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1
Politics & Religion / Re: Russia/US-- Europe
« on: Today at 05:38:33 PM »
We had the absence of conflict with Russia due to his craftiness and look what Baraq 3.0/Biden have done with  that.

He never dissed Putin personally-- not an accident!  If he has an honorable off ramp for Putin he might well be tempted.

2
Politics & Religion / WSJ: Milei's Achilles Heel
« on: Today at 03:44:48 PM »
Javier Milei’s Achilles’ Heel
Without a credible dollarization strategy, Argentina’s president is at risk of failure.
Mary Anastasia O’Grady
By
Mary Anastasia O’Grady
Follow
April 28, 2024 3:58 pm ET



Argentina’s central bank will soon issue a 20,000-peso note, replacing the 2,000-peso note as the largest-denomination bill in circulation. At the official exchange rate, the new bill will be worth around $23. A 50,000-peso note is expected to follow.

This is no doubt painful for Argentines who voted for President Javier Milei in October because he pledged to dollarize the economy and close the central bank. Adding insult to injury, the central bank said it plans to decorate the new 20,000-peso note with an image of Juan Bautista Alberdi, father of Argentine classical liberalism and a staunch advocate of sound money. Alberdi died in 1884, but if he were still around I’m betting he’d sue for defamation.

It’s been four months since Mr. Milei took the oath of office, promising to free the nation from the strictures of Peronism. With a passion for liberty and irreverence for the establishment, he’s generated excitement among long-suffering Argentines tired of a century of government modeled on Mussolini’s Italy. He rails against socialism and endorses Western civilization. He backs Israel, a welcome foreign policy in a region that increasingly bows to Tehran.

Yet Mr. Milei’s talk of freedom is at odds with exchange, capital, and lingering price controls. Monthly inflation for March was below market expectations but still high at 11%. “On an annual basis, headline inflation accelerated to 287.9% [year over year],” Goldman Sachs reported April 12. “Core inflation printed at a lower but still high 9.4% [month over month] in March, reaching 300.0% [year over year].”

In a speech to the nation last week the president boasted that in the first quarter of this year his government achieved a budget surplus—not seen since 2008—of around $309 million, or roughly 0.2% of gross domestic product. This austerity is a main driver of the drop in inflation, down from a monthly print of 25% in December. But it isn’t enough. Inflation expectations remain high. The International Monetary Fund’s inflation forecast for 2024 is 150%, and 45% for 2025.

Nor are the cuts sustainable. They’ve been achieved by denying pensioners inflation adjustments, shutting down public works and putting the kibosh on payments to utilities. As Goldman Sachs explained, this “adjustment” along with “a drag on real economic activity impacted by the erosion of household disposable income should contain price pressures.” In other words, progress on inflation is expected to come from recession and cutting into the bone of government services.

There’s method to this madness since elevated inflation reduces the value of government debt—now at 80% of GDP—in dollars. But the pernicious effects of such a strategy on investment, economic growth and development are undeniable. One question is how long consumers and wage earners will support Mr. Milei if currency uncertainty discourages badly needed capital inflows and there is a persistent decline of real income and purchasing power.

By adopting a credible dollarization strategy immediately, Mr. Milei could stop inflation in its tracks. Instead he’s first trying to address fiscal and regulatory distortions.

A December executive “decree of necessity and urgency” aimed at liberalizing key parts of the economy has scored some points. In a tweet last week, Argentine economist Federico Sturzenegger noted a new open-skies agreement with Chile and authorization for online purchases and home delivery of medications. Yet an appeals court declared the crucial labor reforms in the decree unconstitutional.

The matter now goes to the Supreme Court. But in any case, Mr. Milei won’t be able to restore Alberdi’s Argentina by decree. This is why in February he submitted to Congress a mega-reform bill named the Law of Bases and Starting Points for the Freedom of Argentines. It would have cleared the way to sell 40 state-owned companies; enact political, judicial, education and tax reforms; and open public infrastructure to private investment. It was just what Argentina needs.

But his Liberty Advances party is a minority in Congress, and that made the bill politically impossible in its entirety. When Congress countered with a diluted version of the law, a miffed Mr. Milei pulled it.

Now he’s left with only untenable fiscal cuts and his use of inflation to reduce the dollar value of Argentine debt, both of which threaten to induce many months of pain and scare away investors. After a benchmark interest rate cut last week, Goldman Sachs noted that “the central bank has opted to deepen financial repression as a tool to clean its balance sheet.” To the extent it’s working, it’s also eating away at household disposable income, the investment bank said.

None of this is good for the visionary president, who needs to break the stranglehold of special interests in a dysfunctional legislature and needs popular support to do it. If he doesn’t change course, he could easily turn out to be one more mediocre Argentine president—or worse. Mr. Milei’s government needs stable money, and fast.

Write to O’Grady@wsj.com.

7
Politics & Religion / British PM Rishi Sunak
« on: Today at 05:21:56 AM »
Britain Does Its Part in Ukraine and on Defense Spending
Our military budget will reach 2.5% of GDP by 2030. European allies need to step up as well.
By Rishi Sunak
April 26, 2024 4:01 pm ET



To China's frustration, the Aukus partnership between the U.S., U.K. and Australia to deliver Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines is gaining ground, despite funding challenges to the U.S. submarine industrial base. Images: U.S. Navy/Zuma Press/AP Composite: Mark Kelly
Britons understand and appreciate the vital role the U.S. plays in the world. We are proud to be Washington’s closest ally and welcome the supplemental support for Ukraine that Congress passed and President Biden signed Wednesday.

This funding will make a huge difference in the fight against tyranny in Europe. We welcome the administration’s leadership, which advances not only our interests but also those of the U.S.

China and Iran are closely watching what happens in Ukraine. A victory for authoritarianism and aggression would make us all less secure. For those who recognize the need for Europe to do more for its own security, America’s aid package is an inspiration and an incentive to do so.

The U.K. has acted. This week I announced a major and immediate increase in Britain’s support for Ukraine and in our defense spending, which will reach 2.5% of gross domestic product by 2030. We understand that being an ally means matching words with actions.

That is why the U.K. fought against fascism and communism, and alongside the U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is why we both stood firmly with Ukraine and most recently joined in the defense of international shipping from Houthi attacks. It is why we helped protect Israel from Iran’s missiles and drones. When the going gets tough, we are a steadfast partner: a fellow permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, always by America’s side.

Since Russia’s invasion, the U.K. has been at the forefront of the coalition supporting Ukraine. We were proud to have been the first European country to mobilize lethal aid, from tanks to long-range weapons.

We know that being an ally also requires burden-sharing and investment. At the 2014 North Atlantic Treaty Organization summit in the U.K., we agreed that each member state was to contribute 2% of its GDP toward defense. We spearheaded that effort because we worried that since the end of the Cold War, Europeans nations had been cutting defense budgets and relying only on NATO for their security. This wasn’t sustainable—and the U.S. and the U.K. are winning the argument for changing course. In 2014, only four NATO members spent 2% on defense. Today, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg puts the figure at 18.

Since 2020 the U.K. has increased defense spending steadily, and as chancellor I granted the largest single increase in spending since the end of the Cold War. As Winston Churchill understood, failing to rearm only emboldens your adversaries. And as Ronald Reagan demonstrated, boosting defense spending is the best way to deter enemies and ensure our values prevail.

