Russia-Turkey, Georgia, Caucuses, Central Asia

[Crafty_Dog]

I claim considerable prescience here!   

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December 16, 2022
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Turkmenistan Targets the European Gas Market
New pipeline infrastructure must be built first.
By: Geopolitical Futures
Turkmenistan Gas Market
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Since Russia invaded Ukraine, Europe has announced its intent to diversify its gas supplies away from Russia. Sensing an opportunity, Turkey is angling to become a natural gas hub and alternative supply route to the European Union from resource-rich countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia. During a trilateral summit on Dec. 14 involving Azerbaijan, Turkey and Turkmenistan, Ankara announced its intention to carry Turkmen gas west through the Caspian Sea.

Since gaining independence, Turkmenistan has strived for neutrality, relying on its huge natural gas reserves. It has sought new export markets for years, and the drop in Russian supplies to Europe is a clear opening. However, new infrastructure must be built first, meaning a solution is far off. Additionally, the Kremlin does not take kindly to competition in the post-Soviet space and, as an important trading partner for Turkmenistan, Moscow has some leverage.

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Daily Memo: Perceptions of Iran and Israel
A new poll sheds light on attitudes in the Caucasus about the two Middle Eastern states.
By: Geopolitical Futures
Attitudes in Azerbaijan. In a recent poll on attitudes toward Iran and Israel conducted by Azerbaijan’s Center for Social Research, 67 percent of respondents in Azerbaijan supported their president’s statement that the country would do everything to protect ethnic Azeris in Iran. Meanwhile, some 61 percent of respondents called Israel a reliable partner and had positive feelings about the opening of an embassy in Israel. Israel’s ambassador to Azerbaijan said on Thursday that countries like Azerbaijan, Turkey and Israel should form a united bloc against Iran.

[Crafty_Dog]

Issues that I flagged years ago.
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December 19, 2022
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Uzbekistan’s Virtue of Patience
Appearing to choose sides in the Ukraine conflict, even if it makes economic sense, is a nonstarter.
By: Ekaterina Zolotova

Uzbekistan is rich in recoverable hydrocarbons. Natural gas reserves alone are estimated to be close to 2 trillion cubic meters. Oil and gas account for about 16 percent of the country’s gross domestic product and about 20 percent of budget revenue. And although China is its biggest customer, Uzbekistan has been known to ship gas to the West too, using pipelines that traverse Russia and Kazakhstan.

It’s understandable, then, why Russia and Kazakhstan, whose leaders recently met to discuss the creation of a gas union in Central Asia, would want Uzbekistan in their club. But the government in Tashkent isn’t so sure, reportedly saying it would never agree to political conditions in exchange for gas – a not-so-veiled reference to the war in Ukraine. Still, the economic reality in the country demands cooperation with neighbors, even if formal “membership” in a union is a bridge too far.


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Despite its large reserves, Uzbekistan has turned into a net hydrocarbons importer. It is the most populous country in Central Asia, and though its urban population as a percentage of the total population is lower than others, it boasts the region’s most densely populated area in the Fergana Valley. It also has a comparatively well-developed industrial complex, one that is expected to pick back up quickly to offset the economic damages of the COVID-19 pandemic. The war in Ukraine, and the Russian sanctions that followed, have made Central Asian industry, with its cheap labor and proximity to Russian and European markets, more attractive. Some European companies are considering relocating to Uzbekistan, while others are thinking about investing in existing facilities there.

Put simply, the country consumes a lot of energy, and there’s only so much it can do to goose production. Pipelines and other infrastructure are in various states of disrepair, sometimes leading to significant losses. Hydropower is problematic because there isn’t that much water in the country, and constructing nuclear plants is expensive and time-consuming. Roughly 90 percent of Uzbekistan’s electricity is produced by thermal power plants, but they run on natural gas. This has cut into government revenue from gas exports, which are three times lower in 2022 than they were in 2021, and has made it more difficult for the country to honor its electricity export contracts. Cold weather, meanwhile, has led to shortages in both electricity and heating.

The government in Tashkent is thus looking for ways to replenish its coffers and strengthen its export positions, all while finding more sources of gas for consumption. Cooperating with other gas exporters seems like a natural solution, especially considering Uzbekistan is a landlocked country that can’t afford to invest in new projects or offer competitive pricing.

Under the circumstances, Uzbekistan is interested in receiving and exporting additional gas or becoming a transit hub, and Russia is a natural fit. Uzbekistan would get access to a ton of surplus gas, while Russia would increase its power in areas it considers its traditional sphere of influence, all while increasing deliveries to China (via Central Asian markets). This kind of potential leverage could be enough to get Russia to negotiate its prices. Moreover, there is already a system of gas pipelines in place that passes from Turkmenistan through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to Russia, where the throughput capacity of Uzbekistan’s gas transmission system is 55 billion cubic meters per year. This gives Tashkent even more opportunities to extract transit fees on gas going to Europe and China.

Indeed, this would be in keeping with broader economic cooperation. Russia is a key partner on trade, investment and remittances. Still, Uzbekistan is hesitant to formally join a gas union for a couple of reasons. The first is the issue of neutrality; Uzbekistan gained independence after the fall of the Soviet Union, and it is hypersensitive about maintaining sovereignty. That’s why, for example, the government has halted gas exports. It would rather provide for its citizens itself, even at the expense of the bottom line, than be beholden to someone else. That’s also why it has intensified negotiations with other countries on additional purchases of natural gas, electricity, coal and fuel oil, and why it has banned the use of gas-fired vehicles until next March.

The second (and related reason) is that trade ties and diversification are essential for maintaining independence. Central Asia is marked by a fairly high presence of foreign capital. The gas sector alone is serviced by a state-owned Uzbek company, Russia’s Lukoil, Uzbekneftegaz (with the participation of some Korean companies), Epsilon Development Company, Natural Gas-Stream and New Silk Road Oil and Gas, which are important investors and exporters of technology. There is growing interest – economic and geostrategic – from the United States and the European Union, which often meet with the leaders of the Central Asian countries. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken recently met with Uzbekistan’s foreign minister on the sidelines of the U.S.-Uzbekistan Strategic Partnership Dialogue, while German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock said her recent meeting with Uzbek officials signaled expanding cooperation with Uzbekistan. And this is in addition to, not at the expense of, more traditional partners like Russia and China. Representatives of Beijing recently went to Uzbekistan to discuss the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, and Russia is always looking for new points of contact. Tashkent prefers this kind of state of affairs in ordinary times, but it has even more reason to be cautious about Russia now, lest it run afoul of Western sanctions or be seen as too cozy with an increasingly alienated Russia. That could be deadly for Uzbekistan’s economy.

Perhaps the best option for Uzbekistan would be to join a transit zone in which it receives additional payments for the distillation of gas to large Chinese or European markets, where gas consumption is rising, and then redirect its own production to domestic needs. That would solve the problem of internal shortages and even rake in a few dollars. But Uzbekistan’s cautious foreign policy hovers over all. Hence why its statement about not wanting to join Russia and Kazakhstan should be seen not as an outright refusal but as an attempt to signal that it has no political designs of its own and to shield a future arrangement from sanctions. Either way, Uzbekistan will characteristically take its time. It’s in no more a hurry to join a gas union than it is to open, say, branches of European companies within its borders. In the short term, Tashkent seems content to suffer a relatively tight economy while holding out hope that it can meet its gas needs through one-on-one cooperation with its gas-rich neighbors. The other option – choosing sides or appearing to choose sides in the Ukraine conflict – is a nonstarter. It will simply wait for things to die down.

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Electricity for Europe. Azerbaijan, Hungary, Georgia and Romania signed a deal on Saturday to build an underwater electric cable that will help bring green electricity from Azerbaijan to Europe. The project, which is expected to be concluded in three to four years, aims to reduce Europe’s energy dependence on Russia.

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Shifting stance. Kazakhstan, a close ally of Moscow that has so far refused to openly support Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, voted against a U.N. resolution to condemn Moscow’s actions there and demand its withdrawal. This marks the first time the Central Asian country, which did not recognize Russia’s annexation of four Ukrainian regions earlier this year, has taken such a stance in Moscow’s favor since the beginning of the conflict.

Uzbek first. Uzbekistan says it sent a container train to Europe along the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route last week for the first time. The train passed through Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Georgia to reach its final destination in the Bulgarian port of Burgas. Traffic along the corridor, developed as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, has increased since the beginning of the year.

[Crafty_Dog]

January 9, 2023
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Why Tajikistan Is Headed Toward Instability
The Taliban will actively try to destabilize things north of the border.
By: Kamran Bokhari

On Dec. 27, the Islamic State’s franchise in Afghanistan claimed responsibility for an attack that killed the highest-ranking Taliban security official in Badakhshan province, located on the border of Tajikistan. It was merely the latest incident in a series of accelerated attacks by the Islamic State since the Taliban retook control of the country.

It is especially concerning for Tajikistan, which is the most vulnerable of Afghanistan’s neighbors to cross-border instability. It’s little surprise, then, that in sharp contrast with the more pragmatic approaches of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan (as well as Russia), Tajikistan has adopted a confrontational attitude toward the Taliban regime. The governments in Tashkent and Ashgabat along with the Kremlin have, for example, relied on the Taliban to keep the Islamic State from spreading into their respective territories. They figure that the Taliban, which is a nationalist jihadist group bent on creating an emirate limited to Afghanistan, is a natural counterweight to the more transnational ambitions of the Islamic State. Tajikistan shares this concern but, because of its historical and geopolitical connections, considers the Taliban a more immediate danger.

Cross-border Tensions

The influence of Afghanistan’s Pashtun minorities on Pakistan is well documented – and for good reason. Pakistan shares a 1,640-mile (2,640-kilometer) border with Afghanistan, and ethnic Pashtuns make up about 42 percent of all Afghans and 18 percent of all Pakistanis, most of whom live on either side of the internationally recognized border between the two.


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The situation is similar with regard to Tajikistan, if only on a somewhat smaller scale. Ethnic Tajiks form Afghanistan’s second-largest ethnic group (27 percent) and most of them inhabit the country’s northern regions bordering Tajikistan, where Tajiks account for 84 percent of the population. The Tajik language is a variant of Dari, which binds together the various Afghan ethnicities.

The Russian Empire and, later, the Soviet Union created barriers that prevented the natural commingling of cultural and linguistic influences in borderlands such as these, but those began to erode during Moscow’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Tajikistan was the main launchpad for the deployment of Soviet forces. Moscow relied on its own ethnic Tajik citizens who, thanks to their ethnolinguistic connections to Afghanistan, helped it understand Afghan society and culture. Many served in the Soviet armed forces, of course, but many others adopted civilian roles as interpreters, advisers and technical experts to try to help Moscow improve the standing of the communist regime in Kabul among the broader Afghan population.

But all the while, Afghans were also influencing Soviet Tajiks, who found an opportunity to reconnect with their shared Persianate heritage. The experience helped them not just enhance their language skills but also revive their religious and ethno-nationalist identity, which had long been contained under Russian and Soviet rule. This was taking place at the same time that Mikhail Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika reforms were creating the conditions for Tajikistan and other former Soviet republics to declare independence. The Tajikistani veterans of the Soviet war in Afghanistan played a role in the national and religious revival both in the lead-up to independence and afterward.

When Tajikistan declared independence in September 1991, Afghan Islamist insurgent groups were trying to topple the communist regime in Kabul. One of the most powerful factions was Jamiat-e-Islami, an ethnic Tajik Islamist group led by former Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani and former military commander and Defense Minister Ahmad Shah Massoud. This group would have a significant impact on Tajikistan’s domestic political scene and the country’s relations with Afghanistan. Within three weeks of the collapse of Afghanistan’s communist regime in April 1992, Tajikistan plunged into a civil war that raged for five years.

Two simultaneous conflicts thus emerged. In Afghanistan, after the collapse of the communist regime, opposing factions unable to reach a power-sharing arrangement began to fight each other in a chaotic intra-Islamist war from which the Taliban would eventually emerge victorious. In Tajikistan, protests against the newly independent state dominated by former Soviet elites quickly descended into a full-scale civil war. The opposition consisted of democratic and Islamist factions hailing largely from the highland regions of the center and southeast, while pro-government factions comprised the lowland areas in the north and southwestern parts of the country.

Southern Tajikistan and northern Afghanistan essentially became a contiguous battlespace. Which makes sense – historically, these two regions were effectively the same area, as evidenced by the fact that large parts of territory on both sides of the border are called Badakhshan. Afghanistan’s Badakhshan province was a stronghold of the Tajik-dominated Jamiat-e-Islami, which was embroiled in a conflict between anti-Soviet guerilla factions for control following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Since the fighting was taking place in Kabul, Jamiat-e-Islami could participate in the power struggle at home and help its allies in Tajikistan fight their own government. It offered sanctuary, weapons, supplies and training to the Tajikistani opposition, and there is even evidence that Afghan veterans of the war against the Soviets participated in Tajikistan’s civil war. (It helped that Jamiat-e-Islami’s senior leaders likewise occupied civil and military spots in the rump state in Kabul.)

Decline of the Afghan Tajiks

1994 would prove a significant year for both countries. In Afghanistan, the Taliban emerged on the scene, and in just two years, it would topple the fragile Jamiat-e-Islami-led government. (Jamiat-e-Islami would then retreat and band together with various other groups to form the Northern Alliance.) Meanwhile, in Tajikistan, the government – led by President Emomali Rahmon, who occupies the office still today – had begun to gain the upper hand in the war against what had become the United Tajik Opposition alliance.

