Africa

[Crafty_Dog]

U.S. withdrawal. The U.S. confirmed that it will pull its troops out of Niger and close its air base in Agadez after the country’s military junta announced last month that it was revoking a military agreement with Washington. The U.S., which had roughly 1,000 troops stationed in Niger as of last year, has used the country as its primary base for monitoring and counterinsurgency operations across the Sahel. It has been reported in recent weeks that dozens of Russian military instructors and personnel have arrived in Niamey as the Nigerien government turns to Moscow for security assistance.

[Crafty_Dog]

May 29, 2024
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Russian Strategy in the Sahel
As the U.S. leaves Niger, Moscow’s intentions are becoming clearer.
By: Ronan Wordsworth

A date has been set for the United States to fully demobilize from its military bases in Niger. On Sept. 15, American forces will leave at a time when the West continues to lose ground to Russian influence in the Sahel. As this happens, a clearer picture of Moscow’s broader regional strategy is beginning to form.

The Sahel has long been a hotbed for global terrorism. It was initially identified in the so-called Global War on Terror as a threat to Africa and to U.S. and Europe security because of its potential to nurture extremism and to export extremists through legal migration channels to Europe. Unsurprisingly, Brussels and Washington have each spent hundreds of millions of dollars in the Sahel, with Niger receiving a substantial portion of U.S. training and support. The fact that Russia is now taking over and deploying resources and personnel to Africa amid a stagnating war in Ukraine attests to the importance of the region.

This explains why in March the U.S. engaged in negotiations to remain in Niger. During those talks, U.S. officials said they gave the Nigerien junta a pathway for continuing the relationship, which included a planned roadmap for a return to democracy (which no Nigerian leader has been able to provide) and a reconsideration of its choice to supply yellowcake, a uranium concentrate powder, to Iran. Clearly, the talks were unsuccessful; reports indicate that the junta has already agreed to move forward with the sale of hundreds of tons of the substance to Iran, even though it has denied doing so. U.S. and Nigerien officials met again in mid-May as a last ditch effort to ease tensions and keep a foothold in the country, but these talks failed too, thus the deadline for Washington’s departure.

The U.S. has since halted much of its support to Niger. Though some in the government expected deliveries of things like drones and weaponry to continue, it should not come as a surprise. Washington provides tons of material to countries like Niger, but it does so with strings attached: It tends not to provide military assistance to governments that come to power through coups, and it usually requires certain discussions and degrees of influence in exchange. Moscow has no such compunction. It has a long history providing arms to the region, and it leverages its relationship to curry favor with its regimes. Russia has already provided anti-air defense systems to Niamey, as well as some 100 Russian soldiers and military instructors “to train local forces in the fight against terrorism.” That Russia provides drones, equipment, arms, and ammunition without restrictions will continue to set it apart from Washington when dealing with governments across Africa.

Niger typifies Russian strategy in North and West Africa, but it is only one of many countries the Kremlin is trying to woo. Sao Tome and Principe, for example, recently signed a military cooperation agreement with Russia that calls for military training, logistical support and "possible collaborations" involving Russian ships and planes. The president of Guinea-Bissau recently visited Moscow and declared that Russia was a “permanent and loyal ally.” Guinea-Bissau has had a military agreement with Russia since November 2018, but it’s highly likely that during the president’s trip there was an updated framework agreement proposed to increase military cooperation. Russia also announced that it will be opening an embassy in Equatorial Guinea. The EU was slow to react but has now expressed significant alarm at the developments.

Russia's Increased Presence in Africa

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Why is Russia interested in this part of Africa? First, since its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Moscow has been in search of friendly governments to support it in the international arena and help it avoid diplomatic and economic isolation. Many governments across Africa have bought into the Kremlin’s portrayal of the war as an anti-imperial conflict. Ukraine has fought back, dispatching Foreign Minister Dymtro Kuleba to a dozen African countries (some of which had never received a Ukrainian government delegation before) during four separate visits since early 2022. Kyiv also developed an Africa-focused communications strategy to counter Russian propaganda.

Second, Moscow is establishing a trade corridor to funnel natural resources from the region to Russia – and away from Europe. Russia provides weapons and military equipment, while its paramilitaries protect African military leaders as well as mining operations. In exchange, the African military juntas permit Russian firms to extract gold, oil, diamonds and other valuable commodities. From there, Russia can transport the commodities north to Libyan ports, where they are loaded onto ships and sold abroad. (Thanks to its close partnership with Libya, Russia is also able to disguise its natural gas as Libyan and sell it to Europe, undermining European efforts to end its dependence on Russian energy while refilling the Kremlin’s coffers.) If Niger were to sell yellowcake to Iran, as both Nigerien and Western officials have alleged it may, then the corridor to the Mediterranean would be an ideal route. It is also a superb choice for migrants who aspire to reach Europe – a journey that Moscow and Minsk have not just endorsed but facilitated in recent years to sow discord in European politics and society.

