Russia-China/Asia (Japan, too)

[Crafty_Dog]

In the wake of Japanese weakness to Chinese pressure comes this , , ,

Russia's Focus Shifts to the East

While on a visit to the far eastern Siberian peninsula of Kamchatka, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev said on Wednesday that the Pacific Kuril Islands chain is a “very important” part of Russia. Medvedev pledged to visit the Kuril Islands, which are controlled by Russia but claimed by Japan, in the “nearest future.” Medvedev was scheduled to visit the islands during his trip, but the stop was canceled, allegedly due to bad weather.

STRATFOR has closely followed how Moscow has paid and continues to pay substantial attention to the geopolitical events to its west — i.e., Europe and the United States. But over the past few years, Russia has finally achieved a degree of security that allows it to turn its attention to its neighbors to the east. It is true that these eastern neighbors are thousands of desolate Siberian miles from the Russian core of Moscow and St. Petersburg. But they are important to Russia nonetheless, as Medvedev’s comments about the Kurils indicate. This eastern front, which not only includes the heavyweights of China and Japan but also dynamic players like Vietnam and Indonesia, has of late seen a notable increase in attention from Russia. These interactions raise interesting questions, not only about what is going on now, but also what this could bring — in terms of opportunities, risks and challenges — in the future.

Russia is a country that spans nearly the entire Eastern Hemisphere. As such, while its core and core interests are in the West, it has natural interests in the East as well. And these interests in the Asia Pacific region have paralleled what has in recent decades been a remarkable shift in global economic power from West to East. China and Japan continue to jockey over the position of the world’s second largest economy, and South Korea is nearly in the top 10. While European countries struggle to determine what exactly the eurozone should and should not be, Asian economies, generally in better financial shape after having suffered their own crisis in 1997-98, concentrated on public investment to maintain growth and expanding regional trade relationships to make up for lower demand from Europe and the United States. While they are still heavily dependent on exports, they are not shackled by debt like the Western developed countries and continue to grow at relatively fast rates.

“Russia has finally achieved a degree of security that allows it to turn its attention to its neighbors to the east.”
For Russia, Asia’s increased economic power has made it a growing market to tap. As a country that is capital poor with an economy that is driven by the export of natural resources, Russia inevitably looks to East Asia in its efforts to build new relationships. Russia is increasingly looking at the energy-hungry countries of Northeast Asia especially as an opportunity to increase its oil and natural gas exporting portfolio, signing major deals over the past few years with the likes of China and Japan. Russia sends liquefied natural gas exports to Korea and Japan, and 200,000 barrels of oil flow daily to China. But there are opportunities with other countries as well. Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam and Indonesia are hungry for military, energy, nuclear and space technology — something that Russia also happens to have copious amounts of and is increasingly sending their way.

Even better for Russia, the East Asia region is one where Moscow does not need to attempt to exert hegemony the way it does in Europe. Since the Mongol invasions, there have been no strategic challengers that pose an existential threat to Russia as Hitler or Napoleon did — although Japan has repeatedly threatened Russia’s Pacific presence and China could one day threaten Russia’s dominance in Central Asia. But even if a more substantial challenger were to emerge, Russia has the strategic depth of the sheer space of Siberia, as opposed to the short and smooth invasion route presented by the North European Plain.

Of course there are challenges and potential perils for Russia when looking east as well. Russia has had a historically ambivalent relationship with China, and a disastrous defeat in the Russo-Japanese war was one of the primary reasons for the fall of Tsardom that led to the Russian Revolution. In geopolitics there is no such thing as permanent allies — only alliances of necessity or convenience — and while a dynamic East Asia could present some convenient relationships now, this convenience can quickly change, whether through economic stagnation, political realignment or other means. In particular, Medvedev’s promise of a trip to the Kuril Islands is especially (and deliberately) aggravating for Japan, which is in the midst of a lengthy dispute with China over another group of disputed islands and is therefore attempting to strengthen its defense posture and shore up its security alliance with the United States.

