Fire Hydrant of Freedom

https://www.atr.org/biden-calls-for-44-6-capital-gains-tax-rate-highest-capital-gains-tax-since-its-creation-in-1922/

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/moldova-clamps-down-after-russian-moves/ar-AA1nzurh?ocid=msedgntp&pc=DCTS&cvid=55859edb1f804e48ac6a23f8bcbd9aeb&ei=2

Help me think this one through.

There are two SEXES:  Male and Female.

When the Woke substitute the word "GENDER" for "SEX" then the camel nose is in the tent for all kinds of verbal misdirection, obfuscation, and sleight of hand.

So maybe our efficient tactic is to reassert the word SEX as in what SEX someone is and not use terms related to whether someone is a "pitcher" or a "catcher"?

April 24, 2024
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European Views on US Global Posture
Perceptions aren't consistent with reality.
By: Antonia Colibasanu

The notion that all countries operate within constraints is one of the main pillars of geopolitics. It came up repeatedly during my recent visit to the United States, where I attended several talks on European and Russian affairs. Though we at GPF try to stay out of the D.C. bubble, it’s nonetheless important for us to know what those in the bubble are saying, especially since Europe right now appears so consumed by what’s happening in Washington.

I traveled to the U.S. with a delegation of experts and policymakers from Romania. Analysts and officials from other parts of Europe, including Germany and Poland, were also in attendance. The main topics on the agenda were security and, of course, Ukraine. The event coincided with heated discussions in the U.S. Congress over aid packages for Ukraine and Israel. Though the situation in Israel is potentially hugely impactful for American politics, the conflict in Ukraine is the main focus for many policymakers in Europe. After all, the war there has shifted NATO’s containment line and transformed Eastern Europe into a literal battleground.

Considering that Kyiv is hugely dependent on military aid from Washington, European lawmakers are making concerted efforts to learn more about the constraints within which U.S. politics and politicians operate. Europeans typically have a narrow view of U.S. politics, mainly focusing on the presidency and the administration, which they perceive as ultimately responsible for maintaining the United States’ global leadership role and, by extension, the Western security structure.

That’s because the Europeans tend to believe the U.S. political system mirrors those in Europe, where foreign policies are forged by governments and primarily driven by urgent security threats to their borders. The Europeans thus get either nervous or excited every time another U.S. presidential election comes around, believing that a change in the presidency could alter how Washington interacts with the world. In doing so, they misjudge the way U.S. politics works, believing falsely that the presidency overrides every other institution in the United States, especially when it comes to strategy and foreign policy.

In fact, the U.S. president isn’t as powerful as many assume – and that’s by design. The nation's founders didn’t want to assign too much authority to one person in the political hierarchy. They instead built a system of checks and balances, splitting power among three branches of government: the legislative (Congress), the executive (the president) and the judiciary (the courts). This division of powers guarantees that no branch can overpower the others. Congress enacts legislation, which the president can veto, which Congress can in turn override with two-thirds majorities in both houses. Congress also controls the federal budget, and thus can limit funding for the president’s agenda. The president is commander-in-chief of the military but cannot declare war; that power belongs to Congress. The president also appoints federal judges and other officials, but the Senate must confirm the appointments. The courts, meanwhile, interpret laws and can strike down legislation that they rule unconstitutional. All this means that a president’s powers are limited by the legislative and judicial branches of government – even if his party holds a majority in Congress.

The president thus has a limited ability to wield power over U.S. foreign policy. Moreover, the United States’ global posture isn’t a product of its politics or policymaking to begin with. America's evolution as the leader of the Western world was largely driven by economic interests and the idea that global markets, mobility and interconnectivity would bring profit to U.S. businesses and drive economic growth and development. The role of the private sector – sometimes in coordination with the government – is central to the country’s global standing. Though interactions between companies and politicians are complex, one of the ways in which businesses influence foreign policy is by lobbying representatives in Congress to pursue policies that meet their interests abroad. This pressure resulted in legislation that made it possible for administrations to implement strategies that, over time, turned the U.S. into an economic leader and superpower. This role enabled the government to maintain domestic stability and pursue growth.

