Fire Hydrant of Freedom

The Info Ops are crucial but seriously?

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In August 2009, Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard C. Holbrooke  told the New York Times that "concurrent with the insurgency is an information war," as he discussed the new U.S. effort of up to $150 million a year (to be led by him) to counter the Taliban's well-oiled propaganda machine. "We are losing that war," he confessed.

Now, seven months following the Times interview, Ambassador Holbrooke sings the same tune, even if slightly out of pitch. In accepting the Dr. Jean Mayer Global Citizenship Award last week at Tufts University for his distinguished career in public service, Holbrooke again touted the lack of strategy in countering the Taliban's consistent and effective use of the airwaves to undermine the U.S. engagements in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Citing the initiative mentioned late last summer, Holbrooke stated that efforts to that end are "just rolling in." In fact, the initial figure of $150 million seems to have not been adequate. According to a State Department document from January, the budget this year for Afghanistan and Pakistan communications projects is about $250 million, with pots of money in the Defense Department and other U.S. agencies, too.

Given how complex it is for us living here in the United States to measure the effectiveness thus far of the U.S. strategy to counter the Taliban communications team on the ground -- though by most accounts, progress has been pegged between abject and abysmal, for such information campaigns are inherently viewed as U.S. propaganda themselves -- let's focus on an initiative we can take a closer look at, such as the military's use of Twitter.

"There's an entire audience segment that seeks its news from alternative means outside traditional news sources, and we want to make sure we're engaging them as well," Col. Greg Julian told the Associated Press in June 2009. At the time, Julian was the top U.S. spokesman in Afghanistan and twittered away as part of the strategy, though his last tweet was "Obama Afghan strategy decision 'within days'" in November of last year. Succeeding Julian -- now spokesman for NATO -- as the chief public affairs officer of coalition forces is Col. Wayne Shanks. He does not have a Twitter account, or if he does, it probably has less than Col. Julian's 591 followers. Perhaps Shanks is of the position that the new U.S. forces in Afghanistan Twitter account (USforA) will suffice as an effective counter-Taliban information source. With nearly 6300 followers and a collection of positive tweets and hard facts about the reality on the ground, it would seem the strategy is on point and the initiative well directed.

But wait; let's take a closer look. On March 4th, USforA tweeted, "VIDEO: NATO's Joint Forces Command Photo Contest," which links to a YouTube video of a photo-montage that you simply have to see for yourself:  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TCVxXrIwCoo

"Special Forces Assassins Infiltrate Taliban Stronghold in Afghanistan"

non-kinetic operations at it finest... 

And now from NPR News...

I didn't see where much of the "values" came in...

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=124211413

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Marjah Effort Shows Values, Flaws Of Afghan Forces

by Tom Bowman

March 2, 2010

When the U.S. military began its counterinsurgency offensive in Afghanistan's Helmand River valley last summer, some 4,000 Marines took part in the operation aside about 300 Afghan forces.

By autumn, the number of Afghan troops participating more than doubled, according to Brig. Gen. Larry Nicholson, the Marine commander in southern Afghanistan. Nicholson told NPR that a major challenge in building local relationships was the lack of Afghan soldiers and police.

"We are vetting our police. And my assessment is that probably 3 to 4 out of every 10 we have probably need to really go home," Nicholson says.

More Afghan Troops In Marjah Operation

But senior U.S. officers say the current operation against the Taliban-stronghold of Marjah in Helmand province is far different.

Several thousand Afghan soldiers and police are participating alongside U.S. Marines in the operation that began in mid-February. Afghan national police were brought in from elsewhere in the country to replace corrupt local cops, U.S. officers say.

Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, points out that there are about 4,500 Afghans with U.S. and coalition troops in Marjah. "It's well planned," Mullen says. "Afghans are in the lead."

You don't forge armies out of nothing. It takes a long time for units to become cohesive and to learn their tasks properly.

- James Danly, retired U.S. Army officer

But a senior military official tells NPR that the U.S. definition of "in the lead" means Afghans are planning the operation, and sitting down with Afghan elders in mosques or in meetings known as shuras.

The Afghans are not leading in combat, says the senior official.

The combat performance of Afghan soldiers is spotty, according to numerous reports from the field. Reporters on the ground report Afghan soldiers in the rear, sometimes smoking hashish or looting, as U.S. Marines move forward to secure Marjah.

American and British troops provide the artillery, the airpower and the logistics. They are also suffering the bulk of the casualties — at least 10 times that of Afghans.

An Uneasy Partnership

James Danly, a retired Army officer who trained Iraqi forces, says the problem in Afghanistan is that for years Afghan units were kept on the periphery of U.S.-led operations. They were never real partners, although that is now beginning to change.

"You don't forge armies out of nothing. It takes a long time for units to become cohesive and to learn their tasks properly," says Danly. "It could take a long time."

Just how long that will take is central question of President Obama's Afghanistan strategy. Obama wants to start removing some U.S. troops by the summer of 2011, turning over responsibility to Afghan forces.

But the Afghans may not be ready.

In a secret memo last fall — later leaked to the press — the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, Karl Eikenberry, wrote: "We overestimate the ability of the Afghan security forces to take over."

Eikenberry, who served as commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan until 2007, expressed doubt in the memo that Afghan forces could assume full security even by the target date of 2013.

Retired Army Lt. Gen. David Barno thinks that may be too pessimistic. Like Eikenberry, Barno once commanded U.S. forces in Afghanistan.

Barno says success in the Marjah operation could turn things around in southern Afghanistan, much like the "surge" of American forces in Iraq in 2007 changed the security calculus there.

Afghanistan "could look a lot different in the next six months or a year from now," Barno says. But that will depend on better governance — as well as security, he says.

"I think the Afghan army is going to provide a key part of that," says Barno says. "In some ways maybe this is the first time that the people actually see their army in action. And I know during my experience there that was an eye-opening experience."

An Effort To Recruit In The South

Just getting the Afghan army into the field has been a struggle. The Afghan government has increased pay in an effort to lure and retain recruits. But illicit drug use and illiteracy are common in the ranks.

Senior U.S. trainers, including Maj. Gen. David Hogg, are having a hard time recruiting, especially among the country's largest ethnic group, the Pashtuns.

"Now we do have an issue as far as getting Afghans from the south, Pashtuns mainly, and so that's one of the things that will be a challenge as far as maintaining an ethnic balance," Hogg says.

Hogg says part of the problem in increasing the army's ranks in the south in that the region is the heartland of the Taliban movement.

