brooks, thank you for joining us.
Brooks: It's been a pleasure. Happy New Year to you and FrontPage's readers.
-
http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-daily16feb16,1,4976271,full.story
"Don't forget that human beings have a responsibility to one another and that Americans have a responsibility to the oppressed. Assisting a formerly oppressed population in converting their torn society into a plural, democratic one is dangerous and difficult business, especially when being attacked and sabotaged from literally every direction."
-
GM; enough! America is great at charity; we have big heart. America is great at giving MONEY,
but do you want your son or daughter to DIE for Darfur, or anyone in African, or
"masses of brown people"? The answer for most Americans is "No". We will die
for America, we will die for Europe, maybe Israel; I think that's it. I worry for Taiwan and Japan. It all
sounds good, but when the chips are down, people fold. I grew up in upper
middle class, La Canada (near LA) and now own a home there, but live in LA proper.
Many fine people talk about charity and give money, but when CA state, quite some years ago
offered a $500,000 to La Canada in addition to paying for the construction
to pay for low income housing, the La Canada say, "no thanks" - Not In
Back Yard (NIMBY). I bet Marc's neighborhood would do the same.
People "care" (after the war) about the people in Vietnam, but it's talk. It's easy
to give money; it's clean, and you feel good. But America doesn't like to get their hands dirty.
And they sure were not willing to die to save them. Wrong or right; I don't know. We can't
save all the world.
So please don't tell me about how much money Bill Gates gives (I think it's fabulous)
when you are talking about war and genocide and America caring. Deep down,
it doesn't. We have always been a nation of isolationists.
And I have a suggestion. Marc had once suggested that we talk like we are
at dinner. Superb idea. Agree/Disagree; but enjoy the wine and conversation.
But simply cut and paste articles serve no purpose. I suppose I could cut and
paste 100 articles in my favor, but is that a discussion??? Imagine if I did that
at our dinner together? You seem intelligent, albeit we disagree :-); so give me
your opinion, reference a quote if you like, but give me your opinion. It makes
it much more interesting (let's have a drink one day) than simply cut and paste.
james
-
Woof James:
Gold stars for having read the rules of the road! :-D
GM can speak for himself most ably, but allow me to interject that if you take the time to surf back through the various threads, you will see that many of them are mostly articles-- IMO on the whole articles of well above average quality I might add. This forum's custom of organizing threads by subject matter/themes IMO enables this forum to serve as a tremendous resource for people who want to read about a subject/theme seriously and gain the perspective that can come from seeing what is thought and said over time.
Although it may not readily be apparent at first, these articles often ARE the conversation. GM and I go back and forth sometimes on libertarian questions concerning governmental surveillance, so when he posts about some successful use of data collection, I know he is twitting me a bit and when I post about overzealous or inappropriate use of surveillance cameras, he too knows it is part of the continuing conversation. Thus in the threads, you will often see a comment asking a pithy question or comment--which is then followed by various articles/pieces offering differing perspectives on that question/comment. Again, properly understood, these articles ARE part of the continuing conversation.
Case in point-- you had no problem in understanding GM's point about America's big heart which he made by use of some articles.
The advantage to articles is that they often say what we want to say far better (and quicker than composing a piece of our own). As time goes on I think you will find GM to be an unusually informed and thoughtful man-- one who has been through many times many of the points which are commonly made by many people. As such, he already has a source which is precisely on point and rather than compose a whole new post, he posts it. Case in point-- his use of an article from last year about Senate Majority Leader Sen. Harry Bird saying "We've lost! Run away! Run away!" To me this clearly makes the point I was seeking to make about the reckless indifference of some of the opposition to the consequences of what it says. Yes of course he has the right to say it! And those of us who wish us success, and those in the field putting their asses on the line (a fine example methinks of Americans giving more than money!!!) also have the right to be pretty steamed that it encouraged the enemy to fight harder in the hope that we were in the process of giving up and about to run away-- as well as discouraging those who think to ally with us.
I have the right to find despicable that a former VP and Prez candidate (Al Gore) speaks recklessly in Saudi Arabia of Abu Graib (which was revealed by the PENTAGON after all!!!) and placing it in moral equivalence to AQ cutting off the heads of captured civilian aid workers.
I have the right to loathe the LA Times for publishing about a secret program to get our point of view into the Iraqi press, or the NY Times revealing a program that tracked AQ's money flows. These things seem treasonous to me.
But I digress , , , :-)
In short, GM and I ARE having an after dinner conversation :-) That said, perhaps GM and I can do better in putting in a paragraph fleshing out WHY it is that we are posting a particular piece. I can't speak for GM, but I know I will work at it and I suspect he will as well.
The Adventure continues,
Marc
-
What Crafty said....
I'd say more but work was long and I gotta sleep.
-
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/worl...icle4461023.ece
The Times
August 5, 2008
Secret deal kept British Army out of battle for Basra
Deborah Haynes in Baquba and Michael Evans, Defence Editor
A secret deal between Britain and the notorious al-Mahdi militia prevented British Forces from coming to the aid of their US and Iraqi allies for nearly a week during the battle for Basra this year, The Times has learnt.
Four thousand British troops – including elements of the SAS and an entire mechanised brigade – watched from the sidelines for six days because of an “accommodation” with the Iranian-backed group, according to American and Iraqi officers who took part in the assault.
US Marines and soldiers had to be rushed in to fill the void, fighting bitter street battles and facing mortar fire, rockets and roadside bombs with their Iraqi counterparts.
Hundreds of militiamen were killed or arrested in the fighting. About 60 Iraqis were killed or injured. One US Marine died and sevenwere wounded.
US advisers who accompanied the Iraqi forces into the fight were shocked to learn of the accommodation made last summer by British Intelligence and elements of al-Mahdi Army, the militia loyal to Moqtada al-Sadr, the radical Shia Muslim cleric.
The deal, which aimed to encourage the Shia movement back into the political process and marginalise extremist factions, has dealt a huge blow to Britain’s reputation in Iraq.
Under its terms, no British soldier could enter Basra without the permission of Des Browne, the Defence Secretary. By the time he gave his approval, most of the fighting was over and the damage to Britain’s reputation had already been done.
Senior British defence sources told The Times that Nouri al-Maliki, the Iraqi Prime Minister, who ordered the assault, and high-ranking US military officers had become disillusioned with the British as a result of their failure to act. Another confirmed that the deal, negotiated by British Intelligence, had been a costly mistake.
The Ministry of Defence has never confirmed that there was a deal with al-Mahdi Army, but one official denied that the delay in sending in troops was because of the arrangement agreed with the Shia militia.
A spokesman for the MoD said that the reason why troops were not sent immediately into Basra was because there was “no structure in place” in the city for units to go back in to start mentoring the Iraqi troops.
Colonel Imad, who heads the 2nd Battalion, 1st Brigade, 1st Iraqi Army Division, the most experienced division, commanded one of the quick-reaction battalions summoned to assist British-trained local forces, who faltered from the outset because of inexperience and lack of support.
He said: “Without the support of the Americans we would not have accomplished the mission because the British Forces had done nothing there.
“I do not trust the British Forces. They did not want to lose any soldiers for the mission.”
Lieutenant-Colonel Chuck Western, a senior US Marine advising the Iraqi Army, told The Times: “I was not happy. Everybody just assumed that because this deal was cut nobody was going in. Cutting a deal with the bad guys is generally not a good idea.”
He emphasised, however, that he was not being critical of the British military, which he described as first-rate.
Captain Eric Whyne, another US Marine officer who took part in the battle, said that he was astounded that “a coalition force would make a pact with essentially their enemy and promise not to go into their area so as not to get attacked”. He alleged that “some horrific atrocities” were committed by the militia in Basra during the British watch.
A senior British defence source agreed that the battle for Basra had been damaging to Britain’s reputation in Iraq. “Maliki, and the Americans, felt the British were morally impugned by the deal they had reached with the militia. The British were accused of trying to find the line of least resistance in dealing with the Shia militia,” said the source.
“You can accuse the Americans of many things, such as hamfistedness, but you can’t accuse them of not addressing a situation when it arises. While we had a strategy of evasion, the Americans just went in and addressed the problem.”
Another British official said that the deal was intended as an IRA-style reconciliation. “That is what we were trying to do but it did not work.” The official added that “accommodation” had become a dirty word.
US officials knew of the discussions, which continued until March this year. They facilitated the peaceful exit of British troops from a palace compound in Basra last September in return for the release of a number of prisoners. The arrangement fell apart on March 25 when Mr al-Maliki ordered his surprise assault on Basra, catching both the Americans and British off-guard.
The Americans responded by flying in reinforcements, providing air cover and offering the logistical and other support needed for the Iraqis to win.
The British were partly handicapped because their commander, Major-General Barney White-Spunner, was away on a skiing holiday when the attack began. When Brigadier Julian Free, his deputy, arrived to discuss the situation with Mr al-Maliki at the presidential palace in Basra, he was made to wait outside.
The first British troops only entered the city on March 31.
The MoD spokesman said that the operation was launched at such short notice that the only support that could be given in the first few days was air power – in the form of Tornado ground attack aircraft – and logistics.
He said that after British troops were withdrawn from Basra last year it was realised that the Iraqi forces still needed help, which was why the current British force contained more instructors and trainers.
-
second post of the AM
Moqtada Packs It In
August 6, 2008; Page A14
Good news out of Iraq is becoming almost a daily event: In just the past week, we learned that U.S. combat fatalities (five) dropped in July to a low for the war, that key leaders of al Qaeda in Iraq have fled to the Pakistani hinterland, that troop deployments will soon be cut to 12 months from 15, and that Washington and Baghdad are close to concluding a status-of-forces agreement.
Now this: Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr plans to announce Friday that he will disarm his Mahdi Army, which was raining mortars on Baghdad's Green Zone as recently as April. Coupled with the near-total defeat of al Qaeda in Iraq, this means the U.S. no longer faces any significant organized military foe in the country. It also marks a major setback for Iran, which had used the Mahdi Army as one of its primary vehicles for extending its influence in Iraq.
The story, broken yesterday by the Journal's Gina Chon, marks the latest of serial defeats for Mr. Sadr, beginning in February 2007 when he was forced underground (reportedly to Iran) in anticipation of the surge of U.S. troops. More recently, the Mahdi Army was defeated and evicted from Basra and other southern strongholds by an Iraqi-led military offensive. The Mahdi Army capitulated without a fight from its Baghdad enclave of Sadr City. Now the young cleric will focus his group's efforts on politics and social work, perhaps while he pursues theological studies in Iran. He wouldn't be the first grad student in history with a tendency toward rabble-rousing.
In many respects, the story of the Mahdi Army's decline follows the same pattern as al Qaeda's: Not only was it routed militarily, it also made itself noxious to the very Shiite population it purported to represent and defend. It enforced its heavy-handed religious edicts, coupled with mob-like extortion tactics, wherever it assumed effective control. The overwhelming Shiite rejection of this brand of politics is another piece of good news from Iraq, as it means that Iraqis will not tolerate Iranian-style theocratic rule.
It is also an indication that Iraqi politics is developing in a healthy way. There was considerable anxiety that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, as the leader of the Shiite-dominated Islamic Dawa Party, would practice a sectarian form of politics and toe a pro-Iranian line, particularly since it had long been headquartered in Tehran. Mr. Maliki's coalition initially included Mr. Sadr's loyalists, including several cabinet members.
Mr. Maliki had little choice but to make political alliances with Shiite sectarians and seek good relations with Iran, but he has also proven to be more than a sectarian politician and no Iranian pawn. Instead, he has turned out to be a muscular Iraqi nationalist, a stance that enjoys far greater popular support than many Western "experts" on Iraq believed possible. (Remember Senator Joe Biden and others who advised only last year that Iraq had to be divided into three parts?) It's thus no surprise that the more Mr. Sadr aligned himself with Tehran, the faster his popularity declined.
As with so much in Iraq, Mr. Sadr's sudden turn to moderation remains reversible. Breakaway factions of the Mahdi Army, aided by Iran, will surely launch fresh attacks on U.S. targets -- especially as U.S. and Iraqi elections near. That's all the more reason to regret the U.S. failure to arrest Mr. Sadr in 2004 for the murder the previous year of Imam Abdul Majid al-Khoei, widely believed to have been undertaken on Mr. Sadr's orders.
That mistake, like others the U.S. has committed in Iraq, can't be undone. But our recent and considerable successes can be, which is all the more reason to see our involvement in Iraq through to an irreversible victory. With Mr. Sadr's "retirement," we've taken another long stride in that direction.
See all of today's editorials and op-eds, plus video commentary
-
Victory in Anbar
September 2, 2008
Two years ago, on September 11, 2006, the Washington Post stirred an election-year uproar with this chilling dispatch:
"The chief of intelligence for the Marine Corps in Iraq recently filed an unusual secret report concluding that the prospects for securing that country's western Anbar province are dim and that there is almost nothing the U.S. military can do to improve the political and social situation there . . ."
But there was something we could do: Pursue a different counterinsurgency strategy and commit more troops. And on Monday, U.S. forces formally handed control of a now largely peaceful Anbar to the Iraqi military. "We are in the last 10 yards of this terrible fight. The goal is very near," said Major-General John Kelly, commander of U.S. forces in Anbar, in a ceremony with U.S., Iraqi and tribal officials. Very few in the American media even noticed this remarkable victory.
Yes, the stunning progress in Anbar owes a great deal to the Awakening Councils of Sunni tribesmen who broke with al Qaeda terrorists and allied with U.S. forces. But those Sunni leaders would never have had the confidence to risk their lives in that way without knowing the U.S. wasn't going to cut and run. The U.S. committed some 4,000 additional troops to Anbar as part of the 2007 "surge," along with thousands more Iraqi troops.
The world has since seen al Qaeda driven even from what the terrorists and many in the Western press had claimed were Sunni enclaves that welcomed the terrorist help against the American "occupation." The result has been the most significant military and ideological defeat for al Qaeda since the Taliban was driven from Kabul in 2001. In danger of being humiliated in Iraq in 2006, the U.S. has demonstrated that it has the national will to fight a longer war. The Sunni Arab world in particular has noticed -- and is now showing new respect for Iraq's Shiite government.
For Iraqi politics, the Anbar handover is especially meaningful because the Shiite-dominated Iraq military will now provide security in a largely Sunni province. Anbar is the 11th of 18 provinces that the coalition has turned over to Iraq control, but the first Sunni province. The government of Nouri al-Maliki now has a further chance to show its ability to represent the entire country, the way it did when the Iraqi military routed Shiite militias in Basra and Sadr City in the spring.
For U.S. politics, it is worth recalling that that 2006 Washington Post story became part of a Beltway consensus that defeat in Iraq was inevitable. Democrats made withdrawal the center of their campaign to retake Congress, Republicans like Senator John Warner became media darlings for saying the war couldn't be won, and the James Baker-Lee Hamilton Iraq Study Group laid out a bipartisan road to retreat. According to memos disclosed Sunday in the New York Times, even senior officials at the State Department and Pentagon opposed the surge. President Bush, heeding Generals David Petraeus and Ray Odierno as well as John McCain, overruled the defeatists and ordered a renewed U.S. commitment to Iraq.
The Anbar handover is above all a tribute to the hundreds of Americans who have fought and died in places like Fallujah, Ramadi and Hit over these last five years. Over the horizon of history, we tend to recall only the successes in previous wars at such places as Guadalcanal, Peleliu and the Chosin Reservoir. We forget that those wars and battles were also marked by terrible blunders and setbacks, both political and military. What mattered is that our troops, and our country, had the determination to fight to an ultimate victory. So it is with the heroes of Anbar.
See all of today's editorials and op-eds, plus video commentary, on Opinion Journal.
-
http://www.michaeltotten.com/archives/2008/01/a-plan-to-kill.php
Michael Totten embedded with the Marines in Fallujah. Well worth reading.
-
U.S. Teams Weaken Insurgency In Iraq
By Joby Warrick and Robin Wright
Washington Post Staff Writers
Saturday, September 6, 2008; A01
By the time he was captured last month, the man known among Iraqi insurgents as "the Tiger" had lost much of his bite. Abu Uthman, whose fierce attacks against U.S. troops and Iraqi civilians in Fallujah had earned him a top spot on Iraq's most-wanted list, had been reduced to shuttling between hideouts in a Baghdad slum, hiding by day for fear neighbors might recognize him.
In the end, a former associate-turned-informant showed local authorities the house where Uthman was sleeping. On Aug. 11, U.S. troops kicked in the door and handcuffed him. They quietly ended the career of a man Pentagon officials describe as the kidnapper of American journalist Jill Carroll and also as one of a dwindling number of veteran commanders of the Sunni insurgent group known as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).
Uthman, whose given name is Salim Abdallah Ashur al-Shujayri, was one of the bigger fish to be landed recently in a novel anti-insurgent operation that plays out nightly in Baghdad and throughout much of Iraq. U.S. intelligence and defense officials credit the operation and its unusual tactics -- involving small, hybrid teams of special forces and intelligence officers -- with the capture of hundreds of suspected terrorists and their supporters in recent months.
The "fusion cells" are being described as a major factor behind the declining violence in Iraq in recent months. Defense officials say they have been particularly effective against AQI, which has lost 10 senior commanders since June in Baghdad alone, including Uthman.
Aiding the U.S. effort, the officials say, is the increasing antipathy toward AQI among many ordinary Iraqis, who quickly report new terrorist safe houses as soon as they're established. Fresh tips are channeled to fast-reaction teams that move aggressively against reported terrorist targets -- often multiple times in a single night.
"Wherever they go, they cannot hide," said a senior U.S. defense official familiar with counterterrorism operations in Iraq. "They don't have safe houses anymore."
The rapid strikes are coordinated by the Joint Task Force, a military-led team that includes intelligence and forensic professionals, political analysts, mapping experts, computer specialists piloting unmanned aircraft, and Special Operations troops. After decades of agency rivalries that have undermined coordination on counterterrorism, the task force is enjoying new success in Iraq with its blending of diverse military and intelligence assets to speed up counterterrorism missions.
Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Adm. Michael Mullen said in a recent interview that the cells produce intelligence that nets 10 to 20 captures a night in Iraq.
"We're living in a world now where targets are fleeting," Mullen said. "I don't care if they're on the ground, in the air, on the sea or under the sea -- you don't get much of a shot, and you've got to be able to move quickly."
Fusion cell teams have helped collect and analyze intelligence not only against AQI and Sunni insurgents but also against Shiite militias and foreign fighters, say U.S. military officials.
Headquartered in an old concrete hangar on the Balad Air Base, which once housed Saddam Hussein's fighter aircraft, about 45 miles north of Baghdad, the Joint Task Force in Iraq runs fusion cells in the north, west and south and in Baghdad, U.S. officials said.
The headquarters bustles like the New York Stock Exchange, with long-haired computer experts working alongside wizened intelligence agents and crisply clad military officers, say officials who have worked there or visited.
Huge computer screens hang from the ceiling, displaying aerial surveillance images relayed from Predator, Schweizer and tiny Gnat spycraft. The Bush administration's 2009 supplementary budget request included $1.3 billion to fund 28 unmanned aircraft, officials said, and all will go to the interagency teams in Iraq and Afghanistan, not the Air Force.
For the Joint Task Force, the CIA provides intelligence analysts and spycraft with sensors and cameras that can track targets, vehicles or equipment for up to 14 hours. FBI forensic experts dissect data, from cellphone information to the "pocket litter" found on extremists. Treasury officials track funds flowing among extremists and from governments. National Security Agency staffers intercept conversations or computer data, and members of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency use high-tech equipment to pinpoint where suspected extremists are using phones or computers.
Fusion cells remain one of the least-known aspects of U.S. operations in Iraq, U.S. officials said, but they have produced significant captures. In March, a fusion cell team captured Hajji Mohammed Shibl, whom U.S. authorities had linked to a string of gruesome attacks on U.S. and Iraqi forces. His Shiite militia group has ties to Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps and Lebanon's Hezbollah.
"The capabilities for high-end special joint operations that exist now only existed in Hollywood in 2001," said David Kilcullen, a terrorism expert and adviser to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.
Data gathered in a raid at midnight -- collected by helmet-mounted cameras that can scan rooms, people, documents and cellphone entries and relay the pictures back to headquarters -- often lead to a second or third raid before dawn, according to U.S. officials.
"To me, it's not just war-fighting now but in the future," Mullen said. "It's been the synergy, it's been the integration that has had such an impact."
Defense officials said Uthman's capture reflected the success of the program and also sent a powerful message to remaining AQI members, who are now surrounded by foes even in regions once regarded as friendly. While AQI remains capable of staging deadly suicide bombings, its leaders are becoming reviled throughout the country and are hard-pressed to find sanctuary anywhere in Iraq, according to U.S. defense and intelligence officials.
The progress has somewhat eased concerns among military analysts about an al-Qaeda resurgence in Iraq after U.S. combat troops draw down, Pentagon and intelligence sources said.
The shift also is tacitly acknowledged inside al-Qaeda's base on the Afghan-Pakistan border, as Osama bin Laden has begun retooling his propaganda campaign to emphasize the conflict in Afghanistan instead of the failing effort in Iraq, the officials said. While there is little evidence that al-Qaeda is attempting to move fighters and resources from Iraq to Afghanistan, the Iraq conflict is no longer driving recruitment and donations for al-Qaeda as it did as recently as nine months ago, they said.
Attacks inside Iraq by AQI, meanwhile, have dropped sharply, with 28 incidents and 125 civilian deaths reported in the first six months of this year, compared with 300 bombings and more than 1,500 deaths in 2007.
"Iraq will always be a target that resonates for al-Qaeda, but we believe it will never again be the central front," said a U.S. counterterrorism analyst who was not authorized to speak on the record. "Their ability to affect what is going on in Iraq has been greatly diminished."
AQI's decline can be traced to several factors, the officials said. Last year's troop increase helped stabilize Baghdad and other major cities, freeing combat forces to take on AQI strongholds throughout the country.
Even before the "surge," the much-celebrated Anbar Awakening movement signaled a rift between tribal leaders of Iraq's Sunni minority and AQI. Since 2006, defense officials have described a deepening revolt by Sunnis repelled by al-Qaeda's brutal attacks against civilians and forced imposition of sharia, or Islamic law. Sunni leaders also objected to AQI's takeover of smuggling routes and black-market enterprises long controlled by local chiefs.
"We don't see the Sunni community going back to al-Qaeda under any circumstances," the senior defense official said.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/05/AR2008090503933.html?hpid=topnews
-
Summary
Iraqi forces will soon be taking control of the last of the two provinces in the Shiite south that remain under U.S. military control. The handover will mark a key development in the Iraqi Shia’s bid to consolidate their power base. In turn, this will facilitate Iranian national security policy regarding Iraq, where the Shiite south can act as a buffer between Iran and Iraq’s Sunni population.
Analysis
Iraqi Defense Minister Abdul-Qader Jassim said Sept. 10 that Iraqi security forces would soon take control of Babil and Wasit — two key Shiite provinces — from the U.S. military.
Babil and Wasit are the only two provinces in Iraq’s Shiite south where security is still in the hands of U.S. forces. Iraqi security forces have already taken over security responsibility for the seven other provinces in the region — Maysin, Basra, Dhi Qar, Al Qadasiya, Al Muthanna, An Najaf and Karbala. Together, these nine provinces constitute the envisioned Shiite southern federal autonomous zone — a proposal being championed by Abdel Aziz al-Hakim, leader of Iraq’s most powerful Shiite (and most pro-Iranian) party, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI).
While the notion of federalism is part of the Iraqi Constitution and is already manifested in the Kurdistan Regional Government in the north, several hurdles remain in the path toward this objective, especially intense intra-Shiite power struggles and disagreements over the idea. Whether or not an autonomous southern Shiite zone takes shape, the reality is that the handover of these two provinces will be a major step in the consolidation of Shiite power in the south. A key reason for this is that control over the security forces — police and army — in the south will be in Shiite hands through both the central government in Baghdad and the provincial authorities in each of the nine provinces.
Most of the governors in the Shiite south are affiliated with ISCI, including the governors of Babil and Wasit. Babil, which has a significant Sunni population, is a strategic province in that it is the only direct land link between Baghdad and the Shiite south. Together, the nine Shiite provinces in southern Iraq allow Tehran to keep its historic enemies — Iraq’s Sunnis — far from its borders.
(click map to enlarge)
The Zagros Mountains, which serve as a natural bulwark protecting Iran against an attack from the west, extend from the northern Kurdish areas down to Diyala, a province contested by each of the country’s three principal sectarian groups. Put differently, the Iranian-Iraqi border that runs south of Wasit all the way to Basra is more or less flat territory vulnerable to an attack and a gateway to Iran’s oil-rich Khuzestan province, which is also home to ethnic Arabs opposed to Tehran. This is why the Iraqi Shiite south is of critical strategic importance to Iranian national security.
Iran would like to use the Shiite domination of Iraq as a launch pad for projecting power into the region, but there are significant obstacles — namely, the natural competition that characterizes the various Shiite factions — that will prevent that from happening in any meaningful way. But, at the bare minimum, the pro-Iranian Shia dominating southern Iraq and Baghdad should serve as sufficient assurance for Tehran that Iraq will not attack Iran, as many Persian regimes over the millennia have feared.
Of course, the Iraqi Shia do not want their dominion to become Western Persia, but they are new to the game of governance in their country and they want to ensure that the Sunnis (who have the backing of the region’s wealthy Arab states) do not pose a threat to their hold on power. This is why the Iraqi Shia are likely to remain closely aligned with Iran — the only state actor patron at their disposal — for the foreseeable future.
This alignment is the single most important reason behind the mostly backchannel dealings between the United States and Iran over the past several years, which have yet to culminate in the form of an understanding on the final makeup of Iraq. A U.S.-Iranian settlement has become all the more critical in the wake of last month’s Russian intervention in Georgia, because Washington is now desperate to free up its military capability to more directly confront and deter Moscow. But the situation remains complex, and a deal remains elusive.
Tehran, however, can take comfort from the fact that its plans for Iraq, for which it has been laying the groundwork for years, seem to be taking shape in the form of the consolidation of Shiite power in the south.
-
Bush's Lonely Decision
September 15, 2008; Page A22
Now that even Barack Obama has acknowledged that President Bush's surge in Iraq has "succeeded beyond our wildest dreams," maybe it's time the Democratic nominee gives some thought to how that success actually came about -- not just in Ramadi and Baghdad, but in the bureaucratic Beltway infighting out of which the decision to surge emerged.
That's one reason to welcome "The War Within," the fourth installment in Bob Woodward's account of the Bush Presidency. As is often the case with the Washington Post stalwart, the reporting is better than the analysis, which reflects the Beltway conventional wisdom of a dogmatic and incurious President. But even as a (very) rough draft of history, we read Mr. Woodward's book as an instructive profile in Presidential decision-making.
Consider what confronted Mr. Bush in 2006. Following a February attack on a Shiite shrine in the city of Samarra, Iraq's sectarian violence began a steep upward spiral. The U.S. helped engineer the ouster of one Iraqi prime minister, Ibrahim al-Jaafari, in favor of Nouri al-Maliki, an untested leader about whom the U.S. knew next to nothing. The "Sunni Awakening" of tribal sheiks against al Qaeda was nowhere in sight. An attempt at a minisurge of U.S. and Iraqi forces in Baghdad failed dismally. George Casey, the American commander in Iraq, believed the only way the U.S. could "win" was to "draw down" -- a view shared up the chain of command, including Centcom Commander John Abizaid and then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.
Politically, the war had become deeply unpopular in an election year that would wipe out Republican majorities in Congress. The bipartisan Iraq Study Group, run by James Baker and Lee Hamilton, was gearing up to offer the President the option of a politically graceful defeat, dressed up as a regional "diplomatic offensive." Democrats united in their demands for immediate withdrawal, while skittish Republicans who had initially supported the war, including Senators Chuck Hagel of Nebraska and Gordon Smith of Oregon, abandoned the Administration.
From the State Department, Condoleezza Rice opposed the surge, arguing, according to Mr. Woodward, that "the U.S. should minimize its role in punishing sectarian violence." Senior brass at the Pentagon were also against it, on the theory that it was more important to ease the stress on the military and be prepared for any conceivable military contingency than to win the war they were fighting.
Handed this menu of defeat, Mr. Bush played opposite to stereotype by firing Mr. Rumsfeld and seeking advice from a wider cast of advisers, particularly retired Army General Jack Keane and scholar Fred Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute. The President also pressed the fundamental question of how the war could actually be won, a consideration that seemed to elude most senior members of his government. "God, what is he talking about?" Mr. Woodward quotes a (typically anonymous) senior aide to Ms. Rice as wondering when Mr. Bush raised the question at one meeting of foreign service officers. "Was the President out of touch?"
No less remarkably, the surge continued to face entrenched Pentagon opposition even after the President had decided on it. Admiral Michael Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, went out of his way to prevent General Keane from visiting Iraq in order to limit his influence with the White House.
The Pentagon also sought to hamstring General David Petraeus in ways both petty and large, even as it became increasingly apparent that the surge was working. Following the general's first report to Congress last September, Mr. Bush dictated a personal message to assure General Petraeus of his complete support: "I do not want to change the strategy until the strategy has succeeded," Mr. Woodward reports the President as saying. In this respect, Mr. Bush would have been better advised to dictate that message directly to Admiral Mullen.
The success of the surge in pacifying Iraq has been so swift and decisive that it's easy to forget how difficult it was to find the right general, choose the right strategy, and muster the political will to implement it. It is also easy to forget how many obstacles the State and Pentagon bureaucracies threw in Mr. Bush's way, and how much of their bad advice he had to ignore, especially now that their reputations are also benefiting from Iraq's dramatic turn for the better.
Then again, American history offers plenty of examples of wartime Presidents who faced similar challenges: Ulysses Grant became Lincoln's general-in-chief in 1864, barely a year before the surrender at Appomattox. What matters most is that the President had the fortitude to insist on winning. That's a test President Bush passed -- something history, if not Bob Woodward, will recognize.
-
Iraq Political Progress
For some better news this week, turn the channel to Iraq. The Parliament in Baghdad just undid the biggest political knot in the country. Wednesday's deal to hold provincial elections opens the way for former insurgents and their supporters, mainly Sunni Arabs, to join the democratic process in Iraq. That in turn should help consolidate the stunning security gains of the past year.
[Iraq Political Process] AP
An American soldier stands guard as an Iraqi soldier hands out leaflets of wanted men in Baghdad, Sept. 24, 2008.
We used to hear from Joe Biden, the Pentagon and others on both sides of the aisle in Washington that only political reconciliation and a U.S. force pullout could stem the violence. They got it backwards. The "surge" and General David Petraeus's new counterinsurgency strategy, in a matter of months, turned or neutralized Sunni and Shiite militias and all but defeated al Qaeda in Iraq. Only now that it's calmer do Iraqis feel secure enough to make political progress.
Under the compromise, elections are to be held by January in 14 provinces. Expect Sunnis to win a large chunk of seats in Anbar, Diyala and other regions; most Sunnis sat out the previous polls in 2005 and won't make that mistake again. The notable exception is Tamim, home to the oil-rich city of Kirkuk disputed by Kurds and Sunnis. Iraqi parliamentarians agreed to kick this problem down the road. Elections there will be put off into the spring once disputes over voter rolls and other questions are resolved. This was the necessary compromise to break the deadlock in Baghdad.
Less noticed but also critical is the manner of voting. In the coming provincial elections, Iraqis will choose from a slate of candidates nominated by political parties. Three years ago, they got to vote only for a "closed slate" of parties without knowing which particular politician would end up representing them in the regional or national assemblies.
The change to a so-called open slate is a step forward. It makes politicians more directly accountable to their constituents and reduces the power of party bosses. The national elections, which are expected by 2010 but were also held up by the dispute over the provincial vote, are expected to be open slate, as well.
Unfortunately Iraq remains stuck with "proportional representation," a 2005 gift from U.N. special envoy Lakhdar Brahimi that helped exacerbate sectarian tensions and bring weak coalition governments. Under this system, Iraqis don't vote for individual candidates in set constituencies. Instead they choose among party slates that are then awarded a share of seats based on their showing. This gives a strong incentive for Iraq to have only ethnic-based parties.
Iraqi party bosses are attached to this system, and fought behind the scenes even against an open slate. No surprise there: What politician wants to risk losing power? A move from proportional representation to constituency voting would be hard and time consuming. A U.S. official in Baghdad tells us that Washington "won't take a position" on a preferable system for Iraq. Maybe it should. A constitutional reform that further blunts sectarianism in politics and strengthens this young democracy would seem to be in the American -- and Iraqi -- interest.
For all the remarkable progress, the war in Iraq isn't over. An ambush on Iraqi police in the volatile Diyala province, also Wednesday, left 35 policemen dead. Whoever wins the White House next year would imperil the recent gains by drawing down American forces before Iraq holds provincial and national elections. They're needed to ensure security and guard against sectarian backsliding. As importantly, the U.S. is a trusted neutral observer whose robust presence will reassure various Iraqi communities that the elections are fair.
The election compromise is a major breakthrough and shows that political reconciliation is happening in Iraq. It is also further proof that the sacrifice of American soldiers has not been in vain.
-
US troops kill No. 2 leader of al-Qaida in Iraq
By KIM GAMEL, Associated Press Writer 57 minutes ago
American troops acting on a tip killed the No. 2 leader of al-Qaida in Iraq — a Moroccan known for his ability to recruit and motivate foreign fighters — in a raid in the northern city of Mosul, the U.S. military said Wednesday.
The military statement described the man, known as Abu Qaswarah, as a charismatic leader who had trained in Afghanistan and managed to rally al-Qaida followers in Iraq despite U.S. and Iraqi security gains.
Rear Adm. Patrick Driscoll, a U.S. spokesman in Baghdad, also said the military suspected that Iranian agents were trying to bribe Iraqi politicians to oppose negotiations over a security pact that would extend the presence of American troops in Iraq.
But, he said, the military had no reason to believe Iraqi politicians had taken the Iranians up on the offers.
"There are indicators that Iranian agents may come across the border and use money or other bribes to influence Iraqi politicians," Driscoll said. "It's a whole different matter whether Iraqi politicians would accept that."
U.S. troops killed Abu Qaswarah, also known as Abu Sara, on Oct. 5 after coming under fire during a raid on a building that served as an al-Qaida in Iraq "key command and control location for" in Mosul, the military said.
Abu Qaswarah — one of five insurgents killed — was later been positively identified, the military said, without elaborating.
The insurgent leader became the senior al-Qaida in Iraq emir of northern Iraq in June 2007 and had "historic ties to AQI founder Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and senior al-Qaida leaders in Afghanistan and Pakistan," the military said.
It called him "al-Qaida in Iraq's second-in-command" as the senior operational leader for al-Zarqawi's successor, Abu Ayyub al-Masri, also known as Abu Hamza al-Muhajir.
Driscoll said Abu Qaswarah directed the smuggling of foreign terrorists into northern Iraq and reportedly killed those who tried to return to their homelands rather than carry out suicide bombings and other attacks against Iraqis.
The announcement would indicate that al-Qaida in Iraq's leadership has maintained a presence despite recent reports that many had fled to Afghanistan and Pakistan where fighting has been on the rise.
Abu Qaswarah was described by the military as a "charismatic AQI leader who rallied AQI's northern network in the wake of major setbacks to the terrorist organization across Iraq."
The death of the senior al-Qaida in Iraq leader will cause a major disruption to the terror network, particularly in northern Iraq, the military said.
Nationwide violence has declined drastically over the past year, particularly in Baghdad, but the U.S. military has consistently warned al-Qaida in Iraq and other insurgents remain a serious threat.
A recent series of killings of Iraqi Christians in Mosul, 225 miles northwest of Baghdad, has highlighted the continued dangers in northern Iraq, where many insurgents fled intensive U.S. military operations in the capital and surrounding areas.
The number of Christian families fleeing violence in Mosul since last week has reached 1,390 — or more than 8,300 people, local migration official Jawdat Ismaeel said Wednesday.
Ismaeel said humanitarian teams are distributing food and aid materials to all displaced families, who are largely seeking refuge in nearby Christian-dominated towns and villages.
Islamic extremists have frequently targeted Christians and other religious minorities since the 2003 U.S. invasion, forcing tens of thousands to flee Iraq. However, attacks declined as areas became more secure following a U.S. troops buildup, a U.S.-funded Sunni revolt against al-Qaida and a Shiite militia cease-fire. Driscoll said the attacks against the Christians bore the hallmarks of a "typical al-Qaida in Iraq tactic" of trying to provoke retaliatory killings by pitting members of religious and ethnic groups against each other.
-
Its the NY Times, so caveat lector:
=================================
MOSUL, Iraq — A new Iraqi military offensive is under way in this still violent northern city, but the worry is not only the insurgents who remain strong here. American commanders are increasingly concerned that Mosul could degenerate into a larger battleground over the fragile Iraqi state itself.
The problems are old but risk spilling out violently here and now. The central government in Baghdad has sent troops to quell the insurgency here, while also aiming at what it sees as a central obstacle to both nationhood and its own power: the semiautonomous Kurdish region in the north and the Kurds’ larger ambitions to expand areas under their control.
The Shiite-led government of Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki is squeezing out Kurdish units of the Iraqi Army from Mosul, sending the national police and army from Baghdad and trying to forge alliances with Sunni Arab hard-liners in the province, who have deep-seated feuds with the Kurdistan Regional Government led by Massoud Barzani.
The Kurds are resisting, underscoring yet again the depth of ethnic and sectarian divisions here and the difficulty of creating a united Iraq even when overall violence is down. Tension has risen to the point that last week American commanders held a series of emergency meetings with the Iraqi government and Kurdish officials, seeking to head off violence essentially between factions of the Iraqi government.
“It’s the perfect storm against the old festering background,” warned Brig. Gen. Raymond A. Thomas III, who oversees Nineveh and Kirkuk Provinces and the Kurdish region.
Worry is so high that the American military has already settled on a policy that may set a precedent, as the United States slowly withdraws to allow Iraqis to settle their own problems. If the Kurds and Iraqi government forces fight, the American military will “step aside,” General Thomas said, rather than “have United States servicemen get killed trying to play peacemaker.”
The competing agendas of the Kurds and central government have nearly provoked violence before, but each side eventually grasped the risks. That may be the case now. At the moment, the Americans are hoping to refocus each side on fighting the insurgency rather than each other.
But the tensions underline that achieving basic security is only the first step toward deeper progress in Iraq — and that much remains, bitterly, unresolved.
Mosul falls outside the borders of the Kurdish region, but Mr. Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party came to control the provincial government after Sunni Arabs boycotted the provincial elections in 2005. The Kurds say, however, that they will not abandon the city until they reclaim five areas in Nineveh Province, putting them on a political collision course with the central government.
Tense personal relations between Mr. Maliki and Mr. Barzani worsened, officials on all sides say, after a standoff in September between the Iraqi Army and the Kurdish security forces, the pesh merga, in eastern Diyala Province. American forces helped contain that confrontation.
More broadly, the two men do not see eye to eye on issues as fundamental as the sharing of oil resources, the resolution of disputed internal borders and the shape of the Iraqi nation. The Kurds want a loose federation, while Mr. Maliki, playing on nationalist sentiments, is increasingly pushing for a strong central government.
Relations have deteriorated to the point that the Kurdish leadership has described Mr. Maliki as a new Saddam Hussein, recalling how Mr. Hussein ruthlessly crushed the Kurds in the 1980s. The borders of Iraqi Kurdistan were established as an internationally enforced security zone in 1991.
Testing Loyalties
In this latest offensive against insurgents, Mr. Maliki has been pushing to lessen Kurdish military influence here, and that is testing loyalties at a delicate time.
Mr. Maliki sent nearly 3,000 national policemen from Baghdad to Mosul to prop up the local force. The officers, almost all Shiites and Sunni Arabs, will be in charge of the overwhelmingly Sunni Arab west side of the city.
Predominantly Kurdish units of the army stationed in Nineveh are slowly being replaced by the mainly Sunni Arab and Shiite contingents.
The Defense Ministry also recently appointed Maj. Gen. Abdullah Abdul-Karim, Mr. Maliki’s brother-in-law, as the new commander of the Second Division on Mosul’s east side. Mr. Barzani, sensing a plot to purge the Iraqi Army in the north of its Kurdish leadership, personally intervened recently to freeze a ministerial order to transfer 34 Kurdish officers, said Col. Hajji Abdullah, a battalion commander in the Second Division.
“If the Arabs do not change now, things will get worse and I see confrontation,” Colonel Abdullah said.
In the turmoil, he and another officer in the division, Brig. Gen. Nadheer Issam, say their loyalties are first and foremost to Kurdistan.
======
Page 2 of 3)
“If I were made to choose, I would not even think for a second — I would leave the army,” General Issam said. “We have sacrificed too much fighting the Baathists,” he added, referring to Mr. Hussein’s political party.
The United States has relied on Kurds from the very beginning in Mosul. Ignoring longtime enmities between the city and Mr. Barzani’s party, American Special Forces units accompanied pesh merga fighters beholden to the party when they took Mosul in April 2003. The United States drafted more pesh merga units into the city in 2004 and 2005 when the whole provincial government and the police force collapsed at the hands of insurgents.
Although many of the pesh merga units in Nineveh were merged into the national army, an estimated 5,000 men remained from an elite Kurdistan corps in the province’s north. All these actions have stoked anger in Mosul toward Americans and Kurds.
Karam Qusay, who works in the Zuhoor neighborhood of Mosul, said he wanted the city to be free of the Kurdish military presence, both in the army and outside of it.
“We wish they would leave,” he said. “We despise them.”
Mosul’s allegiance to Mr. Hussein was so staunch that the city was known as the “regime’s pillow.” Now Mr. Maliki appears to be trying to win over the city by playing on grievances toward the Kurds.
“The government wants to extend its authority, and this clashes with the will and ambitions of the Kurds,” said Maj. Ali Naji, a Sunni Arab in one of the army units sent recently from Baghdad. “I predict fighting between Iraqi forces and the pesh merga.”
Sami al-Askari, one of Mr. Maliki’s senior advisers, said he hoped that talks between his boss and Mr. Barzani would head off any such confrontation.
But he made the government’s position clear: that the presence of Kurdish forces outside of the national army and beyond the borders of Kurdistan was “unlawful.” And he said the refusal of Kurdish officers in the Iraqi Army to obey their transfer orders from Nineveh was a “mutiny that must be severely punished.”
The repercussions of a face-off between Baghdad and the Kurds in Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city, would be far more serious than the recent tensions in eastern Diyala.
Tenuous Security
Nineveh, wedged between Iraqi Kurdistan and Syria and close to Turkey, remains a focal point for a number of Sunni insurgent groups linked to Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, the homegrown terrorist group that American officials say is led by foreigners, and to the Baath Party. Both are fighting the Americans, Mr. Maliki’s government and the Kurds.
Despite numerous offensives by American and Iraqi forces since the start of the year, security remains tenuous at best. This was underscored this month when 2,270 Christian families, according to the Human Rights Ministry, fled Mosul after a number of killings and other attacks against Christians.
The overall level of violence has dropped in Mosul to 9 or 10 attacks a day from an average of 40 a day a year ago.
Yet killings continue, and fear is palpable. Judges are so intimidated or corrupt that the Iraqi government has flown in judges from Baghdad. Their main job is to issue arrest warrants for wanted suspects.
People other than Christians are also being attacked. A senior provincial official was killed as he left a mosque last month. Even a man who makes tea in the provincial building was recently killed in what is probably the most secure part of the city, said an American official working with local authorities.
In his push to subdue Mosul and marginalize the Kurds, Mr. Maliki is trying to curry favor with disaffected Sunnis. Last week he sent his deputy, Rafie al-Issawi, a Sunni, here with promises of a reconstruction and investment initiative that would be coordinated this time by respected Sunnis from Mosul.
More significant, Mr. Maliki is courting former army officers and tribal leaders like Sheik Abdullah al-Humaidi, who leads the powerful Shammar tribe in western Nineveh. All are strong nationalists who believe that Kurds must be confined to the borders of Kurdistan drawn after the Persian Gulf war in 1991.
==============
(Page 3 of 3)
General Thomas said Mr. Maliki was promoting Riad al-Chakerji, a Sunni Arab who is a former army general, as the next governor of Nineveh. Mr. Chakerji acts as an adviser to a committee set up to carry out the central government’s new economic initiatives for Mosul.
“The central government must be very strong, especially now,” Mr. Chakerji said.
Mr. Chakerji, Sheik Humaidi and people like Hassan al-Luhaibi, a former Iraqi Army commander who led the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, have all joined a new political coalition known as Al Hadba, which will run in the coming provincial elections.
The coalition is led by Atheel al-Nujaifi, a prominent businessman who owns a ranch in Mosul that once supplied purebred Arabian horses to Mr. Hussein’s sons, Uday and Qusay.
A Call to Keep a Promise
Mr. Nujaifi said the United States military ignored the province’s enmity toward Mr. Barzani and turned itself into a party to the conflict when it relied on pesh merga forces upon arriving in Mosul.
He said that for Mr. Maliki to assert his authority in Mosul he must first make good on his promise to drive out Kurdish forces.
“Many insurgent groups will become law-abiding after that,” Mr. Nujaifi said.
Mr. Nujaifi and his brother Osama, a member of Parliament in Baghdad, blame the Kurds for instigating a campaign against the Christians in Mosul to deflect the central government’s pressure.
One Kurdish leader called the accusations “ludicrous,” and the United States military said it was most likely the work of militants linked to Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia.
But a group of Christian leaders who met with General Thomas last week in the town of Qosh, outside Mosul, blamed the struggle between the central government and Kurdistan for the plight of their people. Sweeping out both sides, they said, may be the only way to restore calm and trust.
“You have done a great job removing Saddam’s regime,” the Rev. Bashar Warda told the general. “Continue with removing this regime, and start over again.”
-
A friend recently arrived in Iraq (Baghdad) comments he saw more Burkhas in the DC area than he sees in Baghad.
=========
WSJ
Iraq's Kurds have consistently been America's closest allies in Iraq. Our Peshmerga forces fought alongside the U.S. military to liberate the country, suffering more casualties than any other U.S. ally.
And while some Iraqi politicians have challenged the U.S.-Iraq security agreement, Iraq's Kurdish leaders have endorsed the pact as essential for U.S. combat troops to continue fighting terrorists in Iraq.
The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is committed to a federal, democratic Iraq that is at peace with its neighbors.
We have benefited enormously from the service and sacrifices of America's armed forces and their families, and we are deeply grateful. We are also proud to have shared in such sacrifices; my brother was among those severely wounded during the liberation of Iraq.
Last year, following a U.S. request, we deployed Kurdish troops to Baghdad. These troops played a decisive role in the success of the surge. Last month I once again visited Baghdad to meet with the leadership of the federal government. We stressed our commitment to developing an Iraqi state that abides by its constitution and that is based upon a federal model with clearly delineated powers for its regions.
In spite of all this, some commentators now suggest that the Kurds are causing problems by insisting on territorial demands and proceeding with the development of Kurdistan's oil resources. These allegations are troubling. We are proceeding entirely in accord with the Iraqi constitution, implementing provisions that were brokered by the U.S.
In the constitutional negotiations that took place in the summer of 2005, two issues were critical to us: first, that the Kurdistan Region has the right to develop the oil on its territory, and second, that there be a fair process to determine the administrative borders of Iraq's Kurdistan Region -- thus resolving once and for all the issue of "disputed" territories.
Unfortunately, ever since the discovery of oil in Iraq in the 1920s, successive Iraqi governments have sought to keep oil out of Kurdish hands, blocking exploration and development of fields in Kurdistan. Saddam Hussein's government went even further, using Iraqi oil revenues to finance the military campaigns that destroyed more than 4,500 Kurdish villages and to pay for the poison gas used to kill thousands of Kurdish civilians.
The Kurdish leadership agreed to a U.S.-sponsored compromise in 2005 in which the central government would have the authority to manage existing oil fields, but new fields would fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the regions. Since then, the KRG has taken the lead with Baghdad in negotiations on a hydrocarbon law that is faithful to Iraq's constitution and is conducive to modernizing Iraq's oil infrastructure and substantially increasing its oil production.
We have awarded contracts for foreign oil companies (including some American ones) to explore our territory. In so doing, Kurdistan is not threatening the unity of Iraq. It is simply implementing the constitution.
The "disputed territories" have a tragic history. Since the 1950s, Iraqi regimes encouraged Arabs to settle in Kirkuk and other predominantly Kurdish and Turkmen areas. Saddam Hussein accelerated this process by engaging in ethnic cleansing, expelling or killing Kurds and Turkmen, or by requiring nationality corrections (in which non-Arabs are forced to declare themselves to be Arabs) and by moving Arabs into Kurdish homes.
The dispute between Baghdad and the Kurds over Kirkuk has lasted more than 80 years and has often been violent. All sides have now agreed to a formula to resolve the problem, to bring justice to Kirkuk, and to correct the crimes against Kurds committed by Saddam Hussein's regime. Iraq's constitution requires that a referendum be held in disputed territories to determine if their populations want to join the Kurdistan Region. Conducting a plebiscite is not easy, but it is preferable to another 80 years of conflict.
In today's Opinion Journal
REVIEW & OUTLOOK
Obama's Lame Duck OpportunityMischief in Minnesota?Same Old Berlin Wall
TODAY'S COLUMNISTS
Business World: Obama's Car Puzzle
– Holman W. JenkinsThe Tilting Yard: Goodbye to All That
– Thomas Frank
COMMENTARY
Is Now the Time to Buy Stocks?
– John H. CochraneKurdistan Is a Model for Iraq
– Masoud BarzaniThis Election Has Not 'Realigned' the Country
– Jennifer MarsicoIf the pro-Kurdistan side should lose the referendum in Kirkuk, I promise that Kurdistan will respect that result. And if they win, I promise that we will do everything in our power to ensure outsized representation of Kirkuk's Turkmen, Arabs and Christians both on the local level and in the parliament and government of the Kurdistan Region.
Regional stability cannot come from resolving internal disputes alone. That is why expanding and deepening our ties with Turkey is my top priority.
My meeting last month in Baghdad with the Turkish special envoy to Iraq was a historic and positive development. There should be further direct contacts between the KRG and Turkey, as well as multilateral contacts that involve the U.S. We are eager to work with Turkey to seek increased peace and prosperity in the region.
I am proud that the Kurdistan Region is both a model and gateway for the rest of Iraq. Our difficult path to a secular, federal democracy is very much inspired by the U.S. And so we look forward to working with the Obama-Biden administration to support and defend our hard-fought successes in Iraq, and to remain proud of what the Kurdistan region is today: a thriving civil society in the heart of the Middle East. When we insist on strict compliance with our country's constitution, we are only following America's great example.
Mr. Barzani is the president of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.
-
Published: 19 November 2008
Email Address
Happy Ending
Between 2007 and 2008, I got to know a man in South Baghdad whose codename was “Bishop.” This is the short story of his life.
His parents were Kurdish Sunnis. They moved to Baghdad 34 years ago – recently married and excited to make a new life for themselves and create a family. Bishop’s real name was Bashar Akram Ameen; the name given to him when he was born on October 6, 1978 in the Abu Ghraib apartments in Baghdad. Bashar had three sisters and one brother. His schooling included graduating from a Baghdad high school in the class of ’96 and attending the Agriculture College of Baghdad University from 1997 until 2002 when he graduated. America had just set its sights on toppling Saddam.
Shortly after graduating, Bashar began service in the Iraqi Army Reserve, but that lasted only three months, because the U.S. crushed a great part of the Iraqi Army and then officially dissolved the rest. For three months, Bashar was one of those unemployed young men we worried about. He got a job in October of 2003 as a bodyguard for an Iraqi judge. His first job didn’t last long because insurgents assassinated the judge. Feeling lost and a bit frightened, Bashar decided to look for a “safer” job, and began interpreting for, as he called it, “the Sally Port Security Company” in al-Mansour, Baghdad. Insurgents in his neighborhood figured out that he was working for an American company, and on February 21, 2006, as he left his job at 6:00 pm, they started shooting at him in his car, “…but I miraculously survived,” Bashar explained to me, “and that was the reason to leave my job at that company.”
His own safety, and therefore that of his loved ones, was in jeopardy, and so, as Bashar recalled, “I quit visiting my family for over four months.” Though he had used caution, his family was forced to flee in order to avoid imminent suffering or death from the insurgents. Bashar explained, “They had killed our neighbor’s son, so their father gave the key of his house to my father to keep the house safe until maybe the situation getting better. Then, on the next day, the same killers of our neighbors came to my father and asked him about the key, so he refused to give it away and he said that he don’t have it and he don’t know anything about it.” The insurgents warned Bashar’s father that they would check the validity of his information, and if it was untrue, “they will teach my father and us a lesson.” His family, doing what they must to survive, reluctantly left their home. Bashar wrote to me, “My father packed some basic stuff and moved from our own house in Ameriya, Baghdad; Iraq.”
By now, the civil war was raging in Baghdad.
Not everything was so bleak. Even at the height of the civil war, life went on. Bashar met a woman named Alyaa, who worked in legal administration at the “Sally Port Security Company.” They courted for a year, and got married on September 14, 2006 – all the while, sectarian violence raged around Iraq. A year later their first son, Mustafa, was born. Around that time, however, the local Shia militia (called Jaish al-Mahdi, or JAM) figured out that Bashar, who is Sunni, had worked for the Americans at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Falcon (where he got the codename “Bishop”). “They began coming around to bother my wife while I was at work,” he recalls. “So we moved again to live in al-Mansour, Baghdad. And since then, I stopped making any type of relationships with the neighbors just because you can’t trust anybody. In al-Mansour, we had very quiet time….”
And so Bashar began working for the American Army as an interpreter, for various units, at the time of peak fighting. I first met Bishop when he worked for 1-4 Cav in South Baghdad. The 1-4 Cav soldiers kept Bishop busy, working him hard, and he became one of the team. As the months rolled by and I came back to 1-4 on several occasions, their area had become quieter and quieter until, really, there was nothing going on except progress. The younger infantrymen were proud of the progress, but wanted to get up to Mosul or out to Afghanistan, where the fighting was. But not Bishop. He’d seen the worst of it and did not want to see any more war. He was old beyond his years and wanted peace.
Bishop with General Petraeus (center) and LTC Crider (right)
The two most dangerous jobs for Iraqis were probably journalist and interpreter. Bishop wanted to come to the United States. As a result, 1-4 Cav Commander, LTC James Crider, and some of the soldiers Bishop had worked with helped with the paperwork.
Just a small aside: LTC Crider and his battalion were serious contributors to success in Iraq. I got e-mails from LTC Crider about his struggles with Iraqi bureaucracy on behalf of Bishop, even after he went home to America. I’d seen this LTC Crider go to bat for Iraqis over and over again in Iraq. In just one example, Crider and his staff waded for months through the Iraqi legal labyrinth to try to free a man who had been wrongfully detained for a bombing he could not have committed; the bombing had never occurred. Crider and his battalion were welcome fixtures in that neighborhood, because he and his men had brought peace and serenity to a place that had previously been one of the most perilous places in Iraq. The last time I was there, I walked around with no body armor or helmet, and bought popcorn on the street. (I was just there again on about November 15; the progress continues without violence.)
I heard that many Iraqis cried when 1-4 redeployed to America. One captain had even been offered a home if he would come back to live in the neighborhood. The captain knew how to get things done, while still making the time to learn the names of every kid there. And he knew their mothers and fathers, too. But that was it; 1-4 went home and Bishop was left behind, with his family scattered by the war.
His father died in July 2007, his mother and two sisters still live in Baghdad, his brother in Kirkuk, and another sister in Syria.
LTC Crider and others struggled…and struggled…and finally succeeded. On November 6, 2008, Bishop emigrated to America, landing in Nolensville, Tennessee along with his wife, Alyaa (who is carrying their second child), and their son, Mustafa. And the amazing 1-4 Cav keeps winning battles, without firing a shot, long after leaving the war.
So now, Bashar is no longer “Bishop,” and he has begun an American life, with the many ups and downs we all have to face. His next fight is to find a job in our troubled economy and overcome a high-voltage dose of culture shock. He will come to understand that our culture is just as complicated as the one he left behind – but without the violence, threats and scars of war.
Many people have welcomed him to America. I think Bashar can be of particular value to America at this time, simply by getting on the radio stations and talking to reporters and telling his story – the story of Iraq – and showing people how it really is over here. (I write this from Iraq.) Perhaps he can explain why many of us think that it was all worth it. I asked Bashar if I could publish his e-mail address, and he agreed.
This is not just a happy ending, but a happy beginning. Please welcome this new family to America and pass this story to your local papers and radio stations. Ask them to talk with a real Iraqi who just got here. People need to know what happened in Iraq.
Bashar can be reached at: bash.amen@yahoo.com
-
U.S. shifts its approach in Iraq
Focus shifts to reconciling factions through programs and peace marches
By Mary Beth Sheridan
The Washington Post
updated 12:17 a.m. PT, Thurs., Nov. 20, 2008
BAGHDAD - It was billed as a peace concert in war-scarred Baghdad. But after 30 minutes of poetry and patriotic songs, only a scattering of tribal leaders and dark-suited bureaucrats were sitting in the vast expanse of white plastic chairs before a stage painted with doves.
That didn't trouble Col. Bill Hickman, whose soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division helped organize the event.
"We have sheiks from different places who will sit here and talk to each other," he said, standing at the edge of the audience with his men, a striking sight in their body armor and night-vision goggles.
With violence down sharply this year, the U.S. military is broadening its efforts to reconcile Sunnis and Shiites, reintegrate former insurgents into society and repair the rift between residents and their government.
But as American forces begin to withdraw, some Iraqis question the long-term impact of the pacification campaign. Iraq has no history of democracy, and the government that has come to power since the 2003 U.S.-led invasion is sharply divided along sectarian lines.
"The idea or identity of this is American, not Iraqi," Kassim Daoud, a former Iraqi national security minister, said of the U.S. efforts. Although the Iraqi government has declared its support for reconciliation, he said, "it hasn't got a real program or a map."
Reality lags behind rhetoric
At the concert, city officials spoke glowingly about reconciliation. But some in the audience acknowledged that reality lagged far behind.
Abdul Ameer, 48, a Shiite who attended the event with his two young sons, said he had Sunni friends but couldn't visit them. The friends live in the town of Tarmiyah north of Baghdad, he explained: "It's only for Sunnis. I can't feel safe if I go there."
The U.S. reconciliation campaign includes some major projects, but much of the American effort is decentralized, consisting of reconstruction programs, peace marches and meetings with rival tribal leaders over platters of rice and lamb. In many cases, soldiers are making up the details as they go along.
Lt. Col. Monty Willoughby, 42, has had to figure out how to keep the peace in an area of northwestern Baghdad that was previously a hotbed of Sunni insurgents. He became worried last spring when U.S. commanders announced a plan to release thousands of Iraqis detained for alleged ties to insurgents.
"We're like, man, how are we going to keep these guys from falling back into it?" asked Willoughby, an earnest, freckled officer from Clever, Mo., who commands the 4th Squadron of the 10th Cavalry Regiment, which is attached to the 101st Airborne.
Willoughby decided he needed someone to help the detainees reenter society. And that is how a squadron of macho U.S. infantrymen and gung-ho tankers came to hire their first professional nurturer.
Fawaz Kashmoola is their "rehabilitation manager."
"The role I play is, when the prisoners get released, I show them love and mercy," said the Iraqi lawyer, a 45-year-old with combed-back hair.
Love, housing and jobs
Love isn't all the former detainees get. Kashmoola and his fellow managers line up housing as well as jobs or training programs. Then the managers check up on the men to ensure they stay out of trouble.
On a recent sunny Thursday, Kashmoola and Willoughby attended a detainee release ceremony on the lawn of a blue-domed mosque. The U.S. military has made these into gala affairs, with flag-waving crowds and speeches from Muslim leaders and Iraqi army officers. The 48 newly freed men were handed gift-wrapped bags of chocolates by U.S. soldiers who a year ago might have flex-cuffed them.
Willoughby said the military is sending a message to men who might be tempted by insurgents' offers to attack the Americans: "We have reconciled with you. We are giving you your next chance. Your community cares about you. We want you to learn a trade, provide for your family -- not be putting IEDs for $200."
In his area, only one of 82 freed detainees has been rearrested. Several other battalions in Baghdad have hired their own versions of Kashmoola.
Detainee-release ceremonies reflect a dramatic change in military doctrine. The Army issued a field manual last month on "stability operations" to guide its troops in facilitating reconciliation and providing essential services. It was produced after the Department of Defense in 2005 elevated "stability operations" to the same level in its doctrine as offensive and defensive operations.
"It's a very different Army from the one that invaded Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003," said John Nagl, an analyst at the Center for a New American Security and a former Army officer.
Building support for government institutions is a key part of the U.S. military's pacification effort in Iraq. In Willoughby's area of northwestern Baghdad, for example, American troops have cleaned out sewers, rebuilt schools and put in a swimming pool.
"As you, as a citizen, are looking on, you've got to say, 'It's nice to live here,' " Willoughby said. If insurgents return, the U.S. officers hope, Iraqis will consider what they have to lose.
It can be difficult to assess the effectiveness of some of the American programs. Hickman's soldiers, for example, have helped organize soccer games between Sunni and Shiite neighborhoods, providing the young players with T-shirts or uniforms.
The matches aren't billed as peace events, he said, but the parents mingle, re-creating an atmosphere that existed before the invasion. The games draw them from neighborhoods divided by giant blast walls and painful memories of sectarian warfare.
"The nuance here is for the Sunni and Shiite to come together," said Hickman, who commands the 2nd Brigade Combat Team.
Peace concert problems
U.S. troops had envisioned the Baghdad peace concert as an event for the public to enjoy. But they organized it jointly with Iraqi officials, who are still unaccustomed to such unscripted activities. Park officials barred most people without a government invitation from entering, resulting in scores of empty seats.
Iraqi government officials have praised the American peace efforts but say they have their limits.
Safa Rasul Hussein, the deputy national security adviser, said the U.S. programs had been helpful, particularly on outreach to the Sunni minority. But he noted that some Iraqi parties and armed groups refuse to talk to the American military.
"Maybe reconciliation will be more when they leave," he said.
The Iraqi government has launched a number of its own reconciliation activities, from organizing political conferences to setting up assistance centers for families displaced by violence.
Sons of Iraq fear U.S. pullout
One of the U.S. military's biggest reconciliation efforts involves the Sons of Iraq, once-hostile Iraqis who became American-paid neighborhood guards. The U.S. military considers the mostly Sunni guards to be a critical factor in the drop in violence over the past year.
It has urged Iraq to integrate the guards into its security forces, but the Shiite-led government has been slow to do so. On Oct. 1, the Iraqi government assumed control of about half the 100,000 guards and last week started paying them.
But the U.S. military is taking no chances. It held two high-level meetings with Iraqi officials to ensure they were prepared to pay the guards under their control. When the Sons of Iraq protested that the Iraqi government wanted to cut their monthly salaries from $300 to $250, the U.S. military stepped in and got the decision changed. On payday, American soldiers sat next to the Iraqi troops handing out the cash.
The Sons of Iraq say they're nervous about what will happen if the American role diminishes, especially because many of them haven't been told yet what their new jobs will be.
"There was some talk in the Iraqi media that the Iraqi government wasn't accepting the Sons of Iraq as it should. We don't know what is going to happen in the future," said one guard, Alaa Ghazi.
Ghazi, 27, is one of hundreds of guards who have been accepted into the Iraqi police academy. On a recent day, he took a break from drilling on a dusty parade ground outside the facility.
The Sons of Iraq program would continue to work well "with the help and support" of the U.S. forces, he said. But asked whether it could succeed without them, he shook his head.
"No, no, no!" he cried.
-
By MICHAEL YON
November 24, 2008, BAGHDAD
THE Iraq War is over.
Flames still burst from various sources and wild cards remain, such as the potential that Muqtada al-Sadr might stomp his feet and encourage his diminished militias to attack us. Yet support for Sadr among Shia is hardly monolithic. In fact, many Shia view him as a simpleton whose influence derives strictly from respect for his father. Others cite the threat from Iran, but the Iranian participation in the fighting here remains overstated.
Nobody knows what the future will bring, but the civil war has completely ended.
The Iraqi army and police grow stronger by the month, and even the National Police (NP) are gaining a degree of respect and credibility.
As recently as last year, the NPs were considered nothing more than militia members in uniform who murdered with impunity. To go on patrol with NPs was to invite attack. But the Americans worked to help alleviate the disdain.
On one occasion, US soldiers peacefully disarmed a local militia that was apparently about to ambush NPs who had harassed it the same morning, and the soldiers sent the NPs to their station and later gave the locals back their guns. The next day, we were at the NP station as the US commander, Lt-Col. James Crider, gave professional instruction to the NP commanders.
Over time, the extremely frustrating process of mentoring the NPs worked. Last week, I went on foot patrol with US forces and NPs in the same Baghdad neighborhood. Kids were coming up to say hello. And the same people who used to tell me they hated the NPs were actually greeting them.
Similar dynamics have occurred in places like Anbar, Diyala and Nineveh. Tour after tour of US soldiers carried the ball successively, further down the field.
Through time, trust and bonds have been built between the US and Iraqi soldiers, police and citizens. The United States has a new ally in Iraq. And if both sides continue to nurture this bond, it will create a permanent partnership of mutual benefit.
Surely, one could pick up a brush and approach a blank canvas using colors from the palette of truth, and, with a cursory glance, smear Iraq to look like a Third World swamp. But Iraq is a complicated tapestry with great depth and subtle beauty. This land and its people have great potential to become a regional learning center of monumental importance.
Iraqis are tired of war and ready to get back to school, to business and to living life as it should be.
Last week, I shed my helmet and body armor and walked in south Baghdad as evening fell. The US soldiers who took me along were from the battle-hardened 10th Mountain Division; about half the platoon were combat veterans from Afghanistan and/or Iraq. Though most were in their 20s, they seemed like older men. None had even fired a weapon during this entire tour, which so far has lasted more than eight months, in what previously was one of the most dangerous areas of Iraq.
Americans and Iraqis had, in those earlier times, been killed or injured on the very streets we patrolled that day. Patched bullet holes pocked nearly every structure as if concrete-eating termites had infested, and there was resonance of car bombs once detonated on these avenues.
Now, the SOI (Sons of Iraq; what pessimists used to scathingly call "America's Militias") are monitoring checkpoints. I talked with an SOI boss and found that he was getting along side-by-side with the neighborhood NP commander, and in fact they were laughing together. Those who derisively called the SOI "America's Militias" have lost much credibility, while the commanders who supported the movement have earned that same credibility.
Though we are still losing American soldiers in Iraq, the casualties are roughly a tenth of previous highs. Attacks in general are down to about the same.
I asked some Iraqis, "Why are the terrorists attacking mostly Iraqis instead of Americans?" One man explained that the terrorists see the Iraqi army getting stronger and unifying with police, and the terrorists fear the Iraqi government.
Focusing on a few "Iraqi trees," one could make the argument that the war is ongoing and perilous. But to step back and look at "the forest," one cannot escape the fact that Iraq's long winter is over, and the branches are budding.
Iraqis and Americans aren't natural enemies. We have no reason to fight each other, and we understand each other far better than we did back in 2003. True bonds have been formed. Iraq and America realize that we have every reason to cooperate as allies.
But the greater, much more important, milestone will be the day when American, British and Polish students are studying in Iraq, while Iraqi students are studying in our countries. Cementing these ties takes time and patience. But we can do it.
Michael Yon has been reporting on the War on Terror since December 2004 at Michaelyon-online.com. His latest book is "Moment of Truth in Iraq."
-
Thanks for the post.
Maybe one day history will redeem W for saving Iraq from Saddam. I still feel we did the right thing against all political correctness.
Of course as things quiet down allowing BO to start withdrawals the MSM will rush to give *him* all the credit.
Like Rome, Americas weakness comes from within, lack of will, political infighting.
The only good thing from the financial mess is that it may slow BOs wish to make the US into an international cream puff.
Bo's foreign policy consists of "Americans need to speak more French than just merci beaucou".
-
Doug,
Here is another write up from Cal Thomas that confirms the same. That Iraq is stabilized. Instead of the W being given credit he is of course demonized by his political enemies.
Russia is going to have a total field day getting concessions from the closet marxist who now leads our country. Let see. If Putin gets in the octagon with Hillary whose derierre is going to be kicked??? :roll:
***Mission Accomplished II
By Cal Thomas
http://www.JewishWorldReview.com | Nineteen months after Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid declared the war in Iraq "lost" and just nine months after Speaker Nancy Pelosi asserted the war has been a "failure" because it had not brought political change leading to reconciliation, it can now be said conclusively that both were wrong.
One of the great military reversals in history is close to achieving victory. That is contributing to stability in Iraq, along with reconciliation between warring factions.
These conclusions are contained in a report compiled by retired General Barry R. McCaffrey after a recent visit to Iraq during which he consulted with Iraqi and American military leaders and diplomats.
McCaffrey, now an adjunct professor of International Affairs at the United States Military Academy at West Point, wrote a memorandum for his academic colleagues. It concludes, "The United States is now clearly in the end game in Iraq to successfully achieve what should be our principle objectives: the withdrawal of the majority of U.S. ground combat forces ... in the coming 36 months; leaving behind an operative civil state and effective Iraqi security forces; an Iraqi state which is not in open civil war among the Shia, the Sunnis, and the Kurds; and an Iraqi nation which is not at war with its six neighboring states."
While adding that the security situation is "still subject to sudden outrage at any moment by al-Qaida in Iraq" or to "degradation because of provocative behavior by the Maliki government," McCaffrey concludes that "the bottom line is a dramatic and growing momentum for economic and security stability, which is unlikely to be reversible."
McCaffrey notes the sharp drop in attacks and casualties in the last two years and praises the "genius of the leadership team of Ambassador Ryan Crocker, General David Petraeus and Secretary of Defense Bob Gates." He credits these three with "turn(ing) around the situation from a bloody disaster under the leadership of Secretary Rumsfeld to a growing situation of security."
While McCaffrey is cautious about the Maliki government, he adds that Maliki "clearly has matured and gained stature as a political leader since he assumed his very dangerous and complex leadership responsibilities." Provisional elections are scheduled for January 2009, district elections for mid-year and national elections sometime next December. McCaffrey says fighting is now more about politics than shooting and bombing and that Americans should "have a sense of empathy for these Iraqi politicians (who) have survived a poisonous Saddam regime and a culture of intrigue and murder from every side."
While optimistic, McCaffrey's memo is filled with caveats that have much to do with America's willingness under a new president to finish the job. The Iraqi military, he says is still "anemic," lacking adequate weapons and equipment. "Their military officer corps is immensely better than a year ago — but the bench is thin."
Though the economy struggles — (unemployment is 20 percent and under-employment is probably 60 percent, he says), the financial system is "immature," investment capital is lacking, enterprises are run with "badly maintained, outmoded equipment" and the country suffers from "brain drain" — things are markedly better than at any time since the war started. "The markets are open. The roads are again viable. Oil and electricity (are) no longer routinely sabotaged by the insurgents and criminals. Cell phone communications, satellite TV, and radio are all operating."
McCaffrey is critical of those responsible for managing the war during its early years: "It did not have to turn out this way with $750 billion of our treasure spent and 36,000 US killed and injured." Still, he says, it is critical that force reductions are conducted in a "deliberate and responsible manner," leaving "a stable and functioning state."
Many still argue — as president-elect Barack Obama does — that we should never have invaded Iraq. But if a stable Iraq results and serves as a bulwark against terrorism and terrorist states, it may turn out to have been worth it. While much could still go wrong, McCaffrey's conclusion that gains are now "irreversible" is the most optimistic assessment since President Bush's "Mission Accomplished" speech aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln five years ago.
That sentiment was premature, but if this one is correct, don't look for the current president to get short-term credit. That will go to Barack Obama for pulling the troops out. Long after any Republican can derive political credit, historians will be forced to acknowledge that freedom won and state terrorism lost in Iraq.***
-
Even TF acknowledges what is happening in Iraq-- the last two paragraphs are gibberish IMHO though.
==========================================================
Obama’s Iraq Inheritance
By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
Published: November 29, 2008
NYT
Here’s a story you don’t see very often. Iraq’s highest court told the Iraqi Parliament last Monday that it had no right to strip one of its members of immunity so he could be prosecuted for an alleged crime: visiting Israel for a seminar on counterterrorism. The Iraqi justices said the Sunni lawmaker, Mithal al-Alusi, had committed no crime and told the Parliament to back off.
That’s not all. The Iraqi newspaper Al-Umma al-Iraqiyya carried an open letter signed by 400 Iraqi intellectuals, both Kurdish and Arab, defending Alusi. That takes a lot of courage and a lot of press freedom. I can’t imagine any other Arab country today where independent judges would tell the government it could not prosecute a parliamentarian for visiting Israel — and intellectuals would openly defend him in the press.
In the case of Iraq, though, the federal high court, in a unanimous decision, vacated the Parliament’s rescinding of Alusi’s immunity, with the decision delivered personally by Chief Justice Medhat al-Mahmoud. The decision explained that although a 1950s-era law made traveling to Israel a crime punishable by death, Iraq’s new Constitution establishes freedom to travel. Therefore the Parliament’s move was “illegal and unconstitutional because the current Constitution does not prevent citizens from traveling to any country in the world,” Abdul-Sattar Bayrkdar, spokesman for the court, told The Associated Press. The judgment even made the Parliament speaker responsible for the expenses of the court and the defense counsel!
I don’t think it’s reasonable to expect Iraq to have relations with Israel anytime soon, but the fact that it may be developing an independent judiciary is good news. It’s a reminder of the most important reason for the Iraq war: to try to collaborate with Iraqis to build progressive politics and rule of law in the heart of the Arab-Muslim world, a region that stands out for its lack of consensual politics and independent judiciaries. And it’s a reminder that a decent outcome may still be possible in Iraq, especially now that the Parliament has endorsed the U.S.-Iraqi plan for a 2011 withdrawal of American troops.
Al Qaeda has not been fully defeated in Iraq; suicide bombings are still an almost daily reality. But it has been dealt a severe blow, which I believe is one reason the Muslim jihadists — those brave warriors who specialize in killing women and children and defenseless tourists — have turned their attention to softer targets like India. Just as they tried to stoke a Shiite-Sunni civil war in Iraq, and failed, they are now trying to stoke a Hindu-Muslim civil war in India.
If Iraq can keep improving — still uncertain — and become a place where Kurds, Sunnis and Shiites can write their own social contract and live together with a modicum of stability, it could one day become a strategic asset for the United States in the post-9/11 effort to promote different politics in the Arab-Muslim world.
How so? Iraq is a geopolitical space that for the last three decades of the 20th century was dominated by a Baathist dictatorship, which, though it provided a bulwark against Iranian expansion, did so at the cost of a regime that murdered tens of thousands of its own people and attacked three of its neighbors.
In 2003, the United States, under President Bush, invaded Iraq to change the regime. Terrible postwar execution and unrelenting attempts by Al Qaeda to provoke a Sunni-Shiite civil war turned the Iraqi geopolitical space into a different problem — a maelstrom of violence for four years, with U.S. troops caught in the middle. A huge price was paid by Iraqis and Americans. This was the Iraq that Barack Obama ran against.
In the last year, though, the U.S. troop surge and the backlash from moderate Iraqi Sunnis against Al Qaeda and Iraqi Shiites against pro-Iranian extremists have brought a new measure of stability to Iraq. There is now, for the first time, a chance — still only a chance — that a reasonably stable democratizing government, though no doubt corrupt in places, can take root in the Iraqi political space.
That is the Iraq that Obama is inheriting. It is an Iraq where we have to begin drawing down our troops — because the occupation has gone on too long and because we have now committed to do so by treaty — but it is also an Iraq that has the potential to eventually tilt the Arab-Muslim world in a different direction.
I’m sure that Obama, whatever he said during the campaign, will play this smart. He has to avoid giving Iraqi leaders the feeling that Bush did — that he’ll wait forever for them to sort out their politics — while also not suggesting that he is leaving tomorrow, so they all start stockpiling weapons.
If he can pull this off, and help that decent Iraq take root, Obama and the Democrats could not only end the Iraq war but salvage something positive from it. Nothing would do more to enhance the Democratic Party’s national security credentials than that.
More Articles in Opinion » A version of this article appeared in print on November 30, 2008, on page WK8 of the New York edition.
-
The Art
of the
End of War
Published: 01 December 2008
Zabul Province, Afghanistan
(Travel from Iraq to Afghanistan, and needless bureaucratic delays, nearly killed this dispatch. Though many photos were made during the recent journey in Iraq, none are included here. Bureaucracy unrelated to our combat forces continues to steal frontline photos and words from your screen. We seem to have two Armies: One Army of true soldiers moving mountains to win wars, while the other Army does everything possible to break the machine while playing soldier. Though I am with excellent U.S. forces in the hinterlands of Afghanistan, this dispatch describes my final “mission” outstanding soldiers in Iraq.)
Baghdad, Iraq
On the morning of 14 November, soldiers from 2-4 Alpha of the 10th Mountain Division set off on a mission in south Baghdad, and I tagged along. About half the soldiers are combat veterans from Afghanistan and/or Iraq. For instance, SSG Zacchary Foust, the 1st Squad Leader of 3rd Platoon, said he had done two combat tours in Afghanistan, and this was his second go in Iraq, making this his fourth combat deployment. Working with multi-tour veterans makes my job much easier, especially when they have worked in more than one war. The words and expectations from the veterans are more measured and matured, even when the soldiers might be young. Combat veterans also tend to be much more relaxed with correspondents. Most of them seem to view correspondents as if we are zoo animals, since most soldiers, even if they have done multiple tours and seen lots of al Qaeda and Taliban up close, have never seen a correspondent up close. I almost expect them to ask, “What do you eat? Do you live in trees or on the ground?” The one constant with service members over here is politeness and professionalism. Combat soldiers are among the most courteous people I have ever met.
SSG Foust explained that after the initial invasion of Iraq in 2003, his group spent long periods patrolling in the Sinjar mountains in Nineveh where many Yezidis live. He said there was no fighting with Yezidis and that the Yezidis were so friendly that they continuously invited the soldiers to eat with them in the villages. Foust said that though the soldiers brought along Army food, they didn’t really need it because the Yezidis kept them stuffed, and the Yezidi food was much better than army food. Foust said the Yezidis offered the best tobacco he’s ever tasted, because they grow their own. It wasn’t until later that Foust learned the Yezidis are supposed to be “devil worshippers,” which seemed a bit perplexing because they seemed like normal people to him.
I said to SSG Foust what I tell our pilots who fly near Yezidis: If your aircraft goes down near Yezidis, you might be sipping tea with your laundry being folded before search and rescue can get to you. And they’ll cook lunch for the rescue team. This is why a lot of Americans who know Yezidis are angered when al Qaeda attacks Yezidi people. Many personal bonds have been formed during this tragic war. We are no longer enemies with the Iraqis, and there is no good reason why Iraq and America should ever fight again.
And so we rolled out of FOB Falcon in those giant MRAPs. It seems that most of the seriously experienced combat soldiers do not like MRAPs. Yes, MRAPs are great for the main roads and convoys, but they are too big and too cumbersome, and they get stuck in mud that you could peddle a bicycle through. MRAPs are not offensive vehicles. There is no doubt MRAPs can save lives – they’re like giant vaults on wheels, though I did see the wreckage of one in Afghanistan that had been nearly obliterated. When we’re on the main roads, I love MRAPs, but we will never win wars or major battles with those things, or by staying on main roads. MRAPs need good roads. Good roads are bomb magnets. In Afghanistan, many of the Taliban scoot around on motorcycles, and there is no doubt that mobility is a weapon. We should melt most of the MRAPs down and forge that metal into killing machines like Strykers. The combat vets from 10th Mountain that day were also not fans of MRAPs. And though it’s easy to find MRAP-lovers, the hardcore fighters seem to want more mobility than steel.
We rumbled into various neighborhoods in south Baghdad. Nothing was going on. No gun battles. No mushroom clouds from car bombs or IEDs. I wore the headset and the incessant radio alerts about units fighting here or there was completely absent. In the old days, while the Iraq war was hot, there was constant chatter about fighting, car bombs, snipers, name it. Today, there were no alerts at all. There was more chatter about the Kenyan sitting in front of me who had been in the Army for a couple years. The other soldiers said he should get automatic citizenship for volunteering to fight, and we all agreed. The soldier came straight from Kenya into our Army. Did not even pass GO, and suddenly was in Iraq.
On another day, I had lunch with a soldier from Ghana. He told me that Ghana has the same constitution as the United States, and that he was proud to join the American Army. He had become an American, to which I said, “Welcome aboard.” He had one of those Ghana accents and was black as coal. By the time he finished telling me about his homeland, I was sold on wanting to travel there someday.
“Are Americans welcome?” I asked.
“Sure!” He seemed to think the question was humorous for its simplicity about Ghana. He said that American soldiers in Ghana are treated like kings, and if anyone gives a hassle, a U.S. soldier has only to show his military ID, and the clouds all disappear. The soldier from Ghana told me that when he goes home on leave, the police actually salute him because he joined the American army. I was incredulous, and asked for reassurance, “Really?! They salute you?”
“Yes,” he said, with that funny Ghana accent. “They Salute American soldiers in Ghana! They love America and many Americans retire there.”
Sounded like Kurdish Iraq, where the kids ask soldiers for autographs, and even ask interpreters for autographs if they work for American soldiers.
The Baghdad mission with 10th Mountain Division soldiers was uneventful, other than the soldiers being proud to say they haven’t had to fire a single shot in combat this year. One soldier wanted to buy a roasted chicken, but the chicken stand no longer takes dollars, only Iraqi dinars. Several stores we stopped at now only take dinar, though I bought a sim chip for my cell phone with dollars. Later in the day, a soldier with a pocket full of dinar bought kebabs for the squad and we devoured the whole lot.
The SOI, or Sons of Iraq, which many people used to derisively call “America’s Militias,” were out there and their behavior was polite. The SOI were even getting along with the National Police (NP) who were with us; just a year ago the SOI and NP used to kill each other. In another encouraging sign, the Iraqi government has started paying the SOI, and their pay is nearly as much as that of Iraqi soldiers. For SOI who want jobs that do not include carrying a gun, there are job training programs that I wanted to cover, but there was no time.
I normally don’t ask British or American soldiers about politics, but I had been asking many American soldiers what they think of Obama vs. McCain, and I came away with no fixed answer. Many wanted McCain, while it seems just as many wanted Obama, though none of the soldiers seem so emotional about it like the folks at home, or in other countries. But across the board, as expected, whether soldiers like Obama or not, nobody wanted to see Iraq get neglected, and I was with them on that. The biggest endorsement for Obama came from al Qaeda’s Vice President, the bitter hate-man and racist Dr. Ayman Muhammad Rabaie al-Zawahiri, when he declared war on Obama. Al Qaeda obviously is afraid of Obama, just like they are afraid of Bush who has been chasing al Qaeda like rats since 9/11. I’ve never enjoyed a day in the Iraq war, or in Afghanistan, but there have been many days of quiet satisfaction when al Qaeda or Taliban were brought to final justice before my eyes. It would be something to see Zawahiri or Bin Laden, captured like rats, shaved of hair and beards, put before the world to face the families of the thousands of Americans, Iraqis, Afghans, and so many others in Pakistan, Africa, and Europe, that they have murdered. Nobody suffers more at the hands of al Qaeda than Muslims.
Al Qaeda was handed a vicious defeat in Iraq, and it can be said with great certainty that most Iraqis hate al Qaeda even more than Americans do. Al Qaeda can continue to murder Iraqis for now, but al Qaeda will be hard pressed to ever plant their flag in another Iraqi city. The Iraqi army and police have become far too strong and organized, and the Iraqis will eventually strangle al Qaeda to death.
I still find people in America, Nepal, Thailand, UAE and other countries who believe al Qaeda propaganda that they attack us because we support Israel or occupy Muslim holy land. This would not explain the decapitated Iraqi children I photographed when locals told me al Qaeda did it. This would not explain the Iraqi children al Qaeda has blown up, or the Afghans and Pakistanis killed by al Qaeda, or the Africans who are murdered by the same cult of serial killers. Did those decapitated children in the Iraqi village even know where America or Israel are? What about the Shia mosques they destroyed in Iraq? Were they occupying Saudi Arabia or supporting Israel?
The streets that I was this day patrolling with Iraqi National Police and soldiers from 10th Mountain Division, were once controlled by al Qaeda. Al Qaeda had intentionally stoked the fires of civil war in Iraq.
What’s next? If you are in this same neighborhood next week (now last week), please go to the art Iraqi Art show that people were talking about:
Rashid Leaders Plan, Prepare for Art and Culture Show
Friday, 21 November 2008
By Capt. Brett Walker
4th Infantry Division
The Doura Art and Culture Show is tentatively scheduled to be held Nov. 26 in the Doura community of southern Baghdad. Approximately 100 pieces of art are expected to be on display at the show. The theme of the event is
FOB FALCON — For the first time in a generation, an art and culture show will be hosted in the Rashid district of southern Baghdad, Nov. 26.
Twenty renowned Iraqi artists, many of them professors at the Baghdad Art Institute, have agreed to participate in the Doura Art and Culture Show, “New Life, New Culture.”
The event’s organizer, Faruq Fu’ad Rafiq Hamdani of Baghdad’s Mansoor district, said he expects approximately 100 pieces of art including paintings, photographs, sculptures and conceptual art pieces to be displayed at the event.
“Southern Baghdad is not thought to be supportive of the arts,” explained Faruq, regarding the theme he personally selected. “Southern Baghdad has a reputation for violence, but this show will change that perception. This show will introduce a new way for the people of Iraq to live.”
The show will be hosted by Ali S. Al Khalid, the dean of the Doura Technical College, on the campus of his academic institution.
“This event will bring much prestige to the Rashid district, and it will provide an excellent educational opportunity for my students,” Ali said.
The Doura Technical College is located in the Rashid district of Baghdad, the dominant district of southern Baghdad consisting of 1.6 million residents.
Hashem Mahmood, the district’s elected deputy chairman, said he will preside over the opening ceremony of the show in recognition of his ardent support of the event.
“I have wanted to see something like this in Rashid for a long time,” Hashem said. “To my knowledge it has not been done in my lifetime.”
The Rashid District Council Chairman Yaqoub Yosif, said he also plans to support the event and plans to attend the opening day.
“I think this is a very good idea,” Yaqoub said. “Everyone I have spoken to about it likes it, too.”
Faruq, the event’s coordinator, as well as a contributing artist, said that the event began as a humble art show with eight contributing artists, but has since attracted the interest of many other members of the Baghdad cultural community, many of whom volunteered to participate for free.
The art show became an art and culture show with the addition of 12 more artists, a three-part orchestra, instructional lectures on art technique, local food purveyors and gifts for any adolescent attendants, he explained.
“This event constitutes an important contribution to redefining the way the world perceives Iraq,” said Lt. Col. Timothy Watson, commander of the 2nd Battalion, 4th Infantry Regiment, attached to the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, Multi-National Division – Baghdad.
The battalion provided funding for the inaugural event, added Watson, who hails from San Diego.
“It is about creating a new cultural identity beyond that of violence and war,” Watson said. “It is about instilling pride in the Iraqi people for their own rich, cultural heritage.”
The “Warriors” Battalion of the 4th Inf. Regt., deployed to the Rashid district in support of MND-B and Operation Iraqi Freedom, is part of the 4th BCT, 10th Mountain Division, stationed at Fort Polk, La.
A civil society is one that admires artists, and has time to admire and critique and argue about their creations. An advanced society is one that can generate and support an Army that promotes the art of a former enemy, to find peace. The Iraqi artists have the opportunity and social obligation to promote healing.
Yes, the war is over. And it will be a great day when the last American division leaves Iraq, and Americans and Iraqis never fire another shot at each other, and we can honestly call each other “friends.”
-
Gibberish yes.
Democratic party loving and bush hating bias pure and simple. Of course. He is already giving all the credit to BO and detracting from W.
***I’m sure that Obama, whatever he said during the campaign, will play this smart. He has to avoid giving Iraqi leaders the feeling that Bush did — that he’ll wait forever for them to sort out their politics — while also not suggesting that he is leaving tomorrow, so they all start stockpiling weapons.***
-
You know you are in Baghdad when the sign on the back of your hotel room door not only tells you what to do in event of a fire, but also tells you what to do in event of:
· Indirect fire attack
· Small arms attack
· VBIED attack
-
Progress in Iraq is often measured in declining rates of terrorist violence, the number of provinces under Iraqi control, growing Iraqi troop strength, and the new U.S.-Iraq Security pact that received final Iraqi approval this week. But a pair of recent Iraqi court decisions also tells us something about the moral distance the country has traveled since the days of Saddam Hussein.
On Tuesday, an Iraqi court handed down a second death sentence to Ali Hassan al-Majeed, better known as "Chemical Ali." Mr. Majeed, a cousin and top lieutenant of Saddam, was first sentenced to die last year for using poison gas against thousands of Kurdish villagers in the late 1980s. This time, he stood trial for his role in suppressing the 1991 Shiite uprising in southern Iraq, in which an estimated 60,000 people were slaughtered.
In today's Opinion Journal
REVIEW & OUTLOOK
Bridge Loan to NowhereJustice in IraqOf Jobs and 'Stimulus'
TODAY'S COLUMNISTS
Declarations: 'At Least Bush Kept Us Safe'
– Peggy NoonanPotomac Watch: Obama's Environmental Test
– Kimberley A. Strassel
COMMENTARY
The Weekend Interview: Andy Stern
– Matthew KaminskiHow the Credit Crisis Will Change the Way America Does Business
– Henry KaufmanIndia Is a Key Ally in the War on Terror
– Douglas J. FeithCross Country: A Property Tax Cut Could Help Save Buffalo
– Steven H. Hanke and Stephen J.K. WaltersDivorce Lawyers Could Use Subsidies Too
– Raoul FelderThink what you will about the death sentence -- and Mr. Majeed was initially spared due to Iraqi President (and Kurdish leader) Jalal Talabani's opposition to it -- it's hard to name anyone who has inflicted more cruelty than Mr. Majeed, and his sentence is of a piece with the justice meted to the Nazis at Nuremberg.
Now take the case of Mithal al-Alusi, an Iraqi legislator who visited Israel in 2004 and paid for it when his two sons were murdered the following year. Undeterred, Mr. Alusi returned to Israel in September, only to be sanctioned by parliament on the grounds that he had violated Saddam-era statutes forbidding travel to the Jewish state. Fortunately, Iraq's constitutional court disagreed, noting that Saddam-era laws don't apply in the new Iraq. Mr. Alusi will now be returning to his parliamentary duties.
It's a shame that Iraq's young democracy isn't prepared to recognize Israel, as Egypt and Jordan have. Then again, any state which sentences a man like Mr. Majeed to die while defending the rights of Mr. Alusi has put itself on the right side of history, and deserves our continuing support.
-
I predict that we will look back on W as having achieved the greatest success in the advancment of the Middle East towards peace in decades:
Milestone in Baghdad
By Charles Krauthammer
Friday, December 5, 2008; Page A25
The barbarism in Mumbai and the economic crisis at home have largely overshadowed an otherwise singular event: the ratification of military and strategic cooperation agreements between Iraq and the United States.
A Framework for Success in Iraq
They must not pass unnoted. They were certainly noted by Iran, which fought fiercely to undermine the agreements. Tehran understood how a formal U.S.-Iraqi alliance endorsed by a broad Iraqi consensus expressed in a freely elected parliament changes the strategic balance in the region.
For the United States, this represents the single most important geopolitical advance in the region since Henry Kissinger turned Egypt from a Soviet client into an American ally. If we don't blow it with too hasty a withdrawal from Iraq, we will have turned a chronically destabilizing enemy state at the epicenter of the Arab Middle East into an ally.
Also largely overlooked at home was the sheer wonder of the procedure that produced Iraq's consent: classic legislative maneuvering with no more than a tussle or two -- tame by international standards (see YouTube: "Best Taiwanese Parliament Fights of All Time!") -- over the most fundamental issues of national identity and direction.
The only significant opposition bloc was the Sadrists, a mere 30 seats out of 275. The ostensibly pro-Iranian religious Shiite parties resisted Tehran's pressure and championed the agreement. As did the Kurds. The Sunnis put up the greatest fight. But their concern was that America would be withdrawing too soon, leaving them subject to overbearing and perhaps even vengeful Shiite dominance.
The Sunnis, who only a few years ago had boycotted provincial elections, bargained with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, trying to exploit his personal stake in agreements he himself had negotiated. They did not achieve their maximum objectives. But they did get formal legislative commitments for future consideration of their grievances, from amnesty to further relaxation of the de-Baathification laws.
That any of this democratic give-and-take should be happening in a peaceful parliament just two years after Iraq's descent into sectarian hell is in itself astonishing. Nor is the setting of a withdrawal date terribly troubling. The deadline is almost entirely symbolic. U.S. troops must be out by Dec. 31, 2011 -- the weekend before the Iowa caucuses, which, because God is merciful, will arrive again only in the very fullness of time. Moreover, that date is not just distant but flexible. By treaty, it can be amended. If conditions on the ground warrant, it will be.
True, the war is not over. As Gen. David Petraeus repeatedly insists, our (belated) successes in Iraq are still fragile. There has already been an uptick in terror bombings, which will undoubtedly continue as what's left of al-Qaeda, the Sadrist militias and the Iranian-controlled "special groups" try to disrupt January's provincial elections.
The more long-term danger is that Iraq's reborn central government becomes too strong and, by military or parliamentary coup, the current democratic arrangements are dismantled by a renewed dictatorship that abrogates the alliance with the United States.
Such disasters are possible. But if our drawdown is conducted with the same acumen as was the surge, not probable. A self-sustaining, democratic and pro-American Iraq is within our reach. It would have two hugely important effects in the region.
First, it would constitute a major defeat for Tehran, the putative winner of the Iraq war, according to the smart set. Iran's client, Moqtada al-Sadr, still hiding in Iran, was visibly marginalized in parliament -- after being militarily humiliated in Basra and Baghdad by the new Iraqi security forces. Moreover, the major religious Shiite parties were the ones that negotiated, promoted and assured passage of the strategic alliance with the United States, against the most determined Iranian opposition.
Second is the regional effect of the new political entity on display in Baghdad -- a flawed yet functioning democratic polity with unprecedented free speech, free elections and freely competing parliamentary factions. For this to happen in the most important Arab country besides Egypt can, over time (over generational time, the time scale of the war on terror), alter the evolution of Arab society. It constitutes our best hope for the kind of fundamental political-cultural change in the Arab sphere that alone will bring about the defeat of Islamic extremism. After all, newly sovereign Iraq is today more engaged in the fight against Arab radicalism than any country on earth, save the United States -- with which, mirabile dictu, it has now thrown in its lot.
-
CCP: "I predict that we will look back on W as having achieved the greatest success in the advancement of the Middle East towards peace in decades"
I personally agree and would say it was an amazing achievement for America under Bush to have acted so strongly and determinedly to see this through to the point where you can find areas of Chicago now more dangerous than Iraq.
There was a very legitimate debate on the way to war where I concede that certain opponents of war were correct for predicting how difficult this would be.
Many war opponents though I think only discovered their dissent when the going got tough and used it opportunistically as an an outlet to vent against Bush.
Stockpiles of WMD weren't found, nonetheless Saddam had and used WMD prior to the war and retained the means and intent to start again. We were 5-7 years away from a world where Saddam Hussein had nuclear weapons, according to the Iraq Study Group, 5-7 years ago. Saddam had attacked 4 of his neighbors and consistently violated his surrender agreement with America, yielding away his right to sovereignty.
Saddam was not found to have a collaborative, operational relationship with Al Qaeda but he did have ties, communications, cooperations and safe havens with known terrorists.
If nothing else, the fact that he paid huge sums to families of suicide bombers outside his borders should have been grounds enough for his elimination.
I am most proud of the newly freed Iraqis who gave Saddam Hussein a fair trial for the DuJail Massacre and performed a very successful execution.
Those who said we went there to take Iraq oil were wrong as were those who thought we wanted too rule the place. American theft of Iraqi resources just didn't happen. We paid for the rebuild of their oil industry and didn't take the oil, or even demand our own money back.
Those like bin Laden who thought we would cut and run at the first sight of heavy casualties were wrong (but very nearly right). America stayed and finished the job, or so it looks at this point in time.
Those who thought this battle had nothing to do with al Qaeda were wrong, from al Qaeda's point of view.
Those most pleased with the liberation should be the feminists of the world. Who could have imagined a short time ago that women would attain any rights much less the right to vote. Women tend to oppose violence and now have a voice.
Those (like Joe Biden) who wanted the America out by splitting the Iraqi territory into ethnic thirds and handing the bulk of the country and it's natural wealth over to the control of Iran as the only way of achieving peace... those people were wrong.
I don't know what the future will bring for Iraq or the Middle East and sometimes democracy has nasty results in places, but these people now have freedom and the opportunity to achieve peace and prosperity within their grasp for the first time in many people's lifetimes.
Like CCP implies, this has implications for Israel and the greater middle east peace. But, if real and lasting peace is achieved in short order, expect the credit to go to Hillary, not W, and we can discuss it on the media thread, lol.
-
From a friend currently traning the Iraqi police:
"Almost every Iraqi I have met has said they fear that if the U.S. leaves, then the sectarian strife will be on like Donkeykong. There was nothing less than wholesale Shia against Sunni neighborhood ethnic cleansing going on in mixed areas of Baghdad back on 2006. Some of it directly attributable to Iraqi police and army. Much of it occurring right in front of them because they were the problem. Militia infested. Militia connected. Militia supporting. Very simply put, Shia versus Sunni. The bottom line here. Time will tell."
-
Maybe a sign of success that there are no war posts for a couple of weeks and most posts now are reflective / looking back or about how it will be viewed from the future.
This study:
http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/President%20Al%20Gore%20and%20the%202003%20Iraq%20War%20A%20Counterfactual%20Critique%20of%20Conventional%20Wisdom.pdf
concludes that Gore would have faced the same pressures, received the same intelligence, listened to his advisers advise war, seen the same public support and made the same decision, but perhaps gone in initially with more troops. Interesting read.
-
Iraq: Stability and Boosting Oil Production
Stratfor Today » January 7, 2009 | 0017 GMT
ALI AL-SAADI/AFP/Getty Images
Iraqi Oil Minister Hussein al-ShahristaniSummary
Iraq’s oil minister has announced a new tender for the development of 11 major energy fields. The tender is part of a plan to restore — and expand upon — Iraq’s status as a major energy exporter. Whether the plan succeeds, however, depends upon Baghdad’s ability to maintain domestic stability.
Iraqi Oil Minister Hussein al-Shahristani on Dec. 31 announced a new international tender for the development of 11 major energy (mostly oil) fields as part of an effort to increase oil production. This second bid round comes six months after the first round of bidding was opened; six oil and two natural gas fields were offered for development in the first round. Al-Shahristani said developing the two sets of fields should allow Baghdad to increase production from its current 2.5 million barrels per day (bpd) to some 6 million bpd in the next four to five years. The Iraqi government plans to sign the contracts of the first round in mid-2009, while the second round is to be concluded by the end of the same year.
(click image to enlarge)
The 11 fields are Majnoon, West Qurna Phase 2, Halfaya, Gharraf, Badrah, East Baghdad, Kifl/West Kifl/Merjan, Qamarim/Gullabat/Naudman, Najmah/Al-Qayara, Khashm al-Ahmar, and Siba (the last two are natural gas fields). Each field is in a politically sensitive area. Majnoon, West Qurna Phase 2, Halfaya, Gharraf, Kifl/West Kifl/Merjan, Khashm al-Ahmar, and Siba are located in southern provinces where rival Shiite factions are pitted against one another. The East Baghdad field in the capital is in a stronghold of the al-Sadrite movement. The Najmah/Al-Qayara field is in Ninawa province contested between the Kurds and the Sunnis. Khashm al-Ahmar and the Qamarim/Gullabat/Naudman field is in the communally mixed Diyala province.
In addition to the domestic issues, three of the fields are jointly owned with neighboring Iran and Kuwait. Majnoon and Badrah are located on the Iran-Iraq border, while Siba is on the Iraq-Kuwait border. Developing them will require agreements between Iraq and its two neighbors, something that will be complicated by a row over oil fields that led to the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and by Iranian interests in Iraq.
Political and security conditions allowing, the development of these fields could allow Iraq to re-emerge as a major oil-exporting state. Despite the global economic downturn, Iraq is the one place that could attract investment from global energy majors given the low cost of development and the potential for success.
As much as 80 percent of Iraq’s energy resources have long remained untapped. Whatever development took place occurred before the former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein became president in 1979. From there onward, Iraq’s links to the wider world became constrained. The process began with the 1980-88 war with Iran and exacerbated in the wake of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Perhaps the worst period began with the 1991 Persian Gulf War and continued through twelve years of sanctions. The country then experienced nearly five years of insurgency in post-Baathist Iraq.
Together, this sequence of events took the country out of the select club of major oil exporters. This meant there is huge potential for increasing oil production, especially in the light of the technological developments that have taken place in the last three decades and the fact that Iraq has not barely been exposed to them.
The introduction of technology into the country will work well with the nature of Iraq’s oil fields - highly shallow and horizontal pool - and thus immensely facilitate development work. Unlike other oil fields around the world, which are deep below the surface and are in the vertical shafts, Iraq’s oil fields are in many ways large lakes that don’t require a whole lot of drilling. This aspect is extremely important from the point of view of the cost of enhancing production, which is why Iraq is the one place where the world’s energy majors are drawn to.
Having oil fields that require little work to begin production constitutes half the undertaking; being able to ship it is an equally important part of developing the energy sector. The world has many places — like Russia — where there is plenty of oil but where the fields are nowhere near any means of transport, which renders the project cost prohibitive. In Iraq, however, most of the fields are located near existing export points and other transit infrastructure. This means it does not require much effort to transport Iraqi crude.
Najmah/Al-Qayara and East Baghdad are not far from a pipeline running from Baghdad through Baiji to the tri-border area with Syria and Turkey. The Khashim al-Ahmar and Qamarim/Gullabat/Naudman are a little west of the same line. Meanwhile, the pipeline from Basra to Hadith runs through the Kifl/West Kifl/Merjan field near Najaf and runs close to Gharraf. And the Halfaya, Majnoon, West Qurna Phase 2, and Siba are located very close to the pipeline network hubbed at Basra. This leaves Badrah as the only field that is far from any existing pipeline. But since it is close to East Baghdad, it can be linked to the pipeline running north from the capital.
Despite these logistical positives, two key factors have prevented energy majors from leaping at the opportunity since the U.S. move to effect regime-change. The first has been the lack of an internationally recognized government, and the second has been a multifaceted security problem.
The Petraeus strategy allowed the United States to collapse the Sunni insurgency from within in 2007, while U.S.-Iranian dealings took care of the Shiite militia problem. The prospect of violence remains, however, given ongoing Sunni-Shiite and Arab-Kurdish tensions. On the political front, the Shiite-dominated central government has considerably extended its writ in the country. Even so, numerous faultlines at both the intra- and inter-communal levels continue to threaten the gains made over the last two years.
The issue of autonomy, which pits the central government against the Kurdistan Regional Government — especially over energy — continues to prevent the enactment of a national hydrocarbon law. Furthermore, 2009 is an election year, with provincial elections scheduled for Jan. 31 and parliamentary polls slated for later in the year. These votes are the next step in the process toward stabilizing the Iraqi state. If Iraq’s various stakeholders can move past these tensions, they will enhance the chances for success of the Oil Ministry’s plans to expand production.
Given the number of moving parts in the new Iraqi republic, any number of things could go wrong. But so long as Baghdad can maintain status quo in terms of Iraq’s relative security and stability, it stands a good chance to greatly exceed its past status as a major oil-exporting nation.
-
A friend in Iraq training Iraqi police reports:
I leave my hootch at about 0515 to walk down the very dark road to the compound gym. As I turn onto "Edinburgh Blvd." I can hear a dog barking. Very agitated like. And getting louder. Within a few seconds I see a white dog somewhat running towards me. That by itself is enough around here to be concerned about. They carry 2 step rabies here. You get bit, you get to take 2 more steps before you drop dead to the ground. Of course I am exaggerating but you get the drift.
Well a moment after I see the dog I notice a light coming down the street. It looks like a flashlight. Only it's like head high. As the light and I get nearer I realize it's a head lamp. Like bicyclists and orienteers wear. By this time the dog sees me and darts bbehind some parked cars and essentially goes out of sight. A couple of seconds later I realiize the guy comiing towards me wearing a head lamp is carrying a freakin' rifle. Well around here, while rifles are not uncommon, guys walking down the street at 0515 in the morning with one and wearing a head lamp is still odd. I admit to instant ppucker factor thinkking holy mierda. Who's gonna believe I got whacked like this? I have never been so happy in my life (when he was just meters away) to hear a voice, a German voice at that say, "good morning sir." And he just kept going. Looking for the dog. But I think the dog took deep cover when he saw me, on top of seeing some guy with a flashlight and a rifle looking for him. And I nnever heard a gunshot.
I checked my underwear when I got to the gym....
-
Another report from my friend:
So yesterday morning one of the women I work with, an American expat/ex-Peace Corp type, waddles into our office and says "why is there a machine gun in the guard tower. It frightens me."
"Umm, let's see. Because this is a war zone. Umm, because there are people out there right now who would kill us if they could."
"Why would anybody want to hurt us?"
I have decided to never speak another word to her. She is a typical hypocrite. She won't go anywhere unless it is safe, yet asks "why would anybody want to hurt us?"
I remember in Virginia, during defensive tactics training, she commented that a person with a knife should be disarmed. Not hurt. Like there's some magical skill set out there that guarantees a disarm everytime.
Some people just should not be here. There's already a scarcity of clean air.
-
So it's been about 3 weeks plus now since the Iraqis have been given back their country. And things seem to feel different. Sometimes visibly so.
I was out at CCCI the other day (Central Criminal Court of Iraq). And for about 1/2 hour an Iraqi helicopter was buzzing the place. Unnecessarily. As if to show their ass. But who was affected? The Iraqi court system. That's who.
One sees way more Iraqi military and police vehicles and personnel than before. Most seem okay. I personally say a sallam alaikum and put my hand on my heart to every Iraqi I meet. I have even seen that turn what appeared to be the occasional cold glare into a luke warm smile. I also take a photo of every security officer who I am in a position to, but I must (and have) give them a copy of the photo. They seem to appreciate the hell out of that. Most I have meet seem basically okay. Like guys everywhere would be.
I do sense that there is some embarrassment to the reality that in direct force on force warfare we have kicked their ass twice. Technology has its benefits.
But the reality is they, for a while, were absolutely wreaking havoc on us with their 4th generational warfare vision. To tell you the truth I think waht happened here in that regard is a harbinger of how "the defeated" can lay waste to an occupying force.
The relative security in Iraq these days came about for four main reasons:
the Surge (liberals hate to hear that) but it was the security foundation that allowed for so much more
General Petraeus: the man simply realized that it required a total approach by all military and civilian assets
the reality that Iraq had a history of civilization long before we came here. I don't know that this is the case in Afghanistan
T-walls.
The Iraqis want to take down the t-walls. I wish them luck. The enemy is not gone. Just constrained. But without the t-wall syystem, man iit's like duck season again....
-
I remember reading somewhere that Muslims may not like their photos taken.
Most Iraqis are Muslims.
But I have yet to meet one who did not want their photo taken when the option was offered. They jump on it. The only thing is you MUST give a copy to each and every person in the photo. If for no other reason than they will torment you to death over it. And since e-mail is not big over here as far as the grunts doing all the work go (remember computers and Internet access costs), that means you have to print them out a copy.
So far I have been real good about that. And it has earned some good mileage.
Sometimes I think about seriously learning Arabic because all the Iraqis I have met so far seem to have a good sense of humor. It's just that we can't laugh more about sh!* because we cannot communicate. If we were going to be in Iraq longer I would do it. But it's hard to generate the energy to make such a commitment.
Oh, and almost all I have met seem to like Americans. And if there were anyy issues they revolved more around they would prefer things to be different in an ideal world. Remember, in straight up combat we have absolutely kicked their asses twice. As a man it's a hard and bitter pill to swallow. Any man, anywhere on this planet would feel the same.
So I just front myself off as being no better than them. Equals. I am not the infidel who is here to tell you how to stop dragging your knuckles on the ground and walk upright. "Tell me what YOU think" about this and that (all translated of course). Positive reinforcement. "Dude your gun is cleaner than most guys I have worked with" (easy to say when it's true).
Iraq, contrary to Afghanistan, was a society with a long history of civilization before we got here. They have had very strong legal institutions for a very long time. Maybe not how we would do things, especially under the evil Saddam Hussein, but they had and still have their ways. And these ways work for them.
One of the projects I see being floated around is an automated court administration system. Frankly I have not personally seen a huge amount of interest in converting to that process. They have their paper way, much like the Colombians did, of doing things. And it works for them. They walk into courthouses with huge court documents that look like the construction paper we used as kids. Light blue. Yellow. Orange. No rhyme or reason as far as I can tell between the colors, but it all works for them.
One final observation. And this is just my opinion. I more and more come to the conclusion that most Muslims could care less about the issues that drive the Jihadists. But the Jihadists are the ones to use violence in support of their view. The average person, for good reason, is punked out by that reality. The Iraqis who have gotten sick and tired of that crap have proven that they will kick al-Qaeda's ass themselves. And they have. At great consequence to themselves. But they ultimately prevailed in many places in Iraq. I don't take the Michael Yon view that all is hunky dory and that there are not serious issues here.
I was against the invasion of Iraq back in 2003. And I have been a harsh critic of our involvement here on many occasions. But seeing things close up now makes me start to believe that some of the Bush administrations vision on how to deal with the greatest current threat to Western civilization (in afct to the entire non-Muslim world), the direct confrontation of the Jihadists, may have some very long term prospects.
-
In a week of symbolic breaks with the ancien regime, President Obama called in U.S. war commanders last Wednesday to signal his desire to get out of Iraq. Then, meeting over, he issued a vague statement about planning "a responsible military drawdown" that omitted mention of his campaign promise to pull out within 16 months.
APFor Iraq's sake, long may such obfuscation reign. The country faces big tests in the coming year, starting with provincial elections on Saturday. Robust American engagement guided Iraq out of its bloodiest days in 2006. The military commanders who implemented the successful surge now counsel against hasty withdrawal, lest those gains be lost. This is a potential win-win for Mr. Obama. If Iraq emerges from 2009 as a stronger democracy, the White House could then reduce troop levels with little risk of relapse. The President, who prospered in the Democratic primaries thanks to his antiwar stance, will reap the strategic benefit. Let historians appreciate the irony.
The 146,000 U.S. troops still in Iraq today are needed less to end violence than as glue for a still fragile polity. The GIs are the honest brokers in an Iraq recovering from vicious sectarian fighting, and they are crucial to building a steadily improving Iraqi Army. To withdraw in 16 months, the U.S. would have to start immediately to rotate out a brigade roughly each month, taking its eye off those crucial missions.
Why take that risk now, of all times? After Saturday's local elections, the majority Shiites will willingly share power with Sunnis, who boycotted the last poll in 2005. Sunnis have chosen to come back into the fold through the ballot box, along the way helping to give birth to vibrant retail politics. Some 14,000 candidates from 400 parties battle for 440 seats on 14 (of 18) provincial councils. There will also be a referendum on the U.S.-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement this summer, and parliamentary elections by the end of the year.
American GIs can make sure these elections come off smoothly and are accepted broadly as legitimate. The current campaign has seen an uptick in suicide attacks and bombings, showing that diehard Sunni insurgents and Iran-backed militias still want to sabotage democracy in Mesopotamia. Iran lost its fight to stop the U.S. forces deal last year and is sure to try again. A Shiite democracy on its border is an existential rebuke to the mullahs. Military commanders are bracing for Iran to stir up trouble in the months ahead, particularly in the south. By helping Iraq resist this powerplay, Mr. Obama will only strengthen his hand for his promised diplomacy with Tehran.
General Ray Odierno, the commander in Iraq, says the U.S. will be able to pull out two, possibly three, of 14 brigades in 2009, assuming all goes well. Last year's forces agreement obliges cuts. By summer, American combat forces are supposed to be out of the cities, and out of the country by the end of 2011, well in time for the next U.S. Presidential election.
The new Administration may still be tempted to pull out in bigger numbers sooner -- both to appease its antiwar left and spend less on defense. Another argument is that the U.S. can't beef up in Afghanistan without quick reductions in Iraq. As a matter of arithmetic, that's broadly correct. But before a larger force can do much good in Afghanistan the U.S. needs a plan for deploying it.
Here's the lose-lose scenario: Allow Iraq to deteriorate by withdrawing too soon and push into Afghanistan without a better strategy. Mr. Obama has inherited a victory in Iraq that he can't afford to squander.
-
By CAMPBELL ROBERTSON
Published: January 27, 2009
BAGHDAD — At a recent meeting with the Iraqi journalists’ union, Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki made a pledge that would have scandalized the Iraqis’ American counterparts: the government would give plots of land to thousands of journalists, for a nominal price or possibly even free.
A campaign sign for Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki of Iraq. Mr. Maliki has pledged to give plots of land to journalists.
His timing, a month before provincial elections, as well as his admonition to journalists to focus on stories of progress and reconstruction, might be seen as an attempt to buy favorable news coverage.
But if it was, there were few objections from the journalists, who have been demanding the land giveaway for years.
“The resolution of distributing lands to journalists is part of several rights that the journalists should have,” said Moaid Allami, the president of the union. “These are social and legal rights to the citizen, to the journalist citizen.”
More than just free elections, policy analysts often say, democracy requires democratic civil institutions like a free press. But the popularity of the land-for-journalists program illustrates the challenges newfound democratic principles face when they clash with entitlements and cozy relationships that no one ever questioned before.
The government has been pledging to give land to journalists for years, and there are doubts as to when or whether it will really happen. Yassin Majeed, a government spokesman, said that the process was going forward and that the current plan was to offer plots all over the country to as many journalists in the union as possible.
But there are few doubts among journalists that they deserve it.
Mr. Allami, whose union represents 10,000 employees of state, party and independently owned media, said journalists were entitled to the state’s support given the hardships they faced in the line of duty. For six years running, Iraq has been declared the most dangerous place in the world for journalists by the Committee to Protect Journalists. Since the American-led invasion in 2003, 114 Iraqi journalists have been killed, the organization reports, victims of cross-fire, bombings or assassination.
Local press organizations say the number is much higher.
Shihab al-Tamimi, the former president of the union, was shot and killed in his car last February, and Mr. Allami was wounded in a bomb blast outside the union’s headquarters in September.
Before the American invasion, all journalists worked for the government and, like other government-employed professionals, including doctors and teachers, they were well paid and had secure jobs, pensions and other benefits.
But since then, the media have been largely privatized, and those benefits have disappeared. The vast majority of Iraqi reporters are paid salaries too low for them to accrue any savings. And unlike state employees, they have little job security and no health insurance, life insurance or pensions.
The journalists’ union has sought compensation in another program from the era of Saddam Hussein’s government: land patronage. For decades, land was given to soldiers, officers and favored government employees. The union has also asked for pensions, as well as reduced fares for journalists on the state-owned airline.
“Support from the government is not a right, but it’s a necessity,” said Maher Faisal, the managing editor of the independent newspaper Addustour. “The media and journalists have been marginalized in this country.”
Mr. Faisal said he hoped that the deal was not politically motivated. “But,” he said, “journalists need to eat.”
A few journalists, however, are worried about a different kind of survival — that of Iraq’s nascent free press.
Hadi Jalow Merei, a writer for the newspaper Azzaman, said the land distribution plan “would open the door to government interference.”
Ziad al-Ajili, the manager of a Baghdad-based advocacy group, Journalistic Freedoms Observatory, said of the land giveaway: “I would not take it even if I have to live in a tent. As soon as you do, it will be the end of Iraq’s independent journalism.”
He acknowledges the difficulties Iraqi journalists face; his organization keeps a tally of arrests, killings and beatings of journalists, as well as government violations of press freedoms. But the best way to address these problems, he said, is through more journalism, not government handouts.
“They’re not thinking about the future,” he said of his colleagues. “If they think about the future as independent journalists, we can do lots of things.”
===================
(Page 2 of 2)
Under Mr. Hussein, journalists walked a fine line. Those who went too far in their reporting were often arrested and tortured. But Mr. Hussein, whose son Uday was president of the journalists’ union, knew how to use the carrot, too.
Reporters who worked during those years said they were granted leeway to criticize government officials as long as Saddam Hussein, his sons and his special interests were left untouched. Those favored by Mr. Hussein were showered with money, cars and land.
Since his government was toppled in 2003, private news outlets have proliferated, some independent and many affiliated with political parties. A free press was enshrined in Iraq’s new Constitution, which guarantees the right “as long as it does not violate public order and morality.” Laws criminalizing certain types of speech have curtailed that right somewhat.
But the new authorities sometimes acted like the old ones. An American public relations firm hired by the Pentagon paid Iraqi journalists for favorable coverage. Both the American-led coalition and the Iraqi government have closed news outlets and arrested journalists, often without charge or on vague accusations of supporting terrorism.
Last year, Iraq ranked 158th out of 173 countries in the Press Freedom Index compiled by Reporters Without Borders, a media watchdog group.
But the old habits die hard for journalists, too.
“The union is still begging from the powerful and working hard to satisfy the government,” said Sadiq al-Moussaoui, who runs the Waael news agency. “When the politicians start becoming afraid of us, that will mean we are real journalists.”
But Mr. Majeed, the government spokesman, insisted that a simple benefit program did not mean that the government expected anything in return. Nor was Mr. Allami, the union president, concerned that the program could appear to compromise journalists’ integrity.
“I’m not afraid about the credibility of the journalism in Iraq after these resolutions,” he said. “On the contrary, I’m afraid of the government if we say something or write something honest against them in the future. They may take away our rights if we criticize them at some point. But once we get the lands and those lands are registered in our names, they aren’t going to be able to take them away.”
-
The democracy that President Bush was an idiot to imagine for Iraq held another election yesterday-- not that you would notice it very much in the MSM :x Here's Stratfor's initial take on it:
==============
Preliminary results emerging a day after Iraq held critical provincial elections suggested that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s group, the Coalition for the State of Law, has made significant gains both in Baghdad and the Shiite south. A Reuters report cited officials from both the largest Shia political group, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), and Muqtada al-Sadr’s movement as acknowledging that al-Maliki had fared far better than expected. Meanwhile, the Sunnis were expected to make considerable gains in certain northern provinces, reversing the gains made by the Kurds in the last elections — which the Sunnis boycotted.
Given the complexities of Iraq’s electoral system, it will be several days before actual results are available to show the precise balance of power between the Shia and the Sunnis. The results of the elections in both the Shiite and Sunni provinces will have a direct bearing on parliamentary election, scheduled for sometime in December. Together, these two elections will determine whether the delicate power-sharing arrangement that the United States shaped will hold.
The fact that elections were held at all, and without any serious violence, speaks volumes about how far things in Iraq have come since 2006, when the Sunni, Shiite and jihadist insurgencies were threatening to tear the country apart. Equally important is the rise of al-Maliki, who was little more than a compromise choice for prime minister about a year ago. Since then, al-Maliki has skillfully exploited Iraq’s factional rivalries and his own government position to enhance his standing.
Though he has been a Shiite Islamist politician throughout his career, al-Maliki went into the Jan. 31 elections promoting himself as a secular, non-sectarian and Iraqi nationalist seeking a strong central government as a counter to regional tendencies. If his coalition did in fact make considerable gains in the Shiite south, he will be able to counter the pro-Iranian ISCI’s moves to create a Shiite autonomous region in the south. Furthermore, his victory will pave the way for improved relations between Baghdad and the provinces, leading to a strengthened central government.
While he maintains strong opposition to the large-scale incorporation of Sunni militias into the state’s security apparatus, al-Maliki’s new makeover as a non-ideological Arab leader, increasingly independent of Iran, has won him a good many allies among the Sunnis. With the help of these Sunni allies, who also are expected to have gained power in the provincial election, al-Maliki is hoping to forge a strong coalition that could serve as a check on both Kurdish ambitions for greater autonomy and the pro-Iranian Shia who also seek a weak national government.
Obviously, new battle lines are emerging in Iraq between ethno-sectarian forces and nationalist ones, and al-Maliki will have a tough time dealing both with Kurds who have been greatly angered by his push for a strong center and fellow Shia who wish to see an Iraq aligned more closely with Iran. For the United States, however, al-Maliki’s gains can facilitate the Obama administration’s plans for an accelerated troop withdrawal and provide Washington with the leverage it needs in moving toward diplomatic engagement with Iran. Considering that it was not too long ago that the United States had all but given up on al-Maliki, this is indeed considerable progress.
-
Was Bush right after all? :evil:
=======================
Imagine yourself as Barack Obama, gazing at a map of the greater Middle East and wondering how, and where, the United States can best make a fresh start in the region.
AP
An Iraqi man holds up an ink-stained finger after casting his vote in Basra, Iraq's second-largest city, Jan. 31.
Your gaze wanders rightward to Pakistan, where preventing war with India, economic collapse or the Talibanization of half the country would be achievement enough. Next door is Afghanistan, where you are committing more troops, all so you can prop up a government that is by turns hapless and corrupt.
Next there is Iran, drawing ever closer to its bomb. You're mulling the shape of a grand bargain, but Israel is talking pre-emption. Speaking of Israel, you're girding for a contentious relationship with the hawkish Benjamin Netanyahu, the all-but certain next prime minister.
What about Israel's neighbors? Palestine is riven between feckless moderates and pitiless fanatics. Lebanon and Hezbollah are nearly synonyms. You'd love to nudge Syria out of Iran's orbit, but Bashar Assad isn't inclined. In Egypt, a succession crisis looms the moment its octogenarian president retires to his grave.
The Opinion Journal Widget
Download Opinion Journal's widget and link to the most important editorials and op-eds of the day from your blog or Web page.
And then there is Iraq, the country in the middle that you would have just as soon banished from sight. How's it doing? Perplexingly well.
The final tallies for Saturday's provincial elections aren't in yet. But a few conclusions are warranted. This time, the election seems to have been mostly free of fraud; four years ago, it was beset by fraud. This time, there was almost no violence; four years ago, there were 299 terrorist attacks. This time, 40% of voters in the overwhelmingly Sunni province of Anbar went to the polls; four years ago, turnout was 2%.
In 2005, Iraqis voted their sectarian preferences. Now sectarian parties are out of fashion. "Those candidates who campaigned under the banner of religion should be rejected," Abdul Kareem told Al Jazeera. "They corrupted the name of religion because they are notorious for being thieves. Religion is not politics." Mr. Kareem is a Shiite cleric.
Also out of fashion: Iran, previously thought to be the jolly inheritor of our Iraq misadventure. In 2005, Tehran's political minions in the Iranian-funded Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq -- itself the funder of the dreaded Badr brigade -- swept the field. Candidates loyal to anti-American fire-breather Moqtada al-Sadr also did well. This time, Sadr didn't even dare to field his own slate, and early reports are that the Supreme Council was trounced.
What's in fashion, electorally speaking, are secular parties, as well as the moderately religious Dawa Party of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. This wasn't supposed to happen. The Palestinian parliamentary election of 2006 that put Hamas in power was taken in the West as proof that Arab democracy was destined to yield illiberal results. Saturday's election suggests otherwise, assuming there is a structure that guarantees that Islamists must stand for election more than once.
What about security? A month ago, Gen. Ray Odierno predicted that "al Qaeda will try to exploit the elections because they don't want them to happen. So I think they will attempt to create some violence and uncertainty in the population." But al Qaeda was a no-show on Saturday. Meanwhile, more U.S. soldiers died in accidents (12) than in combat (4) for the month of January. The war is over.
So what are you going to do about the one bright spot on your map -- an Arab country that is genuinely democratic, increasingly secular and secure, anti-Iranian and, all-in-all, on your side? So far, your only idea seems to bid to it good luck and bring most of the troops home in time for Super Bowl Sunday, 2010.
In Today's Opinion Journal
REVIEW & OUTLOOK
Dodd's Peek-A-Boo DisclosureNationalize ThisMotley Paint Crew
TODAY'S COLUMNISTS
Main Street: Congress's Phony War on Torture
– William McGurn
COMMENTARY
Daniel Pearl and the Normalization of Evil
– Judea PearlWhat Other Financial Crises Tell Us
– Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. RogoffHow to Value Toxic Bank Assets
– Robert C. PozenThat's a campaign promise, but it isn't a foreign policy. Foreign policy begins with the recognition that Iraq has now moved from the liability side of the U.S. ledger to the asset side. As an Arab democracy, it is a model for what we would like the rest of the Arab world to become. As a Shiite democracy, it is a reproach to Iranian theocracy. As the country at the heart of the Middle East, it is ideally located to be a bulwark against Tehran's encroachments.
There was a time when American strategists understood the role countries could play as "pillars" of a regional strategy. Israel has been a pillar since at least 1967; Iran was one until 1979. Turkey, too, is a pillar, but it is fast slipping away, as is Egypt.
Within the Arab world, Iraq is the only country that can now fulfill that role. For that it will need military and economic aid, and lots of it. Better it than futile causes like Palestine, or missions impossible like winning over the mullahs. With Saturday's poll, Iraq has earned a powerful claim to our friendship.
Yes, you'd rather look elsewhere on the map for a Mideast legacy. But Iraq is where you'll find it. Don't miss your chance.
-
Iraq's Remarkable Election
The government ensured integrity and security. Iran and sectarianism were the big losers.
By KIMBERLY KAGAN and FREDERICK W. KAGAN
When the surge in Iraq began in January 2007, no one imagined that two years later Iraq would plan and conduct provincial elections with limited Coalition assistance and presence, that those elections would proceed smoothly and peacefully, and that the United Nations special envoy would be able to certify its legitimacy immediately. Nor could anyone have dreamt that the news story would be not the smoothness and peacefulness of the polling, but its results and the prospects they offer for political progress in Iraq.
The security was an impressive demonstration of the capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and its legitimacy with Iraqis. Iraqi National Police, local police, and Iraqi Army troops were entirely responsible for the physical security of all polling places on election day. They rehearsed procedures for requesting and receiving quick-reaction forces drawn from Coalition and other Iraqi troops, but did not need to implement these emergency plans.
There had been reason to fear suicide bombers at polling sites, but none struck. But Iraqis were confident enough to bring their children to polling places. This was the first time that U.S. forces were not increased prior to an Iraqi election.
The Iraqi High Electoral Commission played a role in conducting legitimate elections. It standardized procedures for ISF securing the polls. Working in conjunction with the U.N. Assistance Mission Iraq, the commission guided the registration of voters and candidates, and oversaw polling procedures, absentee balloting, and the counting of ballots.
Iraqi voters chose nationalist, secularist parties over religious parties by a wide margin. In the mostly Shiite south, candidates associated with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's Dawa Party appear to have gained significantly. This outcome is noteworthy because Dawa came to power in the 2005 elections with virtually no grass-roots support or organization. Few would have predicted Mr. Maliki's electoral success even a year ago.
Moqtada al-Sadr, by contrast, relied on grass-roots support for his movement and seemed poised to dominate elections in the south a year ago. But he lost much of his popular support when Iraqi Security Forces defeated his militias in Basra, Baghdad and Maysan in June 2008. The door was open for the well-organized Iraqi Supreme Islamic Council (ISCI), the clerically dominated party that had controlled many important provincial governorships and councils in the south. Yet Iraqis voted instead for Mr. Maliki's coalition or for the secular Shiite coalition of former prime minister Iyad Allawi.
Mr. Maliki certainly used his position as prime minister and his control of Iraq's wealth to enhance his political position among the Shiites. But he delivered more than money. He cleared southern Iraq's urban areas of Shiite militias, including those directly and actively supported by Iran, and re-established civil order in wartorn Basra, Diwaniyah, Karbala, Maysan, Wasit and Dhi Qar provinces. He thereby gave a degree of security to these communities for which he is now being rewarded electorally.
Early results in the Sunni-Arab core provinces of Anbar, Salah-ad-Din and Diyala are equally heartening. Large numbers of Sunni Arabs boycotted the 2005 provincial and parliamentary elections, leading to feelings of political disenfranchisement that helped fuel the insurgency. Furthermore, those Sunni Arabs who did vote in the 2005 parliamentary elections elected a very narrow and extremist slate that claimed to speak for the entire Sunni-Arab community and refused to make compromises with the Shiite government.
The Sunni political spectrum in 2009 encompasses a much wider range of views, which have each achieved a share of the votes. This development offers the possibility of real cross-sectarian coalitions, as Mr. Maliki is no longer dependent on ISCI for influence in the Shiite areas, and can choose among possible Sunni partners in mixed areas.
The most surprising results were from Ninewah province in the north, where a new political entity formed in 2008 called al Habda seems to have won a majority of the council seats. The Sunni boycott of the 2005 provincial elections had left this province largely under the influence of Kurdish council-members. Kurdish leaders took advantage of that fact to try to create conditions on the ground that would support the annexation of large parts of Ninewah, including parts of its capital, Mosul, to the Kurdish Regional Government.
This effort was highly destabilizing. Ninewah is one of the most diverse provinces, and many of its Arabs and ethnic minorities resented what they perceived as Kurdish expansion. Resentment against this expansion, and also against the failure of the provincial government to provide services, perpetuated a low-level insurgency in this area, permitting al Qaeda to retain its last foothold in Iraq.
Al Habda is a provincial coalition that stands against Kurdish domination of the province and for the provision of security and services to the people of Ninewah. Its rise offers an opportunity to deprive al Qaeda of tacit support within Mosul. It will also force Kurdish leaders to re-evaluate their insistence on "maximalist" demands that threatened to unravel Iraq.
The big loser in this election was Iran. Iranian agents spent a lot of money trying to influence the outcome of the elections in the south, and they largely failed. Iran's favored parties did poorly. The Iranians had hoped to persuade Iraqi voters to punish Mr. Maliki for signing the security agreement with the United States. Instead, these elections proved to be a powerful vote of confidence for the prime minister and his policies, including that agreement.
The big winner in this election was the concept of a unitary Iraq. An attempt to hold a referendum on establishing an autonomous Basra failed before the election. ISCI, the only Arab party that had favored the creation of an autonomous Shiite region, lost ground throughout that region, including in its own stronghold of Najaf. Iraqis have sent a clear message that they want to live in a single state with a strong central government connected to strong provincial governments, rather than in some sort of artificially federated state.
Despite these achievements, American forces will continue to play a vital role as honest brokers and impartial arbiters standing behind efforts to resolve conflicts peacefully. National elections will not occur until December, which may cause considerable tension in a parliament whose majority rests on the disfavored parties. The parliamentary conflict between the prime minister and the disfavored parties may be dramatic.
Results in Ninewah and the south offer the prospect of political resolutions to thorny problems that had been generating violence. In the short term, however, those who stand to lose by those political resolutions may well increase violence and brinksmanship.
Al Qaeda will respond violently, if desperately, to the new Sunni political order. Iran has trained and armed Shiite extremists who fled from Baghdad, Basra and Maysan, and who will seek to reinfiltrate and destabilize those areas.
Also, Iraqi and Kurdish security forces narrowly avoided armed conflict in August 2008 in the ethnically-mixed city of Khanaqin. The status of Kirkuk is still unresolved, much more delicate, and has the potential to generate conflict between the central and regional governments in 2009. The seating of the new councils between now and March, and the election of new governors by those councils, will certainly generate friction, if not armed conflict or assassinations. There are still district (local) and parliamentary (national) elections ahead in 2009.
Now that Iraqis have elected provincial governments of their liking, it is essential that those governments succeed. They will have large budgets to execute with new statutory powers. And the expectations of their electorates are very high.
U.S.-run Provincial Reconstruction Teams, civilian-military units working to rebuild government functions, have a growing role to play in Iraq's provinces and depend on the presence and dispersion of U.S. forces to function. U.S. forces and headquarters still help connect the provinces and the central government, aiding the Iraqi government.
Iraq has gone from being an impending disaster to a golden opportunity. Helping Iraqi internal politics develop peacefully and across sectarian lines is a critical part of reintegrating Iraq into the Arab world, making the world's only Shiite-controlled Arab state acceptable to the Sunni regimes that surround it. That reintegration, in turn, offers tantalizing prospects for balancing Iran and stabilizing the heart of the Muslim world. The stakes in Iraq remain very high, but we are finally starting to see the return on our investment.
Ms. Kagan is president of the Institute for the Study of War. Mr. Kagan is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and co-author of "Ground Truth: The Future of U.S. Land Power" (AEI Press, 2008).
=======================
Iraq's Latest Progress
Political compromise follows security, not vice versa.
One sign that Iraq's local elections went well on the weekend is that there's been so little reporting of the event. Mayhem in the Middle East always gets attention, but a democracy growing in Baghdad is apparently a snooze.
The result is nonetheless worth noting because it showed several encouraging trends in Baghdad while settling some old debates in Washington. While complete results won't be known until the end of the week, the vote itself was peaceful and early returns suggest a victory for Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's coalition and other secular parties at the expense of more religious Shiite parties.
This isn't surprising considering that Mr. Maliki is getting -- and deserves -- credit for rescuing Basra, Baghdad's Sadr City and other parts of Iraq from sectarian violence in the last year. Mr. Maliki's coalition ran on a nationalist platform, in contrast to a couple of the religious parties more closely identified with Iran. The theory that a democratic Iraq would inevitably fall under the orbit of the radical mullahs in Qom has taken another blow.
Iraqi Shiites in particular seemed to favor a strong central government in Baghdad, rather than a splintered nation of the kind favored only a couple years ago by sectarian politicians -- not to mention then-Senator Joe Biden. Iraqi Sunnis also participated this time, unlike in 2005, which shows that they too believe they can get their share of power from the still-largely Shiite government in the capital. Ethnic tensions haven't vanished -- especially in Mosul and Kirkuk in the North, where Arabs and Kurds mix uneasily -- but we are a long way from the fragmenting Iraq of famous prediction.
The peacefulness of the election is also noteworthy. When provincial elections were last held in 2005, terrorists attacked more than 100 polling stations, and U.S. and Iraqi military leaders were girding this time for a macabre reprise. But al Qaeda and other terrorists were a no-show, and we'll wager that isn't because they made a strategic decision to be nice. Rather, it's evidence both of al Qaeda's weakness in Iraq, along with the growing effectiveness of Iraq's security forces.
The election is further evidence that President Bush and proponents of the 2007 surge were right on another point as well: to wit, that security would precede political reconciliation. Recall that Senator Jack Reed, Mr. Biden and for that matter Barack Obama insisted in 2007 that a political agreement was needed before the killing would stop. But such an accord was impossible until Iraqis began to feel safe enough to be able to make compromises. The surge brigades (Iraqi and American), the new U.S. counterinsurgency strategy and above all the demonstration of sustained U.S. commitment improved security so much that democratic deal-making became possible.
All this amounts to a huge strategic gift to the Obama Administration. Iraq now stands as a democratic and pluralistic model for other Arab states, and as proof that Iranian-style theocracy isn't in the Shiite political DNA. If the "smart power" that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton likes to talk about has any meaning, it's to capitalize on developments like these.
That's why we're puzzled by media reports that Mr. Obama intends to name Christopher Hill to replace Ryan Crocker as America's ambassador in Baghdad. Part of the puzzle is that retired Marine General Anthony Zinni -- a straight-shooter if ever there was one, with long experience in Mideast diplomacy -- claims he was tapped for the job, until the White House withdrew the offer without notice or explanation.
But the greater puzzle is why Mr. Hill -- who has spent the better part of the last few years making unreciprocated concessions to North Korea and whose previous stints included postings in Macedonia, Poland and South Korea -- is qualified to be the ambassador. Unlike Mr. Crocker, Mr. Hill has no real diplomatic experience in the Middle East and is not an Arabic speaker, no small point since Prime Minister Maliki is not an English speaker.
Especially with U.S. troop levels going down, Iraqis need the assurance of someone both more knowledgeable and sympathetic. Plenty of Iraqis -- especially Sunnis -- remain suspicious that the U.S. will bargain with Tehran by conceding Iranian interests in Iraq. As ambassador, Mr. Crocker held talks with the Iranians but emerged with a sober view of Tehran's malignant role in Iraqi politics. The elections were another notable sign of Iraq's democratic progress, and the U.S. needs an emissary who won't lose the Iraqi trust so painstakingly won by so many.
-
Summary
Preliminary results from Iraq’s Jan. 31 provincial elections show that the coalition of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki gained significantly against the more pro-Iranian Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, and that the Sunnis, while divided among themselves, appear likely to erode significantly the political advantages previously held by the Kurds. The biggest winner is al-Maliki, who now has an opportunity to consolidate his own political base independent of Shiite Islamists.
Analysis
Related Special Topic Page
Iraq, Iran and the Shia
Iraq’s election commission reported preliminary results from the country’s Jan. 31 provincial elections Feb. 5.
According to the results, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s Coalition for the State of Law has emerged as the largest political bloc in Baghdad and in Shiite southern Iraq. In Sunni areas, turnout was very strong compared to the 2005 election, which the Sunnis boycotted; this time, the Sunni vote appears to have been split between the incumbent Iraqi Islamic Party and the new political movement of the Awakening Councils. While the three principal Kurdish provinces will be holding their own election later in the year, the Kurds who controlled the province of Ninawa suffered a rout as a result of the mass Sunni participation.
Perhaps the biggest winner in the elections is al-Maliki, who appears to have shed his political dependence on Islamist allies, and in fact has emerged as a strong competitor to the largest incumbent party in the Shiite south, Abdel-Aziz al-Hakim’s Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI). He will continue to need allies in order to govern, but the elections place him on a firm political footing from which to deal with both Iran and the United States.
The ISCI, Iran’s closest ally in Iraq, took a beating at the polls, coming second and (in a few provinces) third. This was largely due to its failure to govern effectively, its strong identification with Tehran, its emphasis on Islamism and Shiite sectarianism, and its push for the creation of a Shiite zone in the south. Despite its setbacks, however, the ISCI still has the most well-oiled political machine in the Shiite provinces.
But despite its victory over the ISCI, al-Maliki’s electoral alliance won just 38 percent of the vote in Baghdad and 37 percent in the oil-rich region of Basra, and had smaller majorities in the other eight Shiite provinces. This means al-Maliki will continue to be dependent upon coalitions to govern, and consequently will have a hard time establishing his own core group at the grass-roots level — which, however, he will need to consolidate his gains. Al-Maliki performed as well as he did in the polls because of his position as head of government, his ability to take advantage of the opposition to the regionalist forces, and his skill in forging alliances — particularly with former Sunni insurgents belonging to the Awakening Councils.
Al-Maliki will be able to deal more effectively Iraq’s other sectarian groups, the Sunnis and the Kurds. For the Sunnis, the elections delivered a split mandate. The resulting internal struggle will afford the prime minister some leverage to contain them — but only so long as the factions bicker without resorting to violence. If clashes erupt, however, he will have a security situation on his hands. (The Awakening Councils already are threatening to use force after claims of foul play.) Meanwhile, al-Maliki will benefit from the electoral losses of the Kurds. He is working to check regionalism and impose a strong central order through the creation of alliances that cut across ethnicity, sect, and ideology.
Despite his own gains and the weakened position of his rivals, however, al-Maliki faces numerous hurdles ahead — including national-level elections, the Kurdish provincial elections and the settlement of the controversy over the disputed oil-rich city of Kirkuk. Further, al-Maliki is seeking greater centralization of power, but he will need to find the appropriate center-region balance. The new provincial councils have fewer seats than the outgoing councils that came into existence after the last round of elections in 2005, but they will have greater authority. In particular, they will have the power to appoint and remove governors, approve local security arrangements, influence development projects and ratify provincial budgets (which will now be prepared by the governor as opposed to the central government).
Despite these challenges, however, Al-Maliki has reached a point where he has a viable domestic political base and can position himself well between both the United States and Iran. The electoral losses of the ISCI, Tehran’s closest Iraqi ally, will limit Iran’s ability to exert influence in Iraq. This in turn creates more favorable conditions for Washington’s efforts to extricate U.S. military forces from the country and to deal with other emerging issue such as a resurgent Russia and the deteriorating circumstances in the Afghanistan/Pakistan theater.
The Jan. 31 elections, while not a national vote, will go a long way toward shaping the nascent political structure of post-Baathist Iraq. The vote has brought the Sunnis back into the political system; it has strengthened Iraqi nationalist elements at the expense of ethno-sectarian elements; and it has weakened Iran’s influence via the ISCI. The system continues to be a work in progress, however, and it remains to be seen how the Kurdish and Kirkuk votes, not to mention the upcoming national elections, will transform it further.
-
S-IRAQ: Generals Seek to Reverse Obama Withdrawal Decision
By Gareth Porter*
WASHINGTON, Feb 2 (IPS) - CENTCOM commander Gen. David Petraeus, supported by Defence Secretary Robert Gates, tried to convince President Barack Obama that he had to back down from his campaign pledge to withdraw all U.S. combat troops from Iraq within 16 months at an Oval Office meeting Jan. 21.
But Obama informed Gates, Petraeus and Joint Chiefs Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen that he wasn't convinced and that he wanted Gates and the military leaders to come back quickly with a detailed 16-month plan, according to two sources who have talked with participants in the meeting.
Obama's decision to override Petraeus's recommendation has not ended the conflict between the president and senior military officers over troop withdrawal, however. There are indications that Petraeus and his allies in the military and the Pentagon, including Gen. Ray Odierno, now the top commander in Iraq, have already begun to try to pressure Obama to change his withdrawal policy.
Gareth Porter talks to Real News about his investigative piece for IPS.
A network of senior military officers is also reported to be preparing to support Petraeus and Odierno by mobilising public opinion against Obama's decision.
Petraeus was visibly unhappy when he left the Oval Office, according to one of the sources. A White House staffer present at the meeting was quoted by the source as saying, "Petraeus made the mistake of thinking he was still dealing with George Bush instead of with Barack Obama."
Petraeus, Gates and Odierno had hoped to sell Obama on a plan that they formulated in the final months of the Bush administration that aimed at getting around a key provision of the U.S.-Iraqi withdrawal agreement signed envisioned re-categorising large numbers of combat troops as support troops. That subterfuge was by the United States last November while ostensibly allowing Obama to deliver on his campaign promise.
Gates and Mullen had discussed the relabeling scheme with Obama as part of the Petraeus-Odierno plan for withdrawal they had presented to him in mid-December, according to a Dec. 18 New York Times story.
Obama decided against making any public reference to his order to the military to draft a detailed 16-month combat troop withdrawal policy, apparently so that he can announce his decision only after consulting with his field commanders and the Pentagon.
The first clear indication of the intention of Petraeus, Odierno and their allies to try to get Obama to amend his decision came on Jan. 29 when the New York Times published an interview with Odierno, ostensibly based on the premise that Obama had indicated that he was "open to alternatives".
The Times reported that Odierno had "developed a plan that would move slower than Mr. Obama's campaign timetable" and had suggested in an interview "it might take the rest of the year to determine exactly when United States forces could be drawn down significantly".
The opening argument by the Petraeus-Odierno faction against Obama's withdrawal policy was revealed the evening of the Jan. 21 meeting when retired Army Gen. Jack Keane, one of the authors of the Bush troop surge policy and a close political ally and mentor of Gen. Petraeus, appeared on the Lehrer News Hour to comment on Obama's pledge on Iraq combat troop withdrawal.
Keane, who had certainly been briefed by Petraeus on the outcome of the Oval Office meeting, argued that implementing such a withdrawal of combat troops would "increase the risk rather dramatically over the 16 months". He asserted that it would jeopardise the "stable political situation in Iraq" and called that risk "not acceptable".
The assertion that Obama's withdrawal policy threatens the gains allegedly won by the Bush surge and Petraeus's strategy in Iraq will apparently be the theme of the campaign that military opponents are now planning.
Keane, the Army Vice-Chief of Staff from 1999 to 2003, has ties to a network of active and retired four-star Army generals, and since Obama's Jan. 21 order on the 16-month withdrawal plan, some of the retired four-star generals in that network have begun discussing a campaign to blame Obama's troop withdrawal from Iraq for the ultimate collapse of the political "stability" that they expect to follow U.S. withdrawal, according to a military source familiar with the network's plans.
The source says the network, which includes senior active duty officers in the Pentagon, will begin making the argument to journalists covering the Pentagon that Obama's withdrawal policy risks an eventual collapse in Iraq. That would raise the political cost to Obama of sticking to his withdrawal policy.
If Obama does not change the policy, according to the source, they hope to have planted the seeds of a future political narrative blaming his withdrawal policy for the "collapse" they expect in an Iraq without U.S. troops.
That line seems likely to appeal to reporters covering the Iraq troop withdrawal issue. Ever since Obama's inauguration, media coverage of the issue has treated Obama' s 16-month withdrawal proposal as a concession to anti-war sentiment which will have to be adjusted to the "realities" as defined by the advice to Obama from Gates, Petreaus and Odierno.
Ever since he began working on the troop surge, Keane has been the central figure manipulating policy in order to keep as many U.S. troops in Iraq as possible. It was Keane who got Vice President Dick Cheney to push for Petraeus as top commander in Iraq in late 2006 when the existing commander, Gen. George W. Casey, did not support the troop surge.
It was Keane who protected Petraeus's interests in ensuring the maximum number of troops in Iraq against the efforts by other military leaders to accelerate troop withdrawal in 2007 and 2008. As Bob Woodward reported in "The War Within", Keane persuaded President George W. Bush to override the concerns of the Joint Chiefs of Staff about the stress of prolonged U.S. occupation of Iraq on the U.S. Army and Marine Corps as well its impact on the worsening situation in Afghanistan.
Bush agreed in September 2007 to guarantee that Petraeus would have as many troops as he needed for as long as wanted, according to Woodward's account.
Keane had also prevailed on Gates in April 2008 to make Petraeus the new commander of CENTCOM. Keane argued that keeping Petraeus in the field was the best insurance against a Democratic administration reversing the Bush policy toward Iraq.
Keane had operated on the assumption that a Democratic president would probably not take the political risk of rejecting Petraeus's recommendation on the pace of troop withdrawal from Iraq. Woodward quotes Keane as telling Gates, "Let's assume we have a Democratic administration and they want to pull this thing out quickly, and now they have to deal with General Petraeus and General Odierno. There will be a price to be paid to override them."
Obama told Petraeus in Baghdad last July that, if elected, he would regard the overall health of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps and the situation in Afghanistan as more important than Petraeus's obvious interest in maximising U.S. troop strength in Iraq, according to Time magazine's Joe Klein.
But judging from Petraeus's shock at Obama's Jan. 21 decision, he had not taken Obama's previous rejection of his arguments seriously. That miscalculation suggests that Petraeus had begun to accept Keane's assertion that a newly-elected Democratic president would not dare to override his policy recommendation on troops in Iraq.
*Gareth Porter is an investigative historian and journalist specialising in U.S. national security policy. The paperback edition of his latest book, "Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam", was published in 2006.
-
Another slice of real life report from our man on the ground in Baghdad:
===================
I was interviewing an Iraqi Judicial Police officer this morning. I asked him "so have there been any attacks by prisoners inside the courtroom against judges, police, whoever?"
He responds "well there was the one time the 1-legged Afghani prisoner jumped a U.S. Army soldier trying to get his firearm." (That would mean his M-9 Beretta pistol). These are all terrorists, insurgents, kidnappers, murderers, show throwers, etc.
The attack didn't go to well for the Afghani. For the most part these attacks work better when you are operating from a 2-leg platform. And I gather the Afghani got pounced on and subdued pretty...hmmm...overwhelmingly.
But overall that took some cojones.
=====================
As you may know, one of the things our team really took notice of at CCCI and made major efforts to address, was the cavalier manner in which the Iraqis moved and watched prisoners in the courthouse.
I went back to CCCI today for the first time in about two weeks. Man the folks couldn't wait to give me the scoop on the goings on.
Yesterday an Iraqi prisoner at CCCI, who had just been sentenced to hang (remember if you are at CCCI you are in the major big leagues), walked away from his guards and walked up to a GI at C3 (the courthouse front entrance) begging for help in English and Arabic. "Meester, meester. Help me, help me." He was blindfolded yet could clearly still see where he was going. Freaked out the soldier, who felt a bump against his shoulder, and turned to see this guy blindfolded. The soldier pushed him away. A couple of seconds later the Iraqis tackled the prisoner and dragged him down the stairs.
Seems the Iraqis were each moving different prisoners when they bumped into each other at the top of the stairs...less than 10 meters from the courthouse front door exit. They were like "hey bro, ain't seen you in a while." "Yeah dude, I been busy." Kiss, kiss (the kiss each other on the cheek thing). And I guess the bandit was like "man I need help real bad because today has been a real bad day so far."
=================
It took me a while to get this photo.
If you look in the sky between the two trees you can see one of Baghdad's other quirks. What I call the mortar blimps. They probably have a more official name.
Essentially they are part of an indirect fire detection system. And they are tied into an audible alert system on the ground that warns of "incoming." In theory, and it has had its value in practice, indirect fire (e.g. mortars, artillery, and I believe to a lesser detectable degree rockets) have a signature to them. The rounds move at a certain speed. They have a certain angulation to their trajectory. They have a certain mass. This combination of factors is what the equipment in this blimp is abble to detect and immediately forward as part of an early warning system. Additionally, the network of them, if I am not mistaken, can also help in determining with pretty good precision, where the round was fired from.
Anyway on any given day if you look up in the sky you can usually see a couple of these lazily floating in the air.
=========
====================
Iraqi government ceases arrests among Sadrists in Diwaniya
February 10, 2009 - 04:12:29
DIWANIYA / Aswat al-Iraq: The federal government has ordered to cease arresting Sadrists in Diwaniya, the commander of the emergency brigade said on Tuesday.
“There are verbal orders issued to the emergency police by the federal government to cease arrests among Sadrists in Diwaniya,” Colonel Ghassan Mohamed Hassan told Aswat al-Iraq news agency, noting that this comes within the national reconciliation project.
He criticized statements made by some lawmakers, who said that “the emergency police’s arrest campaign against Sadrists in Diwaniya comes within political clearance, asserting that the police implement the judicial orders.
Diwaniya is 180 km south of Baghdad.
-
Subject: Entertaining Iraqi prisoner release story....
A military officer (O-6) who heads up ________________ told us there was a time when they used to release prisoners from the detention facility in their jumpsuits. With a brand new $20. bill.
The prisoners would get about 1 block before they would have their money roughed from them (imagine the battering your ego must take when you think you are a big, bad al-Qa'ida terrorist and you cannot even walk one block without being mugged).
So they started releasing them in civilian clothes. And the prisoners would get about 1 block before they had that $20 bill roughed from them.
So now they drive them in a non-descript local minivan to either a bus station or train station. Nobody knows what is//is not happening there.
-
Spent the day at the main courthouse in Basrah.
The main theme that came out time and again today was how much safer the city is since the Iraqi Army operation of several years ago where they basically, and apparently, came in and kicked ass on the militias. They refer to the pre-Iraqi Army operation down here as "the violence."
I also heard one person say how the Brits did not do enoough when it came to dealing with the militias. They were never forceful enough.
The Iraqi Army apparently acquitted itself quite well down here. And they are apparently maintaining these gains on their own.
-
To our Brit friends-- alll the love and respect in the world. Please take our intrepid reporter's words below in the spirit of brotherly banter.
===========================
The Iraqis I met in Basrah basically hold the Brits in utter disdain. They feel the Brits came but did not come to fight. They played pussyfoot with the militias down there. They negotiated things like "we will stay in our bases if you don't attack us." The Iraqis I met flat out said the Brits are what made the situation so bad down there.
Then several years ago came the Iraqi Army "Operation of the Knights." This was the Iraqi Army ground operation (supported by U.S. air power) and personally led my Maliki (in Sadr City also). The Iraqi Army came to kick ass. And they did for the most part. When the militias heard that the U.S. Marine Corps was in reserve and they would come in and "Fallujah" Basrah, the militias wanted no part of that and negotiated a solution (that kept them alive).
When I asked so what has become of the militias I was told they are either all dead, in prison or they have have disappeared into the woodwork because they don't want to be dead. And this was all the Iraqi Army. The IA rules Basrah. Let there be no mistake about that. Good men can argue about whether they could have dominated Basrah the way they did without U.S. support, but it is the IA who killed all the militiamen and sent the rest fleeing for their lives. And it is the IA who have maintained those gains with essentially zero help from the Brits.
The Brits are held in contempt by the Iraqis in Basrah. The Americans are held in very high regard. Because the Iraqis know Americans come to fight and will kill people who need killin'.
-
Obama's withdrawal plan would take U.S. forces in Iraq down from a current 142,000 troops to 35,000 to 50,000. Under the status of forces agreement between the U.S. and Iran, negotiated and signed last year by the Bush administration, all forces must be out of Iraq by the end of 2011.
In short, though President Obama will get credit, it was Bush's plan — not Obama's.
When Obama first began running for the nation's highest office in 2006, he vowed he would immediately withdraw all U.S. combat forces if elected. At the time, few with any knowledge about the conflict in Iraq took him seriously.
And sure enough, faced with the realities on the ground in Iraq and in the campaign back home, Obama changed his stance last year from immediately withdrawing all combat forces to one of removing, as his campaign Web site said, "one to two combat brigades each month, and (having) all our combat brigades out of Iraq within 16 months."
Now comes his much-awaited plan. Technically, Obama won't be able keep his most recent promise on troop withdrawals, but he'll come close. For that he can thank President Bush and the highly successful "surge" in troops he and Gen. David Petraeus put in place, making withdrawal possible.
In Friday's remarks, Obama told the assembled Marines: "Today I've come to speak to you about how the war in Iraq will end." But in fact, the actual war has been over for some time. We hate to tell the Bush-haters out there, or to relive painful recent history, but President Bush won it, making the current pullout possible.
That victory was underscored in January when Iraq held largely peaceful elections, in which voters mostly repudiated extremist parties in favor of the moderate leadership of Nouri al-Maliki.
In his comments Friday, Obama noted the progress made.
"Thanks in great measure to your service," he said, "the situation in Iraq has improved. Violence has been reduced substantially from the horrific sectarian killing of 2006 and 2007.
"Al-Qaida in Iraq has been dealt a serious blow by our troops and Iraq's Security Forces, and through our partnership with Sunni Arabs," Obama continued. "The capacity of Iraq's Security Forces has improved, and Iraq's leaders have taken steps toward political accommodation."
He further lauded January's elections showing Iraqis have begun "pursuing their aspirations through peaceful political process."
All very true. Iraq has been a big success, which explains why you never see or hear about it in the mainstream news anymore. Suicide bombings and attacks on troops have become relatively rare, and now that Bush is out of office, there's little political profit remaining for the left in bashing America's bold Mideast initiative.
Whether you agree with Bush or not, he brought a kind of democracy to Iraq that can be found nowhere else in that region. His plan rocked al-Qaida back on its heels, to the point where its survival is in doubt. Iraq is a model.
In short, Obama's policy is really, in most respects, Bush's policy. That the troops can now come home proudly is a tribute to Bush's steadfastness. But Obama will be wise not to remove them all.
We kept troops in Europe and Japan after World War II and in South Korea after the Korean War. Bush's policy proved that democracy can take root where no one thought possible. But as in Europe, Korea and Japan, it must be protected.
-
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...102255_pf.html
--------
Excerpt from article:
One of those Mahmoud's men arrested was Salah Khdeir.
He spent seven months in Bucca after soldiers discovered four mines tucked in his truck. He returned to the prison in 2008 after he was caught burying bombs destined for a U.S. patrol. He was released this month. Five days later, he was arrested again, after a roadside bomb that police say resembled his handiwork detonated near Garma.
Innocent, Khdeir declared at the police station, shaking his head.
"I'm a peaceful man," the gaunt 22-year-old added.
"He's an expert at planting bombs," Mahmoud answered.
After Khdeir left, Mahmoud handed out a letter he said Khdeir had sent his brother.
"If you think I abandoned the jihad, I say that I have paid homage to God and with his will, I will do everything," he wrote in childish Arabic, the script barely legible.
He had signed the letter, "Salah, the roadside bomb."
-
Is this the result of Is BO's bugout?
Or , , ,?
==============================================
Troops Arrest an Awakening Council Leader in Iraq, Setting Off Fighting
ALISSA J. RUBIN and ROD NORDLAND
Published: March 28, 2009
BAGHDAD — American and Iraqi troops arrested the leader of a crucial Awakening Council in Baghdad on Saturday, setting off a rare spasm of street fighting and raising fresh concerns about the troubled Awakening program, which has brought many Sunni extremists over to the government’s side.
A combined force of American and Iraqi Army troops and National Police descended on Fadhil, a Sunni neighborhood and former insurgent stronghold in central Baghdad, and arrested the head of Fadhil’s Awakening Council, Adil al-Mashhadani, on terrorism charges, according to Maj. Gen. Qassim Atta, spokesman for the Iraqi security forces in Baghdad. He said firefights broke out afterward.
The Awakening Councils, the Iraqi name for what the Americans call the Sons of Iraq, are neighborhood-based groups of Sunnis, many of them former insurgents, who are now paid by the Iraqi government. They are credited, along with the increase in American troops, with helping to diminish violence in Iraq.
Many of the Awakening groups recently have complained about mistreatment and warned that some of their followers might switch back to supporting Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, a homegrown extremist group believed by American intelligence to have foreign leadership. Mr. Mashhadani has been a strong critic of the failure of the Iraqi authorities to incorporate Awakening Council fighters into Iraqi security agencies, as had been promised.
“There’s a 50-50 chance that Awakening guys who are not very loyal to Iraq or who need to support their families may decide to join Al Qaeda again,” Mr. Mashhadani said in an interview a week ago.
Abu Mirna, the media coordinator for the Fadhil Awakening Council, said: “American forces have broken the alliance with us by arresting our leader. Now there are clashes in the area between the Americans and Awakening fighters and you can hear shooting. It’s chaos.” Heavy gunfire could be heard over the telephone while he was speaking.
Fifteen Iraqis were wounded in the fighting, according to a high-ranking police official who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak to the news media. American officials did not respond to requests for information.
Five Iraqi Army soldiers were also taken hostage, according to two officials in the Ministry of Interior, speaking on condition of anonymity because they were also not authorized to speak to reporters. The officials said the Iraqi Army called off the fighting to negotiate for the soldiers’ release. Awakening Council members demanded Mr. Mashhadani’s release in exchange for the soldiers’ freedom, the officials said.
It was the first time that disputes between the Sons of Iraq and the authorities have erupted into armed clashes in Baghdad. There have been arrests of some other Sons of Iraq members suspected of still working for insurgents, but not of anyone so prominent.
There were immediate expressions of concern from other Awakening Councils in Baghdad. “Members of the Iraqi Army are trying to pick a fight between them and the Awakening,” said Ahmed al-Rubaie, one of the leaders of the council in the nearby Abu Safain neighborhood. “Do they want the sectarianism to come back, like in 2006?”
Fadhil is a densely populated area of narrow alleyways and congested streets, where some of the city’s most bitter street fighting took place. It was one of the last neighborhoods in the city to join the Awakening movement.
In Adhamiya, another important Sunni area in downtown Baghdad, the local Awakening leader, Abu Sejad, said news of the arrest was received with concern. “All of our guys are asking, ‘What about us? Are they going to arrest us next?’ ” he said.
Mr. Rubaie accused the Iraqi security forces of ignoring Awakening Council members and treating them with disrespect. He also said council leaders’ pay had also been cut recently.
