Iran

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/17053/iran-pursuit-nuclear-weapons

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/17090/iran-biden-weak-president

edited to add:

https://www.nationalreview.com/news/iranian-supreme-leader-threatens-to-raise-uranium-enrichment/?utm_source=email&utm_medium=breaking&utm_campaign=newstrack&utm_term=23015457

[Crafty_Dog]

I am a huge fan of George Friedman but this effort of his IMHO has some serious squishiness-- first and foremost its failure to mention that the Obama-Kerry-Biden deal would openly allow Iran to go nuclear after a certain number of years (12?).  It also fails to mention the $150B that the deal gave Iran up front.
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America’s Iran Strategy
By: George Friedman
President Barack Obama’s administration had a primary goal in the Middle East: It did not want Iran to become a nuclear power. It did not want Israel to be forced to launch a preemptive strike against a nuclear Iran, triggered by the public declaration of Iran’s intentions against Israel. American allies in the region – Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, among others – were frightened that a nuclear Iran might compel them into a subordinate position. And the Obama administration, dedicated to military disengagement from the region, was afraid that to calm regional fears, the U.S. would have to take military action against Iran’s emerging power, with dangerous consequences.

Obama’s administration engineered an agreement with Iran under which Iran would agree to stop its nuclear weapons program and permit international technical monitoring of the program. Implicit in the agreement was that if Iran complied with the terms of the deal, broader agreements would emerge, allowing Iran to normalize its relationship with the outside world and increase its economic well-being.

The agreement was criticized at the time for three reasons. First, Iran was capable of both permitting inspections and evading them, by shifting the location of the nuclear program. Iran has many caves and tunnels where nuclear activities could be concealed. Inspections are focused on known facilities because of the dearth of inspectors and the breadth of the country. In other words, inspections appear to be a reliable guarantee, but their reliability is inherently uncertain. Second, the agreement did not address Iran’s relations with other countries in the region, against which Iran has carried out covert and overt operations. So it did not do anything against Iran in Syria, Lebanon or Yemen, nor did it do anything about Iranian destabilization of and strikes against other countries, such as its attack on a Saudi refinery. Finally, it did not address Iran’s missile program, which seems to involve missiles of multiple ranges and payloads. If Iran were building a nuclear-capable medium-range missile, as some claimed, then there was a mystery. If Iran were abandoning its nuclear program, why spend scarce resources on these kinds of missiles?

The Obama administration’s position was that all of these were important issues but that reaching a long-term understanding with Iran required a step-by-step approach. If the U.S. sought everything at once, it would achieve nothing, and the goal was to use economic incentives to draw Iran forward. His critics said that the patient approach left the door open to dangerous offensive operations, and that, as protecting the agreement would inevitably become a political objective, Iranian actions that violated American interests but not the agreement would be overlooked with the hope of preserving the nuclear deal. There were arguments to be made on both sides, but the core issues were that the guarantees against a continued nuclear program were uncertain in their performance and that the agreement left Iran with significant nonnuclear opportunities.

An element of Donald Trump’s election campaign was his opposition to the Iran nuclear deal. He unilaterally insisted that the agreement go beyond nuclear weapons to the missiles that delivered them. Rather than using an incentive of further economic relations, he imposed significant sanctions on Iran and made their removal the incentive. In other words, where Obama sought not to weaken Iran economically but to focus entirely on the issue at hand, Trump chose to weaken Iran economically in order to expand the goals of the agreement to cover missiles.

Trump also sought to decrease Iran’s foreign operations, or at least increase the cost, by supporting a system of relations, beginning with Israel and the United Arab Emirates and expanding to other countries, that was designed to both isolate Iran and limit its ability to play off one Arab country against another. By the end of the Trump administration, the map of the region had shifted, and with it Iran’s position. Its economy was in steep decline, the hostility of the Arab world was consolidated, and the assumption was that between coalitions and economic costs, the Iranian political and military operations in the Arab world would decline, something not yet clearly visible. But economic weakness and a degree of political unrest in Iran are obvious.

Joe Biden ran against Trump’s Iran policy, as Trump had run against Obama’s. All of this gave the shift a political dimension. Trump favored the actions he took, but he also welcomed them as an attack on Obama’s position. Similarly, while we don’t have a clear sense of Biden’s strategy on Iran, he has a political imperative to reject Trump’s policy.

The Middle East is at the moment a radically different place than it was at Obama’s or Trump’s point of decision. The coalition that was formed had the American imprimatur, even if the mechanics of the creation were primarily in the hands of local powers. But now Biden must consider not only the nuclear deal and Iran but also the effects on the way in which recognition of Israel formed a coalition that even countries that have not formally recognized Israel are part of. The foundation of this organization arises from hostility to Iran, and the fear that when it reemerges, its power will swamp the region. Israel fears Iran’s nuclear weapons, the Saudis fear Iranian drones and Iranian proxies in Yemen, and so on. On the whole, these countries welcomed Trump’s revision of Obama’s approach for the reasons given.

The inclination of Biden, given the American political process, is to reinstitute Obama's strategy and repudiate Trump’s. But the problem is that a return to Obama’s strategy, with the withdrawal of sanctions, would reasonably quickly revive the Iranian economy, strengthen the Iranian hardliners who refused to bend in the face of Trump’s policy and would then be vindicated, and create a massive crisis in the Middle East.

There are those who would argue that the Abraham Accords are a house of cards unable to hold together. That may be true. But it is there now, and it is there because of Iran. A shift in U.S. policy on sanctions will be read in this region as the U.S. moving to a pro-Iran position, a view that might not be true but will appear to be the case. Israel will see it as a mistake, and the UAE and the rest of the Sunni world will argue that whatever the subjective intent of the Biden administration, the objective fact is that its policy is strengthening Iran. And as a result, the anti-Iran construct that is seen as American in its root will in fact fragment. And in a fragmenting Middle East, war is a frequent accompaniment.

Biden obviously doesn’t want this, and his pledge to resurrect Obama’s nuclear deal will pass. Consider that if Israel draws the conclusion that the Abraham system is of no importance and allows it to fragment, Israel will conclude that the management of the Iranian threat is solely an Israeli problem, and Israel strategically cannot allow the threat to evolve. The Saudis, who are facing the Iranians in many ways and who are being investigated by the Biden administration for human rights violations, will have to pick a new direction. It is not in the American interest to have allies (however distasteful to the current ideology) start choosing new directions. At the moment the region is relatively peaceful. If Iran were let out of its box without major concessions and controls, the region would go back to looking how it normally looks. And given Biden’s opposition to “America First,” instability there will draw the U.S. in.