With the Rahmon government in Dushanbe pushing UTO southward, and with the Taliban driving the Northern Alliance northward, the cross-border battlespace began to shrink, leading to a realignment in an area where ethnicity trumped ideology and accelerating negotiations between the government and the UTO. The Afghan Tajik movement’s priority was to defend itself against the Taliban, and it could no longer help the UTO. In fact, Jamiat-e-Islami actually facilitated the peace talks between UTO and the government in Tajikistan – which helped end the conflict there.

Jamiat-e-Islami, which was losing territory to the Taliban, was forced to rely on Dushanbe and Moscow. (It was an ironic turn of events; the group went from fighting the Russians in the 1980s to being clients of them in the 1990s.) Once again, Tajikistan became the springboard for military operations in Afghanistan, only this time it was a Russian-backed Islamist faction fighting a rival and much more hardline Islamist opponent. Even so, by the early 2000s, it seemed that the Taliban were well on their way to consolidating power in Afghanistan, particularly with al-Qaida assassinating Massoud on Sept. 9, 2001.

Two days later, the 9/11 attacks took place, which would change the cross-border landscape again. The U.S. operation to remove the Taliban regime shifted the battlespace well south of the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border. For the next two decades, the American intervention, along with the fact that Afghanistan’s ethnic Tajiks were in dominant positions in the Western-backed Islamic Republic of Afghanistan regime, insulated not just Tajikistan but the broader Central Asian region from the ravages of the subsequent Taliban insurgency. The Taliban knew that the mainstay of the opposition to them was ethnic Tajiks in the north.

After all, the Tajik-majority northern region is where the Taliban faced resistance for years after taking control in 1996 and was the launchpad of the ground offensive that toppled the regime in late 2001. The Taliban also understood the cross-border ethnic Tajik phenomenon and the critical role Tajikistan played as a strategic rear guard for their enemies. They knew that it was only a matter of time before the Americans would withdraw from the country and give them the opportunity to retake Kabul. But what they did not want was to return to a situation where the Tajiks and their allies in the north would be a constant threat.

Looking Ahead

For this reason, the Taliban began expanding their insurgency in the north, taking advantage of the public dissatisfaction with warlordism, factionalism and corruption that had emerged among the old Afghan Tajik elite during the U.S. military presence, especially after the Taliban assassinated Rabbani in 2011. The broader infighting within the internationally backed Afghan state after the 2014 elections only helped the Taliban more. By mid-2016, five years before they retook the country, the Taliban had already gained significant ground in 12 of the 22 provinces of Badakhshan, among other areas in the north. This was an unprecedented development; for the first time, the Taliban had been able to penetrate the region of their historic rivals.

And so, when in the summer of 2021 the Taliban seized Kabul, they did so only after first taking most of the north. Unlike when they took power in 1996, this time they eliminated the possibility of major resistance from the Tajiks. Consequently, they deprived Tajikistan of the buffer that had long existed between Tajikistan and the Taliban-controlled southern and eastern parts of Afghanistan. More important, the Taliban are in a position to leverage the trans-border ethno-linguistic demographics to undermine the Tajikistani government.

Hence the hardline stance Dushanbe has adopted toward the Taliban. Rahmon, who has led the country for almost 30 years, has personally witnessed the geopolitical ebb and flow between his country and Afghanistan since the Soviet era. This emerging threat on the southern flank comes at the worst possible time as the Rahmon government faces growing economic difficulties and sees the weakening of longtime ally Russia.

The Taliban’s stance toward Tajikistan is similar to its attitude toward Pakistan. It may not be seeking to act against either neighbor, but trans-border dynamics are such that the Taliban cannot secure their regime without buffer zones. In the case of Pakistan, they don’t have much to worry about; Islamabad is somewhere between ambivalent and sympathetic toward the new government in Kabul. However, Tajikistan’s opposition to the Taliban regime means that they will actively try to undermine security north of the border. Tajikistan is thus headed for instability, which has the potential to spread to neighboring Uzbekistan and the wider region.

[Crafty_Dog]

Energy in Central Asia. Kyrgyzstan signed a memorandum of understanding with the China National Heavy Machinery Corp. on the construction of a 21-megawatt hydropower plant in Kyrgyzstan. Less than a year ago, the country signed another agreement with a Chinese state-owned company for the construction of a 500-megawatt hydropower plant. Water supplies remain a concern for such projects in Central Asia, but countries outside the region have shown interest in investing, to the irritation of Moscow, which considers Central Asia part of its sphere of influence.

Disruption. Uzbekistan’s Energy Ministry says providers are having trouble servicing some customers amid rising demand for electricity and natural gas due to cold weather. It noted a disruption in supplies from Turkmenistan on Jan. 12 stemming from abnormally cold weather that led to a complete halt in gas imports and a 20 percent drop in electricity imports. In December, Turkmenistan agreed to supply Uzbekistan with an additional 20 million cubic meters of gas per day, part of Uzbek efforts to procure energy outside of Russia. Moscow had proposed creating a gas union with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, but Tashkent rebuffed the idea over fears of incurring Western secondary sanctions.

[Crafty_Dog]

Turkish mediation. Russian President Vladimir Putin held a call on Monday with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. They spoke again about creating a regional gas hub in Turkey using Russian natural gas supplies. Meanwhile, Ankara is mediating talks between Russia and Ukraine on another prisoner exchange of up to 1,000 people, according to Turkey’s chief ombudsman. Ankara is trying to establish itself as the top broker in the conflict.

Bypassing Russia. Kazakh company KazMunayGas and the Abu Dhabi Port Group signed an agreement on a strategic partnership during Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s visit to the United Arab Emirates. Under the deal, Kazakhstan and the UAE will create a merchant and tanker fleet to export Kazakh oil through the port of Aktau, bypassing Russia. Kazakhstan has been looking for alternate routes to export its goods, fearing it could incur secondary sanctions by doing business with Russia.

Armenia looks on. Turkey and eight other countries began joint military exercises in Kars, Turkey, near the Armenian border. Among the participating countries is Azerbaijan, with which Yerevan is in talks on a settlement to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

[Crafty_Dog]

March 13, 2023
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Capitalizing on the South Caucasus
Neither Washington nor Russia is directly stoking regional unrest, but both can benefit from it.
By: Allison Fedirka
As war continues to rage in Ukraine, the wider conflict between Russia and the West is opening new fronts, ones that won’t see actual battle but are nonetheless useful for gaining influence at the other’s expense. One such front is the South Caucasus, which is essential to Russia’s tactical and strategic objectives in Ukraine and is thus a potential distraction for the United States, which would much rather focus on Eastern Europe.

This isn’t exactly a new development; the war implicated countless nations outside Ukraine the minute it began, particularly economically. The U.S. quarterbacked an aggressive sanctions campaign against Moscow, which set up parallel systems to circumvent it. Similarly, Russia and the U.S. have both developed any number of political and security measures to inflict pressure on each other outside Ukraine. Moscow, for example, sent a naval vessel to the Caribbean and conducted high-profile political meetings, replete with political agreements, with Caribbean nations like Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua. The U.S. initially sent various delegations to improve economic and security ties in Central Asia, which Russia considers its traditional sphere of influence. In neither case did one side go so far as to elicit a direct response from the other.

But the recent activity in the South Caucasus is a little different. Before it invaded Ukraine in 2022, Moscow made a concerted effort to secure its control of the South Caucasus ostensibly to help stabilize the region. In truth, Russia put itself in a position to control a series of frozen conflicts and flashpoints in the region so that it could stabilize or destabilize a country at will. And now that domestic unrest has emerged in the South Caucasus more or less independently of the war in Ukraine, Moscow is poised to take advantage of the situation to its own benefit.

Georgia

On March 7, protesters flooded the streets of Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia, in objection to parliament passing legislation in the first reading that would require nongovernmental and civil society groups to register as having foreign support if they receive 20 percent or more of their funding from abroad. After two days of demonstrations, the ruling Georgian Dream party, the bill’s primary supporter, withdrew its support. The parliament formally rejected the law on March 10, and though it can be revived in 30 days if changes are made to the initial draft, it’s likely dead in the water.

Disputed Regions in Georgia
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At the heart of the matter is Georgia’s foreign alignments. The bill’s supporters (and Russian media) compared it to lobbying legislation in the U.S. that seeks only to boost transparency. There are notable differences that these advocates overlook, but the bottom line is that it would have allowed the Georgian government to control the funds that enter the country from abroad. It’s no secret that the U.S. government and associated aid groups give upward of $50 million per year to Georgian NGOs and civil society groups that are active in local politics and to even political parties. (Washington said it would have to reconsider funding if the legislation were passed.)

Protesters saw the bill as an expression of Russian influence. They argued it too closely resembled a similar Russian law from more than a decade ago that was used to suppress political opposition against the Kremlin. European and U.S. officials publicly supported the protesters, and because more than 80 percent of the Georgian population supports EU/Western ties, protests like these blur the line between the airing of a certain domestic grievance and a broader referendum on foreign policy preferences.

It’s unclear whether the protests in Tbilisi will continue. Demonstrators returned to the streets on March 8, after the government announced its plans to backpedal on the legislation and vowed to press on until the bill was officially repealed – which it was on March 10. Still, citizens will likely remain concerned until they are certain the bill can’t be resurrected. There is also the possibility that protests are being orchestrated by outside actors, in which case they may continue under the guise of pro-Europe/anti-Russia protests.

Armenia-Azerbaijan

Then there is Armenia and Azerbaijan. Broadly speaking, Armenia is aligned with Russia, while Azerbaijan maintains stronger ties to the West. But lately, Armenia has been unhappy with the status quo. It wants Russia to take a tougher stance against Azerbaijan, especially with regard to the Lachin corridor in Nagorno-Karabakh, over which the two recently fought a war. Moscow demurred, so Armenia criticized Russia – albeit indirectly, through comments made against the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization’s handling of the issue. It also recently submitted a proposal refusing to appoint a deputy secretary-general to the group and has started to ban certain Russian journalists and media managers from entering the country. However, in early March Russia and Armenia conducted joint air drills involving troops and aircraft from Russia’s air base in Armenia – a notable reminder that cooperation is in each other’s interests.

Nagorno-Karabakh
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But the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict hasn’t gone away. On March 5, fighting broke out between Azerbaijani troops and ethnic Armenian police officers. Two days later, Armenian separatists reportedly blocked a Russian military base in the Khojaly airport. The protesters questioned Russian peacekeeping troops’ capabilities to unblock the road near the city of Shushi and keep the peace in general. They also accused the Russian military of profiting off the food and fuel provided to local populations.

Meanwhile, Washington has been trying to make inroads in the region. Along with the EU, it continues to offer itself as an alternative to Russia for brokering and maintaining peace in Nagorno-Karabakh. On March 6, the U.S. secretary of state’s senior adviser for the Caucasus met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Washington. U.S. officials followed this meeting up with planned visits to Armenia and Georgia. Then on March 10, Azerbaijan’s defense minister received the chief of staff of NATO’s Allied Land Command, who discussed military cooperation and regional instability. The timing of this visit is no coincidence: It was meant to convey to Azerbaijan that it has options and that instability from Georgia need not spill over the border. It also encouraged Azerbaijan not to retaliate to the latest unrest.

The common thread tying all these events together in the South Caucasus is the push and pull between the U.S. and Russia. Geopolitically, the South Caucasus is a region Moscow cannot afford to ignore. It is less strategically imperative to the U.S., even though it provides access to the Black Sea and helps facilitate non-Russian energy exports to Europe. Neither is stoking unrest in the region, but both are trying to capitalize on it. For the West, that means containment and preventing any spillover effects. For Russia, it means using the opportunity to selectively control issues that could stabilize or destabilize the region as needed, even as it maintains a vital buffer zone to its south. The more restless the South Caucasus gets, the more of a problem it will be for Washington – which in turn serves Russian interests.

[Crafty_Dog]

April 3, 2023
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Kazakhstan: Democratization in an Era of Geopolitical Churn
Political reforms in the Central Asian giant will impact not just the region but, more importantly, Russia and China.
By: Kamran Bokhari

At a time of geopolitical uncertainty across Eurasia, Kazakhstan is undergoing a political evolution. The country’s transition away from authoritarianism is a rather unique case of a former Soviet state trying to balance between the conflicting imperatives of maintaining continuity and meeting demands for change. The outcome of its democratization experiment will have profound implications for Central Asia, a region that for centuries has been isolated from the West. More important, Russia and China will both be affected by its evolution.

I had the opportunity to travel to Kazakhstan a few weeks ago as part of an independent observer mission to witness early parliamentary polls on March 19. It was my second trip to the country in four months, having been present for the Nov. 20 snap presidential vote. I could bore you with the minutiae of the electoral process, but I won’t; you can get those details from the ample coverage available in open sources. Instead, I want to share the broader impressions that I walked away with – which will hopefully shed light on the direction in which the country is headed and what this means for a region struggling to untether itself from former liege Russia while it tries to resist China’s advances.

Background

First, a few words about the elections themselves and the broader political context. The turnout (a little over 53 percent) was quite low. This was likely due to voter fatigue given that this was the fifth electoral exercise since 2019 and the average Kazakh voter hasn’t seen many changes in that time. More important than the turnout was that, for the first time, independent candidates were allowed to run for office and two new political parties competed in the election.

The ruling Amanat party retained its majority in the 98-seat Majlis (lower house). Its margin of victory, however, was much lower than it was just two years ago (53.9 percent of the vote compared with 71 percent in 2021). The newly formed Respublica party – representing medium and small businesses – won nearly 9 percent and came in third place. Amanat will now have to work with five parties as well as 29 lawmakers elected as independents in the legislature.