Still, the United States’ approach on Ukraine is often perceived in Europe as a reflection of the administration’s global priorities. During my visit to Washington, Congress was discussing a new Ukraine aid package, which was finally passed on Saturday. Many of the Europeans present at the talks tied the matter to America's leadership role in the world. To many Americans, however, aid for Ukraine is treated more as a matter of domestic politics than foreign affairs. Recent polls indicate Americans are equally split between thinking the U.S. is doing too much for Ukraine and wanting the U.S. to do more.

Another topic of discussion was the security situation around the Black Sea. In 2022, a bill was introduced in Congress that would authorize the National Security Council to direct an interagency strategy to increase coordination with NATO and the European Union, deepen economic ties, and strengthen the security and democratic resilience of partners in the Black Sea region in accordance with U.S. values and interests. The bill was passed in 2023 and has become of increasing interest to the business community in both the U.S. and the Black Sea region.

Western businesses increasingly see opportunities here, especially with the Ukraine war and sanctions on Russia disrupting more traditional routes through which they conduct trade around the world. The Danube has become an alternate trade route linking the so-called Middle Corridor (which connects Southeast Asia to Europe through Central Asia and Turkey instead of Russia) to Germany’s North Sea coast. New rail and road projects linking Romania’s port of Constanta to Gdansk in Poland also have been discussed to help integrate European markets and build a strong containment line in Eastern Europe.

The future of these and other infrastructure projects will depend on how states and businesses address the fallout of the war, its duration and the strategies of both Russia and Ukraine for rebuilding after its conclusion. Any investment plans in Ukraine will need to take into account Russia’s long-term strategy, announced in 2023, to counter Western influence around the world. Thus, the Black Sea region can’t be decoupled from the future of Ukraine – as some suggested during my trip to Washington. Should Ukraine be forced to negotiate ceding parts of its territory to Russia, Kyiv could fall under Russian influence in the longer term – which wouldn’t require a massive investment from Moscow considering the socio-economic realities in Ukraine today. The biggest risk many grappled with was that Ukraine could become a failed state, a black hole between Europe and Russia that Moscow could eventually control.

The Ongoing Rise of U.S. Debt Amid Geopolitical, Financial and Economic Constraints
Apr 3, 2024 | 18:10 GMT



Political, financial and economic constraints will continue to limit the U.S. government's flexibility in adjusting spending in view of rising defense spending requirements, likely resulting in rising debt levels. In its most recent update of its long-term projections released in March, the Congressional Budget Office projected large fiscal deficits and a continued increase of the debt-to-GDP ratio in the United States driven by increasing entitlement and net interest expenditures. It is unlikely that the projected increase in government spending over the next two decades will cause any financing difficulties, let alone a financial crisis. This is because of the pivotal role of the dollar in the global financial system, the relative attractiveness of U.S. assets and a more favorable growth outlook than in most other advanced economies. Continued large deficits could, of course, lead to higher long-term interest rates, which might then lead the government to rein in the fiscal deficit to prevent too rapid an increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio. The current trend of more modest economic growth, at least compared to two decades ago, and large fiscal deficits will, however, translate into greater constraints on defense spending.

U.S. federal government debt stands at $35 trillion, which translates into more than $100,000 per citizen. U.S. federal government debt has more than tripled since the beginning of the century, increasing from 32% of gross domestic product in 2001 to 96% of GDP in 2023. The CBO currently projects the debt-to-GDP ratio will reach 116% of GDP by 2034 and 166% of GDP in 2054. Federal budget deficits will average about 6% of GDP.

Mandatory spending will increase from 13.9% of GDP to 15.1% of GDP over the next 10 years, while discretionary spending is projected to decrease from 6.4% of GDP to 5.1% of GDP, which would represent a substantial squeeze should it come to pass. If the decline in discretionary defense and nondefense spending were to be evenly split, U.S. defense spending would fall to less than 3% of GDP by the middle of the next decade — close to a post-World War II low.