He said Mr. Mashhadani and his followers were particularly volatile about their grievances.
In December, disputes broke out between the Iraqi police and the Fadhil Awakening members, and Mr. Mashhadani ordered his men to abandon some joint checkpoints with the Iraqi police, complaining they had branded the Sons of Iraq as insurgents and Qaeda followers.
The government had pledged to enlist a fifth of the 94,000 Awakening members nationwide in the police and other security forces, and find government jobs for the rest. So far, however, only 5,000 have gotten jobs.
Atheer Kakan and Tareq Maher contributed reporting.
-
So, I have been asked several times what changes I have seen in Iraq since the changeover on January 1st. Well at this point I have a couple of thoughts:
I sense that the Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police are starting to feel their oats. Not just here in Bahgdad but in the other places I have been. With the U.S. military stepping ever more back into the shadows I see the Iraqis coming out and testing the waters ever more.
For example, two months back a convoy of Iraqi Army soldiers was driving past an American security post at the main terrorism courthouse in the country. One soldier let off a round into the air.
Yesterday morning I saw 4 Iraqi Army vehicles (3 SUVs and a pickuup truck) on a joint military base outside of Baghdad driving at least 55 MPH on the military base that used to be exclusively a Coalition Forces base. The speed limit there is 20 MPH.
Yesterday afternoon in Baghdad I saw a 4 vehicle Iraqi police convoy come flying into a traffic circle intimidating all the other vehicles already in the circle. One Iraqi on one of the vehicles made a gesture of shooting at an American Blackhawk that happened to be passing by.
There have been other little incidents like this I have seen. It's almost like they now know they can do shit without getting shot like they would have this time last year. And every day they seem to test the waters just a little more.
I cannot help but wonder if we have simply replaced one group of military and police thugs with another group of thugs.
I find myself starting to wonder when the first "friendly" fire incident will occur where they unlooad into a vehicle (not U.S. military of course because they ain't that brave) carrying Americans.
-
By KIMBERLY KAGAN and FREDERICK W. KAGAN
During his visit to Iraq this week, President Barack Obama commended U.S. forces for their invaluable work there: "From getting rid of Saddam, to reducing violence, to stabilizing the country, to facilitating elections -- you have given Iraq the opportunity to stand on its own as a democratic country. That is an extraordinary achievement." But the president also cautioned that "now is not the time to lose focus" for the next 18 months will be a "critical period."
He's absolutely right.
Iraq has undergone a quiet transformation since Mr. Obama's first visit to the country as a senator in July 2008. We can no longer speak of Iraqi politics at a standstill, or a lack of political accommodation, or an unwillingness of the Iraqi government to take responsibility. The issues facing the president in Iraq, and his military commanders, are fundamentally different from those of 2007 and 2008.
On a visit to Iraq last month, we had the opportunity to see the transformation firsthand. Iraq is now a fully sovereign country. U.S. Commander Gen. Ray Odierno has insisted on the most rigorous implementation of the U.S.-Iraqi security agreement, which gives Iraqi authorities greater responsibility than ever before. U.S. forces now detain Iraqis only after securing arrest warrants from Iraqi judges, and they are releasing or transferring to Iraqi custody all of the detainees they now hold. The U.S. maintains forces and bases only where the Iraqi government wants them. The U.S. has already turned responsibility for the security of the Green Zone over to the Iraqi government, and Iraqi Security Forces have responsibility for an ever-growing proportion of Baghdad well in advance of the agreement's June 30 deadline.
Moreover, Gen. Odierno and the U.S. Embassy have established joint committees with Iraqi military and political leaders at the highest levels both to coordinate operations and to monitor and ensure adherence to the agreement. There is a committee for each article of the agreement that reviews all questions of implementation and investigates all accusations of infringements. Both sides have agreed that the approved minutes of these committees are legally binding.
January's peaceful provincial elections have reinvigorated Iraqi democracy. Iraqis voted in large numbers and, as dissatisfied voters often do, they voted the incumbents out. This was an important step, demonstrating that Iraqis believe that their vote counts and their leaders are held accountable. Iraqi politicians have gotten the message. The losing parties are working to develop platforms to win back their voters in the upcoming national elections. The struggle to form coalitions in the provinces has forced competing parties to compromise with one another at the local level.
Mr. Obama also said that Iraqis must "decide that they want to resolve their differences through constitutional means and legal means." Iraqi leaders of many parties are already showing their determination to do precisely this. For some time, rivals (and even allies) of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki have been concerned about his apparent efforts to concentrate too much power in his own hands through the establishment of extra-constitutional government bodies. The Council of Representatives has used the 2009 budget to clip the prime minister's wings by eliminating all funding for these "illegal" bodies. In other words, Iraqi representatives have discovered the power of the purse. It is a remarkable advance in Iraqi politics that the parliament could act against the prime minister and his party, while nonetheless passing a law that is constructive for the state.
But the country faces three major challenges in coming months: national parliamentary elections, most likely in January 2010; major budget constraints, resulting from the low price of oil; and the threat of growing Arab-Kurd tensions in the north.
The national elections will lead to the first transfer of power in the democratic Iraqi state. This is always a critical moment in the birth of a new democracy. In Iraq it will be especially challenging because of its parliamentary system. Voters must first elect a new Council of Representatives, which must then elect a prime minister and approve a cabinet. The parties must agree not only on a leader but also about how all of the ministries will be parceled out among parties and ethno-sectarian groups. In 2006, this process took five months. U.S. forces will play a critical role in helping the Iraqis secure the elections, but they will also play an important role after the vote supporting the Iraqi Security Forces and deterring dissatisfied groups from resorting to violence.
Meanwhile, the fall in the global price of oil has presented a major problem for Iraq's balance of payments. The current Iraqi budget is based on the assumption that oil would sell for an average of $50 per barrel. Oil prices have been lower than that for most of the year, generating a significant shortfall of revenue so far and forcing the Iraqi government to slash spending and dip into its reserves.
If prices remain low, important programs that maintain Iraq's security and internal stability may be threatened. Revenue shortfalls have already halted the planned expansion of the Iraqi Security Forces and disrupted plans to acquire equipment for them. And since the Iraqi government is the principal employer in the country, any significant reduction in its spending limits its ability to create jobs, including those central to the process of reconciling former insurgents.
The budget crisis, if protracted, can also prevent the newly elected provincial governments and even the central government from providing the services that the population expects, possibly leading to general disillusionment with the political process if not to a resurgence of violence. Tensions between Iraq's Arabs and Kurds, particularly over the status of Kirkuk, are still capable of destabilizing the country rapidly and profoundly. The unexpected success of the Arab al Hadba Party in Ninewah Province shifted the focus of these tensions from Mosul back to Kirkuk. But the friction over Kirkuk's status is not simply one of rival ethnicities. It also involves fundamental constitutional questions about the relationship between the central government, provincial government, and federal regions.
There is little enthusiasm in Kirkuk itself for a violent resolution of the dispute, and the presence of an American brigade near the city has helped keep the peace by helping Kurdish and Iraqi forces to understand each other's positions and actions. But rhetoric and posturing in an election year could inflame this delicate situation, and the presence of U.S. forces there is necessary.
Mr. Obama has stated his objectives in Iraq clearly: The U.S. must "make sure that Iraq is stable, that it is not a safe haven for terrorists, that it is a good neighbor and a good ally." This is an attainable goal. Iraq has undergone a profound transformation -- it is no longer a predatory, dictatorial state or a maelstrom of sectarian violence. It no longer threatens its neighbors or stability in the region. Indeed, Iraq has become an attractive political and economic partner for states throughout the Middle East.
But Iraqis remain most interested in establishing a strategic partnership with the U.S. and the West. In the long run, this partnership will not be defined by the numbers of U.S. troops in Iraq but by the depth of our economic and political cooperation, diplomatic support, and strategic alliance. As Mr. Obama said in Baghdad, America must be "a stalwart partner" and Iraqis must "know that they have a steady partner with us."
Ms. Kagan is the president of the Institute for the Study of War and the author of "The Surge: A Military History," which will be published this month by Encounter Books. Mr. Kagan is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.
=================
Our man in Iraq (there to train police) comments:
I think what many Iraqis think. That once we leave the shit will hit the fan. Some actually believe al Sadr will rule Baghdad.
Back in 2007 when the Iraqi Army attacked Najaf they could not make it happen. The Americans and Brits had to bail them out. There were mass desertions. There was the inability of the Iraqi Army to deal with people (Soldiers of Heaven) who would fight to the death. I think the huge protests in Sadr City yesterday speak volumes of how many people are not pro-current Iraqi government.
Personally I think it still remains very much a coin toss. But what do I know....
-
NYT
BAGHDAD — Members of the Sunni Awakening Councils, the former insurgents who switched sides to help bring calm to Iraq, are increasingly being besieged from all sides.
Thirteen members were killed by a suicide bomber while they gathered to collect their pay south of Baghdad on Saturday, in the latest of a string of attacks against Awakening members in recent weeks. Some of the Sunnis also worry that the Shiite-led government has begun singling out the councils’ leaders for arrest while their chief patron, the American military, slowly abandons them.
One of the most notable cases is that of Sheik Maher Sarhan Abbas, whom the government detained 27 days ago, according to his family and fellow Awakening leaders.
Sheik Maher’s arrest took place in secret and came to light when The New York Times by chance contacted someone who had seen him in jail. It was one of several such cases in recent weeks that have worried not only Awakening members, but also some American diplomats and military officers.
The Sunni leaders have long been targets for Islamist militants and Shiite militias. And there have been other arrests of senior Awakening leaders in the past few weeks.
Some leaders accuse the government of trying to purge them, or at the least of moving too quickly on anonymous accusations against them.
Tensions between the Sunni Awakening groups and the Shiite-dominated government of Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki have been present from the start. American efforts to transfer the Awakening security forces from the American payroll to the Iraqi security forces were initially resisted by leaders in Baghdad, who say that many of the Awakening leaders are still actively supporting antigovernment insurgents.
Sheik Maher, however, was an admired local symbol for the Awakening movement, which began two years ago when American officials started courting Sunni tribes, offering money if they turned against insurgent forces.
The sheik’s Shiite neighbors trusted him and his Sunni followers so much that they took them into their own homes when the insurgent group Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia was still strong. United States soldiers at a nearby base say they considered him a reliable ally, and still do.
Yet on March 15, just after midnight, heavily armed men flung deafening smoke grenades into his home in Hawr Jab, a small village on Baghdad’s southern outskirts, his family said.
They burst into the bedroom where Sheik Maher and his wife were watching television as their 3-year-old daughter slept in a small bed next to them.
“He thought Al Qaeda had finally come for him,” said Shada Rasheed, 23, his wife, as she cradled their daughter in her arms.
The Times learned of Sheik Maher’s detention from another Awakening leader, Raad Ali, whom the Iraqi government had similarly detained on terrorism charges but had released under pressure from the Americans.
Asked about Sheik Maher’s detention, Mohammed Salman al-Saady, who leads the ministerial office that deals with Awakening groups, said he knew nothing of the case.
But he said: “An Awakening member is forgiven for everything except murder. The right question to ask is, ‘Why was this person arrested?’ ”
Sheik Maher had long known he was wanted by the Sunni militants he had spent much of the past two and half years fighting. But the troops who arrested him told his family members that they had been sent directly by the prime minister’s office.
Accompanying the Iraqis were American forces, the family members said. The captain of the local American unit said the troops were probably from a Special Operations unit, which typically does not inform the local forces of raids.
“When they detained him, we were all shocked,” said Capt. Kip Kowalski, the American commanding officer at the joint security station in Hawr Jab, near Sheik Maher’s home.
Captain Kowalski’s unit apologized to the family but said they were powerless to help; the local Iraqi Army unit forbade Sheik Maher’s Awakening followers from holding a peaceful demonstration to demand his release.
“He’s the local council leader here,” Captain Kowalski said. “We didn’t have anything on him, but as far as helping to get him released, it’s a government of Iraq arrest. If they have a warrant it just has to work its way through the process.”
=========
Page 2 of 2)
Many Awakening officials, and some American officers who work with them, say they believe that arrests of people like Sheik Maher are the result of a new strategy by Sunni extremists to get their most effective enemies off the streets.
Former members of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, the theory goes, secretly tell the government that the Awakening leader is himself a Qaeda infiltrator and should be arrested for past crimes. Under the Iraqi legal system, if there are two witnesses, the government can issue a warrant, detain a suspect and then investigate.
A second approach is for members of Qaeda families who have lost some of their relatives to violence to sue the Awakening members, who often are responsible for killing Qaeda members during the last two years of fighting, said Captain Kowalski, who says his unit has heard of several similar cases.
Detention can sometimes last months, and people who are detained on terrorism charges have “no visitors, no lawyers, no sun,” Mr. Ali said, describing the conditions during his detention, which lasted a week.
First Lt. Jobie Siemer, of the First Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry, who has worked closely with Sheik Maher in Hawr Jab, said, “There are a lot of good people around here who I know killed a bunch of people, but they were defending their land and they were helping us and that was a good thing.
Shiite government officials have long been suspicious of the Sons of Iraq, worried that they could become the armed core of a future insurgency. But for their part, Sunni Awakening leaders say the government may be too quick to accept accusations against them.
“They should do research for three months before they arrest people,” said Mr. Ali, the Awakening leader in Ghaziliya, who saw Sheik Maher in detention.
“This is how the terrorists are trying to come back in. It is one of their plans to remove us, to get us off the street and then they can sneak back in,” he said.
A senior American official in Iraq was also skeptical of the motives for the arrests. “Why is the government doing this?” said the official, who asked not to be named because he is not authorized to speak to the news media.
“Every time we said to the government, ‘You have to let this guy go,’ they do it, which they wouldn’t if they thought he was really dangerous,” the American said. “I think they have their hand in the sectarian cookie jar.”
The 13 Awakening members who died Saturday were at an Iraqi Army base in Babil Province collecting their meager pay, which had been delayed for three months. Everyone in the room was dressed in the same Awakening uniform, suggesting that the bomber slipped in disguised as one of them.
At least 12 Awakening figures have been killed in Babil this year, the police said.
Saoud Auda, 30, a father of eight, was badly burned in the suicide bomber’s attack, which came just after he had been paid.
“I was looking forward to going home and paying the grocer and buying my little son a toy airplane,” he said. “But my money burned with my body.”
-
Our man in Iraq reports:
=================
More insurgents for the battlefield. Frankly I personally do not think Iraq will survive our departure:
23 of Anbar residents released from jail
April 19, 2009 - 02:53:47
ANBAR / Aswat al-Iraq: U.S. forces on Sunday freed 23 detainees of Anbar residents from Camp Bucca after they have been cleared of all wrongdoing, according to a media director in the local police.
“The detainees were released from Camp Bucca in southern Iraq after investigations have cleared them of involvement in acts of violence,” Maj. Abd Sattar Mohammed told Aswat al-Iraq news agency.
“Those released have been delivered to their next of kin,” the official noted, providing no further details.
Ramadi, the capital city of Anbar province, lies 110 km west of Baghdad.
SS (P)
-
As our man in Iraq has been warning for some time now , , ,
================
BAGHDAD — A deadly outburst of violence appears to be overwhelming Iraq’s police and military forces as American troops hand over greater control of cities across the country to them. On Friday, twin suicide bombings killed at least 60 people outside Baghdad’s most revered Shiite shrine, pushing the death toll in one 24-hour period to nearly 150.
Iraqis at the site of one of two suicide attacks outside a shrine on Friday in Baghdad burned incense and placed candles. Nearly half of those killed were Iranians making a pilgrimage.
Like many recent attacks, the bombings appeared intended to inflame sectarian tensions, to weaken Iraq’s security forces and to discredit its government.
The bombings on Friday ominously echoed attacks like the one at a Shiite shrine in Samarra in February 2006 that unleashed a wave of sectarian bloodshed and pushed the country toward civil war.
The latest bombings — there have been at least 18 major attacks so far this month — so far have not prompted retaliatory attacks, but they have strained what remains a fragile society deeply divided between Sunnis and Shiites.
Two suicide bombers struck within five minutes of each other on streets leading to the shrine of Imam Musa al-Kadhim and his grandson. One of the attacks, and perhaps both, were carried out by women, witnesses said.
Nearly half of those killed were Iranians making a pilgrimage to the shrine, a golden-domed landmark in the predominantly Shiite Kadhimiya neighborhood of Baghdad that is devoted to 2 of the 12 imams of Shiite Islam. At least 125 people were wounded, many of them also Iranians.
A loose coalition of Sunni militant forces, the Islamic State of Iraq, has claimed responsibility for carrying out many of the recent attacks.
Seemingly attentive to the public wrath, Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki took the unusual step of ordering the creation of a special committee to investigate the attack on Friday and the lapses in security that apparently allowed it to happen. The state television network, Al Iraqiya, reported on Friday evening that Mr. Maliki also ordered the detention of two national police commanders responsible for security in the area.
The killing of so many Iranians prompted Iraq to close its border crossing to Iran at Muntheriya in Diyala Province, through which thousands of Iranians a week pass on pilgrimages to Iraq’s holy Shiite sites.
The deadliest of the three bombings on Thursday struck a restaurant filled with Iranian travelers in Muqdadiya, a town in Diyala not far from the border. The toll in that attack rose to 56, with Iranians making up the majority of the dead. Over all, at least 89 people were killed in the bombings on Thursday, and more than 100 were wounded.
After the attacks on Friday, angry Iraqis who gathered amid the bloody debris blamed lax security and corruption of the police and government officials for what had happened. Some of their anger had a strongly sectarian cast.
“They have been ruling us for 1,400 years,” said a Shiite army soldier who identified himself only as Abu Haidar, referring to the Sunni domination of Shiites in Iraq. “We took it over for four years, and they are slaughtering us.”
The Islamic State of Iraq, an umbrella insurgent group that includes Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, describes the recent attacks as part of a campaign called Harvest of the Good, which it announced in March.
In a statement distributed on extremist Web sites at the time, the group’s leader, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, ridiculed President Obama as “Washington’s black man” and called his plan to withdraw American forces by 2011 an “implied avowal of defeat.”
On Thursday, Iraq’s military claimed to have arrested Mr. Baghdadi, but what was touted as a major success appeared to be in question.
Extremist Web sites denied his arrest, according to the SITE Intelligence Group, which monitors claims and other statements by terrorist and extremist groups. The American military command also said in a statement that it could not confirm “the arrest or capture” of the leader, who the American military believes to be a fictitious Iraqi figurehead of a movement that includes many foreign fighters.
American and Iraqi officials have expressed growing concern that the Islamic State of Iraq, Al Qaeda and other extremists have been able to regroup and exploit gaps in security that are forming as American commanders have closed scores of combat outposts across the country, leaving day-to-day security in the hands of the Iraqis. “All the killing of Shiites is done by Al Qaeda,” a man who identified himself only as Abu Mohammed said after Friday’s bombings. “America was not able to finish them off. How can our forces do it?”
A senior national police official on Friday bluntly cited the limitations of Iraq’s security forces and their equipment for detecting explosives, typically hand-held wands used at checkpoints that the official described as fakes.
==========
(Page 2 of 2)
“We need to redeploy our security units to fill gaps because the American withdrawal gave the terrorists motives to reactivate their sleeper cells,” the official said, speaking on the condition of anonymity because he said he would be punished for speaking frankly about such shortcomings. “We need more cars, modern equipment to detect explosives.”
A relative of a victim of a suicide bombing outside the Kazimiyah hospital in Baghdad on Friday.
Maj. Gen. Abdul-Aziz Mohammed Jasim, a senior commander at the Ministry of Defense, cited other factors behind the recent violence. They included what he called “reactions to political issues” that had divided Iraq since provincial elections in January and the release of thousands of detainees held by American forces into a feeble economy.
As part of a new security agreement with Iraq that took effect this year, the Americans are required to release all Iraqis in their custody or to transfer them to Iraqi jails. “They are releasing detainees randomly, and some of the detainees who have been released might still have contact with Al Qaeda,” General Jasim said in a telephone interview. “And when they return back to their normal life and do not find work, they return back to Al Qaeda.”
General Jasim also lamented the inability of Iraqi forces to stop attacks against what he described as soft targets, like markets and mosques. “The security procedures are continuing,” he said, “but the security forces cannot exist in every inch.”
It was not clear whether the attacks on Friday were specifically aimed at Iranians or the Shiite site they were visiting. The chief administrator at the shrine, Sheik Fadhil al-Anbari, blamed the police for failing to stop the bombings, which he said were intended to disrupt an economy that the visiting pilgrims had bolstered.
“The crowds of the Iranian visitors have brought a boom to the economy in Kadhimiya, and Al Qaeda does not want this,” he said in a telephone interview. “These attacks are clearly meant to sabotage the country.”
-
Iraqi leader: U.S. raid that killed 2 breached accord
BAGHDAD, Iraq (CNN) -- Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki is accusing U.S. troops of violating the security agreement between the two countries after a raid in Wasit province Sunday that left two people dead, Iraqi State TV reported.
U.S. troops raided a house in the city of Kut and arrested six suspected members of so-called "special groups" -- groups that are funded, armed and trained by Iran, according to the U.S. military.
During the operation, which the military said was "fully coordinated and approved by the Iraqi government," a man and a woman were killed by U.S. troops, the military said.
Al-Maliki's accusation that the United States violated the security pact is the first time the Iraqi government has claimed a breach in the deal that governs the presence of U.S. troops in Iraq. It was reached last November and implemented in January.
Under the agreement, the U.S. military cannot carry out raids without Iraqi permission and warrants. And Iraq has primary jurisdiction over members of the U.S. military who commit "grave premeditated felonies" outside of certain geographical boundaries and when they are off duty.
Al-Maliki has asked Gen. Raymond Odierno, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, to release the suspects detained in the raid, and to hand over "those who committed the crime" -- or U.S. troops -- to the Iraqi judiciary, state television reported.
The U.S. military statement said when troops approached the residence, "an individual with a weapon came out of the home. Forces assessed him to be hostile, and they engaged the man, killing him," the U.S. military statement said.
A woman who "moved into the line of fire" was also killed in the shooting, the U.S. military said.
An Interior Ministry official told CNN the raid was on the home of a tribal leader, and said U.S. forces killed the leader's wife and brother and detained a number of family members.
Speaking on Iraqi State TV, the deputy governor of Wasit province called the killings "cold-blooded murder."
The U.S. military said there was a warrant issued for the arrest of the targeted individual -- "a network financier, who is also responsible for smuggling weapons into the country to support JAM Special Groups and Promise Day Brigade," a U.S. military statement said.
Iraqi State TV reported that Iraq's defense ministry ordered the arrest of two Iraqi commanders in Kut who apparently allowed the U.S. military to carry out the raid.
-
Second post of the day:
NYT
BAGHDAD — The United States and Iraq will begin negotiating possible exceptions to the June 30 deadline for withdrawing American combat troops from Iraqi cities, focusing on the troubled northern city of Mosul, according to military officials. Some parts of Baghdad also will still have combat troops.
Some combat troops will remain at Camp Prosperity, which is in the heart of Baghdad.
Everywhere else, the withdrawal of United States combat troops from all Iraqi cities and towns is on schedule to finish by the June 30 deadline, and in many cases even earlier. But because of the level of insurgent activity in Mosul, United States and Iraqi military officials will meet Monday to decide whether to consider the city an exception to the deadline in the Status of Forces Agreement, or SOFA, between the countries.
“Mosul is the one area where you may see U.S. combat forces operating in the city” after June 30, the United States military’s top spokesman in Iraq, Maj. Gen. David Perkins, said in an interview.
In Baghdad, however, there are no plans to close the Camp Victory base complex, consisting of five bases housing more than 20,000 soldiers, many of them combat troops. Although Victory is only a 15 minute drive from the center of Baghdad and sprawls over both sides of the city’s boundary, Iraqi officials say they have agreed to consider it outside the city.
In addition, Forward Operating Base Falcon, which can hold 5,000 combat troops, will also remain after June 30. It is just within Baghdad’s southern city limits. Again, Iraqi officials have classified it as effectively outside Baghdad, so no exception to the agreement needs to be granted, in their view.
Combat troops with the Seventh Field Artillery Regiment will remain in the heart of Baghdad at Camp Prosperity, located near the new American Embassy compound in the Green Zone. In addition to providing a quick reaction force, guarding the embassy and noncombat troops from attack, those soldiers will also continue to support Iraqi troops who are now in nominal charge of maintaining security in the Green Zone.
The details of troop withdrawals and the transfer of facilities are negotiated by the Joint Military Operations Coordinating Committee, led by the top American commander in Iraq, Gen. Ray Odierno, and the Iraqi defense minister, Abdul Qadir al-Obaidi. At its meeting on Monday, the committee will discuss a host of transfer issues, as well as whether to grant any exceptions to the June 30 deadline, and it will make recommendations to Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki for a final decision.
The spokesman for the Iraqi military, Maj. Gen. Muhammad al-Askari, who is also the secretary to the committee’s Iraqi contingent, said also that a decision on Mosul would be made at Monday’s meeting, which he called “critical.”
“I personally think even in Mosul there will be no American forces in the city, but that’s a decision for the Iraqi government and the Iraqi prime minister,” General Askari said.
General Perkins also expressed specific concerns about Mosul, noting how important the city is to Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, the homegrown group that American intelligence officials say is led by foreigners.
“For Al Qaeda to win, they have to take Baghdad. To survive they have to hold on to Mosul,” he said. “Mosul is sort of their last area where they have some maybe at least passive support.”
In Baghdad, whether combat troops remain in the city may well be a function of how they are defined, as well as where the city limits lie.
The Camp Victory complex includes Camps Victory, Liberty, Striker and Slayer, plus the prison known as Camp Cropper, where so-called high-value prisoners are kept. It also includes the military side of Baghdad International Airport.
General Askari emphatically said that the June 30 provision did not apply to the Camp Victory complex because it was effectively outside the city. General Askari also said having American combat troops at Camp Prosperity would not violate the terms of the agreement, because they are there for force protection and to guard the nearby embassy.
“If there is a small group to stay in that camp to guard the American Embassy, that’s no problem,” he said. “The meaning of the SOFA is that their vehicles cannot go in the streets of Baghdad and interfere with our job.”
The Green Zone was handed over to Iraqi control Jan. 1, when the agreement went into effect. In addition to the United States-Iraqi patrols, most of the security for the Green Zone’s many checkpoints and heavily guarded entry points is still done by the same private contractors who did it prior to Jan. 1.
“What you’re seeing is not a change in the numbers, it’s a doctrine change,” said First Sgt. David Moore, a New Jersey National Guardsman with the Joint Area Support Group, which runs the Green Zone. “You’re still going to have fighters. Every U.S. soldier is trained to fight.”
One of the Green Zone’s biggest bases, Forward Operating Base Freedom, was handed back to Iraqi control on April 1, at least most of it. The United States military kept the swimming pool.
===============
age 2 of 2)
In addition to troops, Camp Prosperity will house many American contractors and other personnel. Next door, at Camp Union III, the military is in the process of setting up housing for several thousand soldiers, trainers and advisers working for the Multi-National Security Transition Command, which now has its headquarters elsewhere in the Green Zone.
While those principal Baghdad bases will remain, the United States military has been rapidly erasing its footprint everywhere else in Baghdad. The so-called troop surge added 77 small bases, known as combat outposts, patrol bases and joint security stations, spread throughout the city’s neighborhoods to get United States troops closer to the people. At the height, in 2007, there were nearly 100 such bases. All of them will have been turned over to the Iraqis by June 30, and many already have been, General Perkins said. He added that in many cases the Iraqis would choose not to use them for their own troops.
Nationwide, the American military presence is also changing quickly as June 30 approaches. A survey of northern and central Iraqi provinces by New York Times reporters confirmed that American troops had already withdrawn from all of the bases situated in the centers of major towns or cities, with the exception of Mosul.
General Perkins said that American combat forces had already been drawing down steadily in Iraq’s cities, replaced by Iraqi troops. By September 2008, the number of American troops in Iraq had dropped by about 20 percent from the peak during the so-called troop surge in 2007, he said. An additional 8,000 left by the end of January.
As of April 17, there were 137,934 American service members in Iraq, according to Lt. Col. Amy Hannah, a public affairs officer. An additional 16,000 will go by September, General Perkins said.
“We don’t want to lose the gains we’ve had so far,” he said. “We don’t want to rush to failure here. This isn’t just, we’re going home. We’re just moving.”
“We don’t mean you won’t have soldiers trained in combat skills in the city,” General Perkins said. Trainers and advisers can stay, under the terms of the agreement, and combat troops can re-enter on operations if invited by the Iraqis, he said.
General Perkins gave the example of sending the 82nd Airborne Division to help with the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. “The 82nd are combat troops, but that was not a combat mission,” he said.
-
I am sitting here right now in a deep state of sadness. I was just speaking with "Mercury", the incredibly nice woman from Basrah who is the house manager at the complex I stay at. She was sitting at her laptop and I noticed she had a picture of a precious, beautiful young girl on the screen. So I asked about her. She immediately became very misty eyed and said "that was my daughter. She is gone now." She must have read my thoughts, which were "oh my God, what happened?" She then said to me that her husband and her daughter "were killed by the Americans by mistake." No anger. No hatred. She just sounded dead inside for that moment. Her English is exceptional so there was no mistake in what she said. I can now hear her through my door "happily" doing her usual job.
How in God's name do you ever get over something like that?
These people have been through a lot of crap in the last 30 years. Saddam's war against Iran. The Gulf War and its aftermath. Operation Iraqi Freedom. The years of violence. And frankly I fear within a year of our departure, if not sooner, it will be on like Donkey Kong again.
-
Holy f&$#! A rocket just flew over our hooch and landed not too far away. Pretty decent boom too.
They are telling us the rocket landed one street over from our hooch. In some guy's garden. He had apparently just finished planting his garden and grass. Now it's all a mess. And he's pissed!
Interestingly the whoosh sound associated with this one, which landed quite close, was only about 1/4 second (if that). The one that flew over in December was quite longer (seemed like 2 seconds or so). That one landed much farther away.
I guess the lesson might be if you hear only a very, very short whoosh, don't dither in hitting the deck. They make the most unmistakable whoosh kind of sound.
The security situation is so good that a friend of mine, and her whole unit, is having to leave Fallujah for a safer place.
--------------------------
MARC writing now:
Is President Obama throwing away what we have achieved in Iraq?
-
OMII forwards us this and comments:
================================
5 U.S. soldiers killed in Baghdad
May 11, 2009 - 02:35:03
BAGHDAD / Aswat al-Iraq: Five U.S. soldiers were killed on Monday in a shooting inside a U.S. base in Baghdad, the U.S. army said.
“Five Multi-National Forces were killed in a shooting inside al-Houriya base in Baghdad at 2:00 p.m. on Monday (May 11),” the U.S. army said in a statement received by Aswat al-Iraq news agency. “The incident under investigation,” it added, without giving further details.
====
I become ever more convinced that Michael Yon was on Kool-Aid when he passed through Iraq. I say that matter of factly, not to be disrespectful. This country will not survive our departure. I pray I am wrong.
====
In response I have asked if maybe we are leaving too quickly, too soon, and are throwing away what we finally accomplished. I await his answer.
-
His response:
Personally, and this is only what I think, the Iraqis will not be able to stand up on their own when crunch time comes. The infiltration of militias and insurgents into both the Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police, as evidenced by the number of Sudden Jihad Syndrome attacks, tells me all I need to know.
Again, that's just me....
==========
My response was to ask whether his conclusion implied that we were leaving too soon. His answer:
"Yes we are leaving too soon. But I do not believe that even 5-years from now would work."
-
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/16/AR2009051602137.html?hpid%3Dtopnews&sub=AR
-
Geopolitical Diary: The Reality of Iraqi Geopolitics
May 29, 2009 | 0010 GMT
Iraq’s oil ministry has announced plans for oil exports to Turkey, from newly developed fields in the northern autonomous Kurdish region, to begin on Sunday. The Taq Taq and Tawke fields in Dahuk province will be the first new fields brought online in Iraq in more than three decades. Together, they will yield 100,000 barrels per day (bpd), with production growing to 450,000 bpd by 2011.
Though the Kurds are already celebrating the occasion, this is a bittersweet moment for Sunni and Shiite leaders in Baghdad. Iraq’s Shiite-dominated central government has long been in a fierce contest with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) over oil reserves in the north. On a strategic level, Iraqi Arabs — as well as Iraq’s neighbors — have a core interest in keeping the Kurds on a leash and quelling separatist hopes. The central government is doing its part to keep the Kurds boxed in: It wants to ensure that Baghdad gets sign-off on any oil deals the Kurds make with foreign companies to develop their energy fields, and that all oil revenues go through the central government before being distributed to the regional governorates.
But after the fall of Saddam Hussein, the Kurds knew they had limited time to secure their influence before being ganged up on by an array of rivals (which is happening now.) The KRG signed production-sharing agreements left and right with foreign firms, giving companies 10-20 percent of the profit and partial ownership of the fields, to rush in investment. The Iraqi oil ministry, however, has declared all of these deals void, insisting that Baghdad must be the one to approve agreements and that all deals must be based on less attractive, fixed-fee service contracts, which deny foreign companies ownership of energy fields.
The row between the KRG and Baghdad is ongoing, and it remains to be seen how the foreign companies developing the fields will end up getting paid. But with oil production stagnating at just under 2 million bpd, the Kurds have found a way to exploit the central government’s vulnerability. With the budget in danger, Baghdad reluctantly agreed to get these fields pumping, in order to raise exports and generate more cash for government coffers. The Kurds are getting a nice break, but they are still beholden to central government-controlled infrastructure and the interests of their rivals, like Turkey, to continue exporting oil from KRG territory.
While keeping a close eye on the Kurds, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is also busy picking out scapegoats for the fall in Iraqi oil production. He recently launched a massive anti-corruption drive that has brought down the trade minister and is now targeting the oil and electricity ministers, who could end up getting axed in a widely rumored cabinet reshuffle. Oil Minister Hussein al-Shahristani, who has close ties to Tehran, is expected to be summoned by the Parliament soon to explain why his mismanagement of the ministry (never mind the effects of the global economic crisis) has prevented production increases.
Al-Maliki is doing this for several reasons. He needs to blame someone for the economic pressure Iraq is under, but he also needs to clean house, consolidate power and prepare his government for the day that U.S. forces leave Iraq and Baghdad will have to fend for itself against a host of powerful neighbors — who all feel they have some stake in Iraq. The Turks are on a resurgent path and are privately discussing with the United States their desire to move into the north to contain the Kurds. The Iranians harbor aspirations about carving out Shiite-dominated southern Iraq for themselves. And Saudi Arabia and other Arab states see themselves as the defenders of Iraq’s Sunnis against the Shia; they do not regard al-Maliki as a legitimate leader or even see Iraq as a legitimate country.
Al-Maliki is on a mission to revive Iraq’s standing as a strong Arab state — only this time, under Shiite leadership. Iraq is already an extremely fractious country, split geographically, ethnically and politically among Shia, Sunnis and Kurds. What al-Maliki wants to avoid is a “Lebanonization” of Iraq that would brand the country as paralyzed, fractured and sufficiently vulnerable to be preyed upon by outside powers. The only way to overcome these internal weaknesses is to impose some level of authoritarianism at home.
Al-Maliki is the leader of the Arab world’s newest democracy, but some of his statements hint at an authoritarian strain of thought. He said recently that in the first stage of post-Hussein Iraq, “consensus was necessary for us.” “But,” he continued, “if this continues it will become a problem, a flaw, a catastrophe. The alternative is democracy, and that means majority rule … From now on, I call for an end to that degree of consensus.” Al-Maliki also has begun standing up to Iraq’s neighbors — telling the Saudis, who among other Arab powers continue to snub him at regional summits, that “Iraq has no intention of making new goodwill gestures towards Saudi Arabia because my initiative has been interpreted in Riyadh as a sign of weakness.”
Contrary to popular perception, this behavior is not necessarily a reflection of al-Maliki’s personality. Whether the person at the helm of Iraqi politics is al-Maliki or anyone else, Baghdad will see a need for the Kurds to be contained and — depending on who has the upper hand — for either the Shia or the Sunnis to rule with an iron fist. Such is the reality of Iraqi geopolitics.
-
Unfortunately I cannot upload a pic or two I wanted to right now.
While on the road to haditha yesterday I saw out in the distance (over the course of several miles) about 5-6 Soviet MIGs. Just sitting out there in the desert. A couple looked in mint condition. Others falling apart. One looked like Swiss cheese. They were all a light green color so they stood out against the sand.
Apparently pre-invasion Saddam tried to hide his jets in the desert. I don't know how one could possibly do this but he nonetheless tried.
One story is that you used to be able to go fool around over at the planes. Take cool guy pcis. Sit inside the pilot's seat. And in the case of one U.S. serviceman discover that the ejection seat still worked. It launched him way the hell into the air which resulted in him crashing back to Earth. Yes he died. It was apparently a huge drop.
One night in Haditha proper, al-Qa'ida kidnapped and captured dozens of people, including 20 Iraqi police officers. They made the townspeople come to the soocer stadium and watch their beheadings. It was this night, the story goes, that the Sunni Awakening Councils began. Ultimately, and together, the USMC and the Sunnis kicked the snot out of al-Qa'ida. Some of the fiercest fights the USMC had were in haditha.
Driving, and then walking a considerable distance, down the street I have never seen so many Iraqis wave to our soldiers (Marines). Kids, adults, elders. I never received so many trully warm "salaam a'laikums." It was amazing because they seemed so genuine. People driving down the street in cars beeping their horns.
They are facing huge water problems in the future though. Dams in Turkey and Syria have reduced the Euphrates River to a fraction of its former self. The water level is so low now that the dam only produces something like 10% of its prior capacity. And the watewr treatment facility is overleaded because there is so much sediment in the water that does get treated. Back in Saddam's day apparently they had an understanding. If enough water does not come down the Euphrates into Iraq he would bomb the dams. Now an Iraq with no teeth does not have that option. The Americans are trying to work out some sort of oil for water scenario with Turkey and Syria. Meanwhile the average Iraqi faces a potentially bleak future as far as water goes.
-
(There is an attached foto which for security reasons is not posted here)
Hard to believe that just a couple of years ago al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI) beheaded 60 people in the soccer stadium and announced to the people of Hadithah that Hadithah was now the caliphate of AQI. And here I am the other day on the rooftop of the Hadithah courthouse, where very few criminal cases were allowed by AQI for that period of time, without a single care in the world.
The only reason I am wearing PPE (personal protection equipment) is because regulations require it. Else, as USMC LT Wong said, you could walk down the streets of Hadithah in your PT uniform.
The people there are quite happy to have the Marines there. The USMC saved them from the utter cruelty of life under AQI. Of cousre, there was no AQI before we invaded. Saddam would not have tolerated that crap. He would have had them in the soccer stadium.
Today it bothers me immensely that we broke this place and plan on leaving before we fixed it. Not because I believe we can make Iraq a democracy in our image. I simply do not believe we can. But because these people are trying very hard in the here and now to figure out what their new post-Saddam/post-AQI/post-militia world will be/should be like, but they haven't quite glued it all together.
-
Iraq’s oil minister is being forced to defend himself against various charges stemming from the country’s stagnant oil production. The charges come during a period of heightening tensions over oil among Iraq’s feuding Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish factions. Ultimately, it will probably be up to an outside power to manage this political maelstrom — and of these powers, Turkey is the one to watch.
Iraqi Oil Minister Hussein Shahristani returned to the Iraqi parliament on June 25 to defend himself against a multitude of complaints from parliamentarians involving such issues as Iraq’s declining oil output, its languishing hydrocarbons law and the corruption and mismanagement of the Iraqi oil industry’s profits.
Due to a steep drop in once record-high crude prices over the past year, and aggravated by budget constraints and political infighting, Iraq’s current oil output has stagnated at around 2.4 million barrels per day (bpd) — well below the country’s enormous oil production potential. Since oil revenues account for 95 percent of the state’s income, Shahristani has become the natural scapegoat for Iraq’s current political and economic woes. And with a major oil auction on the horizon, the country’s first since the fall of Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi oil brawl is bound to escalate in the coming weeks. Given what he is up against, there is no guarantee that Shahristani will make it out of these June parliamentary grill sessions in one piece, but he has given no indication that he is prepared to bow out of this fight.
Shahristani’s plan to breathe some life back into Iraq’s oil industry involves circumventing parliamentary approval to allow 32 of the world’s major energy companies on June 29-30 to bid on 20-year-long service contracts to develop Iraq’s six largest oil producing fields and two untapped natural gas fields. These energy companies, which include ExxonMobil, Chevron, Royal Dutch/Shell, ConocoPhillips, Turkish Petroleum Corp., BP, France’s Total, Italy’s Eni, Russia’s Gazprom Neft and LUKoil, India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corp. and China National Petroleum Corp., are taking a risk in investing in a country that has yet to pass an oil law, and whose politics pose a severe threat to business deals. Despite the risks, all these firms have a deep interest in securing these potentially lucrative contracts.
But first, the oil minister must answer to the Federation of Oil Unions in the Shiite southern oil hub of Basra. The southern labor unions produce the bulk of Iraqi crude and are extremely hesitant to allow foreign companies a piece of their contracts. The union federation has strongly criticized the oil minister for offering long-term service contracts, asserting that Iraqi companies and their employees are fully capable of developing the fields themselves. Shahrahstani’s opponents in parliament argue that oil exploration — not production of existing fields — is needed to increase production. Shahristani, on the other hand, claims that exploration will take too much time, and there is a stronger need to focus on boosting current production. He argues that the foreign companies are the ones that the have the training, technological expertise and tools to more rapidly and efficiently boost Iraq’s oil output by an additional 1.5 million bpd within four to five years.
This debate is not only about southern oil unions worried about being edged out by foreign oil majors. As Shahristani himself has claimed, there is a much wider political agenda involving multiple Iraqi factions currently in play.
The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), currently the largest Shiite party in parliament and the political bloc most closely aligned to Iran, carries a great deal of clout in the Shiite south that could strengthen the anti-Shahristani movement. After having fared poorly against Shiite Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his allies in January provincial polls, the ISCI is doing whatever it can to weaken the prime minister’s power base so that it can be on a stronger political footing for legislative elections slated for Jan. 30, 2010.
The ISCI’s strategy involves using its clout in parliament to chip away at al-Maliki’s Cabinet appointees. Already, Iraqi Trade Minister Falah al-Sudani and former Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al-Mashhadani have been forced to resign. Shahristani, who maintains his political independence — and yet is in agreement with al-Maliki’s vision of a strong, centralized government — is next on the target list.
In addition to natural political competition, the ISCI and al-Maliki are on two different wavelengths in trying to shape the future of Iraq. The ISCI, and the Iranians by extension, envision a federalist model of Iraq that essentially carves out a Shiite autonomous zone in the south (similar to the Kurdish autonomous zone in the north). This would augment Iran’s influence in Iraq via their Iraqi Shiite allies. This vision, however, is directly at odds with that of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, smaller regional Shiite parties and the mainstream Sunni parties, who all agree on the need for a strong, centralized government in Iraq that can build up its immunity to foreign penetration. Al-Maliki and Shahristani have been able to draw support from Sunni and Shiite factions for their strong stance against federalism and their iron-fist approach with the Kurds, but they are also up against a number of sore losers from the provincial elections who want to see the prime minister weakened.
Click to enlarge
The ISCI has no shortage of allies to use against al-Maliki. The oil unions in the south do not always get along politically with the ISCI, but they do share a common interest in fighting Shahristani’s oil investment program. The ISCI also has a parliamentary alliance with the Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party, which recently succeeded in getting its own man in the parliamentary speaker position to use as a platform to challenge al-Maliki directly. Finally, the ISCI has found an ally among the Kurds, who have the most to lose in this oil battle against al-Maliki and Shahristani.
Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is locked into conflict with Baghdad over how to manage the country’s massive oil wealth. Blessed by its energy resources and cursed by its geography, the Kurdish region is up against not only Iraq’s Shiite and Sunni Arab communities, but also by its far more powerful neighbors — Turkey, Iran and Syria, who all share a common interest in extinguishing any notion of Kurdish independence or even expanded autonomy.
The Kurds’ best defense against their rivals is to gain as much control as possible over energy resources in the north and to use their region’s energy appeal to lure in foreign investors. The more foreigners buy into the Kurdish region, the more protection the Kurds receive against outside penetration. Consequently, from the moment Saddam Hussein fell from power and the Kurds organized politically, the KRG has been extremely active in inviting foreign firms to explore and develop Iraq’s northern fields.
To sweeten the pot, the Kurds have offered these firms extremely attractive Production-Sharing Agreements (PSAs) that offer firms ownership stakes in the fields. This policy directly opposes Shahristani’s push only to allow foreign firms to charge fees, as opposed to offering them ownership rights that would undermine Baghdad’s central authority, for raising output. The Kurds know they have a narrow window of opportunity to secure these energy rights, and will thus fight tooth and nail in parliament to shoot down Shahristani and al-Maliki’s policies that aim to assert central authority in Iraq and undermine Kurdish autonomy.
But the Kurds can only go so far in their dealings with foreign energy firms, dealings Baghdad terms “illegal” and “unconstitutional.” Energy companies have been exploring and developing fields in the north, but any plan to export for real profit must have both Turkey’s (as the export link) and Baghdad’s approval. The Kurds, however, are feeling more emboldened after the central government — under heavy pressure to raise Iraq’s oil output — reluctantly allowed oil to flow from KRG fields in the north to the Turkish port at Ceyhan for export beginning June 1. The budget pressure on Baghdad allowed the KRG to take another step forward in furthering Kurdish autonomy, but the Kurds also know this export opportunity can just as easily be snatched away by their rivals. For now, the Kurds are trying to exploit the wider criticism against Shahristani, a move that will allow them to continue with business as usual on the energy front while Baghdad remains at odds with itself.
From intra-Shiite rivalries to panicky oil unions to Kurdish-Arab political battles, there are a number of reasons for the world’s oil supermajors to be nervous about the June 29-30 auction. These political fissures run deep, and will continue to hold the country back from checking off critical items on the parliamentary agenda, such as signing a viable oil law. With the central government on the defensive, it will most likely be up to an outside power to manage this political maelstrom.
Of these powers, the United States is too distracted to enter into Iraqi internal politics to resolve these conflicts, and Iranian influence is largely limited to their Shiite allies. Turkey, however, is the country to watch in Iraq’s energy evolution. The Turks are already on an ascendant path in the region, and have been busily shoring up ties with key members of each of Iraq’s warring factions, including the Kurds. If Turkey intends to fulfill its long-term objective to control a substantial portion of Iraq’s energy industry, it is only a matter of time before Ankara dives deeper into Iraqi politics.
-
second post
Summary
STRATFOR learned June 25 that ailing top Iraqi Shiite leader Abdel Aziz al-Hakim’s health has worsened. Al-Hakim was a key player in both Iranian and U.S. plans for the future of Iraq, and his death will complicate matters for Iran. Meanwhile, U.S. forces are preparing to withdraw from urban areas in Iraq on June 30. The main question is whether Iraqi security forces are ready to take on more security responsibilities at a time when a lot could go wrong in their country.
STRATFOR learned June 25 that the condition of ailing top Iraqi Shiite leader Abdel Aziz al-Hakim has deteriorated and that U.S. military authorities are preparing for his death. Al-Hakim, who had long received treatment in Tehran for lung cancer, leads Iraq’s largest and most pro-Iranian Shiite political party, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI). Al-Hakim’s worsening condition comes at a very critical time, considering that he has been a key player in both U.S. and Iranian plans for post-Baathist Iraq.
As far as the Iranians are concerned, al-Hakim’s death will complicate matters as they seek to consolidate the gains they have made in Iraq since the rise of a Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad. Iran is embroiled in a huge internal power struggle between rival conservative factions that came out into the open with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s controversial election victory June 12. A loss of a key foreign policy asset at a time of intense domestic turmoil limits the extent to which Tehran can counter Washington’s moves to finalize the security environment in Iraq.
U.S. plans revolve around a June 30 deadline for the implementation of a key phase of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that requires U.S. troops to complete the withdrawal of combat forces form Iraqi cities. This will not be a sudden or rapid process; the United States has been preparing for this deadline for months, carefully monitoring the progress of Iraqi security forces and slowly drawing back. Nor will the process be uniform. As per a deliberate vagueness in the text of the agreement, U.S. forces likely will retain a significant presence in Baghdad and the northern city of Mosul, the scene of continuing jihadist violence.
The SOFA is the guiding document crafted to oversee the transition of day-to-day security responsibility from U.S. troops to Iraqi forces in preparation for a 2011 withdrawal of U.S. combat troops from the country. Since the agreement’s signing in December 2008, Iraqi forces have taken on more of these responsibilities, while U.S. forces have moved into more of an advisory capacity. Iraqi forces have been running the routine street patrols, checkpoints and other security facilities and have been taking an increasingly greater role in counterinsurgency operations against jihadists.
That said, in places like the capital and Mosul, Iraqi troops still depend heavily upon U.S. troops. Therefore, as U.S. forces transition from tactical oversight to strategic oversight, the main question is the extent to which Iraqi forces will be able to maintain the relative calm that has existed since 2007, when the U.S. military turned Sunni nationalist insurgents who were fighting U.S. troops into critical forces combating al Qaeda in Iraq. The next few months will be a crucial test for Iraq’s security forces, revealing whether they can act as a national force or whether they will succumb to ethno-sectarian struggles. In turn, the Iraqi forces’ success (or lack thereof) will determine the degree to which U.S. forces will have to intervene to stabilize the situation. It should be noted that most of the violence in Iraq has been in urban areas — the same areas from which some 130,000 U.S. forces are leaving under the SOFA.
With their independence and proficiency still a work in progress, it is unclear how capable and willing Iraqi security forces are to perform in a manner that will prevent another descent into sectarian bloodshed. A larger concern is that the violence level in Iraq has remained steady in recent months, with periodic attacks taking place across the country. In the past few days there have been two noteworthy attacks, in Kirkuk and Baghdad, on Shiite targets affiliated with the movement of radical Iraqi Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr. Realizing that this is the time to try to stir up ethno-sectarian tensions and stage a comeback, suspected jihadists have carried out suicide attacks. The June 30 pullback date is also a symbolic time for attacks, as it gives the impression that the jihadists are driving U.S. forces out and that Iraq remains unsafe.
The principals of the country’s three major ethno-sectarian groups have an interest in making sure that the political disputes among them do not escalate to the point of violence. In spite of their intention to remain peaceful, they run into problems when they try to pursue their respective political objectives. A particularly problematic issue is the lingering — and potentially explosive — induction of Sunni tribal militiamen affiliated with the Awakening Councils into the state’s Shiite-dominated security apparatus. Despite his moves away from Islamist sectarian politics and toward a secular Iraqi national platform (which gave him significant gains in recent provincial elections), Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki wants to limit Sunnis’ power, and thus has refused to allow more than 20 percent of these militiamen into the security apparatus. Though the Awakening Councils also made significant gains in the provincial vote and have a bigger stake in the system, there is still a major concern that many of these tribal fighters could revert to their old ways.
At the intra-Shiite level, internal rivalries continue to simmer even though al-Hakim’s ISCI performed badly in the provincial polls and the al-Sadrites’ political and military power has been diminished. After al-Hakim’s death, his successor — likely his son Ammar al-Hakim — will need to consolidate his hold over the movement and ward off rivals’ attempts to take advantage of the opportunity provided by the power vacuum. Iran, which has played the various Iraqi Shiite factions off one another, will have to re-establish an intra-Shiite balance of power. Iran also could try to stir up trouble in Iraq in order to reposition itself in relation to the United States after the Iranian election crisis.
In northern Iraq, the Kurdish bid for greater autonomy pits the Kurds against the Sunnis and Shia. Furthermore, the Kurds will be holding their own regional elections this month. With President Jalal Talabani — leader of one of the two major parties in the Kurdistani alliance that controls the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) — nearing retirement from political activity due to health conditions, the internal balance of power among the Kurds is also in play. The ongoing dispute over sharing energy revenues between the federal government and the KRG and tensions over the future status of the contested oil-rich northern region of Kirkuk are also issues that could easily create security situations.
In other words, there is a lot that can go wrong at a time when Iraqi forces are supposed to demonstrate that they can function as a national force capable of keeping the various ethno-sectarian groups in Iraq from succumbing to multi-directional centrifugal forces. Therefore, the next several months — especially ahead of the Jan. 30, 2010, parliamentary elections that could shake up the political establishment formed after the 2003 regime change — will be very telling in terms of the Iraqi factions’ abilities to keep their disputes within acceptable parameters.
From the U.S. point of view, the Iraqi forces’ performance will be critical in terms of Washington’s ability to focus on Afghanistan and ultimately disengage militarily from the Islamic world.
-
third post
A couple of weeks ago while en route to al Kut I got to see during the course of 3-minutes the best Iraq has to offer security-wise, and their typical slackers.
Hard to explain but we were in MRAPs crossing Suicide Bridge (as affectionately named by the soldiers at FOB Delta). Suicide is a one lane bridge. So at one point we had to stop and wait for the bridge to be availlable to us.
As we were slowing down for the stop I could see two Iraqi Army soldiers standing security. Beforfe the MRAP even stopped I thoought to myself these guys are STRAC. You could see it in their demeanor, the way they comported themselves and their alert behavior. As soon as our MRAPs stopped they both went into hyper alert mode. Scanning 360. Weapons more ready. Basically they were ready to instantly shoot. Clearly in good shape. Out of the ordinary camo uniforms. Helmets on in 115 degree weather. The kind of guys in appearance that 99 out of 100 of us would probably not want to take on. It's like they instinctively knew halted Army MRAPs = exponentially elevated threat level. I tried to get a photo but it did not come out. Damn shame.
So after a minute or two we start moving. We get to the other side of the bridge and there were a couple of Iraqi soldiers and police basically sitting on their fat asses, cigarettes dangling from their fat worthless faces. Utter disgraces to a professional military and law enforcement presence.
I could not help but wonder if when I read aboout all the soldiers and policemen getting killed around the country every day at checkpoints were these worthless, disgraceful clowns. And conversely, whoever trained these other two soldiers I hope they have gotten to see the end result of their labor.
June 30th draws ever nearer and I am not convinced the Iraqis have it together to repel the coming juggernaut.
-
4th post
SAS troopers have carried out the first major combat parachute operations since Suez more than 50 years ago, it can now be disclosed.
By Thomas Harding, Defence Correspondent
Published: 5:04PM BST 26 Jun 2009
Using advanced parachuting techniques Special Forces carried out a series of operational jumps onto the outskirts of Baghdad targeting insurgent leaders and bomb-making factories, The Daily Telegraph has learnt.
The airborne operations - which can only now be disclosed - played a significant role in removing so-called insurgent “high value targets” and reducing their ability to make roadside bombs.
On at least a dozen occasions SAS soldiers using BT80 parachutes jumped from the back of a Hercules aircraft at around 15,000ft. After steering for several miles, they landed silently close to insurgent strongholds on an area the size of a football pitch.
The troops of up 12 men then quietly made their way on foot either to begin an operation or set up a covert observation post where they would mount electronic devices linked to voice and facial recognition software to spy on insurgents.
Dressed in the SAS’s latest pixellated combat uniforms with some carrying the heavy-hitting Heckler and Koch 417 weapon mounted with silencers, the men either assisted other SAS helicopter-borne troops or mounted the raid themselves.
“It was the surprise factor that we were after,” said a special forces soldier involved in the operations. “You could have some time under canopy to travel a few kilometres from the point of opening onto the ground.”
Using a special chest rig mounted with satellite navigation, radios and altimeters and oxygen masks the soldiers at first gathered in the sky and then steered towards the ground as a group.
“These jumps took place all over city but particularly Sadr city on the eastern edge of Baghdad where it heads into countryside. You would land on the outskirts, on the right side of the Tigris, and then tab in.
“It gives you the ability of surprise for a hard knock or to get to that point where you have eyes on the target without anyone having a clue that you are in there. As soon as you put a helicopter up people know what’s going on.”
On some occasions a helicopter force in Pumas was called in to start an operation otherwise they were used to extract the soldiers.
“We had the means to get into a building and means to fight our way out,” the soldier said.
“We did arrests. We are not going in to neutralise everything but to try and capture targets. However, if you are in the course of apprehending somebody and your life is under threat, if somebody is pointing a gun at you then they will be very lucky to survive.”
News of combat jumps, which were made over the last two years, comes at a time when a shortage of RAF Hercules and pilots has meant that a third of the 2,400 paratroopers in 16 Air Assault Brigade are not qualified to jump.
Airborne officers argue that by keeping a parachute capability it maintains Britain’s ability to launch rapid reaction forces that could for instance take a hostile runway in Africa or at the very least “give the enemy something to think about”.
A few parachute jumps were used by the SAS and SBS in Afghanistan in 2001 and on two occasions the Parachute Regiment has come close to making drops in Afghanistan.
During the Suez operation in 1956 more than 700 paratroopers landed in Egypt to successful seize airfields, to enable transport of troops and supplies. The operation by Britain, France, and Israel followed Egypt’s decision to nationalize the strategically-important Suez Canal.
Currently Parachute Jump Instructors are in Afghanistan assessing the situation for parachuting that is made difficult by the high altitude and rough terrain.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/news...o-Baghdad.html
-
WSJ
By MICHAEL RUBIN
Today is a milestone in Iraq. Under the terms of the Strategic Framework Agreement, U.S. troops will withdraw from Iraqi cities. In retrospect, however, June 30 will likely mark another milestone: the end of the surge and the relative peace it brought to Iraq. In the past week, bombings in Baghdad, Mosul and near Kirkuk have killed almost 200 people. The worst is yet to come.
While the Strategic Framework Agreement was negotiated in the twilight of the Bush administration, President Barack Obama shaped the final deal. He campaigned on a time line to withdraw combat troops from Iraq, and his words impacted the negotiation.
Iraq has shown us time and again that military strength is the key to influence in other matters. Just look at the behavior of Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, Iraq's most influential Shiite cleric.
Under Saddam, Mr. Sistani was an independent religious mind, but he was hardly a bold voice. Like so many other Iraqis, he stayed alive by remaining silent. Only after Saddam's fall did he speak up. Though he is today a world-famous figure, the New York Times made its first mention of the ayatollah on April 4, 2003, five days before the fall of Baghdad.
Mr. Sistani is as much of a threat to Iran as he was to Saddam. In November 2003, he contradicted Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei when asked what night the holy month of Ramadan would end, a determination made by sighting the moon. Mr. Sistani said Tuesday, Mr. Khamenei said Wednesday.
To the West, this might be trivial, but it sent shock waves through Iran. How could the supreme leader claim ultimate political and religious authority over not only the Islamic Republic but all Shiites and be contradicted?
Perhaps this is why Iran bolstered its support for militias. When I visited Najaf in January 2004, I saw dark-clad militiamen on the streets outside Mr. Sistani's house. Mr. Sistani quieted until the following year, when U.S. forces retook the city.
Militias are not simply reactions to sectarian violence, nor are they spontaneous creations. They are tools used by political leaders to impose through force what is not in hearts and minds.
Because of both ham-fisted postwar reconstruction and neighboring state interference, militia and insurgent violence soared from 2004 through 2006. The fight became as much psychological as military.
Iranian and insurgent media declared the United States to be a paper tiger lacking staying power. The Baker-Hamilton Commission report underscored such perceptions. Al-Jazeera broadcast congressional lamentations of defeat throughout the region. Iranian intelligence told Iraqi officials that they might like the Americans better, but Iran would always be their neighbor and they best make an accommodation. Al Qaeda sounded similar themes in al-Anbar.
Then came President Bush's announcement that he would augment the U.S. presence. The surge was as much a psychological strategy as it was a military one. It proved our adversaries' propaganda wrong. Violence dropped. Iraq received a new chance to emerge as a stable, secure democracy.
By telegraphing a desire to leave, Mr. Obama reverses the dynamic. In effect, his strategy is an anti-surge. Troop numbers are not the issue. It is the projection of weakness. Not only Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki but Iraqi President Jalal Talabani and Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani have also reached out to the Islamic Republic in recent weeks.
In Cairo, Mr. Obama said the U.S. had no permanent designs on Iraq and declared, "We will support a secure and united Iraq as a partner, and never as a patron." Indeed. But until the Iraqi government is strong enough to monopolize independently the use of force, a vacuum will exist and the most violent factions will fill it.
Power and prestige matter. Withdrawal from Iraq's cities is good politics in Washington, but when premature and done under fire it may very well condemn Iraqis to repeat their past.
Mr. Rubin is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and senior lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate School.
-
The huge difference I see between June 29th and today is the much greater Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police presence inside the IZ. There is some sort of machine gun plus armed military or police vehicle every 200 meters or so. Occasionally you will see a convoy sized line of military or police vehicles pulled off to the side of the road. There are more Iraqi Army guys walking around the vicinity of what is called "the GRD" (which stands for Gulf Regional Development) compound.
What you almost don't see any more is much in the way of U.S. military vehicles moving around. They are not completely gone but you just don't see them like you used to. The sense is that there is no more cavalry to come to the rescue anytime quickly.
Some of the Iraqi Army soldiers and Iraqi Police officers are their usual, typical, reasonably friendly selves. They will wave and smile as they always have. But others have that feeling their oats look in their eyes.
We live in interesting times here in the IZ...
-
Crafty from Russian thread: "To harp on a point I have made several times before, in the 2004 election even his weenie opponent was calling for expanding the US military by 50,000 troops-- but Bush-Rumbo, still too proud to admit that what was going on in Iraq was more than a bunch of Saddamite remnants, refused to admit that we needed to expand our military."
Not fully disagreeing but adding my comment from armchair to armchair...
Some lessons of the Iraq war are still unknown IMO. The beginning of the war was impressive. The execution of the surge was truly amazing. The part in between was brutal. The consequences of rushing our exit are unknown at this point.
Obviously we would like to have won faster with less damage. For sure, plenty of mistakes were made, big ones.
My main thought is that I don't believe with any certainty that a surge could or would have had the same success if only it had been ordered earlier. The strategy and success was built on information/intelligence/knowledge on the ground that we didn't necessarily have earlier. Unfortunately we didn't know who was blowing up Mosques and setting explosives for American troops until they blow up Mosques and set off road bombs, repeatedly, and until our troops developed relationships and trust with witnesses and civilians enough to tell us what they know about the insurgents and locations.
The small footprint, 100,000 in a country of 25 million, limited our ability to get the job done, but a larger footprint might also have flailed away in the early insurgency. A larger footprint would have meant more targets early on for the enemy, possibly more loss of American life during the worst parts of the war, and perhaps more collateral Iraqi civilian damage, turning them even more against us. In other words, to have gone stronger - earlier - with the wrong strategy would have had its own consequences.
I blame others more than I blame Bush-Rumsfeld. I blame our so-called allies who for the most part were absent, starting with Turkey who IIRC blocked a key entry/supply route right from the beginning. I blame our domestic opposition who while troops were in harm's way were constantly sending the message that the American commitment was fragile and temporary. Our troops fought through the domestic political bullshit bravely, but the enemy was certainly energized by it, causing more loss of life on both sides than was otherwise necessary. And I blame our media for the same. They overplayed the death toll and terror accomplishments of the enemy (was a ground war in the heart of the middle east supposed to be easy?) and they missing the real story line (Michael Yon was almost the sole exception to this) of what a brave, amazing, wonderful and historic accomplishment we were actually in the process of achieving by deposing this thug and leaving behind a republic if they choose to keep it. JMHO.
-
Good post.
"My main thought is that I don't believe with any certainty that a surge could or would have had the same success if only it had been ordered earlier. The strategy and success was built on information/intelligence/knowledge on the ground that we didn't necessarily have earlier. Unfortunately we didn't know who was blowing up Mosques and setting explosives for American troops until they blow up Mosques and set off road bombs, repeatedly, and until our troops developed relationships and trust with witnesses and civilians enough to tell us what they know about the insurgents and locations."
"The small footprint, 100,000 in a country of 25 million, limited our ability to get the job done, but a larger footprint might also have flailed away in the early insurgency. A larger footprint would have meant more targets early on for the enemy, possibly more loss of American life during the worst parts of the war, and perhaps more collateral Iraqi civilian damage, turning them even more against us. In other words, to have gone stronger - earlier - with the wrong strategy would have had its own consequences."
MARC: Please allow me to clarify that I was not saying that these additional troops that should have been raised should have been sent to Iraq. My intended point was that we were using up too large of a % of our bandwidth on Iraq-- ESPECIALLY given the policies we were following viz the Russians.
"I blame others more than I blame Bush-Rumsfeld. I blame our so-called allies who for the most part were absent, starting with Turkey who IIRC blocked a key entry/supply route right from the beginning. I blame our domestic opposition who while troops were in harm's way were constantly sending the message that the American commitment was fragile and temporary. Our troops fought through the domestic political bullshit bravely, but the enemy was certainly energized by it, causing more loss of life on both sides than was otherwise necessary. And I blame our media for the same. They overplayed the death toll and terror accomplishments of the enemy (was a ground war in the heart of the middle east supposed to be easy?) and they missing the real story line (Michael Yon was almost the sole exception to this) of what a brave, amazing, wonderful and historic accomplishment we were actually in the process of achieving by deposing this thug and leaving behind a republic if they choose to keep it. JMHO."
We are in complete agreement. I would give a medal of dishonor to the French in particular.
-
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
July 14, 2009
Iraq Suffers as the Euphrates River Dwindles
By CAMPBELL ROBERTSON
JUBAISH, Iraq — Throughout the marshes, the reed gatherers, standing on land they once floated over, cry out to visitors in a passing boat.
“Maaku mai!” they shout, holding up their rusty sickles. “There is no water!”
The Euphrates is drying up. Strangled by the water policies of Iraq’s neighbors, Turkey and Syria; a two-year drought; and years of misuse by Iraq and its farmers, the river is significantly smaller than it was just a few years ago. Some officials worry that it could soon be half of what it is now.
The shrinking of the Euphrates, a river so crucial to the birth of civilization that the Book of Revelation prophesied its drying up as a sign of the end times, has decimated farms along its banks, has left fishermen impoverished and has depleted riverside towns as farmers flee to the cities looking for work.
( Added by Lightfighter, Revelation 16:12 NIV / Verse 12: The sixth angel poured out his bowl on the great river Euphrates, and its water was dried up to prepare the way for the kings from the East. )
The poor suffer more acutely, but all strata of society are feeling the effects: sheiks, diplomats and even members of Parliament who retreat to their farms after weeks in Baghdad.
Along the river, rice and wheat fields have turned to baked dirt. Canals have dwindled to shallow streams, and fishing boats sit on dry land. Pumps meant to feed water treatment plants dangle pointlessly over brown puddles.
“The old men say it’s the worst they remember,” said Sayid Diyia, 34, a fisherman in Hindiya, sitting in a riverside cafe full of his idle colleagues. “I’m depending on God’s blessings.”
The drought is widespread in Iraq. The area sown with wheat and barley in the rain-fed north is down roughly 95 percent from the usual, and the date palm and citrus orchards of the east are parched. For two years rainfall has been far below normal, leaving the reservoirs dry, and American officials predict that wheat and barley output will be a little over half of what it was two years ago.
It is a crisis that threatens the roots of Iraq’s identity, not only as the land between two rivers but as a nation that was once the largest exporter of dates in the world, that once supplied German beer with barley and that takes patriotic pride in its expensive Anbar rice.
Now Iraq is importing more and more grain. Farmers along the Euphrates say, with anger and despair, that they may have to abandon Anbar rice for cheaper varieties.
Droughts are not rare in Iraq, though officials say they have been more frequent in recent years. But drought is only part of what is choking the Euphrates and its larger, healthier twin, the Tigris.
The most frequently cited culprits are the Turkish and Syrian governments. Iraq has plenty of water, but it is a downstream country. There are at least seven dams on the Euphrates in Turkey and Syria, according to Iraqi water officials, and with no treaties or agreements, the Iraqi government is reduced to begging its neighbors for water.
At a conference in Baghdad — where participants drank bottled water from Saudi Arabia, a country with a fraction of Iraq’s fresh water — officials spoke of disaster.
“We have a real thirst in Iraq,” said Ali Baban, the minister of planning. “Our agriculture is going to die, our cities are going to wilt, and no state can keep quiet in such a situation.”
Recently, the Water Ministry announced that Turkey had doubled the water flow into the Euphrates, salvaging the planting phase of the rice season in some areas.
That move increased water flow to about 60 percent of its average, just enough to cover half of the irrigation requirements for the summer rice season. Though Turkey has agreed to keep this up and even increase it, there is no commitment binding the country to do so.
With the Euphrates showing few signs of increasing health, bitterness over Iraq’s water threatens to be a source of tension for months or even years to come between Iraq and its neighbors. Many American, Turkish and even Iraqi officials, disregarding the accusations as election-year posturing, say the real problem lies in Iraq’s own deplorable water management policies.
“There used to be water everywhere,” said Abduredha Joda, 40, sitting in his reed hut on a dry, rocky plot of land outside Karbala. Mr. Joda, who describes his dire circumstances with a tired smile, grew up near Basra but fled to Baghdad when Saddam Hussein drained the great marshes of southern Iraq in retaliation for the 1991 Shiite uprising. He came to Karbala in 2004 to fish and raise water buffaloes in the lush wetlands there that remind him of his home.
“This year it’s just a desert,” he said.
Along the river, there is no shortage of resentment at the Turks and Syrians. But there is also resentment at the Americans, Kurds, Iranians and the Iraqi government, all of whom are blamed. Scarcity makes foes of everyone.
The Sunni areas upriver seem to have enough water, Mr. Joda observed, a comment heavy with implication.
Officials say nothing will improve if Iraq does not seriously address its own water policies and its history of flawed water management. Leaky canals and wasteful irrigation practices squander the water, and poor drainage leaves fields so salty from evaporated water that women and children dredge huge white mounds from sitting pools of runoff.
On a scorching morning in Diwaniya, Bashia Mohammed, 60, was working in a drainage pool by the highway gathering salt, her family’s only source of income now that its rice farm has dried up. But the dead farm was not the real crisis.
“There’s no water in the river that we drink from,” she said, referring to a channel that flows from the Euphrates. “It’s now totally dry, and it contains sewage water. They dig wells but sometimes the water just cuts out and we have to drink from the river. All my kids are sick because of the water.”
In the southeast, where the Euphrates nears the end of its 1,730-mile journey and mingles with the less salty waters of the Tigris before emptying into the Persian Gulf, the situation is grave. The marshes there that were intentionally reflooded in 2003, rescuing the ancient culture of the marsh Arabs, are drying up again. Sheep graze on land in the middle of the river.
The farmers, reed gatherers and buffalo herders keep working, but they say they cannot continue if the water stays like this.
“Next winter will be the final chance,” said Hashem Hilead Shehi, a 73-year-old farmer who lives in a bone-dry village west of the marshes. “If we are not able to plant, then all of the families will leave.”
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/14/wo...euphrates.html
-
So I just heard that DynCorp has been told by the Iraqi government that they have to bring all 60 of their PSD vehicles down at the same time to be formally documented so as to allow their continued presence and operation in Iraq. They will have to pay a 5% import surcharge per vehicle.
These armored Suburbans can run about $200K. So say the tax is $10K per vehicle. That would be about $600,000.
And that's just DynCorp.
-
Iraq: The Shifting Balance Between Iran and the U.S.
IRAQ’S MOST INFLUENTIAL, pro-Iranian Shiite leader, Abdel Aziz al-Hakim, died Wednesday after a two-year battle with lung cancer. Al-Hakim, leader of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) — a group created in and with the backing of Iran in 1982 — was also very close to Washington, particularly during the move to topple the Baathist regime in early 2003 and the ensuing years of effort to establish a stable coalition government in Baghdad. His death, interestingly, came two days after the formation of a new Tehran-leaning Shiite coalition was announced, with the ISCI as its main driver.
The ISCI is Tehran’s main proxy — an instrument of Iranian foreign policy objectives – in Iraq. But it is not the only proxy: Iran wields a great degree of influence over other Shiite factions as well as maintaining leverage with the Kurds and, to a lesser degree, the Sunnis. This relationship is not a new phenomenon.
The Persians have a long history of venturing beyond their mountainous fortress core into the outside world via influence in Mesopotamia. Iraq has always been a buffer securing the Iranian core from threats on its western flank, which is where the Persians historically have faced external aggression. But the land of the two rivers — the Tigris and Euphrates — is also a potential launch pad for Persian power projection, into the heart of the Middle East and beyond.
“Al-Hakim’s death and the creation of a new pro-Iranian Shiite coalition, the Iraqi National Alliance, have re-ignited the U.S.-Iranian struggle over Iraq.”
It is for this very reason that in the imperial age, Iraq was the battleground between the Safavids and the Ottomans, and in early medieval times (before the advent of Islam) between the Sasanids and the Byzantines — a geopolitical condition that dates back to Persia of antiquity. In each of these epochs, the Iranians relied on peoples and groups in what is modern-day Iraq to facilitate the security of the Persian homeland, which is enclosed by mountains from the west, north and east and bordered by the Persian Gulf on the south. The Iranians have relied greatly on non-Persian people to their west to deal with foreign powers that amassed forces in Iraq and had alliances of their own with the locals.
In recent times, al-Hakim and the ISCI have been unique in that they existed at the intersection of U.S. and Iranian interests. Al-Hakim’s death and the creation of a new pro-Iranian Shiite coalition, the Iraqi National Alliance (INA), have re-ignited the U.S.-Iranian struggle over Iraq.
Though a staunch ally of Iran, al-Hakim was always careful to strike a balance between Washington and Tehran. His son Ammar, who is expected to take over as ISCI chief, is likely to be more beholden to Iran, given that the ISCI is trying to emerge from its recent defeat in the January provincial elections at the hands of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s faction — which has been used by the United States as a counter against Iranian influence in Iraq.
The Americans also harbor suspicions about Ammar. In February 2007, he was arrested and detained for several hours by U.S. forces at an Iranian/Iraqi checkpoint while returning home. Some two and a half years later, as Washington tries to draw down forces and increasingly relies on al-Maliki, Ammar likely will lead a new constellation of Shiite forces more closely aligned with Iran.
Meanwhile, Tehran — which is dealing with domestic political problems and is nearing a critical U.S. deadline to commence negotiations over its controversial nuclear program — is relying all the more on the INA to remind Washington that it can upset the American calculus for Iraq. Consequently, Iraq is re-emerging as an arena for a U.S.-Iranian geopolitical struggle.
-
Missing in Action
Obama has opted out of the Iraq–Syria crisis.
By John P. Hannah
It’s hard to believe, but nearly three weeks into a major crisis involving Syrian sponsorship of terrorism in Iraq, the United States is feigning neutrality. That’s a big mistake. Given that almost 130,000 U.S. troops remain in harm’s way trying to bolster Iraq’s stability, and given America’s longstanding concern with Syria’s role in fomenting violence in Iraq, the United States has a huge stake in supporting the Iraqi government’s efforts to pressure Syria out of the terrorism game.
First, some background. On August 19, two massive truck bombs exploded outside Iraq’s ministries of foreign affairs and finance. Up to 100 people were killed and several hundred more injured. Within days, Iraqi TV aired the confession of an alleged accomplice to the finance-ministry attack, who claimed that the bombings had been directed by two members of Saddam Hussein’s outlawed Baath party living under Syrian protection. Iraq demanded that Syria extradite the men. Syria refused. Iraq recalled its ambassador to Damascus. Syria responded in kind.
Refusing to back down, Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki publicly accused Syria of serving as a terrorist safe haven and of harboring a long list of wanted insurgents. Maliki noted that 90 percent of foreign jihadists crossing into Iraq passed through Syria. For good measure, Iraqi TV broadcast a second confession, this one by a Saudi extremist who spoke in some detail of being trained by Syrian intelligence. In a subsequent briefing for foreign ambassadors, Maliki shared evidence of a meeting held outside Damascus in late July between Iraqi Baathists and Sunni extremists in the presence of Syrian security officers. By the end of last week, Maliki had dispatched thousands of police reinforcements to the border with Syria to guard against further infiltrations. He also lodged a formal request with the United Nations for an international investigation of the August 19 bombings and other terrorist attacks, with a special emphasis on the destructive role played by neighboring states.
Remarkably, as tensions escalated between Baghdad and Damascus, the United States had almost nothing to say. The one exception came on August 26, when the State Department spokesman was asked about the deteriorating situation. Reading from prepared guidance, he replied:
We understand that there has been sort of mutual recall of the ambassadors. We consider that an internal matter. We’re — we believe that, as a general principle, that diplomatic dialogue is the best means to address the concerns of both parties. We are working with the Iraqis to determine who perpetrated these horrible acts of violence. But as I said, this is — it’s an internal matter for both — for the Iraqi government and the Syrian government. . . . We hope this doesn’t hinder dialogue between the two countries.
An internal matter? Let’s review a few essential facts. Iraq is a struggling democracy and putative ally of the United States, whose existence was forged in the crucible of an American-led war of liberation. Syria is a brutal anti-American dictatorship that, along with its closest ally, the Islamic Republic of Iran, is a charter member of the State Department’s “state sponsors of terrorism” list. Since 2003 — despite multiple attempts by the U.S. and Iraq to resolve the problem through “diplomatic dialogue” — the Syrian-Iranian axis has worked tirelessly to defeat the American project in Iraq and force a humiliating U.S. withdrawal.
Hundreds of unreconciled Baathists are harbored in Syria. Thousands of foreign jihadists have been welcomed at Damascus International Airport. After receiving money, training, and arms, they have been transported to the Iraqi border to engage in jihad — resulting in the deaths of hundreds of American soldiers and thousands of Iraqis. Syrian Military Intelligence (SMI) — headed by President Bashar al-Asad’s brother-in-law, Asef Shawkat (sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury for his links to Iraqi terrorism) — has been up to its eyeballs in this activity, its agents actively facilitating the work of al-Qaeda in Iraq’s most lethal foreign-fighter networks.
True, as the U.S. military has reported, the flow of jihadists from Syria has slowed significantly in the last year. But this has far more to do with the success of the surge, the overall improvement in Iraq’s security environment, and al-Qaeda’s diversion of recruits to the more promising Afghan theater than it does with any Syrian measures. It’s also true that Syria has in recent years conducted a harsh crackdown on Islamic extremists — but only those who refuse to play by SMI’s rules and stubbornly insist on targeting the Syrian regime in addition to that of Iraq. The objective of the Syrian crackdown has by no means been the elimination of deadly foreign-fighter networks per se, but rather their monopolization under the control of Syrian intelligence. The fact is that while there may be far fewer al-Qaeda-linked networks operating, those that remain continue to conduct lethal operations against Iraq with the knowledge, blessing, and assistance of the Syrian authorities — just as the Maliki government has alleged.
Knowing all this, and bearing in mind all the United States has at stake in Iraq’s success, how can the Obama administration adopt the posture of a disinterested bystander in this conflict? For the first time since 2003, an Iraqi government is prepared to stand up to one of its terrorist-sponsoring neighbors and to take the lead in rallying the international community to its side. And the U.S. remains on the sidelines? What message does that send about U.S. resolve to stand by allies who are under terrorist attack? If Iraq, whose independence has been purchased with immense sacrifice of U.S. blood and treasure, can’t count on American solidarity, what lessons will be drawn by others who look to Washington for support and reassurance against aggressive tyrants?
Even if the United States can’t confirm Maliki’s claims about Syria’s responsibility for the August 19 bombings, it could still easily craft a statement that makes clear whose side it stands on in light of Syria’s violent legacy in Iraq. Something along the lines of: “While we are working closely with Iraq to determine exactly who perpetrated these specific attacks, the United States has longstanding concerns about Syria’s role as a major transit point for foreign fighters and a haven for armed insurgents. We fully support Iraq’s call for the international community to take vigorous steps to enforce U.N. resolutions that require Iraq’s neighbors to prevent the transit of terrorists to and from Iraq, and of arms and finances that would support terrorists. Syria must be made to choose: It can become part of the solution in Iraq, or it can remain a major part of the problem. It cannot be both.” A reassuring phone call from President Obama to Maliki expressing outrage and support would also be helpful, as would a commitment by Secretary of State Clinton to make the issue of Syrian and Iranian support for violent activities in Iraq a talking point in all her meetings at the upcoming U.N. General Assembly in late September.
It’s hard, of course, not to wonder whether the administration’s removal from the Iraq–Syria crisis is not heavily influenced by its ongoing efforts to engage the Assad regime. Before undertaking his own mission to mediate the crisis, Turkey’s foreign minister spoke of an August 30 phone conversation with Secretary Clinton in which the need to insulate U.S.–Syrian relations seemed an important priority. The minister said that “there are extremely positive developments which have recently been emerging in relations between Syria and the U.S. — developments which we also encourage. We attach great importance to this depression between Syria and Iraq not influencing bilateral relations between Syria and the U.S.”
There certainly has been a significant effort by the administration to reach out to the Assad regime, though to what effect remains unclear. Six high-level delegations have visited Damascus in the past several months, pleading for greater Syrian cooperation on a host of Middle East problems. Two of the delegations have consisted of senior military officers from U.S. Central Command seeking Syrian help in shutting down the foreign-fighter pipelines — the second of which traveled just a week ahead of the August 19 Baghdad massacre. The administration has announced that, in response to Syrian demands, it will return a U.S. ambassador to Damascus and ease restrictions on the issuance of export licenses for Syria.
Though U.S. officials privately acknowledge that there has been little meaningful change in Syria’s policies on Lebanon, Palestine, or Iraq, President Obama seems personally committed to wooing Assad. Rumors have circulated of a recent Obama letter underscoring his desire for improved U.S.–Syrian relations. Uppermost in the president’s mind is said to be the goal of re-convening direct peace talks between Israel and Syria after an almost decade-long hiatus. It’s easy to imagine, therefore, that the administration’s hesitancy to enter the Iraq–Syria fray is being driven, at least in part, by its determination not to offend Assad and put at risk the chances for this kind of perceived diplomatic breakthrough.
That would be unfortunate. The United States never does particularly well, especially in the vortex of Middle East power politics, when it disregards the interests of its friends in an effort to appeal to its adversaries. The latter usually perceive such gestures as signs of weakness and indecision, and proceed to intensify their bad behavior. The former, meanwhile, spooked by such demonstrations of U.S. faithlessness, often end up cutting bad deals with America’s enemies in an effort to save their own skins.
When it comes to anti-American dictatorships in general, and Syria in particular, history suggests that leverage and pressure, not reassurance and unconditional concessions, are the most reliable ways to ensure that diplomatic engagement advances U.S. goals. It’s a lesson the Obama administration would do well to heed.
— John P. Hannah, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, served as national security adviser to Vice President Dick Cheney from 2005 to 2009.
National Review Online - http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=OTc2YTE2OTZkMjdjYmEyNjgwMGQ5NDQwMmY2M2IzZTM=
-
General Says Iraq Troop Reductions May Quicken Recommend
By THOM SHANKER
Published: September 29, 2009
WASHINGTON — The senior American commander in Iraq said Tuesday that he could reduce American forces to 50,000 troops even before the end of next summer if the expected January elections in Iraq went smoothly.
Gen. Ray Odierno said he had drafted a new plan for transferring duties to the Iraqis. That could ease the strain across the American armed forces and free up extra combat units for duty in the Afghanistan war, which has become a priority for the Obama administration.
In an interview at the Pentagon, the commander, Gen. Ray Odierno, said he had already ordered some service members and equipment diverted from the Iraq mission to Afghanistan, in particular surveillance aircraft and units known as “combat enablers,” which include engineers for clearing roadside bombs and military police officers for training Afghan forces.
The United States and Iraq agreed last year that American combat forces would be out of Iraq by August 2010, leaving 50,000 troops to advise and support the Iraqis. Since that schedule was set, the need for troops in Afghanistan has made that timing especially important — all the more so if commanders in Afghanistan formally request even more troops and President Obama agrees. In recent months American combat forces pulled out of Iraq’s city centers.
General Odierno described his continuing security concerns, especially in the north of Iraq, where there are deep Kurdish-Arab tensions and where homegrown insurgents who claim allegiance to Al Qaeda continue to operate.
But the general said he was confident enough in the path to stability — with orderly elections and a smooth transfer of power in the winter — that he had drafted a new plan that set out how the duties now performed by American forces would be increasingly transferred to Iraqis before the full withdrawal, planned for Dec. 31, 2011. For the final year and a half or so, the Americans would be advising and training the Iraqis and providing logistics to them.
He did caution that if the Iraqi government and military were not able to shoulder the entire burden of responsibility by that deadline, the ministries in Baghdad would have to rely for support on civilian United States agencies, in particular the State and Treasury Departments.
“We failed the first time in 2003, when things were fairly calm and we didn’t have a plan to transition what we had done militarily over to a civilian-led solution to help solve these problems,” General Odierno said.
“We have another opportunity here in 2010 and 2011 to do this,” he added. “What are the enduring functions that have to be transitioned over that will continue to build Iraqi civilian capacity and continue to improve their ability to provide security? We are very focused on that.”
The new Joint Campaign Plan was written in partnership with the American Embassy in Baghdad, the general said, and should be approved later this fall as the detailed map guiding the American withdrawal from Iraq.
The next benchmark for the American military withdrawal is Aug. 31, 2010, when forces must drop to 50,000. Military officers based in Baghdad said Tuesday that American military forces in Iraq numbered slightly more than 124,000, a reduction of 40,000 since 2008.
General Odierno said he had no intention of dropping below the 50,000-troop level required under a bilateral security agreement by the end of August, but he said he might reach that level before the deadline.
“Between now and May, I could accelerate the drawdown,” he said. “If we get through successful elections, and you seat the government peacefully, that provides another level of stability. That will help to reduce tensions.”
General Odierno said he had discussed the military needs for Afghanistan with Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the senior commander in Kabul, and with Gen. David H. Petraeus, the top officer in the Middle East, and he said all three had agreed that the military urgently required surveillance and transport aircraft in Afghanistan, as well as engineers and military police officers.
“We have been able to move some already over to Afghanistan,” General Odierno said. “We don’t want to affect the mission in Iraq, but we know some of this is needed in Afghanistan. I think we’ve been able to balance this so far.”
He said overall progress in Iraq was “slow, steady.” The leadership of Iraq’s security units has improved, and there is less sectarianism within these forces, the general said. But pitfalls remain.
“There is still too much political interference in the military,” General Odierno said. “That has always been a case there. It is better than it was, but it is still too much, and from a lot of different sources.”
The north of Iraq remains a serious security concern, especially in Nineveh Province, where, he said, “Al Qaeda in Iraq is still trying to re-establish a foothold and then be able to extend its tentacles down into Baghdad.”
Minority tensions, in particular between Kurds and Arabs in the north, are also a “driver of instability” and could be “exploited to destabilize the government of Iraq,” he noted.
And Iran has not halted its efforts to train insurgents and to send weapons and money in a bid for influence across the southern provinces of Iraq, General Odierno said, although Iranian agents “have reduced some of what they are doing.”
Even so, he said that Iraqi security forces continued to intercept large shipments of weapons and high-powered explosives sent from Iran.
-
By GINA CHON
BAGHDAD -- Iraqi politicians say they have put aside for the time being any plans to push for a referendum on the U.S.-Iraqi security pact governing the American troop pullout here.
The threat of a referendum had clouded U.S. withdrawal plans. If Iraqi voters were given a chance to vote on the deal some U.S. officials feared they would reject it, forcing an accelerated U.S. withdrawal.
Military officials have said they will comply with any quicker withdrawal in the case of a "no" vote in a referendum. The flagging momentum for a referendum now, however, eases pressure on U.S. commanders.
U.S. military spokesman Brig. Gen. Stephen Lanza said the referendum is an issue that is up to the Iraqis, and American troops are focused on continuing to comply with the security pact.
The security pact calls for all American troops to be out of Iraq by the end of 2011. When the security treaty was approved, Sunni lawmakers insisted on a referendum as a condition of their support. Originally scheduled for last July, it was delayed.
Many observers suspected it might never happen. But in August, Iraq's cabinet set a new date of Jan. 16, coinciding with nationwide parliamentary polls. A "no" vote on the deal would trigger a termination clause, speeding up a full American troop withdrawal by almost a year. Lawmakers said Sunday there weren't any moves afoot to push through legislation authorizing the referendum. That, they say, means it will either be delayed once again, or dropped altogether.
Recent worry over Iraq's ability to take over security from the U.S. faster -- should the referendum force an early American withdrawal -- appears to have cooled some Sunnis' insistence on the referendum.
"A fast withdrawal of American troops may create a security vacuum," said Sunni lawmaker Saleh Mutlaq, who had pushed for a referendum.
Lawmakers are also consumed with trying to pass a crucial elections law, and they have had no time to deal with legislation for a referendum vote, said Muther al-Hakim, a member of both the largest Shiite alliance in parliament and the legal committee, which would be responsible for putting together a referendum proposal.
Mr. Hakim and Rashid al-Azawi, a lawmaker and senior member of the Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party, both said a referendum was no longer necessary because the U.S. military had so far abided by the security pact.
In the battle over the separate election legislation, political leaders have largely agreed to rely on the elections law from the 2005 race, with a few changes, lawmakers said Sunday.
-
1,000,000 Iraqis Died As a Result of Clinton's Policies... 85,000 Died During "Bush's War" (Horrifying Video)
In 1996 Secretary of State Madeleine Albright admitted that Bill Clinton's policy that resulted in 500,000 dead Iraqi children was worth it.
In a much forgotten exchange between Lesley Stahl and Madeleine Albright on "60 Minutes" back on May 12, 1996:
[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FbIX1CP9qr4&feature=player_embedded[/youtube]
Lesley Stahl on U.S. sanctions against Iraq: We have heard that a half million children have died. I mean, that's more children than died in Hiroshima. And, you know, is the price worth it?
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright: I think this is a very hard choice, but the price--we think the price is worth it.
Here's the horrifying video:
The United Nations estimated that a total of 1 million Iraqi civilians died as result of the sanctions on Iraq.
This tragedy never seemed to bother the Left for some reason.
Yesterday, the Iraqi government reported that 85,000 Iraqis were killed during the Iraq war.
Bush may have saved 750,000 Iraqis.
For some reason this was ignored by the state-run media.
-
Secretary Halfbright seriously bobbled this (which was widely reported in the Arab world btw) by accepting the number. IIRC Reason Magazine did an analysis that showed the actual number was far less-- about 125,000. This is still an outrageous number of people to die so that the French, the UN et al could make their skim off the UN embargo.
One point to draw from this little trip down the memory hole is that the UN embargo had a VERY heavy human cost.
-
So I am back in Amman overnighting for trip bck to Baghdad tomorrow. The hotel has quite a few Australian soldiers staying here. I think they arrived today and would not be surprised if they are on my flight out tomorrow.
Anyway, I have a couple of them on my floor. They have their room door propped wide open and are walking around in shorts and t-shirts. This is a 5 star hotel in the capital of a Muslim country. There are even several fully covered Arab women on my floor and these clowns are walking around like they are back home in their trailers. The only thing I haven't seen is them drinking beer but the night is still young.
Ths kind of behavior will be remembered far more and far longer than any other "good" things these soldiers may do over here. They will be rememberedby those who saw them as uncouth and disrespectful.
-
Bombs in Iraq: One of them hit the Ministry of Justice building today. A place I have been to a number of times. In fact coming back from there was when I missed being atomized by 5 minutes a month or two ago....
Glad I was on a C-130 from Amman today....
==========
Eyes on the Prize
By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
Published: October 24, 2009
BAGHDAD, Aug. 25, 2012 — President Obama flew into Baghdad today on his end-of-term tour to highlight successes in U.S. foreign policy. At a time when the Arab-Israel negotiations remain mired in deadlock and Afghanistan remains mired in quagmire, Mr. Obama hailed the peaceful end of America’s combat presence in Iraq as his only Middle East achievement. Speaking to a gathering of Iraqi and U.S. officials under the banner “Mission Actually Accomplished,” written in Arabic and English, Mr. Obama took credit for helping Iraq achieve a decent — albeit hugely costly — end to the war initiated by President Bush. Aides said Mr. Obama would highlight the progress in Iraq in his re-election campaign.
Could we actually read such a news article in three years? I wouldn’t bet on it. But I wouldn’t rule it out either. Six years after the U.S. invasion, Iraq continues to unnerve and tantalize. Watching Iraqi politics is like watching a tightrope artist crossing a dangerous cavern. At every step it looks as though he is going to fall into the abyss, and yet, somehow, he continues to wobble forward. Nothing is easy when trying to transform a country brutalized by three decades of cruel dictatorship. It is one step, one election, one new law, at a time. Each is a struggle. Each is crucial.
This next step is particularly important, which is why we cannot let Afghanistan distract U.S. diplomats from Iraq. Remember: Transform Iraq and it will impact the whole Arab-Muslim world. Change Afghanistan and you just change Afghanistan.
Specifically, the Obama team needs to make sure that Iraq’s bickering politicians neither postpone the next elections, scheduled for January, nor hold them on the basis of the 2005 “closed list” system that is dominated by the party leaders. We must insist, with all our leverage, on an “open list” election, which creates more room for new faces by allowing Iraqis to vote for individual candidates and not just a party. This is what Iraq’s spiritual leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, is also demanding. It is a much more accountable system.
If we can get open list voting, the next big step would be the emergence of Iraqi parties in this election running for office on the basis of nonsectarian coalitions — where Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds run together. This would be significant: Iraq is a microcosm of the whole Middle East, and if Iraq’s sects can figure out how to govern themselves — without an iron-fisted dictator — democracy is possible in this whole region.
What is tantalizing is that the Iraqi prime minister, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, who emerged from the Shiite Dawa Party, has decided to run this time with what he calls “The State of Law Coalition,” a pan-Iraqi, nationalist alliance of some 40 political parties, including Sunni tribal leaders and other minorities.
Mr. Maliki was in Washington last week, and I interviewed him at the Willard Hotel, primarily to ask about his new party. “Iraq cannot be ruled by one color or religion or sect,” he explained. “We clearly saw that sectarianism and ethnic grouping threatened our national unity. Therefore, I believe we should bring all these different colors together and establish Iraq as a country built on rule of law and equity and citizenship. The Iraqi people encouraged us. They want this. Other parties are also organizing themselves like this. No one can run anymore as a purely sectarian bloc. ... Our experiment is very unique in this region.”
That’s for sure. The Iranians want pro-Tehran Shiite parties to dominate Iraq. Also, the Iranian dictatorship hates the idea of “inferior” Iraq holding real elections while Iran limits voting to preselected candidates and then rigs the outcome. Most Arab leaders fear any real multisectarian democracy taking root in the neighborhood.
“The most dangerous thing that would threaten others is that if we really create success in building a democratic state in Iraq,” said Maliki, whose country today now has about 100 newspapers. “The countries whose regimes are built on one party, sect or ethnic group will feel endangered.”
Maliki knows it won’t be easy: “Saddam ruled for more than 35 years,” he said. “We need one or two generations brought up on democracy and human rights to get rid of this orientation.”
If this election comes off, it will still be held with U.S. combat troops on hand. The even bigger prize and test will be four years hence, if Iraq can hold an election in which multiethnic coalitions based on differing ideas of governance — not sectarianism — vie for power, and the reins are passed from one government to another without any U.S. military involvement. That would be the first time in modern Arab history where true multisectarian coalitions contest power, and cede power, without foreign interference. That would shake up the whole region.
Yes, let’s figure out Afghanistan. But let’s not forget that something very important — but so fragile and tentative — is still playing out in Iraq, and we and our allies still need to help bring it to fruition.
-
The surge is now history. It, coupled with other events, was effective. But it is now history. Water under the bridge. Irrelevant to the moment.
I believe when the USA leaves for good, the civil war will be on like DonkeyKong.
-
Iraq: A Rebounding Jihad
October 28, 2009
By Scott Stewart
On Oct. 25, militants in Iraq conducted a coordinated attack in which they detonated large vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) at the federal Ministry of Justice building and the Baghdad Provincial Council building nearly simultaneously. The two ministries are located in central Baghdad near the Green Zone and are just over a quarter of a mile apart.
The bomb-laden vehicles were driven by suicide operatives who managed to detonate them in close proximity to the exterior security walls of the targeted buildings. The attack occurred just before 10:30 a.m. on a workday, indicating that it was clearly designed to cause maximum casualties -- which it did. The twin bombing killed more than 150 people and wounded hundreds of others, making it the deadliest attack in Baghdad since the April 18, 2007, attacks against Shiite neighborhoods that killed more than 180 people.
The Oct. 25 attack was very similar in design and target set to an attack on Aug. 19, in which coordinated VBIEDs were detonated at the Iraqi Foreign Ministry and Finance Ministry buildings, along with a string of smaller attacks in other areas of the city. The Foreign Ministry building is located in the same part of Baghdad as the Ministry of Justice and the Baghdad Provincial Council, while the Finance Ministry is located a short distance away and across the river. The Aug. 19 attacks, which also were launched shortly after 10 a.m., killed at least 95 people and wounded hundreds.
On Oct. 26, in a statement posted to the jihadist al-Fallujah Web site, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) claimed responsibility for the attack against the Justice Ministry and Baghdad Provincial Council. The group had also previously claimed responsibility for the Aug. 19 attack against the Foreign and Finance ministries. Judging from the targets chosen and the use of suicide bombers, it is likely that the ISI was indeed responsible for both attacks.
These recent attacks in Baghdad reveal a great deal about the ISI and its capabilities. They also provide a glimpse of what might be in store for Iraq in the run-up to the 2010 national parliamentary and general elections, which are scheduled to be held in January.
The Islamic State of Iraq
The ISI is not a single entity but a coalition of groups that includes al Qaeda's Iraqi franchise. This coalition was formed as a result of a conscious decision by jihadist leaders to put an Iraqi face on jihadist efforts in the country rather than have the movement characterized by foreign leaders such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. This transformation was illustrated by the fact that an Iraqi named Abu Omar al-Baghdadi was named to lead the ISI and that Abu Ayyub al-Masri, the Egyptian leader of al Qaeda in Iraq who succeeded Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, pledged his allegiance to al-Baghdadi and the ISI in November 2006. This change enabled the ISI coalition to build stronger ties to the local Sunni tribal elders and to expand its support network in the Sunni-controlled areas of the country.
This link to the local Sunni leadership backfired when the Awakening Councils composed of Sunni Iraqis -- many of whom were former militants -- helped clamp down on the ISI. Because of this, large suicide attacks are less common then they were at the peak of the insurgency (and of overall violence) in 2007. But the Sunni elders never allowed the ISI to be totally dismantled. They saw the coalition as a useful tool in their negotiations with the Shia and Kurds, to ensure that they got what they saw as their fair share of power.
During the crackdown on the ISI that accompanied the U.S. surge of troops into Iraq, many of the foreign fighters were forced to leave the country and flee to greener pastures (many of them went to Pakistan and Afghanistan). However, the core jihadist operatives associated with ISI who survived and remained in Iraq were both battle-hardened and highly skilled after years of combat against coalition forces. As seen by these recent attacks, the ISI retains a great deal of its capability. It has demonstrated that it is still able to gather intelligence, plan attacks, acquire ordnance, build reliable IEDs and execute spectacular attacks in the center of Baghdad against government ministry buildings.
Tactical Clues
A tactical look at the Oct. 25 attack can tell us a great deal about the state of ISI. Perhaps the most obvious thing that can be ascertained is that ISI appears to have no problem securing large quantities of explosives. The two vehicles used in the attack are reported to have contained approximately 1,500 and 2,200 pounds of high explosives. (The larger of the two vehicles was apparently used to target the Justice Ministry.) The photos and videos of the two attack sites would seem roughly consistent with those estimates. From the damage done, it is obvious that the devices employed in the attack were very large and not merely 50 or 100 pounds of high explosives stuffed in the trunk of a car. The ISI not only needs money to purchase such explosive material (or a facility to produce it), but it also must be able to discreetly transport and store the material. So we are talking about vehicles for moving explosives around, places for caching the material and shops where the VBIEDS can be fabricated without detection.
It is also important to note that the two devices functioned as designed -- they did not malfunction or have a low-order detonation where only a portion of the main charge exploded. Whoever built these two large devices (and the two from the August attack) not only had access to thousands of pounds of high explosives but knew what they were doing. Assembling a large VBIED and getting it to actually function as designed is not as easy as it might seem; it takes a great deal of expertise. And the ISI's various bombmakers have accumulated a wealth of bombmaking experience while constructing IEDs of all sorts -- including a large number of massive VBIEDs -- used in many of the hundreds, if not thousands, of terrorist attacks that the ISI's constituent groups have conducted since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.
Reports suggest that the devices used in the Oct. 25 attack were hidden in two small passenger buses, and that those buses were new enough to blend into the traffic in the government sector of Baghdad. It appears that the ISI used the buses to get around the greater scrutiny paid to vehicles used in past attacks like cargo and tanker trucks. It will be interesting to see whether the buses can be traced and where the ISI obtained them. Following the attack, small buses will now be placed under heightened scrutiny -- meaning we can anticipate that the group may switch to another type of vehicle for the next round of attacks. (Jihadists in Iraq have used everything from bicycles to ambulances for their VBIEDs.)
We have not seen a final report on how the completed devices got to Baghdad -- whether they were manufactured outside Baghdad and then smuggled through the various security checkpoints, or if they were constructed in Baghdad from explosives smuggled into the city in smaller quantities. There are some Iraqi politicians who are saying that devices of this size could only have passed through security with inside collaboration, and there are certainly some members of the Iraqi security forces who are either sympathetic to the jihadist cause or have been placed into the security forces to act as agents of influence. However, if the explosives were well-hidden in a nice, new passenger bus with proper documentation, or if the explosives were brought into the city in smaller quantities and the VBIEDs were constructed in Baghdad, it is quite possible that the attackers did not require high-level inside assistance to conduct the attack.
Of course, if the ISI did not have high-level inside assistance for this attack, then it means that it possesses a sophisticated network capable of gathering intelligence, planning attacks and acquiring and smuggling large quantities of explosives into the heart of Baghdad without detection -- which is not an inconsequential thing. If the ISI conducted this attack without any significant inside help, the problem is far greater that if it had; regardless of political settlements or purges of the security forces, the network will remain in place. It will be much harder to ferret out if it is external.
The ministry buildings that were attacked were secured by exterior security perimeters that prevented the vehicles carrying the explosive devices from getting right up next to them. However, they were not hardened facilities and did not present a truly hard target for the attackers. The buildings were standard office buildings built during more peaceful times in Iraq and had lots of windows. They were also built in close proximity to the street and did not have the standoff distance required to provide protection against a large VBIED. Standoff distance had been provided for these buildings previously when the streets around them were closed to traffic, but the streets were opened up a few months back by the Iraqi government as a sign that things were returning to normal in Baghdad. In past VBIED attacks in Baghdad, the ISI was forced to attack soft targets or targets on the perimeter of secure zones. The opening of many streets to traffic in 2009 has expanded the group's targeting possibilities -- especially if it can use large devices to overcome the limited protection that short standoff distance affords at targets like those recently struck.
Hardened construction, protective window film, and perimeter walls and barricades are useful, and such measures can be effective in protecting a facility against a small IED. They also certainly saved lives on Oct. 25 by not allowing the VBIEDs to pull up right next to the facilities, where they could have caused more direct structural damage and killed more people inside the buildings. (It appears that many of those killed were commuters on the street.) However, distance is the most critical thing that protects a facility against an attack with a very large VBIED, and the ministry buildings attacked by the ISI on Oct. 25 lacked sufficient standoff distance to protect them from 1,500- and 2,200-pound VBIEDs.
In practical terms, there are very few capital cities anywhere in the world that provide the space for effective standoff distance for their ministry-level buildings. Even in Washington, streets had to be closed to traffic around buildings like the White House, the State Department and the Pentagon to provide adequate standoff. There is often a great deal of tension between city officials who desire a smooth flow of traffic and security officials attempting to guard facilities against attack.
Following the Oct. 25 attacks, the Iraqi government has increased security around government facilities (as it did after the Aug. 19 attack), but the steps taken are mainly just short-term security measures that tend to gloss over the larger long-term problem of balancing security with feelings of normalcy in Baghdad and throughout Iraq.
Implications
Since August, the ISI has attacked the Iraqi Finance Ministry, Foreign Ministry and Justice Ministry and the Baghdad Provincial Council, and these attacks are being used to send a number of signals.
First, the jihadists in the ISI are attempting to split the existing power-sharing agreement in Baghdad. If the Sunni, Shia and Kurds can reach a final understanding, the jihadists lose their value as a bargaining lever for the Sunni elders and will rapidly lose their operational space (and likely their lives). Second, if the Sunni, Shia and Kurds can form a stable government, the jihadists lose all hope of forming their aspired-for caliphate in Iraq. The ISI needs chaos in Iraq to have any hope of stepping into power like the Taliban did in Afghanistan.
The local Sunni leaders likely are providing at least some level of support to the ISI -- or, at the very least, they are turning a blind eye to the various ISI activities that are almost certainly based out of Sunni-controlled areas. The Sunni sheikhs are using the ISI to send a message to Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki that the Sunnis must be accommodated if there is to be real peace and stability in Iraq. One sticking point for the Sunni elders is that a large percentage of the Awakening Council members have not been integrated into the security forces as promised. Of course, the Shia and Kurds then use these attacks as an excuse for why the Sunnis cannot be trusted -- and it all becomes a vicious circle.
The political situation that is driving the security problems in Iraq is complex and cannot be easily resolved. There are many internal and external players who are all trying to influence the final outcome in Iraq for their own benefit. In addition to the internal squabbles over power and oil wealth, Iraq is also a proxy battleground where the United States and Iran are attempting to maintain and assert influence. Regional players like the Saudis, Syrians and Turks also will take a keen interest in the elections and will certainly attempt to influence them to whatever degree they can. The end result of all this meddling is that peace and stability will be hard to obtain.
This means that terrorist attacks likely will continue for the foreseeable future, including attacks by the ISI. If the attacks in August and October are any indication, the remainder of the run-up to the January elections could prove quite bloody.
-
By GINA CHON
KIRKUK, Iraq -- Arab and Kurdish military commanders here are making efforts at cooperation despite their bitter political differences -- a surprising development that offers some hope that one of Iraq's most difficult ethnic divides may be narrowing.
U.S. Army Lt. Col. Terry Cook, left, discusses security issues with peshmerga commander Brig. Gen. Sherko Fatah Namik at his headquarters in Kirkuk. Above hangs a portrait of Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, a Kurd.
Cook
Cook
Kurdish and Arab politicians in Iraq have clashed over contested land, petroleum legislation and a draft constitution that the Kurdish semiautonomous enclave is pushing. Most recently, the two sides squabbled for weeks in Parliament over an election law governing next year's parliamentary polls. Lawmakers finally passed the legislation on Sunday.
Gen. Ray Odierno, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, has said Arab-Kurd tensions are the country's biggest security threat. But over the past six months, in parts of Iraq's north, American commanders have brokered a quiet, if uneasy, détente between the two sides' military forces. Officers from Iraq's mostly Arab national army have started working with counterparts from the Kurdish regional government's armed militia, the peshmerga.
More
* WSJ.com/Mideast: News, video, graphics
American military officers in Kirkuk have persuaded Arab and Kurdish commanders to cooperate partly by emphasizing what it means to be a professional soldier, which is not being involved in politics. They tell them that the problems between Kurdish and Arab politicians in Baghdad, and between the Kurdish regional and Iraqi governments, need to be solved by the politicians -- that their job as soldiers is to take care of security.
When the Iraqi army's 12th Division, led by a former commander under Saddam Hussein, showed up in Kirkuk last year, Kurdish peshmerga commander Brig. Gen. Sherko Fatah Namik was ready for a fight. "If the Iraqi army comes here, I will kill them all," Gen. Namik told his American counterparts then.
These days, at twice-monthly meetings on a U.S. outpost, Gen. Namik's men, Iraqi army officers and U.S. officials coordinate security and talk out problems, participants from both sides say.
Gen. Namik isn't immune to the political debate. He often tells American commanders there needs to be a referendum on the status of Kirkuk, which he says will prove the city belongs to the Kurdish region. How voting will be held in Kirkuk, which is claimed by Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen, had been the key hurdle holding up the election law. Still, Gen. Namik and Maj. Gen. Abdul Ameer of the Iraqi army -- the former commander under the Hussein regime -- have hammered out a joint-patrol plan for Kirkuk province, in which the U.S. military may play referee, though many Arab and Turkmen tribal and local government leaders oppose the plan. Such patrols for disputed Arab-Kurd areas were floated earlier this year by Gen. Odierno.
Cooperation between the two militaries is incremental but it has eased friction among security-service officials on both sides. There has been a surge in big bombing attacks across the region this year, even as overall violence in much of the rest of Iraq has eased. The peshmerga's contribution in northern Kirkuk province leaves Gen. Ameer free to focus on tamping down violence in the province's south.
Gen. Ameer initially opposed the peshmerga's presence in Kirkuk, saying they belonged in the Kurdish region, until he began meeting with Kurdish commanders, with the help of the U.S. military.
U.S. commanders also have proposed joint patrols in Gaware, an ethnically mixed rural area in Iraq's northern Ninewa province. Currently, peshmerga and Iraqi security forces staff their own checkpoints along a key route there, operated separately on opposite sides of the road. They don't coordinate their patrols, leaving big swaths of territory unguarded, U.S. commanders say. The cooperation hasn't been easy, requiring U.S. troops to play arbitrator, grievance counselor and devil's advocate. Recently, American officers worked to rein in the Kurdish intelligence agency, known as the Asayeesh. U.S. commanders told the Kurds the agency can't conduct offensive operations. That's the job of the Iraqi army or police, they argued.
Both sides say the new relationship would have been impossible without a strong push from the Americans. That has raised worry about whether it will endure once U.S. forces start to draw down as planned next year.
[Iraq map]
Gen. Namik joined the peshmerga in 1985, at age 16, to fight Mr. Hussein's oppressive regime. A year later, the central government launched a campaign of oppression in the north, killing at least 150,000 Kurds and displacing hundreds of thousands. After Baghdad's military defeat in the Gulf War, the Kurdish region was given semiautonomy in 1991. When the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003, Gen. Namik joined American forces as they entered Kirkuk that April. He has been based in the province since. In 2008, Baghdad sent in the Iraqi 12th Army division, headed by Gen. Ameer.
After several near-clashes, the U.S. military convinced peshmerga and Iraqi army commanders to sit down together at a lunch in March. The Iraqi army and local police, which are ethnically mixed but led by a Kurd, started to coordinate raids against insurgents in May.
In June, representatives from the Kurdish and Iraqi security forces began working together at a U.S. base in Kirkuk, exchanging intelligence and coordinating security efforts. "Gen. Ameer and I are friends," Gen. Namik says. "I've told him the Kirkuk issue is bigger than us and can't be solved by us. We're soldiers and we have to take care of security for all Iraqis."
Gen. Ameer said communication has been key to understanding each other because their efforts are now coordinated. Iraqi Ministry of Defense spokesman Mohammed al-Askari says the government supports cooperation between the Iraqi army and the peshmerga. Joint patrols involving the Iraqi army, peshmerga and U.S. forces in disputed areas of northern Iraq may start before the end of this year.
Write to Gina Chon at gina.chon@wsj.com
-
Our man in Iraq is no longer there, but here are some letters from some of the Iraqi men from whom he worked. For reasons of OPSEC, no fotos:
Some goodbye correspondence I felt like sharing. I think it's important for you folks to see Iraqis as I have found many of them to be. Many, if not most, have a great goodness in their hearts. That is how I will remember them when I leave. They can do some stupid, dumb mierda but I have met many who have good hearts. I had to talk Headar out of giving me his Iraq national soccer team jersey yesterday. Can you imagine how precious a memory that is to him? Yet he wanted to give it to me.
---------
I am at a loss of words as am writing this mail with sadness for your leaving the JALEA. I was fortunate to work with a great advisor like you and you added a huge experience to my career, I admired your knowledge and courage from the first moment I worked with you. And I would like to thank you so much for supporting me in many occasions.
You will be impossible to replace.
I hope all the best to you in your future endeavors.
I would be glad if you contact me at me personal e mail: xxxxxx
My best wishes to you and to your family.
Sincerely,
--------- ---------- --------
Hi,
Actually, I don't know how to start to express my gratefulness and appreciation for helping my country and people to rise them up especially in the Judicial Security Sector, which is the most significant element of the Power. In addition, the great efforts and time had been assigned for behalf of our country, by putting your life under risk and terrible circumstances, and leaving your family. So I would like to convey my thanks instead of the Iraqi people and wishing you all the goodness and luck in your life.
And I want to thank your family, and friends for their sustaining and encouraging for being away for a year
Greatly appreciation to stand beside Iraqi employees and try to get the best for them
I hope we can keep in contact: xxxx
-
Iraq - The United States' Other War
MOST NEWS IN THE UNITED STATES that touches the realm of foreign affairs these days focuses obsessively on what U.S. President Barack Obama is going to do about Afghanistan, but on Wednesday, there were a number of reminders that the war in Iraq remains unsettled. Elections that will be a critical test for the Iraqi government were once again thrown into question when the country’s Sunni vice president, Tariq al-Hashemi, vetoed an election law that was cobbled together and passed by the parliament. One major problem with the law, according to al-Hashemi, was that it didn’t provide enough seats in government for refugees who have fled Iraq — many if not most of whom are Sunnis.
The law will now return to the parliament, where members will attempt to hash out yet another compromise. Despite government assurances that elections will take place as scheduled on Jan. 21, it is increasingly likely that the vote will be delayed for several weeks, if not months. The problem is that no political reconciliation is going to be possible in the short term: Elections require an election law; an election law requires a power-sharing deal; and a power-sharing deal requires a belief by all parties that their interests can be served. Yet, the Iraqi parliament is a reflection of the ethnosectarian divisions that characterize the country — and it’s not just a three-way split between Sunnis, Shia and Kurds. There are also major disagreements within the three factions. Getting to the current political agreement was an enormous battle, and finding a way to get the parliament to satisfy Sunni demands undoubtedly will involve another long, drawn-out battle.
“The Iraqi parliament is a reflection of the ethnosectarian divisions that characterize the country — and it’s not just a three-way split between Sunnis, Shia and Kurds.”
Not only are the Sunnis uncomfortable with the agreement that has been hammered out, but it has become apparent that the Kurds of northern Iraq are also gathering steam to say that they aren’t getting the representation they want. With Sunnis and Kurds each in the minority, both groups have every incentive to use their considerable political leverage to cry foul on what they consider the tyranny of the majority Shiite coalition. In the meantime, the Iraqi election commission has said it is not making any preparations for the elections because it simply doesn’t know what the timeline will be.
The shaky political situation also impacts the U.S. military withdrawal effort. There have been signs that violence is on the upswing, and this renewed challenge to political stability – in the form of a law forged through arduous negotiation — is not a positive sign.
The U.S. surge in Iraq was not about using force to impose a military reality — it was about breaking the cycle of violence in order to set some foundations upon which political reconciliation might be built. Central to its success was the accommodation reached between U.S. forces in Anbar province and the Sunni tribal leaders – an accommodation that took place even before the surge began. Those Sunnis broke with al Qaeda and other foreign jihadist elements in the hopes of integrating into the country’s formal security forces and the federal political process. But the Shia in Baghdad have continued to drag their feet on a political solution, and there are signs that Sunni support for al Qaeda and the Baath party is resurging — no doubt partly as a result of the political turmoil.
Seeking to downplay concerns about the weakening political environment, the U.S. commander in Iraq, Gen. Ray Odierno, said Wednesday that a delay for elections would be no challenge to Obama’s promise to withdraw “most” troops from Iraq by Aug. 31, 2010, since the U.S. military can wait until spring to adjust and readjust as necessary. In making this statement, Odierno effectively told the Iraqi parliament that they have until spring to figure out some sort of political solution.
But it not clear that a political solution will be forthcoming, or when — and in the meantime, the security situation likely will get steadily worse. So far, the Sunni insurgency that prompted the U.S. surge has remained quiet; the Sunnis have waited to see if the political solution would work its magic. As the date for elections draws closer, however, the chance that this faction could revive its violent activities grows.
Meanwhile, back in the United States, Obama’s administration has set about putting the Iraq war behind it, while focusing on finding a solution to the war in Afghanistan. The ability to do so was based on the continued stability of Iraq, achieved through the surge. However, the sustainability of the gains from the surge in Iraq — in terms of political consolidation and breaking the cycle of violence — is fragile and questionable. Delays in these critical elections are a reminder that the situation is far from settled.
-
"Our man in Iraq" is back home in America, but today he writes:
"One of the bombs today targeted the new location that the Iraqi HJC (Higher Judiciary Council) guys I used to work and coordinate with moved to (the old "Karkh Appellate courthouse"). That is where they moved much of the judicial operations to after the October bomb destroyed the Ministry of Justice building. Several of those guys did not survive the blast. One of them was a guy named Ahmad Diaa who I probably liked more than any other Iraqi I met over there.
"It is a very sad day for me."
-
I posted about Ahmad Diaa in the Rest in Peace thread with some comments about his courage against Islamic Fascism and the comments of so many other ordinary Iraqi Muslims.
My friend then said:
"Most of the Muslims I met over there could have cared less about a caliphate. Extremist Islam was not their thing. Many did not even go to mosque on Friday. They are Muslim like I am Catholic. That is their religious identification, as Catholic is mine. They have their cultural values that comport with Islamic principles but a desire to impose their view of the world on others? Absolutely not.
"But those wielding weapons and planting bombs command attention and "respect.". They dominate moderates who are by definition moderate.
"I blame al Maliki for his insistence on tearing down T-walls and opening up the Iraqi people once again to be bled out by Jihadists and other anti-government insurgents. T-walls and tight checkpoints gave the Iraqi people some breathing room over the past few years, and he is throwing all caution to the wind."
-
Summary
Kurdish Regional Government President Massoud Barzani has announced his intention to establish a unified Kurdish army in Iraq’s semi-autonomous Kurdish region. Combining Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan forces will not be an easy task, but Iraq’s Kurdish leaders have a strategic imperative to band together in dealing with their Arab rivals in the Iraqi central government. The Kurdish proposal signals a potential revival of militia building in Iraq, which carries significant implications for the U.S. exit strategy.
Analysis
As sectarian tensions flare ahead of Iraq’s parliamentary elections in early 2010, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in the north has announced plans to build its own army. KRG President Massoud Barzani said Nov. 22 that he intends to establish a unified Kurdish army in Iraq’s semi-autonomous Kurdish region by outlawing the areas’ private militias (peshmerga) and bringing them under the direct jurisdiction of the Ministry of Peshmerga. The KRG leaders hope this initiative will mend a political rift within Iraqi Kurdistan and give the KRG more strength in battling its Arab rivals in Iraq’s central government.
(Click here to read a STRATFOR translation of the proposed law taken from the Kurdistan National Assembly’s Web site)
Iraq’s Kurds inhabit a mountainous region in the country’s north. While this terrain has protected them from foreign invasion, it has also nurtured deep-seated tribal rivalries. These rivalries are so strong that Kurds have often sided with a common enemy (like Iran, Turkey or Baathist Iraq) to undermine each other. However, in 2003, rivals Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) put aside their differences and formed a unified regional government to represent Kurdish interests in Iraq’s post-Saddam Hussein government. The alliance has remained intact through a series of formal agreements that have roughly divided power between the parties.
Barzani is hoping the creation of a unified army will consolidate the KDP and PUK and insure the integrity of their alliance. Barzani saw the alliance threatened most recently in July, in the Kurdish provincial election, with the rise of the Goran (“Change”) party. Goran — which campaigned on an anti-corruption, reformist platform — did particularly well in the PUK’s stronghold in Iraqi Kurdistan’s east, claiming 25 parliamentary seats and winning nearly a quarter of the popular vote.
The erosion of PUK’s power has become obvious. Already Jalal Talabani, head of the PUK, has acquiesced to several KDP demands. For example, the KDP has held the KRG’s premiership since 2005 when, according to the KDP-PUK agreement, it should have relinquished control of the post in 2007. However, the KDP does not want to see the PUK deteriorate any further. The KDP is aware of the PUK’s fragile unity, especially following the political turmoil the PUK experienced in the past year, and is concerned that any further weakening will exacerbate existing fissures and splinter the group. Barzani is loath to see a political vacuum develop in the north — especially one that might be filled by Goran, whose demands for a more transparent government and the establishment of the rule of law directly challenge the delicate power balance between the KDP and PUK.
Barzani’s bid to consolidate peshmerga forces is also a direct response to the Kurds’ uncertain relationship with its neighbors. The KRG’s relationship with Baghdad has deteriorated significantly in recent months. As the presence of U.S.-led coalition forces in Iraq diminishes, and as the country readies itself for its second post-Hussein parliamentary elections early next year, the nation’s ethno-sectarian tensions have started bubbling to the surface again. In November, Barzani announced that the Kurds will boycott the upcoming election unless the election laws are amended to increase Kurdish representation in the national parliament. Furthermore, Iraq’s upcoming round of oil auctions has reignited the debate over the distribution of oil revenues from Iraq’s northern fields (the Iraqi central government’s November statement that it would not honor oil contracts signed by the KRG is an example of the strife over oil revenues).
Not only is Baghdad working to contain Iraqi Kurdistan’s economic gains, it also does not want to see the region gain influence in security issues. Starting in 2005, Iraq’s central government, with a strong push from the United States, half-heartedly announced several steps to heal the country’s ethno-sectarian wounds by integrating Kurdish and Sunni militias into the Shiite-dominated army and police force. The plan, however, has not been fully realized. Kurds currently compose 7.2 percent of the Iraqi army, well below the 18-20 percent mandated by the country’s constitution. Nearly 200,000 peshmerga have yet to be integrated into the Iraqi army. Furthermore, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s announcement in November that he would prioritize reconstruction over security could provide him the cover to impede the integration of Kurdish and Sunni forces into the country’s military and maintain the Shiite’s dominance of the army. Baghdad has also dragged its feet on its promise to create two Kurdish brigades in the KRG and recently shut down two military colleges located in the Zakho and Qalachwalan districts in the Kurdistan region.
The slow progress is in no small part due to the Shiite-dominated government’s reluctance to share its security responsibilities with its ethno-sectarian rivals, but the Kurdish leadership is just as wary of relinquishing control of its entire security apparatus to the central government. The KDP and PUK each control about 100,000 peshmerga. Iraq’s army currently numbers just under 260,000 soldiers. If the PUK and KDP can work out their internal differences to create an umbrella group, the Kurds will be able to better resist their Arab rivals in Baghdad, not to mention the Kurds’ array of external rivals in Turkey, Iran and Syria.
While the idea for a unified Kurdish army came from the KDP, the PUK will control the Ministry of Peshmerga — an indication that the plan enjoys at least some high-level support from both parties. However, implementing the plan will be difficult. The KDP and the PUK each control their own police, security and intelligence peshmerga, and it is uncertain how effectively the Ministry of Peshmerga can streamline its operations and overcome substantial issues of distrust. Also, the KRG, which is running a budget deficit of more than $500,000,000 according to some reports, will be hard-pressed to find funding for this plan: The estimated cost of funding a Kurdish army is more than $100 million a month. The KRG’s prime minister and Iraq’s finance minister met Dec. 8 to discuss a host of financial issues, but given the tensions between the KRG and the Iraqi central government, Baghdad is not likely to be willing to bail out the KRG.
The KRG’s proposal that would legalize the plan for a unified army notably specifies that this force will “defend Kurdistan and protect the security of Kurdistan-Iraq, its soil, and the Kurdish people and law.” In previous bills, the KRG has referred to its jurisdiction as “Iraqi Kurdistan.” The shift to “Kurdistan-Iraq” signifies that the Kurds’ ambitions have become more nationalistic. This type of rhetoric is bound to worry Baghdad as well as Turkey, Iran and Syria, all of whom have significant Kurdish populations.
With ethno-sectarian tensions reaching a fever pitch, Iraq’s rival factions can be expected to rely more heavily on their traditional insurance policy: private militias. As the Shiite-dominated government continues to block the integration of its rivals into the security apparatus, the Kurds are unifying their peshmerga while many of Iraq’s Sunnis continue to use the threat of an insurgency as leverage in getting their demands met. Should Iraq witness a resurgence of private militias amidst rising ethno-sectarian tensions, the U.S. exit strategy for Iraq could face serious complications.
-
Oilman Bush went into Iraq for the oil! Here's proof!
====================
Iraq's oil auction hits the jackpot
Russia and China were the big winners in the latest auction of Iraq's oil rights, as was the government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki; United States companies were conspicuous by their absence. If the oil starts to flow as now promised, the next few years should see the rise of a relatively wealthy, Shi'ite-controlled Iraq, friendly with Iran and Lebanon's Hezbollah. Does this make Maliki the new Saddam Hussein? - Pepe Escobar (Dec 15, '09)
Surprises aplenty in selloff
The impression that the West would renew its dominance of the Iraqi oil extraction industry has been shattered with the latest auction of oil rights, with Russia's Lukoil leading the winning bids. Other successful parties include interests from as far afield as Malaysia and Angola. - Robert M Cutler (Dec 15, '09)
-
forwards me this:
Deadly blasts underscore tenuous security in Iraq's Anbar province
By Leila Fadel and Michael Hastings
Washington Post Foreign Service
Friday, January 8, 2010; A10
BAGHDAD -- Five explosions that targeted mostly law enforcement officials ripped through a city in Iraq's Anbar province Thursday, killing at least eight people and underscoring fears that the region's fragile security is deteriorating.
The homemade bombs struck the homes of the deputy police chief, two counterterrorism police officials and a lawyer in the small city of Hit, about 120 miles west of Baghdad, and injured at least 10. The attacks occurred one week after twin explosions killed at least 24 people in Anbar and ripped off the hand of provincial Gov. Qassim Mohammed Fahdawi. They also follow a series of about 40 assassination attempts in the province that have primarily targeted politicians, police officers, tribal chiefs and religious figures.
Anbar was considered an American model of success after Sunni tribal leaders and U.S. forces struck a deal to rein in insurgents in a place once known as a militant heartland. As American troops begin to withdraw from Iraq, the number of U.S. military enclaves in the western province has shrunk from 35 last year to five at present, and by August only three outposts will remain. American forces are largely confined to their base in Ramadi and no longer regularly accompany Iraqi security forces on operations.
Of late, a widespread and complicated power struggle has roiled the province, with elections scheduled for early March and multiple factions trying to assert control over the area, which makes up about one-third of Iraq.
Those forces include the newly elected provincial government, the central government in Baghdad and the traditional tribal leadership. At the same time, insurgents groups such as al-Qaeda in Iraq have used the turmoil to reassert themselves.
After last week's bombings, police chief Tariq al-Assal -- widely viewed as ineffective -- was forced out and replaced with a temporary commander from the Iraqi army in Baghdad. Bahaa al-Azzawi was appointed directly by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, angering tribal chiefs, who saw the move as an affront to their power as well as that of the Sahwa fighters, members of the resistance who allied themselves with the U.S. military to fight al-Qaeda in Iraq but now feel abandoned by the government.
"If this weak government still exists after the election, we anticipate a disaster will happen in Anbar," said Sheik Mohammed Albuthaab, who leads an influential Anbar tribe but was left out of the consultations about the new police chief. "The provincial council spends its time traveling abroad to Turkey, Syria and Jordan, not living here."
It is unclear how long Azzawi will hold this post. The provincial council said it will select a permanent commander but did not specify when.
Assal, who had served as the head of Anbar police for two years, accused members of the provincial council of interfering in police matters, which he said led to the recent security lapses.
"Maybe the situation will be better now," he said in an interview. "How the government interferes with security is unacceptable."
Assal charged that last week's dual bombings were made easier because the 29 provincial council members have their own security details and convoys, which he said were not subject to his authority and could be easily infiltrated by insurgent groups.
He said he had urged Fahdawi, the governor, not to visit the scene of a car bombing last week outside the Anbar police headquarters in Ramadi. When the governor did arrive, with an entourage of bodyguards and vehicles, a man wearing a police uniform was able to sneak through the perimeter and blow himself up, injuring Fahdawi and killing a provincial council member, among others.
"The governor was playing Sherlock Holmes," Assal said. "How can I protect them when they don't follow my advice?"
Tribal leaders blamed Assal for the security lapses, saying that he was more interested in bringing investment to the province, not in security, and that the police were corrupt and the provincial government too weak to deal with al-Qaeda in Iraq.
"We don't need a jury system, we don't need a judge. The tribes will implement the punishments ourselves," Albuthaab said. "I would execute them all by my own hands. Anyone who is killing people deserves to be executed."
He said members of al-Qaeda in Iraq have been released from local prisons after the U.S. military turned them over to Iraqi authorities as part of the withdrawal agreement, an assertion supported by some Iraqi officials. Many of those former inmates have gone on to engage in attacks, Albuthaab said.
Despite the turmoil, all the parties want the Americans to stick to the pullout timetable.
Gen. Ray Odierno, commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, said that although the violence has caused him some concern, the "security situation in Anbar isn't crumbling."
Hastings is a special correspondent. Special correspondents Aziz Alwan and Uthman al-Mokhtar contributed to this report.
-
Across Divide in Iraq, a Sunni Courts Shiites
By ANTHONY SHADID
Published: January 8, 2010
RAMADI, Iraq — In the unforgiving badlands of western Iraq’s Anbar Province, once a cradle of the insurgency and now a muddled landscape of corruption, simmering strife and spirited electoral campaigning, no one seems ready to pardon Hamid al-Hais.
“I always take the path that poses the most obstacles. I always go where no one else dares to go,” said Sheik Hamid al-Hais.
Mr. Hais is a sheik, a title that conveys his tribal pedigree. But that title is too facile in describing one of the more complicated figures in Iraq today. He is also a veteran of the American-backed war against insurgents, a Sunni Muslim politician, and now, in his most recent incarnation, an unlikely confederate of the Iraqi National Alliance, the Shiite Muslim standard-bearer in elections in March for a new Parliament.
A bid for national unity, Mr. Hais calls his foray across Iraq’s entrenched sectarian divide. Many of his neighbors do not see it that way. A traitor to his sect, a stooge of neighboring Iran’s Shiite government, and a rank opportunist, they say.
In his bid for office, Mr. Hais is a bit player in the larger drama of Iraq’s March 7 elections, which United States officials hope will help bridge divisions in the country as the military withdraws its combat troops by August. But in Mr. Hais’s quixotic trek, there is a warning that the elections may just as easily deepen the cleavages — tribal, ethnic and sectarian — that still threaten Iraq’s stability nearly seven years after the American-led invasion.
NOWHERE is that warning more stark than in Anbar, once a showcase of American success in quelling the insurgency. It is now an increasingly unsettled terrain beset by suicide attacks, bombings and assassinations that prompted a Sunni leader to declare that working as a politician here qualifies as the most dangerous job in Iraq.
“I always take the path that poses the most obstacles,” Mr. Hais said, scoffing at the risk, as he took the wheel of his white sport utility vehicle and careened through back roads of countryside he considers his. “I always go where no one else dares to go.”
He quoted a song by Um Kalthoum, the Egyptian diva. “A confident man walks like a king,” he declared.
With hands like a spatula, and girth that rivals his height, Mr. Hais struck an imposing figure as he campaigned along the irrigated farms and groves of date palms outside the provincial capital of Ramadi, populated by families that belong to his tribe of Albu Diyab. Tribal loyalties still run deep in Anbar, and Mr. Hais suggested that they would trump any misgivings his constituency might have over his alliance with Shiite parties that many Sunnis blame for some of the worst sectarian bloodletting in 2006 and 2007.
“I can’t say all of them, but my feeling?” he asked. “They’ll follow me.”
Mr. Hais, 42, still evokes his youthful days as a ne’er-do-well.
In his car, he played loudly a frenetic strain of Arabic pop and, in jest, swerved toward a neighbor riding a bicycle. (The neighbor frowned.) On the trail, he walked with the swagger that a 9-millimeter Beretta in his leather holster brings. Most of his sentences seemed to end in an exclamation point.
“Listen to me!” the married Mr. Hais barked into the phone at his girlfriend.
He hung up, shaking his head. “She’s driving me crazy,” he said.
But beneath the bluster is a compelling argument for an Iraqi identity that transcends sect and allows a man like Mr. Hais, a sheik from Iraq’s most ardently Sunni region, to join hands with parties led by some of the most dogmatic Shiite clergy.
“We’re actually working against sectarianism on the ground, not just through the beautiful words of our speeches,” he said. “The interests of our country require it.”
So far, his words and actions have prompted more outrage than reconsideration. Many in Anbar remain angry about a weeklong trip that Mr. Hais took in June to Iran, a country many Sunnis believe dominates the current government and poses a greater threat to Iraq’s interests than the United States. Since then, some neighbors have taken to calling Mr. Hais’s villa, along the Euphrates, “the Iranian house” or “Khomeini’s house.”
“Absolutely, he’s carrying out an Iranian agenda — without a doubt,” said Dhari al-Hadi, an adviser to Anbar’s governor and deputy of Ahmed Abu Risha, a leading tribal figure in the province. “You wouldn’t find anyone in Anbar who would dare go to Iran.”
MR. HAIS’S Shiite allies at times seem baffled by him, in an Iraqi version of culture shock. They respect his credentials in leading the fight against insurgents and feel confident he can win over enough of his tribe to capture a seat or two. But they are often taken aback by his freewheeling comments in the alliance’s meetings. At various times, he has promised to open bars in Ramadi, stop veiled women from entering Anbar University, break the legs of rival candidates and pursue Baathists in nightclubs in Syria.
“Crazy,” a Shiite colleague said on condition of anonymity, fearful of provoking him. “Then again, if you call someone crazy in Anbar, they consider it a compliment.”
For his part, Mr. Hais finds his new colleagues too reticent.
“They’re always calculating before they say a single word,” he complained.
Lately, though, Mr. Hais seems just as bewildered by his fellow Sunnis.
On a crisp winter day this week, he made his way to the Nineveh Elementary School for Girls in a hardscrabble neighborhood of Ramadi. Teachers there unleashed a torrent of complaints: trash-strewn streets, a lack of money for schools, and drinking water that mixed with sewage and, at times, blood running off from butcher shops.
Mr. Hais listened, slipped the principal an envelope with $1,000, then urged the teachers to organize demonstrations. “It’s up to you to change the reality,” he insisted.
Before long, a former army officer spoke up. “I want to speak frankly,” he said. “We hoped you wouldn’t abandon your province and join the alliance.” Others nodded. “We don’t want Shiites coming into Ramadi,” a woman shouted. “We don’t want Shiite places of worship here.”
More criticism ensued. “We need someone like Saddam Hussein,” a woman cried.
“Someone who will get you into a war and make you all widows?” Mr. Hais asked, with a grimace that suggested he might want his money back.
“At least we’re fighting Iranians and defending our country,” she answered.
An hour later, the meeting ended uneasily. “They’re worn out,” Mr. Hais said, in explanation. But the anger seemed to run deeper, be more intractable.
“He’s a son of Ramadi,” one of the teachers said. “We respect him in that way.”
“But,” she added, “he’s made a mistake.”
-
Chemical Ali meets the noose. An overview of his crimes:
[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1Qm9Vt8J3OI&feature=player_embedded[/youtube]
-
Without notice, our ongoing exit from Iraq coincides with a deteriorating situation. It would appear that without notice our CinC is throwing away pretty much everything that was accomplished there.
Marc
============================================
Yesterday it was three hotels. Today it was the Iraqi forensics operation. Yet I still read pundits who state that AQI/the insurgency is demolished.
Get a grip:
Blast at Baghdad crime lab kills 18
Dozens injured as bomber drives pickup truck through police checkpoint
The Associated Press
updated 6:29 a.m. ET, Tues., Jan. 26, 2010
BAGHDAD, Iraq - A suicide car bomber killed at least 18 and injured dozens more Tuesday in a strike against a police crime lab in central Baghdad, a day after several hotels were hit by suicide attacks, officials said.
Rescue crews are still combing through the rubble looking for casualties. Officials say the majority of those killed were likely police officers who worked in the forensic investigation office at Tahariyat Square in the central neighborhood of Karradah. At least 82 people were reported injured.
This week's bombings — all against prominent and heavily fortified targets — dealt yet another blow to the image of an Iraqi government struggling to answer for security lapses that have allowed bombers to carry out a number of massive attacks in the heart of the capital since August.
Police and hospital officials said the bomber in Tuesday's attack tried to drive a pickup truck through a checkpoint and blast walls protecting the forensic evidence office.
Among those confirmed killed were 12 police officers and six civilians who were visiting the office. Officials said more than half the wounded were police.
Shortly after the bombing, rescue teams in blue jumpsuits combed through the debris of the partially damaged three-story building as a crane removed some of the 10-foot, 7-ton blast walls toppled by the blast.
The office targeted in the attack mainly deals with data collected during criminal investigations, including fingerprints and other pieces of evidence. The office is located next to the Interior Ministry's major crimes office, which deals with terrorism cases.
Government offices have been frequent targets of major attacks in the capital since blasts struck the foreign and finance ministries in August, raising questions about the ability of Iraqi security forces to keep the country safe. While the criminal evidence offices have not been targeted by a major suicide bombing before, attackers have struck nearby.
Shops, restaurants damaged
The attack destroyed rooms on the ground floor of the building and damaged parts of the second floor, raising fears the number of casualties could grow, a police officer on the scene said.
The site is surrounded by low-rise buildings that contain shops, restaurants and offices that were also damaged.
Tuesday's attack comes one day after a series of bombings targeting hotels favored by Westerners.
The toll from those blasts continued to rise, with 41 people confirmed killed and up to 106 reported injured, police and health officials said Tuesday.
The bombings Monday targeted the Sheraton Ishtar Hotel, Babylon Hotel and Hamra Hotel, which are popular with Western journalists and foreign security contractors.
All the officials spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to release details.
'Senseless crimes'
U.S. Ambassador Christopher R. Hill issued a statement Tuesday strongly condemning the attacks against the hotels.
"The terrorists who committed these senseless crimes aim to sow fear among the Iraqi people," he said. "We call upon all Iraqis to unite in combating all forms of violence and attempts at intimidation."
Also on Tuesday, Ahmed Fadhil Hassan al-Majid, the nephew of the man known as Chemical Ali arrived in Baghdad to collect the body of Saddam Hussein's cousin and close deputy who was hanged Monday.
A grave was dug for Ali Hassan al-Majid near his hometown of Tikrit next to Saddam's two sons and grandson.
© 2010 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.
URL: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/35072893/ns/world_news-mideastn_africa/
-
http://davidbellavia.com/2010/our-mission-is-finally-accomplished-anyone-care/
-
BO's strategy begins to bear its fruit:
==============
Kurdish news website Hawlati and Iraqi news site Aswat al Iraq reported Feb. 20, citing a security source, that Iranian forces have made an incursion in Iraq’s Diyala province north of Baghdad. The alleged incursion reportedly occurred near the Munzrya border crossing. According to the report, Iranian forces were seen removing concrete barriers that mark the border demarcation between the two countries. Iraqi border security officials have reportedly sent a memorandum to their superiors in Baghdad explaining the incident and are awaiting their response. STRATFOR is working to verify this report. The last major Iranian provocation in Iraq occurred in late Dec. 2009 when Iranian forces briefly occupied an oil well in Iraq’s southern Missan province. These moves are designed to signal Iran’s dominance over Baghdad and warn the United States of the consequences of carrying out military strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities. As tensions escalate over the Iranian nuclear program, such provocations will likely become more frequent, particularly in the lead-up to contentious parliamentary elections in Iraq on March 7. Iran has already demonstrated through its Shiite political allies in Baghdad that it has the upper hand in this election, as well as the means to destabilize Iraq and ensure that Iraq’s Sunni faction remains sidelined.
-
It is easier to see why our military wants no part in provoking Iran when one looks at the map.
We have our troops to the west in Iraq and our troops to the east of Iran in Afghanistan.
No one appears to want to go the route of using nucs to destroy their capabilities.
It is obvious as to why but Bolton's simple and straight forward question makes me think that may be our best option:
"If anyone thinks Iran or the middle East is a problem now just imagine what it would be like with an Iran that has nucs" [on missles that can reach Europe and is a spark for a nuclear arms race among Middle Eastern monarchies.]
The choice is we either deal with it now or throw the dice and hope it goes away (regime change) or deal with an ever worse situation later.
And of course our economic situation just makes doing anything now even more a problem.
-
Iraq, U.S: A 'Plan B' for Withdrawal Emerges
Stratfor Today » February 23, 2010 | 1549 GMT
WIN MCNAMEE/Getty Images
U.S. Gen. Ray Odierno at a Pentagon press briefing on Feb. 22 The commanding general of United States Forces-Iraq (USF-I), U.S. Gen. Ray Odierno, spent the past week briefing Washington on a “Plan B” for withdrawal from Iraq should conditions require it. With concerns about the durability of the fragile balance of power in Baghdad in the buildup to and the aftermath of the parliamentary elections slated for March 7, there are mounting concerns over whether the already-delayed rapid drawdown of U.S. troops now slated to begin in mid-May is realistic. Between mid-May and the end of August, 46,000 U.S. troops — including all remaining “combat” troops — are scheduled to be pulled out of the country, leaving 50,000 troops engaged in training, advising and supporting Iraqi security forces.
A contingency plan for deteriorating political and security conditions is prudent military planning, and the USF-I would be negligent if it did not have such plans. The Iraq withdrawal is about more than just extricating itself from Iraq. It is also about lightening the burden on U.S. ground combat forces at a time when some 30,000 additional troops are being sent to Afghanistan. Modest delays are not necessarily problematic and the September deadline for the drawdown in Iraq is a political date. But the Pentagon is also counting on not sustaining troop levels as they stand in Iraq through the end of the year. Disengagement is necessary.
Despite the prudence of forming a Plan B, the past week is, to our knowledge, the first time such a plan has been presented publicly. While Washington may well have requested the briefings from Odierno, the heart of the issue is that it is being publicized now. Odierno insisted that there were no signs that implementation of the contingency plan would be necessary, but there are clearly concerns about the fate of Iraq with regard to the looming elections and this may also be an attempt to moderate expectations for the promised rapid drawdown of forces. Whatever the case, he came to Washington to publicize the plan: He did not do this without direction, authorization and coordination with the White House.
Until fairly recently, despite looming concerns about the deterioration of the security situation and ethno-sectarian tensions, there was no reason to publicize contingency plans. The issue is not just the elections. Having a smooth election — one that would be acceptable across the board — is only the first issue of concern. Forming a coalition government (which took six months to finalize after the last parliamentary elections) is another major issue. And this election is expected to have even more participation and factionalism. Furthermore, as the confrontation with Iran over its nuclear program appears to be reaching a decision point, Iran may decide to use its assets in Iraq to retaliate against the United States. Though Odierno insisted that Iranian pressures would not influence the drawdown, Tehran has the ability to affect both Iraq’s security situation and the government in Baghdad through Shiite proxies, a cause of concern for the Sunnis and their allies in the Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia.
Events in Iraq have yet to play out. But the Iraq drawdown and the timetable it follows cuts across a broad spectrum of issues — not just Iraq, but Iran, Afghanistan and domestic U.S. politics. Any shift has potentially wide-reaching strategic significance.
-
forwards this to me:
----------------------------------
Link to a decent article about how the Sadrists did pretty well in the recent Iraqi election, at the expense of the Kurds. To the point that, because of the relative neck and neck tie between the two major parties, the Sadrists may well be the bloc that tips the scales in favor of a coalition that can prevail.
There is mention several times about how the Sadrists essentially game the system quite effectively with the people in order to achieve their political goals, yet certainly haven't surrendered their military arm.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/23/AR2010032304319.html
-
Forwarded to me by Our Man Formerly in Iraq"
============
This looks suspiciously like the sectarian violence of 2006-2007:
Gunmen kill 25 in attack on Iraqi village
Baghdad, Iraq (CNN) -- Gunmen wearing military uniforms stormed houses and killed 25 people, including five women, in a Sunni village south of Baghdad, officials said Saturday. The attack took place late Friday night in a village in Arab Jabour, a predominantly Sunni region about 15 miles southeast of the capital. Most of the victims in Friday's attacks were local members of the Sons of Iraq, the group which helped U.S. and Iraqi forces fight against al Qaeda and suppress the insurgency.
The 25 victims were found handcuffed and died from small arms fire, police said.
Iraqi security forces have arrested 25 suspects in the incident.
=======================
My comments: Perhaps if His Glibness had not run against The Surge and for Immediate Bug-Out things might be different now.
-
Tuesday, April 20, 2010 STRATFOR.COM Diary Archives
Considering a Possible Super Shia Bloc in Iraq
IRAQ SAW PERHAPS THE SINGLE BIGGEST potential speed bump yet since the March 7 parliamentary elections as the winners attempt to form a coalition government. By most measures, the Shia blocs of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law and the sectarian Iraqi National Alliance (which came in second and third in the polls, respectively) appear to be moving toward the formation of a “super Shia” bloc. The Kurdish bloc has pledged to join such an alliance. Taken as a whole, this presents the serious threat that Iraq’s Sunnis may again be politically marginalized.
A super Shia bloc could outmaneuver al-Iraqiya, the centrist, non-sectarian grouping led by former interim Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi. Al-Iraqiya had broad appeal across ethno-sectarian lines at the polls and won the most seats in the election. It was widely supported by the Sunnis, and so its success would bring them to the center of the political process, while its marginalization would risk another political disenfranchisement. In response to the prospects of the super Shia bloc, on Monday al-Iraqiya’s spokeswoman reportedly threatened to withdraw from “the entire political process, including withdrawal from the next Iraqi parliament, if some parliamentary blocs insist on concluding an alliance between them in an attempt to exclude or marginalize [al-Iraqiya].”
This may simply be political maneuvering, and al-Iraqiya is certainly not averse to a brinksmanship strategy if that is what it takes to ensure that it is brought into the ruling coalition. Parliamentary coalition building is often a particularly messy process, even in countries with a long history of it. In Baghdad, this is in many ways the first time it has ever been attempted; the Sunnis largely boycotted the 2005 polls. This led to their disenfranchisement and intensified the insurgency, but dramatically simplified the formation of a coalition government because an entire swath of the population was effectively uninvolved.
Al-Iraqiya could get shut out of the government. It could voluntarily choose to go into opposition. There is no shortage of potential scenarios in parliamentary coalition building, and the Iraqi case this year is particularly intricate.
“Iraq is moving from comparative post-election quietude into a phase of decisive maneuvering.”
The coalition-building process is the dynamic of central importance in Iraq right now. There is still room for all sides to maneuver, but as Iraq inches closer to a firm coalition, there will necessarily be winners and losers. There is little to suggest that the State of Law and Iraqi National Alliance blocs will not be able to agree upon the formation of a super Shia bloc, thus creating a sectarian Shia group rather than the more diverse al-Iraqiya, the single most powerful political entity in the country. With the Kurds’ imperative being to side with the winner, and having already pledged to join the super Shia bloc, al-Iraqiya getting shut out of the ruling coalition is a very real possibility.
And this strikes at the heart of the fate of Iraq. The Sunnis appeared to have made enormous political progress at the polls in March, compared to 2005. Now they face potentially being shut out of Iraqi politics yet again. The Sunnis in Iraq are fractious, and the downfall of al-Iraqiya would not necessarily lead to widespread violence. But the re-emergence of some levels of violence are certainly not outside the realm of possibility, even following the reported deaths of top al Qaeda leaders Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and Abu Ayub al-Masri in Iraq.
But Iraq’s fate is not the only issue in question. A super Shia bloc would provide Iran with substantial influence within the central government of Iraq — something the Turks, Saudis and other Arabs are aggressively attempting to counterbalance, namely by supporting al-Iraqiya. And they are not likely to take any potential marginalization of al-Iraqiya lightly either. After years of violence, most everyone in the region wants a more stable Iraq. But what sacrifices each player in the region is willing to make to facilitate Iraqi stability is another question entirely.
Meanwhile, the formation of the government and the durability of the fragile balance of power and hard-won stability in the country is of central importance for the looming U.S. drawdown of all combat troops, which would see current troop levels halved to 50,000 by the end of August. And even after that drawdown, the only thing that has counterbalanced Persian power in the region since 2003 has been the U.S. military. How Tehran will be managed, especially with what is sure to be a strong Shia presence in any governing coalition in Baghdad, remains an open question.
And so Iraq is moving from comparative post-election quietude into a phase of decisive maneuvering within the country and beyond that will define the existence of Iraq — and the wider region — for years to come.
-
Iraq: A Super Shia Bloc and Iranian Calculus
April 27, 2010 | 2032 GMT
PRINT Text Resize:
ATTA KENARE/AFP/Getty Images
Former Iraqi National Security Adviser Mowaffaq al-Rubaie (L) in 2009Summary
Mowaffaq al-Rubaie, Iraq’s former national security adviser and a key leader in the country’s Shia Islamist coalition, the Iraqi National Alliance (INA), said April 26 that merger talks between the INA and current Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law bloc have come to a dead end. Al-Rubaie’s statement is the first sign that intra-Shia negotiations are not going well, but it is not clear whether the moves toward the creation of a super Shia parliamentary bloc have completely failed. Such an outcome would undermine Iran’s efforts to consolidate its influence in Iraq and, by extension, its bargaining power with the United States.
Analysis
Mowaffaq al-Rubaie, a former Iraqi national security adviser and an influential figure in the country’s Shia Islamist coalition, the Iraqi National Alliance (INA), said April 26 that merger negotiations between his group and incumbent Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law (SoL) coalition have reached an impasse. Speaking to reporters after a meeting in Najaf with top Iraqi cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, al-Rubaie said the two Shia blocs ran into problems over the issue of selecting the next prime minister. He said the INA was now looking into forging an alliance with the Kurdistan Alliance in an effort to form the largest parliamentary bloc, which he described as “an attempt to break the political deadlock plaguing the country and escape this political crisis.”
Al-Rubaie’s statements constitute the first significant indication that several weeks of intra-Shia negotiations over creating a super Shia parliamentary bloc are not progressing well. The INA is the country’s most pro-Iran Shia coalition and it won 70 parliamentary seats in the March 7 elections. The bloc had been negotiating a merger with the Shia SoL, which won 89 seats, to counter former interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi’s non-sectarian al-Iraqiya List, which swept the Sunni vote to win 91 seats — the most in the elections.
Negotiations between the INA and SoL had reportedly worked out all issues other than the question of how to choose the next prime minister. SoL, which has been trying to balance its Shia sectarian core with a centrist agenda, wants to see al-Maliki continue as prime minister in the next government. But it faces opposition from the al-Sadrite movement, which controls as many as 40 of the INA’s 70 seats. Because Sunni-backed al-Iraqiya came in first in the elections, al-Maliki realizes a merger with the INA is the only way to ensure Shia communal interests.
At the same time, though, al-Maliki does not want to lead a government held hostage by the al-Sadrite movement or the INA’s patrons in Iran. Hence, there are reports he has been attempting to put SoL ahead in parliamentary seats by reaching out to some in al-Iraqiya to join his group and attempting to find legal loopholes to bar others from serving in parliament. In response, the INA, which wants to see the creation of a super Shia bloc, is exploiting al-Maliki’s tensions with the Kurds to force him into a merger.
At this point it is too early to conclude that a super Shia bloc is no longer in the making, but that possibility bodes ill for Iran’s plans for a post-American Iraq. Tehran, which has long been working on getting the Iraqi Shia house in order to maximize its influence in its western neighbor, needs to see a single Shia bloc in parliament. The combined 159 seats of a potential INA-SoL coalition, along with the 43 won by the Kurdistan Alliance, could be sufficient to force al-Iraqiya into a power-sharing settlement. If that coalition does not form, it limits Tehran’s bargaining power in its negotiations with the United States on Iraq, the nuclear issue, Afghanistan and other regional disputes.
Therefore, Iran can be expected to accelerate its efforts to sort out intra-Shia issues in Iraq. These could involve visits by Iranian officials to Iraq, or vice versa, to mediate between SoL and INA. The Iranians will be trying to get al-Maliki and the al-Sadrites to see the benefits of a merger and the vulnerabilities of maintaining their separate partisan status, but it is unclear what the outcome of Tehran’s efforts will be.
-
Jihadists in Iraq: Down For The Count?
April 29, 2010
By Scott Stewart
On April 25, The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) posted a statement on the Internet confirming that two of its top leaders, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and Abu Ayub al-Masri, had been killed April 18 in a joint U.S.-Iraqi operation in Salahuddin province. Al-Baghdadi (an Iraqi also known as Hamid Dawud Muhammad Khalil al-Zawi), was the head of the ISI, an al Qaeda-led jihadist alliance in Iraq, and went by the title “Leader of the Faithful.” Al-Masri (an Egyptian national also known as Abu Hamzah al-Muhajir), was the military leader of the ISI and head of the group’s military wing, al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).
Al-Masri replaced Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who was killed in a U.S. airstrike in June 2006. Al-Zarqawi had alienated many Iraqi Sunnis with his ruthlessness, and al-Baghdadi is thought to have been appointed the emir of the ISI in an effort to put an Iraqi face on jihadist efforts in Iraq and to help ease the alienation between the foreign jihadists and the local Sunni population. Al-Masri, the leader of al Qaeda in Iraq and the military leader of the ISI, was considered the real operational leader of ISI/AQI efforts in Iraq.
STRATFOR viewed the initial announcement by Iraqi authorities of the deaths of the two leaders with a healthy degree of skepticism. After all, they had been declared dead before, only to later release statements on the Internet mocking the Iraqi government for making false claims. But the details provided in the April 19 press conference by Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki (complete with photos of the deceased) and the confirmation by the U.S. military helped allay those initial doubts. The recent admission by the ISI, which made a similar statement following the death of al-Zarqawi, has all but erased our doubts about the deaths.
But the ISI’s statement has raised some other questions. It claimed that the deaths of the two leaders would not affect the group’s operations in Iraq because new members had recently joined it. But when viewed in the context of other recent developments in Iraq, it appears that the operational capability of the ISI will indeed be affected — at least in the near future.
Recent Activity
The operation that resulted in the deaths of al-Baghdadi and al-Masri did not occur in a vacuum. Rather, it was a part of a series of operations targeting the ISI in recent months. The raids have come as a result of a renewed effort to counter the ISI following a resurgence in the group’s operations that included high-profile multiple-vehicle bombings directed against targets in central Baghdad on Aug. 19, 2009, Oct. 25, 2009, Dec. 8, 2009, and Jan. 25, 2010.
The raids that resulted in the deaths of the ISI leaders on April 18 were part of a chain of events that stretches back for months, and appear to be the result of the effective exploitation of intelligence gained in one raid used to conduct the next. For example, Iraqi Maj. Gen. Qasim Ata, the spokesman for the Baghdad Operations Command, told Al-Iraqiya TV on April 20 that the intelligence that led to the location of al-Baghdadi and al-Masri was obtained during the March 11, 2010, arrest of Manaf Abdul Raheem al-Rawi, the AQI commander in Baghdad. Iraqi government sources claim al-Rawi is the man responsible for planning the multiple-vehicle bombings in Baghdad. If so, he is another effective operational leader who has been taken out of the ISI/AQI gene pool.
Then, following the April 18 raid, Ahmad al-Ubaydi — aka Abu-Suhaib, whom Iraqi officials identify as the AQI military commander for the northern Iraqi provinces of Ninevah, Salahuddin and Kirkuk provinces — was killed April 20. The next day, Iraqi authorities located an improvised explosive device (IED) factory in western Anbar province and seized two vehicle bombs and some smaller IEDs. On April 22, the U.S. Army announced the arrest of a bombmaker in Anbar province. On April 23, Iraqi police arrested another AQI military leader in Anbar, Mahmoud Suleiman, who was reportedly found with several IEDs in his home. Also on April 23, an Iraqi police SWAT team reportedly killed two AQI leaders during a raid in eastern Mosul. They claimed that one of the AQI leaders, Yousef Mohammad Ali, was also a bombmaker. In recent days, dozens of other alleged AQI members have either surrendered or been arrested in Diyala, Mosul, Salahuddin and Basra.
There have even been unconfirmed reports that Izzat al-Douri was captured April 25. Al-Douri, the “king of clubs” in the U.S. military’s 2003 deck of most-wanted Iraqis and who has a $10 million bounty on his head, was a vice president of Iraq under Saddam Hussein and an important insurgent leader.
In late March, progress was also made against AQI in Mosul. Several suspects were arrested or killed, and among the latter were major AQI figures Khalid Muhammad Hasan Shallub al-Juburi, Abu Ahmad al-Afri and Bashar Khalaf Husayn Ali al-Jaburi.
This type of rapid, sequential activity against jihadists by U.S. and Iraqi forces is not a coincidence. It is the result of some significant operational changes that were made in 2007 in the wake of the American surge in Iraq. The then-commander of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), Gen. Stanley McChrystal, was instrumental in flattening hierarchies and reducing bureaucratic inefficiencies in both intelligence and special operations forces activities inside Iraq in order to create a highly integrated and streamlined organization. The result was the capability to rapidly plan and execute special operations forces raids based on actionable intelligence with a limited shelf life — and then to rapidly interrogate any captives, quickly analyze any material of intelligence value seized and rapidly re-task forces in a series of follow-on operations. The resulting high tempo of operations was considered enormously successful and a key factor in the success of the surge, and recent developments in Iraq appear to be a continuation of this type of rapid and aggressive activity.
Such operations not only can produce rapid gains in terms of capturing and killing key targets, they also serve to disrupt and disorient the enemy. According to Iraqi Maj. Gen. Qasim Ata, AQI is currently in disarray and panic, and he believes that the organization is also facing money problems, since it reportedly has been in contact with al Qaeda prime in an attempt to secure financial assistance. This stands in stark contrast to the 2005 letter in which al Qaeda No. 2 Ayman al-Zawahiri asked AQI leader al-Zarqawi for funding. At that time there was a large flow of men and money into Iraq, but it now appears that AQI is facing some financial difficulties. Following the recent raids in which senior operational commanders and bombmakers have been captured or killed, it also appears that the group may also be facing some leadership and operational-expertise difficulties.
Leadership
As STRATFOR has previously noted, leadership is a critical factor in the operational success of a militant group. Without skilled leadership, militant groups lose their ability to conduct effective attacks, particularly ones of a sophisticated nature. Leadership, skill and professionalism are the factors that make the difference between a militant group wanting to attack something — i.e., its intent — and the group’s ability to successfully carry out its intended attack — i.e., its capability. The bottom line is that new recruits simply cannot replace seasoned operational commanders, as the ISI suggested in its statement.
Although it might seem like a simple task to find a leader for a militant group, effective militant leaders are hard to come by. Unlike most modern militaries, militant groups rarely invest much time and energy in leadership development training. To compound the problem, the leader of a militant group needs to develop a skill set that is quite a bit broader than most military leaders. In addition to personal attributes such as ruthlessness, aggressiveness and fearlessness, militant leaders also must be charismatic, intuitive, clever and inspiring. This last attribute is especially important in an organization that seeks to recruit operatives to conduct suicide attacks. Additionally, an effective militant leader must be able to recruit and train operatives, enforce operational security, raise funds, plan operations and then methodically execute a plan while avoiding the security forces constantly hunting the militants down.
Of course, not every leadership change is disastrous to a militant group. Sometimes a new leader breathes new life and energy into an organization (like Nasir al-Wahayshi in Yemen), or the group has competent lieutenants able to continue to operate effectively after the death of the leader (like AQI after the death of al-Zarqawi). But the current environment in Iraq, where numerous individuals have been rapidly and sequentially killed or captured, makes this sort of orderly leadership replacement more difficult.