The U.K.’s increased investment has allowed us to commit to new capabilities such as the alliance among Australia, the U.K. and the U.S. Aukus will contribute to security in areas such as the Indo-Pacific—one of America’s top priorities. The U.K. also is putting more funding into our nuclear deterrent, which forms part of NATO’s nuclear umbrella, and the stockpiles vital to war readiness on the Continent and in Ukraine.

During a visit to Poland and Germany this week, I agreed to enhance our defense-spending commitments with the biggest single investment for a generation.

We will provide more for Ukraine—with a package that brings total U.K. military support to nearly $15 billion. Overall European support is now $180 billion. The U.K. was the first country to make a long-term security guarantee with Ukraine, which I signed on my visit to Kyiv in January. We will now commit to sustain our support for Ukraine at least at the same levels until the end of the decade.

We are also increasing overall defense spending. Our new baseline is 2.5% of GDP, effective immediately. This will mean an additional $93.6 billion for defense over the next six years.

As I told Mr. Stoltenberg this week, I hope this will become the new baseline for all allies. America should be assured that more European countries are stepping up. Our friends and neighbors are listening to our argument that we can’t expect America to pay any price and bear any burden if we on this side of the Atlantic aren’t prepared to invest in our own security.

Among America’s allies, including the whole of the rest of the Group of Seven, the U.K. is the biggest spender on defense by a significant margin. This is bolstered by our close intelligence cooperation and military interoperability. Above all, however, what distinguishes our partnership is our shared willingness to act.

The challenges to global security are growing. Members of an axis of authoritarian states—Russia, Iran, North Korea and China—are determined to challenge the post-Cold War order that has provided unprecedented prosperity. We must act to deter our enemies, defend our values and secure our interests. Our decision to increase our defense budget proves that—as it always has—the U.K. stands ready to play its role.

8
https://amgreatness.com/2024/04/28/the-philippines-is-a-great-ally-and-the-u-s-needs-to-recognize-it/

The Philippines Is a Great Ally, and the U.S. Needs to Recognize It
Far greater U.S. involvement is necessary to stand with its Filipino ally. The U.S. response has been far from ideal and has failed to reassure Manilla, one of America’s oldest allies.

By James E. Fanell and Bradley A. Thayer
April 28, 2024
The alliance relationships of the U.S. are valuable for diplomatic, military, and economic reasons. Less often considered is that U.S. allies provide the invaluable service of showing when the U.S. is dead wrong. Right now, the Republic of the Philippines is showing the U.S. that its approach to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is in error. Washington’s strategic malpractice needs to be corrected. It needs to support its treaty ally, Manila, in the face of their mutual enemy, the PRC.

But it is not, at least not in substance that matters. For instance, the Philippines boycotted the 19th Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) meeting on April 21–23 in Qingdao, PRC. WPNS was founded in 1987 and includes 23 members and seven observer states to discuss maritime affairs and promote safe and responsible practices. Manila boycotted the meeting to signal to Beijing that the PRC’s aggressive actions in the South China Sea, and specifically at Second Thomas Shoal, is unacceptable. Missing the meeting sent an important message, something that Washington should have understood and supported.

Unfortunately, the Biden administration sent some significant signals as well. The most important of which is that it values engagement with the PRC over support for its treaty ally.

In the case of the WPNS, the U.S. not only attended the meeting in the absence of the Philippines but also dispatched the Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Admiral Koehler, who had just assumed command less than three weeks prior. What is worse is that the U.S. participated in the passage of an updated 3.0 version of the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea. This is a “rules of the road” agreement to assist states in avoiding incidents at sea that might escalate. This agreement sets the norms for navies operating in close quarters over disputed territories like Second Thomas Shoal. The PRC had input, as did the U.S., but the Philippines did not. By establishing these norms, the U.S. committed the Philippines and thereby fettered its military’s response to the PRC’s territorial expansion.

This entire episode exposes the Biden administration’s determination to engage with the enemy of both the Philippines and the U.S.—the PRC. Rewarding enemies and punishing friends is the opposite of what Machiavelli advised, and if not corrected, will ensure that the U.S. has a surplus of enemies and no allies.

The record of the PRC’s duplicity and aggressiveness in the South China Sea is well established, and clashes are worsening at Second Thomas Shoal. Despite the “rules of the road” established by WPNS, the PRC violates them on a regular basis to coerce the Philippines. Beijing is now able to assert direct military force to seize Filipino territory.

Due to the incompetence of the Obama administration, the PRC was able to build seven installations in the Spratly Islands starting in 2013, three of which are the size of Pearl Harbor and equipped with 10,000-foot runways and pier space to equip all the PLA Navy’s (PLAN) aircraft carriers. The PRC’s rhetoric is becoming more belligerent and more frequent. In the last week of December 2023, Wu Qian, a spokesperson for the PRC’s Ministry of Defense, said that “China will not turn a blind eye to the Philippine’s repeated provocations and harassment” while calling upon the U.S. to stop its meddling in the issue.

In fact, that is the last thing the U.S. needs to do. Far greater U.S. involvement is necessary to stand with its Filipino ally. The U.S. response has been far from ideal and has failed to reassure Manilla, one of America’s oldest allies. The four Filipino bases announced for use by the U.S. on April 3, 2023, two in Cagayan and one each in Isabela and Palawan, are important steps forward. But they are insufficient given the immediacy of the threat from Beijing.

Four more major steps are necessary. First, the strategic situation is that Manila faces the PRC, the world’s second-largest military power, and requires its treaty ally, the United States, to choose a side—Beijing’s or Manila’s. The U.S. must stand unequivocally with the Philippines in every respect—with unwavering diplomatic, military, and economic support.

Second, Washington must acknowledge that the defense of the Philippines is linked to the defense of Taiwan. Taiwan occupies key geopolitical real estate, as Beijing and Washington’s military planners recognize. For the U.S. and its allies, Taiwan is a cork in the bottle of the first island chain, and so prevents the PLAN from easily accessing the Pacific, from defending the PRC’s ports from mining, and sustaining the the critical Sea Lines of Communication from the East and South China Seas. As such, bases in Taiwan and the Philippines can serve as important deterrents to the PRC’s aggression, and should deterrence fail, each would have a role to play in reinforcing the other.

Third, working with its Filipino ally and perhaps other allies like Australia and Japan, the U.S. needs to conduct the maritime equivalent of the Berlin Airlift to ensure that regular supplies flow to the Filipino presence on Second Thomas Shoal and the PRC’s coercive attempts fail as Stalin’s did in 1948-1949. This time, though, given the geography, the airlift must be a sealift, something that highlights the low numbers of U.S. Navy ships and the deficiencies of America’s maritime shipbuilding industry.

Fourth, successfully breaking the back of the PRC’s coercive attempts at Second Thomas Shoal would be the first stage of a rollback campaign headed by the U.S., including the Philippines, to apply countervailing pressure on Beijing and work with its allies to enforce international law in the South China Sea as expressed in the 2002 Declaration on a Code of Conduct and the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration decision. For far too long, Beijing has gotten away with aggression in the South China Sea at no cost.

The risk is acute for U.S. national security. In baseball, you either win or lose. So too the U.S. either supports its allies or its enemies. Machiavelli’s advice is clear: reward friends and punish enemies. The Biden administration has reversed this age-old wisdom and is instead destroying the U.S. alliance system. This must change immediately, given the urgency of the PRC threat. Decades of stability in the Indo-Pacific have depended upon the U.S. extended deterrent, which in turn depends upon U.S. credibility and its allies belief in that credibility. The credibility of the U.S. extended deterrent is being tested by Beijing. Now is the time for the U.S. to signal strong support for the Philippines.