Finally, and perhaps most consequential for Western interests, Russia seeks to unite its allies from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic. For a long time, Russia has been pursuing naval bases along the coasts of Africa. (It previously struck a deal with Sudanese leader Omar al-Bashir, who was removed from power during a coup in 2019.) In February, it reportedly started courting the West African country of Togo in a bid to extend its Sahel corridor to the Atlantic Ocean. Elsewhere in West Africa, Senegal’s recently inaugurated president has emphasized anti-colonialism, casting doubt on the future of Dakar’s relations with Paris, its former ruler. He has also spoken openly about drawing closer to the pro-Russia Alliance of Sahel States (comprising Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger). For Russia, an Atlantic naval base would give it more secure access to trans-Atlantic trade routes and support its logistics chain to its Sahelian allies.

The focal point for Russia’s Africa strategy at the moment is Libya, whose rival authorities can both claim good relations with the Kremlin. Wagner mercenaries long fought alongside Gen. Khalifa Haftar’s forces in the east, while Russian diplomats kept in contact with the Government of National Unity in Tripoli. Besides the several thousand ex-Wagner military contractors who were already in the country, Russia has been sending professional soldiers to Libya since February. In the past month alone, it deployed 1,800 troops alongside several hundred special operators. Since April, Russian frigates have made at least five deliveries of military equipment to Tobruk. Moscow’s military build-up in North Africa poses a serious threat to Europe, but Russia’s forces are more likely to be deployed across the region than they are to remain in Libya.

Russia's Prospective Missile Range from Tobruk, Libya

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Following its withdrawal from Afghanistan, the U.S. is determined to ensure that its exit from Niger goes smoothly. One hundred U.S. troops have already departed, but approximately 1,000 remain. They will leave behind an expensive drone base that provided Sahelian governments with intelligence and reconnaissance for their fight against Islamist insurgencies. However, Washington remains convinced of the importance of monitoring and, when necessary, actively disrupting Islamist extremist networks across the Sahel, so it continues to seek a new home for its counterterrorism operations.

Meanwhile, Russia has been proactive in ensuring this will not be an easy task for the United States. In addition to building links between its African allies, Moscow is trying to push further into Lusophone countries. It is also prioritizing collaboration with the new Senegalese president and other countries along the Atlantic coast, including Togo. By forming tighter alliances across the region, Russia will benefit economically and politically, while gaining the ability to threaten NATO in new ways – all of which will increase Moscow’s future bargaining power.

[Crafty_Dog]

September 11, 2024
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In Africa, China Strikes Back
Beijing has prepared for the coming competition with new economic promises.
By: Ronan Wordsworth
A little over a year ago, China was consigned to spend less in pursuit of its interests in Africa. It cut back dramatically on lending, on infrastructure projects, and on any form of investment because the governments were corrupt and there wasn’t much competition to China besides. But now that there is a renewed global interest in Africa for its place in supply chains and its supply of critical minerals, Beijing feels it can no longer sit idly by. The reasons behind the decision are many, but perhaps most tellingly, it shows that Beijing believes it will come out of its current economic malaise.

China’s Decline

The significance of China’s near-monopoly in Africa cannot be overstated. From 2006, when it began to invest in Africa in earnest, to the height of its investment in 2016, Beijing faced very little competition. This enabled the government to secure long-term deals to develop mines and export raw minerals and maintain large trade imbalances. It also gave China a huge head start in developing batteries, solar panels and other products related to green energy. Beijing’s strategy was successful even when African governments failed to pay back their loans, and even when Beijing itself fell under economic duress. The mines stayed open, ensuring a constant flow of critical minerals.

But other countries started to take notice. The United States now intends to partner with Africa partly to develop trade relations but mostly to gain access to its resources. This was exemplified by the first U.S.-Africa Leaders’ Summit in December 2022, when President Joe Biden hosted leaders from the continent in the hopes of demonstrating Washington’s commitment to building new economic engagement, strengthening ties, promoting private equity to use in such key sectors as health, infrastructure, energy, agribusiness and digital, and supporting peace initiatives throughout the continent. Thus, in 2023, a record amount of private and government investment flowed from the U.S. to Africa.

A major recipient of this money was the Lobito Corridor project. With Europe’s help, the U.S. mobilized nearly $2 billion to develop this rail corridor, which links the copper belt in Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo to the Angolan coast and provides a reliable way to export copper, cobalt and other rare earths such as niobium, tantalum and germanium to the Atlantic Ocean shipping routes. More than just an economic initiative, the Lobito Corridor is a way for the U.S. and Europe to counter China’s dominance in critical minerals and reinforce otherwise shaky supply chains.