Therefore, it will be important to watch the ISI carefully to see who is appointed as the group’s new emir and military commander. (In practical terms, the emir may be easier to replace than the military commander, especially if the former is just a figurehead and not a true operational commander.) The group may have had a clear chain of command and competent, designated successors who have survived the recent operations. But if not, the leadership vacuum at the top could result in infighting over control, or result in an ineffective leader assuming control. The jury is still out, but with the recent successes against the ISI, there is a very good chance that it may take some time for the group to regain its footing. This, of course, is the objective of the up-tempo operations recently seen in Iraq. Effective counterterrorism programs seek to keep the militants (and especially their leaders) off balance by killing or capturing them while also rolling up the lower levels of the group. Militants scrambling for their lives seldom have the opportunity to plan effective attacks, and sustained pressure makes it difficult for them to regain the offensive.
Like operational leaders, competent bombmakers are not easy to replace. They also need to possess a broad set of skills and require a great deal of training and practical experience to hone their skills. A master bombmaker is a rare and precious commodity in the militant world. Therefore, the bombmakers recently arrested in Iraq could prove to be almost as big a loss to AQI as the operational leaders.
When we discussed the resurgence of the ISI/AQI back in October, we noted that at that time they had retained a great deal of their capability and that they were able to gather intelligence, plan attacks, acquire ordnance, build reliable IEDs and execute spectacular attacks in the center of Baghdad against government ministry buildings. We also discussed how the polarization surrounding the election in Iraq was providing them an opportunity to exploit. That polarization has continued in the wake of the elections as the factions jockey for position in the new government, but the extent of the damage done to the jihadists through the loss of so many commanders and operatives may not allow the successors of al-Masri and al-Baghdadi to take advantage of the situation before their window of opportunity closes.
We will be watching the jihadists in Iraq carefully in the coming months to see if they can regroup and retain their operational capability. The big question is: Will the recent operations against the ISI/AQI merely serve as another temporary setback like the killing of al-Zarqawi, or do they portend something more long-term for the future of the organization? The ISI/AQI has proved to be resilient and resourceful in the past, but we are not sure they have the ability to bounce back this time.
-
Iran and the United States, Grasping for Diplomacy
THE IRAQI BALANCE SWUNG IN TEHRAN’S DIRECTION Tuesday when an announcement was made that Iraq’s two main rival Shiite coalitions have finally agreed to merge into a single parliamentary bloc. While there is still more political wrangling to be had, including the chore of picking the prime minister, this development carries enormous implications for the United States and its allies in the region. Before diving into those implications, we first need to review the results of the March 7 Iraqi elections.
The Iraqi vote was primarily split four ways: Former Interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, a Shi’i leading the Sunni-concentrated al-Iraqiya bloc, barely came in first with 91 seats, while Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s predominantly Shiite State of Law (SoL) bloc took second place with 89 seats. In third place, the Iranian-backed Shiite Islamist Iraqi National Alliance (INA) won 70 seats, while the unified Kurdish bloc came out with 43 seats. The magic number to form a ruling coalition is 163, raising all sorts of ethno-sectarian coalition possibilities that could make or break the stability the United States created with the 2007 troop surge.
The Kurdish strategy was the most predictable in this fractured political landscape. Knowing that their Arab rivals would lack enough seats on their own to form a coalition, the Kurds positioned themselves early on to ensure their kingmaker status in the new government. An SoL-INA coalition is just four seats shy of the 163 needed to form the government, and the Kurds fully expect to fill that gap.
The Sunni-Shiite and the Shiite-Shiite divisions are where things get much more complicated. With just two seats between them, al-Iraqiya and SoL were both intent on ruling the next government. Since neither bloc could get along with one another, two possibilities emerged over the course of the last eight weeks: Either a super Shiite bloc could be formed between the INA and SoL, effectively sidelining the Sunnis in Allawi’s al-Iraqiya bloc, or the INA could join with al-Iraqiya, leaving al-Maliki in the dust.
“An INA-SoL coalition is thus political poison for Iraq’s Sunnis, the United States, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and anyone else in the region that is highly uncomfortable with the idea of Iraq living under an Iranian shadow.”
Such political wrangling may be taken as a sign of a healthy democracy in most countries, but in Iraq, coalition politics can turn very deadly, very fast. It is important to remember that when Iraq held its first democratic experiment in 2005, the bulk of Iraq’s Sunnis chose the bullet over the ballot. This time around, the Sunnis are looking to regain their political voice in Baghdad, and they still have the guns and militant connections to return to if that search ends in failure.
An INA-SoL coalition is thus political poison for Iraq’s Sunnis, the United States, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and anyone else in the region who is highly uncomfortable with the idea of Iraq living under an Iranian shadow. The United States did not anticipate having more than 98,000 troops in Iraq more than seven years after it toppled Saddam Hussein, and needs at least half of those troops out of Mesopotamia within the next three months. To do that, Washington needs to leave at least some semblance of a Persian-Arab balance in the Middle East, and that means ensuring a place for the Sunnis at the winners’ table in Baghdad.
But Iran is not about to make things easy for the United States. The Iranians can see that the U.S.-led sanctions effort, while irritating, lacks bite. They can also see that the U.S. administration is not interested at the moment in waging a third military campaign in the Islamic world, no matter how much Israel complains. Iran is thus in a prime position. They have a super Shiite majority getting ready to rule Iraq, while the United States is left helpless for the most part.
That does not mean Iran is home free, however. In spite of the daily barrages of rhetoric emanating from Tehran on Iranian military might, the country is ill at ease with having the world’s most powerful military stacked on its eastern and western borders. Iran would very much like those U.S. troops to go home, but only if it can be assured somehow that a U.S. military with more of an attention span will not show up in the neighborhood again with plans for an air campaign against Iranian nuclear facilities. For Iran to get this security assurance, it needs to set a high price: American recognition of Iranian dominance in the Persian Gulf.
Given the United States’ need for a Sunni-Shiite balance in this region, this is likely too high a price for Washington to pay at this point in time. So Iran has to turn to more coercive means to capture the United States’ attention. This could include the threat of disenfranchising Iraq’s Sunnis, upping the ante on the nuclear issue, bolstering Taliban forces when U.S. troops are surging into Afghanistan and a resurgence of Shiite militia activity. Indeed, the same day the Iraqi Shiite political merger was announced, radical Iraqi Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr, who has been living under Tehran’s protection since 2007, proclaimed the official revival of his Mehdi Army and threatened to attack U.S. forces should they outstay their Dec. 31, 2011, deadline. This was not exactly a subtle signal on Iran’s part.
There is no shortage of reasons for the United States and Iran to come back to the negotiating table, but the process will be a painful one. Moreover, the fact that Iran is holding the upper hand in this round is a bitter pill for Washington to swallow. Many in Washington will make the case that it is better for the United States to focus on bolstering its regional allies and rely on a residual force of 50,000 troops in Iraq to keep Iran at bay until more options come into view. But Iran has a plan for that, too. If Tehran cannot get the United States to leave Iraq on its terms, then it might as well have U.S. forces concentrated in places where Iran carries influence through proxies. In other words, maintain the status quo. Either way, Iran has options.
-
Summary
The rapid withdrawal of some 40,000 U.S. troops from Iraq over the course of three months looms even as the delicate ethno-sectarian balance of power in Baghdad looks shakier than it has in years and violence appears to be on the rise. STRATFOR examines this withdrawal and its implications.
There are 94,000 U.S. troops in Iraq. Although reports emerged May 11 that the long-anticipated drawdown to 50,000 troops might not begin in earnest until June, the Pentagon maintains that everything is on track to meet the deadline for all combat troops to be out of the country at the end of August.
The planned drawdown comes as violence in Iraq appears to be on the rise and the ethno-sectarian balance of power holding the country together looks to be growing ever more delicate. The drawdown certainly will have implications for the situation in Iraq, but even a reduced U.S. force remains a significant presence in the country and an important factor in the effectiveness of the Iraqi security forces.
The Basics
The drawdown of just more than 40,000 troops in three months (only 91,000 troops are expected to remain in Iraq by the end of May) can only be described as rapid. Even U.S. Army Gen. Ray Odierno, the top U.S. officer in Iraq, described it as a “waterfall.” But a drawdown of this scale at this pace does not happen without immense preparation, and that is a key aspect of the plan; many of the shifts the drawdown entails have already taken place. Since the 2007 surge, during which the number of U.S. troops in the country peaked at around 170,000, the U.S. military in Iraq slowly shifted from being at the forefront of security efforts to playing a tactical overwatch role. That role has continued to evolve, with U.S. forces continuing to move toward a more operational or, in some cases, even a higher, strategic-level overwatch.
Joint patrols are still conducted, especially in more contentious areas such as the northern city of Kirkuk. U.S. training, advising and support — particularly in terms of intelligence and logistics — are still essential to the effective functioning of the Iraqi security forces, which are not expected to be fully effective until at least the end of 2011. But by and large, the United States has already handed over its role in directly maintaining routine security.
The U.S. role is still practical in terms of facilitating and overseeing the day-to-day maintenance of security. But the drawdown schedule has been informed by projections and calculations about what the Iraqi security forces will need from U.S. forces in terms of said facilitation and oversight. In short, if the overarching but delicate sectarian balance of power holds, the United States will have sufficient forces in place to continue supporting the Iraqis in providing for basic internal security.
The Catch
However, that remains a rather large “if.” Even at the height of the surge, the United States has never had anywhere near enough troops in Iraq to militarily impose a political reality on the entire country. The surge’s success was founded upon the 2006-7 decision by the Sunni tribal chiefs in Anbar and other Sunni provinces to reject al Qaeda in Iraq and form Awakening Councils that worked directly with the U.S. military. It also succeeded because of the 2006 agreement in Baghdad on an acceptable division of control over the various security and intelligence organs of state among Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish leadership.
It was this division of control that provided the foundation for the delicate sectarian balance of power that has made the security environment in Iraq fairly stable and permissive for the last few years. The relatively calm and peaceful March 7 elections appeared promising in terms of sustaining this balance, but the formation of a governing coalition has been fraught with difficulty and sectarian strife. Moreover, in Iraq the winners must not only form a parliamentary coalition but must also decide whether to divvy up the various security and intelligence posts in line with the 2006 deal or to strike a new one. That process remains very much in flux.
Meanwhile, sectarian tensions have begun to flare back up, and Sunnis have serious concerns about being marginalized after they threw their weight behind the non-sectarian al-Iraqiya party, which won the most votes. At the moment, STRATFOR remains fairly confident in its assessment that a massive and devastating blow has been struck against al Qaeda in Iraq, but should the Sunnis return to arms, they could again become more welcoming to foreign jihadists.
So while it is clear that the post-drawdown provisions for security in the country are likely sufficient to maintain the status quo in a benign security environment, the real heart of the matter is the Iraqi security forces’ ability to hold together and impose security, as well as Baghdad’s writ in a more contentious and charged sectarian environment.
Since Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s botched dispatch of Iraqi security forces to Basra in 2008 to take action against Shiite militias — especially the armed wing of Muqtada al-Sadr’s movement — without prior consultation with the United States (an operation that was woefully underplanned and undersupplied and was only saved by quick U.S. intervention), very real and important improvements have been made to the Iraqi security forces. But while some units have performed well under fire, the overall environment has been relatively benign and free of excessive sectarian tension, so the forces have gone effectively untested with respect to the situations they may face in the next year.
The military is institutionally stronger and more coherent than even the National Police service, but Iraqis largely still identify along ethno-sectarian lines. This can create multiple senses of identity and thus competing loyalties — not just among the soldiers but also among the commanders and civilian leaders. Amid the current ethno-sectarian tensions, the security forces remain coherent and intact. But if tensions seriously escalate, the list of potential scenarios is almost limitless. A major breakdown in Iraq could lead to not just desertions but the use of security forces for sectarian purposes and even different elements of the forces fighting amongst themselves.
U.S. Combat Capability
The United States has limited ability to ramp its forces in Iraq back up to intervene in a civil war. With nearly 100,000 U.S. troops slated to be committed to Afghanistan by the end of the summer, the United States simply lacks the troops to return to surge levels in Iraq even if it wanted to — and it certainly has no appetite to do so. Meanwhile, the disposition of U.S. forces has fundamentally shifted and contracted considerably. Not only joint security stations but whole forward operating bases have been decommissioned and handed over to the Iraqis. U.S. troops are becoming less dispersed and less exposed, concentrating at bases that are better protected and less vulnerable. But they are also losing some of their nuanced situational awareness and certainly their ability to respond rapidly across the country. Simultaneously, massive amounts of materiel have either been liquidated or shipped back out of the country. So even with the troops still in place, there are logistical and infrastructural complications to returning to Iraq in a big way.
In any event, the United States requires either a coherent Iraqi security force to support in dealing with widespread sectarian tension or for the violence to take place only in isolated areas where force can be concentrated and Iraqi security personnel can be more carefully selected to minimize ethno-sectarian conflicts of interest.
And while all combat troops are supposed to be out of the country by the end of August, this is less of a distinction than it might seem. In terms of day-to-day operations, Americans remain important force multipliers and enablers for Iraqi security forces, with whom they work regularly. This means that, in areas where U.S. troops remain involved after August, the shift will not necessarily be as sharp and sudden as it might first seem.
An Advisory and Assistance Brigade (AAB) is still, at heart, a brigade combat team — simply under a different name with some reorganization and reorientation. Five of the 10 brigade combat teams in Iraq (not counting three brigades dedicated to convoy and base security) are already designated as AABs. They continue to have not only infantry, but cavalry and in some cases even armored battalions under their command, and even the smallest contingent of American advisers should have the ability to call for artillery support or close air support.
In short, there is no denying that slashing more than 40,000 troops from Iraq in three months will entail significant shifts on the ground. But 50,000 troops is still an enormous commitment of forces (as a point of comparison, U.S. forces in Korea number less than 30,000). The contingent is still larger and more capable than many countries’ entire militaries, and that is without mentioning the potent special operations forces that will remain on the ground. Though these forces will be unable to impose a reality on Iraq as was done in post-World War II Germany and Japan, they will be able to help maximize the effectiveness of Iraqi security forces. They can also defend themselves and, if necessary, conduct limited operations themselves.
This utilization of U.S. forces is not something that would be done lightly or without consequence, but it is a reminder of the enduring, if declining, military capability and subsequent influence that the United States will continue to enjoy in Iraq and with the government in Baghdad. The American position should not be overstated, but it must also not be understated. The essential fact is that it is on a steady, downward trajectory. It is neither precipitous nor cautious, but in the end remains extremely difficult to reverse.
Ultimately, everything rests on the formation of a government in Baghdad and the establishment of an equitable power-sharing agreement for the security and intelligence organs. It need not be perfect, and it need not be without contention. But the more contained and more limited the sectarian flare-ups, the more manageable they will be for the fledgling Iraqi security forces and the remaining U.S. troops. Conversely, if the descent into sectarian chaos becomes deep and sustained, the question will become not if but when the security forces will begin to fracture — and even 170,000 U.S. troops would not be able to manage that without some underlying political understanding between ethno-sectarian factions.
-
Second post of the day:
The Iraq Question
ON MAY 11, AN AP REPORT CITED multiple anonymous U.S. military sources stating that the planned American drawdown of combat troops from Iraq had been delayed. Later that same day, a Pentagon spokesman denied the veracity of those claims. In his rebuttal, Pentagon Press Secretary Geoff Morrell said that of the 94,000 U.S. soldiers currently in Iraq, only 50,000 would remain by the end of August, with the accelerated drawdown set to begin in earnest in June, keeping in line with previous pledges made by U.S. President Barack Obama. Speaking hypothetically, Morrell said that even if the withdrawal timetable had truly been drawn out, it would not have represented a “dramatic development.”
Despite the Pentagon’s official position on the matter, it is undeniable that Iraq has seen a ramp up in violence and political tension of late. This makes it hard to believe that the Obama administration is not wondering just how strong the hand it holds on the Iraq question is these days in relation to the other player at the table: Iran. Make no mistake, however. The United States is leaving Iraq, even if later than the currently scheduled date for total departure, the end of 2011. And while over the long run the United States holds clear advantages over Iran, the question that affects the more immediate future is how much (if at all) the United States will be able to utilize the time it has left in Iraq to ensure that the country will not be politically dominated by Tehran once the United States is gone.
Judging from the results of the March 7 parliamentary elections in Iraq, the United States may have a harder time than it had previously hoped in seeing this goal through. It is now clear that the Shia will hold the upper hand over the Sunnis when it comes to dictating the terms of who gets what in the new Iraqi government, which is good news indeed in Tehran. It is not good news in Washington, which now faces the prospect of a Shia-run Baghdad — albeit with a significant Sunni population acting as a natural check — being heavily influenced by its eastern Shiite neighbor. As American foreign policy in the region is heavily centered upon maintaining balances of power (one of which, the Iran-Iraq balance, was shattered as a result of the 2003 U.S. invasion), an emboldened Iran flanking its Iraqi satellite state would represent a setback for the United States.
There are options for what the Obama administration may decide to do about the Iraq question, but none of them are very appealing from the United States’ point of view. Washington could attempt to renegotiate its Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the Iraqi government and prolong its military occupation of the country past 2011. In this case, it could opt for either a prolonged presence involving a large number of troops (the least preferable option in the United States’ eyes), or an extended presence with a smaller number of troops. Both scenarios would generate fierce opposition from Iran and many sectors of Iraqi society, not to mention Obama’s constituents at home. Choosing an extended occupation — assuming it got the go ahead for the renegotiation of the SOFA with Baghdad — would see the United States keeping its forces in Iraq and re-evaluating its options as time progresses.
“There are options for what the Obama administration may decide to do about the Iraq question, but none of them are very appealing from the United States’ point of view.”
If Washington eschews both options, it could, of course, simply accept Iran as the dominant regional power. The United States’ geopolitical interests make all of these unattractive choices, however, meaning the United States could seek to alter the equation, in this case through negotiations with Iran. To do this, Washington must be prepared to give Iran credible security guarantees in exchange for a promise from Tehran to allow an independent Iraq at least a modicum of political independence.
Iran may hold the better hand at the moment, but the United States is still the global hegemon, meaning that despite being in a pretty good situation these days, the Iranian regime is anything but overly confident. The threat of war or sanctions may have subsided, but Tehran knows that its fortunes could change rapidly.
The Iranians know the United States wants to leave Iraq — sooner rather than later — and despite their bellicose rhetoric, are willing to work to accommodate the American aspiration to leave behind a relatively stable country. What Tehran desires more than anything is to guarantee its national security. It hopes it can take advantage of America’s momentary weakness to extract concessions, using its potential leverage over Iraq as its prized bargaining chip. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s routine reminders that the only way for Obama to solve his country’s problems in the Middle East is to enlist Iranian support serves to highlight this point.
Already, there have been vague signs of a possible opening in dialogue between the two countries. While in New York last week, Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki hosted a dinner that brought together representatives from United Nations Security Council member states. The United States sent Deputy Ambassador to the United Nations Alejandro Wolff, a low-ranking official, but a representative of the United States government nonetheless. Wolff and Mottaki reportedly discussed the status of four American citizens currently believed to be held in Iran, including former FBI agent Robert Levinson, who has not been seen since 2007. On May 11, Mottaki announced that the mothers of the other three Americans discussed at the dinner — a trio of hikers detained on the Iranian side of the border near Iraqi Kurdistan in July 2009 — would be granted visas to come visit their children.
It is exactly these types of gestures, however insignificant they may appear in isolation, that must precede any meaningful dialogue on a topic as momentous as the future of an independent Iraq.
-
Looks like "Our man in Iraq" may be headed back. He writes:
===========================================================
"This is from my 'terp in Iraq. He is a Christian. And a very smart, well educated man. I think it is important to be able to see what is percolating inside their minds."
"People with no hope, when they are forbidden from living normal life, when ambitions die, moments of happiness were stolen from them, when they are forced to see dead bodies only...no newborns, when life become cheaper than an IED or a bullet, life becomes a burden."
-
"Risk-tolerant China investing heavily in Iraq as U.S. companies hold back"
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/01/AR2010070103406.html
-
Ralph Peters in the NY Post has a good read on the situation IMO:
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/will_bam_lose_iraq_LEtd1utUwlgTYS3pE4lVNP
President's weird 'victory' lap
One president gave his premature "Mission Accomplished" speech about Iraq on the deck of an aircraft carrier. Now another has given his own version as part of a Chicago-ward-politics sales pitch to disabled veterans.
The difference is that the first guy was sincere.
President Obama's pork-barrel speech to the Disabled Veterans of America yesterday (if you want to help our vets, shut up and do it) would have drawn a blush from those Soviet propagandists who cropped purged Politburo members from Stalin-era photographs.
Ignoring his own opposition to the liberation of Iraq, supporting our troops and the surge, Obama spoke as if all's well in Baghdad -- thanks to him.
As part of his weird victory lap, the president rightfully praised the way "our troops adapted and adjusted" to the insurgency in Iraq, then stressed that 90,000 service members have come home during his administration.
He preened that we'll meet his Aug. 31 deadline to transition "from combat to supporting and training Iraqi security forces" and reaffirmed that we'll remove the last of our troops in 2012. But the portion of yesterday's speech that focused on Iraq left out . . . Iraq.
While that country has passed its military crisis, it's now in political turmoil -- from which our government has utterly disengaged. We won that war, but we still can lose the peace. Obama shunned the fact that, almost half a year after its last national election, Iraq doesn't have a new government. Determined to abandon "Bush's war," Obama's been AWOL in Baghdad.
His neglect may prove disastrous. And the saddest aspect is that the Iraqis wanted us to step in and act as referees, to press them to get past their political differences.
The Iraqi elections were so close that both main camps claimed victory. In the macho atmosphere of Iraq, neither side could back down or compromise after that without an excuse ("Those mean Americans made me do it!"). Our essential and dirt-cheap role would have been to hand the posturing parties a fig leaf.
We've seen this before, in the Balkans, where all sides wanted to stop fighting but were too macho to be the first to suggest a truce. When American troops arrived, they had their excuse. We just don't get it that a key role for our soldiers and diplomats is to enable foreign parties to do what they already want to do themselves.
The situation in Iraq this year didn't call for more troops. Those force reductions were fine. But after hearing for years about the supremacy of political over military solutions, it was odd to witness this administration's neglect of basic statesmanship (which opened the door to the Iranians).
The problem is that this White House and its left-wing base now believe their own propaganda that Iraq was just a distraction, that Afghanistan's all that matters.
So when his script reached the part about Afghanistan yesterday, the president spoke with the rhetoric of a warlord, insisting that "we are going on the offensive against the Taliban" and "we will disrupt, we will dismantle and we will ultimately defeat al Qaeda."
Apart from sounding like George W. Bush (after extensive training by a public-speaking coach), it was noteworthy that, in the course of rattling his light saber, Obama didn't mention his deadline for troop withdrawals from Afghanistan next year.
We'll see how that one goes. Meanwhile, the really-big-booboo aspect of his speech was Obama's utter refusal to acknowledge that Iraq matters to us at all, that it has any strategic value. Yet Iraq, not Afghanistan, lies at the heart of the Middle East, has a profound psychological grip on the Arab world, possesses a critical geo-strategic location -- and, yes, has a lot of oil.
Even a sloppy, kinda-sorta, not-downright-awful outcome in Iraq improves the Middle East enormously. But all this administration cares about is getting out. We're in danger of throwing away seven years of sacrifices -- many made by those disabled veterans to whom Obama pandered -- because our president won't tell our diplomats to step up.
Sure, some on the left would delight in a belated disaster in Iraq to spite the long-gone bogeyman, George W. Bush. I do not believe President Obama is among them. He just doesn't understand the stakes in Baghdad -- and doesn't want to.
But, then, he never has.
-
Looks like "Our man in Iraq" will be going back , , ,. Our prayers for his safety and the success of his good work, and our gratitude for the reports he will be sending back.
PS: He sent this to me while I was out of town.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/08/AR2010080801923.html
-
Our man soon to return to Iraq reports:
-------------------------------------
This is the type of information that is more meaningful to me than the proclamations of western journalists:
Security in Karbala “confusing” due to security forces “reluctance” – source
August 21, 2010 - 10:13:48
KARBALA: Security situation in Karbala province is “confusing” due to security forces “reluctance,” the head of the Karbala Provincial Council said on Saturday.
“Criminal and terror acts currently taking place in Karbala are due to the weak performance of security services,” Mohammed Hameed al-Mosawi told the press.
He explained that security commands in Karbala do not control the performance and work of their personnel.
The holy city of Karbala lies 110 km southwest of Karbala.
MH (P)/SR
'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
Bomb hits US PRT in Nasseriya
August 21, 2010 - 09:20:56
THI-QAR: A roadside bomb on Saturday dawn hit a convoy of the U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Team (P.R.T) northwestern the al-Nasseriya city, causing no casualties or damage.
“The attack occurred at the al-Chibiesh Intersection, northwestern al-Nassiriya,” a local provincial source told Aswat al-Iraq news agency.
He noted that the blast caused no casualties or damage.
Nassiriya, the capital city of Thi-Qar province, lies 380 km south of Baghdad.
MH (P)/SR
'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
U.S. patrol came under attack by thermal bomb in Kirkuk
August 20, 2010 - 12:14:29
KIRKUK: A U.S. vehicle patrol was attacked on Friday by a thermal bomb in central Kirkuk, without casualties, according to a senior security source.
“Unknown gunmen threw a thermal bomb on Friday afternoon (Aug. 20) on a U.S. vehicle patrol in al-Khadraa neighborhood, central Kirkuk,” Brigadier Sarhad Qader told Aswat al-Iraq news agency.
“The forces was distributing food and aids to poor families in al-Khadraa neighborhood,” he added.
“Policemen cordoned off the region and started to search it, where they arrested two suspects,” the officer noted.
SH (P)
''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
3 judges injured in blast in Diala
August 17, 2010 - 10:11:22
DIALA: Three judges were wounded on Tuesday when a roadside bomb hit their civilian vehicle southwest of Baaquba city.
“The blast occurred at the major street in Baladroz district, 45 km southwest of Baaquba,” a local provincial source told Aswat al-Iraq news agency.
In addition to the three judges, a policeman was also wounded as he was with the judges in the same vehicle.
“The four injuries are serious, and were all admitted to hospital,” the source added.
He explained that the four victims were on their way to work at the Diala Court in central Baaquba when the bomb hit their vehicle.
The source accused the al-Qaida organization and banned political parties of targeting the three judges.
Baaquba, the capital city of Diala province, lies 57 km northeast of Baghdad.
MH (P)/SR
-
From the vantage point of history, Barack Obama's prime-time speech
announcing the Iraq war's end is less important than the speech he gave
eight years ago as a state senator in Illinois. This was the October 2002
"dumb war" speech to an anti-Iraq war rally in Chicago's Federal Plaza. Back
then, Mr. Obama had a more complex view of the stakes in Iraq than he does
now.
Today, the Iraq war has been reduced to not much more than a long, bloody
and honorable gunfight between U.S. troops and various homicidal jihadists
and insurgents inside Iraq, a war sustained by George Bush, Dick Cheney and
some neocon advisers mainly to "impose" democracy on the Iraqis.
I think it is a profound mistake to confine the war's significance to the
borders of Iraq. Mr. Obama himself raised the central question about Iraq in
that 2002 speech: Did Saddam Hussein pose a danger beyond his borders, or
not?
"Let me be clear," State Senator Obama told the Federal Plaza crowd, "I
suffer no illusions about Saddam Hussein. . . . He has repeatedly thwarted
U.N. inspection teams, developed chemical and biological weapons and coveted
nuclear capacity. . . . But I also know that Saddam poses no imminent and
direct threat to the United States. . . [H]e can be contained."
This is a widely held view. The Economist's editors this week said Mr. Obama
was largely right that Iraq was a dumb war. What the war did, they say, was
"rid the Middle East of a bloodstained dictator."
It did a lot more than that.
Let us assume that Mr. Obama's "smarter" view had prevailed, that we had
left Saddam in power in Iraq. What would the world look like today?
Mr. Obama and others believe that Saddam and his nuclear ambitions could
have been contained. I think exactly the opposite was likely.
At the time of Mr. Obama's 2002 antiwar speech, three other significant,
non-Iraqi events were occurring: Iran and North Korea were commencing toward
a nuclear break-out, and A.Q. Khan was on the move.
In March 2002, Mr. Khan, the notorious Pakistani nuclear materials dealer,
moved his production facilities from Pakistan to Malaysia. In August, an
Iranian exile group revealed the existence of a centrifuge factory in
Natanz, Iran. A month later, U.S. intelligence concluded that North
Korea had almost completed a "production-scale" centrifuge facility.
It was also believed in 2002 that al Qaeda was shopping for nuclear
materials. In The Wall Street Journal this week, Jay Solomon described how
two North Korean operatives through this period developed a network to
acquire nuclear technologies. In short, the nuclear bad boys club was on the
move in 2002. Can anyone seriously believe that amidst all this Saddam
Hussein would have contented himself with administering his torture
chambers? This is fanciful.
Saddam was centrifugal. He moved outward, into war with Iran in 1980 and
into Kuwait 10 years later. Saddam was a player, and from 2002 onward the
biggest game in his orbit was acquiring nuclear capability.
The definitive account of Saddam's WMD ambitions is the Duelfer Report,
issued by the Iraq Survey Group in 2005. Yes, the Duelfer Report concluded
that Saddam didn't have active WMD. But at numerous points in the 1,000-page
document, it asserted (with quotes from Iraqi politicians and scientists)
that Saddam's goal was to free himself of U.N. sanctions and restart his
efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and other WMD.
The report: "Saddam wanted to recreate Iraq's WMD capability. . . . Saddam
aspired to develop a nuclear capability." The Survey Group described Iraqi
plans to develop three long-range ballistic missiles.
Saddam was obsessed with Iran. Imagine the effect on the jolly Iraqi's
thinking come 2005 and the rise to stardom of Iran's Mahmoud Ahmadinejad,
publicly mocking the West's efforts to shut his nuclear program and
threatening enemies with annihilation. That year Ahmadinejad broke the U.N.
seals at the Isfahan uranium enrichment plant. In North Korea, Kim Jong Il
was flouting the civilized world, conducting nuclear-weapon tests and
test-firing missiles into the Sea of Japan. In such a world, Saddam would
have aspired to play in the same league as Iran and NoKo. Would we have
"contained" him?
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Iran and Saddam Hussein in Iraq simultaneously would
have incentivized Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Sudan to enter the nuclear
marketplace. Pakistan and India would be increasing their nuke-tinged
tensions, not trying as now to ease them.
We ought to be a lot prouder of our troops coming home from Iraq than we are
showing this week. They deserve a monument. That war wasn't just about
helping Iraq. It was about us. The march across the nuclear threshold by
lunatic regimes is a clear and present danger. The sacrifice made by the
United States in Iraq took one of these nuclear-obsessed madmen off the
table and gave the world more margin to deal with the threat that remains,
if the world's leadership is up to it. A big if.
MARC: The author forgets to mention that Libya coughed up its nuclear program.
-
Our man in Iraq is back there again and we begin anew an intermittent sharing of his slice of real life observations:
From Jordan:
24 Sep 2010 02:13:01 +0000
Well the young folks in Amman sure love their night life. Since I was last here they opened a disco near the hotel I stayed at. The line was like something from the old Studio 54 days. Plenty of girls wearing head scarves. And tight jeans. The music emanating from that place was very loud and booming. I'm gonna go ahead and say that place was smokin' last night. Thursday night in Amman is like Friday night in USA. They are off Friday and Saturday. Friday is religious day. Saturday is family day.
I got up at 02:45 because my internal clock is messed up. And I couldn't get my mind off of the fact that in this part of the world hotels occasionally go boom. Plus I didn't work out yesterday so I was obsessing over that.
==============
Fisticuffs at Amman airport
, , , It took 4 lame ass cop/guard types to drop a guy. I came close to jumping in and taking him down and out because it was taking them forever. I have no idea what it's about. This guy had numerous opportunities to grab a gun from a holster, if any were present because they could not easily take him out
================
Baghdad
One of the first thing somebody who has been to Baghdad before will notice is the essential lack of air assets moving all about. I am out at BIAP right now. Several years aho the whine of USAF aircraft engines, and the taking off and landing of choppers, was almost non-stop (especially at night). It now seems eerily quiet of such background noise. I am told that the several times a week embassy flights often have only 15-25 people on them, whereas they were packed to the gills back in the day. The pervasive sound of non-stop generators also seems somewhat lessed as well.
If one saw the feeble patdowns that were given to guys in Amman who triggered the magnetometer at the airport, one might not want to get on a commerical airliner.
-
Well I have been here in the IZ all of 24 hours and I can already tell you that nothing has changed effectiveness and efficiency wise as far as the USG goes. I still see a fragmented, non-critical area focus in the security project I will be working on. This was one of the huge frustrations I had in 2008-2009 when I did a whole year here. Thank God this time is only 90 days.
The sad truth is that, contrary to popular belief and in my humble opinion, America's best and brightest are not over here. I almost feel like this work milieu (international assistance work) is where all the C students went after graduation. The same incompetent, inefficient people are running the show, and still blaming the Iraqis for everything that does not go according to plan. When you pick up the paper at home and read about how the Iraqis (and Afghans) are still all screwed up after all these years, you should know that our incompetence (which we are in denial of) is as much a root cause as any part the Iraqis (and presumably Afghans) play. They are convenient scapegoats.
-
I hear that the Iraqis recently opened fire on a Danish embassy vehicle in the IZ that tried to roll past a checkpoint without stopping. I am told bullets hit vehicle.
No surprise. My old partner and I saw far too many people in the IZ who drove up too fast on these checkpoints and didn't give the Iraqis time to digest their approach. I always considered it utter arrogance. And then they would come back to the office and whine how the Iraqis were harrassing them.
-
Second post of the day:
A few weeks back I told some of you I noticed a trend towards silenced pistols in hits. Well I spoke today to somebody who works closely with the Ministry of Interior, and he said attacks by silenced pistols are off the charts and are now a more likely occurrence than a non-silenced pistol.
Since the jihadist movement learns from each other, and adopts each other's effective tactics, and since we know stuff happening stateside is only a matter of time, keep this in mind even in the homeland.
-
I heard yesterday that the plethora of silenced pistols finding their way into Iraq, and which are becoming the preeminent means of hits, are coming in from Iran.
I also heard that one member of the Commission on Integrity was whacked several weeks back by a gunman with silenced pistol, as he sat in his car right at an entrance into the Green Zone. The gunman then just melted away.
This is always a difficult senario when pontificating on personal security in a place like Iraq. We always tell them "alter your routes." Well there aren't very many entrances into the Green Zone, and it's not like it's convenient to go to another one. That could add another hour to your commute. Sometimes there simply aren't any alternate routes. In Karmah, or Hadithah, or other places I have been, there is basically one road in and out of those places.
So what does that leave? Altering your times? Well you can't get into the Green before a certain time. And you pretty much want to be out before sunset. So once again the window of option is not that large.
I am sure it doesn't help that half the Iraqis I see driving are on a cell phone, so they don't have the alert level they need to maybe pickup on an attack in progress.
============
-
I have been asked what it's like in the Green Zone, especially how is it different than when I was here 11/2008-11/2009.
Well I'll try. But first a little background.
There are many Amercians who reside and operate in the IZ. Soldiers on FOBs (forward operating bases). Embassy employees on the NEC (New Embassy Complex). And sundry other contractors who do not reside or work on either of those. (Generally speaking I fall into that last category). Many soldiers and civilians never leave the FOBs they work on. Many embassy employees never leave the NEC.
For the embassy employees, even if they leave the NEC to go somewhere they have to get permission. They have to be transported in an armored vehicle with a driver who waits for them. They are not allowed to walk around in the IZ.
Many contractors never leave the bases they work on.
So all in all there are not too many people driving around the IZ by themselves, in a thin skinned vehicle, sometimes parking out of the street, and working in a complex that is not part of a FOB or the embassy. And there are even fewer who are living in a building by themselves, that has only some Iraqis living in containerized housing units on the same grounds (that will change soon when my partner gets here).
As far as "being safe", the siutation here like this. The chances of a VBIED detonation are much less likely than out in the Red Zone because ostensibly all vehicles allowed into the IZ are thoroughly searched. Regular IEDs would still be more difficult to emplace, but not impossible. Heck, a sticky bomb was found on a car inside the IZ on Christmas Eve 2008. However, the IZ is a mortars and rockets magnet. The NEC is right on the Tigris, and the Red Zone is right across from it (the Sdar City side I might add). So rockets and mortars fly into here with some regularity. In the past 2-years several Triple Canopy Peruvian guards have died on their posts. Also some U.N. employees around December 2008/January 2009. Since the IZ is rather small to begin with, the footprint insurgents need to get rockets or mortars into in order to mess with the Americans, Brits, and Iraqi govt. is not that large.
On a good day the counter rocket and mortar system (CRAM) which is able to detect flying objects of specified speeds and angles will sound an alarm and you have maybe 15-seconds to get under cover. They have a video here of a guy who suddenly took off running for a duck and cover bunker (sample photo attached), and maybe 10-seconds later a mortar landed on the exact spot he was standing on when the alarm first sounded. The duck and cover photo attached is actually a better one because it has sandbags around the concrete overhead and side cover.http://
-
By FOUAD AJAMI
The chronicles now assign Iraq a distinction all its own. It holds the world record for the longest period of time spent without a government in the aftermath of a contested election. Seven months on, the Baghdad political bazaar is still open. (Consolation to the Iraqis: Holland had held the distinction of longest without a government.)
This is a far cry from the ways of the Arab autocracies and despotisms in Iraq's neighborhood. The pharaonic state in Egypt would have dispensed overnight with the formation of a cabinet. In the monarchies next door to Iraq, the palace makes ministers and sends them packing. There is mayhem in Iraq to be sure, but there are the growing pains of a new democracy as well. Those who see this frustrating interlude in Iraq as evidence of the waste and the futility of the American project in Iraq give voice to a traditional hostility to the idea of democracy taking root in a distant, non-Western setting.
Incumbency appears to have paid dividends in Iraq as it does in many political contests. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is now all but sure to form and lead the new government. Dogged and taciturn, he hunkered down, cut political bargains, and promised greater patronage in the days ahead—all to cobble together a broad coalition.
The elections last March yielded no clear winner. Four big slates divided and claimed the electorate. There was the Sunni vote, and it went to a Shiite standard-bearer, former prime minister and CIA favorite Ayad Allawi—91 seats in a parliament of 325 members. There was the slate of Prime Minister Maliki, overwhelmingly Shiite, which claimed 89 seats. Another broad Shiite coalition, the National Alliance, came third, with 70 parliamentary seats. The Kurds got roughly their share of the population, a total of 57 seats. All four blocks were far from united movements. They were ramshackle structures, riven by personal ambitions, made up of splinter groups, in quest of what could be had and gotten in a free-for-all scramble.
"Politics has no heart," said the radical firebrand, Muqtada al-Sadr, from his Iranian exile, in response to a follower puzzled by his decision to cease his veto of Mr. Maliki and back his coalition. "Be informed," Mr. Sadr continued, "politics is giving and taking."
For Mr. Sadr this is a remarkable transformation. His hatred of Mr. Maliki ran deep. It was Mr. Maliki who in early 2008 launched a decisive military campaign against Mr. Sadr's Shiite militia, the Mahdi Army. Mr. Maliki had made this decision alone, as the American military command had been dubious about his chances of success. Having won the war for Baghdad against the Sunnis, the Mahdi Army had grown brazen, it had become an instrument of outright pillage and mayhem. The Shiites themselves had grown weary of it, and Mr. Maliki would show its brigades and petty warlords no mercy.
By then Mr. Sadr had quit Iraq for his Iranian exile. He was afraid for his safety, afraid of the Americans, afraid of potential assassins. Above all, there was the sword of Damocles hanging over his head: an arrest warrant for the brutal murder in the spring of 2003 of a scion of one of the most illustrious Shiite clerical families, Abdul Majid al-Khoei.
For Mr. Sadr, his Iranian exile is a gilded cage—no one takes seriously his claim that he is there for religious studies. He chose Iran because no other place was safe for him, and he was largely able to hold his movement together by remote control. On his coattails 40 members made it to the new parliament.
Has Mr. Sadr bent to the will of Iran by backing Mr. Maliki? Conceivably so. Much of the recent commentary takes that as evidence of Iran's power in the making of a new government. But there is a simpler explanation. A political man with 12% of the parliamentary seats wanted access to state treasure and resources, opportunities for patronage and government employment for his brigades. Baghdad is not Chicago, but it has shades of it as the struggle for the oil bounty plays out.
So we can now see the broad outlines of a post-American order in Iraq. The withdrawal of the Americans is already "baked into the cake," a senior Iraqi politician recently told me. This is "the East," and in the East people have an unerring instinct for the intentions and the staying power of strangers. Iraqis needn't rush to the pages of Bob Woodward's "Obama's Wars" to know of the disinterest of the president in the affairs of Iraq. There's little doubt that he'll carry out his promise to withdraw U.S. troops by Dec. 31, 2011. But it would make a great difference to Iraqis were he to signal that Washington has a strategic doctrine for the region, and for Iraq's place in it, that goes beyond that date.
The Iraqis have a fetish about their sovereignty, but they also understand their dependence. They will need American help, cover for their air space, protection for their oil commerce in the sea lanes of the Persian Gulf. This Iraqi government will remain, for the foreseeable future, a Shiite-led government anxious about the intentions of the Sunni Arab states; about the Turks now pushing deeper into Iraq's affairs, armed with Neo-Ottomanist ideas about Turkey as a patron of the Sunnis of Iraq. And there will always play upon Iraqis—Shiites in particular—a healthy fear of Iran and a desire to keep the Persian power at bay. There will be plenty of room for America in Iraq even after our soldiers have packed up their gear and left.
The question posed in the phase to come will be about the willingness of Pax Americana to craft a workable order in the Persian Gulf, and to make room for this new Iraq. It is a peculiarity of the American presence in the Arab- Islamic world, as contrasted to our work in East Asia, that we have always harbored deep reservations about democracy's viability there and have cast our lot with the autocracies. For a fleeting moment, George W. Bush broke with that history. But that older history, the resigned acceptance of autocracies, is the order of the day in Washington again.
It isn't perfect, this Iraqi polity midwifed by American power. But were we to acknowledge and accept that Iraqis and Americans have prevailed in that difficult land, in the face of such forbidding odds, we and the Iraqis shall be better for it. We have not labored in vain.
Mr. Ajami is a professor at The Johns Hopkins School of Advance International Studies and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution.
-
So my partner and I are coming out of the embassy the other day, a little bit ahead of this American officer (LTC) wearing a U.N. blue beret. Turns out his car is parked across the street right next to ours. My partner and I start our comprehensive search for sticky bombs. Now you can just tell that this guy has never searched his car, but he wants the chick he is with to think he's all fly like that, and proceeds to conduct 20-seconds of the most lame ass search I have ever seen. Not once did his eyes go lower than the level of his already visible gut.
Does putting on a sky blue beret, in and of itself, just make you a straight up pussy?
-
As I opened the exterior door of the Villa this morning at about 0655, I heard a huge boom. Second loudest boom I have heard in all thiem time I have been over here combined.
At about 0720 while in the NEC DFAC, I heard another big boom.
Both sounded like truck bombs would.
So, it has been on like Donkeykong in Baghdad this morning.
Which is ironic because just last night as I was surfing the web to see what bad things have been going on in Iraq today, I thought to myself "man it's been very quiet. We are due for something."
Then I thought to myself "I wonder if the Iraqis think like that and warn their security folks the equivalent of we're due for something!"
-
Summary
More than 50 people were killed Oct. 31 after Iraqi security forces raided a Baghdad church where members of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), Iraq’s al Qaeda node, had taken about 135 individuals hostage. This incident demonstrated a shift in ISI tactics from bombings and small-arms attacks to taking large numbers of hostages. It also showed Iraqi security forces are capable of putting down a hostage situation much quicker than witnessed during the 2008 Mumbai attacks, even if not necessarily bloodlessly.
Analysis
At about 5:30 p.m. on Oct. 31, Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) militants set off an explosive device inside a car and staged an assault on the Iraq Stock Exchange and the Sayidat al-Nejat Church in the Karada district of Baghdad. Following the blast, at least 10 gunmen breached the church, two detonated suicide vests, and about 135 people were taken hostage. The attackers then called media outlets to demand that suspected al Qaeda militants held in Iraqi jails be released. The hostage situation lasted less than four hours, until an elite Baghdad counterterrorism force raided the church to end the standoff. At least 58 hostages, soldiers and gunmen were killed and another 75 were wounded during the raid.
On the surface, this incident would appear to bear similarities to the November 2008 attacks in Mumbai, with jihadists taking hostages and attacking targets likely to garner Western media attention — in this case, a Christian Church — in order to provoke a standoff. However there are several differences from the Mumbai attacks that make this incident notable, including a shift in tactics by the ISI to include large hostage-taking operations, an activity long-practiced by other militant groups, as well as the ability of the Iraqi security forces to quickly bring the situation to a close, even if the presence of suicide vests on the gunmen made a bloodless end to the incident nearly impossible.
The Attack
The gunmen, armed with assault rifles, grenades and suicide vests, initially attacked the Iraq Stock Exchange, wounding four civilians and killing two guards in the car bombing. After failing to enter the stock exchange, the attackers moved on to the Sayidat al-Nejat Church. The church appears to have been the main target as the attackers already prepared demands related to Christian interests, and the attack was timed when there would be a large number of parishioners attending services. The gunmen detonated two more explosive devices before taking an estimated 135 parishioners hostage.
As occurred during the Mumbai assault, Al-Baghdadia, a local television station, soon reported that it received calls from the attackers, who claimed they were from the ISI, issuing their demands. The gunmen told Al-Baghdadia they wanted several suspected members of al Qaeda held in Iraqi jails, as well as two women from a Coptic church who they said were detained in Egypt after converting to Islam, to be released. A statement from the ISI released on the Internet after the attack confirmed these demands. Also like the Mumbai siege, it appears that the militants were trying to create a hostage situation and may have planned to take over multiple buildings — they failed to enter the stock exchange — with the intention of dispersing security forces over a wider area and preventing them from focusing on one particular target.
The response by Iraqi security forces demonstrated why the militants would pursue this strategy. With only one building to focus on, Baghdad police and counterterrorism units quickly arrived on the scene and, likely with U.S. support including reconnaissance aircraft, surrounded the church within an hour of the attack. All surrounding homes and buildings were evacuated and a response plan was prepared. At approximately 8:40 p.m., counterterrorism units raided the church, killing five of the attackers, arresting five and freeing all the surviving hostages. The operation to end the hostage situation was over in less than 20 minutes, within four hours of the initial attack.
The Iraqi government is facing criticism for the response by security forces that left 58 killed, including 43 civilians and 10 security forces, and around 75 wounded. Approximately 92 hostages were freed, including many who suffered injuries at some point in the ordeal. As noted before, most of the deaths were caused by the attackers’ suicide vests loaded with ball bearings, though it is unclear if the casualties occurred when the ISI militants initially took the church or during the security response. Some survivors claimed to have survived by barricading themselves with bookshelves in a front room of the church, creating a safe-haven.
The decision by Baghdad forces to raid the building was due to their belief that the attackers were going to kill the hostages, as well as their desire to prevent a drawn-out siege and the accompanying media attention that would increase pressure on them to meet the attackers’ demands. Considering that the attackers made demands they knew would not be fulfilled, set off explosive devices when they took the church and wore suicide vests, increasing the likelihood of mass casualties in a raid, there is reason to believe the militants had no concern for the lives of their hostages.
A Growing Trend
While Iraqi officials and security forces will face scrutiny over the raid, they demonstrated a quick response to an armed assault and hostage situation. After the warnings of similar threats in Europe in September, this incident shows how difficult it is for militants to maintain a hostage situation for more than a few hours, even for heavily armed militants in an insurgency-ravaged country like Iraq.
The ISI employed similar tactics to those used by other groups in attacks such as a May 2010 attack in Lahore, a December 2009 attack in Rawalpindi and a January 2010 attack in Kabul. All of these incidents involved several teams of gunmen, some of whom took hostages, prolonging the incident and complicating the security response.
This tactic of combining assault rifles, suicide vests and other weapons in a hostage or siege situation, while certainly not novel, has increased in popularity since the Mumbai attacks. While this poses challenges for security forces, they are not insurmountable ones. The Baghdad Operations Command response to the Oct. 31 attack demonstrated the ability to end the situation quickly, unlike India’s response to Mumbai, though it may take more training to avoid the high casualty count. Whether the ISI will decide this attack is a success is unclear, but the report by Baghdad officials that most of the attackers were foreign fighters means they may have found a new source for militants, and they may have more resources to carry out fresh attacks.
-
Second post of the day:
Count me as amongst those who think BO and the Dems have thrown away everything we finally achieved in Iraq.
Stratfor
Approximately 100 people have been reported killed and nearly 300 injured in up to 21 seemingly coordinated improvised explosive device (IED) blasts throughout Baghdad the evening of Nov. 2, beginning at 6:15 p.m. At least 10 IEDs were placed in vehicles, four were along roadsides and two were sticky bombs generally placed underneath cars (though their exact positions upon detonation are unknown). The bombings occurred almost exclusively in Shiite neighborhoods — Sadr City, Kadhimiya, Shula, Shab, Ur, Amil, Bayaa and Abu Dshir — with the mixed Sunni-Shiite neighborhood of Yarmouk and the Sunni neighborhoods of Waziryah, Azamiyah and Karkh also being struck. The IEDs targeted popular civilian areas including cafes, restaurants, markets and residential buildings, and there are reports of mortar attacks on a Shiite mosque and blasts in Abu Ghraib, a town outside of Baghdad.
(click here to enlarge image)
The high casualty count is due to the quantity of explosive devices rather than the quality of their construction and placement. The exact locations of the devices are unclear, but their being spread across the city is evidence that the attackers were attempting to thin out the emergency response to the bombings. The timing and number of explosions indicates a coordinated plan to increase ethno-sectarian tensions, likely with the goal of disrupting the formation of an Iraqi government.
The bombings follow the Oct. 31 armed suicide assault and bombing of an Assyrian Catholic Church in Baghdad by the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), Iraq’s al Qaeda franchise, and taken together, these could represent increased capability for the group. However, a large number of individuals and groups in Iraq have the capability to carry out these types of attack, and coordinated IED attacks in the country are nothing new. While the ISI may be the first suspect, there is no shortage of groups and individuals looking to spark renewed ethno-sectarian tensions.
Read more: Coordinated Bombings Across Baghdad | STRATFOR
-
The job description for many of the existing Police Advisor/Police Trainer positions is written such that somebody who has experience as a deputy sheriff in a podunk county in the USA, somebody who barely ever sees anything more than a medium sized city (if that) and patrols hundreds of square miles by himself, suddenly has some expertise in training and advising police officers in large cities in war torn zones. Maybe it's just me but simply don't see the connection between experince possessed and skills required.
Now if a lawman has spent time over here (e.g. Reserve duty), then I would probably feel differently. But absent that I just don't see how 20-years service patrolling Podunk, TN, gives you the experience and knowledge to train and advise the Baghdad police force.
-
I just spent 5-minutes hiding under my desk while 2-4 mortars landed not too awful far away (echoes can make it hard to tell). They sure didn't seem too far off.....
=================================
It never ceases to amaze me how many security "experts" here don't even have the talent or skills that a switched on mall cop might have in the USA....
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Well, several ________ (guys from the office) just came into my office because they heard I had a "complaint." (How does a serious question on matters of life and death become a "complaint?").
Anyway, the bottom line is that at this moment in time and space there is no procedure for ensuring that "convicts" (in other words cooperating witnesses no matter their custody status) are searched prior to entry onto the compound.
Despite the incident in Khost on 12/30/2009, I guess there are still those who believe such could never happen to them.
======================================
Urgent - Two Katyusha rockets hit Baghad’s fortified “Green Zone”
November 6, 2010 - 09:50:37
BAGHDAD / Aswat al-Iraq: Two Katyusha rockets fell Saturday on west Baghdad’s fortified “Green Zone,” where the main offices of the Iraqi government, U.S., British and other Western embassies exist, a security source said.
“The rockets fell on Baghdad’s Green Zone, but the human and material losses were not known,” he said, adding that police forces have managed to discover the area, where the rockets were fire from, on a building in Aqaba bin-Naf’i'e square in central Baghdad.
SKH/SR
----------------------
Apparently several more fell just outside the Green Zone, which since it's rather small would actually make sense as to why they all sounded so close.
-
At about 0800 today my partner and I came upon one of the "gauntlet" operations I have mentioned several times. Basically the Iraqi Army will have about 30 soldiers split on both sides of the travel lane. They stop cars in such a way that they can search about five of them at a time.
The search consists of them going through the entire vehicle. Open trunks, hoods, glove boxes, bags, etc. And not just open and look, but rummage around. Get you out of the car. Talk to you and ask questions. Personally I think this works quite well for them. By doing what they do they eliminate a vast amount of space within a vehicle as being able to carry an explosives payload. So it's a practice I think has substantive value and certainly makes the adversary's job a lot more difficult.
The two soldiers that searched our particular vehicle were quite pleasant. Mine, a young lad, asked me if I was American. Then asked me (in very poor, one word "sentences") if I was from New York, which I was able to honestly answer yes. He then asked me if I liked Iraq, to which I, of course, said yes. Which made him smile. I then said "America likes Iraq", which seemed to make him smile wider.
All in all a very pleasant transaction. So far, knock on wood, I have found the Iraqi Army guys to be professional, respectful, considerate and pleasant. I never quite got that level of positive note vibes from many of the Iraqi Police. We don't have to interact with them a whole lot this time around.
Last week, I was going the other way past one of these gauntlet operations. I suddenly observed one PSD vehicle pull out of the line and start to drive around the gauntlet. An Iraqi soldier motioned for him to stop. He didn't, and kept going. The soldier had to step out into the middle of the road in front of the vehicle with clenched fist (the stop sign that you do not want to drive through no matter who is giving it to you). I could see the PSD driver at that point very animatedly being all pissed off inside his vehicle. I certainly could not help but think to myself that if he got himself dragged out of that car and whupped up on, he would have nobody to blame but himself. Anybody who lives in the IZ for more than a week knows these gauntlet checkpoints are not uncommon, and you just better give yourself plenty of time to get where you need to be. The gauntlet checkpoints usually translate to activity at the Iraqi Parliament building, so the soldiers (and by the way they mostly seem pretty sharp and squared away at these gauntlets), are taking their business seriously. I had interaction with one of their officers a few weeks back, and although he was pleasant and respectful, he clearly was very intense about his business of running that gauntlet. The type of leadership that, in my humble opinion, the Iraqis desperately need more of.
-
Analyst Kamran Bokhari examines Iran’s influence over the Nov. 11 formation of the new Iraqi government.
Editor’s Note: Transcripts are generated using speech-recognition technology. Therefore, STRATFOR cannot guarantee their complete accuracy.
After eight months of excruciatingly complex and drawn out negotiations at both the intra and intercommunal level, the Iraqi factions have finally agreed upon some semblance of a preliminary government. The ongoing lengthy process underscores the extent of influence Iran enjoys in its western neighbor and the fact that this is not your normal jockeying for power that one sees in most countries after an election.
What we have here is a very preliminary form of government emerging as a result of negotiations between the various factions. Today’s session of parliament elected a speaker and his two deputies. The speaker is a Sunni which was the case in the outgoing parliament, and he has two deputies one each from amongst the Shia and Kurdish communities.
In addition to the election of the speaker and the two deputy speakers the house also reelected President Jalal Talabani for another term. What is interesting here is that Jalal Talabiani was elected in two phases of voting and the Sunnis largely walked out of the session when that was taking place. So we enter into a new controversy in which the Sunnis feel betrayed by the Shiites and Kurds.
One of the most interesting and important points in this eight month saga since the election is how Iran was able to essentially checkmate the United States in the sense that the Sunni backed al-Iraqiyah block bagged the most seats in the March 7 election. Yet Iran was able to pull together both the two Shia block that came in second and third place to form a super Shia bloc and thereby claiming the right to form a government in which we now see in process.
in most countries there are democratic elections and then there’s this normal - if there is a hung parliament - is normal jockeying for power between those that bagged the most seats to cobble together a new government. In Iraq it’s much more than just a normal negotiations because essentially Iraqi is a new state. Post-Ba’athist Iraq does not have a lengthy tradition of elections or governments being formed. This is the second government since the overthrow of Saddam.
What’s significant about this new power sharing arrangement is for in the first time the Sunnis en masse were able to participate in elections and therefore pose a challenge to the domination of the system enjoyed by the Shia and Kurds thus far. What this shows is that every time there’s going to be an election for the foreseeable future, we’re going to be going through this same motion again because there is no underlying if you will understanding or formal power-sharing mechanism. It has to be built from scratch based on the results of the elections.
-
Well we went to the airport today only be told we could not leave the country because we did not have an exit visa. So I am stuck here for the immediate future. But at least I am back in the IZ....
-
OMII is back home in the USA. Welcome home! 8-)
-
Our man no longer in Iraq comments:
=============
Once one sees how wild many Iraqis drive, in situations where not driving wildly would be the self-survival oriented thing to do, this becomes no surprise:
http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/meast/11/28/iraq.violence/index.html?hpt=T2
-
http://www.examiner.com/public-safety-in-national/wikileaks-wmd-program-existed-iraq-prior-to-us-invasion
-
"Wikileaks: There WERE WMD in Iraq"
It was always the case that the endless chorus singing "Bush Lied" was further from the truth than Bush. That was a miserable period in American politics. It launched the career of Obama the most credible and consisten of the anti-war candidates, now commander of 2 wars (while signing the extension of the Bush tax cuts). I wonder how many fewer lives would have been lost if the enemy wasn't constantly told we were right on the verge of quitting - because of no WMD threat.
-
The WMD were there. They were smuggled to Syria or elsewhere at some point. Or hidden somewhere and not found.
Of course MSM will ignore this. The opposite of endless coverage of the water boarding of three terrorists as though it was some sort of scandal.
The biggest tragedy of this leak is as pointed out on cable is is highlights just how weak our country is.
A single guy with some computer skills can do such damage and yet, there still has to be a public *debate* as to can we, should we, even do anything to stop him.
More evidence of our decline. I agree with Doug - not inevitable but clearly the result of idiot policies.
This guy is an enemy of the US. We should simply put a bullet in his brain to make an example. And anyone who helps him.
The NYT is not off the hook either though the liberals will force our courts to give them immunity.
-
Anyone doubt what Putin would do if Wikileaks were leaking Russian documents?
-
" I wonder how many fewer lives would have been lost if the enemy wasn't constantly told we were right on the verge of quitting - because of no WMD threat."
My wonderment goes deeper than that. IMHO the liberal left/progressives/liberal fascists deserve considerable credit/blame for the current state in which we find ourselves in Iraq and vs. Iran due to their destructive temper tantrums and sometimes downright disloyal words and actions and for it not being what could have been achieved but for them. :x :x :x
-
Notice how the omnipresent stories on casualties in the MSM stopped after Jan 2009? I guess we didn't have any troops wounded or killed after that.... :roll:
-
This source is unknown to me. It was forwarded by a friend.
Dechristianizations
Breaking news quickly passes into "archive"; but days, weeks, and sometimes years may be required, to reconstruct what actually happened. Sometimes there are no survivors of a crime or catastrophe, and no testimony to work with, beyond what forensic specialists can provide. But humans are not that easy to kill, and there are usually a few accusers left about.
On Sunday, Oct. 31, during Mass, Islamist terrorists attacked the main Syriac Catholic Church in Baghdad -- the Cathedral of Our Lady of Perpetual Help. While there have been persistent and increasing attacks on Christians, as well as on other religious minorities, all over the Muslim world, this one was especially notable, and deserved far more sustained press coverage. Many details are only now emerging, from the wounded who were flown out of Iraq to Rome, and other European cities, for medical treatment.
The attack was sustained over five hours. Iraqi military authorities had the church surrounded for most of this time; American-made helicopters buzzed overhead. But, rather than risk the lives of soldiers, the authorities were content to simply contain the massacre.
It had begun with a diversionary strike against the Baghdad stock exchange, across the street: two of its guards were killed. Those inside the church could hear the automatic rifle fire, which began towards the end of the homily. Congregants were at first relieved that the attack did not seem to be directed at the church. Its entrances were blocked, the main wooden door barricaded.
A jeep parked outside the church then exploded, and a brigade of jihadis, in Iraqi army uniforms, burst through the main entrance commando-style. First one priest -- a Father Wasim, among those trying to hold the door -- shouted, "Leave them alone, take me!" He was immediately shot. A Father Thair then shouted from the altar, likewise, "Leave them alone, take me!" and was likewise annihilated.
While this was happening, a Father Raphael succeeded in herding about 70 of the faithful into the sacristy, and blocking its door. In due course the jihadis found it had a small high window, and tossed grenades through that; others amused themselves by firing bullets through the door.
In the cathedral proper, the jihadis used the central crucifix for target practice, while shouting in mockery, "Come on, tell Him to save you!" At their leisure, they executed the men of the congregation, while terrorizing the women and children in various other ways. They shot the arms off a couple of girls who tried to use cellphones; they shot babies who were crying. And in classical Arabic, with Egyptian and Syrian accents, they declared: "We are going to heaven, and you are going to hell. Allah is great!"
At their leisure, for over the five hours they twice stopped for formal Islamic prayers. They were also able to place bombs around the cathedral, for the purpose of blowing it up at the end, but owing to faulty wiring these did not go off. Survivors, in the accounts I've seen in Italian media, say the jihadis eventually ran out of bullets, and then began calling for the bombs to be detonated. They had several colleagues stationed on the roof, orchestrating their affair; unmolested by the troops surrounding the church. Two of the jihadis with suicide belts managed to blow themselves up.
Finally, the Iraqi troops went into action. The dead were now counted; the wounded removed to area hospitals where friends and relatives were already making their hysterical inquiries. The church was now "secured," so that passersby could not get a view of the devastation inside it.
My reader may get far more detail through patient Internet searching. The facts mentioned above seem incontestable. Unfortunately, most of the mainstream reporting came down to "58 killed and a larger number wounded." There were some insulting editorials, which generically condemned "religious intolerance," thus putting murderers and victims on the same level.
The exodus of Christians from Iraq is, by now, more or less common knowledge. Within Iraq itself, there is a movement from such cities as Baghdad and Mosul -- which once had large Christian populations -- to safer territory in Iraqi Kurdistan.
Throughout the Middle East, from countries that remained majority Christian long after the Islamic conquests of the seventh century, the exodus of the last Christians is proceeding. In Palestine, entirely Christian towns such as Bethlehem have been, quite recently, Islamicized. In Lebanon -- itself established as a Christian enclave -- Hezbollah has largely taken over. The Coptic Christians of Egypt, who still number in their millions, suffer frequent violent attacks. Et cetera.
There were once Jews all over the Middle East; now they are down to Israel only, whose very right to exist is challenged. Christians are now following the Jews into exile or extinction. But in the West, we just don't want to know.
David Warren
© Ottawa Citizen
-
http://www.ottawacitizen.com/news/pogrom+Baghdad/3943188/story.html
A pogrom in Baghdad
By David Warren, Ottawa Citizen December 12, 2010
Breaking news quickly passes into "archive"; but days, weeks, and sometimes years may be required, to reconstruct what actually happened. Sometimes there are no survivors of a crime or catastrophe, and no testimony to work with, beyond what forensic specialists can provide. But humans are not that easy to kill, and there are usually a few accusers left about.
On Sunday, Oct. 31, during Mass, Islamist terrorists attacked the main Syriac Catholic Church in Baghdad -- the Cathedral of Our Lady of Perpetual Help. While there have been persistent and increasing attacks on Christians, as well as on other religious minorities, all over the Muslim world, this one was especially notable, and deserved far more sustained press coverage. Many details are only now emerging, from the wounded who were flown out of Iraq to Rome, and other European cities, for medical treatment.
Read more: http://www.ottawacitizen.com/news/pogrom+Baghdad/3943188/story.html
-
Thank you for the citation GM. Also, "Our man formerly in Iraq" confirms the story as well.
-
Funny how the "vast majority of peaceful muslims" is never around when you need them.....
-
http://www.commentarymagazine.com/blogs/index.php/wehner/384948
“A Rough Version of Mr. Bush’s Dream May Yet Come True”
Peter Wehner - 12.23.2010 - 8:56 AM
In its editorial today, “A Good Year in Iraq,” the Washington Post writes this:
AT THE beginning of this year, Iraq’s fragile new political order faced a momentous challenge. The country needed to hold credible democratic elections at a time when its army was still battling al-Qaeda and other domestic insurgents. The winners had to form a government in spite of deep rifts among leaders and sects, who just three years ago were fighting a civil war. And all this had to happen even as the United States reduced its troops from 150,000 to 50,000 and ended combat operations for those who remained.
The result was a long, painful, contentious, confusing and sometimes bloody year. But when Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki presented his new government to parliament on Tuesday, Iraq could fairly be said to have passed a major test. It is not yet the peaceful Arab democracy and force for good in the Middle East that President George W. Bush imagined when he decided on invasion eight years ago. But in the past 12 months it has taken some big steps in the right direction.
The editorial goes on to point out that (a) the election was judged free and fair, a very rare event in the Middle East; (b) measures to integrate former Sunni militiamen into the security forces or other government jobs have been implemented; (c) fears that Mr. Maliki would establish a dictatorship look to be exaggerated; (d) the economy is nearing a tipping point, with foreign oil companies refurbishing the fields of southern Iraq and the city of Basra, a militia-ruled jungle four years ago, beginning to boom; and (e) violence has dwindled to the lowest level Iraq probably has known in decades (in September 2006, there were more than 3,300 civilian deaths from violence; this month so far it has counted 62, making Iraq a country far safer than Mexico).
The Post editorial concludes this way:
It’s still too early to draw conclusions about Iraq, though many opponents of the war did so long ago. Mr. Maliki’s government could easily go wrong; the coming year, which could end with the withdrawal of all remaining U.S. troops, will likely be just as challenging as this one. But the country’s political class has repeatedly chosen democracy over dictatorship and accommodation over violence. If that keeps up, a rough version of Mr. Bush’s dream may yet come true.
Four years ago this month may have been the low-water mark in Iraq, with the nation gripped by a low-grade but escalating civil war. The American public strongly opposed the war. Almost every Democratic lawmaker in Congress, with the honorable exception of Senator Joseph Lieberman, was in fierce opposition to both the war and what later became known as the “surge.” Republican lawmakers were losing their nerve as well. Three months earlier, in September 2006, Senator Mitch McConnell had asked for, and received, a private meeting with President Bush. Senator McConnell’s message was a simple one: the Iraq war’s unpopularity was going to cost the GOP control of Congress. “Mr. President,” McConnell said, “bring some troops home from Iraq.”
President Bush, to his everlasting credit, not only refused to bend; he increased the American commitment to Iraq and changed our counterinsurgency strategy. And while the situation in Iraq remains fragile and can be undone — and while problems still remain and need to be urgently addressed (including the terrible persecution of Christians occurring in Iraq right now) — this is a moment for our nation, and most especially our military, to take sober satisfaction in what has been achieved. It has not been an easy journey. But it has been a noble and estimable one.
There is no need here to rehearse the names of the few who did not buckle at the moment when the war seemed lost. They know who they are. In the words of Milton, they were “faithful found among the faithless.” Their faithfulness, and in many cases their courage, is being vindicated.
-
By SAM DAGHER
BAGHDAD—Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki ruled out the presence of any U.S. troops in Iraq after the end of 2011, saying his new government and the country's security forces were capable of confronting any remaining threats to Iraq's security, sovereignty and unity.
Mr. Maliki spoke with The Wall Street Journal in a two-hour interview, his first since Iraq ended nine months of stalemate and seated a new government after an inconclusive election, allowing Mr. Maliki to begin a second term as premier.
In an interview, he said Iraq would assume responsibility for all its own security by the end of 2011, and would not fall into alignment with Iran.
A majority of Iraqis—and some Iraqi and U.S. officials—have assumed the U.S. troop presence would eventually be extended, especially after the long government limbo. But Mr. Maliki was eager to draw a line in his most definitive remarks on the subject. "The last American soldier will leave Iraq" as agreed, he said, speaking at his office in a leafy section of Baghdad's protected Green Zone. "This agreement is not subject to extension, not subject to alteration. It is sealed."
He also said that even as Iraq bids farewell to U.S. troops, he wouldn't allow his nation to be pulled into alignment with Iran, despite voices supporting such an alliance within his government.
Video Archives: On Iraq
Obama Addresses U.N. on Economy, Iraq, Talibann
Daniel Henninger: If Saddam Had Stayed
Obama Speech Marks New Focus in Iraq, at Home
."For Iraq to be dragged into an axis or an orbit, that's impossible, and we reject it whether this comes from Iran, Turkey or the Arabs," he said.
He added that a kind of "paranoia" about a Tehran-Baghdad alliance in the U.S. is matched by a fear in Iran about U.S. influence: "An Iranian official visited me in the past and told me, 'I thought the Americans were standing at the door of your office,' " he said.
In an interview in Washington, Vice President Joe Biden also said Iran had failed to buy influence during the election or to co-opt Mr. Maliki, who was among the members of the current Iraqi government who briefly took refuge in Iran during the reign of Saddam Hussein.
Mr. Maliki's new majority depends partly on followers of anti-American cleric Moqtada al-Sadr. But Mr. Biden credited Mr. Maliki for denying Mr. Sadr's bloc any control of Iraqi security, while forming a government with full buy-in from Iraq's main factions of Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds.
U.S. military commanders still accuse Iran of funding, training and providing sanctuary to Shiite militias, like Mr. Sadr's Promised Day Brigades, which they say are responsible for attacks against U.S. forces and gangster-style assassinations that continue to plague Baghdad and other areas.
More
Baghdad to Tackle Oil Issues, PM Vows
.Mr. Maliki suggested his government had co-opted militias like the one associated with Mr. Sadr. "The militias are now part of the government and have entered the political process," said Mr. Maliki. The Sadr contingent, he added, "is moving in a satisfactory direction of taking part in the government, renouncing violence and abandoning military activity, and that's why we welcome it."
Security is the new government's top priority, Mr. Maliki said, as in his previous term. Sectarian violence and suicide bombings continue to plague the country as the full withdrawal of U.S. soldiers nears. Almost a dozen people were killed in double suicide bombings on Monday outside provincial government offices in the city of Ramadi, west of Baghdad, according to security officials.
A resumption of more extreme violence, of course, could alter the thinking in Baghdad and Washington about the U.S. timetable.
But Mr. Maliki said the only way for any of the remaining 50,000 or so American soldiers to stay beyond 2011 would be for the two nations to negotiate—with the approval of Iraq's Parliament—a new Status of Forces Agreement, or SOFA, similar to the one concluded in 2008.
That deal took a year of protracted negotiations in the face of vehement opposition from many among Mr. Maliki's own Shiite constituency, and no repeat is expected.
Mr. Maliki and U.S. officials have refrained for the most part from raising the issue publicly during the months of political wrangling in Baghdad, as Mr. Maliki negotiated with potential coalition partners, many of whom have adamantly opposed an extended U.S. stay.
A senior official in President Barack Obama's administration said Washington was "on track" to withdraw all its remaining soldiers in Iraq by the end of next year. That's the final milestone in the security agreement, following the reduction in American troop levels to below 50,000 in August and the pullout of U.S. soldiers from most Iraqi inner cities in June 2009. "The prime minister is exactly right," said the senior official.
During the interview, Mr. Maliki said he was heartened by America's "commitment" to honoring the agreements it reached with Iraq, and he laughed approvingly when told that U.S. Ambassador James F. Jeffrey keeps a frayed copy of the so-called Strategic Framework Agreement in his leather briefcase. That document calls, in broad terms, for long-term cooperation in security, defense, economy, energy and culture, among other areas.
In a briefing for Western reporters last week, Mr. Jeffrey said that despite the requirement to pull out all American troops at the end of 2011, the framework document and other agreements between Baghdad and Washington contain "a very robust security agenda."
The U.S. embassy in Baghdad will house a "significantly sized" office aimed at security cooperation, Mr. Jeffrey said, comprised of about 80 to 90 military personnel that would take over most of the current functions of the U.S. military in advising, assisting, training and equipping Iraqi forces. That's similar to arrangements with other countries in the region, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. The embassy would also oversee a major Iraqi police-training program.
Mr. Maliki played down Iraq's need for any major help from the U.S. military, even while acknowledging serious deficiencies in areas including control of airspace and borders. He said the days when ethnic or sectarian-based militias roamed the streets of Iraq and operated above the law were over.
"Not a single militia or gang can confront Iraqi forces and take over a street or a house," said Mr. Maliki. "This is finished; we are comfortable about that."
He said full withdrawal of U.S. troops also will remove a prime motivator of insurgents—both the Shiite fighters tied to militia groups and Iran, and Sunnis linked to Mr. Hussein's ousted Baath party.
Mr. Maliki defended his political horse trading with rival factions, many of which are seen as far apart on several substantial policy issues. He called the post-election process—in which he managed to prevail despite his own party bloc failing to gain the most votes—"very arduous."
He acknowledged that he expanded the number of cabinet seats just to placate the squabbling parties that he eventually cobbled together into his governing coalition, arguably the broadest since the fall of Mr. Hussein.
"I mean seven to eight ministries are, allow me to say, ministries for appeasement purposes," he said.
Mr. Maliki said he agreed to several Kurdish demands, including a referendum in contested northern regions, though he didn't think it was feasible without a constitutional amendment to accompany it.
Washington is so concerned about the standoff in the north—where Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen and smaller ethnic groups have faced off—that a large contingent of U.S. soldiers continues to staff joint security checkpoints there, as diplomats work on political solutions.
The referendum was one of 19 demands made by Kurdish President Masoud Barzani in exchange for a power-sharing deal that ended the gridlock that followed the March elections. The resulting unity government headed by Mr. Maliki, a Shiite, includes Kurds and a Sunni-dominated bloc headed by the secular Shiite and former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi.
Mr. Allawi, whose bloc won the most seats in the election but couldn't form a majority, will chair a new National Council for Higher Policies, but won't be able to implement policies without broad government support.
-
I, and I think many Americans wonder why we have spent billions upon billions of dollars and lost lives for Iraq. The same question is being asked of Afghanistan.
We "won" in Iraq. :?
In the latest example of waning American influence in Iraq, anti-U.S. cleric Muqtada Sadr returned home from Iran, where he had gone in 2007 after his Shiite Muslim militia engaged in years of on-and-off battles with U.S. troops and was blamed for some of the country's worst sectarian violence.
For American officials, Sadr's sudden appearance in Najaf appeared to be nothing but bad news.
"I don't think the U.S. Embassy is at all happy about this," said Kenneth Katzman, an analyst on Iraq for the Congressional Research Service. "Sadr has made the calculation that U.S. influence is low enough that the U.S. is not going to pressure him, or chase him … or pressure Maliki to arrest him."
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-iraq-sadr-20110106,0,1577516.story
-
JDN,
We took out Saddam and his sociopathic sons. We pressured the Saudis. We've given the Iraqis a chance at a better future. We got Libya to give up it's nuclear ambitions.
The complaint has always been that we support undemocratic dictators in the arab world. Well, we took one out and tried to rebuild an arab country into something decent. What's the better option?
-
Yes, and , , ,
IMHO most of our current situation there can be laid at the feet of Senator and presidential candidates Obama and Clinton, Senator and now VP Joe Biden, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, House Speaker Pelosi, Senator and former presidential candidate Kerry, former VP Al Gore and many, many other high ranking elected officials, speaking out destructively of our efforts there. Opposing the war was a reasonable position, but most of the people I just mentioned went above and beyond and well into the realm of destructive, quite often for the perception of personal political gain.
How vile!
In this they were aided and abetted by Pravda on the Hudson (NYTimes), Pravda on the Beach (Left Angeles Times) Pravda on the Potomac (WaPo) and much of the MSM with dishonest, misleading and destructive reporting (e.g. reporting on our secret program tracing enemy money flows, our financial support of Iraqi reporters with the courage to write positive articles in Iraq, and much, much more).
If you are an Iraqi deciding which way the wind is going to blow, are you going to go with the country that appears likely to leave you in the lurch, or are you going to cut the best deal that you can? When BO was running he said the surge would fail and that we should run away. Are you going to bet your life on him?
Also, as GM points out, where would Iraq be today if we had not done as we did?
-
"where would Iraq be today if we had not done as we did"
Nuclear armed.
They were 5-7 years away in 2002, according to ISG, not an imminent threat.
Time flies.
-
BAGHDAD (AFP) – Record low water levels at Iraq's largest hydroelectric dam have ground turbines there to a halt, amplifying a power shortage that led to riots last summer, a top official said on Thursday.
Adel Mahdi, advisor to the electricity minister, said water levels at the Mosul dam on the Tigris River had fallen to 298 metres (977 feet) above sea level.
"It is the first time since 1984 when the dam was built that water levels have fallen this low," Mahdi told AFP.
"The installed power generation capacity of Mosul's hydroelectric plant is 1,175 megawatts, but the current production is zero, because the turbines need a minimum water level of 307 metres (1,007 feet) to operate," he added.
-
By Max Boot
POTB
February 13, 2011
My kids — the oldest is 13 — seem to think that anything that happened in the pre-iPad era is ancient history and therefore of little relevance to them. The American public and politicos must tacitly agree. How else to explain the sudden disappearance of Iraq from our public discourse?
Remember Iraq? That country we invaded in 2003? The one where more than 4,400 American soldiers have lost their lives and more than 32,000 have been wounded? The one where we've spent nearly $800 billion?
As recently as 2008, Iraq dominated American politics. But now it's a nonstory. Other subjects have pushed it off the front page, from the economy and healthcare to Afghanistan, Tunisia and Egypt. In a way, Iraq has been a victim of its own success. Because it seems to be doing relatively well, policymakers have shifted their attention to more urgent concerns. But there is a danger that our present inattention could undo the progress that so many have struggled so hard to attain.
Iraq has made impressive gains since 2006, when it was on the brink of all-out civil war. Violence is down more than 90% even as the number of U.S. troops has fallen to 50,000 from 170,000. The Iraqi political system continues to function with the recent inauguration of a new coalition government led by returning Prime Minister Nouri Maliki. And the economy is picking up steam, as contracts are signed with foreign companies that can tap the country's vast oil reserves.
But there remain disquieting reminders of darker days. More than 250 Iraqis died in terrorist attacks in January, up from 151 in December, with most of those attacks attributed to Al Qaeda in Iraq, a group whose obituary has been written more than once. Roughly as many civilians died in Iraq last year as in Afghanistan — about 2,400. Remind me again which country is at peace?
The political situation remains as uncertain as the security situation; indeed, the two are closely connected. The formation of a new government occurred only after an agonizing nine-month deadlock in 2010. Iyad Allawi, who won the most votes, lost the prime minister's office and accepted as a consolation prize leadership of a new strategic policy council with undefined powers. His primarily Sunni Muslim backers remain convinced they will be frozen out of power by the Shiite prime minister. Maliki, in turn, is deeply suspicious of Sunni groups such as the Sons of Iraq, as well as of his Shiite rivals in cleric Muqtada Sadr's movement and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq. Shiites and Sunnis are united chiefly by their desire to curb Kurdish autonomy, a prospect that fills the Kurds with understandable dread.
In short, Iraq remains a volcano. It has been capped for the moment but could erupt again. Especially because the most effective cap — a U.S. military presence — is due to be removed at the end of the year.
Prospects of a security accord that would keep American forces in Iraq past 2011 are rapidly dimming. Maliki, who spent long years of exile in Syria and Iran — no fans of the United States — has always been suspicious of America. He would certainly prefer not to have tens of thousands of U.S. troops under a four-star general looking over his shoulder. President Obama, for his part, came to office pledging to withdraw from Iraq and, judging by his State of the Union address, appears determined to do just that.
Unless both men change course and soon, the mission now performed by 50,000 U.S. troops will be left to about 1,000 diplomats and perhaps 100 soldiers in an Office of Security Cooperation, with thousands of mostly non-American contractors providing security and logistical support.
The State Department plans to set up a network of consulates, training centers and branch offices throughout Iraq, but a new report from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee warns that it will be very difficult to maintain much of a presence outside Baghdad without the support currently of the U.S. military, which provides everything from helicopters to "quick reaction forces" in case of trouble.
Even if the embassy carries out the current plan perfectly, many of the important functions still performed by the American troops will fall into abeyance. For example, U.S. troops conduct joint patrols with Iraqi troops and Kurdish peshmerga fighters along the ill-defined border with the Kurdish region to prevent an outbreak of fighting. That is not a role the State Department can or will perform.
All of this is worrisome because if there is any lesson in American military history, it is that the longer U.S. troops stay in a post-conflict area, the greater the odds of a successful transition to democracy. The iconic examples are Germany, Japan and South Korea. When U.S. forces leave prematurely, on the other hand, the odds of a bad outcome greatly increase, whether in the post-Civil War South, post-World War I Germany, Haiti in the 1930s and 1990s, or Somalia in the 1990s. Foreign peacekeepers are still in Bosnia and Kosovo long after the end of their conflicts. Does anyone think that Iraq is more stable than those postage-stamp-size countries on the periphery of Europe?
Iraq may very well muddle through no matter what. It has so far. But I would be a lot more confident about its future if we were making a bigger commitment. It would be a tragedy if, after years of struggle and sacrifice, we were to lose Iraq now — when we are so close to a successful outcome — because of our own attention deficit disorder.
Max Boot is a contributing editor to Opinion and a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is writing a history of guerrilla warfare and terrorism.
-
Iraq: Al-Sadr Warns U.S. Troops To Leave
April 9, 2011 1334 GMT
Iraqi Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr will "escalate military resistance" and set off his Mehdi Army if U.S. forces do not leave Iraq, a spokesman for al-Sadr said April 9 in a speech written by al-Sadr to tens of thousands of followers, Reuters reported. A senior aide to the leader said al-Sadr's followers were "all time bombs and detonators" at the hands of al-Sadr. The speech said an extension of the U.S. "occupation" would lead to military resistance and the withdrawal of the freeze on the Mehdi Army as well as an increase of peaceful and public resistance via sit-ins and protests.
-
We should be sure to whack Mookie on our way out.
-
BAGHDAD (AFP) – Iraqi leaders should not expect US forces to return to help in a crisis once they leave at the end of the year, a senior American military official said on Wednesday.
The remarks came just days after US Defence Secretary Robert Gates ended a visit to Iraq during which he urged the country's leaders to assess if they wanted any US troops to remain beyond 2011.
All American forces must leave Iraq by the end of the year under a bilateral security pact.
"If we left -- and this is the health warning we would give to anybody -- be careful about assuming that we will come running back to put out the fire if we don't have an agreement," the official said on condition of anonymity.
"It's hard to do that," he told reporters at Al-Faw Palace in the US military's Camp Victory base on Baghdad's outskirts.
-
U.S.-Iranian Struggle and Arab Unrest
Iraq may find it difficult for the United States to assist militarily in a future crisis if all American uniformed forces do in fact leave the country by year’s end as stipulated by the current Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between Baghdad and Washington. “If we left — and this is the health warning we would give to anybody — be careful about assuming that we will come running back to put out the fire if we don’t have an agreement … It’s hard to do that,” an unnamed, senior American military official said on Wednesday at the Al-Faw Palace on the grounds of Camp Victory on the outskirts of the Iraqi capital.
In other words, it simultaneously would be:
more difficult in terms of both the tactical and logistical issues of reinserting forces as well as myriad political hesitancies to reinsert itself once extracted, and
less likely due to the same political difficulties as well as a decreased U.S. interest in its alliance with Iraq if Baghdad forces its hand.
That is the likely scenario of the United States coming to Iraq’s aid if Baghdad insists on the SOFA-mandated full military withdrawal by the end of the year.
“As Iran has reminded every U.S. ally in the region amid the recent unrest, from Bahrain to Saudi Arabia and from Yemen to Israel, Tehran is the rising power and the one filling the vacuum as the Americans leave.”
?In a clear warning to Baghdad that it should reconsider the deadline, the official also attempted to emphasize Iraq’s vulnerabilities. That was a point emphasized by U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates on Wednesday — Iraq will face challenges in defending its own airspace to logistics, maintenance and intelligence if it insists on sticking to the current timeline. Other U.S. officials have pointed out that planning for the withdrawal is already well advanced and the actual drawdown would accelerate in late summer or early fall, so the time for a decision by Baghdad is fast approaching. Gates emphasized that there is an American interest in some residual presence beyond 2011 (perhaps as high as 20,000 troops) and that “the ball is in their court.” This all comes on the heels of Gates’ surprise visit to Baghdad where some extension of the American military presence in the country was the key discussion. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has already rejected the extension proposal.
With less than eight months to go before the deadline for a complete withdrawal of the some 47,000 U.S. troops that remain in Iraq — nominally in an “advisory and assistance” role — and much less than that before provisions for their permanent withdrawal begin in earnest, the fundamental problem that Washington faces in removing military force from Iraq is increasingly front and center. The problem is that American military forces in Iraq and military-to-military relationships in the country are Washington’s single biggest lever in Baghdad and the single most important remaining hedge against domination of Mesopotamia by Iraq’s eastern neighbor, Iran. Persian power in Baghdad is already strong and consolidating that strength has been the single most important foreign policy objective of Tehran since the invasion of Iraq in 2003.
So the problem of the withdrawal of American military forces is that it removes the tool with which the United States has counterbalanced a resurgent Iran in the region for the better part of a decade — and it is being done at a time when the United States has not yet found a solution to the Iranian problem. Until 2003, Iran was balanced by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. As the United States became bogged down in Iraq after removing Saddam, Iran aggressively pushed its advantage across the region.
?As Iran has reminded every U.S. ally in the region amid the recent unrest, from Bahrain to Saudi Arabia and from Yemen to Israel, Tehran is the rising power and the one filling the vacuum as the Americans leave. It is Tehran that has a strong, established network of proxies and covert operatives already in place in key positions across the region. It can foment unrest in Gaza or Lebanon that spills over into Israel; and it can at the very least exacerbate riots in Bahrain, the home of the U.S. Fifth Fleet and which is on the doorstep to Saudi Arabia’s own Shiite population in the oil-rich east. Iran has done all of this while U.S. troops have remained in Iraq, and what it has achieved so far is only a foreshadowing (and intentionally so) of what might be possible if Persia dominated Mesopotamia, the natural stepping stone to every other corner of the region.
While it is difficult to fully or accurately assess the extent and limitations of Iran’s overt and covert capabilities, particularly within the Gulf Cooperation Council countries along the western Persian Gulf, geopolitics suggests that Iran, in deliberately sending a signal to the region, has not yet activated all of its tools nor exerted maximum effort. Indeed, this is the heart of the Iranian threat: that there is more to come.?? Moreover, traditional American allies have either fallen (Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, though the military-dominated, American-friendly regime remains in place for now), are in crisis (Yemen’s Ali Abdullah Saleh), or are looking askance at the way Washington has dealt with Egypt and Libya (Saudi Arabia’s House of Saud).
Due to the unrest of 2011, the American position in the Persian Gulf is worse than Washington might have imagined even at the end of 2010. Washington is left with the same unresolved question: what to do about Iran and Iranian power in the Middle East. For this, it has not found a solution. The possible maintenance of a division of U.S. troops in Iraq would simply be a stopgap, not a solution. But even that looks increasingly inadequate as 2011 progresses, especially as American regional allies’ confidence in Washington has wavered. Iraq and Iran have not dominated the headlines in 2011 so far, but the ongoing U.S.-Iranian dynamic has continued to define the shape of the region beneath the surface. As the American withdrawal nears, it will not remain beneath the surface much longer.
-
Im really keen on hearing you guys' the story on what SHOULD have been done in Iraq ?
-
Well, if the left were not intent on sabotaging the effort from the start, the situation might have shown much more progress. If Turkey had not denied us permission to send in troops from that border, we'd have many more troops in the early days of the invasion, thus potentially preventing the genesis of the insurgency, at least not having the percieved power vacuum in that time period.
-
Speaking of the legal issues of war - in Iraq, I was wondering if anyone is able to obtain a copy or link to the Saddam surrender agreement of 1991: 3 March 1991—Iraq accepted the conditions of the UN resolutions in exchange for a cease fire. Assuming he did not live up to his agreement, what were supposed to be the consequences in 'international law'? Resume firing?
-
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
S/RES/687 (1991)
8 April 1991
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RESOLUTION 687 (1991)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 2981st meeting,
on 3 April 1991
The Security Council,
Recalling its resolutions 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990, 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, 662 (1990) of 9 August 1990, 664 (1990) of 18 August 1990, 665 (1990) of 25 August 1990, 666 (1990) of 13 September 1990, 667 (1990) of 16 September 1990, 669 (1990) of 24 September 1990, 670 (1990) of 25 September 1990, 674 (1990) of 29 October 1990, 677 (1990) of 28 November 1990, 678 (1990) of 29 November 1990 and 686 (1991) of 2 March 1991,
Welcoming the restoration to Kuwait of its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and the return of its legitimate Government,
Affirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Kuwait and Iraq, and noting the intention expressed by the Member States cooperating with Kuwait under paragraph 2 of resolution 678 (1990) to bring their military presence in Iraq to an end as soon as possible consistent with paragraph 8 of resolution 686 (1991),
Reaffirming the need to be assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions in the light of its unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait,
Taking note of the letter sent by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq on 27 February 1991 and those sent pursuant to resolution 686 (1991),
Noting that Iraq and Kuwait, as independent sovereign States, signed at Baghdad on 4 October 1963 "Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters", thereby recognizing formally the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait and the allocation of islands, which were registered with the United Nations in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations and in which Iraq recognized the independence and complete sovereignty of the State of Kuwait within its borders as specified and accepted in the letter of the Prime Minister of Iraq dated 21 July 1932, and as accepted by the Ruler of Kuwait in his letter dated 10 August 1932,
Conscious of the need for demarcation of the said boundary,
Conscious also of the statements by Iraq threatening to use weapons in violation of its obligations under the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and of its prior use of chemical weapons and affirming that grave consequences would follow any further use by Iraq of such weapons,
Recalling that Iraq has subscribed to the Declaration adopted by all States participating in the Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States, held in Paris from 7 to 11 January 1989, establishing the objective of universal elimination of chemical and biological weapons,
Recalling also that Iraq has signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, of 10 April 1972,
Noting the importance of Iraq ratifying this Convention,
Noting moreover the importance of all States adhering to this Convention and encouraging its forthcoming Review Conference to reinforce the authority, efficiency and universal scope of the convention,
Stressing the importance of an early conclusion by the Conference on Disarmament of its work on a Convention on the Universal Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and of universal adherence thereto,
Aware of the use by Iraq of ballistic missiles in unprovoked attacks and therefore of the need to take specific measures in regard to such missiles located in Iraq,
Concerned by the reports in the hands of Member States that Iraq has attempted to acquire materials for a nuclear-weapons programme contrary to its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968,
Recalling the objective of the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the region of the Middle East,
Conscious of the threat that all weapons of mass destruction pose to peace and security in the area and of the need to work towards the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of such weapons,
Conscious also of the objective of achieving balanced and comprehensive control of armaments in the region,
Conscious further of the importance of achieving the objectives noted above using all available means, including a dialogue among the States of the region,
Noting that resolution 686 (1991) marked the lifting of the measures imposed by resolution 661 (1990) in so far as they applied to Kuwait,
Noting that despite the progress being made in fulfilling the obligations of resolution 686 (1991), many Kuwaiti and third country nationals are still not accounted for and property remains unreturned,
Recalling the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, opened for signature at New York on 18 December 1979, which categorizes all acts of taking hostages as manifestations of international terrorism,
Deploring threats made by Iraq during the recent conflict to make use of terrorism against targets outside Iraq and the taking of hostages by Iraq,
Taking note with grave concern of the reports of the Secretary-General of 20 March 1991 and 28 March 1991, and conscious of the necessity to meet urgently the humanitarian needs in Kuwait and Iraq,
Bearing in mind its objective of restoring international peace and security in the area as set out in recent resolutions of the Security Council,
Conscious of the need to take the following measures acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,
1. Affirms all thirteen resolutions noted above, except as expressly changed below to achieve the goals of this resolution, including a formal cease-fire;
A
2. Demands that Iraq and Kuwait respect the inviolability of the international boundary and the allocation of islands set out in the "Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters", signed by them in the exercise of their sovereignty at Baghdad on 4 October 1963 and registered with the United Nations and published by the United Nations in document 7063, United Nations, Treaty Series, 1964;
3. Calls upon the Secretary-General to lend his assistance to make arrangements with Iraq and Kuwait to demarcate the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait, drawing on appropriate material, including the map transmitted by Security Council document S/22412 and to report back to the Security Council within one month;
4. Decides to guarantee the inviolability of the above-mentioned international boundary and to take as appropriate all necessary measures to that end in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;
B
5. Requests the Secretary-General, after consulting with Iraq and Kuwait, to submit within three days to the Security Council for its approval a plan for the immediate deployment of a United Nations observer unit to monitor the Khor Abdullah and a demilitarized zone, which is hereby established, extending ten kilometres into Iraq and five kilometres into Kuwait from the boundary referred to in the "Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters" of 4 October 1963; to deter violations of the boundary through its presence in and surveillance of the demilitarized zone; to observe any hostile or potentially hostile action mounted from the territory of one State to the other; and for the Secretary-General to report regularly to the Security Council on the operations of the unit, and immediately if there are serious violations of the zone or potential threats to peace;
6. Notes that as soon as the Secretary-General notifies the Security Council of the completion of the deployment of the United Nations observer unit, the conditions will be established for the Member States cooperating with Kuwait in accordance with resolution 678 (1990) to bring their military presence in Iraq to an end consistent with resolution 686 (1991);
C
7. Invites Iraq to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations under the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and to ratify the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, of 10 April 1972;
8. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of:
(a) All chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities;
(b) All ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres and related major parts, and repair and production facilities;
9. Decides, for the implementation of paragraph 8 above, the following:
(a) Iraq shall submit to the Secretary-General, within fifteen days of the adoption of the present resolution, a declaration of the locations, amounts and types of all items specified in paragraph 8 and agree to urgent, on-site inspection as specified below;
(b) The Secretary-General, in consultation with the appropriate Governments and, where appropriate, with the Director-General of the World Health Organization, within forty-five days of the passage of the present resolution, shall develop, and submit to the Council for approval, a plan calling for the completion of the following acts within forty-five days of such approval:
(i) The forming of a Special Commission, which shall carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq's biological, chemical and missile capabilities, based on Iraq's declarations and the designation of any additional locations by the Special Commission itself;
(ii) The yielding by Iraq of possession to the Special Commission for destruction, removal or rendering harmless, taking into account the requirements of public safety, of all items specified under paragraph 8 (a) above, including items at the additional locations designated by the Special Commission under paragraph 9 (b) (i) above and the destruction by Iraq, under the supervision of the Special Commission, of all its missile capabilities, including launchers, as specified under paragraph 8 (b) above;
(iii) The provision by the Special Commission of the assistance and cooperation to the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency required in paragraphs 12 and 13 below;
10. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally undertake not to use, develop, construct or acquire any of the items specified in paragraphs 8 and 9 above and requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Special Commission, to develop a plan for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with this paragraph, to be submitted to the Security Council for approval within one hundred and twenty days of the passage of this resolution;
11. Invites Iraq to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968;
12. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable material or any subsystems or components or any research, development, support or manufacturing facilities related to the above; to submit to the Secretary-General and the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency within fifteen days of the adoption of the present resolution a declaration of the locations, amounts, and types of all items specified above; to place all of its nuclear-weapons-usable materials under the exclusive control, for custody and removal, of the International Atomic Energy Agency, with the assistance and cooperation of the Special Commission as provided for in the plan of the Secretary-General discussed in paragraph 9 (b) above; to accept, in accordance with the arrangements provided for in paragraph 13 below, urgent on-site inspection and the destruction, removal or rendering harmless as appropriate of all items specified above; and to accept the plan discussed in paragraph 13 below for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of its compliance with these undertakings;
13. Requests the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, through the Secretary-General, with the assistance and cooperation of the Special Commission as provided for in the plan of the Secretary-General in paragraph 9 (b) above, to carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq's nuclear capabilities based on Iraq's declarations and the designation of any additional locations by the Special Commission; to develop a plan for submission to the Security Council within forty-five days calling for the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless as appropriate of all items listed in paragraph 12 above; to carry out the plan within forty-five days following approval by the Security Council; and to develop a plan, taking into account the rights and obligations of Iraq under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968, for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with paragraph 12 above, including an inventory of all nuclear material in Iraq subject to the Agency's verification and inspections to confirm that Agency safeguards cover all relevant nuclear activities in Iraq, to be submitted to the Security Council for approval within one hundred and twenty days of the passage of the present resolution;
14. Takes note that the actions to be taken by Iraq in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the present resolution represent steps towards the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery and the objective of a global ban on chemical weapons;
D
15. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the steps taken to facilitate the return of all Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq, including a list of any property that Kuwait claims has not been returned or which has not been returned intact;
E
16. Reaffirms that Iraq, without prejudice to the debts and obligations of Iraq arising prior to 2 August 1990, which will be addressed through the normal mechanisms, is liable under international law for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait;
17. Decides that all Iraqi statements made since 2 August 1990 repudiating its foreign debt are null and void, and demands that Iraq adhere scrupulously to all of its obligations concerning servicing and repayment of its foreign debt;
18. Decides also to create a fund to pay compensation for claims that fall within paragraph 16 above and to establish a Commission that will administer the fund;
19. Directs the Secretary-General to develop and present to the Security Council for decision, no later than thirty days following the adoption of the present resolution, recommendations for the fund to meet the requirement for the payment of claims established in accordance with paragraph 18 above and for a programme to implement the decisions in paragraphs 16, 17 and 18 above, including: administration of the fund; mechanisms for determining the appropriate level of Iraq's contribution to the fund based on a percentage of the value of the exports of petroleum and petroleum products from Iraq not to exceed a figure to be suggested to the Council by the Secretary-General, taking into account the requirements of the people of Iraq, Iraq's payment capacity as assessed in conjunction with the international financial institutions taking into consideration external debt service, and the needs of the Iraqi economy; arrangements for ensuring that payments are made to the fund; the process by which funds will be allocated and claims paid; appropriate procedures for evaluating losses, listing claims and verifying their validity and resolving disputed claims in respect of Iraq's liability as specified in paragraph 16 above; and the composition of the Commission designated above;
F
20. Decides, effective immediately, that the prohibitions against the sale or supply to Iraq of commodities or products, other than medicine and health supplies, and prohibitions against financial transactions related thereto contained in resolution 661 (1990) shall not apply to foodstuffs notified to the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait or, with the approval of that Committee, under the simplified and accelerated "no-objection" procedure, to materials and supplies for essential civilian needs as identified in the report of the Secretary-General dated 20 March 1991, and in any further findings of humanitarian need by the Committee;
21. Decides that the Security Council shall review the provisions of paragraph 20 above every sixty days in the light of the policies and practices of the Government of Iraq, including the implementation of all relevant resolutions of the Security Council, for the purpose of determining whether to reduce or lift the prohibitions referred to therein;
22. Decides that upon the approval by the Security Council of the programme called for in paragraph 19 above and upon Council agreement that Iraq has completed all actions contemplated in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 above, the prohibitions against the import of commodities and products originating in Iraq and the prohibitions against financial transactions related thereto contained in resolution 661 (1990) shall have no further force or effect;
23. Decides that, pending action by the Security Council under paragraph 22 above, the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) shall be empowered to approve, when required to assure adequate financial resources on the part of Iraq to carry out the activities under paragraph 20 above, exceptions to the prohibition against the import of commodities and products originating in Iraq;
24. Decides that, in accordance with resolution 661 (1990) and subsequent related resolutions and until a further decision is taken by the Security Council, all States shall continue to prevent the sale or supply, or the promotion or facilitation of such sale or supply, to Iraq by their nationals, or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of:
(a) Arms and related materiel of all types, specifically including the sale or transfer through other means of all forms of conventional military equipment, including for paramilitary forces, and spare parts and components and their means of production, for such equipment;
(b) Items specified and defined in paragraphs 8 and 12 above not otherwise covered above;
(c) Technology under licensing or other transfer arrangements used in the production, utilization or stockpiling of items specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above;
(d) Personnel or materials for training or technical support services relating to the design, development, manufacture, use, maintenance or support of items specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above;
25. Calls upon all States and international organizations to act strictly in accordance with paragraph 24 above, notwithstanding the existence of any contracts, agreements, licences or any other arrangements;
26. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with appropriate Governments, to develop within sixty days, for the approval of the Security Council, guidelines to facilitate full international implementation of paragraphs 24 and 25 above and paragraph 27 below, and to make them available to all States and to establish a procedure for updating these guidelines periodically;
27. Calls upon all States to maintain such national controls and procedures and to take such other actions consistent with the guidelines to be established by the Security Council under paragraph 26 above as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the terms of paragraph 24 above, and calls upon international organizations to take all appropriate steps to assist in ensuring such full compliance;
28. Agrees to review its decisions in paragraphs 22, 23, 24 and 25 above, except for the items specified and defined in paragraphs 8 and 12 above, on a regular basis and in any case one hundred and twenty days following passage of the present resolution, taking into account Iraq's compliance with the resolution and general progress towards the control of armaments in the region;
29. Decides that all States, including Iraq, shall take the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the Government of Iraq, or of any person or body in Iraq, or of any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or body, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was affected by reason of the measures taken by the Security Council in resolution 661 (1990) and related resolutions;
G
30. Decides that, in furtherance of its commitment to facilitate the repatriation of all Kuwaiti and third country nationals, Iraq shall extend all necessary cooperation to the International Committee of the Red Cross, providing lists of such persons, facilitating the access of the International Committee of the Red Cross to all such persons wherever located or detained and facilitating the search by the International Committee of the Red Cross for those Kuwaiti and third country nationals still unaccounted for;
31. Invites the International Committee of the Red Cross to keep the Secretary-General apprised as appropriate of all activities undertaken in connection with facilitating the repatriation or return of all Kuwaiti and third country nationals or their remains present in Iraq on or after 2 August 1990;
H
32. Requires Iraq to inform the Security Council that it will not commit or support any act of international terrorism or allow any organization directed towards commission of such acts to operate within its territory and to condemn unequivocally and renounce all acts, methods and practices of terrorism;
I
33. Declares that, upon official notification by Iraq to the Secretary-General and to the Security Council of its acceptance of the provisions above, a formal cease-fire is effective between Iraq and Kuwait and the Member States cooperating with Kuwait in accordance with resolution 678 (1990);
34. Decides to remain seized of the matter and to take such further steps as may be required for the implementation of the present resolution and to secure peace and security in the area.
.
-
Would someone care to summarize that?
-
reports that his interpreter has been badly wounded in a blast but is expected to live. Prayers for his speedy recovery.
Update: "Laith is out of surgery. He has a pierced abdomen (two holes) lots of blood loss, lost most of his teeth, is very bruised and battered. They say that he is going to be fine though. More as I learn it."
-
Analyst Nathan Hughes examines the possibility of the United States delaying its withdrawal from Iraq and what that will mean for Iran and the region.
Editor’s Note: Transcripts are generated using speech-recognition technology. Therefore, STRATFOR cannot guarantee their complete accuracy.
Two suicide car bombs were detonated outside the perimeter of the former Green Zone in Baghdad on Monday, killing five and wounding as many as three times that. Recent militant activity in the country has been on the upswing but one of the most important dynamics is the looming withdrawal of the remaining American military forces by the end of the year.
The current Status of Forces Agreement between Washington and Baghdad stipulates the remaining nearly 50,000American troops still in country must be withdrawn by the end of the year. The United States has expressed some interest in extending this deadline, including during the visit sending U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to Baghdad earlier this month. However, all such overtures thus far have been rejected by the Iraqi government. The numbers being discussed go as high as 20,000 American troops, and Washington has attempted to emphasize the capabilities the United States provides Iraq that the Iraqi military is not yet capable of providing for itself — everything from the defense of Iraqi airspace, to more sophisticated capabilities in planning, logistics, maintenance and intelligence. U.S. officials have also reportedly emphasized to Baghdad that once the withdrawal of American combat forces is complete, that it will be much more difficult for the United States to come to Iraq’s aid militarily in the future.
At the heart of this discussion is the fundamental importance of the U.S. military in counterbalancing Iranian power in Iraq and in the wider region. The large American military presence in Iraq has been the single most important element of American power in Iraq and in the region since the U.S. invasion in 2003. But it is far from clear how Washington is going to balance resurgent Iranian power in Iraq and in the wider region once those forces withdraw. It is not clear whether a new agreement or an extension can be negotiated between Washington and Baghdad — the U.S. has signaled the ball is in Iraq’s court. But an increasingly rapid withdrawal will have to begin no later than late summer or early fall, this quarter and the next are of pivotal importance not only for the United States and Iraq, but for Iranian power and the wider region.
-
.....If I voted for McCain, we'd be in Iraq forever. They were right!
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/14/opinion/14obama.html
My Plan for Iraq
By BARACK OBAMA
Published: July 14, 2008
CHICAGO — The call by Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki for a timetable for the removal of American troops from Iraq presents an enormous opportunity. We should seize this moment to begin the phased redeployment of combat troops that I have long advocated, and that is needed for long-term success in Iraq and the security interests of the United States.
The differences on Iraq in this campaign are deep. Unlike Senator John McCain, I opposed the war in Iraq before it began, and would end it as president. I believed it was a grave mistake to allow ourselves to be distracted from the fight against Al Qaeda and the Taliban by invading a country that posed no imminent threat and had nothing to do with the 9/11 attacks. Since then, more than 4,000 Americans have died and we have spent nearly $1 trillion. Our military is overstretched. Nearly every threat we face — from Afghanistan to Al Qaeda to Iran — has grown.
In the 18 months since President Bush announced the surge, our troops have performed heroically in bringing down the level of violence. New tactics have protected the Iraqi population, and the Sunni tribes have rejected Al Qaeda — greatly weakening its effectiveness.
But the same factors that led me to oppose the surge still hold true. The strain on our military has grown, the situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated and we’ve spent nearly $200 billion more in Iraq than we had budgeted. Iraq’s leaders have failed to invest tens of billions of dollars in oil revenues in rebuilding their own country, and they have not reached the political accommodation that was the stated purpose of the surge.
The good news is that Iraq’s leaders want to take responsibility for their country by negotiating a timetable for the removal of American troops. Meanwhile, Lt. Gen. James Dubik, the American officer in charge of training Iraq’s security forces, estimates that the Iraqi Army and police will be ready to assume responsibility for security in 2009.
Only by redeploying our troops can we press the Iraqis to reach comprehensive political accommodation and achieve a successful transition to Iraqis’ taking responsibility for the security and stability of their country. Instead of seizing the moment and encouraging Iraqis to step up, the Bush administration and Senator McCain are refusing to embrace this transition — despite their previous commitments to respect the will of Iraq’s sovereign government. They call any timetable for the removal of American troops “surrender,” even though we would be turning Iraq over to a sovereign Iraqi government.
But this is not a strategy for success — it is a strategy for staying that runs contrary to the will of the Iraqi people, the American people and the security interests of the United States. That is why, on my first day in office, I would give the military a new mission: ending this war.
-
reports that his interpreter has been badly wounded in a blast but is expected to live. Prayers for his speedy recovery.
Update: "Laith is out of surgery. He has a pierced abdomen (two holes) lots of blood loss, lost most of his teeth, is very bruised and battered. They say that he is going to be fine though. More as I learn it."
Thanks for posting this.
Laith is more American than many Americans. He loves George Bush. I spent one night with him in Basra where he made a powerful argument that if democracy stuck in Iraq it would change the course of history. He loves American movies...most especially Training Day. After watching it in Basra the three of us howled like a wolf like fools.
He's still in the hospital. He's alive but very badly bruised and battered.
-
reports that his interpreter has been badly wounded in a blast but is expected to live. Prayers for his speedy recovery.
Update: "Laith is out of surgery. He has a pierced abdomen (two holes) lots of blood loss, lost most of his teeth, is very bruised and battered. They say that he is going to be fine though. More as I learn it."
Thanks for posting this.
Laith is more American than many Americans. He loves George Bush. I spent one night with him in Basra where he made a powerful argument that if democracy stuck in Iraq it would change the course of history. He loves American movies...most especially Training Day. After watching it in Basra the three of us howled like a wolf like fools.
He's still in the hospital. He's alive but very badly bruised and battered.
Best wishes for a full recovery. Much respect for guys like him.
-
And for his friend and mine, Bandolero.
If you think it suitable Bandolero, please let him know that we know of him and that he has our prayers.
-
By ADAM ENTOUS And JULIAN E. BARNES
WASHINGTON—Senior U.S. and Iraqi military officials have been in negotiations about keeping some 10,000 American troops in Iraq beyond the scheduled withdrawal of all U.S. forces at year's end, according to officials familiar with the talks.
But the discussions face political obstacles in both countries, and have faltered in recent weeks because of Iraqi worries that a continued U.S. military presence could fuel sectarian tension and lead to protests similar to those sweeping other Arab countries, U.S. officials say.
A separate drawdown deadline is looming in Afghanistan, where President Barack Obama wants to see a substantial U.S. troop reduction starting in July. Some U.S. commanders have cautioned against making reductions too quickly.
Underlining Obama administration concerns that U.S. forces have been stretched too thin, the White House has put strict constraints on American military involvement in Libya. On Thursday, the U.S. said it was sending armed drones to support operations in Libya, but the administration has stood firm against sending any ground troops.
In Iraq, top U.S. military officials believe that leaving a sizeable force beyond this year could bolster Iraqi stability and serve as a check on Iran, the major American nemesis in the region, officials said. U.S. allies Saudi Arabia and Israel have echoed the concern that if the U.S. pulls out completely, Iran could extend its influence.
Adm. Michael Mullen, the chairman of the U.S. military's Joint Chiefs of Staff, arrived in Baghdad Thursday, urging Iraqi leaders to step up discussions soon if they want U.S. forces to stay beyond the end of 2011.
The timing is critical because the U.S. is scheduled to start drawing down remaining forces in late summer or early fall, and the military would have to assign new units months in advance to take their place.
While American defense officials have made clear they want to leave troops in Iraq, such a decision would require presidential approval. President Obama has yet to indicate publicly whether he would sign off on such a deal.
Mr. Obama could face a political backlash at home if he doesn't meet his campaign pledge to bring troops home from Iraq. If the U.S. pulls out of Iraq and violence there surges, the president could face tough questions, particularly from Republicans in Congress, about whether the U.S. misjudged Iraq's capabilities.
Administration officials say Iraqi security forces have been able to tamp down violence during previous troop reductions and express confidence they would be able to do so again.
Officials said final determinations have yet to be made about how large a U.S. military contingent could remain.
"We have conversations with the Iraqis constantly about security issues," an Obama administration official said. But the official added: "The Iraqis haven't made a request for us to keep troops, and we haven't offered."
Likewise, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and other top Iraqi civilian officials have sent mixed messages about the future American military role in the country, U.S. officials say, a reflection of Iraq's delicate political dynamic after years of sectarian warfare.
Anti-American cleric Moqtada al-Sadr has threatened to unleash his militia and step up "resistance" if U.S. troops fail to leave as scheduled this year, his aides say.
Mr. Maliki's hold on power depends on the support from parliamentarians loyal to Mr. Sadr. Iraqi officials are also worried any plan to keep a sizeable number of U.S. troops could touch off protests that could bring down the government. Iraqi Embassy officials didn't respond to requests for comment.
Thousands of Iraqis have taken to the streets in recent months, demanding better basic services and an end to government corruption. Baghdad responded last week by imposing a ban on protests on the streets of the capital.
U.S. military officials are particularly concerned that Iraqis will stage massive protests in support of fellow Shiites in Bahrain. Bahrain's U.S.-backed ruling al-Khalifa family has cracked down on Shiite-dominated demonstrations there.
Advocates of keeping some U.S. troops in Iraq see the forces as a safety net to ensure Iraq doesn't slide back into sectarian warfare. The U.S. is particularly concerned about the volatile north, where Arab-Kurdish tensions remain high.
There are 47,000 U.S. troops in Iraq; they are assigned to training roles, not combat. At the height of the Iraq surge in October 2007 there were about 170,000 U.S. troops in Iraq
If an agreement to keep 10,000 troops is reached, they would be tasked with helping Iraq maintain air sovereignty, providing medical evacuation assistance and training, and gathering intelligence on insurgents and Iranian agents. The extension could also let the U.S. keep advisers with Iraqi brigades.
At the end of the Bush Administration, U.S. and Iraqi negotiators reached a deal to gradually reduce the number of American troops in Iraq and withdraw them completely by the end of 2011. At the time, U.S. military officials said they assumed a new agreement would be reached that would allow some U.S. troops to remain.
The 10,000-troop deal under discussion represents a significant cut from an initial request made by the top commander in Iraq, Gen. Lloyd Austin. Gen. Austin had talked privately of wanting to keep at least 16,000 troops in Iraq, according to U.S. officials. But other military officials believed that figure would be too large for Baghdad to accept, and unpalatable to Mr. Obama, the officials said.
In a roundtable with reporters this month, Gen. Austin said he hadn't made a formal recommendation on how many troops should remain.
The Pentagon believes that, after years of training by the U.S. Army and Marines, Iraqis have a "solid grasp" on internal security, a U.S. official said.
U.S. intelligence agencies say al Qaeda in Iraq's capabilities have been diminished despite occasional high-profile attacks, security continues to improve, and sectarian tensions, for now, remain subdued.
The concern, the U.S. official said, is that the Iraqis have "very little ability to defend their borders." The U.S. believes Iraq will need help to stanch the flow of weapons and militants across the border with Iran, the official said.
Saudi Arabia has privately cautioned the Americans against a rapid withdrawal because of fears the country may not be able to maintain stability on its own, and because of concerns the departure will embolden Iran. Israel has also voiced concerns about possible instability.
"Any change on the eastern front could have implications for Israel's security," an Israeli official said, referring to Israel's border with Jordan, which neighbors Iraq.
The Iraqi military has little heavy weaponry and almost no combat air power. The U.S. is looking to sell Baghdad advanced radar systems that would allow Iraqis to better pinpoint incoming mortar, rocket and artillery fire, in addition to a proposed sale of F-16s, which would allow Iraq to patrol its skies.
Without additional American training, the Iraqis may not be able to maintain or effectively use the equipment they want to acquire after the U.S. troops are due to depart, U.S. officials say.
U.S. military officials hope continued assistance would be a powerful counterbalance to Tehran's attempts to draw Iraq into its sphere. Administration officials have said Iran continues to supply arms to its militia allies in Iraq. Iran denies this.
Some members of Congress have voiced concerns about the sale of sophisticated weaponry to the Iraqi military, on the grounds Baghdad may be aligning itself more closely to Iran.
-
http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20110422/ts_nm/us_usa_iraq_blackwater
-
Ali Wazzan has once again given me an excellent summary of Laith’s current condition and treatments.
Ali also told me that there seems to be a chance that Laith will leave the hospital in the next day or two. If so, he will remain under a doctor’s care at home. He still needs attention for his diabetes and for several pieces of shrapnel remaining in his face and chest. Contrary to what I reported earlier, the removal of shrapnel yesterday required quite a bit of exploratory cutting and probing. As a consequence Laith now has numerous small incisions closed with stiches. Also, I was wrong in reporting that his jaw was broken. It seems that there is only a minor fracture of his jaw. Most of the force was absorbed by his teeth, which is why he lost them.
Every day provides new encouragement.
-
Americans fight, liberate, and die. Chinese kick back and collect all the bennies:
Iraq: Power Plant Expansion With Chinese Company Signed
April 25, 2011 2030 GMT
The Iraqi Electricity Ministry signed a $1 billion deal with China's Shanghai Electric on April 25 to double the size of the power plant located in Zubaidiya, south of Baghdad, Reuters reported. The plant was originally slated to have four 330 megawatt generators for a 1,320 megawatt capacity, but the new deal will add two more 610 megawatt units for a total capacity of 2,540 megawatts.
-
By JULIAN E. BARNES And BEN LANDO
Defense Secretary Robert Gates urged Iraq to host U.S. troops beyond the end of the year to maintain stability and keep Iran at bay, echoing the growing concerns of U.S. military officials that the government in Baghdad isn't moving fast enough to request an extension of the U.S. troop presence.
Mr. Gates predicted the U.S. would accede to such a request to send a message to American allies and Iran that the U.S. isn't withdrawing from the region, he said in remarks to a think tank in Washington on Tuesday.
"It would be reassuring to the Gulf States. It would not be reassuring to Iran, and that is a good thing," Mr. Gates said.
Some military officials say that without a continued U.S. presence, Iraq is likely to fall into the orbit of Iran. In a paper released Tuesday, Frederick Kagan, an influential defense analyst, argued that without a continued U.S. presence, Iraq would also be vulnerable to continued insurgent-style attacks from Iran-backed proxies or even a full-scale invasion by Iran.
U.S. military bases and personnel in Iraq have come under increasing attacks from mortar fire and bombings, in what the military says is an effort to drive the Americans from the country. Two U.S. soldiers were killed Sunday by a roadside bomb in Baghdad.
Mr. Gates said a continued American presence in Iraq would help sustain the "investment in treasure and lives" the U.S. has made in Iraq and help show other countries in the Middle East that a "multisectarian, multi-ethnic" democracy in the Arab world will work.
Under the current agreement between Baghdad and Washington, the U.S. must withdraw nearly all of its troops by the end of this year. The U.S. military would like to keep about 10,000 troops in Iraq, a number the Obama administration is likely to approve, U.S. officials have said.
The Pentagon said on Tuesday that it would rotate two brigades and a division headquarters into Iraq this summer, a move that would position the U.S. to maintain a substantial force in the country should Baghdad request an extension.
Mr. Kagan, a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute who regularly advises military commanders, argued in his paper, which was released Tuesday, that Iraq won't be able to defend itself against Iran and its agents without a U.S. troop presence.
"The Iraqi Security Forces will not be able to defend Iraq's sovereignty, independence from Iran, and internal stability without American assistance, including some ground forces, for a number of years," Mr. Kagan wrote.
Many Iraqi lawmakers say they believe there is a parliamentary majority in Iraq supporting a continued U.S. troop presence. But the influential pro-Iranian cleric, Moqtada al Sadr, is pushing lawmakers to block a request.
Some Iraqi officials have said privately that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki supports keeping U.S. troops, but he won his current term with the backing of Mr. Sadr's supporters.
A Sadr bloc spokesman said the group continues to view the American presence as an occupation and would hold a peaceful protest on Thursday.
Iraq has a long history of brinksmanship in its dealings with the U.S., but with the Americans due to begin shuttering bases, a last-minute deal could come too late for the Pentagon.
"Time is your enemy," said a senior military official.
Officials have said the U.S. military is four months away from a logistical point-of-no-return, when it would need to begin the final dismantling of remaining military installations and sending equipment out of the country to withdraw on time.
There were at least 162 attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq last month, up from 128 in March and 93 in February, according to a foreign security company in Iraq that tracks the data. The surge in attacks last month coincided with a rash of American military, political and diplomatic visits to the country.
"Various extremist groups and illegal militias have said they will increase attacks against U.S. forces and they are trying to do that to claim credit for driving out our forces," said U.S. Army Maj. Gen. Jeffrey Buchanan, a spokesman for the U.S. forces in Iraq.
—Munaf Ammar contributed to this article.
-
Second post of the day:
'Something we could not have predicted five months ago is that Iraq would emerge as the most advanced Arab democracy in the entire region. As messy as it is, when you think back to the months and months that it took to form a government, and the fact that the conflict was political, they weren't in the streets shooting each other. The government wasn't in the streets shooting its people."
Those musings about the Arab Spring don't come from John McCain or Joe Lieberman. That was Bob Gates, speaking yesterday at the American Enterprise Institute, where he delivered one of his last major speeches as a member of the Obama Administration. The soon-to-depart Defense Secretary was responding to a question about the U.S. interest in Iraq, which Mr. Gates said is to sustain "a model for a multisectarian, multi-ethnic society in the Arab world that shows that democracy can work."
Well, well. Mr. Gates's comments are especially remarkable because he was a member of President George W. Bush's 2006 Iraq Study Group, which recommended what amounted to a staged retreat instead of the troop surge that Mr. Bush eventually endorsed and that defeated the insurgency.
Mr. Gates also expanded yesterday on the strategic opportunities that Iraq has opened in the autocratic Middle East, especially as an ally against Iranian ambitions. He sees "a mutual interest both in Iraq and in the United States in sustaining this relationship" after the scheduled pullout of about 50,000 troops at the end of the year, with the U.S. military supporting logistics, intelligence and airspace defense.
Mr. Gates said it would send "a powerful signal to the region that we're not leaving, that we will continue to play a part. I think it would be reassuring to the Gulf states. I think it would not be reassuring to Iran, and that's a good thing."
The Pentagon chief cautioned that the choice is Iraq's, but "I think as is often the case in Iraq, it will take some time for the political leaders to figure out a way to move forward on this, and all I can say is that from the standpoint of Iraq's future but also our role in the region, I hope they figure out a way to ask. And I think that the United States will be willing to say yes when that time comes."
The main case for toppling Saddam Hussein was to protect America from what everyone thought were his weapons of mass destruction, but a secondary argument was to give Iraqis a chance to govern themselves in a way that would become a model for the region and, perhaps, a U.S. ally.
Lo and behold, Mr. Gates is saying that Iraq is that model, and that even the Obama Administration now sees a democratic Iraq as a potential bulwark for American interests in the Gulf. The rest of the press corps won't acknowledge it, but Mr. Gates is more or less saying: mission accomplished.
-
WASHINGTON (AP) — Defense Secretary Robert Gates says Shiite extremists, not al-Qaida terrorists, are to blame for most of the recent U.S. military deaths in Iraq, and they're "clearly getting some fairly sophisticated and powerful weapons" from Iran.
Gates tells CNN's "State of the Union" that he's worried about the Iranian influence in Iraq and he thinks Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is beginning to take these Shiite groups seriously.
Gates says that the U.S. and Iraq are taking steps to try to limit the threat.
A Shiite militia group has claimed responsibility for an attack that killed five American troops on June 6. It was the single largest loss of life for American troops in two years.
-
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/in-iraq-sunni-deaths-stir-sectarian-fears/2011/06/24/AGSJrTmH_story.html
-
BAGHDAD — In darkness and dressed in black, the American and Iraqi Special Operations commandos navigated the dense urban neighborhood here in the capital and approached a house they believed to be a hide-out for two brothers suspected of carrying out assassinations and car-bomb attacks. As the Iraqis bashed in the door, the sound of glass shattering and screams pierced the nighttime stillness.
The Americans, having spent years taking the lead on such missions, waited outside until the house was secure.
The important thing, an American sergeant said after the raid was completed, is that the Iraqis took the lead on this mission. He spoke on the condition that he be identified only by rank to comply with the ground rules allowing a reporter access to an Army Special Forces unit. “They are the ones doing the dirty work,” he said.
But Iraqi and American commanders worry that this crucial military legacy of the war may be at risk now that American forces are withdrawing this year under an agreement between the countries. Americans say the Iraqi special operations force, which was deliberately balanced with the country’s main sects and ethnicities, is more capable than the Iraqi Army and may be critical in preventing a resilient insurgency from exploding into a sectarian civil war. Even as few Iraqi politicians are willing to admit publicly that they need American help, Iraqi soldiers say that American troops must stay longer to continue training and advising.
“The Americans need to stay because we don’t have control over our borders,” said Maj. Gen. Fadhel al-Barwari, commander of the Iraq Special Operations Force.
The commandos make up a tightknit community where relationships between Iraqis and Americans are especially strong, having been nurtured over multiple deployments. In some cases the Americans here are on their eighth or ninth rotation. “Would we hope after spending eight years in this country, sharing blood, sweat and tears, dying side by side, working with each other, that we would maintain a relationship?” Col. Scott E. Brower, commander of the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Arabian Peninsula, said in an interview at a base north of Baghdad. “Of course we would.”
The senior Iraqi military leaders have advised Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki that some troops should stay. American officials have said they would agree to a such a request.
Even though combat has officially been declared over, Iraq still looks like a war to the Special Operations units scattered around the country.
“Yeah, anytime a guy’s got a loaded gun and he’s going out at midnight in a helicopter, you’ve got to treat it that way,” said an American Special Forces major. Even so, he said, the risks of such work have diminished greatly. “It’s been awhile since we’ve gotten in a good firefight,” he said.
As the major spoke at a picnic table in Victory Base Complex, the vast American complex near the Baghdad airport, several American helicopters took off nearby, ferrying a team of Iraqi and American Special Forces troops on their way to capture a Shiite militiaman suspected of firing rockets at an American base.
On the recent nighttime raid organized to seize the two brothers, the commandos did not get their men, but they said that a vast majority of their raids ended with the capture of suspects. Shots are rarely fired.
There were about six Iraqis on the mission for each American, who were dressed in the same black fatigues the Iraqis wore. After the house was secured, several team members went to the roof, where an Iraqi commando rooted through a storage bin looking for explosives, repeatedly kicking a plastic cassette player that turned out not to be an improvised explosive device. Others monitored rooftops next door for threats.
Eleven family members were in the house, but not the suspects. As the relatives were questioned, several versions of the brothers’ whereabouts emerged. According to one version, they had left that afternoon. In another, they had not been in the home for a year and a half.
“No bad guys tonight,” said one American soldier, a chief warrant officer.
=========================
Page 2 of 2)
No weapons caches or explosives were found either. “Usually they don’t keep the materials in the house,” said the American chief warrant officer, who explained that they were often stored with a neighbor. “With the laws, we can’t search the neighbor’s house,” he said.
American Special Operations units have been training and equipping an Iraqi counterterrorism force almost from the beginning of the war in 2003. General Barwari was made to do push-ups eight years ago by some of the Americans who still advise his unit. Today he lives in a palace once owned by Saddam Hussein, where he shares living space with peacocks, ostriches, pigeons, an alligator and two monkeys. From the palace, he directs near-nightly raids with the help of the Americans.
General Barwari, whose relationship with the American military began in 1991 in northern Iraq, benefited greatly from America’s war here, and in its closing days he frets about what will become of his country without the American troops.
If Americans stay, he said, “He won’t be fighting beside me, but he will give us air support.”
“There are many things we don’t have knowledge about,” he added.
Some of the Iraqi units remain outside the regular military chain of command, and report directly to Mr. Maliki. This has proved to be fodder for the prime minister’s critics who believe he has amassed too much power, and removing the units from his direct control was part of an American-backed power-sharing agreement last year that ended months of political stalemate after parliamentary elections. But that agreement has never been completed and is now threatening to come apart amid political discord. Mr. Maliki has yet to name ministers of defense and the interior, and the counterterrorist units remain under his control.
The American Special Operations advisers worry about what will happen to their Iraqi counterparts without their American relationships — and largess, evident in the Special Operations headquarters on Victory Base. The complex, paid for with $32 million of American money, includes $2 million for an indoor training ground the commandos refer to as the “shoot house.” They note that many of the nighttime missions are carried out with American helicopters.
The American government has spent hundreds of millions of dollars training and arming these forces, yet the exact amount is unknown because the military has not fully accounted for it, according to a report late last year by the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, which reported that only $237 million had been directly attributed to support for the Iraqi special forces.
The future of the American military here is a political decision in the hands of the government of Iraq, which must formally ask to modify the security agreement to allow some troops to stay.
The American “S.F. guys always believe we’ll be back,” said the American major.
-
I highlighted a section below, which I found to be the biggest problem there as regards training and standing up Iraqi security forces. Long term mentoring. Or the lack thereof. This is not a couple of years project. Change is slow, but of the places I went to the ones that had come the longest way were those where the day in/day out, leadership by example mentoring process was of a longer duration. Too often we trained them and then expected they would like suddenly change their thousands of years culture to suddenly be like us. Because some fat, cigar in the mouth gringo trainer yelling at them told them this was the way they should be.
> But Iraqi and American commanders worry that this crucial military legacy of
> the war may be at risk now that American forces are withdrawing this year
> under an agreement between the countries.
-
New Pentagon chief Leon Panetta's maiden journey to America's conflict zones this week garnered attention for his alleged misstatements about the pace of the Afghan troop drawdown and the rationale for the Iraq war. We came away more concerned by his incomplete answers to Iran's designs on Iraq and America's future role there.
Five months before a planned final withdrawal, Iran's proxies in Iraq are putting the squeeze on the U.S. and its allies. Three senior U.S. officials, including Mr. Panetta, say "forensic proof" shows that Iran is funding, arming and training Shiite militias, among them remnants of pro-Iranian cleric Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi army. These groups are behind the recent escalation in violence. Fifteen GIs were killed in June, the highest monthly toll in three years, including nine in rocket attacks that carry a Tehran return address.
A public diagnosis of Iran's role is clarifying, but the next step has to be a coherent response to this provocation. The U.S. needs to protect its troops as well as the nearly decade-long investment in a secure and democratic Iraq. The gains made since the success of the 2007 surge aren't in immediate danger, yet they're reversible.
We doubt many of the troops in his audience in Iraq found reassuring Mr. Panetta's promise to "push the Iraqis to take on the responsibility" and lead a crackdown on the Shiite militias. The U.S. has chosen not to go after the militias directly to shield the government of Nouri al-Maliki from the domestic political fallout of unilateral American military action. Such considerations are cold comfort to soldiers under attack. The U.S. has a legal and moral responsibility to respond. We ought to go after the militias in Iraq as well as their backers in Iran who've decided to make Iraq a proxy war.
Iraqi domestic politics complicate American options. Mr. Maliki proved a brave and able leader during the hardest days of the 2007 surge, and he helped turn Iraq around. But his nationalist politics have boxed him in. Last year Mr. Maliki made political peace with the Sadr party, bringing them into his unwieldy coalition government. He won't fight Shiite militias with the same resolve he showed against Sunni extremists.
More recently Mr. Maliki has banked his political future on a U.S. withdrawal, proclaiming last year that "the last American soldier will leave" in December and that the decision "is sealed." Now Iraqi leaders quietly say they want some U.S. troops to stay beyond December, perhaps 10,000 or more, but they're too paralyzed by internal squabbling to put in the request. One can appreciate Mr. Panetta's frustration in saying, "Dammit, make a decision."
America's continued troop presence can fill in security gaps and provide a stabilizing influence in Iraq and the region. The U.S. has kept troops in South Korea and Japan for six decades after the end of the wars there, and a similar presence in Iraq might be as salutary. But it should only do so as long as the troops can protect themselves and have a good partner in Baghdad. They can't be sitting ducks.
As much as al Qaeda, Iran wants to rekindle sectarian tensions and undermine democratic politics in Iraq. Their model is Lebanon. The U.S. can help the Iraqis push back. The proposed multibillion dollar sale of up to two F-16 squadrons, which the Journal reported yesterday was back on track, is one step forward. A long-term security relationship with Iraq can best ensure that the sacrifices made in the last decade aren't squandered.
-
Also see the analysis just posted in the Mid-east SNAFU, TARFU, FUBAR thread:
An Iranian offensive in Kurdish-concentrated northern Iraq entered its fourth day July 19. As early as July 13, Iranian media reported that 5,000 Iranian troops had massed along Iran’s northwestern border with Iraq in preparation for an offensive. By the morning hours of July 16, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) forces crossed 1 to 2 kilometers (0.6 to 1.2 miles) into Iraqi territory in the border region of Dolie Koke/Zalle and clashed with members of the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), Iran’s main Kurdish militant group. According to STRATFOR sources in the area, the Iranian army has continued artillery bombardments in the areas of Sune, Ali Rese, Dolie Koke, Sehit Ahyan, Sehit Harun and Zalle. On the Iranian side of the border, IRGC reinforcements continue to build up in the Valley of Wesne.
The mountainous terrain favors PJAK, operating as a guerrilla group, over Iranian ground forces with more conventional capabilities such as armored vehicles that could be difficult to use effectively. It is unclear how heavily Iran is relying on artillery in the offensive, rather than patrols and raids, which are more vulnerable to ambush. PJAK claims around 10 of its members and 180 IRGC troops have been killed in the clashes, though these figures could not be verified.
The Iranian offensive is unlikely to build into a regional crisis. Skirmishes between Iranian forces and PJAK militants are typical for this time of year — though the scale of the deployment and the geopolitical climate surrounding the Iranian offensive are noteworthy. Local and regional media reporting on the issue have painted it as largely routine, and the governments of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the United States have so far remained quiet on the issue.
(click here to enlarge image)
The incursion may be an attempt to intimidate Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), which has thus far been the Iraqi faction most opposed to the upcoming U.S. withdrawal from the country. As Washington struggles to negotiate an extension of the current Status of Forces Agreement to allow U.S. forces to remain in Iraq and reposition into a blocking force against Iran, the KRG, wary of the threat of being marginalized by its Arab rivals in Iraq, has been attempting, thus far unsuccessfully, to negotiate for the establishment of permanent U.S. bases in northern Iraq. Thus, this offensive may be a message to the KRG to respect Tehran’s demands as well as a demonstration to Washington of Tehran’s military capability in extending its writ in the Iran-Iraq borderlands.
If this is the case, Iran does not want to go so far in this action that it would allow Washington to justify a military extension for its troops, regardless of whether the extension is sanctioned by Baghdad. Currently, the limited nature of Iran’s military activity in northern Iraq does not rise to the level of crisis that would allow the United States and certain Iraqi factions to claim that Iraq is too vulnerable for the United States to leave by the end of the year, but how far Iran’s military action will go in this offensive is yet to be seen.
Read more: Iran's Limited Incursion into Northern Iraq | STRATFOR
-
From "Our man formerly in Iraq":
Two civilians killed, three others injured in Iranian bombardment of Arbil villages
7/25/2011 1:31 PM
ARBIL / Aswat al-Iraq: Two citizens have been killed and three others were injured by Iranian artillery bombardment of Kurdish villages in northeast Arbil over the past 24 hours, the Border Guards Command in Arbil reported on Monday.
“The Iranian artillery has continued its bombardment of Seidakan area (this is well inside Iraq) of Soran Township, 110 km to the northeast of Arbil, beginning from last night till this (Monday) afternoon, killing 2 civilians and wounding 3 others of villages inhabitants,” the Border Guards Command announced, adding that the “Iranian forces have given the inhabitants of those villages 3 days to leave their home villages.”
Noteworthy is that northern Iraq’s Kurdistan Region’s border areas, close to Iran and Turkey, had become targets for Turkish and Iranian bombardment, under justification of chasing the anti-Ankara Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and the anti-Tehran Free Life Party (PJAK), taking refuge in those areas.
Expect more of this as the US withdrawal continues.
-
“Iraq remains an extraordinarily dangerous place to work,” U.S. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Stuart W. Bowen Jr. wrote in his quarterly report to Congress and the Obama administration. “It is less safe, in my judgment, than 12 months ago.”
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle%20east/us-review-finds-iraq-more-dangerous-than-a-year-ago/2011/07/30/gIQAkHvuiI_story.html
-
US troops must have legal immunity to stay in Iraq
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen speaks to reporters at a news conference in Baghdad, Iraq, Tuesday, Aug. 2, 2011. The top U.S. military officer says American troops must be given protection from legal prosecution as part of any agreement to keep them in Iraq beyond the end of the year. (AP Photo - Maya Alleruzzo)
LOLITA C. BALDOR
From Associated Press
August 02, 2011 5:24 AM EDT
BAGHDAD (AP) — The top U.S. military officer said Tuesday that American troops must be given immunity from prosecution as part of any agreement to keep them in Iraq beyond the end of the year and that this protection must be approved by Iraq's parliament.
The comments by Joint Chiefs chairman Adm. Mike Mullen could make it more difficult for the troops to stay here.
Mullen and other U.S. officials have been pushing Iraq to decide whether they would want additional American forces to stay in the country past their Dec. 31 departure date, and the immunity issue has been one of the key sticking points.
"An agreement, which would include privileges and immunities for our American men and women in uniform will need to go through the COR," said Mullen, referring to the Council of Representatives as Iraq's parliament is known.
Washington has offered to let up to 10,000 U.S. troops stay and continue training Iraqi forces on tanks, fighter jets and other military equipment.
Mullen told reporters in Baghdad that Iraq's president and prime minister have promised to quickly consider the offer, and stressed that time is running out.
U.S. officials have said repeatedly that they need to know soon whether Iraq wants them to stay longer so they can figure out which of their forces must stay and which must go. Right now, about 46,000 American forces remain in country, and this fall their departure will begin ramping up.
"A significant part of this is just a physics problem. You get to a point in time where you just can't turn back and all the troops must leave. That's why it's so important to make the decision absolutely as soon as possible," he said.
But Iraqi lawmakers and government officials have been leery about taking a public stand on whether they want American forces to stay or go.
U.S. troops are still unpopular with many Iraqis who are tired of eight years of war. One of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's top allies, anti-American cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, has made it his mission to drive American forces from the country, leaving the prime minister in a tough position.
Neighboring Iran is also lobbying for American forces to leave Iraq. The U.S. says Iran is behind a campaign of violence against American forces that began back in March and is intended to make it appear Shiite militias are driving the Americans from the country.
Mullen accused Iran of supplying the militias with arms and interfering with Iraq's internal affairs.
"These are hardly the acts of a friend. It is clear that Tehran seeks a weak Iraq and an Iraq more dependent upon and more beholden to a Persian worldview," he said.
Mullen credited U.S. and Iraqi forces with bringing down the violence in recent weeks by going after Shiite militias, something Iraq's Shiite leadership has been reluctant to do in the past.
Mullen met Monday night with al-Maliki and Iraqi President Jalal Talabani. He said they know a decision must come soon but acknowledged that they face "internal challenges, associated with reaching this decision."
"They're very aware of the urgency of the issue," said Mullen. "It was apparent to me in meeting with both the prime minister and the president that they're anxious to resolve and reconcile those differences. but that's really up to them."
Al-Maliki said in a statement on his website late Monday that he hoped Iraqi political blocs would be able to reach a consensus Tuesday night when they are expected to meet.
The Shiite prime minister stressed that regardless of the decision on U.S. troops that he wanted Washington and Baghdad to continue cooperation, especially in the area of air defense.
Iraq is unable to provide for its own air sovereignty. Over the weekend al-Maliki announced that Iraq would purchase 36 F-16 fighter planes from the U.S., which is a jump from the 18 that Baghdad initially planned to buy.
But even after the purchase goes through it would take years of training for the Iraqi Air Force to be able to protect its air space.
-
Thursday, August 11, 2011 STRATFOR.COM Diary Archives
Iraq's Divided Shia Complicate Iran's Regional Plans
An AFP report on Wednesday quoted radical Iraqi Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr criticizing Iran, his principal benefactor. Al-Sadr claimed that he had asked Tehran to hand over a renegade leader of his movement, Abu Deraa (who was thrown out of the al-Sadrite movement some three years ago and has been living in the Islamic Republic ever since), but Iranian authorities refused to do so. “The one who must be eliminated is not being eliminated, and the one who needs shelter is not sheltered,” remarked al-Sadr.
“Intra-Shia rifts in Iraq represent the biggest challenge to Tehran’s efforts to consolidate influence in Baghdad. The divisions among Shia place serious arrestors in the path of the Persian Islamist state and its ambitions of becoming a regional player”
These remarks are rather extraordinary, considering the close ties that al-Sadr has enjoyed with Iran, a nation where he has spent most of the past three years. Al-Sadr, with his Iraqi nationalist credentials and his independent streak, has never been fully under Iranian control. These latest remarks, however, suggest a shift is under way in this patron-client relationship.
From Iran’s point of view, a wide range of Iraqi Shiite political and militant entities are needed to maintain influence in its western neighbor. Al-Sadr has always known that his group is one of many Shiite assets that the Iranians have in his country. However, it appears that Iran’s support for entities that have splintered from his movement is now beginning to threaten al-Sadr’s political plans, and he is speaking out.
This apparent souring of relations comes at a time when Iran is focused on the prospect of filling the geopolitical vacuum that will exist once the U.S. military withdraws from Iraq by the end of the year. Intra-Shia rifts in Iraq represent the biggest challenge to Tehran’s efforts to consolidate influence in Baghdad. The divisions among Shia place serious arresters in the path of the Persian Islamist state and its ambitions of becoming a regional player. This dissent is comforting for both the region’s Sunni Arab countries and the United States as they look for ways in which to stem the rising Iranian tide.
Only a few months ago, Saudi Arabia prevented Iran from exploiting popular unrest in Bahrain, despite the protests being led largely by Bahrain’s majority Shia and being targeted to undermine the stability of the Sunni monarchy. As in Iraq, Bahraini intra-Shia differences worked counter to Iran’s strategic impetus. But divisions among Shiite communities are endemic across the region, a part of the historical evolution of the minority Islamic sect.
The fragmented nature of Shia communities has its roots in the structure of Shia religious leadership. The clergy hold a very strong role in Shia Islam. Shia are obligated to follow a cleric known as marjaa taqleed. Clearly, every community has multiple clerics who in turn become rival centers of power.
Despite the preeminent position enjoyed by the clerics, Shiite politics have no shortage of non-clerical rival political forces. Between the clerics who concern themselves with religious matters and the non-clerics who focus on political matters, there exists the clerics who double as politicians. Add competing ideological trends to this mix, and the result is the highly fragmented Iraqi Shia landscape.
In spite of this factionalized state of affairs, the Iranians have been successful in pulling together a single Shiite coalition that currently dominates the Iraqi state. This alliance, however, remains extremely tenuous. The Iranians will have to continuously spend a great deal of resources to hold this coalition together, which in turn means that they will likely struggle to dominate Iraq for the foreseeable future.
-
From "Our man formerly in Iraq"
I can't help but wonder if this was the police station/courthouse complex I did an assessment at. I think there was only one police station in the town.
--- --- ---
9 Killed in Bomb Attack Against Iraqi Police
Published August 25, 2011 | Associated Press
Iraqi police and hospital officials say two bombings west of the capital have killed nine people, including eight policemen.
Gunmen attacked a police station Thursday in the town of Karmah, about 50 miles west of Baghdad . After exchanging gunfire with the policemen, the attackers withdrew and a car bomb exploded near the police station, killing five of the police officers. About 30 minutes later a car bomb exploded near a police checkpoint in a village outside of Fallujah , 40 miles west of Baghdad. Three policemen and one civilian were killed in the second attack.
The officials spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to speak on the record.
Read more: http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/08/25/killed-in-bomb-attack-against-iraqi-police/#ixzz1W84Pc3Hj
-
JULIAN E. BARNES, ADAM ENTOUS and SIOBHAN GORMAN
WASHINGTON—Military commanders and intelligence officers are pushing for greater authority to conduct covert operations to thwart Iranian influence in neighboring Iraq, according to U.S. officials.
The move comes amid growing concern in the Obama administration about Iran's attempts in recent months to expand its influence in Iraq and the broader Middle East and what it says is Tehran's increased arms smuggling to its allies.
Compounding the urgency is the planned reduction in the U.S. military presence in Iraq by the end of the year, a development that many fear will open up the country to more influence from Iran, which also has a majority Shiite population.
If the request is approved by the White House, the authorization for the covert activity in Iraq likely would take the form of a classified presidential "finding." But unlike the secret order that authorized the Central Intelligence Agency's campaign against al Qaeda in 2001, the current proposal is limited in scope, officials said.
Still, such a step would reflect the U.S.'s effort to contain Iranian activities in the region. Ending the U.S.'s involvement in the Iraqi conflict was a central promise of President Barack Obama's 2008 campaign, and the administration wants to ensure it doesn't withdraw troops only to see its main regional nemesis, Iran, raise its influence there.
Officials declined to provide details about the kinds of covert operations under consideration, but said they could include more aggressive interdiction efforts at the Iraq-Iran border and stepped-up measures to stop Iranian arms smuggling after the American drawdown.
The United Nations has blocked Iran from exporting sophisticated arms, guided missiles and nuclear technology. U.N. resolutions don't ban small arms exports or the kind of primitive weapons Tehran has provided Shiite militias in Iraq, defense officials said.
The U.S. has conducted secret operations against Iran in Iraq before. In recent months the U.S. military has quietly boosted efforts to capture Iranian agents and intercept Iranian munitions in Iraq.
The U.S. government conducts covert operations when it wants to maintain the ability to deny a secret mission took place for security or diplomatic reasons.
The White House has become more worried about Iranian meddling in Iraq, Syria and Bahrain in recent months and has pushed the military and intelligence communities to develop proposals to counter Tehran.
Enlarge Image
CloseGetty Images
U.S. soldiers searched a truck last month in Babil Province, Iraq. The U.S. says it has evidence Iran smuggles arms.
.In Iraq, U.S. officials say they have evidence that Iran has been providing Shiite militias with more powerful weapons and training, helping to increase the lethality of their attacks against U.S. forces—in particular, with the crude but deadly IRAM, or improvised rocket-assisted munitions.
Iran also has stepped up its support of the embattled Syrian government, providing equipment and technical know-how for the crackdown on antiregime protests, U.S. officials say. Tehran also has provided backing to Shiite protesters in Bahrain, though its support there has been limited, the officials say.
Iranian officials have repeatedly denied that they have played any role in arming militants in Iraq or worked to destabilize other Arab nations. Tehran has claimed the U.S. has leveled charges of arms smuggling to justify a continued American military presence.
Anthony Cordesman, a defense analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said the U.S. and Iranian competition for influence in Iraq was part of an attempt by both countries to preserve their interests in the Middle East amid a reordering of interests under the Arab Spring revolutions.
"From a U.S. viewpoint, containing Iran is critical and our strategic relationship with Iraq is critical," Dr. Cordesman said. "This is one set of moves in a much more complicated chess game."
In part, the proposal for new covert operations reflects a more hawkish attitude toward Iran within the Obama administration's reshuffled national security team. Leon Panetta, the former CIA director now leading the Pentagon, has pressed Iraq to deal more forcefully with the threat from Iran.
Many members of the national security team, such as recently retired Gen. David Petraeus, who assumes the role of CIA director on Tuesday, have served in the U.S. Central Command, where military leaders have long viewed Iran as a threat to America and its Arab allies.
Nonetheless, both military and senior Obama administration officials believe they must proceed cautiously to ensure that any expansion in covert action doesn't prompt Tehran to retaliate and inadvertently trigger a wider conflict.
.While expanding covert activity, some government officials also want to improve communication with the Iranian military. Doing so could help ensure that Tehran doesn't misconstrue covert actions that the U.S. sees as self-defense.
Attacks by Iranian-backed Iraqi militias pose the most immediate concern for U.S. officials. In June, 15 U.S. soldiers died in Iraq, the highest monthly total in three years.
American officials blamed Iranian involvement for many of the deaths and the White House approved a counterterrorism campaign to defend American troops.
Senior U.S. officials said those missions, which included secret operations on the Iran-Iraq border, helped curb Iranian backed attacks. There were no American deaths in August.
But the U.S. military is slated to withdraw nearly all of its 47,000 forces from Iraq by the end of December. U.S. and Iraqi officials are negotiating over whether to allow some troops to remain, but even if Baghdad approves a small residual force, that effort could be restricted to training activities.
Top Iraqi officials visited Tehran this summer to ask Iran to stop supplying Shiite militias with arms, and officials have condemned such Iranian interference. But the government remains divided over whether to more closely ally itself with the U.S. or Iran.
After December, the job of ensuring that Tehran can't mount attacks in Iraq, arm militia groups or destabilize the government in Baghdad will fall more heavily on U.S. intelligence.
The CIA isn't expected to draw down in Iraq as quickly as the military after December.
It also is possible that the agency will need to work with the U.S. military's secretive special operations forces, as it did in the May raid in Pakistan resulting in the killing of Osama bin Laden.
If the presidential finding for an expansion of covert action is approved—and if some special operations forces remain in Iraq—they could be assigned to operate temporarily under CIA authority. The agency, under the National Security Act, is the only U.S. entity that can conduct covert operations.
Special operations forces would have the ability to carry out risky capture-or-kill missions that the CIA may not be able to conduct on its own.
More
Iran Cracks Down on Dissent
.A new finding also would ensure that the CIA and military special operations forces working for the agency have the legal ability under U.S. law to shut down the flow of arms from Iran to allied militia groups—even if those weapons aren't explicitly banned by the U.N.
Other officials, including some in Congress, favor a broader secret campaign against Iran to block its support to Syria or to other militant groups elsewhere in the Middle East.
But officials said the current proposals being considered by the administration are focused more on countering malign Iranian influence in Iraq.
-
The natural results of the Dems continuous war against US success in Iraq come to their natural conclusion.
============
U.S. Military Presence in Iraq Will Struggle to Counter Iran
Most U.S. officials Tuesday and Wednesday denied that any decision had been made regarding the number of American troops that might remain in Iraq beyond the end-of-year deadline for complete withdrawal stipulated under the current Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). However, The New York Times reported Tuesday that newly appointed U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta supported a plan keeping 3,000-4,000 troops as the continued U.S. military presence in Iraq— a number far less than previously discussed. Only a day after the Times report which cited an unnamed senior military official, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq James Jeffery went a step further than most in responding to the leak. The ambassador rejected the given figure as having ‘no official status or credibility.’
“The continued maintenance of U.S. forces in Iraq is ultimately merely a symptom of the larger, unresolved issue of Tehran’s increasing regional influence.”
Washington is less concerned with Iraq itself, and more with how the changes in Iraq following the U.S. invasion have affected Iran. Despite the accommodation reached with the Sunnis in 2006 and the successes of the surge of 2007, no extension of U.S. troop presence in Iraq is going to change the fact that Iran has been the single biggest beneficiary of the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. Iran has seen a rapid rise in the magnitude of its regional influence — and has every intention of keeping it.
Despite domestic politics at home, the U.S. desire to maintain some military presence in Iraq beyond the end of the year is motivated by Iran’s increased influence. Tehran’s regional rise is a problem to which Washington has no ready solution — unless, of course, Washington wants to engage in a politically unpalatable rapprochement with the Persians from a disadvantageous negotiating position.
Thus, Washington is left with an unresolved and, at least in the near term, unsolvable problem — an increase in Iranian power, not just in Iraq, but across the Persian Gulf and the wider region. Iraq benefits from direct military-to-military relations with the United States through training, advising and assistance (particularly with things like planning, logistics and maintenance) and modern arms. These ties provide Iraq and its security forces with capabilities they would otherwise lack. For Washington, a residual military force in Iraq helps maintain the influence, leverage and situational awareness that having its personnel in these positions provides. This capability is not something Washington wants to lose, particularly after longstanding American-Egyptian military-to-military relations proved so crucial in communicating with Cairo in February.
While the benefits to Washington of a continued military presence in Iraq are real — starting with its impact on Washington’s influence in Baghdad — they do little to address the larger problem of Iranian power in the region. Even if tens of thousands of troops remained in Iraq beyond 2011, they could not halt the decline of American influence and power in Iraq vis-a-vis Iran.
While the question of the size, role and disposition of any U.S. military contingent in Iraq beyond 2011 is an important one, the continued maintenance of forces in Iraq is ultimately merely a symptom of the larger, unresolved issue of Tehran’s increasing regional influence. Even if no American uniformed forces remain save a Marine Security Guard detachment and attache personnel at the embassy, the United States will still be maintaining the largest diplomatic presence in the world in Iraq. Nevertheless, no quantity of U.S. forces currently under discussion — not 3,000 and not even 30,000 — will change the fact that this American presence, while attempting to hold the line against Persian influence, leaves personnel and troops vulnerable to Iranian proxies and covert Iranian forces in the country.
-
BAGHDAD – Gunmen forced their way onto a bus of traveling Shiite pilgrims Monday and shot all 22 men onboard as they traveled through western Iraq's remote desert on a trip to a holy shrine, security officials said.
The bodies were discovered late Monday night, hours after the gang of gunmen stopped the bus at a fake security checkpoint and told all the women and children to get off, according to one security official who interviewed a survivor.
The gunmen then drove the bus a few miles (kilometers) off the main highway between Baghdad and the Jordanian border in Iraq's Sunni-dominated Anbar province. The pilgrims were ordered off the bus and shot one by one, the security officials said.
"The terrorists stopped the bus at gunpoint and killed 22 men," said Maj. Gen. Abdul-Hadi Rizayig, the provincial police chief.
Read more: http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/09/12/22-shiite-pilgrims-shot-dead-in-iraq/#ixzz1Xmi1APG4
-
25 3ShareThis42
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MUSTAFA OZER/AFP/Getty Images
Turkish soldiers on patrol near the Turkey-Iraq borderSummary
An uptick in attacks by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) militant group has killed more than 40 Turkish soldiers in southeastern Turkey since the beginning of August. Media reports from both Turkey and Iraq have indicated that Ankara wants to improve its existing military assets in northern Iraq as a way to attack PKK hideouts and prevent the infiltration of Turkey’s borders. While this improved military capability would be tactical and intended to undercut the current threat posed by Kurdish militancy, it also has a strategic component in that it would allow Turkey to gradually build up its military presence in northern Iraq, which Iran — as a long-term competitor for influence in Iraq — views with serious concern.
Analysis
Fighting between the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Turkish military has intensified since a de facto cease-fire expired in June. More than 40 Turkish soldiers have been killed in southeastern Turkey since August. The Turkish military has responded with increased airstrikes and artillery attacks on PKK hideouts in northern Iraq.
The Turkish offensive is unlikely to lead to a sustained conventional ground operation in Iraq in the near future. Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party is already facing pressure over the number of deaths sustained in fighting, and a large-scale operation in rough, mountainous terrain where the PKK has the advantage as a guerrilla force would certainly increase that figure. However, reports emerging from both Turkey and Iraq indicate Ankara is interested in improving its existing military assets and adding new bases in northern Iraq to better collect and act on intelligence, in order to prevent PKK attacks and incursions into Turkish territory.
This potential increase in Turkey’s military capability would be largely tactical in nature, intended to reduce the threat posed by Kurdish militant groups. Yet there is an inevitable strategic component: It would allow Turkey to build up its military presence in northern Iraq over the longer term. This development is being eyed with concern in Tehran, which is one of Turkey’s long-term competitors for influence in Iraq and is currently undertaking its own battle with Kurdish militants along its border.
Turkey’s Presence in Iraq
Turkey first established a military presence in northern Iraq in the mid-1990s when a full-blown war was raging between rival Kurdish factions. Turkey supported the Kurdistan Democratic Party led by the Barzani clan (Massoud Barzani is the current president of the Kurdistan Regional Government, or KRG) against an alliance of the PKK and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, led by the Talabani clan (Jalal Talabani is Iraq’s president). The U.S.-imposed cease-fire agreement signed in 1997 formalized Turkey’s military presence.
Turkey’s main military base in northern Iraq is the Bamerni airfield, located in Dahuk province, along with several security checkpoints near the towns of Batufa and al-Amadiyah. Turkey is believed to have roughly 2,000 troops, a few dozen tanks and a few helicopters in the region. The main duty of these units is to gather intelligence, not to engage PKK militants in combat. Increasing the number of troops in these areas would help Turkey improve logistical support and monitoring for combat troops that could be mobilized against the PKK, though it would necessarily expose more troops for the PKK to target and provide a longer logistical supply train to be harassed.
While reportedly considering ramping up its military assets in Iraq, Turkey has also worked to keep ties with the KRG on an even keel. Senior Turkish Foreign Ministry officials met with Jalal Talabani on Sept. 11 and visited with Kurdish officials in Arbil the following day, and KRG members are expected to visit Ankara soon. Ankara’s relations with the KRG have always been uneasy — the KRG represents a semi-autonomous Kurdish government, something that Kurdish separatists in Turkey hope to emulate. Turkey has considerable leverage over the KRG because the KRG’s economic livelihood depends on Turkey keeping open the main export routes that run north through Turkish territory, and Turkey does not hesitate to use military force when it perceives the KRG to be overstepping its bounds.
The escalating threat posed by the PKK is Turkey’s top national security concern, and increasing its military presence in Iraq is one way to contain it. But this prospective move also comes at a time of major geopolitical changes in the region. As the United States draws down its forces from Iraq by the end of the year, Iraqi Kurds will be left more vulnerable to Iranian and Turkish influence as well as pressure from the Arab-dominated federal government in Baghdad. As a political vacuum opens in the country, Kurd-dominated northern Iraq is becoming a natural battleground between two historical competitors: Turkey and Iran. Regardless of whether Turkey is pursuing additional assets expressly for this purpose, those assets would certainly allow Turkey to increase its influence in northern Iraq in a way that could later be used to counter Iran.
The Iranian Calculus
Iran is well aware of Turkey’s PKK problem and knows it can leverage its actions in northern Iraq to influence its relationship with Turkey. Iran does not want to push Turkey into a confrontational stance; rather, it wants to court Ankara for more cooperation on regional matters, such as Syria, by working with Turkey against the PKK. This is likely part of the reason Iran has been waging an offensive against the PKK’s Iranian branch, the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), despite the PJAK’s repeated calls for a cease-fire. Even though Tehran does not formally have bases in northern Iraq as Ankara does (Turkey’s bases are in areas dominated by the Kurdistan Democratic Party, a legacy of the 1990s Kurdish civil war), it maintains significant intelligence facilities near its borders, mainly in areas where the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan is more influential. Iran also has a strategic interest in making clear to the KRG the costs of hosting a large U.S. military presence in Iraq, so the offensive against the PJAK is not intended to send a message solely to Turkey.
Iran tries to maintain relations with both the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party, which make up the current KRG, though it has closer ties with the former. Iran has worked closely in diplomacy with Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan since the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war. Iran even helped it reclaim territory from Kurdistan Democratic Party forces during the 1990s civil war, though it has regular military contacts with both. Iran’s principal areas of influence in northern Iraq are close to the border, usually under the jurisdiction of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, including the cities Sulaymaniyah and Halabja. A growing point of contention, however, between both the parties and Iran has been Tehran’s assistance in directly or indirectly funding other smaller parties such as the Goran party as it attempts to diversify its options in the region. This, along with occasional acts of subversion on Kurdish soil such as kidnappings and bombings, has led to a great deal of mistrust and undermined Iran’s position.
Turkey, in contrast, pursues a much more nuanced approach in dealing with its Kurdish neighbors. Because of Turkey’s commercial interests in northern Iraq — Turkish firms have been increasingly dominant in the area, often at the expense of Iranian firms — Ankara’s interest are served best by maintaining stability and making clear to the KRG that their economic livelihood depends on Ankara’s consent. And unlike Iran, which has no natural sectarian allies in Iraqi Kurdistan, Turkey has a sizable Turkmen minority in Iraq on which to rely.
Both Iran and Turkey have a mutual interest in battling Kurdish militants and clamping down on separatist aspirations, by force if necessary. To this end, the two powers will likely engage in short-term cooperation. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan recently said he plans to visit Iran and noted the potential for Iran and Turkey to work together against the PKK. Over the longer term, however, Turkey’s rise as a regional power will make competition between the two inevitable, and the KRG’s economic dependence on Turkey is likely to give Ankara the long-term advantage.
-
STRATFOR
---------------------------
October 7, 2011
WEIGHING AN EXTENDED U.S. PRESENCE IN IRAQI KURDISTAN
Kurdish officials in northern Iraq on Wednesday raised the possibility of some 1,500
U.S. troops remaining stationed at the airport in the contested city of Kirkuk past
January 2012, the deadline for all American military forces to withdraw from the
country under the current U.S.-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement.
"What is at stake for Washington is not the fate of Iraqi Kurds, but the most
powerful means of leverage the United States has left in Iraq: its military
presence."