Officials estimate that three-quarters of insurgents in the southern Afghanistan were born and raised there, and did not come from neighboring Pakistan — which is the case for many insurgents in eastern Afghanistan.

But for the Afghan army to be seen as legitimate in the south, more soldiers have to come from there. Most military-age males in the south are already fighting — for the Taliban.

Hogg also says that large numbers of Afghan soldiers are going absent without leave or not reenlisting.

"What that means is we've got retain more and we've got to recruit more to make up for the attrition," Hogg says.

But recruiting is going better outside the south. Hogg says nationwide in December there were nearly 9,000 recruits for the army, double the number from just a few months earlier.

Hogg says his command is hopeful it can meet its target of 134,000 Afghan soldiers by this fall.

But that recruiting success has revealed still another problem: Finding instructors from NATO countries to turn the Afghan recruits into soldiers.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates has pressed NATO countries to send more trainers. But Hogg says the allied training effort is still short about 1,900 trainers.

If NATO doesn't send more, the U.S. may have to fill that void, even as the already expanding U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan is expected to reach about 100,000 this fall.

Yep, we take them down any time we want, like when we first went into Afganistan.  Can we get a change in the conditions/ environment that allowed them to regrow? THAT is the trick. Either that or settle for doing a little pruning of their organization, which will eventually backfire.   

That is the trick now isn't it?  Too many for too long have been worried about "getting the bad guys".  We can take out TB commanders and key players all we want, but that's like trying to cut the heads off of the fabled Hydra.  Cut one off and two more are there to take its place.  What about the "good guys"?  The common, average, run of the mill Afghan.  The people that don't want anything to do with either side (US/CF or TB).  What measures are we, as the "good guys", implementing to change these peoples lives and possibly motivate them to take ownership of the situation in their territory/country?  Our current approach is hardly working...
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http://www.eisf.eu/alerts/item.asp?n=698 

Civil-military relations in Afghanistan and Pakistan

09 Feb 2010 | 10:56

In Afghanistan, following US President Obama's decision to "surge" military forces and endorse the strategy earlier laid out by General Stanley McChrystal, military "aid", designed to provide quality-of-life improvements to populations and thus win their "hearts and minds", has become an increasingly emphasized component of NATO operations.  The Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), a fund military commanders can draw upon to support projects in their areas of operation, will be worth up to $1.2 billion in 2010, for instance.  This indicates the growing trend of militaries involved in counterinsurgency operations adopting humanitarian activities and language in order to support political agendas.  This was highlighted further by the deaths of three US soldiers in Pakistan on 2 February 2010; in the country to train the Frontier Corps, they were killed on their way to attending the opening ceremony of a girls school, whilst dressed in civilian clothes.  These articles analyse the issue of civil-military interaction in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the military's use of "aid" to build support for the governments their operations are designed to support:

3 US soldiers among 9 killed in bombing in northwest Pakistan
 
from the Long War Journal, 3 Feb 2010
 
This article demonstrates the conflation between "aid" and counterinsurgency in Pakistan.  The Pakistani Frontier Corps is playing a major role in reasserting government influence and control over previously Taliban-held parts of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).  As noted above, three US soldiers, in Pakistan to train the Frontier Corps in counterinsurgency techniques, were killed whilst dressed as civilians as they convoyed towards the opening ceremony of a girls' school.  That the soldiers were attending such an event illustrates the importance of the underlying counterinsurgency principles of "clear, hold and build", with the latter phase judged central to cementing populations' support.  It also highlights military encroachment upon activities traditionally undertaken by international aid agencies, and hints at the danger that actors will not be able to, or will not want to, distinguish between humanitarian and political motives where the outputs appear comparable.

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/02/three_us_soldiers_am.php
 
"Humanitarian aid" not something the military can do - experts
 
from IRIN, 26 Jan 2010
 
Military forces in Afghanistan are not simply seeking to harness humanitarian activities to serve political ends, but also are adopting the language of humanitarian aid, even when contradicting its central principles.  Thus, this article provides an example of a NATO/Afghan army operation labelled "humanitarian" by military spokesmen, but which clearly served a political motive.  It argues that such activities could cause a perceptual conflation of military and humanitarian actors in the eyes of Afghan communities and armed actors; insecurity for both humanitarians and their beneficiaries could thus be increased.
 
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/IRIN/2c9f5559304d2c5f416282e2aecb909a.htm
 
Money can't buy America love
 
from Foreign Policy, 1 Dec 2009
 
This article provides a case against militarised "aid", though it also reflects some scepticism toward the effectiveness of aid agencies' activities in Afghanistan.  As noted, counterinsurgency's "build" component is judged increasingly central to fostering support for the Afghan government.  And yet this research, conducted by the Feinstein International Centre at Tufts University, argues that this use of aid as a "weapons system" is actually ineffective, and perhaps even counterproductive.  It contends that politicised aid tends to feed the dynamics Afghans despair of - most notably government corruption - whilst failing to ensure the provision of sufficient needs-meeting programmes.  It further contends that this has lead Afghan perceptions of those delivering aid, including aid agencies, to grow "overwhelmingly negative".  This article thus provides a scathing critique of politicised aid, but it does not provide an unreserved endorsement of humanitarian aid activities either.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/12/01/money_cant_buy_america_love?page=0,0

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Humanitarian assistance and the like SHOULD IN NO WAY be something with a US/CF military face on it at this point with the situation Afghanistan.  The first couple of years, yes.  But 9 years later we should barely be a shadow.  As with any complicated situation, there are a lot more factors involved that need to be taken into consideration.  We still have a lot to offer but there is a different approach.  So as Rarick said, "THAT is the trick".   

-John   

Woof,

Just something I think is quite relevant to the Afghanistan situation.

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The following is a guest column, written by a reserve NCO with Special Forces, Mark Sexton.  It is based on his personal observations in Afghanistan.  It represents his analysis only, not any position taken by DOD, the U.S. Army, or any other agency of the U.S. government.  In my opinion, it represents exactly the sort of intelligence analysis we need but seldom get.

How the Taliban Take a Village
By SFC Mark Sexton
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A current method used by the Taliban in Afghanistan to gain control of an area deemed of strategic interest to the Taliban leadership, which operates from safe havens in Pakistan or within Afghanistan, is to identify and target villages to subvert. The Taliban have recognized the necessity to operate with the cooperation of the local population, with their modus operandi being to gain villagers’ cooperation through indoctrination (preferred) or coercion (when necessary).