Kazakhstan Parliamentary Results 2023
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Kazakhstan’s transition began when Kassym-Jomart Tokayev assumed the presidency in March 2019. Since gaining independence in 1991, Kazakhstan had been ruled by Nursultan Nazarbayev, who decided to step down after nearly three decades as head of state as he was approaching 80. However, Nazarbayev retained the chairmanship of the Security Council, allowing him to have oversight of government institutions even after he handed executive authority to Tokayev.

This arrangement broke down after unrest erupted in January 2022. Though the violence lasted only about 10 days, it was a wakeup call for the government. The unrest was a challenge particularly for Tokayev, who, though he was a senior government figure since the Soviet days, was still trying to find his bearing as president, especially while Nazarbayev still maintained some power. Evidence suggests that figures close to Nazarbayev tried to take advantage of the protests, which erupted over a major hike in fuel prices, to undermine Tokayev and help deplete his authority for their own gain.


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The wealth accumulated by Nazarbayev’s relatives and associates during his reign fueled the public ire. Tokayev was able to manage the crisis, in part by removing Nazarbayev as chairman of the Security Council, effectively sending him into retirement after he posted a video pledging his support to Tokayev. While the president was able to relatively quickly contain the friction within his government, he also had to address the much bigger challenge of broad public dissatisfaction with the country’s political and economic conditions. Tokayev thus embarked on a rather ambitious reform agenda.

By June, he held a referendum on constitutional amendments that changed a third of the national charter. The move brought an end to the super-presidential system of governance – which afforded greater powers to the presidency than parliament – creating more space for the public in the affairs of the state. In a speech to the nation in September, Tokayev unveiled several additional reforms, most notably limiting presidents to a single seven-year term. Until then, there was no limit to how many five-year terms a president could run for.

The Road Ahead

Presidential and parliamentary elections, held in November 2022 and March 2023 respectively, represented the culmination of Tokayev’s efforts to stabilize the country’s political system. But the road ahead will be long and challenging. We in the West tend to gauge democratic progress (or the lack thereof) by looking for evidence of more freedoms, the establishment of rule of law and upholding of human rights. It is a natural tendency given that these are cherished values in democratic systems, but we tend to forget that democratization is a long and messy process.

Each nation that embarks on this nonlinear path has a unique starting point that shapes the scope and scale of its transformation. For a country like Kazakhstan, which gained independence in 1991 and whose political transition began only four years ago, it is remarkable that it can hold well-organized elections, with little sign of systemic voter fraud. Our group toured 70 polling stations in Astana and the Almaty region on both trips. One of the things that stood out was the total absence of security forces. In many other countries that have had far greater experience with the democratic process, it’s common to see security forces deployed on voting day.

Especially in the age of social media, which allows for rapid mass mobilization, elites in historically autocratic polities are forced to strike a balance between maintaining regime stability and catering to demands for reform. In the case of Kazakhstan, I got a strong sense that its transformation is an organic development informed by an understanding that the country cannot realize its national imperatives without reforming the political system and giving the public greater involvement in the country’s governance.

The challenge with these types of reforms is achieving the right balance in terms of how the system is liberalized. The default approach is to limit the extent to which it’s opened up because allowing for too much change too quickly could destabilize the regime. On the other hand, there is also the need to gain public buy-in, which can be achieved only with substantive reforms. Considering that the country saw a major uprising just last year, its political establishment has embarked on what seems to be a substantive reform process, but one that it can manage.

Regional Implications

Unintended domestic consequences aren’t the only thing informing the cautious manner in which Kazakhstan is proceeding with reform. The changes are taking place in a perilous strategic environment. The future of Russia, with whom the country shares the world’s second-longest border, is mired in uncertainty, which could have serious implications for Kazakhstan’s stability and security. Meanwhile, its southern flank is highly vulnerable to the instability radiating out of Afghanistan. From the east, China is trying to fill the vacuum being slowly left by the Russians in Central Asia.

Central Asia
(click to enlarge)

In this context, Kazakhstan’s internal dynamics suggest that its transition will be bumpy, to say the least. The changes will also have an impact on other parts of Eurasia. There are implications for neighboring Uzbekistan, which is also in a transition of sorts and has a much larger population and fewer resources. That Uzbekistan borders each of the other three smaller Central Asian states means the region cannot remain immune to Kazakhstan’s transformation.

More broadly, a weakening Russia will have decreased influence in Kazakhstan. Moscow will have to contend with a major partner undergoing political reforms while it’s bogged down in Ukraine, a country at an advanced stage of the same phenomenon. Eventually, it will become very difficult for Russia to shield itself from the political reforms taking place around it.

Likewise, Kazakhstan’s political transformation is not in China’s interest. If it’s successful, it could block China’s efforts to expand its influence westward through Central Asia and the rest of Eurasia. In the worst case, political reforms in Kazakhstan and the region could create problems for Beijing’s attempts to manage the restive Uyghur minority in Xinjiang, sandwiched between China’s geopolitical core in the east and its intended sphere of influence well beyond its western periphery. Therefore, both the Russians and the Chinese will be trying to block political reforms in Kazakhstan, but by doing so, they risk creating the instability they fear.

[Crafty_Dog]

Caucasus in play. The U.S., meanwhile, is stepping up its involvement in Russia’s own backyard. In the past two weeks, four delegations of high-ranking U.S. officials have visited Armenia, ostensibly to discuss economic, energy and security matters. U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Erika Olson is currently in Armenia for talks on the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process. (On that subject, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said Yerevan was ready to recognize Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity within the borders of the former Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic, adding that mutual recognition of borders was the main condition for a peace treaty.) In addition, Azerbaijan’s foreign minister spoke by phone with Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Derek Hogan and met on Monday with U.S. State Department Senior Adviser on Caucasian Negotiations Louis Bono.

[Crafty_Dog]

Friendly with the neighbors. Israeli Foreign Minister Eli Cohen is in Azerbaijan for a meeting with President Ilham Aliyev. The two are expected to discuss regional security and trade. Cohen will next travel to Turkmenistan for the April 20 opening of Israel’s embassy. During the visit, he will also meet with Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov and Foreign Minister Rashit Meredov. With its latest diplomatic moves, Israel appears to be trying to improve ties with countries that neighbor Iran.

Market transition. Addressing the government, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev emphasized the need for his country to transition to a genuine market economy that focuses on satisfying the needs of its citizens. This shift is necessary due to the disruption in conventional economic and logistical connections, which have resulted in record inflation, a sluggish global economy and an increase in national debt. Tokayev also acknowledged the surge in gasoline and diesel prices and recommended that the funds raised from the increase be put toward new oil and gas initiatives. Meanwhile, some energy-sector workers, including former employees of Appak, a Kazakh-Japanese firm that is a subsidiary of Kazatomprom, the state-owned uranium and nuclear energy company, are still protesting their recent dismissal. The Kazakh government is apprehensive about the consequences and is seeking to grant the secret police additional powers to safeguard security. It is also contemplating extending the capabilities of the country's intelligence service to enable it to intervene in social disputes and take action in the event of a crisis

[ccp]

 

ya just can't get rid of these people and they will not simply go away:

https://www.cnbc.com/2023/05/28/turkeys-president-erdogan-seals-election-victory-to-enter-third-decade-in-power.html

we see this a lot .
this leader that leader is in political trouble and yet when the "election " comes out
they win.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/19726/china-russia-central-asia

[Crafty_Dog]

OPOLITICS
The Plight of Central Asian Migrants in Wartime Russia
14 MIN READAug 17, 2023 | 21:40 GMT


Editor's note: The primary author of this column, Kurtis Yan, is a summer fellow at RANE.

As its war in Ukraine rages on, Russia is finding itself in need of increased manpower to sustain a war with no clear end in sight. And to address this challenge, Moscow is increasingly turning to its growing population of Central Asian migrants.

Though estimates are difficult to discern due to frequent exit and reentry, at least 6 million migrants in Russia officially hail from Central Asia, with millions more likely working and residing in the country illegally. This large pool provides the Russian Armed Forces with an important source of infantry, as well as an influx of desperately needed workers in Russian-occupied territories in Ukraine. Many of these migrants already work in low-paying unskilled positions, making potential war service all the more attractive, given the lucrative financial compensation — and even suggestions of an expedited path to citizenship — offered to those willing to serve Russia in Ukraine.

But Russophilic and nationalist attitudes subject them to racism, xenophobia, and politicization that demeans them and their native countries. One would expect that Central Asian states would disapprove of their citizens being used as cannon fodder in Russia's war, as political punching bags for nationalist and populist voices, and that this would, at a minimum, harm Russia-Central Asia relations. On the contrary, however, a deeper look into the current state of migrant affairs reveals the drivers for Moscow and Central Asia to overcome these tensions over migration to maintain close ties.

The Role, Perception and Politicization of Central Asian Migrants in Russia
In Russian society, Central Asian migrants are often treated as second-class citizens. For instance, announcements for the sale or leasing of living space often ask that buyers be of ''Slavic appearance.'' A more concrete recent example was on July 20, when Sergei Mironov, the leader of Russia's pro-Putin ''A Just Russia - For Truth'' party, proposed a bill that would increase the cost of a work permit for migrants from 1,200 rubles (around $12) to 4,800 rubles (around $48). Mironov's justification dubiously claimed, without evidence, that migrant workers are paid too much, despite the majority of them working in very low-paying jobs; the explanatory note from the Duma, however, argued that migrants have issues adapting ''to Russian society,'' suggesting the goal of the legislation was to benefit politically from migrant-bashing rather than generate significant new revenues for the state. This form of political targeting has grown more prevalent in recent years, especially as the Russo-Ukrainian War continues shaping domestic politics and economics.

The roots of this discrimination can be traced back to the Soviet period. Soviet policy promoted discrimination against Central Asians as Moscow sought to Russify their countries and subjugate non-Slavic peoples to transmigration. For the ethnically Turkic peoples of Central Asia, much of the migration meant moving to an urban center within their respective country in an effort to find better work, but this has led to the loss of their traditional languages and cultures, as higher-paying employment opportunities and life in the more industrialized cities of Soviet Central Asia required knowledge of the Russian language. But even so, the Soviet government often prioritized ethnic Slavs for Communist Party memberships and better-paying posts. Shortly after the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the propiska migratory regulation system was abolished, which loosened restrictions on migration from more rural areas to larger cities and allowed for freer movement across the former empire. However, much like people migrating to the Russified capitals of their respective countries throughout the Soviet period, many migrants in the post-Soviet space now make the trek to Russia. Though years of forced Russification and Russian-language knowledge help them integrate and survive in Russia, it has always been challenging for Central Asian migrants to obtain the same quality of life as the average ethnic Russian.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Moscow has continued to promote discriminatory policies against Central Asian migrants and incite public distrust of them. High-ranking officials regularly allege that Central Asia is the gateway for Islamic radicalism into Russia. Russia's police also perpetuate this xenophobia: Migrants are viewed as easy targets for bribes and extortion. Torture and inhumane detainment are rampant, with numerous human rights cases tried over violations and systemic abuse in past years. Institutional tactics are working, as opinion polls show that most Russians favor crackdowns on Central Asian migration as well as increased deportation. As the Islamic and Central Asian share of Russia's population rises because of increased immigration and birth rates, nationalist figures are likely to increasingly bash Central Asian migrants for the alleged degradation of traditional Russian society.

At the same time, the Kremlin understands it can use Central Asian migrant flows to alleviate its own demographic crisis. Russia's population has steadily declined over the past two decades, a trend that will deepen in the coming years. Promises of citizenship can be a useful tool in reducing Russian labor shortages and filling labor in key sectors, particularly now as Russia's demographic issues worsen. Between 2022 and 2023, for example, the number of Tajik migrants who received Russian citizenship skyrocketed from 104,000 to 174,000.

At present, most migrants are male and come from the Central Asian states with lower-than-average wealth — Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan — in order to find new better-paying labor opportunities compared to those at home. The money made in Russia translates into remittance flows that help their families back in Central Asia. Migrants often come to Russia to fill positions in the construction and service sectors or other physical labor (partly because discrimination locks them out of certain jobs) and receive very low pay on average. Despite the low pay and overall harsh living conditions for immigrants, migrant flows from Central Asia have not faltered in recent years. Reasons for this include slower economic development and natural resource scarcity. Labor migration plays a further role in stymying local economic growth, as migrants make more money working in Russia as opposed to working at home, which ultimately perpetuates a cycle of over-dependence on remittances. Remittances comprise around a third of Kyrgyzstan's and Tajikistan's GDPs, making them some of the most dependent on remittances in the world, while over 10% of Uzbekistan's wealth comes from money flowing from Russia.

The Symbiotic Relationship Between Moscow and Central Asian Governments
Despite Russia's exploitative treatment of its citizens, Central Asian states generally maintain favorable relations with Russia. This is in part because the region's autocratic governments actually benefit from transferring a large portion of their labor force to Russia. The states that send the largest migrant flows have less developed infrastructure and struggle to alleviate poverty. By allowing their citizens to work in Russia, these states do not have to improve their local infrastructure, while their departure alleviates unemployment and stabilizes wages. Thus, Central Asian autocrats are less inclined to worry if high percentages of their respective GDPs are made up of remittances; as long as the local population does not put a strain on their local infrastructure, and there is less unemployment and downward pressure on wages, they can have fewer concerns regarding public dissatisfaction and instability. Relatedly, when Central Asian harmony is disrupted, Russia can be a useful tool to strengthen a grip on power and quell the masses, as shown during the January 2022 unrest in Kazakhstan.