Washington has been pushing for an agreement that would keep U.S. troops in Iraq
past the deadline as a way to counter Iran, and some Iraqi factions would also like
to see an extended U.S. presence for their own reasons -- especially the Kurds, who
see the prospect of U.S. troops in northern Iraq as a way to ensure Kurdish
autonomy. However, other Iraqi factions, many of which are influenced by Iran, have
thus far been successful in preventing any such accord from being struck. Given the
fractious nature of Iraqi politics and the logistical requirements for removing
forces by the deadline, the longer these factions delay an extension, the more
difficult it becomes to enact one.
What is at stake for Washington is not the fate of Iraqi Kurds, but the most
powerful means of leverage the United States has left in Iraq: its military
presence. The U.S. State Department plans to maintain the largest embassy in the
world in Baghdad and the Iraqi government will continue to accept American aid and
military hardware (as well as the contractors necessary to maintain it). But neither
the diplomatic presence nor U.S. aid and equipment can provide the deterrent to Iran
that military forces stationed in the country could, and the removal of troops will
inevitably erode U.S. influence, along with situational awareness and
intelligence-gathering capabilities. In addition, the advisory and assistance
support the U.S. military has provided its Iraqi counterpart in areas of planning,
logistics, intelligence and air sovereignty (among others) will be denied, meaning
that Iraqi security forces will be somewhat less capable, particularly in the near
term.
By invading in 2003, the United States destroyed the Iranian-Iraqi balance of power
that had defined American foreign policy in the region since the fall of the Shah in
1979, and the Iraq of today is not capable of containing and counterbalancing Iran.
This is not a problem that can be solved by military force, or at least by the
military force the United States is willing to keep committed to the region. Because
of this, a political accommodation and understanding with Iran is necessary. The
question is about the terms of that accommodation and understanding, and at the
moment the U.S. negotiating position is weak. Some sort of residual American
military presence in Iraq is ultimately intended to buy time for the American
negotiating position to improve while attempting to provide allies and partners in
the region like Saudi Arabia enough reason to stay with Washington instead of
reaching an independent accommodation with Iran on Iranian terms.
This is the context in which any residual American military presence in Iraq must be
understood. That presence -- however it is officially described -- could be
composed, equipped and positioned to serve as a credible conventional blocking force
in coordination with U.S. forces stationed in Kuwait (though this looks increasingly
unlikely). Alternately, the remaining U.S. forces could take the shape of a training
mission with very limited applicability to the larger strategic problem
(particularly if it is limited to 1,500 troops in Kirkuk). Either way, it will be
vulnerable to attack by Iranian proxies while failing to address the real means of
Iranian power in the region -- its extensive network of covert operatives that are
able to move quite freely across the Persian Gulf region.
The United States wants to prevent Tehran from filling the power vacuum that would
be left in Iraq after the withdrawal until other means of leverage can be brought to
bear against Iran -- ideally when most U.S. and allied forces have also withdrawn
from Afghanistan and the global economy is not being held hostage to skirmishes in
the Strait of Hormuz. A residual military presence can be can be composed in ways
that make it better- or worse-suited to deal with this, but it cannot solve the
underlying problem of Iranian power in the region.
-
In that he was involved in training the Baghdad police and others, his words carry particular weight here.
========================================
This is not a surprise to me. We have spent 8-years over there trying to impose a U.S. centric view on a culture that has no need for this U.S. centric view. Like training police in evidence collection. The police there do not collect evidence. That is not their system. We may want it to be that way, but it ain't. Over there "judicial investigators" are the collectors of evidence.
We have spent 8-years practicing mirror imaging at its absolute finest....
-------------------------------------
BAGHDAD — A U.S. State Department program to train Iraqi police lacks focus, could become a "bottomless pit" of American money and may not even be wanted by the Iraqi department it's supposed to help, reports released Monday by a U.S. government watchdog show. The findings by the U.S. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction paint what is supposed to be the State Department's flagship program in Iraq in a harsh light.
-
• From the Mediterranean to the Hindu Kush: Rethinking the Region
On Oct. 21, U.S. President Barack Obama formally announced that, with a few minor exceptions, all U.S. military personnel would be leaving Iraq before the end of the year in accordance with the status-of-forces agreement between Washington and Baghdad.
The U.S. has spent most of the year, both officially and unofficially, attempting to arrange some sort of an extension for as many as 20,000, and as few as a couple thousand, U.S. troops to remain in Iraq beyond the end of the year deadline for a complete withdrawal. What none of this would do is address the underlying issue of resurgent Iranian power, not just in Iraq, but the wider region, and this is something the U.S. has yet to come up with a meaningful response for. From a military perspective, the U.S. training presence’s advisory and assistance role, particularly in issues of maintenance, planning and logistics, will inherently leave the Iraqi military and Iraqi security forces less capable than they are now.
The U.S. military presence in Iraq has been pivotal to U.S. situational awareness across the country. In some cases, U.S. forces were still operating alongside Iraqi forces, but even where they were not, the disposition of American forces and the nature of their presence meant that the U.S. had a considerable awareness of the way in which Iraqi forces were being employed and their operational performance on the field, as well as the ways in which Iraqi commanders were directing and employing those forces. The U.S. also maintained considerable freedom of action in terms of the way in which it employed intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance platforms in Iraqi airspace. This means that even as the U.S. inevitably ramps up its covert collection capabilities, both inside Iraq and by other means, there will be a considerable lapse and degradation of the U.S. intelligence gathering and situational awareness capabilities in Iraq.
In terms of the drawdown itself, while contingency plans have long been in place and forces in Iraq have been preparing for the contingency of drawdown, just under 40,000 U.S. troops remain in the country, positioned at over a dozen facilities that have to be sanitized and handed over to Iraqis. This means that an enormous challenge remains for the U.S. in Iraq, in terms of managing vulnerabilities and exposure during the process of withdrawal. But the other significant question was the security of U.S. nationals that remained behind beyond the deadline for withdrawal. Some military forces, a couple hundred total, remain behind to facilitate the transfer of U.S. arms, training and the presence at the U.S. Embassy.
The U.S. military has been an enormously important backstop for the overall security of U.S. nationals in the country. Without the presence of nearly 50,000 U.S. troops that has defined the security environment in recent years, there will inherently be a greater exposure and vulnerability of the U.S. personnel that remain behind in the years ahead.
-
Without the presence of nearly 50,000 U.S. troops that has defined the security environment in recent years, there will inherently be a greater exposure and vulnerability of the U.S. personnel that remain behind in the years ahead.
No worries, I'm sure the Iranian forces will look after them.
-
Analyst Kamran Bokhari discuses the emerging regional competition for influence in Iraq that is expected to intensify as American troops withdraw.
Editor’s Note: Transcripts are generated using speech-recognition technology. Therefore, STRATFOR cannot guarantee their complete accuracy.
Related Links
• Iraq’s Attempt to Protect its Autonomy
• Iraq: Possibilities and Complications After the U.S. Drawdown
• Libya and Iraq: The Price of Success
Iraq’s prime minister on Nov. 9 came out with some tough words on attempts by several provinces in the country to establish autonomous zones in the country. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki warned that every single piece of Iraq’s territory should be governed by its central government. Al-Maliki’s statements have implications for the domestic balance of power at a time when U.S. forces are about to withdraw from the country, but more importantly it speaks volumes about the regional tug-of-war, particularly that between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
Now that it is clear that the United States will be withdrawing its forces completely from the country, save a few hundred troops that would be engaged in security for diplomatic and international entities in Baghdad, Iraq’s minority Sunni community is feeling threatened and is trying to make the best use of the options that it has available. And one of the options is to establish an autonomous zone within its areas, at least one if not more, as a means of trying to counter the overbearing power of Iraq’s Shiite-dominated government, which on its end is trying to make use of the American withdrawal to consolidate its hold over the new Iraqi republic.
The move on the part of Iraq’s disenfranchised Sunni community has the Shia majority worried because from the point of view of the Shia their hold over power is a very nascent development, and with American forces leaving it is creating a new dynamic in which that balance of power needs time to settle, and they are worried about any attempts by the Sunnis to disrupt the attempt of the Shiites to consolidate their influence in the post-Baathist republic.
So what we have here is a revival of a Sunni-Shia tug-of-war at a time when American forces are not going to be around to prevent a direct clash. It is not inevitable that there will be a direct violent clash. Much will depend upon how both sects and their principal stakeholders are able to negotiate with one another.
But far more important than the role of the Iraqi factions is the role of their external patrons. In the case of the Sunnis it is Saudi Arabia, and in the case of the Shiites it is Iran. Both countries are looking at the American withdrawal from Iraq from very different perspectives. From the point of view of the Iranians, this is the moment that they have been waiting for — i.e. the withdrawal of American forces — which creates a vacuum that Tehran can use to consolidate its influence in Iraq. On the other hand, the Saudis have been dreading this moment and they see this as a threat to their national security. The Iranian attempt to consolidate its influence has to be countered from the Saudi point of view.
How do you do that? Well there are not that many good options because Iran does have the upper hand, so what Riyadh is hoping is that the Sunnis can make use of this constitutional provision to create autonomous regions as a means of securing their influence in this post-Baathist Iraq.
And one of the more interesting angles to the Iranian-Saudi struggle in post-American Iraq is the implications for Syria. From the point of view of Iran and its Iraqi allies, they do not want to see anyone using Iraqi territory, particularly that of the Sunni areas that border Syria, for action against the Syrian regime that is facing an uprising on the home front. Conversely, the Saudis and their allies would like to do just that.
So the question is how far are the Iranians and the Saudis willing to push their respective Iraqi proxies?
-
By NATHAN HODGE
U.S. troops are on track to leave Iraq before the end of December, but the U.S. involvement there is anything but over—meaning local resistance to Americans, and the security challenges that come with it, will continue.
In place of the military, the State Department will assume a new role of unprecedented scale, overseeing a massive diplomatic mission through a network of fortified, self-sufficient installations. After the troops have left, the U.S. presence in Iraq—which peaked at 170,000—will number between 15,000 and 16,000, including federal employees and private contractors.
Federal officials are busily signing hundreds of millions of dollars in contracts for on-site health care, food, protection and other needs, so that American personnel can steer clear of a perilous security situation on Iraq's city streets.
The State Department will hire more than 5,000 private security contractors for armed details and has contracted with a private service to ferry U.S. personnel in helicopters and planes.
The State Department will command four major diplomatic centers and seven other facilities, a total of 11 sites around the country. The tab will be around $3.8 billion for the first year, far above the operating cost of any other U.S. diplomatic mission—but far lower than the more than $40 billion in U.S. spending budgeted for fiscal 2011 in Iraq.
With the new mission, U.S. officials hope to redefine a strategic relationship that has rested for nearly nine years almost solely on war. They say they will work with Iraq's central bankers, justice officials and agriculture experts, while trying to improve its police and armed forces.
The U.S. posture is likely to be controversial within Iraq. The militant cleric Moqtada al-Sadr has called a truce through year-end to allow U.S. troops to leave, but has called on followers to resist the "occupiers" that remain.
U.S. Ambassador James Jeffrey acknowledged the dangers. "If we move out into the Iraqi economy, out into the Iraqi society in any significant way, it will be much harder to protect our people," he said in an interview with The Wall Street Journal.
Mr. Jeffrey said Iraq still has "significant and highly trained, quite large terrorist groups, with very potent weapons that are trying to target us, and we have to be prepared for that."
The U.S.'s reliance on private security contractors troubles many in Washington, particularly since a 2007 incident in which guards working under a State Department contract opened fire in a crowded Baghdad traffic circle, leaving 17 Iraqis dead.
"The long history of the lack of transparency and accountability and the legal limbo in which these contractors operate mean that it could be a formula for problems," said Rep. Jan Schakowsky (D., Ill.), a longtime critic of the U.S. government's reliance on contractors overseas.
U.S. officials said they hope eventually to reduce reliance on security contractors, or at least shift to hiring more local guards, as Iraq's security improves.
Meanwhile, officials have awarded a series of contracts, including a $974 million deal to SOC Inc. for a "static guard" force at the Baghdad embassy and a $1.5 billion award to Triple Canopy Inc. to operate diplomatic convoys. DynCorp International Inc., a subsidiary of Tucker Holdings Inc., will run the State Department's air operations.
The four main U.S. diplomatic facilities—the embassy in Baghdad, consulates general in Basra and Irbil and a consulate in Kirkuk—will be comparable in size to important diplomatic posts in other countries, with one crucial difference: The core personnel will be outnumbered by security. Contract security at some sites will outnumber "mission personnel" by as much as two to one, according to documents viewed by The Wall Street Journal.
The flagship is the mammoth U.S. Embassy, the high-walled complex on the Tigris River occupying 104 acres, or twice the area of the White House and its adjoining Ellipse.
In describing the embassy, Mr. Jeffrey avoided the frequent comparisons to fortresses, prisons or compounds. Instead, he likened it to a "college campus in a desert."
The State Department has faced tough questions in Washington about its readiness to take on this new mission.
"There is no doubt that the scope of the department's diplomatic activities in Iraq is beyond anything that we have done in the past," Patrick Kennedy, the State Department's top management official, said this summer in congressional testimony.
In some ways, the State Department's record of operating in crisis zones is "under-appreciated," said Richard Douglas, a former foreign service officer and onetime Pentagon counter-narcotics official. The State Department, Mr. Douglas noted, operates drug-interdiction aircraft in other countries.
The departure of the military may leave crucial gaps. Areas of "lost functionality" include the recovery of downed vehicles and aircraft, clearing of roadside bombs and disposal of unexploded ordnance, according to an official briefing slide viewed by The Wall Street Journal. Another question is how to counter insurgents firing rockets and mortars.
Iraqi security forces are supposed to provide the first line of defense for U.S. facilities, and the Pentagon will also provide some support. A defense official said the Defense Department would operate a system to provide warning of incoming rocket and mortar attacks.
—Sam Dagher contributed to this article.
-
BTW I note this thread joins the evergrowing list of threads with over 100,000 reads.
By SAM DAGHER
BAGHDAD—Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki said Friday that Baghdad wouldn't terminate ExxonMobil Corp.'s contract to develop the West Qurna-1 oil field in southern Iraq as punishment for signing a deal with the country's semi-autonomous Kurdistan region, with whom Baghdad has a long-running dispute over land and the sharing of oil resources.
"We haven't cancelled its contract in the south," said Mr. Maliki in an interview with The Wall Street Journal ahead of a scheduled state visit to Washington next week. "We are looking for a way for [ExxonMobil's] other contracts in any area to be within the legal contexts, but as for cancelling its contract in the south, no."
Mr. Maliki also said that Exxon has "frozen" its controversial contract with the KRG, which was announced in November, and suggested that his government was willing to find a way to ultimately make the deal work if negotiations were restarted with the involvement of the Ministry of Oil.
"It [the contract] has a legal violation, it doesn't work unless Exxon comes back and negotiates with the Ministry of Oil in the presence of a representative of the Kurdistan region, then possible," Mr. Maliki said. "Even Exxon I think has frozen the project, now the contract is frozen and we will try to find a formula to remedy it."
It wasn't immediately clear if Mr. Maliki's comments were motivated by an eagerness to avoid any potentially protracted legal battle with oil major, which could cast a shadow over Iraq's existing deals with other energy giants and its hugely ambitious plans to quadruple production to 12 million barrels a day by 2017.
Exxon is currently producing 370,000 barrels a day at West Qurna-1 under a central government service contract. The government had warned the company that it could lose its contract to develop the field, which has proven reserves of about 8.7 billion barrels, for signing the deal for six exploration blocks in the north with the Kurdistan Regional Government, or KRG.
Some of those blocks are in a hotly contested oil-rich territory claimed by both the KRG and the central government, stretching from the Iranian border to the east to the Syrian border in the northwest.
An Exxon Mobil media officer in the U.S. declined to comment. So far the company has said nothing about the deal.
KRG Minister of Natural Resources Ashti Hawrami couldn't be reached for comment, but another well-placed Kurdish source said the KRG is "unaware of anything of this nature.
"We are working within Iraq's Constitution for the benefit of the whole of Iraq," he said, on condition of anonymity because he was unauthorized to discuss the deal.
The KRG and the Baghdad government are at loggerheads over scores of oil deals that the KRG signed with international oil companies. Baghdad has said they are nul and void because they need approval by the central government, while the Kurds say they are in line with the country's new constitution.
Baghdad has also blacklisted companies that maintain deals with the Kurds, excluding them from working elsewhere in Iraq. Among those is U.S. oil firm Hess Corp., which was barred in September from competing in a fourth energy auction scheduled by the Ministry of Oil for next year.
-
RAMADI, Iraq — Meeting various neighbors and supplicants on a recent evening, America’s staunchest ally in Iraq, Sheik Ahmed Abu Risha, sat in a tent sipping tea from an implausibly tiny glass cup. He greeted each new visitor with a hearty outburst of “dear one” and a kiss on the cheek.
At one point a young man walked in carrying an M-16 rifle, leaned over and kissed the sheik on the cheek, too, in a clear sign of loyalty from a member of a tribal militia.
Mr. Abu Risha is often credited with helping turn the tide of the Iraq war beginning in 2006 by rallying local tribal leaders to fight Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, the homegrown Qaeda affiliate in Iraq, which has some foreign members. He still commands, by his own estimate, about 80,000 militia members.
With two weeks left before the United States military completes its withdrawal from Iraq, these units, known broadly as the Sunni Awakening, still remain outside the new Iraqi police force and army. Ragtag groups of men wearing jeans and carrying rifles at dusty checkpoints throughout western Iraq, they are a loose end left by the United States.
Some Awakening members are former insurgents and members of Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party who fought in a nationalist wing of the Sunni uprising early in the war, a matter of grave concern to the Shiite-dominated government of Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki. Without the buffer provided by the Americans, relations between the Awakening and the central government, always touchy, are growing increasingly strained, and the government now wants the Awakening to disband by Dec. 31, the deadline for the exit of the United States military.
Mr. Abu Risha, in an interview in his compound beside a lazy bend in the Euphrates River, said members of the tribal militias in western Iraq were not likely to disarm quickly — and certainly not by the end of the month.
“I don’t think the Awakening members will give up their weapons,” he said, contending that the problem was a lack of government protection against Al Qaeda. “They want to defend themselves. The weapons they carry are their personal weapons.”
In the tradition of the endless negotiations, feints and shifting alliances of desert tribes, the Sunni chieftains in Anbar Province unexpectedly switched sides in 2006 and 2007, in perhaps the most important single step for establishing stability here after the war and the insurgency. Once on the American side, they were an enormous help in hunting down their former insurgent allies, members of the Islamic militias, including Al Qaeda.
Members of the Abu Risha family first caught the eye of American commanders in Anbar Province by attacking trucks carrying Qaeda militants passing on the highway in front of their compound in 2006.
These were acts of vengeance more than politics; Al Qaeda had killed eight family members. But they illustrated that the tribe and the United States had a common enemy. Soon, platoons of Marines were dropping into the Abu Risha compound for feasts of lamb and rice, and fighting side by side with former insurgents and Baathists they might have been battling just months before.
But the pendulum is now swinging back toward repression of Baathists, something being discussed over tea in places like Mr. Abu Risha’s tent, pitched in the courtyard of his fortresslike compound.
The Shiite-dominated central government has arrested prominent Sunnis on accusations that they are secret members of the long-disbanded Baath Party, which has alienated Sunni elites. Meanwhile, a Sunni revolt a few hundred miles to the north of here against the Shiite-aligned government in neighboring Syria is gathering force.
Last month, government police officers wounded two guards and detained two others in a raid on the home of a Sunni, Sheik Albo Baz, in Salahuddin Province, prompting a protest by several thousand Sunnis in Samarra, a city divided by sect.
This followed the roundup by police officers of 600 suspected Baath Party sympathizers in October; they were accused of planning a coup.
Distressingly for Sunnis, the government paraded some of those arrested on state television in a bizarre spectacle: relatives of their supposed victims were invited into the room and screamed at the suspects, and demanded their execution. Such a program was a tradition on Mr. Hussein’s state television, though the suspects then were more likely to be Shiites.
In the interview, Mr. Abu Risha produced an envelope containing photographs of shrapnel damage on an armored sport utility vehicle, proof, he said, that he was the target of an assassination attempt two months ago on a highway in Abu Ghraib.
He said a Shiite-dominated police brigade that is part of the central government was responsible, because the roadside bomb that struck his car, ineffectually, was set 50 yards from one of the brigade’s watch towers.
The government has denied this, though the anti-American cleric Moktada al-Sadr agreed to open an investigation into the unit, called the Muthana Brigade.
Mr. Maliki and other Shiite politicians insist that they are legally fighting sedition among former Baathists, and that the police are evenhanded with Sunnis.
Mohammad Rida, a member of the Sadrist party in Iraq’s Parliament, said in an interview that the government had documents indicating that Baath Party sleeper cells intended to stage a coup after the American withdrawal. The police obtained the names of hundreds of conspirators in a confession by a former Baathist detained in July, he said.
In addition, Mr. Rida said, documents found in the ruins of the Libyan intelligence office after the fall of Tripoli corroborated the plot. “Iraq did what any other country would do,” he said. “We responded.”
Mr. Abu Risha’s compound is less than a mile from what used to be Camp Blue Diamond, home of the young United States Army officers who first struck up a friendship with him, and who brought him to the American side. (A grandfather of Mr. Abu Risha had chosen a different path, choosing to fight the British occupation in the 1920s.)
About 30,000 former Awakening militia members have received jobs in the Anbar police, and thousands more have entered the army. Mr. Abu Risha said about 80,000 remained in irregular tribal-based units. The central government has put thatfigure at 50,000.
Mr. Abu Risha has entered politics, with nine supporters in Parliament, but he does not hold public office, wielding power instead in informal gatherings over tea or feasts at his house.
He often cites the Iraqi Constitution in asserting rights for Anbar Province and describes himself as an Iraqi patriot opposed to any foreign meddling in Iraq, whether from Syria or Iran.
In the latest calibration of his loyalties, Mr. Abu Risha has become a steadfast supporter of Kurdistan-style autonomy for the Sunni desert regions of western and northern Iraq, a position gaining traction in provincial councils. This, he said, would resolve disagreements with the central government about the expected wealth from natural gas fields in the desert and the future of militias, with regions being granted the right to field their own guard units.
“We will form a region,” he said.
-
Woof All:
Any thoughts or reflections?
Marc
==========================
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 15, 2011 STRATFOR.COM Diary Archives
U.S. Closing Out Military Presence in Iraq
By Nate Hughes
United States Forces-Iraq (USFI), the American military command in Iraq, cased its colors Thursday outside Baghdad International Airport (BIAP). During the traditional military ceremony, the unit’s colors and the American flag were rolled and stowed, symbolizing the disestablishment of the formation and the end of the U.S. military’s nondiplomatic presence in the country. The last U.S. forces (save a company-sized Marine Security Guard detachment at the U.S. Embassy) are slated to leave the country next week, well ahead of the Dec. 31 deadline stipulated by the status of forces agreement between Washington and Baghdad.
“The invasion did reshape the region, but not in the way Washington had intended.”
In April 2003, then-Saddam International Airport was designated Objective Lions and seized by Task Force 2-7 in an assault for which an Army combat engineer would posthumously receive the Medal of Honor. These were the days of “shock and awe,” as the outset of the war in Iraq was dubbed, during which the United States military occupied the Iraqi capital in a matter of weeks. Objective Lions would quickly become the sprawling Victory Base Complex, the iconic centerpiece of the United States’ eight-year war in Iraq. Two American presidents would subsequently pass through BIAP, the center of the operation that became the focal point of U.S. military operations and foreign policy for the better part of a decade.
In invading Iraq, the United States had hoped to fundamentally reshape the region’s geopolitical reality by establishing a pro-American regime in Baghdad. The invasion did reshape the region, but not in the way Washington had intended. The invasion and subsequent American pressure did ultimately push Saudi Arabia to cooperate with Washington’s counterterrorism objectives, as well as prompt Riyadh to begin meaningfully, and with increased aggression, confronting the radical Islamist elements within its own borders. But the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime also destroyed the established balance of power between Iran and Iraq, which had stood as a pillar of American foreign policy in the region for generations.
As the American war effort deteriorated into a protracted counterinsurgency and nation-building project, resurgent Iranian influence and power became increasingly difficult to ignore. The United States and its allies found themselves fighting not only foreign jihadists but domestic Sunni nationalists and Shiite militias, some armed with improvised explosive devices provided by Iran — the single most deadly and effective weapons used to kill U.S. and allied troops.
The war ultimately cost the lives of almost 4,500 American troops, more than 300 allied troops, and a likely unknowable number of Iraqis. The United States maintained more than 100,000 troops on the ground in Iraq — and for a significant period closer to 200,000 — throughout almost the entire duration of the war. That number does not count significant contributions made by allies, not to mention the legions of private security contractors that supplemented those forces. While this was never sufficient to impose a military reality on the country — the numbers, in other words, were not substantial enough to pacify the population — this nevertheless represented an enormous and sustained commitment. It impacted the entire power structure in Iraq, the balance of power in the region and American military commitments elsewhere in the world. The structural significance of this commitment of forces is difficult to overstate, therefore it is difficult to overstate the significance of that force’s removal.
Only a few thousand American troops remain in the country, and for all practical purposes, USFI has long been declining as a significant military presence. But few elements operating in Iraq or Iran had any interest in taking any action that might delay the U.S. withdrawal. When USFI finally leaves next week, it is hard to envision a force of any magnitude being redeployed to the country in the foreseeable future — barring an extreme scenario — for any length of time. The circumstance most likely to lead U.S. troops to intervene would probably involve a noncombatant evacuation of diplomatic personnel and American nationals (for the purposes of that evacuation, the runway at BIAP will likely play a central role in American thinking about Iraq.)
In short, a key structural element of the framework in which Iraq and the wider region has operated for nearly a decade officially ceased to exist on Thursday. And this framework played a central role in the apparent quietude of Iraq in recent years. That quietude cannot be taken for granted moving forward, and the most important geopolitical result of the American invasion of Iraq — the emergence of Iran as a regional power — has yet to be meaningfully addressed and countered.
-
Woof,
I said way back when, that we would give them a chance at a free society and in the end we would just walk away from it and leave them to their own designs. I also said that they didn't have a chance in hell of keeping it free after we left. I'm glad Saddam is gone, I'm glad we killed a lot of terrorist fighters there. I feel sorry for the Iraqi people that do want freedom. We should have done it like we did Japan, but there were too many people invested in it's failure back here at home to have had that kind of success. It takes commitment to do things right, unfortunately our News Media and Press are committed to an ideology that breeds failures like this then they will turn their back on the massacre to come and have no shame in saying they are not to blame, much like the million or so slaughtered after we pulled out of Vietnam. It won't come as immediate as Vietnam but in time it will.
The President was correct in not celebrating this as victory in Iraq, because it is not a victory, it's a retreat from the frontlines of the war on Western civilization by the Islamic Fascist's. We should be building more bases in Iraq, right in Iran's backyard, not shutting them down. Iraq should be paying us in oil for every cent we have spent there too. History has shown us that you must win a peace and that you cannot retreat your way to it. Retreats, most often end in massacre's. For you Liberal, so called, peace activist's out there that have facilitated this result, and are celebrating this as being the end of the Iraq war; the war there is just starting, thanks to you.
P.C.
-
We should be building more bases in Iraq, right in Iran's backyard, not shutting them down. Iraq should be paying us in oil for every cent we have spent there too. History has shown us that you must win a peace and that you cannot retreat your way to it. Retreats, most often end in massacre's. For you Liberal, so called, peace activist's out there that have facilitated this result, and are celebrating this as being the end of the Iraq war; the war there is just starting, thanks to you.
P.C.
Sounds like Colonialism and Imperialism at it's finest.
-
I agree with the points well-articulated by Prentice. It seems odd in a crucial national and global security question that we leave without declaring any kind of victory, defeat or followup plan. We are declaring our adherence to a politically calculated timetable, no matter the outcome, after all the investment and sacrifice.
Lost in translation throughout the Middle East is that we didn't mean 'democracy,' we meant consent of the governed in a way that individual liberties would flourish. Not old oppression replaced with new oppression.
Soon our on the ground intelligence gathering capabilities from both the Af-Pak and Iran-Iraq regions will go back to Sept 10 2001 levels, this time with two radical Islamic nuclear threats possible. What could possibly go wrong?
-
Woth noting at this moment is the misdirection by Baraq that we are leaving because of the deal that Bush signed. Anyone who followed this at all understands that the intention was to give the Iraqis the chance to innoculate themselves against accusations of being puppets by giving them the respect to negotiate the terms of our presence there instead of having them dictated-- but with Baraq's obvious determination to leave regardless of the costs, no one was willing to stand up only to be abandoned to the mercies vicious enemies once we were gone.
I agree with almost everything that PC said, but I do disagree with the notion of charging the Iraqis for what we spent. Of course I get the logic for saying so, and it is sound, but it leaves the door open to muddy-the-waters accusations such as we see JDN making.
I would add my particularly hearty agreement with this"
" there were too many people invested in it's failure back here at home to have had that kind of success. It takes commitment to do things right, unfortunately our News Media and Press are committed to an ideology that breeds failures like this."
I would flesh this out by distinguishing honorable disagreement and dissent from the dissent that crossed the line into sabotage, and giving aid and comfort to the enemy.
There were plenty of good reasons to disagree with the Iraq War, but once we were in all good Americans should have united in desire for our success. Bad Americans such as the NY Times and the LA Times published articles on how we were tracing the enemy’s money and how we were paying Iraqi journalists to get out our side of the story. Bad Americans ranted and raved about US torture in Saudi Arabia (Gore? Kerry? Both?) at Abu Graib instead of pointing out that it was our Army’s own internal processes that brought it to light of day. Ambitious Americans such as Hillary Clinton furthered their campaigns by accusing General Petraeus of lying about the Surge and by associating and taking money from those who called him a traitor (Soros, Move On.org et al) Power hungry Americans such as Sen. Majority leader Harry Reid worked for our failure.
Also worth noting is the utterly destructive actions taken by our “allies” in Europe, particularly the French and Germans (and UN bureaucrats too) who profited scandalously and illegally from the Food for Oil program (the Volcker Commission estimated about $26 BILLION) and by continuing to disable sanctions against Iran so they could make money.
I could go on an on, but my morning moves on.
TAC!
-
We should be building more bases in Iraq, right in Iran's backyard, not shutting them down. Iraq should be paying us in oil for every cent we have spent there too. History has shown us that you must win a peace and that you cannot retreat your way to it. Retreats, most often end in massacre's. For you Liberal, so called, peace activist's out there that have facilitated this result, and are celebrating this as being the end of the Iraq war; the war there is just starting, thanks to you.
P.C.
Sounds like Colonialism and Imperialism at it's finest.
Woof JDN,
I don't deny that, and I know those labels, just like being called Hitler or racist can be applied broadly enough to discredit any solution to any problem. Nothing happens in war without some pain but that doesn't mean the pain lasts forever. The reality is, one: Iraq should pay for it's own reconstruction because they can afford it, and it is they that benefit from it not us. I didn't say load up the ships then set fire to what's left or let's make a profit off the deal, but quite frankly we couldn't afford to do this on our own, and two: our enemies are going to grab the oil for themselves after we leave and they are going to set fire to the place. So short term name calling or long term failure. The President has picked failure.
P.C.
-
The fact that we killed Saddam and his evil sons and built hospitals, schools and governmental structures and then walked away proves how false the leftist "imperialism" claims were.
-
GM, I don't think anyone is making "imperialism" claims at this time. We're leaving. Thankfully. Frankly, it was a mistake. 62% of all Americans are happy we are leaving. Thousands of American lives were lost,
many many more thousands of lives were physically injured some very seriously, 100's of thousands of innocents were killed, and billions upon billions of our needed dollars were wasted. And wow, we
killed Saddam and his evil sons. The world is full of Saddam's who have evil sons; we are better off minding our own business.
However, if we had followed PC's suggestion, it would be the worst form of imperialism if we stayed and built more bases in Iraq against the wishes of the Iraqi government.
Further, it would be colonialism at it's worst if we demanded oil to pay for our invasion. Ahhh the spoils of war. Maybe we should take slaves too.
I mean why not attack Venezuela. Then we can demand their oil too. Even Cuba; then we can demand beach front property for our Hotels and good cigars :-) Or maybe Saudi Arabia;
again, we can take their oil as payment. They are all dictatorships of the worst kind. Actually, there is a long list of countries we could invade in the name of righteousness.
Heck, following PC's opinion, since we should demand payment, maybe we can turn our Defense Department into a profit center.
On another subject, Crafty said, "There were plenty of good reasons to disagree with the Iraq War, but once we were in all good Americans should have united in desire for our success."
I don't get it; if I thought the war was wrong before it started, or if I changed my mind and thought the war was wrong later, why can't I oppose the war and work for and support our withdrawal in any way that's legal? It's not "treason" to oppose our government's wars or actions. We live in a democracy and are entitled to our opinion, even if our opinion is contrary to our government's policy and position.
-
"GM, I don't think anyone is making "imperialism" claims at this time. We're leaving."
That was the left's claim at the start of the war, including Frau-eed and Noam "Pol Pot" Chomsky. Remember "No blood for oil"? Well, it wasn't.
-
"The world is full of Saddam's who have evil sons; we are better off minding our own business."
http://www.fas.org/irp/news/1998/11/98110602_nlt.html
4. Al Qaeda also forged alliances with the National Islamic Front in
the Sudan and with the government of Iran and its associated terrorist
group Hezballah for the purpose of working together against their
perceived common enemies in the West, particularly the United States.
In addition, al Qaeda reached an understanding with the government of
Iraq that al Qaeda would not work against that government and that on
particular projects, specifically including weapons development, al
Qaeda would work cooperatively with the Government of Iraq.
-
"GM, I don't think anyone is making "imperialism" claims at this time. We're leaving."
That was the left's claim at the start of the war, including Frau-eed and Noam "Pol Pot" Chomsky. Remember "No blood for oil"? Well, it wasn't.
But if you listen to PC, we should be getting oil for our blood. Following that logic, we would be "imperialists". I think PC is disappointed.
However, I'm not claiming "imperialism", we've packed out bags and are leaving; I'm, like most Americans, am just glad we are finally getting out and wish we had never entered into the war
or if we had, I wish we had gotten out a long time ago.
-
Who said this?
http://articles.cnn.com/1998-02-17/politics/transcripts_clinton.iraq_1_national-security-american-people-freedom/7?_s=PM:ALLPOLITICS
But Saddam Hussein could end this crisis tomorrow simply by letting the weapons inspectors complete their mission. He made a solemn commitment to the international community to do that and to give up his weapons of mass destruction a long time ago now. One way or the other, we are determined to see that he makes good on his own promise.
Saddam Husseins Iraq reminds us of what we learned in the 20th century and warns us of what we must know about the 21st. In this century, we learned through harsh experience that the only answer to aggression and illegal behavior is firmness, determination, and when necessary action.
In the next century, the community of nations may see more and more the very kind of threat Iraq poses now a rogue state with weapons of mass destruction ready to use them or provide them to terrorists, drug traffickers or organized criminals who travel the world among us unnoticed.
If we fail to respond today, Saddam and all those who would follow in his footsteps will be emboldened tomorrow by the knowledge that they can act with impunity, even in the face of a clear message from the United Nations Security Council and clear evidence of a weapons of mass destruction program.
But if we act as one, we can safeguard our interests and send a clear message to every would be tyrant and terrorist that the international community does have the wisdom and the will and the way to protect peace and security in a new era. That is the future I ask you all to imagine. That is the future I ask our allies to imagine.
If we look at the past and imagine that future, we will act asone together. And we still have, God willing, a chance to find adiplomatic resolution to this, and if not, God willing, the chanceto do the right thing for our children and grandchildren.
-
Woof JDN,
That is the genius behind the Lefts' political correctness. They can define anything, in part or as a whole, for any amount of time, as being some terrible thing. Political correctness is going to insure our ultimate defeat in any war we have to undertake if we don't secure the victory. And if you can find anywhere in the history of man where at least a short term form of occupation or form of imperialism wasn't used to successfully do it, I'd like you to name it. You completely ignored what I actually said and redefined it as being oil for blood. I said the Iraqi's should pay for what we have spent there, meaning the cost of their reconstruction, not the cost of our blood and treasure or for our profit and I clarified that in a follow up post which you ignored all together so you could continue your attack and add to it the asinine crap about Cuba just to further distort the debate and malign me personally; all the while not directly addressing me. That is a very disrespectful way of debate and verge's on being dishonest. However, time will tell as to what is going to be the out come in Iraq, the die has been cast, and I'm afraid it's going to be much worse than if we had kept at least a presence there. @JDN THERE WILL BE NO FURTHER DEBATE BETWEEN ME AND YOU ON THIS SUBJECT.
P.C.
-
PC; If you don't want to debate the subject further, that's your prerogative, and I don't care. We can agree to disagree.
As to the "asinine crap about Cuba" and "malign you personally" I don't get it. Are you Cuban? Or? Personally, I like Cuba and think we should open relations. Maybe you don't? So we disagree again.
While we may disagree on this and many subjects, I have never maligned you "personally". So don't get so huffy.
As for Iraq, that's my point, "let the die be cast"; I don't care what happens. We NEVER should have been there in the first place. There were no WMD - it was all BS. America was probably better off with Hussein in power; now Iraq's future is bedlam and unpredictable.
We lost thousands of AMERICAN lives, 10's of thousands of AMERICAN'S were injured, 100's of thousands of Iraqis dead or injured, and we spent billions upon BILLIONS of OUR dollars and for what???
We killed Hussein and his sons. We "freed" Iraq. So what... Guess what? The Iraqi's still hate us...
And as a side note, and as proof, the democratically elected Iraqi government has CLEARLY said THEY don't want us there. THEY are the ones kicking us out. Doesn't that tell us something....?
We're the fools....
-
"There were no WMD - it was all BS."
(http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/a/a7/Halabja1.jpg/220px-Halabja1.jpg)
These Kurds just got sleepy all at once.
-
JDN:
Please allow me to correct your statement:
"The government of Iraq has no one in stupid enough to speak up for wanting America to stay when it is clear we have a President who was against the War, against the Surge, could not admit that the Surge worked, and who generally has made it clear that the US is leaving."
Concerning this:
"I don't get it; if I thought the war was wrong before it started, or if I changed my mind and thought the war was wrong later, why can't I oppose the war and work for and support our withdrawal in any way that's legal? It's not "treason" to oppose our government's wars or actions. We live in a democracy and are entitled to our opinion, even if our opinion is contrary to our government's policy and position."
You are right, you don't get it. One can certainly say "I think this war is a mistake. I think we should leave. I will vote for candidates who agree with me."! What I am talking about it people who do their best to undercut our efforts so that the war goes badly so they will be proven "right" and come to power. :x :x :x
@GM: Dammit man! Please use the subject line for your posts so I can find the cool excrement you post at later dates!
-
Funny how this went down the memory hole.
[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u7n3ivH3pCQ[/youtube]
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u7n3ivH3pCQ
-
A little stroll down memory lane with Saddam and Osama, Sept 12 2002 Sen.Fritz Hollings D-S.C. entered a reprint from the Iraqi state newspaper from exactly two months before the attacks of Sept 11 2001 arguably praising bin Laden and naming the targets of the attacks. Hollings, a Democrat, entered this in support of his decision to vote to authorize military action in Iraq.
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getpage.cgi?dbname=2002_record&page=S8525&position=all
Here is a news story from July 21,
2001, before 9/11 of last year, in the
Iraqi news. The name of that particular
newspaper is Al-Nasiriya.
Quoting from it:
Bin Ladin has become a puzzle and a proof
also, of the inability of the American federalism
and the CIA to uncover the man and
uncover his nest. The most advanced organizations
of the world cannot find the man and
continues to go in cycles in illusion and presuppositions.
It refers to an exercise called ‘‘How
Do You Bomb the White House.’’ They
were planning it.
Let me read this to all the colleagues
here:
The phenomenon of Bin Ladin is a healthy
phenomenon in the Arab spirit. It is a decision
and a determination that the stolen
Arab self has come to realize after it got
bored with promises of its rulers; After it
disgusted itself from their abomination and
their corruption, the man had to carry the
book of God . . . and write on some white
paper ‘‘If you are unable to drive off the Marines
from the Kaaba, I will do so.’’ It seems
that they will be going away because the
revolutionary Bin Ladin is insisting very
convincingly that he will strike America on
the arm that is already hurting.
In other words, the World Trade Towers.
Here, over a year ahead of time in
the open press in Iraq, they are writing
that this man is planning not only to
bomb the White House, but where they
are already hurting, the World Trade
Towers.
I ask unanimous consent to print
this article in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the material
was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
[From Al-Nasiriya, July 21, 2001]
AMERICA, AN OBSESSION CALLED OSAMA BIN
LADIN
(By Naeem Abd Muhalhal)
Osama Bin Ladin says that he took from
the desert its silence and its anger at the
same time.
He has learned how to harm America and
has been able to do it, for he gave a bad reputation
to the Pentagon as being weakened
in more than one spot in the world. In order
to follow one step taken by Bin Ladin America
has put to work all its apparatus, its
computers and its satellites just as the governor
cowboy of Texas has done. Bin Ladin’s
name has been posted on all the internet
sites and an amount of $5 million dollars has
been awarded to anyone who could give any
information that would lead to the arrest of
this lanky, lightly bearded man. In this
man’s heart you’ll find an insistence, a
strange determination that he will reach one
day the tunnels of the White House and will
bomb it with everything that is in it.
We all know that every age has its revolutionary
phenomenon. In Mexico there was
Zapata. In Bolivia there was Che Guevara,
during the seventies came out Marcos and
the Red Brigades in Italy, the Baader
Meinhof Gang in Germany and there was
Leila Khaled the Palestinian woman and
others. They all appeared in violence and disappeared
quietly. During the nineties Bin
Ladin came out in the open having been
completely overtaken in his mind by the robbery
happening to his country and its treasurers.
For him it was the beginning of the
revolution. For this endeavor he mobilized
everything that he had of money, of investments
and Sudan was his first stop. Bin
Ladin ended up in Afghanistan where his revolutionary
drive pushed this stubborn revolutionary
to plan very carefully, and in a
very detailed manner, his stand to push back
the boastful American onslaught and to
change the American legend into a bubble of
soap.
Because Bin Ladin knows what causes pain
to America, he played America’s game, just
as an oppressed man entertains itself with
the thing oppressing him. He countered with
the language of dynamite and explosives in
the city of Khobar and destroyed two US embassies
in Nairobi and Dar al Salaam.
America says, admitting just like a bird in
the midst of a tornado, that Bin Ladin is behind
the bombing of its destroyer in Aden.
The fearful series of events continues for
America and the terror within America gets
to the point that the Governor of Texas increases
the amount of the award, just as the
stubbornness of the other man and his challenge
increases. This challenge makes it
such that one of his grandchildren comes
from Jeddah traveling on the official Saudi
Arabia airlines and celebrates with him the
marriage of one of the daughters of his companions.
Bin Ladin has become a puzzle and
a proof also, of the inability of the American
federalism and the C.I.A. to uncover the man
and uncover his nest. The most advanced organizations
of the world cannot find the man
and continues to go in cycles in illusion and
presuppositions. They still hope that he
could come out from his nest one day, they
hope that he would come out from his hiding
hole and one day they will point at him their
missiles and he will join Guevara, Hassan
Abu Salama, Kamal Nasser, Kanafani and
others. The man responds with a thin smile
and replies to the correspondent from Al
Jazeera that he will continue to be the obsession
and worry of America and the Jews,
and that even that night he will practice and
work on an exercise called ‘‘How Do You
Bomb the White House.’’ And because they
know that he can get there, they have started
to go through their nightmares on their
beds and the leaders have had to wear their
bulletproof vests.
Meanwhile America has started to pressure
the Taliban movement so that it would hand
them Bin Ladin, while he continues to smile
and still thinks seriously, with the seriousness
of the Bedouin of the desert about the
way he will try to bomb the Pentagon after
he destroys the White House . . .
The phenomenon of Bin Ladin is a healthy
phenomenon in the Arab spirit. It is a decision
and a determination that the stolen
Arab self has come to realize after it got
bored with promises of its rulers: After it
disgusted itself from their abomination and
their corruption, the man had to carry the
book of God and the Kalashnikov and write
on some off white paper ‘‘If you are unable to
drive off the Marines from the Kaaba, I will
do so.’’ It seems that they will be going away
because the revolutionary Bin Ladin is insisting
very convincingly that he will strike
America on the arm that is already hurting.
That the man will not be swayed by the
plant leaves of Whitman nor by the ‘‘Adventures
of Indiana Jones’’ and will curse the
memory of Frank Sinatra every time he
hears his songs. This new awareness of the
image that Bin Ladin has become gives
shape to the resting areas and stops for every
Arab revolutionary. It is the subject of our
admiration here in Iraq because it shares
with us in a unified manner our resisting
stand, and just as he fixes his gaze on the Al
Aqsa we greet him. We hail his tears as they
see the planes of the Western world taking
revenge against his heroic operations by
bombing the cities of Iraq . . .
To Bin Ladin I say that revolution, the
wings of a dove and the bullet are all but one
and the same thing in the heart of a believer.
-
Post 1
Iran's Secret Plan For Mayhem
By ELI LAKE, Staff Reporter of the Sun | January 3, 2007
http://www.nysun.com/foreign/irans-secret-plan-for-mayhem/46032/
WASHINGTON — Iran is supporting both Sunni and Shiite terrorists in the Iraqi civil war, according to secret Iranian documents captured by Americans in Iraq.
The news that American forces had captured Iranians in Iraq was widely reported last month, but less well known is that the Iranians were carrying documents that offered Americans insight into Iranian activities in Iraq.
An American intelligence official said the new material, which has been authenticated within the intelligence community, confirms "that Iran is working closely with both the Shiite militias and Sunni Jihadist groups." The source was careful to stress that the Iranian plans do not extend to cooperation with Baathist groups fighting the government in Baghdad, and said the documents rather show how the Quds Force — the arm of Iran's revolutionary guard that supports Shiite Hezbollah, Sunni Hamas, and Shiite death squads — is working with individuals affiliated with Al Qaeda in Iraq and Ansar al-Sunna.
Another American official who has seen the summaries of the reporting affiliated with the arrests said it comprised a "smoking gun." "We found plans for attacks, phone numbers affiliated with Sunni bad guys, a lot of things that filled in the blanks on what these guys are up to," the official said.
One of the documents captured in the raids, according to two American officials and one Iraqi official, is an assessment of the Iraq civil war and new strategy from the Quds Force. According to the Iraqi source, that assessment is the equivalent of "Iran's Iraq Study Group," a reference to the bipartisan American commission that released war strategy recommendations after the November 7 elections. The document concludes, according to these sources, that Iraq's Sunni neighbors will step up their efforts to aid insurgent groups and that it is imperative for Iran to redouble efforts to retain influence with them, as well as with Shiite militias.
Rough translations of the Iranian assessment and strategy, as well as a summary of the intelligence haul, have been widely distributed throughout the policy community and are likely to influence the Iraq speech President Bush is expected to deliver in the coming days regarding the way forward for the war, according to two Bush administration officials.
The news that Iran's elite Quds Force would be in contact, and clandestinely cooperating, with Sunni Jihadists who attacked the Golden Mosque in Samarra (one of the holiest shrines in Shiism) on February 22, could shake the alliance Iraq's ruling Shiites have forged in recent years with Tehran. Many Iraq analysts believe the bombing vaulted Iraq into the current stage of its civil war.
The top Quds Force commander — known as Chizari, according to a December 30 story in the Washington Post — was captured inside a compound belonging to Abdul Aziz Hakim, the Shiite leader President Bush last month pressed to help forge a new ruling coalition that excludes a firebrand Shiite cleric, Moqtada al-Sadr.
According to one Iraqi official, the two Quds commanders were in Iraq at the behest of the Iraqi government, which had requested more senior Iranian points of contact when the government complained about Shiite death squad activity. The negotiations were part of an Iraqi effort to establish new rules of the road between Baghdad and Tehran. This arrangement was ironed out by Iraq's president, Jalal Talabani, when he was in Tehran at the end of November.
While Iran has openly supported Iraqi Shiite militias involved in attacks on American soldiers, the Quds Force connection to Sunni insurgents has been murkier.
In 2003, coalition forces captured a playbook outlining Iranian intentions to support insurgents of both stripes, but its authenticity was disputed.
American intelligence reports have suggested that export/import operations run by Sunni terrorists in Fallujah in 2004 received goods from the revolutionary guard.
"We have seen bits and piece of things before, but it was highly compartmentalized suggesting the Iranian link to Sunni groups," a military official said.
A former Iran analyst for the Pentagon who also worked as an adviser to the Coalition Provisional Authority, Michael Rubin, said yesterday: "There has been lots of information suggesting that Iran has not limited its outreach just to the Shiites, but this has been disputed."
He added, "When documents like this are found, usually intelligence officials may confirm their authenticity but argue they prove nothing because they do not reflect a decision to operationalize things."
A former State Department senior analyst on Iraq and Iran who left government service in 2005, Wayne White, said he did not think it was likely the Quds Force was supporting Sunni terrorists who were targeting Shiite political leaders and civilians, but stressed he did not know.
"I have no doubt whatsoever that al-Quds forces are on the ground and active in Iraq," he said. "That's about it. I saw evidence that Moqtada al Sadr was in contact with Sunni Arab insurgents in western Iraq, but I never saw evidence of Iran in that loop."
Mr. White added, "One problem that we all have is that people consistently conduct analysis assuming that the actor is going to act predictably or rationally based on their overall mindset or ideology. Sometimes people don't.
"One example of a mindset that may hinder analysis of Iranian involvement is the belief that Iran would never have any dealings with militant Sunni Arabs. But they allowed hundreds of Al Qaeda operatives to escape from Afghanistan across their territory in 2002," he said.
P.C.
-
Post 2
After Deadly Attacks in Iraq, Iran Lays Low While U.S. Plans Withdrawal
By Jennifer Griffin & Justin Fishel
Published October 03, 2011
A failed Improvised Rocket-Assisted Missile attack on a U.S. military outpost in eastern Iraq led an explosives team to this nearby weapons cache in July. Analysis indicates that the 107mm rockets are unique to Iranian design and manufacturing, validating U.S. assertions that the Iranian Regime has been playing an increasingly nefarious role within Iraq’s borders.
U.S. intelligence officials suspect that Iran, after deadly attacks by proxy militia in Iraq, is laying low until U.S. troops leave Iraq at the end of the year.
An Iranian militia on July 12 attempted to fire 41 Iranian-made rockets at a U.S. military post in eastern Iraq near the border with Iran. Seventeen of the 107 mm rockets were confiscated by U.S. and Iraqi forces before they could be launched, but the rest missed the U.S. base known as COS Garry Owen in Maysan province just north of Basra and instead hit the base for the Iraqi 10th Army division, killing several Iraqi women and children.
U.S. defense officials familiar with the incident tell Fox News that in response an angry Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki issued a communiqué warning his Iranian counterparts that should such destabilizing operations continue he would be forced to ask U.S. forces to remain in Iraq past December 31, the current deadline for all U.S. forces to leave.
Since then, the number of Iranian proxy attacks by Asaib ahl al-Haq (AAH), or the League of the Righteous, against U.S. forces has dropped significantly. The reduced attacks led U.S. intelligence officials to conclude that Iran’s short term strategy may now be to wait for U.S. troops to leave at the end of the year before trying to reassert itself through the militias which have been trained by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps - Quds Force.
Until the misfire in July the Iranian strategy, according to U.S. military commanders, was to step up the number of attacks on U.S. forces in order to make it look as though U.S. troops were being forced to leave the region. The July incident appears to mark a shift in strategy, according to one senior defense official. The Revolutionary Guard asked the Asaib Ahl al-Haq militia to stand down while Maliki completes a difficult round of negotiations with the U.S. ambassador and State Department, determining how many, if any, U.S. troops will stay past December.
The 107 mm rockets fired at the U.S. base had writing on them that linked them to Iran and color bands on the munitions that also link them to Iraq’s next door neighbor, according to classified weapons manuals shared by Iraqi and U.S. forces.
AAH, the group that fired the rockets, is led by the notorious. Shiite cleric Qais Khazali who founded the group in 2006 after splitting from Muqtada al Sadr at the height of the Iraq civil war, according to the Institute for the Study of War. Khazali led a daring raid on U.S. forces in January 2007 in Karbala using American vehicles, uniforms and identification cards that left 5 U.S. soldiers dead. He and his brother and a Lebanese Hezbollah operative were captured by U.S. troops two months later.
AAH then carried out a coordinated attack on Iraq’s Finance ministry, kidnapping a British consultant. Khazali was released by U.S. forces in 2009 as part of a prisoner swap and attempt by the Maliki government to bring the Shiite militia into the political process.
Recently Khazali was photographed at a conference sponsored by the Iranian government in Iran celebrating the “Islamic Awakening,” Iran’s answer to the Arab Spring. He sat 4 rows behind President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, raising eyebrows among U.S. military officials who have faced dozens of attacks by his Shiite Iraqi militia since his release in 2009.
In June of this year, 9 U.S. soldiers were killed as a result of Iranian rockets. U.S. troops were attacked 6 times this year by militias firing Iranian rockets, twice as many times as the year before. Admiral Mike Mullen before retiring as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs last week warned, “If they [Iran] keep killing our troops that will not be something that we will sit idly by and watch.” Now it seems that Iran’s leadership has made a new calculation that it may be more beneficial to slow the attacks until the government of Iraq finalizes its request for how many U.S. troops it will ask to remain.
P.C.
-
Post 3
Woof,
Very chummy. I wonder why? See post 4 :wink:
Russia and Iraq present peace plans for Syria
Posted By Mary Casey, Tom Kutsch Friday, December 16, 2011 - 8:47 AM Share
Russia and Iraq present peace plans for Syria
After months of reticence on international involvement in Syria, Russia has proposed a surprisingly tougher draft resolution on Syria to the United Nations Security Council. The resolution would call on all parties to immediately end violence, "including disproportionate use of force by the Syrian authorities." Western countries believe the language was too weak, but were willing to negotiate, optimistic that these efforts would end the Security Council deadlock. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was encouraged that Russia acknowledged the need for the Security Council to address the violence in Syria, however said "There are some issues in it that we would not be able to support. There's unfortunately a seeming parity between the government and peaceful protesters." Meanwhile, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki said Iraq will send a delegation to Syria to discuss an Iraqi peace initiative encouraging dialogue between the government and opposition in efforts to end the conflict. Elsewhere, Syrian army defectors killed 27 soldiers in a three-pronged, seemingly coordinated attack. The insurgency is becoming increasingly better armed and organized, with the Free Syrian Army claiming to have orchestrated many recent attacks.
P.C.
-
Post 4
Syria Today | Coast to CoastHOMEPOLITICSBUSINESSFOCUSLIFEARCHIVETIME OUTCONTACTSUBSCRIPTION January 2011 - Politics
January 2011
Coast to Coast
What is the "Five Seas Vision", how will it be achieved and what does it mean for Syria?
By Dania Akkad
Photos SANA
President Bashar al-Assad travelled to Bucharest in November where he met with Romanian President Traian Basescu.
Look at any regional map and you will see Syria in the middle, encircled by the numerous blue shapes that represent the Caspian, Black, Mediterranean, Red and Arabian Gulf seas. Syria's foreign policy is now being shaped by this strategic location through a concept dubbed the "Five Seas Vision", a strategy announced by President Bashar al-Assad in 2004 that seeks to use Syria's geographic position to put it at the centre of a regional energy and transportation network.
Assad, with delegations in tow, has crisscrossed the Black Sea in recent months, meeting with leaders in Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania, Russia and Azerbaijan. Closer to home, Syria and its neighbours – Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey – are moving closer to forming a free-trade bloc.
The 11th Five-Year Plan beginning this year aims to build the roads, ports and pipelines to attract the energy Syria hopes will pass through it from its neighbours. Syria may soon serve as a pipeline route to Turkey and Europe for oil from Iraq, which plans to ramp up its production this year.
Though the Five Seas remains a nascent idea, experts say that it could eventually transform Syria, enriching its coffers as well as its international reputation. Nevertheless, making Syria a strategic hub is still a long way off, requiring two important measures that have thus far eluded the country – securing unprecedented foreign investment and achieving regional stability.
The origins
To understand Five Seas, it helps to go back seven years. In the midst of the war in Iraq and the introduction of US sanctions, Syria felt pressured and isolated.
That year, Assad became the first Syrian head of state to make an official visit to Turkey. In light of the strained relationship with the US, the president's time in Turkey sparked the idea for the Five Seas partnership, said Joshua Landis, Syria expert and director of the Centre for Middle East Studies at the University of Oklahoma.
"I think [Assad saw Turkey as] a world that was dynamic, that branched east and west, was creative and vital," Landis said. "I'm sure he thought: 'Why shouldn't Syria get a piece of this? This is the model. We don't want to be Iran. We want to be Turkey.'"
Soon after the trip, Assad first began to publicly articulate what he dubbed his "Five Seas Vision". Looking locally and eastward for business partners meant that Syria was less reliant on the sometimes-fickle whims of western countries – a consideration that remains relevant today, as US sanctions remain in place.
Despite its name, the Five Seas, analysts said, should not be interpreted literally as a strategy designed to align Syria with countries that border nearby bodies of water. Rather, it should be taken as a symbol that Syria will no longer depend on the US and its main allies for stability, a message that many other countries – Venezuela, Brazil and Argentina, for example – have also been asserting in recent years.
Tangible moves
Beyond the symbolic message that the policy sends, Assad and other Syrian officials have made tangible progress with the Five Seas Vision since 2004. Perhaps the best example is the improvement in Turkish-Syrian relations, culminating in the start of a free-trade area and visa-free border crossing between the countries in 2007.
More recently, Syrian delegations have paid visits to several of Syria's Five Seas partners, securing a number of agreements. Syrian and Iraqi officials have agreed to build new cross-border pipelines for oil and natural gas, running from Kirkuk in Northern Iraq to Syria's port at Banias, near Tartous. A previous pipeline connecting the same cities from 2000 to 2003 generated an estimated SYP 46bn (USD 1bn) for Syria annually, before it was bombed by the US in the beginning of its war in Iraq, according to Raymond Hinnebusch, director of the Centre for Syrian Studies at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland.
Secondly, a deal signed in December allows Syria to start importing natural gas from Azerbaijan this year via a pipeline running through Turkey. Currently, Syria imports all its natural gas from Egypt.
Syria and Iran also signed a free-trade agreement in the summer of 2010, though the benefits of this are questionable as trade between the two countries has historically been limited. There has, however, been an ongoing discussion about importing Iranian gas – via Iraq – to Syria. Iraqi officials have reportedly authorised plans for an Iranian pipeline running through their territory.
Transportation agreements between Syrian ports and ports in Bulgaria and Ukraine – both countries which Assad visited recently – have also been completed. Further, Ukranian President Viktor Yanukovych and Assad are scheduled to sign a free-trade agreement in February.
Benefits and challenges
Before such a plan can be successful, however, Syria must build the kind of infrastructure needed to make it a central hub. It needs new ports, railways, roads and pipelines. The five-year plan relies heavily on foreign investment for infrastructure upgrades. While Syria received SYP 69bn (USD 1.5bn) in foreign investment last year, this is far from the SYP 506bn (USD 11bn), which Abdullah al-Dardari, deputy prime minister for economic affairs, has said Syria needs annually over the next five years in order to achieve its infrastructure upgrades.
Economist Jihad Yazigi said the government plans to cover some of the infrastructure costs through the December 2010 introduction of bond sales and with funding from international institutions such as the World Bank.
Some costs may also be recouped. In addition to the increased revenue Syria could earn through charging fees for pipelines, electricity grids and boats docked at its ports, Landis said new infrastructure could also attract companies that find it too expensive to do business in other countries.
"If you can tie this all together," he said, "it jump starts all sorts of other things."
Inside Syria the opening of new markets and relations creates "huge expectations", said a source who has travelled with Assad to many of the Five Seas countries but asked not to be named.
"It's basically a huge window for choice and alternatives for Syrians [involved in business]", he said.
Daily News Brief
15 December 2011
Iran signs economic agreements with Syria
SANA reported that following a meeting of the Syrian-Iranian officials in Damascus,
Reports on clashes in Homs, Hama and Dera’a
Yesterday in Homs three people were killed when armed groups targeted a bus, Syrian private daily Al-Watan reported.
Iraq prepares to send its delegation to Syria, meanwhile SNC announces its first conference in Tunisia
The Daily Star has reported that Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Malaki has announced that Iraq
P.C.
-
EVERYONE:
PLEASE USE THE SUBJECT LINE IN YOUR POSTS
Thank you,
Marc
-
Post 5
Iraq’s announcement last week that U.S. forces would be required to leave Iraq under terms of the Status of Forces Agreement by 31 December blindsided Washington, and aroused predictable partisan cries of Iraqi ingratitude.
Since 2003 Washington has watched with growing alarm Iraq’s rapprochement with neighboring Iran, though any Middle Eastern specialist could have observed that a military intervention that overthrew a brutal but secularist dictatorship would allow the country’s repressed Shi’a majority an increased say in a new democratic regime, and the subsequent government would undoubtedly look more kindly on its Shi’a neighbors than Washington might like.
Proof of the changing regional dynamics was underlined on 29 October, when Iraqi Kurdistan's Regional Government President Massoud Barzani at the head of a high-powered delegation met in Tehran with Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi.
Obviously relishing the moment to discomfit the Obama administration, Salehi emphasized to journalists the Iranian government's commitment to further expand relations with neighboring countries commenting upon the two nations’ friendly relations and the two nations' historical, cultural and religious bonds and commonalities, and expressing his government’s wish to expand ties and cooperation between Iran and Iraq's Kurdistan region, particularly in the areas of economy, bilateral trade, culture, transit links, border issues and reciprocal official visits by the two countries' nations.
Barzani in turn expressed his pleasure in his visit to Iran, and thanked Iran's minister for his country’s aid and assistance to the Iraqi people in hard times before concluding that Kurdistan attaches priority to cooperation with the Islamic Republic of Iran as an important neighbor.
The following day Barzani met with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who told reporters after referring to Iran's cordial and friendly relations with different Iraqi tribes and religions that, "Iran supports progress, development and security in Iraq. It also considers Iraq's progress beneficial to the entire region."
In a not so oblique swipe at Washington’s policies Ahmadinejad stated that the world's superpowers have been weakened, people everywhere are unhappy with the global status quo and hence they should unite to set up a suitable alternate political system in the world before concluding, "Iran and Iraq should step toward development and establishment of security in the region. Iran's security is of paramount importance for Iraq. We consider insecurity along borders harmful to both countries. We are fully ready for cooperation in all areas."
Barzani’s busy schedule also included a meeting with Iranian Vice President for International Affairs Ali Saeedlou, who remarked that Iran and Kurdistan should expand their trade and economic ties through setting up a joint economic committee.
The same day that Barzani met with Ahmadinejad in Tehran Iran's Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi met with Iraqi President Jalal Talabani in Baghdad, where they discussed bilateral ties and the development of Iraq along with the current political situation in Arab and Muslim countries. Salehi has also scheduled meetings with Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari.
Why can a region of Iraq have such an autonomous foreign policy? Because, the Iraqi government has allowed Iraqi Kurdistan to have oversight, to some degree, of its foreign relations without reference to Baghdad.
Despite the warm diplomacy, an interesting element was absent from both the Kurdish and Iranian remarks about cooperation – energy, more specifically, oil.
Iraqi Kurdistan exports its oil via Iraq's North Oil Company main export pipeline, which carries about 100,000 barrels of crude per day to Turkey’s deepwater port at Ceyhan on the Mediterranean. In August Iraq exported 2.189 million bpd, including 461,000 bpd from fields in the north of the country. Baghdad has ambitious plans to ramp up oil production to 12 million barrels per day within just five years and, as Iraqi Kurdistan is the most stable part of the country, it could turn the region into a magnet for foreign investment and make it a competitor to Iran, where decades of sanctions have stymied government efforts to raise production above is current level of approximately 4.5 million bpd.
If energy issues might impact growing Iranian-Kurdish relations, the attendant foreign policy issues are equally complex. Iran has persistently sought to improve relations with its neighbors, seeing it as both a way to weaken international sanctions and provide surety against any possible Israeli-U.S. military strike on its civilian nuclear facilities.
Iraqi Kurdistan is well aware that the March 2003 U.S. invasion opened up political opportunities for the region denied it by the dictatorship of former President Saddam Hussein, and will undoubtedly be loathe to overly antagonize to anger its U.S. patron by siding too closely with Tehran.
Finally, Iran has issues with the Kurdish Regional Government about reigning in the activities of the Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistan, better known by the acronym PJAK, a Marxist Kurdish nationalist group responsible for numerous terrorist attacks against Iran. Turkey has a similar problem with The Kurdish Marxist Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan, or PKK, and the failure of the Kurdish Regional Government to reign in the groups recently led Turkey and Iran to agree to share military intelligence. While the Barzani administration is understandably nervous about repressing PJAK and the PKK lest they turn their guns on them, exasperation in both Ankara and Tehran is rising over the lack of concrete action and if Iran is eventually forced to choose between Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan, there is little doubt that Iran will side with Turkey.
But at the moment, there is a warm glow in Arbil and Tehran about improving relations.
As a corollary to the flurry of diplomatic activity, Iraqi Kurdistan Prime Minister Barham Saleh on 30 October left for the U.S. for an official visit accompanied by Minister of Natural Resources Ashti Hawrami and Minister of Planning Ali Sindi, where they will meet with U.S. officials and participate in some symposiums on the Arab Spring. The representative of the Kurdistan Regional Government to the United States is Qubad Talabani, the youngest son of Iraqi president Jalal Talabani.
Beyond discussing the Arab Spring, doubtless the quartet will be pressed by eager U.S. officials to learn all about the Arbil-Tehran “thaw,” engaging in “frank and candid” discussions, to use diplomatese.
By. John C.K. Daly of Oilprice.com
P.C.
-
EVERYONE:
PLEASE USE THE SUBJECT LINE IN YOUR POSTS
Thank you,
Marc
Woof,
Oh, ye of little faith. I wasn't done yet, but thanks for the stern reminder. :lol:
P.C.
-
Post 6
China becomes chummy with Iraq.
Iraq, China to improve relations: Iraqi PM
English.news.cn 2011-07-16 15:47:31 FeedbackPrintRSS
by Zhang Ning
BAGHDAD, July 16 (Xinhua) -- Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al- Maliki here on Thursday said Iraq and China have the common wish to further improve the mutual relations.
The Iraqi premier, who is slated to pay a visit to China from Sunday to July 21, said in an joint interview by Xinhua and China's CCTV that Iraq and China both have long history of civilizations and the two cultures have had impact on each other.
"We'd like to renew the Silk Road," said Maliki, referring to the ancient trade route from China to Europe which had a stop in Iraq.
In the modern history, said the Iraqi leader, the two countries have seen close relations in politics and economy.
"China has become a major power in the world arena and Iraq wishes to strengthen the ties with China," said the premier.
He said China's economy is on good track and Iraq is eager to enhance the economic cooperation with China.
Chinese companies have been working in Iraq in sectors including oil, electricity and construction.
Maliki said Iraq is faced with difficulties in its reconstruction effort, as infrastructure, public service and government institutions are all in need of more fund.
"So the first step is to improve the production of crude oil, in a bid to increase revenue," said the prime minister.
In his tour to China, Maliki wishes he could bring more Chinese companies to Iraq to help with the country's reconstruction.
"These companies will find in Iraq a good investment environment. Iraq is capable of rewarding the investors with benefits," said the prime minister.
In regard to the country's government reform plan, Maliki said he has sent a letter to the national parliament, asking for the approval to decrease the number of cabinet positions.
Maliki's government has over 40 ministers, which is criticized by the public and rival groups.
"The aim of the reform is to urge the ministries to help people more efficiently and successfully," said the prime minister.
As to the security situation, Maliki said, "things have improved compared with years ago."
He said the Iraqi security forces have strengthened in training and equipment, adding "They can take responsibility without the help of foreign troops."
However, he added the Iraqi security forces still need U.S. help in training.
Editor: Wang Guanqun
P.C.
-
Post 7
Woof,
Venezuela is chummy again.
www.mofamission.gov.iq/VEN/en/articles.aspx
Embassy of
The Republic of Iraq in Caracas
Home
FAQ's
Other Links
Download Forms
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
| عربـی |
Latest News
Embassy address:
Embassy address: St Nicholas Street Kobirinko branching from Los Malabars / Villa Babellonia / Faye Ariba suburb / municipality Baruta / mandate Miranda / Caracas / Venezuela >>>more
News Archive
AmbassadorEmbassyPress RoomLatest News News Archives
Consular ServicesEntry visas to IraqThe issuance of the new edition(A)passportsRegistration of marriages and divorceObtaining of Birth CertificatesObtaining the identity of the Civil StatusObtaining an Iraqi nationality certificateNon-conviction certificateObtaining a life certificateIssuing laissez-passerRatificationsPublic and private authorizationsFees
Contact DetailsAbout IraqGeneral Information
Media GalleryPhoto Gallery
Iraq ConstitutionClick here to down load PDFInvestment in IraqInvestment OverviewnInvestor GuideNIC Projects Dec 09Iraq EncyclopediaClick here to down load PDFInt. ConventionsGeneva ConventionConsular RelationsDiplomatic Relations
Editor's Choice Articles
Republic of Iraq -- Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
P.C.
-
@JDN THERE WILL BE NO FURTHER DEBATE BETWEEN ME AND YOU ON THIS SUBJECT.
P.C.
Gee, you could have fooled me. :-D
Since then you have posted 7 long mostly irrelevant posts with no comments so I'm not sure what they have to do with your support for American IMPERIALISM ("We should be building more bases in Iraq, right in Iran's backyard"). It doesn't matter to you that this is against the will of the Iraqi government? Oh that's right, your answer is we are the CONQUERORS. Did you notice, the AMERICAN people don't want us there either. But that doesn't seem to matter to you either.
Or what do your most recent posts have to do with your previous post suggesting that we participate in vile COLONIALISM "Iraq should be paying us in oil for every cent we have spent there too." We invade them, we've foolishly spent billions upon billions, so now you want make them pay and bleed them dry huh? Back to the days of to the victor go the spoils. Do you think we should take slaves too? :-o
Following that bent, maybe you are right. Let's go invade and conqueror Venezuela, Cuba, Saudi Arabia et al (anyone who is weak and has assets we want), let's conquer them all, it should be relatively easy, then let's "build some bases" and make them pay for "every cent" we spent. As I said, maybe some good accountant can turn the Defense Department into a profit center. And your PR department can say we are doing it for their own good. :?
-
Woof,
That's strange I can only hear crickets on this thread.
http://youtu.be/CQFEY9RIRJA
P.C.
-
Finally it's peaceful... :-o
-
Outrage In Iraq
As our involvement in Iraq has wound down, a few loose ends remained. The most important was the status of Ali Mussa Daqduq. Daqduq is a Hezbollah operative, apparently directed by Iran, who was responsible for the capture, torture and murder of five American servicemen. Under the status of forces agreement, he was to be turned over to Iraqi authorities, and could only be removed from that country with the permission of its government. A number of conservative activists and politicians campaigned to retain custody of Daqduq and bring him to Guantanamo Bay or another suitable venue for trial. A correspondent forwarded this email:
I know Captain Dan Fritz, Jake Fritz’s brother. He’s been to our house in Morgantown — in fact, one year to the day after Jake was abducted and murdered in Iraq.
I know Noala Fritz, Jake’s mother, from Verdon, Nebraska. She is one of the most humble, down to earth, pleasant people you will ever meet. Jake’s father, Lyle, a Marine and Viet Nam vet, passed away in June of this year. Together, they raised one of the most patriotic, caring, and giving families in America.
I write you to seek your assistance in stopping this absolute lunacy and ultimate travesty of justice that is about to occur. Please, contact anybody and everybody you can, and enlist their support in stopping Daqduq’s release from happening. Use the power of the internet, social media, or whatever means available, and get people to speak up. Leverage what you can (political parties, TEA parties, prayer groups, etc.) to let our Congressmen and Senators in DC know of our interest to stop the release of this calculated, cold-blooded murderer.
The Fritz’s are a family that has seen more than its share of suffering, and is “all in” on the War on Terror. We owe it to them, and to Jake’s honor, to see that his killer faces justice.
Thank you for your engagement — there is little time to act.
All such pleas fell on deaf ears, and the Obama administration turned Daqduq over to the Iraqis, despite widespread predictions that they will send him to Iran, where he will receive a hero’s welcome and soon return to the fight. The Wall Street Journal reported:
U.S. officials have feared turning [Daqduq] over to Iraq would lead to his release without trial.
The Obama administration “sought and received assurances that he will be tried for his crimes,” a White House spokesman said. “We have worked this at the highest levels of the U.S. and Iraqi governments, and we continue to discuss with the Iraqis the best way to ensure that he faces justice.”
We will see. My guess is that Daqduq will be released and will be lavished with wealth and honors until we encounter him on a battlefield once again. My own view–call me a Neanderthal–is that things never should have gone this far. If Daqduq is who we think he is, and to my knowledge there is no dissent on that point, he should simply have been shot, long ago.
http://www.powerlineblog.com/archives/2011/12/outrage-in-iraq.php
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203733304577102763173795988.html?mod=googlenews_wsj
-
One of the most widely photographed acts of President Obama's first year in office was his symbolic pre-dawn salute to the caskets of U.S. soldiers returning to Dover Air Force Base. In the case of a terrorist named Ali Musa Daqduq, who was released yesterday from U.S. custody in Iraq, the President is letting down those fallen soldiers and their families.
Daqduq is a Lebanese national and top Hezbollah operative who in January 2007 masterminded the ambush, kidnapping and murder of five American soldiers in the Iraqi city of Karbala. Arrested by U.S. forces in Basra two months later, Daqduq is said to have initially pretended to be deaf and mute. But he eventually talked, giving U.S. interrogators an extensive picture of the ways in which Iran was arming and training Iraq's insurgents.
Now Daqduq is in Iraqi custody—released, according to the Administration, because it could not lawfully do otherwise. "We have sought and received assurances [from the Iraqi government] that he will be tried for his crimes," said Tommy Vietor, a spokesman for the National Security Council.
Mr. Vietor surely knows the likelier outcome is that Daqduq will be released or acquitted so that he can rejoin his comrades in Beirut or Tehran. The Iraqi government has already released some 50 other prisoners responsible for attacks on U.S. forces.
The Administration contends that its hands were tied by the U.S.-Iraq status-of-forces agreement negotiated by the Bush Administration, which required Iraq's consent—not forthcoming—to remove any prisoners from the country. But it's hard to see why that stipulation would apply to Daqduq, who is not an Iraqi citizen.
The Administration also thought of bringing Daqduq to the U.S. for trial in federal court or a military tribunal. Both ideas would have meant taking political heat, but at a minimum it showed that the status-of-forces deal was not an insuperable obstacle to keeping Daqduq in U.S. custody provided the Administration was determined to do so.
Alas, it wasn't. The one place Daqduq unquestionably belongs is in the prison at Guantanamo, which also happens to be the one place the Administration wouldn't countenance having him. By now, even Mr. Obama understands that Gitmo serves a vital role in housing terrorists who either can't be safely released or easily tried. Daqduq, the most senior Hezbollah figure in U.S. custody and a man who conspicuously disdained the laws of war, fits that bill.
But even if Mr. Obama can't close Gitmo as he promised, neither can he bring himself openly to acknowledge its benefits. Leftist furies are more than he's willing to face. Instead, the Administration has made the calculation that one more terrorist kingpin on the loose with American blood on his hands is an acceptable price to pay for not establishing the precedent that new prisoners may again be brought to Guantanamo.
In a different world, Daqduq would not be heading for a hero's welcome in Beirut or Tehran but instead would be on a military flight to Cuba, with the (feigned) indignation of the Iraqi government receding in the distance. In a different world, too, the families of Daqduq's victims would have the solace that he is behind bars and unable to do further harm. That's a world that will have to await a different Administration.
-
In the WSJ-- second post of afternoon.
By FOUAD AJAMI
'The tide of war is receding, and the soul of Baghdad remains, the soul of Iraq remains," Vice President Joe Biden said at Camp Victory, by the Baghdad airport, earlier this month, in the countdown to the official end of the Iraq war. In truth, the receding tide Mr. Biden glimpsed was that of American power and influence in Iraq and in the Greater Middle East.
This wasn't something the people of that region pined for. These are lands that crave the protection of a dominant foreign power as they feign outrage at its exercise. Nor was it decreed by the objective facts of American power, for this country still possesses all the ingredients of influence and prestige. It was, rather, a decision made in the course of the Obama presidency—the ebb of our power has become a self-fulfilling prophesy.
America was never meant to stay in Iraq indefinitely. In all fairness to President Obama, he had ridden the disappointment with Iraq from the state legislature in Illinois to the White House. He was not a pacifist, he let it be known. He did not oppose all wars. It was only "dumb" wars he was against. In every way he could, he kept Iraq at arm's length. He never partook of the view that we had secured strategic gains in that country worth preserving. It was thus awkward to watch the president on Monday, with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki by his side, explaining as we exit that "We think a successful, democratic Iraq can be a model for the entire region." The words rang hollow.
A president who understood the stakes would have had no difficulty justifying a residual American presence in Iraq. But not this president. At the core of Mr. Obama's worldview lies a pessimism about America and the power of its ideals and reach in the world.
Enlarge Image
CloseGetty Images
Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki meets this week with President Obama.
.The one exception to this strategic timidity is the pride Mr. Obama takes in prosecuting the war against terrorists. In a moment evocative of George W. Bush, Mr. Obama last week swatted away the charge that he had been appeasing America's enemies abroad: "Ask Osama bin Laden and the 22 out of 30 top Al Qaeda leaders who've been taken off the field whether I engage in appeasement." Fair enough. But the world demands more than that, it begs for a larger strategic reading of things.
We shall never know with certainty what was possible and open to us in Iraq. On the face of it, the Iraqis wanted us out, and Mr. Maliki and his coalition had been unwilling to give our troops legal immunity from prosecution. But how we got there is less understood. The U.S. commanders on the ground thought that a residual presence of 20,000 soldiers would suffice to keep the order in Iraq and give the United States an anchor in that country. The White House had proposed a much lower figure, somewhere between 3,000 and 5,000. That force level would have been unsustainable, a target for the disgruntled and the conspirators.
No Iraqi government would run the gauntlet of a divided country, and a feisty parliament, for that sort of deal. Mr. Maliki may not be fully tutored in the ways of American democracy, but he is shrewd enough to recognize that this American leader was not invested in Iraq's affairs.
Six years ago, when this war was still young and its harvest uncertain, a brilliant Iraqi diplomat and writer, Hassan al-Alawi, wrote a provocative book titled "al-Iraq al-Amriki" ("American Iraq"). It was proper, he observed, to speak of an American Iraq as one does of a Sumerian, a Babylonian, an Abbasid, an Ottoman, then a British Iraq. He didn't think that America would stick around long in Iraq, but he thought the American impact would be monumental. Whereas British Iraq empowered the Sunnis, the Americans would tip the scales in favor of the Shiites.
All three principal communities in Iraq had a vested interest in American protection. The Kurds, the most pro-American population in the region, were desperate to have America remain—a balance to the power of Turkey, a buffer between their autonomous zone in the north and the Baghdad government. The Sunnis, the erstwhile masters of the country, had come around: An American presence with enough authority would be their shield against a sectarian, Shiite regime that would cut them out of the spoils.
Ironically, the Shiite majority, the followers of the radical cleric Moqtada al-Sadr aside, had a vested interest in an American deterrent on the ground. For all their edge in the politics of Baghdad, the Shiites are still given to a healthy measure of paranoia about the world around them. The Iraq midwifed by U.S. power had been delivered into a hostile neighborhood. The Sunni Arabs had yet to accept and make their peace with the rise of a Shiite-led government in Baghdad. And the rebellion in Syria added to the uncertainty, feeding the anxiety of Mr. Maliki and the Shiite political class over a Syrian regime to their west ruled by the Sunni majority. There is also Turkey, large and now with economic means and a view of itself as a protector of the Sunnis of the region.
And there remained Iran, to the east, with the traffic of commerce and pilgrimage, with the religious entanglements born of a common Shiite faith. For the Sunni Arabs—and for Americans who had opposed this war—Iraq is destined to slip, nay it has already slipped, into the orbit of the Persian theocracy. The American war, with all its sacrifices, had simply created a "sister republic" of the Persian state, it is said.
Those who love to organize an untidy world have spoken of a "Shiite crescent" that stretches from Iran, through Iraq, all the way to the Mediterranean and Syria and Lebanon. But the image is false. Iraq is a big and proud country, with a strong sense of nationalism, and oil wealth of its own. An Iraqi political class, with its vast oil reserves, has no interest in ceding its authority to the Iranians.
The Shiism that straddles the boundaries of the two countries divides them as well. The sacred lands of Shiism are in Iraq, and the Shiism of the Iraqis is Arab through and through. The pride of Najaf is great, I can't see it deferring to the religious authority of strangers.
One of our ablest diplomats, Ryan Crocker, then ambassador to Baghdad, now our envoy in Kabul, once pronounced the definitive judgment on these contested Iraqi matters: "In the end, what we leave behind and how we leave will be more important than how we came." It so happened that when it truly mattered, the president who called the shots on Iraq had his gaze fixated on the past and its disputations.
Mr. Ajami is a senior fellow at Stanford's Hoover Institution and co-chair of Hoover's Working Group on Islamism and the International Order.
-
Christopher Hitchens writing in The Wall Street Journal, April 2, 2004:
A few more years of Saddam Hussein, or perhaps the succession of his charming sons Uday and Qusay, and whole swathes of Iraq would have looked like Fallujah. The Baathists, by playing off tribe against tribe, Arab against Kurd and Sunni against Shiite, were preparing the conditions for a Hobbesian state of affairs. Their looting and beggaring of the state and the society—something about which we now possess even more painfully exact information—was having the same effect. A broken and maimed and traumatized Iraq was in our future no matter what.
Obviously, this prospect could never have been faced with equanimity. Iraq is a regional keystone state with vast resources and many common borders. Its implosion would have created a black hole, sucking in rival and neighboring powers, tempting them with opportunist interventions and encouraging them to find ethnic and confessional proxies. And who knows what the death-throes of the regime would have been like? We are entitled, on past experience, to guess. There could have been deliberate conflagrations started in the oilfields. There might have been suicidal lunges into adjacent countries. The place would certainly have become a playground for every kind of nihilist and fundamentalist. The intellectual and professional classes, already gravely attenuated, would have been liquidated entirely.
All of this was, only just, averted. And it would be a Pangloss who said that the dangers have receded even now. But at least the international intervention came before the whole evil script of Saddam's crime family had been allowed to play out. A subsequent international intervention would have been too little and too late, and we would now be holding an inquest into who let this happen—who in other words permitted in Iraq what Bill Clinton and Madeleine Albright and Kofi Annan permitted in Rwanda, encouraged by the Elysee. . . .
I hope I do not misrepresent my opponents, but their general view seems to be that Iraq was an elective target; a country that would not otherwise have been troubling our sleep. This ahistorical opinion makes it appear that Saddam Hussein was a new enemy, somehow chosen by shady elements within the Bush administration, instead of one of the longest-standing foes with which the United States, and indeed the international community, was faced.
-
NYTimes.com
In Iraq, Abandoning Our Friends By KIRK W. JOHNSON
Published: December 15, 2011
U.S. Marks End to 9-Year War, Leaving an Uncertain Iraq (December 16, 2011)
Op-Ed Contributor: An Unstable, Divided Land (December 16, 2011)
Editorial: A Formal End (December 16, 2011)
ON the morning of May 6, 1783, Guy Carleton, the British commander charged with winding down the occupation of America, boarded the Perseverance and sailed up the Hudson River to meet George Washington and discuss the British withdrawal. Washington was furious to learn that Carleton had sent ships to Canada filled with Americans, including freed slaves, who had sided with Britain during the revolution.
Britain knew these loyalists were seen as traitors and had no future in America. A Patriot using the pen name “Brutus” had warned in local papers: “Flee then while it is in your power” or face “the just vengeance of the collected citizens.” And so Britain honored its moral obligation to rescue them by sending hundreds of ships to the harbors of New York, Charleston and Savannah. As the historian Maya Jasanoff has recounted, approximately 30,000 were evacuated from New York to Canada within months.
Two hundred and twenty-eight years later, President Obama is wrapping up our own long and messy war, but we have no Guy Carleton in Iraq. Despite yesterday’s announcement that America’s military mission in Iraq is over, no one is acting to ensure that we protect and resettle those who stood with us.
Earlier this week, Mr. Obama spoke to troops at Fort Bragg, N.C., of the “extraordinary milestone of bringing the war in Iraq to an end.” Forgotten are his words from the campaign trail in 2007, that “interpreters, embassy workers and subcontractors are being targeted for assassination.” He added, “And yet our doors are shut. That is not how we treat our friends.”
Four years later, the Obama administration has admitted only a tiny fraction of our own loyalists, despite having eye scans, fingerprints, polygraphs and letters from soldiers and diplomats vouching for them. Instead we force them to navigate a byzantine process that now takes a year and a half or longer.
The chances for speedy resettlement of our Iraqi allies grew even worse in May after two Iraqi men were arrested in Kentucky and charged with conspiring to send weapons to jihadist groups in Iraq. These men had never worked for Americans, and they managed to enter the United States as a result of poor background checks. Nevertheless, their arrests removed any sense of urgency in the government agencies responsible for protecting our Iraqi allies.
The sorry truth is that we don’t need them anymore now that we’re leaving, and resettling refugees is not a winning campaign issue. For over a year, I have been calling on members of the Obama administration to make sure the final act of this war is not marred by betrayal. They have not listened, instead adopting a policy of wishful thinking, hoping that everything turns out for the best.
Meanwhile, the Iraqis who loyally served us are under threat. The extremist Shiite leader Moktada al-Sadr has declared the Iraqis who helped America “outcasts.” When Britain pulled out of Iraq a few years ago, there was a public execution of 17 such outcasts — their bodies dumped in the streets of Basra as a warning. Just a few weeks ago, an Iraqi interpreter for the United States Army got a knock on his door; an Iraqi policeman told him threateningly that he would soon be beheaded. Another employee, at the American base in Ramadi, is in hiding after receiving a death threat from Mr. Sadr’s militia.
It’s not the first time we’ve abandoned our allies. In 1975, President Gerald R. Ford and Henry A. Kissinger ignored the many Vietnamese who aided American troops until the final few weeks of the Vietnam War. By then, it was too late.
Although Mr. Kissinger had once claimed there was an “irreducible list” of 174,000 imperiled Vietnamese allies, the policy in the war’s frantic closing weeks was icily Darwinian: if you were strong enough to clear our embassy walls or squeeze through the gates and force your way onto a Huey, you could come along. The rest were left behind to face assassination or internment camps. The same sorry story occurred in Laos, where America abandoned tens of thousands of Hmong people who had aided them.
It wasn’t until months after the fall of Saigon, and much bloodshed, that America conducted a huge relief effort, airlifting more than 100,000 refugees to safety. Tens of thousands were processed at a military base on Guam, far away from the American mainland. President Bill Clinton used the same base to save the lives of nearly 7,000 Iraqi Kurds in 1996. But if you mention the Guam Option to anyone in Washington today, you either get a blank stare of historical amnesia or hear that “9/11 changed everything.”
And so our policy in the final weeks of this war is as simple as it is shameful: submit your paperwork and wait. If you can survive the next 18 months, maybe we’ll let you in. For the first time in five years, I’m telling Iraqis who write to me for help that they shouldn’t count on America anymore.
Moral timidity and a hapless bureaucracy have wedged our doors tightly shut and the Iraqis who remained loyal to us are weeks away from learning how little America’s word means.
Kirk W. Johnson, a former reconstruction coordinator in Iraq, founded the List Project to Resettle Iraqi Allies.
A version of this op-ed appeared in print on December 16, 2011, on page A43 of the New York edition with the headline: The Iraq We're Leaving Behind: Abandoning Our Friends.
P.C.
-
"The Iraq war killed almost 4,500 Americans, wounded another 32,000 and cost the country somewhere in the neighborhood of $1 trillion, and counting. No one knows how many Iraqis died in the war — 100,000 is considered a starting estimate."
For what; as someone said here, "to kill Hussein and his sons"?
Interesting, in the immediate prior post, our revered first President George Washington "was furious to learn that Carleton had sent ships to Canada filled with Americans, including freed slaves, who had sided with Britain during the revolution." George Washington did not think it was appropriate nor was he concerned. It was war. Maybe as the article suggests, we don't have a Guy Carleton, but I trust George Washington's judgment.
As for "trust" and "honor" something pointed out elsewhere on this forum, please remember we invaded Iraq. They were not out "allies" nor did we have a treaty with them. Instead, we attacked, invaded, and stayed for over eight years. We are now so unwelcome that the Iraqi government wouldn't give immunity to our soldiers if we stayed any longer. It's clear, the people in Iraq want us out. There is no "trust" issue. The analogy is inappropriate.
PC has argued that we should use force if necessary, and totally disregard the will of the Iraqi government. We should increase and "build bases" ignoring the will of the Iraqi's. That's IMPERIALISM at it's worst. Or is COLONIALISM worse as PC has suggested here; suggesting that after we have now invade them, that we now demand that they reimburse us the $1 trillion dollars we spent to conquer them. Wow...
Think about that... :-o
As side note, but perhaps more important, in addition to Iraq wanting us out, the AMERICAN people want us out.
Isn't that enough? It's not Obama; it's the majority of the AMERICAN people that are tired of this war.
-
BAGHDAD — Even as Iraqis celebrated the departure of the last American troops Sunday, the dangers left behind after nearly nine years of war were on full display. Politicians feuded along the country's potentially explosive sectarian lines and the drumbeat of deadly violence went on.
The last U.S. convoy rumbled out of Iraq across the border into Kuwait around sunrise under a shroud of secrecy to prevent attacks on the departing troops. When news reached a waking Iraqi public, there was joy at the end of a presence that many Iraqis resented as a foreign occupation.
In the northern city of Mosul, pastry shop owner Muhannad Adnan said he had a swell of orders for cakes — up to 110 from the usual 70 or so a day — as families threw parties at home. Some asked him to ice the cakes with inscriptions of "congratulations for the end of occupation," he said.
But the happiness was shot through with worries over the future.
"Nobody here wants occupation. This withdrawal marks a new stage in Iraq's history," said Karim al-Rubaie, a Shiite shopowner in the southern city of Basra. But, he said, "the politicians who are running this country are just a group of thieves."
"These politicians will lead the country into sedition and civil war. Iraq now is like a weak prey among neighboring beasts."
In the morning, a bomb hidden under a pile of trash exploded on a street of spare car parts stores in a mainly Shiite district of eastern Baghdad, killing two people and wounding four others. It was the latest in the near daily shootings and bombings — low-level but still deadly — that continue to bleed the country and that many fear will increase with the Americans gone.
Violence is far lower than it was at the worst of the Iraq War, in 2006 and 2007, when Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias preyed on Iraqis around the country in a vicious sectarian conflict that nearly turned into complete civil war. But those armed groups still remain, and there are deep concerns whether Iraqi security forces are capable of keeping them in check without the help of U.S. troops.
Iraq's military chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Babaker Zebari said Sunday that his troops were up to the task of uprooting militant groups.
"There are only scattered terrorists hiding here and there and we are seeking intelligence information to eliminate them," Zebari said. "We are confident that there will be no danger."
Equally worrying, the resentments and bitterness between the Shiite majority and Sunni minority in this country of 31 million remain unhealed. The fear is that without the hand of American forces, the fragile attempts to get the two sides to work together could collapse and even turn to greater violence.
In an escalation of the rivalry, the main Sunni-backed political bloc on Sunday announced it was boycotting parliament to protest what they called Shiite Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's attempts to monopolize government positions — particularly those overseeing the powerful security forces. The bloc has complained of security forces' recent arrests of Sunnis that it says are "unjustified."
The Iraqiya bloc warned that it could take the further step of pulling its seven ministers out of al-Maliki's coalition government.
Story: 'Iraq War Ledger': The conflict by the numbers
"We are against the concentration of security powers in the hands of one person, that is the prime minister," said Sunni lawmaker Hamid al-Mutlaq, a member of the bloc.
Sunnis have long feared domination by the country's Shiites, who vaulted to power after the 2003 fall of Saddam Hussein at the hands of the Americans. The rivalry was exacerbated by the years of sectarian killing.
The Iraqiya bloc narrowly won the most seats in last year's parliamentary election. But its leader Ayad Allawi was unable to become prime minister, outmaneuvered by al-Maliki, who kept the premier's post after cobbling together key support from Shiite parties.
That has left al-Maliki beholden to Shiite factions, including those led by radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, whose militiamen were blamed for sectarian killings during the worst of Iraq's violence. Since forming his new government, al-Maliki has effectively controlled the Interior and Defense Ministries, which oversee the police and military, while conflicts between Sunni and Shiite politicians have delayed the appointment of permanent ministers.
Many on both sides of the sectarian divide also worry that neighboring Shiite-led powerhouse Iran will now increase its influence in their country. Al-Maliki's party and other Shiite blocs have close ties to Tehran. But even some in the Shiite public resent the idea of Iranian domination.
"I am afraid that this occupation will be replaced by indirect occupation by some neighboring countries," said Ali Rahim, a 40-year-old Shiite who works for the Electricity Ministry.
Omar Waadalla Younis, a senior at Mosul University, said at first he was happy to hear the last Americans were gone and thought the city government should hold celebrations in the streets. Then he thought of the possible threat from Iran.
"Now that the Americans have left, Iraq is more vulnerable than before."
___
AP correspondent Bushra Juhi in Baghdad contributed to this report.
P.C.
-
Woof,
I want to make sure all of what I actually said, stays with JDN's continued chirping, color commentary, and hysterics in his last five post's. He's become obsessed I'm afraid and continues to repeat himself over and over, even after I already answered him, and now that I no longer address him directly, he answers other people's post's and uses that as a way to ascribe things to me that I never said or thought. For some reason he thinks because I'm still posting on this thread, even without mentioning his name in those post's or directing a post to him, that I'm still engaging him personally. I'm not, but I'm also not going to let him distort what I said. So here is what I said and my answer to his original comment. Anything else are his words and thoughts, completely made up in his head, not mine.
Woof,
I said way back when, that we would give them a chance at a free society and in the end we would just walk away from it and leave them to their own designs. I also said that they didn't have a chance in hell of keeping it free after we left. I'm glad Saddam is gone, I'm glad we killed a lot of terrorist fighters there. I feel sorry for the Iraqi people that do want freedom. We should have done it like we did Japan, but there were too many people invested in it's failure back here at home to have had that kind of success. It takes commitment to do things right, unfortunately our News Media and Press are committed to an ideology that breeds failures like this then they will turn their back on the massacre to come and have no shame in saying they are not to blame, much like the million or so slaughtered after we pulled out of Vietnam. It won't come as immediate as Vietnam but in time it will.
The President was correct in not celebrating this as victory in Iraq, because it is not a victory, it's a retreat from the frontlines of the war on Western civilization by the Islamic Fascist's. We should be building more bases in Iraq, right in Iran's backyard, not shutting them down. Iraq should be paying us in oil for every cent we have spent there too. History has shown us that you must win a peace and that you cannot retreat your way to it. Retreats, most often end in massacre's. For you Liberal, so called, peace activist's out there that have facilitated this result, and are celebrating this as being the end of the Iraq war; the war there is just starting, thanks to you.
P.C.
Woof JDN,
I don't deny that, and I know those labels, just like being called Hitler or racist can be applied broadly enough to discredit any solution to any problem. Nothing happens in war without some pain but that doesn't mean the pain lasts forever. The reality is, one: Iraq should pay for it's own reconstruction because they can afford it, and it is they that benefit from it not us. I didn't say load up the ships then set fire to what's left or let's make a profit off the deal, but quite frankly we couldn't afford to do this on our own, and two: our enemies are going to grab the oil for themselves after we leave and they are going to set fire to the place. So short term name calling or long term failure. The President has picked failure.
P.C.
-
Woof,
Latest poll taken of what Iraqi citizens think.
http://cnsnews.com/news/article/73-iraqis-iran-likely-act-aggressively-when-us-troops-leave
P,C,
-
Woof,
Let the slaughter begin.
http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/316340
P.C.
-
Actually, I understand your position, my commentary has been quite accurate. You haven't answered me, other than to change your position and post that you will not be engaging me, yet you continue to post on the same subject. :?
Iraq, in essence has kicked us out (we can't nor should we stay unless our soldiers are given immunity). They don't want us. If we stayed against their will, we would need to use force if necessary. Almost everyone in America, even Romney thinks we need to get out, although he suggests leaving a few thousand troops. But if we stay against their will, that's imperialism. That's wrong.
Further, NO ONE has suggested, other than you, that Iraqi reimburse us for "every cent we have spent there". That is colonialism at it's worst. That's really wrong.
In your original quote, you did not say "Iraq should pay for it's own reconstruction because they can afford it, and it is they that benefit from it not us." With our dollars, we helped and paid to rebuild Japan and Germany after the war; we sure as heck didn't send them a bill for every cent we spent on our effort to attack and destroy them.
Rather, to quote you, notice you used past tense, you want them to reimburse (spoils of war) us the one trillion dollars we have already spent. Your words were, "Iraq should be paying us in oil for every cent we have spent there too."
Quite clear... :-o
That said, perhaps should we stay with some troops a little longer. But then we should do it because the Iraqi people and government invite us to stay - want us to stay. Why don't they ask us to stay, and if we agree, why don't they say thank you to us for our effort. Europe was grateful for our help. I'm tired of losing thousands of American lives, spending billions/trillions of dollars to help and they still hate us.
Let's spend the money and lives fighting for where it is appreciated. And where it will help America.
As for the slaughter, IF it begins, as GM has pointed out, it has been going on in this region before any of us were born, and will continue after our death. Sectarian violence is happening throughout the middle east and there is no end in sight. Slaughter is tragic, but in the last 20 years I bet I can point to over 20 examples of slaughter around the world where over 100,000 people died and we didn't intercede. Nor should we always intercede. Let's worry about America first.
-
Woof,
No where to go.
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/12/20111215164220357796.html
P.C.
-
"Bloomberg poll (PDF) asked Americans if they would support pulling all troops out of Iraq and Afghanistan. The poll found an overwhelming 66 percent would favor this action, while only 30 percent oppose it."
Or is it 75%?
Americans widely support President Obama's recent decision to withdraw nearly all U.S. troops from Iraq by the end of the year, with 75% approving.
http://warnewsupdates.blogspot.com/2011/11/mass-majority-of-americans-favor-us.html
-
Woof,
No where to go.
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/12/20111215164220357796.html
P.C.
"tens of thousands have since applied for immigration visas in the United States."
I can't wait for their arrival. :-( I'm sure everyone is happy they are coming. :-o
-
Sorry PC, but that is what he does: answer through distortion and ask what has been answered many times previously in the thread.
""The Iraq war killed almost 4,500 Americans, wounded another 32,000 and cost the country somewhere in the neighborhood of... For what; as someone said here, "to kill Hussein and his sons"? "
There were 24 reasons cited in the bipartisan authorization to use force in Iraq, (none of which said kill Saddam Hussein and his sons). I wonder if that is posted anywhere in this thread. FYI, Saddam was deposed in 2003 and given a fair trial by the Iraqis after being found, not killed, by the Americans. Uday And Qusay were both dead in 2003. Those wouldn't count as triple digit reasons we stayed in 2009, 2010 and 11 1/2 months of 2011.
Negotiating the right to keep a base or two after winning their country back for them - that would require leadership, not having advisers follow the polls while playing hacker level golf back home and telling America at taxpayer expense that Republicans just want dirtier water and dirtier air.
If the mission was truth over trolling, one might ask:
Why did the most anti-war of all 2008 candidates stay 3 more years under his watch - 8 years past the deposing of the aforementioned oppressors? Perhaps there was some other concern or objective.
The most anti of the anti-war in the land saw a national security interest value in what we were doing - and stayed up until the kickoff of his reelection. Our own naysayer pretends there was none. Not very helpful or convincing.
-
I would add some frustration on my part that JDN has yet to address my repeated point about WHY the Iraqis did not come to terms with the US.
As for the rightness of standing by those who stood with us regardless of popularity of the issue, well, either one gets it or one does not.
-
Woof,
URGENT: Southern Iraq’s Basra Province’s petrodollar revenues exceed one trillion and 131 billion Iraqi dinars
BASRA / IraqiNews.com: The Petrodollar revenues of southern Iraq ’s Basra Province for the year 2011 has reached one trillion (t) and 131 billion (b) Iraqi dinars (US$1.009 billions (b) approx.), according to a Basra Province Council’s source on Thursday.
P.C.
-
ABOUT IRAQI NEWS
WRITE FOR IRAQI NEWS
CONTACT US
ADVERTISE
Demo in north Iraq’s Tal-Afar city demanding resignation of commanders
NINEWA / IraqiNews.com: Hundreds of citizen took to the streets of Tal-Afar city of northern Iraq’s Ninewa Province on Sunday, demanding the resignation of the Commanders of Army and Police in the city, due to the deterioration of the security conditions in their city, a Ninewa security source reported. “Hundreds of citizens have launched a demonstration on Sunday morning close to the Mayoralty building of Tal-Afar city, 60 km to the west of Mosul, chanting slogans demanding the resignation of the Commander of the Iraqi Army’s 10th Brigade and the Director of Tal-Afar Police, due to the deterioration of the security situation in the city,” the Security source told IraqiNews.com news agency. Tal-Afar city had witnessed last week 2 booby-trapped car explosions in al-Kifah district in the city, killing 3 persons and wounding 32 others, all civilians, whilst the city had witnessed another incident of killing 2 Iraqi soldiers by armed men on a checkpoint in al-Bawary district of the city. Mosul, the center of Ninewa Province, is 405 km to the north of Baghdad.
P.C.
-
I would add some frustration on my part that JDN has yet to address my repeated point about WHY the Iraqis did not come to terms with the US.
I don't know why the Iraqis did not come to terms with the US. They didn't or wouldn't.
But my point is that it would seem to be in Iraq's favor to have us stay. Frankly, why do we have to negotiate and plead and "come to terms" when they are the one's mostly benefiting? We've lost
thousands of lives and spent probably a trillion dollars...
In exchange, if Iraq offered a little accommodation, showed a little gratefulness, it would go a long way. Instead, many Iraqis hate us. Americans have figured out we are not wanted in the middle east so we are getting out. It's that simple.
Woof,
URGENT: Southern Iraq’s Basra Province’s petrodollar revenues exceed one trillion and 131 billion Iraqi dinars
P.C.
So? Are we suppose to bill Iraq for "every cent" we have spent? Take it out of their oil revenue?
By the way, you do know that one million dinars is worth less than $860.00 American don't you? :-o :-o :-o
-
"I don't know why the Iraqis did not come to terms with the US. They didn't or wouldn't."
Please feel free to read what I posted twice and respond.
-
I reread the last few months; it's always good to review; that's one of the advantages of the board.
"I don't know why the Iraqis did not come to terms with the US. They didn't or wouldn't."
Please feel free to read what I posted twice and respond.
I went back to an 8/2 post of yours where Adm. Mullin emphasized the importance of immunity.
I assume you are referencing Obama's "intent to leave". Well, after 8 years and an overwhelming American desire for us to leave, that's not all bad in my opinion or most Americans.
Or, your comment,
"The government of Iraq has no one in stupid enough to speak up for wanting America to stay when it is clear we have a President who was against the War, against the Surge, could not admit that the Surge worked, and who generally has made it clear that the US is leaving."
I understand your point, but I go back to mine and one CCP has made indirectly in the past. On multiple levels, the Iraqis are the one's who benefit the most by us staying. The people of America are against the war, and yes, so is our President. Therefore, to persuade us to stay, given that the Iraqis benefit more than us, shouldn't the Iraqis be the ones who beg/plead at least ask politely for us to stay versus throwing rocks at us and refusing to give us immunity? I'm not asking to be reimbursed like some are, but we shouldn't have to ask or even negotiate the issue of immunity and other small issues; Iraq should offer just about anything reasonable to get us to stay. But they don't. They want us gone. I get the message and so do most Americans.
Time to move on.
-
One poster quotes another regarding a likely bloodbath, but there is a difference. One has expressed concern and opposition to that while another demeans all people associated with this board by making statements alleging that Americans don't care about bloodbaths in other countries.
Polls of Iraqis run by majority Shia rule perhaps should be separated into opinions from the minority groups about a complete American exit. What do the Kurds think? (I wonder what the Copts in Egypt think about rule by poll taking.) When convenient, all of the sudden we hear the Iraqis speak with one voice. Two wolves and a lamb voting on what to have for lunch passes for consent of the governed in an election year.
Polls of Americans about Iraq and Afghanistan are lumped together along with the question of all troops leaving versus most troops leaving posted, but these are crucial difference when talking about the possibility of maintaining bases for future security threats. Meanwhile the < 0.1% of Americans polled at random have no idea what our commanders on the ground are saying.
Poll questions have a large effect on results. Poll this: 'Given the estimates that as many as a million innocent people were slaughtered in the immediate aftermath of the US pullout in Vietnam and that a similar scenario is possible in Iraq, do you favor or oppose all US leaving now with no regard to the consequences, versus the other proposals such as negotiating the right to maintain a smaller presence (base) over the horizon to prevent the genocide of Iraqis and to deal with future security threats that are certain to develop?'
Did the President discuss his final decision more with Axelrod or Petraeus? I will bet he relied on the same focus group advisers he called when he sat 16 hours on his difficult bin Laden question.
"Time to move on. "
We will miss you.
-
I'm against all bloodbaths; but we as a country simply can't nor do we intercede in all blood baths. But you seem supportive of the Iraqis so
for those "tens of thousands have since applied for immigration visas in the United States." let's send them to MN. I doubt if GM wants them in
his back yard. And CA already has enough problems.
Interesting, Vietnam is now peaceful; it's a reasonably close ally of ours. I wonder if Iraq will ever truly be peaceful or our ally.
As for "Time to move on"...
Yep, it's time for America to move on and get out of Iraq. :-)
-
MARC: "The government of Iraq has no one in stupid enough to speak up for wanting America to stay when it is clear we have a President who was against the War, against the Surge, could not admit that the Surge worked, and who generally has made it clear that the US is leaving."
JDN: I understand your point, but I go back to mine and one CCP has made indirectly in the past. On multiple levels, the Iraqis are the one's who benefit the most by us staying. The people of America are against the war, and yes, so is our President. Therefore, to persuade us to stay, given that the Iraqis benefit more than us, shouldn't the Iraqis be the ones who beg/plead at least ask politely for us to stay versus throwing rocks at us and refusing to give us immunity?
I'm sorry, but I just don't feel this really addresses my point. Would you want to bet your life and the life of your family on being able to persuade Baraq to stay? Really? Agree or disagree, I think this analysi worthy of acknowledgement in what you post and that I should not have to be so persistent to have it addressed.
-
"you seem supportive of..." "I doubt if GM..." "let's send them to MN."
Let's split up the work here. I'll post my view. You post yours.
St. Paul is the number one destination for Hmongs. Minneapolis is number one for Somalis. The Twin Cities has the lowest unemployment of any metro over a million in the country. I wasn't aware this thread was for immigration policy. Just digressions. No comment on points of substance and no adherence to the agreement to move on.
Interestingly, this would have been a VERY short war if not for the moderate insistence that if we break what was already broken, then we have to fix it even if they keep blowing us up while we attempt to do that. How about if we had taken down the regime and left them with some suggestions for protecting individual liberties and peaceful nation building. Then came back and toppled them again (and again) when any one of the 24 points of American security interests in the Iraq War declaration became true again.
-
I doubt if GM wants them in his back yard.
The Iraqis that honorably served along side our troops, put their lives and the lives of their families on the line. It would be wrong to leave them to the fate the dems left our Vietnamese allies to suffer.
-
I'm sorry, but I just don't feel this really addresses my point. Would you want to bet your life and the life of your family on being able to persuade Baraq to stay? Really? Agree or disagree, I think this analysi worthy of acknowledgement in what you post and that I should not have to be so persistent to have it addressed.
I'm trying to address your point. No, I wouldn't bet my life that I could persuade Obama OR the overwhelming majority of the American public who want us to leave.
However, if I was an Iraqi, and if my life and my family's life depended upon it as your question stated, I sure as heck would try, beg, plead, do/offer almost anything to persuade America to stay.
Instead, many Iraqis openly hate us, they act arrogant, they throw rocks at us, they refuse to give immunity to our soldiers, they are still demanding lots more money from us, etc.
Something is very wrong with this scenario.
-
Doug, PC in his post brought up the immigration issue.
I'm not denigrating MN, but I think CA has done it's share.
"Minnesota is home to an estimated 60,000-70,000 Hmong, making it the 2nd state with the largest Hmong population, closely behind only California at about 80,000 – 90,000."
Also, much more dramatic, nearly a half million Vietnamese live in CA!!!
And while I don't doubt that GM would accept those Iraqi's that honorably served our cause, I still think he might be a bit reluctant to accept "10's of thousands" Iraqi Muslims in his back yard;
leaving it up to our government to choose who is worthy and who is not.
-
The key thing with legal immigrants is to scatter them across the country to rapidly intigrate them into the culture and language, with the clear understanding that to come to America means becoming an American.
-
I agree. It just doesn't seem to work that way.
-
I agree. It just doesn't seem to work that way.
Because of mealy-mouth "multiculturalism" garbage. I'm reminded of a friend of mine who's ancestors were Italian immigrants. They changed their name from Casio to Cash, refused to teach their kids Italian and explained to them "We came to America to be Americans".
-
My grandfather is from Norway. My father doesn't speak a word of Norwegian. I asked him why, and he said that my Grandfather said, "We're American's now, the boy should speak English!".
I don't completely agree, there is nothing wrong with being proud of your heritage or learning the language, but it definitely should take 2nd to being proud to be American and learning English.
That's got to be first, or just go home.
-
This pretty much sums it all up.
___________
Why after all these years can't our government bring itself to tell us the truth about Iraq?
FROM CNN's Jack Cafferty:
I don't know about you, but I'm a little tired of being treated like a mushroom by my government. You know... kept in the dark and fed fertilizer.
President Obama is hailing the end of the Iraq war as though the enemy had signed the terms of surrender on the deck of the U.S.S. Missouri. What hogwash.
This is the same war Obama referred to as dumb nine years ago, but now it's "Hail to the Chief," marching bands and rah-rah-rah. Look what we did.
What we did was invade a country that had done nothing to us, killed hundreds of thousands of their people as well as thousands of our own, bankrupted the Treasury in the process - all in the search for weapons of mass destruction that a cynic might suggest we knew didn't exist in the first place.
The Iraqi government told us a few months ago to get the hell out of their country. That's why we're leaving. We're being kicked out. Nothing noble about that.
Before we were told to take a hike though, we built the largest embassy in the world along with more than 500 military bases at the height of the war. All at taxpayers' expense.
We had every intention of occupying. We had no intention of going anywhere. See there's all that oil over there.
As it is, we will leave behind some 17,000 people at that embassy compound. Yes, some will be members of the diplomatic corps, but there will also be contractors and intel folks who can keep an eye on things. Just in case those weapons of mass destruction turn up. Or Iran tries to fill the power vacuum, which it will.
What garbage. And the government has the gall to paint this as some sort of military triumph.
-
Jack Cafferty is to intelligent geopolitical analysis what Jack Cafferty is to safe and sober driving.
-
http://formerspook.blogspot.com/2011/12/casing-colors.html
Casing the Colors
For the U.S. military, the war in Iraq formally ended today, with a ceremony in Baghdad. From The Wall Street Journal:
After nearly nine years of war, tens of thousands of casualties--including 4,500 Americans dead--and more than $800 billion spent, the U.S. military on Thursday formally ended its mission in Iraq and prepared to leave the country.
.
For years, U.S. commanders in Iraq have handed off to their successors the top call sign, Lion 6, along with the American battle flag adorned with a Mesopotamian sphinx. But on Thursday, in a tradition-drenched ceremony with Defense Secretary Leon Panetta looking on, the current Lion 6—Army Gen. Lloyd Austin—pulled down the colors and cased them for a return to the U.S.
"No words, no ceremony, can provide full tribute to the sacrifices that brought this day to pass," Mr. Panetta said.
In the coming days, the last of the 4,000 U.S. military personnel still in Iraq will follow the flag and head home—leaving fewer than 200 to serve as part of the diplomatic mission.
There was, of course, a certain irony in today's events. As with most modern wars, there was no surrender ceremony, and there won't be any ticker-tape parades through New York City for our returning heroes. And no one used the word "victory" to describe the outcome of our nine-year stay in Iraq.
Sadly, that is also a reflection of our times. After almost a decade (and thousands of war dead), no one appears willing to call Iraq a victory, given that country's uncertain future. Iran is already moving to fill the power vacuum created by the departure of our troops, and it's easy to envision an Iraq that (at some point) will be closely aligned with Tehran.
And, perhaps future historians will note that we had the opportunity to extend our stay in Iraq, providing more training for the domestic forces now charged with keeping the peace. But we took a pass on that option, in the name of election-year politics. As a politician who long opposed the war in Iraq, President Obama will be happy to run for re-election as the man "who brought the troops home."
But before the colors fade, and Iraq becomes a chapter in our history books (or a sound bite for a campaign commercial), it is well worth remembering the sacrifice, heroism and valor of the men and women who served there. All were volunteers, and many pulled multiple tours in Iraq, enduring months and years of separation from family, friends and loved ones.
They deserve credit for not only performing their duty, but transforming Iraq in the process. After the toppling of Saddam's government, Iraq began a slide into chaos, as old sectarian divides resurfaced, with scores to be settled. Al Qaida joined the fray as well, pouring thousands of jihadis into the battle, hoping to inflict massive casualties on the U.S. and drive us from Iraq.
But those efforts failed. A U.S. military designed for large-scale maneuver warfare shifted its focus to small-unit, counter-insurgency operations. aimed at eliminating terrorist networks and protecting the Iraqi people. And, at a critical juncture in the battle, President Bush went against the counsel of so-called "wise men" (and women) in Washington, adopting a surge strategy that sent even more troops to Iraq. Our new commander in Iraq, General David Petraeus, put more ground forces out in the field, based among the Iraqi citizens they were charged with defending.
There were months of bitter fighting in 2007 and American casualties actually rose, and the pace of our operations increased. But the surge worked, breaking the back of enemy resistance. Iraq became a much more peaceful place as thousands of terrorists met their end, eventually prompting Al Qaida to look at more promising operational theaters--namely Afghanistan.
The efforts of U.S. and Iraqi troops, along with the coalition partners also allowed Iraq to form a fledgling democracy. Iraqis defied terrorist threats and violence to go the polls for free and fair elections, dipping their fingers in purple ink wells that signified they had voted. It was a powerful rebuke to the terrorists and one of the earliest indicators that Iraqis were willing to do their part--if the U.S. stayed the course.
While some Iraqis are cheering the departure of our last troops, others are worried about what comes next. The U.S. spent billions of dollars training and equipping Iraq's security forces, and many of them are extremely competent. But they will face a real test in the months and years ahead, as Iran tries to exert its influence, and sectarian groups push their own agendas.
In the end, it might be written, the U.S. gave Iraq a fighting chance for a democratic future. It is now up to the sons and daughters of that country to preserve what was established in blood and treasure. In today's world, it may be the best outcome we could hope for. But on the other hand, we should also hope that historians and war college students in 2020 aren't debating about "who lost Iraq," due to a hasty pull-out.
*****
ADDENDUM: If you know someone who served in Iraq, thank them for their service. They helped introduce a genuine "Arab Spring," creating security conditions that helped foster the most democratic regime in that part of the world (with the exception of Israel). Compare that to the more recent Arab uprisings that are ushering in new authoritarian regimes. The contrast between Iraq and what is happening in Egypt could not be more clear. We can only hope that Iraq's democracy survives the tough road ahead, so the sacrifice of thousands of young Americans will not have been in vain.
-
Jack Cafferty is to intelligent geopolitical analysis what Jack Cafferty is to safe and sober driving.
I don't care about Jack Cafferty one way or another, but while you may not want to hear them, he made some good points. But, your article also made some good points.
I'm just glad we're done. Now I, and also I believe most Americans, look forward to getting out of Afghanistan.
-
Woof,
This just now coming across the wires: Iraq News: A Video of Saddam Hussein has been found showing the former dictator personally spaying Kurd's with WMD. In a related story the Left would rather he still be in control in Iraq.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_detailpage&v=KkOtGP1qWgE
P.C.
-
Woof,
On a more serious note.
BAGHDAD -- Iraq's Human Rights Ministry has decided to create a center tasked with identifying the thousands of unidentified bodies found in Saddam Hussein-era mass graves in Iraq, RFE/RL's Radio Free Iraq (RFI) reports.
Human Rights Ministry spokesman Kamil Amin told RFI on September 20 that the unresolved situation has pushed the ministry to establish the special center, which will work with other ministries and health institutions to identify the remains from mass graves.
"This is a huge and very ambitious project that will need governmental and political support," Amin said. "We also asked many other countries with similar experiences for help, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina," he added.
The Hussein regime used to arbitrarily arrest, torture, and often kill and bury anyone suspected of being an opponent of the government.
Eyewitnesses in recent years have said that some people were even buried alive, especially during the 1991 revolt that took place after the Iraqi army was forced out of Kuwait.
More Than 100,000 Bodies
Some estimates put the number of bodies found in mass graves since the fall of Hussein's regime in 2003 at more than 100,000. A number of experts think there are many more thousands still to be uncovered.
Salah Muhammad, 25, is married and has three children. He told RFI that he has wondered where his father is since 1991, when he was taken away from his family.
Muhammad said he has been told by Iraqi officials that his father was executed and buried in one of the Hussein-era mass graves that are systematically uncovered several times a year.
Muhammad said he remembers the day when security agents entered their house by force and took away his father, who was a teacher, accusing him of being a member of the banned Al-Dawah party.
"I was still a child at that time," he told RFI, "but to this day, I am unable to forget this scene of those men dragging my father away, forcing him into a car. This was the last time I saw him," he said with tears in his eyes.
Muhammad said he searches everywhere for his father, including in every new mass grave that is discovered. But he said this is a very difficult and frustrating task.
"All the remains and bodies are lacking any ID proving who they are," he said. "How can they expect anyone to identify the missing loved ones [we are] looking for?"
Muhammad's story is one of many thousands of similar stories of Iraqis still seeking the bodies of missing relatives.
P.C.
-
Woof,
The Iraqi holocaust very well documented.
http://iraqshoahfiles.blogspot.com
P.C.
-
Tuesday, December 20, 2011
Stay Connected
Iraqi News IRAQINEWS.COM
Iran is a friendly country, we need it, Barzani
ARBIL / IraqiNews.com: Kurdish region President Masoud Barzani described Iran as “a friendly country”, stressing the need for it, according Iranian Mehr Newe Agency. The agency added that leader of the Iranian revolution Ali Khamanei received today President Barzani. Barzani stated that “we will not forget the assistance of the Iranian people and government during the hard times passed by Iraq”. “To preserve our victory, we need Iranian assistance and guidance in this sphere”, Barzani added. Khamanei declared that “Iran will support a unified Iraq with full stability”, stressing “Iraq should be rebuilt in order to have its rightful status”. He described the peaceful coexistence among ethnic groups is “a precious opportunity” describing the present situation in Iraq “relieves Iranian republic”. He added that all Iraqi ethnic groups are ” close brothers to Iran with deep rooted relations with the Iranian people”, stressing that “bilateral relations are good and should be developed day by day”. RM 71
Baghdad wants unilateral control of power, Masoud Barzani
ARBIL / IraqiNews.com: Kurdish President Masoud Barzani stated today that the behavior of the Iraqi government is to have “unilateral” control, pointing out that the Regional Government aims at solving all problems withBAGHDAD . In a conference for Kurdistan representatives abroad, held in Arbil, he declared that a delegation, headed by Premier Barham Saleh, will be sent toBAGHDAD to discuss matters pending betweenBAGHDAD and Arbil. “The attitude inBAGHDAD is to have unilateral control of power”, he added. Barzani referred to anti-Iran PJAK and anti-Turkey PKK parties as “not taking into consideration the interests of Kurdistan “, calling both parties “to discharge ideas gaining their rights by military means”. “We are planning to end this war, if we succeeded then we rendered a great service to the people of Kurdistan, Iran and Turkey, otherwise, we will not be part of it”, he confirmed. The Iranian bombardment continued for the last two months, while the Turkish shelling prevailed for its third week which led to civilian killings and material damages in homes and lands. Local Kurdish sources said that the Turkish jet fighters are continuing bombing Iraqi villages along the borders in Qandeel mountains in Kurdistan region. Areas in Arbil and Duhuk are having massive Turkish aerial bombardments against possible PKK sites inside Kurdistan , where reports said that 30 Turkish soldiers were killed. The Turkish government announced that it will continue its attack till terminating PKK members and stop their attacks inside Turkey . 665
Malikis’ government is a dictatorship – MP
BAGHDAD / IraqiNews.com: An al-Iraqiya MP described the present Iraqi government as being similar to a dictatorship, warning against the wrath of the Iraqi public for unilateral governmental decisions. MP Khalid Abdullah al-Alwani told IraqiNews.com that “the present government , headed by Premier Nouri al-Maliki, is similar to a dictatorship, with one ruler and one party, without real partnership, just in name”. “There are no consultations in government affairs and non-implementation of Arbil agreement”, he added. Alwani warned against public wrath for unilateral control of government decisions. Kurdistan president Masoud Barzani criticized Tuesday the work of the Iraqi government as “unilateral” and pointed out that the Regional Government aims at solving all problems with Baghdad. RM (TS)/SR 375
Thoughts to withdraw from government to weaken Maliki – MP
BAGHDAD / IraqiNews.com: Al-Iraqiya bloc MP called today to think of political alternatives to amend the situation in the country which is moving to unilateral rule and party, pointing one of these alternatives is to withdraw from the government to weaken the status of Premier Nouri al-Maliki, according to a statement of his office. In a statement, as received by IraqiNews.com, MP Ahmed al-Alwani warned against the rule of one person and one party, which facilitates the return of the dictatorship, “which matter we cannot accept,” as he said. He criticized the State of Law bloc for not abiding with the agreements reached to. Alwani said that he demanded the withdrawal from the present government “in order no to be partners in future destruction of the country”. Al-Iraqiya bloc leader Iyad Alawi announced last Thursday his rejection to preside of the Higher Strategic Policies Council due to “the absence of national partnership and unilateral rule.” Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani made an initiative in September 2011 to solve the current government crisis after a delay lasted for nine months, which led to the formation of a partnership government. RM (TI)/SR Number of Reads:351
P.C.
-
The Iraq War: Recollections
December 20, 2011
By George Friedman
The war in Iraq is officially over. Whether it is actually over remains to be seen. All that we know is that U.S. forces have been withdrawn. There is much to be said about the future of Iraq, but it is hard to think of anything that has been left unsaid about the past years of war in Iraq, and true perspective requires the passage of time. It seemed appropriate, therefore, to hear from those at STRATFOR who fought in the war and survived. STRATFOR is graced with seven veterans of the war and one Iraqi who lived through it. It is interesting to me that all of our Iraq veterans were enlisted personnel. I don’t know what that means, but it pleases me for some reason. Their short recollections are what STRATFOR has to contribute to the end of the war. It is, I think, far more valuable than anything I could possibly say.
Staff Sgt. Kendra Vessels, U.S. Air Force
Iraq 2003, 2005
STRATFOR Vice President of International Projects
Six words capture my experience during the invasion of Iraq: Russian linguist turned security forces “augmentee.” I initially volunteered for a 45-day tour of the theater — one of those unique opportunities for those in the intelligence field who don’t see much beyond their building with no windows. My field trip of the “operational Air Force” turned into a seven-month stint far beyond my original job description. But in the end I wouldn’t trade anything for that experience.
I will always remember March 19, 2003 — not only because it was my 22nd birthday but also because it was the day that brought an end to the hurry-up-and-wait that I had experienced for the four months since I’d arrived in Kuwait. During that time it was a slow transition from the world I knew so well, which was confined to a sensitive compartmented information facility (SCIF) and computer screens to practically living in mission oriented protective posture (MOPP) 4 gear, working with a joint-service security team and carrying a weapon. The day I was pulled from my normal duties to take a two-hour refresher on how to use an M-16 was a wake-up call. I had shot an M-16 once before, in basic training. Carrying a weapon every day from then on was new to me. While my Army and Marine counterparts knew their weapons intimately, I was still at that awkward first-date stage.
This anecdote represented a broader issue. As much as we might have known ahead of time that we would eventually invade Iraq, I don’t think we ever could have really been prepared. There were definitely creative solutions, like issuing an Air Force intelligence Barbie an assault rifle.
The invasion of Iraq that I describe is narrowly focused, but that’s what I knew at the time. As far as seeing a bigger picture, I was subject to the opinions on CNN and Fox just as everyone was back home. The only morsel that stands out is a “need to know” briefing we had on weapons of mass destruction a month before things kicked off. Slide after slide of imagery “proved” we needed to go into Iraq. Those giving the presentation seemed unconvinced, but at our level, we didn’t question those presentations. We always assumed someone much higher up knew much more than we would ever have access to. So we drove on, kept our mouths shut and did our jobs as we were told.
As an airman, the most memorable part of the experience for me was the shock and awe of the initial bombing attack. All the days before and after are blurred in my memory — either because they all seemed the same or because I’ve buried them somewhere. There were so many mixed emotions — pride in the U.S. Air Force as we watched the initial attack live on the news, fear of what would follow and sadness in saying goodbye to my friends who would leave to cross into Iraq in the following days. Among those friends were our British counterparts who did not feel they had a stake in the fight but were there because they took pride in their jobs and wanted to do well.
Indeed, I always took notice of the many nationalities that were there to fight beside us. They were less than enthusiastic about being in Iraq and, of course, blamed the Americans for causing them to be there. This is when I first began to feel the “uncoolness” of being American overseas because of the war. I did not foresee how bad it would get and would eventually experience outright hostility in Asia, Europe and other countries in the Middle East.
Two years later, I was “deployed in-garrison.” This concept captures not only what I love about the Air Force but also why my friends in every other service always had ample material for teasing me. If we can’t take all the luxuries of home to the war (and believe me, we tried: surf and turf and endless ice cream in the chow halls, televisions in every living space and air-conditioning or heating as needed), we will bring the war to us. It seemed like a great idea at the time. I spent a year driving less than 10 miles from my duty station in the United States to carry out a mission in Iraq through radio, chat and live feed on television screens. We experienced the same crew day, tempo and real-world mission requirements but worked in over-air-conditioned vans parked inside giant hangars.
Anyone who has ever done this can relate to how bizarre it is to work inside one of these vans in full winter gear during the peak of summer. But in comparison to my first experience on the ground in Iraq, I felt I contributed far more the second time around. Our unit was able to see results daily and know that we were directly contributing to units in contact with the enemy. I could finally begin to see the forest for the trees, but by that time, I could also see that the situation on the ground was far worse than before.
My take-away from the latter experience was the perception that the rest of the United States was detached from what was happening in Iraq and Afghanistan. I would spend 12 hours engaged with the reality on the ground, full of adrenaline and exhausted by the end of the day, only to wake up and do it all over again the next day. But between the missions at work I would interact with those not directly involved, and it was endlessly frustrating. My civilian friends were more concerned about what happened on “Lost” the night before or where they were planning to vacation during the upcoming holiday. This sentiment continues even today, as those of us who were directly impacted by the war reflect on how it changed our lives while others hardly notice that the war is coming to an end. I gently remind them that this is, in many ways, a victory for us all.
Basima
Iraq 2003
STRATFOR Middle East and Arabic Monitor
In 2003, when the news in Iraq began to report that U.S. President George W. Bush would invade Iraq, Iraqis began to wonder if this would really happen — and if it would be the solution to and the end of the tyrant era in Iraq. I was sitting with my father, an old man addicted to listening to the radio instead of watching the two boring Iraqi television channels that mostly broadcast Saddam’s interviews, speeches and songs about him. I asked my father, “Dad, do you think the Americans will really come to save us and our country from this tyrant?” He said, “Yes they will, and there will be no other way to get rid of this tyrant but by a strong power like America.” As all other Iraqis, I kept watching television and listening to the radio to follow the news.
My husband, my kids and I were all staying at my parents’ house, along with my other two sisters and their families. We bought much food and stored water in a big container. We contacted our relatives and they contacted us, everyone wanting to make sure that the others were ready for the war and for the moment of salvation. If you draw an image of the Iraqi streets at that time, you will see very close and trusted friends secretly sharing their happiness about the idea that the Americans will come and topple the brutal regime. No one was afraid of the war because we are a people used to being in a war, and we were suffering enough from the blockade.
When the war began, I would say most Iraqis, if I cannot say all, were happy to see the end of the madman Saddam. When the statue of Saddam was pulled down in Firdos Square, my family and I were so happy our eyes were full of tears. They were not tears of sadness but of happiness. It was unbelievable. It was the moment of freedom.
After that, when the people began to get out of their houses, they could see all the military trucks and soldiers. And the people waved their hands and nodded or made signs with their hands to show the Americans that they were happy and thankful. For the first time in their lives, Iraqis practiced the freedom to speak in the streets freely and loudly without being afraid of Saddam’s loyalists.
Sgt. “Primo,” U.S. Marine Corps Task Force Tarawa
Iraq 2003
STRATFOR Tactical Analyst
As the C-130 ramp dropped at Kuwait International Airport in March 2003, I was hit in the face with a wave of heat and sand. I remember thinking to myself that this was going to suck, a lot. But at the same time there was a sense of relief at the finality and completion of mobilization orders and deployment, and despite the disruption of our civilian lives we knew that this was it, and it was all we had to concentrate on.
An infantry unit in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, we were a motley mix of professions and lifestyles — mechanics, school teachers, policemen, college students (roughly half of us), boilermakers, bankers, bartenders, small-business owners and kids straight out of high school. And we respected our leaders. Our commanding officer was a successful corporate executive, our company first sergeant and company gunnery sergeant had living-legend status in their respective law enforcement agencies, and all of our staff non-commissioned officers — most of whom were veterans of the first Gulf War and/or employed in law enforcement in their civilian lives — had served active-duty tours in their younger days, as did the NCOs that just got out of the Fleet and volunteered to deploy with us.
My squad (in which I had been unceremoniously promoted, as a lance corporal, to fire team leader) was pulling security for the command tent in the staging area in northern Kuwait when all members of the company staff gathered for a meeting with the battalion staff. The purpose of the meeting was for the battalion gunny to list all the ammunition that we would be allotted, and it did not include 5.56mm link or 7.62mm link and only a shockingly small amount of non-linked 5.56mm. We knew we were leaving soon, and we exchanged bug-eyed glances when we overheard the gunny listing the allotment. Fire suppression capability had been a central tenet of our training, and it would not be possible with the ammo we were getting. And there was only about one grenade per squad. If we hit action, our survival could depend on the pitiful first-aid kits we had been issued. Then “Doc” Chris showed up with a ton of “acquired” gauze, medical tape, iodine and morphine from battalion headquarters, which earned him a godlike status despite his many personal shortcomings.
When we received the warning order in our platoon hooch later in the evening we were told we were going to Nasiriya, where a battle was still raging. In the morning, we threw on our over-loaded packs and said our goodbyes. With the sound of helicopters in the air, the company gunny rolled up in a Humvee overflowing with 5.56mm link, 7.62mm link, more grenades and much-needed bandoleers. Every rifleman had the equivalent of about 12 magazines and the squad automatic weapon (SAW) gunners had about four or five 5.56mm link boxes.
Fortunately, the landing zone (LZ) we were flown into in Nasriya was not hot. We spent two days in Camp White Horse and then moved on into the city and took up positions, which we fortified when we were not patrolling or running raids. After a week, we were moved to the Saddam Canal, the site of a fierce battle just days earlier, where we set up checkpoints to control anyone going to or from the city over our bridge. After about a month of bridge security, patrols and raids in the nearby neighborhood, we were moved to Qulat Sikkar, south of Al Kut.
While the Shiite Muslims in our area of operation may not have wanted us there, the United States took out Saddam and we were there to help them, so there was a tentative peace. While the locals outnumbered us, they did not want to rock the boat, nor did we. For all intents and purposes, we served as the local government, court and police of Qulat Sikkar. For the first few weeks, we raided residences of suspected Baath Party members, Fedayeen and criminals. You never knew what was behind the door, which was quite stressful, but you got used it. However, it didn’t take too long to realize that despite the weapons caches we would occasionally find, a good portion of the information we were receiving to conduct these raids may have had more to do with personal revenge than actual threats.
What we were trying to do was maximize our strength at the street level by interacting with the locals as much as possible during foot and mounted patrols, which we ran 24 hours a day. We wanted the locals to know that we were ready for anything while our medical corpsmen were helping injured civilians and kids who were brought to our position for care. Locals would come to us to report criminals and other threats, which we would respond to. The professional policemen in our reserve unit trained local police. Because of this, and the fact that the local Shia were happy to see Saddam ousted and were not politically organized, we experienced no serious attacks, nothing more than the occasional spray-and-pray or potshot. The people, all of whom were destitute, just tried to keep on living and begin building an uncertain future as we continued our patrols, dreaming of home in our spare time.
The uncertain future became most evident when local Iraq army veterans began asking for their pay or pensions and we told them to go away. And while the Bush administration’s decision to remove all Baath Party members rather than just the unsavory elements from official life was not such a factor for us in the Shiite south, the move was something that we debated endlessly. The majority of the Marines in my platoon — college students and working men alike — saw it as a very bad idea and something that would almost guarantee a resistance movement.
We stayed just under six months and did a lot of good for people who have not faced much good in their history. The reality of war is that sometimes you are lucky and sometimes you are unlucky. During that deployment, we were very lucky. No Marines in our unit were killed in action, and no Marines were seriously wounded. The Italians who replaced us were not so lucky. A few months after our departure and after becoming fully immersed in civilian life again (except for drill weekends), I turned on the television to see that Nasiriya had been hit by a major suicide bombing and that 19 Italian soldiers — some of whom we had undoubtedly dined with at Camp White Horse just weeks earlier — were killed along with 11 civilians. I remember thinking that this was just the beginning of a different type of war that would last a long time.
Cpl. Nathan Hughes, U.S. Marine Corps Regimental Combat Team 1
Iraq 2003
STRATFOR Deputy Director, Tactical Intelligence
Looking back, the paradigm that pulls it all together for me is one of a military that has spent too many years in garrison going off to war. By March 2003, 9/11 had dominated everyone’s thinking for a year and a half, but only a tiny fraction of the military had actually been to Afghanistan. And there had been no time for operational lessons that might have been learned to percolate through the system.
None of that was apparent then. When we first came ashore in February, the negligent discharge of a SAW at the port in Kuwait and seeing servicemen from other units carrying their rifles slung muzzle down stuck out to us after six months with a Marine Expeditionary Unit (pretty much the height of readiness and cohesion for a Marine infantry battalion at that point). The truth was that even six months at sea in 2002, aside from the loss of Marines in a shooting in Kuwait, did little to prepare us for the post-9/11 realities that would become so apparent in subsequent years.
After weeks of waiting in Kuwait (to the point where unfounded rumors of the death of Jennifer Lopez were beginning to get too much traction) and after we had resigned ourselves to never leaving that miserable place, we suddenly received orders to immediately mount up. We were a U.S. Marine regiment on amphibious tractors, unarmored Humvees and seven-ton trucks. I remember feeling bad for anyone who got in our way, and how that illusion crumbled over and over again in the subsequent weeks.
I remember exactly how shallow the first fighting positions we dug had been at our staging area south of the Iraqi border. The ground had been ridiculously tough, and we knew we were moving in as little as a few hours. That expediency was fine until the first “Lightning, lightning, lightning” came across the net, signaling that an Iraqi “Scud” missile had been fired. We were already in our MOPP 1 attire, which we would wear during most of the invasion, but despite endless drills (and laps around the flight deck on the way over in MOPP 4), it had taken us distressingly long to suit up. And lying in a far-too-shallow fighting position recalling how useless I had been — how useless we all had been — learning how to fire a rifle while wearing a gas mask in 1998, I mulled over everything I knew about fighting in a chemical or biological environment. The only thing I knew for sure was that doing so was a terrible, terrible idea.
On the outskirts of Nasiriya, we saw the first burned-out hulks of American vehicles and the first section of our platoon was moved, briefly, from our unarmored Humvees to the “protection” of the welded-aluminum hulls of amphibious tractors. Before someone somewhere cancelled the whole maneuver, we were on the verge of following an artillery barrage through a city where the entire urban expanse had been declared hostile. One surreal experience flowed into the next.
Between spending a night where no one slept because we had erected our 81mm mortar gun line in an exposed position in the middle of an Iraqi village and reconnoitering for positions in a pair of Humvees with our heaviest weapon, a SAW, it became clear how desperately thin we were spread. The civilian looting of Baghdad was comprehensive and immediate. As we moved to our initial objective, there were already stolen construction vehicles with air-conditioning units chained to the shovels moving down the shoulders of the city’s roads. The magnitude of pacifying an urban population — and our complete inability to do so — was blatantly apparent.
By the time we fell back to Kuwait that summer (even the senior-most Marine commanders were assuring us in good faith that the objective was kicking in the door and seizing Baghdad and that the Army would take it from there), it was already a different world. Children that had once been restrained by their parents or their own uncertainty would now stand inches from moving tracked vehicles and demand candy. What we had achieved, in other words, was done in the space created by “shock and awe.” But the shock and awe had already worn off and the Iraqis were adapting and settling into the new reality with a frightening speed.
Staff Sgt. Paul Floyd, U.S. Army Special Operations Command
Iraq 2005-2008
STRATFOR Tactical Intern
My unit worked under Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), and our primary role was high-value target (HVT) kill or capture missions. These missions were meant to apply pressure to or destroy enemy networks, not to win over popular support. I served eight tours overseas, half in Iraq. Our deployments lasted anywhere from 90 to 140 days. During these deployments, my platoon conducted hundreds of missions and killed or captured many HVTs. Most missions were successful in the sense that we got who we were after. Some missions were not successful. The following are the missions that stick out.
My first deployment was in 2005 to Baghdad. I was scared and didn’t know a damn thing about where I was going, and my team leaders and squad leaders were not about to enlighten me. After a short layover in Germany, we flew directly into Baghdad instead of Kuwait, where most units staged. The lights in the cargo bay went red, the crew donned body armor and they dropped the plane onto the runway like it was crashing to avoid being shot down. We had arrived in the middle of the night and were still recovering from the sleeping pills they had provided for the flight. We had to unpack all of our mission-essential gear from our cargo pallets and prep our gear for a helicopter flight into our operating base. Our leaders still didn’t divulge many details about where we were going even as we loaded magazines and donned body armor.
We loaded a CH-47 with half of our platoon and our personal bags and lifted off to what I had been told was the most dangerous city in the world at that time. When we landed, I was a little beside myself as we rushed off the helicopter to establish security, sweeping our sectors of fire and waiting for our first firefight while others frantically threw bags off the bird. It took a few minutes, but the helicopter finally took off to pick up the rest of our platoon and then we were able to hear the laughter. “Hey dumbasses, we are in the Green Zone and you are pointing your weapons at the guys who guard our compound,” our team leaders said between guffaws. “Welcome home.”
This was not what I was expecting. My first mission was the next night. I was a top gunner on an up-armored Humvee manning a medium machine gun. We worked at night, and all I knew was that we were going to get some guy in some place in Baghdad. In other words, I could barely understand what I was seeing, didn’t know where I was and had no idea who we were after. The last thing my team leader had told me before we rolled out was to shoot back if we were shot at and if the vehicle rolled, try and get clear because the night before a Humvee had been hit by an improvised explosive device (IED) and rolled and everyone inside had burned alive. He might have been lying, but it stuck. We rolled through Baghdad for about 15 minutes and finally stopped 200 meters past an intersection. To help with radio communication, we turned off our jammers, per standard operating procedure, and an IED detonated at the intersection we had just passed. We went on two more missions that night and, over the course of 90 days, conducted around 120 missions.
My second deployment was to Ramadi in summer 2006. At that time, Ramadi was falling apart. The entire city was hostile, every single place we went. One mission during this deployment sticks our more than any other. We received intelligence on the whereabouts of a target high enough on the food chain that the strike force commander launched us during the day. The coordinates we had been given led us to what was essentially a strip mall on the side of the road. Since it was daytime, we found it to be more successful to move hard and fast, so we “landed on the X.” As we were leaping out of our vehicles, we realized there were more than 100 people running in all directions. We detained every single military-aged male. It took hours and we had to call in the regular army to help us move them all, but we got the al Qaeda cell leader we were after and his lieutenants. We didn’t make any friends that day, but we accomplished the mission and then some.
On a similar mission, we found ourselves being launched during the middle of the day to capture a man who we thought was a major piece of the Ramadi insurgency. This time we drove to a house, contained it, blew down the door and seized it. All we found inside was a woman and 13 teenage girls. We started to search the house, and I was tasked with searching the room where the girls were being kept while a younger guy watched them. Searching a room in the desert while wearing body armor is miserable work. About halfway through I heard some light giggling and looked up to find that two of the girls had taken a fancy to their overseer and were trying to flirt. There he was smiling from ear to ear while they both were moving their veils and hijab’s just enough to show a little hair and some of their faces. I started to laugh when the radio explodes with chatter about a car returning to the house. We quickly rearranged ourselves and detained the men as they pulled into the driveway. It was their uncle who had to pick up an associate and who also happened to be our target. We detained him and left.
My third deployment in Iraq was back to Ramadi in 2007. This was after the local tribal leaders had banded together and begun working with the United States to push al Qaeda out of the city. This meant that the enemy had moved to the countryside, and we were going to air assault instead of drive. Every night, we flew to the countryside and walked to our targets. This deployment was different. I experienced more firefights in those first seven missions than I ever had before.
On my eighth mission, the intelligence that drove us to a target was literally “there is a suspicious blue truck there.” We ridiculed that assessment as we boarded the helicopters. I was point man for my platoon and led it up to the house. As I cleared the initial courtyard I saw a man open a door, stick his head out and, clearly frightened, duck back inside, leaving the door partially open. Following my training and not wanting him to have any more time to prepare for a fight I followed him through the door with my fire team. I kicked the door fully open and two men armed with what I later learned was an AK-47 and an M-16 fired on us as we came through the door. I cleared my corner and returned fire while my teammates did the same. Suddenly my firing hand was thrown off of my weapon. I placed it back but found that I could not pull the trigger. It seemed like time just stopped. I looked down to find that my finger was flapping wildly against my weapon and realized that I could not shoot. I took a knee and yelled “down” to let my team know I was out of the fight and they adjusted their sectors of fire. There was a brief pause before another armed man opened fire from behind the door. I thought I was dead. The fire team behind us entered the room immediately and eliminated the threat.
I had been shot in the hand while one of my team members had been shot through the arm and the other had had a bullet graze the side of his head. We all walked out of that room in time to see the rest of the house erupt with gunfire. My platoon moved us back under fire and returned fire. A man then ran out of the house and our rounds detonated his suicide vest. His head and leg landed in the road in front of us. The fight ended with two 500-pound bombs and a medevac helicopter to Balad. I went home early that deployment.
My last deployment to Iraq was in 2008, back in Baghdad. One again we were driving, part of a task force assigned to counter Iranian influence. The new threat was the explosively formed projectiles being imported by the Iranians. These next-generation IEDs could punch through any standard armor we had. U.S. troops adapted with solid metal plates bolted to the sides of vehicles with an 18-inch standoff. The enemy adapted by aiming the IEDs slightly higher so the force of the blast would miss the metal plates and take heads off in the passenger compartments.
This react and counteract game never stopped. We were there during the winter, which meant it actually rained a fair amount for a brief period. I was a convoy commander on this deployment. On one particular mission, we had stopped to let the assault force off more than a kilometer away so as not to spook the target at night with our engine noise. After they assaulted the house, they called to us to pull the vehicles forward. During the height of the sectarian violence of 2007, Baghdad neighborhoods had trenches and earthworks to protect them. On this wet winter night, we were forced to drive through one of these trenches to get to our platoon, and it took about three seconds to get my vehicle stuck.
Since we were running skeleton crews at this point and it was my fault, I decided to jump out by myself to perform the vehicle recovery. This is a pretty simple process of just having the nearest vehicle pull up, attaching a tow cable between the two and pulling the stuck vehicle out. As we started the pulling part, I stepped back to make room only to plunge into a hole filled with water well over my head. I was submerged, wearing about 60 pounds of armor and equipment and barely hanging onto a ledge. I thought about the irony of dying in Iraq not because of enemy fire or an IED but by drowning. I managed to extract myself, and since no one could hear or see me, I calmly walked back to my extracted vehicle. If my gunner wondered why I was soaking wet and freezing, he didn’t ask.
Staff Sgt. Benjamin Sledge, U.S. Army Special Operations Command
Iraq 2006-2007
STRATFOR Senior Graphic Designer
I had done a lot in eleven years in the military: Afghanistan, language training, John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, and Iraq. But Iraq would be the nail in the coffin of my military career.
In Iraq I kicked in doors, took shotgun pellets to the face (courtesy of a trigger happy Marine), watched IEDs explode in front of my vehicle, watched people shoot at my vehicle, made friends with the locals, rebuilt infrastructure, had the locals tell me they loved me and had the locals shoot at me. I also watched people shoot my friends, attended memorial services, cried, laughed, got depressed, ranted, fought, got dirty, got dirtier, cried some more and then went home.
The twin bloody battles of Fallujah in 2004 would move the insurgents to a city 20 miles west named Ramadi, which we would lovingly nickname the “Meat Grinder.” The rules of engagement were so lenient that if someone popped their head around the corner twice you could shoot a warning shot. The third peek was considered hostile and you could engage the person with lethal force. Every morning the roads were declared clear for about 30 minutes after an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team had spent the night clearing them. Thirty minutes later, every road had multiple IEDs on them. By noon, you were guaranteed to get shot at.
The turning point in my deployment came when a former Special Forces captain named Travis Patriquin came up with a simple — and hilarious — PowerPoint slide mocking how complex the American war machine had made the war in Iraq. My team began to work with him and other teams trying to win over the tribal sheiks and empower the people in the area. In accordance with a plan devised by Col. Sean McFarland, commander of the 1st Brigade Combat Team of the 1st Armored Division, U.S. troops also began to occupy all points of Ramadi in small combat outposts. In time, the tide began to shift and we began to see a significant, perceptible change. For once, my spirits were lifted and I thought we would achieve some success in the war. Capt. Patriquin would not live to see it. He was killed by an IED, leaving behind his wife and three small children.
When the war shifted in Ramadi, my team began to work hard rebuilding infrastructure instead of slinging lead, but complications soon arose. After the fighting died down, staff officers found new ways to look like rock stars in order to advance their careers. This was when my faith in the U.S. military began to crumble. Instead of working on the power grid or sewage system — basic life necessities that the people desperately needed — I was ordered to win hearts and minds by building soccer fields and other “Iraqi entertainment” venues. (Aid money was poured into a multimillion-dollar soccer stadium that only collected trash.)
After asking instead to work on the power grid, I was threatened with administrative punishment by a colonel in the 3rd Infantry Division. I acquiesced, then filed a report about waste and abuse of taxpayer dollars. More threats, more soccer fields demanded, but my unit never backed down. We eventually got electricity running in the city 18 hours a day. This was a big deal, though the cost was high: Purple Hearts, Bronze Stars with valor and marital problems. (A third of our 30-man team left Iraq divorced, including me.) Coming home should have been a joyous occasion, but after 15 months, we were all very different and the world was not the same.
Though the Iraq war is ending, it will never be over for those who went. Anytime someone finds out you’re a veteran and a little about what you did, the question comes up: “Did you kill anyone?” And with that inevitable question comes an inevitable floodgate of memories, good and bad.
Anonymous, U.S. Army Human Intelligence Collector
Iraq 2007-2008
STRATFOR Tactical Intern
I remember following the U.S. invasions in Afghanistan and Iraq from the comfort of my living room with no idea what a war zone was really like. Little did I know that one day I would have my own experiences in the Iraqi and Afghan cities I was watching on television.
A couple years after the fall of Saddam Hussein I was running human intelligence (HUMINT) operations in Baghdad, having one-on-one conversations with U.S. adversaries. I was elated by the opportunity to hear the perspective of the enemy. In the interrogations, our conversations varied. We would discuss anything from a planned attack on a convoy to the art of raising homing pigeons. While the typical image in Iraq was one of U.S. soldiers in fierce battles with insurgents, I would find myself smoking from a hookah with someone who had killed dozens. The polite nature of Iraqis carried over to the individuals with whom I would have conversations. A man who had just detonated an IED against an American convoy would offer me his prison-issued jacket if the weather was cold. I was shocked to see how cordial a detained insurgent could be, even if uncooperative.
There was a steep cultural learning curve for me, beginning with my mission in Iraq. Having never left the Western Hemisphere and having focused on Latin America with my previous unit, I was amazed to see what a different world the Middle East was. Language barriers were surprisingly easy to work around with interpreters, although my ability to gather intelligence depended on my cultural understanding. Picking and choosing which interpreter to use in communicating with a source was the first step. (An outspoken Lebanese Christian would not be very effective with a Sunni extremist.) It was also important to consider the gender, age and Islamic sect of interpreter and source. Putting aside intelligence gathering and turning instead to light-hearted conversations revolving around the source’s life not only improved my cultural understanding but also helped elicit critical information and actionable intelligence.
My time in Iraq was quite different from that of a soldier patrolling the streets of Baghdad. While I left my friends and family behind and worked long hours, sometimes exceeding 48-hour shifts, I still enjoyed most of the comforts of home that many soldiers in Iraq could not enjoy. The dangers were minimal compared to those faced by soldiers who kicked open doors and endured regular ambushes and IEDs. I often felt that I was not really doing my part compared to others who were risking their life in combat. However, I cherish the knowledge I gained from the Iraqi people and hope my contribution in Iraq was to save both U.S. and Iraqi lives.
Sgt. Frank B., U.S. Marine Corps
Iraq 2008
STRATFOR Junior Tactical Analyst
During our operations in northern Anbar province, I was continuously struck by the unintended consequences of our actions. As a platoon size, eight-vehicle element, we conducted patrols around the region checking in on disparate parts of the population. However, due to a lack of good road maps we relied on aviation charts that made it hard to identify good or established ground routes.
In our effort to survey our area of operations for security threats (in addition to other taskings), we found that our two mine-resistant, ambush-protected (MRAP) trucks, weighing more than 10 tons apiece, would easily crush the simple, mud-packed irrigation networks in the area. This would result in the limited water supply being quickly absorbed by the vast expanse of baked earth. And our communication and electronic countermeasures antennae, some 15 feet tall, would routinely pull down or short out the low-hanging, rudimentary power lines that tenuously fed electricity over long distances to isolated populations.
All of this was impossible to avoid while executing our tasking orders and providing mandated levels of protection to our unit, yet it hampered our ability to build any kind of rapport with people in areas that had had limited contact with the ousted Baathist regime in the first place. I remember realizing at the time that many of our interests and actions negated one another, and I often wondered how much more of that was happening with the many different units across the country.
I would later realize this example would prove to be one of many examples where our best operational intentions were obfuscated by the complexity of procedures, precautions and logistics necessary for our activity within the country. I’ll never forget walking away from my time in Iraq realizing the one-step-forward-two-step-backward reality of my unit’s time in Iraq, and how it forever changed how I understand the net costs of military and foreign interventions everywhere.
Conclusion
I know each of the authors well enough to have been startled by their recollections of the war. The humor, dedication and bitterness expressed in these pieces show me dimensions of each of them that I had not known were there. War reshapes the soul and makes people we think we know into mysteries. Life goes on, but not as it once was. No geopolitical meaning can be extracted from these memories, but human meanings can be. Suffice it to say that I am proud to be associated with these men and women.
-
WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 21, 2011 STRATFOR.COM Diary Archives
Iraqi Divisions Come to the Fore
The colors of the now-disestablished U.S. Forces-Iraq arrived back in the United States on Tuesday, where they were received by U.S. President Barack Obama. Between the day those colors were cased in Baghdad (last Thursday) and the day the last contingent of U.S. troops crossed into Kuwait (Sunday), Iraq’s Sunni vice president, Tariq al-Hashimi, fled to the Kurdish Regional Government in the north in order to evade a warrant issued for his arrest on charges of terrorism.
The comparative quietude of recent years in Iraq has existed within the framework of the U.S. military presence in Iraq, but not because the remaining — and dwindling — U.S. forces in Iraq have maintained any sort of lockdown on security. Rather, various factions were held in check by outside forces or by their own interests — many of which centered on not giving the Americans, and the factions within Iraq that benefited from their presence, any additional reason to leave U.S. troops in the country. With the final crossing of a large convoy into Kuwait on Sunday, that broad alignment of interests in Iraq has ended, and the artificiality of the quietude that framework has facilitated over the last few years has immediately come to the fore.
“Iraq’s senior leadership is filling the power vacuum left in Iraq by the withdrawal of U.S. forces and thus the removal of the framework that has defined Iraq for the better part of a decade.”
Washington and Baghdad have established a considerable relationship over the last eight years, during which the United States has played a central role in crafting the very structure of the Iraqi government. The United States now leaves behind a 16,000-strong diplomatic presence (including more than 5,000 diplomatic security personnel and their contractors). The two governments maintain robust if more informal technocratic contacts, and the contacts between their military and intelligence communities also remain strong. Washington maintains leverage through existing and forthcoming American military hardware sales and the contractor support those sales entail. But Iraq has now definitively entered the post-American occupation phase for which it has been preparing since at least 2008.
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has been using his increasingly strong hold over the Iraqi security forces and intelligence services for political and ethno-sectarian purposes for years, further consolidating his power. But whatever personal gain is at stake or not for al-Maliki in the al-Hashimi case, the latter must be understood as part of a natural geopolitical process: Iraq’s senior leadership is filling the power vacuum left in Iraq by the withdrawal of U.S. forces and thus the removal of the framework that has defined Iraq for the better part of a decade.
Seeing this as political maneuvering, however, also runs the risk of missing the point. Iraq is an artificial entity itself, built around borders defined by the United Kingdom and the League of Nations in 1920. Those borders encompass three distinct ethno-sectarian groups: Arab Shia, Sunni and Kurds. Since Iraq’s establishment, the country within these borders has, by and large, only been managed successfully with a strong hand where inherent ethno-sectarian strife has been suppressed.
So the issuing of an arrest warrant by the regime of al-Maliki for a Sunni (who may well have been involved in militant activity targeting Shiite leaders after Saddam’s fall) is neither simply a continuation of the trend of using military, law enforcement and intelligence powers for political and ethno-sectarian gain, nor an instance of political maneuvering within the existing political framework. It may well prove to be the opening gambit in a state-run coup d’état. The parliamentary system may or may not survive such a move if it is indeed taking place, but the point would be its subversion and subordination to Shiite domination and, at least at the moment, the increasingly robust military, law enforcement and intelligence powers at al-Maliki’s disposal.
It is uncertain how far al-Maliki will push this. But the whole point of a coup d’état is to create the perception of an overwhelming preponderance of powers before those powers are fully solidified (and there is little doubt that al-Maliki’s control over the instruments of hard power in Iraq is significant). Iraq’s political situation and its power dynamics were unsettled when the United States finalized its withdrawal, and they must find a new equilibrium. That new equilibrium is overwhelmingly turning in favor of the Shia, and the regional player that has the most to gain from this new geopolitical reality is none other than Iran.
-
BBC
A wave of apparently co-ordinated bomb attacks in the Iraqi capital, Baghdad, have killed at least 57 people and injured more than 170, say officials.
The interior ministry said 13 locations had been attacked, including al-Amil in the south of the city and Halawi and Karrada closer to the centre.
The bombings are the worst in months - and follow the withdrawal of US troops.
They come amid fears of rising sectarian tensions as the unity government faces internal divisions.
It was not immediately clear who was behind the attacks.
However, analysts say the level of co-ordination suggests a planning capability only available to al-Qaeda in Iraq.
Bombings remain common in Iraq despite an overall fall in violence.
In al-Amil there were two blasts, the second of which appeared to target rescuers who had come to the scene of the first explosion.
Raghad Khalid, a teacher at a kindergarten in Karrada, said all their windows had been blown out.
"The children were scared and crying. Some parts of the car bomb are inside our building."
Another woman said her baby had been covered in glass.
"She is now scared in the next room. All countries are stable. Why don't we have security and stability?" said Um Hanin.
Political turmoil
Iraq's year-old power-sharing government is in turmoil after an arrest warrant was issued for Sunni Vice-President Tariq al-Hashemi on terror charges.
The entire al-Iraqiyya group, the main Sunni bloc in parliament, is boycotting the assembly in protest. It accuses Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Maliki, a Shia, of monopolising power.
Mr Hashemi denies the charges. He is currently in Irbil in Iraqi Kurdistan, under the protection of the regional government, but Mr Maliki has demanded that they give him up.
The last American troops departed from Iraq on Sunday, nearly nine years after the war that toppled Saddam Hussein in 2003.
President Barack Obama acknowledged that the situation was not perfect, but said the US forces were leaving behind "a sovereign, stable and self-reliant Iraq, with a representative government elected by its people"
P.C.
-
Woof,
I wonder... in a month or two from now, would a poll show that the Iraqi people are still happy we are gone? Of course a month or two from now there won't be as many Iraqis left to poll and it's doubtful if it would be a fair poll. I also wonder in in a year or two, how many Americans are going to be happy we pulled out. It's true that most Americans are happy about it now but our enemies are even happier. I wonder why that is? :-P
P.C.
-
Also worth noting is that polling results are likely to vary considerably between the Kurd region, the Sunni region, and the Shia region.
Also worth noting is the relative silence here at home of most Republicans and many on the right on this-- I suspect in great part because lots of Americans have a sense that we have been badly led in this war and blame Bush and the Republicans.
My views about the destructiveness and the serious consequences thereof, sometimes to the point of being disloyal to America, of those who opposed the war I have already expressed-- but in fairness it needs to be noted that Rumsfield overruled the generals who clearly warned that more boots would be needed on the ground to establish a new order, that Bush, because he wished to avoid the political consequences of it being used against him, failed to expand the size of our presence for YEARS (even though candidate Kerry was calling for an increase of some 50,000 in the US military) thus badly thrashing our troops by sending them into the fray again and again at a very high tempo. The Surge should have been done MUCH sooner. Rumsfield was arrogant in his failure to see that his original perception of the what was happening on the ground (Saddamite deadenders) was wrong. The disbanding of the army, a huge decision made almost as a whim by Bremer, was a profound mistake.
I would add that the incoherence of our strategy in Afpakia has similarly sapped the support of the people for the effort there.
-
Woof,
Not to worry, OB is in direct talks with the Taliban to strike a deal so we can withdraw there too.
P.C.
-
Well let's hope Obama's "direct talks with the Taliban" are successful since nearly two thirds of all Americans oppose the war in Afghanistan. And the percentage is rising....
Like Iraq, it's time to get out of Afghanistan as well.....
-
Well let's hope Obama's "direct talks with the Taliban" are successful since nearly two thirds of all Americans oppose the war in Afghanistan. And the percentage is rising....