In terms of energy cooperation, Moscow is pursuing opportunities in the Asia Pacific region that show promise, though they also bring enormous geographical and financial difficulties. The success of these projects depends on future Asian economic growth, which faces risks related to global circumstances and, in particular, China’s structural flaws and deepening imbalances. Moreover, Russia’s thorny territorial disputes and deep-seated antagonism with Japan, and the persistent differences with China that prevent a long-term strategic alignment, ensure that a growing Russian focus on the region brings political and security challenges. Asian countries also have much to gain from Russia, but are simultaneously wary of Russia’s tendency to use energy as a political tool, its military might, its arms trade with their regional opponents, and its plans to revitalize its naval presence in the Pacific. At the same time, the United States is strengthening its Pacific alliance structure and attempting to re-engage with Southeast Asia. In other words, Russia is becoming more involved in the region at a time when the region’s economic and security conditions are changing rapidly, and changing in ways that suggest heightening competition.

So after decades of being engrossed in the Western theater throughout the Cold War, and the subsequent 20 years of rebuilding the influence it had lost after the collapse of the Soviet Union, there has emerged in the East an area worth looking at for Russia. And now, even if only remarking on the importance of a small and far-flung island chain, it certainly appears that Moscow finally has a mounting interest to do so.

[Crafty_Dog]

http://www.military.com/news/article...ml?ESRC=dod.nl

[DougMacG]

There are a number of stories out there now abut the tightening of relations between Russia and China.  This chart n Gazprom explains quite a bit of it:  http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/images/user3303/imageroot/2014/03-overflow/20140322_gazprom.png

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-03-22/most-important-company-europe

[Crafty_Dog]

Stratfor
Landmark China-Russia Agreements Go Far Beyond Energy
Geopolitical Diary
Wednesday, May 21, 2014 - 17:08 Text Size Print

On Wednesday, Russian President Vladimir Putin concluded a successful trip to China that was marked by a range of major bilateral agreements. The most important was a long-awaited natural gas deal between Russian state-owned energy firm Gazprom and China National Petroleum Corp. But the significance of Putin's trip goes far beyond energy. The deal, along with the others reached, highlights a major shift in Sino-Russian relations that has widespread geopolitical implications.

With Russia set to export some $400 billion worth of natural gas to China over the next 30 years, or approximately 38 billion cubic meter annually at $350 per thousand cubic meters, the deal is a good fit for both sides. China's energy demands are rapidly escalating, while Russia is looking to further diversify its energy exports away from Europe. Moscow has been particularly eager to complete the deal with Beijing, since it will give it considerable leverage in its bitter, protracted energy talks with Europe and Ukraine. To sweeten the deal, Moscow proposed several changes to its energy tax and export structures and offered China a large stake in Gazprom's liquefied natural gas project at Vladivostok. (China had already been awarded a stake in the Yamal LNG project run by Novatek, which is partly owned by Gazprom.)

What is a Geopolitical Diary? George Friedman Explains.

The other agreements struck during Putin's two-day visit are unique in that they involve Chinese investments, infrastructure and businesses inside Russia. Moscow has long shied away from allowing heavy Chinese investment in its strategic projects; it feared that it would not have sufficient leverage over Chinese activities in Russia, as Moscow has had with the Europeans. For example, most Asian investors were not given a chance to bid on the Kremlin's modernization and privatization programs between 2008 and 2010.

The new deals include a $10 billion aviation agreement, a $2.6 billion power grid agreement, plans to build auto manufacturing plants and housing, and increased rail connectivity. Each of these would take place in Russia. Moreover, the largest proposal on the table would give China National Petroleum Corp. a 19 percent stake in Russian oil behemoth Rosneft, giving China a seat on the board of Moscow's most prized company.

Over the past decade, Russia and China have worked well together, especially on minor economic deals. Beijing and Moscow have found common political ground, aligning constantly against Western (particularly U.S.) interests by, for example, voting in tandem at the U.N. Security Council on issues involving Iran and Syria. But the current deepening of Sino-Russian economic relations is unprecedented.

This does not portend a return to the Sino-Soviet axis against the West of the 1950s. China is far too intertwined with the U.S. and European economies to attempt a grand realignment, and regional frictions, particularly in Central Asia and the Pacific, would further complicate such an alliance. Nonetheless, tighter bilateral relations would give Russia and China a stake in each other's futures. With significant investments in Russia, Beijing would have no desire to see an unstable Russia, and vice versa.

China now has sufficient interest in cooperating with Russia to avoid conflicts -- whether direct or in their overlapping spheres -- that could detract from Beijing's ability to manage attempts at containment by the United States and its allies. Russia is one of the few powers capable of significantly resisting or interfering with major U.S. foreign policy initiatives. Beijing's willingness to enhance its strategic relationship with Moscow reflects its belief that the United States poses a far greater threat to Chinese interests than does Russia. Similarly, giving another power a stake in Russian stability will help Moscow deter U.S. attempts to isolate or destabilize the country, particularly as tensions with the West continue to escalate.