A fiscal adjustment involving reforms to Social Security would help create more space for significant defense expenditure increases, but such reforms are highly unlikely in the short or medium term. Mandatory spending covers expenditures on entitlement and other programs, including Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid and several other programs related to health care or the elderly, which require Congress to approve separate legislation and cannot be modified as part of the annual budget process. Discretionary spending, on the other hand, is controlled by the annual budget process and pays for the operations of most federal agencies and national defense. It requires annual authorization. Discretionary spending as a share of GDP has declined gradually over time, while nondiscretionary (or mandatory) spending has continued to increase. An aging population makes it more difficult to substantially reduce entitlement spending, as the elderly account for a more substantial share of the electorate each year. Moreover, U.S. voters regard Social Security as almost on par with constitutionally guaranteed rights, making it very difficult to cut benefits or otherwise reform the entitlement program. At a minimum, this will require any entitlement reform to phase in a reduction of expenditure (relative to the baseline) very gradually so as not to upset actual and potential beneficiaries in terms of their accrued welfare benefits — and even this will prove politically difficult. That neither party supports reforming social security and other programs is evidence of these political constraints, with the last significant entitlement reform that sought to balance the books having taken place in 1983.

In FY 2023, the U.S. federal government spent $6.1 trillion. The U.S. federal government spends more than what the Japanese economy, the world's third-largest, produces.

Mandatory spending accounts for 60% of federal spending, discretionary spending for 30% and interest on debt 10%. Discretionary spending includes defense and nondefense spending with defense spending accounting for 13-15% of federal spending (or roughly half of discretionary spending).

As per the 2020 census, 17% of Americans were aged 65 or older. This share will increase to 23% by 2050. In absolute terms, this age group will increase from 58 million to 82 million.

The political, financial and economic constraints on U.S. defense spending will strengthen over time. Economically, high levels of defense spending are detrimental to long-term growth if spending reduces the availability of national savings and investment, which is typically the case. Even if investment represents a significant share of defense spending, it tends not to have much of an impact on civilian economic productivity. In the short run, however, a sharp increase in defense expenditure can help boost economic growth, particularly in the presence of ample spare capacity. Increased defense expenditures need to be financed through higher debt, increased revenues or budget cuts in other areas. With more resources allocated to consumptive defense spending and no offsets elsewhere, savings and investment will fall, and economic growth will suffer over the medium to long term. Faced with increased geopolitical competition, the need for increased defense spending will make for painful economic, financial and political choices, while increased defense spending (as a share of GDP) will weigh on the longer-term growth outlook. While none of this means that the United States will not be able to increase defense expenditure, it does mean that the economic, financial and political trade-offs and constraints will become more important over time.

In the short run, the government can almost always mobilize massive resources to support defense spending if flanked by appropriate economic and financial measures, such as capital controls, central bank purchases of additional debt issuance, increased taxes or reduced expenditures elsewhere. In 2023, U.S. defense spending (including Department of Energy spending on nuclear weapons) was 3.5% of GDP. In 1953 (during the Korean War), U.S. defense spending reached 11.3% of GDP; in 1968 (during the Vietnam War), 8.6% of GDP. In 1999, it fell to a post-1940 low of 2.7% of GDP before increasing again to reach 4.5% of GDP in 2010 (during the Afghanistan and Iraq wars). Defense spending exceeded 40% of GDP during World War II.