Like Iraq, it's time to get out of Afghanistan as well.....
Of course. It's not like there were any negative results the last time we walked away from A-stan. Right?
-
Nor is there, apart perhaps from our YA and my echoes of him, is there a coherent strategy being offered for staying.
-
Nor is there, apart perhaps from our YA and my echoes of him, is there a coherent strategy being offered for staying.
Maybe that's part of or IS the problem...
Sometimes war is necessary. But the American public is entitled to know why we entered into the war, why we stay,
what specifically we hope to accomplish, and when we plan on getting out.
Frankly, I, and I bet most Americans, can't figure out the answer to any of these questions in regards to Afghanistan.
-
GM:
You're a very bright and very thoughtful man.
a) Do you think there is a "Jew in Waziristan's chance" of YA-like policies being taken up? I don't.
b) Of the politically plausible strategies available, which do you favor? For which would you want a son of yours to fight?
c) Or?
-
1. It will be trumpeted globally that the muj again defeated a kafir superpower, demonstrating the jihad in the name of allah wins.
2. Back to being a base for launching mass casualty attacks on the infidels in their homelands.
-
GM:
You're a very bright and very thoughtful man.
a) Do you think there is a "Jew in Waziristan's chance" of YA-like policies being taken up? I don't.
**I don't either.
b) Of the politically plausible strategies available, which do you favor? For which would you want a son of yours to fight?
**As much eye rolling it might engender, there is a truth to "fighting them over there so we don't over here". We have seriously degraded their command and control. Hard for them to plot the next 9/11 while hiding from drones and snatch and grab raids.
c) Or?
**Refuse to learn from history and let the lesson be retaught to us. Perhaps with something that rattled loose from P-stan's arsenal.I note that every retired DoD expert on loose nukes lives far away from America's major cities. Just saying....
-
BTW, my bad-- I should have asked you these questions in the Afpakia thread.
BTW, this was in my email today:
Back in the USA for the past 2 weeks. Well... I do foresee us returning to Iraq again as a military force in the future. That place is screaming corruption and the whole situation is a poster child for mismanagement. There is a rule since DOS (Dept of State) is running the show in Iraq: fire a shot and you go home and are banned from DOS contracts for a year. In way that is good. That's because it protects you from the Iraqi legal system. It's one thing for an accidental discharge. It should not happen. It's another to fire a shot in self defense. We had one of our employee (ex-swat guy) kill a translator who came to his living area drunk and attempted to rape him. He got sent home and banned to work on DOS contracts and banned from Iraq. If he did not go home Iraq would have put him on trial for murder. Dept of State would not have protected him. Man on man rape is popular in Iraq. We had an US Army general raped by a bunch of muslim dudes (East Indian muslims) in the shower area during my tour of duty. It was at a different camp. We have been fortunate that it was not in our camp. Now I'm applying for other security contracts so we shall see what will happen next
-
As the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq ended Dec. 18, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki launched a political offensive against high-level Sunni officials. The crisis came rapidly but was also a long time coming, as Iraq’s Shiite majority — and by extension Iran — have been waiting to exploit the vacuum left by the United States to consolidate influence in Iraq. The main regional stakeholders opposed to Iran’s expanding influence — the United States, Saudi Arabia and Turkey — are poorly positioned to counter the Shia, leaving open the question of how far Iran will go in trying to use Mesopotamia to reshape the region’s politics.
STRATFOR forecast nearly one year ago that a political crisis would erupt once the United States withdrew its last troops from Iraq, and would reverberate throughout the region. The geopolitical trend centered on Iran’s opportunity to fill the power vacuum the United States would leave in Baghdad, ending centuries of Sunni rule over Mesopotamia. For Iran to fully realize this historic opportunity, it would first need to enhance its hold over Shiite groups in Iraq. Tehran would also need to consolidate its power within Iraq’s government, allowing Iran both to secure its western flank and to use Iraq as a base from which to project influence in the wider Arab world.
The political fury emanating from Baghdad in recent days can thus best be understood as Iraq’s entering a wrenching, albeit predictable, phase of Shiite consolidation. Leading this transformation is al-Maliki, who is fast becoming Iraq’s Shiite authoritarian.
Ever since al-Maliki became prime minister in 2006, he has been working to monopolize Iraq’s military as well as its security and intelligence services, mostly through purges and through the creation of loyal parallel security agencies. After he won a second term in 2010 following nearly a year of intense political wrangling over electoral results, al-Maliki concentrated on cementing his authority over the political, security and economic affairs of the state. The makeup of the current Cabinet clearly illustrates al-Maliki’s prowess; he holds the positions of acting defense minister, interior minister and minister of state for national security. But in order for al-Maliki to effectively wield his influence in each of these arenas, he needed to go beyond Baghdad politics and whittle down whatever tenuous influence Iraq’s Kurdish and Sunni factions maintained.
Desperate Times for Iraq’s Sunnis and Kurds
Al-Maliki’s political battles against the Kurds mostly occurred in the field of energy. Mountainous geography, significant energy assets and U.S. protection provided the foundation for Kurdish political autonomy — but the United States is no longer part of that framework. Previously, the Kurds could use foreign investment in the northern oil fields to resist al-Maliki’s campaign to control the right to sign contracts independently and to manage the share and distribution of oil revenues. Now the Kurds must deal alone with their Arab rivals. This dynamic manifested itself most recently in October, when U.S. energy major ExxonMobil struck a natural gas exploration deal with the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) without Baghdad’s consent. The ExxonMobil move was intended as a signal to the Iraqi central government of U.S. support for the Kurds. Rather than acceding to Kurdish demands in energy negotiations, however, the al-Maliki government (knowing that U.S. forces were on their way out of the country) retaliated by threatening to blacklist ExxonMobil from deals elsewhere in the country. By mid-December, al-Maliki was meeting personally with ExxonMobil executives and he announced that the energy firm had decided to “reconsider” its deal with the KRG.
The Sunnis are in an even more desperate situation than the Kurds. Iraqi Sunnis chose the bullet over the ballot in 2005, boycotting elections and waging an insurgency. By doing so, they allowed Shia and Kurds to garner disproportionate power in parliament. When Sunnis tried to re-enter the political scene in 2010, they did so under the banner of al-Iraqiya, a centrist political bloc with heavy Sunni representation. Though al-Iraqiya won the largest number of seats in the 2010 elections, al-Maliki and his Shiite allies maneuvered to deny al-Iraqiya an electoral victory. In the early stages of its formation the government half-heartedly promised al-Iraqiya various appeasements, but it did not take al-Maliki long to begin purging the government of Sunni power. While resisting U.S. pressure to integrate Sunni Awakening Council members into the security apparatus, al-Maliki used the Shiite-led Justice and Accountability Commission as a vehicle for targeting Sunnis and former Baathists.
The Sunnis, who unlike the Kurds have no energy assets or autonomous territory, tried to loosen Baghdad’s grip with their own autonomy drive — first in the mainly Sunni Anbar and Salahuddin provinces and then in the more ethnically mixed Diyala province. The autonomy push in Diyala province came about through Sunni-Kurdish collaboration: Sunni council members allegedly promised the KRG control of the Khanaqin district in exchange for Kurdish council member votes in favor of Diyala’s autonomy. This gave some indication that the Sunnis and Kurds were finding reasons to align against a more significant Shiite threat.
But the Shiite response was fast and fierce. Al-Maliki declared the province’s proclamation illegal. Shiite militias were deployed to the province and Shiite rallies quickly broke out in Diyala to protest the Sunni autonomy drive. Al-Iraqiya announced Dec. 17 that, in response to the events in Diyala and to the growing centralization of government powers, the party was boycotting parliament. A day later, al-Maliki launched his political offensive against high-level Sunni officials.
The Shiite Offensive
On Dec. 18, al-Maliki urged parliament to pass a vote of no confidence against Sunni Deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlak, who described al-Maliki in an interview as “worse than Saddam Hussein.” The same day, Iraq’s Sunni Vice President Tareq al-Hashemi was escorted off a plane at the Baghdad airport and two of his bodyguards were detained on terrorism charges. Al-Hashemi was permitted to fly to Iraqi Kurdistan but on Dec. 19, an arrest warrant was issued against al-Hashemi alleging that he and his security detail had commissioned assassinations of Iraqi political and security officials. One of the charges to which al-Hashemi’s detained bodyguards confessed involved an assassination plot three weeks ago against al-Maliki. Al-Hashemi, banned from traveling abroad, is now in Kurdish territory in the north, trying to evade the arrest warrant. The KRG, still resisting pressure from Baghdad, announced Dec. 21 that it would not hand over al-Hashemi to the central government authorities.
Al-Maliki’s drive against the Sunnis is designed to achieve Shiite preeminence in Iraq. Al-Maliki now has every Sunni politician in Iraq wondering who will be arrested next. The Sunnis are faced with stark choices: accommodate the Shia, attempt to flee the country or resist. Power in Iraq rests largely with the Shia, and the United States is no longer in the country to assist the Sunnis, making resistance — political, militant or both — difficult to sustain.
The Kurds also have a big decision to make in response to al-Maliki’s latest power surge. The Kurds face opposition from both Sunni and Shiite Arabs, but the Shia (given their disproportionate power) currently pose the greater threat. The Kurds and Sunnis have thus found common cause for collaboration and reportedly are discussing an attempt to form a new government. With their combined parliamentary clout, the Sunnis and Kurds could trigger a collapse of the al-Maliki government in an attempt to slow the Shiite consolidation drive.
However, a Sunni-Kurdish move to collapse the government could end up strengthening al-Maliki’s hand even more. The prime minister already has broken out of parliamentary bounds in asserting his dominance over the political system. The Sunni and Kurdish political blocs have the ability to bring down the government but lack the numbers to form a new government on their own. Al-Maliki, who has already leaked rumors about running for a third term, may not mind a government collapse, since parliamentary paralysis would leave the effective governance of the security, military and intelligence establishment open to the Shiite leader at the helm. If the Kurds view the Shiite show of strength as too formidable to resist, and they are still involved in territorial disputes with the Sunnis in the north (especially over the oil-rich province of Kirkuk), they may have to reconsider their options and reluctantly move toward accommodation with their Shiite rivals in Baghdad.
Iran’s Role
Iran is crucial to the outcome of this crisis. Al-Maliki may have strong political ambitions of his own, but his actions clearly align with Iran’s strategic interest in consolidating Shiite control in Iraq. With the United States now out of Iraq, Iran needs to exploit the growing sense of vulnerability felt by the region’s Sunni Arabs if Tehran is to reshape the politics of the region in its favor. Iran’s strongest hand is in Iraq, where it has been building up assets since well before Hussein’s fall. Iran can thus exploit the political fire in Baghdad to make a show of Shiite strength at this critical time. Iran’s need to demonstrate its growing leverage in the region, in order to fend off pressure from the Saudis, Americans and Turks in Syria, makes this even more important.
For now, al-Maliki’s actions help Iran meet its imperative of consolidating Shiite strength in Iraq during this sensitive transitional period. In the longer run, Iran likely will work to temper al-Maliki’s authority, to avoid having to contend with a more independent-minded leader in exerting influence in Baghdad. The question moving forward is how far al-Maliki intends to take this offensive against the Sunnis and the degree to which Iran is directly manipulating the crisis. Al-Iraqiya is trying to involve the Arab League and Turkey to build some foreign backing against Iran’s Shiite expansionist agenda, but neither Turkey nor Saudi Arabia is well-positioned to compete effectively with Iran in Iraqi politics. This political crisis far transcends the desires of a single Iraqi politician like al-Maliki; it exemplifies a long-standing Iranian strategy to shift the balance of power in the region firmly in its favor.
Read more: Special Series: The Shiite Political Offensive in Iraq | STRATFOR
-
Man on man rape is popular in Iraq. We had an US Army general raped by a bunch of muslim dudes (East Indian muslims) in the shower area during my tour of duty. It was at a different camp. We have been fortunate that it was not in our camp. Now I'm applying for other security contracts so we shall see what will happen next.
WTF ??
I'm pretty jaded, but mannnnnnnn.......... :-o
-
I'm jaded too, but ...... And I agree, WTF???
But this does NOT sound credible........ Sorry. Sources are important here....
-
That was from a one to one email sent directly to me by someone I know who has been corresponding with me while he was there. There are additional identifying details in his follow up to my queries, but I choose to not post them here.
-
I agree. It just doesn't seem to work that way.
Because of mealy-mouth "multiculturalism" garbage. I'm reminded of a friend of mine who's ancestors were Italian immigrants. They changed their name from Casio to Cash, refused to teach their kids Italian and explained to them "We came to America to be Americans".
It still works that way. My fiancée parents immigrated in the 60s, but you couldn't tell by talking to her.
-
I agree. It just doesn't seem to work that way.
Because of mealy-mouth "multiculturalism" garbage. I'm reminded of a friend of mine who's ancestors were Italian immigrants. They changed their name from Casio to Cash, refused to teach their kids Italian and explained to them "We came to America to be Americans".
It still works that way. My fiancée parents immigrated in the 60s, but you couldn't tell by talking to her.
I hope she is fluent in Italian cooking!
-
One of the things that seems lost in the U.S. leaving Iraq is that Democrats and/or liberals, including many anti-war activists who were opposed to the invading Iraq to begin with, recognized that upon invasion it became the duty, or even moral imperative, of the U.S. to improve the Iraqi situation. Leaving prematurely, allowing for sectarian violence, no matter what public opinion says, is in my opinion shirking the duty of the nation. While I realize that it was the Bush administration who invaded, this situation should not be ignored by a new administration. I get so g&%d#%! pissed off at all the partisan finger pointing, Republican vs. Democrat, liberal vs. conservative bullsh!+ that goes on in Washington, state caps, and even here sometimes. This is a question/issue that should be beyond the pale of partisanship and political ideology. It is a moral question. It should be the responsibility of the United States and the American people to do what is right.
Below is a link to an article dated from Oct., 2004 which includes the following, in regards to Iraq: "'Secretary of State Colin Powell told this president the Pottery Barn rule,; Kerry said, 'If you break it, you fix it.'... 'Now if you break it, you made a mistake. It's the wrong thing to do. But you own it. And then you've got to fix it and do something with it. Now that's what we have to do.' http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/17/arts/17iht-saf18.html (even John Kerry got the responsibility of the US in Iraq)
I remember many, many anti-war activist/protester folks using the analogy before the invasion. Now, though, and immediately in the wake of deposing Saddam, they wanted to get out. BS then and BS now. It IS the responsibility of the U.S. to make it right.
-
Very well said BD.
-
"In Iraq this year I asked an Iraqi military officer doing joint training at an American base what was the big thing he'd come to believe about Americans in the years they'd been there. He thought. "You are a better people than your movies say." He had judged us by our exports. He had seen the low slag heap of our culture and assumed it was a true expression of who we are."
-
I agree. It just doesn't seem to work that way.
Because of mealy-mouth "multiculturalism" garbage. I'm reminded of a friend of mine who's ancestors were Italian immigrants. They changed their name from Casio to Cash, refused to teach their kids Italian and explained to them "We came to America to be Americans".
It still works that way. My fiancée parents immigrated in the 60s, but you couldn't tell by talking to her.
I hope she is fluent in Italian cooking!
Taiwanese - I'm the actual cook though (;
-
Taiwanese is good, except for the rotting dofou dishes. Bleargh!
-
Iraq's fragile political ecosystem was sure to be tested after the Obama Administration pulled out all U.S. troops to cash a campaign chip. Only the speed and gravity of the crisis now unfolding comes as a surprise.
In hosting Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki last week at the White House, President Obama hailed Iraq as "sovereign, self-reliant and democratic." Mr. Maliki returned home and promptly began a putsch against his Sunni coalition partners.
Before television cameras on Monday, the Maliki government laid out lurid terrorism charges against Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi, a Sunni leader, and issued a warrant for his arrest. Mr. Hashemi fled to the autonomous northern Kurdish region. Two days later, Mr. Maliki signalled his readiness to break up his multisect coalition and moved to unseat his Sunni deputy prime minister. He ordered the Kurds to "hand over" Mr. Hashemi or face "problems."
Mr. Maliki is playing a combustible game. Iraq is only four years removed from vicious sectarian fighting, which was halted by the 2007 U.S. troop surge and the "Sunni awakening." Instability, renewed violence or a break-up of Iraq would be welcome by Tehran, some of its Shiite proxies in Iraq and al Qaeda-inspired terrorists. The latter were presumably behind the 16 bombs set off in Baghdad yesterday, killing 69.
The signs of trouble have been building for some time. Mr. Maliki's forces have arrested a couple dozen people connected to Ayad Allawi, leader of the Sunni-dominated Iraqiya party that nearly won the last election. Violence is rising in Diyala province, northeast of Baghdad, whose Sunni-dominated council last week declared autonomy. The Kurds can probably maintain a measure of independence. But the Sunnis, interspersed among Shiites, have nowhere to go.
America's military presence had calmed these sectarian fevers. Out of view of regular Iraqis, U.S. soldiers were honest brokers in Kurdish and Sunni eyes, shielding them against Mr. Maliki's heavy hand. With the U.S. on the ground, Mr. Maliki also had less reason to fear threats—real or imagined—from rivals.
U.S. commanders recommended that a force of 15,000 to 18,000 stay on, which was welcomed by Sunnis and Kurds. The White House rejected the advice and floated, without pressing its case in Baghdad, the idea of keeping 3,000. Mr. Maliki, who has to protect his own nationalist flank, refused to pay the political price to accept a small force and he let the 2008 withdrawal agreement play out.
Former Prime Minister Allawi, a Shiite, on Tuesday offered the following analysis to Reuters: "The Americans have pulled out without completing the job they should have finished. We have warned them that we don't have a political process which is inclusive of all Iraqis and we don't have a full-blown state in Iraq. We want to resolve issues between Iraqis in a peaceful way and we want to bring stability. Iraqis should fill the vacuum, rather than anyone else." Iranians and al Qaeda may fill the vacuum now.
Inevitably we'll hear this is all the fault of the Bush Administration and the original sin of invasion. Some facts are inconvenient. In the last four years, Iraq put together a workable if imperfect political process. Major violence ceased and a 600,000-man military was formed. Oil revenues are flowing. What changed? The U.S. decided to leave.
The White House, which hoped to take credit for success, seems to understand it has a problem. CIA Director David Petraeus flew to Baghdad on Tuesday to press the case for moderation. Vice President Joe Biden called Mr. Maliki and requested an "inclusive partnership government." Yet the U.S. finds itself with little leverage. On Wednesday, Mr. Maliki ignored Mr. Biden and declared his intention to take Iraq to "a new stage" of Shiite-dominated rule. If Iraq now descends into a sectarian brawl or dictatorship, Mr. Obama's withdrawal will have been the needless trigger.
-
Yes. Next question?
-
Taiwanese is good, except for the rotting dofou dishes. Bleargh!
The vegans I know keep on trying to get me into that... yuck...
-
Taiwanese is good, except for the rotting dofou dishes. Bleargh!
The vegans I know keep on trying to get me into that... yuck...
I knew a chef who was widely praised for his vegitarian meals. One night after several drinks, he confided in me his secret.
"Beef and chicken stock".
-
Woof,
HA! :lol:
P.C.
-
Vegetarian is actually an old Apache word meaning "bad hunter".
-
Taiwanese is good, except for the rotting dofou dishes. Bleargh!
The vegans I know keep on trying to get me into that... yuck...
I knew a chef who was widely praised for his vegitarian meals. One night after several drinks, he confided in me his secret.
"Beef and chicken stock".
Nice. I used to be vegetarian until I decided it was just impossible to keep it up an feel healthy. Some places I just had to drop it anyway to keep from arguing, like Asian restaurants.
"is this vegetarian?"
"yes... It just has chicken in it."
-
"Leaving prematurely, allowing for sectarian violence, no matter what public opinion says, is in my opinion shirking the duty of the nation."
bigdog, Your post here yesterday is a great one. I agree 100% in the moral responsibility of: "If you break it, you fix it."
The vote to go to war was bipartisan and it was made very clear from the start that the effort was not simply to bring down Saddam but to take care in what replaces that regime.
Very shortly into the war when fighting became more difficult and more personal, it seems that dissent and political opportunism and publicly polling kept undermining the effort. We will never know what part of the loss of life and length of the war were attributable to our own lack of resolve which was certainly followed by the enemy combatants.
Where I differ with Sec Powell and others is the inference in that guiding principle that a) things were not broken when we arrived, and b) that we have the capability to fix it now.
Low violence under 100% oppression is a hard thing to judge. Add in the mass murders of his own people, attacks on 4 of his neighbors and a known history of supporting terrorists and terrorism, Iraq under Saddam was already broken.
My view at the time was that if your neighbor's house is on fire (rule by Saddam Hussein) and you have the only fire hose available (American military) then you pitch in and fight the fire until it is out. Further, you help with the rebuild rather than walk away from a family sitting in the ashes if they need your help, but not forever if they keep tearing down what you help build or are shooting at you while you work.
From my midwest armchair with no intelligence briefings it would be presumptuous to know what we should be doing in Iraq, but we didn't leave Europe or the Pacific with no presence or capability to follow up. Decisions based on polling and elections at home instead of events on the ground are very likely to be wrong.
The answer is do the right thing whatever that is and bring the American people with you great leadership with great communications. Following polls is the opposite of leadership.
-
I tend to disagree.
I am glad we have left.
We lost 3+K, 30+K with lifelong injuries, spent I have heard one trillion.
It is enough.
We have done the noble thing in ridding Iraq and the world of the monster and his family.
The Iraqis told us it is time to leave. Yes 100K of them reportedly died. Was it worth it?
The fact no one can really answer is in itself very telling. Do Iraqis think it was worth it?
I dunno. Some do and some don't I think. The US did do a noble thing. And we sacrificed our people's lives, blood, limbs, money to try and minimize collateral damage. There is NO other country in history that was this noble.
Are we loved for it? I dunno.
I for one bravely post on this board - I am glad we left.
If Iraq falls apart now - screw em.
-
THANK YOU!!!
-
JDN,
I have been reading the posts on this thread for a while. I actually do agree with you for the most part! Surely most Americans do as well. That doesn't make us right.
For those who are libertarian or freedom tea party types (I mostly fall into the latter myself) to take a position that we know best with free markets, less government to tell us what to do at home but then say we don't know enough what we are talking about in an overseas war is a bit of a contradiction.
I as most Americans are not expert in economics, government, domestic, or foreign policy, war, etc. If our opinions are therefore not worth listening to on those issues (because we are not expert) then we may as well get rid of *voting*. Certainly there is an argument to be made most of us who vote are generally partly or wholly ignorant of what we are voting about. So if we say polls don't matter with regard to what we do in Iraq why do we all vote on our opinions about anything.
I am not sure what "stay the course" means when we still don't have any idea exactly what we are doing, what we need to do, where we are going, still are not sure if anything we do or have done is/was the right thing .
It is like holding a speculative stock down near the bottom. Does one still hold and hope things improve or bail and cut any potential losses and take what we get?
-
I was for staying in Iraq just to keep the military tied up. I think they are happy to return to a position of "tactical flexibility." The longer we were tied up in Iraq, the less likely we were to go destroy some other part of the world. Now its just a matter of time. You can already hear the war drums beating.
-
Thoughtful commentary across the spectrum is welcome. This OTOH, doesn't quite measure up.
"The longer we were tied up in Iraq, the less likely we were to go destroy some other part of the world. Now its just a matter of time. You can already hear the war drums beating."
-
The cost of an action should not absolve a nation, of its responsibility. I doubt seriously that anyone on this board would be as forgiving of a father who failed to pay child support because the cost to him undermined his standard of living.
The arguement that the voters play a role in pulling out of Iraq ignores the votes cast by American citizens in prior elections. George W. Bush was elected in 2000. He was also REELECTED in 2004, in large becasue of his willingness to invade and fight in Iraq. Those elections cannot be ignored any more than current claims that Obama's election was a vote for change. Again, whether or not you intended to make baby does not absolve you of the responsibilites that accompany your actions (and lack of quality decision making, if you feel that a mistake was made).
The people of Iraq have been fighting for hundreds of years. Iraq is hardly a mature democracy at this point. Continuing on with my methaphorical comparison to parenthood, you wouldn't leave your seven year old triplets at home by themselves, even they asked you to do so. And, yes, I am aware that this is unfair, in many ways, to the Iraqi people. The comparison is just meant to simplify and explain. Actions that some of you would never excuse under some circumstances you seem to be lining up to do so now.
Here is the heart of my concern. Electoral politics should not be the reason why we, as a nation, choose to engage or disengage internationally. The U.S. has a moral imperative that few, if any, other nations have or have ever had historically. It kills me when politics undermines the actions we take. If we are to have a moral purpose in the world, we need to have a credible committment to act responsibly. Period. Regardless of party. Regardless of election cycle. And for anti-war folks to use an argument for reasons not to go to war, and then change arguments once we do really concerns me as citizen who wants my country to be the illustration of a responsible world power AND democracy.
-
The cost of an action should not absolve a nation, of its responsibility. I doubt seriously that anyone on this board would be as forgiving of a father who failed to pay child support because the cost to him undermined his standard of living.
The arguement that the voters play a role in pulling out of Iraq ignores the votes cast by American citizens in prior elections. George W. Bush was elected in 2000. He was also REELECTED in 2004, in large becasue of his willingness to invade and fight in Iraq. Those elections cannot be ignored any more than current claims that Obama's election was a vote for change. Again, whether or not you intended to make baby does not absolve you of the responsibilites that accompany your actions (and lack of quality decision making, if you feel that a mistake was made).
The people of Iraq have been fighting for hundreds of years. Iraq is hardly a mature democracy at this point. Continuing on with my methaphorical comparison to parenthood, you wouldn't leave your seven year old triplets at home by themselves, even they asked you to do so. And, yes, I am aware that this is unfair, in many ways, to the Iraqi people. The comparison is just meant to simplify and explain. Actions that some of you would never excuse under some circumstances you seem to be lining up to do so now.
Here is the heart of my concern. Electoral politics should not be the reason why we, as a nation, choose to engage or disengage internationally. The U.S. has a moral imperative that few, if any, other nations have or have ever had historically. It kills me when politics undermines the actions we take. If we are to have a moral purpose in the world, we need to have a credible committment to act responsibly. Period. Regardless of party. Regardless of election cycle. And for anti-war folks to use an argument for reasons not to go to war, and then change arguments once we do really concerns me as citizen who wants my country to be the illustration of a responsible world power AND democracy.
Well said.
-
Amen.
-
Don't think this doesn't get factored into the strategic thinking of current and future opponents.
-
Thoughtful commentary across the spectrum is welcome. This OTOH, doesn't quite measure up.
"The longer we were tied up in Iraq, the less likely we were to go destroy some other part of the world. Now its just a matter of time. You can already hear the war drums beating."
Sorry if you don't like what I said but I mean ever word of it. Also, sorry for not linking to a pundit that half way agrees with me. I know linking to political commentary makes a post much more valid.
Rachel Maddow puts it together pretty well: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26315908/ns/msnbc_tv-rachel_maddow_show/#45691998
-
The cost of an action should not absolve a nation, of its responsibility. I doubt seriously that anyone on this board would be as forgiving of a father who failed to pay child support because the cost to him undermined his standard of living.
The arguement that the voters play a role in pulling out of Iraq ignores the votes cast by American citizens in prior elections. George W. Bush was elected in 2000. He was also REELECTED in 2004, in large becasue of his willingness to invade and fight in Iraq. Those elections cannot be ignored any more than current claims that Obama's election was a vote for change. Again, whether or not you intended to make baby does not absolve you of the responsibilites that accompany your actions (and lack of quality decision making, if you feel that a mistake was made).
The people of Iraq have been fighting for hundreds of years. Iraq is hardly a mature democracy at this point. Continuing on with my methaphorical comparison to parenthood, you wouldn't leave your seven year old triplets at home by themselves, even they asked you to do so. And, yes, I am aware that this is unfair, in many ways, to the Iraqi people. The comparison is just meant to simplify and explain. Actions that some of you would never excuse under some circumstances you seem to be lining up to do so now.
Here is the heart of my concern. Electoral politics should not be the reason why we, as a nation, choose to engage or disengage internationally. The U.S. has a moral imperative that few, if any, other nations have or have ever had historically. It kills me when politics undermines the actions we take. If we are to have a moral purpose in the world, we need to have a credible committment to act responsibly. Period. Regardless of party. Regardless of election cycle. And for anti-war folks to use an argument for reasons not to go to war, and then change arguments once we do really concerns me as citizen who wants my country to be the illustration of a responsible world power AND democracy.
It isn't right or fair to keep placing this burden on the shoulders of the same one percent. I have some mixed feelings about the war in Iraq and I'm sorry to see it fall apart just like so many people predicted. That said, I know people that have been deployed over and over again. What's worse, those that come back aren't taken care of correctly and it isn't like there is really even that many of them. We are stingy with our support of vets. In my mind, our moral imperative to stay there is tied to the need for a large portion of the population to participate and for them to be taken care of when they come home. If we can't do that, we shouldn't be there. They have been there long enough. The sad fact that a bunch of them will probably get rotated to Afghanistan sucks.
-
Maddow goes with the"No weapons of mass destruction" lie. Saddam killed Kurds, Iraqi Shiites and Iranians with WMD. Intelligence agencies, including those in europe and the middle east believed Saddam never ended his well known and well documented WMD programs.
What is the cost of inaction regarding Iran? Think they can't reach us here? That the geopolitical effects of a sunni-shia arms race or a hot war between Israel and Iran won't mean anything for America?
-
Maddow goes with the"No weapons of mass destruction" lie. Saddam killed Kurds, Iraqi Shiites and Iranians with WMD. Intelligence agencies, including those in europe and the middle east believed Saddam never ended his well known and well documented WMD programs.
What is the cost of inaction regarding Iran? Think they can't reach us here? That the geopolitical effects of a sunni-shia arms race or a hot war between Israel and Iran won't mean anything for America?
I don't want to see a draft and I don't want to see the same volunteers being asked to fight another war.I don't see how we are going to fight a preemptive war without one of those, unless some horrible tragedy happens to generate a bunch of volunteers. The moral imperative to treat young men like meat leads to some pretty good sounding speeches, but I'm not for war with someone just because they are building up a defense against us. If Iran's neighbors want to stop them, maybe we can help support them.
-
Bigdog said, "The people of Iraq have been fighting for hundreds of years. Iraq is hardly a mature democracy at this point. Continuing on with my methaphorical comparison to parenthood, you wouldn't leave your seven year old triplets at home by themselves, even they asked you to do so. And, yes, I am aware that this is unfair, in many ways, to the Iraqi people. The comparison is just meant to simplify and explain. Actions that some of you would never excuse under some circumstances you seem to be lining up to do so now."
With no offense, I usually agree with you Bigdog, but I'm not sure your analogy is applicable. A better comparison would be if you now had 21 year old triplets at home. Yes, you could tell them what to do (as my father always said, my house, my rules) but they are adults and are responsible for themselves. As is Iraq. We have been there eight LONG years. Maybe they were mere children, but after eight years, they claim to be adults. Thousands of Americans have died, THOUSANDS upon thousands more have been wounded. And we have spent nearly a trillion dollars. Enough is enough. As you point out, Iraq is hardly a mature democracy at this point, NOR will it be in my lifetime. Time for us move on.
Further, with all due respect to the Iraqis, they are not Americans. Again, using your analogy, Family is family; I would die for my seven year old triplets if they were threatened, but I'm not sure why Americans are dying in Iraq. Why should Americans keep dying for someone who seems to hate us? Because WE think the cause right? Even though their freely elected government is clearly kicking us out? I think after EIGHT LONG YEARS with little to show for it except thousands of American lives lost or injured and a trillion dollars gone, Americans have a right to wise up and change their mind and say enough.... What the heck are we doing in Iraq? And that is just what happened. America wised up.
At this time of year especially, one wants to do good. But the world if full of places that need help. We can't be everywhere, we can't help everyone. Let's take care of family first and those that appreciate us.
-
I don't want to see a draft
**The military doesn't want a draft. Our military doesn't want or need unhappy clock watchers and a 2 year enlistment is a waste of time and money.
and I don't want to see the same volunteers being asked to fight another war.I don't see how we are going to fight a preemptive war without one of those
**There are multiple ways to fight a war, one need not invest in a large number of boots on the ground to seek out and destroy Iran's nuclear infrastructure.
, unless some horrible tragedy happens to generate a bunch of volunteers. The moral imperative to treat young men like meat
**I'm glad to see you memorized well the bogus claims of your leftist indoctrinators. The US military does not treat it's troops "like meat". We invest a huge amount of money in trainingand equipping our troops to survive and win.
leads to some pretty good sounding speeches, but I'm not for war with someone just because they are building up a defense against us.
**I'm not sure how promising to wipe Israel off the map translates to wanting to defend themselves from the US. If either the US or Israel were of a mind to, we could turn all of Iran into radioactive glass without them getting off a shot. Their nuclear program makes this more likely, not less.
If Iran's neighbors want to stop them, maybe we can help support them.
-
CW:
It is not your opinion I am having trouble with. It is your way of expressing it in you last couple of posts.
As I said, "THOUGHTFUL commentary across the spectrum" is fine, trite snarky anti-American crap is not.
"The longer we were tied up in Iraq, the less likely we were to go destroy some other part of the world. , , ,"The moral imperative to treat young men like meat leads to some pretty good sounding speeches."
If you want to talk like that on your own time when you are drinking with like-minded buddies, that's fine. This forum however is not for that sort of talk. OTOH this says pretty much the same thing without the trite snarky anti-American crap.
"It isn't right or fair to keep placing this burden on the shoulders of the same one percent. I have some mixed feelings about the war in Iraq and I'm sorry to see it fall apart just like so many people predicted." That said, I know people that have been deployed over and over again. What's worse, those that come back aren't taken care of correctly and it isn't like there is really even that many of them. We are stingy with our support of vets. In my mind, our moral imperative to stay there is tied to the need for a large portion of the population to participate and for them to be taken care of when they come home. If we can't do that, we shouldn't be there. They have been there long enough. The sad fact that a bunch of them will probably get rotated to Afghanistan sucks."
-
Already answered, but Iran "building up a defense against us" did not strike me as a serious observation either. Poor defenseless Iran - aren't they the number one sponsor of terror in the world according to both Bush and Obama administrations (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8028064.stm), sponsor of Hezbollah, makers of IED's aimed at Americans, jailed hikers for pawns, threaten to blow Israel off the map, stormed our embassy - what else? I don't understand regretting the American loss of life in Iraq, a very large part of it directly attributable to actions by Iran, and then feeling ambivalent or sympathetic toward Iran. If you are sympathetic to Iran then you should be joyous for the American loss of life. They are.
My reaction earlier today reading: "I was for staying in Iraq just to keep the military tied up" was that my sense of humor does not come through well in the written word either. Subsequent post said he meant every word of it, whatever that means. It makes no sense to me but I don't see America as the destroyer.
--------------
Is there any part of JDN's post that he didn't already express. It's enough because "enough is enough"..."Time for us move on." - Okay, you got your say and you got it 2, 3, 4 times saying I think the same thing. None of it IMO, even in repetition, addresses a very compelling moral point made by bigdog.
-
I actually think this is the most aggressive of all the forums I've been on and I don't see my way of talking as being any worse than the tone normally used on here. I mean, there is a running thread title "Cognative Disonance of the Left" which is funny, but not very nice. I could start one called, "Short Sight of the Right" with about the same attitude.
In any case, I'll try to sound nicer from now on.
-
JDN: I take no offense, but I appreciate your sentiment. My analogy might be better with 7 year old adopted triplets. They aren't blood, but they are your responsibility because you chose to take responsibility for them.
Eight years is not a long time. Americans, myself included, have this weird time frame issue that doesn't exist elsewhere. I once heard a former reporter tell a story about meeting a Chinese diplomat, and asking if China was failing in the wake of WWII, Mao, being overshadowed by the Soviets, etc. The diplomat replied that China remained strong, and that it had "only been a bad century." I have a friend who attended the University of Edinburgh in Scotland. He had a great time. One of the things that struck him was that the university was divided into two campuses: the old campus and the new campus. The new campus was something like 300 years old. Americans have a short time vision. We treat the Revolution and Civil War like they were ancient history. (This view is seen in many people, in many different policy arenas, including racial equality, by the way, when it is argued that blacks have had sixty years to work toward equality, and the tone is that of incredulity or disbelief that inequality could remain pervasive, but I digress to make a point.) Eight years is not long.
There are things that Americans can change their minds about. I can decide I don't like a brand of car, a pair of shoes, a way of eating, or a sport. I cannot simply walk away from my adopted triplets. We can change our minds about relationships (changes in our view toward Japan and Germany spring to mind), our domestic policy (welfare or health care), but we simply should not forego a responsibility that we chose to bear.
With no offense, I usually agree with you Bigdog, but I'm not sure your analogy is applicable. A better comparison would be if you now had 21 year old triplets at home. Yes, you could tell them what to do (as my father always said, my house, my rules) but they are adults and are responsible for themselves. As is Iraq. We have been there eight LONG years. Maybe they were mere children, but after eight years, they claim to be adults. Thousands of Americans have died, THOUSANDS upon thousands more have been wounded. And we have spent nearly a trillion dollars. Enough is enough. As you point out, Iraq is hardly a mature democracy at this point, NOR will it be in my lifetime. Time for us move on.
Further, with all due respect to the Iraqis, they are not Americans. Again, using your analogy, Family is family; I would die for my seven year old triplets if they were threatened, but I'm not sure why Americans are dying in Iraq. Why should Americans keep dying for someone who seems to hate us? Because WE think the cause right? Even though their freely elected government is clearly kicking us out? I think after EIGHT LONG YEARS with little to show for it except thousands of American lives lost or injured and a trillion dollars gone, Americans have a right to wise up and change their mind and say enough.... What the heck are we doing in Iraq? And that is just what happened. America wised up.
-
Woof,
Regardless of what has passed in Iraq, the cost in lives, money and time, the mistakes made, any moral obligation and so on, the troops are no longer there now. However, that doesn't mean that Iraq just dropped off the face of the planet. There are still going to be consequences to be paid for those troops not being there and it's going to continue to cost us lives, money and time, the difference being that we are going to have much less control of a continuing situation and there is no telling what the future cost's will be. People are acting like we can just wash our hands of it and walk away, that is simply not the case.
P.C.
-
Bigdog, thank you for your response. On the analogy, let's try to compromise. I'm glad you agree "they aren't blood". I would go further and say Iraq is not "adopted". We adopted Hawaii and Alaska. They have
become part of our "blood" family and if attacked, we will respond with the full fury of our ability stopping at nothing to defeat our immediate blood family's enemy.
Rather, I look upon Iraq as at most a 7 year old foster care child. "Foster care is temporary care provided to children who have been removed from their home due to abuse or neglect. Foster parents are responsible for the day-to-day care of a child, ..." "Foster care is a temporary situation, and is dependent on this child's family circumstances. This can range from days to months, or even years. The main goal is to safely reunite a child with his or her family."
Iraq will never be our "blood family" nor does any American intend to "adopt" Iraq. Out of the goodness of our heart, like to a foster child, we will provide short to immediate term care. But they are not our long term responsibility. Our goal is to make them independent. After eight years, like from a foster child we can with honor walk away after all that we have done for Iraq. And while I hope for their best, like a foster child, I bare no future responsibility for Iraq other than to say I tried my best; the same I would say if I was a foster parent.
As to time, I appreciate your point, however for America, the Revolution and even the Civil War are ancient history. Further, I would ague that "time" seems to have accelerated. Changes are happening more frequently. I am not criticizing Edinburgh's concept of time (I spent a lovely month in Edinburgh), but the world is changing much faster than that small town. Eight years is a long time for a mere foster child relationship. It was too long in Iraq.
-
What I don't understand about this story is the delay. I suppose Iran didn't want it to look like the US leaving and them coming in were related events.
12/25 http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-12-25/news/30556663_1_iraq-coalition-casualty-count-status-of-forces-agreement-1st-cavalry-division FORT HOOD, Texas: Last US troops out of Iraq make it home for Christmas
12/26 http://www.businessinsider.com/iran-declares-its-ready-to-expand-military-ties-with-iraq-2011-12
Iran Declares It Is Ready To Expand Military Ties With Iraq
A week after U.S. forces pulled out of Iraq, Iran has announced its willingness to expand its military and security links with Baghdad.
The AFP reports Iranian General Hassan Firouzabadi praised the "forced departure" of U.S. troops, saying it ""was due to the resistance and determination of the Iraqi people and the government."
Firouzabadi: "Iran was now ready to expand its military and security ties with Iraq."
-
CW:
Thank you. Yes it gets rough and tumble around here (indeed to the point where sometimes guidance needs to be given) but in our search for Truth, cheap shot comments at America are not in play. BTW, I would point out this thread. http://dogbrothers.com/phpBB2/index.php?topic=2184.0
Again, thank you.
Marc
-
I did compromise, JDN. You aren't going to get me to make a claim that the US lacks a responsibility to Iraq. Short term outlooks come back to bite countries in the ass in the long term. See: the end of WWI; the end of US support in post-Soviet Afghanistan; and arguably the lack of invasion of Iraq under GHW Bush. Countries that lack long term vision make mistake after mistake after mistake.
Bigdog, thank you for your response. On the analogy, let's try to compromise. I'm glad you agree "they aren't blood". I would go further and say Iraq is not "adopted". We adopted Hawaii and Alaska. They have
become part of our "blood" family and if attacked, we will respond with the full fury of our ability stopping at nothing to defeat our immediate blood family's enemy.
Rather, I look upon Iraq as at most a 7 year old foster care child. "Foster care is temporary care provided to children who have been removed from their home due to abuse or neglect. Foster parents are responsible for the day-to-day care of a child, ..." "Foster care is a temporary situation, and is dependent on this child's family circumstances. This can range from days to months, or even years. The main goal is to safely reunite a child with his or her family."
Iraq will never be our "blood family" nor does any American intend to "adopt" Iraq. Out of the goodness of our heart, like to a foster child, we will provide short to immediate term care. But they are not our long term responsibility. Our goal is to make them independent. After eight years, like from a foster child we can with honor walk away after all that we have done for Iraq. And while I hope for their best, like a foster child, I bare no future responsibility for Iraq other than to say I tried my best; the same I would say if I was a foster parent.
As to time, I appreciate your point, however for America, the Revolution and even the Civil War are ancient history. Further, I would ague that "time" seems to have accelerated. Changes are happening more frequently. I am not criticizing Edinburgh's concept of time (I spent a lovely month in Edinburgh), but the world is changing much faster than that small town. Eight years is a long time for a mere foster child relationship. It was too long in Iraq.
-
"The U.S. has a moral imperative that few, if any, other nations have or have ever had historically. It kills me when politics undermines the actions we take. If we are to have a moral purpose in the world, we need to have a credible committment to act responsibly."
First, I don't agree that few if any other nations have ever had. Many nations have had over thousands of years.
Second, politics has actually forced us to be extemely poltically correct in foreign policy. WE ahve already gone to extraordianry lengths to protect the life and limb of non citizens at much cost to us.
"and arguably the lack of invasion of Iraq under GHW Bush"
Wow.
-
IIRC the invasion of Iraq in Gulf War was forestalled by our promises to the UN made in return for putting the huge coalition together.
Returning to the subject of the moment, moral obligations, here's this from today's Pravda on the Beach http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-iraq-interpreters-20111227,0,2012248.story
-
"Progressive" politics in foreign policy.
We are never good enough we never do enough it is our moral obligation to fix everything and protect everyone overseas.
Smart war smart power. Smart assination. Advancing freedom.
Does anyone else see the endless creeping game this is; very akin to progressivism in domestic policy. That every wrong, every unequality, has government action as it's answer? Lest we be morally berift.
No individual responsibility to those overseas. They need out help. They need their nanny. etc.
-
Give me a list of nations, historically, with a moral imperative similar to the US.
And I am not making the argument that the US should have invaded Iraq at the end of the Gulf War (and Guro you do recall correctly). But don't pretend you've never heard the argument, ccp. The argument HAS BEEN MADE.
"The U.S. has a moral imperative that few, if any, other nations have or have ever had historically. It kills me when politics undermines the actions we take. If we are to have a moral purpose in the world, we need to have a credible committment to act responsibly."
First, I don't agree that few if any other nations have ever had. Many nations have had over thousands of years.
Second, politics has actually forced us to be extemely poltically correct in foreign policy. WE ahve already gone to extraordianry lengths to protect the life and limb of non citizens at much cost to us.
"and arguably the lack of invasion of Iraq under GHW Bush"
Wow.
-
By AYAD ALLAWI, OSAMA AL-NUJAIFI and RAFE AL-ESSAWI
Published: December 27, 2011
IRAQ today stands on the brink of disaster. President Obama kept his campaign pledge to end the war here, but it has not ended the way anyone in Washington wanted. The prize, for which so many American soldiers believed they were fighting, was a functioning democratic and nonsectarian state. But Iraq is now moving in the opposite direction — toward a sectarian autocracy that carries with it the threat of devastating civil war.
Since Iraq’s 2010 election, we have witnessed the subordination of the state to Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki’s Dawa party, the erosion of judicial independence, the intimidation of opponents and the dismantling of independent institutions intended to promote clean elections and combat corruption. All of this happened during the Arab Spring, while other countries were ousting dictators in favor of democracy. Iraq had a chance to demonstrate, for the first time in the modern Middle East, that political power could peacefully pass between political rivals following proper elections. Instead, it has become a battleground of sects, in which identity politics have crippled democratic development.
We are leaders of Iraqiya, the political coalition that won the most seats in the 2010 election and represents more than a quarter of all Iraqis. We do not think of ourselves as Sunni or Shiite, but as Iraqis, with a constituency spanning the entire country. We are now being hounded and threatened by Mr. Maliki, who is attempting to drive us out of Iraqi political life and create an authoritarian one-party state.
In the past few weeks, as the American military presence ended, another military force moved in to fill the void. Our homes and offices in Baghdad’s Green Zone were surrounded by Mr. Maliki’s security forces. He has laid siege to our party, and has done so with the blessing of a politicized judiciary and law enforcement system that have become virtual extensions of his personal office. He has accused Iraq’s vice president, Tariq al-Hashimi, of terrorism; moved to fire Deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlaq; and sought to investigate one of us, Rafe al-Essawi, for specious links to insurgents — all immediately after Mr. Maliki returned to Iraq from Washington, wrongly giving Iraqis the impression that he’d been given carte blanche by the United States to do so.
After Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. urged all parties to maintain a unity government on Dec. 16, Mr. Maliki threatened to form a government that completely excluded Iraqiya and other opposition voices. Meanwhile, Mr. Maliki is welcoming into the political process the Iranian-sponsored Shiite militia group Asaib Ahl al-Haq, whose leaders kidnapped and killed five American soldiers and murdered four British hostages in 2007.
It did not have to happen this way. The Iraqi people emerged from the bloody and painful transition after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime hoping for a brighter future. After the 2010 election, we felt there was a real opportunity to create a new Iraq that could be a model for the region. We needed the United States to protect the political process, to prevent violations of the Constitution and to help develop democratic institutions.
For the sake of stability, Iraqiya agreed to join the national unity government following a landmark power-sharing agreement reached a year ago in Erbil. However, for more than a year now Mr. Maliki has refused to implement this agreement, instead concentrating greater power in his own hands. As part of the Erbil agreement, one of us, Ayad Allawi, was designated to head a proposed policy council but declined this powerless appointment because Mr. Maliki refused to share any decision-making authority.
After the 2010 election, Mr. Maliki assumed the roles of minister of the interior, minister of defense and minister for national security. (He has since delegated the defense and national security portfolios to loyalists without parliamentary approval.) Unfortunately, the United States continued to support Mr. Maliki after he reneged on the Erbil agreement and strengthened security forces that operate without democratic oversight.
Now America is working with Iraqis to convene another national conference to resolve the crisis. We welcome this step and are ready to resolve our problems peacefully, using the Erbil agreement as a starting point. But first, Mr. Maliki’s office must stop issuing directives to military units, making unilateral military appointments and seeking to influence the judiciary; his national security adviser must give up complete control over the Iraqi intelligence and national security agencies, which are supposed to be independent institutions but have become a virtual extension of Mr. Maliki’s Dawa party; and his Dawa loyalists must give up control of the security units that oversee the Green Zone and intimidate political opponents.
The United States must make clear that a power-sharing government is the only viable option for Iraq and that American support for Mr. Maliki is conditional on his fulfilling the Erbil agreement and dissolving the unconstitutional entities through which he now rules. Likewise, American assistance to Iraq’s army, police and intelligence services must be conditioned on those institutions being representative of the nation rather than one sect or party.
For years, we have sought a strategic partnership with America to help us build the Iraq of our dreams: a nationalist, liberal, secular country, with democratic institutions and a democratic culture. But the American withdrawal may leave us with the Iraq of our nightmares: a country in which a partisan military protects a sectarian, self-serving regime rather than the people or the Constitution; the judiciary kowtows to those in power; and the nation’s wealth is captured by a corrupt elite rather than invested in the development of the nation.
We are glad that your brave soldiers have made it home for the holidays and we wish them peace and happiness. But as Iraq once again teeters on the brink, we respectfully ask America’s leaders to understand that unconditional support for Mr. Maliki is pushing Iraq down the path to civil war.
Unless America acts rapidly to help create a successful unity government, Iraq is doomed.
Ayad Allawi, leader of the Iraqiya coalition, was Iraq’s prime minister from 2004-5. Osama al-Nujaifi is the speaker of the Iraqi Parliament. Rafe al-Essawi is Iraq’s finance minister.
-
Second post of the morning
For the record, IIRC it was Bremer who made the decision to disband the Iraqi Army. That noted, I think it worth the time to read his current take on things.
Please do note (attention JDN :wink:) his echoing of my point that Baraq telegraphed to the Iraqis a complete lack of intention to stay-- which underlines the plea of the Iraqis in my previous post.
==============
By L. PAUL BREMER
Geography is forever and Iraq lives in a rough neighborhood. For millennia, leaders in Mesopotamia have survived by making fine calculations about power. And in the wake of the U.S. decision to withdraw all troops from their country, Iraq's leaders have drawn their own conclusions about what comes next. Events so far seriously impair the security and economic gains of the last four years, and endangers the slow but steady progress toward a sustainable political settlement.
The year after the American-led coalition overthrew Saddam's dictatorship in 2003, al Qaeda in Iraq revealed a cynical plan to kill and maim Shiites to spark a sectarian war. It almost worked. Only President George W. Bush's courageous decision to surge additional troops in early 2007 saved the country.
Iraqi civilian casualties this year have been less than 5% what they were in 2007. In the wake of better security, the Iraqi economy has blossomed. According to the Brookings Institution's Iraq Index, per capita income today is six times what it was under Saddam. Three times as many Iraqis have access to drinkable water. Thirty times as many have telephones.
A residual American military presence in Iraq would have helped us achieve three security goals: striking al Qaeda and Iranian terrorists still active in Iraq; helping train Iraqi security forces; and dampening tensions along the "green line," the contested demarcation between the Kurdish north and Arab south. Our withdrawal makes all three objectives more difficult to sustain.
EnBut the most important reasons for a continued American military presence were always political. Such a presence would demonstrate to Iraq's neighbors—and especially to Iran—that America had a lasting interest in containing the Iranian quest for regional hegemony. It would also be a clear sign of American intent to stick with the Iraqis as they work to develop durable political institutions.
The benefits of a continued military presence were illustrated by the political conflagration that flared within 24 hours of our departure. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a Shiite, issued an arrest warrant for the country's vice president, a Sunni, who then fled to the northern Kurdish area.
It did not have to be this way. Last year, American military commanders recommended retaining a minimum of 20,000 troops after 2011 to maintain stability. Quiet diplomacy had secured the agreement of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani not to oppose a continued American presence. That gave Mr. Maliki maneuvering room with his Islamist followers.
But this summer, extensive leaks in Washington made clear that the administration was prepared to consider a residual force of only 3,000. Such a force would be barely sufficient to provide for its own protection, let alone carry out the three necessary security tasks. This was understood in Baghdad—but how could an Iraqi leader ask for more troops than the U.S. government was offering? They could only conclude that the American government was not serious about staying on.
The administration compounded the problem with its approach to the question of immunities for our troops if they were to stay on. Naturally the U.S. had to insist on those immunities, which have been an essential feature of all Status of Forces Agreements we have signed over the past half century—including the one with Iraq. This issue was sensitive for Iraqi politicians but the American approach made it impossible by insisting that the Iraqi Parliament, not just the government, had to approve any immunities.
Iraqi leaders decided that these two hurdles made the game not worth the candle. One resists with difficulty the conclusion that some in the U.S. government intended this outcome, which allowed them to argue that the U.S. wanted to keep troops in Iraq but the Iraqis refused to provide the necessary immunities. In any event, a post-American crisis was not long in coming.
Where does this leave us? The stakes could not be higher. Much depends on how the current crisis is resolved. Further collapse would be a disaster for Iraqis, leading to more terrorism there and elsewhere and possibly threatening Iraq's young democratic institutions. It would do serious damage to American interests, too, leaving Iran in a position to assert more influence in Iraq and the region.
A better outcome could strengthen Iraqi's young political institutions. To encourage that path, the U.S. needs to move vigorously on the political and diplomatic fronts in Iraq and with its neighbors. We should mount a full-court effort to broaden economic, commercial and cultural relations between the U.S. and Iraq while we encourage a peaceful resolution of today's political impasse.
This past week's bombings in Baghdad also underscore the need for better intelligence about the terrorist threat. Regrettably, the most useful intelligence can be collected only on the ground, and we have lost a significant capability through our withdrawal. Still, we should work to expand intelligence cooperation with the Iraqis.
We should also seek ways to extend our contacts with the Iraqi military, with the eventual goal of returning at least a cadre of U.S. forces to Iraq. Training Iraqi forces outside Iraq, in the U.S. or elsewhere, could be a useful step. Finally, we should recognize that most Iraqis don't want to become pawns of Iran and would welcome robust American diplomatic engagement in the region to balance Iranian influence.
President Obama made a serious mistake in withdrawing all American forces. He has a chance to begin to remedy the results, but there's no time to lose.
Mr. Bremer was U.S. presidential envoy to Iraq in 2003-04.
-
Frankly, as you indirectly pointed out, if Bremer did not make the foolish decision to disband the Iraqi Army, we wouldn't be needed in Iraq to maintain the peace. I don't see him acknowledging that he made a "serious mistake".
Another issue as this article points out is immunity. "Naturally the U.S. had to insist on those immunities, which have been an essential feature of all Status of Forces Agreements we have signed over the past half century—including the one with Iraq." We needed a clear agreement signed by Parliament otherwise downstream there could be problems.
I'm not against 20,000 troops remaining. My point, as well as American's point is that I never heard a plea for us to stay. I never heard, We (Iraq) will do whatever it takes, but "please stay". No appreciation. Instead, they kick us out and hurl insults at us. Are we to stay against their government's will? We have gone to extraordinary lengths to help Iraq, thousands of American's have died, we have spent a trillion dollars, and we have little thanks or anything else to show for it. I, and most Americans are glad we are gone. As CCP so succinctly put it, "If Iraq falls apart now - screw em."
-
Never heard a plea to stay?
Lets try this again:
A)
By AYAD ALLAWI, OSAMA AL-NUJAIFI and RAFE AL-ESSAWI
Published: December 27, 2011
IRAQ today stands on the brink of disaster. President Obama kept his campaign pledge to end the war here, but it has not ended the way anyone in Washington wanted. The prize, for which so many American soldiers believed they were fighting, was a functioning democratic and nonsectarian state. But Iraq is now moving in the opposite direction — toward a sectarian autocracy that carries with it the threat of devastating civil war.
Since Iraq’s 2010 election, we have witnessed the subordination of the state to Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki’s Dawa party, the erosion of judicial independence, the intimidation of opponents and the dismantling of independent institutions intended to promote clean elections and combat corruption. All of this happened during the Arab Spring, while other countries were ousting dictators in favor of democracy. Iraq had a chance to demonstrate, for the first time in the modern Middle East, that political power could peacefully pass between political rivals following proper elections. Instead, it has become a battleground of sects, in which identity politics have crippled democratic development.
We are leaders of Iraqiya, the political coalition that won the most seats in the 2010 election and represents more than a quarter of all Iraqis. We do not think of ourselves as Sunni or Shiite, but as Iraqis, with a constituency spanning the entire country. We are now being hounded and threatened by Mr. Maliki, who is attempting to drive us out of Iraqi political life and create an authoritarian one-party state.
In the past few weeks, as the American military presence ended, another military force moved in to fill the void. Our homes and offices in Baghdad’s Green Zone were surrounded by Mr. Maliki’s security forces. He has laid siege to our party, and has done so with the blessing of a politicized judiciary and law enforcement system that have become virtual extensions of his personal office. He has accused Iraq’s vice president, Tariq al-Hashimi, of terrorism; moved to fire Deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlaq; and sought to investigate one of us, Rafe al-Essawi, for specious links to insurgents — all immediately after Mr. Maliki returned to Iraq from Washington, wrongly giving Iraqis the impression that he’d been given carte blanche by the United States to do so.
After Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. urged all parties to maintain a unity government on Dec. 16, Mr. Maliki threatened to form a government that completely excluded Iraqiya and other opposition voices. Meanwhile, Mr. Maliki is welcoming into the political process the Iranian-sponsored Shiite militia group Asaib Ahl al-Haq, whose leaders kidnapped and killed five American soldiers and murdered four British hostages in 2007.
It did not have to happen this way. The Iraqi people emerged from the bloody and painful transition after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime hoping for a brighter future. After the 2010 election, we felt there was a real opportunity to create a new Iraq that could be a model for the region. We needed the United States to protect the political process, to prevent violations of the Constitution and to help develop democratic institutions.
For the sake of stability, Iraqiya agreed to join the national unity government following a landmark power-sharing agreement reached a year ago in Erbil. However, for more than a year now Mr. Maliki has refused to implement this agreement, instead concentrating greater power in his own hands. As part of the Erbil agreement, one of us, Ayad Allawi, was designated to head a proposed policy council but declined this powerless appointment because Mr. Maliki refused to share any decision-making authority.
After the 2010 election, Mr. Maliki assumed the roles of minister of the interior, minister of defense and minister for national security. (He has since delegated the defense and national security portfolios to loyalists without parliamentary approval.) Unfortunately, the United States continued to support Mr. Maliki after he reneged on the Erbil agreement and strengthened security forces that operate without democratic oversight.
Now America is working with Iraqis to convene another national conference to resolve the crisis. We welcome this step and are ready to resolve our problems peacefully, using the Erbil agreement as a starting point. But first, Mr. Maliki’s office must stop issuing directives to military units, making unilateral military appointments and seeking to influence the judiciary; his national security adviser must give up complete control over the Iraqi intelligence and national security agencies, which are supposed to be independent institutions but have become a virtual extension of Mr. Maliki’s Dawa party; and his Dawa loyalists must give up control of the security units that oversee the Green Zone and intimidate political opponents.
The United States must make clear that a power-sharing government is the only viable option for Iraq and that American support for Mr. Maliki is conditional on his fulfilling the Erbil agreement and dissolving the unconstitutional entities through which he now rules. Likewise, American assistance to Iraq’s army, police and intelligence services must be conditioned on those institutions being representative of the nation rather than one sect or party.
For years, we have sought a strategic partnership with America to help us build the Iraq of our dreams: a nationalist, liberal, secular country, with democratic institutions and a democratic culture. But the American withdrawal may leave us with the Iraq of our nightmares: a country in which a partisan military protects a sectarian, self-serving regime rather than the people or the Constitution; the judiciary kowtows to those in power; and the nation’s wealth is captured by a corrupt elite rather than invested in the development of the nation.
We are glad that your brave soldiers have made it home for the holidays and we wish them peace and happiness. But as Iraq once again teeters on the brink, we respectfully ask America’s leaders to understand that unconditional support for Mr. Maliki is pushing Iraq down the path to civil war.
Unless America acts rapidly to help create a successful unity government, Iraq is doomed.
Ayad Allawi, leader of the Iraqiya coalition, was Iraq’s prime minister from 2004-5. Osama al-Nujaifi is the speaker of the Iraqi Parliament. Rafe al-Essawi is Iraq’s finance minister.
B0
"It did not have to be this way. Last year, American military commanders recommended retaining a minimum of 20,000 troops after 2011 to maintain stability. Quiet diplomacy had secured the agreement of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani not to oppose a continued American presence. That gave Mr. Maliki maneuvering room with his Islamist followers.
"But this summer, extensive leaks in Washington made clear that the administration was prepared to consider a residual force of only 3,000. Such a force would be barely sufficient to provide for its own protection, let alone carry out the three necessary security tasks. This was understood in Baghdad—but how could an Iraqi leader ask for more troops than the U.S. government was offering? They could only conclude that the American government was not serious about staying on.
"The administration compounded the problem with its approach to the question of immunities for our troops if they were to stay on. Naturally the U.S. had to insist on those immunities, which have been an essential feature of all Status of Forces Agreements we have signed over the past half century—including the one with Iraq. This issue was sensitive for Iraqi politicians but the American approach made it impossible by insisting that the Iraqi Parliament, not just the government, had to approve any immunities."
-
I'm sure a few people in Iraq gave a plea for us to stay, but they are hard to hear among the roar of "get out".
But the majority, the Iraqi government, their freely elected Prime Minister have wanted us out for a long time. Even before Obama was elected, when asked in and interview with SPIEGEL when he thinks US troops should leave Iraq, Maliki responded "as soon as possible, as far as we are concerned." Note Maliki was freely elected by the people of Iraq; someone we supported, a man Bush in particular supported.
America is hated in the Middle East - I think on this forum in particular that fact is known. Why stay where you are not wanted, but hated?
Sorry, but I think you can find article after article confirming the Iraqi government's and the people of Iraq saying "get out" or much much worse.
I'ld rather not "try this again", lose more American lives or spend another trillion dollars. Instead, I am happy we got out.
-
What do they call it, 2 wolves and a sheep voting on what to have for dinner? Or is it one wolf and 2 sheep with the wolf counting the votes - same outcome.
"if Bremer did not make the foolish decision to disband the Iraqi Army, we wouldn't be needed in Iraq to maintain the peace."
There never was some easy answer for all of this.
"I'm not against 20,000 troops remaining."
Yes, that is the concept. Pull back, but maintain some presence and some readiness. Dems used to argue for pulling our troops to the 'horizon', not complete abandonment.
"If Iraq falls apart now - screw em."
Iraq is globally strategic. If Iraq falls apart, we are all screwed. What we fear from Iran is twice as large and more than twice as dangerous when Iran dominates Iraq.
"I never heard a plea for us to stay"
See Crafty's Allawi post!
"For years, we have sought a strategic partnership with America to help us build the Iraq of our dreams: a nationalist, liberal, secular country, with democratic institutions and a democratic culture. But the American withdrawal may leave us with the Iraq of our nightmares: a country in which a partisan military protects a sectarian, self-serving regime rather than the people or the Constitution; the judiciary kowtows to those in power; and the nation’s wealth is captured by a corrupt elite rather than invested in the development of the nation...Unless America acts rapidly to help create a successful unity government, Iraq is doomed."
We didn't hear? Or we didn't listen?
-
"Give me a list of nations, historically, with a moral imperative similar to the US."
Wait a second. Are you saying morality was invented by the US?
The concept of kindness to one's neighbor and that war is evil is hardly new.
am not clear why you are going off that this country is suddenly assigned with a global moral crusade.
As for,
the argument that Bush senior made a mistake in not finishing the job and not being new is of course correct.
I pointed out in previous posts how he dangerously put the US in the position of losing its independence in taking action by making precedents that we can no longer unilaterally act (whether in our best interests or not) without the aproval of "the international community" much of which was a crock anyway since it takes bribes to get many countries on board with the US anyway.
Iraq is globally strategic. If Iraq falls apart, we are all screwed. What we fear from Iran is twice as large and more than twice as
I posted how George Will pointed this out during the first invasion. Certainly he was not alone in seeing this as even I could see it a mile away. Crafty points out that Bush had promises to keep with this coalition thing.
That said there may not have been a right answer as to whether we should have removed Saddam the first time as a power vacuum would have ensued, and possibly Iran moved in. Who knows?
Doug writes,
"Iraq is globally strategic. If Iraq falls apart, we are all screwed. What we fear from Iran is twice as large and more than twice as dangerous when Iran dominates Iraq.
The two main problems for us:
Oil and proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Our country has truly failed to deal with both. There is no hope for either with Brockster in charge.
It is too late for a country like Pakistan. I don't know about Iran. Bockster is changing his tune now tht he needs wealthy Jewish donations for his re-election. All of a sudden with an election in 12 he is showing signs of intention to either use military force in Iran or allow Isarel to do so. OTOH perhaps this was part of the strategy in pulling out of Iraq. To better concentrate on Iran. Who knows. But I wish to God my fellow Jews would stop supporting this liberal. But 75-80% are wedded to the Democratic party. Brockster has taken away Jews worry about Iran by putting on the tale the military card. It is about time. But this all has the appearance of a polticial move to help his re election.
-
IN follow up to my post above let me place my thoughts into my own perspective:
I remember hearing and seeing the events in Somalia and thinking why can't we do something to help these people some of whom are starving. Bush senior wanted to do a humanitarian deed and look what happened.
Then we had the stories of Saddam continuing to leak out. The sheer terror and the cruelty was beyond description. I thought how can we not do something. I didn't even care about the WMD. I thought justice was enough of a reason to try to help stop the inhumanity.
We all know the rest.
I guess my point is we cannot always help. We cannot change people. There comes a point where we have to just step back and say it is YOUR responsibility.
I guess every situation is somewhat unique and we can go on hand wringing forever.
I just think most Americans think we did our best in Iraq and it is time to say it is up to them to do the right thing. IT could break up into Syunni Shia and Kurd. It could get dominated by Iran. Who knows?
-
OTOH look what happened in BosniaSerbia. Dole who pushed for air attacks then actually implemented with Clinton - luckily and a very big luckily - it worked. Without our troops having to go in there we got rid of Milosiivich with some smart weapons.
But how do we know in advance this would work.
As for Libyia I don't know what to say. 30K died. We could easily have assasinated Khaddafi from day one. We didn't because *we don't do that*. So we dragged along a bunch of regular folks in a slower war for the same result.
Of course we got to know them and of course leaders arose who can hopefully fill the void with a humane society. :| :-P
-
Helping the people agaisnt the savagery of SH was but one of the reasons we went in.
Geopolitical factors were another reason. Amongst the variables in this regard was the benefit of sitting on Iran's western border should it be necessary to prevent them from going nuclear. This variable remains quite pertinent, but IMHO we have made a major mistake in throwing this away.
Another reason was to drain the swamp of the political stagnation of Arab world which enabled and stimulated Islamic Fascism and for Iraq to set an example of what an Arab country could accomplish. I count my memory as being amongst those who remember the great joy in which the elections we enabled were held. However this too has been thrown away by a president who has clearly signalled we are getting the F out of there, regardless of the promises we have made.
The whilrlwinds of change that we see in the region now I think would have a far more promising quality than what we see now if we were to have stood strong and clear in our commitments in the aftermath of the Surge.
-
"Amongst the variables in this regard was the benefit of sitting on Iran's western border should it be necessary to prevent them from going nuclear"
Certainly that would have given us the access better than from Carriers alone - Turkey doesn't seem to want to get involved.
To me it is *extraordinarily* curious who suddenly, suddenly, we are actually hearing some whispering about military force from the military under the Brockster. Why now?
Indeed it seems more bizzare to hear that now that we did move most of our guys out of neighboring Iraq.
We are certainly not getting the behind the scenes information to understand this. It certainly has the appearance of wagging the tale from a desperate guy in the WH - no?
Does anyone know what to make of this?
(Please just don't quote Farreed the Zakaria who is just a buddy of Brock doing his utmost best to make the One look like he is still the great one.)
-
1 of 13 photos
http://news.yahoo.com/photos/dozens-dead-in-iraq-bomb-attacks-1325774158-slideshow/iraqi-security-forces-people-seen-smashed-glass-damaged-photo-130300744.html#
Scores killed in Iraq bombings targeting Shiites
By ADAM SCHRECK | AP – 9 hrs ago
Article: Timeline: Deadliest attacks in Iraq in last year
16 hrs ago
BAGHDAD (AP) — An apparently coordinated wave of bombings targeting Shiite Muslims killed at least 78 people in Iraq on Thursday, the second large-scale assault by militants since U.S. forces pulled out last month.
The attacks, which bore the hallmarks of Sunni insurgents, come ahead of a Shiite holy day that draws hundreds of thousands of pilgrims from across Iraq, raising fears of a deepening of sectarian bloodshed. Rifts along the country's Sunni-Shiite faultline just a few years ago pushed Iraq to the brink of civil war.
The bombings in Baghdad and outside the southern city of Nasiriyah appeared to be the deadliest in Iraq in more than a year.
Thursday's blasts occurred at a particularly unstable time for Iraq's fledgling democracy. A broad-based unity government designed to include the country's main factions is mired in a political crisis pitting politicians from the Shiite majority now in power against the Sunni minority, which reigned supreme under the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein.
Some Iraqis blame that political discord for the lethal strikes.
"We hold the government responsible for these attacks. They (the politicians) are bickering over their seats and these poor people are killed in these blasts," said Baghdad resident Ali Qassim not long after the first bomb went off.
The attacks began during Baghdad's morning rush hour when explosions struck the capital's largest Shiite neighborhood of Sadr City and another district that contains a Shiite shrine, killing at least 30 people, according to police.
Several hours later, a suicide attack hit pilgrims heading to the Shiite holy city of Karbala, killing 48, police said. The explosions took place near Nasiriyah, about 200 miles (320 kilometers) southeast of Baghdad.
Hospital officials confirmed the causalities. Authorities spoke on condition of anonymity because they weren't authorized to release figures of the dead and wounded, who numbered more than 100.
The blasts occurred in the run-up to Arbaeen, a holy day that marks the end of 40 days of mourning following the anniversary of the death of Imam Hussein, a revered Shiite figure. During this time, Shiite pilgrims — many on foot — make their way across Iraq to Karbala, south of Baghdad.
Baghdad military spokesman Maj. Gen. Qassim al-Moussawi said the aim of the attacks is "to create turmoil among the Iraqi people." He said it was too early to say who was behind the bombings.
Coordinated attacks aimed at Shiites are a tactic frequently used by Sunni insurgents.
The last U.S. combat troops left Iraq on Dec. 18, ending a nearly nine-year war. Many Iraqis worry that a resurgence of Sunni and Shiite militancy could follow the Americans' withdrawal. In 2006, a Sunni attack on a Shiite shrine triggered a wave of sectarian violence that pushed the country to the brink of civil war.
"People have real fears that the cycle of violence might be revived in this country," said Tariq Annad, a 52-year-old government employee in Sadr City, after Thursday's bombings.
Attacks on Wednesday targeted the homes of police officers and a member of a government-allied militia. Those strikes, in the cities of Baqouba and Abu Ghraib outside Baghdad, killed four people, including two children, officials said.
Two weeks earlier, militants killed at least 69 people as a wave of bombs ripped through mostly Shiite neighborhoods in Baghdad. An al-Qaida front group in Iraq claimed responsibility.
Iraq's political mess is providing further ammunition for extremists.
Shiite Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's government issued an arrest warrant for the country's top Sunni politician last month. The Sunni official, Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi, is holed up in Iraq's semiautonomous Kurdish region in the north — effectively out of reach of state security forces.
Al-Maliki's main political rival, the Sunni-backed Iraqiya bloc, is boycotting parliament sessions and Cabinet meetings to protest what its members say are efforts by the government to consolidate power.
Gala Riani, a Middle East analyst at IHS Global Insight, said the political storm feeds into Sunni fears they could be marginalized by the Shiite-dominated government — worries that Sunni militants are trying to exploit.
"The political crisis has set up a perfect scenario for Sunni militants to re-establish themselves," she said. "It's very sectarian in nature and gives them fuel for their fire."
While the political showdown appears far from being resolved, there are tentative signs of progress.
Al-Maliki met Thursday with the Sunni speaker of parliament, Osama al-Nujaifi, a member of al-Hashemi's Iraqiya party. In televised comments afterward, they described the talks as positive and said they will work to find a way out of the crisis.
Earlier, both men condemned Thursday's bombings.
In Washington, State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland also denounced the "terrorist violence" in Iraq and called the attacks "desperate attempts by the same kind of folk who've been active in Iraq trying to turn back the clock."
Britain's Foreign Office minister for the Middle East and North Africa, Alistair Burt, urged Iraq's leaders to renew their efforts to break the political impasse.
Meanwhile, six Iraqiya lawmakers broke ranks with their party over the boycott by attending a parliament session. Ahmed al-Jubouri, one of the Iraqiya lawmakers who participated, said he did so to "encourage all blocs to sit together and open dialogue."
___
Associated Press writers Sameer N. Yacoub, Qassim Abdul-Zahra and Mazin Yahya in Baghdad, and David Stringer in London contributed to this report.
P.C.
-
Summary
A Sunni-Shia standoff has taken shape in Iraq following the U.S. military
withdrawal. While the Sunnis are looking to such outside actors as the United States
and Turkey to intervene on their behalf, Iran continues to hold more influence in
Iraq than any other country. Ideally, Tehran would like to keep Iraq in a manageable
state of instability. Indeed, Tehran will have to perform a delicate balancing act
in resolving the Shia-Sunni standoff, helping its Shia proxies enough to retain its
influence but preventing them from becoming too powerful.
Analysis
Iraq's political, ethnic and sectarian groups saw the December 2011 U.S. military
departure as an opportunity to grab for power. Even Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri
al-Maliki tried to capitalize on the U.S. departure, as evidenced by his attempted
arrest of Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, the country's highest-ranking Sunni
official, on terrorism-related charges. Al-Hashimi evaded arrest by fleeing to
northern Iraq's Kurdish enclave, under the auspices of Iraqi President Jalal
Talabani.
The incident has created a standoff between al-Maliki's Shia-dominated government
and the country's Sunnis, represented by the al-Iraqiya bloc, and has exacerbated
tensions between the Iraqi and Kurdish governments. It has also exposed rifts
between al-Maliki and the movement led by Iraqi Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr, which
holds more seats in parliament than any other Shiite political group.
While the Sunnis have sought Turkish and U.S. political assistance in the matter,
Ankara and Washington have markedly less influence in Iraq than Tehran. In fact,
Iran has been trying to assuage tensions in Iraq, as shown by its appointing senior
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force commander Gen. Sardar Majidi to mediate
the Sunni-Shia standoff. The challenge for Tehran is to ensure a resolution of the
current crisis without empowering the Sunnis.
In similar past situations Iran has played one faction off the other, maintaining
its influence over Iraq's Shia community without weakening the Shia position
overall. Despite being competitors, both al-Maliki's and al-Sadr's factions realize
they need to work with one another. But the current situation is slightly different
than those of the past. Iran not only has to secure Shiite unity but also make sure
al-Maliki's moves against the Sunnis do not go too far. Iran cannot afford to
alienate the Sunnis entirely, especially with so much uncertainty in Syria. Should
the Alawite government in Damascus give way to Sunni government -- or if there is
anarchy -- Iraqi Sunnis could feel so empowered as to confront the Shia who
currently dominate Baghdad.
Unchecked instability in Iraq is not in Iran's interest, especially now that
Tehran's influence in Syria is threatened. In truth, the current situation in
Baghdad is ideal for the Iranians, considering it took nine months for Iraqis to
create a government after the March 7, 2010, parliamentary elections. However,
managed Iraqi instability is useful for Iran because it keeps Iraq within Iran's
sphere of influence -- and because it can be used as leverage against the United
States. But if such instability threatens Shia political domination, Tehran would
have to intervene to ensure that its foreign policy interests were not undermined.
Another problem is that Tehran's interests differ from those of its various Shia
proxies. While Iran certainly has influence over Iraq's Shia community, this
influence is limited by differences within Iraq's Shia factions. In fact, the
leaders of Iraq's two main Shia factions, al-Maliki and al-Sadr, on several
occasions have tried to free themselves from Iranian influence. Al-Maliki attempted
to do so when he formed the State of Law coalition and contested the parliamentary
elections independently of the Iraqi National Alliance. As al-Maliki tightens his
control over Iraq -- he is the acting interior minister, defense minister and
national security chief -- Iran is careful not to see him become too powerful or
allow him to upset the balance Tehran has been trying to maintain.
Interestingly, Iran was instrumental in al-Maliki's winning the Iraqi premiership.
He was able to win the post because of his post-election partnership with the Iraqi
National Alliance. This partnership formed a super Shia bloc that collectively won
159 seats, allowing al-Maliki to prevent his biggest rival, al-Iraqiya leader Iyad
Allawi, from becoming prime minister. The Iranians were heavily involved in this
post-election engineering.
Al-Maliki also was aided by support from his Shia rivals, whom he could not afford
to alienate. If his Sunni opponents were to somehow persuade these opponents to
abandon their support of al-Maliki, they might be able to remove him. But al-Maliki
is betting his rivals will refrain from going that far, lest they want to undertake
the daunting task of forming a new government. This gives him much leverage. Already
he is operating outside parliamentary bounds by establishing an executive branch
with sweeping powers, which is exactly the type of scenario Iran wants to avoid.
Iran has the option of working with the Kurds, who also have close ties to Tehran.
However, if the Sunnis realize that the Iranians and their Iraqi Shia allies are on
the defensive, they will try to gain more political power. In essence, the Iranians
would have to oversee a fresh power-sharing understanding in Baghdad.
A Sunni-Shia standoff has taken shape in Iraq following the U.S. military
withdrawal. While the Sunnis are looking to such outside actors as the United States
and Turkey to intervene on their behalf, Iran continues to hold more influence in
Iraq than any other country. Ideally, Tehran would like to keep Iraq in a manageable
state of instability. Indeed, Tehran will have to perform a delicate balancing act
in resolving the Shia-Sunni standoff, helping its Shia proxies enough to retain its
influence but preventing them from becoming too powerful.
-
When the last American troops came home from Iraq in December, thousands of Iraqis who had worked with the Americans were left behind. Many have already been targeted by militants, and some had taken refuge on American military bases. But once the bases were closed — or handed over to the Iraqi government — those Iraqis were forced into hiding. Unless Washington lives up to its moral obligation, many more will suffer or be killed.
The Special Immigrant Visa program was enacted by Congress in 2007 for Iraqis who helped the military, other parts of the American government and military contractors. It authorized 5,000 special visas annually — but only 3,317 were granted through 2011. Iraqis who aided American non-governmental organizations and media outlets can apply under the refugee program and are also having a hard time. But the special visa program has the worst delays.
Because of security vetting, processing has always been slow. The programs came to a near halt last year when two Iraqis living in Kentucky were charged with providing arms and money to Al Qaeda. The Obama administration then imposed additional security checks on all applicants. Approval in the Special Immigrant Visa program is now taking at least a year.
The American government never kept track of how many Iraqis it employed, so no one knows how many thousands of Iraqis are potentially eligible for admission. It is unclear exactly how many thousands of those Iraqis have visa applications pending. The administration refused to disclose a number last week.
Last July, the Iraqi Refugee Assistance Project at the Urban Justice Center, a nonprofit, put the estimate at 62,000 Iraqis, including 29,000 who worked for the Americans, plus their family members. The group now says it has been told that 19,000 cases were dropped from the process, perhaps because people went into hiding, or they were just lost track of. The Philadelphia Inquirer recently used a figure of 15,000 Special Immigrant Visa applicants.
The United States has a responsibility to rigorously screen visa applicants and ensure they pose no threat to this country. The process needs to be transparent and accountable — and it needs to work expeditiously.
Today, Iraq is more stable than it was at the height of the violence, but with American troops gone, sectarianism and bloodshed are on the rise. The State Department is concerned enough about safety trends that this month it again formally warned Americans against all but essential travel to Iraq. There should be as much concern for the Iraqis who risked their lives to work with Americans — and are still living there and still at risk.
-
Woof,
Oh that war is so yesterday, out of sight and out of mind. Sure, a few million unarmed civilians will ultimately be slaughtered because Obama wanted to make his "anti war", "peace at any cost" base happy by surrendering Iraq just before an election, but it will be spread out over the next ten to twenty years, so no one will really notice, and those deaths really don't count anyway since a real war has troops on both sides. It's the same logic used by the Left during Vietnam. Bygones.
P..C.
-
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/09/colin-powell-book_n_1503592.html
Bush insisted in his own 2010 memoir, "Decision Points," that the invasion was something he came to support only reluctantly and after a long period of reflection. During his book tour, he even cast himself as “a dissenting voice” in the run-up to war. “I didn't wanna use force,” he said.
But Powell supports the increasingly well-documented conclusion that there was actually no decision-making point -- or decision-making process -- during the events between the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, which had nothing to do with those attacks.
-
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/13/world/middleeast/us-may-scrap-costly-effort-to-train-iraqi-police.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1
"A lesson given by an American police instructor to a class of Iraqi trainees neatly encapsulated the program’s failings. There are two clues that could indicate someone is planning a suicide attack, the instructor said: a large bank withdrawal and heavy drinking."
----- -----
You may recall me ranting about exactly this sort of stuff over the past few years.
Ironically, the USIP guy mentioned in the article, Bob Perito, is somebody I mentioned this sort of stuff to a couple of months back. He seemed to disbelieve me (or didn't seem especially interested). I guess maybe the NY Times a huntin' changed his public tune?
-
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/letter-to-president-obama-in-reference-to-ali-musa-daqduq.htm
-
The Newest Oil Exporter? Iraq
We heard the "no blood for oil" refrain from the Left the entire time we were in Iraq, but the fact is that oil is a national security issue. Iraq has rebuilt its oil infrastructure to a degree that they are now exporting 2.5 million barrels per day, which is driving the price down world wide. This rebound comes in handy as neighboring Iran deals with Western sanctions beginning in July.
The Iraqi government has ambitious plans to export 10 million barrels a day within the next five years. While outside experts think that's a bit of a stretch, six million barrels a day is realistic -- and that's more than double Iraq's current output. It would give the war-torn nation an opportunity for prosperity after decades of unrest under Saddam Hussein's regime, as oil is practically the only source of revenue for Iraq. Even though there's potential for the United States to increase its oil output to a point that Middle Eastern oil would be nearly unnecessary for importation, Western companies, including Exxon Mobil, aren't hesitating to invest in Iraq, and its output, as mentioned before, plays a significant role in prices.
-
"We heard the "no blood for oil" refrain from the Left the entire time we were in Iraq, but the fact is that oil is a national security issue."
I believe the blood for oil argument was upside down. The short term effect was the opposite. Saddam was producing oil. Doing what we thought was the right thing to do for humanity and for security involved a war and a disruption. It never was any kind of attempt to take their oil fields for our own purposes as was suggested by opponents of the war. We don't even buy their oil at market price but we benefit as everyone else does from them returning to the supply market - and no longer threatening to take over gulf states like Kuwait and Saudi.
-
http://pjmedia.com/blog/what%e2%80%99s-happening-in-iraq-after-the-u-s-withdrawal/?singlepage=true
-
One of the key missions of this forum is to provide a sense of persepective over time and the ability to pull things up out of the Orwellian memory holes in which those who seek to rule us would put them out of our sight.
Michael Yon recently reminded his readers of this report from seven years ago in Iraq
================
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/the-battle-for-mosul.htm
-
Here is my brief review of the book written shortly after its publication:
Brilliant, Concise and Cogent...
June 18, 2008
In this thoroughly researched and heavily footnoted book, Horowitz and Johnson set forth and explicate with exacting precision the relentless campaign the American Left and the Democratic Party have pursued to discredit George W. Bush and the War on Islamic Fascism. Unfortunately many, if not most Americans have forgotten the details of how the Democrats and the Left have undermined our country's response to Islamic radicals beginning with the Carter administration.
The authors clearly organize their thesis into 5 sections: The Path to 9-11, The Response to 9-11, Why America Went to War, The War Against the War, and Conclusion. They demonstrate with unassailable factual narrative how Presidents Carter and Clinton, in concert with an anti-war leftist establishment and willing accomplices both in the mainstream media and the Democratic Party refused to confront our enemies, leading inexorably to the 9-11 attacks.
This was itself inexcusable, but it was unfortunately only a prelude to the shocking and unprecedented betrayal of our forces in the field - first in Afghanistan, then in Iraq. The Democrats first voted to authorize military action in Iraq using the same intelligence information the President had at his disposal, and then not only rescinded their support of our military while they were actively engaged in battle, but launched a full-scale political attack on their commander-in-chief, branding him a liar and a war criminal. This despicable and treasonous behavior has fractured America's resolve, damaged our troops' morale, and weakened the President's ability to prosecute the war. Top-ranking Democratic leaders have demonstrated by their statements and actions that they fail utterly to understand the nature of this war and its implications.
Every American owes it to themselves to become familiar with this material so that they can combat the misinformation campaign being waged internally - if unwittingly by some - on behalf of our enemies. Horowitz and Johnson have produced a tour de force analysis of what is quite possibly the most serious political betrayal in American history.
-
"They demonstrate with unassailable factual narrative..." :? :? :?
surely you joke?
"...fractured America's resolve, damaged our troops' morale, and weakened the President's ability to prosecute the war."
Thank the Lord; otherwise even more Americans would have been killed for naught. You seem to forget, it's the American People who overwhelmingly wanted this/these worthless and pointless war(s) to end. Thousands upon thousands have needlessly died, our daily life profoundly changed for the worse, it has drained our economy, billions upon billions, probably trillions of dollars has been spent all for what? As I, and I think most Americans agree, these prolonged wars in the Middle East have been a terrible terrible mistake.
Further, opposing the wars or our President's policies is neither "despicable or treasonous", but rather our patriotic duty if we disagree with policy; this freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Constitution.
Odd, I note while Obama is our Commander in Chief, Republicans have no problem criticizing him.
-
Iraq says al Qaeda members crossing into Syria
By Sylvia Westall
BAGHDAD | Thu Jul 5, 2012 2:09pm BST
(Reuters) - Iraq has "solid information" that al Qaeda militants are crossing from Iraq into Syria to carry out attacks and has sent reinforcements to the border, the foreign minister said on Thursday. (More at link)
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/07/05/uk-syria-crisis-iraq-qaeda-idUKBRE8640DK20120705
-
"Further, opposing the wars or our President's policies is neither "despicable or treasonous", but rather our patriotic duty if we disagree with policy; this freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Constitution. Odd, I note while Obama is our Commander in Chief, Republicans have no problem criticizing him."
JDN:
This is really, really tedious. Please do not waste our time with such specious nonsense. This is NOT what I said. I clearly delineated loyal dissent and disloyal acts. As examples of the latter, I specified Pravda on the Hudson and Pravda on the Beach revealing secret military programs.
-
"Further, opposing the wars or our President's policies is neither "despicable or treasonous", but rather our patriotic duty if we disagree with policy; this freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Constitution. Odd, I note while Obama is our Commander in Chief, Republicans have no problem criticizing him."
JDN:
This is really, really tedious. Please do not waste our time with such specious nonsense. This is NOT what I said. I clearly delineated loyal dissent and disloyal acts. As examples of the latter, I specified Pravda on the Hudson and Pravda on the Beach revealing secret military programs.
Tedious perhaps, I disagree, but here nor there, I was not referring to anything you said. I was quoting from Objectivist1's, "Brilliant, Concise, Cogent" :? review of Horowitz and Johnson's book posted immediately prior to my response.
-
It doesn't seem to be gathering much attention, but I'm noticing what seems to me a lot of reports of bombing and killing Iraq.
Is AQ reactivating in the vacuum left by Baraq's bug out?
I'm seeing suggestions that AQ and its ilk are behind much of the fight against Assad in Syria too.
-
Iraqi Ironies
Victor Davis Hanson
Jul 26, 2012
Amid all the stories about the ongoing violence in Syria, the most disturbing is the possibility that Syrian President Bashar Assad could either deploy the arsenal of chemical and biological weapons that his government claims it has, or provide it to terrorists.
There are suggestions that at least some of Assad's supposed stockpile may have come from Saddam Hussein's frantic, 11th-hour efforts in 2002 to hide his own weapons of mass destruction arsenals in nearby Syria. Various retired Iraqi military officers have alleged as much. Although the story was met with general neglect or scorn from the U.S. media, the present director of national intelligence, James Clapper, long ago asserted his belief in such a weapons transfer.
The Bush administration fixated on WMD in justifying the invasion of Iraq while largely ignoring more than 20 other writs to remove Saddam, as authorized by Congress in October 2002. That obsession would come back to haunt George W. Bush when stockpiles of deployable WMD failed to turn up in postwar Iraq. By 2006, "Bush lied; thousands died" was the serial charge of the antiwar left. But before long, such depots may finally turn up in Syria.
Another staple story of the last decade was the inept management of the Iraq reconstruction. Many Americans understandably questioned how civilian and military leaders allowed a brilliant three-week victory over Saddam to degenerate into a disastrous five-year insurgency before the surge finally salvaged Iraq. That fighting and reconstruction anywhere in the Middle East are difficult under any circumstances was forgotten. The press preferred instead to charge that the singular incompetence or malfeasance of Bush, Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld led to the unnecessary costs in American blood and treasure.
But perhaps that scenario needs an update as well. Journalist Rajiv Chandrasekaran's new book, "Little America: The War Within the War for Afghanistan," is a blistering critique of the Obama administration's three-year conduct of the Afghanistan war and its decision to surge troops, chronicling stupid decisions, petty infighting, arrogance and naiveté. In an earlier book on Iraq, Chandrasekaran had alleged that America's Iraq dilemmas were the result of a similarly bungling Bush administration.
So was the know-it-all reporter right then about Iraq, or is he right now about Afghanistan, or neither, or both? And will the media revise their earlier criticism and concede that America's problems in conducting difficult wars in the Middle East are inherent in the vast differences between cultures -- fault lines that likewise have baffled even Barack Hussein Obama, the acclaimed internationalist and Nobel laureate who was supposed to be singularly sensitive to customs in that part of the world?
In 2008, we were told that predator drone attacks, renditions, preventative detentions, military tribunals, the Guantanamo detention center and the surging of troops into difficult wars were all emblematic of Bush's disdain for the Constitution and his overall ineptness as a commander in chief. In 2012, these same continuing protocols are no such thing, but instead valuable antiterrorism tools, and seen as such by President Obama.
For all the biases and incompetence of Nouri al-Maliki's elected government in Iraq, the Middle East's worst dictatorship now seems to have become the region's most stable constitutional government. Given Iraq's elections, the country was relatively untouched by the mass "Arab Spring" uprisings. And despite sometimes deadly Sunni-Shiite terrorist violence and the resurgence of al Qaeda, Iraq's economy, compared with some of the other nations in the Middle East, is stable and expanding.
The overthrow of Saddam was also supposed to be a blunder in terms of grand strategy, empowering our enemies Iran and Syria. True, Saddam's ouster and the subsequent violence may have done that in the short term. But how about long-term, nine years later?
The Assad dynasty seems about to go the way of Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, Tunisia's Zine El Abidine Bin Ali and Libya's Muammar Gadhafi. Syria's grand ally, Iran -- which barely put down popular demonstrations in 2009 -- has never been more isolated and beleaguered as it deals with sanctions, international ostracism and growing unpopularity at home.
Who knows whether Saddam's fall, trial and execution, coupled with the creation of an Iraqi constitutional government, triggered a slow chain reaction against similar Arab tyrannies.
The moral of the story is that history cannot be written as it unfolds. In the case of Iraq, we still don't know the full story of Saddam's WMD, the grand strategic effects of the Iraq war, the ripples from the creation of the Iraq republic, or the relative degree of incompetence of any American administration at war in the Middle East -- and we won't for many years to come.
http://townhall.com/columnists/victordavishanson/2012/07/26/iraqi_ironies
-
The Sunni Terror Threat Beyond Iraq
For now the jihadists seem content to kill Shiites. Don't assume that will continue
By ROBIN SIMCOX
Imagine that an al Qaeda franchise emerged in a war-scarred nation with a fragile government. Imagine that this franchise launched sophisticated, coordinated attacks every four to six weeks, killing dozens—sometimes even hundreds—dwarfing the operational capacity of al Qaeda franchises in both Yemen and Somalia. Imagine it had between 800 to 1,000 individuals in its network, ranging from fighters to financiers to media operators.
This franchise would be labeled a "new front" in the War on Terror; a potentially catastrophic new threat to Western lives. Governments around the world would never dream of ignoring it.
Such a group exists today. It is called the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), and it was created in October 2006 out of the remnants of al Qaeda in Iraq. Last week the group's leader threatened Americans with attacks on U.S. soil, saying "our war with you has just begun." Hours later, the group killed more than 100 people in 40 coordinated bomb attacks in Iraq. Yet no government in the West seems in the least bit concerned. This attitude could come back to haunt us.
There are a variety of reasons for this relaxed attitude toward the ISI.
One lies in the ISI's parochialism. I recently analyzed two years of their press releases. The ISI is utterly obsessed with Iran and the "Safavid" threat (a reference to the Shiite Persian empire that ISI believes Iran is attempting to recreate). This is supported by my analysis of their intended targets of attack over the past year. Majority-Shiite areas were bombed in 86% of all major ISI attacks. When it came to ISI operations that solely targeted civilians, six out of seven attacks were aimed at Shiite-majority regions.
However, the ISI's parochialism by itself is not enough to justify ignoring it. After all, an entire wing of Somalia's al Shabaab leadership wants to focus on local, rather than global, jihad. Yet the U.S. has engaged significantly in that region on a whole range of fronts—politically, financially and militarily.
Strategic reasons also play a role. Having suffered major military defeats against Sunni tribes and the U.S. military in late 2006 and 2007, the ISI came to be regarded as a busted flush—defeated militarily and without legitimacy domestically.
In January 2011, al Qaeda's American spokesman Adam Gadahn confirmed that relations between the core and the ISI were "cut off for a number of years." A week before his death, bin Laden bemoaned the "scarcity" of correspondence with the ISI. Therefore, the ISI's fortunes are not necessarily connected to that of al Qaeda central.
That leaves the ISI's location as an explanation for the West's relative indifference. There is a great sense of Iraq fatigue in the West. The U.S. has only just managed to pull itself out the country. The last thing it wants to do is begin to think about threats from that country following the U.S. home.
Yet even this does not fully explain why the U.S. government seems so unconcerned. Despite the carnage the ISI had caused, the noises coming out of Washington last week were bordering on the delusional. U.S. officials said that the ISI remains "isolated," with its attacks not "having the desired effect." A White House spokesman said that Iraq's authorities can "handle their own security."
That is one way to look at it. Another would be that a country powerless to stop the monthly slaughter of its own citizens is not one that is "handling" its own security very effectively.
The U.S. government does not want the ISI to be a problem, because it knows—unlike in the cases of al Qaeda's affiliates in East Africa and Yemen—that there is precious little it can do about it. There is zero chance of the fallback play—armed Predator and Reaper drones—being used against militants in Iraq. Not only would it be an admission of complete strategic failure, it would fatally undermine the quasi-democracy that America helped bring about. Baghdad would fiercely object to the breach of its sovereignty. Despite eight years of blood and treasure expended, American political capital in Baghdad is disturbingly low.
President Obama oversaw an unexpectedly hasty withdrawal from Iraq, and subsequently the U.S. ceased being a significant political player. Intelligence-sharing between the countries has decreased, and there is only so much threat the U.S. military can pose to the ISI while operating out of a base in Kuwait. As a result, the U.S. can only stand idly by as the ISI murders by the hundred, attempts to reignite sectarian warfare, and explicitly threatens the American homeland.
It is tempting to believe that the U.S. and its allies can dismiss this. After all, sectarian violence in Iraq no longer threatens Western lives. We have been tempted into such delusions before. The last country with an al Qaeda presence that we ignored was called Afghanistan, and nearly 3,000 people died on 9/11 because of it. We may have lost interest in the Iraqi jihad. That does not mean it has lost interest in us.
Mr. Simcox is a research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.
-
Woof,
http://news.yahoo.com/iraqis-helping-iran-skirt-sanctions-ny-times-004556825.html (http://news.yahoo.com/iraqis-helping-iran-skirt-sanctions-ny-times-004556825.html)
....WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Iraq has been helping Iran skirt economic sanctions imposed because of its nuclear program, using a network of financial institutions and oil-smuggling operations that are providing Tehran with a crucial flow of dollars, the New York Times said on Saturday.
In some case, Iraqi government officials are turning a blind eye to trade with Iran, while other officials in Baghdad are directly profiting from the activities -- with several of them having close ties to Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, the Times said.
U.S. President Barack Obama acknowledged the problem last month when he barred a small Iraqi bank, the Elaf Islamic Bank, from any dealings with the American banking system, the newspaper said.
At the time, the president said that the bank had "facilitated transactions worth millions of dollars on behalf of Iranian banks that are subject to sanctions for their links to Iran's illicit proliferation activities."
And yet Iraqi banking experts told the Times that Elaf Islamic Bank was still participating in the Iraq Central Bank's daily auction at which commercial banks can sell Iraqi dinars and buy dollars. Through these auctions, Iran is able to bolster its reserve of dollars that are used to pay for much-needed imports.
The Times, citing sources in the Obama administration, current and former American and Iraqi officials and banking and oil experts, said Washington has privately complained to Iraqi officials about financial and logistical ties between Baghdad and Tehran.
In one recent instance, when Obama learned that the Iraqi government was aiding the Iranians by allowing them to use Iraqi airspace to ferry supplies to Syria, he called Maliki to complain, and Iranian planes then flew another route, the Times said.
Iranian organizations apparently have gained control over at least four Iraqi commercial banks through Iraqi intermediaries, which would gives Iran direct access to the international financial system, from which they are barred by the economic sanctions, the Times said.
The problem with illegal Iraq-Iran trade has become well-enough known in Baghdad that it has roiled Iraqi politics, the newspaper said.
"We want to question the central bank and the banks that are involved," Ali al-Sachri, a member of Parliament, told the Times. He said he was concerned that the huge dollar transfers threatened the economic stability of Iraq by depleting the country's foreign reserves.
Iran's ability to trade and the incoming flow of dollars is crucial to the country because the economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations and individual countries are squeezing its economy, the paper said.
(Writing by Philip Barbara; Editing by Cynthia Osterman)
P.C.
-
W's embracing of the neocons' concept of spreading democracy around the world is so far a decided failure for America's interests.
This is the thanks we get.
Reminds me of the thanks Jews get for being so worried about the underdogs.
Iraq was in retrospect a mistake. Afghanistan, I don't know how long we keep this up.
The only good thing is perhaps the right can use this against the Dems 2016 pres candidate - hillary clinton.
Of course there are already trial balloons suggesting it ain't her Sec of State failures as much as Bamster's policies. She is just doing his bidding and of course she has "privately" had great bouts of disagreements but she has just been the good soldier.
Oh she has had so many disgreements with the chosen "ONE". If only she was in charge and not subject to carrying out his policies.
The Middle East would be a peaceful lake without a ripple......
So goes the spin from the Clintonites who are just drooling to get her in position for '16. There is no way she won't run.
-
Some deep questions are presented here; I apologize for not having the time and focus at this moment for writing an extended post with my thoughts at the moment, but I disagree with the notion that Iraq was a mistake. IMHO Bush-Rumbo led the war poorly, many Dems and progressives and the Pravdas were disloyal in the nature of their opposition which had the effect of making the war much more difficult to wage successfully, and Baraq has thrown away what we did accomplish. Furthermore one must ask what would be there now had we not gone in. Reflect upon this.
-
http://pjmedia.com/blog/increasing-iraq-violence-u-s-withdrawal-to-blame/?singlepage=true
-
Pravda on the Hudson reports that Iran is using Iraqi air space to supply Syria :-P
-
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/06/opinion/forgotten-in-iraq.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_th_20121206
-
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/06/opinion/forgotten-in-iraq.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_th_20121206
This is exactly the sort of thing that enrages me.
-
The Kurdish Alliance at Risk
August 16, 2012 | 1101 GMT
Summary
Stratfor
The alliance at the base of Iraq's Kurdistan Regional Government is straining amid mounting regional tensions. Though the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan still benefit from maintaining their alliance, the underlying rifts between the two parties will widen as a broader competition intensifies between Turkey and Iran.
Analysis
The Kurdistan Democratic Party, led by Kurdistan Regional Government President Massoud Barzani, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, led by Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, currently are renegotiating a 2005 power-sharing agreement. Signed following the 2003 fall of Saddam Hussein, the agreement was essential in uniting Iraq's three Kurdish provinces under a single Kurdish administration. Prior to the agreement, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan administered the southeastern province of Sulaimaniyah while the Kurdistan Democratic Party administered the northwestern provinces of Arbil and Dahuk; party members kept to their respective domains.
Details surrounding the negotiations are unclear, but the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan apparently wants to revisit the 2005 agreement, which gave the two parties equal shares of power in the regional government. Provincial elections in 2009 upset the balance of power by strengthening the Goran party, a secular offshoot of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, as well as Islamist parties such as the Islamic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Islamic Group.
Over the past six months, Arbil residents have reported that many government institutions initially based in Sulaimaniyah have been relocated to Arbil as the Barzani clan has expanded its control at the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan's expense. Questions surrounding the health and succession of Talabani have also eroded the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan's power. Unsurprisingly, the Kurdistan Democratic Party wants to retain its advantage while the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan tries to shore up its position.
The Goran party's anti-corruption platform carries a lot of weight among Kurds who are disenchanted with corruption in the two leading parties. The Goran party's approval has increased, particularly within the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan's sphere of influence. Many Goran members are former Patriotic Union of Kurdistan officials. In fact, Goran party leader Nawshirwan Mustafa served as a Peshmerga commander and then as the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan's secretary-general from 1976-2006 before founding the Goran party in 2009. For many Kurdish youths and for disaffected members of the two leading parties, the Goran offers a fresher alternative.
The rise of the Goran party exposed the liability of a joint political ticket between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan: Both parties are seen as stale and corrupt. While each party is trying to distance itself from the other, both parties are independently reaching out to the Goran party to try to form an alliance. The parties view such a potential cooperation as a way to improve their political image and ultimately undercut their long-time rival. With Kurdish politics in such flux, neither party cares to test the voters' will in fresh elections. In June, provincial elections were delayed for the fourth time -- this time indefinitely.
The External Factor
Internal fractures are endemic to Kurdish tribal politics. A mountainous territory has long given the Kurds refuge from surrounding enemies, but it also has cemented divisions in power and tradition between the more conservative, Kurmanji-speaking peoples of the northwest, where the Kurdistan Democratic Party has its power base, and the more left-leaning, secular Sorani-speaking peoples of the southwest, which is controlled by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.
.
The natural divisions within the Kurdish landscape have allowed regional powers such as Turkey, Iran and Syria to prevent their substantial Kurdish populations from establishing a unified state that could threaten these states' own territorial integrity. Each of these states has used Kurdish divisions, as well as mutual concerns over the Kurds' aspirations for statehood, to keep Kurds divided.
Particularly detrimental to the Kurds is when more powerful neighbors exploit these fissures and play Kurdish factions off one another in the broader regional competition. This happened during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), when the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, backed respectively by Iran and Iraq, turned to their regional adversaries for help in fighting against their Kurdish rivals. A tenuous truce reached by the two parties in 1986 fell apart in 1994 -- just two years after the original formation of the Kurdistan Regional Government -- when a full-scale civil war broke out between them. In the conflict, the Kurdistan Democratic Party accused the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan of receiving support from Iran and Syria. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan meanwhile accused their rival of receiving support first from Iran, and then from Turkey.
After the United States imposed a no-fly zone in Iraqi Kurdistan in 1992, Iran and Syria worried that Washington would help foster an independent Kurdish state in order to encourage independence movements. Tehran and Damascus encouraged the Kurdistan Workers' Party -- which, known by its Kurdish acronym PKK, is Turkey's largest and most active Kurdish militant group and has bases in northern Iraq -- to attack the Kurdistan Democratic Party in hopes of derailing U.S. attempts at establishing a truce between the two leading parties. Meanwhile, Turkey grew alarmed at the prospect of a security vacuum in northern Iraq that could further empower the PKK.
The fall of Saddam Hussein marked the next turning point for Iraqi Kurds. The Kurds again united, under the aegis of the Kurdistan Regional Government, in an attempt to capitalize on the fall of their biggest and most proximate foe. Energy reserves were used to lay the economic foundation for the Kurdistan Regional Government. The alliance between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan has endured for nearly a decade, but the strategic pact is again straining under the regional balance of power.
Regional Power Struggle
Home to the world's largest Kurdish population, Turkey has long struggled to develop a policy to manage its Kurdish constituency and to neutralize Kurdish militant groups like the PKK. In recent years, Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party has prioritized political and economic engagement with the Kurds over military crackdowns. The party believed that a strategic partnership with Iraq's Kurdish leadership was essential to undercutting the PKK at home (the PKK has a crucial support base in Iraq's Qandil Mountains).
Economic leverage was important to developing this strategic partnership. Turkey is the Kurdistan Regional Government's main export corridor. As tensions grew between Arbil and Baghdad over the development of northern oil reserves and the allocation of oil revenues, Ankara offered to guarantee Iraqi Kurdistan's economic security in exchange for Arbil's cooperation in limiting PKK activities and in curtailing Kurdish ambitions for an independent state. The Justice and Development Party focused on the Barzani clan as it made these arrangements.
.
Turkey has a strategic interest in increasing its energy imports from northern Iraq, but empowering the Kurdistan Regional Government economically at the expense of Baghdad's authority is risky for Ankara. Turkey will continue to foster competition in Iraqi Kurdistan, but Ankara also needs its Kurdish partner to have real authority and the ability to keep its end of the bargain. With the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan's support base already eroding, the Barzani clan was the natural choice. Barzani's nationalist rhetoric on Kurdish statehood distressed Turkey a decade ago, but he is now Turkey's favored Kurdish politician. However, Turkey's close dealings with Barzani -- and the economic benefits that accompany this partnership -- have also isolated the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and exacerbated the divide between the two leading parties in Iraqi Kurdistan.
Turkey is not the only regional power taking a special interest in the Kurds right now. The conflict in Syria has exposed an underlying tension between Turkey and Iran. Indeed, Turkey has decided to support a Sunni rebel insurgency specifically to curb Iranian power in the Levant and to extend Turkish influence deeper into its periphery through like-minded Sunni governments.
Hoping to push Turkey to back off this strategy and to respect the Iranian sphere of influence, Tehran and Damascus are trying to pit the Kurds against Ankara. Turkey is on alert for Iranian- and Syrian-backed PKK attacks. In fact, Ankara recently carried out a major military offensive in the mostly Kurdish southeast. The operation appeared to be a pre-emptive strike against the militant group. A rise in Kurdish militant activity in Turkey's Hatay province has fed Turkish suspicions that Iran and Syria are aiding the PKK and its sympathizers in Syria.
Turkey is also highly concerned about the power vacuum developing in Syria's Kurdish northeast. Already stretched thin battling rebel forces throughout the country, the Syrian military has deliberately pulled back from Syria's Kurdish-populated northern border region with Turkey. The Syrian regime's strategy is to create a situation that will inhibit Turkish support for the Syrian rebellion. Turkey has been wary of intervening militarily in Syrian territory to contain the flow of refugees, but Ankara now faces an increasingly lawless situation in its Kurdish borderland. This environment could fuel Syrian Kurdish aspirations for autonomy, since the Kurds are unencumbered by a consolidated Arab regime in Damascus. More important for Ankara, however, is that it could allow the PKK to expand into Syria and foster militant factions to threaten Turkey.
Situated on the steppes of the Jazirah plateau, Syria's Kurdish northeast does not offer the same resources or mountainous refuge as Iraqi Kurdistan. This makes the Syrian Kurdish situation more manageable so long as Turkey can count on the support of the Barzani clan. As several editorials in the Turkish media point out, Turkey's growing reliance on Barzani has limits, but it is one of the few decent tools Ankara has to shape the Kurdish landscape in its favor.
The Syrian Kurdish landscape is already breaking apart under regional pressures. On one side, Syria and Iran are backing the PKK-linked Democratic Union Party and are trying to veer the Syrian Kurdish movement toward militancy. On the other side, Turkey and the Barzani clan are supporting the Kurdish National Council and are relying on this faction to remove PKK sympathizers from Syria. This match-up has in turn applied PKK pressure on the Kurdistan Democratic Party. The PKK already showed in the 1994 Iraqi Kurdish civil war that it will work to undermine the unity between Iraqi Kurdistan's two leading parties, especially when one faction has a working relationship with its prime adversary, Turkey.
Meanwhile, Iran can be expected to court the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan to try to undermine the relationship that Ankara has developed through Barzani. Iran has also been trying to establish a close working relationship with the up-and-coming Goran movement to expand its options in the Kurdish political scene.
With the Syrian regime waning, Iran on the defensive and Turkey on the regional ascent, the Kurdistan Regional Government will be pulled in multiple directions as its regional neighbors compete. Regional pressures are intensifying as a power imbalance within the Kurdistan Regional Government threatens to undermine the Iraqi Kurdish alliance. A little less than a decade ago, many things were going right for Iraqi Kurdistan: Saddam Hussein had fallen, foreign oil companies were moving in to develop northern energy assets and the United States had committed a large military presence in the area -- a move many Kurds interpreted as a security guarantee against hostile neighbors. At that time, there was ample reason for the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan to put aside their differences and band together to seize the historic opportunity to consolidate Iraqi Kurdish autonomy.
Currently, Turkey holds the key to Iraqi Kurdistan's energy independence. Meanwhile, U.S. military forces have withdrawn from Iraq, regional competition is growing between Iran and Turkey and the United States is developing a strategic partnership with Turkey to manage the region -- a partnership that largely eliminates any incentive for Washington to support the Kurds against Ankara's interests. In these tougher times, the cohesion of the Kurdistan Regional Government will be tested.
.
Read more: The Kurdish Alliance at Risk | Stratfor
-
Summary
Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's heavy-handed attempts to consolidate power have finally triggered a backlash from the country's Sunni minority, putting the ruling Shiite community on the defensive. The government's use of anti-terrorism laws to marginalize its opponents sparked an uprising in Sunni areas that has been ongoing for weeks. Occurring alongside a Sunni armed rebellion in Iraq's western neighbor, Syria, the unrest is destabilizing the regime in Baghdad.
In addition to unsettling Iraq's Sunnis, al-Maliki's moves have disrupted Iran's strategy for managing Iraq -- a strategy that depends on balancing various Shiite factions. And with the Sunni revival in Syria encouraging a Sunni resurgence in Iraq, Tehran has no good options to deal with the rising threat and is struggling to prevent the gains it made in Iraq over the last decade slip away.
Analysis
Given that the new Iraqi state was built under his watch, al-Maliki has been able to assume a great deal of power over the years. The country has had two elections since the approval of its new constitution in 2005, both of which produced Shiite majorities that resulted in coalition governments led by al-Maliki. In essence, since its emergence, the new system has not experienced a transfer of power. That fact, along with the already delicate communal balance, renders the Iraqi state fairly fragile.
.
For most of his time in power, al-Maliki has pursued two political objectives. First, he has worked to ensure that the Sunnis, who historically ruled the modern Iraqi nation-state, are never again able to dominate the Iraqi political system. Second, he has tried to keep his State of Law coalition at the top of the country's current ethnic and sectarian power-sharing arrangement.
From al-Maliki's perspective, the first objective cannot be accomplished without the second. As a result, he has tried to undermine opponents in parliament and has assumed powers well beyond constitutional limits, for instance, taking control of the security and energy sectors.
Al-Maliki's attempts to solidify his power have upset his fellow Shia, especially his main political rival, the al-Sadrite movement. However, the Shia have restrained their rivalries to ensure that the Sunnis cannot threaten their newfound power. Freed from the challenges of rival Shiite factions, al-Maliki has focused on keeping the Sunnis weak.
The Sunnis and al-Maliki's Dwindling Support
Initially, al-Maliki worked against the Sunnis by exploiting divisions and by drawing significant Sunni factions into the State of Law coalition. However, the last elections in March 2010 demonstrated the shortcomings of that strategy. In those elections, the State of Law came in second, winning two seats fewer than former interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi's non-sectarian al-Iraqiya List -- in large part because most Sunnis backed Allawi's party. Had he not agreed to merge the State of Law with the Iraqi National Alliance, another Shiite group, al-Maliki would not have secured a second term.
After nine months of negotiations to form his second administration, al-Maliki knew the Sunnis were still powerful, primarily because they had aligned with al-Iraqiya, the non-sectarian nationalist group with considerable nationwide appeal -- a challenge for al-Maliki's sectarian agenda. Though he did not fulfill his promises made to al-Iraqiya in exchange for joining his government, al-Maliki largely avoided confrontation until after the departure of U.S. troops at the end of 2011. The day after the U.S. military withdrawal, al-Maliki accused the country's highest-ranking Sunni official, Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi, of orchestrating several large-scale terrorist attacks in the country and ordered the arrest of many members of al-Hashemi's security detail. Al-Hashemi sought refuge in the autonomous Kurdistan region before going into exile, where he has remained (spending most of his time in Turkey) because the Iraqi judiciary sentenced him to death in absentia.
Due to divisions within al-Iraqiya and al-Hashemi's lack of broad Sunni support, the incident did not elicit a strong reaction from either al-Iraqiya or the Sunni community. However, al-Hashemi's being given sanctuary by the Kurds exacerbated Shiite-Kurdish tensions. (The row between the Shia and Kurds has steadily increased in the months since, with the two sides now battling for security control of the disputed, energy-rich Kirkuk region.) As a result, al-Maliki is simultaneously fighting the Sunnis and the Kurds, making his Iraqi Shiite allies and his Iranian supporters uncomfortable with his rule.
Stuck with al-Maliki
In early 2012, the largest Shiite political movement in parliament, the al-Sadrite movement, threatened to side with the Kurds and Sunnis, who were discussing initiating a vote of no confidence against the prime minister. Of course, the leader of the al-Sadrite movement, Muqtada al-Sadr, is motivated by his desire to eventually replace al-Maliki's faction as the leaders of the Shia. Nevertheless, in the interest of the Shiite community, he did not follow through with his threat. Though al-Maliki is a liability, Iran and the Iraqi Shia realize that replacing him without disturbing the Shiite-dominated political order would be difficult.
Similarly, the Kurds have issues with al-Maliki. Like the Shia, the Kurds have territorial disputes with the Sunnis, but al-Maliki's push for a strong central state encroaches upon their desire for increased autonomy. Still, they do not want to counter al-Maliki badly enough to risk strengthening the Sunnis.
Al-Maliki is aware of the Shia's and Kurds' reservations about challenging him, but he overestimated his advantage when he went after his own finance minister, Rafi al-Issawi. On Dec. 19, al-Maliki began arresting members of al-Issawi's security detail on terrorism charges. Unlike al-Hashemi, al-Issawi hails from a prominent tribe based in Fallujah -- the center of the Sunni insurgency from 2003 to 2007 -- and so al-Maliki's targeting of him triggered widespread protests from the Sunni community.
Syria's Role and Early Elections
Another factor in the Sunni reaction is the Sunni uprising in neighboring Syria. Iran's regional opponents (Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and others) have been hoping that once Syrian President Bashar al Assad loses control of Damascus, the Sunnis' increased clout would spill over into Iraq, rolling back Iranian influence there. In fact, there is already evidence that there is some level of cross-border coordination between Sunnis in the two countries -- due in large part to al-Maliki's controversial policies.
The protests in Iraq are the most significant Sunni uprising in five years and have knocked al-Maliki off balance. In response, the prime minister offered to release 700 female Sunni detainees who have been incarcerated for years. Seeing the government reeling has emboldened the Sunnis, who are now calling for early elections -- an option that is also being considered by the Shia as a way out of the crisis, especially considering that elections are due in a little more than a year. However, elections are unlikely to defuse the crisis because the opponents of the Shia and Iran want to erase Iranian influence in Iraq. In general, Iraqi elections tend to aggravate the country's deep ethnic and sectarian divisions because they produce highly fractured legislatures and, given the sectarian war brewing in Syria, the next election will probably have an even more polarized outcome.
Sunnis boycotted the first election in 2005 and were divided during the 2010 vote. They are likely to be more unified the next time, which means that cobbling together a coalition government will be even more difficult. Moreover, the Kurds would want to use this sectarian division to demand greater concessions on issues related to their autonomous status.
The Sunnis will be unlikely to accept their current share of political power, increasing the risk of violence. There is a strange alignment of interests between Syrian Sunni forces, transnational jihadists and Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, all of whom have their reasons for wanting to weaken Iranian influence in Iraq. Simply put, the risk of sectarian violence in Iraq is at its highest since the end of the Sunni insurgency around late 2007.
Iran Seeks a Political Solution
Iran is well aware of the stakes. While Tehran tries to maintain influence in post-al Assad Syria, it wants to make sure it does not lose ground in Iraq. The Iranians need to protect the Shiite-dominated order, which is currently more threatened by the problems created by al-Maliki than by the Sunni protests.
Al-Maliki's power grab has not just galvanized the Sunnis, it has also upended Iran's traditional strategy for managing Iraq, which consists of supporting rival Shiite forces. Al-Maliki's moves to institutionalize an independent power base has made it difficult for Iran to control him. When the Iraqi government's tensions with the Kurds and the Sunnis were under control, this was not a problem. But with the events in Syria, and with regional rivals Saudi Arabia and Turkey working to loosen Iran's grip in Iraq, Iran can no longer ignore al-Maliki's unilateralism. At the same time, al-Maliki is not easily replaceable.
Ideally, Iran wants to find a replacement for al-Maliki who can create a new power-sharing mechanism in the country that satisfies the Sunnis without empowering them. In theory, one of al-Maliki's associates in his party, Hizb al-Dawah -- such as his subordinate, Ali al-Adeeb -- could replace al-Maliki in the same way that he replaced his predecessor, former interim Prime Minister and veteran Hizb al-Dawah leader Ibrahim al-Jaafari. But unlike al-Jaafari, who governed for barely a year, al-Maliki has deeply entrenched himself in the republic.
Replacing al-Maliki would also require a new power-sharing agreement among the Shia that could lead to infighting and weaken the community's position in the country. Therefore, Iran has no choice but to get the various Shiite factions to rally behind al-Maliki. For now at least, Iran is concerned with resolving the Iraqi crisis politically and preventing the situation from descending into violence.
A political resolution would require a coherent and unified Shiite political bloc as well as concessions to the Sunnis that do not undermine the Shia's dominance. While not impossible, both of these tasks will be difficult for Iran to achieve. Major concessions, such as changing the terrorism laws and giving Sunnis more say in policymaking, would weaken the Shia, while limited concessions risk emboldening the minority community.
Although it cannot be discounted, the chances that Iran can manage the situation politically are slim. This means that Iraq could experience a fresh bout of sectarian conflict. Regardless of how the situation unfolds, Iran's position in Iraq is likely to weaken.
Read more: Iran Losing Influence in Iraq | Stratfor
-
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/01/al_qaeda_in_iraq_vid.php
-
Summary
The government of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is hoping to quell a resurgence of unrest among the country's Sunni minority by increasing the salaries of Sunni militiamen. In the short term, al-Maliki will likely be able to prevent the agitation from growing into a full-blow insurgency. However, in the long term, concessions made now will embolden the Sunnis to press the Shia-dominated central government for a more equitable share of political power.
Analysis
Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Hussain al-Shahristani announced Feb. 4 that Baghdad is increasing the salaries of the Sunni militiamen who were inducted into state security organs in 2008, when Sunni nationalist militants ended their insurgency and agreed to join the post-Baathist political system. The move comes after the federal government decided to release thousands of Sunnis who have been imprisoned for years. This prisoner release came in response to the protests that broke out in December after the al-Maliki government arrested the bodyguards of the country's fourth-highest ranking Sunni official, Finance Minister Rafi al-Issawi, on terrorism charges.
Since the arrests, al-Maliki has found himself trapped between the Sunnis, the Kurds and his Shiite allies. The backlash from the Sunnis came at a time when Baghdad's feud with the Kurds, who are seeking greater autonomy, had escalated into a standoff. Al-Maliki's resistance against both minority communities has angered his own Shiite allies and their patrons in Iran, who both see al-Maliki's personal and partisan agenda as undermining their interests.
There has been a great deal of pressure on al-Maliki from Tehran and the other Iraqi Shiite factions, especially the movement of Muqtada al-Sadr, to defuse the situation with the Sunnis and return the ethnic and religious tensions to within tolerable limits. This is especially important considering the Sunni uprising in neighboring Syria.
Complicating matters for al-Maliki, the Iraqi parliament on Jan. 26 -- with the help of a significant number of Shiite lawmakers -- passed a law that limits the prime minister to two terms, which means al-Maliki, who is in his second term, cannot remain prime minister after next year's parliamentary elections. While al-Maliki is challenging that law in the courts, he knows he has to regain the confidence of his Shiite allies, something that is possible only if he can demonstrate that he has brought the minority situation under control. To do that, he must ensure that Sunni political unrest and low-level violence does not turn into a full-blown insurgency. It is to his advantage that the Sunnis do not want to create a situation that would benefit al Qaeda and the transnational jihadists.
Part of al-Maliki's strategy is increasing the salaries of the Sunni militiamen, but that decision is also designed to exploit divisions within the Sunni community. The beneficiaries of the salary increase will be those who are already part of the security network and have been working with the al-Maliki administration. It is quite possible that in the coming weeks and months Baghdad could reach out to others in the Sunni community with similar incentives.
Al-Maliki can gain some short-term respite from these initiatives, but ultimately these concessions will embolden the Sunnis, who will not settle for occasional small benefits. Ultimately, it will be very hard for the Shia to continue to dominate Iraqi politics, particularly when Sunnis in neighboring Syria achieve a degree of empowerment.
Read more: Iraq's Shia Try to Quiet Sunni Unrest | Stratfor
-
Summary
AZHER SHALLAL/AFP/Getty Images
Iraqi Sunni protesters hold a picture of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki with slogans reading "Liar...sectarian, thief collaborator" on Jan. 4
While the political infighting and violence that have afflicted Iraq since the U.S.-led invasion in 2003 are by no means over, the Shia-dominated government has been able to channel them for its own purposes. Baghdad has accomplished this largely by pitting Iraq's two smaller ethno-sectarian groups -- the Sunnis and the Kurds -- against each other.
This tactic was seen most recently when last week Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's party, with the help of some Sunni lawmakers, pushed a new budget through parliament that allocated far less money to the Kurds -- who in previous years had been the Shiite government's main ally -- than they had requested. The government's flexibility in making alliances of convenience demonstrates that it feels relatively secure in its position and is prepared to deal with rising Sunni unrest in Iraq and elsewhere in the region, especially neighboring Syria.
Analysis
After nearly two months of wrangling, the Iraqi parliament approved a $118.6 billion budget in a March 7 session boycotted by Kurdish lawmakers. The Kurdish members of parliament refused to attend the session as a means of protesting the budget's allocation of only $650 million of the $3.5 billion requested for the Kurdistan Regional Government's debts to foreign oil companies operating within its borders.
The unprecedented manner in which Shia lawmakers and a handful of their Sunni counterparts unilaterally approved the budget is an indication that the government believes there is little risk in approving the budget without the Kurds' support, for several reasons. First, the government believes the Kurds are not likely to resort to armed insurrection or secession over a budget dispute. Second, the Kurds' only potential partner against the Shia-dominated central government is the Sunnis, who if anything have an even more strained relationship with the Kurds than the Shia do. Consequently, the Sunnis are unlikely to join with the Kurds to form a unified opposition any time soon.
The help from some of the Sunni lawmakers in approving the budget also highlights another important part of al-Maliki's strategy: keeping the Sunnis divided among themselves. Al-Maliki won the support of several Sunni lawmakers by offering pay increases to Awakening Council militias in the areas the lawmakers represent and by pledging to distribute 25 percent of the country's budget surpluses among the people, a pledge that is particularly helpful for the Sunnis, who mainly reside in areas that lack oil reserves.
Iraq's Shia, who make up about 60 percent of the country's population, are not in agreement on numerous policies, especially on how to deal with the Sunnis and Kurds. However, the various factions that make up al-Maliki's coalition have supported the prime minister as long as he has been able to show that he is preventing an alliance from developing between the Kurds and Sunnis, as well as keeping the Sunnis divided among themselves. The budget deal did both.
The Evolving Shiite Strategy
As the post-Saddam government was forming in Iraq in 2003 and for several years thereafter, the Shia aligned with the Kurds to ensure that the Sunnis, who had previously dominated the country, were effectively cut out of the political process. However, the Sunnis and Shia both had an interest in preventing the Kurds from expanding beyond the borders of the semi-autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government in the north. Despite this mutual concern, the immediate priority for the Shia was forcing the Sunnis to accept their new status as a political minority.
After the Sunnis were brought into the system from 2007 to 2008, the dispute between Baghdad and Arbil over the central government's insistence that energy development in Iraqi Kurdistan be done under Baghdad's supervision and control became more prominent. To push back against Kurdish demands, the al-Maliki administration aligned with the Sunnis, who were even less enthusiastic about Kurdish autonomy and who had a territorial dispute with the Kurds in northern Iraq, especially surrounding the oil-rich city of Kirkuk.
.
Since 2009, however, this balancing act has become more complicated. Both the Kurds and the Sunnis have become more assertive in challenging the Shia-dominated government. Indeed, after the 2010 elections in which the Sunni-backed secular al-Iraqiya List won the most seats, the Sunnis sought and failed to form a coalition with the Kurds and even the al-Sadrite Shiite faction against al-Maliki and his Shiite allies. The withdrawal of the remaining U.S. forces from Iraq in late 2011 exacerbated these divisions, and over the past year al-Maliki has taken a more aggressive approach against the Sunnis, as evidenced by the terrorism cases brought against Iraqi Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi and more recently against the bodyguards and associates of former Finance Minister Rafi al-Issawi, one of the country's most senior Sunni officials. Tensions with the Kurds have also increased, particularly regarding security responsibility in the disputed areas around Kirkuk.
The simultaneous escalation by the Kurds and the Sunnis in 2012 made al-Maliki's Shiite allies and their Iranian patrons nervous, especially with large-scale demonstrations occurring in Sunni areas to protest al-Maliki's decision to implicate al-Issawi for terrorism-related activities. With the pressure rising, al-Maliki tried to defuse tension with the Kurds through talks that led to both sides pulling back their forces and agreeing on local police patrols in the disputed part of Kirkuk. At the same time, he offered concessions to the Sunnis -- mainly in the form of releasing some Sunni prisoners and offering certain groups financial incentives -- which likely is the reason that significant portions of the Sunni community are not participating in the protests against al-Maliki.
Meager Options for the Kurds
Sensing that the prime minister was on the defensive, the Sunnis and the Kurds tried to press their advantage. The Sunnis have mainly attempted to keep the pressure on through demonstrations, while the Kurds have sought to use the 2013 budget to get Baghdad to pay the $3.5 billion Arbil owes international oil companies that have been operating in the Kurdistan region over the past three years.
From al-Maliki's point of view, there is no way that the central government would underwrite the Kurdistan Regional Government's efforts to develop energy resources independent from Baghdad. Al-Maliki used Arbil's demands to make the case that the Kurds are trying to take revenues away from the national budget for their region while also playing to Sunni concerns about Kurdish autonomy. At the same time, al-Maliki was able to convince his Shiite allies that if they pushed the budget through parliament despite the Kurdish boycott, the Kurds would not be able to retaliate in any serious way. On that point, al-Maliki's confidence stems from the fact that the Kurds are landlocked and surrounded by Turkey, Iran, the Shia-led central government and Sunnis elsewhere in Iraq, and thus face serious constraints on exporting energy independent of Baghdad.
Turkey is the one country that could act as an energy transit state for Kurdistan if it chose to do so. However, doing so would require building costly new infrastructure to connect northern Iraq to Turkey, not to mention protecting that infrastructure from the militants who are active in the border region. Additionally, helping Iraqi Kurds gain greater autonomy -- even if Ankara's aims were limited to an energy partnership -- would risk empowering Turkey's own Kurdish rebels while also provoking Iraq and Iran. Given that a Kurdish enclave of some type will likely emerge in Syria when the ruling Alawite regime falls, Turkey is even more apprehensive about assisting the Iraqi Kurds.
The Sunni uprising occurring in Syria poses a threat to the Shia-led government in Baghdad because a spillover of Syrian militants into Iraq could rekindle large-scale sectarian violence. But the Shia are not alone in facing this threat; the Kurds too would stand to lose out, perhaps even more than the central government considering the Kurds' lack of allies and the already-fraught Sunni-Kurdish relations in Iraq. Consequently, the Kurds may have no choice but to accept the current limits of their autonomy. For Iraq's Sunnis, as long as certain factions can be persuaded to join with the Shia against the Kurds to form alliances of convenience, they will also be incapable of acting against the Shia-dominated government. The result may not be efficient or satisfying for all the participants, but it may be what the future of governance in Iraq looks like, and for the Shiite majority, it may be an acceptable outcome.
Read more: Iraq Ten Years After the U.S. Invasion | Stratfor
-
http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/343870/why-did-we-invade-iraq-victor-davis-hanson
On the tenth anniversary of the invasion of Iraq, the back-and-forth recriminations continue, but in all the “not me” defenses, we have forgotten, over the ensuing decade, the climate of 2003 and why we invaded in the first place. The war was predicated on six suppositions.
1. 9/11 and the 1991 Gulf War. The Bush administration made the argument that in the post-9/11 climate there should be a belated reckoning with Saddam Hussein. He had continued to sponsor terrorism, had over the years invaded or attacked four of his neighbors, and had killed tens of thousands of his own people. He was surely more a threat to the region and to his own people than either Bashar Assad or Moammar Qaddafi was eight years later.
In this context, the end of the 1991 Gulf War loomed large: Its denouement had led not to the removal of a defeated Saddam, but to mass slaughter of Kurds and Shiites. Twelve years of no-fly zones had seen periods of conflict, and the enforcement of those zones no longer enjoyed much, if any, international support — suggesting that Saddam would soon be able to reclaim his regional stature. Many of the architects or key players in the 1991 war were once again in power in Washington, and many of them had in the ensuing decade become remorseful about the ending of the prior conflict. The sense of the need to correct a mistake became all the more potent after 9/11. Most Americans have now forgotten that by 2003, most of the books published on the 1991 war were critical, faulting the unnecessary overkill deployment; the inclusion of too many allies, which hampered U.S. choices; the shakedown of allies to help defray the cost; the realist and inhumane ending to the conflict; the ongoing persecution of Shiites, Marsh Arabs, and Kurds; and the continuation of Saddam Hussein in power.
Since there was no direct connection between Osama bin Laden and Saddam, take away the security apprehensions following 9/11, and George Bush probably would not have taken the risk of invading Iraq. By the same token, had the 1991 Gulf War ended differently, or had the U.N. and the NATO allies continued to participate fully in the no-fly zones and the containment of Iraq, there likewise would not have been a 2003 invasion. The Iraq War was predicated, rightly or wrongly, on the notion that the past war with Saddam had failed and containment would fail, and that after 9/11 it was the proper time to end a sponsor of global terrorism that should have been ended in 1991 — a decision that, incidentally, would save Kurdistan and allow it to turn into one of the most successful and pro-American regions in the Middle East.
2. Afghanistan. A second reason was the rapid victory in the war in Afghanistan immediately following 9/11. Scholars and pundits had warned of disaster on the eve of the October 2001 invasion. Even if it was successful in destroying the rule of the Taliban, any chance of postwar stability was declared impossible, given the “graveyard of empires” reputation of that part of the world. But the unforeseen eight-week war that with ease removed the Taliban, and the nonviolent manner in which the pro-Western Hamid Karzai later assumed power, misled the administration and the country into thinking Iraq would be a far less challenging prospect — especially given Iraq’s humiliating defeat in 1991, which had contrasted sharply with the Soviet failure in Afghanistan.
After all, in contrast to Afghanistan, Iraq had accessible ports, good weather, flat terrain, a far more literate populace, and oil — facts that in the ensuing decade, ironically, would help to explain why David Petraeus finally achieved success there in a manner not true of his later efforts in Afghanistan.
Since the U.S. had seemingly succeeded in two months where the Soviets had abjectly failed in a decade, and given that we already had once trounced Saddam, it seemed likely that Iraq would follow the success of Afghanistan. History is replete with examples of such misreadings of the past: The French in 1940 believed that they could hold off the Germans as they had for four years in the First World War; the Germans believed the Russians would be as weak at home in 1941 as they had seemed sluggish abroad in Poland and Finland in 1939–40. Had Afghanistan proved as difficult at the very beginning of the war as it did at the end, the U.S. probably would not have invaded Iraq.
3. Everyone on board. A third reason was the overwhelming bipartisan support in Congress, in the media, and among the public — for reasons well beyond WMD. In October 2002, both houses of Congress passed 23 writs justifying the removal of Saddam, an update of Bill Clinton’s 1998 Iraq Liberation Act. Senators Hillary Clinton, John Kerry, and Harry Reid were among those who not only enthusiastically called for Saddam’s removal, but also warned of intelligence estimates of Saddam’s WMD arsenals. Pundits on both sides, from Thomas Friedman to George Will, likewise supported the invasion, which on the eve of the war enjoyed over 70 percent approval from the American people. Bush, in that regard, had achieved what Clinton had not on the eve of the Serbian War — he had obtained a joint resolution of support from Congress before attacking, and had taken nearly a year in concerted (though failed) attempts to win U.N. approval for Saddam’s removal. Had Bush not gone to Congress, had he made no attempt to go to the U.N., had he had no public support, or had he been opposed by the liberal press, he probably would not have invaded Iraq.
4. WMD. A fourth reason was the specter of WMD. While the Bush administration might easily have cited the persuasive writs of the bipartisan resolutions — genocide against the Kurds, Shiites, and Marsh Arabs; bounties for suicide bombers; sanctuary for terrorists; attempts to kill a former U.S. president; violations of U.N. sanctions and resolutions; etc. — it instead fixated on supposedly unimpeachable intelligence about WMD, a “slam dunk,” according to CIA director George Tenet, a judgment with which most Middle Eastern governments and European intelligence agencies agreed. This concentration on WMD would prove a critical political mistake. Note in passing that the eventual public furor over missing WMD stockpiles (although there is solid evidence that Saddam was perilously close to WMD deployment) did not fully develop with the initial knowledge of that intelligence failure, but only with the mounting violence after a seemingly brilliant victory over Saddam.
The missing vast stockpiles of WMD then became the source of the convenient slogan “Bush lied, thousands died.” Yet had the reconstruction gone well, we would surely not have heard something like “Bush lied — and so there was no need, after all, to depose Saddam and foster consensual government in Iraq.”
The Bush administration apparently believed that, without the worry over WMD, the other writs would not generate enough public urgency for preemption, and thus it would not have invaded Iraq. Note that when Barack Obama talks of “red lines” and “game changers” in Syria that might justify U.S. preemptive action, he is not referring to 70,000 dead, the horrific human-rights record of Bashar Assad, Syria’s past effort to become nuclear, or even the plight of millions of Syrian refugees, but the supposition that Syria is planning to use chemical or biological weapons — a crime Saddam had often committed against his own people, and one that inflames public opinion in the West. As a footnote, we will probably not know the full story of WMD in the region until the Assad regime is gone from Syria — although we are starting to hear the same worries about such Syrian weapons from the Obama administration as we did of Iraqi weapons during the Bush presidency.
5. Nation-building. A fifth reason was the notion of reformulating Iraq, so that instead of being the problem in the region it would become a solution. Since the 1991 war had not ended well, because of a failure to finish off the regime and stay on, and since the aid to the insurgents against the Soviets in Afghanistan had been followed by U.S. neglect and in time the rise of the Taliban, so, in reaction, this time the U.S. was determined to stay. We forget now the liberal consensus that the rise of the Taliban and the survival of Saddam were supposed reflections of past U.S. callousness — something not to be repeated in Iraq.
Finally, America would do the right thing and create a consensual government that might ensure not only the end of Saddam’s atrocities, but also, by its very constitutional existence, pressure on the Gulf monarchies to liberalize and cease their support for terrorism of the sort that had killed 3,000 Americans. While there may well have been neo-cons who believed that the Iraqi democracy would be followed by a true Arab Spring of U.S.-fostered democracy sweeping the Middle East — something akin to the original good blowback of Pakistan’s detaining Dr. Khan, Qaddafi’s surrendering his WMD arsenal, and Syria’s leaving Lebanon, before all this dissipated with Fallujah — most of the Bush administration policymakers believed that democracy was not their first choice, but their last choice, for postwar reconstruction, given that everything else had been tried after past conflicts and just as often failed.
Administration officials were not hoping for Carmel, but for something akin to post-Milosevic Serbia or post-Noriega Panama, as opposed to Somalia or post-Soviet Afghanistan. Note well: Had George Bush simply announced in advance that he would be leaving Iraq as soon as he deposed Saddam, or that he planned to install a less violent relative of Saddam’s to keep order as we departed, Congress probably would not have authorized an invasion of Iraq in the first place. The Iraq War was sold partly on the liberal idealism of at last doing the right thing — after not having done so previously against Saddam or following the Soviets in Afghanistan.
6. Oil! Sixth and last was the issue of oil. Had Iraq been Rwanda, the Bush administration would not have invaded. The key here, however, is to remember the war was not a matter of “blood for oil,” given that the Bush administration had no intention of taking Iraqi oil — a fact proven by the transparent and non-U.S. postwar development of the Iraqi oil and gas fields.
Instead, oil was an issue because Iraq’s oil revenues meant that Saddam would always have the resources to foment trouble in the region, would always be difficult to remove through internal opposition, and would always use petrodollar influence to undermine U.N. resolutions, seek to spike world oil prices, or distort Western solidarity, as the French collusion with Saddam attested. Imagine North Korea with Iraq’s gas and oil reserves: The problem it poses for its neighbors would be greatly amplified and far more likely addressed. Had Iraq simply been a resource-poor Yemen or Jordan, or landlocked without key access to the Persian Gulf, the U.S. probably would not have invaded.
TEN YEARS LATER
The invasion of Iraq was a perfect storm predicated on all these suppositions — the absence of any one of which might well have postponed or precluded the invasion.
That we have forgotten or ignored most of these causes stems not just from the subsequent terrible cost of the war. Instead, our amnesia is self-induced, and derives from the fact that 70 percent of the American people and most of the liberal media commentators supported the invasion, came to reverse that support, and remain hurt or furious at someone other than themselves for their own change of heart — one predicated not on the original conditions of going to war, but on the later unexpected costs in blood and treasure that might have been avoided.
Given that less than a third of the American people initially opposed the war, the subsequent acrimony centered on whether it was better for the nation to give up and depart after 2004, or to stay and stabilize the country. Ultimately the president decided that the only thing worse than fighting a bad war was losing one.
— NRO contributor Victor Davis Hanson is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. His The Savior Generals will appear in the spring from Bloomsbury Books.
-
Summary
AHMAD AL-RUBAYE/AFP/Getty Images
A picture of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein on a CD in Baghdad on April 7
The debate surrounding the Iraqi Cabinet's proposed changes to debaathification laws reflects the growing sectarian pressures on the Shiite-led government in Baghdad. Announced April 8, the proposed change is only the latest in several moves meant to pacify an increasingly restive Sunni population. Baghdad has been negotiating with the country's Sunni minority since December 2012, when large demonstrations in western Anbar province began. So far, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has proved capable of meeting some of the Sunnis' demands, but pressure against him remains.
Analysis
The proposal would curtail some of the provisions of the Justice and Accountability Commission, more commonly known as Iraq's debaathification law, which was originally drafted to exclude elements of the Saddam Hussein regime from post-U.S. invasion politics. Under the new law, government and bureaucratic positions long occupied by Iraq's Sunni minorities were available for the country's Shiite majority. The law also denied lower-level but experienced government workers the opportunity to help rebuild Iraq.
Individuals not blacklisted under the current version would be eligible to re-enter political life. Local-level Baath Party branch chiefs would no longer be banned from political and governmental positions, and pension payments would be instituted for Hussein's personal paramilitary force, the Fedayeen Saddam.
Political Engagement
The Sunni-led civil war against Syrian President Bashar al Assad has spread into Iraq. The spillover has forced al-Maliki to respond to his country's own discontented Sunni population, which so far has staged largely peaceful protests. He has made several concessions to the Sunnis in an attempt to keep their demonstrations peaceful and help prevent more moderate Sunni opposition from joining jihadist fighters against the Iraqi state.
Some of those concessions include the release of hundreds of female prisoners, raising the salaries of Sunni Arab militia councils loyal to Baghdad and promising to redistribute budgetary surpluses to the Iraqi population. Elections in Anbar and Nineveh provinces, once delayed indefinitely, are now being delayed for only about a month. Although large-scale demonstrations have been scaling down, the political pressures of Sunni demands remain.
Notably, Sunnis are not Iraq's only social demographic unhappy with post-Saddam Iraq. Since the beginning of the year, Iraq's Kurdish and Shiite political centers have also tried to increase their pressure on the government to extract concessions. Iraq's northern-based Kurdistan Regional Government sought to increase budgetary allowances for foreign companies operating Kurdish oil fields and to secure federal funds to pay the pensions of peshmerga fighters. In this instance, al-Maliki was able to partner with Iraq's Sunnis to limit Kurdish ambitions. However, the move resulted in Iraqi Kurdish members of parliament largely boycotting parliament in recent weeks.
This draft law is the latest in a series of attempted reforms since 2006 to the Justice and Accountability Commission meant to placate Sunnis. The proposed amendments to the debaathification law are also facing strong opposition from al-Maliki's own Shiite political base, especially from those associated with his Shiite rival Muqtada al-Sadr's al-Ahrar bloc. Many of those in his camp continue to view the law as a safeguard against rising Sunni power that risks the gains made by both Shia and Kurds since the collapse of Saddam's pro-Sunni Arab state.
The strong Shiite opposition -- and likely the Kurdish opposition -- to the Cabinet's proposed changes to the law means the proposal probably will not pass in its current form. And even though it represents a check on the rising demands of Iraq's Sunnis, the debate also underscores the growing divisiveness of Iraq's sectarian political sensibilities, especially in the wake of the Syrian conflict. Even though the reforms are unlikely to pass -- and even if they pass, they are unlikely to halt Sunni demands entirely -- the process still reflects a desire by many Sunni Arabs to engage al-Maliki's government politically rather than violently.
Read more: In Iraq, Another Step Toward Reconciliation? | Stratfor
-
By the way, we won the Iraq War
9:39 AM 04/09/2013
Jim Treacher
I know, right? Here I thought it was the biggest mistake ever, by the most evil president ever. At least that’s what I’ve been told again and again by our moral, ethical, and intellectual betters on the left. But apparently Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki disagrees.
Here he is, writing in the Washington Post yesterday:
Today, on the 10th anniversary of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the debate about whether it was worth it to topple the regime and the direction of the U.S.-Iraqi relationship is influenced by a pessimistic view that the United States has lost Iraq. Not true. Despite all the problems of the past decade, the overwhelming majority of Iraqis agree that we’re better off today than under Hussein’s brutal dictatorship.
Iraqis will remain grateful for the U.S. role and for the losses sustained by military and civilian personnel that contributed in ending Hussein’s rule. These losses pale by comparison, of course, to those sustained by the Iraqi people. Our government emerges from this experience determined to ensure that these sacrifices contribute to a future of freedom and prosperity for our country…
The United States has not “lost” Iraq. Instead, in Iraq, the United States has found a partner for our shared strategic concerns and our common efforts on energy, economics and the promotion of peace and democracy.
Well, that’s weird. That whole thing was George Bush’s idea, wasn’t it? And yet this guy is claiming it was the right thing to do? How can that be right?
Isn’t it odd how everybody stopped keeping a death toll of Americans killed overseas after January 20, 2009? But then, as the great lady once said: What difference does it make?
It’s not like the President of the United States is a Republican.
(Hat tip: Ed Morrissey)
P.S. In related news: 700 Special Ops vets call on Congress to establish special select committee on Benghazi. Just let it go. Obama Is Awesome.
Read more: http://dailycaller.com/2013/04/09/by-the-way-we-won-the-iraq-war/
-
The U.S. Struggles for Influence in Iraq
April 10, 2013 | 1643 GMT
Summary
A publicized effort by Iraqi officials to intercept Iranian planes bound for Damascus appears to be an act by Baghdad and Tehran to ease U.S. pressure on the government of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. The United States has a strategic interest in maintaining a foothold in Baghdad to manage the region and is leaning on Turkey to aid in this effort. However, Iraq's alleged plane interceptions actually reveal a much tighter relationship between Baghdad and Tehran as the Syrian conflict continues to widen ethnic and sectarian fissures in the region.
Analysis
Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast on April 10 criticized the Iraqi government for its recent inspection of an Iranian plane carrying humanitarian materials to Syria, calling Baghdad's actions "a violation of international law." The United States has been pressing Baghdad to stop allowing Iranian aircraft to pass through Iraqi airspace en route to Syria. After the Iraqi government pledged to do more random searches to intercept weapons heading for Syria by land and air, Iraqi officials claimed that they forced two Iranian cargo planes to land this week at Baghdad International Airport. The Iranian cargo plane intercepted April 8 was allegedly carrying humanitarian supplies. Iraqi officials did not elaborate on the contents of the plane intercepted April 9.
Convenient Interceptions
Since the U.S. withdrawal that left Iraq in control of its airspace, Iraq still lacks the air force capability to scramble jets and force the landing of an aircraft. Instead, the Iranian airliners that were purportedly forced to land did so willingly. Though Iran is now expressing outrage at the supposed interceptions, the Iraqi government was likely closely coordinating with Iranian authorities. Conveniently, the interceptions that Baghdad has publicized so far reveal only humanitarian supplies destined for Syria. However, it is an open secret that Iran has been funneling weapons and fighters in civilian aircraft primarily through Iraq to reinforce the regime of Syrian President Bashar al Assad.
.
The al-Maliki government is not simply doing its Iranian allies a favor in allowing Iraqi territory to be used for this purpose. The Shiite government in Baghdad can already see increased movement by Sunni fighters between Syria and Iraq's Sunni-concentrated western provinces and is carefully manipulating the Sunni political situation in Iraq to prevent the return of a Sunni nationalist insurgency that could threaten the Shia's hold on Baghdad. The more the Syrian conflict intensifies, the more reason Baghdad has to align itself more closely with its sectarian allies in Iran and Syria to keep the Sunni rebellion contained.
But al-Maliki must also manage perceptions in the region. The Iraqi government does not want to give the United States, Turkey or other regional governments a reason to reinforce al-Maliki's own political adversaries in an attempt to weaken Iran's link in Baghdad. Al-Maliki also understands that the United States has a strategic interest in maintaining a foothold in Baghdad to balance against Iran, and he can exploit that interest to try to secure economic and military aid from Washington. But even the assets the United States currently has in Iraq and increased aid from Washington cannot compete effectively with Iran's extensive political, intelligence, security, religious and business relationships in Iraq.
Turkey's Role
The United States' attempt to keep a working relationship with Baghdad can also be seen in the growing tension between the U.S. and Turkish governments over the latter's attempts to unilaterally engage with the Kurdistan Regional Government in defiance of Baghdad. Though Turkey sees the need to continue dealing with Baghdad, it is trying to fashion a strategy to develop a reliable source of energy in northern Iraq and use that economic leverage to secure cooperation from Iraqi Kurdish officials in neutering a Kurdish insurgency.
Though the United States is interested in seeing Turkey play a bigger role in Iraq to counter Iran, Washington sees the danger in the Turkish policy of alienating Baghdad and fragmenting Iraq. Washington has thus been encouraging Ankara to temper its interactions with the Kurdistan Regional Government and to re-engage with Baghdad, particularly in the energy sphere. The United States is also trying to push Baghdad into striking a compromise with Ankara, as was seen April 5 when al-Maliki -- a day before U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry arrived in Turkey -- issued a statement expressing his desire for a rapprochement with Turkey. The Turkish diplomatic rumor mill suggests that al-Maliki's gesture was made with a nudge from the United States and that Ankara's relationship with Baghdad was a major theme during Kerry's visit to Turkey. This remains a sore issue between Turkey and the United States, but it will likely be discussed further when Kerry returns to Turkey in two weeks and when Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan heads to Washington on May 16.
Washington has no easy or direct way to influence Iraq in the current geopolitical environment. Though it shares with Turkey a common aim to use Iraq as an arena to balance against Iran, Turkey will put its own interests first -- including curbing Kurdish militancy and pursuing alternative energy resources -- when developing its strategy for Iraq. Turkey is not interested in alienating itself from Baghdad -- after all, it still needs Baghdad to keep a check on the Kurdistan Regional Government -- but it is finding it difficult to maintain a good relationship with Baghdad when it is also pursuing a strategy to develop closer energy ties with the Kurdish government in Arbil and when the regional environment is pushing Iran and Turkey into more competition. Turkey will try to balance its current Iraq strategy by maintaining its own relationship with Iran by, for example, continuing to help Iran circumvent sanctions (much to the United States' discontent). The United States is trying to rectify this disconnect through its increased interactions with Ankara, but Turkey will probably require much more U.S. involvement in the region before it feels compelled to change its strategy, and the United States is unlikely to have the appetite for that at a time when it is trying to recalibrate its position in other parts of the world.
Meanwhile, al-Maliki will continue to engage with Ankara and Washington to try to discourage either from reinforcing its support for Iraq's Sunni and Kurdish factions. Ultimately, this does not amount to much of a balancing act by al-Maliki. As the plane interceptions reveal, Baghdad's interactions with Washington are unlikely to be carried out without coordination with Tehran. That is a reality that Turkey has already acknowledged but one that Washington will struggle to adapt to.
.
Read more: The U.S. Struggles for Influence in Iraq | Stratfor
-
Summary
MARWAN IBRAHIM/AFP/Getty Images
Iraqi protesters in Hawijah on March 1
Deadly clashes that broke out early April 23 between Sunni demonstrators and security forces in northern Iraq illustrate the challenges facing Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki as his Shia-dominated government tries to manage Sunni dissent through a combination of force and appeasement. The clashes appear to have been orchestrated by Sunni militant groups, which have been trying to remilitarize the Sunni political and tribal landscape in Iraq. Baghdad's struggle to contain the gradual rise of Sunni militancy will only get more difficult with time.
Analysis
Militants, presumably Sunnis, attacked a checkpoint run by security forces and soldiers near the northern Iraqi town of Hawija, Kirkuk province, on April 19. The Iraqi Defense Ministry said the militants seized weapons from the checkpoint before disappearing into a crowd of Sunni demonstrators that had already assembled in tents as part of a sit-in in Hawija to protest the al-Maliki government's alleged unfair treatment of Sunnis.
Iraqi security forces reportedly warned the protesters to disband before storming the protest area early April 23 to arrest the suspected militants. As Iraqi forces tried to make arrests, they reportedly came under fire from somewhere within the crowd. Reports on casualties vary widely depending on the source, but the Iraqi Defense Ministry has claimed that 20 militants were killed, along with an army officer and two soldiers. Security forces detained 75 people and reportedly seized an assortment of weapons from the protest camp, including machine guns, hand grenades, knives and swords.
A Deliberate Provocation
Several aspects of this incident suggest that the clashes were the work of a Sunni militant faction intent on spurring already disaffected Sunnis to take action against the al-Maliki government. Jihadists have repeatedly attacked Sunni and Shiite targets over the past several months. Some of these maneuvers are meant to intimidate Sunnis and keep them out of the political process -- for example, attacks against poll stations and Sunni politicians. Others, such as attacks on sensitive Shiite religious sites, are meant to encourage the Shia-dominated security apparatus to crack down harder on Sunnis.
These attacks have occurred against a tense political backdrop, as Sunni protests since December 2012 have spread from western Iraq in Anbar and Ninawa provinces to other areas with large Sunni populations in Salah ad Din, Diyala and Baghdad. Sunni militant groups, including local al Qaeda node Islamic State of Iraq, the 1920 Revolution Brigades and the Naqshbandi Army, which includes many former Sunni Baathist officers among its ranks, have publicly endorsed the Sunni protests. These groups hope that the spread and intensification of Sunni dissent against the Shiite government in Baghdad will revive the Sunni insurgency. The Naqshbandi Army is the most active group in the Kirkuk area and has the support of many local tribes. Indirectly aiding their cause, a growing Sunni rebellion in Syria against the Iran-backed Alawite regime has increased the traffic of militants and weapons in the Sunni borderland linking western Iraq and eastern Syria.
Iraq
In the summer of 2012 a new group emerged, modeling itself after the Free Syrian Army and calling itself the Free Iraqi Army. The group reportedly includes former Iraqi Baathist officers and members of the Awakening Council, which previously aligned with the United States against jihadists in Iraq. Though the group still appears to have limited capabilities and geographic reach, the Free Iraqi Army has carried out small-scale attacks on security forces in Mosul and Anbar provinces -- attacks on what the group refers to as "Safavid" checkpoints, a reference to the Persian Empire that reveals the group's perception that Baghdad is run by Iranian foreign agents. The Free Iraqi Army has spoken publicly of its coordination with jihadist groups in Iraq, but it has carefully distinguished itself as an organization fighting on behalf of Iraqi Sunnis who have been sidelined by the Shiite government in Baghdad. Should this group expand its presence on the battlefield in the coming months and draw more members of Iraq's Awakening Council, it will be a clear sign that al-Maliki's efforts to appease segments of Iraq's Sunni landscape are faltering.
The Limits of Appeasement
Fearing the effects of potential collaboration between disaffected former Baathists and jihadists active in the country, al-Maliki has tried to defuse the escalation of Sunni unrest through security crackdowns, direct payments and offers of political appeasement. Most recently, al-Maliki proposed to amend the highly controversial de-Baathification law that aims to bar Saddam Hussein-era officials from serving in the government. The Iraqi Cabinet's proposed amendments would place a time limit on the de-Baathification process, allowing the Justice and Accountability Commission that runs the process to blacklist former Baathists only until the end of 2013. This would theoretically help mitigate future political discrimination against Iraqi Sunnis, particularly during the process of vetting election candidates, but the proposal already faces stiff resistance from Shiites and Kurds in parliament and may end up being an empty gesture.
The Hawija clashes carry special significance. The town is a prime target for jihadists -- a destitute town home to some 40,000 people, the overwhelming majority of them Sunnis who were well cared for during the Saddam era and lost their livelihoods when he fell. Hawija sits on the ethnic and sectarian crossroads of Iraq, just below the Kurdish autonomous region and on the path to Mosul to the north, Kirkuk to the northeast and Salah ad Din to the southwest. Since 2003, Hawija has served as an important haven for Sunni insurgents. The town's proximity to the Kurdistan Regional Government's boundaries may also be of value to the fighters. Kurdish leadership is locked in an escalating dispute with Baghdad over energy rights and Kurdish autonomy that could also turn violent and further undermine the ability of Iraqi security forces to maintain control.
The Challenge for Shiite Leadership
Deep divisions within the Sunni camp have thus far allowed the al-Maliki government to manage the various political and militant manifestations of Sunni opposition to the government while also addressing opposition from the Kurds and from rivals in his own Shiite camp. But the deaths of civilian protesters -- regardless of government claims that only al Qaeda militants and Baath party members were killed -- will reinvigorate Sunni protests against the government, and these protests now are likelier to turn violent.
Already, protesters and Sunni tribal sheikhs from Mosul in Ninawa province and from Fallujah in Anbar province have announced their solidarity with Sunnis in Hawija and have declared their intent to take up arms and drive the Iraqi army out of these areas. Sunni protesters in Salah ad Din province have also threatened to form an army for self-defense. In what may be a similar provocation to the one that instigated the clashes in Hawija, suspected Sunni gunmen reportedly attacked a police checkpoint on the same day in Tikrit, the capital of Salah ad Din province. Kirkuk's governor has meanwhile demanded the withdrawal of the Iraqi army from the province following the Hawija clashes, and curfews have been announced in Mosul, Fallujah and the Muqdadidiya district of Diyala province. With the suspicion that the Hawija clashes could be part of a broader campaign to instigate clashes that result in Sunni civilian deaths, Iraqi security forces are attempting to clamp down in areas with a heavy Sunni population in order to pre-empt attacks and demonstrations.
Neighboring powers such as Saudi Arabia may also have an interest in quietly encouraging these protests in order to further weaken Iran's foothold in Baghdad. While his government has no alternative to security crackdowns as violence escalates, al-Maliki can try to pay off select tribes and attempt to force through his amendments to the de-Baathification law as a form of political appeasement. However, if al-Maliki's political concessions are perceived as insufficient, the coming security crackdowns designed to stamp out Sunni unrest may well end up enflaming it, which is exactly what jihadists hope.
Read more: Provoking Sunni Militancy in Iraq | Stratfor
-
A Looming Showdown Over Iraqi Kurdish Oil Exports
Analysis
MAY 30, 2013 | 1300 Print - Text Size +
Stratfor
Summary
Another showdown is building between the Kurdistan Regional Government and the government of Iraq, only this time Turkey has entered the fight. Ankara and Arbil's coordinated efforts to export northern Iraqi oil against the wishes of Baghdad are gaining momentum, but Turkey will have to provide credible security guarantees for these energy projects if it wants to avoid another stalemate on its borders.
Analysis
Turkey has a dilemma. Its competition with Iran in Syria has already been exposed -- Turkey is backing the Sunni rebels, who are struggling to sustain their momentum against the Iranian-backed Alawite regime. Turkey also cannot effectively pursue its interests in Iraq, where the Shiite-dominated government is tightly aligned with the Shia in Tehran. Turkey's decision to reach beyond its borders and re-enter the ethnic and sectarian competition in the region has cost it its effective working partners in Iraq, Syria and Iran. Even issues of common interest, such as containing the Kurds' ambitions for autonomy, have become part of the regional struggle, with the Iranian and Syrian regimes seeking to exploit Kurdish militancy to keep Turkey occupied at home.
Turkey has come up with an ambitious plan to try to free itself of these constraints. The ruling Justice and Development Party does not share the deep-seated fears that its Kemalist-minded predecessors had with regard to pursuing Turkey's interests abroad. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his team believe it is Turkey's rightful and historical place to assume the role of regional power, despite the challenges of such a policy. Recognizing the inherent limits of dealing with Iraq, Syria and Iran, Erdogan is trying to carve out a more independent foreign policy for Turkey, relying on previously unlikely allies, such as the Kurds, to achieve its goals.
Opportunities in Kurdish Oil
In northern Iraq, Turkey sees an embattled Kurdish Regional Government with the resource potential to help meet its growing demand for energy. Turkey, a country of 73 million with an economy ranked 17th in the world by gross domestic product, consumed around 40 billion cubic meters of natural gas and 700,000 barrels per day of oil in 2012, and consumption is steadily rising in line with the country's economic growth. Iraqi Kurdistan has 4 billion barrels of proven oil reserves -- a figure expected to rise if the investment climate permits further exploration -- and current production would give Iraqi Kurdistan the potential to deliver around 215,000 barrels per day of crude to Turkey. That is, if the Kurdistan Regional Government can find a way out of its row with Baghdad.
The Iraqi Kurdish government has resigned itself to the fact that there is no enduring solution to its dispute with Baghdad over energy rights. So long as Baghdad meters and pumps Kurdish crude and controls the budget and all Iraqi oil revenues, Arbil's attempts to attract and follow through in paying foreign firms to develop its fields will meet endless obstacles. The Kurds, caught between Syria, Iraq, Turkey and Iran, cannot avoid working with their regional adversarie, so at this point, they find it far more compelling to work with an interested Turkey than with a hostile Baghdad.