Like every American president, Biden has his campaign position and then his governing position, just as the campaign advisers who were awarded senior positions find themselves more liability than asset. In any case, if he moves ahead to serious talks with Iran, the rest of the Middle East will be extremely frightened. A U.S.-Iran entente – which is how it will be seen – is not compatible with a U.S.-Israel or U.S.-Arab alliance. Candidates may speak of things that become impossible in the light of victory. They get over it.

It may seem as if I am charting a history based on the whims of a president. But presidents are simply trapped by reality. Put another way, the U.S. sought to pacify the Middle East. One fear was Iranian nuclear weapons, and the first focus was on them. But the concern about Iran in the region went beyond nuclear weapons to other dimensions of Iranian power. The U.S. then generated a broader response, from sanctions to a regional coalition. But the coalition is fragile, and concerns about Iran’s nuclear program are still there. A return to the initial agreement is attractive, but since it will unleash other forces the U.S. doesn’t want to see, the problem becomes more complex.

The U.S. had to withdraw major military force from the region as the initial intervention failed to achieve its goals. (MARC:  Strongly disagree; the withdrawal by Obama-Biden threw away the stability that had been finally achieved and enabled ISIS, etc) But the U.S. can’t be indifferent to the region because it is a strategic part of Eurasia, and other great powers can take advantage of it. In the long run, it is easier to manipulate the region to American ends than to dislodge another major power, or face the emergence of a regional power destabilizing the region. And thus we see Israel and the Arab coalition. Speaking of presidents is a useful marker, but their policies are crafted by reality, not the other way around.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2021/02/23/south-korea-to-unlock-7-billion-in-iranian-assets-after-consultations-with-biden-admin/

[Crafty_Dog]

What I Learned in an Iranian Prison
U.S. foreign policy isn’t to blame for the mullahs’ deep-rooted hatred of America and Americans.
By Wang Xiyue
Updated Feb. 24, 2021 4:07 pm ET



Iran, Europe and many American progressives are pressuring the Biden administration to revive the 2015 nuclear deal known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA. Official groupthink has coalesced around a singularly misguided belief: The U.S. has so badly mistreated Iran in the past that it must engage and appease the Islamic Republic now. I understand this view because I was once taught to believe it. This mindset is what convinced me in 2016 that I could safely do research for my dissertation in Iran. My optimism was misplaced. Not long after I arrived, I was imprisoned by Iran’s brutal regime and held hostage for more than three years.

When I went to Iran, I shared the prevailing academic view of the Middle East. I had absorbed the oft-repeated lesson that political Islam arose in response to Western colonialism and imperialism, and that the West—particularly America’s Middle East behavior—was chiefly responsible for the region’s chaos. My professors taught that the U.S. had treated Iran with a mixture of Orientalist condescension and imperialist aggression since the founding of the Islamic Republic in 1979. I believed America’s role in the 1953 coup that removed Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh explained everything that had gone wrong in Iran. Convinced that the mullahs’ hostility toward the U.S. was exaggerated, I often dismissed allegations of the regime’s malign behavior as American propaganda.


Since it was obvious that American foreign policy itself was the problem, and that the regime would happily normalize relations once the U.S. pivoted away from disrespect, I assumed I’d be left alone in Iran if I remained apolitical and focused on historical research. Imagine my shock when the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence arrested me on false espionage charges in August 2016, shortly after the implementation of the JCPOA—during what appeared to be a period of rapprochement between the U.S. and Iran. I was thrown into solitary confinement, forced to confess things my interrogator knew I had not done, and sentenced to 10 years in prison.

My interrogator made clear that my sole “crime” was being an American. He told me I was to be used as a pawn in exchange for U.S.-held Iranian prisoners and the release of frozen Iranian assets. (I was released in a 2019 prisoner swap.)


My terrible 40-month imprisonment was a period of intense re-education about the relationship between Iran and the U.S. The Islamic Republic is an ambitious power, but not a constructive one. It’s a spoiler, projecting influence by exporting revolution and terrorism via its proxies in the Middle East. Domestically, the mullahs have failed to deliver on their political and economic promises to the Iranian people, on whom they maintain their grip through oppression.


Nothing I’d learned during my years in the ivory towers of academia had prepared me for the reality I encountered in an Iranian prison. I learned what many Iranians already know: The regime’s hostility toward the U.S. isn’t reactive, but proactive, rooted in a fierce anti-Americanism enmeshed in its anti-imperialist ideology. As I witnessed firsthand, Tehran isn’t interested in normalizing relations with Washington. It survives and thrives on its self-perpetuated hostility against the West; a posture that has been integral to the regime’s identity.

The regime didn’t regard President Obama’s engagement as a goodwill gesture, but rather as an “iron fist under a velvet glove.” Iran’s revolutionary regime retains power through conspiracy and intrigue, and views everything through that lens. The notion that it will be difficult for the U.S. to regain Iran’s trust after quitting the JCPOA is incorrect. The Iranian regime has never trusted the U.S., and never will.

When I was being interrogated in Evin Prison in summer 2016, my interrogator boasted that he and his hard-line colleagues were eager to see Donald Trump elected, not because the regime viewed him as the type of pragmatic leader they could deal with, but because it would justify a more confrontational stance against the Great Satan.

The menace of the Islamic Republic can’t be appeased. It must be countered and restrained. Only the U.S. has the capacity to lead such an endeavor. For 42 years Iran has demonstrated that it changes its behavior only in response to strength in the form of American-led international pressure. If the Biden administration returns to the JCPOA without extracting concessions from Tehran beyond the nuclear threat, it will relinquish all U.S. leverage over the regime.

Diplomacy can’t succeed without leverage. Only by showing strength of will can President Biden hope for genuine progress in containing the Iranian threat to peace.