Read more: Landmark China-Russia Agreements Go Far Beyond Energy | Stratfor

[Crafty_Dog]

Analysis

Editor's Note: Russian President Vladimir Putin will meet with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang on Oct. 14, during three days of significant business negotiations and deal signing between the countries. Russia has been looking for an investment boost as a remedy for its economy, which is in sharp decline because of slowing internal growth, sanctions from the West and a sour investment climate overall. Already, Moscow's focus on expanded economic ties has shifted east, prompted by Russia's tense relations with the West in recent years. Moscow has traditionally been reserved in its relations with Asia -- and China in particular -- but this trend appears to be changing.

Russia reached out with the expansion of the East Siberia Oil Pipeline, completed in 2012, a move that increased eastbound oil exports from 4 percent to approximately 20 percent. Russia hopes to duplicate this success with natural gas exports through the Power of Siberia pipeline, which began construction this summer. The oil and natural gas deals with China are worth some $270 billion and $400 billion, respectively, over the next three decades.
Russia-China Deals Since 2012
Click to Enlarge

Beyond energy, Moscow now views China as a much larger investor in Russia as well as an alternative market for credit. Both areas are reflected in the type and quantity of deals struck between the two countries over the past three days, 38 agreements in all, worth approximately $25 billion. Among the first notable deals is an agreement with China's Exim Bank that could provide $2 billion of long-term loans to Russia's Vnesheconombank, or VEB, which is currently suffering under sanctions imposed by the West. Additionally, Beijing said it would invest $10 billion in a high-speed rail project connecting Moscow and Kazan, Tatarstan, a $25 billion project that was put on hold when Western investors shied away because of sanctions.

Moscow also offered Beijing the chance to purchase a stake in Russia's oil giant, Rosneft. This is alongside a proposed stake in planned liquefied natural gas facilities on Russia's eastern coast and a possible expansion of the Power of Siberia pipeline -- one that would add a large spur supplying China's western regions. Though indicators appear to show a revival of the Sino-Soviet alliance, both countries are carefully calculating their commitments: Beijing and Moscow are naturally wary of being beholden to one another. For the time being, however, there is a shared willingness to come to terms, which offers a distinct advantage for a Russia badly in need of new markets and investors, and a China that fits both those bills.
Russia and China Strengthen Their Energy Relationship

    June 18, 2011: Russia is one of the world's largest energy producers and China is one of the biggest consumers, but these bordering countries have done very little energy trade. Instead, Russia relies mostly on the West as a consumer — it supplies one quarter of Europe's energy — while China largely relies on energy supplies from the Middle East and Africa imported via sea routes. The reason for this disconnect is that Russia's current oil and natural gas production occurs mostly in the west of the country, while most of China's population is in its east, leaving thousands of kilometers between the source and the consumers. The distance — and therefore investment — involved in connecting Russia's energy to China's population is massive.

    Considering the difficulties involved in any oil and natural gas projects linking Russia and China, the endeavors appear to make no economic sense. However, this is not only about economics. Beijing and Moscow have many political, security and other issues in their overlapping and respective regions. It could be that energy cooperation, even at a high price, is considered mutually strategically necessary, or it could be a tradeoff for concessions in other areas. It is not clear what the tradeoff could be, but it is clear that a serious discussion is going on between the two Asian giants on finding common ground and shaping a stronger relationship in the future.

Russia Diversifies Oil Export Routes and Markets

    March 9, 2012: Russia is diversifying its customer base so that if demand in Europe declines -- or if Russia and its European customers find themselves in a politically untenable situation -- Russia will still have a large market to its east. In the past decade, Russia has increased its oil exports to Asia from 3 percent to 15 percent of total exports, with more increases expected. When the Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean oil pipeline (ESPO) is expanded, Russia theoretically could supply one-fifth of China's imports, or one-third of Japan's imports. However, Russia is not singling out one customer in East Asia yet; it is supplying many customers. Conversely, no East Asian country wants to become too reliant on Russia after seeing Moscow cut off supplies to its customers in the West.