VILLAGE NODES OF INFLUENCE
For a non-Afghan or foreigner to understand how the Taliban can subvert a village, we can use a simple social structure model to identify the key nodes of influence within a typical Afghan village. A village can be divided into three areas that most affect how daily life is lived. These key nodes are political and administrative, religious, and security aspects of village life. Of the three nodes, the one that is the most visible to outsiders is that of the malik (tribal leader or chieftain) and village elders. The malik and village elders represent the political aspects of the village. A second key node of influence is the imam (religious leader). The imam represents the religious node of influence within a village. A third local node of influence is the individuals and system of security found within a village. Security is traditionally conducted by the men of each individual village. If either the Taliban or the Afghan government controls one of the parts or nodes of influence in a village, then that entity also heavily influences or controls the village and perhaps other villages in the area.
 
TALIBAN CONTROL OF VILLAGE NODES
The Taliban look for villages and areas within which they can operate and use as a base against US and Afghan forces. Areas with little US or Afghan police or army presence are prime areas the Taliban will initially seek to subvert and hold. The Taliban build networks by getting a fighter, religious leader, or village elder to support them. Whichever one or more are initially used will be exploited for tribal and familial ties. The village politics administered by the elders and represented by an appointed malik are the most identifiable node of influence of any particular village. The Taliban will attempt to sway those maliks who are not supportive by discussion and, if necessary, threats, violence, or death. In villages where the locals say there is no malik, it is usually described as a convenience to the village as “no one wants the position,” or sometimes “the elders cannot agree on a malik so it is better there is none.” In these cases it is most likely the Taliban have neutralized the desired representative of that village. When locals are pressed for a representative they will give you a name of a person who has come to represent the village. This individual will also most likely be in support of and supported by the Taliban. The Taliban will try to install a malik or “representative of the village” by coercion or force.
 
A sub-commander will be established in the village to keep those in line who would resist the Taliban or their malik, who will be supported by limited funding. The sub-commander will generally have 2–5 fighters under his control. The fighters will often be armed only with small arms and shoulder-fired antitank rocket launchers (RPGs). They may or may not have an improvised explosive device (IED) capability, and if not will coordinate IED activities for the defense and when possible offense against US and Afghan forces. These fighters may stay in the village, but preferably are not from the village. Locals can sometimes be pressed into service to fight when needed, but the Taliban tend to use fighters from different villages so that when threats or physical violence is utilized, it won’t be kinsman against kinsman. The Taliban often visit the village imam and local mosques. Villagers do not generally oppose this, as it is expected that even the Taliban must be allowed to perform and express their Islamic duties. These mosque visits afford the Taliban opportunities to gage village sentiment and to build and establish contacts within localities. Village religious leaders also serve to educate children in villages where the Taliban have either closed or destroyed the local school. The mosque and imam serve as an education center for the Taliban while still presenting an opportunity for village children to be “educated.” This presents a solution to the unpopular notion of schools being closed. A constant and recognized complaint from the Afghan people is the lack of opportunity because of poor education. The Taliban will supplant the local imam if needed by supplying their own to a village. A village with no imam will receive one and the Taliban will establish a mosque. This mosque will serve as a Taliban meeting place, storage facility, and indoctrination center.

Sympathetic locals are used as auxiliaries to provide food and shelter. One way to do this is for known supporters to place food and blankets outside their living quarters or in guest quarters to be used by Taliban in transit or operating within a village. This gives the resident supporter some plausible deniability. When US or Afghan forces arrive, all that is found are the blanket, possibly clothing, footprints and other signs of visitors. The Taliban have blended into the surrounding village.

TALIBAN CAN CONTROL WITH FEW FIGHTERS
The Taliban method requires relatively few of their own personnel. Its strength is in the local subversion of the most basic levels of village organization and life. It is also a decentralized approach. Guidance is given and then carried out, with commanders applying their own interpretation of how to proceed. The goal is to control the village, and at the local level the only effective method, which must be used by all commanders, is to control what we have termed the nodes of influence. Form fits function; an Afghan village can only work one way to allow its members to survive a subsistence agrarian lifestyle, and the Taliban know it well.
 
To control an area the Taliban will identify villages that can be most easily subverted. They will then spread to other villages in the area one at a time, focusing their efforts on whichever node of influence seems most likely to support their effort first. Using this model the Taliban could influence and dominate or control a valley or area with a population of 1000–2500—ten villages with 100–250 people (100–250 compounds)—with only between 20–50 active fighters and ten fighting leaders. The actual numbers may encompass greater population and fewer fighters.

The Taliban will have an elaborate network to support their fighters in areas they control or dominate. They will have safe houses, medical clinics, supply sites, weapons caches, transportation agents, and early warning networks (the British Army calls them “dickers”) to observe and report. The US and Afghan forces, heavily laden with excessive body armor and equipment, are reluctant to leave their vehicles. They are blown up on the same roads and paths they entered the area on. The Taliban will use feints and lures to draw our forces away from caches and leaders in an attempt to buy them time to relocate, or into a lethal ambush. After the attack the Taliban will disperse and blend into the village. The village will frequently sustain civilian casualties and the information or propaganda will be spread of US and Afghan soldiers using excessive force. The US and Afghan forces will leave or set up an outpost nearby, but the attacks will continue because the forces are not in the village, do not truly know “who’s who in the zoo,” and aren’t able to effectively engage Taliban personnel or effectively interface with the village nodes of influence to their benefit.

We say one thing but our actions are different. Locals are reluctant to help because to be seen talking with the Americans and Afghan security forces will result in a visit from a Taliban member to determine what they talked about and to whom. The local villagers know the government has no effective plan that can counter the Taliban in their village, and will typically only give information on Taliban or criminal elements to settle a blood feud. The Pashtu people are patient to obtain justice and will use what they have to pay back “blood for blood,” even against the Taliban.

COUNTERING THE TALIBAN IN THE VILLAGE
Countering Taliban subversion of the populace is not done effectively with just more troops located at outposts. The troops must coordinate their activities with the local population and establish security through and within the village. When US and Afghan forces do this, the fight will typically take on a particularly violent aspect, and involve the population as the Taliban attempt to maintain or reassert control.
The US and Afghan forces and government will need to identify individuals in order to employ lethal and non-lethal targeting. This requires in-depth knowledge of tribal structure, alliances, and feuds. Viable alternatives or choices need to be available to village leaders and villagers. Just placing US and Afghan soldiers at an outpost, conducting token presence patrols, occasionally bantering with locals, and organizing a shura once a month are not going to work.