Mr. Wang is a doctoral candidate in history at Princeton and a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

[Crafty_Dog]

I regard this piece as profoundly foolish and glib in its denial of Iran's nuclear ambitions and in its indifference to whether we keep Trump's economic pressure on Iran.  Once Iran gets its nukes, it will have an umbrella against retaliation for expansion of its misdeeds.
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February 26, 2021
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For Iran, Nuclear Weapons Can Wait
There’s a lot more to Iranian ambitions than nuclear weapons.
By: Hilal Khashan


The last two years have been the toughest for Iran since its 1979 revolution. Most Iranians have been negatively affected by Western sanctions as well as the ongoing pandemic. At least one-third of the population lives in abject poverty. Malnutrition is rampant, especially among children in rural areas. Meat is becoming increasingly scarce, and the price of food staples such as rice, grains and legumes is skyrocketing, with the consumer price index for food increasing by 67 percent in January compared to the previous year. More than 1.2 million Iranians lost their jobs because of COVID-19, divorce rates have risen by 7 percent and the number of people treated in rehabilitation centers has jumped to 663,000 from 417,000.

Because of Iran’s mounting economic and social problems, the mere prospect of reviving the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), following U.S. President Joe Biden’s election last year, is a godsend for Iran. While the acquisition of nuclear weapons continues to be a strategic objective for Iran, the country is in no rush to achieve it, considering that doing so could jeopardize its ability to resuscitate its economy, consolidate its regional influence and build its conventional military might. In the immediate term, its main objectives are to salvage the regime, improve standards of living and relaunch the economy, while also maintaining and accelerating its regional gains. Nuclear weapons can wait.

What Iran Really Wants

Over the past six centuries, Iran has suffered military defeats, territorial losses, foreign power manipulation and, in the 20th century, occupation by British and Soviet troops. It also, however, has a long history of territorial expansion and imperial drive. The Sasanian Empire (224-226) seized the Caucasus, the entire coastline of the Arabian Peninsula, Egypt and Asia Minor, and even reached India’s doorstep. In the 16th century, the Safavids built an empire that included the Caucasus, though they gradually lost territory to czarist Russia, and their Qajar successors lost what territory remained. The revolutionary clerics regretted dismantling Iran’s nuclear program and its formidable army and air force, which the shah had built with U.S. backing, arguing that Iraq would not have attacked Iran in 1980 had they remained intact.

Sasanian and Safavid Empires
(click to enlarge)

Iran now wants to become a regional hegemon once again. Its leaders see Iran as entitled to become the leader of the Middle East, or at least an equal of Israel, which is currently the region’s only real power. Its challenge, however, is that Israel is resistant to having any nation rise to its level, and so has actively pushed back against Iranian expansionism. But the Iranians are playing the long game and will bide their time. As the Israelis understand better than most, there’s a lot more to Iranian ambitions than nuclear weapons.

The Nuclear Issue in Perspective

Every U.S. administration since the Iranian Revolution has been keen on avoiding direct military confrontation with Iran. Like former President Donald Trump, Biden sees the divisive issues with Tehran – its nuclear and missile programs and burgeoning regional influence – as part of the same package. The only difference between the two presidents is that Biden is more flexible, believing that there’s no need to weaken an already emaciated Iran.

Biden is keen on resolving the standoff over Iran’s nuclear program through diplomacy and is focused on reaching a better deal than the JCPOA, which in reality would have only delayed Tehran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. The Biden administration knows that Iran’s ballistic missile program and regional policy are nonnegotiable, and believes Tehran’s regional meddling is beyond the scope of the nuclear talks, important as it may be for Middle East stability. Trump, on the other hand, chose to apply a maximum pressure campaign, hoping to force Iran to sign a new, more rigorous deal that would further slow Iran’s nuclear program while also downsizing its ballistic missile program and curtailing its regional adventurism.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is also opposed to merely renegotiating the nuclear deal. But Israel’s threats of military action are more posturing than warning of imminent conflict. Realizing that Biden cannot ignore Israel’s concerns, Israel is trying to secure more concessions from Iran by voicing its opposition to nuclear talks. Iranian officials are also adept at the politics of brinkmanship. As expected, they reached a temporary, last-minute deal with the International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure Iran’s nuclear sites were still monitored even after it suspended compliance with the JCPOA’s voluntary protocol. Last December, Iran’s parliament approved a bill to stop cooperation with the agency and increase uranium enrichment to 20 percent. Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif said that the government respected the parliament’s decision but would continue cooperation with the atomic agency, adding that the parliament’s decision is reversible if the U.S. cooperates.

For Iran, acquiring nuclear weapons is not an immediate goal. The dispute over its nuclear program has been ongoing for more than 15 years, and it hasn’t manufactured a nuclear weapon yet. Indeed, lifting sanctions takes precedence over everything else – even acquiring nuclear arms – because the ruling mullahs want to modernize the economy and provide for the basic needs of Iran’s restive population.

There is a real concern, however, that lifting sanctions would enable Iran to consolidate its regional presence and further weaken embattled Saudi Arabia, which has been hit by several drone attacks from Iran-linked groups like the Houthis in Yemen. The Houthis are launching the final battle in Yemen’s oil-rich Marib province, the last remaining bastion of control for President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi. If their offensive succeeds, Yemen as we know it would no longer exist. The United Arab Emirates already controls the south, the Houthis would tighten their grip on the north, and Saudi Arabia would emerge as the biggest loser.

Territorial Control in Yemen
(click to enlarge)

But Washington is gradually losing interest in Saudi Arabia as a country of vital national interest. Former President Barack Obama once called Saudi Arabia a free-rider, without directly naming it, and Trump, during his 2016 election campaign, said, “If Saudi Arabia was without the cloak of American protection, I don't think it would be around.” For his part, Biden said the U.S. would halt arms shipments to Saudi Arabia and terminate support for its war in Yemen. He also withdrew Trump’s letters to the U.N. that led to the reinstatement of Iran sanctions and expressed his willingness to work with the Europeans to reach a new nuclear deal. Biden’s Middle East policy seeks to reduce regional tensions, deal separately with various explosive issues and introduce an elaborate system of balances that does not exclude Iran. Regardless of who rules Iran, the country is essential to Washington’s balance of power policy.

Indeed, it’s too late to end Iran’s meddling in its neighbors’ affairs anyway. In Iraq, the government says that the pro-Iran Popular Mobilization Forces report to the Ministry of Interior. They receive their budget from the central government in Baghdad – which amounted to $1.6 billion in 2020. In Lebanon, Hezbollah is part of the political system and runs Lebanon along with its Maronite Christian ally, the Free Patriotic Movement. In Yemen, the Houthis have been removed from the U.S. list of terrorist groups.