For Russia, hosting such vast migrant numbers augments its leverage over its Central Asian partners to ensure that their governments do not act out of line with Moscow's interests. With Russia providing remittance opportunities, the disruption of migrant flows or any disruptions of key economic stability would rupture societal harmony and threaten the power of Central Asia's autocrats. Understanding this, Moscow uses its leverage to prevent Central Asia from leaving its sphere of influence and adopting a pro-Chinese, pro-Turkish or pro-Western platform. China, in particular, is likely to become an increasingly attractive location for Central Asian migrants due to its close physical proximity and aging population.

Additionally, the Kremlin has worked with Central Asian governments to reduce Central Asia's risk of being a gateway for Islamic radicals into Russia. Like Russia, Central Asian autocrats also fear the radicalization of their populations. As migrant flows can reduce the chances of economic dissatisfaction in Central Asia, the hope is that accepting such large numbers of migrants into Russia's more Christian and secular society can help reduce Islamic fundamentalist sentiments, which ultimately reduces the risk of radical Islamic terrorism returning to Central Asia. It's a fundamentally sound strategy, but potentially risky because it involves bringing large numbers of people to Russia, some of whom may have already been radicalized, and also because they may radicalize in response to the discrimination and xenophobia they encounter in Russia.

Central Asian Migrants on the Russian Homefront and in Ukraine
Since the start of the war in Ukraine, Central Asian migrants have been pressured to join the Russian army, with officials, politicians and regime commentators weaponizing citizenship and passportization to push the migrants to the front lines. Migrant centers are filled with Russian army recruiters and advertisements, and recruiters have even targeted mosques often frequented by Central Asian migrants. Given the sheer number of undocumented workers in Russia and the tedious length of the citizenship process, recruiters use promises of legalized status or expedited citizenship to convince migrants to join the Russian army by, for example, forcing them to choose between signing an enlistment contract or facing deportation. This also pertains to the Wagner Group, which has targeted Central Asian prisoners in Russia to join the private military company's efforts.

The growing number of Tajiks and other Central Asians living in Russia and receiving Russian residence (and even citizenship) provides the Kremlin with an expanded pool to draw potential soldiers from. Even Russian politicians who criticized Central Asian migrants for overloading Russia's infrastructure and taking jobs are now using the same rhetoric to criticize them for not joining their Russian counterparts on the front lines. On May 6, Duma Deputy Mikhail Matveev questioned where Russia's ''Tajik battalions'' were, advocating for compulsory military service for migrants aspiring for citizenship. He added that Russians are dying and being ''replaced'' by ''Asians'' at home. In a similar vein, on April 16, Investigative Committee Chair Aleksandr Bastrykin accused Central Asian migrants of increased murders, saying that ''while Russians are at the front, migrants are attacking our rear.'' This rhetoric may very well support the increased use of Central Asians in Ukraine as Moscow tries to avoid unpopular new mobilization efforts ahead of the March 2024 presidential election. As ''real'' Russians continue dying on the battlefield, efforts to send Central Asians to the front lines in greater quantities may sufficiently appease nationalist fervor and quell fears of new conscription.

But despite Russia's wartime conditions and intensified anti-migrant rhetoric, migrant flows from Central Asia have not fallen. 1.3 million migrants entered Russia in just the first quarter of 2023, with around half hailing from Uzbekistan. With the war causing a labor shortage in Russia, Central Asian migrants are seen as the source to fill the workforce gaps now more than ever. Russian companies have also sent migrant workers to occupied territories in Ukraine, in order to rebuild destroyed infrastructure and start new construction projects. Other migrants work in factories or even collect dead soldiers and bury them. Despite the dangers, these job prospects are considered more prosperous compared to opportunities in their home countries. Central Asian governments cannot do much to prevent these outflows, but they are attempting to crack down on migrants joining the war. Kazakhstan promised jail time for those who fight for either Russia or Ukraine, including those who sign financial contracts with Wagner Group. While Russian recruitment ads continue targeting Kazakhstan, many are unlikely to risk jail time. But in the near-to-medium term, these efforts will not override the drivers of continued migration because they are relatively halfhearted and only target those who want to leave Central Asia for the purpose of enlistment, as opposed to preventing migrants already in Russia from joining the army,

Moreover, there are already clear signs that Central Asians will continue to migrate to Russia and subsequently participate in Moscow's war efforts in Ukraine. Russia's Labor Ministry estimates the country will need 400,000 more migrant workers by 2030, on top of those already in the country. Currently, foreigners make up 4.2% of all workers employed by Russian companies. But according to the ministry's forecast, that number should increase to 4.7% over the next seven years. As migration continues and Russia's war recruitment intensifies, opportunities arise for bailiffs and creditors to impose exit bans and debt recovery claims that prevent foreign nationals from leaving at the expiration of their legal residence. Over 100,000 migrants are expected to become undocumented by 2024, with exit bans playing a large role in restricting migrant movement. Thus, debts are an important factor that could ultimately pressure more migrants into joining the Russian army or labor projects in Russian-occupied territories. Without legal status and the necessary income to pay off debts, Russian recruiters can capitalize on this and pressure migrants into wartime service.

Migrant Affairs on Regional Geopolitics Going Forward
In the coming months and years, two outstanding and interrelated factors will significantly influence regional geopolitics: The extent to which Moscow discourages migration flows and the extent to which it attempts to draw more Central Asians into participation in the Ukraine war.

The Kremlin's safest course of action is to maintain migrant flows to increasingly draw upon the existing pool of migrants for mobilization purposes, while also marginally limiting the growth of migration to avoid the subsequent backlash. It's a safe course of action because it helps Russia continue the Ukraine war without over-exposing the Kremlin to the socio-political consequences of growing Central Asian migration, as opposed to overly investing in their use in the war or limiting their entry into Russia to score political points from migrant bashing. Therefore, in the long run, Central Asian migrant affairs will likely hold at the status quo of large flows into Russia and moderate politicization within Russia. The Kremlin will look to balance nationalist fervor against Central Asian migration while enabling the potential of migrant populations as the next pool to draw manpower from. Though Central Asian countries have remained neutral in the war and looked to prevent their citizens from joining, it is more likely that Central Asians will continue fighting in the Russian army or working in Russian-occupied territory. For survival and stability, Central Asia's autocrats will continue to accept the racism and poor labor conditions their citizens face in Russia, so long as Russia remains an attractive source for remittance flows. The dependence on Russian employment opportunities is too great to risk rupturing.

But there are low-likelihood, high-impact alternatives to be aware of. For example, the Kremlin could cave into ultranationalist sentiments and drastically limit migration flows. This would not only severely harm Russia's economy, but it would also help bolster the Kremlin's popularity among a key constituency in the near term. For Central Asia, migrants returning to or being forced to stay in their home countries would lower wages, accentuate Central Asia's shortage of natural resources, and increase the chances of domestic instability. Central Asian leaders would warn Moscow that this move would damage their economies if not compensated for, and if Moscow proceeds, then regional leaders would turn to China, Turkey and the West to secure investment.

Alternatively, Moscow could drastically expand the mobilization of Central Asian migrants for labor and infantry in Ukraine while continuing to encourage migration flows from Central Asia. This would work to appease ultranationalists by sending the migrants to the front lines, with the expectation that many will die, and allowing ethnic Russians to avoid mobilization. However, Central Asian autocrats would also be dissatisfied with the clear funneling of their own citizens to the battlefield, which they have tried to restrict.

In any case, to some extent, Central Asians may themselves increasingly choose to work in places other than Russia. Particularly as the Russian Ruble continues to slide on global markets, they may find Russia an increasingly less attractive place from which to send home remittances. New opportunities are opening up for them in, for example, construction in South Korea and for agricultural work in the United Kingdom. But more likely, proximity and cheaper transport costs would motivate migrants to find alternative work in Turkey and China. Turkey already hosts hundreds of thousands of Central Asian migrants, particularly women, and pan-Turkic ties can augment Turkey's image for those seeking work. Likewise, higher-paying labor opportunities can encourage increased migration to China, which could provoke Moscow and increase Sino-Russian competition in Central Asia.

[Crafty_Dog]

August 23, 2023
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Water as a Barrier to Central Asia’s Rise
The region’s growing role could be hampered by a long-standing problem.
By: Ekaterina Zolotova
Amid growing Western pressure and changes throughout Eurasia, regions that were once considered on the Eurasian periphery are now gaining significance. Chief among them is Central Asia, a region that was historically considered part of Russia’s sphere of influence and is today emerging as a key territory connecting major players like Russia, Iran and China. But one critical issue is increasingly hampering the political ambitions of Central Asian countries: water.

Origins of the Problem

Central Asian states can be divided into two groups: water-rich countries (Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) and water-dependent countries (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan). Most water deposits in the region are formed by melting snow and glaciers from the mountains. The two main rivers that flow through the region, the Amu-Darya and Syr-Darya, provide water for domestic, agricultural and energy use.

Central Asian Waterways

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But these sources are proving increasingly insufficient. Central Asia has been facing a serious water deficit for several years for several reasons. The first is climate change, which is causing glaciers to melt faster than before, decreased snow cover in the Tian Shan and Pamir-Alay mountain ranges and declining water levels in lakes. Second, outdated infrastructure, including Soviet-era industrial facilities and water management systems, is leading to water loss. In Uzbekistan, for example, 40 percent of water loss is due to poor infrastructure. This second is the mounting tensions between the former Soviet states over how to manage resources. In the Soviet era, Moscow managed the irrigation system for the entire region. After gaining independence, Central Asian countries initially supported the idea of sharing water that flowed through transboundary rivers – which was reinforced by a number of regional agreements. But gradually they began to prioritize their own self-interests. Thus, when water-rich Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan experienced serious energy shortages, they sought to boost domestic production using water, which directly affected downstream countries. Their decisions to build hydroelectric power plants were met with anger in downstream states, which were concerned that such projects would deplete their own supplies.

Water Stress and Dependency | Central Asia

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The third problem is the increasing demand. According to U.N. estimates, the population of the region has grown by 50 percent since the 1990s (from 52 million to 78 million) and is expected to reach more than 100 million by 2050. Water is also needed for irrigation in the agricultural sector, which accounts for up to 15 percent of the Kyrgyz economy, 27 percent of the Tajik economy and up to 26 percent of the Uzbek economy. Hydroelectric power, which accounts for nearly 90 percent of energy in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, is also a growing consumer of water resources.

Meanwhile, the Qosh Tepa irrigation canal in northern Afghanistan is a concern for Central Asia. It aims to transform the country’s agricultural landscape but could cut off supplies from the Amu Darya River to Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, which could lose up to 15 percent of their flow from the river when the waterway is completed in 2028.

These factors explain why even upstream Kyrgyzstan is facing a shortage this year. On Aug. 1, Kyrgyz authorities declared a state of emergency in the energy sector that will run last until the end of 2026. Earlier this month, the country stopped supplying irrigation water to Kazakhstan due to declining supplies from the Kirov reservoir, which now receives only 1.3 cubic meters per second compared to 13.7 cubic meters per second in 2022. Kazakhstan’s own water shortage threatens irrigation and drinking water supplies, which have resulted in small protests. This week, a state of emergency was declared in six districts of the southern region of Zhambyl due to heat waves and water scarcity. Crop losses this year are expected to increase by 25-30 percent from last year because of the lack of irrigation water and high temperatures. People in Uzbekistan also say they have been forced to conserve water and stagger their usage.

Geopolitical Implications

These issues have implications for Central Asia and beyond. Crop damage from insufficient irrigation is a major concern for the agricultural sector, as well as consumers who could face rising food costs. This could lead to social unrest as populations grow frustrated with spikes in prices for food, energy and utilities. Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, which rely on food for 20 percent and 10 percent of their total exports, respectively, could see reduced export earnings. Poor quality and inadequate water supplies could also help spread diseases.

As economic and environmental conditions deteriorate, populations could begin to migrate. Rural areas, which account for more than half of the Central Asian population – and which are often low income – could see declining numbers as people grow wary about the state of the agricultural sector and their own livelihoods. The World Bank projects that the number of climate migrants in Central Asia could reach 2.4 million by 2050. Those who choose to leave their homes will be concentrated along Kazakhstan’s southern border, areas surrounding the Ferghana Valley and areas around Bishkek due to declining water access and crop quality. These populations are most likely to move to Central Asia’s neighboring countries (especially Russia and China) in search of work, housing and a better life, which could have security implications.

Conflict between the countries of the region is also a possibility. In 2022, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan saw violent clashes over access to water and land along their border, which hasn’t been fully demarcated. This week, Kazakhstan blocked Kyrgyz vehicles from entering the country after Kyrgyzstan announced that it would reduce water supplies to Kazakhstan. Kyrgyzstan says the Kazakh move violates Eurasian Economic Union rules on the free movement of goods and undermines the authority of the bloc.

Indeed, the water issue could complicate regional relations, cause friction in regional alliances, and disrupt trade, infrastructure projects and military operations. And as Central Asia’s importance as a transit route and provider of energy and resources grows, these disruptions will have implications beyond the region. Russia and China, in particular, would incur potential economic costs if the region destabilizes. They don’t want to see the EAEU and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization undermined because of disputes over water.

Major players understand that they will have to invest in resolving this issue if Central Asia is to play a significant role in the geopolitics of the region. Thus, the Kyrgyz government earlier this month signed an agreement with Chinese firms on the construction of multiple hydroelectric power plants, which will help generate more energy while reducing water loss by developing more modern infrastructure. Central Asian countries are also likely waiting for proposals from Russia, such as reviving the Soviet-era project of transferring water from Siberia to Central Asia. This case shows that long-standing problems in peripheral regions increasingly have the potential to reach major Eurasian powers.