In the long term, however, there are economic limits to defense spending. The reduction of defense spending following the end of the Cold War led to the so-called "peace dividend" that allowed for lower government spending, higher national savings and lower interest rates. Unsustainable defense spending meanwhile drove the USSR into economic stagnation, financial failure and ultimately political collapse.
The United States remains the world's top military spender by a wide margin, but Chinese defense spending has been increasing rapidly on the back of rapid economic growth, which, in turn, is putting increased pressure on U.S. military spending. A decade or so ago, the United States spent more on defense than the rest of the world combined. Today, measured in current dollar terms, U.S. expenditure continues to account for nearly 40% of global spending, while China accounts for less than half of U.S. spending. The size of defense spending matters, but it is not everything. Several caveats apply. First, comparing military spending — even if adjusted for purchasing power parity to capture the effective spending power — is difficult, as different countries include and exclude different defense-related spending categories and items, and some countries' defense expenditure figures lack transparency. Second, even with a purchasing power parity adjustment, it is not obvious that one dollar of defense spending buys an equivalent amount of security. Leaving aside that security is a relative concept, even purchasing power parity is an imperfect metric to compare spending, both in quantitative and qualitative terms, even when adjusted for purchasing power. This is due to differences in terms of what the money is spent on as well as what adjusted dollars can buy, given that advanced military technology is not necessarily traded on international markets and local production costs differ, and sometimes certain defense-related technologies are unavailable for comparison. Moreover, not only what the money is spent on matters, but how it is spent, as well as the ultimate strategic value one gets. For example, directing funds to procurement and development rather than spending them on veterans' pensions or outdated platforms is likely to increase security, particularly in the longer term, and translate to greater military effectiveness.

The United States accounts for almost 40% of global military spending. China and Russia account for a combined 17%, with China accounting for 13% and Russia for 4%. The so-called Big Four European countries account for 9.5%, compared to Russia's 3.9%.
In 2023, U.S. defense expenditure accounted for 3.5% of GDP and China's official defense expenditure for less than half at 1.6% of GDP. Due to much more rapid underlying economic growth, Chinese defense expenditure has been growing much more rapidly in dollar terms without translating into higher expenditure as a share of GDP.

When comparing U.S. and Chinese defense expenditures, it is important to take into consideration differences in terms of force structure and military posture. The U.S. has worldwide commitments and a costly and extensive global security footprint. China does not, and its military forces are geographically much more concentrated. Military spending should therefore at best be seen as a proxy for defense capabilities. In this sense, the political and economic costs the United States faces to increasing defense expenditure act as a constraint. Yet this constraint can be alleviated, at least partly, via means other than increasing defense spending, including better resource allocation. In the long term, however, significant differences in spending will affect the military balance, especially in East Asia.

In current dollar terms, the United States spent a little less than $900 billion and China $300 billion on defense. In 2010, the United States spent $740 billion, compared to Chinese spending of $100 billion. In purchasing power parity terms, Chinese defense spending was about two-thirds of U.S. spending.

In addition to faster economic growth, China has also greater scope to increase defense spending as a share of GDP without jeopardizing its long-term economic outlook because it has excess savings and limited profitable investment opportunities. This should allow it to convert its excess savings into military consumption without unduly undermining the long-term growth outlook; the United States is far more constrained in this respect.

https://rumble.com/v4qwqii-gascn-allegedly-backed-off-election-case-because-evidence-helped-trump-tipp.html?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=One%20America%20News%20Network

OTOH what happens on the field of battle and on the American political landscape if we didn't send the money/ammo?

https://dailycaller.com/2024/04/22/it-would-only-take-months-ukraine-weapons-congress-aid-package/?utm_source=piano&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=rundown&pnespid=v6VrGX1ZJqEewf3aoCTpA5DXsE6vTsZ7IuizzbYwsRFmNRxVsuFxTPgXY7i9MAVIfCUSAvAb

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/putin-sets-stage-for-upheaval-in-another-country/ar-AA1nstgm?ocid=msedgntp&pc=HCTS&cvid=7acce9055f0d45f2b878bd7c3808f2da&ei=8

(3) TRUMP LAWYERS SAY BIDEN ADMIN COLLUDED ON CLASSIFIED DOCS CASE: Former President Trump’s legal team said Jack Smith’s office disregarded legal obligations and Department of Justice (DOJ) policies “to support the Biden Administration’s egregious efforts to weaponize the criminal justice system” against Trump.