Iran's Sphere of Influence
(click to enlarge)

Iran will resist any attempt to cut it off from its regional proxies, without whose support it cannot realize its regional ambitions. Tehran’s Shiite Arab allies are more crucial than its nuclear program for expanding its sphere of influence. Iran is still militarily weak, and it needs allies who can fight on its behalf. The more Iran organizes military exercises and announces breakthrough defense innovations, the more it reveals its inability and unwillingness to get involved in a general war. As it has been doing since the revolution, it prefers to fight through proxies, be they in Lebanon, Yemen, Syria or Iraq.

Inevitable Domestic Change

Despite the facade of cohesion, state resolve and military preparedness, Iran is more vulnerable than ever. Endemic bureaucratic corruption, poor economic planning, austere sanctions and the pandemic have nearly crippled the country and exposed its weakness. Iran’s reformists accuse power-wielding conservatives of benefiting from the sanctions through their parallel economy, whose profits they claim run around $25 billion annually. Iran’s ruling conservatives probably face more problems at home than abroad, with many Iranians frustrated by the lack of action and preferring a secular and democratic political system to replace the Wilayat al-Faqih system. Some Iranian intellectuals, academics, political activists and former officials even expressed hope that Trump would win a second term to increase the pressure on the regime.

Over the past 50 years, Iranian society has changed markedly. Even though 90 percent of its population is Shiite, according to statistical yearbooks, only 32 percent describe themselves as Shiites. Most others profess no religious affiliation or see themselves as agnostic, atheist or Zoroastrian. The regime is not facing an existential threat, and it can rely on its extensive coercive powers to suppress protests. The dilemma of the ayatollah and the regime is that they are ruling a population that not only resents their religious ideology but is continuously drifting away from them.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/17089/iran-appeasing-mullahs

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/17109/nuclear-inspectors-iran

[Crafty_Dog]

second post

Israeli officials say Iran was behind the mysterious blast.
By: Geopolitical Futures

Pointing fingers. Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz blamed Iran for an explosion on an Israeli-owned cargo ship in the Gulf of Oman over the weekend. The ship is currently in the port of Dubai undergoing repairs. Israeli Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi said the incident is a reminder that the threat posed by Iran is not just nuclear. Meanwhile, Israel carried out its own attacks over the weekend, targeting Iran-backed militias in southern Damascus, according to the Syrian military.

[Crafty_Dog]

   
The US, Iran and Bargaining Positions
By: George Friedman
The Iranian government has announced that it will not attend the first round of negotiations over restoring the agreement that limited its ability to develop nuclear weapons. Tehran says sanctions imposed by the administration of former President Donald Trump must first be removed for talks to begin.

Obviously, this is a tactic meant to improve its bargaining position with the United States. But that position must be credible, and read that way by both sides. Iran reads President Joe Biden to be particularly vulnerable on this issue. Biden has long maintained that abandoning the nuclear agreement was a mistake that he would correct at the first opportunity.

Biden therefore needs to resurrect the original agreement or replace it with something similar. Iran understands U.S. politics as well as anyone, and it has proved to be an excellent negotiator. If officials believe Biden must restore the agreement, they will make it as difficult as possible.

One of the best ways to negotiate is to appear irrational. Rational actors believe themselves to be reasonable and operate under the assumption that their counterparts believe them to be rational too. Negotiators might well be rational, but showing their cards in a reasonable way gives the counterpart a roadmap of how to calm the talks. Iran is a master at appearing suicidal, when, in fact, it is as scared of nuclear annihilation as any other country. Religious fanaticism about the annihilation of Israel, for example, doesn’t comport with reality. The Israelis have a substantial nuclear arsenal and years of experience gaming possible Iranian threats. Any planned Iranian attack would be detected early in the process, and Israel would strike preemptively. In other words, the worst place Iran could be is close to completing a nuclear weapon, and its leaders know it.

The value of a nuclear program, on the other hand, is substantial. It shows an attempt to possess a nuclear weapon without giving any indication of already having one. It is the program that is perfect for Iran. It frightens without forcing anyone to take risky actions. The tools for building a program are lying on the floor with apparently earnest efforts to put it together. Iran gets to negotiate concessions for not building a nuke, even without itself being directly threatened by nuclear annihilation.

Meanwhile, it also tries to assert its power in a more effective way – by providing support, for example, for the Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps forces in Syria, and by becoming deeply involved in Iraq. Iran’s most effective foreign policy tactic in the region is delivering covert support to non-Iranian forces that can bring pressure on Sunni Arab states, Israel and U.S. forces still deployed in the region. Nuclear weapons are a notional concept designed to magnify Iranian power. Their real power rests on their ability to destabilize certain countries. This strategy carries with it only minimal risk compared to building a nuclear weapon and the missiles to deliver it. Iran wants the ability to go nuclear without going nuclear while engaging Israel, the Arabs and the Americans with covert operations that are difficult to counter.

Refusing to discuss the old nuclear treaty serves two purposes. It tests the new American president to see how badly he needs this agreement, and it allows the Iranians to escalate their actual priorities by using the American desire for a resurrected agreement. There’s no real downside for Iran. What Tehran needs more than anything is the lifting of sanctions. The sanctions imposed on Iran after Trump abrogated the nuclear agreement are wrecking its economy and, in turn, generating political opposition to the architects of the first agreement. (This was compounded by the budding coalition between Sunni Arab states and Israel, a nominally defensive alignment that could, as Iran well knows, turn offensive quickly.)

Politically, if Biden wants to make good on his promises, he needs to resurrect some version of the old treaty. The Iranians read this need as an opportunity to extract concessions, particularly removing sanctions but also, in the long run, minimizing the threat from the forces across the Persian Gulf. These are critical to Iran.

Biden’s problem is that he has not yet begun to govern. The first few months of any new administration is an extension of the campaign. Thus, Biden ordered an airstrike against Iran-backed militias in Syria to demonstrate that he is willing to strike at their prized covert operations. The Iranians are watching carefully to see if the left-wing of the party governs or if the center governs. Similarly, following his campaign commitment to human rights, Biden went after Saudi leader Mohammed bin Salman – who, according to U.S. intelligence, authorized the murder of Jamal Khashoggi – before trying to heal whatever breach in relations it might have caused.