The Turkish vision is to establish a bond with the Iraqi Kurds built on economic dependence, in which the flow of Kurdish energy exports will rely on Ankara's -- not Baghdad's -- good will. In theory, such a relationship would also grant Turkey the political leverage to prevent Kurdish militants in Turkey from using northern Iraq as a haven -- a critical component to Turkey's ongoing and delicate peace process with the Kurdistan Workers' Party.
A Risky Endeavor
This is a vision that requires a great deal of cunning, not to mention a sober understanding of the intent and capabilities of Turkey's opponents in Iraq, Syria and Iran. Turkey and the Kurdistan Regional Government have been carefully avoiding a major confrontation with Baghdad while creating confusion over their projects in northern Iraq.
This endeavor began in mid-2012 when Iraqi Kurdish authorities in dispute with Baghdad began trucking small volumes of oil to Turkey in exchange for refined goods, such as gasoline, for local consumption. Things escalated in early 2013 when crude oil trucked from Iraqi Kurdistan to Turkey was sold on the global market without Baghdad's consent. Presently, between 30,000 and 40,000 barrels per day of crude is being trucked by Turkish drivers from northern Iraq to Turkey, including oil produced at the Taq Taq field. Meanwhile, the Baghdad-controlled Kirkuk-Ceyhan oil pipeline has been operating at roughly one-fifth of its official capacity of 1.6 million barrels per day due to frequent bombings, poor maintenance and lower output overall.
The trucked crude irritates Baghdad, but the high cost of transport across mountainous terrain naturally limits the profitability and volume of the operation. If the Kurdistan Regional Government wants a reliable export link to the outside world, it needs pipelines -- preferably ones that run exclusively through territory administered and protected by Iraqi Kurds.
The next phase in Kurdish-Turkish ambitions begins at Taq Taq oil field, where production is managed through a joint venture between Anglo-Turkish consortium Genel Energy and China Petroleum & Chemical Corp. Iraqi Kurdish firm KAR Group has built an oil pipeline from the Taq Taq oil field to the Khurmala Dome complex, which connects to the Baghdad-controlled Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline network. Several sources claim the Taq Taq-Khurmala pipeline is operational, but crude from Taq Taq continues to be trucked -- the more expensive of the two transport options -- raising questions about the actual condition of the pipeline.
From Khurmala, the crude can take a circuitous route through the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline, with Baghdad's consent and at the risk of more pipeline sabotage attacks. The alternative is for the crude to travel along a new pipeline route being built by KAR Group that heads northwest through Kurdish-administered territory. There has been a deliberate amount of ambiguity surrounding this particular pipeline project. The project began as a seemingly uncontroversial natural gas pipeline that would travel from Khurmala to feed the Sumel power plant in Dohuk province. The trouble with that story was that the pipeline was built with a capacity of at least 11 million cubic meters per day, at least four times the capacity of the power plant it was to feed. Soon enough, reports started trickling out that the mysterious natural gas pipeline was being transformed into an oil pipeline, with oil pumps taking the place of gas compressors along the line. Trenches that have been dug for the pipeline leading up to the power plant have now been rerouted to the northwest, running parallel to the main road from Dahuk to Zakho, only a few kilometers from the Turkish border. So far, this pipeline has been laid but not welded.
The question now is what will be the final connection of this pipeline before it enters Turkish territory. Turkish officials are affirming that the pipeline will ultimately run through Fishkhabor, the Baghdad-controlled pumping and metering station that receives crude for the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline and from a 100,000-barrel-per-day oil pipeline from Tawke field owned and operated by Norway's DNO. This would mean that Baghdad would theoretically have the power from its federally administered oil facilities to shut off the flow of oil through this line at will, seemingly undermining the original aim of the Turkish-Kurdish plans.
More audacious Kurdish officials are claiming that the pipeline will actually avoid Fishkhabor altogether and that another pipeline extension will be built directly into Turkish territory. This would be unacceptable for Baghdad, however. In spite of Kurdistan Regional Government maps that display such plans, the Turkish government has cautiously distanced itself from such claims publicly, reaffirming instead that Baghdad cooperate and that crude will flow through Fishkhabor unheeded. In fact, Turkey has said it will ensure the uninterrupted flow of crude through this route by directly managing Kurdish energy revenues -- or even Iraq's entire energy revenues -- through an escrow account to prevent either side from withholding product or payment.
Not surprisingly, Baghdad has balked at the idea of Turkey managing Iraqi energy revenues. From Baghdad's point of view, this is a fundamental sovereign right, certainly not to be trusted to a larger and more powerful ethnic and sectarian adversary to the north. This is where Turkey's strategic vision and dilemma once again collide.
Turkey's Constraints
Turkey simply does not have the diplomatic wherewithal to convince Iraq, the United States or the major foreign firms eyeing these projects that having Ankara manage energy revenues and infrastructural investments in northern Iraq will fundamentally resolve Baghdad's energy dispute with Arbil. The further Turkey goes in these energy endeavors with the Kurds, the more resistance it will encounter from Baghdad -- and by extension, from Iran.
The Kurds understand this and thus are counting on Ankara to go further and bypass Baghdad altogether to pump crude to Turkey. The Kurdistan Regional Government is even escalating the pressure by passing legislation that essentially issues an ultimatum to Baghdad to produce an estimate within 90 days and pay the amount it owes to Iraqi Kurdistan from the federal budget. If Baghdad does not respond within 30 days, the legislation authorizes the Kurdistan Regional Government to begin unilateral operations to export its oil. The Iraqi Kurds are not expecting a favorable response from Baghdad but are trying to at least get paperwork in order to claim that they have the legal right to pursue their projects with Turkish backing. But a decision to bypass Baghdad-controlled infrastructure and receive payment for oil independent of the central government is one fraught with danger, and it is unlikely that Turkey is ready for that level of confrontation.
Before heading to Washington for talks with U.S. President Barack Obama, Erdogan made it a point to announce that ExxonMobil had struck a deal with Turkish state-owned subsidiary TPIC to develop oil and natural gas in Iraqi Kurdistan for export to Turkey. Unnamed Turkish officials also told Iraq Oil Report that both Chevron and ExxonMobil have shown interest in constructing and financing these plans. The Iraqi central government has so far relied on threats to blacklist foreign firms that unilaterally sign energy exploration and production deals with the Kurdistan Regional Government from energy development in the south. Erdogan was undoubtedly trying to create the impression that Turkey and the Iraqi Kurdish government had the backing of U.S. super-majors to force Baghdad to accede to its plans in the interest of maintaining foreign investor interest in southern energy production.
However, both ExxonMobil (which has a stake in Iraq's West Qurna-1 operations in the south) and Chevron have remained silent on the matter. The firms are likely watching with interest the Kurdistan Regional Government's energy plans with Turkey but are unlikely to make any firm moves until they can be assured that Turkey will be able to physically secure these projects against an irate Baghdad and Tehran. Turkey still has a couple thousand troops in northern Iraq, but it does not necessarily want to find itself in a situation where it is fighting alongside Kurdish Peshmerga forces against Iranian-backed Iraqi federal forces, creating an ideal conflict zone for jihadists to also exploit.
Moreover, Turkey is still trying to manage a very shaky and slow-moving peace process with the Kurdistan Workers' Party at home and cannot afford a security crisis in northern Iraq that could derail that effort. The multi-step peace process depends heavily on the cooperation of the Iraqi Kurdish government, specifically Kurdistan Democratic Party leader Massoud Barzani. After decades of a fairly predictable duopoly between Barzani's party and Iraqi President Jalal Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, the incapacitation of Talabani and rise of third parties raises questions about whether Turkey will be able to maintain strong enough alliances in this increasingly competitive Kurdish political landscape to pursue its energy goals.
Erdogan may well be bluffing at this point. Though the chase of profit versus strategic interest does not always allow U.S. energy giants and the U.S. government to work in sync, Washington has made clear that it is not interested in seeing Turkey provoke a Kurdish fight with Baghdad when the United States has no appetite to intervene and when the Syrian civil war is already causing enough problems. This is why the United States has instead urged Turkey to pursue pipeline projects that connect Iraqi southern production to northern export lines as a holistic approach to dealing with Iraq. But U.S. attempts to treat Iraq as a cohesive entity may be as unrealistic as Turkey's expectations of winning Baghdad over. There are no easy next steps, and no player, especially Turkey, has the option of decisive action to grant Iraqi Kurdistan an independent and reliable export route to sell its crude against Baghdad's consent.
Read more: A Looming Showdown Over Iraqi Kurdish Oil Exports | Stratfor
-
Up from the memory hole:
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/25546334/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/secret-us-mission-hauls-uranium-iraq/#.UbwquPkvWb4
Separately, I have just finished T. Rick's history of the Iraq War through 2006 called "Fiasco". Definitely worth the reading but no time right now to write a review.
-
A Thriving American Legacy in Iraq
The Kurds are prospering like never before, even as the pretense of 'one Iraq' fades.
By FOUAD AJAMI
Kurdistan Region, Iraq
The weather has cooperated and the commencement ceremony, held outdoors, proceeds as planned—jubilant students, speakers straining for humor and advice, the awarding of diplomas. The campus, a modern structure of tan stone sitting handsomely atop a hill, framed by nearby mountains, could be anywhere in the American Southwest. But this isn't America, it is the American University of Iraq-Sulaimani, in Iraqi Kurdistan's second-largest city.
Nearly all of Kurdistan's elite are on hand—former peshmerga military commanders, technocrats, businessmen, and two of the region's most influential younger politicians, Barham Salih, former prime minister of the regional government, and Nechirvan Barzani, the current occupant of that position.
The American University of Iraq-Sulaimani had been, as late as 2006, an impossible idea held by Mr. Salih, a devoted and driven modernizer with a doctorate of his own from the United Kingdom. Its first students attended classes in portable cabins. Today, in late May, a beautiful campus surrounds us, and degrees are being conferred in information technology, international studies and business administration.
The pride is palpable. Success and tranquillity have not been the lot of the Kurds, but now they are making, and safeguarding, their history.
The Kurds are not waiting on Baghdad. In May alone, 1,045 people were killed in Iraq, 2,377 wounded, and there were more than 560 episodes of violence. Several years back, a stranger venturing into Kurdistan was treated to tales of hurt and grief, the cruelty meted out by Saddam Hussein's Baath regime. The memory lives on, but there is in the air a sense of vindication—and practicality. On the ruins of that old, cruel world the Kurds are busy building a decent public order.
Geographically, Baghdad is just 200 miles southwest, but it could be worlds away. Stran Abdullah, at 44 one of Kurdistan's most informed and talented journalists, tells me hasn't been to Baghdad in more than five years. For him, he says, it is now an alien city. Still, his Arabic is fluid and rich—a contrast to so many young Kurds who have lost touch with that language. He didn't quibble when I dubbed him Kurdistan's last Iraqi.
.Everywhere, the pretense of "one Iraq" grows weaker by the day. Yet it is still observed if only because a hard partition is destined to be a bloody affair. The line where Kurdistan ends and the rest of Iraq begins runs through an explosive mix of ethnic claims and economic ambitions.
Kirkuk alone should suffice to sober up those who rush into the breach—it is a city as rich in oil as it is in political troubles. One doesn't have to be terribly imaginative to foresee catastrophe in that tinderbox: ethnic cleansing, a Kurdish victory in Kirkuk matched by the eviction of Kurds from the Sunni Arab side of the dividing line.
A people schooled in tragedy are not eager to call it up again. There is an economic boom in Kurdistan, and those here who have known privation for so long now savor their newfound prosperity. The traffic jams bear witness to that. There are more than a million cars on Kurdistan's roads, in a place with fewer than five million people. The consumer goods of the world are here and plentiful.
The region's capital, Erbil, is a surprise after the stark mountains: a boomtown with swanky hotels, shopping malls and construction cranes everywhere. It has the feel of Houston and shades of Dubai. Entrepreneurship seems to be the people's creed. The region produces 200,000 barrels of oil a day, expected to reach a million a day by 2015, and there is an estimated 45 billion barrels in the ground. No wonder the optimism.
.
.The fantasy of Iraqi Kurdistan serving as a magnet for the Kurds of neighboring Syria, Iran and perhaps southeast Turkey, in a bid for Greater Kurdistan, has no takers here. A substantial refugee population from Syrian Kurdistan has made its way here. But the advice given the Syrian Kurds has been stick to your land, create facts on the ground, be wary of the Assad dictatorship and of the rebellion alike. This is a small landlocked regional government and it knows better than to trifle with the two giants that overhang it—Iran and Turkey.
Turkish companies are the largest foreign presence here, and a recent deal struck between the regional government, a Turkish state-run oil firm and Exxon Mobil XOM -0.82%to develop projects in the region confirms that Turkey is now Kurdistan's preferred outlet to the world. Ankara's historic distrust of the Kurds is rapidly receding, and Iraqi Kurdistan has played no small part in the recent truce between the Turkish government and the rebel Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK.
The Kurds remain the most pro-American population in this swath of broad Middle Eastern geography. Yet Washington spurns the Kurds as it courts a strongman in Baghdad who has cast his lot with the Iranian theocracy and the Syrian dictatorship.
In December 2011, as President Obama boasted of his strategic retreat in the region and of U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, he held up Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki as "the elected leader of a sovereign, self-reliant and democratic Iraq." Never mind that Mr. Maliki was hard at work intimidating the opposition, consolidating power and warning the Kurds that all oil proceeds must run through Baghdad.
A member of the Kurdish political class lamented to me: "This world we have was bequeathed us by the United States, by the protection that Anglo-American air power gave us after the disastrous events of the first Gulf War of 1990-91. And now the troubles we have holding our own against Baghdad are the product of American policies as well."
What American influence remained after military withdrawal was the U.S. pressure brought to bear on the Kurds—and on the Turks—against the oil deals pursued by Turkey in Kurdistan. But these oil and gas fields had their own power. The Kurds, the Turks and the big oil companies defied the protestations of the White House. The supreme irony: At a time when Iraqis of all stripes were breaking with the idea of a dominion from Baghdad, the U.S. was arguing that Kurdistan ought not to run afoul of Baghdad's dictates on oil exploration.
The friends we spurn, the antagonists and strongmen we court: This is a recurrent theme in American diplomacy. Of late, America's wars in Iraq have lacked for vindication. But look north to the Kurds for a redemption. Before the Obama retreat, a long-suffering people were sheltered by American power, and made the best of their chance.
Mr. Ajami is a senior fellow at Stanford's Hoover Institution and the author most recently of "The Syrian Rebellion" (Hoover Press, 2012).
a
-
Opening a New Era in U.S.-Iraq Relations
We Iraqis, grateful for America's sacrifice, now seek an economic partner.
Article
Stock Quotes
Comments
more in Opinion »
smaller
Larger
facebook
twitter
google plus
linked in
Email
Print
Save ↓ More
By
LUKMAN FAILY
Last week, the United Nations Security Council voted unanimously to lift international trade and financial sanctions on Iraq that have been in effect since Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in the 1990s. Iraq's exit from Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter—and the substantial progress it has made with Kuwait—is a major accomplishment, and one of several recent developments we Iraqis are celebrating.
Though most Americans probably believe that Iraqis are fed up with the U.S., the truth is that Iraqis appreciate what the U.S. has done and are looking for more U.S. involvement—not more sacrifice of blood and treasure, but more diplomatic, political, trade, investment and economic partnership.
The next clear step is for the U.S. and Iraq to fully implement the Strategic Framework Agreement, signed prior to the 2011 withdrawal of U.S. forces, which defines the overall political, economic, cultural and security ties between our two countries. Americans should see this agreement not as a ticket out of Iraq, but as the foundation for a long-term partnership with the people and government of Iraq.
Enlarge Image
image
image
Associated Press
A man exchanges money at a street money changer in Karbala, near Baghdad, in June.
At a time of profound change in the Middle East, the implementation of the agreement has so far been slow and uneven. While security coordination through military sales and financing programs continues, an expedited delivery of promised sales, better intelligence sharing, and stepped-up assistance in counterterrorism and training is essential for Iraq's fight against terrorism—a clear national security interest of the U.S. Implementing this agreement should not be linked to regional issues, such as the conflict in Syria.
As we look forward to full implementation of the Strategic Framework Agreement, the legacy of the past 10 years is something to build on. After decades of dictatorship, three disastrous wars, international isolation, economic sanctions, the displacement of more than a million Iraqis and the deaths of tens of thousands more, Iraq has begun to build a multiethnic, multiparty democracy with respect for the rule of law.
It hasn't been easy. But Iraqis are making progress towards creating a democratic system. All the political parties have accepted elections as a method of power-sharing and peaceful change. Terrible as it is, the current violence in Iraq is primarily caused by terrorism, not civil war. As the recent provincial elections affirmed, Iraqis are developing a culture of democracy—something that many of our neighbors do not yet have.
With Iraq taking its place as a partner, not a protectorate, Americans can help by providing political, diplomatic and security assistance, in addition to technical know-how and investment capital.
On the political front, the U.S. can serve as an honest broker among Iraqi factions that are learning to work with each other. Americans are seen as mature partners who have proven their commitment to Iraq, and their involvement is not perceived as a threat to our sovereignty or national interest.
On the diplomatic front, Iraq has rejoined the international community by exiting Chapter VII, and it has done important work with the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and the Arab League. Looking ahead, Iraq and the U.S. can cooperate to resolve broader regional challenges.
Now that Iraq is moving toward a market economy friendly to foreign investment, Americans can provide what our nation needs: expertise on energy technologies, engineering, design, construction and financial services. Iraq offers tremendous investment opportunities for developing and servicing telecommunications, health care, education, water treatment, and bridges and highways, to name a few.
Meanwhile, oil production has increased by 50% since 2005, and our economy is expected to grow by at least 9.4% annually through 2016. Iraq expects to increase oil production to 4.5 million barrels per day by the end of 2014 and nine million barrels a day by 2020—a 157% increase from our current production levels. With the goal of diversifying our economy beyond energy, Iraq plans to invest these oil revenues in education and critical development projects, including restoring electrical power and rebuilding our transportation system.
Moreover, Iraq is in the process of purchasing over $10 billion worth of military equipment, paid for with our own revenues, and we are eager to buy this hardware from the U.S. Iraq's recent purchase of 30 Boeing BA -1.71% planes for our national carrier testifies to our potential as a market for U.S. goods and services.
Iraqis will be forever grateful to Americans for sacrificing alongside us to overthrow Saddam's brutal tyranny. We now look forward to working together to build a strong and prosperous democracy in Iraq and to cement a strategic partnership between our nations.
Mr. Faily is the newly appointed ambassador of Iraq to the United States.
-
"On June 27, 2013, Iraq's Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) announced the final results of the provincial elections held in the two predominantly Sunni Arab provinces of Anbar and Ninawa. Voter turnout in Anbar reached 49.5%, but was significantly lower in Ninawa at 37.5%. The polls in Anbar and Ninawa were pushed from April (when the rest of Iraq's provinces had their elections) to late June. The Kurdistan Regional Government (Dohuk, Erbil and Sulaymania) is expected to have theirs in September 2013. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki invoked 'security concerns' to justify his decision to delay elections in both provinces -- namely increasing insurgent attacks and assassinations of candidates and members of the armed forces. However, his decision was in fact primarily motivated by months of unprecedented anti-government protests carried out by politically marginalized and disenfranchised Sunni Arab populations. These protests first broke out in December 2012 following the unexpected arrest of several guards of former Finance Minister Rafi al-Issawi -- an Anbar native linked to Iyad Allawi's Iraqiyya bloc who has since resigned from government. The unrest then spread across other Sunni Arab provinces including Ninawa, Salahaddin, Diyala, Baghdad, and Tamim.
These provincial election results illustrate the enduring resentment and sociopolitical alienation of Sunni Arab populations over a decade after the fall of Saddam Hussein, and a clear weakening of the political process in the country. Compared to the 2009 elections, fewer Sunni Arab voters went to the ballot box, while political parties scattered among a variety of alliances. Once again, these elections demonstrated the difficulty for Sunni Arabs to organize themselves and define an effective action plan in their lasting confrontation with the Shia dominated central government. This has not only benefited al-Maliki's State of Law coalition and its partners, but also the Kurdish parties in their regions.
Just as Sunni Arabs were marginalized under the U.S. occupation for their collective association with the former regime, most Sunni Arabs still have not been reintegrated into new institutions and face what they perceive to be discriminatory policies aimed at 'de-Sunnifying' Iraq. In particular, they maintain that without the abolition of 'de-Ba'athification,' as well as certain laws and anti-terrorism provisions, political normalization will be impossible. Previously downplayed by the U.S. coalition, these demands have been met with disdain by the Shia-led government. In fact, instead of engaging in a dialogue, al-Maliki has persistently refused to involve the opposition -- notably Sunni Arabs -- in public debates and decision- making. In response, criticisms of this apparently authoritarian drift have mounted steadily in the last months."
-- Joshua Haber
-
http://www.businessinsider.com/al-qaeda-leaders-mass-escape-from-prison-iraq-2013-7
HUGE PRISON BREAK IN IRAQ: 500 Escape Including Senior Al-Qaeda Members Who Were Due To Be Executed
Kareem Raheem and Ziad al-Sinjary, Reuters Jul. 22, 2013, 4:47 PM 5,292 12
REUTERS
Iraqi security forces at Abu Ghraib prison.
The deadly raid on the high-security jail happened as Sunni Muslim militants are re-gaining momentum in their insurgency against the Shi'ite-led government that came to power after the U.S. invasion to oust Saddam Hussein.
Suicide bombers drove cars packed with explosives to the gates of the prison on the outskirts of Baghdad on Sunday night and blasted their way into the compound, while gunmen attacked guards with mortars and rocket-propelled grenades.
Other militants took up positions near the main road, fighting off security reinforcements sent from Baghdad as several militants wearing suicide vests entered the prison on foot to help free the inmates.
Ten policemen and four militants were killed in the ensuing clashes, which continued until Monday morning, when military helicopters arrived, helping to regain control.
By that time, hundreds of inmates had succeeded in fleeing Abu Ghraib, the prison made notorious a decade ago by photographs showing abuse of prisoners by U.S. soldiers.
"The number of escaped inmates has reached 500, most of them were convicted senior members of al Qaeda and had received death sentences," Hakim Al-Zamili, a senior member of the security and defense committee in parliament, told Reuters.
"The security forces arrested some of them, but the rest are still free."
One security official told Reuters on condition of anonymity: "It's obviously a terrorist attack carried out by al Qaeda to free convicted terrorists with al Qaeda."
A simultaneous attack on another prison, in Taji, around 20 km (12 miles) north of Baghdad, followed a similar pattern, but guards managed to prevent any inmates escaping. Sixteen soldiers and six militants were killed.
CONVOY ATTACK
Sunni insurgents, including the al Qaeda-affiliated Islamic State of Iraq, have been regaining strength in recent months and striking on an almost daily basis against Shi'ite Muslims and security forces amongst other targets.
The violence has raised fears of a return to full-blown conflict in a country where Kurds, Shi'ite and Sunni Muslims have yet to find a stable way of sharing power.
In the northern city of Mosul, 390 km (240 miles) north of Baghdad, a suicide bomber detonated a vehicle packed with explosives behind a military convoy in the eastern Kokchali district, killing at least 22 soldiers and three passers-by, police said.
Suicide bombings are the hallmark of al Qaeda, which has been regrouping in Mosul, Iraq's third-largest city and capital of the Sunni-dominated Nineveh province.
A separate attack in western Mosul killed four policemen, police said.
Relations between Islam's two main denominations have been put under further strain from the civil war in Syria, which has drawn in Shi'ite and Sunni fighters from Iraq and beyond to fight against each other.
Recent attacks have targeted mosques, amateur football matches, shopping areas and cafes where people gather to socialize after breaking their daily fast for the holy Muslim month of Ramadan.
Nearly 600 people have been killed in militant attacks across Iraq so far this month, according to violence monitoring group Iraq Body Count.
That is still well below the height of bloodletting in 2006-07, when the monthly death toll sometimes exceeded 3,000.
(Additional reporting by Ahmed Rasheed and Suadad al-Salhy in Baghdad; Writing by Isabel Coles; Editing by Robin Pomeroy)
Read more: http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/22/us-iraq-violence-idUSBRE96L0RM20130722#ixzz2Zocf79tf
-
Summary
The tempo of deadly attacks has quickened in Iraq, with coordinated bombings and other assaults occurring almost daily since the beginning of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. On Aug. 28, for example, some 12 devices reportedly detonated simultaneously in mostly Shiite neighborhoods in Baghdad, killing 30 people and wounding another 160. Casualties over the past four months have reached their highest levels since the sectarian conflict that raged from 2006 to 2008 during U.S. Operation Enduring Freedom. Near-daily attacks seem likely to continue, but the dramatic rise in violence in Iraq does not portend a return to total instability.
A close look at the tactics, target sets and geographical locations of recent operations indicates that there has not been a marked increase in militant capabilities, despite the high casualty counts. Moreover, militants have avoided attacking critical economic installations and important government targets, and the violence has not disrupted Iraq's delicate balance of power, which has helped facilitate the country's reconstruction after a decade of war.
Analysis
Coordinated, high-casualty attacks like those on Aug. 28 have become common in Iraq since the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the country at the end of 2011. The majority of operations, which are carried out by groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, have been concentrated in certain geographic regions against similar targets by insurgents using a standard set of tactics.
Iraq's Limited Risk of Civil War
The violence has occurred primarily in regions around Baghdad, Tikrit, Kirkuk and Mosul. Less frequently, militants have also attacked national security forces stationed in Sunni regions and targets deeper into areas traditionally controlled by Shia. The geographic focus of the attacks indicates that the reach of militants is limited to areas in which they can routinely operate freely, typically where the Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish spheres of influence intersect.
Small Attacks, Soft Targets
The high daily casualty rates are typically achieved by detonating multiple devices dispersed across large areas. Exact details of the attacks are elusive, but the fact that there are relatively few casualties and relatively little structural damage in each explosion suggests the use of weak vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices and small improvised explosive devices placed in cars rather than traditional car bombs. Suicide vests have also been used, albeit less frequently, and while small-scale small arms attacks are common, they have been used only rarely in large, coordinated assaults.
Civil War is Unlikely in Iraq Despite a Surge in Violence
Thus far, militants appear to be taking a path of least resistance, preferring softer targets to pillars of Iraqi stability. These targets include civilians in residential areas and security personnel manning exposed checkpoints. More notable is what has not been attacked: oil transportation infrastructure, the revenues from which are critical to uniting Iraq's various power factions, and systems essential for daily needs, such as drinking water and electricity. Government buildings, including ministry headquarters, have also been spared.
Militants have occasionally carried out larger, more complex operations. For example, an assault freed several hundred prisoners from Abu Ghraib on July 21. The attack utilized vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, suicide vests and armed personnel infiltrating a hardened target. However, the prison was not as strategically significant or symbolic as other targets around Baghdad, and such sophisticated operations have remained relatively rare. Moreover, the spike in casualties during Ramadan was not due to improved capabilities among the militants but rather the wider availability of soft targets. Insurgents simply increased the tempo of their attacks to take advantage of the holiday.
Despite Vulnerabilities, a Resilience to Violence
The militants' preference for soft targets was caused in part by the success Iraqi security forces have had hardening and protecting critical targets. Iraqi forces have also proved capable of carrying out successful offensives against insurgent groups, such as one launched in western and central Iraq after the end of Ramadan that resulted in the arrests of more than 800 suspected militants. Still, Iraqi authorities cannot protect the entire country or project strength widely enough to degrade the insurgency. There are just too many targets and too few resources available to protect them, so the Iraqi government has prioritized hardening some targets while leaving others exposed.
Moreover, militants can take advantage of the vast, desolate desert regions in western Iraq, as well as in areas disputed between Kurdish and Iraqi authorities or the security vacuum in eastern Syria. Large, insecure areas with borders that restrict movements of security forces (or require coordination among authorities from multiple territories) serve as ideal sanctuaries for militants to plan operations, access supplies and project power.
For the time being, current levels of violence will likely continue in Iraq, without devolving fully into civil war. Iraqi stability has been achieved through careful cooperation among Sunni, Kurdish and Shiite authorities, and thus far militants have failed to destabilize the balance of power or provoke the three sides into fighting one other. If they are unable to fracture modern Iraq's power structures, militants will continue to achieve high body counts with daily attacks but little else. Iraq's resilience to bloodshed is high after years of war, and the country appears capable of absorbing the recent spike in violence as well.
Read more: Iraq's Limited Risk of Civil War | Stratfor
-
Underlining my repeated point that our exiting from Iraq will be revealed to have been a huge historical error.
http://patriotpost.us/articles/20926
-
Obama's decision to throw away success in Iraq begins to reify.
Violence Reverses Gains in Iraq
By
Matt Bradley and
Ali A. Nabhan
Oct. 24, 2013 7:37 p.m. ET
BAGHDAD—A flurry of recent attacks by al Qaeda-linked militants in Iraq—strengthened by their alliance with jihadist fighters in Syria—is threatening to undo years of U.S. efforts to crush the group, widening sectarian conflict in the Middle East.
The chaos across the border in Syria and Iraqi Sunnis' feeling of discrimination under the Shiite-led government has reignited the kind of intense sectarian strife that brought Iraq to the verge of civil war in 2006-2007. A security vacuum left by the withdrawal of American combat troops in December 2011 is also helping the fighters regain a foothold.
The civilian death toll so far this year is nearly double last year's, up to over 5,700 from at least 3,200. In July 2013 alone, 1,057 people were killed—the deadliest month for Iraqis in five years.
Iraqi security officials say al Qaeda-linked fighters from the militant group Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, or ISIS, are moving aggressively to re-establish a base of operations in Anbar province, the stronghold of the Sunni insurgency during the U.S.-led war.
If the extremists succeed, they would undo one of the hardest-fought gains of U.S. forces and their Iraqi allies. By the time of the U.S. pullout at the end of 2011, the insurgency had been significantly weakened, in large part by a U.S. alliance with moderate Sunni tribesmen.
"This is a strategic goal for ISIS to control the western part of Iraq," said Ammar Tou'ma, a member of the Iraqi parliament's security and defense committee. "In 2005 and 2006, they were controlling on the ground and used some areas as bases and training camps for their members and as a safe haven to carry out operations."
Sparsely populated Anbar province, with its majority Sunni population, sits on the porous frontier with Syria and borders Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Violence there has risen dramatically since the spring, when a mostly Sunni and primarily peaceful protest movement against the Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad drew a violent response from security forces.
Enlarge Image
Iraqi policemen inspect the damage inside a building after clashes and suicide bomb attacks in Fallujah on Oct. 21. EPA
On Tuesday, at least 22 members of the security forces were killed in a series of suicide bombings and shootings, mostly in Anbar.
No group has claimed responsibility, but the high level of coordination and sophistication—one attack sparked a 10-hour standoff with security forces—points to the involvement of ISIS, which Iraqi and American intelligence forces believe is operating out of eastern Syria.
Following recent attacks in Anbar and the northern city of Mosul, Syrian and Iraqi jihadis openly congratulated ISIS operatives on jihadi Web forums.
Whereas attacks in the rest of the country tend to be isolated acts of terror such as car and suicide bombings, Anbar officials say attacks in the province look more like muscular efforts to gain and hold territory.
The growing instability in Iraq coincides with the strengthening of jihadist rebels in Syria, many of them foreign fighters, battling to unseat President Bashar al-Assad.
The fighters flow fluidly back and forth across the Iraq-Syria border, staging attacks on both sides, Iraqi intelligence officials said.
Cooperation has bolstered the main jihadist groups in both countries and caused an escalation of attacks in Iraq, the officials said.
Security officials in Anbar say the weapons al Qaeda uses in Anbar have become more sophisticated than those used by the police and military, reflecting a relatively new interchange in military hardware between Syria and western Iraq.
"The regional situation is applying huge pressure on us," said Falih al Essawi, the deputy head of Anbar provincial council and a member in a prominent Sunni tribe. "ISIS is trying to control the borders to find a means to transport weapons, equipment and fighters between the two countries."
In Syria, the Nusra Front, an al Qaeda-linked group, has been one of the most effective fighting forces in the revolt against Mr. Assad. But it has also contributed to divisions within the rebel camp and complicated Western efforts to aid the uprising because U.S. officials don't want to help the jihadists.
Iraqi and American intelligence agencies suspect Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the head of al Qaeda's Iraq division, is operating out of eastern Syria.
During the Iraq war, Syria's regime facilitated a flood of foreign fighters who flowed into Iraq. The militants were battling U.S. forces and the Shiite-led government that took over after Saddam Hussein's minority Sunni regime was ousted in the early days of the war.
American troops fought some costly battles against al Qaeda and its sympathizers in Anbar, particularly in the so-called Sunni Triangle, which extended from Fallujah near Baghdad westward to the provincial capital of Anbar, Ramadi.
U.S. and Iraqi forces were finally able to subdue Anbar province during the "surge" of 2007.
While most local residents in Anbar don't support al Qaeda, many see the group as a last bastion of resistance against Shiite domination.
"ISIS isn't facing any refusal or resistance from the locals," said Mr. Tou'ma, the Shiite legislator.
Iraq, and by extension Anbar, lies at the fulcrum of the Middle East's power struggle between Shiite-majority Iran and Sunni states such as Saudi Arabia.
Mr. Assad, who belongs to a sect that is an offshoot of Shiite Islam, has received substantial support from Iran and some tacit encouragement from Iraq's prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, who hasn't blocked Iranian flights suspected of carrying weapons over Iraqi airspace to Damascus, despite U.S. objections.
The Obama administration, in turn, has angered its Persian Gulf allies with its overtures to Iran and its decision not to intervene in Syria.
Inspired by the Arab uprisings sweeping the region, Sunnis in Anbar and other western provinces began weekly protests in December 2012, mostly against antiterrorism laws they claimed were disproportionately aimed at Sunnis.
When security forces killed more than 50 in a raid on a protest encampment in April, the protests evolved into a cycle of rising violence.
-
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/30/opinion/international/have-patience-with-us.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_th_20131030&_r=0
BAGHDAD — Imagine how Americans would react if you had a terrorist organization operating on your own soil that killed dozens and maimed hundreds every week. For Iraqis, that isn’t a hypothetical question; Al Qaeda in Iraq and its affiliates are conducting a terrorist campaign against our people.
These terrorists aren’t just Iraq’s enemies. They are also America’s enemies. That is why, when I meet with President Obama on Friday, I plan to propose a deeper security relationship between the United States and Iraq to combat terrorism and address broader regional security concerns, including the conflict in Syria and the threat that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons could pose in the region.
It has been almost two years since American troops withdrew from Iraq. And despite the terrorist threats we face, we are not asking for American boots on the ground. Rather, we urgently want to equip our own forces with the weapons they need to fight terrorism, including helicopters and other military aircraft so that we can secure our borders and protect our people. Hard as it is to believe, Iraq doesn’t have a single fighter jet to protect its airspace.
The United States is our security partner of choice, so we have been working with the U.S. government and American defense firms to procure the equipment we need. We see this as helping to solidify a relationship that we want to remain the cornerstone of our security strategy. Iraqis are grateful for the great sacrifices Americans have made on behalf of our country. But Iraq today is no longer a protectorate; it is a partner in what President Obama has described as “a normal relationship based on mutual interests and mutual respect.”
These mutual interests include combating terrorism and resolving the conflict in Syria. The war in Syria has become a magnet that attracts sectarian extremists and terrorists from various parts of the world and gathers them in our neighborhood, with many slipping across our all-too-porous borders. We do not want Syria or Iraq to become bases for Al Qaeda operations, and neither does the United States.
While the world sees Syria as a humanitarian tragedy, we also see an immediate threat to the security of our own country. Al Qaeda is engaged in a renewed, concerted campaign to foment sectarian violence and drive a wedge between our people. We will not let that happen again.
Because we do not want Syria to continue to attract violent extremists, much less cause a regional conflagration, our top priority is to end the bloodshed and achieve a negotiated settlement. The Iraqi government is serious about not allowing our own citizens to arm any side of the Syrian conflict.
We are also committed to preventing the territory, the waterways and, yes, the airspace of our country from being used by any outside entity to fuel the conflict in Syria. But, with many better-armed neighbors and no air force or air defenses to speak of, our ability to enforce this policy is limited. This is one of many reasons we are urgently seeking to improve our air defense capabilities.
After some initial differences, American and Iraqi policies toward Syria are converging. We are pleased by the agreement to eliminate Syria’s chemical weapons and eager to support it in any way we can. No country would be more threatened than Iraq if these awful weapons fell into the hands of terrorists.
In our region, we worry not just about chemical weapons, but all weapons of mass destruction. We strongly support gradually transforming the Middle East into a nuclear-weapon-free-zone. (MARC: Translation: Israel needs to give up its nukes too) And to underscore our commitment to this goal, Iraq recently became the 161st nation to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
As we combat violent extremism, we are striving to create and improve our vibrant democracy. Iraqis understand and respect the difference between terrorist attacks and peaceful protests. While resisting terrorists and militias, our government is responding to peaceful protesters by engaging in extensive dialogue through the formation of high-level coordinating committees, and we are working to address the demands of protesters. Since the end of Saddam Hussein’s tyranny in 2003, we have conducted more than five free elections, cementing our democracy and creating a coalition government that represents every region and religious group.
Ultimately, the answer to terrorism is progress. We have one of the world’s fastest-growing economies; it expanded by 9.6 percent in 2011 and 10.5 percent in 2012. Our oil production has increased by 50 percent since 2005, and we are expected to emerge as the world’s second largest energy exporter by 2030. We are reinvesting our energy revenues in rebuilding our infrastructure and reviving our education and health care systems. As we rebuild, Iraqis can be promising partners for American companies in all of these fields.
Iraq has matured into a country with democratic institutions. But we are in need of more training, education, practice — and patience.
We are on the road to security, democracy and prosperity. While we still have a long way to go, we want to walk that road together with the United States.
Nuri Kamal al-Maliki is the prime minister of Iraq.
============================================
POTH
Senators Warn Obama Before Iraq Leader’s Visit
By MICHAEL R. GORDON and ERIC SCHMITT
Published: October 29, 2013
WASHINGTON — As Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki of Iraq headed to Washington on Tuesday, an influential group of senators sent a strongly worded letter to President Obama warning that Mr. Maliki’s “mismanagement” of Iraqi politics had contributed to the surge of violence there.
Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki of Iraq is to meet with President Obama Friday.
Mr. Maliki, who is scheduled to meet with Mr. Obama on Friday, has signaled that he wants the United States to provide sophisticated weapons, including Apache attack helicopters, so that the Iraqi government can fight Al Qaeda in Iraq and other insurgent groups.
The letter, signed by ranking Democratic as well as Republican lawmakers, sought to put Mr. Maliki on notice that continued American support for Iraq would depend heavily on his willingness to share power with his nation’s Sunni and Kurdish minorities.
Mr. Maliki, a Shiite politician who became prime minister in 2006 with the support of the American ambassador to Baghdad, has often been accused of being sectarian and authoritarian. Those tendencies, the senators wrote, made Iraq more fertile ground for insurgents who have been mounting attacks with increasing frequency.
“This failure of governance is driving many Sunni Iraqis into the arms of Al Qaeda in Iraq and fueling the rise of violence,” the letter said.
Earlier on Tuesday, two of the senators spoke angrily in separate interviews about Mr. Maliki’s failure to unify the competing factions in Iraq. “He’s got a lot of work to do in terms of pulling together diverse elements of his country,” said Senator Carl Levin, a Michigan Democrat who heads the Armed Services Committee. “He’s not done a particularly good job of it.”
Mr. Levin also criticized Mr. Maliki for acquiescing in, if not facilitating, Iran’s efforts to supply weapons to President Bashar al-Assad of Syria, using flights through Iraqi airspace. “They’ve allowed overflights, Iranian planes, to supply Syria,” Mr. Levin said.
Senator Bob Corker of Tennessee, the senior Republican on the Foreign Relations Committee, which is to meet with Mr. Maliki on Wednesday, was even more critical of the Iraqi leader. “What he’s done is create a situation where the population is more accepting of what Al Qaeda is doing there because of his lack of inclusiveness,” Mr. Corker said.
The other senators who signed the letter were John McCain of Arizona and Lindsey Graham of South Carolina, both Republicans who have long taken a strong interest in Iraq; Robert Menendez, the New Jersey Democrat who is chairman of the Senator Foreign Relations Committee; and James M. Inhofe, a Republican from Oklahoma who is the ranking minority member of the Armed Services Committee.
In expressing alarm over the rising number of bombings and the deteriorating security situation in Iraq, the senators also appeared to chide Mr. Obama for not being more outspoken about developments there.
The letter emphasized that Mr. Maliki’s visit was an opportunity for Mr. Obama to “re-engage with the American people about the continuing strategic importance of Iraq.”
The last American troops left Iraq at the end of 2011 under an agreement signed by President George W. Bush and Mr. Maliki. The United States and Iraq have signed an agreement calling for cooperation on security and economic issues. But critics say that such cooperation has never fully developed.
In their letter, the senators urged the president to step up American efforts to help Iraq’s security force to fight terrorist groups, especially through the increased sharing of intelligence.
The senators stopped short of saying that such support should be withheld if Mr. Maliki did not adopt a more inclusive approach in governing. But they warned that the degree of American support for security assistance and arms sales would be influenced by Mr. Maliki’s “governance strategy.”
A major concern of many lawmakers is that American weapons supplied to the Iraqi government might be used by Mr. Maliki to crack down on his political opponents.
Mr. Maliki is leading a large delegation to Washington and is also scheduled to meet with Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr., Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel and other senior officials.
In his remarks in Baghdad before flying to Washington, Mr. Maliki made clear that his priority was to secure support for sale of American arms and other forms of security assistance. “We will discuss security and intelligence in addition to arms needed by the military to fight terrorism,” he said.
-
How We Won in Iraq
And why all the hard-won gains of the surge are in grave danger of being lost today.
BY DAVID H. PETRAEUS | OCTOBER 29, 2013
One of five internet pages, more at the link. Free registration required or (contact me).
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/10/29/david_petraeus_how_we_won_the_surge_in_iraq?wp_login_redirect=0
The news out of Iraq is, once again, exceedingly grim. The resurrection of al Qaeda in Iraq -- which was on the ropes at the end of the surge in 2008 -- has led to a substantial increase in ethno-sectarian terrorism in the Land of the Two Rivers. The civil war next door in Syria has complicated matters greatly, aiding the jihadists on both sides of the border and bringing greater Iranian involvement in Mesopotamia. And various actions by the Iraqi government have undermined the reconciliation initiatives of the surge that enabled the sense of Sunni Arab inclusion and contributed to the success of the venture. Moreover, those Iraqi government actions have also prompted prominent Sunnis to withdraw from the government and led the Sunni population to take to the streets in protest. As a result of all this, Iraqi politics are now mired in mistrust and dysfunction.
This is not a road that Iraqis had to travel. Indeed, by the end of the surge in 2008, a different future was possible. That still seemed to be the case in December 2011, when the final U.S. forces (other than a sizable security assistance element) departed; however, the different future was possible only if Iraqi political leaders capitalized on the opportunities that were present. Sadly, it appears that a number of those opportunities were squandered, as political infighting and ethno-sectarian actions reawakened the fears of Iraq's Sunni Arab population and, until recently, also injected enormous difficulty into the relationship between the government in Baghdad and the leaders of the Kurdish Regional Government.
To understand the dynamics in Iraq -- and the possibilities that still exist, it is necessary to revisit what actually happened during the surge, a history now explored in a forthcoming book written by my executive officer at the time, Col. (Ret.) Peter Mansoor, now a professor of military history at the Ohio State University.
Leading the coalition military effort during the surge in Iraq in 2007 and 2008 was the most important endeavor -- and greatest challenge -- of my 37 years in uniform. The situation in Iraq was dire at the end of 2006, when President George W. Bush decided to implement the surge and selected me to command it. Indeed, when I returned to Baghdad in early February 2007, I found the conditions there to be even worse than I had expected. The deterioration since I had left Iraq in September 2005 after my second tour was sobering. The violence -- which had escalated dramatically in 2006 in the wake of the bombing of the Shiite al-Askari shrine in the Sunni city of Samarra -- was totally out of control. With well over 50 attacks and three car bombs per day on average in Baghdad alone, the plan to hand off security tasks to Iraqi forces clearly was not working. Meanwhile, the sectarian battles on the streets were mirrored by infighting in the Iraqi government and Council of Representatives, and those disputes produced a dysfunctional political environment. With many of the oil pipelines damaged or destroyed, electrical towers toppled, roads in disrepair, local markets shuttered, and government workers and citizens fearing for their lives, government revenue was down and the provision of basic services was wholly inadequate. Life in many areas of the capital and the country was about little more than survival.
In addition to those challenges, I knew that if there was not clear progress by September 2007, when I anticipated having to return to the United States to testify before Congress in open hearings, the limited remaining support on Capitol Hill and in the United States for the effort in Iraq would evaporate.
In short, President Bush had staked the final years of his presidency -- and his legacy -- on the surge, and it was up to those on the ground to achieve progress. In the end, that is what we did together, military and civilian, coalition and Iraqi. But as my great diplomatic partner Ryan Crocker, the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, and I used to note, Iraq was "all hard, all the time."
The Surge of Forces and the Surge of Ideas
The surge had many components. The most prominent, of course, was the deployment of the additional U.S. forces committed by President Bush -- nearly 30,000 of them in the end. Without those forces, we never could have achieved progress as quickly as we did. And, given the necessity to make progress by the hearings anticipated in September 2007, improvements before then were critical.
As important as the surge of forces was, however, the most important surge was what I termed "the surge of ideas" -- the changes in our overall strategy and operational plans. The most significant of these was the shift from trying to hand off security tasks to Iraqi forces to focusing on the security of the Iraqi people. The biggest of the big ideas that guided the strategy during the surge was explicit recognition that the most important terrain in the campaign in Iraq was the human terrain -- the people -- and our most important mission was to improve their security. Security improvements would, in turn, provide Iraq's political leaders the opportunity to forge agreements on issues that would reduce ethno-sectarian disputes and establish the foundation on which other efforts could be built to improve the lives of the Iraqi people and give them a stake in the success of the new state.
But improved security could be achieved only by moving our forces into urban neighborhoods and rural population centers. In the first two weeks, therefore, I changed the mission statement in the existing campaign plan to reflect this imperative. As I explained in that statement and the guidance I issued shortly after taking command, we had to "live with the people" in order to secure them. This meant reversing the consolidation of our forces on large bases that had been taking place since the spring of 2004. Ultimately, this change in approach necessitated the establishment of more than 100 small outposts and joint security stations, three-quarters of them in Baghdad alone.
The establishment of each of the new bases entailed a fight, and some of those fights were substantial. We knew that the Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias would do everything they could to keep our troopers from establishing a presence in areas where the warring factions were trying to take control -- and those areas were precisely where our forces were needed most. Needless to say, the insurgents and militias would do all that they could to keep us from establishing our new operating bases, sometimes even employing multiple suicide car bombers in succession in attempts to breach outpost perimeters. But if we were to achieve our goal of significantly reducing the violence, there was no alternative to living with the people -- specifically, where the violence was the greatest -- in order to secure them. Our men and women on the ground, increasingly joined during the surge by their Iraqi partners, courageously, selflessly, and skillfully did what was required to accomplish this goal.
"Clear, hold, and build" became the operative concept -- a contrast with the previous practice in many operations of clearing insurgents and then leaving, after handing off the security mission to Iraqi forces that proved incapable of sustaining progress in the areas cleared. Then -- Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno, commander of the Multi-National Corps-Iraq, and his staff developed and oversaw the execution of these and the other operational concepts brilliantly. Indeed, in anticipation of the new approach, he ordered establishment of the initial joint security stations in the weeks before I arrived. His successor in early 2008, then Lt. Gen. Lloyd Austin, did a similarly exemplary job as our operational commander for the final portion of the surge. On receiving the Corps' guidance, division and brigade commanders and their headquarters orchestrated the implementation of these concepts. And our company, battalion, and brigade commanders and their troopers translated the new strategy and operational concepts into reality on the ground in the face of determined, often barbaric enemies under some of the most difficult conditions imaginable.
But the new strategy encompassed much more than just moving off the big bases and focusing on security of the people. Improving security was necessary, but not sufficient, to achieve our goals in Iraq. Many other tasks also had to be accomplished.
The essence of the surge, in fact, was the pursuit of a comprehensive approach, a civil-military campaign that featured a number of important elements, the effects of each of which were expected to complement the effects of the others. The idea was that progress in one component of the strategy would make possible gains in other components. Each incremental step forward reinforced and gradually solidified overall progress in a particular geographic location or governmental sector. The surge forces clearly enabled more rapid implementation of the new strategy and accompanying operational concepts; however, without the changes in the strategy, the additional forces would not have achieved the gains in security and in other areas necessary for substantial reduction of the underlying levels of ethno-sectarian violence, without which progress would not have been sustained when responsibilities ultimately were transferred to Iraqi forces and government authorities.
(Much more at link)
-
Following up on Doug's fascinating post of yesterday:
TAMPA, Fla.—The top U.S. commander in the Middle East said Iraq has entered a downward spiral of violence that threatens to drive the country's leader further into the hands of Iran and heighten sectarian tensions across the region.
Enlarge Image
Gen. Lloyd Austin talking to reporters at Fort Riley, Kansas, in a file photo from July 2012. Associated Press
With Iraqi security forces responding inadequately, U.S. officials are concerned that al Qaeda will develop a haven stretching from western Iraq into Syria.
"If left unchecked, we could find ourselves in a regional sectarian struggle that could last a decade," Army Gen. Lloyd Austin, the head of the U.S. military's Central Command, told The Wall Street Journal in an interview here.
Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki met with Vice President Joe Biden and congressional leaders on Wednesday, at the start of a visit to Washington and is set to meet President Barack Obama on Friday. The Washington visit comes at a pivotal moment. Gen. Austin and other U.S. officials have blamed the violence in part on decisions by Mr. Maliki's government to exclude most Sunni Muslims from access to any real power in the Shiite Muslim-majority country.
Baghdad's alienation of Sunnis has compounded the problems Iraq faces from the civil war raging in neighboring Syria, Gen. Austin said, prompting some Sunnis to support, or at least tolerate al Qaeda. Al Qaeda-linked Sunni extremists have killed thousands of Iraqis this year, most of them Shiites.
Gen. Austin said that Shiite groups haven't yet joined in the fighting in Iraq. But he said if violence continues, Shiites are likely to retaliate, plunging Iraq into even deeper violence.
Iraqi soldiers arrest suspected militants this week. U.S. officials worry Sunni violence is pushing Iraq closer to Iran. Reuters
"What we are very worried about is a continued downward spiral that takes you to a civil war," Gen. Austin said. "It could easily get worse."
The presence of undisputed militant strongholds could lead to a push by al Qaeda-aligned groups in Iraq and Syria to form what Gen. Austin called "a larger caliphate"—a conservative Islamic empire ruled by Shariah law, long a goal of al Qaeda.
The U.S. spent more than $800 billion on the Iraq war, based on Congressional Research Service estimates. But U.S. officials said this week that Mr. Maliki has squandered many of the advantages the U.S. left to him, including a well-trained military. Mr. Maliki has flirted with making Iranian-backed militias part of the nation's security force, a move some U.S. officials believe could further strengthen the influence of Tehran inside Iraq. Gen. Austin said the increased power of al Qaeda in western Iraq has prompted Mr. Maliki to seek closer ties with Shiite-majority Iran.
"We do worry that this has driven Maliki further into the hands of the Iranians, I think it has a bit," Gen. Austin said.
Lukman Faily, Iraq's ambassador to the U.S. "categorically" denied the Iraqi government was reaching out to Iran for assistance. He said there were many causes of the rising violence in Iraq, including growing sectarian tension across the Middle East.
"We have no doubt the situation is a multilayered issue," he said. "One primary driver is spillover from Syria and the whole region is becoming more polarized."
Senior U.S. administration officials said Wednesday they were increasing intelligence cooperation with the Iraqis, but declined to provide specifics.
"We want to help the Iraqis have a better vision of what they face, so they can target it effectively," one official said.
The U.S. withdrew its forces from Iraq in December 2011. Since then, a small contingent of military officers has operated out of the U.S. Embassy, but there has been little U.S. training or advising of Iraqi forces. U.S. officials said Iraq remained opposed to any overt presence of American troops. Still, Iraqi officials said they were open to more cooperation with the Defense Department. Gen. Austin said a closer working relationship between the U.S. and Iraq was possible. "It is wise to help in any way we can, whenever we can," Gen. Austin said. "I do think there is some opportunity here. It will depend on whether their leadership wants the help."
U.S. military officials say many Iraqi units have seemingly forgotten their U.S. training, eschewing targeted raids on al Qaeda camps for heavy-handed tactics that have punished whole Sunni communities and are driving more Iraqis to back extremists. "The Iraqi government's tactics are accelerating the violence," said a military official.
Gen. Austin said the violence could be reversible if the government pursues policies that make the Sunni minority feel better represented. He said a revival of the Sunni Awakening movement, an American program that paid salaries to Sunni militias to fight al Qaeda-aligned militants, could help counter the rising violence. A bipartisan group of lawmakers this week called on Mr. Obama for greater intelligence sharing. Some lawmakers and defense analysts have said now is a good time to reset the relationship between U.S. and Iraq.
Mr. Faily said the government has taken recent steps to reach out to Sunnis and address their concerns. He also said the delegation discussed with Mr. Biden a revival of the Sunni Awakening program. But Mr. Faily added that without more-powerful American weapons, Iraq's security forces cannot move effectively against al Qaeda.
Iraq officials met with U.S. lawmakers Wednesday to press for further arm sales, including the transfer of Apache attack helicopters, arguing they are needed to counter the heavy machine guns of al Qaeda fighters.
In the letter, released Tuesday night, lawmakers including Sens. John McCain (R., Ariz.), Carl Levin (D., Mich.), expressed similar concerns as Gen. Austin about rising violence in Iraq. The lawmakers said Mr. Maliki's visit for a meeting with Mr. Obama—his first since December 2011—is an opportunity for the administration to press him to change his leadership style and be more inclusive.
"An Iraqi political strategy should involve sharing greater national power and revenue with Sunni Iraqis, reconciling with Sunni leaders, and ending…policies of blanket retribution," the senators wrote.
-
Can Iraq Be Saved?
By THE EDITORIAL BOARD
Published: November 1, 2013 207 Comments
With Iraq wracked by the worst violence in three years, Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki was in Washington this week looking for military aid and other help. This was quite a turnabout, since he had essentially forced American troops to leave in 2011. Since then, the pressures in Iraq have grown, and Mr. Maliki bears much responsibility for the current turmoil.
His plea for assistance is urgent because Al Qaeda in Iraq, a Sunni group and Al Qaeda affiliate that was significantly degraded in 2008, is again a major threat, stoking war against Iraq’s majority Shiites. Since January, more than 7,000 people have been killed in bombings and shootings in outdoor markets, cafes, bus stations, mosques and pilgrimages in Shiite areas.
Al Qaeda in Iraq waged a virulent insurgency that brought the country near civil war in 2006 and 2007, then suffered big defeats from Iraqi Sunni tribal groups and American forces. Since the Americans withdrew, the group has gained strength against Iraqi forces that are incapable of fully protecting civilians and has taken in fighters spilling in from neighboring Syria. These are serious problems. Mr. Maliki, however, has been playing a central role in the disorder. There is no doubt that militant threats would be less pronounced now if he had united the country around shared goals rather than stoked sectarian conflict.
Instead, he has wielded his power to favor his Shiite majority brethren at the expense of the minority Sunnis. The Sunnis, banished from power after Saddam Hussein’s ouster, have grown more bitter as they have been excluded from political and economic life. Mr. Maliki is also at odds with the Kurds, the country’s other major ethnic group in what was supposed to be a power-sharing government.
American officials have often argued that, however imperfect, post-Saddam Iraq has benefited because Iraqis shifted their battles from the street to the political arena. But the escalating bloodshed has steadily poisoned the political space, undermined incipient democratic institutions and made a stable future that much more elusive.
Iraq might be in a safer place today had Mr. Maliki reached a deal with the administration to keep a small number of American troops in the country after 2011 to continue military training and intelligence gathering. (AND MAYBE THE DEAL WOULD HAVE BEEN REACHED IF OBAMA HAD SOUGHT A SERIOUS NUMBER OF TROOPS INSTEAD OF 3000-- A NUMBER WHICH CLEARLY COMMUNICATES AN INTENTION TO LEAVE) He would also have more credibility if he had not aligned Iraq so closely with Iran, a Shiite state, and had not permitted Iran to fly through Iraqi airspace to deliver arms to Syria.
The United States has a strategic interest in Iraq’s stability, and in recent months it has resumed counterterrorism cooperation, including intelligence sharing. That should continue, as should American efforts to foster better relations between Iraq and the region.
President Obama and Mr. Maliki, who met at the White House on Friday, agreed on the need for equipment so Iraqi forces can pursue militants. But there was no indication that Mr. Maliki, who plans to run for a third term, had received new commitments for American-made weapons like Apache helicopters and expedited delivery of F-16 fighters.
Given his authoritarian duplicity, there is no reason to trust him with even more arms unless he adopts a more inclusive approach to governing and ensures that next April’s election will be fair and democratic.
-
http://www.wilsonquarterly.com/in-essence/where-we-part-company
From the article:
...since the U.S. invasion of 2003, Kurdistan, a semi-autonomous region of Iraq, has become an oasis in an otherwise anarchic and dangerous country. The veteran journalist describes celebrations marking the Kurdish New Year in Sulaimaniya: “Never before had I, a Westerner, been able to walk safely through a vast throng of Iraqis, or experienced such tolerance, friendliness, and absence of fear or religious stricture. Women with uncovered heads wore makeup and golden jewelry. Teenagers discreetly flirted. A few obviously gay men, and the odd drunk, wandered uncensored through the crowds.”
With life so good for so many Kurds today, and so bad in the rest of Iraq, might Kurdistan secede?
-
This piece concerns a point I have been pounding here for years.
This being from Pravda on the Hudson, no mention is made that Obama's offer was of only 3,000 troops i.e. the Iraqis could reasonably infer there was no meaningful intent instead of POTH's description "In 2011, the deal effectively broke down over Iraqi domestic politics."
Nonetheless, the fact of the advice offered Karzai is significant.
A Top Iraqi Official’s Advice to Karzai? Take America’s Deal
By AZAM AHMED
Published: December 17, 2013 2 Comments
KABUL, Afghanistan — With one of the most important chapters of Afghanistan’s history open before him, President Hamid Karzai took time this month for a personal meeting with the longtime foreign minister of Iraq, Hoshyar Zebari.
Mr. Zebari told Mr. Karzai that his government could not even secure Baghdad, the site of a May car bombing, after the American troop withdrawal in 2011.
It had been years since an Iraqi official had been to Afghanistan, and the trip was nominally meant to ease the passage of Afghan Shiites to holy shrines in Iraq. But it came right as Mr. Karzai had chosen to dig in and delay signing a security agreement with the United States, leaving long-term Western military support, and billions of dollars in aid, hanging in the balance.
In a moment of candor, Mr. Zebari offered a piece of advice to the president that would have been unthinkable from an Iraqi official just two years ago: Get over your differences with the Americans and sign the deal.
“Don’t be under the illusion that no matter what you do the Americans are here to stay,” Mr. Zebari told Mr. Karzai. “People used to say that about the American presence in Iraq, too. But they were eager to leave, and they will be eager to leave your country as well.”
When the last American troops departed Iraq in 2011, after the collapse of a similar security agreement, many Iraqis reveled in a moment of national pride, expressing faith in the government’s ability to maintain security. Since then, the country has fallen back into hellish violence, with thousands killed in sectarian attacks this year.
The Iraqi government could not even secure Baghdad anymore, despite billions of dollars in oil revenue and well-trained security forces, Mr. Zebari told the Afghan president, according to Iraqi and Afghan officials at the meeting. So how could the Afghan government, which can barely fund 20 percent of what it spends each year, hope to control the country without American help?
The conversation was a resonant moment between two leaders at different points in their respective journeys — one pondering his country’s post-American future, the other contending with it. With the benefit of hindsight, Mr. Zebari reached out to a president he scarcely knew, seizing on their shared experience at the crossroads of American involvement in the Muslim world.
Some of the parallels for Afghanistan are clear. As impasse has deepened into crisis, some of Mr. Karzai’s closest aides have seized on Iraq as proof that the Americans could just walk away, leaving the country’s security forces without military support and training in the middle of a war against the Taliban. Billions in badly needed international aid would also probably dry up, collapsing the economy. Worries about a return to civil war in Afghanistan would leap to center stage.
But Mr. Karzai had heard it all before.
American officials, in fact, have long used the withdrawal from Iraq as a cautionary example when talking with reporters and Afghan officials about the struggle to reach an Afghan security deal. And in the days after Mr. Karzai said he would put off signing the agreement, several senior American officials warned him that they would be forced to begin considering the “zero option” — a total and final troop withdrawal in 2014 — if he did not reverse course.
And that was the way Mr. Karzai appeared to take Mr. Zebari’s words, to the chagrin of Afghan officials who had hoped their president might take heed of Iraq’s troubles.
“You see?” he told the small group of Afghan officials after the meeting ended. “The Americans want this deal so badly they are even getting the Iraqis to pressure me.”
In a telephone interview, Mr. Zebari insisted his advice had merely been an expression of good will, not water-carrying for the Americans.
“Two years after the troop withdrawal, because of the rise of violence, we went back to Washington and asked them for continued support and military help,” he said, referring to a Nov. 1 trip by the Iraqi prime minister, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, after a huge surge in attacks by Al Qaeda in Iraq and other Sunni militants. “One should really draw from that conclusion.”
In 2011, the deal effectively broke down over Iraqi domestic politics. But within Mr. Karzai’s response to Mr. Zebari’s plea lies one of the core reasons it might yet happen that the United States leaves Afghanistan outright, too, despite urgency within parts of the Obama administration not to see a decade of lost lives and treasure blown away.
===========================
(Page 2 of 2)
Facing a world of potential consequences, Mr. Karzai again seemingly reduced the moment to himself. And whether out of paranoia or justifiable suspicion, his reaction has increasingly been to express profound distrust for his American allies.
“Even if they are not bluffing, we will not give in to the pressure to sign if our requirements are not fulfilled,” he told the French newspaper, Le Monde last week. “What I am hearing these days, and what I have already heard, is typical of colonial exploitation.”
Trying to understand Mr. Karzai’s intentions has become something of a parlor game in Kabul and Washington over the last few weeks. Has the bitterness over a failed 12-year war against the Taliban, and fear that the Americans will betray him, made him feel he must finally take a stand? Is he, as he says, using brinkmanship to ensure the best possible deal for Afghans, as he has with greater frequency in recent years?
“It might be a political game he’s playing, it might be for the sake of the nation or for his personal interests,” said Mohammad Homayoon Shinwari, an adviser to the president. “Politics is always what happens behind the curtain.”
In any case, the specter of Iraq has not just been used as a threat. It has loomed over every step of the debate on a long-term troop presence, both inside the White House and the Afghan presidential palace.
For the Americans who want to see troops stay on, the Iraqi example has served as a fallback position. “You can point to what’s been happening in Iraq, and you can say, ‘We can’t allow that to happen in Afghanistan,’ ” one senior administration official said.
Those in favor of a total withdrawal have a sense of having avoided a debacle in Iraq — that leaving incurred almost no political cost at home and most likely saved American lives. The same would be true in Afghanistan, another American official said.
Still, even those relieved at having avoided catastrophe in Iraq are reluctant to see Afghanistan descend into bloodshed.
The outcome of a grand assembly of Afghan leaders last month, the loya jirga, was an expression of urgency to seal a security deal, just one indicator that at least some of the Afghan public wants continuing American support. And American officials do not want to “punish the Afghan people” because of Mr. Karzai’s intransigence, the senior administration official said.
The officials asked not to be identified because they were describing internal discussions and delicate negotiations.
Within the Afghan government, Mr. Karzai’s stance has started to create a sense that he is on the fringe.
Even his most senior cabinet officials, including the ministers of defense and the interior, had no idea he planned to insist on delaying the deal and push for better terms until the words had left his mouth, during a speech before the loya jirga on Nov. 21 that left the audience, and other officials, shocked, according to a range of Afghan officials.
Some officials even suspect Mr. Karzai had not planned to, either: They say the words had not appeared in any drafts of the speech.
-
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/26/world/middleeast/us-sends-arms-to-aid-iraq-fight-with-extremists.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_th_20131226&_r=0
Coherent? Half-assed?
Maybe we should have reached a status of forces agreement in the first place?
-
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/03/world/middleeast/Al-Qaeda-threatens-Iraqi-cities.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_th_20140103&_r=0
By YASIR GHAZI and TIM ARANGO
Published: January 2, 2014 412 Comments
BAGHDAD — Radical Sunni militants aligned with Al Qaeda threatened Thursday to seize control of Falluja and Ramadi, two of the most important cities in Iraq, setting fire to police stations, freeing prisoners from jail and occupying mosques, as the government rushed troop reinforcements to the areas.
Falluja and Ramadi were major battlegrounds during the war in Iraq. Both towns formed focal points of the armed Sunni Arab insurgency against the American-led military presence.
In 2004, Falluja was the site of one of the biggest battles of the war as international forces struggled to wrest it from insurgent control. Dozens of allied soldiers were killed and hundreds wounded over eight days of sustained street-to-street combat.
Ramadi was also rocked by regular insurgent violence. In 2006, American officials recorded as many as 25 violent episodes every day in Ramadi.
Violence in both towns was largely tamed in 2007 when groups of local Sunni Arab leaders, some former militants themselves, organized into “Awakening Councils” that worked with American forces to turn their communities against violent jihadist extremism.
Dressed in black and waving the flag of Al Qaeda, the militants commandeered mosque loudspeakers to call for supporters to join their struggle in both cities in the western province of Anbar, which have increasingly become centers of Sunni extremism since American forces withdrew from the country at the end of 2011.
For the United States, which asserted at the time that Iraq was on track to become a stable democracy, Anbar holds grave historical significance — as a place for America’s greatest losses, and perhaps its most significant success, of the eight-year war.
Nearly one-third of the American soldiers killed in the war died trying to pacify Anbar, and Americans fought two battles for control of Falluja, in some of the bloodiest combat that American troops had faced since Vietnam.
The violence in Ramadi and Falluja had implications beyond Anbar’s borders, as the Sunni militants fought beneath the same banner as the most hard-line jihadists they have inspired in Syria — the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIS.
That fighting, and a deadly bombing in the Beirut area on Thursday, provided the latest evidence that the Syrian civil war was helping breed bloodshed and sectarian violence around the region, further destabilizing Lebanon and Iraq while fueling a resurgence of radical Islamist fighters.
It was not possible, amid the unfolding chaos, to determine a precise number of casualties, but officials in hospitals in Anbar reported at least 35 people were killed Thursday and more than 70 were wounded. Security officials in Anbar said the total killed over several days of fighting was 108, including 31 civilians and 35 militants. The rest of the dead were Iraqi security force members.
The fighting began after Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, a Shiite, ordered security forces to dismantle protest encampments in Falluja and Ramadi.
The order came after fighting erupted following the government’s arrest of a prominent Sunni lawmaker who had been a supporter of the protests, which had been going on for more than a year and had become an outlet for disenchanted Sunnis angered over their treatment by Mr. Maliki’s Shiite-dominated government. The arrest attempt set off a firefight that left several bodyguards and the brother of the lawmaker dead, and led to clashes between the government and armed tribesmen.
Officials later seemed to have calmed the situation, and in a deal between local tribal leaders and the central government, Mr. Maliki agreed to withdraw army troops from Anbar on Tuesday.
But as soon as any trace of government authority vanished, large numbers of Qaeda-aligned fighters attacked the cities, and by Wednesday the prime minister reversed his decision. He sent troops to try to secure the support of local tribal leaders, offering them guns and money to join forces with the regular army.
In a telephone interview on Thursday, one tribal fighter loyal to the government, Abu Omar, described heavy clashes across Falluja, and said the government had started shelling militant hide-outs.
“We told all the families to leave their houses,” he said over the phone, with the sound of gunfire in the background. “Many of the families fled from the city, and others are still unable to because of the heavy clashes. We have reports that the hospital in Falluja is full of dead and wounded people.”
Many of the tribesmen fighting alongside government security forces have been doing so reluctantly, making the calculation that, in this case, the government is the lesser evil than Al Qaeda.
Sheikh Hamed Rasheed Muhana echoed what many Sunnis in Iraq feel when he complained that the government had alienated Sunnis with harsh security crackdowns and mass arrests of Sunni men, militants and ordinary civilians alike. He said the government had worsened matters by “creating more depressed people willing to join Al Qaeda because of the sectarian behavior and ongoing arrests.”
Also on Thursday, in a move that seemed calculated to appease Sunni resentment, the government arrested a Shiite militia leader in Baghdad who is believed to be the leader of the Iraqi affiliate of Hezbollah, the Lebanese militant group.
===============================
Page 2 of 2)
Thursday was the fourth consecutive day of battles in Anbar. Late in the afternoon, security officials said the government had regained some territory in Ramadi but that fighting was still fierce in Falluja, where militants controlled a much larger portion of the city than they did in Ramadi.
Falluja and Ramadi were major battlegrounds during the war in Iraq. Both towns formed focal points of the armed Sunni Arab insurgency against the American-led military presence.
In 2004, Falluja was the site of one of the biggest battles of the war as international forces struggled to wrest it from insurgent control. Dozens of allied soldiers were killed and hundreds wounded over eight days of sustained street-to-street combat.
Ramadi was also rocked by regular insurgent violence. In 2006, American officials recorded as many as 25 violent episodes every day in Ramadi.
Violence in both towns was largely tamed in 2007 when groups of local Sunni Arab leaders, some former militants themselves, organized into “Awakening Councils” that worked with American forces to turn their communities against violent jihadist extremism.
With Iraqi casualty rates at their highest in five years, the United States has rushed to provide the Iraqi government with new missiles and surveillance drones to combat the resurgence of Al Qaeda.
American officials have been in touch with the Maliki government and its Sunni critics, trying to encourage them to join forces against Al Qaeda.
“We’ve encouraged the government to work with the population to fight these terrorists,” said Marie Harf, a State Department spokeswoman.
The chaos in Anbar has underscored the steady deterioration of Iraq’s security since the withdrawal of American forces. The battles have heightened fears that Iraq is descending into the type of sectarian civil war that it once faced during the American-led occupation.
The center of that unrest was in the desert region of Anbar, a cradle of Sunni discontent where swaggering tribesmen defied authority even under Saddam Hussein. An American pact with those Anbar tribesmen in 2007 — to pay them to switch sides and fight alongside the United States against Al Qaeda — became known as the Awakening and is considered partly responsible for turning the tide of the war.
Abu Risha, a leading tribal sheikh in Ramadi, was perhaps the Americans’ most stalwart partner, and even today he is likely to show visitors the plaques he received from American officers, and old pictures of him with American soldiers, even as he speaks of what he calls betrayal by the United States for leaving without finishing the job.
(MARC: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! )
In a statement released this week, he exhorted his men to again fight Al Qaeda, and hinted at business left unfinished by the Americans.
(MARC: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!)
“We were all surprised that the terrorists left the desert and entered your cities to return a second time, to commit their crimes, to cut off the heads, blow up houses, kill scholars and disrupt life,” he said. “They came back, and I am delighted for their public appearance after the security forces failed to find them. Let this time be the decisive confrontation with Al Qaeda.”
Violence continued elsewhere in the country on Thursday, with a suicide attack in a market in Diyala Province killing at least 17 people, and two explosions around Baghdad that killed eight.
In another indication that the war in Syria is reverberating back here, Iraqis who fled the country by the thousands after the American invasion and then began to return as the fighting eased are becoming refugees again.
On Thursday, Andrew Harper, an official with the United Nations refugee agency in Jordan, posted a message on Twitter saying that over the past three weeks the number of Iraqi refugees entering Jordan, which borders Anbar Province, had increased fivefold, with an average of 415 Iraqis leaving their country each week.
Analysts have long worried that the war in Syria would engulf Iraq, as hard-line Sunni rebels in Syria have said they see the two countries as one battlefield in the fight for Sunni dominance. For some time, the Syrian war has dragged in Iraqis along sectarian lines, with Iraqi Shiites rushing to Syria to support the government of President Bashar al-Assad, and Iraq’s Qaeda affiliate fostering the most extremist Sunni fighting units across the border.
These fears of spillover have been most acute in Anbar’s ungovernable desert, which borders Syria and where tribal loyalties cut across national boundaries, making it fertile territory for Al Qaeda’s resurgence.
Earlier in the week many tribesmen fought against the government, following the arrest of the Sunni lawmaker and the dismantling of the protest tents, but when Al Qaeda returned many quickly switched sides.
“We don’t want to be like Syria,” said Sheikh Omar al-Asabi, who led a group of fighting men in an area east of Falluja.
For many men of Anbar over the last several years, fighting has been a constant, even as the enemy has shifted. “We fought the Americans, and we fought the Maliki army, and now we are fighting Qaeda,” said Firas Mohammed, 28, who is an engineer when he is not at war. “We will not allow any outsider to come here and impose his will on us.”
-
http://dailycaller.com/2014/01/03/al-qaida-retakes-fallujah/
-
http://dailycaller.com/2014/01/03/al-qaida-retakes-fallujah/
"Ending two wars" meant surrendering. The year after we left Iraq was one of the bloodiest years there. No we did not negotiate to keep a military base there as a deterrent to this sort of thing or to attack future terrorist camps as they spring up.
How many American dollars and lives went into securing Falluja? Ah, who cares. Or as the former Secretary of State would say, "what difference does it make now".
The Honolulu Star captured the President's reaction to this troubling development:
(http://media.staradvertiser.com/images/312*226/bd99ce264c79cc00470f6a706700123a.jpg)
http://www.staradvertiser.com/news/breaking/20140103_Obama_ending_2week_Hawaii_vacation_Saturday_night.html?id=238665611
-
On the Bret Baier Special Report last night the opening segment, plus one of the segments on the roundtable was on exactly this development and both segments featured a clip of retired military intel man Col. Ralph Peters saying that in his opinion the failure to go for and get a status of forces agreement and abandoning our success there was the biggest of Baraq's many errors in foreign affairs-- a historical error. Charles Krauthammer and Steve Hayes agreed.
Almost sounded like Peters, SH and CK had been reading my posts here for the last five years. I'd laugh, but for the tragedy of it all.
If there is someone willing and able to put up the clips of these two segments, it would be greatly appreciated.
-
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/01/04/world/meast/iraq-violence/index.html
-
http://patdollard.com/2014/01/brit-hume-shreds-obama-for-turning-iraq-victory-into-defeat/?fb_action_ids=442151939218208&fb_action_types=og.likes&fb_source=other_multiline&action_object_map=[471055873000324]&action_type_map=[%22og.likes%22]&action_ref_map=[]
-
http://www.businessinsider.com.au/iraq-war-reasons-2014-1
-
http://www.businessinsider.com.au/iraq-war-reasons-2014-1
Because Buraq Hussein Obama's foreign policy is about empowering America's enemies.
-
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/jan/8/iraqi-diplomat-wants-obama-engagement-in-al-qaeda-/
-
Sadly, you guys called this right. The scope of the problem is astounding.
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/01/12/many-iraq-war-gains-now-lost-or-threatened/4393439/
-
Government forces and al Qaeda-linked rebels from exploding. Associated Press
Tribal sheiks and al Qaeda-affiliated militants huddled in Iraq's embattled city of Fallujah on Monday night in an effort to negotiate an end to a two-week siege and avert a full-scale sectarian conflict.
The negotiations began a week ago, when Sunni tribal chiefs asked Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a Shiite, to pause the military's assault on the city to give the Sunni sheiks time to persuade gunmen from the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, or ISIS, to leave the city.
Iraq's Shiite-dominated military has laid siege to Fallujah, long a center of al Qaeda resistance to central authorities, since ISIS militants seized the city two weeks ago.
The discussions conferred added political power on one of western Iraq's more neglected groups: the Sunni tribal leaders who are wedged between their resistance to al Qaeda militants on the one hand and the mostly Shiite army on the other.
"Any military assault on the city without the help and coordination with the local tribes will worsen the situation even more," said Sheik Rafie Abdul Kareem, a leader in the Abu Fahad clan in western Iraq.
Local Sunni leaders hope to arrive at a face-saving exit both for the ISIS militants and for soldiers fighting for Mr. Maliki. The Iraqi leader's bid for re-election in parliamentary polls this spring is widely seen as pegged to his ability to check al Qaeda's rise in western Iraq. Local leaders say they hope to persuade ISIS fighters to yield control of Fallujah to local, Sunni-dominated police forces with the promise that Mr. Maliki's Shiite-dominated army will remain on the city's outskirts. Monday's negotiations were set to continue on Tuesday as ISIS leaders deliberate among themselves over terms of the deal.
Since fighting broke out in late December, Mr. Maliki has struggled to contain the violence, which seemed to take him and his security forces by surprise.
Scenes from Fallujah, in Iraq's Anbar province, where the fighting between al Qaeda-linked militants and government forces remains fierce. Via The Foreign Bureau, WSJ's global news update. (Photo: AP)
The latest episode began after Mr. Maliki's security forces arrested a prominent Sunni opponent in a violent nighttime raid that left six people dead. Mr. Maliki's forces then raided and dispersed a year-old encampment of Sunni demonstrators who had been protesting against the prime minister and what they described as his anti-Sunni security policies.
Mr. Maliki's decision to raid the camp sparked an abrupt uprising of al Qaeda-affiliated ISIS militants in Fallujah and Ramadi that belied Mr. Maliki's previous claims that he had successfully contained the group.
"Maliki needs to demonstrate that he's cleared Fallujah of al Qaeda one way or the other," said Michael Knights, an Iraq expert at the Washington Institute. "It can't recur—there has to be some kind of dependable end to this otherwise it's just going to risk humiliation again and again and again."
Mr. Maliki made a concession to ISIS on Saturday when he agreed to replace Fallujah's mayor and police chief with officials who had no history of fighting al Qaeda militants.
U.S. diplomats had also appealed to Mr. Maliki to take a cautious approach to the Fallujah militants to avoid further escalation. Secretary of State John Kerry said on Sunday that while the U.S. would support Mr. Maliki's efforts in Anbar province, the U.S. had no plans to intervene militarily.
In a visit to Baghdad on Monday, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon expressed concern about the continuing violence in Anbar.
Officials in Saudi Arabia, which shares borders with Iraq, watched the Fallujah and Ramadi violence with dismay. Some Saudi officials said they believe Mr. Maliki has tried to hide the rising discontent among Anbar's Sunnis from U.S. officials to keep them from questioning his authority over the province.
"He doesn't want to show the Americans that he's weak," said Ahmed al-Ibrahim, an adviser to the Saudi government. Mr. Maliki "wanted to show that with him, Iraq is safe," believing that it is critical to his political survival to show Iraqis that Americans supported him, said Mr. Ibrahim.
-
Mustache mania
Posted 5/11/03
BAGHDAD--Want to insult a man in Iraq? Threaten to shave off his mustache with your shoe. But be prepared: Nothing is a bigger symbol of manhood here than the mighty 'stash. "A mustache means strength and manliness. A full and long mustache gives a man a strong face, and you know he is a good person," says Farris Al-Timini, proprietor of the Al Fen Nanin barbershop, as his customers get their bushy black lip-toppers trimmed. "The people in our country like to look like their leaders. If a leader has a big mustache, then the men will grow big mustaches."
A flier circulating around Baghdad shows Iraq's 55 "most wanted" individuals. Most sport an abundance of autocratic facial hair. Apparently, the Great Father--well known for his own thick whiskers--worked hard to promote the cult of facial fur. "Saddam used to give bonuses to some of his soldiers if they grew longer mustaches because it made them look angrier," recalls Muttaz Al-Abbas, 31, who runs an ad agency. "When he spoke of the Israelis, he said that the people of Iraq must fight them so hard that their mustaches will tremble," adds Al-Abbas, who sports a neat goatee, popular with a younger generation of Iraqis trying to bring more panache to the facial-hair sweepstakes.
Real men. Actually, Iraq's love affair with the mustache long predates Saddam Hussein; there are endless tales and proverbs about its powers. Tribal chiefs, for instance, measure a man's worth by his mustache. To wit, the old adage: An eagle can land on a great man's mustache. To swear on one's mustache here is to swear on one's honor. Tell a friend that he's "in your mustache," and you're vowing to protect him, perhaps for life.
More practically, Iraqi women are loath to pick a mustacheless partner. Hairdresser Hanan Al-Azawi, 35, takes great pride in her husband's lustrous mustache; without it, she says, she would never have married him. "A man with no facial hair is not attractive," she shrugs. "It is very important for a man to have a mustache. It means he is a real man." -Ilana Ozernoy
This story appears in the May 19, 2003 print edition of U.S. News & World Report.
-
Forgive me for not having the citation, but I gather that (then General? CIA director?) Petraeus told Obama that we had proof that one cause of our difficulties in obtaining a Status of Forces Agreement with Iraq was that Iran was paying off Iraqi legislators.
Question presented: Why did we not go public with this information?
-
WASHINGTON—Hundreds of contractors working for America's biggest defense companies are taking on a broader role in helping Iraq's military learn to use new weapons in a growing battle against Islamist insurgents.
Over the next few months, the U.S. government is expected to begin sending more than $6 billion in military equipment to Iraq. The latest deal includes 24 Apache attack helicopters made by Boeing Co. BA -0.19% and nearly 500 Hellfire missiles produced by Lockheed Martin Corp. LMT -0.01%
While the helicopters may not arrive in time to help with the current fighting, the missiles are expected to be used by the Iraqi military in the battle to uproot Islamic fighters from Ramadi and Fallujah, cities that were the focus of major U.S. military operations during the height of the war in Iraq.
When the U.S. begins sending the first batch of Apache helicopters and additional Hellfire missiles this year, more than 200 private defense-company personnel will be on hand.
They won't be alone.
Across Iraq, military specialists are helping the Iraqi military maintain its growing number of surveillance drones, attack helicopters and powerful missiles. Thousands more support the U.S. government as security guards, analysts, drivers and cooks.
The strategic deployment of defense contractors in Iraq underscores the shifting security landscape as the U.S. downsizes its military presence around the world. With fewer than 200 American military personnel in Iraq, continued U.S. military support there relies increasingly on the presence of contractors.
The role for the military contractors, which has dwindled along with the U.S. presence in Iraq, could become more important in the coming months as the Iraqi government seeks billions more in international military support to combat a growing threat from Islamist militants.
Employees of Bell Helicopter, a unit of Textron Inc., TXT +1.53% are training Iraqi forces to fly and repair light attack helicopters stationed at a military base in the so-called Sunni Triangle northwest of Baghdad, where the Iraqi military is battling resurgent Islamist fighters..
Two dozen Lockheed employees are helping the Iraqi military keep their C-130 transport planes in the air. The company is also sending nearly 500 Hellfire missiles, which are being increasingly used in the fight against al Qaeda militants.
And more than a dozen employees with Beechcraft Corp. and General Atomics maintain a fleet of "Peace Dragon" surveillance airplanes used to track insurgent activity around the country.
The U.S. spent more than $200 billion on contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past decade as its reliance on private support grew, according to congressional estimates. In all, more than 5,000 contractors now work in Iraq as intelligence analysts, security guards, military trainers, translators and cooks.
"You have a situation where the government has become dependent on contractors," said Allison Stanger, a political-science professor at Middlebury College. "It's a real quantum shift."
Most U.S. contractors working in Iraq are unlikely to get involved in direct military operations. Along with U.S. legal restrictions on civilians engaging in combat, foreign military sales contracts often include provisions preventing contractors from being involved in direct combat, said Anthony Cordesman, a defense expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
"Almost all of them will be protected from being asked to, or participating in, combat," Mr. Cordesman said. "You can't require anyone to have any kind of direct combat role."
Still, contractors serve in dangerous areas. In Afghanistan, more civilian contractors were being killed than U.S. soldiers by 2012, according to an analysis by Steven Schooner, a professor at George Washington University Law School. Now, he said, the traditional U.S. military role has been supplanted by civilians who are training and equipping the Iraqi military.
"The military task has, in fact, been outsourced in Iraq," he said.
The U.S. troop withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 brought the war to an official end. But the U.S. still retains a large presence at the embassy in Baghdad, which is still one of the biggest American diplomatic facilities in the world.
Over the past few years, the U.S. has been scaling back its presence in Iraq, and even the contractor force has dwindled.
As of January 2013, the U.S. had more than 12,500 contractors in Iraq, according to State Department and Pentagon figures. The U.S. has significantly reduced that number over the past year.
Of the roughly 5,000 contractors supporting the American diplomatic mission in Iraq, the State Department said, more than a third of them are U.S. citizens. They work for companies like Triple Canopy Inc., which provides security guards for U.S. diplomats, and L-3 Communications Holdings Inc., LLL -0.56% which helps the State Department vet Iraqis seeking jobs with the U.S. Many serve as cooks, translators and janitors.
Those numbers don't account for scores of military contractors working in Iraq as part of U.S.-approved foreign military sales that provide the Iraqi government with helicopters, missiles and other critical support.
U.S. lawmakers, led by Sen. Robert Menendez (D., N.J.), had blocked the Apache helicopter sale because of concerns that the Iraqi government would use them to crack down on minority groups.
Those concerns have now been allayed and the U.S. is stepping up its help as the Iraqi government tries to quash Sunni militants in Anbar province.
-
WSJ:
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304834704579405440767359448?mod=WSJ_hp_RightTopStories&mg=reno64-wsj
For Iraq, he was a decorated war hero, severely wounded in battle. As an officer for the Iraqi army, Brigadier General Mustafa Al Mashhadani fought against Iran in the 1980s, against Kuwait in the early 1990s, and on his home turf against Americans in 2003.
But now, coming out of retirement at age 55, he is doing battle with a new enemy in his hometown of Fallujah: the army he served for decades. And he is doing it with a contingent of more than a hundred al Qaeda-linked fighters.
"Every time I fight, I whisper to myself, 'It's me, you idiots,' " said Gen. Mashhadani. "This could have been different."
His anguish is emblematic of some of the strange alliances that have cropped up since armed militants overtook the important city of Fallujah early this year and placed it under the control of the city's Sunni majority. That majority may hate al Qaeda and its rigid theocratic mores—but they despise Nouri Al Maliki, the Shiite prime minister, even more.
More than two years after U.S. forces withdrew from the country it occupied for almost a decade, Iraq is on a bloody downward spiral. Devastating terror attacks now kill dozens of people with horrifying regularity. Highly organized and well-armed militants, capable of bold strikes against police and military targets, have been able to take and hold territory.
Indeed, the past year of worsening sectarian tensions and violence has already produced death tolls reminiscent of Iraq's not-so-distant past. At least 7,818 civilians were killed in Iraq in 2013, the highest annual total since 17,956 were killed in 2007, the year the sectarian civil war first began to subside, according to the United Nations. And the violence hasn't let up: In Baghdad on Saturday, a car bombing—a style of attack that has become routine—killed 19 people.
Experts say that as the crisis deepens, the country risks returning to the kind of sectarian civil war that, at its zenith in 2005 and 2006, killed hundreds of thousands of Iraqis and nearly tore the country apart.
Nowhere are signs of the country's crumbling more evident than in Fallujah, a city seared in the minds of U.S. Marines who did fierce battle with insurgents there. Mr. Maliki, who is vying for a third term in parliamentary elections at the end of April, has sought to portray the occupation of Fallujah as an al Qaeda uprising with international links. And U.S. officials, concerned about the deteriorating security there, have responded. In December, the U.S. delivered 75 Hellfire missiles to Iraq, the first such shipment since it left the country. Then in January, the administration notified Congress of a new weapons package for Iraq that includes up to 500 Hellfire missiles.
In Fallujah, many Sunni politicians blame the bloody uprising on Mr. Maliki and his policies, which his critics say amount to Shiite chauvinism. Contrary to recent reports, locals interviewed in the city say the strongest occupying force in the Sunni-majority city isn't al Qaeda but tribal fighters whose impatience with Mr. Maliki has finally boiled over into violence.
In response, the premier has said the policies aren't chauvinistic and that militants are trying to use them to stir an uprising. Mr. Maliki's spokesman also denied criticisms that the prime minister had been playing up al Qaeda's presence in Anbar province, saying that there would be "no political benefit" to overstating the region's terrorist threat.
But observers warn that unless Mr. Maliki takes a more conciliatory tone with Iraq's powerful Sunni minority, the sectarian division could lead to a more permanent political rupture. Mr. Maliki risks pushing Sunnis out of politics altogether only months before this spring's parliamentary vote, Sunni politicians warn.
"If the government fails to convince people to stand against al Qaeda…it could be the beginning of a civil war in Iraq," said Rafi Al Essawi, a Sunni who served as Finance Minister under Mr. Maliki, but quit under protest last year after his bodyguards were arrested and accused of terrorism. He said he is working to encourage Fallujah's tribal leaders to reject al Qaeda.
In all, since the outbreak of violence began in Fallujah, Ramadi and other areas of Anbar province in December, some 400,000 civilian residents have been displaced, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The fighting in Fallujah has pushed February's death toll above 1,000 across the country, according to the U.N. and the Health Committee of the Provincial Council of Anbar.
Known as the city of mosques, Fallujah has long been a focal point of Sunni extremist sympathies. U.S. forces fought two blistering battles against al Qaeda-linked insurgents in the city in 2004. Though some U.S. officials have quietly voiced concern over Mr. Maliki's policies, a spokeswoman for the White House said this month that the U.S. was actively consulting with Iraqi leaders because of concerns about terrorism.
For the moment, the size of the threat directly from al Qaeda is hard to determine. While al Qaeda's Iraqi affiliate, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, or ISIS, can claim a sizable deployment in Fallujah, interviews with local officials, tribal sheiks and antigovernment fighters suggest that much of the fighting is also led by ordinary Sunni Iraqi tribesmen, jilted loyalists of Saddam Hussein's regime like Gen. Mashhadani and Islamist fighters whose jihad, unlike that of al Qaeda, doesn't exceed Iraq's borders.
For the bulk of the fighters, locals say, the goal of the uprising is far more provincial than al Qaeda's global agenda. Their aims align more closely with the Sunni protesters who erected and maintained largely peaceful protest encampments against Mr. Maliki's government throughout Anbar and other Sunni provinces over the past year.
Among the Sunni protest movement's chief grievances is a counterterrorism law that Sunni leaders say Mr. Maliki has wielded disproportionately against Sunnis, arresting them by the tens of thousands.
The Sunnis' other main complaint is an exclusion law against loyalists of the former regime. Demonstrators say the law against former Baath Party members, the dominant party under the old regime of Saddam Hussein, functions as little more than a sectarian filter to keep Sunnis from getting government jobs or rising in the ranks of Iraq's bureaucracy and military.
"What Maliki has done, the way the security services operate, this has created support for al Qaeda," said Kirk Sowell, a Jordan-based political risk analyst who is the publisher of Inside Iraqi Politics. Al Qaeda-linked fighters, he estimated, make up only about a fifth to a third of the fighters in Fallujah.
Mr. Maliki and his supporters say that both laws are essential tools in the fight against global Islamist extremism and the return of the former regime of Hussein—very real threats that the prime minister insists are incubating inside at least a dozen Sunni protest camps.
"The de-Baathification law included people from both sides, and even may include more Shiites than Sunnis," said Ali al-Moussawi, Mr. Maliki's spokesman, who added that Mr. Maliki is bound by the law and remains "unhappy" that he isn't able to recommission certain former officers who had "proven their loyalty" to the nation. "These are attempts by the politicians in the Sunni areas to gather people around them by telling them that the government is treating them unfairly as an excuse to create trouble in Iraq."
Mr. Moussawi acknowledged that some former senior army officers under Hussein were now colluding with al Qaeda to fight against the Iraqi army. While he didn't know of Gen. Mashhadani, the general would definitely be considered a traitor if he were caught, Mr. Moussawi said.
Loyalists of Hussein, who was executed in 2006, have organized themselves into a group known as the Army of the Men of the Naqshabandi Order, a violent resistance movement with loose ties to the global Naqshabandi Order of Sufi Islamic mystics. Their ranks have populated some of the protest encampments in the north of the country.
ISIS, meanwhile, has strengthened as the bloody conflict in neighboring Syria drags on. Syria's war has given militants access to a plethora of heavy weapons and fighters transported over the two countries' porous shared border, allowing them to ramp up the scale, frequency and sophistication of their attacks. ISIS operates in multiple countries with the aim of carving out an Islamic caliphate.
Though pro-Maliki politicians acknowledge the Sunni protesters' legitimate grievances, they say al Qaeda-linked groups like ISIS have exploited sectarian divisions to advance a regional agenda.
"If the government didn't raid the protest camps, then Anbar would have already been named an Islamist state for al Qaeda," said Khaled Al Assady, a member of the Dawa Party that Mr. Maliki leads.
Despite their ideological differences, most antigovernment militants in Fallujah see their main goal as preventing Mr. Maliki's Shiite-majority Iraqi military from re-entering the city—which to them is tantamount to a hostile takeover by foreign occupiers.
Weeks of negotiations between local tribal leaders loyal to the militants and Anbar politicians with ties to Baghdad have revolved around which security force would eventually take charge of the city in lieu of the armed forces.
For Mr. Maliki's part, the Fallujah calculations include the added complication of the April 30 parliamentary elections, in which the two-term prime minister will be seeking a third chance at the helm. In Fallujah, analysts say the prime minister has what may be his last, best chance to show Shiite Iraqis that he can deal firmly with a rising jihadist threat without further alienating the Sunni minority.
"Maliki needs to demonstrate that he's cleared Fallujah of al Qaeda one way or another," said Michael Knights, an Iraq expert at the conservative-leaning Washington Institute for Near East Policy. "There has to be some kind of dependable end to this, otherwise it's just going to risk humiliation again and again."
Yet as the fighting wears on, more and more secularists like Gen. Mashhadani are finding themselves seduced by al Qaeda.
When he enrolled in the military academy in 1979 at age 20, he says being in the army was a different experience. Being an officer was "marvelous, and you could propose to any girl."
Greeting guests in his house in a neighborhood populated by former officers loyal to Hussein, the sharply dressed, mustachioed Gen. Mashhadani still boasts of the war wounds he earned while fighting against Iran—what he calls "the Persian state of evil." His disfigured leg recalls where an Iranian shell gouged out a chunk of muscle during a firefight in 1987.
He says he climbed the ranks by fighting in what he termed "the disastrous invasion of Kuwait" in 1991 and then against American air incursions in 1993 and 1997. After the army was dissolved following the U.S. invasion in 2003, Gen. Mashhadani returned to his home in Fallujah, and tried civilian jobs. He says he asked about recommissioning in the army four years later, but says he and other Sunni retirees were turned down under the de-Baathification law.
Ultimately, the former general cites increased crackdowns on his fellow Sunnis as a driving force behind his shift in allegiance. In December last year, after the prime minister declared that a protest camp outside Ramadi was dominated by al Qaeda-linked militants, Iraqi security forces killed at least a dozen protesters while dispersing the camp. Shortly afterward, Gen. Mashhadani says he followed his son to a Fallujah mosque where militants were organizing themselves and distributing weapons.
He says he was quickly assigned as a brigade commander over 60 mostly untrained men, and on the same day found himself face-to-face with the first division of the same Iraqi army he served. He says he ordered his unit to retreat. "Some of my old colleagues serve in that division," he said.
Gen. Mashhadani believes the presence of at least one hundred former Iraqi army officers among the Islamists' ranks has made them a more professional, merciful fighting force. He claims to have convinced al Qaeda leaders to halt the practice of launching rockets from civilian neighborhoods.
The former general recalls one incident in which he and his ex-officer colleagues argued with al Qaeda leaders to prevent them from executing 14 captured Iraqi soldiers. Gen. Mashhadani says he saw to it that the men were given over to the protection of a local Fallujah sheik. Such experiences have hardened Gen. Mashhadani's belief in the dignity of his fight.
"I'm not exaggerating when I say I'm a living schizophrenia case," he said. "On the one side I refuse al Qaeda ideology, but on the other I miss military life and hate the government that commands this army."
According to Khalid Al Dulaimi, a leading figure in the Fallujah tribal military council that functions as an informal umbrella group for antigovernment militants, Gen. Mashhadani has become a favorite among younger fighters. He now controls a unit of 103 militants, all from different tribal backgrounds, in a southern suburb of Fallujah.
Gen. Mashhadani admits that it was "bad luck" that compelled him to join with al Qaeda. But for the first time since 2003, he says, he is earning a respectable salary of about $1,000 a month—comparable to that of a new army lieutenant, he says. And he has a refrigerator stocked with food, some spare cash to spend and a loyal following of young soldiers who value his hard-won expertise.
"Today I will prove to Maliki and to anyone who refused my return to the army that I deserve to be an army commander," he said. "Today, I am absolutely with al Qaeda."
—Uthman Al Mukhtar, Adam Entous and Julian E. Barnes contributed to this article.
Write to Matt Bradley at matt.bradley@wsj.com
-
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/03/25/the-certainty-of-donald-rumsfeld-part-1/?emc=edit_th_20140326&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=49641193
-
I do not have audio where I am, but if I am not mistaken I know one of the men who was on this roof top. BTW he has attended a DB Gathering and is a big fan. He also introduced me to some serious friends of his and asked me to share my analysis of certain things.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=youtube_gdata_player&v=v00pc9-zP_s&app=desktop
-
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/29/world/middleeast/iraq-prepares-for-national-elections-in-the-shadow-of-militant-threats.html?emc=edit_th_20140429&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=49641193&_r=0
-
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/01/world/middleeast/with-security-tight-iraqis-cast-votes-in-unaccustomed-peace.html?emc=edit_th_20140501&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=49641193
Looks like even POTH has to admit that people are standing for democracy:
BAGHDAD — Millions of Iraqis voted for a new Parliament on Wednesday, defying threats from Islamist extremists, in an election that was carried out, by Iraq’s brutal standards, in remarkable peace.
After a surge in violence leading up to the vote, and threats by a Sunni extremist group, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIS, to strike polling sites, no attacks were reported in Baghdad, and none with any large numbers of casualties were reported elsewhere in the country.
The election, the first nationwide vote since the departure of American troops more than two years ago, was seen as a referendum on Nuri Kamal al-Maliki’s eight years as prime minister as he seeks a third term amid a growing Sunni insurgency that has brought the country to the edge of a new civil war. But with results pending, the story on Wednesday was simply that the election was held at all, and that so few people were killed.
Iraqis voted amid extraordinary security procedures. Last weekend, the government announced a weeklong national holiday to ensure that most people stayed home from work, allowing the security forces to prepare in the streets. As Election Day approached, the authorities announced a curfew in Baghdad, which went into effect on Tuesday night and prohibited most traffic, forcing Iraqis to walk to polling centers. Even the airport was closed for a few days.
Photo
Workers counted ballots under lamplight on Wednesday after a cut in power in Baghdad. The turnout was put at 60 percent. Credit Karim Kadim/Associated Press
Despite the threats, the turnout for the vote was 60 percent, according to Iraq’s electoral commission, just below the percentage of eligible voters who participated in the last national election, in 2010.
“We have the power to make change, inshallah,” said a voter, Emad Ibrahim, using a common Arabic expression that means “God willing.”
Paralyzed from a bombing five years ago, he arrived to vote in a wheelchair. “Iraq needs construction,” he said. “Every day people die in Iraq, and it is time to stop this.”
Noting his war injuries, he said, “Now I will take my revenge over the terrorists by having the chance to vote for a better Iraq.”
Some attacks were carried out north of Baghdad. In one, in a town near Tikrit, Saddam Hussein’s hometown, a police officer pounced on a suicide bomber as he approached a polling center. The officer was killed, and two civilians also died, but his action saved the lives of many others. In the same area, a roadside bomb exploded near a polling center, killing two police officers. And in Diyala Province, northeast of Baghdad, two civilians were killed by a roadside bomb.
All in all, Election Day or otherwise, that amounted to a quiet day in Iraq.
In a statement, Secretary of State John Kerry praised the police officer who impeded the suicide bomber and said, “Iraqi voters sent a powerful rebuke to the violent extremists who have tried to thwart democratic progress and sow discord in Iraq and throughout the region.”
In Anbar Province, which is dominated by the Sunni minority and where insurgents from ISIS control large amounts of territory, including Falluja, voting was severely restricted. In the polling centers near the provincial capital, Ramadi — where a mortar attack killed two civilians — turnout appeared low, and it seemed that more women were voting then men.
One man who did vote there, Muhammad al-Rawi, 34, said: “I came here today to stand against ISIS. I am voting to defeat those terrorists so Anbar will return to the way it was. We need buildings and flowers. We don’t want guns and war anymore.”
Continue reading the main story
Continue reading the main story
Advertisement
In the early morning, Mr. Maliki voted at the Rashid Hotel in the Green Zone, the secure section in the city’s center where many government buildings are situated, and lauded Iraq’s ability to carry out the election with the absence of American forces. “We are having great success, and there is not one single foreign soldier on the ground,” he said.
Final results from the Independent High Election Commission should be announced within a couple of weeks, although partial results, accurate or not, will probably trickle out before then through political parties.
Each of Iraq’s elections has been held under difficult circumstances, but this one had new challenges. Tens of thousands of American troops were not on standby. There were fewer international election monitors, because of the lack of security, and allegations of fraud, particularly from losing parties, are probably inevitable. And the hurdles to voting in Anbar Province raised questions about the legitimacy of the vote for Sunnis.
Mr. Maliki, if he does not win a significant plurality that would indicate a smooth path to a new term, is likely to use his influence over Iraq’s institutions to influence the process, such as challenging the results through the judiciary, over which he wields enormous influence, experts said.
On Wednesday, Mr. Maliki said that his victory was “certain,” and, dramatizing the role of the strongman that he sought to portray during the campaign, he also promised victory against the insurgents.
“Soon, there will be a solution in Falluja,” he said. “There is no backing down from destroying ISIS and those who support them.”
While the effort by Iraq’s political factions to form a governing coalition could take a long time, as it has in the past, an ominous question that is often raised privately within Iraq’s political class will hover over the process: If Mr. Maliki loses, will he relinquish power peacefully?
“It’s a big question,” said Ahmed Ali, an Iraq analyst at the Institute for the Study of War who has closely followed the election. “If we know anything about Prime Minister Maliki, it’s that he doesn’t retreat easily.”
-
Initial reports of high turnout and relative security during Iraq’s parliamentary elections have buoyed optimism that things might not be so bad there after all. Unfortunately, a smooth election and even the formation of a new government are not likely to reverse the negative security trends that are bringing Iraq ever closer to full-scale sectarian war.
The Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS) has established havens in Anbar, Diyala, and southern Baghdad in many of the locations from which al-Qaeda in Iraq, its ancestor, threatened the capital in 2006.
ISIS drove the Iraqi Security Forces from Fallujah in January. The Iraqi army has operated from the city’s outskirts but lacks the urban warfare capability to clear its interiors. It is shelling the city. Nearly 73,000 Iraqi families from Anbar have fled their homes, according to United Nations figures on internally displaced persons.
ISIS has been advancing on Baghdad since January. The gunmen who have controlled the Fallujah dam have twice flooded areas between Fallujah and Baghdad. ISIS destroyed an oil pipeline near the Tigris in ways that contaminated the capital’s water supply.
Shi’a militias have mobilized to counter the growing threat from ISIS and to serve the political parties with which they are affiliated. Militias have engaged in retaliatory executions and sectarian killings in several provinces. Some militias have forcibly displaced residents of Sunni villages; they have razed Sunni homes in Diyala province. Sunni families in remote areas have fled their villages en masse.
Cooperative relationships exist between Shi’a militias and the Iraqi Security Forces. These conditions do not bode well for any Iraqi government. Should Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki win a third term, he would do so having lost a province to terrorists and having entrusted terrain to militias. Meanwhile, competitors for power have organized militias with which to engage Mr. Maliki and one another.
The Iraqi people have shown their extraordinary resiliency in the face of danger. Iraqis voted in large numbers despite terrorist and militia violence in 2006 and 2010. But American troops were in Iraq then to ensure that the millions of Iraqis could overcome their terrorist foes. Without American support, it is far from clear that the terrorists won’t win this time.
Kimberly Kagan is president of the Institute for the Study of War.
-
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bm64E5R12s8&feature=youtu.be&t=1m10s
-
Saddam,
" I like to call a spade a spade" when speaking of Zionists and Americans. Just not himself or his sons.
Bush thought Iraqis would be dancing in the streets when we rid them of this monster. Some Iraqis felt that way. But not enough. How many Iraqis died since then 100K?
Our country did a glorious deed. Our troops are heroes to the World. And look at the thanks we get. Look at the Democrat Party twisting this for political gain.
Disgusting and sad.
-
Iraq WAS ready to go for a status of forces agreement, which IMO would have provided the stability needed for the democracy we enabled to put down deep roots. Instead Obama communicated a desire to bug out by asking to leave only 3,000 instead of the 35-50,000 recommended by our generals, which politically forced Iraqi politicians to demand US departure. WE HAD SUCCESS. IT WAS WORTH THE DOING! BARAQ THREW IT AWAY.
-
"BARAQ THREW IT AWAY"
He would see it in his political interests that the mission is not a long term success. Fits the Democrat/Socialist Party narrative.
No coincidence.
-
WASHINGTON — The team of F.B.I. agents arrived in Iraq to investigate a shooting involving a private company that provided security for Americans in a war zone. It was October 2007, and the name of the company — Blackwater Worldwide — did not yet mean anything to the agents. But what they found shocked them.
Witnesses described a convoy of Blackwater contractors firing wildly into a crowded traffic circle in Baghdad the previous month, killing 17 people. One Iraqi woman watched her mother die as they rode the bus. Another died cradling the head of her mortally wounded son.
“This is the My Lai massacre of Iraq,” one agent remembers John Patarini, the team’s leader, saying as they were heading home.
That shooting in Nisour Square, along with the massacre by Marines of 24 Iraqi civilians at Haditha and the abuses at Abu Ghraib prison, became a signature moment in the Iraq war. Five Blackwater security guards were indicted on manslaughter and weapons charges, and a sixth entered a plea deal to testify against his former colleagues.
Photo
Nicholas A. Slatten, a contractor, in 2008. Accused of firing the first shots, he faces a new charge of first-degree murder. Credit Douglas C. Pizac/Associated Press
But over the years, a case that once seemed so clear-cut has been repeatedly undermined by the government’s own mistakes.
Prosecutors are trying to hold together what is left of it. But charges against one contractor were dropped last year because of a lack of evidence. And the government suffered another self-inflicted setback in April when a federal appeals court ruled that the prosecution had missed a deadline and allowed the statute of limitations to expire against a second contractor, Nicholas A. Slatten, a former Army sniper from Tennessee who investigators believe fired the first shots in Nisour Square. A judge then dismissed the case against Mr. Slatten.
The appeals court unanimously rejected the argument that letting Mr. Slatten walk free would be a miscarriage of justice. If such an injustice occurred, the court said, it was caused by the government’s delays, which the court called “inexplicable.”
The Justice Department responded Friday by charging Mr. Slatten with first-degree murder, which has no statute of limitations but carries a much heftier burden of proof.
The trial will renew focus on an episode that inflamed anti-American sentiment abroad and helped cement the image of Blackwater, whose security guards were involved in scores of shootings, as a trigger-happy company that operated with impunity because of its lucrative contracts with the American government.
Now known as Academi, the company was sold by its founder, Erik Prince, to a group of private investors three years after the Nisour Square killings.
But the difficulty the government has had in making a case against the former employees is likely only to reinforce the impression that American contractors were not subject to any rules in Iraq, despite the Obama administration’s attempts to allay Iraqi concerns about the case and Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr.’s expression of his “personal regret” for the shooting.
“As citizens, we need to ask why our government fails to achieve any accountability for such blatant wrongdoing,” said Susan Burke, a lawyer who represented Iraqi victims of the Nisour Square shooting in a lawsuit that Blackwater settled by paying an undisclosed amount. “The ongoing delays and mistakes undermine any confidence in the system.”
Continue reading the main story
Continue reading the main story
Advertisement
When the F.B.I. team arrived home from Iraq in 2007, court testimony and interviews show, members believed they had the makings of a strong case. Witnesses told a horrific tale, and while Blackwater guards said the shooting had begun with an ambush by insurgents, American military officials told investigators that there had been no sign of such an attack. Even if there had been, the military said, firing grenade launchers in such a crowded space was excessive.
“It was an investigation into the protection of basic human rights that should be afforded to all people, not just citizens of the United States,” Joseph Persichini Jr., the assistant F.B.I. director then in charge of the Washington field office, said in 2008.
But from the beginning, investigators said, they felt their case was being undermined. A State Department security agent reported that, shortly after the shooting, his colleagues had gathered up shell casings, trying to clean up the scene to protect Blackwater. The agent, David Farrington, recalled a meeting in which other State Department officials said, “We’ve got enough to get these guys off now,” according to court testimony.
State Department investigators also gave limited immunity to the Blackwater contractors in exchange for statements about the shooting. After someone leaked those statements to reporters, the investigators tried to make sure that none of their witnesses were influenced by those statements, which could not be used as evidence.
Still, the F.B.I. remained confident. “We already had enough evidence to show that we could work off of the physical evidence,” Mr. Patarini said in court. “The fragments, the casings, the witnesses.”
A key development came in 2008 when one of the guards, Jeremy P. Ridgeway, pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter, admitting that he and his colleagues had fired unprovoked on unarmed civilians. That admission was made public the same day that prosecutors in Washington announced manslaughter and weapons charges against the five Blackwater contractors.
But a year later, the case appeared to be all but lost. A federal judge dismissed the charges, citing the Justice Department’s “reckless” behavior. The judge found that, among other things, the prosecutors Kenneth Kohl and Jonathan Malis had distorted evidence and violated the constitutional rights of the defendants.
In response, the Justice Department replaced its prosecution team, which became the subject of internal investigations. And in an unusual move that reflected the diplomatic sensitivities of the case, Mr. Biden personally announced, on a trip to Iraq, that the government would appeal. “A dismissal is not an acquittal,” he said.
An appeals court later reinstated the case against four of the guards, but not Mr. Slatten, whose case prosecutors acknowledged was tainted. They said they planned to charge him again using untainted evidence.
But that did not happen in time, and in September 2012, the five-year statute of limitations for manslaughter expired.
Mr. Slatten is scheduled to be arraigned Monday on the new first-degree murder charge, and prosecutors say they want him to be tried next month alongside his former colleagues. His defense lawyer is expected to oppose that, which could delay the case further.
With or without Mr. Slatten, the case against the three remaining guards is set finally to go to trial, with Mr. Ridgeway as a likely key witness, and the government ready to paint a fearsome picture of a company that became an arm of the United States war effort in Iraq.
-
Summary
A shift in the activities of militant group Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, known as ISIL, within Syria over the past year and growing Sunni frustration with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's policies pose challenges for the Iraqi government reminiscent of those following the ouster of Saddam Hussein. But the recent developments do not signal an immediate threat to Iraq's sectarian balance. ISIL attacks have yet to expand beyond the group's demonstrated area of operations, the group has not been able to directly confront security forces at hardened facilities and the central government still maintains powerful levers with which to counter expanding ISIL influence. Yet ISIL is showing early signs of an improved capacity to weaken Baghdad's control over Sunni regions and spark more violent sectarian strife across Iraq.
In recent weeks, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant has been particularly successful at striking important pillars of Iraqi stability such as oil pipelines, bridges, power generation facilities, water infrastructure and civil society buildings. Maintaining control over these facilities is critical for Baghdad's ability to exert influence across a fragmented state.
Analysis
Recent jihadist activity in Iraq is evoking early parallels with the chaos of 2003-2004, when al Qaeda in Iraq militants capitalized on a security vacuum and Sunni Arab disenfranchisement to enhance its influence within Sunni regions and promote sectarian strife. Over this period, the group managed to seize and control Ar Ramadi and Fallujah, proved it was capable of directly confronting the Iraqi army in Anbar province and carried out regular strikes on key infrastructure such as bridges and pipelines. Al Qaeda in Iraq's activities directly threatened the stability of the state and challenged Baghdad's control over Sunni regions, fracturing the state's sectarian balance of power and inciting violent civil war.
Ethnic and Sectarian Divisions in Iraq
Click to Enlarge
Al Qaeda's successors (including most recently ISIL) have retained their predecessor's goals within Iraq but have demonstrated far diminished capabilities -- ultimately lacking the domestic and regional environment that allowed al Qaeda in Iraq to flourish temporarily. However, the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011 provided an opportunity for Iraqi jihadists to expand their influence across the border, leading to the emergence of ISIL in April 2013 and a new goal to carve out an uninterrupted operating space stretching from Iraq to Lebanon.
The group quickly distinguished itself on the battlefields of eastern and northern Syria and reached the peak of its influence there in the latter half of 2013, giving those ISIL militants still in Iraq limited access to more powerful ordnance either stolen from Syrian armories or shipped in by foreign backers of opposition groups. In this period, attacks accelerated considerably in Iraq, with growing numbers of complex operations against infrastructure and civil society facilities that had been relatively unscathed since al Qaeda in Iraq was neutralized in the mid-2000s.
So Far This Year
Since early January, ISIL has been withdrawing to Syria's eastern regions near the Iraqi border under heavy pressure from mainstream Syrian opposition forces and, to a lesser extent, the Syrian regime. Driven by these developments, more experienced ISIL fighters are returning to Iraq with heavy weapons and explosives. ISIL's Iraq faction has also benefited from friendly forces concentrated across the border, expanding the security vacuum in western Iraq and providing a base of operations to which they can fall back to resupply and rest and then use to stage attacks back into Iraq. Oil shipments trucked in from Syria's eastern ISIL-controlled fields are also increasingly making their way to militants in Anbar province and providing revenue for the group.
Syria and Iraq
Click to Enlarge
The regional dynamic compounds the pre-existing social frustrations because growing segments within the Sunni Arab community feel disenfranchised and ignored by the government of Shiite Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki -- particularly in the Sunni Arab stronghold of Anbar province. ISIL capitalized on these sectarian tensions in early January to regain its predecessor's control over Fallujah, Ar Ramadi and surrounding towns. This provided the group a domestic base from which to expand operations and strike out at vulnerable state targets. ISIL has attempted to repeat this strategy in the east, most notably on March 21-22 when militants blocked all entrances and took control of the local police station in Buhriz, Diyala province, before eventually withdrawing under pressure from security forces.
Across the sectarian borderlands, key bridges have been attacked, often with large truck bombs, in most cases causing extensive structural damage if not complete collapse. On April 28, a coordinated predawn operation destroyed two bridges in a village outside the eastern Diyala town of Qara Tepe. ISIL planners have used the extensive Tigris and Euphrates river systems to their benefit, targeting bridges to insulate regions from Baghdad's influence and leaving population centers isolated.
The Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline transported 90 percent less oil in March than it did in February due to frequent bombings by the jihadist group. This cost the Iraqi state more than $1 billion in lost revenue in March alone, with state oil exports falling by some 400,000 barrels per day. Pipelines are notoriously difficult to defend because they often run across vast swathes of rugged terrain. Jihadists have capitalized on these vulnerabilities to disrupt the State Oil Marketing Organization's northern and western export options, while cutting off smaller branches that supply local towns and villages.
The jihadists have also targeted critical water sources, including an April 9 explosion at the al-Kanaka water project in northern Tikrit and the April 8 seizure of the Nuaimiya and Haditha dams near Fallujah, which divert Euphrates water to the central and southern provinces. In the latter incident, ISIL closed most of the dams' gates, restricting water supply to downstream regions -- where most Iraqis depend on agriculture for their livelihoods -- and flooding the area around Fallujah to prevent Iraqi army movement. On April 17, militant attacks on a pipeline in northern Tikrit produced a major oil spill on the Tigris River, forcing downstream Baghdad authorities to cut drinking water due to contamination.
ISIL has also attacked electricity generators, power stations and communications towers with improvised explosive devices. Police stations, administrative buildings, universities and other state facilities have been frequent targets of suicide bombers or powerful vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, used to breach outer defenses, followed by coordinated ground assaults.
Recent ISIL operations should be viewed as part of a broader transformation of the group's tactics and capabilities that have allowed ISIL to make limited gains in restricting Baghdad's control of Sunni regions, as the group seeks to expand the reach of its base of operations and deepen the security vacuum beyond western Iraq. Meanwhile, the group's ability to strike at key infrastructure and civil society buildings in the restive sectarian borderlands has allowed it to stoke underlying tensions among Iraq's various communities.
ISIL seeks to highlight Baghdad's inability to manage the social contract that has loosely incorporated these groups into the state structure and prevented further deterioration of the security environment. The ability of jihadists to disrupt these state services incites panic and anger among affected populations who now see their livelihoods threatened. ISIL's ultimate goal is to push this frustration into sectarian reprisals and expand the presence of self-defense militias operating outside Baghdad's control -- creating the conditions necessary for greater sectarian civil war.
An Intensifying but Manageable Challenge
ISIL will likely continue to prioritize operations against lightly defended targets, since the group has not yet demonstrated the capabilities to directly take on Iraqi security forces at hardened sites. The Iraqi army is well equipped to respond to attacks with mobile strike forces, but limited resources and manpower will force the military to prioritize the defense of key facilities, leaving many lower-priority sites vulnerable. ISIL will continue to focus its operations in the group's traditional area of operations -- Iraq's sectarian borderlands and the western Sunni regions.
For the time being, the group is still far from demonstrating the capabilities of al Qaeda in Iraq during the 2003-2004 violence, despite early similarities. Their hold over Fallujah and portions of Ar Ramadi is tenuous at best, and ISIL has yet to demonstrate an ability to overcome the heavy security presence and hostile ethnic groups in the Shiite and Kurdish heartlands. The southern hydrocarbon sector, which provides the majority of Iraq's oil revenues, and the country's main export port remain unthreatened. Moreover, Baghdad retains limited ties within the Sunni community and will use this leverage to support pro-Baghdad self-defense and tribal militias. This was highlighted by a May 7-8 agreement that saw a number of ISIL militants withdraw from northern Fallujah under heavy pressure by Sunni tribal power brokers. For the time being, a highly localized insurgency still in its early stages of development remains manageable for Baghdad.
Nevertheless, Baghdad will likely find itself facing growing security challenges as increasing numbers of ISIL militants and ordnance return from Syria. And as ISIL in Syria continues to consolidate its base of operations in the east, the security vacuum in western Syria is likely to deepen, allowing Iraqi jihadists to gain greater mobility and access to Syria's oil deposits. New obstacles are on the horizon for Iraq as it struggles to preserve the last decade's internal balance of power.
Read more: The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant Presents Challenges for Baghdad | Stratfor
-
Preliminary results announced Monday from Iraq's elections indicate that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's alliance has won the largest number of parliamentary seats. The results from the April 30 elections are still subject to challenges, however initial results show Maliki's State of Law bloc taking 92 seats in Iraq's 328-seat parliament, far more than his main Shiite rivals: the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, which won 29 seats; and the movement of Moktada al-Sadr, which won 28 seats. An estimated 62 percent of eligible voters participated in the elections, which were considered credible, though there were some reports of violations. Maliki will likely secure a third term as prime minister and be asked to form a new coalition government, a process that could take months.
-
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/04/opinion/friedman-iraqs-best-hope.html?emc=edit_th_20140604&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=49641193&_r=0
-
I take no pleasure in saying I told you so.
As ISIS marches toward Baghdad: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/06/11/iraq_war_iii_has_now_begun_mosul_isis_takeover
Iraqi soldiers, police drop weapons, flee posts in portions of Mosul
http://www.cnn.com/2014/06/10/world/meast/iraq-violence/
Now Tikrit falls to Islamist terrorists
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2654861/Escape-Mosul-150-000-Iraqis-overnight-refugees-flee-terror-al-Qaeda-splinter-group-taken-countrys-second-biggest-city.html
Islamist militants effectively took control of oil-rich Mosul yesterday after four days of heavy fighting
Today they seized power in Saddam Hussein’s home city of Tikrit - they also freed hundreds of prisoners
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, 43, known as Adu Dua, has emerged as one of the world's most lethal terrorist leaders
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant now controls territory in eastern Syria and western and central Iraq
More than half a million Iraqis have been displaced sparking a major refugee crisis
Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki asked parliament to declare a state of emergency to give him more power
Tonight Turkey warned it will retaliate if any of its 48 citizen taken hostage at its embassy in Mosul are harmed.
P.C.
-
You're not the only one around here PC :wink:
If I understand the map correctly, it would appear that much of the territory claimed is in Kurdistan. I confess that this surprises me-- I had thought that a) the Kurds can and do fight well, and b) they don't really care for Islamic Fascism.
-
Militants from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) have overtaken a number of towns and major cities in Iraq and said they are moving toward the capital of Baghdad. On Wednesday, ISIL fighters over took Saddam Hussein's hometown of Tikrit as well as small towns north of Baghdad. Government forces, however, slowed the militants' advance outside Samarra and appear to be preparing for a counter-strike. ISIL forces reportedly now hold between 10 and 15 percent of Iraqi territory, excluding the autonomous Kurdistan region. On Thursday, Kurdish forces took control of Kirkuk after the Iraqi army abandoned its posts there. The Iraqi government has signaled it would allow U.S. airstrikes to stop the advance, and in May Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki reportedly secretly requested the Obama administration consider carrying out airstrikes against militant staging areas. A National Security Council spokeswoman said the current U.S. focus is to bolster Iraqi capacity. However, an anonymous U.S. official said the administration is considering several options, including drone strikes.
-
...the administration is considering several options, including ...
doing nothing.
It was the "wrong war", he said. He had his laser focus on Afghanistan. And jobs.
This is very sad to see, all the American effort, lives and fortune squandered.
What is so deceitful is for him to portray our exits as "ending the wars". Why not say what he believes: they aren't worth it.
If the lesson learned is that the pursuit of a stable democracy in Iraq was unattainable all along, besides George Bush, Hillary, Biden and all the rest, we have Colin Powell's idiotic mantra, "If we break it, we must fix it", to blame. We didn't break Iraq by toppling a murderous regime. It was already broken, as evidenced in the 23 justifications for going to war in Iraq.
--------------------------------------------------
Fred Kaplan blames this on Nouri al-Maliki, not the United States.
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2014/06/mosul_s_collapse_is_nouri_al_maliki_s_fault_iraq_s_prime_minister_failed.html
As the U.S. pullout began under the terms of a treaty signed in 2008 by then-President George W. Bush, Maliki, the leader of a Shiite political party, promised to run a more inclusive government—to bring more Sunnis into the ministries, to bring more Sunnis from the Sons of Iraq militia into the national army, to settle property disputes in Kirkuk, to negotiate a formula on sharing oil revenue with Sunni districts, and much more.
Maliki has since backpedaled on all of these commitments and has pursued policies designed to strengthen Shiites and marginalize Sunnis. That has led to the resurgence of sectarian violence in the past few years. The Sunnis, finding themselves excluded from the political process, have taken up arms as the route to power. In the process, they have formed alliances with Sunni jihadist groups—such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIS, which has seized not just Mosul but much of northern Iraq—on the principle that the enemy of their enemy is their friend. (more at link)
-
The Jihadists armored convoys consist of a bunch of Toyota pick up trucks with platoons of guys wearing black hoods and carrying Kalishnokov weapons. A few jets scrambled could finish the whole thing off. This is reminiscent of Herbert Bush encouraging Kurds to rise up against Saddam and then leaving them alone to be murdered.
Now we encouraged and supported moderate elements in Iraq only to abandon them when they need some help.
-
Pravda on the Hudson is reporting that Baraq is declining to act. I will admit that given the Iraqis role is Baraq's huge historical error in having us leave completely that there is a certain feeling of "Life is tougher when you're stupid" in this moment (cf the Philippines kicking the US out of our bases there regretting it now that the Chinese are fging with them) but the fact remains as I have repeatedly commented here at the time and since then, our leaving was a huge, huge, error.
OTOH, who the hell wants to go back in now?-- Especially with a blithering incompetent of dubious patriotism like Baraq at the helm?
===========================
In Iraq, a Militant Group Takes Mosul
Analysis
June 10, 2014 | 1251 Print Text Size
The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant Takes Mosul
Iraqi families fleeing violence in northern Ninawa province gather at a checkpoint in the autonomous Kurdistan region on June 10. (SAFIN HAMED/AFP/Getty Images)
Summary
Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki declared a state of high alert in Iraq on June 10 and asked parliament to approve a state of emergency as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant militant group seized most of the northern Iraqi city of Mosul. This marks a serious downturn for Baghdad's monthslong attempt to contain the group in the Fallujah and Ar Ramadi region, where the militants seized territory at the beginning of the year.
The rapid seizure of Mosul demonstrates a new capability for the militant group in Iraq, where highly mobile light forces using technicals -- pickup trucks with medium to heavy arms mounted on them -- can cover territory quickly and mass to overwhelm the enemy's weak points. This will strain Iraqi security forces, which are already struggling to control a restive western Iraq. Regaining Mosul could require the Kurdistan Regional Government's security forces, known as the peshmerga, a situation that could aggravate the ongoing struggle centered on the Kurdish region.
Analysis
The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant reportedly overran the west bank of Mosul with hundreds of fighters. Resistance seems to have ended quickly, with Iraqi army and police units abandoning their equipment and positions. The militants now control the provincial government headquarters, security bases and the airport, along with equipment that was left behind. They also were able to free as many as 1,500 prisoners, who could swell the group's ranks rapidly or at least add to the current chaos.
Late last week, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant launched another round of violence in western and northern Iraq over several days. Militants stormed Anbar University, taking more than 100 students hostage, and mounted raids using technicals in As Samarra and Mosul. In all three instances, Iraqi security forces reacted relatively quickly and the militants withdrew. Violence in any of these places is quite common. The most notable element of these attacks was the use of technicals in rapid raids -- similar to tactics used in Syria but much less common in Iraq, where the militants have preferred ambushes, improvised explosive devices, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices and small teams.
Ethnic And Sectarian Divisions
Click to Enlarge
Iraqi security forces and Kurdish peshmerga have been fairly successful in protecting the core Shiite region and Kurdish territories. Attacks by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant are on the rise in Iraq, but they largely have been limited to Sunni regions where the militants can try to garner support from residents in areas bordering the other regions. The Syrian civil war, while drawing militant manpower from Iraq, has also slowly empowered the Islamic State in Iraq in the Levant by expanding the group's sources of supplies and other resources, including captured Syrian army equipment. The militants' ability to mass quickly and overwhelm Iraqi security forces and seize territory in different areas of Iraq threatens to overstretch the Iraqi forces' already tenuous military capability in the Sunni regions.
Baghdad is facing the possibility of losing control of large swathes of western and northern Iraq. As a result, the government will implore the international community for assistance and rapid arms sales. (Many deals are in the works but have been slow to materialize.) The loss of Fallujah and Ar Ramadi prompted the United States to accelerate its response, which included the sale of small arms, ammunition and Hellfire missiles. The United States is also training Iraq's special forces in Jordan, and the first F-16s for Iraq will be delivered before the end of the year. The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant's expanding presence will hasten further cooperation.
The loss of Mosul and the potential for Iraqi security forces to be stretched too thin opens up another avenue for potential, albeit unwelcome, cooperation from the Kurdish peshmerga. Mosul sits at the heart of the oil-centered territorial struggle between Baghdad and Arbil. The Kurdistan Regional Government's official boundaries are three provinces to the east and north of Mosul, but the regional government's control has spread into other areas, including just outside Mosul.
Using the peshmerga to retake Mosul could curb the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant's expansion, but a stronger peshmerga presence in Mosul further complicates the ongoing confrontation between Baghdad and Arbil. The governor of Mosul escaped the takeover by fleeing to Dohuk in the Kurdish region, and Mosul's authorities have formally called on the peshmerga to help them.
Kurdistan Regional Government President Massoud Barzani has not given the official order for peshmerga forces on the outskirts of Mosul to move into the city center, where militants are entrenched. It is unclear whether Barzani is trying to coordinate with Baghdad on a security response or is more concerned with the high risks associated with engaging the militants in densely populated areas. Although the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant is a common threat for Arbil and Baghdad and leaves space for security cooperation in Mosul, the eventual outcome for Baghdad could be loss of control over the city.
Moreover, although the militant group continues to threaten the region, its actions remain relatively restricted to Iraq's Sunni territories, and there is a difference between taking part of a city and controlling territory well enough to reap its resources. As long as Syria provides refuge and resources for the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, the militant group can continue to destabilize this region, but seizing territory in Iraq will be more difficult than it was in Syria. The group's ability to reach farther into Iraq and disrupt the southern oil regions remains elusive, and the United States -- along with Iran -- will support Baghdad in protecting those areas. Iraq probably will reach equilibrium, and the Sunni regions will become the battleground for the militants on the one hand and Baghdad and Arbil on the other. However, while the conflict in Syria continues, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant will be hard to eliminate.
Read more: In Iraq, a Militant Group Takes Mosul | Stratfor
Follow us: @stratfor on Twitter | Stratfor on Facebook
-
"I have repeatedly commented here at the time and since then, our leaving was a huge, huge, error."
Yes, you and others on the board notably GM and I think Doug and objectivist. I was not so sure what to do.
I hope the soldiers who fought there will know no matter what happens they did not fight in vain, that they bravely risked lives, limb and golden years for their country, that their efforts were as noble as they come, and the rest of us armchair Americans will always be proud of them. The Military should never be treated like the Vietnam Vets were by the liberals of the 60s including Clintons, Kerry, and Fonda ( who for some unclear reason is lionized now for making postmenopausal exercise videos for post menopausal broads).
At the very least the Brockster should be screaming the praise of our military and our nation that valiantly tried to free Iraq from homicidal dirtballs. Instead he makes us look like we are to blame and we are the disgrace.
-
Iran Deploys Forces to Fight al Qaeda-Inspired Militants in Iraq
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Forces Helped Iraqi Troops Win Back Control of Most of Tikrit, the Sources Said
By Farnaz Fassihi
June 12, 2014 1:05 p.m. ET
BEIRUT, Lebanon—Iran deployed Revolutionary Guard forces to fight in Iraq, helping government troops there wrest back control of most of the city of Tikrit from militants, Iranian security sources said.
Two battalions of the Quds Forces, the overseas branch of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps that has long operated in Iraq, came to the aid of the besieged, Shiite-dominated government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, they said.
Combined Iraqi-Iranian forces retook control of 85% of Tikrit, the birthplace of former dictator Saddam Hussein, according to Iraqi and Iranian security sources.
They were helping guard the capital Baghdad and the two Shiite holy cities of Najaf and Karbala, which have been threatened by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, an al Qaeda offshoot. The Sunni militant group's lightning offensive has thrown Iraq into its worse turmoil since the sectarian fighting that followed the 2003 U.S.-led invasion.
Shiite Iran has also positioned troops along its border with Iraq and promised to bomb rebel forces if they come within 100 kilometers, or 62 miles, of Iran's border, according to an Iranian army general.
In addition, Iran was considering the transfer to Iraq of Iranian troops fighting for the regime in Syria if the initial deployments fail to turn the tide of battle in favor of Mr. Maliki's government.
The Iraqi government has signaled to the U.S. it would allow airstrikes against insurgents and asked Washington to speed the delivery of promised weapons.
That raises the prospect of both the U.S. and Iran lending support to Mr. Maliki against ISIS insurgents, who are seeking to create a caliphate encompassing Iraqi and Syrian territory.
Gen. Qasem Sulaimani, the commander of the Quds Forces and one of the region's most powerful military figures, traveled to Baghdad this week to help manage the swelling crisis, said a member of the Revolutionary Guards, or IRGC.
Qassimm al-Araji, an Iraqi Shiite lawmaker who heads the Badr Brigade bloc in parliament, posted a picture with Mr. Sulaimani holding hands in a room in Baghdad on his social-networking site with the caption, "Haj Qasem is here," Iranian news sites affiliated with the IRGC reported on Wednesday. "Haj Qasem" is Mr. Sulaimani's nom de guerre.
At stake for Iran in the current tumult in Iraq isn't only the survival of an Shiite political ally in Baghdad, but the safety of Karbala and Najaf, which along with Mecca and Medina are considered sacred to Shiites world-wide.
An ISIS spokesman, Abu Mohamad al-Adnani, urged the group's Sunni fighters to march toward the "filth-ridden" Karbala and "the city of polytheism" Najaf, where they would "settle their differences" with Mr. Maliki.
That coarsely worded threat further vindicates Iran's view that the fight unfolding in Iraq is an existential sectarian battle between the two rival sects of Islam-Sunni and Shiite—and by default a proxy battle between their patrons Saudi Arabia and Iran.
"Until now we haven't received any requests for help from Iraq. Iraq's army is certainly capable in handling this," Iran's Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Marzieh Afgham said Wednesday.
Despite those assuring comments, measures by the Iranian government in the past day indicated that an air of crisis had enveloped Tehran. Iran's army and border guards have been placed under full alert along the country's long border with Iraq, Iranian media reported.
Iran's President Hasan Rouhani cut short a religious celebration on Thursday and said he had to attend an emergency meeting of the country's National Security Council about events in Iraq.
"We, as the Islamic Republic of Iran, will not tolerate this violence and terrorism….We will fight and battle violence and extremism and terrorism in the region and the world," he said in a speech.
Iran's chief of police, Esmail Ahmadi-Moghaddam, said the National Security Council would consider intervening in Iraq to "protect Shiite shrines and cities."
ISIS's rapid territorial gains in the past few days appeared to have caught Iranian officials by surprise and opened a debate within the regime over whether Iran should publicly enter the battle, citing the country's strategic interest and ideological responsibility. Iranian officials also privately expressed concern about whether Mr. Maliki was capable of handling the turmoil.
"The more insecure and isolated Maliki becomes, the more he will need Iran. The growth of ISIS presents a serious threat to Iran. So it would not be surprising to see the Guards become more involved in Iraq," said Alireza Nader, a senior policy analyst at the Rand Corp.
Quds Forces have been active in Iraq since shortly after the U.S.-led invasion in 2003 and have helped create, train and fund Shiite militias that fought U.S. military forces. Their reach and influence extends from Iraq to Lebanon, Syria and the Palestinian territories.
The two IRGC battalions moved to Iraq on Wednesday were shifted from the Iranian border provinces of Urumieh and Lorestan. Their task is to help secure the holy Shiite cities of Karbala and Najaf and tighten security around Baghdad, according to IRGC members in Iran.
Revolutionary Guards units that serve in Iran's border provinces are the most experienced fighters in guerrilla warfare because of separatist ethnic uprisings in those regions. IRGC commanders dispatched to Syria also often hail from those provinces.
Write to Farnaz Fassihi at farnaz.fassihi@wsj.com
-
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/19/world/middleeast/former-loyalists-of-saddam-hussein-crucial-in-helping-isis.html?emc=edit_th_20140619&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=49641193&_r=0
-
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/19/world/middleeast/former-loyalists-of-saddam-hussein-crucial-in-helping-isis.html?emc=edit_th_20140619&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=49641193&_r=0
Wait, I was told that Saddam wasn't a threat because baathists would never work with jihadists.
-
Same reasons as Bush ~Obama REASONS Iraq matters: Humanitarian, energy and strategic interests, no safe haven for terrorists
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-announces-he-is-sending-up-to-300-troops-back-to-iraq-as-advisers/2014/06/19/a15f9628-f7c2-11e3-8aa9-dad2ec039789_story.html?hpid=z2 P.C.
-
Worth noting that PC's post makes for an excellent talking point.
-
Nothing stops terrorists like advisers on the ground, each with a phone and a pen.
Obama Doctrine, mentioned elsewhere as failed:
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/27/the_obama_doctrine
"...what could be called an "Obama doctrine" on the use of force. Obama's embrace of multilateralism, drone strikes, and a light U.S. military presence in Libya, Pakistan, and Yemen, they contend, has proved more effective than Bush's go-heavy approach in Iraq and Afghanistan."
It's been a few years since anyone argued that approach is working around the world.
I don't see why we want to pretend to be engaged, just to take partial credit for failure.
-
Iraq's Kurds Could Find Leverage With Baghdad in Fighting Sunni Militants
Analysis
June 19, 2014 | 0421 Print Text Size
Iraq's Kurds Could Find Leverage With Baghdad in Fighting Sunni Militants
Kurdish peshmerga soldiers parade during their graduation ceremony in the northern Kurdish city of Arbil in 2010. SAFIN HAMED/AFP/Getty Images
Summary
Recent moves by the Iraqi and Iranian governments suggest that their Shiite leaders are content to let Kurdish peshmerga forces contain the Sunni militants in northern Iraq, relieving pressure on the Iraqi army and enabling Baghdad to focus on threats closer to home before looking north. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki could be willing to bargain for Kurdish military support. Baghdad's dependence on the peshmerga gives the government in Arbil leverage, which the Kurds will likely use to further pressure Baghdad on key issues -- such as recognizing the Kurdish political status in disputed territories and allowing limited Kurdish energy exports.
Even if a short-term compromise is reached, the peshmerga are unlikely to venture far into Sunni Arab-dominated regions. Although the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and its Sunni militant allies have avoided opening a new front against the Kurds, wary of overextending themselves by challenging Iraqi forces and peshmerga simultaneously, the Kurdish forces are well aware of the dangers they would face if they launched operations against the militant group and its supporters. Moreover, any concessions al-Maliki offers to stabilize the security environment will prove to be stopgap measures and must be limited in scale so as not to alienate his remaining support among nationalist Sunni Arabs or hard-liners within his own Shiite camp. The constraints on both sides will prevent anything more than a short-term marriage of convenience, meaning the underlying dispute between Baghdad and Arbil will remain unresolved.
Analysis
Since the start of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant's offensive across northern Iraq, there have been no major confrontations between Sunni Arab militants and Kurdish peshmerga. Aside from isolated shellings and low-level clashes around Kirkuk, Mosul and Diyala provinces, the Kurdistan Regional Government and its security forces have remained relatively buffered from the recent Sunni Arab uprising in Iraq. The Kurds have proved reluctant to extend beyond their new security cordons on the outer fringes of Iraq's disputed territories, which peshmerga forces were able to occupy quickly following the withdrawal of the Iraqi army. On June 16, the Kurdish Rudaw news agency reported that the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant had requested a truce with Kurdish militants based near Tuz Khurmato. The same day, rumors emerged that Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant fighters stationed in militant-occupied Tikrit had freed some 18 Kurdish soldiers -- including three senior officers -- attached to the Iraqi army. With the Kurds content to operate defensively, the Sunni Arab militants seem reluctant to devote meaningful resources against the peshmerga.
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant Activity
Click to Enlarge
The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant has not yet publicly criticized the Kurds' rapid expansion of control to the edges of Iraq's Sunni Arab heartland. Kurdish peshmerga now occupy many cities with strong Arab minorities, including Kirkuk. At the moment, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant is devoting its very limited resources to working with an array of Sunni militants to challenge regime forces along the main highways to Baghdad and across Iraq's east-west Sunni Arab belt.
Nevertheless, the militant group's leadership appears aware that any army marching from the north could attack its exposed flank. Drawing the Kurds into a fight would open up a second front and risk encouraging military cooperation between the Kurds and Shia. Thus, the Sunni militants have been extremely cautious to avoid taking any action that could prompt the Kurds to go on the offensive. The militants could also be hoping to persuade the Kurds to maintain the flow of crude from Kirkuk's oil fields -- now under peshmerga protection -- to the Bayji refinery. The Sunni militant group is fighting for control of the refinery to provide fuel and revenue to sustain its campaign.
The leadership in Arbil seems far more interested in consolidating its new control of the disputed territories and establishing solid lines of defense in case Baghdad or militant forces come looking for a fight in the future. The Kurds have more than a decade of experience dealing with Sunni Arab jihadists and are under no illusions about the dangers involved in confronting the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, including potential threats to the Kurds' long-sought-after sphere of control. A peshmerga offensive against the Sunni militants would also risk inciting Sunni Arab minorities in the newly peshmerga-occupied cities. For the government in Arbil, there is little to gain by striking out in Sunni Arab-dominated cities and regions beyond the Kurdish security cordons.
The Shiite Leaders' Perspective
Al-Maliki and the Shiite authorities in Baghdad are struggling to regain control of areas across northern Iraq. They likely see the peshmerga as a useful tool for containing the Sunni Arab militants in these regions and preventing the insurgents from moving south to Baghdad and the Shiite heartland. Opening up a second front would also ease the pressure on the Iraqi security forces. Thus, despite Kirkuk's importance for the regime, al-Maliki's inner circle has yet to publicly condemn Kurdish mobilization in the disputed territories, not wishing to press the issue at a time when the peshmerga's assistance could prove useful. In fact, according to Kurdish BasNews, Iraqi National Security Adviser Falah al-Fayyad announced June 16 that Baghdad had approved of the peshmerga's continued presence in the disputed regions, a concession that would have been unthinkable prior to the Sunni uprising.
Tehran has also been pressuring Arbil to mobilize the peshmerga against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. A senior Iranian delegation reportedly arrived in Iraqi Kurdistan in recent days to persuade the Kurds to take military action. Given the tense state of the Arbil-Baghdad relationship, Iran could be willing to help the two sides work out a compromise that enables military cooperation in return for key concessions from Baghdad. Only hours after Kurdistan Regional Government Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani's meeting with Iranian officials, al-Maliki sent a letter via the general commander of the Iraqi army, Babakir Zebari, to Kurdistan Regional Government President Massoud Barzani reportedly mentioning a "shared solution" to the current security situation.
Arbil's Likely Demands
Arbil will try to ensure that any agreement on peshmerga assistance includes important concessions from Baghdad on outstanding disagreements. In particular, Barzani likely will seek a resolution outlining the future status of the disputed territories, ensuring Arbil's portion of the national oil revenue and formalizing the Kurdish right to export limited crude quantities.
Baghdad's current dependence on Kurdish military cooperation provides the Kurdistan Regional Government with unprecedented leverage that Arbil is unlikely to give up without a major negotiation breakthrough. A peshmerga offensive against Sunni militants in northern Iraq would carry enormous risks, meaning Arbil would expect something major in return. In the meantime, the Kurds have raised the stakes in the negotiations, with an official Kurdistan Regional Government spokesman announcing June 18 that the region now demands a 25 percent share of the country's oil revenue (rather than the 17 percent outlined in the Iraqi Constitution). Arbil also has announced that preparations are underway to load a third tanker of unilaterally piped Kurdish crude, and Turkey continues to claim that the exports are being bought on the international market (although neither of the tankers loaded with Kurdish oil appear to have unloaded their cargo yet). All of these developments increase pressure on Baghdad to reach a temporary settlement.
Signs of an agreement could be emerging in Diyala province, where al-Maliki has sent his newly appointed commander of the region's security forces to Khanaqin -- a disputed Kurdish-majority city in the northeast -- to negotiate military coordination with local peshmerga. In this context, it is notable that al-Fayyad's announcement on June 16 was clear in highlighting that peshmerga are "legal and registered in the list of Iraqi security forces" and that the Iraqi government and Kurdistan Regional Government had agreed on their use to bolster Iraqi security and fight the Sunni militants "in the near future." However, a short-term agreement on security cooperation is unlikely to resolve the underlying tensions between Baghdad and Arbil, especially with Kurdish peshmerga occupying key disputed regions and Arbil's recent announcement that it has linked its pipeline export infrastructure to the peshmerga-occupied Kirkuk oil fields.
Read more: Iraq's Kurds Could Find Leverage With Baghdad in Fighting Sunni Militants | Stratfor
Follow us: @stratfor on Twitter | Stratfor on Facebook
-
The Threat Is Blowback
Posted By Caroline Glick On June 20, 2014 - frontpagemag.com
Originally published by the Jerusalem Post.
Watching the undoing, in a week, of victories that US forces won in Iraq at great cost over many years, Americans are asking themselves what, if anything, should be done.
What can prevent the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) – the al-Qaida offshoot that President Barack Obama derided just months ago as a bunch of amateurs – from taking over Iraq? And what is at stake for America – other than national pride – if it does? Muddying the waters is the fact that the main actor that seems interested in fighting ISIS on the ground in Iraq is Iran. Following ISIS’s takeover of Mosul and Tikrit last week, the Iranian regime deployed elite troops in Iraq from the Quds Force, its foreign operations division.
The Obama administration, along with Republican Sen. Lindsay Graham, views Iran’s deployment of forces in Iraq as an opportunity for the US. The US, they argue should work with Iran to defeat ISIS.
The idea is that since the US and Iran both oppose al-Qaida, Iranian gains against it will redound to the US’s benefit.
There are two basic, fundamental problems with this idea.
First, there is a mountain of evidence that Iran has no beef with al-Qaida and is happy to work with it.
According to the 9/11 Commission’s report, between eight and 10 of the September 11 hijackers traveled through Iran before going to the US. And this was apparently no coincidence.
According to the report, Iran had been providing military training and logistical support for al-Qaida since at least the early 1990s.
After the battle of Tora Bora in December 2001, al-Qaida’s leadership scattered. Many senior commanders – including bin Laden’s son Said, al-Qaida’s chief strategist Saif al-Adel and Suleiman Abu Ghaith – decamped to Iran, where they set up a command center.
From Iran, these men directed the operations of al-Qaida forces in Iraq led by Abu Musab Zarqawi. Zarqawi entered Iraq from Iran and returned to Iran several times during the years he led al-Qaida operations in Iraq.
Iran’s cooperation with al-Qaida continues today in Syria.
According to The Wall Street Journal, in directing the defense of Bashar Assad’s regime in Syria, Iran has opted to leave ISIS and its al-Qaida brethren in the Nusra Front alone. That is why they have been able to expand their power in northern Syria.
Iran and its allies have concentrated their attacks against the more moderate Free Syrian Army, which they view as a threat.
Given Iran’s 20-year record of cooperation with al-Qaida, it is reasonable to assume that it is deploying forces into Iraq to tighten its control over Shi’ite areas, not to fight al-Qaida. The record shows that Iran doesn’t believe that its victories and al-Qaida’s victories are mutually exclusive.
The second problem with the idea of subcontracting America’s fight against al-Qaida to Iran is that it assumes that Iranian success in such a war would benefit America. But again, experience tells a different tale.
The US killed Zarqawi in an air strike in 2006.
Reports in the Arab media at the time alleged that Iran had disclosed Zarqawi’s location to the US. While the reports were speculative, shortly after Zarqawi was killed, then-secretary of state Condoleezza Rice floated the idea of opening nuclear talks with Iran for the first time.
The Iranians contemptuously rejected her offer. But Rice’s willingness to discuss Iran’s nuclear weapons program with the regime, even as it was actively engaged in killing US forces in Iraq, ended any serious prospect that the Bush administration would develop a coherent plan for dealing with Iran in a strategic and comprehensive way.
Moreover, Zarqawi was immediately replaced by one of his deputies. And the fight went on.
So if Iran did help the US find Zarqawi, the price the US paid for Iran’s assistance was far higher than the benefit it derived from killing Zarqawi.
This brings us to the real threat that the rise of ISIS – and Iran – in Iraq poses to the US. That threat is blowback.
Both Iran and al-Qaida are sworn enemies of the United States, and both have been empowered by events of the past week.
Because they view the US as their mortal foe, their empowerment poses a danger to the US.
But it is hard for people to recognize how events in distant lands can directly impact their lives.
In March 2001, when the Taliban blew up the Bamiyan Buddhas statues in Afghanistan, the world condemned the act. But no one realized that the same destruction would be brought to the US six months later when al-Qaida destroyed the World Trade Center and attacked the Pentagon.
The September 11 attacks were the blowback from the US doing nothing to contain the Taliban and al-Qaida.
North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic-missile tests, as well as North Korean proliferation of both nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles to rogue regimes, like Iran, that threaten the US, are the beginnings of the blowback from the US decision to reach a nuclear deal with Pyongyang in the 1990s that allowed the regime to keep its nuclear installations.
The blowback from Iran’s emergence as a nuclear power is certain to dwarf what the world has seen from North Korea so far.
Yet rather than act in a manner that would reduce the threat of blowback from Iraq’s disintegration and takeover by America’s worst enemies, the Obama administration gives every indication that it is doubling down on the disastrous policies that led the US to this precarious juncture.
The only strategy that the US can safely adopt today is one of double containment. The aim of double containment is to minimize the capacity of Iran and al-Qaida to harm the US and its interests.
But to contain your enemies, you need to understand them. You need to understand their nature, their aims, their support networks and their capabilities.
Unfortunately, in keeping with what has been the general practice of the US government since the September 11 attacks, the US today continues to ignore or misunderstand all of these critical considerations.
Regarding al-Qaida specifically, the US has failed to understand that al-Qaida is a natural progression from the political/religious milieu of Salafist/Wahabist or Islamist Islam, from whence it sprang. As a consequence, anyone who identifies with Islamist religious and political organizations is a potential supporter and recruit for al-Qaida and its sister organizations.
There were two reasons that George W. Bush refused to base US strategy for combating al-Qaida on any cultural context broader than the Taliban.
Bush didn’t want to sacrifice the US’s close ties with Saudi Arabia, which finances the propagation and spread of Islamism. And he feared being attacked as a bigot by Islamist organizations in the US like the Council on American Islamic Relations and its supporters on the Left.
As for Obama, his speech in Cairo to the Muslim world in June 2009 and his subsequent apology tour through Islamic capitals indicated that, unlike Bush, Obama understands that al-Qaida is not a deviation from otherwise peaceful Islamist culture.
But unlike Bush, Obama blames America for its hostility. Obama’s radical sensibilities tell him that America pushed the Islamists to oppose it. As he sees it, he can appease the Islamists into ending their war against America.
To this end, Obama has prohibited federal employees from conducting any discussion or investigation of Islamist doctrine, terrorism, strategy and methods and the threat all pose to the US.
These prohibitions were directly responsible for the FBI’s failure to question or arrest the Tsarnaev brothers in 2012 despite the fact that Russian intelligence tipped it off to the fact that the 2013 Boston Marathon bombers were jihadists.
They were also responsible for the army’s refusal to notice any of the black flags that Maj. Nidal Hassan raised in the months before his massacre of his fellow soldiers at Fort Hood, or to take any remedial action after the massacre to prevent such atrocities from recurring.
The Muslim Brotherhood is the progenitor of Islamism. It is the organizational, social, political and religious swamp from whence the likes of al-Qaida, Hamas and other terror groups emerged. Whereas Bush pretended the Brotherhood away, Obama embraced it as a strategic partner.
Then there is Iran.
Bush opted to ignore the 9/11 Commission’s revelations regarding Iranian collaboration with al-Qaida. Instead, particularly in the later years of his administration, Bush sought to appease Iran both in Iraq and in relation to its illicit nuclear weapons program.
In large part, Bush did not acknowledge, or act on the sure knowledge, that Iran was the man behind the curtain in Iraq, because he believed that the American people would oppose the expansion of the US operations in the war against terror.
Obama’s actions toward Iran indicate that he knows that Iran stands behind al-Qaida and that the greatest threat the US faces is Iran’s nuclear weapons program. But here as well, Obama opted to follow a policy of appeasement. Rather than prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, or stem its advance in Syria and Iraq, Obama treats Iran as though it poses no threat and is indeed a natural ally. He blames Iran’s belligerence on the supposedly unjust policies of his predecessors and the US’s regional allies.
For a dual-containment strategy to have any chance of working, the US needs to reverse course. No, it needn’t deploy troops to Iraq. But it does need to seal its border to minimize the chance that jihadists will cross over from Mexico.
It doesn’t need to clamp down on Muslims in America. But it needs to investigate and take action where necessary against al-Qaida’s ideological fellow travelers in Islamist mosques, organizations and the US government. To this end, it needs to end the prohibition on discussion of the Islamist threat by federal government employees.
As for Iran, according to The New York Times, Iran is signaling that the price of cooperation with the Americans in Iraq is American acquiescence to Iran’s conditions for signing a nuclear deal. In other words, the Iranians will fight al-Qaida in Iraq in exchange for American facilitation of its nuclear weapons program.
The first step the US must take to minimize the Iranian threat is to walk away from the table and renounce the talks. The next step is to take active measures to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power.
Unfortunately, the Obama administration appears prepared to do none of these things. To the contrary, its pursuit of an alliance with Iran in Iraq indicates that it is doubling down on the most dangerous aspects of its policy of empowering America’s worst enemies.
It only took the Taliban six months to move from the Bamiyan Buddhas to the World Trade Center. Al-Qaida is stronger now than ever before. And Iran is on the threshold of a nuclear arsenal.
-
Thank you for posting this great piece. Wouldn't it be great if we had a US President who understood what was happening as well as this one columnist.
-
OBJ: Please post in the Foreign Policy thread too.
TIA.
-
Crafty: What is "TIA?"
Doug: Obama understands that he is weakening the U.S., which is his intention. His interests are not ours.
-
Doug: Obama understands that he is weakening the U.S., which is his intention. His interests are not ours.
[/quote]
Obj: That is outrageous of you to say about him. Unfortunately you are right! (You are also right that Bill Ayers wrote his main book.)
Not just Obama but for the 40% who still cling to him, it is tempting to think the world would be safer if power were more evenly distributed around the world and everyone took responsibility for their part in it. In fact though, it isn't so. Where the US retreats, people like the Mullahs of Iran, the Taliban, al Qaida and its iterations and affiliates, a KGB guy in Russia and the New Soviet Union, and a old communist Politburo backed by the Peoples Liberation Army are the ones who step in to fill the void. The void is not filled by the honest, hard working, peace loving people and nations around the world.
Crafty: What is "TIA?"
My understanding, TIA = Thanks in advance. TAC = The adventure continues.
-
First oil delivery from disputed Kurdish pipeline set for Israel
http://news.yahoo.com/first-oil-delivery-disputed-kurdish-pipeline-set-israel-100744734.html
P.C.
-
Leaving aside the fact that there were plenty of reasons other than WMDs to go to war with Iraq, and that Democrats demanded a second unanimous vote IN FAVOR OF authorizing the war,
This latest information establishes just how dishonest and politically-motivated Democrats - including John Kerry and Hillary Clinton - have been since shortly after the war began - turning on G.W. and waging war against the Republicans over these trumped-up charges of "manipulated intelligence." Both are beneath contempt for betraying our soldiers in harms way (John Kerry for the second time - having viciously slandered soldiers in Vietnam with made-up stories of atrocities before a Congressional committee.) It is to our shame as a nation that these people retain their political viability after such statements and actions.
Saddam’s WMDs: The Left’s Iraq Lies Exposed
Posted By Arnold Ahlert On June 23, 2014 @ frontpagemag.com
The recent turmoil in Iraq brought on by the rise of the Sunni extremist group known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has ironically struck a blow to the American Left’s endlessly repeated narrative that there were no weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in Iraq prior to the war. The State Department and other U.S. government officials have revealed that ISIS now occupies the Al Muthanna Chemicals Weapons Complex. Al Muthanna was Saddam Hussein’s primary chemical weapons facility, and it is located less than 50 miles from Baghdad.
The Obama administration claims that the weapons in that facility, which include sarin, mustard gas, and nerve agent VX, manufactured to prosecute the war against Iran in the 1980s, do not pose a threat because they are old, contaminated and hard to move. “We do not believe that the complex contains CW materials of military value and it would be very difficult, if not impossible to safely move the materials,” said State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki.
The administration’s dubious rationale is based on information provided by the Iraq Study Group, which was tasked with finding WMDs in the war’s aftermath. They found the chemical weapons at Al Muthanna, but they determined that both Iraq wars and inspections by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) had successfully dismantled the facility, and that the remaining chemical weapons were rendered useless and sealed in bunkers. The report called the weapons facility “a wasteland full of destroyed chemical munitions, razed structures, and unusable war-ravaged facilities,” the 2004 report stated.
Yet other sections of the same report were hardly reassuring. “Stockpiles of chemical munitions are still stored there,” it stated. “The most dangerous ones have been declared to the UN and are sealed in bunkers. Although declared, the bunkers’ contents have yet to be confirmed.” It added, “These areas of the compound pose a hazard to civilians and potential black-marketers.”
Another report paints an even more disturbing picture of the Muthanna facility. It warned that the number and status of Saddam’s sarin-filled rockets was unknown because facilities were not able to be inspected, leaving investigators only able to surmise about the weapons’ condition. Even in degraded conditions, the report said, these rockets still posed a proliferation risk:
Although the damaged Bunker 13 at Muthanna contained thousands of sarin-filled rockets, the presence of leaking munitions and unstable propellant and explosive charges made it too hazardous for UNSCOM inspectors to enter. Because the rockets could not be recovered safely, Iraq declared the munitions in Bunker 13 as ‘destroyed in the Gulf War’ and they were not included in the inventory of chemical weapons eliminated under UNSCOM supervision.
Because of the hazardous conditions in Bunker 13, UNSCOM inspectors were unable to make an accurate inventory of its contents before sealing the entrances in 1994. As a result, no record exists of the exact number or status of the sarin-filled rockets remaining in the bunker. … In the worst-case scenario, the munitions could contain as much as 15,000 liters of sarin. Although it is likely that the nerve agent has degraded substantially after nearly two decades of storage under suboptimal conditions, UNMOVIC cautioned that ‘the levels of degradation of the sarin fill in the rockets cannot be determined without exploring the bunker and taking samples from intact warheads.’ If the sarin remains highly toxic and many of the rockets are still intact, they could pose a proliferation risk.”
Nonetheless, U.S. officials, who claimed they were well aware of the facility insisted that the United States wouldn’t have left it there if it were a genuine threat. They also continued to stress that the takeover by ISIS doesn’t constitute a military gain by the group because the weapons would prove useless, even if ISIS were able to penetrated the sealed bunkers where they are stored. ISIS has reportedly yet to gain access to the bunkers.
However, there are numerous holes in these assessments. The Obama administration, eager to leave a “sovereign, stable, and self-reliant Iraq” as the president described it in 2011, paid little heed to the prospect of large swaths of that nation being overrun by terrorists who have taken over key cities and military bases, and confiscated sophisticated American military equipment in the process. One defense official conceded as much, telling the Wall Street Journal that had they known the Maliki government would lose control so soon, they might not have left the weapons behind. And Psaki’s contention that the weapons could not be moved safely even by terrorists is hardly reassuring when one considers the reality that ISIS uses suicide bombings as one of it chief military tactics.
A far more critical consideration is the possibility that many of the Iraqi Sunnis who have joined ISIS due in large part to their alienation by the Shi’ite-dominated government of Nouri al-Maliki are comprised of former Saddam Hussein loyalists, some of whom may have working knowledge of the chemical weapons stored at Al Muthanna. Former WMD specialist Paul Perrone extrapolated on where such working knowledge might lead. “I’m more concerned with the prospect that these Muslim terrorists have access to formulas or precursors that would enable them to create their own WMD,” he warned.
The latest revelations on the details of Saddam’s weapons stockpile, now potentially in the hands of Sunni radicals, affirm the Bush administration’s characterization of Iraq as a territory situated in a hotbed of radicalism, flooded with a bevy of highly dangerous weapons and overseen by a criminal rogue regime. Indeed, the WMDs are to say nothing of the Hussein government’s nuclear weapons program, also put to a stop by intervention in Iraq. In 2008, American and Iraqi officials had “completed nearly the last chapter in dismantling Saddam Hussein’s nuclear program with the removal of hundreds of tons of natural uranium from the country’s main nuclear site,” the New York Times reported. Approximately 600 tons of “yellowcake” was removed from the Tuwaitha facility, the main site for Iraq’s nuclear program. According to global security.org, uranium enrichment levels of 95 percent were achieved at the Tuwaitha facility. That site was also the location of the Osirak nuclear reactor destroyed by Israel in 1981.