Russia Looks East for New Energy Consumers

    Jan. 23, 2013: With its oil and natural gas exports to Europe declining, Russia is expanding its energy export networks to Asia. Russia has long relied on Europe as its primary customer, but over the past two years Moscow has worked to build out its energy infrastructure to the east as a way of diversifying its customer base. Today, it has enough capacity to divert about half of its oil exports to eastern markets. Because oil and natural gas are the chief sources of revenue for the Russian government, the Kremlin wants to ensure it has the flexibility to shift routes and destinations as demand in different regions rises or falls, somewhat insulating the country from volatility in energy markets.

Russia Tries to Crack China's Natural Gas Market

    Sept. 11, 2013: The past two weeks have been particularly busy for Russia and China as they discuss energy deals. Last week, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin traveled to China and struck a series of deals on behalf of Russian oil giant Rosneft, of which he is a board member. In June, the two sides agreed to a $270 billion oil deal under which Russia, starting in 2015, will export 300,000 barrels per day to China for 25 years, on top of the 400,000 barrels per day it already delivers noncontractually. In addition to this deal, Sechin and Rosneft agreed with China National Petroleum Corp. to construct a new oil refinery in the Chinese city of Tianjin and launch a joint venture to open gas stations across China that would be fed by Russian oil -- Moscow's first venture into China's gasoline market.

Russia's Competition for Natural Gas Deals with China

    Sept. 12, 2014: As China diversifies its options for natural gas suppliers, it is leveraging its position to get the best deals it can out of new contracts with Russia. Because Russia is counting on the Chinese natural gas market to help it move away from exporting energy to Europe, Moscow is offering concessions to Beijing, particularly in light of the growing competition it faces. Beijing's wariness of a natural gas contract with Russia and its concern about the end price of Russian natural gas has put Gazprom in a difficult position. The company was supposed to begin constructing the Power of Siberia pipeline in September, but without a final deal with China in place, it is postponing construction of the $32 billion pipeline until early 2014 to ensure that there will be a market for the natural gas the line will carry. Gazprom is courting other customers, such as South Korea and Japan, to sign contracts for natural gas exports via the pipeline, but the volume these countries would import is not nearly as great as the amount China has proposed.

Russia, China Agree to Natural Gas Deal

    May 21, 2014: Russia and China struck a long-awaited deal on natural gas May 21, according to Alexei Miller, the CEO of Russian natural gas giant Gazprom. According to the provisions of the deal, which is worth $400 billion, Russia will supply 38 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year to China for the next 30 years, with the option to raise supplies to 60 billion cubic meters per year in the future. The agreement will enable Russia to launch plans for building the $42 billion Power of Siberia pipeline, a 4,000 kilometer-long (approximately 2,500 miles) pipeline that will tap two new source fields and run from Siberia to China. The energy deal does not mean that Beijing and Moscow are aligned politically, as they were periodically during the Cold War. But each country now has a use for the other, and their partnership could help ensure domestic stability and enhance their respective positions in the world.


Read more: A Chronology of Russia's Rekindled Alliance with China | Stratfor
Follow us: @stratfor on Twitter | Stratfor on Facebook

[DougMacG]

Trump accuses Russia of helping North Korea evade sanctions
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-exclusive/exclusive-trump-accuses-russia-of-helping-north-korea-evade-sanctions-says-u-s-needs-more-missile-defense-idUSKBN1F62KO
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http://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/comments/the-prospect-of-regime-change-in-north-korea-is-a-serious-concern/

Moscow’s position was motivated by a belief the status quo made Russia a powerful geopolitical player in the crisis because of its close ties to Pyongyang, Kortunov said, just as Russia’s support for Assad has gifted it greater Middle East clout.
...
If the United States were to remove Kim Jong Un by force, he said Russia could face a refugee and humanitarian crisis on its border, while the weapons and technology Pyongyang is developing could fall into even more dangerous non-state hands. (From the Russian perspective)

[Crafty_Dog]

Russia Suspends Fishing Agreement With Japan in Disputed Territory
2 MIN READJun 9, 2022 | 21:22 GMT





The Kuril Islands appear on the horizon as a boat approaches.
The Kuril Islands appear on the horizon as a boat approaches.