The United States needs the Israel-Arab coalition to block Iranian covert ambitions, so it needs Saudi Arabia to be part of it. All presidents must figure out how to square the circle of what they promised to do and what they must do. And in this sense, Biden has a problem: He is pledged to resurrect an agreement that did not really address the problem of Iran, and he must do it to show the Europeans that he is not Trump while making clear to the Iranians that he is not giving away Trump’s strategy without making a fundamental change in America’s Iranian policy. And Iran will make this as hard as possible for him.

[Crafty_Dog]

Opportunity Beckons in the Mideast
The Biden administration called Iran’s bluff early. It should continue to play the strong hand it was dealt.
By Jared Kushner
March 14, 2021 3:35 pm ET

The geopolitical earthquake that began with the Abraham Accords hasn’t ended. More than 130,000 Israelis have visited Dubai since President Trump hosted the peace deal’s signing this past September, and air travel opened up for the first time in August. New, friendly relations are flowering—wait until direct flights get going between Israel and Morocco. We are witnessing the last vestiges of what has been known as the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The conflict’s roots stretch back to the years after World War II, when Arab leaders refused to accept the creation of the state of Israel and spent 70 years vilifying it and using it to divert attention from domestic shortcomings. But as more Muslims visit Israel through Dubai, images are populating on social media of Jews and Muslims proudly standing together. More important, Muslims are posting pictures of peaceful visits to the Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, blowing a hole in the propaganda that the holy site is under attack and Israelis prevent Muslims from praying there. Every time Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu tweets something positive in Arabic about an Arab leader, it reinforces that Israel is rooting for the success of the Arab world.

One of the reasons the Arab-Israeli conflict persisted for so long was the myth that it could be solved only after Israel and the Palestinians resolved their differences. That was never true. The Abraham Accords exposed the conflict as nothing more than a real-estate dispute between Israelis and Palestinians that need not hold up Israel’s relations with the broader Arab world. It will ultimately be resolved when both sides agree on an arbitrary boundary line.

The Biden administration is making China a priority in its foreign policy, and rightly so—one of Mr. Trump’s greatest legacies will be changing the world’s view of China’s behavior. But it would be a mistake not to build on the progress in the Middle East. Eliminating the ISIS caliphate and bringing about six peace agreements—between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, Morocco and Kosovo, plus uniting the Gulf Cooperation Council—has changed the paradigm.

During his 2017 visit to Saudi Arabia, Mr. Trump called on Muslim-majority countries to root out extremist ideology. As the custodian of the two holiest sites in Islam, Saudi Arabia has made significant progress in combating extremism, which has greatly reduced America’s risk of attack and created the environment for today’s new partnerships. In Mr. Trump’s final deal before leaving office, he brokered the end of the diplomatic conflict between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, restoring an important alliance to counter Iran.

The Biden administration, however, has one asset that the Trump administration never had—a relationship with Iran. While many were troubled by the Biden team’s opening offer to work with Europe and rejoin the Iran deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, I saw it as a smart diplomatic move. The Biden administration called Iran’s bluff. It revealed to the Europeans that the JCPOA is dead and only a new framework can bring stability for the future. When Iran asked for a reward merely for initiating negotiations, President Biden did the right thing and refused.

Mr. Trump has said that Iran has never won a war but never lost a negotiation. This negotiation is high-stakes and, thanks to his policies, America holds a strong hand. Iran is feigning strength, but its economic situation is dire and it has no ability to sustain conflict or survive indefinitely under current sanctions. America should be patient and insist that any deal include real nuclear inspections and an end to Iran’s funding of foreign militias.

If the threat from Iran decreases, so can the region’s military budgets. Imagine how many lives could be improved if that money, an outsize share of gross domestic product, were invested in infrastructure, education, small business and impoverished communities.

Following the new road map will prevent the Biden administration from repeating the mistakes of the past and unlock opportunities for U.S. businesses. On Friday the U.A.E. announced a $10 billion fund to invest in Israel; the Arab world is no longer boycotting the Jewish state but betting that it will thrive. There are also several more countries on the brink of joining the Abraham Accords, including Oman, Qatar and Mauritania. These relationships should be pursued aggressively—every deal is a blow to those who prefer chaos.

Most important, normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel is in sight. The kingdom dipped a toe in the water by granting overflight rights to Israel and, most recently, allowing an Israeli racing team to participate in the Dakar Rally. The Saudi people are starting to see that Israel is not their enemy. Relations with Israel are in the Saudi national interest and can be achieved if the Biden administration leads.

I was touched when I read in the Associated Press of a Jewish man who said he felt more comfortable wearing a yarmulke in Dubai than in France. The estrangement between Jews and Muslims in the Middle East over the past 70 years is not the norm. As Jews and Muslims now travel more freely through the region, they return to the tradition of ages past, when members of the Abrahamic faiths lived peacefully side by side.

The table is set. If it is smart, the Biden administration will seize this historic opportunity to unleash the Middle East’s potential, keep America safe, and help the region turn the page on a generation of conflict and instability. It is time to begin a new chapter of partnership, prosperity and peace.

Mr. Kushner was a senior adviser to President Trump.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.nationalreview.com/2021/03/iran-probably-already-has-the-bomb-heres-what-to-do-about-it/?fbclid=IwAR3Fl8A-4H2eGWbP4mtW5FtFSTivWpq-ld-7sifzrn6Qv7XFJHqHqIoddwQ

[ccp]

are the "great satans "
wait till they get a load of China........

for now they are likely allies ... for now

[DougMacG]

https://www.nationalreview.com/2021/03/iran-probably-already-has-the-bomb-heres-what-to-do-about-it/?fbclid=IwAR3Fl8A-4H2eGWbP4mtW5FtFSTivWpq-ld-7sifzrn6Qv7XFJHqHqIoddwQ

From the article:
"Iran’s nuclear and missile programs are not just indigenous, but are helped significantly by Russia, China, North Korea, and probably Pakistan."

   - I know it's true but isn't it also outrageous?  If we know these rogue nations are helping the world's number one sponsor of terror develop nuclear weapons, isn't our policy toward them a bit lackadaisical?  Hardly shunned, one of those nations, China, is hosting the Olympics, ho hum?  A public relations event of the largest possible scale, and we endorse it?