[Crafty_Dog]

September 7, 2023
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Turkey’s Resurgence in the Black Sea Basin
Ankara is seeking to re-establish leadership over a former sphere of influence at Russia’s expense.
By: Kamran Bokhari
Russia’s weakening, especially following its invasion of Ukraine, has serious implications for its southern flank. In the years ahead, Moscow’s ability to project power in the Black Sea basin will decline, and one of the main beneficiaries will be Turkey. Though currently overwhelmed by political and economic problems at home, in the medium to long term Turkey can be expected to fill the strategic vacuum left by Russia’s receding footprint in the Caucasus region.


(click to enlarge)

The countries of the region are even starting to publicly acknowledge Russia’s decline. In a Sept. 4 interview with Italian paper La Repubblica, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said Russia had failed to ensure his country’s security from an increasingly aggressive Azerbaijan, which since late 2020 has gained the upper hand in the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region. Responding to the claims, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters that his country continues to be the “guarantor of security” in the region. Peskov also insisted that Moscow has played a consistent role in stabilizing the region and will continue to do so. Separately, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova called Pashinyan’s comments “public rhetoric verging on rudeness” and said that, rather than blaming others, the Armenians should take responsibility for their own actions. A day earlier, the Russian Defense Ministry announced that it had replaced the head of its peacekeeping forces in the South Caucasus, the second change in recent months.

The Armenian prime minister’s comments were extraordinary, especially considering that Yerevan has long been a close ally of Moscow and dependent on the Kremlin for its security and economic well-being. Russia’s reaction was equally telling, reflective of just how weak its position has become – at least in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, both former Soviet republics that have maintained ties with Russia. Pashinyan explained Moscow’s inability to provide for Armenia’s security as a result of the Kremlin’s preoccupation with the Ukraine war. But the fact is that the situation in the South Caucasus predates the conflict in Ukraine.

In the summer of 2020, fighting between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh erupted once again. Azerbaijan retook territories that Armenia had controlled since the end of the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, which ended in 1994. The Azerbaijanis were able to force a major reversal in the regional balance of power in large part due to military and intelligence support from their ally Turkey. The Turks took advantage of an opening in what was unquestionably part of Russia’s sphere of influence.

For decades following the Soviet Union’s collapse, Moscow had been the security guarantor of the region – which explains why the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was left frozen in Armenia’s favor for a quarter of a century. Turkey and Azerbaijan saw an opportunity in Russia’s focus on its western neighbor since the ouster in February 2014 of the pro-Russian government in Kyiv. Ankara and Baku realized that Moscow was distracted and unlikely to intervene in Nagorno-Karabakh – despite the fact that it had, and still has, troops stationed in the area. Their bet paid off. When the fighting in 2020 escalated, the most that the Russians could do was formally preside over the cessation of hostilities later that year.

Russia’s peacekeeping operation, which began following the conflict in 2020, was ineffective because Moscow was likely already preparing for the war in Ukraine, which it believed would strengthen its position relative to the West or at least prevent its further decline. Nineteen months into the Ukraine campaign, the Russians find themselves in a far weaker position given the terrible performance of Russian forces on the ground, the economic toll of Western sanctions and, more recently, the infighting within the Kremlin exemplified by the Wagner crisis.

Though Pashinyan only recently expressed it in public, he’s been watching the Russians flounder for some time now. His comments show that he realizes his country can no longer rely on Russia and that he needs a new strategy. He also understands that, despite the U.S.’ official recognition in April 2021 of the 1915 Armenian genocide at the hands of the Ottoman Empire, Washington has done very little to challenge the Turkish-Azerbaijani alignment in the South Caucasus. Indeed, it’s becoming increasingly clear that U.S. and Turkish interests are converging, particularly given the situation in Ukraine. This is why, despite facing opposition at home, Pashinyan has been trying to work with the Turks to insulate his country from an increasingly assertive Azerbaijan.

The Armenians aren’t the only ones in Russia’s near abroad to realize the tectonic shifts underway. The Georgians are also closely watching the situation. They have a lot at stake with the presence of Russian forces in two breakaway regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Any further weakening of Moscow could allow them to regain control over these two territories. With signs of growing closeness between Ankara and Tbilisi, Georgia certainly wouldn’t decline Turkey’s help if it was offered.

For now, the Turks are focused on leveraging the Ukraine conflict to enhance their influence in the northern Black Sea basin, which the Russians seized from the Ottoman Empire in the late 18th century. Since 2014, the Turks have opposed Russia’s annexation of Crimea, whose Tartar population they view as their ethnic kin. More recently, Ankara’s role in brokering the now-defunct Black Sea grain deal between Russia and Ukraine and its efforts to revive it are a small but key part of Turkey’s strategy here. Ultimately, the Turks are seeking to re-establish leadership over their former sphere of influence at Russia’s expense.

================

Daily Memo: Turkey's Economy, Escalation in the Caucasus
Ankara has a new plan to spur growth.
By: Geopolitical Futures
New plan. The Turkish government unveiled a package of economic reforms that it hopes will launch a structural transformation of the economy over the next three years. A key goal of the plan is to reduce inflation to single digits by 2026 through tight monetary policies and fiscal discipline. Ankara will also encourage investment, especially in technology related to semiconductors, electric vehicles, batteries and critical technology products.

Serious situation. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said at a Cabinet meeting that Azerbaijan has been massing troops along the contact line in Nagorno-Karabakh and on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border for several days. He also said the situation is so serious that the U.N. Security Council needs to take action to avoid an “explosion” in the region.

Surging population. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi said his country needs to lower its birth rate to avoid a “catastrophe.” He suggested that 400,000 births per year would be more sustainable than the current 2.2 million. He also objected to remarks by Egypt’s health and population minister that having children is “a matter of complete freedom,” arguing that leaving the choice up to individuals has implications for society as a whole. Egypt is the most populous country in the Middle East, with roughly 113 million people.

Infrastructure in the Caucasus. Following a Chinese-organized conference in Tbilisi, China’s ambassador to Georgia, Zhou Jian, said Beijing is interested in developing infrastructure projects through the so-called Middle Corridor, a broadly defined trade route that runs through the Caucasus. China has particularly shown interest in Georgia’s deepwater port of Anaklia. The ambassador noted that the Middle Corridor is an important link between the Chinese and European markets.

[Crafty_Dog]

second

September 11, 2023
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Tensions Escalate in Nagorno-Karabakh
The question is when, not if, conflict resumes in this highly volatile region.
By: Ekaterina Zolotova

Azerbaijan has been massing troops along the line of contact with Nagorno-Karabakh and on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border for several days. Local media also report the presence of tanks, self-propelled artillery mounts, electronic warfare systems and other equipment. Armenian sources drew particular attention to an increased frequency of cargo flights from Azerbaijan to Israel, presumably for additional weapons. Both sides have accused the other of provocation, and both have warned that another war isn’t out of the question.

It’s not unusual for Azerbaijan and Armenia to level accusations at each other. The broader Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has been going on for decades, and it’s been only a few years since Azerbaijan prevailed in the second actual war over the territory. Skirmishes in the region are common, as are periodic drone operations from both sides. But the threat of a new war is another matter entirely. The Caucasus is a strategically important hotbed of geopolitical activity. Russia has long held a presence there, and its influence has only grown since the end of the war, when it sent troops to keep the tenuous peace. The war in Ukraine has also led to an influx of Russian immigrants and has goosed regional trade. Then there is Turkey. The government in Ankara wants to strengthen its role as a regional leader, drawing more attention from the European Union, which has intensified its efforts to mediate the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The United States, which ordinarily doesn’t have as much at stake in the Caucasus, is waiting in the wings, ready to use whatever pressure points are available to hurt Russia.

To be sure, the possibility of war is real. Neither Azerbaijan nor Armenia has signed the treaty ending the last war (despite both insisting that they are committed to it). The only road connecting Armenia proper to the ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, a route known as the Lachin corridor, is still subject to a blockade. The breakaway area recently held elections, which the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry said violates the principles of international law. Armenians themselves are unhappy with the outcome of the last conflict; after losing, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan conceded that Nagorno-Karabakh belonged to Azerbaijan, inviting criticism from opposition parties and sparking protests among the public. Amid growing discontent and ongoing protests, Pashinyan may feel compelled to correct the situation, if not by returning losses then at least by improving his negotiating position.

The Lachin and Zangezur Corridors | Caucasus
(click to enlarge)

In this context, Armenia’s attempts to attract the attention of the international community – and, if possible, its assistance – have become clear. For example, Armenia announced joint military exercises with the U.S. from Sept. 11 to Sept. 20, ostensibly to train peacekeeping forces. Pashinyan also spoke by phone with French President Emmanuel Macron to discuss the situation, and he recently criticized his erstwhile ally in Moscow, expressing dissatisfaction with Russian peacekeepers’ inactivity.

Importantly, Yerevan’s actions in this regard can also be interpreted as an attempt to attract the attention of Russia and the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization rather than an outright rejection of Moscow. Armenia is known to balance between the West and Russia. Before becoming prime minister, Pashinyan himself advocated for Armenia’s exit from the Eurasian Economic Union. In August, he expressed hope that trade turnover between Armenia and Russia this year would exceed $5 billion. Armenia's Security Council was recently conducting concurrent negotiations with NATO, citing insufficient benefits from its membership in the CSTO, and with Moscow over strengthening bilateral military and political cooperation. Moreover, Yerevan and Moscow both understand that Armenia is economically dependent on Russia, and their economic ties, especially through the EAEU, have only grown stronger in recent years. In the wake of Western sanctions, Armenia became the largest beneficiary of the EAEU, its economy growing by 12.6 percent in 2022 thanks to the expansion of the services, construction and trade sectors facilitated by the bloc. In 2022, trade turnover between Russia and Armenia doubled after most European cargo carriers refused to cooperate directly with Russia.

Azerbaijan, meanwhile, has its own reasons to rattle the saber. Armenia has still not signed a treaty officially renouncing its claims to Nagorno-Karabakh. In addition, Azerbaijan is still cut off from Nakhchivan, which is part of Azerbaijan but separated from the country by Armenian territory. But as important, critical trade and transportation routes are emerging in the region, and Azerbaijan wants to position itself to capitalize off them accordingly. The demand for new routes in the wake of the Ukraine war is high basically everywhere, but Turkey, which is struggling with myriad economic problems, is especially interested in creating new, unencumbered routes now that Black Sea traffic has taken a dip. (Doing so, of course, would also spread its political influence throughout the region, hence talks this summer on a new railway.) Enter the Zangezur corridor, which is meant primarily to link the government in Baku to Nakhchivan but would have added benefits for other interested parties. According to various forecasts, Zangezur could add an additional 5 million to 8 million tons of cargo transportation to the Middle Corridor, a loosely defined trade route from Europe to East Asia that passes through Central Asia, the Caspian Sea and the Caucasus. Armenia was supposed to ensure free access from Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan so that the Zangezur-affiliated Horadiz-Aghband-Meghri-Julfa-Arazdeyan railway could be restored, but Baku has accused Yerevan of dragging its feet. Azerbaijan has gone so far as to say that Zangezur will be completed by 2024 with or without Armenia’s participation. It’s possible, then, that Azerbaijan would want to proactively secure the area.

But Azerbaijan and Armenia are not the only competitors in a region as famously unstable as the Caucasus. Turkey is concerned that other countries will try to undermine its position by implementing the Middle Corridor on their own. China’s ambassador to Georgia recently said Beijing is interested in such infrastructure projects, particularly the one at the deep water port of Anaklia. China has also stressed the importance of the Middle Corridor for logistics with Europe, and that collaboration with the EU would be an important venue for relations between Brussels and Beijing. In other words, Azerbaijan and Turkey are highly motivated to finish the project as soon as possible.

None of the majors – the U.S., Russia and the EU – are interested in a full-blown military conflict. The U.S. and the EU simply don’t have much at stake here, and Russia needs the region to be stable. However, each could, in theory, benefit from a minor skirmish. Western powers may believe that if the conflict worsens, it could require Russian intervention and thus distract Moscow from its war in Ukraine. (Russia may believe similarly – that open conflict in the Caucasus could distract the West from Ukraine.) If Pashinyan falls, Moscow would get rid of the ever-balancing leader in Armenia and Russia would likely strengthen its relationship with Azerbaijan, with which it is building a transport project. Another notable mention is Iran, which like many of its neighbors has begun to benefit from its position along the North-South Corridor. Despite its poor relations with Azerbaijan, Tehran doesn’t want a war to break out either. On Sept. 9, the Azerbaijani defense minister met with an Iranian delegation to discuss the situation and military cooperation.

Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh will very likely break out, given the unresolved territorial disputes and the nature of the conflict. The question is when it will happen and how severe it will be. Meanwhile, the geopolitical game in the region will remain unchanged: Russia isn’t going, the United States is ready to irritate Moscow with periodic appearances, and Turkey will further advance its interests.

[Crafty_Dog]

September 25, 2023
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Daily Memo: Nagorno-Karabakh Fallout
Turkey and Russia are among the countries that have reacted to the breakaway region's agreement to disarm.
By: Geopolitical Futures

International reaction. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan arrived on Monday in Nakhchivan, an Azerbaijani exclave separated from the rest of Azerbaijan by Armenian territory. He held talks with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev on bilateral and regional issues, about a week after Azerbaijan conducted a military operation in the breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh that led ethnic Armenian authorities there to agree to disarm. Meanwhile, over the weekend, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh were partly responsible for the situation in the disputed territory, where thousands of ethnic Armenians have reportedly fled from their homes since last week. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said Moscow rejected the criticism. Russia’s internal affairs minister arrived in Yerevan on Monday to meet with officials from Armenia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs. U.S. Agency for International Development chief Samantha Power is also in Armenia.