(Shutterstock)

Russia has suspended a 1998 agreement with Japan that allowed Japanese fishing boats near the disputed Russian-occupied Kuril Islands, which Japan claims as part of its Northern Territories. Moscow claims the suspension resulted from Tokyo’s non-payment of agreed-upon fees and the failure to sign documents related to technical cooperation on Sakhalin Island. The suspension is the latest reflection of growing tensions between Russia and Japan after Tokyo firmly sided with Western nations in its response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Russian and Chinese strategic bombers recently conducted a joint patrol around Japan, and Tokyo has revived diplomatic language accusing Russia of illegally occupying four disputed islands in the Kuril chain.

The 1998 fisheries agreement was established in part to ensure the safety of Japanese fishing vessels in what they consider their historic territorial waters. It established a process for the annual negotiation over the number of marine products Japanese vessels could catch and the fee Japan would pay for the joint use of the disputed waters. Prior to the agreement, Japanese fishing vessels in the area were subject to Russian seizure. Following the suspension, Tokyo vowed to protect its fishing fleets, as the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Forces have the authority to intervene if fishing vessels and their crews are threatened. Even so, it is unclear whether Tokyo is willing to potentially face off against the Russian Coast Guard or Navy in the disputed waters when the autumn fishing season kicks off.

The suspension highlights Moscow's ability to counter economic and diplomatic pressure over its invasion of Ukraine. Japan is currently reassessing its energy dependency on Russia and has suspended loans for Russian Arctic natural gas development. For Tokyo, loss of access to the fisheries around the Northern Territories will impact local fishery livelihoods and have a minor impact on Japan’s food security. If Moscow decides to sell licenses to Chinese fishing vessels, Japan would be more gravely impacted, although Moscow has not yet suggested such a move publicly. China-Russia fishing cooperation has grown over the last decade, with Chinese-manned vessels already operating off Russia’s northeast coast, and Chinese fleets are always looking for new areas to operate.


image of globe
Connected Content

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.zerohedge.com/energy/anti-russian-alliance-fractures-after-japan-decides-stay-russias-sakhalin-1-energy-project?utm_source=&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=1042

[Crafty_Dog]

Daily Memo: Moscow's Warnings to Tokyo
The Kremlin sees Japan's move toward militarization as a barrier to peace negotiations.
By: Geopolitical Futures
Russian warnings. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey Rudenko warned against Japan’s move toward militarization, saying Moscow may be forced to take retaliatory measures. Among the changes Rudenko said ran counter to Tokyo's “peaceful development” are large-scale military exercises near Russian borders, the adoption of updated defense doctrines and large increases in military spending. He called the moves “a serious challenge for the security of our country and the Asia-Pacific region” and said negotiations on a peace treaty to formally end World War II hostilities would not be possible if Tokyo doesn’t abandon its “anti-Russian course.”

[Crafty_Dog]

China Is Eating Russia’s Lunch in the Defense Market
The script has flipped in the countries’ traditional defense-industrial relationship.
BY THOMAS CORBETT
RESEARCH ANALYST, BLUEPATH LABS
APRIL 3, 2023 11:19 AM ET
COMMENTARY
THE CHINA INTELLIGENCE
CHINA
RUSSIA
INDUSTRY
In the new Sino-Russian defense relationship, China does what it wants, and there isn’t a whole lot Russia can do about it.

Xi Jingping’s recent visit to Moscow—his first since Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine last year—was summed up by historian Sergey Radchenko in this way: “The summit can be summarised by the Chinese saying 雷声大雨点小 (Loud thunder but few raindrops). Scratch that, even the thunder wasn’t all that loud.”

The meeting, which apparently produced no major policy shifts nor even notable statements of support, did further illustrate a tectonic shift in the supposed "no limits" relationship: China is taking the lead in nearly every aspect, including in the defense-industrial sphere once dominated by Russia.

Russia’s modern defense ties to China go back to the 1920s. when the new Communist regime in Moscow initially supported the Kuomintang, rather than Mao’s forces, during the Chinese civil war and in the battle against imperial Japan. But Stalin eventually came to back the Chinese Communist Party, handing over Manchuria and its heavy industry in 1945, then supplying economic aid and helping to establish the nascent People’s Republic of China’s civilian and defense manufacturing sector. During this period, the USSR willingly transferred various military technologies to the PRC, including systems that China eventually recast into the J-5 and the J-6 fighter aircraft, as well as the H-6 bomber. This was not merely an expression of goodwill; by allowing an ally to copy their designs, the USSR was able to not only arm a close partner without stressing its own manufacturing, but also rely on them for a supply of materiel to other client states, such as during the Korean War.