Are we suicidal watching all this happen and doing nothing about it?  The authors get it but their answer is to harden our targets and build missile defense while Iran and the like build and aim nuclear missiles at us.  What could go wrong?

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/17162/arabs-warning-biden-iran

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/17214/iran-hiding-nuclear-program

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.nationalreview.com/news/state-department-open-to-lifting-sanctions-on-iran-to-restore-nuclear-deal/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=MJ_20210408&utm_term=Jolt-Smart

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-9459427/Israel-launches-cyber-attack-Iran-nuclear-facility-Tehran-decries-act-nuclear-terrorism.html

Better yet!

April 12, 2021   
         
Iran says it was a victim of "nuclear terrorism" during a power outage at it Natanz uranium plant as U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin visited Israel this weekend. The damage occurred as the Biden administration and Iranian officials danced around talks about returning to compliance with the 2015 nuclear deal that had slowed Tehran's progress toward nuclear weapons.

The Sunday blackout followed an explosion at the site "that completely destroyed the independent — and heavily protected — internal power system that supplies the underground centrifuges that enrich uranium," the New York Times reports.

Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, said the explosion was an act of "nuclear terrorism" and called upon the international community to act.

"We will take revenge on the Zionists," Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif told parliament today. "Military and political officials of the Zionist regime have explicitly said they will not allow progress in removal of the unfair sanctions and now they think they reach their goal," he said, according to the Wall Street Journal.

FWIW: Russian officials say they hope whatever happened won't "undermine" progress on nuclear talks, Agence France-Presse reports.

[Crafty_Dog]

second post

Iran’s need to secure sanctions relief in newly restarted nuclear talks will limit its response to the suspected Israeli attack on Iran’s Natanz facility. Any act of Iranian retaliation, however, will increase overall global scrutiny on the negotiations between Tehran and the West. Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility south of Tehran suffered an overnight electricity blackout early April 11 after an explosion reportedly destroyed the internal power system that supplies the underground centrifuges. The timing of the incident follows the first indirect diplomatic engagement between the United States and Iran in three years, and comes amid ongoing tit-for-tat maritime and regional escalations between Israel and Iran. This further indicates the incident was intentional sabotage, with the intent to disrupt Iran’s nuclear program progress, as well as potentially spoil talks between Iran and the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany), which are set to continue in...

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/17273/iran-biden-administration

[DougMacG]

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/17273/iran-biden-administration

Our policy toward Iran [and China, NK and Venezuela] should be regime change.

[DougMacG]

https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/kerry-iran-american-deserve-explanation-michael-pompeo

[ccp]

democrat ketchup barrons

do not need to explain

good luck

with that
while Biden and the Dem mob is in power

their response is always the middle finger to the Right
coumo is governor leader for corona ? 
rahm emanuel gets ambassador ship to japan

we always get the middle finger from the left
biden was always this way
those who keep saying he is/was a moderate are fools

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/17371/biden-iran-temptation

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2021/05/detente-iran-could-unlock-foreign-policy-gold-mine/174107/

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2021/may/23/iran-says-inspectors-may-no-longer-get-nuclear-sit/?utm_source=Boomtrain&utm_medium=subscriber&utm_campaign=newsalert&utm_content=newsalert&utm_term=newsalert&bt_ee=omWp2EpvMoSrw0Z6Vi%2BUMt6XYe9vS0%2FKMd%2FA8U4CjwxeoZ3%2BVC%2FooLOfkKeHgarW&bt_ts=1621770925535

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/17400/iran-will-pursue-nukes

[DougMacG]

https://www.cnbc.com/2021/05/26/iaea-chief-on-iran-nuclear-program-only-countries-making-bombs-are-enriching-at-this-level.html

‘Only countries making bombs’ are enriching uranium at Iran’s level, IAEA chief says

[G M]

https://www.cnbc.com/2021/05/26/iaea-chief-on-iran-nuclear-program-only-countries-making-bombs-are-enriching-at-this-level.html

‘Only countries making bombs’ are enriching uranium at Iran’s level, IAEA chief says

Better start loading up pallets of cash! It's the only option!

[Crafty_Dog]

https://washingtontimes-dc.newsmemory.com/?token=5f8a54c4d53220144bd9141f810b50aa_60b4e22c_6d25b5f&selDate=20210531&goTo=A01&artid=1&utm_medium=Email&utm_campaign=washingtontimes-E-Editions&utm_source=washingtontimes&utm_content=Read-Button

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.zerohedge.com/energy/irans-largest-warship-mysteriously-catches-fire-and-sinks-gulf-oman?utm_campaign=&utm_content=Zerohedge%3A+The+Durden+Dispatch&utm_medium=email&utm_source=zh_newsletter

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/17470/biden-iran-policy-carrots

[Crafty_Dog]

July 8, 2021
View On Website
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Iran’s Pretense of Strength
Iranian threats don’t match up with Iranian actions.
By: Hilal Khashan

Iran presents itself to the outside world as the mighty Islamic Republic, built on strength, perseverance and independence. But in reality, Iran is a weak country. Its military hardware is obsolete, and its economy is hurting. It became a regional power only by default following Iraq’s loss in the 1991 Gulf War and the subsequent crippling blockade. The uprisings that shattered several Arab countries didn’t affect Iran, which then gained a modicum of power and influence in the region, despite its internal weakness. Iran thus succeeded in transforming its mediocre capabilities into assets in a turbulent Middle East, but this should not be confused with real strength.

Iran's Sphere of Influence
(click to enlarge)

Empty Rhetoric

Iranian officials often issue fiery statements against the West threatening violence and retribution for any moves targeting Tehran. A former commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, for example, threatened to level Tel Aviv and Haifa if Israel attacked Iran. In 2018, the IRGC’s commander-in-chief promised to annihilate Israel, saying, “If there is war, the result will be your destruction.” That same year, the head of the Iranian army predicted that Israel would disappear in 25 years. Former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad also threatened to wipe Israel off the map.

But despite their aggressive rhetoric, the Iranians know that acting on their threats could provoke a response they’d rather avoid. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei described the killing of Qassem Soleimani, the commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force, by a U.S. drone in 2020 as a declaration of war and promised to have no mercy on his killers. But Iran’s retaliation – hitting two Iraqi bases housing U.S. troops and having its proxy Popular Mobilization Forces fire rockets at a military base near Baghdad – was a feeble response to the murder of the second-most powerful person in the country.