And in what sounded like a harbinger of the future, the Times noted that although the yellowcake could not be used in its current form to produce a nuclear device or dirty bomb, the “unstable environment” in Iraq necessitated its removal, lest it fall into the “wrong hands.” In an updated correction to the article, the Times notes that the Osriak nuclear reactor “theoretically produced plutonium, which can fuel an atomic bomb.”
The Left dismissed this reality by claiming the yellowcake had been in Iraq prior to 1991 and thus was not the same yellowcake Bush referred to in his 2003 State of the Union address as part of his justification for invading Iraq. Led by former ambassador Joseph C. Wilson IV, the emboldened anti-war Left attempted to turn the claim into a scandal saying that Bush knowingly lied to the American public regarding Iraq’s effort to procure yellowcake from Niger.
Ultimately, Wilson and his story were thoroughly discredited a year later by a Senate Select Committee report, which further noted that President Bush had been fully justified in including the infamous “16 words” regarding that intelligence in his speech. Moreover the left has never bothered to explain why yellowcake procured before 1991 was any less dangerous in terms of its WMD potential, given Saddam Hussein’s regular defiance of international law also enunciated by Bush as one of the primary reasons for deposing him.
In 2010, documents procured by Wikileaks revealed more information on the WMD threat posed by Iraq that was known to the government. The self-described whistleblowers, who could hardly be called pro-war, released 392,000 military reports from Iraq that revealed several instances of American encounters with potential WMDs or their manufacture. These included 1200 gallons of a liquid mustard agent in Samarra that tested positive for a blister agent; tampering by large earth movers thought to be attempting to penetrate the bunkers at Muthanna; the discovery of a chemical lab and a chemical cache in Fallujah; and the discovery of a cache of weapons hidden at an Iraqi Community Watch checkpoint with 155MM rounds that subsequently tested positive for mustard.
Foreign involvement with WMDs in Iraq was documented as well. A war log from January 2006 speaks of 50 neuroparalytic projectiles smuggled into Iraq from Iran via Al Basrah; Syrian chemical weapons specialists who came in to support the “chemical weapons operations of Hizballah Islami” (Hezbollah); and an Al Qaeda chemical weapons expert from Saudi Arabia sent to assist 200 individuals awaiting an opportunity to attack coalition forces with Sarin. As Wired Magazine characterized it, the Wikileaks documents revealed that for several years after the initial invasion, “U.S. troops continued to find chemical weapons labs, encounter insurgent specialists in toxins and uncover weapons of mass destruction.”
Left-wing members in Congress were certainly aware of these threats and more posed by the Hussein regime, which lead them to unanimously authorize war and even vocally champion its necessity. Their assessment was based on nothing less than the very intelligence known to the Bush administration at the time. Secretary of State John Kerry, as a member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations before war was authorized, said, “There’s no question in my mind that Saddam Hussein has to be toppled one way or another, but the question is how” and that there was likewise “no question” that Hussein “continues to pursue weapons of mass destruction, and his success can threaten both our interests in the region and our security at home.”
Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton intoned in 2002:
In the four years since the inspectors left, intelligence reports show that Saddam Hussein has worked to rebuild his chemical and biological weapons stock, his missile delivery capability, and his nuclear program. He has also given aid, comfort, and sanctuary to terrorists, including Al Qaeda members … It is clear, however, that if left unchecked, Saddam Hussein will continue to increase his capacity to wage biological and chemical warfare, and will keep trying to develop nuclear weapons.
Justifying her well-known position, Clinton said later said in a 2003 interview with Code Pink, “I ended up voting for the resolution after carefully reviewing the information, intelligence that I had available, talking with people whose opinions I trusted … I would love to agree with [Code Pink], but I can’t, based on my own understanding and assessment of the situation.”
However, these statements were made in the wake of 9/11 when Democrats sensed hawkishness was the key to their political fortunes. A few short years later, sabotaging the war that they had started and betraying the troops that they had sent to the field was where Democrats’ political futures lied. Hillary Clinton, John Kerry and others made this transition through a blatant campaign of deceit that went virtually unchallenged by the media. Clinton, for example, averred on the campaign trail, “f we had known then what we know now there never would have been a vote and I never would have voted to give this President that authority” and claimed that she didn’t know that her vote for the “Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002″ was a vote for war.
The con is still on going. In September of last year, Secretary Kerry brazenly asserted that he and Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel had “opposed the president’s decision to go into Iraq” and that “evidence was used to persuade all of us that authority ought to be given.” Chuck Hagel, in fact, also voted in favor of the war before jumping ship, forsaking the lost lives he squandered in the field and joining with the hard left. As for the “manipulated evidence” canard cited by Kerry, the latest details of Saddam’s WMD stockpile — something there can be no doubt that the Secretary of State was aware of — exposes yet again the left’s great deception on the danger of Hussein and the motivation behind the Iraq war.
And now ISIS, disowned by al Qaeda for being even more ruthless than it is, controls a chemical facility containing contents declared “destroyed” because they couldn’t be recovered safely, along with bunkers containing contents “yet to be confirmed.” And an administration with an unparalleled facility for lying assures us everything will be fine because the chemical weapons have no useful military value and can’t be moved safely. As with the rest of the Left’s handling of Iraq, this is an analysis that no one should have faith in.
-
Summary
Over the weekend of June 22, Sunni opposition fighters, including Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant militants, seized several important towns and border crossings in western Iraq's Anbar province. The insurgents took advantage of the army's reduced presence there; troops are being redeployed northward and eastward ahead of a planned offensive along the Tigris River. The Sunni gains made in Anbar will pressure the government and distract Baghdad from the impending offensive.
Analysis
The militant attacks in Anbar province were fast and concentrated, and they were directed against weak government forces hundreds of kilometers away from Baghdad. The result was the seizure of the towns of Rutba, Qaim, Rawah and Anah and three border crossings: the Qaim and Al Waleed crossings into Syria and the Trebil crossing into Jordan.
The militants' success is owed partly to Baghdad's offensive to the north. In preparation for the offensive, the government withdrew large numbers of regular Iraqi army units from Anbar province and dispatched further reinforcements from the south, massing these forces near As Samarra, northwest of Baghdad. The government continues to call for volunteers, and in response, large numbers of Shiite militia fighters have mobilized and moved north. Others are returning from Syria, where they had been defending the regime of Bashar al Assad against rebel forces that also included Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant militants.
Click to Enlarge
There are an estimated 50,000 Iraqi soldiers around As Samarra, and their presence has already slowed the militants' momentum south along the Tigris River. With these troops in place, the government will likely push north along two routes. One will seek to reinforce Baquba and move against Sunni militant forces in Diyala province. The other will head north from As Samarra toward Mosul, with the short-term goal of clearing Tikrit and securing the oil refinery at Baiji.
However, redeploying troops from Anbar province left the region vulnerable. Baghdad hoped to maintain control by coordinating with local Sunni tribes against Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, in part by paying tribal fighters overdue salaries. Despite these efforts, Sunni tribes appear to have largely sided with the opposition coalition of Sunni militants against the government. Armed parades by Shiite militias in Baghdad and southern cities have aggravated concerns that the conflict would be divided along sectarian lines.
The recent Sunni advances have intensified the threat to the west of Baghdad, diverting government attention from the offensive toward the northeast. In addition, Sunni militants are now close to the important Haditha Dam on the Euphrates River. With control of the dam, rebels would be able to disrupt Iraq's national electric grid and cause major flooding. Baghdad has mobilized 2,000 soldiers toward the dam in an effort to maintain control accordingly.
Militant control of the Saudi and Jordanian borders in Anbar province virtually cut off land routes to Jordan and Syria from government-controlled areas. This has already severely disrupted Iraqi-Jordanian trade and will have a substantial impact on the Syrian regime's war effort, making it completely dependent on air and sea routes. Anonymous sources in the Iraqi security forces, however, issued unconfirmed reports June 23 that Baghdad has retaken the border stations at Trebil and Al Waleed, suggesting that these disruptions may be temporary.
As Baghdad prepares to begin its offensive toward the north, it will remain distracted by the deteriorating security situation in Anbar province, a situation that could eventually threaten the capital. But Sunni opposition forces will find it difficult to seize the capital or even make progress outside Sunni-majority areas, especially as tens of thousands of Shiite militiamen mobilize to defend the central government. This in turn will lead to an increasingly sectarian conflict amid slow, painful government advances.
Read more: Iraq Update: Sunni Militants Make Key Gains in Anbar Province | Stratfor
-
second post
Analysis
Editor's Note: The renewed insurgency in central Iraq led by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant has prompted Bret Boyd, Stratfor's Vice President of Custom Intelligence Services, to reflect on the potential spillover effects in the country's south. He recently returned from Basra and offers his observations on the region. Boyd has been to Iraq previously, having deployed four times with the infantry and Army Rangers. While the views expressed here are personal and not institutional, we are publishing them in light of Boyd's unique insight.
I began to write this set of reflections from downtown Basra, overlooking the Shatt al Arab River. I left Iraq during this most recent visit four days before a Sunni Islamist insurgency overran Mosul. Since then, the erratic march of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant has captured the world's headlines and once again riveted attention on the country's basic ethno-sectarian split along Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish lines.
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant Activity
Click to Enlarge
Many of the secondary headlines have keyed on Basra, Iraq's second largest city, with a population of just over 2 million. It is a largely Shiite city but more heterogeneous and cosmopolitan than others due in part to the fact that it is a port city. It controls Iraq's access to the Persian Gulf, primarily through the ports of Um Qasr, Al Maqal, Khor al Zubair and Mina al Bakr. Basra was occupied by the British after defeating the Ottoman troops at the Battle of Basra in 1914 and was more recently managed primarily by British troops after the 2003 invasion through the withdrawal of coalition forces in 2011.
As violence flares anew in the north, Basra garners global attention because it is the gateway to Iraq's southern oil fields, which contain the overwhelming majority of Iraq's hydrocarbon resources. Eighty percent of Iraq's petroleum reserves are estimated to be in the south, reflected by seven major fields -- Rumaila, Majnoon, West Qurna-1, West Qurna-2, Zubair, Halfaya and Maysan. The majority of Iraq's energy export infrastructure also flows south through Basra, to the Al-Faw Peninsula and the Al Basra Offshore Terminal in the Persian Gulf.
Basra has been scarred by war, both from the Iran-Iraq war and the more recent occupation by the British and Americans. One does not have to look hard to find toppled structures or bomb craters. Basra is years away from the fine hotels and modern infrastructure seen in the northern Iraqi city of Arbil. Yet there is a vibrancy to the town, and there is growth. Streets have been repaved and bridges built. A large shopping mall is being built -- aspiringly titled Times Square Basra.
Many foreign businesses operate in this region, primarily in the energy sector. However, given the concentration of hydrocarbon resources and infrastructure development in the area, the lack of American businesses here is striking. ExxonMobil, Halliburton and others are present at some level, but the seven major fields in southern Iraq are overwhelmingly operated by Russian, Chinese and European firms.
This is immediately apparent before even setting foot in Iraq. The Emirates flight I arrived on, which operates daily from Dubai at the time of writing, was populated primarily by Russian and Chinese oil field workers. I admittedly make this generalization from the observation of a single data point, but I am told that this is typically the case. I did not identify another American on the flight and have encountered very few after several days of staying at a hotel downtown and eating at local restaurants.
My general assessment after many conversations with Iraqis and others operating in the country is that Russian and Chinese state-owned or state-sponsored firms are realizing the economic benefit of the eight years of blood and treasure that the United States and its allies poured into Iraq. I readily admit to personal bias, being an American citizen and having participated in our most recent Iraq war. I perhaps also suffer from aspiration bias, as I deeply respect the Iraqi people both as antagonists in conflict and partners in rebuilding, and desire to see American industry continue to support their growth.
Some of the lack of investment relates to perceptions of Iraqi instability and its impact on energy producing regions. Iraq has two primary ethnically and culturally homogeneous regions that provide relatively high levels of safety: the Kurdish region in the north and Shiite Arab core in the south. The majority of the Iraqi violence occurs in Iraq's borderlands, places where population centers blend the lines between Sunnis, Kurds and Shia. Baghdad, in addition to now representing Shiite political hegemony over Iraq, lies at the crossroads of these divisions and is often a focus of insurgent attacks.
But Iraq's distinct ethnic and sectarian population centers also create very distinct realities on the ground; even while many in the mainstream media report from Arbil on the violence raging to the south of the Kurdish region's borders, they neglect to illustrate the stability and lack of violence in both the Kurdish region and Basra. The Kurdish and Shiite communities have rallied local forces in defense of their sizable regional oil reserves, and Baghdad's success in preventing the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant from directly impacting this oil production relies heavily on security coordination with locals. While the rebels continue to lead a pro-Sunni offensive north of Baghdad, Iraq's primary oil exporting regions remain relatively calm. Political and bureaucratic impediments pose a bigger challenge to Iraq's steadily growing oil industry than jihadists and insurgent attacks.
There are significant growth opportunities in Iraq. The sanctions regime imposed from 1991 to 2003, combined with the reality that oil production was less a strategic priority for Saddam Hussein than was internal control, led to underdevelopment. The small influx of foreign investment in 2010 and 2011 has caused oil production to increase -- a trend that is likely to continue as production gains from modern technologies have not yet been fully realized. Iraqi production is currently at its highest level ever yet is nowhere near capacity. In May, Iraq produced 3.37 million barrels of oil per day, an increase of 1.2 million barrels per day from pre-invasion production levels in 2002.
Production forecasts have fluctuated in recent years, but the disagreement has been over the magnitude of growth, as opposed to the likelihood of growth. The federal government in Baghdad and international bodies like the International Energy Association have recently come closer together, forecasting production targets from 6 million to 8 million barrels per day by 2020. Growth of 3 million to 5 million barrels per day over the next six years presents a remarkable opportunity. The only other markets that the International Energy Association forecast to grow by more than 2 million barrels per day during this time period are the United States, Canada and Brazil, and all show less growth potential than Iraq.
To be clear, there is risk here alongside opportunity. This is still Iraq, a nation struggling from decades of conflict as well as the complexity resulting from the forced convergence of unique and ancient peoples, with rich and conflict-ridden histories. The Kurdish north and the Shiite south each have some measure of physical security resulting from relative cultural homogeneity and the shared interest of safeguarding hydrocarbon resources. But challenges remain, especially in central and western Iraq.
The recent election, budget impasse and machinations required to form a new coalition government exacerbate these challenges. This process will inevitably be lengthy. Some of the violence recently experienced in Ar Ramadi, As Samarra and elsewhere is likely a manifestation of post-election politics, as different groups exert influence and vie for power. Current levels of violence are unlikely to abate in the near term, but they will generally remain contained to a central Sunni belt in Iraq, leaving the south relatively stable.
However, businesses that operate in complex emerging and frontier market environments understand that they get paid for risk. Risk often creates outsized returns and thus is an element of business to be managed, not necessarily avoided. Understandably, the costs associated with managing risks sometimes provide for a poor investment, regardless of the potential value of the opportunity. Perhaps that is the case with Iraq today.
But perhaps not. The businesses that can best calculate and manage risk are naturally positioned to capture emerging opportunities and achieve risk-adjusted return. This is simply a statement of fact, not a political statement, security assessment or endorsement that companies should necessarily flock to Iraq, American or otherwise.
The opportunities in hydrocarbons, infrastructure projects and both consumer and services markets are of such potential magnitude that they merit thoughtful evaluation. As I sit, sipping instant coffee, unguarded, watching Iraqis walk the boulevard of the Shatt al Arab, I wonder if American firms are mispricing risk and thus bequeathing gains from the rise of this region to the Russians, Chinese and others.
American firms are eager to engage Iraq's large -- and growing -- hydrocarbons sector. The difficulty lies in navigating a patchwork of local and national political interests, a system that violence in northern Iraq is revealing to be fraught with competition and that requires a deep awareness of local sensibilities. Baghdad is set to face a period of both regional security challenges and a difficult and complex political negotiation involving Kurds, Sunnis and Shia. Despite these challenges, we expect oil exports to continue to grow and the stability of Iraq's Kurdish and core Shiite regions to endure.
Read more: Observations From Basra | Stratfor
Follow us: @stratfor on Twitter | Stratfor on Facebook
-
(How Obama's withdrawal from Iraq became a surrender.)
Relief Over U.S. Exit From Iraq Fades as Reality Overtakes Hope
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/23/world/middleeast/relief-over-us-exit-from-iraq-fades-as-reality-overtakes-hope.html?_r=0
PETER BAKERJUNE 22, 2014
WASHINGTON — Standing in Al Faw palace in Baghdad, surrounded by an artificial lake and the ragged remnants of eight years of war, Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. felt a surge of emotion on that day in December 2011.
He had gone to Iraq to note the end of an era, the departure of American troops from a country that had cost his own so much. Ebullient, he praised the troops, congratulated the generals, wished Iraqi leaders good luck and called President Obama to share his excitement.
“All I’ve said about this job, I take it back,” Mr. Biden later recalled telling Mr. Obama. “Thank you for giving me the chance to end this goddamn war.”
“Joe,” he remembered the president responding, “I’m glad you got to do it.”
For two men who had run for office on the promise of getting out of Iraq, it seemed like a moment of validation. But that moment has proved achingly ephemeral. It was not the end of the war or even the end of their involvement.
Two and a half years later, Mr. Obama has ordered up to 300 Special Operations members back to Iraq and may yet authorize airstrikes to prevent the collapse of the government at the hands of a brutal Islamic insurgency.
President Obama greeted soldiers at Fort Bragg, N.C., on Dec. 14, 2011, and spoke about the end of American military involvement in Iraq. Credit Doug Mills/The New York Times
The journey from then to now is a tale of premature celebration and dashed hopes. A president who thought he had set Iraq on a more stable course that could be sustained without American help has now determined that American diplomacy and power are critical to saving it. Tired of war, like most Americans, he found his aspiration to move on bedeviled by forces tearing across a region in a story punctuated by miscalculation and missed opportunities.
The withdrawal ceremony on that winter day in 2011 was, in the end, the result of a failed negotiation. In theory, both Mr. Obama and the Iraqi leadership wanted a small American detachment to stay behind. In reality, neither side was enthusiastic and seemed just as happy that a dispute over legal conditions scotched the deal.
The residual troops would not have been a combat force, but might have mounted counterterrorism missions and helped Iraqi forces gain better intelligence on the militants. Whether it would have made a difference is impossible to know, but will be a subject of debate for a long time.
Just as important if not more so, however, was the impact of the civil war in next-door Syria. Few if any expected on that day in 2011 just how far the Syria conflict would escalate, leading to the creation of virulent new Islamist jihadist groups like the Nusra Front and Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, known as ISIS or sometimes ISIL, that would ultimately spill over the border and threaten Baghdad.
“The notion that Syria would completely fall apart and become this major staging ground for Nusra and ISIS, which wasn’t even ISIS at the time, I don’t think people anticipated and I don’t think could have been anticipated,” said Colin Kahl, who was the Pentagon official in charge of Iraq until the withdrawal.
But in the months that followed, as Syria degenerated into a toxic stew of rebellion and jihadism, some inside and outside the administration warned of the dangers of a broader regional destabilization. The administration overestimated the capacity of the Iraqi security forces and underestimated the power of ISIS. And it felt stymied by Iraqi leaders and a Syria crisis that it considered beyond its control.
“We’ve had to overcome Iraqi reluctance, political dysfunction and the chaos in Syria,” said Antony J. Blinken, the president’s deputy national security adviser and a key player on Iraq policy. “It was a work very much in progress when ISIL launched its offensive.”
At various points, the president approved modest measures to shape the Syria conflict but resisted a broader intervention, afraid of another Iraq. Now he finds himself facing another Iraq anyway — in Iraq. And the war that Mr. Biden cursed is again cursing the Obama administration.
Quieted War Offers Hope
Mr. Obama came to office vowing to withdraw from Iraq but he largely followed an agreement signed by his predecessor, George W. Bush, with Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki committing the United States to leave by the end of 2011. Both Washington and Baghdad had imagined that they would negotiate a new agreement for a small residual force after that.
But as 2011 opened, the war had quieted down. After a troop increase ordered by Mr. Bush, a strategy shift by Gen. David H. Petraeus and a change of sides by Sunni militias, Mr. Maliki’s government seemed in a strong position. Gen. Lloyd Austin, the commander on the ground, developed proposals for keeping as many as 24,000 troops in Iraq after 2011, only to run into instant resistance.
“The White House looks at the 20,000 number and was like, you’ve got to be kidding,” Mr. Kahl recalled. “This looks like a permanent Korea-style presence in Iraq, which nobody supported.” Mr. Obama’s appointees concluded that the military was trying to still do everything it was doing before, just with fewer troops, rather than changing the mission to reflect a more reduced role. At a meeting in the White House Situation Room, Robert M. Gates, then the defense secretary, made clear that was not acceptable.
Pentagon officers and General Austin’s team refined the plans, developing options of 19,000 troops, 16,000 troops and 10,000 troops. The general preferred the highest number and deemed the lowest unwise. Mr. Biden aggressively pushed for a smaller force. Tom Donilon, the president’s national security adviser, asked Mr. Gates if he could live with 10,000. Mr. Gates said he could.
At a May 19 meeting, Mr. Obama decided to keep up to 10,000 troops and on June 2 talked with Mr. Maliki by secure video to open the discussions. To help negotiate an agreement, the administration brought back Brett McGurk, a Bush aide who had negotiated the original 2008 withdrawal deal. But the talks quickly foundered on the question of maintaining legal protections for American troops from Iraqi law. The 2008 agreement had been approved by Iraq’s Parliament, and Pentagon lawyers insisted a follow-on agreement would have to be as well.
Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki of Iraq and President Obama in December 2011, as the American pullout was being completed. Credit Pool photo by Olivier Douliery
Though Mr. Maliki was willing to send it to Parliament, chances of passage seemed slim. Kurdish leaders supported it, but Sunni and other Shiite leaders did not. Mr. Maliki suggested instead that he sign an executive agreement guaranteeing immunity for American troops and Mr. McGurk supported that, arguing that the need to keep some troops was worth some risk. But lawyers in Washington rejected it, and even Iraq’s chief justice quietly advised it had to be approved by Parliament.
Even as that debate raged, the White House was rethinking the 10,000-troop option. Mr. Obama was locked in tense deficit negotiations with Republicans and the cost of a residual force weighed on the discussions. Officials concluded that one part of the planned mission, keeping troops along the line dividing Arabs and Kurds in northern Iraq, was unnecessary. With that discarded, they reduced the plan to 5,000 troops.
James Jeffrey, then ambassador to Iraq, said it was clear that some around the president were not eager to stay.
“Certainly there were people close to him in the White House that were uncomfortable with his decision,” he said, “and every time we were running into trouble trying to get the Iraqis to go along, they wanted to pull the plug.”
But he added that the immunity dispute left them little choice. Without parliamentary approval of the agreement, American troops would fall under Iraqi legal jurisdiction, a position rejected by the Pentagon. Ultimately, Mr. Obama had enough. “He wasn’t going to beg the Iraqis to let us stay,” Mr. Kahl said.
On Oct. 21, Mr. Obama talked with Mr. Maliki by video again and they agreed that American troops would pull out by the end of the year according to the original agreement. Neither seemed unhappy.
“We really didn’t want to be there and he really didn’t want us there,” said a former senior White House official. “It’s not like Maliki went out of his way to get a deal. It was almost a mutual decision, not said directly to each other, but in reality that’s what it became. And you had a president who was going to be running for re-election, and getting out of Iraq was going to be a big statement.”
Reason for Optimism
For Mr. Biden, that day in December 2011 was suffused with emotion — not triumph, a former aide said, but a sense that they had put Iraq back on a stable course and put an end to a terrible catastrophe for the United States.
“That’s why I ran for president in the first place,” Mr. Biden said in an interview last year. The same was true for Mr. Obama. “He felt as happy and as fulfilled as I did,” Mr. Biden said. “He knew it meant a lot to me. And it meant a lot to him.”
Mr. Obama at the time called it a “moment of success” and said “we’re leaving behind a sovereign, stable and self-reliant Iraq, with a representative government.”
There was reason for optimism. The insurgency seemed exhausted and the remaining threat could be managed by a newly trained Iraqi Army. An intelligence assessment at the time concluded that without American troops “things might get a little worse than they were in 2011 but Iraq would not fall off the rail,” Mr. Kahl recalled.
But ominously, the intelligence analysts said a few things could change their conclusion: There could be a major external shock. Iraq’s government could overreact to residual bombings by alienating the Sunni minority. And Iraqi factions could fail to resolve outstanding differences.
Those caveats, Mr. Kahl said, proved “fairly prescient.” Within days of the departure, the Maliki government issued an arrest warrant for a Sunni vice president accused of orchestrating bombing attacks. Mr. Maliki began consolidating power at the expense of Sunni leaders.
President Obama last Thursday, announcing steps to shore up Iraqi forces against Sunni insurgents. Credit Gabriella Demczuk/The New York Times
The year 2012 was relatively quiet in terms of violence but some saw signs of a resurgent problem. Michael Knights, a scholar at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, briefed the National Security Council staff on indicators of a reviving insurgency, but officials said there was internal debate over whether his numbers showed what he said they did.
With American troops gone, Mr. Obama focused his attention on other issues, not to mention his re-election. There was ample evidence that Mr. Maliki might return to the sort of sectarian approach that alienated Sunnis in the past, sowing the sort of disaffection that would ultimately create an environment that would prove fertile for ISIS. But Mr. Obama had no regular contact with Mr. Maliki, leaving it to others to manage.
“The last three years saw a continuous erosion of Iraq’s institutions — from the marginalization of Parliament to the politicization of the military and judiciary — without much or any public criticism or U.S. pushback from the highest levels,” said Meghan O’Sullivan, who was Mr. Bush’s deputy national security adviser.
Mr. Obama believed it was time for Iraq to handle its own affairs.
“It’s hard to say the president should spend every week nurturing this guy and keep troops in there,” said Mr. Jeffrey, who also served as a deputy national security adviser to Mr. Bush. “The whole purpose of propping it up is so it will stand on its own.”
‘You Could See This Coming’
At that time the Syria civil war was raging and the scattered remnants of Al Qaeda in Iraq were reconstituting themselves as ISIS. “You could see this coming,” said another administration official. “It was a little dot and it was growing and growing and growing.” But the official said that while some raised alarms, senior levels in Washington were not focused on the implications for Iraq until a year ago.
Other officials blamed Iraqi leaders who were not all that interested in American help. In early 2012, Obama advisers said they tried to create a joint “fusion center” in Baghdad to share intelligence, but the Iraqis backed out. Similarly, in March 2012, when Iraq was hosting an Arab League summit meeting, the Americans offered to conduct surveillance flights for security, but Mr. Maliki said no.
“Iraq kept a distance until about a year ago when the pressure from western Iraq was threatening the state,” said Mr. Donilon, who stepped down as national security adviser in mid-2013. “They failed to deal with it and exacerbated it through the political process.”
Iraqi leaders began asking Washington for help and the administration responded by increasing military sales. It could provide small arms and Hellfire missiles but Iraq had only two Cessna planes to carry such missiles. The administration pushed Congress to authorize the sale or lease of Apache helicopters and F-16 fighter jets, but lawmakers were wary of empowering Mr. Maliki, who they feared might use the power to strengthen his political hand.
Mr. Maliki came to Washington last October seeking aid and Mr. Obama authorized setting up a targeting cell in Baghdad to help Iraqis combat the growing threat from ISIS. A group of Special Operations members — “small double digits,” according to one official — were sent to the United States Embassy in Baghdad, the largest American diplomatic outpost in the world, but were limited in what they could do. The Americans flew just one surveillance flight a month over Iraq at the time.
Suicide bombings spiked, up from five a month when the Americans left to 50 a month by last winter. Then came the fall of Falluja and Ramadi in western Iraq in January. While stunned, the administration responded with only modest efforts to turn the tide, still unwilling to consider a more robust intervention. American officials focused on making sure Mr. Maliki went through with April elections in hopes of defusing political unrest.
“From virtually the day our troops left because the Iraqi people wanted them out, we pressed Baghdad to accept our security assistance” and “urged its leaders to govern inclusively,” Mr. Blinken said. “In 2013, when Syria added accelerant to ISIL, Baghdad finally began to welcome our help and we’ve been building it quietly ever since, with arms, intelligence and advice.”
By the time Mosul, Tikrit and Tal Afar fell this month, it was too late. Like Mr. Bush before him, Mr. Obama misjudged the American-trained Iraqi forces, which melted away in the face of the ISIS advance. The White House was stunned, and Mr. Obama confronted the choice of letting Iraq sink into a fratricidal civil war with a safe haven for Islamic jihadists or re-engaging in a place he wanted to leave. Mr. Biden was back on the phone with Mr. Maliki, calling from a trip in Latin America. And some wondered whether the results in Iraq foreshadow a similar result after Mr. Obama’s planned withdrawal from Afghanistan.
The debate in recent days examined a range of options, from letting Iraq handle its own problems to launching airstrikes on ISIS forces. Mr. Obama tried to “resist calls to leap before we look,” one aide said. He chose what another adviser called the “70 percent” option, ordering Special Operations Forces to help the Iraqi government assess the threat. Surveillance flights were up to more than 30 a day. An aircraft carrier was moved into the Persian Gulf, with the option of delivering strikes.
But Mr. Obama rejected a full-scale return. “We do not have the ability to simply solve this problem by sending in tens of thousands of troops and committing the kinds of blood and treasure that has already been expended in Iraq,” he said in announcing his decision. “Ultimately, this is something that is going to have to be solved by the Iraqis.”
P.C.
-
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/26/opinion/the-iraqi-friends-we-abandoned.html?emc=edit_th_20140626&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=49641193&_r=0
-
http://2paragraphs.com/2014/06/isis-has-control-of-saddam-husseins-wmd-in-iraq/?se_id
-
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/381242/looking-back-iraq-victor-davis-hanson
======================
Effort to retake Tikrit stalls , , ,http://online.wsj.com/articles/iraqi-forces-set-back-in-push-against-militants-say-officials-1404028148?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTTopStories
-
ISIS/ISIL declares Islamic State, shortens name to “The Islamic State” (IS)
Robert Spencer Jun 29, 2014 at 2:28pm
They clearly intend to hold the territory they have captured. They’ve also declared Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi the new caliph; he claims to be a descendant of Muhammad, so it is possible that if they can make their state viable, this claim will gain currency. If that happens, it will be interesting to see how Muslims in the West react to the idea that he is the “leader for Muslims everywhere,” which historically was always a claim of the caliph.
“ISIS declares creation of Islamic state in Middle East, shortens name to ‘IS,’” RT, June 29, 2014:
ISIS jihadists have declared the captured territories from Iraq’s Diyala province to Syria’s Aleppo a new Islamic State – a ‘caliphate.’ They removed ‘Iraq and the Levant’ from their name and urged other radical Sunni groups to pledge their allegiance.
ISIS announced that it should now be called ‘The Islamic State’ and declared its chief, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, as “the caliph” of the new state and “leader for Muslims everywhere,” the radical Sunni militant group said in an audio recording distributed online on Sunday.
This is the first time since the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1923 that a Caliph – which means a political successor to Prophet Muhammad – has been declared. The decision was made following the group’s Shura Council meeting on Sunday, according to ISIS spokesman Abu Mohammed al-Adnani.
The new Islamic State has marked its borders, spanning the territory captured by the group in a bloody rampage, from Iraq’s volatile Diyala province to Syria’s war-torn Aleppo.
FacebookTwitterBookmark/FavoritesEmailLinkedInPinterestRedditTumblrStumbleUponPrint
-
The 'Sons of Iraq,' Abandoned by Their American Allies
Sunnis who battled al Qaeda with us were left to the mercies of Maliki. Now the ISIS killers are slaughtering them.
By Philip 'PJ' Dermer
July 1, 2014 6:21 p.m. ET
A former colleague with whom I served in the coalition forces in Iraq recently sent me one of the slick YouTube productions by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIS, now rampaging through the country. I was extremely reluctant to watch the video by this al Qaeda spin-off. I was already depressed about the chaos in Iraq, given how much effort my colleagues and I spent with Iraqis after 2003 attempting to forge the great democratic experiment in the Middle East.
As the video of jubilant ISIS members extolling their bloody conquests slipped by, I began to fast forward to get through the madness, but I froze when I saw ISIS thugs attacking captured Iraqis. Many of the men being taunted, tortured and killed were leaders of the Sahwa, the Sunni militants who once fought against the American military and the Iraqi government before they realized that their bigger enemy was al Qaeda and joined us in the fight. U.S. forces, grateful for their support, dubbed them Sons of Iraq.
The Sahwa's decision to ally with us was the primary contributor to the calming of central Iraq from 2007-09. Without the Sahwa, I suspect the outcome of the vaunted military "surge" would have been vastly different. The number of Iraqis in the Sahwa movement grew into the tens of thousands, as U.S. forces' outreach to small groups of armed men evolved into larger circles of family members, friends and tribal groups.
Enlarge Image
Shiite Turkmen at a checkpoint in the Iraqi town of Taza Khurmatu in June. AFP/Getty Images
Working with the Sahwa in a sense became a two-way aid program. The coalition delivered small monthly payments in return for the much larger dividends of safety for U.S. soldiers and the Iraqi civilian population.
What to do about the Sahwa in the long term was complicated. In 2007-08, I was part of a small office in Baghdad chartered to work with representatives of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki on how to reconcile with the Sahwa and integrate them into Iraq's post-surge environment. We understood that unless the Sahwa and their Sunni support base could be integrated in mainstream Iraq, our battle successes would be short-lived.
The dilemmas were immense. First, the movement was almost exclusively Sunni while the government in Baghdad and its political support mechanisms were largely Shiite. Second, while the Sahwa had "reconciled" to a large degree with the U.S. by turning against al Qaeda, it had not made such a commitment toward the Iraqi government, which many Sahwa saw as an agent of Iran. For its part, the Iraqi government viewed thousands of armed Sunnis as a strategic threat (this view has not diminished). Most of Iraq's senior security leadership wanted no part of any militia, Sahwa or otherwise.
Still, the goal of our office was to find ways to foster life after the fight with the Sahwa fully embedded in Iraq, including in its security services. This is what we told the Sahwa and their U.S.-commander counterparts who were trying to manage Sahwa fears and expectations. This is why I froze while watching the ISIS lunacy on YouTube. We, the United States of America, had made the Sahwa and their Sunni popular base a promise, a moral commitment, when they took up the fight beside us beginning in 2007. We told the Sons of Iraq that we would work out the operational mechanisms with the Iraqi government and not leave them twisting in the wind. We made this promise time and again all over Iraq.
The coalition's payment program for the Sahwa necessitated gathering personal identification data on every member, close to 100,000 names; continuing the payments was going to be under the obligation of the Iraqi government after the coalition turned over governing authority to Baghdad. I remember when we delivered the database to Prime Minister Maliki's office. The rest is history. He never attempted to fulfill his part of the bargain. Instead, the Sahwa were dismembered piecemeal, including extrajudicial killings, internment and expulsion from Iraq. After U.S. forces withdrew from Iraq in 2011, U.S. diplomats sat idly by behind concrete walls.
A couple of years ago I was in Amman, Jordan, and was invited to meet with one of the Sahwa leaders we had worked closely with in western Baghdad. When I entered the home arranged for our meeting, he had his hands in his pockets and his countenance was not one of seeing a long-lost friend. Staring at me, he pulled his hands out of his pockets and dumped two handfuls of military-unit coins—decorated with logos of various U.S. units—on the table. The coins represented mementos of appreciation from various American commanders the Sahwa leader had worked with. Now they crashed onto the table and several fell to the floor. He said: "What good are these now?"
I had no answer then and I still don't. When I think of the ISIS goons on the video accusing Sahwa members of the heinous crime of now working with the "apostate" government in Baghdad, I don't know whether to laugh or cry. But the Sahwa episode should not be forgotten as we forge our way through this crisis. America's promises and moral commitments must stand for something. If not, we may pay an even greater price as events unfold. No one will believe anything we say and will act strictly in their own interests. The Sahwa from 2007-09 is no more. And, yes, the Sunni are now doing what it takes for their own political interests, so things have come full circle because ISIS is the new al Qaeda—the vanguard.
Col. Dermer, a retired Army officer, served two tours in Iraq, where he now works in a private business.
-
It's a proud democrat traditional to ensure that those who allied themselves with us end up in mass graves.
Ask the South Vietnamese.
-
GM: That was as much a function of popular opinion being turned against the war by the monopoly media at the time, as it was the Democrat Party. Similarly, as David Horowitz lays out brilliantly in his book "Party of Defeat," the Democrat Party, having unanimously voted to support sending troops to Iraq, only one month hence decided to demonize George W. Bush as a war criminal and undermine the troops in unprecedented fashion while they were deployed. Of course the establishment media went along with this narrative, and one of G.W.'s great failings was that he refused to respond to these treasonous attacks. Karl Rove and Dick Cheney have said as much. Bush 43 to this day refuses to defend his record or criticize the current President - to his shame in my opinion. The welfare of this nation is damn well worth defending, especially by a former President who enacted these policies. If he actually thinks he is benefiting the country by remaining silent in the face of its destruction he is sadly misguided. Neither Bill Clinton nor Barack Obama has shown any hesitation to trash G.W. at every opportunity and continue the false narrative about the Iraq war, seriously damaging U.S. interests in the process. If G.W. won't defend his own record, and the Republican Party leadership has no will to do so, who will? As Horowitz has said for decades - politics is war by other means, and you don't win it by remaining silent in the face of lies specifically designed to demoralize the troops and the citizenry for craven political purposes. Said another way - lies repeated endlessly without rebuttal soon become accepted as truth by the low-information citizenry.
-
http://therightscoop.com/fantastic-bill-whittle-anti-war-democrats-are-losing-the-peace-in-iraq-just-like-they-did-in-vietnam/
-
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/07/06/why-the-white-house-ignored-all-those-warnings-about-isis.html#
-
The Associated Press
Published: July 9, 2014
UNITED NATIONS — Iraq said the Islamic State extremist group has taken control of a vast former chemical weapons facility northwest of Baghdad, where 2,500 chemical rockets filled with the deadly nerve agent sarin or their remnants were stored along with other chemical warfare agents.
http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/iraq-terrorists-seize-chemical-weapons-site-24476238
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I didn't know Iraq had WMD. Was this under Saddam Hussein?
-
http://www.miamiherald.com/2014/07/11/4231510/expansion-of-secret-facility-in.html
-
http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2014/07/us_advisers_give_dark_assessme.php#
-
http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Peace/2014/07/15/Reports-ISIS-Using-Chemical-Weapons-on-Kurds
http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Peace/2014/07/15/Report-ISIS-Starving-out-Christians-in-Mosul-May-Have-Used-Chemical-Weapons
-
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/jul/15/isil-captured-52-us-made-howitzers-artillery-weapo/
-
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/jul/17/gen-james-amos-marine-corps-commandant-slams-obama/
-
"... the worst military reversal Iraqi troops have suffered since the Islamist forces captured nearly half the country last month."
Read more here: http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2014/07/18/233786/islamic-state-overwhelms-iraqi.html#storylink=cpy
-
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/20/us-iraq-security-kurds-idUSKBN0FP06320140720
-
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/21/world/middleeast/concern-and-support-for-iraqi-christians-forced-by-isis-militants-to-flee-mosul.html?emc=edit_th_20140721&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=49641193&_r=0
-
Defeating the Islamic State: Crafting a Regional Approach' (Douglas A. Ollivant and Terrence Kelly, War on the Rocks)
"It is important not to overstate ISIL's connection with the current dysfunction in Iraqi politics. It is not 'an al-Qaeda army marching across Iraq' as some news commentators have claimed. It has succeeded in Iraq through a partnership with local Sunni forces. While it is true that current sectarian tensions have led Iraqi Sunnis to support ISIL to oust the Shi'a dominated government, this has happened before during the Iraqi resistance in 2004-2007. Moreover, this alliance need not be permanent; Iraq's Sunnis, with U.S. help, decimated ISIL's predecessor, al Qaeda in Iraq, in 2007 and 2008 because of the threat it posed to local Iraqi leaders and their way of life through their imposition of a strict version of Sharia law and other social changes they sought to impose on the local communities (e.g., forced marriages into important tribal families). Further, it will be interesting to see how Iraq's more nationalist Sunnis, including the outlawed Ba'ath Party, react to the Caliphate announcement and similar threats to local leaders, which will no doubt occur. It is likely that these groups will turn on ISIL again once they have realized their true goal of getting Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki out of power."
-
second post
U.S. Increases Surveillance, Military Advisers in Iraq
Total U.S. Military Personnel in Iraq Now at 825
By Felicia Schwartz
Updated July 23, 2014 5:16 p.m. ET
WASHINGTON—The U.S. has increased surveillance efforts and has sent additional military advisers to Iraq to better aid national forces and understand the expanding extremist insurgency there, officials told Congress on Wednesday.
Since extremists seized control of Mosul in June, U.S. surveillance flights over Iraq have increased to nearly 50 a day, up from one flight a month, said Brett McGurk, the deputy assistant defense secretary for Iraq and Iran, in testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
The Pentagon said 20 additional military advisers recently arrived in Iraq, bringing total U.S. military personnel there to 825. Pentagon spokesman Col. Steve Warren said there are now 90 advisers working with Iraqi military forces, assessing their capabilities, and 160 Americans are assigned to joint operation centers in Baghdad and Erbil.
Mr. McGurk and Elissa Slotkin, a Pentagon policy official, emphasized the continued threat that the extremist group Islamic State poses to the U.S. and its allies. Mr. McGurk spent the past seven weeks in Iraq and described the group as a "full-blown army," not just a terrorist organization, and said it was worse than al Qaeda.
Lawmakers from both parties expressed frustration that the U.S. didn't do more to help Iraqi forces and Syrian groups fighting extremists sooner.
Lukman Faily, Iraq's ambassador to the U.S., said the U.S. was sending mixed signals to Baghdad about its intentions regarding military support. "If Iraqis don't believe that meaningful U.S. assistance is forthcoming, then they will not have enough incentive to adopt the political reforms that America is urging," he said in a statement to The Wall Street Journal.
Rep. Ed Royce (R., Calif.), chairman of the committee, said the Obama administration denied repeated requests for drone strikes from the Iraqi government, which he said Iraqi leaders had made since last August. Mr. McGurk said the U.S. received a formal request for support from Iraq in May.
Mr. McGurk said the U.S. has continued to study the possibility of drone strikes in Iraq. When asked about assessments of Iraqi forces on the ground, Ms. Slotkin said there are some "very capable units" that could assist the U.S. with airstrikes, should President Barack Obama pursue that option.
However, both Mr. McGurk and Ms. Slotkin said military support alone wouldn't sufficiently address instability in Iraq, and that the formation of a new Iraqi government would be key to lessening the Islamic State's strength.
Ms. Slotkin said a "strong, capable" federal government in Baghdad would be the best defense against threats from the Islamic State and strong Iranian influence in the region.
U.S. officials have been pushingfor the formation of a new government that can convincingly move away from exclusionist policies that Washington believes have been in effect under Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.
Of the U.S. troops sent to Iraq, 475 are providing security for the American Embassy in Baghdad.
The Obama administration's priorities in Iraq are improving U.S. intelligence, supporting the formation of a new government and aiding Iraqi forces in repulsing the Islamic State, which has taken control of much of Iraq, Mr. McGurk said in the hearing Wednesday.
-
http://www.mercatornet.com/articles/view/terrified_christians_driven_out_of_mosul
-
second post-- be sure to see first one
Summary
Nouri al-Maliki, the only prime minister Baghdad has known since the United States invaded Iraq and overthrew Saddam Hussein, may soon lose his job as his country struggles to form a government. Like al-Maliki, Iraq's next head of state will almost certainly be beholden to Tehran, even as he manages an insurgency that threatens to tear the country apart.
Analysis
Al-Maliki owes his tenure largely to his ability to placate U.S. and Iranian interests. For eight years he was able to keep his Shiite coalition intact, but his tactics alienated Iraq's once-dominant Sunnis and the Kurds, who were once allied with the Shia. In some ways, his exclusion of the country's minority populations explains why the country is fraying.
Government Formation
There are several factors in Iraq's struggle to form a government. The Kurds have sought more autonomy by assuming control over oil-rich areas. More important, the ongoing Sunni rebellion, led by the Islamic State, has overrun large swaths of Syria and central Iraq, and rebels have captured parts of Mosul and Tikrit.
It is under these circumstances that Iran is trying to forge a new power-sharing agreement among al-Maliki's erstwhile allies. While replacing the prime minister with someone likewise friendly to Iran will be difficult, it appears Tehran has narrowed down its choices to four candidates: Vice President Adel Abdul-Mahdi, National Alliance chair Ibrahim al-Jaafari, al-Maliki's former chief of staff and close adviser Tariq Najm, and Ahmed Chalabi, the onetime darling of the George W. Bush administration.
The international community has clamored for al-Maliki's departure ever since the Islamic State began its campaign of violence, which is brutal even by Iraq's standards. But the momentum really turned on the prime minister July 21, when Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif said his country did not support al-Maliki. Specifically, Zarif said in a CNN interview that Tehran would support whomever the Iraqi people elected. Zarif's statement comes after Iranian national security chief Ali Shamkhani traveled to Iraq to meet with al-Maliki, Iraq's top cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, and several other Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish leaders.
Iraqi Parliamentary Elections Results
Click to Enlarge
The problem for Iran is that al-Maliki, his party (Hizb al-Dawah) and the State of Law coalition constitute Iraq's political establishment, which Tehran has no interest in dislodging. Baghdad's ruling coalition is based on a delicate balance of power within the Shiite community and, more broadly, Iraq's three main population groups. In fact, the outcome of the April 30 elections, which gave the State of Law coalition a majority in parliament, validated Iran's strategy. And even though there were rising calls for al-Maliki's ouster, Iran was unprepared to replace him because it was dealing with an even bigger crisis: Syria.
But the Islamic State offensive has forced Iran to reconsider its strategy. Not only has the jihadist assault emboldened Kurdish separatists, it has also forced Iran to work with its Shiite allies to elect Salim al-Jubouri, a prominent Sunni politician, as parliamentary speaker. (Tehran needs as many Sunni partners as possible so that it can help manage the Islamic State-led uprising.) By Aug. 15, Iraqis should also select the president and his vice president, though internal rivalries among the Kurds, who typically occupy the presidency, could delay this process.
Iran's Endorsement
But these posts are not nearly as important as the premiership, a fact that Iraq's minorities understand well. In this context, determining the next prime minister is no longer a purely internal matter among the Shia; they will have to consider the Kurds and the Sunnis. Already there have been signs of discord between rival Shiite parties. A member of Hizb al-Dawah, Heidar al-Abadi, recently was elected as one of the country's two deputy parliamentary speakers (one post always goes to a Shi'i). The move may be part of a compromise whereby al-Maliki surrenders the premiership. Bayan Jabr Solagh, a former interior and finance minister and a senior leader of the Shiite Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, went so far as to say that since al-Maliki's party got the deputy speaker post, it should not be given the premiership.
Potential Iraqi Prime Ministers
Click to Enlarge
Meanwhile, Chalabi reappeared to submit his own candidacy for the deputy speaker's position. Interestingly, Chalabi took 107 votes -- 42 fewer than al-Abadi -- which was enough to force a run-off. After Chalabi agreed to withdraw his candidacy, al-Abadi won the second round with 188 votes. Chalabi's move showed that he may not have enough votes to win the premiership, but he does have the numbers to block al-Maliki from retaining his post.
Chalabi's maneuvering has fueled speculation that he is staging his political comeback. Already he has the support of the two main rivals of al-Maliki's party, the movement of Muqtada al-Sadr and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, which enabled him to be elected as a lawmaker. Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq chief Ammar al-Hakim has even said Chalabi is one of his top candidates for prime minister. Chalabi has considerable support from the Kurds, and with his secular credentials, he also has influence among the Sunnis.
However, there are some obstacles to Chalabi's election. Al-Maliki's bloc has 92 seats while Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq and the Sadrists combined have 63. Legally, the largest parliamentary bloc is entitled to the premiership. This is why other Shiite stalwarts such as Abdul-Mahdi and Solagh, who are Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq members, are not strong contenders for the job. If al-Maliki is replaced, the premiership is still likely to stay with Hizb al-Dawah. That leaves Deputy Prime Minister for Energy Affairs Hussain al-Shahristani, an independent politician in the State of Law, on the outside -- unlikely to succeed al-Maliki despite being one of his top lieutenants.
There are several members in Hizb al-Dawah that are suitable for the premiership. These include national security adviser Falah al-Fayadh, al-Maliki's closest adviser, Najm, and Ali al-Adeeb, who is seen as the second-in-command in the party. Ultimately, the premiership will be determined according to an internal power-sharing agreement that all the main stakeholders endorse.
In geopolitics, personalities matter more in the short term than in the long term. This is particularly true in Iraq, where a functional three-way power-sharing arrangement has yet to take hold. According to a July 22 report by the Kurdish news website Khandan, Shamkhani told the leaders of the National Alliance that Tehran approved of the list of four candidates. All these candidates are close to Iran, and though the Sunni insurrection has weakened Iraq, the state remains firmly under Iranian influence, even if al-Maliki's successor is untested.
Read more: Iraq's Prime Minister May Be Replaced | Stratfor
-
http://online.wsj.com/articles/jihadists-in-iraq-erase-cultural-heritage-1406313661?mod=trending_now_5
Jihadists in Iraq Erase Cultural Heritage
By Nour Malas
connect
July 25, 2014 2:41 p.m. ET
Raw footage shows the Shrine of Yunus (Tomb of Jonah) mosque in Mosul being blown up by Islamic State militants. Courtesy: YouTube
BAGHDAD—A campaign by Sunni insurgents to establish an Islamic caliphate across Iraq and Syria and expel other Muslim sects and religions is taking a sharp toll on the countries' cultural heritage.
The latest casualty was a shrine in the northern Iraqi city of Mosul said to contain the tomb of Jonah, who is revered as a prophet by Jews, Christians and Muslims—who call him Younes. The Nabi Younes Mosque, a towering structure that housed the shrine, was also destroyed in Thursday's blast.
Militants from Islamic State, the al Qaeda spinoff that seized Mosul on June 10, wired the periphery of the mosque with explosives and then detonated them, residents said, erasing a revered piece of Iraqi heritage. It collapsed in a massive explosion that sent clouds of sand and dust tumbling into the air.
"They turned it to sand, along with all other tombs and shrines," said Omar Ibrahim, a dentist in Mosul. "But Prophet Younes is something different. It was a symbol of Mosul," said Mr. Ibrahim, a Sunni. "We cried for it with our blood."
Though its population is predominantly Sunni, Mosul was a symbol of religious intermingling and tolerance in Iraq. Nineveh, the wider province, is a Assyrian Christian center dating back thousands of years. That Jonah's shrine was in a mosque was a proud reflection of that coexistence.
Visitors used to stream from across Iraq to pray at the mosque, unique in the country for its grand ascending stairs and alabaster floors. Its large prayer rooms had arched entrances inscribed elaborately with Quranic verses.
The Nabi Younes Mosque, which housed Jonah's tomb, was left in rubble on Friday, a day after extremists detonated explosives around it. Reuters
The site was a monastery centuries ago before it was turned into a mosque, said Emil Nona, the Chaldean Catholic archbishop of Mosul. "Nabi Younes was famous in the city of Mosul, the most famous mosque in the area," Archbishop Nona said. "I'm very sorry to see this place destroyed."
Islamic State and other groups following ultraconservative Sunni ideology believe the veneration of shrines or tombs is unholy. Many also denounce the veneration of any prophet besides Muhammad, believed by Muslims to be God's messenger.
The group has announced by decree its plan to destroy graves and shrines, a strategy it has already followed in neighboring Syria, where the militants have thrived in parts of the north and east.
Iraqis inspect the wreckage of the Nebi Younes mosque in Mosul on Thursday. European Pressphoto Agency
In Mosul, they have already destroyed at least two dozen shrines, as well as Shiite places of worship, and raided the Mosul Museum, officials said.
"This most recent outrage is yet another demonstration of the terrorist group's intention to shatter Iraq's shared heritage and identity," said Nickolay Mladenov, the United Nations secretary-general's special representative for Iraq, on Friday.
Iraqi officials at the tourism ministry and religious officials in Mosul confirmed the shrine as destroyed in a militant attack on Thursday. The attack is captured in amateur video footage shot by locals and posted online. In one, a thick plume of brown smoke rises in the air, presumably over the mosque as it collapsed, as the narrator says: "No, no, no. There goes the Prophet Younes."
The shrine held particular significance for Iraqis because Jonah—who in stories in both the Bible and Quran is swallowed by a whale—"was a prophet for all," said Fawziya al-Maliky, director of heritage at the tourism ministry. "We don't know what these backward militants are thinking, what kind of Islam they are pursuing," she said. "They are pursuing the end of civilization."
The attack was another blow to the country's Christian community. The Islamic State has been pursuing a deliberate anti-Christian campaign in Iraq.
The Muslim shrine, seen above on July 19, was destroyed on Thursday by militants who overran the city in June and are imposing their harsh interpretation of Islamic law. Associated Press
Thousands of Christians fled Mosul last week after Islamic State posed an ultimatum: convert to Islam, pay a tax, flee or face death. Christian residents said they were terrorized and humiliated in their own city as militants singled out their homes.
Candida Moss, a professor at the University of Notre Dame, called it "part of the irreversible eradication of Christian history and culture in Iraq."
—Ali A. Nabhan
-
http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/obamas-2012-debate-boast-i-didnt-want-leave-any-troops-iraq_802219.html
-
http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/obamas-2012-debate-boast-i-didnt-want-leave-any-troops-iraq_802219.html
It would not be fair to these other creatures to call him a weasel or a snake for the way he passes blames and shifts positions.
-
http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/obamas-2012-debate-boast-i-didnt-want-leave-any-troops-iraq_802219.html
It would not be fair to these other creatures to call him a weasel or a snake for the way he passes blames and shifts positions.
http://pjmedia.com/eddriscoll/2014/08/10/past-performance-is-no-guarantee-of-future-results-5/
-
http://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2014/08/iraqs-fight-mosul-dam-water-security/
From the article:
It is clear water has ascended as a key security variable for the Islamic State, for Iraq, and for the wider international community. And it’s understandable that in the rush to portray the existential threat posed by the Islamic State controlling vast water resources, officials and journalists have focused on the struggle over scarce resources and the potential for catastrophic damage. A careful reading of the situation, however, reveals multiple layers of complexity and interaction between water and security that suggest more calculated motives.
-
An interesting read in it's own right, but catching my attention was the part about the consequences of Bush-1 standing aside while Hussein massacred Shias and Kurds after Gulf War 1 on the attitudes of the Shias in Gulf 2 and now.
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/04/world/middleeast/surviving-isis-massacre-iraq-video.html?emc=edit_th_20140904&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=49641193&_r=0
-
second post of the morning:
Though this is the WSJ, I am not wild about the reporter's description of things. Nonetheless , , ,
Iraqi Lawmakers Back U.S. Intervention
By Matt Bradley
WSJ
Sept. 3, 2014 2:48 p.m. ET
BAGHDAD—Iraqi politicians appeared to unite Wednesday around hopes that the U.S. would intervene more forcefully to fight Islamic State militants in the country after Islamist insurgents released a video showing the beheading of a second American journalist. (Allow me to rewrite this: The same Shias who demanded us to leave and fuct up what we left them by their political and military treatment of the Sunnis and whose army ran away from a FAR smaller force and abandoned the vast armament now in the hands of ISIL, want us to bail their collective ass out without putting their names to the request-- so Iran won't have to do it.)
Nearly three years after Iraqi politicians hurried the last U.S. troops out of Iraq in December 2011 following a nearly decadelong occupation, the brutality of the Islamist insurgency brought a rare consensus calling for U.S. intervention from across the country's typically divided political spectrum.
Even those politicians who recently called for America's departure are now urging U.S. forces to return. Many of them hope Islamic State's Tuesday release of a videotape showing the execution of Steven Sotloff, a 31 year-old American freelance journalist who disappeared in Syria last year, will goad Americans into re-engaging in a conflict many would like to forget.
"Within one week, America would be able to force an end to terrorism in Iraq," said Hakim Al Zamili, an Iraqi politician from a bloc allied with Moqtada Al Sadr, a once viscerally anti-American Shiite cleric, in an interview.
Mr. Zamili, who spent a year and a half in American custody, acknowledged that he had helped fight the U.S. occupation. "What I hope from the American administration and Obama is that they show more seriousness in dealing with the issue of terrorism."
Yet few Iraqi leaders, particularly those within Iraq's Shiite-dominated leadership, have been eager to demand U.S. help in public or acknowledge its military role in helping with a few rare recent victories over the Islamic State. The U.S. has launched more than 100 airstrikes since President Barack Obama announced that he would crack down on Islamic State on Aug 8.
Mr. Zamili, for his part, said he hoped to see more U.S. airstrikes but cautioned against U.S. troops "declaring themselves the occupiers again." He said he was unimpressed with the American attacks so far, which he said focused on less strategic targets.
In a speech before Wednesday's parliament session, outgoing Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who had pushed for the U.S. troop departure three years ago, made no reference to Mr. Sotloff's killing nor the American airstrikes that helped liberate the town of Amirli from a nearly three-month blockade last week.
The masked militant who decapitated Mr. Sotloff blamed his killing on the U.S. attacks around Amirli this week that helped Iraqi militias to end the Islamic State's siege of the town and its environs.
"The readiness of many countries of the world to support Iraq in its war against the Islamic State came because of the determination and the will of the Iraqi people," Mr. Maliki said. "If you want a real international war on terrorism, then let it begin from Iraq."
The Obama administration has made its further intervention in Iraq contingent upon political unity.
The process of forming a new government has proceeded smoothly by Iraqi standards. Lawmakers have so far largely abided by a timeline to select a new speaker of parliament, president and prime minister. That is a marked improvement over 10 months of negotiations in 2010.
Members of parliament announced on Wednesday that Haider al-Abadi, who was appointed last month to replace Mr. Maliki as the new premier, will begin the final stages of selecting a new power-sharing cabinet on Thursday—a week before the constitutional deadline.
But Iraqi politicians' rare consensus on the question of U.S. intervention belies deeper divisions among the Sunni Arabs, Shiites and ethnic Kurds that have divided Iraq's most important institutions.
Those differences were on full display during a special session of parliament on Wednesday when lawmakers heard testimony about an Islamic State massacre of Iraqi soldiers at the Camp Speicher base in June.
After interim Minister of Defense Saadun Al Dulaimi told parliament that the massacre of hundreds of mostly Shiite Iraqi troops wasn't a sectarian issue, Iraq's military spokesman, Lt. Gen. Qassim Atta, publicly contradicted him and declared that the insurgents acted with the help of local Sunni tribes.
A public bickering between a top general and the defense minister ensued.
"The most outrageous thing that I heard at the session today was what was said about the Sunni tribes, trying to give the image that they were collaborating with the Islamic State," said Dhafer Al Ani, a Sunni lawmaker, who also said he hoped to see more U.S. intervention. "The military officers just proved how weak the Iraqi army is."
-
(That's a University of Michigan hockey taunt for those not in the know.)
http://www.businessinsider.in/Iraqi-Military-Top-Aide-To-ISIS-Leader-Baghdadi-Killed-In-Airstrike-In-Mosul/articleshow/41719410.cms
-
(That's a University of Michigan hockey taunt for those not in the know.)
http://www.businessinsider.in/Iraqi-Military-Top-Aide-To-ISIS-Leader-Baghdadi-Killed-In-Airstrike-In-Mosul/articleshow/41719410.cms
This seems like great news, a hit in the inner circle. Also good to learn about rival hockey. )
-
People are noticing lately that George Bush warned in 2007 exactly what would happen when we left:
“I know some in Washington would like us to start leaving Iraq now. To begin withdrawing before our commanders tell us we're ready would be dangerous for Iraq, for the region and for the United States. It would mean surrendering the future of Iraq to Al Qaida … It'd mean that we'd be risking mass killings on a horrific scale. It'd mean we'd allow the terrorists to establish a safe haven in Iraq to replace the one they lost in Afghanistan. It'd mean we'd be increasing the probability that American troops would have to return at some later date to confront an enemy that is even more dangerous.”
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bush was told this scenario by his top military advisers. Obama;s top military advisers would have told him the same thing if they were allowed to give him security briefings. Instead Pres. Obama makes foreign policy decisions based on ignorance and political considerations, which turns out to not be a very good political consideration.
-
Who Really Lost Iraq?
Leon Panetta says the White House wanted all U.S. troops out in 2011.
136 COMMENTS
Oct. 2, 2014 7:28 p.m. ET
Leon Panetta was one of the Obama Administration's adults, providing good counsel as CIA director and later Secretary of Defense. President Obama could use him now. So Mr. Panetta's account in his forthcoming memoir about how the White House bungled negotiations over keeping U.S. troops in Iraq past 2011 is a bombshell that explains the real reason Americans must fight again in that country.
Mr. Obama has repeatedly claimed that he wanted to leave U.S. forces in Iraq but that Iraq's government wouldn't agree to reasonable terms. For example, on June 19 the President told CNN's Jim Acosta :
"Keep in mind, that wasn't a decision made by me. That was a decision made by the Iraqi government. We offered a modest residual force to help continue to train and advise Iraqi security forces. We had a core requirement which we require in any situation where we have U.S. troops overseas, and that is that they are provided immunity . . . The Iraqi government and Prime Minister [Nouri al-] Maliki declined to provide us that immunity."
In an excerpt from his memoir published this week on the Time magazine website, Mr. Panetta tells a different story. He relates that "privately, the various leadership factions in Iraq all confided that they wanted some U.S. forces to remain as a bulwark against sectarian violence. But none was willing to take that position publicly, and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki concluded that any Status of Forces Agreement, which would give legal protection to those forces, would have to be submitted to the Iraqi parliament for approval."
That made negotiations harder, but as Mr. Panetta relates "we had leverage," such as withdrawing reconstruction aid. The White House refused to use it: "My fear, as I voiced to the President and others, was that if the country split apart or slid back into the violence that we'd seen in the years immediately following the U.S. invasion, it could become a new haven for terrorists to plot attacks against the U.S. Iraq's stability was not only in Iraq's interest but also in ours. I privately and publicly advocated for a residual force that could provide training and security for Iraq's military."
Mr. Panetta says he and his deputies pressed this argument, "but the President's team at the White House pushed back, and the differences occasionally became heated. . . . [T]hose on our side viewed the White House as so eager to rid itself of Iraq that it was willing to withdraw rather than lock in arrangements that would preserve our influence and interests.
"We debated with al-Maliki even as we debated among ourselves, with time running out. . . . To my frustration, the White House coordinated the negotiations but never really led them" and "without the President's active advocacy, al-Maliki was allowed to slip away."
Mr. Panetta adds that, "To this day, I believe that a small U.S. troop presence in Iraq could have effectively advised the Iraqi military on how to deal with al-Qaeda's resurgence and the sectarian violence that has engulfed the country."
All of this comports with our own reporting from 2011, but it is nonetheless distressing to have confirmed how much Mr. Obama and his munchkin Metternichs in the White House put their political desire to withdraw from Iraq above the U.S. national interest.
-
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/07/world/middleeast/promise-is-seen-in-deals-with-tribes-in-iraqs-battle-against-isis.html?nlid=49641193&src=recpb
-
Oddly, plenty of chemical weapons were found and kept secret by the Americans, 2003-2008.http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/10/14/world/middleeast/us-casualties-of-iraq-chemical-weapons.html?_r=1
-
See also:
Top News,
chemical weapons,
Society,
weapons of mass destruction
WMD found in Iraq after all, Bush was right: Pentagon 'hid' chemical weapons?
Use your key for the next article
Next: UFOs on Mars not far-fetched anymore: NASA chief reveals agency take on Mars
October 15, 2014 10:31 AM MST Facebook
Twitter
Pinterest
Linkedin
Google Plus
Comment
HuffPost senior media reporter Michael Calderone joins HuffPost Live's Jason Linkins to talk about the responsibility journalists have in covering the current turmoil in Iraq.
Play
HuffPost senior media reporter Michael Calderone joins HuffPost Live's Jason Linkins to talk about the responsibility journalists have in covering the current turmoil in Iraq.
on.aol.com
It's been 11 years since George W. Bush ordered an American invasion of Iraq after the 911 World Trade Center attacks. Then, President Bush was convinced Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein, had an active chemical weapons program. However, no weapons of mass destruction were found, as reported by the Administration at the time. Nonetheless, a shocking report out Tuesday by the New York Times says that WMD were found in Iraq after all, but the Pentagon did its best to hide the truth.
George W. Bush and Saddam Hussein
George W. Bush and Saddam Hussein
Bing
Watch video above of Huff Post Live talking about how weapons of mass destruction were not found in Iraq
Sources, namely former and retired U.S. and Iraq veterans, shared appalling stories of U.S. troops coming across dangerous abandoned chemical munitions during a span of time from 2004 to 2011. One such incident took place in 2008 with a team of military technicians charged with disposing of artillery left behind in the toils of war.
They told of handling shells that oozed of some pungent liquid that smelled acrid. "That doesn't look like pond water," said his team leader, Staff Sgt. Eric J. Duling. And after swabbing the discharge, the color indicated the presence of the agent mustard, a potent chemical weapon outlawed from past a war, that burns the skin, eyes, and airway of anyone exposed.
The sergeant gave the order: "Get the hell out." He knew the dangers of the WMD, and from that point on, an alleged government cover up ensued as officials tried desperately to keep the finding of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq from getting out to the public. The Times weighed in.
'The American government withheld word about its discoveries even from troops it sent into harm's way and from military doctors. The government’s secrecy, victims and participants said, prevented troops in some of the war's most dangerous jobs from receiving proper medical care and official recognition of their wounds."
Recently, through the Freedom of Information Act, the truth finally came out: There were chemical weapons of mass destruction found in Iraq, but not from an active Iraqi program at the time Bush ordered the famous, “Shock and Awe” invasion. All told, some 5,000 or more WMDs were located by military techs even when Pentagon officials say they were inert and posed no harm to humans.
“
"I felt more like a guinea pig than a wounded soldier," said a former Army sergeant who suffered mustard burns in 2007. This same veteran was denied medical treatment for "exposure to WMDs" and despite requests from his commander to be evacuated from theater, higher-ups denied requests.
Years later, soldiers in mass began reporting harmful effects from nerve and mustard gas agents. However, bureaucratic red tape is complicating their care. Some facilities are saying the ill effects reported by veterans are not related to the discovery of outlawed chemical weapons, based on the Geneva Convention Protocol, as ICRC explains.
“
"The use of chemical weapons is prohibited in international armed conflicts in a series of treaties, including the Hague Declaration concerning Asphyxiating Gases, the Geneva Gas Protocol, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Statute of the International Criminal Court.[1] At present, only 13 States are not party to either the Geneva Gas Protocol or the Chemical Weapons Convention.[2] Of these, at least three have made statements to the effect that the use of chemical weapons is unlawful, or have indicated that they do not possess or use them or that they are committed to their elimination.[3] The prohibition is also contained in a number of other instruments."
So, why did the government allegedly conceal the fact weapons of mass destruction were found in Iraq? After all, it was President George W. Bush's premise for invading the country in 2003 and targeting Saddam Hussein and Al-Quaeda for the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001?
The NY Times suggests that the Bush Administration would have a hard time explaining why officials sent soldiers into harms-way after leading them to believe the WMDs were harmless. A second reason is that the outing of the information could possibly fuel attempts by ISIS to locate the remaining unearthed chemical weapons – and use them. Finally, and, arguably, the most damaging reason why the U.S. government didn't disclose the finding of chemical weapons was that most, if not all of them were allegedly manufactured in European and American companies before 1991.
Just last year, reporters visited a pair of abandoned bunkers that were contaminated by dangerous munitions left behind during the long occupation in Iraq. What they found was nothing short of alarming.
"Two contaminated bunkers — one containing cyanide precursors and old sarin rockets — loomed behind. The area where Marines had found mustard shells in 2008 was out of sight, shielded by scrub and shimmering heat. The Iraqi troops who stood at that entrance are no longer there. The compound, never entombed, is now controlled by the Islamic State," according to Times.
-
I remember hearing of this many years ago. This is no surprise to me.
My understanding is this:
The chem weapons were all pre-Gulf War, and were all seriously degraded. A danger to those handling them certainly, but not likely to function as weapons. As pre-Gulf War, their degraded presence, in effect, underlined that the active program we asserted was devoid of proof after our invasion.
The embarrassment of the West's role, including a US role, in their manufacture, would have been VERY bad in the context of our used of WMD as a justification in front of the UN.
-
Mark Levin's radio show last night (at least the portion that I heard) was all about this. That Rove and other WH officials in the Bush administration basically kept this from the public which seems absurd since WMD were one of the reasons we went to war.
"The embarrassment of the West's role, including a US role, in their manufacture, would have been VERY bad in the context of our used of WMD as a justification in front of the UN."
This makes sense to me as to why Rove et al would have chosen to keep this quiet from a political point of view. As far as I heard Levin did not mention this line of reasoning.
Yet we sent our children their many of whom died or were maimed physically and or psychologically. The country ought to know the truth.
-
I confess myself being surprised that everyone, including POTH is surprised. I'm not sure how, but I certainly knew of these finds of stuff from the 80s.
Tangentially, I note it is a bit discouraging to see some on "our side" think this proves "Bush was right" for it does not. The claim was of an active WMD program and stuff sitting around degrading since the 80s does not do that at all.
-
On the board we had reports, with unknown validity, ranging from trucks carrying WMD to Syria during the dithering process to trace WMD measured in the Euphrates river indicating a dump.
It isn't that this vindicates Bush; they relied on the best intelligence in the world at the time, right or wrong. To me it is that this story and others proves false the mantra later of the opponents hollering and repeating, "No WMD". Bush acted on best faith while they spoke with intentional deceit, which worked quite well for them.
There were 23 reasons given in the authorization that Hillary, Biden, et al passed for going to war. A pretty good description of them below is from Wikipedia. Proof of past WMD use and shooting at inspections planes is an indicator of current intent.
Iraq Study Group later determined that Saddam was 7 years away from having nuclear weapons - 12 years ago. Good enough reason to depose him for me.
...The U.S. stated that the intent (in Iraq war) was to remove "a regime that developed and used weapons of mass destruction, that harbored and supported terrorists, committed outrageous human rights abuses, and defied the just demands of the United Nations and the world". ...For the invasion Iraq the rationale was "the United States relied on the authority of UN Security Council Resolutions 678 and 687 to use all necessary means to compel Iraq to comply with its international obligations".[3]
-
URL for the Wiki entry please?
-
URL for the Wiki entry please?
http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rationale_for_the_Iraq_War
They have source links. I have posted the actual resolution previously. Here it is again, the 23 reasons:
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-107hjres114enr/pdf/BILLS-107hjres114enr.pdf
Joint Resolution
To authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against Iraq.
Whereas in 1990 in response to Iraq’s war of aggression against and illegal occupation of Kuwait, the United States forged a coalition of nations to liberate Kuwait and its people in order to defend the national security of the United States and enforce United Nations Security Council resolutions relating to Iraq;
Whereas after the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, Iraq entered into a United Nations sponsored cease-fire agreement pursuant to which Iraq unequivocally agreed, among other things, to eliminate its nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs and the means to deliver and develop them, and to end its support for international terrorism;
Whereas the efforts of international weapons inspectors, United States intelligence agencies, and Iraqi defectors led to the discovery that Iraq had large stockpiles of chemical weapons and a large scale biological weapons program, and that Iraq had an advanced nuclear weapons development program that was much closer to producing a nuclear weapon than intelligence reporting had previously indicated;
Whereas Iraq, in direct and flagrant violation of the cease-fire, attempted to thwart the efforts of weapons inspectors to identify and destroy Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction stockpiles and development capabilities, which finally resulted in the withdrawal of inspectors from Iraq on October 31, 1998;
Whereas in Public Law 105-235 (August 14, 1998), Congress concluded that Iraq’s continuing weapons of mass destruction programs threatened vital United States interests and international peace and security, declared Iraq to be in ‘material and unacceptable breach of its international obligations’ and urged the President ‘to take appropriate action, in accordance with the Constitution and relevant laws of the United States, to bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations’;
Whereas Iraq both poses a continuing threat to the national security of the United States and international peace and security in the Persian Gulf region and remains in material and unacceptable breach of its international obligations by, among other things, continuing to possess and develop a significant chemical and biological weapons capability, actively seeking a nuclear weapons capability, and supporting and harboring terrorist organizations;
Whereas Iraq persists in violating resolution of the United Nations Security Council by continuing to engage in brutal repression of its civilian population thereby threatening international peace and security in the region, by refusing to release, repatriate, or account for non-Iraqi citizens wrongfully detained by Iraq, including an American serviceman, and by failing to return property wrongfully seized by Iraq from Kuwait;
Whereas the current Iraqi regime has demonstrated its capability and willingness to use weapons of mass destruction against other nations and its own people;
Whereas the current Iraqi regime has demonstrated its continuing hostility toward, and willingness to attack, the United States, including by attempting in 1993 to assassinate former President Bush and by firing on many thousands of occasions on United States and Coalition Armed Forces engaged in enforcing the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council;
Whereas members of al Qaida, an organization bearing responsibility for attacks on the United States, its citizens, and interests, including the attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, are known to be in Iraq;
Whereas Iraq continues to aid and harbor other international terrorist organizations, including organizations that threaten the lives and safety of United States citizens;
Whereas the attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, underscored the gravity of the threat posed by the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by international terrorist organizations;
Whereas Iraq’s demonstrated capability and willingness to use weapons of mass destruction, the risk that the current Iraqi regime will either employ those weapons to launch a surprise attack against the United States or its Armed Forces or provide them to international terrorists who would do so, and the extreme magnitude of harm that would result to the United States and its citizens from such an attack, combine to justify action by the United States to defend itself;
Whereas United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (1990) authorizes the use of all necessary means to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution 660 (1990) and subsequent relevant resolutions and to compel Iraq to cease certain activities that threaten international peace and security, including the development of weapons of mass destruction and refusal or obstruction of United Nations weapons inspections in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), repression of its civilian population in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 688 (1991), and threatening its neighbors or United Nations operations in Iraq in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 949 (1994);
Whereas in the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1), Congress has authorized the President ‘to use United States Armed Forces pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (1990) in order to achieve implementation of Security Council Resolution 660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, and 677’;
Whereas in December 1991, Congress expressed its sense that it ‘supports the use of all necessary means to achieve the goals of United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 as being consistent with the Authorization of Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1),’ that Iraq’s repression of its civilian population violates United Nations Security Council Resolution 688 and ‘constitutes a continuing threat to the peace, security, and stability of the Persian Gulf region,’ and that Congress, ‘supports the use of all necessary means to achieve the goals of United Nations Security Council Resolution 688’;
Whereas the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (Public Law 105-338) expressed the sense of Congress that it should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove from power the current Iraqi regime and promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime;
Whereas on September 12, 2002, President Bush committed the United States to ‘work with the United Nations Security Council to meet our common challenge’ posed by Iraq and to ‘work for the necessary resolutions,’ while also making clear that ‘the Security Council resolutions will be enforced, and the just demands of peace and security will be met, or action will be unavoidable’;
Whereas the United States is determined to prosecute the war on terrorism and Iraq’s ongoing support for international terrorist groups combined with its development of weapons of mass destruction in direct violation of its obligations under the 1991 cease-fire and other United Nations Security Council resolutions make clear that it is in the national security interests of the United States and in furtherance of the war on terrorism that all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions be enforced, including through the use of force if necessary;
Whereas Congress has taken steps to pursue vigorously the war on terrorism through the provision of authorities and funding requested by the President to take the necessary actions against international terrorists and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations, or persons who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such persons or organizations;
Whereas the President and Congress are determined to continue to take all appropriate actions against international terrorists and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations, or persons who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such persons or organizations;
Whereas the President has authority under the Constitution to take action in order to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States, as Congress recognized in the joint resolution on Authorization for Use of Military Force (Public Law 107-40); and
Whereas it is in the national security interests of the United States to restore international peace and security to the Persian Gulf region: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
-
http://www.cnn.com/US/9812/16/clinton.iraq.speech/
-
http://www.cnn.com/US/9812/16/clinton.iraq.speech/
From the report:

Clinton: Iraq has abused its last chance
President Clinton addressed the nation from the Oval Office
Clinton spells out Iraq's non-compliance
Iraq repeatedly blocked UNSCOM from inspecting suspect sites.
Iraq repeatedly restricted UNSCOM's ability to obtain necessary evidence.
Iraq tried to stop an UNSCOM biological weapons team from videotaping a site and photocopying documents and prevented Iraqi personnel from answering UNSCOM's questions.
Iraq has failed to turn over virtually all documents requested by the inspectors.
US Forces:
There are 15 U.S. warships and 97 U.S. aircraft in the Persian Gulf region, including about 70 aboard the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise. More than 12,000 sailors and Marines are in the region.
U.S. sources said eight of the warships, equipped with cruise missiles, have been moved into the northern part of the Gulf, within easy striking distance of Baghdad. More troops and jets have been ordered to the region.
Clinton statement from the Oval Office on attack against Iaq
'Without delay, diplomacy or warning'
Strikes necessary to stunt weapons programs
WASHINGTON (CNN) -- From the Oval Office, President Clinton told the nation Wednesday evening why he ordered new military strikes against Iraq.
The president said Iraq's refusal to cooperate with U.N. weapons inspectors presented a threat to the entire world.
"Saddam (Hussein) must not be allowed to threaten his neighbors or the world with nuclear arms, poison gas or biological weapons," Clinton said.
Operation Desert Fox, a strong, sustained series of attacks, will be carried out over several days by U.S. and British forces, Clinton said.
"Earlier today I ordered America's armed forces to strike military and security targets in Iraq. They are joined by British forces," Clinton said.
"Their mission is to attack Iraq's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs and its military capacity to threaten its neighbors," said Clinton.
Clinton also stated that, while other countries also had weapons of mass destruction, Hussein is in a different category because he has used such weapons against his own people and against his neighbors.
'Without delay, diplomacy or warning'
The Iraqi leader was given a final warning six weeks ago, Clinton said, when Baghdad promised to cooperate with U.N. inspectors at the last minute just as U.S. warplanes were headed its way.
"Along with Prime Minister (Tony) Blair of Great Britain, I made it equally clear that if Saddam failed to cooperate fully we would be prepared to act without delay, diplomacy or warning," Clinton said.
The president said the report handed in Tuesday by Richard Butler, head of the United Nations Special Commission in charge of finding and destroying Iraqi weapons, was stark and sobering.
Iraq failed to cooperate with the inspectors and placed new restrictions on them, Clinton said. He said Iraqi officials also destroyed records and moved everything, even the furniture, out of suspected sites before inspectors were allowed in.
"Instead of inspectors disarming Saddam, Saddam has disarmed the inspectors," Clinton said.
"In halting our airstrikes in November, I gave Saddam a chance -- not a license. If we turn our backs on his defiance, the credibility of U.S. power as a check against Saddam will be destroyed," the president explained.
Strikes necessary to stunt weapons programs
Clinton said he made the decision to strike Wednesday with the unanimous agreement of his security advisors.
Timing was important, said the president, because without a strong inspection system in place, Iraq could rebuild its chemical, biological and nuclear programs in a matter of months, not years.
"If Saddam can cripple the weapons inspections system and get away with it, he would conclude the international community, led by the United States, has simply lost its will," said Clinton. "He would surmise that he has free rein to rebuild his arsenal of destruction."
Clinton also called Hussein a threat to his people and to the security of the world.
"The best way to end that threat once and for all is with a new Iraqi government -- a government ready to live in peace with its neighbors, a government that respects the rights of its people," Clinton said.
CNN had no comment on the double standard of news coverage.
-
Awesome find-- what is the date? Is there a URL?
-
Post 955 from above. 12/16/1998
-
Nice to see scholar Victor Davis Hanson reading and following up on our discussion here on the forum:
Previously in this thread (http://dogbrothers.com/phpBB2/index.php?topic=946.msg84236#msg84236):
"trucks carrying WMD to Syria during the dithering process"
"There were 23 reasons given in the authorization..."
"Proof of past WMD use and shooting at inspections planes is an indicator of current intent."
" this story...proves false the mantra of the opponents, "No WMD"... they spoke with intentional deceit"
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/390725/biggest-lie-victor-davis-hanson
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/390725/biggest-lie-victor-davis-hanson/page/0/1
OCTOBER 21, 2014 4:00 AM
The Biggest Lie
The Left would rather forget its old slogan, “Bush lied, thousands died.”
By Victor Davis Hanson
The very mention of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and Iraq was toxic for Republicans by 2005. They wanted to forget about the supposed absence of recently manufactured WMD in great quantities in Iraq; Democrats saw Republican defensiveness as key to their recovery in 2006. By the time Obama was elected, the issue had been demagogued to death, was no longer of any political utility, and so vanished.
So why all of a sudden is the New York Times strangely focused on old WMD stockpiles showing up in Iraq? Is the subtext perhaps that the rise of ISIS poses an existential threat in such a dangerous landscape (and by extension offers an explanation for the current bombing)? Or are we to be reminded that Bush stirred up a WMD hornets’ nest that Obama was forced to deal with? Or is the sudden interest intended to preempt the story now before we learn that ISIS routinely employs WMD against the Kurds? How strange that Iraq, WMD, bombing, and preemption reappear in the news, but now without the hysteria of the Bush era.
Advertisement
Indeed, for the last two years, reports of WMD of some sort have popped up weekly in Syria and Iraq. Bashar Assad has used them, apparently with strategic profit, both in deterring his enemies and in embarrassing the red lines of Barack Obama, who had threatened to bomb him if he dared use them.
ISIS is rumored to have attempted to use mustard gas against the Kurds. Iraqi depots are periodically found, even as they are often dismissed as ossified beyond the point of easy use, or as already calibrated and rendered inert by either U.N. inspectors or U.S. occupation forces. But where did all the WMD come from, and why the sudden fright now about these stockpiles’ being deployed?
For much of the Bush administration we heard from the Left the refrain, “Bush lied, thousands died,” as if the president had cooked intelligence reports to conjure up a nonexistent threat from Saddam Hussein’s stockpiles of WMD — stockpiles that Bill Clinton had insisted until his last days in office posed an existential threat to the United States. Apparently if a horde of gas shells of 20th-century vintage was found, it was then deemed irrelevant — as if WMD in Iraq could only be defined as huge Iraqi plants turning out 21st-century stockpiles weeks before the invasion.
The smear of Bush was the bookend of another popular canard, the anti-Bush slogan “No blood for oil.” Once the fact that the U.S. did not want Iraqi oil was indisputable, that slander metamorphosed. Almost immediately the Left pivoted and charged that we were not so much oil sinister as oil stupid. If the Iraqi oil ministry, for the first time in its history, was both acting transparently and selling oil concessions to almost anyone except American companies, it was now cast as typically ungracious in not appreciating the huge American expenditure of blood and treasure that had allowed it such latitude. Was the Iraq War then a stupid war that helped Russia and the Chinese? Poor Bush ended up not so much sinister as a naïf.
Although we don’t hear much any more about “No blood for oil,” the lie about “Bush lied, thousands died” has never been put to rest.
What was odd about the untruth was not just that Michael Moore, Cindy Sheehan, and the anti-war street crowd become popular icons through spreading such lies, but that the Democratic party — whose kingpins (Joe Biden, Hillary Clinton, John Kerry, Harry Reid, et al.) had all given fiery speeches in favor of invading Iraq — refined the slur into an effective 2006 talking point. That Democrats from Nancy Pelosi to Harry Reid had looked at the same intelligence from CIA Director (and Clinton appointee) George “slam-dunk” Tenet (who authored a self-serving memoir ankle-biting George W. Bush while still in office), and had agreed with Tenet’s assessments, at least until the insurgency destroyed public support for the war, was conveniently forgotten.
The Bush administration did not help much. It never replied to its critics that fear of stockpiled WMD had originally been a Clinton-administration fear, a congressional fear, an international fear — and a legitimate fear. I suppose that the Bush people wanted the issue of WMD to just go away, given the insurgency raging in Iraq and the effective Democratic campaign to reinvent fear of WMD as a sinister Bush conspiracy. (Do we remember Colin Powell’s U.N. testimony and the years that followed — cf. the Valerie Plame/Richard Armitage fiasco — in which he licked his wounds while harboring anger at his former associates for his own career-ending presentation?) In sum, the Bush White House certainly did not remind the country that most of the Clinton-era liberal politicians in the 1990s had warned us about Iraqi WMD (do we even remember the 1998 Iraq Liberation Act?).
Nor were we reminded that foreign leaders like Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak had predicted mass death for any invaders who challenged Saddam’s WMD arsenal. (“General Franks, you must be very, very careful. We have spoken with Saddam Hussein. He is a madman. He has WMD — biologicals, actually — and he will use them on your troops.”) Was part of the Bush administration’s WMD conspiracy forcing tens of thousands of U.S. troops to lug about chemical suits and masks in the desert? No one, of course, noted that the initial success in Iraq also helped shut down Moammar Qaddafi’s WMD program in Libya and pressured the Pakistanis to arrest (for a while) the father of their bomb, Dr. A. Q. Khan. The latter nations apparently feared that the U.S. was considering removing dictators who that they knew had stockpiled WMD.
The current The Iran-Iraq War by Williamson Murray and Kevin Woods is a frightening reminder of how Saddam massacred the Kurds (perhaps well over 150,000 killed), often with gas, and how habitual was Saddam’s use of WMD against the Iranians in that medieval war.
Nor do we remember that James Clapper, in one of his earlier careerist contortions as a Bush-era intelligence officer, along with top-ranking officials in both the Iraqi and Syrian air forces, all warned us that WMD were stealthily transferred to Syria on the eve of the invasion of Iraq. The dutifully toadyish Clapper added the intensifier adverb “unquestionably” to emphasize his certainty. Clapper, remember, went on to become Obama’s director of national intelligence and a key adviser on much of the current Obama Middle East decision-making, including the near bombing of Syria.*
Advertisement
So there were stocks of at least older WMD throughout Iraq when we arrived in 2003, and it was plausible that many of the newer and more deployable versions somehow found their way into Syria. So worried was Barack Obama about the likelihood of Syrian WMD that he almost started a preemptive war against Bashar Assad, but without authorization of Congress and with no attempt to go to the U.N., as Bush had done. (Indeed, we are now preemptively bombing Iraq on the basis of the 2002 authorizations that state legislator and memoirist Barack Obama derided at the time.)
There were all sorts of untold amnesias about Iraq. No one remembers the 23 writs that were part of the 2002 authorizations that apparently Obama believes are still in effect. They included genocide, bounties for suicide bombers, an attempt to kill a former U.S. president, the harboring of terrorists (among them one of the 1993 World Trade Center bombers), and a whole litany of charges that transcended WMD and were utterly unaffected by the latter controversy. How surreal is it that Obama is preemptively bombing Iraq on twelve-year-old congressional authorizations that he opposed as trumped up and now may be relevant in relationship to dealing with Syrian and Iraqi stockpiles of WMD?
We forget too how Harry Reid declared the surge a failure and the war lost even as it was being won. Or how Barack Obama predicted that the surge would make things worse, before scrubbing such editorializing from his website when the surge worked. Do we remember those days of General Betray Us (the ad hominem ad that the New York Times, which supposedly will not allow purchased ad hominem ads, granted at a huge discount), and the charges from Hillary Clinton that Petraeus was lying (“suspension of disbelief”)? As Obama megaphones call for national unity in damning Leon Panetta’s critiques during the present bombing, do we remember the glee with which the Left greeted the tell-all revelations of Paul O’Neill, George Tenet, and Scott McClellan during the tenure of George W. Bush, or how they disparaged the surge when Americans were dying to implement it?
It is hard to recall now the fantasy climate that surrounded “Bush lied, thousands died.” Cindy Sheehan is now utterly forgotten. So mostly is the buffoonish propagandist Michael Moore, except for an occasion tidbit about a nasty divorce and cat fights over his man-of-the-people sizable portfolio — and occasional attacks on Barack Obama’s supposed racial tokenism. Hillary’s shrill outbursts about Iraq evolved into “What difference, at this point, does it make?” Barack Obama rode his anti-war distortions to the presidency only to adopt his own anti-terrorism protocols and preemptive wars using the Bush-era justifications, but without the candor and congressional authorizations. The media went from “No blood for oil” and “Bush lied, thousands died” to noting strange discoveries of WMD and trumpeting near energy independence. The U.S. is now nonchalantly referred to as the world’s largest oil producer, but largely because the Bush administration green-lighted fracking and horizontal drilling, which the present administration opposes and yet cites as one of its singular achievements in terms of lowering gas prices — the one bright spot in an otherwise dismal economic record.
So we live in an era of lies about everything from Benghazi and Obamacare to the alphabet soup of scandal and incompetence at the IRS, ICE, VA, USSS (Secret Service), NSA, GSA, and even the CDC.
But before we can correct the present lies, we should first address the greatest untruth in this collection: “Bush lied, thousands died” was an abject lie.
-
(https://fbcdn-sphotos-c-a.akamaihd.net/hphotos-ak-xpa1/v/t1.0-9/10639409_767830563263185_23312209791727283_n.jpg?oh=398193ab8ed59bce5b03e744fe3b024d&oe=54848821&__gda__=1418167715_f6a87eb9ecb8a0f65047b0f3948c97ba)
-
(https://fbcdn-sphotos-c-a.akamaihd.net/hphotos-ak-xpa1/v/t1.0-9/10639409_767830563263185_23312209791727283_n.jpg?oh=398193ab8ed59bce5b03e744fe3b024d&oe=54848821&__gda__=1418167715_f6a87eb9ecb8a0f65047b0f3948c97ba)
Who cares more about women, the ones who saw a shot at freedom and self determination of the ones openly said they aren't worth it.
I took my daughter (10 years old then) to see President George Bush on the weekend of the first election ever in Afghanistan, where women were not only voting but candidates and people in a Muslim country were openly supporting women's rights. I was quite proud of our side and our country on that particular point. War is ugly but so is silence and tolerance of genocide fascism, terror, oppression.
http://archive.kare11.com/news/news_article.aspx?storyid=70311 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afghan_presidential_election,_2004
-
As we re-debate the Iraq war(s) and what to do with "secular" dictators, I have been looking for the speech that Saddam gave in March 1991 accepting the UN resolutions that ended the Persian Gulf War at that time with a conditional ceasefire. Not finding that speech, I post this Saddam speech from a week earlier for the record. I count at least 60 references in one speech to God, the Almighty, Infidels, Holy War, Muslims, Islam, Islamic Faith, Mujahedeen, etc. plus verses quoted from the Koran. That is a lot of religion for a man said to be secular.
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/02/27/world/war-gulf-iraqi-leader-saddam-hussein-s-speech-withdrawal-his-army-kuwait.html
In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate.
O great people; O stalwart men in the forces of holy war and faith, glorious men of the mother of battles; O zealous, faithful and sincere people in our glorious nations, and among all Muslims and all virtuous people in the world; O glorious Iraqi women:
In such circumstances and times, it is difficult to talk about all that which should be talked about, and it is difficult to recall all that which has to be recalled. Despite this, we have to remind of what has to be reminded of, and say part -- a principal part -- of what should be said.
We start by saying that on this day, our valiant armed forces will complete their withdrawal from Kuwait. And on this day our fight against aggression and the ranks of infidelity, joined in an ugly coalition comprising 30 countries, which officially entered war against us under the leadership of the United States of America -- our fight against them would have lasted from the first month of this year, starting with the night of 16-17 [ January ] , until this moment in the current month, February of this year.
It was an epic duel which lasted for two months, which came to clearly confirm a lesson that God has wanted as a prelude of faith, impregnability and capability for the faithful, and a prelude of an [ abyss ] , weakness and humiliation which God Almighty has wanted for the infidels, the criminals, the traitors, the corrupt and the deviators.
To be added to this time is the time of the military and nonmilitary duel, including the military and the economic blockade, which was imposed on Iraq and which lasted throughout 1990 until today, and until the time God Almighty wishes it to last.
Before that, the duel lasted, in other forms, for years before this period of time. It was an epic struggle between right and wrong; we have talked about this in detail on previous occasions. The Age of the Showdown
It gave depth to the age of the showdown for the year 1990, and the already elapsed part of the year 1991.
Hence, we do not forget, because we will not forget this great struggling spirit, by which men of great faith stormed the fortifications and the weapons of deception and the Croesus [ Kuwaiti rulers ] treachery on the honorable day of the call. They did what they did within the context of legitimate deterrence and great principled action.
All that we have gone through or decided within its circumstances, obeying God's will and choosing a position of faith and chivalry, is a record of honor, the significance of which will not be missed by the people and nation and the values of Islam and humanity.
Their days will continue to be glorious and their past and future will continue to relate the story of a faithful, jealous and patient people, who believed in the will of God and in the values and stands accepted by the Almighty for the Arab nation in its leading role and for the Islamic nation in the essentials of its true faith and how they should be.
These values -- which had their effect in all those situations, offered the sacrifices they had offered in the struggle, and symbolized the depth of the faithful character in Iraq -- will continue to leave their effects on the souls.
They will continue to reap their harvest, not only in terms of direct targets represented in the slogans of their age -- whether in the conflict between the oppressed poor and the unjust and opportunist rich, or between faith and blasphemy, or between injustice, deception and treachery on the one hand and fairness, justice, honesty and loyalty on the other -- but also the indirect targets as well. Shake the Ranks of the Infidels
This will shake the opposite ranks and cause them to collapse after everything has become clear. This will also add faith to the faithful now that the minds and eyes have been opened and the hearts are longing for what the principles, values and stances should long for and belong to.
The stage that preceded the great day of the call on 2 August 1990 had its own standards, including dealing with what is familiar and inherited during the bad times, whether on the level of relations between the ruler and the ruled, or between the leader and the people he leads.
The relations between the foreigners among the ranks of infidelity and oppression and among the region's states and the world had their own standards, effects and privileges that were created by the Arab homeland's circumstances, and which were facilitated by propaganda, which no one could expose more than it has now been exposed.
The conflict was exacerbated by the vacuum that was created by the weakness of one of the two poles that used to represent the two opposite lines in the world. However, after the second of August 1990, new concepts and standards were created.
This was preceded by a new outlook in all walks of life, in relations among peoples, relations among states, and the relations between the ruler and the ruled, and by standards of faith and positions; patriotism, pan-Arabism, and humanitarianism; holy war, faith, Islam, fear and non-fear; restlessness and tranquillity; manhood and its opposite; struggle, holy war and sacrifice, and readiness to do good things and their opposite.
When new measures spring forth and the familiar, failed, traitorous, subservient and corrupt [ people ] , and tyrants are rejected, then the opportunity for the cultivation of the pure soil will increase in its scope, and the seeds of this plant will take root deep in the good land, primarily, the land of the Arabs, the land of the revelation and the messages, and the land of prophets. Quotes From the Koran
God says: "Like a goodly tree, whose root is firmly fixed, and its branches reach to the heavens. It brings forth its fruit at all times, by the leave of its Lord." [ Koranic verses ]
Then everything will become possible on the road of goodness and happiness that is not defiled by the feet of the invaders nor by their evil will or the corruption of the corrupt among those who have been corrupted, and who spread corruption in the land of the Arabs.
Moreover, the forces of plotting and treachery will be defeated for good. Good people and those who are distinguished by their faith and by their faithful, honorable stands of holy war will become the real leaders of the gathering of the faithful everywhere on earth, and the gathering of corruption, falsehood, hypocrisy and infidelity will be defeated and meet the vilest fate.
The earth will be inherited, at God's order, by His righteous slaves. "For the earth is God's, to give as a heritage to such of his servants as he pleaseth; and the end is best for the righteous." [ Koranic verses ]
When this happens, the near objectives will not only be within reach, available and possible, but also the doors will be open without any hindrance which might prevent the achievement of all the greater, remoter and more comprehensive objectives, to the Arabs, Muslims and humanity at large.
Then, also, it will be clear that the harvest does not precede the seeding, and that the threshing floor and the yield are the outcome of a successful seeding and a successful harvest. Even Greater Harvest to Come
The harvest in the mother of battles has succeeded. After we have harvested what we have harvested, the greater harvest and its yield will be in the time to come, and it will be much greater than what we have at present, in spite of what we have at present in terms of the victory, dignity and glory that was based on the sacrifices of a deep faith which is generous without any hesitation or fear.
It is by virtue of this faith that God has bestowed dignity upon the Iraqi mujahedeen, and upon all the depth of this course of holy war at the level of the Arab homeland and at the level of all those men whom God has chosen to be given the honor of allegiance, guidance and honorable position, until He declares that the conflict has stopped, or amends its directions and course and the positions in a manner which would please the faithful and increase their dignity.
O valiant Iraqi men, O glorious Iraqi women. Kuwait is part of your country and was carved from it in the past.
Circumstances today have willed that it remain in the state in which it will remain after the withdrawal of our struggling forces from it. It hurts you that this should happen.
We rejoiced on the day of the call when it was decided that Kuwait should be one of the main gates for deterring the plot and for defending all Iraq from the plotters. We say that we will remember Kuwait on the great day of the call, on the days that followed it, and in documents and events, some of which date back 70 years.
The Iraqis will remember and will not forget that on 8 August, 1990, Kuwait became part of Iraq legally, constitutionally and actually. They remember and will not forget that it remained throughout this period from 8 August 1990 and until last night, when withdrawal began, and today we will complete withdrawal of our forces, God willing. Circumstances of Withdrawal
Today certain circumstances made the Iraqi Army withdraw as a result of the ramifications which we mentioned, including the combined aggression by 30 countries. Their repugnant siege has been led in evil and aggression by the machine and the criminal entity of America and its major allies.
These malicious ranks took the depth and effectiveness of their aggressiveness not only from their aggressive premeditated intentions against Iraq, the Arab nation and Islam, but also from the position of those who were deceived by the claim of international legitimacy. Everyone will remember that the gates of Constantinople were not opened before the Muslims in the first struggling attempt, and that the international community [ placed ] dear Palestine's freedom and independence in oblivion.
Whatever the suspect parties try, by virtue of the sacrifices and struggle of the Palestinians and Iraqis, Palestine has returned anew to knock at the doors closed on evil.
Palestine returned to knock on those doors to force the tyrants and the traitors to a solution that would place it at the forefront of the issues that have to be resolved; a solution that would bring dignity to its people and provide better chances for better progress.
The issue of poverty and richness, fairness and unfairness, faith and infidelity, treachery and honesty and sincerity, have become titles corresponding to rare events and well-known people and trends that give priority to what is positive over what is negative, to what is sincere over what is treacherous and filthy, and to what is pure and honorable over what is corrupt, base and lowly. The confidence of the nationalists and the faithful mujahedeen and the Muslims has grown bigger than before, and great hope more and more.
Slogans have come out of their stores to strongly occupy the facades of the pan-Arab and human holy war and struggle. Therefore, victory is [ great ] now and in the future, God willing. 'Shout for Your Victory'
Shout for victory, O brothers; shout for your victory and the victory of all honorable people, O Iraqis. You have fought 30 countries, and all the evil and the largest machine of war and destruction in the world that surrounds them. If only one of these countries threatens anyone, this threat will have a swift and direct effect on the dignity, freedom, life, or freedom of this or that country, people and nation.
The soldiers of faith have triumphed over the soldiers of wrong, O stalwart men. Your God is the one who granted your victory. You triumphed when you rejected, in the name of faith, the will of evil which the evildoers wanted to impose on you to kill the fire of faith in your hearts.
You have chosen the path which you have chosen, including the acceptance of the Soviet initiative, but those evildoers persisted in their path and methods, thinking that they can impose their will on their Iraq, as they imagined and hoped.
This hope of theirs may remain in their heads, even after we withdraw from Kuwait. Therefore, we must be cautious, and preparedness to fight must remain at the highest level.
O you valiant men; you have fought the armies of 30 states and the capabilities of an even greater number of states which supplied them with the means of aggression and support. Faith, belief, hope and determination continue to fill your chests, souls and hearts.
They have even become deeper, stronger, brighter and more deeply rooted. God is great; God is great; may the lowly be defeated.
Victory is sweet with the help of God.
-
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/16/world/iraqs-premier-has-narrowed-nations-divide.html?emc=edit_th_20141216&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=49641193
-
http://m.nationalreview.com/corner/398586/watch-spectacular-sight-kurdish-marksman-detonating-isis-car-bomb-distance-patrick
-
http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2015/02/16/report-cia-bought-hundreds-of-iraqi-weapons-of-mass-destruction-in-operation-avarice/
-
Iraq Military Begins Campaign to Reclaim Tikrit From Islamic State
Reclaiming Tikrit is seen as critical to defeating Islamic State militants in Mosul
Iraq’s military, backed by some 20,000 volunteer fighters, have begun a campaign to recapture the birthplace of Saddam Hussein from Islamic State, also known as ISIS and ISIL. Mark Kelly reports. Image: AFP/Getty
By
Tamer El-Ghobashy and
Ghassan Adnan
March 2, 2015 4:09 a.m. ET
25 COMMENTS
BAGHDAD—Iraq’s military, backed by some 20,000 volunteer fighters, began a campaign to reclaim the city of Tikrit on Monday, state television said, in what is seen an important political and military step in the fight against Islamic State militants.
Monday’s offensive, announced by Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, marks the third attempt by Iraqi security forces to rout militants out of the city, best known as the birthplace of former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein in Iraq’s Sunni heartland, which fell last summer during a dramatic assault by the Islamic State group.
Previous attempts had failed, mostly due to poor coordination between Iraq’s military and the mostly Shiite volunteer forces, which have proven to be the most effective fighters against the insurgency but carry with them political liabilities.
The Shiite militias are severely distrusted by Sunnis in Iraq, owing to years of abuse under a Shiite-dominated regime that was backed by the U.S.
An Iraqi soldier sits on a military vehicle at Udhaim dam, north of Baghdad, March 1, 2015. Iraq’s military, backed by some 20,000 volunteer fighters, began a campaign on Monday to reclaim the city of Tikrit , hometown of former president Saddam Hussein. ENLARGE
An Iraqi soldier sits on a military vehicle at Udhaim dam, north of Baghdad, March 1, 2015. Iraq’s military, backed by some 20,000 volunteer fighters, began a campaign on Monday to reclaim the city of Tikrit , hometown of former president Saddam Hussein. Photo: Reuters
In the hours before the operation was launched, Mr. Abadi sought to ease the concerns of Tikrit’s overwhelmingly Sunni residents, saying many of the volunteer forces aiding in the fight for the city are Sunni locals supporting the military’s effort.
He also reiterated a pledge to offer clemency to tribal leaders in Tikrit who had previously aided the insurgency.
“We will forget about their bad deeds if they come back to the side of the nation,” he said in a news conference broadcast on state television.
Reclaiming Tikrit, a city about 80 miles north of Baghdad, is seen as a critical point toward a planned offensive to defeat Islamic State militants in Mosul, Iraq’s second city, which had been the de facto base for the insurgency in Iraq.
It is also considered a goodwill gesture from Iraq’s mostly Shiite leadership toward the nation’s Sunnis, whose disaffection after years of policies that marginalized them is seen as a major contributor to the success of the Islamic State in taking large portions of the country under their control.
Write to Tamer El-Ghobashy at tamer.el-ghobashy@wsj.com
Popular on WSJ
-
WASHINGTON — At a time when President Obama is under political pressure from congressional Republicans over negotiations to rein in Tehran’s nuclear ambitions, a startling paradox has emerged: Mr. Obama is becoming increasingly dependent on Iranian fighters as he tries to contain the Islamic State militant group in Iraq and Syria without committing American ground troops.
In the four days since Iranian troops joined 30,000 Iraqi forces to try to wrest Saddam Hussein’s hometown of Tikrit back from Islamic State control, American officials have said the United States is not coordinating with Iran, one of its fiercest global foes, in the fight against a common enemy.
That may be technically true. But American war planners have been closely monitoring Iran’s parallel war against the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, through a range of channels, including conversations on radio frequencies that each side knows the other is monitoring. And the two militaries frequently seek to avoid conflict in their activities by using Iraqi command centers as an intermediary.
As a result, many national security experts say, Iran’s involvement is helping the Iraqis hold the line against Islamic State advances until American military advisers are finished training Iraq’s underperforming armed forces.
“The only way in which the Obama administration can credibly stick with its strategy is by implicitly assuming that the Iranians will carry most of the weight and win the battles on the ground,” said Vali R. Nasr, a former special adviser to Mr. Obama who is now dean of the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. “You can’t have your cake and eat it too — the U.S. strategy in Iraq has been successful so far largely because of Iran.”
It was Iran that organized Iraq’s Shiite militias last August to break a weeklong Islamic State siege of Amerli, a cluster of farming villages whose Shiite residents faced possible slaughter. American bombs provided support from warplanes.
Administration officials were careful to note at the time that the United States was working in Amerli with its allies — namely Iraqi Army units and Kurdish security forces. A senior administration official said that “any coordinating with the Shiite militias was not done by us; it would have been done by the I.S.F.,” a reference to the Iraqi security forces.
It was also Iran’s Quds Force that backed Iraq’s Shiite militias and Iraqi security forces in November to liberate the central city of Baiji from the Islamic State, breaking the siege of a nearby oil refinery. (A month later, the Islamic State took back a part of the city.)
And last summer, when Islamic State militants first captured Mosul and got within striking distance of the Kurdish capital, Erbil, the head of Iran’s Quds Force, Maj. Gen. Qassim Suleimani, flew to Erbil with two planes full of military supplies, American and regional diplomats said. The Iranian move helped to bolster Kurdish defenses around Erbil, the officials said.
In Tikrit this week, Iranian-backed Shiite militia leaders said that their fighters made up more than two-thirds of the pro-government force of 30,000. They also said that General Suleimani, the Iranian spymaster, was helping to lead from near the front line.
Websites supporting the militias circulated photographs of General Suleimani on Wednesday drinking tea on what was said to be the front line, dressed in black and holding his glass in one hand and a floral patterned saucer in the other.
The presence of General Suleimani — a reviled figure in American security and military circles because he once directed a deadly campaign against American forces in Iraq — makes it difficult for the United States to conduct airstrikes to assist in the Tikrit operation, as it might like, foreign policy experts said.
“There’s just no way that the U.S. military can actively support an offensive led by Suleimani,” said Christopher Harmer, a former aviator in the United States Navy in the Persian Gulf who is now an analyst with the Institute for the Study of War. “He’s a more stately version of Osama bin Laden.”
But the United States strategy in Iraq can benefit from Iran’s effort to take back Tikrit from the Islamic State, even if it is not involved directly. Appearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Tuesday, Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that the involvement of Iranian-backed Shiites in Tikrit could be “a positive thing” provided it did not exacerbate sectarian tension.
“This is the most overt conduct of Iranian support, in the form of artillery and other things,” General Dempsey said. “Frankly, it will only be a problem if it results in sectarianism.”
But that is a big worry. In the past — notably just after the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq in 2011 — Shiite militias have been accused of atrocities against Sunnis. And in January, Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi ordered an investigation into accusations that Shiite militiamen massacred 70 people in Diyala Province after pro-government forces expelled Islamic State militants.
This week, Republican lawmakers warned that Iran’s influence in Iraq would increase with the Tikrit offensive. “We share the president’s goal to degrade and defeat ISIL,” Senator John McCain, Republican of Arizona, and Senator Lindsey Graham, Republican of South Carolina, said in a statement Tuesday. “But success in this mission will not be achieved by capitulating to Iran’s ambitions for regional hegemony.”
Landon Shroder, an intelligence analyst for corporations in Iraq who was in Baghdad last summer when Mosul fell, countered that the worry that Iran will gain influence in Iraq ignores the reality that Iran’s Shiite government is already a key Iraqi ally.
“By this stage, everybody who observed what happened in Iraq with the Islamic State should know that the main influencer in Iraq is Iran,” he said in a telephone interview on Wednesday. “That’s an unpopular perception in the United States, after spending so much money and lives lost in the conflict, but it’s reality.”
Mr. Shroder said that at the moment, the only force with the ability to bring Kurdish troops, the Iraqi Army and the Shiite militias together to fight the Islamic State is Iran.
Rafid Jaboori, the spokesman for Mr. Abadi, the Iraqi prime minister, said in an interview Wednesday that Iraq had urged the United States and Iran not to play out their bilateral conflict in Iraq’s battle against the Islamic State.
“So far in general there was no clash within the two,” Mr. Jaboori said.
He drew a comparison to World War II. “Countries with different ideologies, different priorities, different systems of government, cooperated to defeat the Nazis,” he said. “It’s foreseeable that we see countries which might not get along very well in terms of their bilateral relations working to help Iraq to defeat this threat.”
-
http://www.prageruniversity.com/Political-Science/Why-America-Invaded-Iraq.html#.VP5U6S5UWAh
-
The power of a impassioned plea.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HdIEm1s6yhY (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HdIEm1s6yhY)
P.C.
-
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/390725/biggest-lie-victor-davis-hanson
-
http://www.latimes.com/world/great-reads/la-fg-c1-iraq-rambo-20150402-story.html#page=1
-
The Iraq War and Stubborn Myths
Officials didn’t lie, and I wasn’t fed a line, writes Judith Miller
Then-New York Times reporter Judith Miller took part in a discussion on the protection of confidential sources on March 15, 2005, at the National Press Club in Washington,
By Judith Miller
April 3, 2015 2:53 p.m. ET
1158 COMMENTS
I took America to war in Iraq. It was all me.
OK, I had some help from a duplicitous vice president, Dick Cheney. Then there was George W. Bush, a gullible president who could barely locate Iraq on a map and who wanted to avenge his father and enrich his friends in the oil business. And don’t forget the neoconservatives in the White House and the Pentagon who fed cherry-picked intelligence about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, or WMD, to reporters like me.
None of these assertions happens to be true, though all were published and continue to have believers. This is not how wars come about, and it is surely not how the war in Iraq occurred. Nor is it what I did as a reporter for the New York Times. These false narratives deserve, at last, to be retired.
There was no shortage of mistakes about Iraq, and I made my share of them. The newsworthy claims of some of my prewar WMD stories were wrong. But so is the enduring, pernicious accusation that the Bush administration fabricated WMD intelligence to take the country to war. Before the 2003 invasion, President Bush and other senior officials cited the intelligence community’s incorrect conclusions about Saddam’s WMD capabilities and, on occasion, went beyond them. But relying on the mistakes of others and errors of judgment are not the same as lying.
I have never met George W. Bush. I never discussed the war with Dick Cheney until the winter of 2012, years after he had left office and I had left the Times. I wish I could have interviewed senior officials before the war about the role that WMDs played in the decision to invade Iraq. The White House’s passion for secrecy and aversion to the media made that unlikely. Less senior officials were of help as sources, but they didn’t make the decisions.
No senior official spoon-fed me a line about WMD. That would have been so much easier than uncovering classified information that officials can be jailed for disclosing. My sources were the same counterterrorism, arms-control and Middle East analysts on whom I had relied for my stories about Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda’s growing threat to America—a series published eight months before 9/11 for which the Times staff, including me, won a Pulitzer.
In 1996, those same sources helped me to write a book about the dangers of militant Islam long before suicide bombers made the topic fashionable. Their expertise informed articles and another book I co-wrote in 2003 with Times colleagues about the danger of biological terrorism, published right before the deadly anthrax letter attacks.
Another enduring misconception is that intelligence analysts were “pressured” into altering their estimates to suit the policy makers’ push to war. Although a few former officials complained about such pressure, several thorough, bipartisan inquiries found no evidence of it.
The 2005 commission led by former Democratic Sen. Charles Robb and conservative Republican Judge Laurence Silberman called the estimates “dead wrong,” blaming what it called a “major” failure on the intelligence community’s “inability to collect good information…serious errors in analyzing what information it could gather, and a failure to make clear just how much of its analysis was based on assumptions.” A year earlier, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence denounced such failures as the product of “group think,” rooted in a fear of underestimating grave threats to national security in the wake of 9/11.
A two-year study by Charles Duelfer, the former deputy chief of the U.N. inspectors who led America’s hunt for WMD in Iraq, concluded that Saddam Hussein was playing a double game, trying (on the one hand) to get sanctions lifted and inspectors out of Iraq and (on the other) to persuade Iran and other foes that he had retained WMD. Not even the Iraqi dictator himself knew for sure what his stockpiles contained, Mr. Duelfer argued. Often forgotten is Mr. Duelfer’s well-documented warning that Saddam intended to restore his WMD programs once sanctions were lifted.
Will Tobey, a former deputy administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration (which oversees America’s nuclear arsenal), still fumes about the failure to see problems in the CIA’s intelligence supporting Secretary of State Colin Powell’s now largely discredited prewar speech at the U.N. about Iraq’s WMD. Based partly on the CIA’s assurances of strong evidence for each claim, Mr. Tobey told me, Mr. Powell was persuaded that the case against Saddam was “rock solid.”
Mr. Powell declined my requests for an interview, but in his 2012 book on leadership, he acknowledges having been annoyed years later when former CIA officials bemoaned his speech’s “unsupported claims.” “Where were they,” he wrote, “when the NIE [National Intelligence Estimate] was being prepared months earlier?”
The CIA repeatedly assured President Bush that Saddam Hussein still had WMD. Foreign intelligence agencies, even those whose nations opposed war, shared this view. And so did Congress. Over the previous 15 years, noted Stuart Cohen, the former vice chairman of the National Intelligence Council, none of the congressional committees routinely briefed on Iraqi WMD assessments expressed concern about bias or error.
Though few legislators apparently read the classified version of the 2002 WMD estimate—which contained more caveats than the sanitized “key findings” disclosed in October of that year—almost none disputed the analysts’ conclusion, with “high confidence,” that Saddam retained both chemical and germ weapons, or their view, with “moderate confidence,” that Iraq did not yet have nuclear weapons. Speeches denouncing Saddam’s cheating were given not just by Republican hawks but by prewar GOP skeptic Sen. Chuck Hagel and by senior Democrats Al Gore,Hillary Clinton and Jay Rockefeller, among others.
Another widespread fallacy is that such neoconservatives as Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz strong-armed an inexperienced president into taking the country to war. President Bush, as he himself famously asserted, was the “decider.” One could argue, however, that Hans Blix, the former chief of the international weapons inspectors, bears some responsibility. Though he personally opposed an invasion, Mr. Blix told the U.N. in January 2003 that despite America’s ultimatum, Saddam was still not complying fully with his U.N. pledges. In February, he said “many proscribed weapons and items,” including 1,000 tons of chemical agent, were still “not accounted for.”
Years would pass before U.S. soldiers found remnants of some 5,000 inoperable chemical munitions made before the first Gulf War that Saddam claimed to have destroyed. Not until 2014 would the U.S. learn that some of Iraq’s degraded sarin nerve agent was purer than Americans had expected and was sickening Iraqi and American soldiers who had stumbled upon it.
By then, however, most Americans had concluded that no such weapons existed. These were not new chemical arms, to be sure, but Saddam Hussein’s refusal to account for their destruction was among the reasons the White House cited as justification for war.
— Ms. Miller’s new book, “The Story: A Reporter’s Journey,” will be published on April 7 by Simon & Schuster. She was a staff writer and editor at the New York Times from 1977 to 2005.
Popular on WSJ
‘
-
http://www.armytimes.com/story/military/careers/army/2015/04/08/82nd-airborne-deploy-iraq/25458325/
-
http://www.ifyouonlynews.com/videos/bushs-top-cia-briefer-bush-and-cheney-lied-to-the-public-about-iraq-war-video/
-
Hard to think of anyone more responsible for the foul ups than Rumbo.
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2015/06/08/1391586/-Rumsfeld-Now-Says-George-W-Bush-was-Wrong-About-Iraq?detail=facebook_sf
-
Our attempt to install consensual, self-government in place of bloody, murderous tyranny in Iraq at the cost of thousands of American lives and hundreds of billions of dollars was heroic. It almost worked. It did work for a while. Others tossed away the gains that were made at such a great cost. Saddam was hanged. That sent a message. We lost patience. That sent another message. We didn't even keep intel resources on the ground much less a residual force or 'base on the horizon' as was once contemplated. A year ago our dear leader was calling ISIS the JV team. Today he still doesn't have a plan to defeat them. Commander in Chief in name only. The commands he has issued in Iraq are stand down.
Saddam would be nuclear by now if left alone in 2002 when this debate occurred, 13 years ago according to the Iraq Study Group.
-
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/01/welcome-to-basrastan-iraq-basra-secession-oil-shiite-south/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=*Editors%20Picks&utm_campaign=2015_EditorsPicks_Promo_Russia_Direct_Jun29%20through%207%2F3%20SO%2071
-
Very interesting stroll down memory line which is then contrasted with now
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/390725/biggest-lie-victor-davis-hanson
-
Iraq's Coming Apocalypse
by Daniel Pipes
The Washington Times
March 13, 2016
http://www.meforum.org/5908/iraq-coming-apocalypse
No, it's not ISIS or rampaging Shi'i militias. It's the Mosul Dam, Iraq's largest, and its possible collapse, perhaps leading to millions of deaths. Those in the know worry catastrophe could strike this spring, as snows melt and build an uncontrollable water pressure.
Hastily built in wartime for the dictator Saddam Hussein by a German-Italian consortium, the Mosul Dam was located where it is because one of Hussein's cronies came from the area and used his pull, despite the fact that engineers knew from the start that its porous gypsum base could not sustain such a huge structure.
What was then called the Saddam Dam opened in 1984 and within two years needed constant grouting, that is, day and night infusions of microfine cement, lots of it – 200 million pounds over the decades – to keep it from collapsing. The grouting keeps the foundational problem from worsening but does not solve it.
The years went by; fortunately, there was no disaster on the American watch. Then, during a fateful ten-day period, August 7-17, 2014, the Islamic State (ISIS) seized control of the dam. While the group neither sabotaged nor blew up the structure, grouting stopped for six weeks and the whole repair regime – especially the skilled workers and the supply of cement – henceforth became less consistent.
As a result, the dam has steadily weakened over the past 19 months, to the point that experts worry that a surge of spring waters will overwhelm it and cause its collapse. That the dam's two emergency floodgates are broken and cannot be opened to relieve intense pressure renders the situation the more fraught.
The consequences of a collapse are terrifying: A wall of water 45-70 feet high would reach Mosul, a city of some one million inhabitants, in about four hours. Then the flood wave would roll down the Tigris River valley to other cities, including the capital Baghdad, before dispersing in a wide flood. A huge number of immediate casualties would be followed by drought, disease, lack of electricity, chaos, and crime, ensuring biblical-level miseries and fatalities.
For years, quiet grouting and blithe assurances kept the precariousness of the Mosul Dam obscure. But heightened alarms coming from the U.S. government since the start of 2016, relying primarily on U.S. Army Corps of Engineers estimates, appear finally to have awakened Iraqis to the dangers they face. The U.S. embassy in Baghdad has even issued a highly unusual "Mosul Dam Preparedness Fact Sheet" with advice (in English, alas) on evacuation steps, educational needs, and relief efforts.
The Iraqi government has issued a stream of dishonest assurances that there's no problem.
In contrast, the Iraqi government issues a stream of dishonest assurances that there's no problem. Mohsen al-Shimari, Iraq's minister for Water Resources and official in charge of the dam, says "The danger is not imminent, it's far off. The danger is 1 in 1,000" (itself, an unacceptable risk). Or he insists that Mosul Dam is in "no greater" danger than other dams. At other times he actually claims "there is no problem in the dam that may lead to its collapse." Note the inconsistency, itself a sign of duplicity.
In keeping with this irresponsible, even criminal nonchalance, Iraqi authorities have done next to nothing to prepare for a possible collapse. Yes, they claim that a contingency plan exists, but no one has seen it, much less learned its details, so what use can it have in time of crisis? Yes, they signed a $300 million deal with Trevi, an Italian company, to repair and maintain the Dam, but this is a Band-Aid fix, not a long-term solution.
To make matters worse, the dam's most vulnerable city, Mosul, labors under the rule of the apocalyptic Islamic State, whose disregard for human life and extreme hostility toward the outside world negates both crisis planning and international assistance. But there is a silver lining here; ISIS' monstrous rule has caused Mosul's population to decline from 2½ million two years ago to about 1 million now, thereby reducing the number of potential casualties there.
Assuming the dam survives this year's snow melt, only one long-term solution exists: to complete the Badush Dam downstream from the Mosul Dam, which would mitigate the consequences of a collapse. Started soon after the grouting began in 1986 but halted in 1990, this ancillary dam will cost US$10 billion that the Iraqi government cannot afford. But it must be the country's highest priority.
Daniel Pipes (DanielPipes.org, @DanielPipes) is president of the Middle East Forum.
-
http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2016/04/21/obama-important-not-withdraw-iraq/
-
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/02/joe-biden-didnt-lose-iraq-obama-did/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=New%20Campaign&utm_term=*Editors%20Picks
-
The Iraq war debate, war, exit, ISIS takeover, and lessons learned issue never seems to get settled unless you are comfortable like our nominee saying falsely that Bush lied and people died.
Larry Elder is now a national show, on evening radio here. Yesterday he replayed an interview he had with an Iraqi General in 2011. His version of events match what was posted on the forum at the time only he has much more detail to offer. Judge the veracity for yourself. Getting this story right is still relevant.
https://www.larryelder.com/blog?action=viewBlog&blogID=843699310595324643&dest=/pg/jsp/community/printblog.jsp
March 30, 2011
Bush lied, people died?
I recently interviewed General Georges Sada, who served as the second-highest ranked general in the Iraqi Air Force. A two-star general, he wrote a recently published book called "Saddam's Secrets: How an Iraqi General Defied and Survived Saddam Hussein." Here are some sound bites from that interview:
Elder: General, as you know, the president has been accused of lying about the intelligence, fabricating it, cherry-picking it, that he wanted to go to war, he really didn't believe that Saddam had WMD. It was all a big smokescreen. When you hear people accuse the president of lying about WMD, of misleading the country and the world, your reaction, Gen. Georges Sada, is what?
Sada: Let me tell you. I am really surprised how people are speaking like this and their soldiers are still in the battle. You see, a soldier when he is in battle, he wants to feel that all his nation are backing him and they are with him. And now I tell you I feel very sorry when I see some people in this country, their soldiers are in the battle, and they are discussing political things making that soldier to feel that he is there in the wrong place. That's one. Second, if there was something right had been done in this country, it was the best decision taken in the proper time, to go and liberate Iraq from an evil dictatorship who only God knows what he was going to do in the region, and maybe even to America, because that man was possessing the weapons of mass destruction and then he was with very evil intentions towards all the West, especially America.
Elder: Fifteen months before we invaded Iraq, the president began talking about what our intentions would be if Saddam would not comply with the U.N. resolutions. During those 15 months . . . did Saddam have WMD, have stockpiles of WMD, and, if so, what type?
Sada: Iraq possessed WMD and they were there, and they were chemical and biological, and nuclear weapons. He have also deals with China to make it in China this time, not in Iraq, because F-16s of Israelis have destroyed the Iraqi nuclear project, therefore, he designed a new system to have the atom bomb to be done in China, and he would only pay the money, and he did for $100 million, and $5 million were paid for down payment. I know the bank, I know the branch, and I know the accountant who did it.
Elder: What happened to the chemical and biological weapons?
Sada: The chemical and biological weapons were available in Iraq before liberating the country, but Saddam Hussein took the advantage of a natural disaster that happened in Syria when a dam was collapsed and many villages were flooded. So Saddam Hussein took that cover and declared to the world that he is going to use the civilian aircraft for an air bridge to help Syria with blankets, food and fuel oil, and other humanitarian things, but that was not true. The truth is he converted two regular passenger civilian aircraft, 747 Jumbo and 727 . . . all the weapons of mass destruction were put there by the special Republican Guards in a very secret way, and they were transported to Syria, to Damascus, by flying 56 flights to Damascus. . . . In addition . . . also a truck convoy on the ground to take whatever has to do with WMD to Syria.
Elder: I've always thought it incredible, bizarre, unbelievable, that our intelligence could have been wrong, British intelligence could have been wrong, the French, the Germans, the Russians, the U.N., the Egyptians, the Jordanians, all of whom thought he had WMD. I never felt comfortable with the idea that everybody got it wrong. . . .
Sada: Your intelligence said that Saddam Hussein had WMD. . . . I agree with them. They were there in Iraq. But they didn't find them after liberation of Iraq, because they were searching not in the right place. These things were transported by air and by ground.
Elder: General, why would Saddam, knowing we were about ready to invade, transfer WMD out of the country instead of using it on American and coalition troops?
Sada: Because he knew that the power of America to liberate the country is more than what he can do. And maybe not all WMD were ready to use then. And that's why he transported to Syria and he thought that he's going to maintain in the power as he was maintained in 1991 and then he was going to get it back again and then proceed to complete the whole project of WMD. ...
Also: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B4KOSlNCPGg
-
"Elder: General, why would Saddam, knowing we were about ready to invade, transfer WMD out of the country instead of using it on American and coalition troops?
Sada: Because he knew that the power of America to liberate the country is more than what he can do. And maybe not all WMD were ready to use then. And that's why he transported to Syria and he thought that he's going to maintain in the power as he was maintained in 1991 and then he was going to get it back again and then proceed to complete the whole project of WMD. ..."
This is what I have heard to. The exponentially increases the damage that Trump did when he said Bush lied. He hands to the political enemy, the enemy of our sovereignty, the propaganda lies the disillusions our youth, our allies, our military personnel, and all the people in our country who hate America all the ammo they need.
Not even to say what he did to smear Bush's reputation.
Trump will not care.
-
So is Iraq better off with or without Saddam? Either way the people are screwed if you ask me. If the left thinks that the second Iraq war was a mistake then they have to accept that they think Iraqis were better off with him. Or they are saying they give a damn about them and that it was just bad to remove Saddam for us. Trump was right is saying that there would be no ISIS , at least in Iraq if Saddam was still there. He did not say he loved Saddam. Just that Saddam would not have put up with ISIS like we do:
http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/06/opinions/trump-comments-on-saddam-opinion-bergen/
-
So is Iraq better off with or without Saddam? Either way the people are screwed if you ask me. If the left thinks that the second Iraq war was a mistake then they have to accept that they think Iraqis were better off with him. Or they are saying they give a damn about them and that it was just bad to remove Saddam for us. Trump was right in saying that there would be no ISIS , at least in Iraq if Saddam was still there. He did not say he loved Saddam. Just that Saddam would not have put up with ISIS like we do:
http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/06/opinions/trump-comments-on-saddam-opinion-bergen/
Saddam would be nuclear by now. For me, enough said. And then Iran next. And we would be safer? Or that doesn't affect us? Saddam crushed rivals but gave plenty of support to terrorists and terrorism. He paid the families of Palestinian suicide bombers. The bombers of the first attack on the World Trade Center traveled on Iraqi passports. Saddam's state newspaper cryptically warned with glee of the Sept 11 2001 attacks 2 months before they occurred. Saddam opposed terrorism? That's bullshit.
Saddam or ISIS is a false choice. We had both out at great cost before we surrendered and abandoned our hard-fought victories in Iraq. THAT is the policy decision to question.
Take Trump at his word and he would have left Saddam in power. Not loved him but would have left him in power, developing weapons, aiding and harboring terrorists, oppressing 33 million of his own, gassing the Kurds and with a history of attacking four of his neighbors, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi and Israel, plus shooting at US planes on UN missions.
I don't follow his logic.
-
Summary
The fight for Mosul is far from finished, but Iraqi politicians are already well into planning what will come next for their country. Though organizational and funding challenges could push Iraq's scheduled 2017 parliamentary elections off into the next year, the country's political parties have begun to assemble their blocs. The incipient coalition-building efforts have been unusually peaceable, unwittingly keeping with the loose framework that Ammar al-Hakim, head of Iraq's comprehensive Shiite coalition, the National Alliance bloc, laid out in October. Known as the "historic settlement," the plan provides a loose framework to reconcile Iraq's various religious sects and political factions once the country is rid of the Islamic State, emphasizing compromise and renouncing violence. However optimistic the historic settlement may seem, Iraq's competing parties are apparently heeding it, and they have so far limited themselves to verbal battles rather than enlisting the help of militias. Still, recent conflicts among Shiite and Kurdish political parties hint at the rivalries that will come to light as election season approaches.
Analysis
Iraq has much at stake in the next round of legislative elections, regardless of when it takes place. For one thing, the Iraqi people, weary after years of violence and upheaval, have pinned their hopes on the next vote to help usher in a new era for the country. For another, the elections will be a measure of Iraq's progress in restoring order after the bitter battle against the Islamic State. Legislative elections have long functioned as an indicator of the country's stability. Under Saddam Hussein's rule, Shiites and minority communities, including Kurds, were sidelined from the electoral process, which was neither free nor fair. After Saddam's administration fell in 2003, turnout among the Sunni population dropped — to just 2 percent in Anbar province during the 2005 vote — as competing militias and al Qaeda attacked Sunni voters in an effort to discredit the elections. Though conditions improved in the 2010 and 2014 elections, neither vote was free of sectarian violence. Facing the momentous task of rebuilding the war-torn country, Iraq's government knows that the success of the next elections will be essential to prove its stability to the international community. To that end, al-Hakim has taken his pacific plan on a tour of the Middle East to try to convince Iraq's regional allies of the country's future prospects and win financial support for the costly reconstruction process ahead.
The Shifting National Alliance
But already, Iraqi parties' differences are starting to show. Though the National Alliance is still Iraq's main Shiite coalition, its constituent parties are competing for dominance within the bloc. Vice President Nouri al-Maliki recently discovered that his party, State of Law, is losing ground in areas where it used to command the most power. During a recent tour of Maysan, Basra and Dhi Qar provinces in southern Iraq, the former prime minister and founder of State of Law faced angry protesters, evidence of al-Maliki's waning influence in the area. In the 2014 elections, by contrast, State of Law handily won in these provinces, securing between 32 and 40 percent of the vote in each location. Al-Maliki's hostile reception is none too surprising, even in his former electoral strongholds. After all, he is best known today for presiding over Iraq during the Islamic State's incursion into the country; before that, many Iraqis associated him with corruption and empowering Shiites at the expense of the country's minority populations.
Nevertheless, he is still a powerful figure in Iraq's political system, and his influence is far-reaching. Al-Maliki used his clout in the judicial system to regain his position as vice president after Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi's anti-corruption campaigns swept him from office in 2015. Along with State of Law, which still dominates Iraq's 328-seat parliament with 92 seats, al-Maliki also heads the Reform Front party, albeit unofficially. Earlier in the year, that party spearheaded efforts to unseat prominent ministers from Iraq's government.
For other Shiite parties in the bloc — especially those led by Muqtada al-Sadr — State of Law's loss could be their gain. As al-Maliki's reputation has suffered in recent years, al-Sadr, whose supporters booed the vice president during his trip to southern Iraq, has steadily amassed influence despite his controversial past. Although the Shiite parties stand to benefit from banding together to pass legislation, they will have a hard time uniting their respective constituent pools given the deep mistrust between them.
Deepening Divides in Iraqi Kurdistan
A similar factional rivalry threatens to limit Kurdish parties' gains in the upcoming elections. Iraqi Kurdistan's ruling Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) is finding itself increasingly at odds with the autonomous region's other political groups. Its main rival party, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, for instance, has taken Baghdad's side in a dispute over the Kurdistan Regional Government's oil profit-sharing agreement with Iraq. In addition, a leader from the Gorran party recently criticized the KDP for its treatment of the peshmerga, provoking a backlash from the ruling party. As the rifts between the Kurdish parties widen, Arbil's internal divisions are becoming more stark than its differences with Baghdad.
In the runup to Iraq's next round of elections, rivalries will continue to emerge between the country's political parties, and alliances will keep shifting. But political infighting is a dramatic departure from sectarian violence — and for the Iraqi people, a welcome one. The coalition-building process, along with the preparations for the legislative vote, will help determine whether Iraq will continue reconciling its differences politically or will fall back into its pattern of sectarian conflicts.
-
With ISIS on the Run, an Unexpected Leader Emerges in Iraq
Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, who generated few expectations, stitched together a military alliance and damped sectarianism
An Iraqi girl stands in a destroyed street in Mosul on Sunday.
An Iraqi girl stands in a destroyed street in Mosul on Sunday. Photo: Felipe Dana/Associated Press
By Ben Kesling
July 2, 2017 7:16 p.m. ET
88 COMMENTS
MOSUL, Iraq—Three years ago, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi proclaimed the existence of an Islamic State caliphate and proceeded to sweep his forces through northern Iraq and toward Baghdad, threatening the viability of the fragile country.
Today, the leader declaring an end to the caliphate is someone few would have imagined in the position, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi. A man seen as the favorite of none but acceptable to all, the 65-year-old former electrical engineer has managed to turn that tepid sentiment into a defining strength.
Over nearly three years in office, Mr. Abadi has narrowed gaps between Iraq’s warring Shiite and Sunni politicians. He balanced competing interests among geopolitical rivals Iran and the U.S., and spearheaded an overhaul of Iraqi security forces, who had fled advancing Islamic State fighters. Iraq is close to retaking Mosul, Islamic State’s psychologically important stronghold.
“Abadi has magnificently shifted between leading and balancing,” said Jon Alterman, director of the Middle East program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. “If he led too much then there’d be too many alienated people, and if he balanced too much there would be no forward progress.”
Today, Iraq’s security forces are on the verge of defeating Islamic State, the key requirement if the nation wants to enjoy a stable and cohesive future, despite daunting challenges that remain. Sectarian anger still simmers, and the country’s economy and infrastructure have been devastated by years of fighting.
The ruins on Sunday of the Al-Nuri Mosque in Mosul, where militant leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi proclaimed the Islamic State caliphate three years ago.
The ruins on Sunday of the Al-Nuri Mosque in Mosul, where militant leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi proclaimed the Islamic State caliphate three years ago. Photo: ahmad al-rubaye/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
“Abadi is riding high,” said one U.S. official in Washington. “But the government needs to show that it can act to make people’s lives better, and probably the window for that is pretty limited. If it doesn’t, all that goodwill Abadi built up will diminish.”
There wasn’t always such a sense of possibility in Iraq. Before Islamic State swept to power in 2014, the country was at its most-fractious since the fall of Saddam Hussein. Mr. Abadi’s predecessor, Nouri al-Maliki, was a polarizing figure, accused of fueling sectarian conflict and packing ministries with loyalists.
Transparency International ranked the country near the bottom at 171 of 177 countries world-wide for corruption, with such pervasive problems that the country has only moved up a few positions after years of attempted overhauls. Mr. Maliki didn’t respond to a request for comment, but Sunday released a public statement praising the military and militias.
Related
Iraq’s Dilemma: Who Will Lead the Next Big Fight Against ISIS? (June 30)
Islamic State Is Near Defeat in Iraq, Prime Minister Says (June 29)
Torn by War on ISIS, Mosul Risks Lasting Divisions (June 9)
Iraqi Forces Close In on Militants in Mosul (June 6)
Splits Within Iraq’s Three Communities Reshape Its Politics (April 13)
When the festering Syrian civil war next door bled across the border, Iraq’s military crumbled. In June of 2014, militants exploited Iraq’s problems to blitz into Mosul—grabbing nearby land, stores of weapons and oil fields. In Islamic State’s advance, millions of civilians came to live under the Sunni extremist group’s rule.
Some Sunnis initially welcomed the militants as an alternative to the predominantly Shiite government of Mr. Maliki. The implementation of Shariah law followed, where people could be jailed for smoking or executed for unauthorized use of a cellphone.
Amid the turmoil, the conciliatory Mr. Abadi was tapped to become prime minister, an antidote to Mr. Maliki’s divisive rule. He faced growing alarm among Iraq’s allies.
Iran, the world’s biggest Shiite-majority country, couldn’t countenance its neighbor falling to a Sunni extremist group. In 2014 Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the pre-eminent Shiite cleric in Iraq, called on fellow countrymen to rise up to help protect the country; Shiite militias formed that Mr. Abadi has both empowered and theoretically kept under central government control. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’s elite Quds Force decided to fund and train many of them.
Ayatollah Sistani, who typically makes public statements via a representative at Friday prayers, didn’t respond to a request for comment.
For Iran, forging such a partnership offered a way to cultivate a new proxy in Iraq and also to nurture others. Iran could revive overland supply routes through Iraq and its other ally, Syria, to Lebanon, where the Shiite political and militant group Hezbollah is based.
For Mr. Abadi, the relationship provided a backstop to a buckling Iraqi military. It also offered a skilled battlefield partner in Qasem Soleimani, the commander of the Revolutionary Guards. Iran’s heavy involvement in Iraq also exposed Mr. Abadi to accusations that he was turning his country into an Iranian pawn.
An official in the office of Iran’s United Nations representative didn’t return a request for comment on Iran’s relationship with Mr. Abadi.
U.S. State Department officials mostly sidestep the thorny issue of Iran’s involvement in Iraq’s war against Islamic State, saying Baghdad was ultimately in charge of the powerful Shiite militias. As part of this balancing act, Mr. Abadi courted the U.S. military for assistance, too, just years after the Americans pulled troops out of the country.
What Would the Fall of Mosul, Raqqa Mean for ISIS?
As Islamic State's control over its strongholds in Iraq and Syria crumble, the extremist group acknowledges that soon not much may be left of its self-declared caliphate. So what does the loss of its territory mean for ISIS and will it bring its fight closer to the West? WSJ's Niki Blasina reports.
In 2014, the U.S. military started a gradual increase of troops with the launch of Operation Inherent Resolve. By the end of Barack Obama’s presidency, more than 5,000 Americans were deployed to Iraq with hundreds close to the front lines of combat. Support has increased under President Donald Trump.
Iraq has benefited from a more than billion-dollar investment by the U.S. to train and equip conventional army troops and special operations forces, and fund U.S. troops in the country. Mr. Abadi also fired generals from the Maliki era and demanded that top officers eschew sectarianism. Those steps brought increased assistance from the U.S., including advanced weapons and air support.
Comparing the current force to that of just a decade ago, when U.S. forces were still leading many operations, Lt. Col. James Downing, a U.S. Army adviser who is near the front lines in Mosul, said, “they are infinitely more capable.”
As the war with Islamic State heated up, Iraq became a tinderbox of crisscrossing rivalries and sectarian tensions. Christian and Sunni minorities in Iraq grew wary of Iran’s growing influence, with those groups forming some of their own militias.
Some Iran-friendly Shiite forces, meanwhile, became openly hostile to U.S. troops. In late 2015, multiple militias pledged to fight U.S. troops if they deployed to Iraq and established bases in the country, harking back to their efforts against Americans during the Iraq war.
Mr. Abadi sought to keep everyone on the same side, largely by lauding the benefits of a unified Iraq, adding Kurdish and Sunni elements to his cabinet and reaching out to Sunni leaders for dialogue.
From the beginning of his tenure, the Iraqi prime minister reached out to Sunni Arab countries in the region while maintaining his ties with Iran. In 2015, the Saudi government reopened its embassy in Baghdad, which had been shuttered decades before in response to Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait.
Inside Iraq, Mr. Abadi begin to win over the country’s minority Sunnis.
“This government led by Abadi has not met desired levels of ambitions, but if you compare it with the previous government, you will find a big difference,” said Ahmed al-Masari, head of the Sunni political bloc in federal parliament. “Now there are reforms and progress, while during the previous government several provinces fell to terrorism.”
Renad Mansour, a fellow at Chatham House, a London-based internationally focused think tank, said Sunni leaders came to realize a flexible Shiite leader may be their least bad option, especially if they hoped to exercise some power as a minority group in a democratic Iraq. “The Sunnis are past their denial of reality,” he said. “They realize that they’re going to be a minority.”
Mr. Abadi didn’t neglect the country’s Shiite majority either. By 2015, Ayatollah Sistani, arguably the most revered figure in the country, voiced strong support for Mr. Abadi and worked to ensure the militias remained by law ultimately under Iraqi government control. Mr. Abadi in turn has praised the cleric, even this week saying his call to form militias was a crucial move to save the country from Islamic State dominance.
In marshaling foreign and domestic support, Mr. Abadi’s government began racking up wins. In mid-2015 Iraqi forces took back Tikrit from Islamic State, their first major territorial victory. In November 2015, Kurdish Peshmerga forces pushed into the northern town of Sinjar, and the Iraqi military soon declared the Anbar hub of Ramadi free from militant control. The city of Fallujah fell months later.
Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, left, with Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in June, has built an alliance with Iran to help defeat Islamic State.
Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, left, with Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in June, has built an alliance with Iran to help defeat Islamic State. Photo: Iranian Supreme Leader/European Pressphoto Agency
In Mosul, where an offensive began last fall, Islamic State didn’t retreat but dug in deeper. Even as Iraqi forces surrounded the city and advanced, the militants used hundreds of thousands of civilians as human shields while stockpiling munitions and setting up snipers’ nests in the warrens of the old city.
Today, Iraqi forces are fighting scattered pockets of Islamic State fighters.
In east Mosul, shops selling mobile phones or fashionable jeans have reopened next to restaurants slicing up kebabs. Patrons smoked openly, even during the holy month of Ramadan—a display unthinkable under Islamic State control.
Still, seeds of new conflicts are just below the surface.
Iraqi soldiers are accused of beating and summarily executing unarmed men and boys fleeing fighting in the heart of Mosul. The most recent allegations come from a Human Rights Watch report released Friday. Because the military is seen as a Shiite institution and Mosul is predominantly Sunni, such abuses, real or even rumored, threaten to fan sectarian tensions.
The Iraqi government will investigate any credible cases of abuse, according to Saad al-Hadithi, a spokesman for Mr. Abadi, but he said those allegations must be based on evidence and not hearsay. Mr. Abadi has said he wouldn’t tolerate any human-rights abuses by troops.
In Anbar Province, tribal officials have exiled families of Islamic State members. In the city of Mosul, the city council recently passed a resolution declaring the same. Mr. Abadi has signaled he will use his federal authority to prevent the local government from taking such actions.
Mosul mobile-phone salesman Forat Latif said the environment is ripe for another antigovernment group to lure Sunnis into more fighting.
“We will go back to the same environment that created Daesh,” he said. “It’s the same cloud that brought all this rain.”
Inside the ruins of Mosul’s Al-Nuri Mosque on Sunday.
Inside the ruins of Mosul’s Al-Nuri Mosque on Sunday. Photo: ahmad al-rubaye/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
Iraqi officials recently released a 10-year $100 billion reconstruction plan. The government doesn’t have the money, and the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund haven’t come forward with funds. Last year, the IMF provided a $5.3 billion dollar emergency loan to help stabilize the country—a sizable contribution at the time but a fraction of what is needed now. Large sections of major cities like Ramadi and Mosul have been destroyed, with buildings, bridges and water mains turned to rubble.
During his tenure, Prime Minister Abadi has overseen an increase in oil production, which helped boost the country’s GDP last year by 11%, according to the IMF. Yet low oil prices have complicated Iraq’s efforts to pay government workers, who have sporadically taken to the streets to protest, and the non-oil sector of the economy is still reeling.
One of the biggest challenges for Mr. Abadi is the pressure from different Iraqi minorities for more autonomy. The Kurdish north, led by President Masoud Barzani, has been angling for independence for years, and last month announced it will hold a referendum on the issue in September.
Federal elections are scheduled for April, and Mr. Abadi may face rivals for his position. He has managed to remain on good terms with both Iran and the U.S.—with U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson praising the prime minister publicly in March.
But as the relationship between the U.S. and Iran deteriorates, there is a risk that Iran will back a challenger to the prime minister more clearly in Tehran’s camp. Mr. Maliki has remained a constant presence in the political realm.
Mr. Abadi may face his biggest test when Iraq and its foreign allies no longer share a common foe.
On Thursday, as he declared the end of the caliphate, Mr. Abadi stayed focused on defeating Islamic State. “We will continue to fight Daesh until every last one of them is killed or brought to justice.”
On the same day, though, brownouts in Baghdad left millions without power, showing the government’s limited capacity to provide public services to its people. Four improvised bombs, meanwhile, detonated in different areas of Baghdad, killing a handful of people. Such attacks are a reminder that the war against Islamic State is moving beyond the battlefield and into the daily lives of Iraqis, something they had hoped a prime minister would prevent.
—Ghassan Adnan in Baghdad, Asa Fitch and Ali A. Nabhan in Erbil, Iraq, and Dion Nissenbaum in Washington contributed to this article.
-
http://www.speroforum.com/a/JQXMKQBSPM21/81788-Muslim-hatred-seeks-to-destroy-Christianity-in-Iraq-says-Patriarch-Sako?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=LEJYGFVVZY5&utm_content=JQXMKQBSPM21&utm_source=news&utm_term=Muslim+hatred+seeks+to+destroy+Christianity+in+Iraq+says+Patriarch+Sako#.WdNQlXrcCeQ
-
http://havokjournal.com/culture/books/dreaming-ishtar-land-two-rivers/?utm_source=Havok+Journal&utm_campaign=5e0d61755a-Havok_Journal_Weekly&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_566058f87c-5e0d61755a-214571297
-
In its quest to counter Iranian influence, Saudi Arabia is hoping to use its financial clout to turn the tide on a different sort of battlefield. According to Iraqi media sources, behind the scenes talks in the Kurdistan region of Iraq have led Saudi Arabia to offer $10 million to support the Shiite TV station Al Forat. Further reports indicate that media personnel from the station were sent to Saudi media offices in the United Arab Emirates for training. Though the reports haven't been confirmed by Saudi or Emirati sources, Al Forat recently announced that it has upgraded its channel to air in high definition and that its app will soon support IOS and Android devices. It may not be a complete confirmation, but the new upgrades suggest the channel has indeed acquired more funding.
If the reports are true, it would be a clear effort from powerful Sunni Arab Gulf states to support Iraqi media that could counter Iranian influence in Iraq. More than that, it would mark an effort by Saudi Arabia to increase its influence with Iraqis, regardless of sectarian affiliation. A well-known media station in Iraq, Al Forat is owned by Shiite cleric and political leader Ammar al-Hakim. However, Hakim's political party, the National Wisdom party, has denied reports of Saudi funding for the TV station.
Hakim is a logical personality for Saudi Arabia to connect with in Iraq. A member of a prominent family of Shiite clerics, Hakim maintains significant popularity. In addition, he split from the Iran-linked Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq last fall to form his own political movement with greater independence from Iran. Although he is Shiite, Hakim still ticks a lot of boxes for the Sunni Arab Gulf states. It's not guaranteed that he and his network have received their backing, but Hakim and Al Forat are exactly the sort of influential voices that it would make sense for Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies to support.
-
Iraq, Russia: A Russian presidential aide said Russia is delivering a brigade’s worth of armored hardware to Iraq. This comes after Iraq’s prime minister issued a decree formalizing the inclusion of Shiite groups in the Iraqi security forces. This seems like a lot of equipment. Could it be further evidence of Russia and Iran taking over Iraq? How will the U.S. respond?
-
The Role of Militias in Iran’s Strategy for Iraq
Iran’s strategy in Iraq is to gradually exercise greater control over Iraqi state institutions.
Last updated: March 19
By George Friedman and Xander Snyder
Iran’s activities in Syria get a lot of press, but less attention is paid to what Iran has done in Iraq to make those activities manageable. Iran operates a Shiite foreign legion that over the years has trained 200,000 fighters in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen. And one part of that foreign legion is the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq. The militias of the PMF all but control northern Iraq, which Iran has transformed into a land bridge to supply its other proxy groups in Syria and Lebanon.
The term “Popular Mobilization Forces” was first used in 2013 by former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to refer to the Shiite militias in Iraq, but it wasn’t until the fall of Mosul in 2014 that the PMF really came into existence. As IS flooded into the city, Iraqi Shiite cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Husseini al-Sistani issued a fatwa calling on all able-bodied men—regardless of sect—to mobilize and oppose the invasion. Around the same time, al-Maliki signed a decree mandating the formation of the PMF Commission, which administers Iraqi state funds for PMF groups. Iran also discreetly funds some of these groups, and many pro-Iran militia leaders today occupy important positions within the Iraqi government, giving them substantial control over funding decisions… and even battle plans.
According to a report by the Washington Institute for Near East Studies, an American think tank, there are 67 unique PMF militias, approximately 40 of which are pro-Iran in some form or another. Estimates of the total size of all PMF groups vary from 100,000 to 140,000 fighters. Most of these are Shiite fighters, but not all—approximately 25,000 to 30,000 are Sunnis. Minorities like Yazidis, Kurds, and Turkmen also fight in PMF militias.
In 2014, when IS started to advance on Mosul, the Iraqi security forces fled. American support was practically nonexistent, and the Iraqi government was defenseless. The Popular Mobilization Forces came to Mosul’s aid. During the PMF’s siege to retake Mosul, Hadi al-Amiri, Badr’s current leader and an Iraqi member of parliament, ordered a significant adjustment at the last minute.
(click to enlarge)
The original plan was to enclose the city on three sides, leaving open an escape corridor to the west for civilians to flee. Of course, this would also allow IS fighters to escape in the direction of Syria, whose borders are only some 110 miles (180 kilometers) from Mosul along the road through Tal Afar. But Iran did not want IS fighters flooding into the Syrian theater and making the fight harder for Bashar Assad just as he was beginning to turn the tide of the civil war. Under al-Amiri’s revised plan, PMF forces completely enveloped Mosul, forcing IS to fight to the death. The late move also gave pro-Iran PMF groups control of more territory in northern Iraq, which solidified Iran’s supply lines through Iraq into northern Syria. The intervention of an Iraqi politician was therefore instrumental in securing Iran’s control of a northern land bridge through Iraq and into Syria.
PMF Factions
Broadly speaking, there are three main factions within the PMF: those loyal to Iran and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, those loyal to Iraqi Shiite cleric Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani, and those loyal to Muqtada al-Sadr, another Iraqi Shiite cleric known for his populism. Notably, all three of these factions are majority Shiite, meaning the Sunni-Shiite fault line that often defines Middle Eastern conflicts hardly applies in this case. The more relevant division is between Iraqi nationalists and Iran loyalists. Groups that side with al-Sistani and al-Sadr are in the Iraqi nationalist camp.
The pro-Iran groups advocate and fight to further Iran’s interests regardless of whether they conflict with the interests of Iraq. In addition to the funding they get from the PMF Commission, they are usually funded by Iran and report either directly or indirectly to the Quds Force, the foreign expeditionary arm of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard. Further, they support Iran’s vision of a pan-Islamic state that is governed by Iran’s Islamic institutions and, importantly, report to Iran’s supreme leader (a religious-political theory known as wilayat al-faqih, or Rule of the Jurisprudent).
Other Shiite groups, such as those loyal to al-Sadr, advocate a system similar to that in Iran but with a strictly Iraqi nationalist flavor and its own leader. (Al-Sadr would be his own choice as Iraq’s version of supreme leader.) Al-Sistani’s focus, meanwhile, was on defeating the Islamic State, and in the past, he has called for the forces loyal to him to demobilize after beating IS. He has since seemed to backtrack, recognizing that PMF factions are perhaps the best way to resist Iranian influence, not to mention the risk of an IS resurgence.
Iran’s Strategy
Iran’s strategy in Iraq, like its strategy with Hezbollah in Lebanon, is to gradually exercise greater control over Iraqi state institutions. It has already succeeded to a degree, although Iran’s influence is not yet as pervasive in Iraq as it is in Lebanon, in part because of the sheer number of competing factions.
Iran wants a weak, but stable, Iraq. The first part is easy to pursue, but not without endangering the second part. Iran does not want Iraq to be strong enough and nationalistic enough to challenge it outright, which would put its supply routes to Syria and Lebanon at risk and could threaten it with another general war. But if Iran pushes too far, Iraqi state institutions could be imperiled, potentially providing the opportunity for a re-emergence of an IS-like group. Iran also risks triggering a concerted pushback by the Sunnis—either in the form of, again, an IS-like group, or simply staunch electoral opposition. And Iran doesn’t want Iraq to become so divided that secession of any group becomes a possibility. Secession would set a worrying precedent for Iran, which is facing its own domestic political challenges and difficulty in spurring more equitable economic growth.
An ideal situation for Iran is one in which, even if the Iraqi government is not fully under its control, it is weak enough to allow for the ongoing presence of pro-Iran militias. Even if Iran’s militia groups do not become as fully incorporated into the Iraqi government as Hezbollah is in Lebanon, Iran could use its groups to launch attacks in Syria and elsewhere in the Middle East.
-
By Karl Zinsmeister
April 8, 2018 4:30 p.m. ET
19 COMMENTS
The debate over the Iraq War’s impact—pitting critics like President Trump against defenders like new national security adviser John Bolton —has been dramatic since the conflict began 15 years ago. Then, supporters described the war in utopian terms, as when President George W. Bush assured Americans it would be “a watershed event in the global democratic revolution.” Critics in America and abroad were as vehement in their pessimism. “Every Iraqi is a potential Saddam,” opined one Middle Eastern academic when asked that same year by the Economist whether democracy had a chance in Iraq.
Today’s reality is somewhere in between. Yet it is startling to note—given the series of coups that made Iraq one of worst-governed places on earth for much of the 20th century—that the country seems to be building a resilient democracy. Iraq now has a reasonable chance of joining a rarefied club: countries escorted by U.S. troops into decent governance and national success.
A few hard measures of social progress demonstrate the significant improvement of Iraqi society. Start with national income, the factor that generally determines whether other good things can happen in a nation. According to the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, Iraq’s per capita gross domestic product was 51% higher in 2017 than in 2002, the year before U.S. troops arrived. By comparison, eurozone nations grew by 11% in the same income measure during that period.
Or take the annual mortality rate, perhaps the most overarching measure of a society’s health. United Nations data show that Iraq’s mortality rate fell 18% from 2002-17.
Is Iraq a thriving nation? By no means. The fraction of the population in the labor force is low, and unemployment is around 16%. About three million residents fled their homes when ISIS took over a third of the countryside, and though many are returning now that the terror group has been nearly destroyed, homes and neighborhoods need rebuilding. As throughout Iraq’s history, graft continues to be a plague, with the nation’s bureaucracy rated as “highly corrupt” by Transparency International.
Iraq’s government must find a way to solve these problems. Which brings us to the biggest surprise, and a source of cautious hope for the nation’s future. On May 12, Iraq will conduct its fifth consecutive free national election. Only a handful of countries within a 1,000-mile radius have any tradition of competitive balloting. Saddam Hussein had dictated to Iraqis for 24 years until he was removed. Hardly any Arab governments allow fair voting. The Iranians next door hold sham elections.
As summarized in November by The Wall Street Journal’s Yaroslav Trofimov, Iraq has “a genuine political life and a relatively free press,” and “the country is bucking the slide toward autocratic rule that has become the norm across the region.” The durability of Iraqi self-rule is especially remarkable in the face of recent shocks like the ISIS invasion, Kurdish attempts at separation, and a 55% drop in the price of oil, which makes up about half of Iraq’s economy.
The latest cheering news has been the backlash against Iranian meddling. When Ali Akbar Velayati, the top foreign-policy adviser to Iran’s supreme leader, visited Iraq in February, he was criticized angrily by many Iraqis for interfering in their nation’s affairs. The top Shiite cleric in Iraq, Ali al-Sistani, refused to meet with Mr. Velayati in protest of Iran’s efforts to influence Iraqi electors.
Even former collaborators with Iran like Shiite radical Moqtada al-Sadr are now harshly critical of the way the Iranian Revolutionary Guards are trying to manipulate Iraq. The Iraqi cleric has modified his style of Islamism to court Sunnis and secular Iraqis into a nationalist alliance focused on addressing corruption and poverty. Shiite leader Ammar al-Hakim is likewise promoting a new nonsectarian effort to unite Iraqis across religious and ethnic lines.
On the opposite side, leaders of some pro-Iranian Shiite militias will soon test the popularity of continued sectarianism as candidates in the May election. But Iraq’s dominant Shiites are no longer acting as a monolithic tribal bloc. They are maturing into voters who define themselves by policy divergences. That is a healthy development.
Similar reshuffling is taking place among Iraqi Kurds, many of whom were so annoyed by Kurdish President Masoud Barzani’s self-aggrandizement and failure to relinquish power at the end of his term that they acquiesced in the Iraqi army’s recent reassertion of control over Kirkuk and other Kurdish areas.
This breakdown of unbending tribal allegiances is allowing a much richer national politics, based on problem-solving and rule of law rather than blood and soil. Iraq’s next ruling party and prime minister will emerge at the head of a broad, complex coalition. The new government will promise many things to many different kinds of Iraqis. The governing process will be messy, and wholly successful efforts will be rare.
But in this mercurial part of the world, that kind of checked-and-balanced rule that protects minorities and different viewpoints represents progress. While tribal preferences and favors will continue, there will be chances for prudent leaders like current Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi to extend Iraq’s income rise and the decline in mortality. Reformers can press for improvements in education and health care, and rebuilding neighborhoods.
If today’s trends continue for another 15 years, Iraq’s representative government and economic growth will become impossible for neighbors like Iran and Syria—and perhaps also Turkey and Saudi Arabia—to overlook.
Mr. Zinsmeister was an embedded reporter in Iraq from 2003-06 and served as White House chief domestic policy adviser, 2006-09.
-
Iraq: The U.S. deactivated its command center in Iraq overseeing U.S. ground operations against the Islamic State, citing the “changing composition and responsibilities” of the jihadist threat. But the Pentagon said it is not pulling all U.S. troops out of the country. The continued presence of U.S. troops has become a campaign issue ahead of Iraq’s national elections later this month. What is the new disposition of U.S. forces in Iraq? What is the risk of the U.S. getting pushed out of Iraq again – and would the U.S. care?
-
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/11/world/middleeast/iraq-iran-election-enemies.html?nl=top-stories&nlid=496
-
second post and not unrelated to the first
What’s at Stake in Iraq’s Elections
The government in Tehran will still have some degree of influence in Iraq regardless of who wins.
Iran’s influence in the Middle East is no secret. The government has made no effort to hide its regional ambitions, and it has barely balked in expanding its influence since the Islamic State was weakened. Its influence has always been kept in check by the fact that it is a Shiite country in a majority Sunni region. One notable exception is Shiite-majority Iraq, and the parliamentary elections on May 12 will be an indicator of just how deep Iran has sunk its roots into the organs of the state – and of just how divided Iraqi society is.
New and notable about the upcoming election is just how many political parties and coalitions there are in a contest that ordinarily sees just a few broad coalitions. These coalitions tend to run the gamut of political interests. In power currently is the State of Law coalition, which won more seats than any other coalition in 2014 but failed to win an outright majority. That year, Nouri al-Maliki, a member of the Islamic Dawa Party, which is part of the ruling coalition, lost his position as prime minister. At the time, he was Iran’s preferred candidate, but fearing his loyalties to Tehran could lead to civil war again, Iraqi Sunnis and Kurds, the United States, Iran and Iraqi Shiites all pressured him to step down from his post. He was replaced by current Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, who is also a member of the Dawa Party but who is considered more moderate and less hostile to Sunni and Kurdish interests.