Their strategic partnership frayed as the Cold War continued, yet swathes of China’s defense industry, from missiles and radar to warships, have been heavily influenced by equivalent Soviet and then Russian models. Some of these models were licensed directly from Russian defense conglomerates; others were either stolen or legitimately purchased and then reverse-engineered.


In the post-Soviet era, even as Russian firms showed more concern about corporate espionage and technological theft, cooperation between the two countries’ defense industries surged again. This is not just a reflection of their increasingly close ties, but also because defense technology is a rare area where Russian products remained globally competitive and better than their Chinese counterparts. But Moscow increasingly grew caught in a dilemma of immediate sales versus long term loss. It has consistently taken the short view, continuing its arms sales to China, even if it knows that its eastern partner is likely to copy these products and erode its advantage. This policy dilemma has been compounded by the post-Ukraine effect on Russia’s economy, which has left the Russian economy increasingly reliant on China, further decreasing any remaining leverage in the relationship.

Aviation and air defense show this in action.

The J-11, debuted in 1996, was the first Chinese aircraft made after the fall of the Soviet Union to feature significant Russian input. It began as an officially licensed, Chinese-made copy of the Russian Su-27 multirole fighter, a sale welcomed by the cash-strapped Kremlin. However, before long, China canceled the agreement and began producing the aircraft independently, going on to build over 400 of them—a loss to Russia of roughly $30 million or more in sales per plane.

This appears to have become standard operating procedure for China. For example, when Beijing was looking to upgrade the J-11D, it decided the best method was to purchase Russia’s advanced Su-35 multirole fighter. The deal was completed in 2018 and conspicuously included numerous spare turbofan engines. China then reverse-engineered the engine, shoring up a broader area of continued weakness in its indigenous arms industry. An even more accelerated version of this process played out with Russia’s Su-33 carrier-based fighter. China obtained an early version and began producing an unlicensed indigenous version, the J-15.

Similarly, China’s defense industry has bought, copied, and adapted Russian-made air and missile defense systems, apparently with Russian acquiescence. Six years after acquiring Russia’s S-300, China produced its own copy, the HQ-9, which still serves as one of the PLA’s primary surface-to-air missile systems. Likewise, the Chinese HQ-16 missile system was copied from the Russia Buk-M1-2 but appears to have been made in full collaboration with the Russian Almaz-Antey Corporation. This trend continues with even the most advanced systems, as China purchased the state-of-the-art S-400 in 2014, began testing in 2018, and appears to be currently using the system to improve its own designs.

If Russian officials are unhappy with China slowly absorbing more and more of its defense market, they have remained low-key about it. Aware of its limited options, Russia has tried to make the best of the situation, promoting official licensing and tech-transfer deals. While many of these licensing and technology-sharing agreements respond to China’s earlier technology thefts, they are also reflect Russia’s increasing international isolation. As far back as 2019, a representative from Rostec implied that U.S. pressure was harming its arms business with Turkey. In October 2021, just four months before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Rostec announced it would pull away from conducting dollar transactions and maintain strong business ties with East Asia. Last year, Rostec announced a full decoupling from Western countries in the aerospace field. Chinese firms have been more than happy to try to step into this void.

This dependency has now turned from markets to military hardware itself. The perfect storm of Western sanctions and severed business and political ties have severely curtailed Russia’s options in supplying its own forces, especially as the war consumes far more parts than expected. China’s practice of purchasing Russian modeled weapons, largely for acquiring the technology to make itself, though, means China now has a large reserve of military hardware it can supply to Russia’s flagging war effort.

In February, the Chinese firm AVIC International delivered $1.2 million in parts for Russia’s Su-35 fighter, which China began operating in 2018 and has been studying for its own fighter development. The PLA Air Force has also used a subsidiary to deliver critical components for Russia’s S-400 missile defense system. The deliveries also included navigation equipment for the Russian Mi1-71 helicopters, for which China now runs a maintenance center. In new technology areas, China has provided at least $12 million in drones and drone parts since the war began.

As the war goes on, Russia will likely need even more of China’s military industrial capacity to keep elements of the Russian war machine on its feet. Russia faces massive sanctions from the international community, and its defense industry is being forced to source critical components through elaborate third-party arrangements, and even electronics cannibalized from washing machines and refrigerators. Their changing ambitions were recently summed up by Russia's Kommersant newspaper: "Technological sovereignty for the Russian Federation and China means two different things. China has set itself the task of producing the entire range of key products and possessing all key technologies as the global leader. For Russia...it is about the possession of a minimum set of technologies that would allow it to compete with the West and not lag behind in development."