The West isn’t alone in its interests. In trying to diversify their portfolios away from hydrocarbons, many Middle Eastern countries have started to invest in African commodities markets. Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar are all active there, and though they operate in different countries and sectors and for different short-term goals, they are all directly competing with China. The UAE, for example, which is now the fourth largest investor on the continent, is participating in areas such as infrastructure, energy, transport and logistics – areas in which China used to have a strong presence. It also signed an agreement with the DRC to establish a mining joint venture to extract tantalum, tungsten and tin – all critical raw materials used in the manufacture of green technology.

China is still Africa’s most important trade partner and the biggest beneficiary of African resources, but its position now is nowhere near as strong as it was just a few years ago. In fact, Chinese outreach had begun to drop even before the competition was rekindled. Money for programs related to agricultural assistance, climate and environment, health, peace and security, and trade dropped by roughly 50 percent. During that time, there was also an 80 percent drop in the sheer number of projects being announced. In a Zoom call with African leaders in 2021, Chinese President Xi Jinping made no reference whatsoever to continental infrastructure – once seen as a hallmark of their relationship.

The most recent China-Africa summit, held just a few days ago, focused on how to add value to African exports. According to China's Foreign Ministry, imports from Africa reached $305.9 billion over the past two and a half years, beating preliminary objectives on targeted value but still failing to add much beyond the utility of the minerals themselves. Beijing also said it wants to reduce its trade imbalance to usher in a new era of bilateral ties, demonstrating a willingness to develop a more sophisticated relationship based on trade ties and potential dependencies rather than one based purely on extraction.

China’s Response

And because China knows its position in Africa has declined relative to others, it has prepared for the coming competition accordingly. Its plans, crucially, include the largest ever military pledges, but its outreach still centers on economic cooperation. At last week’s summit, Xi announced that the ”Beijing Action Plan for 2025-2027” includes a promise of 360 billion yuan ($50 billion) for the continent over the next three years comprising credit funds, government-issued yuan-denominated loans, private investment from Chinese firms, an involvement in 30 infrastructure projects, the creation of 1 million jobs in Africa, a unilateral improvement on access to its market for African trade, 30 clean energy projects and Chinese involvement in developing Africa's nuclear energy industry.

Though this is no small matter, in some ways it is merely in keeping with previous efforts. In 2023, Chinese investment in Africa came roaring back. By the end of August, the Global China Initiative reported that China had approved $4.61 billion in loans to eight African countries and two regional financial institutions, marking the first annual increase in loans to the continent since the peak of the Belt and Road Initiative. Chinese financing also returned to small-scale renewable energy projects, such as solar and hydropower, after two years of no energy investment in Africa. These projects remain modest, however, and the “30 clean energy projects” promised by Xi at the summit will likely be of similar scale. Infrastructure projects are also expected to be smaller, reflecting lessons from earlier large-scale initiatives that faced repayment challenges. However, China continues to extend loans to countries with ongoing financial difficulties, including Egypt, Nigeria and Angola – three of its largest loan recipients.

One notable memorandum of understanding from the summit concerned revitalizing a railway between Tanzania and Zambia. Built in 1976 and funded by a zero-interest Chinese loan, the railway helps copper and cobalt from Zambia and the DRC reach ports in Tanzania. The refurbished railway will highlight the benefits of cooperation between China and Africa, according to Xi. It also looks like a direct response to the Lobito Corridor.

Besides economic support, Xi also pledged $140 million in military aid to Africa. The aid package includes training for 6,000 military personnel, 1,000 police officers and 500 young military officers who will come to China for further training. Insecurity in places like Sudan, the Sahel, the DRC and the Central African Republic is disrupting Chinese mining and logistics operations. What’s more, some of this instability is a result of Russian activity, as Moscow exploits the lawlessness to access and covertly export minerals. This dynamic has led to clashes between Chinese and Russian actors in areas such as the Central African Republic. Meanwhile, China accounted for 19 percent of sub-Saharan Africa’s arms imports from 2019 to 2023 – a figure that is likely to grow as Russia remains preoccupied with Ukraine.

Though African leaders welcomed these pledges, they now hold a stronger bargaining position with Beijing. As a result, China is unlikely to match the levels of infrastructure financing seen before 2016. Instead, Beijing is adopting a multifaceted strategy, deepening military ties with African countries while signaling its return as a reliable partner for development assistance. It faces significant competition this time from Western and Middle Eastern countries. These rivals are challenging China’s traditional areas of influence and working to secure their own supply chains in order to reduce their dependence on Chinese manufacturing for the green energy transition. The China-Africa summit shows that the competition has forced China to refocus on Africa just as it was beginning to shift its attention elsewhere