James E. Fanell and Bradley A. Thayer are authors of Embracing Communist China: America’s Greatest Strategic Failure.

11
Politics & Religion / Secret Service
« on: April 27, 2024, 08:27:03 PM »


https://amgreatness.com/2024/04/26/secret-service-scuffle-prompts-dei-vetting-scrutiny/

Secret Service Scuffle Prompts DEI, Vetting Scrutiny
Secret Service agents and officers are privately questioning the hiring process and whether the agency had adequately screened Herczeg’s background.

By Susan Crabtree

April 26, 2024
An incident involving a physical attack by a female Secret Service agent tasked with protecting Vice President Kamala Harris is raising questions about whether the agency had thoroughly vetted her during her hiring and whether an ongoing push to increase the numbers of women in the service and boost overall workforce staff played a role in her selection. 

The Secret Service agent assigned to Vice President Kamala Harris was removed from her duties Wednesday after physically attacking the commanding agent in charge and other agents trying to subdue her, according to an agency spokesman and knowledgeable Secret Service sources.

Several sources in the Secret Service community identified the agent who physically attacked her superior as Michelle Herczeg. The altercation occurred at approximately 9 a.m. at Joint Base Andrews, the home base for Air Force One and Air Force Two, the call signs of the Boeing aircraft used by the president and vice president. Harris was at the U.S. Naval Observatory at the time of the incident, and it did not delay her travel, said agency spokesman Anthony Guglielmi.

Herczeg showed up at the terminal and began acting erratically, grabbing another senior agent’s personal phone and deleting applications on it, according to two sources familiar with the matter. The other agent, a shift leader, was able to recover his phone and then acted as if nothing had happened.

But Herczeg’s bizarre behavior didn’t stop. She then began mumbling to herself, hid behind curtains, and started throwing items, including menstrual pads, at an agent, telling him that he would need them later to save another agent and telling her peers that they were “going to burn in hell and needed to listen to God,” a source told RealClearPolitics.

Herczeg also screamed at the special agent in charge (SAIC), rattling off the names of female officers on the vice president’s detail and claiming they would show up and help her and allow her to continue working. At that point, other agents on the scene believed Herczeg was suffering from a mental lapse, and the superior officer, SAIC, approached her to tell her she was relieved from the assignment.

“That’s when she snapped entirely,” one source recounted.

Herczeg then chest-bumped and shoved her superior, then tackled him and punched him. The agents involved in restraining Herczeg were especially concerned because she still had her gun in the holster. They wrestled her to the ground, took the gun from her, cuffed her, and then removed her from the terminal.

The agent was immediately “removed from their assignment,” a Secret Service spokesman told RCP in a statement. The Washington Examiner first reported the incident.

“A U.S. Secret Service special agent supporting the Vice President’s departure from Joint Base Andrews began displaying behavior their colleagues found distressing,” said Guglielmi, chief of communications for U.S. Secret Service.

The agents on the scene then called medical personnel to remove Herczeg from the terminal. Guglielmi has described the incident as a “medical matter” and said the agency would not “disclose further details.”

“The U.S. Secret Service takes the safety and health of our employees very seriously,” he added. But the bizarre scuffle is once against raising concerns about the state of the once-vaunted force charged with protecting the president.

Following the incident, Secret Service agents and officers are privately questioning the hiring process and whether the agency had adequately screened Herczeg’s background. Some also wonder whether her hire was part of a diversity, equity, and inclusion push in response to years of staff shortages that may have required the agency to lower its once-strict employment standards and physical performance to reach quotas for female agents and officers.

In 2016, Herczeg, then an officer with the Dallas police force, filed a gender discrimination lawsuit against the city, claiming she was assaulted by a male superior and asking for more than $1 million in damages.

The suit alleged that Herczeg was “targeted for being a female officer and treated less favorably” and was retaliated against after she reported sexual harassment and illegal actions of other officers. She also claimed she was not allowed to return to a crime-reduction team after she alleged a senior officer assaulted her. A Texas trial court dismissed the suit, Herczeg appealed, and a Texas court of appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision in 2021 and denied a rehearing in 2022.

While serving on the Dallas police force, Herczeg and another officer shot an armed man while he sat in a parked car. . According to a department spokesman, the officers were firing in self defense because the man, who had previously been convicted of sexually assaulting a child, was brandishing a weapon and eventually shot himself in the head. A headline in the Dallas Observer raised some doubt about the official police account: “Two Dallas Cops Shot a Man Last Night, but They Say He Killed Himself.”

Ronald Kessler, a former investigative reporter for the Washington Post who has written several books on the Secret Service said the agency would have traditionally viewed the dismissed discrimination lawsuit as disqualifying.

“Yes, that should have been enough to exclude her, because you really have to have a pristine record,” he told RCP Wednesday. “Certainly, this has been true in the past. There’s tremendous competition, and she never should have been hired.”

Kessler also pointed to a new initiative to increase the number of women in the Secret Service workforce. Guglielmi confirmed that the agency is one of numerous federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies that have signed onto the 30×30 initiative, an effort to increase the representation of women in all ranks of policing across the country to 30% of the workforce by 2030.

“Claims that the Secret Service’s standards have been lowered as a result of our signing this pledge are categorically false,” Guglielmi told RCP. According to the initiative’s website, women currently make up only 12% of sworn officers and 3% of police leadership in the U.S., a low statistic that 30×30 advocates says “undermines public safety.”

“Research shows that women officers use less force and less excessive force; are named in fewer complaints and lawsuits; are perceived by communities as being more honest and compassionate, see better outcomes for crime victims, especially in sexual assault cases, and make fewer arrests,” the website states.

“It is critical that participating agencies focus on increasing the representation of all women,” the website adds. “They must account for the diverse experiences of all women of all backgrounds and life experiences to better promote the creation of a diverse and inclusive workplace for everyone.”

The Secret Service has an “Inclusion and Engagement Council,” which pledges to become the agency’s “game-changers” when it comes to helping the agency “build, foster, create and inspire a workforce where diversity and inclusion are not just ‘talked about’ but demonstrated by all employees through ‘Every Action, Every Day.’”

During President Obama’s time in office, the Secret Service experienced a string of scandals and several changes in leadership, including the appointment of its first female director, Julia Pierson. Obama appointed Pierson in March 2013 in an attempt to change the culture of the agency, which was then under scrutiny after a Colombian prostitution scandal. But Pierson lasted less than two years on the job when she resigned in the face of multiple revelations about drunken behavior and security breaches, including one in which Obama had shared an elevator in Atlanta with an armed guard who was not authorized to be around him.

In 2014, a blue-ribbon panel convened at the height of several scandals, and several members of Congress urged Obama to tap an “outsider” to head the agency, a recommendation he ignored. There were complaints that only a new director unconnected to the current and former leadership could truly change the insular culture and uneven discipline partially responsible for low morale and a mass exodus of agents and uniformed division officers fleeing the agency.

In August 2022, President Biden appointed Kimberly Cheatle, a 27-year veteran of the agency, as the director and only the second woman to lead it. She replaced James Murray, a Trump appointee, who announced his retirement after three years on the job. During the Trump administration, the agency faced its own set of controversies, including missing text messages to and from agents around the time of the Jan. 6, 2021, attack on the Capitol.