Under these conditions, China has even more leverage in a relationship that was already tilting its way. The accelerated loss of one of Russia’s few competitive edges against China and in the global market is among the many costs of Putin’s war. As Russia’s defense industry collapses, Chinese firms are moving to the fore in supplying not just the PLA, but also foreign markets that Russia once sold arms to, and even now to the Russian military itself.

The new China-Russia defense industrial relationship can best be summed as beneficial to both parties, but one in which China ultimately benefits far more. 

Thomas Corbett is a research analyst with BluePath Labs. His areas of focus include Chinese foreign relations, emerging technology, and Indo-Pacific security studies

[Crafty_Dog]

This thread has been dormant for a goodly while, but maybe it is time to bring it back into circulation

By: Geopolitical Futures
Snap drills. Russia’s entire Pacific Fleet was put on high alert on Friday for snap drills in the Far East region. Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said the exercises were necessary “to work out methods of action to prevent the deployment of enemy forces in the operationally important region of the Pacific Ocean.” Kremlin press secretary Dmitry Peskov called the surprise check a “usual practice.” Meanwhile, China announced that its defense minister will visit Russia from April 16-18 for talks with Shoigu. The growing collaboration between the two countries is causing concern in the West, especially after the Chinese military announced last month its readiness to cooperate with Russia.

[Crafty_Dog]

By: Geopolitical Futures
Different takeaways. The defense ministers of China and Russia met on Tuesday and pledged to support each other’s core interests. They also said their military academies, branches and theater commands will work together more closely in the future. Russian media added that the countries plan to expand military trade, but this was absent from Chinese reports, which said only that the two sides intend to continue high-level communication. Russian media also said Sino-Russian military ties were “outperforming” their Cold War-era cooperation, while Chinese media emphasized that their relationship was not targeted at any third party.

[Crafty_Dog]

China Conducts Reforms to Streamline Combat Readiness, Explores Military - AI Fusion with Russia
China has sped up its mobilization reforms in Fujian province by combining the military-civil fusion office with the mobilization office. This change is part of an effort to better integrate military and civilian resources, aiming to enhance combat readiness. The move aligns with China's strategy to improve coordination between military and civilian sectors, following President Xi Jinping's directive to reform the national defense mobilization system. This system includes the political, economic, and defense resources necessary for deployment in times of war or security threats.

After the Communist Party Congress in October 2022, provinces like Fujian, starting in December of that year, set up defense mobilization departments. A significant shift with these reforms is that provincial leaders now manage tasks that were once the responsibility of local military districts. This adjustment is intended to make it easier for provincial governments to orchestrate the efforts of various administrative departments in mobilization tasks.

Activities supporting these reforms have included:

Over 1,200 national defense training events in Xiamen, Fujian Province, with participation from more than 860,000 people.

Joint training exercises in Luan City, Anhui Province, involving civilian units for water/energy supply and rescue services, along with psychological counseling.

The transformation of a residential area into a “mobilization village” in Shijiazhuang, Hebei Province, complete with emergency signs and information on air defense and bomb shelter locations.

Local government officials throughout China have also increased interactions with the military, in response to Xi Jinping's call for advanced defense development. This includes visits by leaders from the Communist Parties of Fujian, Anhui, and Jiangxi provinces to the PLA Eastern Command, which oversees the Taiwan Strait and the East China Sea.


In seperate reporting, Beijing held Russian-Chinese consultations on the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in the military. The discussions focused on exchanging views and coordinating actions on the use of AI in military applications, especially regarding lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS). The talks highlighted the shared perspectives of Russia and China on this issue, emphasizing the importance of continued cooperation both in bilateral settings and international forums.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/china-s-quiet-push-into-russia-s-far-east-puts-putin-in-a-pickle/ar-BB1kXvG2?ocid=msedgntp&pc=HCTS&cvid=3c9ec92753d24cbfa9c70db58ba94d48&ei=9

[Crafty_Dog]

https://cdrsalamander.substack.com/p/russia-with-chinese-characteristics?utm_source=substack&publication_id=247761&post_id=147960262&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&utm_campaign=email-share&triggerShare=true&isFreemail=true&r=z2120&triedRedirect=true