Afghan identity is not primarily national, i.e., belonging within a geographic boundary with a centralized national government. Afghan identity is tribal in nature. Americans view identity as a national government; Afghans in the villages do not. The tribe is most important. The country “Afghanistan” running things from Kabul does not mean very much to the Afghan people in the villages under duress from the Taliban.
US and Afghan forces must be able to infiltrate and shape the village nodes of influence and then target individuals. Right now our military embraces a centralized, top-driven approach that prevents our military and US-trained Afghan counterparts from doing so. Current US procedures and tactics attempt to identify the Taliban without regard to their influence or social role at the village level. Instead we attempt to link individuals to attacks and incomplete network structures through often questionable intelligence. The individuals in nodes of influence must be identified as neutral, pro, or anti-Afghan government and then dealt with. To target any other way is haphazard at best and does not gain us the initiative.

US and Afghan forces must also devise and utilize tactics to fight outside and inside the village. This requires true light infantry and real counterinsurgency tactics employed by troops on the ground, not read from a “new” COIN manual by leadership in a support base. The tactics must entail lightly equipped and fast-moving COIN forces that go into villages and know how to properly interact with locals and identify Taliban insurgents. They must have the ability to take their time and stay in areas they have identified at the local level as worth trying to take back. Being moved from place to place and using armored vehicles while scarcely engaging local leadership will not work. Targeting identified high value targets will only result in the “whack-a-mole” syndrome. It’s demoralizing for US and Afghan troops, the American public, and the Afghans who just want to live in peace. A light infantry force conducting specialized reconnaissance in villages, and using proven tactics like trained visual trackers to follow insurgents into and out of villages, proper ambush techniques on foot outside the village, and knowledge of the local village situation is the key. Infantry tactics should also include vertical envelopment of Taliban fighters by helicopter and parachute to cut off avenues of escape. Troop units should have a secure local patrol base from which to operate, send foot patrol into villages at night, and talk with and document compounds and inhabitants for later analysis. Mega bases or forward operating bases (FOBS) are only for support; units and tactics should be decentralized.

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Any thoughts?

KABUL, Afghanistan (CNN)  -- Afghan commandos backed by coalition troops killed 60 militants in a four-day operation in southern Afghanistan and seized an unprecedented amount of narcotics, officials said Saturday.

The operation was in the city of Marjah in Helmand province, where soldiers have been targeting the city's Loy Cherah Bazaar. The bazaar is considered by the U.S. military as the southern region's "militant stronghold and narcotics processing hub."

Afghan and coalition forces launched coordinated air strikes against militant buildings used as drug-making facilities, a joint news release said.

The operation, which started earlier this week, seized about 92,271 kilograms of narcotics.

The haul included 16,850 kilograms of black tar opium, 201 kilograms of processed heroin and 75,000 kilograms of poppy seeds, the release said.

Heroin-processing materials such as ammonium chloride, activated charcoal and soda ash were also found, according to the release.

The combined forces also destroyed bomb-making material, including diesel fuel, improvised explosive device battery systems and homemade explosive materials set for detonation.
   
"The commandos and their coalition partners relentlessly penetrated an area militants and criminals considered a safe-haven, again proving they will not be denied access to any area in this country," said Col. Greg Julian, a spokesman for the U.S. Forces-Afghanistan.

"The four-day operation severely disrupted one of the key militant and criminal operations, and narcotics hubs in southern Afghanistan," he said.

An unmanned craft was flying over the site to ensure militants do not claim false civilian casualties, according to the release.

Woof Guro Crafty,

"Where's the plan?  WTF is the plan?"
I honestly couldn't tell you

"Do we the American people have what it takes to stay the course?"
No. 

"Does our President?"
No Comment.

"WTF is "The Plan"?"

"One example of a plan would be what retired Col Ralph Peters has suggested-- working from memory it was something like this:  Go in and kick ass, then leave while saying "Do something stupid again" and we'll be back even harder to kick your asses again."
Personally my all time favorite approach and the ideal approach to American foreign policy when people somewhere else act like idiots by flying planes into buildings and whatnot. 

"Another example of a plan would be to seek to establish democracy and women's rights..."
probably not going to happen in this neck of the woods anytime soon.

"...and defund the enemy by taking out the opium crops."
Then what about the poor farmers that need to feed their families by growing poppy?  If we piss them off by destroying their opium crop, they might go join the TB...  Not so fast!  They wont if the TB can't pay 'em.  Sure, they might be pissed at first but I guess they'll have to cultivate some other type of crop.  In reality they should be considered "enablers" or "auxilliary enemy forces" since they are in fact enabling the enemy to continue with their activities and they should be treated as the enemy.

"Another example would be to maintain a low grade war of indefinite duration keeping the AQ-Taliban distracted by by lobbing in Predators and the life."
So far it's not doing much

"Another example would be to take out Pakistan's nukes and come home."
Pakistan still has a "legitimate" government in place and is considered an "ally" to the U.S.

"As best as I can tell it is to:

1) Give less troops than required and lob predators until , , , what?
2) Not address the role of the opium trade in financing the enemy
3) Continue to maintain the fantasy of the Durand Line (i.e. that there is a border between Afg and Pak and not simply Pashtunstan)
4) Wonder WTF to do as Pak collapses.
5) Lack the will to go after Pak's nukes-- and certainly Secretary Clinton and his recent responses to North Korea's missile test bodes quite poorly here."

Maybe not the best courses of action to take but...
hell why not.  Seems like were getting pretty good at all of that stuff 

Woof!

Now can anyone see why terrorists should not be negotiated with?  Give 'em an inch and they take a mile.  Pak needs to nip this one in the bud while they still have a chance otherwise they can look forward to ... well there's really nothing that I can think of unless a nuclear winter can be something to be looked forward to  . 

"Much of this is because the state is caught between the contradictory needs to combat the “bad” Taliban (those that fight in Pakistan) while still maintaining influence over the “good” ones (those that fight in Afghanistan)."  They are considered "good" by certain people in Pakistan because they keep Afghanistan weak.  Do you think Pak wants enemies on both sides?  Well, I think their little plan backfired and now they have to deal with "the enemy within".  I think that if it gets too bad in Pakistan that India will have no problem rolling through and I don't think many would mind it at all.

Woof,

P.C. is correct.  We don't need another Operation Anaconda.  The mountains of Afghanistan are the primary reason why the Afghan people have never truly been beaten by outsiders.  That Lt. definitely has his mind right for the type of situation him and his platoon have to face. 