(click to enlarge)
Now, the Dawa Party is fractured. Al-Maliki, who still has close ties to Iran, is running as the candidate from the State of Law coalition, which is attempting to appeal to the conservatives in Dawa, while al-Abadi is as the candidate from the Victory coalition, which seeks to draw support from younger and less conservative Dawa members. Then there is the Marchers Alliance, led by Muqtada al-Sadr, who also leads one of the biggest Shiite militias known as the Popular Mobilization Forces. Al-Sadr had Iran’s supported during the U.S. occupation in Iraq, but he has since resisted Iranian influence in favor of his own brand of Iraqi Shiite nationalism.
In all, there are five Shiite coalitions in the running for parliament, including the Conquest Alliance, which is led by the same man who heads an Iranian-backed PMF unit. Also in contention are two Sunni groups and multiple Kurdish factions that are even more divided than usual following the Kurdistan Regional Government’s failed independence referendum held last year.
Though Iran may prefer one group to beat the others, the government in Tehran will still have some degree of influence in Iraq regardless of who wins. After all, it still controls and funds plenty of PMF militias, at least one of whose leaders has publicly claimed that he would topple the Iraqi government if Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei so ordered. Several important government positions, moreover, are held by people sympathetic to Iran, including the one responsible for determining which PMF groups get funding from the Iraqi government. In this context, whether a pro-Iran militia leader is elected to office is less important than what their mere candidacy reveals about Iran’s efforts to exert influence in Iraq.
Underlying the competition between Iraqi nationalists and pro-Iran factions is a battle for leadership of the Shiite Muslim world itself. Iran’s regime derives its legitimacy from its unique interpretation of a Shiite theological concept called velayat-e faqih, which roughly translates to “rule by jurist.” According to this theory, management of social matters should be entrusted in a jurist who will lead Muslims until the true successor to the Prophet Muhammad re-emerges. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the first ruler of Iran, used this theory to argue that the Islamic Republic needed to be ruled by a supreme leader who would guide the nation in both religious and political affairs.
(click to enlarge)
Others, however, have interpreted the doctrine differently. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iraq’s leading Shiite cleric, believes that the jurist’s role should be limited to providing spiritual guidance. Al-Sistani has advocated for a democratic system in Iraq, one that incorporates all segments of society – Shiites, Sunnis, Kurds and Christians – into the body politic. Before Khomeini established the Islamic Republic in 1979, al-Sistani’s interpretation was the dominant one in Shiite theological circles, and even some ayatollahs in Iran opposed Khomeini’s doctrine.
This may seem like an arcane and nebulous theological distinction, but it has practical consequences. Al-Sistani’s approach lends itself to nationalism and conflicts with the transnational Shiite identity that Iran is trying to cultivate throughout the region in the hopes that it can ultimately build a Shiite empire. Al-Sistani, who ordered all able-bodied Iraqi – not Shiite – men to form militias to fight the Islamic State, told the PMF units loyal to him to disband after the Islamic State’s defeat and has advocated that religious leaders stay out of politics. But it is through those very PMF groups that Iran has exercised greater influence in Iraq. Nonetheless, Shiites loyal to al-Sistani remain wary of Iran’s role in Iraq and will seek to defeat the pro-Iran candidates in this weekend’s election.
Iran claims to be the true leader of Shiites in the Middle East, and since its clerical rule is based on the premise that religious leaders must also be political leaders, al-Sistani’s approach is a threat not only to Iran’s ability to project power in Iraq, but also to the legitimacy of the theocratic regime in Iran itself. The two interpretations therefore focus on two competing identities: one as a citizen of a Shiite empire, and the other as a citizen of a nation-state where politics and religion are mostly separate (at least by the standards of the region). The upcoming election therefore is about more than just politics; it is the latest battle in a war over leadership of the Shiite world itself.
-
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-6528453/Iraq-makes-Christmas-Day-official-nationwide-holiday-mark-birth-Jesus-Christ.html?ito=social-facebook
-
Iraq: What a Kurdish Military Return to Kirkuk Means for the Province
The Big Picture
Iraq's status as one of the world's top oil producers, its persistent problems with jihadist militants, and its geographic location between Middle Eastern powers make it geopolitically important. The Iraqi Kurds, who predominantly reside in their own semi-autonomous region in the country's north, are stakeholders in all of these issues. As Kurdish officials continue to work through their disagreements with Iraq's federal government and each other, the outcomes of their power struggles will directly impact Iraq's stability and security. And thanks to the country's contribution to oil markets, Iraq's internal struggles and the relationship between its different major oil producing regions matter for the global energy sector.
See 2019 Annual Forecast
See The Kurdish Struggle
What Happened
The tension between Iraq's federal government and its semi-autonomous Kurdish region appears to be simmering down. According to Rudaw, a media outlet affiliated with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), Kurdish and Iraqi officials have reached an agreement to replace the Shiite Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) that currently patrol Kirkuk city with KDP-affiliated peshmerga forces. The news came from an official within the KDP and was tacitly confirmed by a Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) official, but the report still needs to be taken with a grain of salt — particularly because it has not been confirmed by Baghdad or PMF officials. However, the news does indicate that Iraq's federal government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Arbil are holding discussions over one of their thornier disagreements.
Why It Matters
A return of KDP fighters to Kirkuk would suggest improved relations between Bagdad and Arbil, which could lead to breakthroughs in other ongoing disagreements — including energy production, cooperation against the Islamic State and territorial disputes. Currently, some Kirkuk residents view the presence of PMF personnel as a visible symbol of federal, Shiite or Iranian influence in their community. And Kurdish authorities, particularly those in the KDP, desperately want to reassert their political influence over Kirkuk by deploying peshmerga forces to areas now held by federal forces — including Shiite PMF troops.
Kirkuk province is not only home to lucrative oil reserves and a complex mosaic of Iraqi communities, it also lies in territory claimed by both Arbil and Baghdad. Because of this, it is one of the most contentious locations in Iraq and is struggled over by competing military and political forces. Moreover, the region has caught the attention of Turkey and Iran, which both maintain local interest groups in Kirkuk to pursue the benefits of deeper trade ties with the wealthy province.
Background
Iraq's federal government deployed forces to Kirkuk province in October 2017 as a punitive response to the September 2017 Kurdish independence referendum. The move cost the KDP — which spearheaded the referendum — its political influence in Kirkuk, as well as some of its military presence. Indeed, the KDP has not been present at a meeting of the Kirkuk Provincial Council since federal forces arrived. Because of this, the KDP's military return to the region — provided it happens — would also indicate that the group has managed to resolve disagreements with other Kurdish politicians from the PUK who weren't fully on board with the independence referendum. As Kurdish authorities work to further their own power by increasing cooperation with each other and with Baghdad, they may also succeed in increasing the Kurdistan region's stability and prosperity.
Cheat Sheet
Kurdistan Region of Iraq: An autonomous Kurdish region in northern Iraq encapsulating Arbil, Dohuk and Suleimaniyah governorates (provinces).
Kirkuk: A city 238 kilometers (148 miles) north of Baghdad and the capital of the oil-rich Kirkuk province. Home to both Kurds and Arabs, a contentious independence referendum in 2017 strained relations between the KRG and Baghdad.
KRG: Kurdistan Regional Government. Based in Arbil, the ruling body of Iraq's Kurdistan region, one of the country's four federal regions.
PUK: Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. One of the main Kurdish political ruling parties in the region, originally a coalition of five separate political entities.
KDP: The Kurdistan Democratic Party. Along with the PUK, one of the main Kurdish political ruling parties in the region. Led by the Barzani tribe.
Peshmerga: A catchall term for the armed forces of the various Kurdish factions of Iraqi Kurdistan. The peshmerga are divided in loyalty between the KDP and the PUK.
PMF: Shiite Popular Mobilization Forces, sponsored by Baghdad, consisting of at least 40 militias. Along with the peshmerga, these units were heavily involved in the fight against the Islamic State.
-
Like It or Not in Iraq, U.S. Ties Are Here to Stay
Iraqis gather in a mosque in Najaf on Feb. 20, 2019, to mourn victims who were reportedly abducted and killed by armed men on motorbikes.
As the United States begins to withdraw troops from Syria, maintaining a presence in Iraq will become increasingly important to countering terrorism and Iranian influence in the region.
The economic threat of U.S. sanctions because of Baghdad's ties to Iran will continue to spark debate and fracture Iraq's dominant Shiite political elite.
Some Iraqi lawmakers have been pushing to legally expel the United States from their country, though such legislation is unlikely to pass.
Despite mounting anti-U.S. sentiment in the country, Iraq's pervasive security concerns will solidify its need to keep ties with Washington.
Editor's Note: This assessment is part of a series of analyses supporting Stratfor's upcoming 2019 Second-Quarter Forecast. These assessments are designed to provide more context and in-depth analysis on key developments over the next quarter.
In December, the United States abruptly announced it would begin withdrawing troops from Syria, leaving neighboring Iraq to consider how its own political and security situation might be affected. However, Washington has assured Baghdad that it does not intend to change its deployment in Iraq, where it currently maintains more than 4,000 troops. This is partially because Iraq's security and stability depend on its relationship with the United States, and partially because leaving Iraq would force Baghdad to align more closely with Iran.
Amid increasingly hostile relations between Washington and Tehran, Iraq is attempting to balance necessary U.S. cooperation alongside its close but complicated economic and security relationship with Iran. And while this dynamic has led to Iraq's increasingly nationalist political environment in recent years, the truth is that in the face of mounting security threats, Iraq remains too weak to completely sever ties with either the United States or Iran.
The Big Picture
Iraq’s internal security and stability depends on the support Baghdad can accrue from its external allies, namely the United States and Iran. But in recent years, rising nationalist movements in the country have begun pressuring Baghdad to cut its ties with foreign powers. However, doing so will prove difficult, as its perpetually poor security situation leaves Iraq little choice but to remain dependent on outside help.
See Rebalancing Power in the Middle East
Why Washington Remains
Maintaining a presence in Iraq is critical for the United States to pursue its own regional goals, including countering Iran's influence and presence in the country, as well as cooperating with its regional allies on counterterror measures. This is why, even after former President Barack Obama's major drawdown of troops in 2011, a sizeable contingent of U.S. forces remains in Iraq to this day — working alongside Iraqi security forces to fight the Islamic State, among other terrorist groups and sources of instability.
Leaving Iraq would also open the door for the United States' regional rival, Iran, to take its place. Iran is intent on retaining control over its political capital in Iraq, especially as widening U.S. sanctions on Iranian commercial ties threatens the vast web of Tehran's economic inroads and business ties in Iraq. U.S. ally Israel has also threatened to strike Iranian proxies within Iraq — including thousands of Iran-backed militia members who are part of the popular mobilization units — should they start to threaten Israel with missiles. In addition, removing U.S forces from Iraq would also alarm Washington's Arab allies, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, which it has been encouraging to invest in Iraqi reconstruction efforts to help counter Iran from doing so.
Beyond supporting the Iraqi federal government in Baghdad, Washington's relationship with the Kurdish regional government in Arbil will likely become even more valuable as well, as it tries to reassure allied Kurdish forces that it is not wholly abandoning all Kurds in the wake of its withdrawal from the Syrian territories, where U.S. forces have worked closely with Syrian Kurds for years.
However, both the economic threat of U.S. sanctions, as well as the physical threat of a potential strike on Iraqi militia forces, have also fired up pro-Iranian Iraqis (both in Iraqi Kurdistan and the rest of Iraq) who want to defend against foreign interference — contributing to the momentum of anti-U.S. sentiment now building in Baghdad.
The Rise of Anti-U.S. Sentiment
Over the past year, an increasing number of nationalist and Iran-allied politicians have begun calling for the Iraqi government to consider expelling U.S. forces, and to reassess Iraq's relationship with the United States more broadly. This was recently evidenced when President Donald Trump visited U.S. troops in Iraq in December and ruffled political feathers by not meeting with Iraqi leaders while he was there. Qais al-Khazali, who is head of one of the major Iranian-backed Shiite militias in Iraq, quickly seized on the upheaval following Trump's visit by publicly calling for an end to the U.S. occupation of Iraq. And while not all Iraqis support politicians such as al-Khazali's close alliance with the Iranian government, many do share their anti-imperialist and anti-Western sentiment.
A graphic showing the party breakdown in Iraq's National Assembly.
The election of a more nationalist parliament in May 2018 laid the political groundwork for some of the increasing backlash against the United States' extended stay in Iraq. Cross-sectarian coalitions, like that of nationalist Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr, won the most seats by running campaigns that called for Iraqis to reject imperialist projects in their country. And Iranian-allied political blocs with deep militia ties, such as that of politician Hadi al-Amiri, won the second-highest number of seats.
Washington's hardening resolve to limit Iran's influence and economic activity across the Middle East has also fueled Iraqis' growing discontent. Iraq is one of the biggest foreign markets for Iranian goods and services, meaning its citizens would suffer if Iraqi companies were no longer able to easily transact with Iranian companies.
Political Constraints
However, pleas from Iraqi lawmakers and the public to reassess their country's ties with the United States — no matter how noisy — won't ultimately succeed in fundamentally changing U.S.-Iraq relations.
Any bill to expel the United States from Iraq would also require amending the Strategic Framework Agreement signed by former President George W. Bush in 2008, which stipulates that U.S. forces are in Iraq only at the invitation of the Iraqi government. Iraqi President Barham Salih, for one, has expressed his support for retaining the agreement and Baghdad's bilateral relationship with Washington. This also means that even if parliament were to pass such a bill amending the agreement (majority support doesn't seem to currently exist), the final decision would go to Iraq's Supreme Court because it involves matters of national security.
As long as Iraq’s security concerns remain acute, the country's ties with Washington are unlikely to break.
Nonetheless, the debate in Baghdad will continue to rage on — deepening divisions between Shiite political leaders who fall on opposing sides. The resulting gridlock will further thwart the Iraqi government's ability to finish basic functions, such as completing the appointment of its Cabinet where the justice, interior and defense minister posts still remain vacant. In the near future, this means that the government will also struggle to address the unrest in Iraq's southern provinces expected this summer when temperatures rise and water and electricity shortages become more acute.
No End in Sight
With that said, this current flare-up of anti-U.S. sentiment is, of course, part of the long-standing fallout from the U.S. invasion in 2003. When Washington forcibly removed Saddam Hussein, it inadvertently gave its rival Iran an opening in the Shiite-majority country — which Tehran has taken advantage of ever since. This complexity has only increased in recent years, with the United States stating that it wants regime change in Tehran.
But above all else, the enduring severity of the counterterror fight is what has kept — and will continue to keep — relations between Iraq and the United States as firm as they are. While the territorial caliphate of the Islamic State is largely defeated, the U.S. Defense Department recently assessed that the group was still a potent force in Iraq, adding that it could also resurge in Syria without appropriate pressure to keep it down. This sobering assessment has solidified Iraq's dependence on both U.S. forces and Iranian-backed militias, which are both integral in helping Baghdad on the front line of its grueling counterterror fight. Therefore, as long as Iraq’s security concerns remain acute, the country's ties with Washington are unlikely to break.
-
https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/03/us-army-trying-bury-lessons-iraq-war/155403/?oref=d-mostread&fbclid=IwAR1cBAMlth2ODNZ0gI2HEwG5B06ypeKdKULjkf1NeJ-5BWDcveVIFBb0kcg
-
The U.S. welcome in Iraq. Iraq’s parliamentary speaker said in an interview that U.S. forces are still needed in Iraq to combat the Islamic State’s remaining presence. It seems Iraq is being pulled in two directions: It still wants ties with the United States, and some 5,000 U.S. troops remain stationed there. But it also has a strong Iranian presence as Iran-backed politicians are winning seats in the government, Iranian trade (including electricity) is increasingly important to the Iraqi economy, and tens of thousands of Iran-backed militants operate in Iraq. The speaker’s comments show that Iraq still believes it needs U.S. support despite the growing Iranian influence in the country.
-
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/only-2-iraqi-translators-who-worked-u-s-troops-got-n1035661?fbclid=IwAR0a114z1j3WmhNG9F2wLg8JJTlL25s30szlVs9bGpYpymxDx-Lf-e5dP3w
-
https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/9797095/isis-fighter-killed-by-drone-bomb/
-
Iraq: Metastasizing Protests Threaten to Upend the Government
4 MINS READOct 4, 2019 | 21:10 GMT
The Big Picture
Despite possessing some of the world's most sizable oil reserves, Iraq has struggled to stabilize its security or provide its citizens with sufficient access to goods, services and job opportunities. An ongoing swell of protest demonstrates the extent of Iraqis' exasperation with ongoing government inefficiency and how ill-equipped Iraq is to answer protesters' grievances in the near term.
What Happened
If protests in Iraq, fueled over the past week by long-standing grievances over corruption and economic need, continue to increase in intensity and scope, they could bring down the government. Substantial unrest in major Iraqi cities over the past three days has occurred largely in Shiite areas in the central and southern parts of the country. Although they were triggered by a handful of disparate political and economic issues, the demonstrations have since coalesced into a broad movement and taken a violent turn. Clashes between protesters, who have chanted anti-government and anti-Iran slogans, and security forces on Oct. 4 have left more than 40 people dead and hundreds more injured.
The resignation of the Abdul-Mahdi government could come sooner than later.
In an address delivered early Oct. 4, Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdul-Mahdi told Iraqis there were "no magic solutions" to solving their grievances and pleaded for more time to solve the country's endemic issues of corruption and unemployment. In an effort to assuage public anger, the prime minister has announced a new stipend program for poor families and the firing of 1,000 government employees accused of corruption, among other measures. But those promises have done little to calm the situation — something that isn't surprising given that Iraq's underlying problems endure despite similar assurances during previous bouts of unrest.
Elsewhere on Oct. 4, the influential Shiite cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani condemned the security response to the protests and urged the prime minister to establish an anti-corruption committee. Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr also issued a call for the government to resign, saying his Sairoon bloc in parliament would stop participating in legislative activities until the government introduces real reform, echoing his long-standing call for anti-corruption measures.
Why It Matters
Unrest driven by economic and political concerns isn’t new in Iraq. But the current outburst features several unique facets that indicate the risk they pose to the continuity of the current government. They differ from previous years' economically motivated demonstrations, primarily in terms of scale and scope. In addition, these protests do not appear to have a centralized leader, making them harder to control, whether by the Iraqi government or foreign actors. Even though there are signs that pro-protest social media hashtags may be originating from Saudi Arabia, given the diversity of Iraq's social and political spectrums, it's unlikely that any single external actor will be able to take advantage of the current unrest.
The protests come at a time of particular weakness in the Iraqi government. There is a wide divergence among its factions, especially the Shiite elite, over how to respond, especially since none of the near-term solutions under consideration will solve the long-term, endemic issues that have been festering for years.
What To Watch
The resignation of the Abdul-Mahdi government could come sooner than later. Watch for a surge of unrest as the first anniversary of his Oct. 25 assumption of office approaches.
The headquarters of U.S. and other foreign companies, especially in the oil and gas sector, could become targets, especially if pro-Iran factions in the country's political and security forces want to take advantage of the unrest. While this has not occurred during the current round of protests, foreign businesses have been attacked during previous episodes of unrest.
A meeting on Oct. 5 in parliament with representatives of the protesters will provide an important indicator of the direction of the unrest. Watch for any tangible promises as part of an effort to placate their demands, including the resignation of specific government officials and offers of economic concessions.
The mostly Shiite Popular Mobilization Units could play a key role in the eventual outcome. Given their grassroots origins, it’s unlikely that they'll be willing to put down protests. But their connections to Iran and their formal inclusion in the Iraqi security apparatus make it an open question as to how they will react moving forward.
The Islamic State and other jihadist groups could take advantage of the current unrest, especially if Iraqi security forces are focused on dispelling serious unrest.
-
Why Baghdad's Attempts to Mollify Protests Are Falling on Deaf Ears
6 MINS READOct 11, 2019 | 14:15 GMT
This photo show burning tires in a Baghdad street during protests on Oct. 5.
(AHMAD AL-RUBAYE/AFP via Getty Images)
Burning tires block roads in Baghdad during protests on Oct. 5, 2019. Issues including corruption, poor public services and unemployment have fomented public anger at the Iraqi government. Its options for responding will come at a cost.
Highlights
Popular anger at lingering political and economic grievances is bound to keep resurfacing in Iraq so long as the economy continues to suffer from deep structural problems.
Citizens, mistrustful after years of unfulfilled promises of more jobs and better services, are pushing their leaders to root out the corruption at the heart of Iraq's economic stagnation.
Contrary to popular perceptions about Iraq, the unrest isn’t sectarian in nature, but focused instead on poor governance, corruption and a general lack of economic opportunity.
Deadly anti-government protests in Iraq have shed fresh light on the fragility of Iraq's post-2003 government and economy. Like episodes of significant unrest in 2011, 2015, 2016 and 2018, these protests include calls for improvements in social services, an increase in economic opportunities and an end to government corruption. But in terms of scale and scope, this spate of protests is unprecedented, perhaps portending the beginning of a moment of transition for Iraq’s government — not only for Prime Minister Adel Abdul-Mahdi's current administration, but also the broader system of governance as a whole.
The Big Picture
A deep and wide mistrust of government has made keeping the peace in Iraq more difficult. As Iraqis demand more tangible and complete solutions to their political and economic grievances, the state is faced with two broad choices over how to manage cyclical unrest — and both will mean disruptions for businesses in Iraq.
See Broken Contracts in the Middle East
In the long run, the promises of increased subsidies and jobs that the Iraqi government has used to calm previous economically fueled grievances are unsustainable. To preserve the current system in the face of repeatedly resurfacing political and economic gripes, the political class has two stark choices. It must either permit massive structural changes that will transform the economy into a stronger, more diverse and sustainable system, or it must stage the harshest crackdown since the U.S. intervention in 2003 to preserve the system as it is. Both options, naturally, will lead to profound business disruptions in the near term.
The Cycle of Economic Weakness Endures
One issue repeatedly drawing Iraqis onto the street is the country's structural economic weaknesses. Iraq's economy leans heavily on oil and natural gas extraction (energy exports constitute 99 percent of Iraqi exports and provide 84 percent of government revenue). But to keep producing at capacity, the energy sector sorely needs reform. Half of the government's budget goes to state pensions and public sector wages, plus handouts and subsidies that maintain social support. This has stifled diversification in the Iraqi economy, leading to an anemic private sector and a population overly dependent on public sector jobs that counts on the government to provide cheap and often unreliable services. A few reforms have taken place, but not enough to solve these structural problems. Donations from countries concerned about Iraqi stability, plus help from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, have helped paper over the fundamental issues but failed to bring about the needed changes.
This map shows the total number of protests in Iraq's provinces in 2018 and 2019.
The government's familiar tactic of offering piecemeal solutions ultimately worsens the problems at the heart of Iraq's structural economic inefficiency. Overspending on public wages and subsidies that the government deems necessary to ensure stability has inflated public debt and created a massive budget deficit. In part to appease demands for jobs, public sector employment tripled from 900,000 in 2004 to roughly 3 million today; the subsequent wage inflation took jobs spending from 7 percent of the overall budget in 2004 to more than 40 percent today. Even with public-sector hiring freezes, such as one implemented in 2016, that's an unsustainable growth rate that could lead to breakdowns in government spending. Nevertheless, the government is relying on those familiar promises to quell the current unrest, including offers to add even more public sector jobs, plus hand out cash transfers and housing support that would deepen the hole it has found itself in.
The familiar government promises do not satisfy Iraqis like they once did. With previous pledges to create jobs and improve services going unfulfilled, this round of promises, unsurprisingly, hasn't convinced all protesting Iraqis to get off the streets. This also means that its familiar pattern won't work in the future. In fact, broken promises of reform have become such a familiar refrain that they have provided a platform that nationalist leaders like Muqtada al-Sadr have used to win popular support.
Broken Trust Transcends Sectarian Lines
Also feeding the protests is Iraqis' perception of a broken political system that doesn't answer their demands for representation and solutions. Iraqis have gone to the polls for at least eight local and national elections since Saddam Hussein's ouster in 2003. But none of the leaders they have chosen have managed to turn the broken economy around or satisfy their needs. In fact, poverty levels and security woes have increased during that time. Mistrust in parts of the government system isn't new; previous instances of unrest also stemmed from Iraqis' demands for an end to corruption and the introduction of fresh faces into the government. What's new this time is the breadth of the frustration, which transcends Iraq's traditional sectarian politics. Public anger is not directed at any single sect, party or external patron. For example, the influence of powerful cleric Ali al-Sistani, whose voice once commanded considerable respect among all Iraqis, is reportedly weakening among a younger generation that has heard the same unfulfilled promises, year after year, from traditional sources of authority. This points to the likelihood that demands will emerge from Iraq's citizens that will become harder for the government to solve.
Iraqis are pushing their government to tackle tough political issues, like solving pervasive corruption, instead of just offering the same old solutions.
Although the protests transcend sectarian lines, their predominant participants — and many of the targets of their ire in government — are Shiite Muslims. This reflects the fact that Shiites constitute the largest share of the Iraqi population, a reality reflected in the structure of the post-2003 government system. One factor influencing the current protest movement is the deepening influence of Iran, a Shiite power, in Iraq. Anti-Iranian slogans that have become part of the ongoing protests point to a popular rejection of the growth of Iranian sway. This stems not so much from a specific rejection of Iranian influence as much as a desire to preserve Iraqi sovereignty, ultimately translating into a rejection of how the Iraqi government conducts its affairs and foreign policy.
The Risks to Iraqi Stability
Iraqis are pushing their government to tackle tough political issues, like solving pervasive corruption, instead of just offering the same old solutions. But a sincere and effective effort to diminish corruption in Iraq would require the state to engage in massive structural reform while unraveling some of the patronage networks that have formed within the political class around the energy sector. Not surprisingly, there is little enthusiasm among the political class to take this challenging and controversial route, which would create widespread disruptions and necessitate a reorganization of the energy sector over the long term. Nevertheless, the government has taken small steps in that direction. On Oct. 8, the Iraqi government froze the activities of provincial councils, followed by a government reshuffle announced two days later. The question in the near term remains whether that will be enough to assuage protests; it certainly won’t be enough to overhaul the entire system.
-
November 18, 2019 Open as PDF
How Iran Lost Its Hold Over Iraqi Shiites
By: Hilal Khashan
After the creation of the Iraqi state in 1921, Iraqi Shiites largely chose to eschew politics for decades, bogged down as they were in the bitter split in Islam that pitted them against the Sunnis. Iraqi Shiites have always been proud of their roots in Yemen and the Hejaz in the Arabian Peninsula, but they were never particularly drawn to Arab nationalism. They did, however, absorb pan-Arab nationalist influences following the 1958 military coup that toppled the Hashemite monarchy and, more importantly, after the radical Baathist coup that brought Saddam Hussein to power in 1968. The Baathist regime inundated Iraqi Shiites with pan-Arab political and cultural rhetoric that, during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War, turned into anti-Persian propaganda.
Shiites overlooked Saddam’s oppression that culminated in the execution of prominent opposition cleric Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, who issued a religious edict banning membership in the Baath Party. They fought for Iraq against Iran, a Shiite-majority country. Shiites, who account for two-thirds of the population of Iraq, played a decisive role in winning the war, which ultimately led to a surge in Arab national identity and widespread animosity for a fellow Shiite country.
(click to enlarge)
Politicization of Sectarian Identity
The 1991 uprising in Basra that spread throughout southern Iraq was started by an Iraqi soldier who was humiliated by the defeat in the First Gulf War. The Republican Guard’s brutal crushing of the Shiite uprising caused Shiites to turn inward, shifting their focus from Iraqi nationalism to sectarian concerns. The fall of Saddam’s regime in 2003 ushered in a new political system based on sectarian accommodation that gave Shiites, who for 60 years stood outside the corridors of Iraqi power, overwhelming control over the state and its resources.
The Badr Brigade, established in Tehran in 1982, became the military wing of a Shiite political party known as the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq. The brigade, which took Iran’s side during the Iran-Iraq War, led the rebellion in 1991 and joined the U.S.-led coalition to overthrow Saddam’s regime in 2003. It took advantage of the vacuum left by the collapse of the government and ousted those who played a significant role in the war that led to Iran’s defeat in 1988. Poor post-war planning by the Americans allowed Iran to use the SCIRI and Iran-funded Shiite militias to overwhelm Iraq and penetrate its centers of power.
Despite the rapid spread of Iranian influence in Iraq, especially in the south, Iran’s promotion of an exclusivist and belligerent sectarian identity did not sit well with most Shiites, who see themselves as the descendants of major tribes that hailed from Arabia. Ibrahim al-Jaafari, the leader of the 2005-06 transitional government in Iraq, sought to supplant Iraqi Shiite Arab heritage with a narrow sectarian identity. His zeal for Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s religious edicts alienated him among Shiites, who did not hide their distaste for religious revolutionism and influenced his political demise. Iran’s clerical establishment has always sought to dominate Iraqi Shiism and replace Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who does not subscribe to Khomeini’s rule of the jurisconsult, with a conformist spiritual leader. This policy backfired, despite Iran’s financial support of students in Najaf’s religious academies, making Iranian pilgrims generally unwelcome in the holy city.
Since 2003, almost 70 Iran-sponsored Shiite militias have emerged, most of which have been legitimized by the government in Baghdad. Iran has financially supported these groups, including the Popular Mobilization Forces, which have been active in fighting the Islamic State. Wahhabi raids on Shiite holy shrines in the early 20th century, and the Islamic State’s capture of a large swath of Iraqi territory, convinced only a minority of Shiites that Iran should be seen as a trusted ally. Distrust of Iran in Iraq runs deep and cuts across sectarian lines. Despite endless proclamations of solidarity with Iraq, Iran – which is still haunted by the memory of its defeat in the 1980-88 war – had been contributing to the country’s instability by providing it with arms and explosives. Shiites therefore understand that Iran wants Iraq to remain a weak and fragmented country.
An Identity Crisis
Suspicion of Iran is by no means surprising since Iraqi Shiites and Sunnis, who hail from the same tribes, are culturally and ethnically homogeneous. Most Shiites are former Bedouins who adopted Shiism in the 19th century after the development of Najaf into a provincial city and an economic hub in central Iraq. Iraqi Shiites are part of the national struggle between Arabs and Persians that dates back to the Muslim conquest of Persia and the fall of the Sasanian Empire in the seventh century. This deep-rooted conflict has been disguised as an ideological crusade since Khomeini’s Islamic revolution, but Shiites share the Sunni belief that Iranian influence is actually detrimental to Iraq. They argue that Iran sees Iraq as a base for its tug of war with the United States and a key part in its bid to establish itself as a supreme power in the Middle East.
(click to enlarge)
An example of Iraqi grievances against the Iranians is Tehran’s water management policies. After 2003, Iran accelerated the Shah’s policy of dam construction and diversion of the Tigris River’s principal tributaries such as the Lower Zab, Karun and Kerkhe that feed into the Shatt al-Arab river south of Baghdad. Iran dumps wastewater into the river, which is the primary source of water for Basra. Iraqis blame Iran for water shortages and salinity, as well as its deliberate destruction of their country’s fishing industry.
Torn between Baathist oppressive hegemony, rapacious pro-Iranian militias, and abandonment by wealthy Arab states in the Gulf, many Iraqi Shiites feel they have lost their sense of identity. They see themselves as a besieged population, portrayed as untrustworthy by Sunni Arabs and manipulated by the Iranians. Indeed, a large number of Iraqi Shiites want to resolve their identity crisis and appear to have settled for an Arab national identity. They appear to have lost hope that the post-Saddam regime will release them from the repression they have suffered and concluded that the time has come for the regime to go.
Over the past month, anti-government protests have erupted in several cities, including Basra and Bagdad. Angry demonstrators have burned the posters of Khomeini, who is revered as sacred by Iraqi Shiite political parties and militias, and set the Iranian consulate in Karbala ablaze. In Basra, they chanted: “Iran out, Basra is free.” In Nasiriyah, southeast of Baghdad, they burned the offices of pro-Iran parties, as well as the headquarters of the Badr Brigade.
The size and scope of the demonstrations that have spread throughout southern and central Iraq reveals the magnitude of the anger toward Iranian influence in Iraq – which has become synonymous with corruption, poverty and unemployment. The rise in youth unemployment and surge in poverty levels in oil-rich southern Iraq have fueled the protests. But it’s clear that the demonstrations, which the government has used excessive force to subdue, say more about the search for a true identity than they do about living standards. Demonstrators want to regain their dignity and free themselves from Iran’s grip. Most Iraqis, be they Sunni Arabs or Shiites, reject any suggestions of a cultural link to their Persian neighbors and see their connection to Iran as purely spiritual. (Imam Ali al-Rida, the eighth imam in Twelver Imami Shi’ism, died and was buried in Tus, in northeastern Iran.)
Iran Entrenched in Iraq
Iraqi Shiites turned to Iran reluctantly. Saddam Hussein’s reign of terror cut off Iraq’s contact with the outside world and its liberating tendencies. With the emergence of the information revolution, Iraqi Shiites after 2003 were energized and tried to break the sectarian shackles Iran had used to bind the two countries together. But having given sanctuary to Shiite dissidents in the 1980s, who became the rulers of the post-Baathist regime in Bagdad, Iran controls the power centers of the Iraqi political system and its armed forces. In this respect, Iraq doesn’t differ from other Arab countries. Despite the schism between the public and the despotic rulers, the latter continue to wield power at the top because they are willing to use excessive coercion to prevent real political change from taking place. Iraqi citizens of all denominations are emerging as a real political force, but this is a long and painful process, and one can only hope that it will grow to become impervious to sabotage. In the meantime, Iran seems well-positioned to maintain its hold over the centers of power in Iraq.
-
second post:
Very interesting to contrast with prior post
https://theintercept.com/2019/11/18/iran-iraq-spy-cables/?utm_source=The+Intercept+Newsletter&utm_campaign=79064d9373-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_11_18&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_e00a5122d3-79064d9373-133356797
-
Excrement happens , , ,
https://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2019/12/31/iranian-militia-leader-who-led-raid-u-s-embassy-baghdad-previously-visited-obama-white-house/?utm_source=facebook&utm_medium=social
https://americanmilitarynews.com/2019/12/100-marines-2-apaches-being-sent-to-secure-us-embassy-in-iraq-from-iran-backed-group/
-
"Iranian Militia Leader Leading Iraq U.S. Embassy Raid Listed as Obama White House Guest"
so he has ties to the Deep State that is working furiously to oust Pres. Trump.
-
"Iranian Militia Leader Leading Iraq U.S. Embassy Raid Listed as Obama White House Guest"
so he has ties to the Deep State that is working furiously to oust Pres. Trump.
Good point!
-
https://www.theblaze.com/news/iraqis-dancing-in-street-soleimani?utm_content=bufferd127a&utm_medium=referral&utm_source=facebook&utm_campaign=fb-theblaze
https://www.timesofisrael.com/iraq-anti-govt-protesters-sing-dance-after-soleimani-death/
-
Iraqi-U.S. Ties Reach a Breaking Point
8 MINS READ
Jan 6, 2020 | 23:03 GMT
An Iraqi demonstrator poses with the national flag as angry protesters blocked roads in the central city of Najaf on Jan. 5, 2020, to oppose the possibility that Iraq would become a battleground between the United States and Iran.
An Iraqi demonstrator poses with the national flag as angry protesters blocked roads in the central city of Najaf on Jan. 5, 2020, to oppose the possibility that Iraq would become a battleground between the United States and Iran. The killing of senior Iranian commander Qassem Soleimani has driven a wedge between Washington and Baghdad.
(HAIDAR HAMDANI/AFP via Getty Images)
HIGHLIGHTS
The U.S. killed Qassem Soleimani in part to roll back Iranian influence in the Middle East. At least in Iraq, the decision is poised to do the opposite. ...
In death, senior Iranian military figure Qassem Soleimani may be getting closer to achieving one of his overarching aims: removing the U.S. military presence from Iraq. On Jan. 5, Iraq's parliament convened a special session in the wake of the U.S. airstrike that killed Soleimani and other Iraqi militia leaders to accelerate the government's expected request that the United States withdraw its forces from Iraq. In the nonbinding resolution, legislators demanded that the Iraqi government cancel its request for assistance from the U.S.-led coalition fighting the Islamic State, remove all foreign troops from Iraqi land and airspace, keep all weapons in government hands, investigate the U.S. airstrike that killed Soleimani, and lodge a complaint at the United Nations over Washington's alleged violation of Iraqi sovereignty. One day later, a draft letter from the U.S. Department of Defense and a statement from Secretary of Defense Mark Esper indicated that the United States could be already preparing to reposition its forces there.
The Big Picture
The issue of U.S. forces on Iraqi soil has been a lightning rod ever since U.S. and British forces ousted Saddam Hussein in 2003 and, more recently, since Washington deployed troops to assist Iraqi forces against the Islamic State in 2014. The Iraqi parliament's resolution to demand a withdrawal of American troops, and the U.S. response that it might already be repositioning its forces in the country, won't rupture U.S.-Iraqi ties, but it will lead to a significant readjustment.
The parliamentary resolution is just one facet among many suggesting that Iraqi authorities will ultimately ask the U.S. military to leave the country. Naturally, Iraq is weighing the pros and cons of continuing its security cooperation with the United States, but one outcome ultimately seems far more likely than the rest: namely, that Iraq pushes ahead with its request that the United States leave, or supports a U.S. decision to withdraw, resulting in an overhaul to their ties that downgrades their security cooperation.
Why Iraq Would Want the U.S. to Go
U.S. forces are currently in Iraq under a relatively informal agreement between the Iraqi and U.S. governments following Baghdad's 2014 request for military assistance and security cooperation to help defeat the Islamic State. Given that, the agreement between Baghdad and Washington is not a typical status of forces agreement but more like an invitation that Baghdad can rescind as it wishes.
One key reason that Baghdad would want the United States to go is that the original reason for the invitation — the threat of the Islamic State — has receded, given that the group has lost influence (as well as all its territory) over the last several years. The close coordination between the United States and Iraq in their fight against the jihadist group has also become a target for extremist recruitment.
At present, Iraq resents how the United States has dragged it into its campaign of maximum pressure against Iran. More than that, however, it fears that the American campaign has made it vulnerable to collateral damage from yet more proxy conflict between Iranian-allied forces and U.S. troops. In fact, the airstrike that killed Soleimani illustrated the threat of the United States' anti-Iran campaign so starkly that even the country's U.S.-allied politicians are voicing a more independent stance. The Jan. 5 session began with an unusual condemnation of U.S. actions by Prime Minister Adel Abdul-Mahdi, who voiced his anger over Washington's infringement of Iraqi sovereignty. (The acting prime minister, meanwhile, revealed on Jan. 5 that Soleimani traveled to Baghdad the night he was killed to deliver a message to Iraq regarding Saudi-Iranian mediation talks, underscoring how Iraq feels the United States might have manipulated it with the strike on Soleimani.)
A greater rift between the United States and Iraq won't automatically translate into greater closeness between Baghdad and Tehran. After all, many Iraqis of all walks of life resent the impudence of Iranian-allied militias.
Why Iraq Would Want the U.S. to Stay
The wave of Iraqi anger at the United States notwithstanding, there are many reasons why Baghdad would prefer Washington's continued involvement. For one, the strong pro-Iran camp in Iraq has been threatening to vote on the U.S. presence in the country since the last election in 2018, but the backlash over Soleimani's assassination has emboldened it — a development that could worry Baghdad as it tries to maintain a modicum of an independent foreign policy and rein in Iranian-allied militias that rarely heed the commands of the Iraqi government. Without question, that balance would be harder to maintain if the United States withdraws and loses some of its direct influence, ceding ground to Iranian-allied politicians and militia forces.
Ultimately, the Iraqi government is split over the issue, as many lawmakers want to maintain U.S. support. With just 172 out of the 329 total lawmakers present for the vote, the Jan. 5 resolution barely met quorum requirements, as practically no Kurdish and Arab Sunni lawmakers attended the session. Moving forward, further political fractures in Baghdad are a distinct possibility, particularly between the Kurds — the U.S. government’s closest allies in the Iraqi government — and the rest of the largely Arab government.
Given such considerations, a greater rift between the United States and Iraq won't automatically translate into greater closeness between Baghdad and Tehran. After all, many Iraqis of all walks of life resent the impudence of Iranian-allied militias, their tendency to operate outside the control of the Iraqi government and their violence toward civilians. But a rift would open a vacuum that other powers including Iran, naturally, but also external actors like Russia and China, would move to fill.
What Happens Next
These considerations notwithstanding, the Iraqi government is ultimately likely to move forward with a request for the United States to withdraw. Procedurally, the government can now use the Jan. 5 resolution to pressure the U.S. government or submit a bill to parliament articulating some of the motion's demands. Aside from the legally hazy issue of whether a caretaker prime minister has the authority to make such a decision, it is clear that it is only the executive branch, rather than parliament itself, that holds the power to oust the United States. What's more, the Federal Supreme Court would also need to rule on such a bill given that its contents affect Iraq's national security.
If Iraq does, indeed, show the United States the door, there will likely be a period of negotiation between the two governments over how the withdrawal will occur.
And then there's the question of the battle against the Islamic State — a common enemy to Washington, Iranian-backed militia forces and the Iraqi army alike. A U.S. withdrawal could help presage a resurgence of the group, which endures but is largely contained. The threat of Iranian-backed militia groups to the United States, in particular, is now so great that U.S. forces in the country announced a pause in the battle against the jihadist group to focus on defense against Tehran's proxies.
If Iraq does, indeed, show the United States the door, there will likely be a period of negotiation between the two governments over how the withdrawal will occur — rather than Washington attempting to stay against Baghdad's wishes. To many, that would put the United States in the role of an occupier, necessitating even more troops on the ground to protect the mission amid an almost-certain uptick in militia attacks on U.S. forces and installations.
At the same time, however, the United States, especially the White House, could respond to an Iraqi request for its withdrawal by adopting a punitive stance toward Baghdad by, for instance, taking a harder line on Iraq. In February, for example, Iraq is likely to apply for waivers from Washington to be able to continue importing the Iranian natural gas it needs to generate electricity. Such action, however, would only drive a bigger wedge between Washington and Baghdad, driving the latter further into the arms of Tehran over the long term, despite the economic barriers created through sanctions. U.S. President Donald Trump, meanwhile, has floated the idea of imposing sanctions against Iraq, although it's unlikely the United States would do anything that would significantly reduce Iraqi oil production. After all, at 4.7 million barrels per day, Iraq's volume is simply too big for Saudi Arabia to offset — and a rising cost of crude could result in higher fuel prices in the United States, dragging down presidential approval ratings.
Before the airstrike that killed him, Soleimani and Iranian-backed militia leaders were polarizing figures, inspiring reverence and loathing in Iraqis in equal measure. But amid Baghdad's bid to walk a fine line between Washington and Tehran, the killing of the senior Iranian military figure could tilt the balance, putting the Islamic republic in the ascendancy in Iraq at the expense of the United States.
-
Important piece of history that is easily buried and forgotten
https://www.westernjournal.com/obama-years-biden-reportedly-helped-soleimani-iran-gain-power-middle-east/?utm_source=facebook&utm_medium=westernjournalism&utm_content=2020-01-06&utm_campaign=manualpost
-
second post
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/ignoring-reality-biden-got-it-wrong-on-iraq-mattis-says
-
The U.S., Iraq and Iran
The Baghdad vote isn’t the last word on American troops.
By The Editorial Board
Jan. 5, 2020 5:37 pm ET
A handout photo made available by Iraqi prime minister office shows Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdul-Mahdi (C, down) and Iraqi parliament speaker Mohamed al-Halbosi (C, up) attending an Iraqi parliament session in Baghdad, January 5. PHOTO: PRIME MINISTER OFFICE HANDOUT/SHUTTERSTOCK
The U.S. strikes in Iraq against Iranian-backed militias and Qasem Soleimani were necessary, but they always risked a nationalist backlash. The Iraqi Parliament’s symbolic vote Sunday to oust U.S. troops from the country is an example of that backlash, but it’s also far from the last word.
Trump Orders an Attack on Iran's Revolutionary General
The vote was not decisive, as only a little over half of Iraq’s 329 members of parliament were present to vote on the nonbinding resolution. Kataib Hezbollah, the militia allied with Iran’s Quds Force that stormed the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad last week, issued threats against lawmakers who voted against the resolution.
Shiite lawmakers hold a majority and most voted in favor, while Kurdish and most Sunni members didn’t show up. Iraq’s minorities understand better than anyone the risk of Iranian domination, and both have supported a continuing American military presence.
Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdul-Mahdi supported the vote, but he’s a caretaker who in November promised to resign after widespread protests sapped the legislature’s legitimacy. Elections for a new parliament are expected this year. The public already has registered its disgust with the Iraqi ruling class, and no doubt the U.S. and Iranian presence in the country will be major election issues.
The parliament also voted to file a complaint with the United Nations about the strike against Soleimani. Those suddenly concerned about international law apparently weren’t worried that Soleimani’s presence in Iraq was illegal under a 2007 United Nations Security Council resolution that was still in force. If the terrorist ringleader had adhered to that U.N. travel restriction, he’d still be alive.
The modest presence of 5,000 or so U.S. troops is in the interests of Iraq and America. Iraq could never have retaken Mosul and defeated Islamic State without U.S. air power, precision weapons, intelligence and training. Those assets are protection against the revival of ISIS or another Sunni jihadist insurgency. U.S. troops also give Iraqi patriots confidence to counter Shiite militias armed by Iran and resist Iran’s strategic goal of making Iraq its political and military subsidiary.
The U.S. can’t, and shouldn’t, remain in Iraq if American diplomats and soldiers are under siege. Iraq’s security forces failed to protect the U.S. Embassy last week, and they proved unable to stop Soleimani and the Shiite militias that fired rockets at U.S. troops 11 times in two months.
Deterring such attacks was the reason President Trump made the decision to attack the militias and target Soleimani. Allowing open season on U.S. forces wasn’t tenable, and something had to be done. If such American self-defense is too much for Iraqis to tolerate, then the pro-Iran militias would have been allowed to drive Americans out in any case.
By the way, Ben Rhodes, Susan Rice and other Obama Administration alumni are the least credible voices on the U.S. presence in Iraq. Barack Obama used Shiite Iraqi objections as an excuse to justify a complete U.S. withdrawal from the country in 2011. “The tide of war is receding,” he claimed as he ran for re-election in 2012. Team Obama wanted out of Iraq and barely tried to negotiate a new status-of-forces pact.
But Islamic State emerged and grew in America’s absence, and Mr. Obama had to send troops back to Iraq to avoid the strategic catastrophe of a jihadist caliphate in Baghdad. If U.S. troops are forced to leave again, it won’t be because Mr. Trump wants to appease Iran as the Obama Administration did.
Mr. Trump should make clear that the U.S. presence is to maintain a free and independent Iraq and support its sovereignty when threatened by ISIS and Iran-controlled militias. Most Iraqis know the U.S. played a decisive role in defeating Islamic State and have no interest in becoming Tehran’s colony.
-
Iraq Faces America's Economic Wrath
Matthew Bey
Matthew Bey
Senior Global Analyst, Stratfor
9 MINS READ
Jan 14, 2020 | 10:00 GMT
HIGHLIGHTS
Washington will tighten the enforcement of its existing sanctions on Iran and Iranian proxies in Iraq, meaning more companies, banks and individuals will fall afoul of U.S. measures.
The United States will probably expand its sanctions beyond just Iranian-backed militias in Iraq to target pro-Iran politicians directly.
The country could impose limited economic sanctions on Baghdad, but only in the event that it is forced to remove its troops from Iraq.
The United States is likely to tailor any economic sanctions so as to hurt Iraq's economic future rather than inflict immediate significant economic harm — the latter of which would only occur should American forces suffer significant casualties in the pullout.
For companies active in Iraq, threats to physical security — whether from a possible military conflict between the United States and Iran, militia violence or a resurgent Islamic State — aren't the only thing they need to worry about. That's because dark economic times could also be on the way, especially as U.S. President Donald Trump has threatened to enact sanctions on Iraq if Baghdad continues to push for a withdrawal of U.S. forces in Iraq following the U.S. assassination of Qassem Soleimani. If Baghdad pushes U.S. forces out, the aftermath, bluntly speaking, will be messy. Given that bilateral diplomatic relations inevitably would take a nosedive in such a situation, the United States would most likely impose punishing sanctions on Iraq. And even if such measures don't come to pass, the United States' campaign of maximum pressure on Iran will certainly leave Iraq worse for wear as well.
Below are some of the actions — some more likely than others — that the United States could take against Iraq amid its larger battle with Iran.
The Big Picture
Tensions between the United States and Iran reached new heights at the start of the month following the United States' targeted killing of senior Iranian military official Qassem Soleimani in Baghdad. Amid an outcry in Iraq over Soleimani's killing, Washington is now threatening sanctions against Baghdad. But even if this does not occur, Iraq will bear a significant brunt of the fallout between the United States and Iran.
See Middle East and North Africa section of the 2020 Annual Forecast
Most Likely: Tighten Enforcement of Existing Sanctions
On Jan. 10, the United States announced new sanctions on Iran's metal, construction, mining and textile sectors; beyond this, though, there is little that Washington can target to ratchet up the economic pressure on Iran. Accordingly, the next wave of pressure is likely to focus on tightening the enforcement of existing sanctions on Iran — something that could place a lot more scrutiny on Iraq's significant economic connections to Iran. Regardless of whether circumstances push U.S. forces out of Iraq, more Iraqi companies and financial institutions that work with Iran are likely to become the target of U.S. sanctions, meaning they could lose access to the international financial system. Ultimately, the United States' intent is not so much to compel Iraq's companies and banks to take a harder line on Iran but to force Iraqi firms to sever their own ties with their eastern neighbor for their own economic and security interests.
So far, the United States has not enforced its sanctions on Iraq to the fullest extent over fears about the economic and political repercussions. Washington, however, could try to shape Baghdad's decisions by taking action on waivers that allow Iraq to continue buying Iranian electricity and natural gas for power generation. With the waivers set to end next month, the United States could threaten to end them or only renew them under specific conditions.
The next wave of U.S. pressure is likely to focus on tightening the enforcement of existing sanctions on Iran — something that could place a lot more scrutiny on Iraq's significant economic connections to the Islamic republic.
Very Likely: Widen Sanctions on Militias and Iranian-Linked Politicians
Over the past year, the United States has substantially increased its sanctions on Iranian-backed militias in Iraq. Most recently, it announced on Jan. 3 that it was implementing new sanctions on Asaib Ahl al-Haq leader Qais al-Khazali, although it is likely to extend such measures to other groups and their leaders. At the same time, the United States could legally designate more groups and entities as foreign terrorist organizations, further circumscribing their activity and creating more of a legal basis for drone strikes.
After that, the United States could consider sanctions on Iraqi political entities linked to Iran — a line of action that would become far more likely if U.S. troops are forced out of Iraq. Unsurprisingly, the targets would likely be those pushing for the United States' expulsion, including Hadi al-Amiri, the head of the Fatah political bloc, one of the largest in Iraq's parliament, and the Badr Organization militia. As it is, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo accused al-Amiri of being an Iranian proxy following his appearance at protests outside the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad on Dec. 31. A move against al-Amiri would be particularly incendiary, driving retaliation against the United States.
Possible: Limited Economic Sanctions
Economic sanctions on Iraq are possible, but likely only in the event that Iraq continues to push U.S. forces to leave. One of the first things that Washington could cut is financial support to Baghdad. The United States supports Iraq in a number of ways, providing foreign, security and other aid. Washington allocated $451 million in assistance for Iraq in the 2019 fiscal year and has so far earmarked $165.89 million in assistance for the 2020 fiscal year (although the final figure is likely to be far more under normal circumstances). Restricting the White House's actions, however, is Congress, which could pass legislation to limit Trump's aid cuts.
Another option is limited financial sanctions, in which the United States could emulate its measures against Russia by imposing restrictions on the Iraqi government or preventing Iraqi state-owned companies from raising debt. In this, Washington would not seek to starve the Iraqi government immediately but rather slowly impinge on its long-term economic security. Such a move would contrast sharply with the United States' current measures against Iran and Venezuela, which are designed to deal an immediate, significant blow.
Washington could also consider sectoral sanctions as part of a limited sanctions campaign against Iraq that targets the country's lifeline — oil and gas. Initially, the United States would likely only impose sanctions that limit U.S. companies and entities from participating in projects in Iraq. Again, this mirrors current sanctions on Russia, in which the United States has targeted Russia's Arctic, deep-water and shale production. Again, the United States would not seek to take Iraqi oil off the market quickly but rather impede its long-term expansion. Sanctions would likely focus on just U.S. companies, but given the U.S. importance to the global financial system and America's centrality to the global oil and gas industry, this would hamper all foreign companies looking to invest in Iraq's oil sector and its growth.
Washington could also consider sectoral sanctions as part of a limited sanctions campaign against Iraq that targets the country's lifeline — oil and gas.
Iraq, furthermore, is considering buying Russian military equipment amid fears that it will become the battleground between the United States and Iran as Russia has offered to sell S-400 surface-to-air missiles to the country. Doing so, however, could trigger U.S. measures under the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), but Iraq is unlikely to make such a purchase until after the United States pulls out of Iraq, if it does.
Whether the United States extends sectoral sanctions to Kurdistan depends on the Kurds' support — or lack thereof — for Iraq's push against U.S. forces. Kurdish members of the Iraqi parliament, for instance, sharply opposed a Jan. 4 resolution that demanded the federal government withdraw its invitation to U.S. forces to remain in the country. It is possible that instead of blanket sanctions against all of Iraq, the United States could simply focus on entities that are linked to Baghdad. For example, the U.S. could place sanctions on new deals with Iraq's Oil Ministry and some state-owned oil companies, like the Basra Oil Co., while sparing the Kurdish Oil Ministry.
Unlikely: Significant Economic Sanctions
In responding to the resolution demanding U.S. troops leave, Trump specifically threatened to impose sanctions on Iraq that were even larger than those against Iran. Realistically, the United States would not go that far, but if the U.S.-Iraqi breakup creates a political mess amid frequent attacks on U.S. forces, the United States could view Iraq as essentially an Iranian client state — putting it on a par with Syria — meaning it could enact sanctions with the goal of immediately torpedoing the Iraqi economy.
Already, the United States has reportedly threatened to freeze Iraq's access to the Iraqi central bank's account with the New York Fed, having previously done so once in 2015. A move like that would affect Iraq's ability to trade in U.S. dollars and require it to become more creative in accepting payments for oil. Even so, the United States would likely only freeze access for an extended period of time in the event of a more significant breakdown in relations.
In addition, the Trump administration could impose direct sanctions on Iraq's central bank due to its transactions with the Iranian central bank and impose substantial secondary sanctions to reduce Iraq's oil exports. Still, at least at the outset, the United States would likely not cut the Iraqi central bank's access to the U.S. financial system as a result of its involvement in importing oil from Iran — as it has for the central lenders of other countries that have purchased Iranian oil. Instead, such U.S. sanctions would more likely echo the current sanctions against Venezuelan oil exports, which focus more on the companies themselves. After all, attempting to hit Iraq's oil exports would certainly reverberate across the global oil market, meaning the United States would carefully have to weigh the pros and cons before proceeding.
In the end, rather than knock Iraq's economy out for the count if U.S. troops are forced out of the country, the United States is likely to take a different tack by reviewing just how stringently it enforces existing sanctions on Iraqi companies, politicians and militias with ties to Iran. But even if U.S. soldiers get to stay in the country, Iraq — as well as the foreign firms that operate in it — have little chance of escaping the blowback from the wider U.S.-Iranian battle.
-
Why Iraq Remains Ripe for a U.S.-Iran Confrontation
Omar Lamrani
Omar Lamrani
Senior Military Analyst, Stratfor
Emily Hawthorne
Emily Hawthorne
Middle East and North Africa Analyst, Stratfor
6 MINS READ
Feb 4, 2020 | 10:30 GMT
Iraqis run for cover during an anti-government demonstration in Baghdad on Jan. 23, 2020. Protests have rocked Iraq since October but recently had abated amid spiraling tensions between the country's key allies, the United States and Iran.
Protesters run for cover on a highway in Baghdad during a Jan. 23 anti-government demonstration. Amid escalating political unrest, the Iraqi government will struggle to keep the country's armed militias from conducting an attack that pushes the United States and Iran toward war.
HIGHLIGHTS
Iraq is the most likely site for a U.S.-Iran confrontation in the coming months because of Iran's deep ties to several violent and capable Iraqi militias in close proximity to U.S. forces.
While the perception of a common U.S. threat will foster short-term cooperation between Iran-allied militias, Washington's assassination of a prominent Iraqi militia leader will ultimately increase competition between the country's rival armed forces.
This will make it all the harder for Baghdad to control militia-led violence, in addition to political violence being stoked by escalating anti-government protesters.
In Iraq, a mix of violent militias and volatile politics could provide the spark that sends Iran and the United States spiraling into an armed conflict — and with it, any remaining shreds of stability in Baghdad. In June, the United States declared that the killing of any U.S. military personnel and other American citizens in Iraq would warrant retaliation. Washington then proved its willingness to enforce that red line in a series of raids and strikes following a rocket attack that killed an American contractor in December.
In the aftermath of the Jan. 3 assassination of Iranian Gen. Qassem Soleimani, it can be argued that a potential trigger for a full conflict between the two countries was narrowly avoided when an Iranian counterstrike with ballistic missiles didn't kill any U.S. troops in Iraq. But there is no guarantee that a follow-up round of clashes arising from another deadly attack wouldn't push the two countries back to the brink. And indeed — rife with militias, weapons and unrest — Iraq offers the perfect site for such a scenario to unfold in the months ahead.
The Big Picture
Following the uptick of U.S. tensions earlier this month, Iran is as motivated as ever to retaliate against Washington's maximum pressure campaign. And proxy attacks in Iraq are one of the most powerful methods that Iran has in its playbook in pursuing this objective. But as Iraqi militia groups seek to coordinate their strategies in the face of a common U.S. threat, the government in Baghdad will find it increasingly difficult to stabilize the country's security situation.
Setting the Scene
The fact that both Iran and the United States are prepared to use violent action against each other following the recent surge in tensions is further inflamed by the nature of the Iraqi theater itself. Iraq remains highly unstable and awash with weaponry, with the Iraqi government unable to exercise its will on the vast array of disparate militias operating in the country. Of the dozens of militias in Iraq that don't fall under direct state control, there are three broad factions: those closely allied with Iran, those closely allied with Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr and those under the leadership of the more mainline Shiite clerical authorities in the holy Shiite cities of Najaf and Karbala. All of these militias are all largely comprised of Shiite Iraqi fighters. Many also assisted and worked alongside Iraqi federal forces and, in some cases, even U.S.-led coalition forces to fight the Islamic State. And while none fall directly under the state's command and control, most Iraqi militias also fall under an umbrella organization, the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), which has become a formal component of the Iraqi state's security forces.
While the Iran-allied militias logically fall the closest under Tehran's command and control, they remain independent actors. This distance provides Iran some plausible deniability about its culpability when an armed group attacks a U.S. or civilian target in Iraq. But the United States is increasingly willing to directly blame Iran even when a proxy group is the culprit of an attack, which could prompt retaliatory attacks from militias and spark a cycle of escalation. Already, U.S. forces in Iraq are increasingly targeting heavyweight Iranian proxies such as Kataeb Hezbollah and Asaib Ahl al-Haq. Shortly after the assassination of Soleimani, Iran hosted a series of meetings with Iraqi militia leaders. And as this U.S.-Iran pressure intensifies, there will be more efforts between Tehran and its Iraqi proxies to coordinate retaliation against the United States.
But of the plethora of armed groups in Iraq, many are also already hostile to U.S. troops in the country without necessarily being loyal to Iran. This means that some Iraqi militia forces — regardless of whether they're closely allied with Tehran — have both the motivation and the means for further mortar, rocket or improvised explosive device attacks on nearby U.S. forces. So while it's often assumed that most of the militia attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq are somehow tied back to Iran (including the latest attack on the U.S. Embassy on Jan. 26), a strike that results in U.S. casualties could thus also conceivably originate from different armed factions on the ground, only to be misconstrued by Washington as an Iranian-led or -directed operation.
Enduring Iraqi Instability
The intensifying competition between various militia groups, as well as Baghdad's long-standing inability to exert command and control over any of them, further deepens the likelihood of greater overall instability in Iraq. In the same airstrike that killed Soleimani on Jan. 3, the United States also killed the prominent Iran-allied militia leader, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. A powerful consolidator, al-Muhandis was increasingly the center of gravity within the PMU umbrella organization. His absence will thus eventually open up space for even greater competition among Iraqi militias, further weakening what little control Baghdad had over the country's militias as they jockey for more power. This will increase the risk for violence, inhibiting cooperation between external actors such as the United States and Iraq's central government and federal security forces on counterterrorism operations.
In Iraq, a mix of violent militias and volatile politics could provide the spark that sends Iran and the United States spiraling into an armed conflict in the months ahead.
Compounding this chaos for Baghdad is also an emboldened anti-government, nationalist protest movement that has been demanding government reforms since October. There already have been violent crackdowns by federal security forces on protesters, who managed to prompt the resignation of former Prime Minister Adel Abdul-Mahdi in November. And the unrest is likely to intensify as different political factions in Iraq attempt to manipulate the movement, including the one led by al-Sadr.
Al-Sadr's recent decision to switch from supporting the protests to opposing the movement reflects his desire to maintain his political power, which over the years has grown in tandem with the central government's weakening authority. The move also appears to show some coordination between al-Sadr, Iran-allied militias and the federal government who otherwise have fundamentally opposing visions for Iraq's political future. Rather than a larger political alignment, however, al-Sadr's decision to reverse his position is more reflective of a shared desire among Iraq's political elites to avoid disrupting a status quo that has allowed them to flourish in Baghdad. But the appearance of a more coordinated front against the anti-government movement is likely only to inflame protesters' frustration with the powers that be in Iraq — raising the risk for even more unrest and, in turn, more destabilizing crackdowns in the near term.
Amid the recent surge of tensions between Washington and Tehran, there remains a fair chance that the red line of U.S. casualties will be crossed in the coming months. And with even less control over both its armed militia groups and angry citizens, there's little the Iraqi government will be able to do to keep a bloody proxy war from breaking out on its turf. Iraq — as an activated front between Iran and the United States — will, therefore, remain one of the likeliest flashpoints for another confrontation for the foreseeable future.
-
"unconditional-surrender
Noun
A surrender without conditions, except for those provided by international law."
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
On 3 August 1990, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 660 condemning the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and demanding that Iraq unconditionally withdraw all forces deployed in Kuwait.
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/peace/docs/scres660.html
3 March 1991—Iraq accepted the conditions of the UN resolutions.
Iraq soldiers were waving white underwear in the air in the desert.
http://media.gettyimages.com/photos/iraqi-soldiers-surrendering-to-the-allied-forces-thus-becoming-of-picture-id607457408?s=594x594
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gulf War I - reversed the occupation of a sovereign country, the demand of the coalition. We did not depose Saddam or rebuild the nation.
-
Interesting on a number of levels , , ,
https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2020/03/why-us-troops-are-pulling-back-all-over-iraq/163888/?oref=d-channelriver
-
The U.S. Strategy in Iraq Could Come Back to Bite
Emily Hawthorne
Emily Hawthorne
Middle East and North Africa Analyst, Stratfor
6 MINS READ
Apr 6, 2020 | 19:35 GMT
An image of cracked, painted picture of the U.S. and Iraqi flags illustrates the two countries' decaying relationship due to Washington's ongoing pressure campaign and proxy battle against Iran.
An image shows the U.S. flag intersecting with the Iraqi flag. Against the backdrop of the low oil prices and the COVID-19 pandemic, Washington’s emboldened push to rid Iraq of Iran's economic and military influence risks further damaging its already fragile relations with Baghdad.
)
HIGHLIGHTS
Iraq has become a hot theater for escalating U.S.-Iran tensions, with Iran-backed Iraqi militias attempting to force U.S. military forces out of the country via ongoing attacks. The United States has responded by repositioning its troops instead of withdrawing them, highlighting its continued priority of ensuring Iraqi stability. But against the...
The Big Picture
Iraq has become a hot theater for escalating tensions between Iran and the United States, with Iran-backed militias continuing to attack U.S. military forces stationed in the country. The United States has responded by repositioning its troops instead of withdrawing them, highlighting its continued priority of ensuring Iraqi stability. But against the backdrop of the global COVID-19 crisis, Washington’s intensified pressure campaign against Iran’s regional proxies and economic ties risk backfiring by throwing Iraq deeper into chaos.
See Iran's Arc of Influence
By tightening the screws on Iran’s regional proxies and energy sector, the United States risks damaging its remaining ties in the Iraqi government. Pentagon documents leaked in late March show an internal debate within the U.S. military over whether to escalate against Iran-backed Iraqi militias, which have recently ramped up their attacks on nearby U.S. and U.S.-allied targets in the country. Then, on March 26, the United States granted Iraq its shortest sanctions waiver yet for Baghdad to continue purchasing crucial Iranian natural gas exports without facing Washington’s financial wrath. These efforts are aimed at squelching Iran’s economic and military influence in Iraq, which the United States perceives as key to ensuring Iraqi stability under a U.S.-friendly government. Though doing so at a time when the economic blow of COVID-19 and low oil prices is threatening to already rip Iraq’s government apart at the seams could ultimately undermine this goal, and in turn, the U.S.-led fight against global terrorism.
Shifting U.S. Priorities in Iraq
The United States views containing Iraqi militias — especially those with the closest ties to Tehran, such as Kataib Hezbollah — as ultimately combatting Iran’s rivaling influence in the region. But degrading the influence of Kataib Hezbollah, or any other paramilitary organization in Iraq, is exceptionally challenging. Though their degree of public support varies across the country, these militias are deeply enmeshed in Iraqi politics and society, and have become a fundamental component of the Baghdad’s security forces and government over the years. This means that the government endures a political cost each time the United States attacks a militia group.
Despite U.S. pressure, there is also little the Iraqi government can do to more tightly control the actions of Iran-backed militias, which will continue to fight for their own survival and territorial goals beyond the direction of Tehran, let alone Baghdad. Attempts to rein in Iraq’s many powerful militia groups could also further complicate the ability of Adnan al-Zurfi, the country’s relatively U.S.-friendly prime minister-designate, to form a government by stoking pro-Iran parties to only further argue against his formal installation.
It is thus perhaps no surprise that the Iraqi government, which has been in a precarious position since the prime minister resigned in October 2019, has issued increasingly defensive statements in response to the United States directly bombing militia groups and continuing to threaten sanctions. Meanwhile, Washington is repositioning its military forces in the country with the long-term goal of an eventual drawdown, prompting mixed reactions in the Iraqi government. Those close to Iran celebrate it, while those closer to Washington fear the opportunities a lighter U.S. presence could provide the Islamic State and other terrorist groups.
Ill-timed Sanctions Pressure
The continued threat of U.S. sanctions, in particular, also risks further destabilizing Iraq’s already fragile economy, which is facing its own profound struggles due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the oil price downturn. For years, the United States has been pressuring Iraq to wean itself off of Iranian energy supplies. But Washington recently increased this pressure by shortening the latest sanctions waiver period to only 30 days before it supposedly begins sanctioning Iraq’s imports of Iranian natural gas. This is likely an effort to force Iraq to show that it has made good-faith progress on its stated goal of replacing all of its Iranian exports over the next three years, especially given that Iraqi consumption of Iranian gas imports actually increased from 24 percent to 31 percent between 2018 and 2019.
Against the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic, Washington’s heightened push to rid Iraq of Iranian influence risks only throwing the country's economy and government deeper into chaos.
Significantly reducing this consumption, however, will require massive international investment, as well as increasing Iraq’s capture of flared gas to better economize and utilize its own domestic production. And now, the dual economic shocks of the COVID-19 pandemic and the low oil prices spurred by the recent collapse of OPEC+ cooperation will make completing such an economic overhaul on such a short timeline all but impossible for Baghdad. Despite exporting roughly the same amount of oil, Iraq earned roughly $2 billion less in revenue on its oil shipments in March than it did in February, underscoring how shocks to global oil demand due to the COVID-19 crisis are further straining Iraqi’s financial reserves. With no immediate end in sight to the pandemic and the related economic impacts, the ongoing global health and economic crisis is threatening the Iraqi government’s very ability to keep its budget balanced and its essential government services running, let alone its ability to make deep structural changes to its energy and electricity sector.
Adding to the Chaos
Yet while the COVID-19 pandemic is likely to deal a sharp blow to Iraq’s economy, concerns about containing the country’s own outbreak are also offering Baghdad a temporary reprieve from the recent wave of heated anti-government protests. With more people staying home for fear of contracting and/or spreading the disease, far fewer Iraqis have taken to the streets in recent weeks to voice their grievances with Baghdad. But after the immediate health crisis begins to wane, and as Iraq’s typically severe water and electricity shortages once again emerge over the summer, the demonstrations are all but certain to return. And if the United States intensifies its bombing campaign against Kataib Hezbollah or other Iran-backed Iraqi militias, it could risk yet more protests in Iraq by fueling anger among Iraqis tired of being caught between the crossfire of the United States and Iran’s proxy battle.
Opting to ramp up the pressure at a time when Iraq is already grappling with such extreme economic and political risks could thus very well backfire on the United States by making Iraq not only a less receptive partner in the U.S. fight to contain Iranian influence, but an overall less compliant ally in the enduring global counterterrorism fight, of which Iraq remains an epicenter.
-
Rumblings of an Islamic State Resurgence in Iraq
Thomas Abi-Hanna
Thomas Abi-Hanna
Global Security Analyst, Stratfor
8 MINS READ
May 19, 2020 | 10:00 GMT
)
HIGHLIGHTS
The Islamic State has increased the scope and scale of its operations in Iraq due to its internal cohesion and strength, as well as a lack of significant pressure from the forces opposing it.
The militant group will continue to build off of the momentum it has already gained and increase its operations in Iraq, and potentially elsewhere in the region, over the next several months.
The developments will undermine Iraqi stability and energize grassroots militants to carry out attacks around the world, even though the Islamic State remains far from reestablishing its caliphate.
In a world preoccupied with COVID-19, the Islamic State may have faded from international headlines. But a spike of attacks across large swaths of Iraq over the past month shows the group remains a potent threat capable of returning with a vengeance. A lack of pressure from opposing forces and a groundswell of internal support have enabled the Islamic State to increase its insurgent and terrorist activity in its core territory, which threatens to not only further destabilize Iraq but energize other jihadists to carry out attacks across the globe.
The Big Picture
The Islamic State lost control of its last sliver of territory in March 2019, but has been looking to revitalize itself ever since. The group still has branches stretching from West Africa to the Philippines, though Iraq and Syria remain its most important pieces of territory. Both countries remain fragile states facing crises and stark internal divisions, which the Islamic State has sought to exploit using the tens of thousands of fighters and hundreds of millions of dollars that remain at its disposal.
While the Cat's Away
Using the lessons learned following its previous defeat in 2010, the Islamic State has amassed money, manpower and resources to pick itself back up again, while opposing foreign forces have either withdrawn or been distracted by other issues.
The group has had enough time to recover and recuperate following the loss of its final remaining core territory in March 2019 and the death of its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in October 2019. The United Nations estimated the group still commands up to 20,000 fighters, has access to hundreds of millions of dollars and earns up to $4 million a month, which — according to estimates from the Center for Global Policy and The Washington Post — it has used to replenish itself.
Meanwhile, numerous military exchanges between U.S. forces and Iranian-backed militias in Iraq, also known as Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) — most notably around the time of the killing of Iranian Gen. Qassem Soleimani in January — have further eased pressure on the Islamic State by diverting the attention of two of the most powerful actors in Iraq away from the jihadist group and toward each other. In March 2020, the United States began repositioning forces in Iraq away from the Islamic State's areas of operations near Mosul and Kirkuk, as well as in the Anbar and Ninevah governorates, in order to focus on the threat posed by PMUs in other areas in Iraq, where the Islamic State is much less active.
The COVID-19 pandemic has also prompted European countries to temporarily draw down their forces from the fight against the Islamic State. Between March 19 and 25, the Czech Republic, France, the Netherlands and Spain all announced they were temporarily pulling out of Iraq, while Germany and the United Kingdom indicated they were downsizing their presence. While these countries expended far less manpower and resources than the United States in Iraq, they still played a key part in the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State.
Following the collapse of the Iraqi government in December, Baghdad has been bogged down in a myriad of economic, health and political crises. The country finally formed a government in May, the primary focus of which will be managing a burgeoning protest movement, as well as containing the country's COVID-19 crisis. Fears of spreading COVID-19 have also forced Iraqi security forces to limit their movements in recent months.
The Mice Will Play
With both its regional and Western enemies distracted, the Islamic State has recently increased the scale and scope of its attacks, kidnappings and other operations across northern and western Iraq. These operations are meant to intimidate locals, weaken security forces, foment instability and serve as propaganda boons for the group. According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project and the Center for Global Policy, the number of violent incidents in Iraq linked to the Islamic State spiked by 58 percent between March and April alone. When comparing the number of attacks from April of last year (21) to April of this year (87), the number of attacks jumped by over 300 percent.
The Islamic State has also begun testing the waters for more sophisticated attacks. According to the Middle East Institute, the group has recently been conducting nighttime raids, multipronged coordinated assaults and suicide bombings. This marks a notable uptick from the typical drive-by shootings, mortar attacks and roadside improvised explosive devices (IEDs) it had done in previous months. On April 28, the group launched an attack against intelligence headquarters in Kirkuk. Such a direct attack against a government building had been a rare occurrence since the group lost its remaining territory in Iraq in 2017.
The Islamic State has been able to increase the sophistication for a number of reasons:
The lack of external pressure, for one, has given the group more time to construct larger devices and plan more sophisticated operations.
It has also seized weapons, explosives, ammunition and other materials during raids against villages and security forces to use in these operations.
Weapon inflows from Syria, where the group is also gaining momentum, has further bolstered its strength.
No Signs of Slowing
In the absence of significant pressure from the forces opposing it, the Islamic State will likely continue to increase in the coming months, building off of the momentum it already achieved. The anti-Islamic State forces are unlikely to be either willing or able to muster formidable countermeasures to contain the group in the coming months, much less drive it back. The United States, for one, has an agreement with Iraq that it will not redeploy its troops to areas of intense Islamic State activity. And amid rising U.S.-Iran tensions, the White House will likely remain preoccupied with containing PMUs in central and southern Iraq. Likewise, European nations are unlikely to redeploy its troops back to Iraq in the near term, as it remains unclear if there will be the political will to do so once the COVID-19 pandemic passes.
With its regional and Western adversaries distracted, a recent spike in attacks in Iraq shows the Islamic State is well-positioned to return with a vengeance in its core territory.
The Iraqi government, for its part, will struggle with the immediate economic and health fallout from COVID-19 for at least the next several months. Political stagnation and social unrest could plague Baghdad for years beyond that as well. Iraq's new government said it would prioritize counterterrorism efforts and the fight against the Islamic State, but its ability to do so will be constrained by a decrease in international support and internal political strife. U.S.-Iranian tensions will also remain high for the foreseeable future, raising the risk for further exchanges between U.S. forces and Iranian-backed PMUs that keep two of the Islamic State's primary opponents fighting each other instead of it.
Going Global?
The Islamic State's expanding operations will make the group and its adherents a greater threat on a local, national, regional and potentially international level. The group's attacks, kidnappings and other operations will compound the already high threat to personnel, facilities and infrastructure in northern and western Iraq, and will also pose a resurgent threat to the capital of Baghdad itself, where attacks by the group have dramatically decreased in recent years after the Islamic State lost its remaining Iraqi territory. To be clear, the Islamic State is still years away from being able to recapture territory and reestablish its so-called caliphate, which remains the group's ultimate goal. But by undermining Iraq's already fragile economy and security situation, such attacks risk setting back reconstruction efforts in areas that Iraqi authorities recaptured from the Islamic State in 2016 and 2017.
There is also the risk that the Islamic State could use Iraq as a staging ground for attacks in other regional countries such as Jordan, Iran and Lebanon. The group has launched attacks from Iraq into these places in the past and is intent on doing so again. The group has also been increasing its insurgent activity in Syria, which could serve as another springboard for launching attacks into neighboring Jordan and Lebanon.
The Islamic State's surging activity in Iraq will play a role in reenergizing grassroots militants elsewhere in the world, who have no direct connection to the group but are still inspired by its ideology to carry out attacks. While there is no precise science for determining when and where an attack will take place, these are most likely to spring up in locations where attacks by grassroots militants occurred during the peak of the group's power in 2014 and 2015, including Western European countries such as Belgium, France, Germany and the United Kingdom. Middle Eastern countries such as Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia also face a heightened risk of being targeted.
Returning With a Vengeance
Since beginning its initial resurgence in Iraq during 2011, the Islamic State has morphed from a local insurgent group to a global movement, with branches that have continued to launch attacks in areas ranging from West Africa to Afghanistan. And without sustained pressure from its adversaries, including the United States and Iraq, the group is well-positioned to continue its resurgence in its core territory — a development with potentially grave global consequences.
-
Iran’s diminished influence. Iranian influence in Iraq suffered a major blow after Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi directed a raid last week on a Kataib Hezbollah post, leading to the arrest of over a dozen fighters and the confiscation of weapons systems. Several Iran-backed militias have accused the U.S. and Iraq of fomenting division, but the Iranian government itself has been careful not to publicly incite further tensions with Iraq. Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesman, for example, said that the raid was an internal Iraqi affair and that Iran has no comment.
-
At Long Last, Iraq Is Getting Back on Track
The costs have been high, but the country is doing better in many ways than it was before Saddam’s fall.
By Sam Gollob and Michael O’Hanlon
Aug. 5, 2020 12:05 pm ET
Iraq has had a turbulent 2020. The year began with the U.S. killing of Qassem Soleimani and a top Shia militia leader on Iraqi soil. Iraq’s Parliament responded with a nonbinding demand that 5,000 American military personnel exit the country promptly, which Washington rightly ignored. Iran also retaliated, with a missile barrage against U.S. bases in Iraq.
After months of limbo, Iraqis finally settled on a new prime minister, Mustafa al-Kadhimi. He faces the daunting challenges of reducing corruption and improving employment prospects in a country rocked by demonstrations against the previous government, and now also by Covid-19. Throughout it all, Iraq remains in the unenviable position of being squeezed between the rock of proximity to Iran and the hard place of an unsettled yet important relationship with the U.S.
Yet something else of note is happening. Since the 2003 overthrow of Saddam Hussein, there have been huge ups and downs. Recently, however, there have been modest signs of progress in the land of the two rivers. We have recently rebuilt the Brookings Iraq Index, after a hiatus of several years, and noticed some trends:
• The country’s population has grown from about 25 million in the last years of Saddam’s rule to 40 million today. That in itself is neither good nor bad, but it does mean that Iraq is big enough to be a significant player in Mideast politics.
• Per capita gross domestic product has increased to nearly $6,000 today from less than $4,000 two decades ago (in constant 2010 dollars). To be sure, there is still great poverty in Iraq, corruption abounds, and job prospects for young Iraqis are mediocre. Yet there have been positive economic developments.
• Oil production is up from about 2.5 million barrels a day in the latter Saddam years to about 4.5 million barrels now, and export revenues from oil have at least tripled, on average, since 2002.
• With the defeat of ISIS—an achievement that involved far more Iraqi than American forces—the annual rate at which Iraqis have been displaced internally has dropped by more than half since 2014-15.
• Numerous quality-of-life indicators have improved notably over the past two decades. Mobile telephones, once the exclusive preserve of the Baathist elite, are everywhere, with total users roughly equaling population. Internet users now total almost 10 million.
• Life expectancy is up from 67 in 2002 to about 73 today.
• Modern sanitation has climbed and now reaches more than 40% of the population, up from 32% before Saddam’s fall, and more than half the population has safe drinking water, too (though there is clearly much more to do on these fronts).
• The nationwide literacy rate is up from 74% at the turn of the century to 85% today.
• Electricity usage has more than tripled since 2002.
• Estimated civilian fatalities from political violence now total in the low thousands annually—still too high in a land that remains restless and unstable, but reduced 10-fold from the ugly years of the early to mid-2000s, to say nothing of the bloodiest times of Saddam’s rule.
To be sure, if Iraq is on a better path these days, it still has a long way to go to be stable politically and economically. Hundreds of thousands of demonstrators took to the streets last year, and 75% of Iraqis who have told pollsters in recent years that their country was headed in the wrong direction. In indices on corruption and press freedom, Iraq consistently scores in the bottom quarter of all countries. But the country is gradually becoming more prosperous and, it appears, somewhat more stable.
Keeping things going in a better direction will be a huge challenge for Iraqi leaders. Washington should do what it can to help; polls suggest that Iraqis themselves, whatever their Parliament said earlier this year, want a partnership with the U.S., and fear too close a relationship with Iran.
The U.S. has devoted so much to Iraq since 2003—at least $1.5 trillion, more than 4,500 American lives and many times that number wounded, not to mention huge political effort in the Bush and Obama years. More-modest investments are appropriate today. If the issue comes up in the 2020 electoral campaign, American politicians should emphasize not only Iraq’s terrible past, both during and after Saddam’s rule, but its potential—and America’s capacity to help realize it.
Mr. Gollob is a student at Williams College and an intern at the Brookings Institution, where Mr. O’Hanlon is a senior fellow.
-
The Gulf War Ended Too Soon
Bush was right not to go all the way to Baghdad, but he should have backed Shiite rebels in southern Iraq.
By Paul Wolfowitz
Aug. 12, 2020 5:53 pm ET
Thirty years ago this month, on Aug. 2, 1990, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. The U.S. mounted an impressive response, but strategic errors at the end of the Gulf War had consequences the world still lives with today.
As Defense Secretary Dick Cheney’s representative on the Deputies Committee, I had the privilege to observe President George H.W. Bush from the second row. I have nothing but admiration for Bush’s leadership in responding to an aggressive act virtually no one had anticipated. Swallowing an entire country and its oil wealth shocked the world. While it left no doubt about the danger Saddam posed, it made the challenge all the more formidable. In less than a week from a cold start, Bush put together the basic elements of a political-military strategy to force Saddam to relinquish his conquest—peacefully if possible, by force if necessary.
Bush recognized that he could do little, and nothing militarily, without Saudi support. But he also understood the dilemma at the heart of Riyadh’s thinking. For them, the one thing worse than dealing with an aggressive Saddam on their own would be to accept U.S. support only to see it waver, as Jimmy Carter did with Iran and Ronald Reagan in Lebanon.
Bush ignored advice to play down the size of the force the U.S. would have to deploy to defend Saudi oil fields. He authorized Mr. Cheney to tell them the full extent of what was needed. The Saudi ambassador swallowed hard, then said: “At least we know you’re serious.”
The president reinforced that seriousness by his spontaneous statement to reporters: “This will not stand, this aggression against Kuwait.” Implicitly it committed him to taking military action if all else failed. Asked where that phrase came from, Bush replied: “That’s mine. . . . That’s what I feel.”
Throughout the next seven months, Bush made repeated difficult decisions crisply after consulting with his advisers. Some involved great risks, and often the advisers didn’t all agree. By the beginning of March 1991, Saddam’s army was evicted from Kuwait with miraculously low American and coalition casualties.
But unlike his principal advisers, Bush was not “exhilarated” by the outcome. “How can I be exhilarated,” he said to reporters, “when Saddam Hussein is still in power?” That unhappiness, only briefly displayed publicly, comes through clearly in Jon Meachem’s authorized 2015 biography of Bush, who allowed the author access to his diaries.
“I don’t feel euphoria,” Bush wrote on Feb. 28, 1991, the day after the combatants announced a cease-fire. “Hitler is alive, indeed, Hitler is still in office, and that’s the problem. . . . American people elated, [but] I have no elation.” What Mr. Meachem calls “Bush’s postwar despondency” was rooted in the “failure to bring about Saddam’s fall” and some specific contributing failures.
Bush regretted the decision not to force Saddam to the surrender table at Safwan, just across the Kuwaiti border, where U.S. and Iraqi troops had a standoff after the withdrawal and cease-fire. “More substantively,” Meachem writes, “when the rebellions against Saddam began after Safwan, everything went wrong. The United States did nothing to support the insurgents, and the uprising was put down in part by Iraqi helicopters,” which Saddam’s army had been allowed to keep on the pretext that it needed them because the bridges had been destroyed, not strafe and drop mustard gas on the Shiite rebels.
Historians examining how that happened need to ask why the formal decision structure, which Bush had used masterfully until then to make critical decisions almost daily, broke down at the very end.
I still believe Bush was right not to risk American lives pursuing the retreating enemy into Iraq or all the way to Baghdad, particularly since Iraqi defenses against Iran had stiffened when on their own territory. It turned out also that several Republican Guard divisions were still intact.
But there were at least three alternative courses of action that should have been considered, separately or together, as part of a postcombat strategy: Demand that Saddam or one of his principal subordinates surrender personally; secure United Nations Security Council endorsement of the large “disengagement” zone along Iraq’s entire southern border, which our U.N. Ambassador Thomas Pickering had proposed; and insist that Saddam stop using at least his helicopters, if not his tanks as well, to slaughter the Shiite rebels in southern Iraq.
The helicopters were a focus of attention because Iraq had been permitted to keep them on the pretext that they were needed for transportation because of the damage done by coalition bombing. At that point, the fate of the rebellions was the single most important issue for the future of Iraq and for the reputation of the U.S. in the eyes of the Iraqi people. The president himself, personally and publicly (at a March 13 press conference in Canada), had warned Iraq to stop using helicopters against the rebels.
Moreover, Saudi leaders had urged Secretary of State James Baker, during his early March visit to Riyadh, to support the Iraqi rebels. They said, as I remember, that Saddam was still dangerous, “like a wounded snake,” and added that “we’re not afraid of the Shia of Iraq,” who are “Arabs and not Persians,” and had remained loyal to Iraq during eight years of war with Iran.
None of those alternatives would have caused the coalition to collapse—particularly with the Saudis on board—nor would they have required the U.S. to occupy Baghdad. In combination, they would have been an appropriate response to Iraq’s treacherous abuse of the permission it had obtained to fly helicopters.
Supporting the rebellions had risks of its own, but those risks should have been deliberated carefully, as so many others had been over the course of the preceding seven months. But leaders were anxious to end the war and avoid mission creep that would get the U.S. stuck in Iraq, so they weren’t. As a result, Saddam played a cat-and-mouse game that kept the U.S. stuck anyway for 12 more years and beyond.
There was time to allow the president to think things through, but it wasn’t used. The lesson: If time is on your side, don’t succumb to a self-generated sense of urgency. Take the time to examine whether there are better outcomes than simply abandoning “endless wars” in the mistaken belief that you won’t be forced back to war again.
Mr. Wolfowitz, a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, served as U.S. ambassador to Indonesia (1986-89), undersecretary of defense for policy (1989-93) and deputy defense secretary (2001-05).
-
October 5, 2020 Open as PDF
A New US Embassy in Iraq?
By: Caroline D. Rose
Last week, Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi received a phone call that he had been dreading since he took the premiership in May. On the line was U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who said Washington was considering moving its embassy in Baghdad either to Erbil, the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan, or to the al-Asad airbase.
The relocation, Pompeo said, was a matter of security. Attacks by Iran-backed militias had been on the rise since the U.S. killed Qassem Soleimani, the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, earlier this year, but rocket attacks intensified dramatically this summer.
But the prospect of moving isn’t anchored solely in safety concerns. The U.S. is signaling that it is fed up with Iraqi security structures that house militant organizations loyal to Iran that often serve Tehran’s interests. It also reflects Washington’s desire to scale down its presence in the Middle East, and exemplifies the Iraqi government’s struggle to play the zero-sum game against Iran-backed militias that the U.S. wants it to play.
Close Calls
The U.S. Embassy in Baghdad is situated in the Green Zone, a fortified compound of foreign diplomatic missions and Iraqi government buildings. During the global war on terror and the Iraq war, it was the largest and most expensive U.S. embassy in the world. Yet it has always been a rich target for hostile attacks, most recently by Iran, which is highly influential among Iraq’s Shiite militias. The attacks on the U.S. embassy in the Green Zone have been almost too many to count, increasing in frequency to almost once or twice a week. For the most part, the Katyusha rockets fired into the Green Zone have failed to land on target, not imposing any casualties or major damage. However, there have been some close calls. The Iraqi public itself is also becoming cause for concern. Following months of nationwide demonstrations, anti-U.S. protesters breached the embassy’s walls and damaged embassy property in December 2019. Among the participants were Shiite militiamen who didn’t even bother to take off their uniforms.
Clearly, the U.S. can deploy more of its armed forces to deal with the threat – and, in fact, has at various points throughout the year – but Washington has made clear that embroiling itself in Middle Eastern wars is no longer part of its global strategy. Since March, the U.S. has authorized a drawdown of U.S. forces from 5,200 troops to 3,000 and departed a slew of important bases in Camp Taji, the Qayyarah airfield, al-Taqaddum and al-Qaim.
As the military reduced its footprint, the State Department followed suit. The U.S. Mission in Baghdad reduced the size of its staff again in May 2020, keeping a smaller team of State Department personnel and the chief of mission to reduce security risks.
Inducing Behavior
Washington is thus considering whether it will move the embassy to Iraqi Kurdistan. It already has a consulate in Erbil and is building a larger, more secure compound to be completed in 2022. The move is somewhat sensible; Erbil has been subjected to fewer attacks than Baghdad, thanks to increased protection from Kurdish peshmergas and increased distance from militia hotspots. But it’s not without its problems, and it’s not entirely clear that it will stay so safe. As soon as Iraqi militias caught wind of the U.S. consideration to move, they conducted strikes on a U.S. coalition base near the Erbil International Airport to send the message that unless the U.S. pulls out of Iraq entirely, Iran-backed groups will target American personnel wherever they are. Moreover, relocating to Kurdistan would aggravate a decadeslong ethnic and financial dispute between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government. It would also require additional financial assistance to the KRG, something that would be seen as preferential treatment in highly sensitive matters of political autonomy and budget allocation that could undermine Baghdad’s authority.
(click to enlarge)
The option of moving to al-Asad airbase shows an even greater desire to scale down in Iraq. There are some advantages to moving the compound there, of course. It’s located in Anbar province and offers a more neutral, less-politicized alternative to Erbil. The base is one of the largest and oldest joint U.S.-Iraq bases in the country and is therefore heavily securitized. It houses Iraqi armed forces that Shiite militias are generally less likely to attack.
But that doesn’t mean it’s immune to attack. Al-Asad was one of the highest-profile targets of Iran’s response to the killing of Soleimani. At least 11 ballistic missiles inflicted heavy damage, though because of advanced warning systems no personnel were killed. Put simply, if the U.S. combined its embassy with one of its largest remaining military posts, al-Asad would become an inevitable target for attacks.
Indeed, no matter where the U.S. moves its mission, Iran-backed militias will follow. They’re simply too important to Iran’s regional strategy of projecting power to the Mediterranean. This is why, security issues aside, Washington is hoping to induce certain behaviors in the Iraqi government. Pompeo has pressured al-Kadhimi to rein in rogue militias, threatening U.S. presence and thus financial, political and humanitarian assistance. The problem is that, like his predecessors, al-Kadhimi has no solid base of support; he must try to juggle between appeasing pro-American, pro-Iranian, Sunni and Kurdish parties. This has led to short-term solutions such as one-off raids to curb the militias’ power. But Baghdad has learned the hard way that quick fixes won’t root Iranian influence in its security apparatus. The Popular Mobilization Forces, for example, is an Iraqi state organization that by law reports to the Iraqi prime minister but comprises militias like Kataib Hezbollah that unofficially are loyal to the IRGC. These militias are deeply embedded in Iraq’s defense structure and paid by Iraqi federal funds for helping defeat the Islamic State. Collectively they outmatch Iraqi armed forces, wield economic influence through infrastructural projects, tax collection, and informal trade, and are politically relevant in parliament through their parliamentary bloc, the Fatah Alliance.
What modest efforts al-Kadhimi has made to remove the militias’ influence over the state’s economy, political process and national security have come at great cost. Rocket strikes against Iraqi government sites – even Iraqi civilian centers – have been on the rise, while militias have harassed government officials and assassinated government advisers.
The relocation of the U.S. Embassy may well mark a new stage in Washington’s relationship with Iraq and thus in its influence in the Middle East. If militias simply choose to attack a new location, it may well be more of the same. Whether or not the U.S. leaves entirely, its departure from Baghdad after nearly two decades of heavy presence is at least symbolically meaningful insofar as it shows Washington’s growing disinterest in and disengagement from Iraq.
-
What the U.S. Troop Drawdown Means for Iraq
Thomas Abi-Hanna
Thomas Abi-Hanna
Global Security Analyst, Stratfor
5 MINS READ
Dec 24, 2020 | 12:00 GMT
HIGHLIGHTS
President-elect Joe Biden will seek to draw down the U.S. presence in Iraq due to long-standing domestic political pressure, shifting the foreign policy focus to other objectives such as near-peer competition with China and Russia. This will create room for Iran, its proxies and others to gain more influence in Iraq....
President-elect Joe Biden will seek to draw down the U.S. presence in Iraq due to long-standing domestic political pressure, shifting the foreign policy focus to other objectives such as near-peer competition with China and Russia. This will create room for Iran, its proxies and others to gain more influence in Iraq.
After the U.S. troop surge in Iraq in 2007, the Bush, Obama and Trump administrations all subsequently decreased the U.S. presence in Iraq to a degree. (The notable exception being when the Obama administration was forced to reverse course from its 2011 withdrawal following the rise of the Islamic State.)
Biden faces long-standing pressure from the left wing of the Democratic Party to deprioritize Iraq as a foreign policy objective, and the president-elect himself has a record of calling for the U.S. to draw down its presence in Iraq — most notably when he served as vice president. Likewise, U.S. Central Command has a stated goal of drawing down the U.S. presence in Iraq by 2023, during Biden's term.
Biden's current foreign policy platform focuses on other issues such as competition with China, reestablishing ties with European allies in NATO and the European Union, and addressing climate issues as more important foreign policy objectives. In fact, Iraq does not even appear in Biden's published foreign policy plan, which only indirectly refers to the issue in saying that the administration intends to "end forever wars."
Iraq's parliament passed a nonbinding resolution in January 2020 demanding Iraq expel all foreign troops, a resolution whose timing in the wake of the targeted killing of Iranian Gen. Qassem Soleimani in Baghdad by the United States indicated it was clearly aimed at the United States.
The Biden administration will have more leeway to draw down because it does not face the same factors that constrained the previous two administrations, but will not completely withdraw in an attempt to maintain some influence in the country. The Obama administration did withdraw from Iraq, but had to reverse when the country faced an existential security crisis in 2014 from the Islamic State. The Trump administration then helped Iraq to complete a campaign to retake all Islamic State-controlled territory, while also taking a more aggressive military posture toward Iranian-backed militias in the country as a part of its wider maximum pressure campaign on Iran.
Biden faces a weakened Islamic State which, unlike in the Obama administration, no longer exercises territorial control over parts of Iraq and does not pose the level of threat that required a larger U.S. military presence.
In contrast to the Trump administration's aggressive approach, Biden has signaled he will take a far less confrontational military posture toward Iranian-backed militias in Iraq as a part of a broader policy of reducing tensions with Tehran.
The U.S. view of Iraq as a regional partner on counterterrorism and other issues means it will not completely withdraw from the country. The Biden administration understands the potential dangers of a complete U.S. withdrawal and will seek to avoid those by maintaining a limited military presence. Absent another existential security crisis in Iraq, however, the United States is unlikely to completely reverse course and increase its military presence.
Iran is the external power with the greatest incentive and ability to expand its power and influence in Iraq, which it will be able to do more extensively given a diminished U.S. presence. Geopolitical imperatives have always driven Iran to seek more influence in Iraq, while its already extensive political, economic and security links to Iraq have put it in a prime position to capitalize on any U.S. withdrawal.
Iran's proximity to Iraq gives it the incentive and capability to exert more pressure in the country. One of Iran's main strategic objectives is to prevent Iraq from becoming the independent, strong and hostile neighbor it was under Saddam Hussein.
Iran also has preexisting economic, religious and political ties to Iraq that it has built up significantly since 2003. Iran played an important role in preventing the Islamic State from seizing Baghdad in 2014, and Iranian-backed militias still hold significant sway within the country.
These factors give Iran an advantage over other regional powers such as Turkey or Saudi Arabia, which have various incentives to expand their influence in Iraq, but lack the advantages Iran enjoys.
Although it will not completely withdraw, the drawdown of the U.S. presence in Iraq will weaken its influence in the country, make it more difficult for the U.S. to achieve additional future policy objectives in Baghdad and contribute to further political instability. Various Iraqi groups have opposed the U.S. presence in Iraq and called for the full withdrawal of American troops, while elements of the country's ties with Iran and Russia have caused tensions between Washington and Baghdad.
A less significant U.S. presence in Iraq means Baghdad will look for other external powers for additional economic and political support, opening up the door for major players outside of the Middle East like China and Russia to expand their influence in the country.
Other Iraqi actors will also seek to fill the vacuum of U.S. influence, creating even more political friction points between competing groups in an already-fragmented and -fraught domestic political environment. This could compound Iraq's economic problems.
Concrete U.S. moves to draw down its military presence will also likely embolden Iraqi factions that have called for a complete U.S. withdrawal. More emboldened opposition to the U.S. presence in the country will make it more difficult for Washington to achieve other policy objectives in Iraq.
Iraqi factions hostile to the U.S., including Iranian-backed militias, will be incentivized to accelerate this withdrawal by launching attacks and driving up the cost for continued U.S. involvement in the country — a strategy they saw as successful in the run-up to the 2011 withdrawal.
Beyond 2021, a more significant Iranian influence in Iraq will also set the stage for the country to reemerge as a hotspot for a potential resurgence in U.S.-Iranian tensions.
-
second post
Stratfor Worldview
SIGN IN
SUBSCRIBE
Iraq's Currency Devaluation Will Prove a Double-edged Sword
5 MINS READ
Dec 24, 2020 | 10:00 GMT
An employee of a currency exchange counter shows a stack of local currency bank notes in the southern Iraqi city of Nasiriyah in Dhi Qar province on Dec. 20, 2020.
An employee of a currency exchange counter shows a stack of dinars in the southern Iraqi city of Nasiriyah in Dhi Qar province on Dec. 20, 2020.
(ASAAD NIAZI/AFP via Getty Images)
HIGHLIGHTS
Devaluing its currency will help Iraq slow the drawdown of foreign currency reserves but will increase the cost of living, weakening already fraught public support for Iraqi government efforts to implement other longer term reforms in 2021....
Devaluing its currency will help Iraq slow the drawdown of foreign currency reserves but will increase the cost of living, weakening already fraught public support for Iraqi government efforts to implement other longer term reforms in 2021. On Dec. 19, Iraq's central bank adjusted the sale price of dollars to Iraqi banks and currency exchanges from 1,180 dinars to the dollar to 1,460 dinars, an almost 24% devaluation, Iraq's first since 2003. The devaluation will help the government balance sheet going into 2021 by enabling Baghdad to pay overdue salaries in local currency at a better rate, but will not help with other deeper economic reform efforts still being debated by politicians.
The government is actively debating the 2021 budget, which projects high spending — 150 trillion dinars, higher than the 133 trillion-dinar 2019 budget — but also a high deficit at 58 trillion dinars. (Passing a budget can be such a fraught process in Iraq that a 2020 budget was never officially passed.)
The International Monetary Fund warned in late 2019 that Iraq's real exchange rate risked moving into "overvalued territory" without fiscal adjustment, and indeed Iraq has increasingly used reserves to prop up its currency.
Iraq's government took the unpopular decision to devalue now because it will help balance its growing budget deficit and stem the swift drawdown on its financial reserves. Iraq's widening budget deficit was aggravated by COVID-19's negative impact on oil prices and oil revenue, Iraq's main source of income, which is earned in dollars. Iraqi foreign exchange reserves (excluding gold) fell to $51 billion by the end of September per the Central Bank of Iraq's most recent available data, down from $62 billion at the end of 2019. The same day as the devaluation, the Iraqi government estimated that it would deplete foreign currency reserves entirely within seven months if it had not devalued the currency — and if the central bank could suddenly no longer defend the currency peg, Iraq would have faced a disorderly and abrupt devaluation anyhow.
The IMF forecast in mid-December 2020 that Iraq would see an 11% contraction in gross domestic product growth this year and the World Bank forecast in October 2020 that Iraq's economic growth could recover to somewhere between 2.0% and 7.3% in 2021, but only if crisis conditions ease.
The Iraqi government derives 90% of its revenue from oil, which becomes a liability and not a strength in a year like 2020 that saw a global decrease in demand for energy.
Devaluation will enable the government to pay public sector salaries in the near term. But it will not help solve the growing price tag of public sector salaries, pensions and benefits in the long term, highlighting one of the biggest and toughest financial problems Iraq faces. Devaluation will lower the cost in dollars of public sector salaries and other dinar-denominated liabilities, but actually reducing the overall cost of salaries as a percentage of spending in the budget will require undoing long-standing social expectations of the government providing welfare, employment and other benefits to Iraqis.
Iraq's biggest employer by far is the government, which employs 4 million public sector workers, pays pensions to 3 million and supplies welfare to 1 million.
The Iraqi government loosely plans to reduce the public sector wage bill from 25% of GDP to 12% of GDP over the coming year, which will mean forced retirements likely to stir anger at the government.
A bar graph showing Iraqi Government Spending
Devaluation will raise the price of imports in a country that imports most of its goods and lacks the ability to quickly ramp up domestic substitutes, which will increase the cost of living in a poor country about to face other austerity measures. Iraq already struggles with significant poverty. Its official poverty rate has roughly doubled this year to 40%, high even by regional standards. A sharp increase to the cost of imports without sufficient cheaper domestic substitutes will exacerbate inflation and existing cost of living struggles, even if over the long term this encourages the development of domestic manufacturing. In a country that struggles with persistent economically motivated popular unrest and frequent anti-government demonstrations, any cost-of-living increase easily risks sparking even more unrest. Moreover, devaluation comes as the government is planning to implement other measures in 2021 that will increase the cost of living, including a new income tax. New planned hikes to utility costs in 2021 will also collide with planned slashes to Iranian energy imports, likely increasing the cost of electricity and creating volatility in supply.
Iraq imports more than it exports. In 2019, it imported $92 billion worth of goods, mostly manufactured goods (Iraq does not have a well-developed manufacturing sector), medication, vehicles, tobacco and food. Iraq exported $86.8 billion, overwhelmingly crude oil and fuels.
Part of the 2021 budget discussions include plans to rationalize subsidies on utilities and implement a new 15% income tax, both of which will increase the cost of living.
The Iraqi government will struggle to implement deeper reforms given the weak political will of the current government, growing public anger over devaluation and the volatile economy, and the fact that 2021 is an election year. Public dissatisfaction with the government's decision to devalue the currency will weaken Baghdad's ability to implement and follow through on much-needed reforms. Moreover, slated legislative elections in June 2021 will render many politicians skittish about making any unpopular decisions on reforms that could lead to austerity measures. And without fixing systemic corruption (a highly unlikely development over the next year), it's hard to see Iraq's economy getting on a better footing in the long term.
In mid-December, the IMF said that in order for Iraq to actually establish firm financial footing for the long term, it needed to "strengthen public finances, improve governance, reform the electricity sector, promote private sector development, and ensure financial sector stability," all of which will require significantly increased state power and stability.
-
https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2021/02/biden-administration-taking-steps-stay-iraq-forever/172209/
-
https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2021/03/militias-iraq-provide-security-wield-political-power-and-may-be-tearing-country-apart/172390/
-
Protests Back Iraq’s New Government Into a Corner
A resurgence of protests in Iraq risks destabilizing the country’s one-year-old government ahead of October elections, but is unlikely to unseat Iran’s deep-rooted influence in Baghdad. May 25 protests demanding reform and accountability from the Iraqi government for extrajudicial killings reignited popular mobilization in numbers akin to those seen in 2019 before the COVID-19 pandemic. Similar protests are likely to continue leading up to October parliamentary elections, which will be a flashpoint between Iraq’s activists and the Iran-backed militias that they believe are to blame for the dozens of assassinations and attempted assassinations of activists in Iraq over the last two years.
-
https://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-backed-militias-threaten-revenge-after-u-s-airstrikes-in-iraq-syria-11624877977?mod=politics_lead_pos1
-
U.S., Iraq to Agree That Combat Troops Should Leave by End of 2021
Officials to reaffirm that U.S. military presence is still needed to help Iraqi forces fight Islamic State
Some experts on the region said that the change may have little effect on the day-to-day duties of most U.S. troops in Iraq.
PHOTO: JOHN MOORE/GETTY IMAGES
By Michael R. Gordon
Updated July 22, 2021 6:13 pm ET
Top Iraqi and U.S. officials plan to issue a statement calling for U.S. combat troops to leave Iraq by year-end, both nations’ officials said, but would reaffirm the need for a U.S. military presence to help Iraqi forces in their fight against Islamic State.
“We don’t need any more fighters because we have those,” Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein told The Wall Street Journal. “What do we need? We need cooperation in the field of intelligence. We need help with training. We need troops to help us in the air.”
The statement is to be issued in connection with Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi’s visit to Washington on Monday, when he will meet with President Biden.
The purpose of the statement, current and former officials said, is to enable the Iraqi leader to blunt the political pressure from hard-line Shiite factions who want all of the approximately 2,500 American troops in the country to depart, while maintaining U.S. support for Iraqi security forces.
One U.S. official said that Washington plans to meet the terms of the statement mainly by redefining the role of some of the U.S. forces in the country instead of reducing the U.S. presence.
“It is not really a numerical adjustment but rather a functional clarification of what the force would be doing consistent with our strategic priorities,” a U.S. official said.
Propaganda footage appears to show Taliban forces guarding a U.S.-built border crossing between Afghanistan and Tajikistan. WSJ’s Gordon Lubold reports from Kabul as American troops withdraw and the Taliban claim control of more than one third of the country. Photo: Sky/Associated Press
Some experts on the region said that the change may have little effect on the day-to-day duties of most U.S. troops in the country, who have been advising and supporting Iraqi forces in their fight with Islamic State militants.
“The aim is to help Kadhimi go home with an achievement but without collapsing the counterterrorism campaign,” said Michael Knights of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. “Almost none of the forces in Iraq engage in combat unless they are attacked.”
Still, it is unclear whether the move will do enough to placate Mr. Kadhimi’s critics at home. And it is unlikely to satisfy the Iran-backed militias that have been mounting rocket and drone attacks at bases where U.S. troops have been located.
“The Iranian-backed Shia hard-liners have never differentiated U.S. troops by their mission or status,” said James Jeffrey, a former U.S. ambassador to Iraq. “They want them all out.”
U.S. and Iraqi officials didn’t provide details on how the removal of combat troops would be implemented and how the planned statement could be interpreted to allow for core missions. For instance, the U.S. military generally considers air defense units that protect against rocket and drone attacks to be combat troops. But the Pentagon also remains strongly committed to safeguarding all U.S. troops—combat and noncombat—in Iraq.
Officials also didn’t specify how a combat troop withdrawal might affect future operations by U.S. special operations forces, which have used Iraq as a base to mount raids against Islamic State militants in neighboring Syria.
The presence of U.S. forces in Iraq has been a sensitive issue for Mr. Kadhimi, who depends heavily on U.S. military and political support and is buffeted by hard-line Shiite politicians.
The Iraqi military deteriorated considerably after U.S. forces left Iraq in 2011 and American efforts to train the Iraqi army ceased. U.S. troops returned to advise and train Iraqi forces and also support them with airstrikes after Islamic State took Mosul, Iraq’s second-largest city, in June 2014.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization nations have also pledged to scale up the alliance’s modest training effort in Iraq, and the organization would be unlikely to continue its mission if the U.S. military were to leave. The small U.S. military presence in Iraq is also used to support the approximately 900 troops the U.S. has in Syria as part of the campaign against Islamic State militants there.
But Iranian-backed militias have kept up the pressure on the U.S. military to leave by mounting rocket and drone attacks against Iraqi installations where American forces are based. President Biden has conducted two retaliatory strikes in response.
Hossein Taeb, head of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, has visited Iran in recent weeks to meet with the militias Iran supports, Middle Eastern officials say.
White House spokeswoman Jen Psaki said Thursday that there was a decreasing need for U.S. forces with a combat role in Iraq and that the future American military role in Iraq would be discussed when Mr. Kadhimi meets with Mr. Biden. In April, the U.S. and Iraq said in a statement that the mission of U.S. and coalition forces was focused on training and advising, and that a schedule for the “redeployment of any remaining combat forces from Iraq” would be decided in future talks.
—Benoit Faucon in London contributed to this article.
Write to Michael R. Gordon at michael.gordon@wsj.com
Copyright ©2021 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8
Appeared in the July 23, 2021, print edition as 'U.S. to Pull Combat Troops Out of Iraq.'
-
By: Geopolitical Futures
Ambitious plans. French President Emmanuel Macron was in Iraq over the weekend and pledged that French forces would remain in the country even if the United States pulls out.
-
https://michaelyon.locals.com/upost/1100375/possibly-significant-pay-attention-to-this-one
-
https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2021/12/combat-mission-iraq-has-ended-troops-arent-coming-home/187433/
-
Geopolitical Futures
August 25, 2022
View On Website
Open as PDF
In Iraq’s Political Stalemate, Muqtada al-Sadr Is No Kingmaker
The Shiite cleric has a long history of shifting allegiances to pursue his own ambitions.
By: Hilal Khashan
Iraq’s political impasse shows no signs of ending. Following elections last October, a bloc led by influential Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr emerged as the largest parliamentary faction, winning 73 of 329 seats in the country’s national assembly and setting the stage to form a new government with its allies. Meanwhile, the Iranian-backed Coordination Framework, which performed poorly in the elections, insisted that a national unity government be formed that would accommodate all significant political forces. Al-Sadr rejected the plan and instead forged a coalition called the Save the Homeland Alliance with the Sunni Sovereignty Coalition and the Kurdistan Democratic Party. The fierce rivalry between the Sadrist movement’s camp and the Framework escalated as the latter blocked parliament from convening and prevented al-Sadr and his Sunni allies from forming a government without them.
Last month, al-Sadr’s followers held a five-day sit-in at the parliament building in support of the cleric and in protest against rival attempts to nominate a prime minister. Earlier this week, they held another brief protest at the Supreme Judicial Council. Iraqi politicians have warned that this escalating crisis could trigger an intra-Shiite civil war. Though the current political turmoil is more intense than in the past, it’s unlikely to lead to serious unrest. Al-Sadr is a populist leader, and his opposition to Iran and its Iraqi allies is part of a ploy to gain popular legitimacy, but he will not cross Iran’s red lines.
The Making of the Crisis
After the outcome of the 2021 elections was announced, the Framework warned that proceeding with the results would undermine peace in Iraq. The Fatah Alliance, an umbrella group consisting of 17 Shiite movements, was a big loser in the election, winning just 16 seats after coming in second place in the 2018 vote with 48 seats. The Federal Supreme Court ruled that two-thirds of the members of parliament, or 210 deputies, needed to be present for a parliamentary session in order to nominate a new president – which is a prerequisite for forming a government. But after members of the Framework boycotted parliamentary meetings, lawmakers were unable to elect an official to the post. Al-Sadr angrily threatened the Iranian-backed factions with further escalation and publicly criticized the judiciary, accusing it of colluding with the parliamentary minority to block the legislative branch of government. The Framework denounced al-Sadr’s questioning of the court, describing his comments as dangerous. They urged him and his allies to curtail their efforts to form a majority government, prioritize the national interest and stop trying to monopolize power.
2021 Iraqi Parliamentary Election Results
(click to enlarge)
Al-Sadr rejects the Lebanese-style sectarian quota system of forming a government, which has been used in Iraq since the 2005 general elections and led to Hezbollah’s increasingly influential role in Lebanese politics. He criticized the system for allowing one-third of deputies, who represent political parties that lack popular legitimacy, to prevent a new government from being formed. His supporters even released the names and addresses of Iranian-backed militia leaders, hinting that they would be targeted soon.
The Framework says al-Sadr went too far this time. It seems that the policy of containment has failed, as al-Sadr now sees himself as a kingmaker who can get away with anything. The Framework issued a stern warning, saying that they were “patient with him for a long time” but that “this stage is over, and he will see a different approach from us in the coming days.” In what appears to be a threat to ignite a Shiite civil war, a Framework militia leader also warned al-Sadr’s militia against choosing armed confrontation.
Unpredictable Politician
Al-Sadr’s political biography is complicated and full of contradictions. He supports uprisings and then turns against them. He enters contradictory alliances but never loses popularity among poor Shiites. He promotes himself as the voice of dispossessed Shiites against the ruling elite’s corruption, but his representatives control lucrative Cabinet portfolios, amassing great personal wealth. He calls for the disarmament of militias but runs one of the largest and most important Shiite armed factions, Saraya al-Salam.
Al-Sadr has changed alliances many times throughout his political career. In 2003, he established the Mahdi Army, a militia that, between 2006 and 2008, cooperated with Iran to become its functionary in attacking American troops in Iraq. He also established the death squads that assassinated Sunni officers in the now-defunct armed forces, specifically air force pilots. In 2006, al-Sadr helped his former opponent, Nouri al-Maliki, become prime minister before al-Maliki turned against him in the 2008 Battle of Basra, after which al-Sadr laid down his arms, demobilized the Mahdi Army and left for Iran. Al-Sadr nonetheless helped al-Maliki secure a second term but joined ranks with Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani in 2014 to prevent al-Maliki from winning again.
After the October 2019 uprising against rampant corruption, al-Sadr cooperated with Shiite militias to force Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi to resign, despite promoting his candidacy in 2018. In the massive demonstrations, al-Sadr said he backed the people’s demands, sending his supporters to join the protesters, setting up tents in central Baghdad, and providing the protesters with food and medical supplies. But the demonstrators, primarily middle-class youth, questioned his intentions. They set up separate protest camps and did not allow al-Sadr’s followers to join them. By the end of the year, al-Sadr changed his position on the uprising after meeting Qassem Soleimani, the commander of the Quds Brigade of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, whom the U.S. assassinated in January 2020. Al-Sadr’s militiamen attacked the demonstrators’ tents, killing and wounding hundreds of them.
After years of following a strict Shiite policy line and cooperating with Iran, al-Sadr is beginning to give the impression that he is independent of Tehran’s influence and trying to liquidate the political role of its local proxies. He shifted from supporting pan-Shiism to Iraqi Arab nationalism as he explored different domestic and regional alliances. In 2018, al-Sadr formed Sairun Alliance to promote far-reaching political reforms. The cross-sectarian and nationalist alliance comprised Shiites, Sunnis, Kurds and six political parties, including the Iraqi Communist Party.
Ethnic & Religious Demographics of Iraq
(click to enlarge)
Frustrated Leader
Al-Sadr hails from a prominent religious family that formed Iraq’s most significant Shiite movement with millions of loyal followers. He inherited leadership of the group from his father, Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, who sparked an uprising against Saddam Hussein’s regime in 1991 and was assassinated in 1999. His father-in-law, Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, cofounded the Islamic Dawa Party in 1957 and was killed by the Baathist regime in 1980.
Known as the city of the poor, Sadr City in east Baghdad is where Muqtada al-Sadr gained influence after 2003. Despite his family background and popularity, al-Sadr failed to achieve his objective of leading Iraq. Although he is a prominent spiritual leader, al-Sadr has not yet attained the status of a mujtahid, or jurist, which is at the bottom of the hierarchy leading to the title of ayatollah. He is a frustrated ally of Iran, having worked closely with the Iranians until they began recruiting his men to form new militias to contest his control over Shiites. Tehran now turns a blind eye to his reckless rhetoric because it doesn’t represent any real threat to Iran's dominance of Iraq. He objects to the idea of Shiite unity promoted by Iran because it would undermine his power and influence.
Al-Sadr was accused of killing Shiite cleric Abdul-Majid al-Khoei, who was close to the U.S. after arriving in Najaf immediately following the fall of Saddam’s regime. Al-Khoei’s father, Grand Ayatollah Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei, was the leader of the Shiite seminary in Najaf until his death in 1992. Were it not for his murder, Abdul-Majid al-Khoei would have become the uncontested leader of Iraqi Shiites, and al-Sadr would not have appeared on the country’s political map. Al-Sadr’s visit to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in 2017 raised suspicions in Iran, though they soon faded because the rulers of the two Arab countries didn’t take him seriously. After Soleimani’s assassination, al-Sadr expected Iran to back him to become its unofficial regent in Iraq, but they remained at odds, in part because of the Iranians’ lack of confidence in al-Sadr’s changing moods and in part because he feels they don’t appreciate his political importance.
Iran tolerates al-Sadr’s criticism because it doesn’t see him as a threat to its influence in Iraq. He serves Iranian interests by preventing Shiites in Iraq from joining secular political parties and ensuring they remain split between the Sadrist movement and the pro-Tehran factions organized under the Framework. Iran prefers that Iraqi Shiites disillusioned with the Framework join the Sadrist movement, which it can quickly rein in, as opposed to the secularist and nationalist Iraqi groups over which it has no influence. The Iranians remember how Shiite activist cleric Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr cofounded the Islamic Dawa Party and pulled young Shiites away from the Iraqi Communist Party, which threatened to marginalize the Najaf-based clerical establishment.
Al-Sadr’s campaign against rampant corruption in Iraq is a facade to promote his political career. While he presents himself as a staunch opponent of Iran’s presence in Iraq, he takes refuge in Iran whenever he feels threatened at home. The Iranians, meanwhile, view him as a useful adversary because of his appeal to poor Shiites, whom he can readily control.
-
Cleric’s exit puts Iraq’s survival in peril
Chaos gives uncertainty to U.S., opening to Iran
BY BEN WOLFGANG THE WASHINGTON TIMES
Iraq descended deeper into chaos Monday after influential Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr announced his “definitive retirement” from politics, sparking deadly clashes at Baghdad’s presidential palace and potentially opening the door for Iran-backed militia groups to emerge from the turmoil with more power.
Although his track record suggests the retirement won’t be permanent, Mr. al-Sadr’s exit from the Iraqi political scene immediately plunged the country into an uncertain future with significant consequences for U.S. national security and regional stability. The cleric’s unexpected move caps a tumultuous 10-month period of deadlock inside the Iraqi government after Mr. al-Sadr’s party captured the largest share of parliamentary seats in October’s elections but fell far short of the number needed to form a majority government.
The cleric, an Iraqi nationalist who achieved fame leading Shiite militias that battled the U.S.-run administration after the ouster of Saddam Hussein, has been battling for power with other Shiite groups, in particular the Iran-backed Coordination Framework. The clashes have virtually paralyzed the government since those elections and led to months of escalating protests and occupations of government buildings from Mr. al-Sadr’s legions of followers.
The U.S. still bases thousands of troops across Iraq, partly to keep down the Islamic State terrorist group, which once held broad swaths of the country, and partly to check Iran, which has pushed for more influence over its troubled neighbor as the instability has risen. Iran has deep links to fellow Shiite Islam groups inside Iraq and to the network of Shiite militias and their political wing that has battled Mr. al-Sadr for power.
With no clear path forward, the powerful cleric said he would
leave politics and shutter all of his party offices.
“I’ve decided not to meddle in political affairs. I therefore announce now my definitive retirement,” he said in his announcement, according to Englishlanguage media translations.
The move led to immediate violence in Baghdad. Mr. al-Sadr’s supporters stormed the government palace inside the city’s heavily fortified Green Zone and reportedly clashed with Iraqi security forces. At least 15 protesters were reported killed, according to the Reuters news agency. Dozens more were wounded by gunfire, tear gas and physical altercations with law enforcement, according to media reports from the ground.
Images of protesters inside the palace halls, some even bathing in the complex’s swimming pool, flooded social media as authorities tried to regain control of an increasingly volatile scene. The Iraqi military quickly imposed a nationwide curfew beginning at 7 p.m. local time and called on protesters to show restraint.
The United Nations mission in Iraq cast the protests as an “extremely dangerous escalation” that could quickly spiral out of control.
“The very survival of the state is at stake,” the mission’s statement said.
State Department officials condemned the violence but denied reports that the Biden administration ordered an evacuation of the huge U.S. Embassy inside the Green Zone.
“Reports of Embassy Baghdad being evacuated are false,” State Department spokesman Vedant Patel told reporters. “Reports of unrest throughout Iraq today are disturbing as Iraqi institutions are not being allowed to function. … Now is the time for dialogue, and we urge all of those involved to remain calm and pursue peaceful avenues of redress.”
Asked whether Secretary of State Antony Blinken would speak with Iraqi officials, Mr. Patel said there were no such plans to announce as of Monday afternoon.
Within hours of Mr. al-Sadr’s announcement, some foreign policy observers quickly mocked the cleric and said the move is little more than showmanship. The charismatic cleric has made such retirement declarations several other times, only to eventually return to the political scene.
“By my account since 2003 this is the 6th time that Iraqi cleric Muqtada Sadr announces his retirement from politics. Each ‘retirement’ lasted an average of 8 months,” Iranian-born columnist Amir Taheri said in a Twitter post. “He is still short of Frank Sinatra’s 12 ‘final goodbye’ concerts.”
Despite having never formally served in the Iraqi government, Mr. al-Sadr has long been a pivotal player in the country’s politics. He rose to international prominence in the years after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 by commanding militias that battled U.S. and coalition forces in a series of bloody battles.
Given that violent past, Mr. al-Sadr hardly qualifies as a U.S. ally in the traditional sense. Still, as the chief rival to Iran’s political proxies in Iraq, Mr. al-Sadr became a crucial figure in the battle for Iraq’s future.
The Biden administration’s handling of Iraqi politics over the past 10 months will be heavily scrutinized in the days and weeks to come.
Critics say that under President Biden and Mr. Blinken, the U.S. took too much of a hands-off approach to the turmoil in Baghdad and failed to fully grasp the potential for Mr. al-Sadr’s Shiite opponents, the Iran-backed Coordination Framework, to assume more power.
The total collapse of Iraq, or Iranian proxies claiming full control of the government, would represent a major foreign policy disaster for the Biden administration, especially just one year after the U.S. military withdrawal led to a second Taliban reign in Afghanistan.
The turmoil in Iraq also has escalated during U.S. negotiations with Tehran over its suspect nuclear programs. The administration is hoping to revive an Obama-era deal limiting that program in exchange for sanctions relief.
Foreign policy analysts say the administration should have done more to try to head off the chaotic situation unfolding in Baghdad and limit Iran’s influence in the region.
“Iran will likely emerge with a strengthened position in Baghdad, thwarting the will of an Iraqi electorate that overwhelmingly voted for change last October,” David Schenker, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, wrote in a recent piece for Foreign Policy magazine. “To be sure, it’s not clear that Washington could have prevented this outcome. In any event, it doesn’t appear that the administration made any concerted effort to forestall this scenario.
“All this matters because Iraq is important to the United States and its interests in the region,” said Mr. Schenker, who served as assistant secretary of state for Near East affairs during the Trump administration. “Not only did thousands of Americans lose life and limb to help build a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, but, unlike Afghanistan, Iraq really is a counterterrorism partner with a real chance at becoming a full-fledged democracy. The country stands on vital geostrategic territory, holds the world’s fifth largest oil reserves, and is on the front line against Iran’s effort to expand its influence throughout the Middle East.”
In addition to diplomatic staff in Baghdad, the U.S. has about 2,500 troops stationed in Iraq even though its combat mission is technically over.
Those troops are stationed as part of an international mission to battle the Islamic State terrorist group. About 1,000 U.S. troops stationed in neighboring Syria are tasked with the same mission.
American forces in both countries have come under repeated rocket and drone attacks from Iran-backed militias belonging to Iraq’s Shiite Popular Mobilization Forces umbrella organization. U.S. troops responded forcefully last week with a series of airstrikes on militia facilities and weapons depots in Syria.
-
Biden / Obama
lets kiss mullahs butts and crush Republicans at home
lets tax the heck out of Americans ( "the rich ")
and pay off the mullahs
:wink: :roll:
who would have ever thought we have leadership like this ......
Even James Earl Carter was not this crazy
-
https://sonar21.com/bidens-new-crisis-is-he-u-s-losing-control-of-iraq/
-
What to Make of the Bloody Clashes in Baghdad
6 MIN READAug 31, 2022 | 22:32 GMT
The recent violence in Baghdad will add greater impetus among stakeholders in Iraq, including Iran, to finally resolve the country's nearly year-long political crisis. But Iraq's feuding Shiite factions are unlikely to reach a compromise anytime soon, portending more militia violence and unruly protests that could eventually disrupt the country's vital oil exports. At least 30 people were killed and 700 wounded in clashes in Baghdad on Aug. 29 and 30, marking the bloodiest episode of unrest the Iraqi capital has seen in recent years. The violence erupted after influential Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr unexpectedly announced that he was stepping down from politics on Aug. 29, prompting confusion and anger among his millions of followers. In Baghdad, al-Sadr's supporters took to the streets, where they clashed with supporters of the rival Shia Coordination Framework (SCF). Sadrist protesters then escalated their demonstrations by storming the presidential palace in Baghdad's Green Zone, leading to more bloody clashes as Iraqi security forces tried to restore order. In an Aug. 30 address, al-Sadr called on his supporters to retreat and reiterated his decision to exit Iraq's political scene, which has since helped restore relative peace in the capital city. But Iraq's security situation remains precarious — especially given that the political tensions underpinning the recent clashes remain unresolved.
The clashes come amid tensions between al-Sadr supporters and the pro-Iran SCF over efforts to form a government following October 2021 elections. Sadrists won the most seats, but not enough seats to unilaterally form a government. Their rivals within the SCF won the second-largest number of seats in the election, which they've since used to block the formation of a Sadrist government — leaving Iraq lodged in a political crisis for nearly a year.
The clashes show how violence risks increasingly becoming a go-to answer for Iraqis who are frustrated with their leaders' continued failure to form a new government. The continued lack of progress in government formation talks since last year's election has seen rival political camps increasingly resort to inciting violence by rallying their supporters to take to the streets in anger. Within this context, the Iraqi political system cannot effectively shepherd through a peaceful political transition. The more violence replaces dialogue, the harder it will be for the government to function effectively, which will in turn fuel more social and political unrest by further reducing the probability of structural reforms — highlighting just how unsustainable the current status quo is. Resolving the current political impasse will likely require either Sadrists or the SCF to abandon one of their key demands for the formation of the next government (i.e. who to name for president, or whether to group together in a larger bloc). But it could take months before such a compromise is reached, portending more violence and instability in the interim.
The situation also underscores the limits of al-Sadr's own political brinkmanship. Al-Sadr has mobilized his followers in Iraq by saying he'll step back from politics numerous times in recent years. Calling supporters out into the streets remains his most powerful political card, especially considering he has consistently failed to form a government despite record winnings in the 2021 elections. However, this strategy is becoming less effective. The increasingly violent tactics of his supporters, as evidenced by the recent raiding of the presidential palace, create popular blowback that damages al-Sadr's ability to engage in dialogue with other political stakeholders. This may see al-Sadr remain out of the political spotlight for a time to allow him to focus more on shoring up his religious credentials, which could increase his popular appeal among some of his devout Shiite followers.
Amid his struggle to form a majority government, al-Sadr forced his followers in parliament to resign in July in the hopes of forcing the SCF to beg for his lawmakers to come back, or potentially trigger a new election in which he'd be able to secure enough seats to unilaterally form a government. The risky gamble has left Sadrists without the most seats in the next parliament. Frustration over al-Sadr's inability to establish a Sadrist government over the past year could reduce turnout among his supporters in a hypothetical new election.
As the most influential external actor in Iraq, Iran is best-positioned to de-escalate tensions by helping broker a political compromise. Over the past year, Iran has pushed its political proxies in the SCF to maintain a strong position in government formation talks. But Iran also does not want to see an extended power vacuum in Iraq, which would threaten Tehran's interests and years of influence-building in the country. To mitigate this risk, Iran might seek to avoid aggravating tensions in the wake of the recent clashes in Baghdad. Tehran could also push the SCF to reach a compromise with Sadrists, which could potentially include holding new elections. In addition, Iran has close ties with the clerical establishment in Iraq, who have so far been silent on the recent surge of violence in Baghdad. But if these religious leaders issue statements calling for peace, it could influence political stakeholders to ask demonstrators to go home and for militiamen to lay down their arms.
Iran has a vested interest in Iraq's economic and political stability, driven by its deep trade connections to the Iraqi economy. Tehran also uses its close ties with the Iraqi parties and militias in the SCF to shape Baghdad's policies in Iran's favor.
Iraq is unlikely to devolve into another large-scale civil war, but further violent clashes are probable. Individual militias would risk losing their political capital if they waged a broader war against the Iraqi military, which is largely cohesive and increasingly well-trained. The recent increase in political violence thus remains unlikely to spiral into another all-out civil conflict. However, federal Iraqi security forces' failure to control non-state militias and angry demonstrators during the escalation in Baghdad bodes ill for their ability to tamp down on future violent outbreaks — keeping the risk of sporadic violence high in the near term. This will continue to fuel fears among foreign investors that Iraq may be headed for another prolonged period of widespread instability, which will create greater economic uncertainty in Iraq as well.
The growing unrest also risks disrupting Iraq's oil exports. The Aug. 29 protests by al-Sadr supporters also expanded to the southern city of Basra, which is home to the majority of the country's oil industry and hosts a number of foreign-owned projects. The unrest has not yet impacted Iraq's oil exports but could in the future if clashes and demonstrations continue at oil company property. Although initial reports suggested Sadrist protesters had closed oil fields near Basra, sources cited by Reuters on Aug. 30 said the recent violence did not affect Iraq's oil production and ability to export oil. However, future disruptions are possible — especially if protests continue around the country's refineries. Decreased Iraqi oil exports following a prolonged shutdown would exacerbate Iraq's economic problems, depriving the government of a key revenue source. Escalating violence and the potential for road closures could also eventually threaten foreign-owned oil operations in Iraq.
-
Iraq worried about China’s control over oil
Shrewd China has always used ‘soft power’ strategies to take over countries in need of money
By Jianli Yang
In 2003, the United States invasion of Iraq liberated the Iraqi people from the tyrannical rule of Saddam Hussein. Nearly two decades later, China has been busy exploiting Iraq’s oil-rich resources by aligning with militia groups to gain a strong foothold in the country’s lucrative oil industry.
So far, China has made three attempts to gain control of Iraq’s petroleum resources, but each attempt was foiled by Iraq’s oil ministry. For instance, Russia’s Lukoil and U.S. oil giant Exxon Mobil wanted to sell their stakes in major fields to Chinese government-backed firms, but intervention from Iraq’s Ministry of Oil prevented it. Even Britain’s BP was contemplating selling a stake to a Chinese company but was dissuaded by Iraqi officials. If China had succeeded, it might well have triggered an “exodus” of international oil giants that would leave Iraq open to a more extensive takeover by Beijing. Iraqi government officials have already expressed deep concern over the fast pace at which China is attempting to virtually take over Iraq. A recent demonstration near the headquarters of a Chinese oil company in Iraq’s southeastern governate of Maysan has once again brought into focus Iraq’s growing concern about China’s expansion into the oil sector.
According to the Italian think tank Geopolitica, China is exploiting the security vacuum in Iraq created after the United States’ withdrawal from the West Asian country, with its companies aligning with militia groups to gain a strong foothold in the Iraqi oil industry. A Financial Times report stated that in 2021 alone, Beijing struck deals worth $10.5 billion in Iraq’s construction sector. Iraq, the third biggest exporter of oil to China, is eager to secure Chinese investments in infrastructural development. That’s because several U.S. and European companies have been reluctant to invest in Iraq due to rampant corruption and militias (reportedly loyal to Iran) targeting U.S. coalition forces and Western interests.
Unlike others, Beijing has been finding ways to work within this system and deal with deep structural corruption and the domination of Iraq’s public space by militias. In fact, Iran is the de facto arbiter of power in Iraq, via its client military and political organizations. Although China prefers to collaborate with strong and centralized state authorities, it has found ways of dealing with an unstable Iraq. According to a recent report from Shanghai’s Fudan University, in 2021, Beijing secured new construction deals in Iraq worth $10.5 billion — constituting almost one-sixth of China’s Belt and Road Initiative investments that year.
For China, Iraq has emerged as the number one trading partner in the region and the third largest oil supplier, right after Saudi Arabia and Russia. Its energy reserves and strategic location — near the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz — prove critical to the BRI. With the U.S. withdrawal from the region, Beijing was poised to expand its influence; improving economic relations with Baghdad will likely translate into political influence over a period of time.
Experts say that China’s role in the reconstruction of Iraq and growing China-Iran relations are accelerating Beijing’s presence in Iraq at the expense of the United States. The U.S., Iran, and Turkey, all actively and deeply connected to Iraq, are closely watching China’s moves.
China-Iraq energy cooperation has been the cornerstone of the two countries’ bilateral ties since 1981. At this juncture, it is estimated that Iraq will need a massive $88 billion for its post-Daesh reconstruction needs, which will provide an ample opportunity for Beijing to increase its visibility through investment and construction. While bilateral trade topped $30 billion in 2018, relations were enhanced under former Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi, who described the ties as poised for a “quantum leap” during Beijing’s 2019 visit. In the first half of 2021, trade volume between the two countries exceeded $16 billion.
Shrewd China has always used “soft power” strategies to take over countries in need of money.
In the case of Iraq too, Beijing has done the same, in sharp contrast to the United States’ hard power initiatives. “Soft power” strategies include economic investments and non-intervention politics. Beijing has recently been getting benefits from post-conflict opportunities with mediation efforts and commercial commitment as opposed to military involvement and discourse elsewhere. It has also used its U.N. veto right many times, acting with Russia and against the Western bloc on the Syrian conflict. It is more active in major regional files like Afghanistan. China also wants to prevent the U.S. from using political and military power in Iraq, as and when needed.
China has a vested interest in the oil and energy sectors. Beijing has been building power plants, factories, water treatment facilities, as well as badly needed schools across the country, according to the Los Angeles Times. Dozens of contracts signed in recent years ensure China’s growing footprint, even as major Western companies, including the U.S., plot their exit. While Iraqi officials concede that they desire a greater U.S. presence, they find appeal in China’s offer of development without conditions for democracy or reform and its deft diplomacy. As a result, Chinese companies are dominating Iraq’s key economic sector, oil, and Beijing consumes 40% of the country’s crude exports. From a narrow focus on hydrocarbons, Chinese investments have grown manyfold. Chinese companies are operating in numerous key sectors — including finance, transport, construction, and communications — as noted by the Los Angeles Times.
In the oil sector too, Chinese companies are dominating oil contracts — from operating fields to providing downstream services, and they continue to win more. Recently, Iraq finalized terms with China’s Sinopec to develop the Mansuriya gas field, which could produce up to 300 million standard cubic feet per day.
Although Baghdad has expressed deep concern over China’s control over Iraqi resources, it is worrisome that Iraq could become a puppet in the hands of China in the foreseeable future. The only way to counter these efforts, it seems clear, is for the U.S. to raise its diplomatic and economic game.
This means, first and foremost, that the U.S. should frame America’s strategic competition with China in Iraq as an ideological contest between democracy and autocracy. The U.S. should make concerted diplomatic and economic efforts to strengthen Iraq’s democracy, which would enhance its independence and the Iraqi people’s sovereignty.
For example, through initiatives like the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment — which President Biden along with other G7 leaders unveiled in late June and which will mobilize $600 billion of investments by 2027 to deliver “transparent” and “game-changing” infrastructure projects in developing countries — the U.S. must present itself to Iraq as a more reliable, supportive, and likeminded partner
-
An Opening Emerges for Cooperation Between Iraq's Federal and Kurdish Leaders
10 MIN READOct 20, 2022 | 20:34 GMT
Recent cooperation between Iraq's federal government in Baghdad and the government in Iraq's semi-autonomous Kurdish region suggests that a pragmatic solution to many of their disagreements is possible, but oil exports will remain a major sticking point in the near term. A long-delayed government formation process in Iraq has progressed in recent weeks thanks to cooperation between the country's feuding groups, including the Kurds. On Oct. 13, the two largest and most powerful political parties in Iraqi Kurdistan agreed on a presidential candidate and voted in the federal Iraqi parliament alongside other parties — bringing Iraq the closest it's been to forming a government in a year. Kurdish leaders' involvement in the government formation process proves that they can still work productively with their federal counterparts in Baghdad when Iraq's stability is at stake. This bodes well for continued political and security cooperation between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) — which sits in Erbil and controls domestic affairs in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) — and Iraq's central government in Baghdad. But in the near term, the KRG will likely keep drawing a hard line on oil exports and sharing revenue on those exports, despite facing mounting legal pressure from Baghdad.
On Oct. 13, Iraq's new President Abdul Latif Rasheed named Mohammed Shia Al Sudani as the country's prime minister-designate and asked him to form the next government. Al Sudani has 30 days to submit his Cabinet lineup to the National Assembly for approval.
Since Iraq's 2021 parliamentary elections, numerous efforts at government formation have failed due to rivalries between the major Shiite parties, particularly the Shiite Coordination Framework and the Sadrists.
The government formation process is being led by a new bloc called the State Administration Coalition, which brings together the pro-Iran Shiite Coordination Framework, the Sunni-majority Taqaddum party and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). The coalition says it is focused on drafting an oil and gas law that will be agreed to by both the federal and Kurdish-Iraqi governments.
The KRG and the Iraqi federal government have sparred over various issues — including budget revenue allocation, security cooperation and territorial demarcation — since Iraqi Kurdistan was established as a semi-autonomous region in 2005. The 2005 Iraqi constitution, drafted in the formative years following the 2003 ouster of Saddam Hussein and his authoritarian government, sought to settle the demands of Iraq's ethnic Kurdish minority for a self-ruled territory by officially granting them control over the northern region of the country, which is where most Iraqi Kurds live. By nature of being the umbrella government over the KRG, Iraq's federal government is still, in theory, in charge of securing the borders in Iraqi Kurdistan. Iraq's Federal Supreme Court also technically has jurisdiction in the semi-autonomous region. But Kurds' overwhelming desire for sovereignty, combined with ongoing territorial disputes, has long complicated Baghdad's ability to assert power over the KRI.
Over 90% of voters in Iraqi Kurdistan supported a non-binding independence referendum held in the region in 2017. In a show of force following the referendum's results, Iraqi federal forces closed the region's borders and recaptured large swathes of territory disputed by both governments — including the oil-rich Kirkuk fields.
But the issue of oil exports (and, in particular, how to divvy up the revenue generated by those exports) remains by far the largest and most intractable point of contention between Baghdad and Erbil. Both the Iraqi federal government and the KRG control the development of some of the world's largest and most lucrative oil and gas reserves. According to the U.S. government's Energy Information Agency, the KRG-controlled areas hold roughly 3.7 billion barrels of oil resources. The KRG itself more generously estimates they control 45 billion barrels of oil, which includes unproven reserve estimates as well as the reserves in Kirkuk. Baghdad also controls the allocation of Iraqi budget funds to the KRG, which comprise an important part of the KRG's own budget and is supposed to be proportional to the amount of Iraq's population that lives in the KRI. After the backlash from Baghdad over the 2017 referendum, the KRG agreed to hand over oil exports to Baghdad in exchange for 17% of the federal Iraqi budget, but the agreement has not been implemented. Only a small amount of money has been transferred to Erbil and no oil export control has been transferred to Baghdad.
If the new coalition succeeds in forming a government, it could improve relations between Erbil and Baghdad, in part because it includes Iraq's most powerful Kurdish party (the Kurdistan Democratic Party). This could help yield compromise on complicated files like security cooperation, potentially improving Iraqi stability. The KRG has militia forces, or peshmerga, that protect it, and which have worked closely with federal Iraqi forces in counterterrorism and security operations in the past. But disputes endure over the payment of peshmerga salaries, as well as over territory demarcation. Historically, uniting over security issues has led to compromises on economic- and oil-related issues. The 2014 oil revenue sharing agreement (which established a framework for revenue sharing between the two governments for the first time, even if it hasn't been implemented) was paved thanks to a strong impetus on both governments to cooperate closely on security cooperation to defeat the Islamic State terrorist group, which at the time was terrorizing northern and central Iraq. Any future major security threat will likely see Peshmerga and federal security forces work together pragmatically, helping ease Iraq's often-worrisome security picture.
However, disagreements between Erbil and Baghdad over oil exports and revenue will likely still worsen in the near future as Baghdad deploys its stronger leverage to try and exert greater control over Kurdish oil. In February, Iraq's Federal Supreme Court ruled that Kurdish oil and gas products that aren't exported in coordination with Baghdad are illegal, citing that only the federal government has legal control over what can be exported out of Iraqi territory per the country's 2005 constitution. Previously, Baghdad had little choice but to try to ''force'' control over Kurdistan's energy production, some of which is located in disputed regions. But the Supreme Court ruling has since enabled Iraq's federal government to use more legal mechanisms to try to freeze future Kurdish oil sales or development — namely, by trying to force international companies to cut ties with the KRG until it cooperates with Baghdad's wishes of granting the federal government oversight over all of Iraqi Kurdistan's energy sector. This has angered Kurdish officials in Erbil, who have continued to export oil via Turkey without the explicit consent of Iraq's oil ministry, saying the court decision was politically motivated and that Kurdistan's right to export and produce oil is enshrined in Iraq's constitution. Within this context, oil-related tensions between Erbil and Baghdad have only intensified over the past year. And they are unlikely to quickly ease, even if a new federal government opens the door for increased cooperation elsewhere — especially as high global prices further motivate both sides to retain control over lucrative oil shipments.
On Feb. 15, Iraq's Federal Supreme Court ruled that Kurdistan's 2007 oil and gas law, which regulates the Kurdish oil sector and is the basis for foreign companies' investment in the region, was unconstitutional. At the heart of the dispute is the interpretation of Article 112 of the Iraqi constitution, which says the ''federal government, with the producing governorates and regional governments, shall undertake the management of oil and gas extracted from present fields.'' The Iraqi government and Federal Supreme Court interpreted this to say that only the federal government can regulate oil and gas production, while the Kurdish government has said the article only applies to ''present fields'' that were in production before the constitution passed in 2005.
If Baghdad's legal pressure successfully deters all international companies from doing business with the KRG, the financial blow will likely eventually force Kurdish regional leaders to abide by the Supreme Court ruling. Several major international oilfield service companies have heeded warnings from federal Iraqi institutions against brokering new contracts or investments in the KRI for fear of being banned from doing business in the country. This loss of business risks serving a devastating blow to Iraqi Kurdistan's economy, given that oil exports fund 85% of the KRG's budget and that the regional government is already holding $38 billion in debt. For Erbil, generating more revenue in the future depends on more development and investment from foreign firms with special expertise. If foreign firms continue to bow to Baghdad's pressure campaign by cutting ties with Kurdish oil, the regional government will thus likely have little choice but to bow to the federal government's demands that it hand over control of Kurdistan's oil production.
According to a letter seen by Reuters on Aug. 23, Iraq's State Organization for Marketing of Oil (SOMO) threatened buyers of crude oil from Iraqi Kurdistan with legal action. SOMO on Sept. 19 said it had informed international companies not to purchase crude oil from Kurdistan, following the Federal Supreme Court's guidelines.
Iraq's oil ministry has removed several companies from its blacklist, including the U.S.-based Weatherford, after the firms pledged not to seek new contracts in the KRG. France's TotalEnergies also recently sold its 18% stake in the Sarsang oil field in Kurdistan for $155 million amid pressure from Iraq's Federal Supreme Court.
According to an Aug. 30 Reuters report, the KRG has calculated that oil production in Iraqi Kurdistan could be cut in half by 2027 without new exploration or major investments. If Iraqi Kurdistan can accrue optimal levels of investment, the regional government foresees the region's oil output rising in five years from current levels of 434,000 barrels per day (bpd) to 580,000 bpd, with 530,000 of those barrels being exported. But without those investments, the government foresees the region only being able to export 240,000 bpd of oil due to expected depletion at aging wells.
But in the near term, Iraqi Kurdistan's continued oil exports to Turkey and domestic refining capabilities will enable Erbil to maintain control of the region's energy production, despite mounting pressure from Baghdad. Erbil exports through Turkey's Ceyhan Oil Terminal without the explicit consent of Iraq's state-owned SOMO oil company. Turkey is thus a lifeline for Erbil, and Ankara shows no signs of wanting cooperation with the KRG to slow. For Erbil, pursuing its own exports as long as it possibly can will ensure that the KRG doesn't lose control over the one thing that generates revenue and enables Iraqi Kurdistan to not be entirely dependent on Baghdad.
Non-Western companies are not leaving Iraqi Kurdistan as Western firms have been since the February Supreme Court ruling. UAE-based Dana Gas and Russian gas giant Gazprom, for example, remain heavily active in the semi-autonomous region, despite both companies being summoned by a Baghdad court to appear as defendants in cases filed by the oil ministry.
Most downstream activity in Iraq's Kurdistan region is conducted by local firms.
-
I have profound disagreement with most of this. As I have posted many times previously, reasonable people can disagree on the merits of going in, but leaving after we established a still fragile new order was a grave historical error.
========================
Two Decades Later, the Iraq War Is Hard to Defend
Baghdad is no longer a threat, but it’s fallacious to claim invasion was the only means to that end.
Gerard Baker hedcutBy Gerard BakerFollow
March 20, 2023 1:25 pm ET
SAVE
PRINT
TEXT
10
image
Smoke billows from a presidential palace compound during air strikes in Baghdad, Iraq, March 21, 2003.
PHOTO: GORAN TOMASEVIC/REUTERS
Some of those who supported the invasion of Iraq 20 years ago this week are making the best defense they can of what the rest of us long ago concluded was probably the most flawed decision in American foreign policy since the founding of the republic.
The case for the war two decades in the rearview mirror goes something like this:
It was messy and poorly executed, true, but Iraq is better off now than it was then, and more important, it no longer poses a threat to the U.S., its allies and its interests. Tragic as American and allied military deaths and injuries are, this was achieved with the loss of a fraction of the casualties in Korea or Vietnam, let alone the world wars. The fiscal cost was relatively small too, perhaps $100 billion a year for eight years, well below 1% of U.S. gross domestic product.
What’s more, the defenders say, we tend to see events like these through a static rather than a dynamic view of history. Even if the U.S. hadn’t invaded Iraq in 2003, it’s likely that over the next 10 years terrible violence would have unfolded there. Sooner or later the suppression of the Shiite two-thirds of the population by the Sunni Arab quarter would have ended in mass bloodshed.
Respectfully, I dissent. For one thing, to defend the war on the grounds that Iraq is no threat is premised on an obvious fallacy—that invasion was necessary to ensure this outcome. We know that this wasn’t true. Saddam Hussein had been in his United Nations inspections cage for more than a decade already in 2003. After the 9/11 attacks, the scrutiny and containment was only getting tighter. Do we really think, given what he was witnessing in Afghanistan, that he would be insane enough to attack the U.S. or its allies?
We know for sure that the argument that the inspections regime was dangerously insufficient didn’t hold up because, to bolster it, advocates of war had to adduce lurid claims about weapons of mass destruction. In his brilliantly forensic 2020 analysis, “To Start a War: How the Bush Administration Took America into Iraq,” Robert Draper methodically documents the campaign of deception—including self-deception—that officials deployed, pointing frantically at every molehill of intelligence that supported their case and dismissing the mountains that cast doubt on it.
It is astonishingly blithe to say of the hundreds of thousands of Iraqis who died in the internecine strife that took place under the supervision of the U.S. that they might have died in any case. What kind of vacuum of conscience does it take to balance a known historical tragedy against a hypothetical one and conclude that they have equal moral weight?
So the case that the war was justified fails on its own merits. But this doesn’t even begin to weigh the real costs, including the damage to America’s reputation and its strategic strength.
The promulgation of the WMD fictions, the Abu Ghraib horrors, the catastrophically inept initial occupation and administration—all undid in a matter of months the post-Cold War authority and heft the U.S. had earned over decades. Almost every calamity that followed—Iran’s ascent, the rise of ISIS, Barack Obama’s disastrous failure in Syria—can be traced back more or less directly to the war.
If we are going to play the alternative-history game, think how the region might have been different if the U.S. had taken advantage of the extraordinary solidarity that obtained after 9/11 to advance its long-term security rather than, through hubris and ineptitude, surrender much of the territory to Islamo-fascists, theocratic mullahs and the butcher in the Kremlin.
Much worse is the damage the war did to the fabric of American democracy. The American people were terrified by their government into war, with the bogus menace of nuclear weapons wielded by a man with bogus connections to the 9/11 terrorists. They were promised a war that would be a cakewalk followed by an occupation in which their sons and daughters would be greeted with sweets and flowers.
This cloud castle of fictions did incalculable damage to the bonds of trust between Americans and their leaders.
There is a direct line between the deceptions worked on the American people about the war and the angry popular disillusionment with the performance of American political leaders that led the rise of Donald Trump and for that matter the deep reluctance many Americans feel about support for Ukraine.
Worse still is that there has been no accountability for the architects of the debacle. The political leaders have mostly moved on, but with Olympic-level chutzpah, many of the so-called intellectuals who advocated it are still out there, lecturing the American people that it’s treasonous to oppose immersing America into other conflicts.
Is there a word for the complete lack of self-awareness you need to possess to denounce Donald Trump and the new conservative populism even as you are principally responsible for the disasters that ignited it?
-
Iraq 20 Years Later
In retrospect, what can we learn from an invasion that most Americans now think was an awful mistake?
Nate Jackson
March 20 marked 20 years since the second U.S. invasion of Iraq, which George W. Bush defined as a mission "to disarm Iraq, to free its people, and to defend the world from grave danger." One article can't possibly sum up those two decades, or even come close to "The Conclusion" about the war and its aftermath, but we can offer an analytical look at the pros and cons.
Over the course of U.S. involvement in Iraq, 4,586 American service members paid the ultimate price, as did roughly another 3,500 contractors and civilians. Another 32,455 military personnel were wounded, some losing limbs or sustaining other lifelong serious injuries. That's to say nothing of PTSD, broken families, and other ramifications. What did their blood and sacrifice achieve?
The Iraqi civilian death toll is estimated to be somewhere between 100,000 and 500,000. Many of them were Iraqi Christians, of whom there are now far fewer than before the war. Millions of people were displaced, often by the subsequent rise of ISIS. To be clear, Iraqi insurgents and others were responsible for the vast majority of civilian deaths, not American military personnel. Nevertheless, what did this loss of life and possessions bring?
American taxpayers spent hundreds of billions of dollars in Iraq. What did this expenditure of treasure buy?
The answers to those questions are complicated. They're not black and white.
One result has been a dramatic shift in public opinion regarding foreign wars. As our Mark Alexander recently wrote about Ukraine, U.S. intervention at various levels can be a pretty mixed bag, and that yields vacillating public response. That was certainly the case in Iraq.
The war in Iraq was popular at the beginning. When Bush and his team, led by Secretary of State Colin Powell, made the case that Iraq, part of what Bush called the "Axis of Evil," had spent years violating international rules about weapons of mass destruction and supporting terrorists, the overwhelming majority of the American people rallied behind them. We were, after all, still unified in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks to take the fight to the enemy in what we dubbed Jihadistan rather than face them here on our shores.
There's no question that Iraqi strongman Saddam Hussein was an evil and brutal despot. His genocidal record and warmongering in the Middle East, as well as his attempt to assassinate George H.W. Bush, were tangible threats to U.S. national security interests. Since his execution in 2006, the world is better off, and Iraq is in many ways a better place now than in 2003.
More importantly, Iraq is no longer a threat to the U.S., though it's true we'll never know if that could have been achieved without war.
A year after the 2003 invasion came the 2004 election, and Democrats wanted to oust Bush. That meant turning — hard — against the war many of them had supported. Political division here fed what became a tough slog in Iraq as the insurgency dug in for a long war in which jihadis knew they could outlast fickle Americans. The insurgency is exactly why Alexander and others argued back in 2005 that "we should stay in Iraq — for decades." An essentially permanent military presence there would help secure our interests.
Today, only about 2,500 American troops remain in Iraq in advisory and training roles.
Democrats failed to turn public opinion in 2004, though by 2008 the story was far different as the nation grew tired of war.
By 2013 and 2014, Barack Obama's foolish withdrawal from Iraq led directly to the rise of the Islamic State. That caused more civilian death and posed as great a threat to U.S. security as did Hussein's regime. It took years to crush the "caliphate."
Obama's malfeasance, coupled with failures in Iraq, also enabled the rise of Iran. The failures in Syria and Libya can be likewise traced to Iraq.
When Donald Trump won the Republican nomination in 2016, it was largely seen as a repudiation of the Bush era, perhaps foremost in the arena of national security and foreign policy. Trump called the war in Iraq "a big, fat mistake," and Republican voters supported him. Very few Americans today still stand by the decision to invade Iraq.
So, was it all a mistake?
In some ways, Bush and Powell thought so. Both men certainly lamented that the weapons of mass destruction key to justifying the war were never found. "I knew the failure to find WMD would transform public perception of the war," Bush wrote in his memoir. "While the world was undoubtedly safer with Saddam gone, the reality was that I had sent American troops into combat based in large part on intelligence that proved false. That was a massive blow to our credibility — my credibility — that would shake the confidence of the American people. No one was more shocked or angry than I was when we didn't find the weapons. I had a sickening feeling every time I thought about it. I still do."
By 2005, Powell called his February 2003 WMD speech to the UN a "blot" that "will always be part of my record," adding: "It was painful. It's painful now."
Whether Hussein's weapons were expended, squirreled away to some other location, or never existed in the first place is still the subject of some debate. What is not up for debate is that Saddam used chemical weapons against both the Iranians and the Kurds in his own nation, and he never gave up trying to produce or procure WMD.
Team Bush and its defenders largely tried to make the most of Powell's "you break it, you own it" so-called Pottery Barn rule. Since we'd deposed Saddam, we might as well focus on building an allied nation. That turned out to be far easier said than done in the Arab/Islamic world. "Nation building" is now largely considered a discredited fetish of the establishment neocons, which helps explain the growing skepticism about involvement in Ukraine.
As we said at the outset, our object here isn't the final and comprehensive case for or against war in Iraq. Mistakes were definitely made, primarily in ascertaining the truth about the war's justification and in managing the post-invasion battle to stabilize Iraq. The war itself had consequences, and not all of them were good.
But it's revisionist history to suggest that we should have known better or that nothing good came from U.S. intervention in the Middle East from 2001 until today. Moreover, it dishonors the sacrifices made by American military personnel — both the ones who came home changed and scarred, and the ones who never made it back home at all.
-
I have repeatedly pounded the table over the magnitude of the Obama-Biden error in withdrawing from Irag and by so doing creating the ensuing power vaccum.
============
GPF
November 24, 2023
View On Website
Open as PDF
Iraq’s Balancing Act Over Gaza
The threat of spillover violence is real, as is Baghdad’s need not to isolate Iran or the U.S.
By: Caroline D. Rose
In early November, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken arrived in Baghdad to meet with Iraqi officials. It was a notable stop on a tour meant to identify a way to de-escalate the situation in Gaza, one that necessarily entails coordinating with regional stakeholders to prevent spillover violence and keep Iran-aligned proxies at bay. But perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of Blinken’s trip to Iraq wasn’t why he went but what he wore: a bulletproof vest, an accessory he ditched on other stops in the West Bank and Turkey. Far from a sartorial choice, the vest exemplified the ongoing tensions between the U.S. and Iran, which, through its proxies, has launched a string of rocket and drone attacks on U.S. military positions throughout Iraq.
Indeed, since Oct. 7 – the day Hamas attacked Israel – there have been an estimated 60 strikes on U.S. forces and defensive positions in Iraq and Syria, including attacks on the Erbil International Airport and al-Asad air base. The U.S. has occasionally retaliated, albeit proportionally against Iran-backed militias. Their entry into the Gaza conflict is meant to discourage the U.S. from getting any more involved than it already is. All the while, the government in Baghdad has been left to carefully balance its relationships with Iran and the U.S., making sure to stay out of the conflict as best it can.
Iraq is well-versed in hostilities between the U.S. and Iran. For years, the two have engaged in limited strikes against each other in Iraq. U.S. forces have been stationed there for years, first during Operation Iraqi Freedom and then during Operation Inherent Resolve, which was part of the global campaign to defeat the Islamic State. The American military continues to equip and modernize the Iraqi military and to help suppress residual IS enclaves. Iran has long held cultural, economic and political influence in Iraq, but the fight against IS allowed Tehran to deepen its influence even more. Following the Islamic State’s rise to power, Iranian Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani issued a fatwa that called on Iraqi Shiites to take up arms against the group, and the militias that arose eventually came together under an Iran-supported umbrella organization called the Popular Mobilization Forces, which comprised 60 factions and more than 100,000 fighters. So effective were they in the campaign against IS that Baghdad sought to formally incorporate them into its security apparatus. And so, since 2016, Iran has had a foothold in the very security establishment its rival, the U.S., is supposed to advise and assist.
Tensions came to a head in January 2020 after the U.S. killed Qassem Soleimani, the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ elite Quds Force, while he was visiting Iraq. What followed was a series of retaliatory strikes among Iran-aligned militias, U.S. forces and even Iran itself, culminating in an Iranian missile attack on U.S. forces at al-Asad air base. The uptick in strikes resulted in an incremental, partial and quiet U.S. withdrawal from Iraq as Washington transferred eight military bases to Iraqi security forces, reduced personnel from around 5,000 soldiers to some 2,500, and formally reclassified its operation from a combat to an advisory role.
The escalation since Oct. 7 is similar to that of 2020. Iran-aligned forces have conducted over 60 rocket and drone strikes on U.S. positions in both Iraq and northeast Syria, and U.S. forces have conducted at least three rounds of strikes against them. But notably, both sides have been measured – even cautious – with their attacks, raising the stakes but never too far. Many Iran-aligned militias, for example, have launched strikes that are meant to inflict injury on U.S. forces but not mass fatalities since doing so would invite major U.S. retaliation. The U.S. favors an approach of quality over quantity, conducting limited and proportional strikes on specific militia positions. But even with the best intentions, it doesn’t take much for situations like this to spiral out of control.
This has placed Iraq’s government in a difficult situation. After a month of strikes against U.S. forces, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani went on a diplomatic offensive, speaking to officials such as U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and publicly condemning the attacks. The Iraqi government also enhanced security over diplomatic missions. When al-Sudani met with Blinken earlier this month, both officials discussed the risk of spillover violence from Gaza, the risk to U.S. forces operating in Iraq and Syria, and the risks inherent in Iraq’s commitment to protect U.S. personnel.
Al-Sudani, meanwhile, has been speaking to Iran too since Blinken's visit to Baghdad. He jetted to Tehran to meet with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and President Ebrahim Raisi. While Raisi said Iraq and Iran shared positions in opposing Israel’s ongoing offensive in Gaza, al-Sudani counseled restraint as he gauged the odds of Iran entering the conflict through proxies like Hezbollah.
As the U.S. and Iran carefully try to up the pressure on each other short of outright conflict, Iraq is once again in the crosshairs. Iraq has an imperative to maintain relations with both patrons, but it’s possible that continued violence in Gaza will lead to protests inside Iraq, force a closer alignment with Iran, and create more ill will to the American military presence in Iraq. This would only make Iraq’s balancing act even more precarious.
-
GPF
Beginning of the end? Washington has reportedly communicated that it’s ready to start talks with Baghdad on ending the U.S.-led operation in Iraq, according to Al Arabiya news outlet. In doing so, the U.S. dropped its previous precondition for the talks – that attacks against it by Iran-backed groups in Iraq stop. The report comes a day after an Iraqi military spokesman said recent U.S. airstrikes in Iraq undermined agreements on joint security cooperation.