According to the legal team’s filing, new evidence revealed that “politically motivated operatives” in the Biden administration and the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) began a “crusade” against Trump in early 2021.

Why It Matters: Newly un-redacted filings in the Miami court show that Trump Presidential Record Act representatives were cooperating with the NARA on turning over documents as required by the law. However, the records Trump’s legal team received through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) show that the White House Counsel’s Office was already in contact with the NARA on 21 January 2021 and referred the NARA to the DOJ. The evidence presented by Trump’s counsel appears to show that federal officials, including the Biden White House, began coordinating a politically motivated effort to punish Trump as soon as he left office. – R.C.

https://washingtontimes-dc.newsmemory.com/?token=a363029918ec080eaf226611394cc505_6627b2d2_6d25b5f&selDate=20240423

https://washingtontimes-dc.newsmemory.com/?token=a363029918ec080eaf226611394cc505_6627b2d2_6d25b5f&selDate=20240423

Mayorkas broke various laws and perjured himself in front of Congress.

https://washingtontimes-dc.newsmemory.com/?token=75113e2914a674447326b4859dfbbeee_66266102_6d25b5f&selDate=20240422

(6) SHEINBAUM PROPOSES INDUSTRIAL PARKS FOR MIGRANTS: Mexican presidential candidate, Claudia Sheinbaum, who is likely to be the next president, proposed the construction of 10 new industrial parks in Mexico’s southern states in order to employ migrants.

“Migrants go to the United States because in their country they don’t have [opportunities]. The southern [Mexico] border is going to serve to employ migrants in a considerable percentage,” a Morena party official said.

Why It Matters: Mexican President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador has repeatedly requested more money from the United States in order to improve economic conditions. This may become an attractive target for U.S. foreign development aid for two reasons. First, because Mexico is a near-shoring option for U.S. manufacturing. And second, because it could make a small dent in the numbers of migrants headed towards the U.S. border. – M.S.

Spike in exports. Russian oil exports to China increased by 12.85 percent in the first quarter of this year compared to the same period in 2023, Russia’s TASS news agency reported, citing data from China’s General Administration of Customs. Russia remains China’s largest oil supplier, ahead of Saudi Arabia and Iraq, which hold the second and third spots.

Russia and the Caucasus. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev will hold talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on Monday. The trip comes after Russia began last week withdrawing its peacekeeping forces from the Nagorno-Karabakh region, which Azerbaijan recaptured from ethnic Armenian authorities last year. Moscow had previously tried to mediate the dispute between the two countries until Armenia accused it of failing to protect its interests there. According to Russia’s Kommersant newspaper, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan is expected to visit Moscow after Aliyev’s trip.

=====================

Russian banking. Kyrgyzstan’s Finca Bank announced that starting May 5 it will introduce restrictions on transfers through the mobile app of Russia’s Sberbank Online. It will also suspend payments through Russia’s Tinkoff bank. In early April, Kyrgyz banks stopped servicing Russia’s Mir card payment system due to the threat of secondary sanctions. Meanwhile, the U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for Central and South Asian affairs arrived in Kyrgyzstan to discuss bilateral relations.

"Our diversity is our strength " only if "E pluribus unum."   

(3) ZUCKERBERG: AI RUNNING INTO ENERGY CONSTRAINTS, REGULATIONS: Meta founder Mark Zuckerberg said Artificial Intelligence (AI) development is going to run into energy constraints before the full potential of AI is reached.

Zuckerberg added that AI development data centers have also run into issues with energy infrastructure and transmission permitting, but data centers that draw 300 megawatts (MW) to 1 gigawatt (GW) are coming.