In recent years, the Secret Service has ranked either dead last or near the bottom of a government employee survey of job satisfaction conducted annually by the nonpartisan Partnership for Public Service. The agency’s most recent ranking for 2023 is near the bottom at No. 375 out of 432 agencies.

Those morale problems, tied to agents’ and officers’ crushing workloads – long hours amid increased security demands from the White House and in protecting presidential candidates in recent years – have led to lagging employment and poor retention rates.

Gary Byrne, a former Uniformed Division officer who wrote a book about his experiences protecting President Clinton, said there have been plenty of exceptions to usual Secret Service standards in the agency’s hiring practices, including numerous incidents of nepotism.

Byrne remembered a push for more female agents during the Clinton administration and one female Secret Service officer telling him that she was never required to take a polygraph before she was hired, which is a requirement for all officers and agent applicants.

“They tell you if you have character issues or mental-stability issues, you can’t take the job, they’ll find out about it,” he said, though many times mental health issues have remained hidden until they surface under stress.

“If you have any instability issues at all, this job will expose them,” he said.


15
Politics & Religion / Re: US Foreign Policy & Geopolitics
« on: April 27, 2024, 07:34:52 AM »
Well, left out of that was discussion of Kissinger's machinations to enable the Shah to form and lead OPEC , , ,
(Working from memory here-- do I have this right?)

20
Politics & Religion / Chinese Penetration of America via Mexico
« on: April 26, 2024, 06:55:41 PM »

April 26, 2024
View On Website
Open as PDF

Mexico Is China's Backdoor to the US Market
Chinese producers keep finding new ways around US trade barriers.
By: Geopolitical Futures
Mexico Bridges the U.S.-China Trade War

(click to enlarge)

Due to the trade war between the United States and China, some Chinese companies are employing third parties to help their products enter the U.S. market. One of these is Mexico. Last year, U.S. imports from Mexico surpassed those from China for the first time in years. At the same time, the shipment of 20-foot containers from China to Mexico surged to 881,000 in the first three quarters of 2023, up from 689,000 in the corresponding period of 2022.

Chinese firms aim to circumvent U.S. trade barriers by establishing manufacturing or processing facilities in Mexico. With the plants established, the firms ship components and partially assembled products from China to their Mexican facilities. The finished goods are then exported to the United States. For Chinese companies establishing operations in Mexico, securing a Mexican "certificate of origin" is crucial. However, the U.S. is looking at ways to prevent Chinese companies from gaining duty-free access to the U.S. market via the U.S.-Mexico-Canada free trade agreement.

23
Science, Culture, & Humanities / Anti-Lorenz
« on: April 26, 2024, 01:48:00 PM »
Even though this is but a teaser in search of money to see the whole thing, there are several interesting footnotes:

https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/002234337601300401

25
Politics & Religion / WT
« on: April 26, 2024, 01:13:43 PM »
Courts push back against Democrats’ fringe legal assaults on honest, fair elections

Radically reshaping state election integrity through litigation rather than legislation

By Trevor Stanley

Recent court rulings against the Democrats’ legal assaults on fair, honest and open elections could spell trouble for Democrats’ master strategy to use lawfare for political advantage.

In 2017, when control of the Virginia General Assembly was at stake, Marc Elias — the partisan Democratic lawyer sanctioned by the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for violations of the ethical guidelines covering a lawyer’s conduct — sued to overturn the result of a valid election, used political operatives to pressure the state board not to certify election results, and deployed lawyers seeking to prevent the counting of a single legal vote that could sway the outcome of the pivotal election. Mr. Elias’ unhinged legal assault resulted in a strong rebuke from a panel of judges objecting to the legal strategy.

When the court finally stopped these partisan tactics and ruled in favor of the Republican candidate, it wrote: “The right of a citizen to cast a free vote has been secured to us by the blood of patriots shed from Lexington and Concord to Selma, Alabama. The manifest injustice against which we must always guard is the chance that a single vote may not be counted.”

Instead of taking the court’s message to heart, Mr. Elias, the lead counsel in those matters, doubled down on shaky legal theories to do whatever he could to tilt the electoral playing field so Democrats could have an advantage at the ballot box.

Although lower courts sometimes acquiesce to pressure from the media and lawyers on the left, appellate courts — often led by judges appointed by Democrats — are pushing back against these fringe legal arguments that threaten state election administration regimes. Most recently, this fight came to Pennsylvania.

The legal battle in Pennsylvania revolved around an

expansive reading of the Materiality Provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 pushed by national Democrats. Congress enacted the provision to outlaw tactics used by Southern Democrats through the mid-1960s to prevent minorities — mostly African Americans — from registering to vote.

For example, the Materiality Provision prevented states from requiring that a person interested in voting list the exact number of months and days in his age or be prevented from registering. Put another way, the Materiality Provision prevents unduly restrictive laws on who may register to vote; it does not prohibit valid election integrity laws that govern the casting of a ballot.

Recently, the 3rd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, in Pennsylvania State Conference of the NAACP v. Schmidt, rejected the interpretation of the Materiality Provision advanced by the Democratic National Committee. Had the court sided with Democrats, states would not be able to require that qualified voters vote for one candidate per contest, mark ballots with pens or pencils (not crayons), use a standard envelope to mail ballots, or signify on absentee envelopes that a ballot is enclosed.

This panel of judges, entirely appointed by Democrats, affirmed a state’s ability to protect the integrity of elections by upholding essential state voting rules that give voters confidence that elections in our country are fair, honest and open.

But the fight won’t stop in Pennsylvania. Lawyers from the Democratic Party have virtually unlimited funding to fight on all fronts. Whether the money comes from liberal billionaires such as George Soros and Swiss citizen Hansjorg Wyss, or so-called good government groups like Eric Holder’s National Democratic Redistricting Committee, which is purportedly “working to protect fair maps” and “combat ongoing gerrymandering,” the result is the same: an endless barrage of legal volleys against fair, open and honest elections.

In reality, these funders, as Mr. Holder’s committee admitted to the IRS, are working to “favorably position Democrats,” not to protect the right to vote.

Although the Democratic Party has mostly moved past Mr. Elias because of his big bills and even bigger self-promoting online persona, this unlimited funding allowed him to file suits regarding an expansive reading of the Materiality Provision in states in nearly every federal circuit court of appeals. But the 3rd Circuit’s ruling spells trouble for all these cases.

And while Mr. Elias has been marginalized by the Biden White House, many law firms and lawyers are looking to take his place as the lead lawyers for the Democrats.

This new brand of lawyer will continue to try to radically reshape state election integrity laws through litigation rather than the legislative process by using theories and tactics that fall outside the mainstream. As the court in Virginia found in 2017 in deciding to accept a single vote that Democratic lawyers attempted to prevent from counting: “It matters not the importance of the disposition of a ballot in a given election; it matters the dignity of the citizen, the integrity of the electoral process and the destiny of our constitutional republic.”

Thank goodness the appellate courts are putting black-letter law above politics and supporting the election integrity initiatives that give voters confidence in the American system.

Trevor Stanley is an attorney who specializes in political law. He is also vice president for election education at the Republican National Lawyers Association

30
Politics & Religion / Re: Immigration issues
« on: April 26, 2024, 09:32:54 AM »
OTOH would that strategy concede that the many millions get to stay?