"At each dug-in position, Kerr recorded the GPS coordinates of unmanned enemy positions, down to the 10th digit."  ...and later on in the fight...  "With a rush of satisfaction, Kerr reached into his pocket and pulled out the GPS coordinates of the enemy positions he'd scribbled down that morning. From six miles away at their base in Asmar, a 10th Mountain artillery battery unleashed a torrent of 105 mm howitzer shells onto the enemy positions. In the twilight, .50-caliber machine guns blazed."

Beautiful.

The mountainous terrain is one thing and the human terrain is another but they're both the biggest obstacles that need to be overcome in Afghanistan.  "Almost all the males in the valley had gone missing".  Why?  Most were probably fighting age males.  What did the TB have to offer that The ANA/ANP didn't?  Maybe it's a case of "if you can't beat 'em, join 'em".  People will always fight for something and rarely for nothing.  Why didn't they do what the villagers in Bazitkhel, Pakistan do and fight back? 

The U.S. and Coalition forces can only do so much and it's sad but true but, a lot of soldiers don't really care what happens here as long as they make it home alive. Ultimately it's up to the Afghan people whether or not they live in a state of constant fear under the Taliban. Then again, that depends on who can provide them with their basic needs, the biggest one being security and not just through arms.  Is it the ANA and ANP or the TB?  The poppy fields are blooming in Helmand and eradication efforts are weak and ultimately ineffective.The TB buys every bit of the opium crop for the farmers.  I don't think that the present government of Afghanistan will be subsidizing wheat anytime soon.  A man has to feed his family.

There are so many issues that need to be addressed here and if too much focus is placed on one thing, others fall off the radar.  Damn!  I wish I could type faster.

INTERVIEW-Ghani says Afghanistan must take its "second chance"
03 Mar 2009 09:14:07 GMT
Source: Reuters
By Simon Denyer

KABUL, March 3 (Reuters) - Afghanistan needs to clean up its act if it is to take its "second chance" after this year's election, but foreign aid also has to be much more effective and accountable, said presidential contender Ashraf Ghani.

"The current world financial crisis is going to put severe constraints on the availability of aid, and Afghanistan will have to compete and make its case," former finance minister, World Bank and U.N. official Ghani told Reuters in an interview.

"We failed at the first chance," he said, referring to efforts to build a stable and prosperous nation after the fall of the Taliban in 2001. "This time we need to get it right."

Ghani, a 59-year-old senior fellow at the Brookings Institute and author of a book on fixing failed states, said time was running out. "Two years from now, we need to be in a position to show the world positive momentum," he said.

"The politics of your countries is not going to support the current image of misgovernance, misrule and corruption in our country," he said. "Why would they support massive expansions here on infrastructure or education, when they themselves are going to be under severe constraints to cut services?"

Global attention has turned back to Afghanistan after U.S. President Barack Obama vowed to send in 17,000 more troops and make stabilisation of the country and the war on Islamist militants there a top foreign policy priority.

Many Afghans argue more U.S. troops, widely blamed for mounting civilian casualties, will only make matters worse.

Ghani said the troop deployment was "necessary but not sufficient" to combat a menacing Taliban insurgency, but questioned the balance between military and economic assistance.

He echoed U.S. General David Petraeus in Iraq, who said an effective counterinsurgency strategy had to be 20 percent military and 80 percent political and economic.

"NATO's monthly expenditure is $20 billion, and is estimated to rise to $22 billion," Ghani said. "$22 billion spent educating the Afghan people would change five generations."

FAILURE OF THE AID EFFORT

But it is not just about money. Ghani said the aid effort was "dysfunctional" and lacked accountability, with much of the money ending up in the hands of foreign experts and contractors.

In 2002, donors gave the U.N. $1.6 billion to rebuild Afghanistan from the ruins of war, Ghani said, accusing the U.N. of using much of the money raised to solve its own funding crisis and of never accounting to Afghanistan how it was spent.

The U.S. government's aid arm, USAID, did not have a single strategy paper for Afghanistan until 2006, he said, and ended up managing a "totally broken" system.

"Illustration: the head of USAID came and said you really need schools, the president really needs schools, 400 schools are going to be built before the presidential election (in 2004). They built eight, and the roof of four of them collapsed."

USAID's work was subcontrated out up to six times to tens of thousands of contractors, he said.

"This became a bonanza for contractors," Ghani said. "The poor Afghan contractor who is doing all the work is getting paid 10 percent or maximally 30 percent of the money. Everything else goes to people who are managers.

"To sum up: we have a dysfunctional international system faced and combined with a dysfunctional Afghan system where corruption became the norm. Now there are accusations of mutual corruption and mutual incompetence reinforcing each other."

Ghani says the election must not just be about changing an individual at the top, but a fundamental restructuring of the regime of President Hamid Karzai.

A formidable intellectual who was even been touted as a potential U.N. Secretary-General, Ghani is seen as an outside contender who lacks the support and clout to become president.

He admits his term as finance minister did not make him any more popular at home.


Ashraf Ghani

Ashraf Ghani, who holds a PhD degree in Anthropology from Colombia University in New York, is an Afghan-American intellectual who served briefly as Hamid Karzai's chief advisor in his interim administration and eventually was chosen as Afghanistan's finance minister from 2002 - 2004, during Hamid Karzai's transitional administration. Before joining the Afghan government, Ghani held positions with the United Nations and the World Bank, and helped prepare the Bonn Agreement.

Because of his success at carrying out a series of important reforms as finance minister, he was voted as the best finance minister of Asia in 2003 by Emerging Markets. Ghani is a strong advocate of foreign investment in Afghanistan, and even today works towards having Afghanistan be seen as a great opportunity for investment, not a charity.

When Afghanistan's new constitution was put it place, it required that the president's cabinet members must have only Afghan citizenship and so dual citizenships were not allowed. Not wanting to give up his American citizenship, Ghani declined to remain as finance minister and instead asked to be appointed as Chancellor of Kabul University. He later resigned from his position as Kabul University Chancellor and in 2005 co-founded and is currently chairman of the Institute for State Effectiveness (ISE). On their website, it states that the ISE "uses a citizen-centered perspective to rethink the fundamentals of the relationship between citizens, the state and the market in the context of globalization."

Ashraf Ghani wrote a book titled The Framework: Fixing Failed States, with Clare Lockhart (also from the the Institute for State Effectiveness), and was published in May 2008 by Oxford University Press.