More fallout. Relatedly, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic said at a press conference that what has happened in Nagorno-Karabakh has strengthened his country’s resolve to never recognize Kosovo’s independence. Kosovo declared independence in 2008. It has been recognized by many Western nations but not by Russia.

[Crafty_Dog]

Excellent find by CCP


https://www.cnn.com/2023/09/20/asia/azerbaijan-armenia-nagorno-karabakh-explainer-intl/index.html

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/20123/new-war-armenia-azerbaijan 

[Crafty_Dog]

November 17, 2023
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New Visitors in the Caucasus
Thoughts in and around geopolitics.
By: George Friedman

With all that’s happening in the Middle East, it’s easy to forget about what’s happening in the Caucasus, which careful readers will recall I wrote about a while back. The Ukraine war was moving toward its non-conclusion, and Russia was neglecting its other frontiers (and, frankly, the wider world). The Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict was a case in point.


(click to enlarge)

The situation was this: Azerbaijan and Armenia had been enemies for some time, intermittently clashing over Nagorno-Karabakh, an ethnically Armenian enclave located entirely inside Azerbaijani territory, and fighting an all-out war over the area as recently as 2020. Azerbaijan is the more powerful of the two, thanks in part to the money it has made off its considerable energy reserves, but Armenia had historically been buoyed by Russian support. Moscow even helped broker the cease-fire that nominally ended hostilities three years ago. But Russia’s interests in the Caucasus are broad, extending well beyond any supposed allegiance to Armenia. It has since broken faith with Armenia and backed Azerbaijan so that it could keep its southern border secure and, hopefully, gain access to some of the country’s energy resources. This left Armenia with no outside supporters to supply weapons. And in September, Azerbaijan launched a full-scale invasion of Nagorno-Karabakh, effectively “winning” the decadeslong conflict.

It seems as though the United States noticed Russia’s shift from Armenia to Azerbaijan and has tried to take advantage accordingly. Along with France, the U.S. has said it would support the country militarily. Washington has been vague about what it will provide, but the important thing here is that it has announced its intention to have a presence in a region traditionally in Russia’s sphere of influence. Russia’s “defection” had undercut what influence the U.S. had in Azerbaijan and, given Armenia’s weakness, strengthened its position in an area critical to its interests. The U.S. and French response gave Russia exactly what it didn’t need: a source of more vulnerability rather than control.

In a broader context, this is going to be part of the peace negotiations, public or otherwise, over Ukraine between Washington and Moscow. In any negotiation, it is useful to hold cards that threaten an opponent, cards that can be used to gain concessions or, at the very least, make the opponent nervous. Since the Caucasus matters more to Russia than it does to the U.S., pledging military aid to Armenia creates the possibility, however remote, of American action. It’s a potent play, especially considering Russia already had more at risk.

Washington has said nothing of this, of course, but there’s a precedent: In 2008, Russia went to war with Georgia in a conflict that the U.S. helped resolve. But Washington’s relationship with Georgia was important to the U.S. only while the Russians were attacking Georgia; when Russia lost interest, so too did the United States. American (and French) involvement in Armenia, then, should be seen as an effort to enhance their positions for future Ukraine talks. If Ukraine is significantly weakened before then, the U.S. will need as many levers as it can get.

[Crafty_Dog]

Moving forward. Armenia and Azerbaijan expressed their intention to normalize relations and sign a peace deal in a joint statement on Thursday. They also announced a prisoner exchange and said they would work on more confidence-building measures, two months after Azerbaijan’s recapture in September of the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave. A U.S. statement said Secretary of State Antony Blinken looks forward to hosting the foreign ministers of both countries in Washington soon for peace talks. It also said Azerbaijan’s central bank governor and energy minister will visit the United States, though no date was provided.

[ccp]

"A U.S. statement said Secretary of State Antony Blinken looks forward to hosting the foreign ministers of both countries in Washington soon for peace talks."   

" It also said Azerbaijan’s central bank governor and energy minister will visit the United States, though no date was provided"

did blinks send over a 737 loaded with cash?

[Crafty_Dog]

March 21, 2024
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Geoeconomic Integration of Central Asia
The U.S. sees regional integration and global connectivity as the way to loosen the grip of Russia and China.
By: Kamran Bokhari

In a hyperconnected world, Central Asia is the final frontier, a vast region with few links to the international community. In the more than three decades since the end of the Cold War, the region’s remoteness and lack of oceanic access have benefited its gigantic neighbors, Russia and China. But now the United States and its allies are undertaking an ambitious strategy to foster Central Asian integration. The key challenge is how to form a regional bloc from the five nations, which are still defining themselves politically and economically and remain entangled in the geopolitical architectures of Moscow and Beijing.

Central Asia

(click to enlarge)

Last week, I had the opportunity to participate in the inaugural gathering of the B5+1 Forum in Almaty, Kazakhstan, organized by the Washington-based Center for International Private Enterprise with the support of the U.S. State Department. B5+1 is the business counterpart to the C5+1, a diplomatic framework comprising the United States and the five Central Asian states – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – established in 2015. Conceived during President Joe Biden’s meeting in New York last September with his five Central Asian counterparts, the B5+1 gathers private and public sector leaders to discuss ways to make Central Asia more attractive for foreign investment. During the March 13-15 gathering, participants identified five economic sectors as development priorities: trade and logistics, agribusiness, e-commerce, tourism and renewable energy.

Washington’s strategy is to facilitate regional economic integration while leaving ownership of the process to the Central Asians, whose region has been subject to Moscow’s influence as far back as the founding of the United States. In the decades following the Soviet Union’s breakup, the region was too distant and isolated – and other global challenges were too great – for the U.S. to exert any control. Russia and China continue to enjoy the advantage of proximity, while Beijing also has heaps of cash to dump into developing the region’s infrastructure through its Belt and Road Initiative.

What has changed, however, is that Russia, beleaguered by its war in Ukraine, is losing its grip over the region, while China is battling a serious economic slowdown. In this turbulent environment, the Central Asian states cannot assume that Russia will continue to be willing and able to guarantee their security. Nor can they be sure that Chinese investments, while attractive in the short term, will not have deleterious longer-term effects – as they have in Sri Lanka and Pakistan, for example. Therefore, the Central Asian states have each tried to varying degrees to balance relations with Russia and China while also seeking greatly enhanced ties with the United States and the European Union. After all, if they are going to move beyond autocratic governance and embrace economic reforms, only the U.S. and its allies can help.

The U.S. interest is to make these states resilient enough to withstand the upheaval occurring all around them. Their autocratic legacies, inherited from former liege Russia, coupled with the heavy influence of China mean that their path toward political reform is long and tortuous. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have made noteworthy strides, especially in recent years, but Tajikistan and Turkmenistan remain stuck in authoritarianism.

Cognizant of these constraints and the reality that political reform hinges on a decent measure of economic prosperity, Washington is focused on supporting the latter two states. Hence, the establishment of the B5+1 to complement the existing diplomatic track. Considering that three years ago the Biden administration’s Interim National Security Strategic Guidance document failed to even mention Central Asia, a good deal of progress has been made.

Yet, forging a Central Asian economic union modeled after the European Union or even the Association of Southeast Asian Nations is a major undertaking. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the region’s connectivity indicator – a measure of how much global gross domestic product is reachable – is among the lowest in the world. In theory, greater regional economic integration will make Central Asia more attractive for Western investments. However, maximizing trade between the five nations would require them to develop transnational mechanisms to harmonize regulations and customs procedures and arbitrate disputes.

Another difficulty is that Russia and China do not wish to see the region more globally connected and will thwart such efforts. Both countries want to limit Western influence in the expansive terrain that separates them. This is particularly important for Russia, which is already battling the West along its western frontier. Moscow also recognizes that it is already losing ground in the region to Beijing, which hopes to fill the vacuum Russia is leaving behind. For China, which aspires to build its Eurasian economic thoroughfare known as the Belt and Road Initiative through Central Asia, any increase in the region’s autonomy is potentially threatening.

But the biggest challenge for U.S. efforts to foster regional integration and enhance Central Asia’s global connectivity is financing. China can pour tens of billions of dollars into infrastructure projects for geopolitical reasons, but the U.S. and its allies must rely on the private sector to do most of the heavy lifting. Western firms are motivated by returns on their investments, which is why Washington is urging the Central Asian governments to implement political and economic reforms that render their region attractive to investors.

For a region that is trying to put its Soviet past behind it and has been doing more and more business with the Chinese, the challenge of forming a regional bloc is about transforming norms as much as it is about structural change.

[Crafty_Dog]

Russia and the Caucasus. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev will hold talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on Monday. The trip comes after Russia began last week withdrawing its peacekeeping forces from the Nagorno-Karabakh region, which Azerbaijan recaptured from ethnic Armenian authorities last year. Moscow had previously tried to mediate the dispute between the two countries until Armenia accused it of failing to protect its interests there. According to Russia’s Kommersant newspaper, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan is expected to visit Moscow after Aliyev’s trip.

=====================

Russian banking. Kyrgyzstan’s Finca Bank announced that starting May 5 it will introduce restrictions on transfers through the mobile app of Russia’s Sberbank Online. It will also suspend payments through Russia’s Tinkoff bank. In early April, Kyrgyz banks stopped servicing Russia’s Mir card payment system due to the threat of secondary sanctions. Meanwhile, the U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for Central and South Asian affairs arrived in Kyrgyzstan to discuss bilateral relations.

[Crafty_Dog]

Palestinian supporters. The Russian republic of Chechnya is creating a community for Palestinian refugees, according to an aide for the head of the region. The official stated that 209 Palestinian refugees currently live in Chechnya. Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov declared his support for the Palestinians shortly after the war in Gaza began and has indicated that his government will help accommodate civilians fleeing the fighting.

==============

Works for me , , ,

[Crafty_Dog]

July 5, 2024
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Peace and US Interests in the South Caucasus
Much depends on U.S. relations with Azerbaijan.
By: Kamran Bokhari

Peace negotiations between Azerbaijan and Armenia are an opportunity for the United States to expand its influence in the South Caucasus. A U.S.-brokered peace agreement would give Washington another foothold in Russia’s traditional sphere of influence between the Black and Caspian seas. But this won’t happen if Washington doesn’t improve relations with Azerbaijan and thus balance its ties with Armenia.

On July 1, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said a peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia is achievable, and it seems as though the State Department is putting in the work to make it happen. He has spoken with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev several times over the past few months, most recently on June 20, and on June 28, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs James O'Brien told reporters in Baku that Azerbaijan and Armenia had been invited to the foreign minister-level NATO meeting, which will be held July 9-11. Meanwhile, Armenian Deputy Prime Minister Mher Grigoryan said in a statement July 1 that his country had made progress in negotiations with Azerbaijan on the delimitation of their border and that they will soon finish a relevant common document.

Talks between the two have indeed gained momentum, especially since a meeting of their foreign ministers in Kazakhstan’s capital, Astana, in early May. Despite facing considerable opposition at home, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan says his country is prepared to sign an accord by November. Yerevan has already handed back control of four key villages to Baku, effectively redrawing eight miles of border.

Armenia’s interest in concluding a peace agreement stems from its defeat in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war with Azerbaijan, whose outcome dramatically reversed the balance of power in the South Caucasus. What little control Armenia retained in the disputed region was taken in September 2023 by Azerbaijan as part of a cease-fire agreement in November 2020. There are a variety of reasons that Armenia lost, including Turkish support for Azerbaijan, but the government in Yerevan came away from the conflict feeling betrayed by its erstwhile ally Russia, which it believed failed to deliver on much-needed military support. Bilateral relations deteriorated, and in May Russia withdrew nearly all its forces from Armenia save small contingents on its borders with Turkey and Iran. Last month, Armenia announced a withdrawal from the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization.

Geopolitically isolated in its own strategic environment, Armenia has since turned to the West, overtly trying to improve relations with France and the U.S. But it has come to realize that the West is preoccupied with and struggling to support Ukraine. Russia is likewise mired in the war, and in an attempt to ensure its influence in the South Caucasus, it is trying to forge closer bonds with Azerbaijan. Yerevan therefore has no choice but to make peace, especially since doing so preserves its territorial integrity.

Having lost strategic depth on its eastern border, Armenia has to contend with the fact that Azerbaijan’s exclave of Nakhchivan is located to its southwest, separated from mainland Azerbaijan by its southernmost province of Syunik. Having successfully taken back its territories in Nagorno-Karabakh, Baku is now interested in establishing connectivity with Nakhchivan via the Zangezur corridor. From Armenia’s point of view, this project will make the country more vulnerable to Azerbaijan, so a peace treaty now will, in theory, protect its territory going forward.

Azerbaijan's Proposed Zangezur Corridor

(click to enlarge)

Part of the strategy calls for improving relations with Turkey, but most of it depends on U.S. support in the peace process. Washington has its own strategic reasons for peace: It allows Washington to expand its influence in an increasingly important region. The U.S. realizes that to be a major player in the South Caucasus will require good relations with Azerbaijan and Armenia alike.