If so, it could be argued that realistically is that all we are likely to succeed in pulling off politically?

31
Low Intensity Conflict (Early Warning)

(4) EARLY WARNING INDICATOR OF WORSENING FAR LEFT ACTIVITY: Over the past three years, I’ve described the Far Left as being on “life support” as their sense of urgency has waned, there has been no sustained cause or motivation for widespread street-level demonstrations, their networks have atrophied, funding has dried up, and their activities in volume and intensity have diminished. Pro-Palestine activists set up occupation encampments this week, and militants are trying to use this as a base to build a new revolutionary movement. Will they succeed?

As I explained in reports and videos over the past two weeks, the A15 “day of action” and these occupations are an attempt to jumpstart the Far Left revolutionary movement. These protests (ostensibly), and I’m sure many of the protestors are focused on Palestine, but this is part of a broader effort to rebuild the networks of militant activism from 2020.

One of the strongest and most concerning indicators of future activity is the reemergence of previously dormant Far Left social media accounts. This week, I’m seeing old accounts beginning to post 2020-era incendiary memes and training content.

These posts have included illustrated guides to protest, riot, and black bloc tactics, police tactics, gas masks, and respirators, how to construct barricades, and other 2020-era training guides and documents. One notable new guide is to the lessons learned from the 1968 “occupations movement.”

In a post entitled “First We Take Columbia,” militant activists draw comparisons to the 1968 Columbia takeover and advise participants to expand the occupation to new buildings.

Another segment encourages activists to form a “defense committee” tasked with building barricades and defending the occupation from administrators and law enforcement.

Finally, activists are encouraged to create additional Columbia-style occupations at college campuses across the United States to build a new revolutionary movement.

Why It Matters: I remain doubtful that organizers will be able to build the Palestine issue into the kind of powerful and sustained social movement like we saw with Black Lives Matter in 2020. There are several reasons why.

First, too many Americans are ambivalent or have mixed views over the Israel-Palestine issue. A recent Pew Research poll found that, overall, just 16% of American adults sympathize with Palestine, while 23% share equal sympathies and a little less than one-third sympathize with Israel. At its height, support for Black Lives Matter was double that – roughly two-thirds of all American adults supported BLM in 2020. Videos and images of disruptive protests and blockading critical infrastructure are not going to cause more Americans to sympathize with the Palestinian cause. That ceiling is likely unmovable, largely due to the actions of Hamas on 07 October 2023.

Second, the Palestinian cause is not a core part of most activists’ identity, like “blackness” and domestic issues of race. The Palestinian cause is often a part of social justice messaging, but American connections to Palestine are not strong enough to build a national movement.

Third, reaction and opposition to the Israeli-Palestine war is not the same as the fervent and often violent reaction to the U.S. war in Vietnam. This is probably the greatest limiting factor for U.S.-based pro-Palestinian activists, and it’s strongest to explain why they are unlikely to gain national traction like BLM. Most Americans just don’t care.

Fourth, although this is dominating the news cycles this week, these pro-Palestine occupations remain a small fraction of the violent social movements seen in 2020-2021. In addition to weaker U.S. ties to the Palestinian cause, a recession, and pandemic lockdowns have not put millions of activist-age Americans out of work. And there have been no stimulus payments for “walking around money” while activists are out protesting. These are two significant limiting factors. Some of this could be offset by the summer break, with activist-age students out of school, and social justice money employing paid protestors, but overall conditions are not conducive to another 2020-esque national protest movement.

And, lastly, another strong reason I have to doubt a national expansion is that city officials, law enforcement personnel, and even campus administrators are not lining up in support of these occupations as they did with BLM. There are no city officials giving militant activists “room to riot.” There are no law enforcement officers taking a knee for Hamas. Several of these encampments were cleared within a day or two of the occupation. Hundreds of activists have been arrested this week. Schools have been closing down and blocking access to their campuses, and virtually no one is entertaining the thought of weeks or months-long occupations as we saw in 2020.
Although these conditions could change, I believe they are unlikely to change substantially. I believe the most likely course of action is that this remains a disruptive but substantially smaller protest movement that does not gain widespread traction outside of universities and other typical, common protest locations.

The most dangerous course of action is that militant activists, perhaps aided by foreign governments, conduct violent attacks, such as bombings, reminiscent of the late 1960s and early 1970s militant activists and terrorist movements. A common Far Left tactic is to escalate when protests aren’t working. The protests are not working. Ensure you stay current with our protest and riot tracker over the next couple of weeks, and if you see a protest that we don’t have listed, please let us know!

Finally, I have no doubt there are efforts to use the pro-Palestinian movement to build a broader revolutionary movement, like we saw in 2020, If a larger protest movement, mass mobilization, or popular revolution attempt does grow, then the pro-Palestine movement will be a plank but is very unlikely to be the core of the movement. – M.S.

32
Politics & Religion / Re: Immigration issues
« on: April 26, 2024, 09:00:00 AM »
Interesting to get a beginning sense of where we stand as a people on this.


33
Politics & Religion / Re: Israel, and its neighbors
« on: April 26, 2024, 08:41:26 AM »
I'm seeing an article but not any video or audio of that length.

36
Politics & Religion / Weinstein granted new trial
« on: April 25, 2024, 05:53:24 PM »
From nothing more than reading the article off the top of my head I would say this is correct.

https://twitchy.com/samj/2024/04/25/weinstein-rape-charges-overturned-n2395511

40
Politics & Religion / Re: Nikki Haley
« on: April 25, 2024, 09:01:09 AM »
"Why not make her VP? , , , Otherwise the VP slot is almost unsolvable."

Given what has been said by each of them, it would make Trump look just another politician.

I would rather Vivek-- there is a tradition of VP candidates being the Presidential candidates' pitbull and he certainly can do that.  Very articulate and capable of reframing the political debate on a wide range of issues.

Tim Scott is a plausible choice as well.

45
Politics & Religion / Sex and Gender
« on: April 24, 2024, 09:17:01 AM »
Help me think this one through.

There are two SEXES:  Male and Female.

When the Woke substitute the word "GENDER" for "SEX" then the camel nose is in the tent for all kinds of verbal misdirection, obfuscation, and sleight of hand.

So maybe our efficient tactic is to reassert the word SEX as in what SEX someone is and not use terms related to whether someone is a "pitcher" or a "catcher"?

46
Politics & Religion / FO: FTC bans Non-Compete Ags
« on: April 24, 2024, 08:06:01 AM »
(1) FTC VOTES TO BAN NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS NATIONWIDE: The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) voted yesterday on a new rule to ban non-compete agreements nationwide in a 3-2 party-line vote.
FTC attorney Ben Cady said the new rule will allow existing non-compete agreements for senior executives, but once it is implemented, all other current non-compete agreements will become unenforceable.
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce said the new rule is “blatantly unlawful” and said it will file a lawsuit to block the rule.
Why It Matters: Previous arguments say that non-compete agreements undermine the economy by locking former employees out of new jobs and economic opportunities, while opponents say these agreements are intended to protect businesses from unfair practices. This new rule is likely to be impacted by Supreme Court decisions expected this session that could strike down Chevron Deference. – R.C.