Ghani was born in 1949 in the province of Logar.

by Abdullah Qazi / October 15, 2008

You gotta love the Marines 


http://news.scotsman.com/latestnews/We-will-not--take.5012425.jp

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We will not take British orders, say US marines in Helmand


Published Date: 25 February 2009
By Jerome Starkey in Kandahar
US MARINES deploying to Afghanistan's violent Helmand province this summer have refused to take orders from the British headquarters in the provincial capital, Lashkar Gah.
Instead they will report directly to a regional headquarters in Kandahar, a Nato general said yesterday, effectively sidelining Britain's Taskforce Helmand.

Senior Nato officials have confirmed US plans to double the number of troops in Helmand, where the Taleban-led insurgency is fiercest.

More than a quarter of the 17,000 extra US troops, pledged by Barack Obama, the US president, will be deployed in the poppy-rich province, where Britain is nominally in charge.

It means American troops will outnumber the British-led force in Helmand. But unlike the Danish troops fighting alongside UK forces, they will not be under British command.

The snub comes after months of discontent in Nato's Kabul headquarters, which culminated in generals questioning whether Britain had any long-term plan.

UK commanders have been accused of treading water as the insurgency gained ground.

Major-General Mart de Kruif, Nato's commander in southern Afghanistan, said: "The insurgents see Helmand as their heartland, and from a military point of view central Helmand is their top priority.

"From a security point of view you just need to have more boots on the ground to deliver security 24/7 to the people."

He said the Americans would probably take over huge parts of the province, slashing the remit of Britain's overstretched force.

Nato's top general in Afghanistan, David McKiernan, said in December that troops were locked in a stalemate.

Although Britain has more than 8,000 troops in Afghanistan, there are only around 4,500 in Helmand, where the Taleban are fighting hardest.

Only a small fraction of them are front-line fighting troops, the rest are in support.

"I think we'll see the number of troops at least double," Maj-Gen de Kruif added.

Violence has soared in Helmand since the UK troops took charge of "peacekeeping" there in 2006. The province produces almost half Afghanistan's illegal poppy crop, most of it beyond the lasting reach of UK forces.

Although UK troops win every battle, they are unable to hold ground once they win and the insurgents re-infiltrate as soon as they leave.

There is already a 2,000-man US task force based at Camp Bastion in Helmand, which reports directly to Kandahar. Most of their troops are stationed in neighbouring Farah province.

They also have a 30-man mentoring team in Musa Qala, alongside the British garrison, and a company in Now Zad, which the US marines call an "Alamo".

The town has been abandoned and the soldiers come under almost constant attack whenever they leave their base.

Maj-Gen de Kruif said Britain's lead role would be confined to reconstruction.

US troops have been wary of accepting UK command after Nato's International Security Assistance Force was led by General David Richards in 2006. He oversaw a botched deal which effectively handed the town of Musa Qala back to the Taleban, and his interpreter was arrested on charges of spying for Iran.

Most incoming US marines are expected to deploy in southern Helmand, around Garmsir, to control Taleban infiltration routes in and out of Pakistan.

Unlike mountainous eastern Afghanistan, southern Helmand is mostly desert. The marines in Farah are already protecting Helmand's north-western flank, while troops from the US army's 2nd Infantry have set up in Maiwand, west of Helmand, in Kandar province – controlling the main road in and out of the province.

"It looks as though the Americans are trying to hem in Helmand," an analyst in Kabul said. "Fighters will find ways around, but the bulk of the drugs have to go on the roads. If the Americans can control them they might hurt the insurgents' purse."

• Four US special forces soldiers and their Afghan interpreter were killed in Helmand yesterday when their vehicle was hit by a roadside bomb.

It was the deadliest attack on international forces this year. The soldiers were believed to have been patrolling Garmsir, doing reconnaissance before more US marines arrive.

The same anti drug stuff that Thailand has been doing for years with an apparently good deal of success has already been going on in Afghanistan for a while but is still in the beginning stages.  The Thai government also has a strong military to back it up.  Afghanistan doesn't, so it's going to take a while before "alternative" crops are the "normal" thing around here.  We can't change much of anything and hope to make an impact without security and we'll have to be in Afghanistan for a while  to provide that security so the Afghan people can get back on their feet and take care of themselves.  Too many American, Australian, British, Canadian, French, German, Danish and other Coalition Forces soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen have made the ultimate sacrifice not for just for their respective countries, but for Afghanistan as well.  Many of them died right alongside the Afghan soldiers, police, and security forces personnel who also fell in the line of duty because they wanted to see Afghanistan become a better place. 

Any quick fix we try to is just going to be a short term fix.  We need to be patient in order to implement programs like the one that Thailand has as an answer to their drug problem.  The only way to win a war against America or any Western Nation is to stretch it out until the public gets tired and say "hell with it"  or bored with it, and the bad guys know it.     
   

Cool deal G M   you taught me something new today.  

So they dealt the first blow and they're still sore about how the crusaders invaded the holy land...

I went ahead and did a search on pre-crusade jihad and came across this site: http://www.historyofjihad.com/sitemap.html

And a little thing I found interesting from the above site

===================================

"The Hudna (Temporary Peace Treaty) of Hudaibiya demonstrates in a very telling way, the evil genius that Mohammad was. And this character of his has been filtered down to the last Muslim, who uses it to cheat and trick non-Muslims in every small thing in day-to-day life in a practice popularly known among the Muslims as Taquiyya (also spelt as Taqiyya or Taqiya) which means deception.

Pervez Musharraf the President of Pakistan, referred to this Hudna (Temporary Peace Treaty) of Hudaibiya (and to the double-crossing that exists in it), when he announced after 9/11 that he was making a pact with America to fight the Taliban who then ruled Afghanistan and whose guest was that, horror of all horrors, Osama Bin Laden."

===================================

Pakistan made the pact just to dupe U.S.  And now they're getting ready to something stupid with the TB.  They've got nukes too.  They could team up with Iran and nuke Afghanistan from each side but they're probably waiting for America to get out of Iraq so Iran doesn't have to worry about that side of the border and before you know it we'll have the United Islamic States of Ahmadinejad.

I'm sure the scenarios are endless.....  

Has that been talked about in the WW3 thread yet?  I haven't had a chance to read that much of it yet.
 

This sums it up

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hudna

and according to this site, it's "a tactical cease-fire that allows the Arabs to rebuild their terrorist infrastructure in order to be more effective when the "cease-fire" is called off."

http://www.omdurman.org/hudna.html

  ...absolutely mind boggling...

===========================

 MINGORA, Pakistan, Feb 21 (Reuters) - Taliban fighters have agreed to a "permanent ceasefire" in Pakistan's northwestern valley of Swat, a senior government official said on Saturday.

