Fire Hydrant of Freedom

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-14510663/White-glamour-model-Martina-Big-36-identifies-black-having-tanning-injections-announces-plan-Africa.html

How would you apply your last sentence to China threatening to shut down its British steel operations?

"Regarding China etc. I don't see a conflict between free trade generally and banning imports, exports with adversaries."

Add 'ban Chinese ownership' to the above, if that's how they behave.

https://apnews.com/article/britain-steel-job-losses-scunthorpe-china-fe3a0edf7ebbc8340115677dddd9ddb5

I agree, free trade doesn't apply to thieves and scoundrels. In all trade policy discussions, China is a unique case.

Also, export licenses have long been required for military and dual use technologies.

I get what you are saying about protecting strategic Industries, but isn't that what Canada is doing with dairy and lumber, what Germany is doing with automobiles, etc. Accept all of that and add in all of ours plus the retaliations and where does it end?
-------------

Isn't there a contradiction between setting tariffs so high that no one Imports steel for example, and having a steady tariff revenue stream?

Our central planners are going to dynamically set tariff rates for every individual product so perfectly that both domestic production and a reliable tariff revenue stream will exist?

Color me skeptical.

second

March 28, 2025
View On Website
Open as PDF

Japan’s Slow-Moving Security Independence From the US
Autonomy isn’t impossible, but the U.S. isn’t leaving the region anytime soon.
By: Victoria Herczegh

Tokyo is reportedly considering the deployment of long-range missiles on Kyushu, the southwesternmost of Japan’s main islands, by early 2026. Because the island faces the East China Sea to the west and the Korean Peninsula to the northwest, missiles there would give Japan enhanced counterstrike capability against China and North Korea.

In one sense, the deployment is nothing new; Japan has undertaken several measures over the years to strengthen its deterrence capabilities against its regional adversaries, including participating in exercises in the South China Sea, approving a massive defense budget for 2025 and releasing white papers underscoring the threats China and North Korea pose. In another sense, the deployment marks a shift toward an offensive rather than a defensive military posture. This shift is evidenced by the recent procurement of certain weapons systems, efforts to boost security cooperation with countries such as the Philippines, India, Australia and the United Kingdom, and a very rare military exchange with China.

Japan’s behavior suggests Tokyo wants to diversify its alliances and become a leading security partner in the Asia-Pacific. Much more important, however, it suggests Japan wants to achieve a higher degree of military autonomy than it currently enjoys. But because this will necessarily require Tokyo to lessen its dependence on the U.S., this will be a long and difficult process.

Indeed, some of the weapons Japan has recently purchased attest to a more offensive-oriented posture. In December 2022, the government revised its defense policy so that it could strike enemy bases. This “counterstrike capability” allows Japan to directly attack adversary territories in emergency situations. According to the revision, Japan can invoke this capability if it is attacked or if an attack on an ally threatens its survival; if there are no adequate means to repel an attack; or if there is no other way to ensure the minimization of force.

By 2024, the government began to develop and acquire weapons that comport with this capability. Domestically, it has extended the operational range of its Type-12 surface-to-ship missile from 200 kilometers (124 miles) to 900 kilometers (with plans to extend it further to 1,500 kilometers), giving Japan a much larger area in which it can preempt or respond to attacks. It also converted Izumo-class destroyers into aircraft carriers capable of deploying F-35B stealth fighters, greatly expanding the military’s operational radius beyond its territorial waters. Tokyo has signed a deal with Washington to receive 105 F-35A and 42 F-35B fighter aircraft, and has ordered some 400 Tomahawk cruise missiles. And it has developed its hypersonic glide vehicle, which is explicitly intended to strike distant land or maritime targets at high speeds.

Crucially, all of this took place with Washington’s express support or involvement. In contrast, the plan to deploy long-range missiles on Kyushu does not involve the U.S. in any way. This is almost certainly because Japan has had some conflicts of interest with the U.S. of late – namely, the Trump administration’s request calls for Tokyo to spend 3 percent of its gross domestic product on defense “as soon as possible.” Japan had already independently decided to increase defense spending to 2 percent of GDP, but Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba and his Cabinet have been hesitant to go any further than that. Partly that’s due to economic reasons: food-driven inflation, lingering deflationary pressures and external economic risks. But partly it’s due to Ishiba's desire to achieve self-reliance on Japan’s own terms and at its own pace. President Donald Trump has since questioned the terms of the U.S.-Japan alliance, raising doubts about the extent to which Washington would protect Tokyo in a conflict with China or North Korea.

Japan's Annual Military Spending

(click to enlarge)

Even so, Ishiba had begun to take Japan in a different security direction before Trump took office again. Trump aside, there is uncertainty in Tokyo about the long-term reliance on the U.S. and the opportunity cost of excluding itself from a leadership role in an Indo-Pacific security pact. Since last year, Ishiba has taken a more measured approach in boosting Japan’s regional alliances. Instead of focusing on collective defense, he seems to now prefer separate bilateral meetings, finding success in elevating high-level strategic cooperation with the Philippines, organizing more frequent joint drills with India and upgrading interoperability with the U.K.

Though these efforts signify a more intense, more planned pursuit of Tokyo’s security needs, especially considering the cracks that have emerged in the U.S. alliance, Japan continues to be heavily dependent on Washington in terms of military technology, personnel, training, logistics and strategy. Moreover, Washington is unlikely to decrease its military presence in the Indo-Pacific anytime soon – if anything, it has been reinforcing its defense capabilities in the region as it continues to invest in defense infrastructure. So for Japan, significantly reducing its security dependence on the U.S. and establishing a fully autonomous defense capability is a longer-term effort. That’s not to say it's unattainable; it’s just to say it will be a gradual process rather than a dramatic one.