47
Politics & Religion / GPF: Euro Views of US Global Posture
« on: April 24, 2024, 04:41:13 AM »
April 24, 2024
View On Website
Open as PDF

European Views on US Global Posture
Perceptions aren't consistent with reality.
By: Antonia Colibasanu

The notion that all countries operate within constraints is one of the main pillars of geopolitics. It came up repeatedly during my recent visit to the United States, where I attended several talks on European and Russian affairs. Though we at GPF try to stay out of the D.C. bubble, it’s nonetheless important for us to know what those in the bubble are saying, especially since Europe right now appears so consumed by what’s happening in Washington.

I traveled to the U.S. with a delegation of experts and policymakers from Romania. Analysts and officials from other parts of Europe, including Germany and Poland, were also in attendance. The main topics on the agenda were security and, of course, Ukraine. The event coincided with heated discussions in the U.S. Congress over aid packages for Ukraine and Israel. Though the situation in Israel is potentially hugely impactful for American politics, the conflict in Ukraine is the main focus for many policymakers in Europe. After all, the war there has shifted NATO’s containment line and transformed Eastern Europe into a literal battleground.

Considering that Kyiv is hugely dependent on military aid from Washington, European lawmakers are making concerted efforts to learn more about the constraints within which U.S. politics and politicians operate. Europeans typically have a narrow view of U.S. politics, mainly focusing on the presidency and the administration, which they perceive as ultimately responsible for maintaining the United States’ global leadership role and, by extension, the Western security structure.

That’s because the Europeans tend to believe the U.S. political system mirrors those in Europe, where foreign policies are forged by governments and primarily driven by urgent security threats to their borders. The Europeans thus get either nervous or excited every time another U.S. presidential election comes around, believing that a change in the presidency could alter how Washington interacts with the world. In doing so, they misjudge the way U.S. politics works, believing falsely that the presidency overrides every other institution in the United States, especially when it comes to strategy and foreign policy.

In fact, the U.S. president isn’t as powerful as many assume – and that’s by design. The nation's founders didn’t want to assign too much authority to one person in the political hierarchy. They instead built a system of checks and balances, splitting power among three branches of government: the legislative (Congress), the executive (the president) and the judiciary (the courts). This division of powers guarantees that no branch can overpower the others. Congress enacts legislation, which the president can veto, which Congress can in turn override with two-thirds majorities in both houses. Congress also controls the federal budget, and thus can limit funding for the president’s agenda. The president is commander-in-chief of the military but cannot declare war; that power belongs to Congress. The president also appoints federal judges and other officials, but the Senate must confirm the appointments. The courts, meanwhile, interpret laws and can strike down legislation that they rule unconstitutional. All this means that a president’s powers are limited by the legislative and judicial branches of government – even if his party holds a majority in Congress.

The president thus has a limited ability to wield power over U.S. foreign policy. Moreover, the United States’ global posture isn’t a product of its politics or policymaking to begin with. America's evolution as the leader of the Western world was largely driven by economic interests and the idea that global markets, mobility and interconnectivity would bring profit to U.S. businesses and drive economic growth and development. The role of the private sector – sometimes in coordination with the government – is central to the country’s global standing. Though interactions between companies and politicians are complex, one of the ways in which businesses influence foreign policy is by lobbying representatives in Congress to pursue policies that meet their interests abroad. This pressure resulted in legislation that made it possible for administrations to implement strategies that, over time, turned the U.S. into an economic leader and superpower. This role enabled the government to maintain domestic stability and pursue growth.

Still, the United States’ approach on Ukraine is often perceived in Europe as a reflection of the administration’s global priorities. During my visit to Washington, Congress was discussing a new Ukraine aid package, which was finally passed on Saturday. Many of the Europeans present at the talks tied the matter to America's leadership role in the world. To many Americans, however, aid for Ukraine is treated more as a matter of domestic politics than foreign affairs. Recent polls indicate Americans are equally split between thinking the U.S. is doing too much for Ukraine and wanting the U.S. to do more.

Another topic of discussion was the security situation around the Black Sea. In 2022, a bill was introduced in Congress that would authorize the National Security Council to direct an interagency strategy to increase coordination with NATO and the European Union, deepen economic ties, and strengthen the security and democratic resilience of partners in the Black Sea region in accordance with U.S. values and interests. The bill was passed in 2023 and has become of increasing interest to the business community in both the U.S. and the Black Sea region.

Western businesses increasingly see opportunities here, especially with the Ukraine war and sanctions on Russia disrupting more traditional routes through which they conduct trade around the world. The Danube has become an alternate trade route linking the so-called Middle Corridor (which connects Southeast Asia to Europe through Central Asia and Turkey instead of Russia) to Germany’s North Sea coast. New rail and road projects linking Romania’s port of Constanta to Gdansk in Poland also have been discussed to help integrate European markets and build a strong containment line in Eastern Europe.

The future of these and other infrastructure projects will depend on how states and businesses address the fallout of the war, its duration and the strategies of both Russia and Ukraine for rebuilding after its conclusion. Any investment plans in Ukraine will need to take into account Russia’s long-term strategy, announced in 2023, to counter Western influence around the world. Thus, the Black Sea region can’t be decoupled from the future of Ukraine – as some suggested during my trip to Washington. Should Ukraine be forced to negotiate ceding parts of its territory to Russia, Kyiv could fall under Russian influence in the longer term – which wouldn’t require a massive investment from Moscow considering the socio-economic realities in Ukraine today. The biggest risk many grappled with was that Ukraine could become a failed state, a black hole between Europe and Russia that Moscow could eventually control.

48
Politics & Religion / Stratfor: The Rise of US debt amid constraints
« on: April 24, 2024, 04:33:03 AM »
The Ongoing Rise of U.S. Debt Amid Geopolitical, Financial and Economic Constraints
Apr 3, 2024 | 18:10 GMT



Political, financial and economic constraints will continue to limit the U.S. government's flexibility in adjusting spending in view of rising defense spending requirements, likely resulting in rising debt levels. In its most recent update of its long-term projections released in March, the Congressional Budget Office projected large fiscal deficits and a continued increase of the debt-to-GDP ratio in the United States driven by increasing entitlement and net interest expenditures. It is unlikely that the projected increase in government spending over the next two decades will cause any financing difficulties, let alone a financial crisis. This is because of the pivotal role of the dollar in the global financial system, the relative attractiveness of U.S. assets and a more favorable growth outlook than in most other advanced economies. Continued large deficits could, of course, lead to higher long-term interest rates, which might then lead the government to rein in the fiscal deficit to prevent too rapid an increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio. The current trend of more modest economic growth, at least compared to two decades ago, and large fiscal deficits will, however, translate into greater constraints on defense spending.

U.S. federal government debt stands at $35 trillion, which translates into more than $100,000 per citizen. U.S. federal government debt has more than tripled since the beginning of the century, increasing from 32% of gross domestic product in 2001 to 96% of GDP in 2023. The CBO currently projects the debt-to-GDP ratio will reach 116% of GDP by 2034 and 166% of GDP in 2054. Federal budget deficits will average about 6% of GDP.

Mandatory spending will increase from 13.9% of GDP to 15.1% of GDP over the next 10 years, while discretionary spending is projected to decrease from 6.4% of GDP to 5.1% of GDP, which would represent a substantial squeeze should it come to pass. If the decline in discretionary defense and nondefense spending were to be evenly split, U.S. defense spending would fall to less than 3% of GDP by the middle of the next decade — close to a post-World War II low.