This explains the surge in Washington’s engagement with Baku and its efforts to reestablish a new balance of power in the region. Azerbaijan’s victory in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict worked to the advantage of the United States by weakening Russian influence in the South Caucasus. Even so, Washington has to worry about Moscow and Baku’s relationship, which it could balance by improving its own ties with Azerbaijan.

By helping the two rivals conclude a peace agreement, the U.S. also improves its relations with Turkey. Washington and Ankara share an interest in connecting the region to Central Asia through the Trans-Caspian Corridor. They are more or less on the same page with their positions on Iran (as is Baku). An east-west connectivity running through Azerbaijan can also serve as an effective counter to the growing Russian-Iranian alignment, exemplified by their efforts to establish the International North-South Transport Corridor.

In simple terms, conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia will inhibit the West’s ability to have a more robust relationship with the heart of Eurasia, where China already has had a major head start. The U.S. means to change that.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/satellite-images-unveil-china-builds-secret-military-base/ar-BB1pV83N?ocid=msedgntp&pc=DCTS&cvid=4627deaef62740878c55ed07c1714dd2&ei=39

[Crafty_Dog]

Some intriguing points herein.

====================


August 22, 2024
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Azerbaijan's Role in Russian Strategy
An understanding with Baku could help Moscow manage its otherwise vulnerable southern flank.
By: Kamran Bokhari
Russian President Vladimir Putin visited the capital of Azerbaijan on Aug. 18 in what was a very curiously timed trip. Not only was it the first time Putin had traveled to Baku in six years, but he made the trip amid the first incursion of Russian borders since World War II. The Russian leader is many things but not impetuous, so traveling to Baku under the current circumstances was likely part of a broader strategy to manage the biggest crisis to hit Russia since the fall of the Soviet Union.

Judging by joint press statements issued after the trip, it seems unlikely that anything major was discussed between Putin and his host, President Ilham Aliyev. There was some mention of increasing bilateral trade and the usual inking of inter-governmental agreements in non-critical sectors such as health care, education, climate change and food safety. But perhaps the most significant topic was the Azerbaijan-Armenia peace talks, which have been ongoing since Baku’s victory in the 2020 war. While acknowledging that “Russia is also facing crises, first of all on the Ukrainian track,” Putin also said, “If we can do something so that we can sign a peace agreement with Azerbaijan and Armenia, complete the delimitation and demarcation of the border … unblock logistics and the economy, we would be very glad.”

The statement brings home the fact that Moscow understands how much geopolitical ground it has lost in the South Caucasus, its decline caused by the outcome of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war. Azerbaijan’s victory, aided as it was by Turkey, shifted the regional balance of power in Baku’s favor, while Armenia’s belief that Russia failed to sufficiently aid it in the conflict soured relations with its former ally in Moscow.

Putin’s choice of words in the offer to help mediate between the two sides is also telling. Moscow came late to the party, but it is trying to use its influence in Azerbaijan to position itself as a guarantor of peace. It certainly does not want Turkey, much less the West, to claim that role, especially in a region so critical to Russian security. Moscow knows that Yerevan is now gravitating toward the West, but Baku’s cold relations with the U.S. and Europe give it an opportunity to disrupt the process.

The question is: How reliable is Russia as a partner if it can’t protect its own territory from Ukraine? This is why the timing of this visit is odd. Baku may not need Moscow’s help to mediate with Yerevan, but Russia is its northern neighbor, and there are long, deep and extensive ties between the two. Azerbaijan can’t help but be worried about what it sees as continued setbacks for the Kremlin. The war in Ukraine – and Russia’s overall strategic interests – therefore had to be front and center between Putin and Aliyev, even if it didn’t make it into the official readouts. Recall, too, that the two met only a few months ago in Moscow. It’s hard to believe that Putin, in such a small amount of time, would need to address more than he already had in April and with someone he had otherwise not bothered to visit in years.

Indeed, Russia’s motivation is fairly straightforward: As the war in Ukraine takes a turn for the worse, it needs to do everything it can to secure its other border areas. For now, its strategic backyard is insulated from the West. It maintains much security influence in Central Asia, even as China is expanding in a geoeconomic sense. Belarus is highly dependent on Russia for its national security, and with the West so focused on Ukraine, Moscow likely believes it is safe on that front. Its southern flank, however, is exposed. With the 2008 conflict in Georgia far from settled and Azerbaijan wresting Nagorno-Karabakh away from Armenia, the South Caucasus is heading in an uncertain direction.

Russia was unable to prevent the new military reality in the South Caucasus, but it is now trying to position itself in the peace process – as a means of countering Turkish and Western encroachment in its soft underbelly. A settlement between Azerbaijan and Armenia would remove a major obstacle in the path of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, also known as the Middle Corridor, which will connect Central Asia to Europe and, critically, weaken Russia’s influence in its near abroad.



(click to enlarge)

Naturally, Russia has tried to counter the TITR with its own project called the International North-South Transport Corridor. But given that Russia is under massive financial constraints and that Iran, a key cog in the INSTC, is likewise under sanctions, the corridor is unlikely to take off anytime soon. But the fact remains that Russia cannot cede to the West a presence on its southern flank – let alone in the heart of Eurasia.

Given its geostrategic position, Azerbaijan would want the best of both worlds. But there is only so much it can do to help Russia solve its main problem: Ukraine. Meanwhile, Baku’s relations with the West need improvement as it worries about its southern neighbor Iran, which is in the throes of unprecedented struggles of its own. The Azerbaijanis are also becoming increasingly concerned about Russia's growing dependency on Iran, especially considering the animosity between Baku and Tehran.

Ultimately, Azerbaijan will have to live with the dynamics on both its northern and southern frontiers. Russia will try to maintain its influence in its near abroad despite its setbacks in Ukraine. But without adequately solving the latter, it will continue to fail at the former.




=============

Sources say otherwise. Contradicting denials from both countries, Azerbaijani sources confirmed that Iran and Armenia signed a $500 million arms deal, the Azerbaijani news site Caliber.az reported. Last month, the opposition channel Iran International broke news of the agreement, which it said entailed the sale to Armenia of multiple types of drones and anti-air missile systems.

[Crafty_Dog]

September 12, 2024
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The Corridor Dividing Russia and Iran
Moscow’s endorsement of a new route through the South Caucasus sparked a fierce backlash in Tehran.
By: Kamran Bokhari
The Ukraine war has brought Russia and Iran closer, but the full scope of their evolving relationship is more complicated. Until last year, Tehran was the junior partner. But as Moscow’s reliance on Iranian drones and missiles for the war against its neighbor has grown, so has Iran’s leverage. A strategic divergence is now emerging: Iran needs to negotiate with the United States, while Russia’s policy in the South Caucasus conflicts with Iran’s interests.

Strategic Divergence

When the U.S. accused Iran this week of sending Russia short-range ballistic missiles to use against Ukraine, it obscured a far more significant development in Russian-Iranian relations. Recently, several senior Iranian officials have publicly criticized Russia for supporting Azerbaijan’s plan to establish a corridor in Armenia along the border with Iran. Iran’s new foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, described the so-called Zangezur corridor as a “redrawing of boundaries” and said it was “totally unacceptable and a red line for Iran.” Earlier, the head of the ministry’s Eurasia Directorate warned the Russian ambassador to Iran not to encourage a conflict on its borders. Additionally, Maj. Gen. Mohsen Rezaei, the secretary of Iran’s Expediency Council and formerly the longest-serving head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, said Russia’s behavior stood in “clear contradiction” to its professed friendship with Iran.

Iran’s concerns over its northern border have increased since Azerbaijan’s 2020 victory over Armenia, an Iranian ally, in the second war for Nagorno-Karabakh. Administered by Armenia since their first war in 1994, the region’s fall to Azerbaijan significantly extended the Azerbaijani-Iranian border. Azerbaijan’s push to secure the Zangezur corridor, connecting it with its Nakhchivan exclave, threatens to create a contiguous Turkic belt along Iran’s northwestern border. This is a major security threat for Tehran, compounded by the country’s enormous ethnic Azeri population (which constitutes almost a quarter of the total population and is concentrated in the country’s northwest), its ongoing domestic political transition and its high-risk campaign to expand its influence in the Middle East.

Iran-Russia Borderlands

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For years, Iran felt secure because Armenia had the upper hand over Azerbaijan and the South Caucasus was firmly under Russian influence. Over the past four years, however, the region has undergone a strategic shift. For starters, massive Turkish support enabled Azerbaijani forces to overwhelm their Armenian rivals to capture Nagorno-Karabakh, overturning the balance of power that had existed since the Soviet Union’s implosion in 1991. Despite their alliance under the Collective Security Treaty Organization, Moscow failed to come to Yerevan’s aid, prompting Armenia to threaten openly to leave the security pact and pursue partnerships with the likes of France and the United States. Meanwhile, over the past two and a half years Turkey has exploited Russia’s preoccupation with Ukraine to expand its influence in the region even more and strengthen its connectivity with Central Asia.

With Turkey challenging its monopoly around the Caspian and Azerbaijan emerging as the top power in the South Caucasus, the Kremlin had no choice but to extend a hand to Baku, whose relationship with the West is still chilly. To secure a seat at the table where Turkey and Azerbaijan were redrawing the region’s security and economic order, Russia needed to endorse the Zangezur corridor. However, this put Moscow at odds with Tehran, which fears that such changes will sever Iran’s access to its landbridge to Eurasia.

Turning Point

Since the early 16th century, the Persians controlled much of the South Caucasus and large parts of the North Caucasus (including Dagestan and parts of Chechnya). Starting in 1801, however, czarist Russia began capturing these territories from the Qajar Empire. In 1813, under the Treaty of Gulistan, the Persians ceded Dagestan, eastern Georgia, most of Azerbaijan and parts of northern Armenia to the Russians. Qajar Iran retained much of Armenia, Nakhchivan and southern Azerbaijan until the 1828 Treaty of Turkmenchay, which established Iran’s current northwestern border along the Aras River. Moscow controlled the South Caucasus until the Soviet Union’s breakup, when Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan gained their independence, though the Russian Federation continued to enjoy unchallenged influence in the region. From Iran’s perspective, not much had changed about the status quo that had existed for well over a century and a half, except that history and ethnicity made a sovereign Armenia a natural ally of the Iranians.

Newly independent Armenia controlled Nagorno-Karabakh, a 1,700-square-mile (4,400-square-kilometer) area inside Azerbaijan, for nearly three decades – which suited Iran just fine. Through an aggressive foreign policy in the Arab world, Iran had succeeded in blocking Turkey, which no Persian power had accomplished since the rise of Islam in the seventh century. However, the 2020 Azerbaijani-Armenian war was a turning point. Turkey, which had never controlled the bulk of the South Caucasus, even at the height of the Ottoman Empire, now had a strong presence on Iran’s northern border. This was a major affront to Iran, whose heavy focus on dominating the northern rim of the Middle East had made Turkey’s advances possible. And with Russia joining Turkey in aligning with Azerbaijan, Iran is further constrained.

What’s more, Iran recognizes that with Russia in long-term decline, Turkey is best positioned to fill the vacuum. Turkey enjoys ethnic ties not only with Azerbaijan but also with most Central Asian states east of the Caspian. Historically, Persian empires, particularly since the fall of the Timurid Empire in the early 16th century, controlled large parts of what is now Turkmenistan, with influence extending into present-day Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Iran's current border with Turkmenistan was established by the 1881 Treaty of Akhal, which saw the Qajar Empire lose its Central Asian territories to Russia.

In the 19th century, as Iran lost control of large parts of the Caucasus and Central Asia to Russia, its historical rival, the Ottoman Empire, was losing the Middle East to the British and French. Effectively cut off from the north by Russia’s conquest of much of Eurasia, Iran reoriented its strategic focus westward and southward. Meanwhile, the discovery of oil in the Middle East, the rise of Arab states and the Cold War's onset forced Iran to concentrate on new regional dynamics.

The Iranian monarchy aligned with the West to counter Soviet influence in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan. But then the 1979 revolution brought an anti-U.S. regime to power with imperial ambitions, particularly in the Arab world. The 1980 Iraqi invasion of Iran sparked an eight-year war, resulting in a million deaths and billions of dollars in economic damage, further cementing Iran's geopolitical orientation toward its western and southern frontiers.

The Gulf War in early 1991 and the Soviet Union’s collapse later that year set the stage for closer Russian-Iranian relations. This relationship deepened after the 9/11 attacks, with Iran relying on Russia for support against the United States. The 2011 Arab Spring uprisings further solidified their alliance as both backed the Assad regime in Syria, with Iran leading ground operations and Russia providing air support. Thus, by the time Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, Moscow and Tehran had an established model for cooperation. The Ukraine conflict also made Russia more and more reliant on Iranian weaponry, particularly drones.

Iran will maintain its relationship with Russia, but it recognizes Russia’s declining geopolitical power. After the Ukraine war, Moscow will likely remain preoccupied with its European front. Meanwhile, Iran faces growing tensions with Israel and needs to consolidate its influence in the Arab world, which requires some form of understanding with the United States. This need for a rapprochement with the West helps to explain why the regime permitted the election of the pragmatist candidate, Masoud Pezeshkian, in Iran’s recent elections.

Given these trajectories, Iran will see diminishing returns from its relationship with Russia. A weakened Russia, grappling with the fallout from its Ukraine invasion, is likely to grow more dependent on Iran, which could lead to conflicts, as seen in the South Caucasus. And as Russia's position weakens, Turkey's ambitions in Eurasia will become increasingly significant.