On Friday, the militants' commander Maulana Fazlullah met his father-in-law, radical cleric Maulana Sufi Mohammad who was freed by the government to negotiate peace.

"They have made a commitment that they will observe a permanent ceasefire and we'll do the same," Syed Mohammad Javed, the commissioner of Malakand, a region of Northwest Frontier Province, told reporters after meeting elders. (Reporting by Junaid Khan; Writing by Kamran Haider)

===========================

Somebody is getting paid,  Somebody is scared, or the TB is finally coming around and ready to shape up 

Yes sir, it's no big secret, that's a BIG part of where the TB gets the money they need to continue their "jihad".  Opium accounted for an estimated 25% of Afghanistan's overall GDP in 2008 or the equivalent of 33% of licit GDP.  Overall gross profits for the Afghan drug traffickers was estimated to be about 2.7 billion dollars.  The U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime 2008 Opium Survey for Afghanistan is right here:

http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan_Opium_Survey_2008.pdf

And also take a look here to get an idea of Afghanistan's economy:

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/print/us.html

then compare the numbers to other neighboring countries to kinda put things into perspective.   

I honestly don't know why we don't just wipe out the entire poppy crop.  No poppy=no money for the TB.  Without money to fund the "jihad" and pay their "fighters", they'll fizzle away.  The only reason I think dudes "fight" for the TB is because they have to feed their families.  Just like a lot of people in the world, Afghans believe in money.  If the TB has no money to pay, then the "believers" quit believing. Does that make sense?  Now if the "fighters" quit "fighting", they'll most likely end up going back to the fields or being a productive member of Afghan society somehow.  All that would be left is the true believers hardcore TB. 

Success cannot be built in Afghanistan until the main underlying cause of instability is taken care of.  First and foremost, Afghanistan needs to be rid of the Taliban once and for all.  All they really do is cause the people to live in fear.  I hope the people get sick of them and just start running them out of villages all over Afghanistan.  After that, people hopefully wont have to live in a country that the rest of the world has to worry about.  I also think that once things do start getting better for them that they will start taking pride in their country.  Who knows...

Opium cultivation is on the decline since last year but in the few years before that it was on the rise.  Hopefully it stays on the decline.       

I am by no means an expert on the subject but I will offer my point of view based upon my limited experience.  I do think that sharia is just as complex as other legal systems but it hasn't evolved as most other forms of law have evolved to fit in with the modern world.  Punishments are overly brutal and sharia has remained virtually unchanged since its inception.  

a brief overview of sharia law from the Council on Foreign Relations website...

http://www.cfr.org/publication/8034/

and I hate to do it, but it is actually a very in depth explanation and although the validity of legal scholar John Makdisi's claim that English law, the predecessor of American law, has roots in medieval Islamic law thanks to the Normans is questionable, anything is possible.  The Normans did play a role in the crusades and occupied Muslim lands for a brief period of time.  But yeah...  Wikipedia...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sharia

For sharia law to be accepted by the rest of the world, many compromises will have to be made by the ones who uphold the law in that part of the world.  Shuria has strong roots in The Qur'an, Sunnah, and hadith and since the words and deeds of the prophet Mohammed are absolutely infallible, these compromises may never be accepted among hard line Muslims.

Another issue with sharia is that there is no rock solid, in black and white, this is the way it is and is going to be when someone f----s up "Sharia Law Book" in existence which states clearly the crimes and punishments in Islam.  There is only the Qur'an and the wide open interpretation of the words of the prophet by the mullah or whoever is relied upon to enact Islamic law against an offender.  Now, personal opinion,  if that dude is having a bad day or doesn't like you for some reason or has any ulterior motives whatsoever, he can pretty much do what he wants and it kinda gives him some power.   The Ottoman Empire apparently codified sharia and that pretty much replaced the legal scholars and jurists who upheld the law.  Still it would need to be toned down quite a bit.

Or if the IMPOSSIBLE were to happen in that region.... SEPARATION of MOSQUE AND STATE and the conversion or destruction of Muslim extremists in that part of the world, the code of honor of the Pashtun could serve as a foundation for a form of law a little more lenient than sharia.  

Here's an overview of Pashtunwali from www.Afghanland.com

Pashtunwalai, literally means the way of the Pashtuns, it’s the rules and regulations and laws of the Pashtun tribes which protected the world’s biggest tribal society. These rules are responsible for the survival of the Pashtun tribes for over 2000 years. Some of the rules go back to the days of Adam and eve and are still puritan today

NANEWATEI: Under Nanewatei a penitent enemy is forgiven and the feuding factions resume peaceful and friendly relations. Thus it creates a congenial atmosphere for peaceful co-existence and mutual understanding through eventual reconciliation.

TEEGA OR KANRAY: Teega or Kanray is cessation of bloodshed between contending parties. Teega (putting down of a stone) in other words means a temporary truce declared by a Jirga. The word stone is used figuratively as actually no stone is put at the time of the cessation of hostilities. Once the truce is enforced, no party dares violate it for fear of punitive measures.

BADAL: (Eye for an Eye) Self-respect and sensitivity to insult is another essential trait of Pashtun character. The poorest among them has his own sense of dignity and honor and he vehemently refuses to submit to any insult. In fact every Pashtun considers himself equal if not better than his fellow tribesmen and an insult is, therefore, taken as scurrilous reflection on his character. An insult is sure to evoke insult and murder is likely to lead to a murder.

JirgaMELMASTIA: Pashtun have been described as one of the most hospitable peoples of the world. They consider Melmastia or generous hospitality as one of the finest virtues and greet their guest warmly with a broad smile on their faces. A Pashtun feels delighted to receive a guest regardless of his past relations or acquaintance and prepares a delicious meal for him and offers up to their ability the finest meals available to them.

TOR: Pashtuns are sensitive about the honor of their women folk and slight touching of the women is at times considered a serious and an intolerable offence. The cases of adultery and illicit relations are put down with iron hand in and no quarter is given to culprits either male or female. Casting of an evil eye on woman is tantamount to imperil one's life. Both sexes, therefore, scrupulously avoid indulgence in immoral practices.

GHUNDI: Ghundi is a classic case of balance of power in tribal areas. It is derived from Pashto word Ghund, meaning a political party but it is used for an alliance. As modern states enter into bilateral agreements for promotion of trade, cultivation of friendly relations and mutual defense, similarly various sections of a tribe align themselves in blocs or Ghunds to safeguard their common interests. Ghundi is entered into defeat the aggressive and nefarious designs of a hostile neighbor. In tribal fighting the Ghundi members espouse their mutual interests against their common enemy and act as a corporate body with all the resources at their command.