A fiscal adjustment involving reforms to Social Security would help create more space for significant defense expenditure increases, but such reforms are highly unlikely in the short or medium term. Mandatory spending covers expenditures on entitlement and other programs, including Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid and several other programs related to health care or the elderly, which require Congress to approve separate legislation and cannot be modified as part of the annual budget process. Discretionary spending, on the other hand, is controlled by the annual budget process and pays for the operations of most federal agencies and national defense. It requires annual authorization. Discretionary spending as a share of GDP has declined gradually over time, while nondiscretionary (or mandatory) spending has continued to increase. An aging population makes it more difficult to substantially reduce entitlement spending, as the elderly account for a more substantial share of the electorate each year. Moreover, U.S. voters regard Social Security as almost on par with constitutionally guaranteed rights, making it very difficult to cut benefits or otherwise reform the entitlement program. At a minimum, this will require any entitlement reform to phase in a reduction of expenditure (relative to the baseline) very gradually so as not to upset actual and potential beneficiaries in terms of their accrued welfare benefits — and even this will prove politically difficult. That neither party supports reforming social security and other programs is evidence of these political constraints, with the last significant entitlement reform that sought to balance the books having taken place in 1983.

In FY 2023, the U.S. federal government spent $6.1 trillion. The U.S. federal government spends more than what the Japanese economy, the world's third-largest, produces.

Mandatory spending accounts for 60% of federal spending, discretionary spending for 30% and interest on debt 10%. Discretionary spending includes defense and nondefense spending with defense spending accounting for 13-15% of federal spending (or roughly half of discretionary spending).

As per the 2020 census, 17% of Americans were aged 65 or older. This share will increase to 23% by 2050. In absolute terms, this age group will increase from 58 million to 82 million.

The political, financial and economic constraints on U.S. defense spending will strengthen over time. Economically, high levels of defense spending are detrimental to long-term growth if spending reduces the availability of national savings and investment, which is typically the case. Even if investment represents a significant share of defense spending, it tends not to have much of an impact on civilian economic productivity. In the short run, however, a sharp increase in defense expenditure can help boost economic growth, particularly in the presence of ample spare capacity. Increased defense expenditures need to be financed through higher debt, increased revenues or budget cuts in other areas. With more resources allocated to consumptive defense spending and no offsets elsewhere, savings and investment will fall, and economic growth will suffer over the medium to long term. Faced with increased geopolitical competition, the need for increased defense spending will make for painful economic, financial and political choices, while increased defense spending (as a share of GDP) will weigh on the longer-term growth outlook. While none of this means that the United States will not be able to increase defense expenditure, it does mean that the economic, financial and political trade-offs and constraints will become more important over time.

In the short run, the government can almost always mobilize massive resources to support defense spending if flanked by appropriate economic and financial measures, such as capital controls, central bank purchases of additional debt issuance, increased taxes or reduced expenditures elsewhere. In 2023, U.S. defense spending (including Department of Energy spending on nuclear weapons) was 3.5% of GDP. In 1953 (during the Korean War), U.S. defense spending reached 11.3% of GDP; in 1968 (during the Vietnam War), 8.6% of GDP. In 1999, it fell to a post-1940 low of 2.7% of GDP before increasing again to reach 4.5% of GDP in 2010 (during the Afghanistan and Iraq wars). Defense spending exceeded 40% of GDP during World War II.

In the long term, however, there are economic limits to defense spending. The reduction of defense spending following the end of the Cold War led to the so-called "peace dividend" that allowed for lower government spending, higher national savings and lower interest rates. Unsustainable defense spending meanwhile drove the USSR into economic stagnation, financial failure and ultimately political collapse.
The United States remains the world's top military spender by a wide margin, but Chinese defense spending has been increasing rapidly on the back of rapid economic growth, which, in turn, is putting increased pressure on U.S. military spending. A decade or so ago, the United States spent more on defense than the rest of the world combined. Today, measured in current dollar terms, U.S. expenditure continues to account for nearly 40% of global spending, while China accounts for less than half of U.S. spending. The size of defense spending matters, but it is not everything. Several caveats apply. First, comparing military spending — even if adjusted for purchasing power parity to capture the effective spending power — is difficult, as different countries include and exclude different defense-related spending categories and items, and some countries' defense expenditure figures lack transparency. Second, even with a purchasing power parity adjustment, it is not obvious that one dollar of defense spending buys an equivalent amount of security. Leaving aside that security is a relative concept, even purchasing power parity is an imperfect metric to compare spending, both in quantitative and qualitative terms, even when adjusted for purchasing power. This is due to differences in terms of what the money is spent on as well as what adjusted dollars can buy, given that advanced military technology is not necessarily traded on international markets and local production costs differ, and sometimes certain defense-related technologies are unavailable for comparison. Moreover, not only what the money is spent on matters, but how it is spent, as well as the ultimate strategic value one gets. For example, directing funds to procurement and development rather than spending them on veterans' pensions or outdated platforms is likely to increase security, particularly in the longer term, and translate to greater military effectiveness.

The United States accounts for almost 40% of global military spending. China and Russia account for a combined 17%, with China accounting for 13% and Russia for 4%. The so-called Big Four European countries account for 9.5%, compared to Russia's 3.9%.
In 2023, U.S. defense expenditure accounted for 3.5% of GDP and China's official defense expenditure for less than half at 1.6% of GDP. Due to much more rapid underlying economic growth, Chinese defense expenditure has been growing much more rapidly in dollar terms without translating into higher expenditure as a share of GDP.

When comparing U.S. and Chinese defense expenditures, it is important to take into consideration differences in terms of force structure and military posture. The U.S. has worldwide commitments and a costly and extensive global security footprint. China does not, and its military forces are geographically much more concentrated. Military spending should therefore at best be seen as a proxy for defense capabilities. In this sense, the political and economic costs the United States faces to increasing defense expenditure act as a constraint. Yet this constraint can be alleviated, at least partly, via means other than increasing defense spending, including better resource allocation. In the long term, however, significant differences in spending will affect the military balance, especially in East Asia.

In current dollar terms, the United States spent a little less than $900 billion and China $300 billion on defense. In 2010, the United States spent $740 billion, compared to Chinese spending of $100 billion. In purchasing power parity terms, Chinese defense spending was about two-thirds of U.S. spending.

In addition to faster economic growth, China has also greater scope to increase defense spending as a share of GDP without jeopardizing its long-term economic outlook because it has excess savings and limited profitable investment opportunities. This should allow it to convert its excess savings into military consumption without unduly undermining the long-term growth outlook; the United States is far more constrained in this respect.

49
The Ongoing Rise of U.S. Debt Amid Geopolitical, Financial and Economic Constraints
Apr 3, 2024 | 18:10 GMT



Political, financial and economic constraints will continue to limit the U.S. government's flexibility in adjusting spending in view of rising defense spending requirements, likely resulting in rising debt levels. In its most recent update of its long-term projections released in March, the Congressional Budget Office projected large fiscal deficits and a continued increase of the debt-to-GDP ratio in the United States driven by increasing entitlement and net interest expenditures. It is unlikely that the projected increase in government spending over the next two decades will cause any financing difficulties, let alone a financial crisis. This is because of the pivotal role of the dollar in the global financial system, the relative attractiveness of U.S. assets and a more favorable growth outlook than in most other advanced economies. Continued large deficits could, of course, lead to higher long-term interest rates, which might then lead the government to rein in the fiscal deficit to prevent too rapid an increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio. The current trend of more modest economic growth, at least compared to two decades ago, and large fiscal deficits will, however, translate into greater constraints on defense spending.