Why It Matters: Accelerating construction of data centers, especially those dedicated to AI development, remains a threat to future U.S. grid stability due to aging energy infrastructure and flat generation capacity. A data center that draws 300 MWs of power would draw two orders of magnitude more power than proposed electric commercial truck depots with five or six MW draws, which have been canceled due to drawing more power than nearby small cities. According to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, a 1000 MW coal plant with a 75% capacity factor could power roughly 460,000 to 900,000 homes, depending on the region. – R.C.

https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2024/apr/19/idf-facial-recognition-surveillance-palestinians

April 22, 2024
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Beijing’s View of the Chinese Economy
By: George Friedman

At an economic forum last week in Shanghai, a senior Chinese government adviser named Liu Yuanchun, who is also the president of the Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, made some stark remarks about the state of the Chinese economy.

Liu said that the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic were far worse than expected and that the fiscal standing of local governments is deteriorating quicker than thought. Seismic, structural shifts are happening rapidly, and more non-economic risks are emerging than economic ones. All of this has created imbalances that Beijing is struggling to navigate. According to Liu, China’s development in the recent past and immediate future will be marked by such disequilibrium, and striking a new balance will take time.

He went on to say these challenges from within – and the economic competition from powers without – are more daunting than the ones of a decade ago, when China was able to achieve double-digit economic growth. Growth now is much more uneven, of course, and even President Xi Jinping seems to have admitted as much when he called moderate growth the “new normal.” Evidence to that effect can be seen in China’s overcapacity issues, with the producer price index declining in March by 2.8 percent year on year, while languishing in the negative range for the 17th straight month. Supply-demand disequilibrium is apparent, too, with the first quarter’s utilization rate at just 73.6 percent, down some 7 percentage points. In short, capacity is sitting idle.

Liu also warned that the consumer price index, which grew in March by 0.1 percent year on year after expanding by 0.7 percent in February, is too off-kilter to achieve Beijing’s targeted supply-demand balance of 2-3 percent.

Perhaps most importantly, Liu said that these and other economic imbalances are here to stay. The downturn in the property market is particularly noteworthy. Property-sector investments fell in the first quarter of 2024 by 9.5 percent year over year, with total sales dropping by 27.6 percent. In other words, the days of the property sector being a “super pillar” of the Chinese economy are gone. (The sector used to account for nearly 11 percent of gross domestic product but stood at nearly 6 percent as of 2023.) Beijing is looking to other sectors such as high-tech manufacturing and electric vehicles to fill the void, but so far they have yet to do so.

What makes the statements made by Liu – who is an adviser to Xi, meaning his speech was likely approved by the president himself – so important is that they indicate Beijing is finally coming to terms with the obvious. The long-held conventional wisdom was that China’s would be an unending surge, but even in the heyday of growth, its economy was limited and unbalanced. But economic risks are expanding amid geopolitical uncertainties, the root of which, for China, was a decision a few years ago to threaten the United States with potential future military action. The threat was an unrealized bluff, but its most important outcome was to convince the U.S. that it was real.

Under those circumstances, the U.S. government adopted a hostile economic posture toward China, and private corporations in the United States saw an increased risk in operating there. Rather than increase economic activity to placate the U.S., Beijing sought the opposite outcome, curbing its access to U.S. investment. That created another imbalance, this one based on the assumption that Chinese exports to the U.S. and U.S. investment in China would not dip low enough to seriously threaten the economy.

Economists like Liu focus on the economics of a given event, but the real question is political. How private industry will respond is important; more important is how the public will respond. In China, economic fumbling can create desperate citizens and launch the country into uncharted territory. The government is working hard to contain unrest, and it seems to have now adopted a strategy of honesty – a rarity for any government. Even so, its admission is less a matter of altruism than it is a matter of strategy

Grammar Nazi here:

"A lot of people faced nasty verbal lashings from Trump: Jeb, Pelosi, Pence, Mathis, Bolton, etc.

"And a lot of people died strange deaths in the path of the Clintons: Vince Foster,  Jeffrey Epstein, etc."

FOX reported a poll showing RFK on ballot hurt Trump more than Biden.

There are at least two attorneys on the jury.  Perhaps one or both with have the mental coherence to grasp the incoherent inanity of the charges.

https://twitter.com/YosephHaddad/status/1715821604750479560