Indeed, Iran’s leadership understands the rules of the game, and it abides by them. It knows that U.S. President Joe Biden does not want war or regime change in Tehran. Former President Donald Trump committed to withdrawing U.S. troops from the Middle East and, in 2020, ordered that the number of soldiers stationed in Iraq be slashed by one-third.

The Iranians, meanwhile, have also learned lessons from past experience. In 1988, the USS Samuel B. Roberts frigate hit a naval mine laid by Iran in the Persian Gulf during the Tanker War. The U.S. then launched Operation Praying Mantis, which sank six Iranian ships and destroyed two oil rigs. In 2019, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu bragged about the Israeli Air Force’s ability to reach any target in Iran, which could not respond in kind. A year earlier, three Israeli F-35 fighter jets flew over Tehran and returned safely to base. Israel launched hundreds of airstrikes on Iranian convoys loaded with weapons for Hezbollah, and neither Iran nor Hezbollah dared to fight back. Last month, a former Iranian intelligence minister admitted that Israel’s Mossad intelligence agency has penetrated Iran and is increasing its influence, especially among Iran’s minority groups. Israel’s assassination last November of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, known as the father of Iran’s nuclear program, revealed the extent of Iran’s vulnerability to Israeli subversion.

Hungry for Recognition

In 2014, when the U.S. assembled a coalition to try to oust the Islamic State from Mosul, Iraq’s second-largest city, Iran wanted to join it, in part to reduce its global isolation and in part to deflect attention from its nuclear program. The U.S., however, preferred to engage instead with Iran’s proxy group, the Iraq-based Popular Mobilization Forces.

For the anti-IS coalition, there was little direct collaboration with Iran. The U.S. Air Force provided support to an offensive that included Iraqi army troops, peshmergas and PMF units to oust IS from Amerli, a Shiite Turkmen town in northern Iraq some 100 kilometers (60 miles) from Iran’s border. But for the most part, the U.S. opposed Iran’s involvement. Washington’s view was that both the Islamic State and Iran presented serious threats. Its opposition drove Iran to denounce U.S. military action in Syria and Iraq as a violation of their national sovereignty and international law.

Iran claims it defeated IS and other radical Islamic movements in Syria and Iraq. But in Syria, government forces and their Iranian allies were on the defensive until 2015, when the Russian air force joined the fighting. And in Iraq, the decisive factors in the Islamic State’s defeat were the U.S. Air Force and the Kurdish troops on the ground.

Contrary to official claims, Iran is eager for Israeli recognition as an equal regional power. Israel, however, prefers to negotiate peace treaties with Arab countries, not Iran, which had no role in the Arab-Israeli conflict and recognized Israel as a de facto entity in 1950.

To make itself appear more powerful, Iran grossly exaggerates the value of its weapons industry. In 2007, it introduced a copy of the 1950s Northrop F-5 fighter, and in 2014, it replicated a U.S. RQ-170 drone that landed in Iranian territory in 2011. Aviation experts say the Iranian version is nothing more than a propaganda tool. Similar doubts shroud Iran’s Qaher 313, allegedly a fifth-generation stealth plane that looks more like a replica of the F-313 trainer.

Weak Retaliation

Despite their bombastic rhetoric, Iran and its allies regularly fail to retaliate against attacks on their personnel and assets. When Israel killed top Hezbollah military commander Imad Mughniyeh in 2008, Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah said he would destroy the Israeli army, but of course that never happened. Similarly, the PMF condemned last month’s U.S. airstrikes against its bases in the Iraqi-Syrian border area but refrained from retaliating.

For the past two years, Israel has been attacking Iranian ships transporting strategic supplies for the Syrian regime and Houthi rebels in Yemen. Iran calibrates its reaction to avoid casualties or severe damage to Israeli ships. Iran has been exceptionally keen on not sliding into a full-scale war with the U.S. or Israel, cleverly using Iraq’s PMF and Yemen’s Houthis to wage asymmetric attacks on its behalf.

The PMF use unguided rockets and drones against U.S. bases in Iraq to avoid inflicting casualties and provoking retaliation. When firing rockets at the vast U.S. Embassy in Baghdad or military bases housing U.S. troops, the PMF makes sure they land outside the perimeter of the facilities. These attacks are a means of communication, not a serious attempt to inflict harm.

Meanwhile, U.S. sanctions on Iranian oil exports have severely hurt its already weak economy. Iran’s oil exports dropped from 2.8 million barrels per day in 2018 to 300,000 barrels per day in 2020. (They rose recently to 750,000 barrels per day.) Iran responded cautiously by attacking Saudi and Emirati oil tankers in the Persian Gulf because it knows that they would not retaliate, unlike the U.S. and Israel. The Houthis continue to launch frequent attacks on air bases and other military and infrastructure facilities in southwest Saudi Arabia. Members of the PMF in southern Iraq attacked oil facilities in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province in 2019. The Saudis do not respond to provocations from Iraq, and their airstrikes against the Houthis have not affected the Houthis’ control over most of Yemen.

Iran is a country engulfed in economic problems ranging from deep-seated corruption to debilitating U.S. sanctions to economic domination by religious institutions and IRGC-affiliated companies. Its conservative clerics and senior commanding officers have put up a facade of military prowess that has been less than convincing for critically minded Iranians. Still, the regime in Tehran remains secure, despite the occasional protest. The ruling elite seem convinced that Iran has a bright future ahead, while the reformists face an uphill battle to secularize the country.

[Crafty_Dog]

Iran Redux
by Potkin Azarmehr
Special to IPT News
July 16, 2021

https://www.investigativeproject.org/8943/iran-redux

[Crafty_Dog]

Iranian Terror Comes to America
There will be dangerous consequences if Biden doesn’t respond strongly to the kidnapping plot.
By Navid Mohebbi and Cameron Khansarinia
July 20, 2021 6:24 pm ET
\
The foiled kidnapping plot against activist and journalist Masih Alinejad, an Iranian-born U.S. citizen living in New York City, has sparked a wave of outrage. The Justice Department’s indictment and detailed court documents indicate the Islamic Republic’s significant investment in the plot. The most troublesome part of this case, however, has been the Biden administration’s weak public response, which invites more malign behavior from Tehran.