U.S. federal government debt stands at $35 trillion, which translates into more than $100,000 per citizen. U.S. federal government debt has more than tripled since the beginning of the century, increasing from 32% of gross domestic product in 2001 to 96% of GDP in 2023. The CBO currently projects the debt-to-GDP ratio will reach 116% of GDP by 2034 and 166% of GDP in 2054. Federal budget deficits will average about 6% of GDP.

Mandatory spending will increase from 13.9% of GDP to 15.1% of GDP over the next 10 years, while discretionary spending is projected to decrease from 6.4% of GDP to 5.1% of GDP, which would represent a substantial squeeze should it come to pass. If the decline in discretionary defense and nondefense spending were to be evenly split, U.S. defense spending would fall to less than 3% of GDP by the middle of the next decade — close to a post-World War II low.

A fiscal adjustment involving reforms to Social Security would help create more space for significant defense expenditure increases, but such reforms are highly unlikely in the short or medium term. Mandatory spending covers expenditures on entitlement and other programs, including Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid and several other programs related to health care or the elderly, which require Congress to approve separate legislation and cannot be modified as part of the annual budget process. Discretionary spending, on the other hand, is controlled by the annual budget process and pays for the operations of most federal agencies and national defense. It requires annual authorization. Discretionary spending as a share of GDP has declined gradually over time, while nondiscretionary (or mandatory) spending has continued to increase. An aging population makes it more difficult to substantially reduce entitlement spending, as the elderly account for a more substantial share of the electorate each year. Moreover, U.S. voters regard Social Security as almost on par with constitutionally guaranteed rights, making it very difficult to cut benefits or otherwise reform the entitlement program. At a minimum, this will require any entitlement reform to phase in a reduction of expenditure (relative to the baseline) very gradually so as not to upset actual and potential beneficiaries in terms of their accrued welfare benefits — and even this will prove politically difficult. That neither party supports reforming social security and other programs is evidence of these political constraints, with the last significant entitlement reform that sought to balance the books having taken place in 1983.

In FY 2023, the U.S. federal government spent $6.1 trillion. The U.S. federal government spends more than what the Japanese economy, the world's third-largest, produces.

Mandatory spending accounts for 60% of federal spending, discretionary spending for 30% and interest on debt 10%. Discretionary spending includes defense and nondefense spending with defense spending accounting for 13-15% of federal spending (or roughly half of discretionary spending).

As per the 2020 census, 17% of Americans were aged 65 or older. This share will increase to 23% by 2050. In absolute terms, this age group will increase from 58 million to 82 million.

The political, financial and economic constraints on U.S. defense spending will strengthen over time. Economically, high levels of defense spending are detrimental to long-term growth if spending reduces the availability of national savings and investment, which is typically the case. Even if investment represents a significant share of defense spending, it tends not to have much of an impact on civilian economic productivity. In the short run, however, a sharp increase in defense expenditure can help boost economic growth, particularly in the presence of ample spare capacity. Increased defense expenditures need to be financed through higher debt, increased revenues or budget cuts in other areas. With more resources allocated to consumptive defense spending and no offsets elsewhere, savings and investment will fall, and economic growth will suffer over the medium to long term. Faced with increased geopolitical competition, the need for increased defense spending will make for painful economic, financial and political choices, while increased defense spending (as a share of GDP) will weigh on the longer-term growth outlook. While none of this means that the United States will not be able to increase defense expenditure, it does mean that the economic, financial and political trade-offs and constraints will become more important over time.

In the short run, the government can almost always mobilize massive resources to support defense spending if flanked by appropriate economic and financial measures, such as capital controls, central bank purchases of additional debt issuance, increased taxes or reduced expenditures elsewhere. In 2023, U.S. defense spending (including Department of Energy spending on nuclear weapons) was 3.5% of GDP. In 1953 (during the Korean War), U.S. defense spending reached 11.3% of GDP; in 1968 (during the Vietnam War), 8.6% of GDP. In 1999, it fell to a post-1940 low of 2.7% of GDP before increasing again to reach 4.5% of GDP in 2010 (during the Afghanistan and Iraq wars). Defense spending exceeded 40% of GDP during World War II.

In the long term, however, there are economic limits to defense spending. The reduction of defense spending following the end of the Cold War led to the so-called "peace dividend" that allowed for lower government spending, higher national savings and lower interest rates. Unsustainable defense spending meanwhile drove the USSR into economic stagnation, financial failure and ultimately political collapse.
The United States remains the world's top military spender by a wide margin, but Chinese defense spending has been increasing rapidly on the back of rapid economic growth, which, in turn, is putting increased pressure on U.S. military spending. A decade or so ago, the United States spent more on defense than the rest of the world combined. Today, measured in current dollar terms, U.S. expenditure continues to account for nearly 40% of global spending, while China accounts for less than half of U.S. spending. The size of defense spending matters, but it is not everything. Several caveats apply. First, comparing military spending — even if adjusted for purchasing power parity to capture the effective spending power — is difficult, as different countries include and exclude different defense-related spending categories and items, and some countries' defense expenditure figures lack transparency. Second, even with a purchasing power parity adjustment, it is not obvious that one dollar of defense spending buys an equivalent amount of security. Leaving aside that security is a relative concept, even purchasing power parity is an imperfect metric to compare spending, both in quantitative and qualitative terms, even when adjusted for purchasing power. This is due to differences in terms of what the money is spent on as well as what adjusted dollars can buy, given that advanced military technology is not necessarily traded on international markets and local production costs differ, and sometimes certain defense-related technologies are unavailable for comparison. Moreover, not only what the money is spent on matters, but how it is spent, as well as the ultimate strategic value one gets. For example, directing funds to procurement and development rather than spending them on veterans' pensions or outdated platforms is likely to increase security, particularly in the longer term, and translate to greater military effectiveness.

The United States accounts for almost 40% of global military spending. China and Russia account for a combined 17%, with China accounting for 13% and Russia for 4%. The so-called Big Four European countries account for 9.5%, compared to Russia's 3.9%.
In 2023, U.S. defense expenditure accounted for 3.5% of GDP and China's official defense expenditure for less than half at 1.6% of GDP. Due to much more rapid underlying economic growth, Chinese defense expenditure has been growing much more rapidly in dollar terms without translating into higher expenditure as a share of GDP.

When comparing U.S. and Chinese defense expenditures, it is important to take into consideration differences in terms of force structure and military posture. The U.S. has worldwide commitments and a costly and extensive global security footprint. China does not, and its military forces are geographically much more concentrated. Military spending should therefore at best be seen as a proxy for defense capabilities. In this sense, the political and economic costs the United States faces to increasing defense expenditure act as a constraint. Yet this constraint can be alleviated, at least partly, via means other than increasing defense spending, including better resource allocation. In the long term, however, significant differences in spending will affect the military balance, especially in East Asia.

In current dollar terms, the United States spent a little less than $900 billion and China $300 billion on defense. In 2010, the United States spent $740 billion, compared to Chinese spending of $100 billion. In purchasing power parity terms, Chinese defense spending was about two-thirds of U.S. spending.

In addition to faster economic growth, China has also greater scope to increase defense spending as a share of GDP without jeopardizing its long-term economic outlook because it has excess savings and limited profitable investment opportunities. This should allow it to convert its excess savings into military consumption without unduly undermining the long-term growth outlook; the United States is far more constrained in this respect.

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