[Crafty_Dog]

Competition for Moscow. Kazakhstan plans to increase natural gas exports to China, the head of Kazakh national gas operator QazaqGaz told Bloomberg. He said the firm is in talks to increase export volumes to China, where demand is growing despite indications of an economic slowdown. It’s even considering building a second pipeline to China to facilitate the exchange. This could pose a challenge to Russia, which has increased its own gas supplies to China after European governments slashed their imports following the invasion of Ukraine.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/russia-on-brink-of-civil-war-after-chechen-leader-declares-blood-feud/ar-AA1s2YvZ?ocid=msedgntp&pc=HCTS&cvid=eb02b4b903874de7b48a73d1fdaf3bbd&ei=8

[Crafty_Dog]

FWIW, my sense of things is that the Georgians rather reasonably want to know about foreign money coming in to affect domestic politics and that the West is trying to bully them out of it.


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Undermining relations. Britain will freeze ministerial-level talks with Georgia and cancel dialogue between the countries’ defense staffs due to recent actions of the Georgian government, the British ambassador to Georgia, Gareth Ward, said. Ward said the Georgian government’s recent decisions, especially regarding a so-called foreign agents law, undermined relations between the two countries. He expressed hope that after elections set for next month, Georgia will resume its previous Euro-Atlantic path.

[Crafty_Dog]

Makes clear the motivations behind the recent and ongoing brouhaha about identifying foreign donations , , ,
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Strong accusations. Just days ahead of parliamentary elections in Georgia, the founder of Georgian Dream, the country’s ruling pro-Russian party, accused an unnamed high-ranking Western official of suggesting that Georgia start a war with Russia. The official supposedly said the conflict would last only three to four days and then spiral into guerrilla warfare with the support of the West. Georgian Dream's founder, Bidzina Ivanishvili, said that former Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili told him about the comment and that the incident compelled the party to get tougher with the West. No evidence was provided to support the claim. Since the Ukraine war began, Georgian officials have repeatedly accused “forces” of trying to drag Georgia into a military confrontation with Russia.

[Crafty_Dog]

October 24, 2024
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Middle Powers, Polarity and the International System
Second-tier countries are arguably as influential as ever.
By: Kamran Bokhari

The great power competition currently underway has created space for second-tier states, or middle powers, to emerge as strong as ever. Alarmed by the growing disruptions to the post-World War II order and what they see as the inability of greater powers to manage the international system, regional actors such as Turkey, Indonesia, Kazakhstan and Australia will begin to play larger geopolitical roles as the U.S. struggles to contain the likes of Russia, China and Iran.

Kazakhstan is particularly noteworthy. Last week, I presented at a conference organized by the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies in Astana on this very topic. Kazakhstan doesn’t just see itself as a middle power; it sees itself as a potential leader in the global conversation over what it means to be a middle power. This is no small feat for a country that has existed for only 30 or so years.



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As the conference proceeded, the government announced elsewhere that it would not apply for membership in the BRICS – essentially a club led by China and Russia meant to counterbalance the West. A spokesperson for President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev explained that Astana was more interested in focusing its energy on reforming the United Nations so that middle powers would have a greater role in the premier international organization. In his keynote address at the conference, the president said Russia was an “invincible” military power that would force a negotiated settlement to the war in Ukraine. Tokayev warned that if a diplomatic solution to the conflict was not found, it would turn into a “war of mutual extermination.”

The president’s remarks were telling, if not altogether unusual. Kazakhstan is trying to navigate between Russia, its former imperial overlord with which it shares a 4,750-mile-long border, and the West. By spurning the BRICS for the U.N., Astana is committing itself to the global system as constructed by the United States. But by standing against continued Western military support for the war in Ukraine, it is signaling that it is not entirely in Washington’s camp. This is hardly surprising for a country that practically invented the notion of a multivector foreign policy. Hence Astana’s cozy relationship with China, which is trying to claim for itself the influence Russia is losing in Central Asia.

This kind of balancing act is typical of all middle powers. They lack the geopolitical heft of great powers, but they have the political and economic influence great powers need to advance their interests. Middle powers try to leverage this position to shape the behavior of great powers in an effort to pursue their strategic objectives. But they arguably have never been so potentially influential. After the Soviet Union collapsed, the bipolar era came to an end as the U.S. emerged as the world’s sole superpower, a status it will maintain for the foreseeable future. The United States’ 20-year response to the 9/11 attacks gave Russia an opportunity to rise from the ashes, even as China emerged as a great power and competitor to the U.S. Many argue that the world has since become increasingly multipolar, and that the rise of middle powers only furthers this trend. The problem is that not all poles are the same. The war in Ukraine has exposed Russian weaknesses, despite its large military force and massive defense production capacity. Meanwhile, China is a geo-economic force, even if not a military one, but its domestic economic problems suggest it isn’t the power it’s made out to be.

The U.S. has challenges of its own. But it remains the center of gravity of the international system because of its hard and soft power projection capabilities. Cognizant of the global landscape and the revisionist nature of Russian and Chinese ambitions, the middle powers will seek safety in the Western-led global order, despite its many flaws. There are, of course, many different types of middle powers, but their desire to have a stake in the international system will help the U.S. deal with its adversaries.

[Crafty_Dog]

EU involvement. Azerbaijani media reported that an increasing number of EU observers have been visiting the Azerbaijani-Armenian border since October. Azerbaijan’s Report news agency said it obtained footage showing a French flag flying on one of three cars that recently brought these observers to the border area. The outlet concluded that the individuals in the car worked for French intelligence.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1970809/ukraine-russia-georgia-arms?fbclid=IwY2xjawGU5rRleHRuA2FlbQIxMQABHbEXxRsVscu_L9XQaWzTWpTx6Gs0n0EbjN-VvxF2nWjQgRppc-OToi0DMw_aem_BjJLo8SmuNB2x5lIXV_nNQ

[Crafty_Dog]

GPF

NATO in the South Caucasus. A NATO delegation held talks with Armenian defense officials in Armenia this week. Headed by the deputy chief of staff of the Supreme Allied Command Europe, the delegation met with Armenia’s top military officials to discuss prospects for further cooperation. It also received an update on the progress of Armenian defense reforms.

[Crafty_Dog]

Central Asia's Looming Conflict Over Water, Part 1: The Upriver Countries
Analysis
Nov 21, 2024 | 15:54 (UTC)
A picture taken on November 14, 2018 shows a general view of the Rogun hydro-electric dam on the Vakhsh River in southern Tajikistan.
(-/AFP/Getty Images)
Tajikistan on November 16, 2018 inaugurates the USD 3.9 billion hydro-electric power plant, a mega project that will enable the impoverished country to eliminate domestic energy shortages and export electricity to Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Two of Central Asia's poorest countries, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, are attempting to leverage one of their few geographic advantages — control over the headwaters of two major regional rivers — to build new hydropower dams. The proposed dams, which were originally drawn up by the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s, offer the prospect of boosting electricity production both for domestic use and potentially for export to neighboring states.

Financing for the dams has not yet been secured, though Russia has periodically offered some assistance to each country. However, if the projects do proceed, the already tense relations are likely to become even more fraught between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and their richer downriver neighbors, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, which depend on the rivers' waters. While military confrontations are unlikely in the near term, any developments that jeopardize the downriver countries' water supply could prompt a harsh response.

Under the Soviet Union, Central Asia was split into five Soviet republics. All administrative matters in these republics were decided by Moscow, including how the individual republics used and distributed their natural resources. When the Soviet Union dissolved in December 1991, the former republics (now independent states) kept their Soviet-imposed borders, even though they were explicitly designed by Moscow to keep any one state from becoming powerful or independent enough to challenge the Kremlin's central authority. Consequently, these countries are dependent on one another for their natural resources and energy needs, which is a challenge now that each individual country, rather than Moscow, is responsible for managing those resources.

Resource Competition in Central Asia
Portions of the Central Asian steppe — especially Uzbekistan — were endowed with fertile soil and favorable weather patterns, making them well suited for agriculture, though the arid land requires irrigation. To create agricultural zones and provide sufficient water for other uses in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, the Soviet Union constructed extensive irrigation networks to redirect water from Central Asia's two largest rivers, the Syr Darya originating in Tajikistan and the Amu Darya originating in Kyrgyzstan.

Water diversion measures combined with inefficient infrastructure and general overuse have caused the rivers' drainage point, the Aral Sea, to lose about 75 percent of its water volume since the 1960s and become increasingly saline. This has reduced the sea's ability to provide a moderating effect on temperatures and has resulted in the desertification of the surrounding areas. Considering the increasing demand on and the possible reduction of the rivers' glacial sources, the already-strained water situation in the region looks set to grow tenser in the coming years.

Former Soviet republics now independent states) are dependent on one another for their natural resources and energy needs, which is a challenge now that each individual country, rather than Moscow, is responsible for managing those resources.
This is the context under which Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan hope to build two new hydropower plants that could further reduce the water flow to downriver countries. Bishkek and Dushanbe want the power plants to expand their electrical production capacity, which could lessen their energy dependence on downstream countries, especially natural gas from Uzbekistan. These projects could eventually even allow the countries to export excess energy to China, Afghanistan and Pakistan if the necessary infrastructure is built, which would be extremely valuable for the two historically poor countries.

Proposed Hydroelectric Projects
Kyrgyzstan's proposed Kambarata-1 hydropower plant would be built on the Naryn River, a tributary of the Syr Darya, while Tajikistan's proposed Rogun hydropower plant would be built on the Vakhsh River, a tributary of the Amu Darya. These are two of the largest hydroelectric projects ever planned in Central Asia, with potential generating capacities of 1,900 megawatts and 3,600 megawatts, respectively.

Kambarata-1 and Rogun were designed by the Soviets to improve water management in Central Asia. Two significant sources of the region's river water are snowmelt and glacial thaw, and thus the flow slows in the winter months while becoming more rapid when temperatures heat up in the summer. Kambarata-1 and Rogun are designed to be able to better control the fluctuation of water flow by retaining water in reservoirs and releasing it when it is most needed. But this introduces competing goals for reservoir use: While the downriver areas need more water in the summer to irrigate their crops, the upriver regions require more water in the winter to generate hydroelectricity.

Both proposed dam projects have received external funding to carry out feasibility studies, but the estimated high costs of the dams make it impossible for Dushanbe and Bishkek to pay for them on their own. Kambarata-1 will cost an estimated $2-4 billion, while Rogun is projected at $2-3 billion. Considering Kyrgystan's gross domestic product was $5.9 billion in 2011 and Tajikistan's was $6.5 billion, foreign investment will be essential for the projects. Russia has proposed creating a joint-stock company with Kyrgyzstan to build Kambarata-1 and also paid for its feasibility study. But while Kyrgyz President Almaz Atambayev said construction would begin by spring 2013, the funding needed to begin, much less complete, the project has yet to materialize.

Water Resources in Central Asia
Water Resources in Central Asia
In the past, Russia has backed out on promises to fund such projects in Central Asia. At the end of 2004, Russian aluminum company RUSAL expressed interest in finishing construction of Tajikistan's Rogun hydropower plant, which the Soviets had begun in 1976 but never completed. RUSAL pulled out of the project, ostensibly over disagreements regarding the design of the dam and how much electricity should be allocated for residential versus industrial use. The actual reason for the withdrawal, however, was that Russia did not want to seriously provoke Uzbekistan by building a hydropower plant of such size.

Since then, however, the project has been revived. Projected to become the world's tallest dam if it is built to Tajikistan's specifications, Rogun is currently undergoing its second feasibility study, funded by the World Bank. The Tajik government raised less than $200 million for the project by forcing citizens to buy shares in it. But the rest of the $2 billion needed to build the project will likely have to come from foreign investment. Whether the funding for either dam comes from Russia will likely depend on how far the Kremlin feels it can push Uzbekistan rather than how interested it is in being a stakeholder in these two hydroelectric power plants.

While neither project will likely be completed in the near future, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan have all expressed their concerns about how these new hydropower dams could affect them. These countries are worried that if the dams are built, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan will hoard water in reservoirs during the summer months (when the downriver agricultural regions need it most) so the upriver countries can release it in the winter to generate hydroelectric power.

If the Rogun dam were to be built, it could affect the Vakhsh River's water flow — but this impact would likely not be felt for years. Some estimates indicate it could take more than a decade to fill Rogun's reservoir, during which time the river would probably only experience an estimated 1-2 percent reduction in its water flow, with less water lost the slower it is filled. Once the reservoir is filled, however, downriver countries could expect a worst-case scenario (where the dam is generating full electricity) of an estimated 18 percent reduction in water flow during the summer months and an estimated 54 percent increase in water flow in the winter, which could cause flooding downriver depending on how Tajikistan decides to control the timing of water release.

While dam-related variations in water flow are unlikely to become an issue in the near future, since the completion of these projects is many years off, the three downstream countries have already expressed their hostility to the projects. If the two hydroelectric power plants come closer to fruition, economic and political tensions between the upriver and downriver countries would almost certainly escalate. Uzbekistan in particular is capable of cutting off natural gas exports to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Military confrontations, while unlikely, could not be ruled out since a dramatic decline in water supplies could force the downriver countries to respond as a matter of national security. This could risk inviting retaliation from larger powers like Russia, which has extensive economic and security interests in Central Asia and wants to prevent any of the countries there, particularly Uzbekistan, from emerging as a regional hegemon.

Looking Ahead
The likelihood that Kambarata-1 or Rogun will be built is contingent on each project acquiring the foreign financing that Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are seeking. If either project receives the necessary funding, Bishkek and Dushanbe are still years away from developing a substantial hydropower industry. Still, tensions in the region over water supplies will likely continue to escalate, especially if downriver countries perceive a serious and imminent threat to their water supplies.