LOKHAY WARKAWAL: Lokhay Warkawal literally means `giving of a pot' but it implies the protection of an individual or a tribe. A weaker tribe to a stronger one with the object of ensuring its safety and security generally gives Lokhay. It is accepted in the form of a sacrificial animal such as a goat or a sheep. When a tribe accepts a Lokhay from another tribe, it undertakes the responsibility of safeguarding the latter's interests against its enemies and protects it at all costs.

Afghan Lashkar Lead by Wazir Akbar KhanLASHKAR: Lashkar is an armed party, which goes out from a village or tribe for warlike purposes. The Lashkar may consist of a hundred to several thousand men. The Lashkar assembled for Jihad (Holy Struggle) is usually very large. The decisions of a Jirga, if violated by a party, are enforced through a tribal Lashkar. The Lashkar thus performs the functions of police in the event of a breach of tribal law.

CHIGHA: Chigha means a pursuit party. The Chigha party is formed or taken out in case armed bandits with the object of lifting cattle, looting property or abducting an inmate of the village, raid a village. Composed of armed persons, the Chigha party goes in pursuit of the raiders to affect the release of the cattle etc or recover the stolen property.

TARR: A mutual accord between two tribes or villagers themselves with regard to a certain matter is called Tarr. For instance, after sowing wheat or any other crop, the people of the village agree not to let loose their cattle to graze in the fields and thus damage the crop. The man whose cattle are found grazing in the fields in violation of this agreement has no right to claim compensation for an injury caused to his cattle by the owner of the field.

MLA TARR: Mla Tarr, which literally means `girding up of loins' denotes two things. Firstly it is used for all such members of a family who are capable of carrying and using firearms. Secondly, it means espousing the cause of a man against his enemies and providing him with an armed party. The tribesmen resort to Mla Tarr when a person belonging to their village or tribe is attacked, mal-treated or disgraced by their enemies.

BADRAGHA: An armed party escorting a fugitive or a visitor to his destination is called Badragha. Badragha is a guarantee for the safety of a man who is either hotly pursued by his enemies or there is an apprehension of his being killed on his way home. An armed party accompanies such a man as Badragha or `escort' to ensure his safe return to the place of his abode. Badragha is never attacked by the second party because of fear of reprisals and the blood feud that is sure to follow if an attack is made on it. The Badragha convoy can be depended upon only within its own geographical limits; beyond it, the people of other tribes take the charge to convoy the traveler.

Treaty of GandomakBILGA: The word Bilga is used for stolen property. A man is held responsible for theft or burglary if any of the stolen articles are recovered from his house. In such a case he is obliged to make good the loss sustained by the afflicted person. He, however, stands absolved of Bilga if he discloses the source or the persons from whom he had purchased the stolen articles.

BOTA: Bota means carrying away. It is a sort of retaliatory action against an aggressor. For instance, if a creditor fails to recover his debt from the debtor, he resorts to Bota by seizing his cattle or one of his kith and kin. The creditor keeps them as hostages till his dues are fully realized or the debtor has furnished a security to make payment within a specified period to the creditor.

BARAMTA: Baramta like Bota is resorted to when the grievances of a party are not redressed or a debtor adopts delaying tactics in respect of payment of a debt to the creditor. The word Baramta is derived from Persian word Baramad, which means recovery or restitution of property etc. Under Baramta hostages are held to ransom till the accused returns the claimed property. The Pashtuns consider it an act against their sense of honor and contrary to the principles of Pashtunwali to lay their hands on dependent classes such as blacksmiths, tailors, barbers and butchers etc belonging to the debtor's village.

BALANDRA OR ASHAR: Balandra or Ashar can be best described as a village aid program under which a particular task is accomplished on the basis of mutual cooperation and assistance. At the time of sowing or harvesting, the villagers lend a helping hand to the man who seeks their help. They take out their pair of bullocks to plough his fields at sowing time and assist him in reaping his crops at the time of harvest. The man, thus obliged, by the fellow villagers holds a feast in their honor in the evening.

MEERATA: Meerata means complete annihilation of the male members of a family by brutal assassination. This is not a custom but a criminal act. Under Meerata, the stronger member of family used to assassinate their weak but near relatives with the sole object of removing them from the line of inheritance and gaining forcible possession of their lands, houses and other property. The tribal law seriously views this kind of cold-blooded murder and persons responsible for such an inhumane and ghastly act cannot escape the wrath of Pashtuns. The Jirga immediately assembles to take suitable action against the culprits. The penalty is usually in the form of setting on fire their houses and other property and expulsion of the culprits from their area.

SAZ: The word Saz is used for blood money or compensation in lieu of killing. Under the custom of Saz a person who feels penitent after committing a deliberate murder, approaches the deceased's family through a Jirga and offers to make payment of blood money to end enmity between them. All hostilities come to an end between the parties after acceptance of Saz. Sometimes the payment of compensation takes the form of giving a girl in marriage to the aggrieved party. It is also called Swarah, which binds together the two parties in blood relations and thus helps in eradicating ill will and feelings of enmity.

ITBAR: Itbar, which means trust, or guaranteed assurance or is the arch of society, which is governed by un-written laws or conventions. All business including contracts relating to sale and mortgage or disposal of property, is transacted on the basis of trust or Itbar. Such transactions are verbal and are entered into in the presence of the village elders or a few witnesses. The violation of Itbar is considered to be dishonorable act, un-becoming of gentleman and contrary to the norms of Pashtunwali.

HAMSAYA: The word Hamsaya stands for a neighbor but in Pashto it applies to a man who abandons his home either due to poverty or blood feud and seeks protection of an elder of another village. In this way the latter becomes his client or vassal. It is, therefore, incumbent upon the protector to save his Hamsaya from insult or injury from any source.

Or maybe a blend of Pashtunwali and sharia.  


The fact of the matter is that we cannot and are never going to change the culture, the people or their way of thinking.  We can only try to bring out the best in them and nurture that as an international community.  Then, you might have peace and stability over there.

However, giving the Taliban the right to anything at all is the wrong answer  .  "...the recognition of Islamic law in the region "isn't something that hasn't happened before."  No shiite, but for the Pakistani govt to allow those fahk-heads to have any right to anything is the beginning of the end for Pakistan.  If it keeps up the TB will eventually have access to nuke to use against whoever they perceive as an "infidel"