Hundreds of dissidents have been threatened, kidnapped or assassinated since 1979, when the current regime rose to power in Iran. Since 2018, however, the Islamic Republic has carried out its campaign of terror with a new fervor. In 2019, Tehran lured, kidnapped and killed Ruhollah Zam, an Iranian dissident journalist residing in France. In July 2020, the Islamic Republic abducted Jamshid Sharmahd in Dubai and brought him to Iran, where he has been detained ever since. Mr. Sharmad is a lawful permanent resident of the U.S. The regime also abducted Habib Chaab, an Iranian-Swedish political activist, in October 2020.

Like other Iranian activists, the Brooklyn-based Ms. Alinejad has long faced threats for her opposition to the clerical regime. But attacking a U.S. citizen on American soil is something the Islamic Republic hasn’t attempted in more than four decades. Why now?

Iran, pressed to show its strength by the tide of discontent rising among its restive population, is likely taking these actions to send two messages. The first is to the Iranian people: No matter where you flee to, if you speak up, we will find you. This is at a time when antiregime protests are erupting in the country. The second and more important is meant for the U.S.: We will come after your people on your soil, spreading terror and brutality in the belief that, as the regime’s founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, put it, “America can’t do a damn thing against us.”


So far, President Biden has proved Khomeini prescient. His cowed stance is dangerous not only for those residing within the U.S. but for liberty’s advocates all around the world. The plot to kidnap an American citizen from New York has thus far gone unrecognized and uncondemned by Mr. Biden. The one tweet that did come from Secretary of State Antony Blinken didn’t even name Iran as the perpetrator or mention that an American citizen had been threatened on U.S. soil.


Ignoring this threat will have three lasting consequences. First, for dissidents of all types, it sets a horrifying precedent. Those who left their homelands for the promise of safety and freedom are realizing the current administration doesn’t care. If Tehran can be caught trying to kidnap a U.S. citizen in Brooklyn and receive billions of dollars in sanctions relief on the same day the U.S. government announces the foiled plot, what stops the Chinese or Russian government from attempting the same? The Biden administration is putting not only Iranian-Americans but also Cubans, Venezuelans, Hong Kongers and other dissident communities who sought refuge in America in physical danger.

Second, the message to the Iranian negotiating team in Vienna couldn’t be clearer: Washington wants a deal at any cost. Word is already emerging that the Biden administration has made massive concessions to the world’s leading state sponsor of terror in negotiations to return to the now defunct Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. By letting the Islamic Republic get away with the plot against Ms. Alinejad and other dissidents, the U.S. shows there’s nothing it isn’t willing to give away for a deal.

The third, and perhaps most lasting, consequence of ignoring the threat against Ms. Alinejad, is that the world now knows Mr. Biden’s promise to give human rights priority in U.S. foreign policy was nothing more than a slogan. Dictators and tyrants will feel emboldened, realizing there will be no price to pay for abusing their citizens.

The president can avert this. All he needs to do is put serious pressure on Tehran. At the very least, Mr. Biden should halt negotiations in Vienna, expel the remaining diplomats at the Iranian regime’s Interests Section in Washington—the country’s de facto embassy—and open a substantial dialogue with activists, dissidents, and the secular democratic opposition.

The president has a choice to make. He can show that while his administration values diplomacy, it values the lives of Americans more. Or he can shirk his most basic responsibility to keep American citizens safe and let dictators’ sovereignty extend into places like Brooklyn.

Mr. Mohebbi, a former political prisoner in Iran, is policy fellow at the Washington-based National Union for Democracy in Iran, where Mr. Khansarinia is policy director.

[Crafty_Dog]

New Nuclear Deal Would Empower the Iranian Regime
by Hany Ghoraba
IPT News
July 21, 2021

https://www.investigativeproject.org/8945/new-nuclear-deal-would-empower-the-iranian-regime

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2021/07/how-ai-revealing-secrets-irans-nascent-centrifuge-factory/184113/

[DougMacG]

https://hotair.com/jazz-shaw/2021/07/20/did-biden-pull-anti-missile-systems-from-middle-east-as-a-concession-to-iran-n403332

Whatever reason Obama had to coddle the world largest state sponsor of terrorism must be the same reason Biden is doing it.  Too bad they don't tell us what reason that is.

All we know is that coddling Iran is not in America's best interest.

"Did Biden pull anti-missile systems from Middle East as a concession to Iran?"

Why would anyone pull and anti-missile defense system?  Didn't they win the cold war for us?

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/17604/iran-killing-us-eu-silence

[Crafty_Dog]

https://michaelyon.locals.com/upost/917909/report-israel-vows-to-respond-to-iranian-attack-if-us-does-not

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/17611/iran-rouhani-presidency

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/17633/iran-sea-war

[Crafty_Dog]

1) How far is it from Jerusalem to Teheran?

2) How far is it from Teheran to Bagram AF Base?

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/17678/iran-taliban-victory

[G M]

https://www.breitbart.com/asia/2021/09/02/u-s-afghan-military-equipment-iran/

[Crafty_Dog]

The U.S. and Iran. Robert Malley, the U.S. special representative for Iranian affairs, will be in Russia and France until Friday to discuss the Iran nuclear deal. Malley said the U.S. cannot wait forever for Iran to resume talks. His visit to France comes a week after French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian spoke by phone with his Iranian counterpart, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, during which he emphasized the need for Iran to resume nuclear deal negotiations and France’s desire to use its relationship with Iran to achieve a happier outcome. It also comes after Washington hosted Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett to discuss Iran and other regional security issues. Israel’s foreign minister has already been invited to Washington to continue discussions on this matter.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://andmagazine.com/talk/2021/09/18/iranians-to-get-uranium-for-their-nuclear-weapons-courtesy-of-biden-administration/

[Crafty_Dog]

September 30, 2021
View On Website
Open as PDF

    
Prospects for Saudi-Iranian Talks
Both countries have come to the table but hurdles abound.
By: Hilal Khashan

In recent months, regional rivals Iran and Saudi Arabia have been in talks with the aim of improving bilateral relations and maintaining regional security. Their rivalry intensified over the past several years over regional conflicts in which they supported opposing sides. But the competition between them goes back to 1969, when U.S. President Richard Nixon established the Nixon Doctrine, which defined both countries as “twin pillars” of the Middle East but designated Tehran as the guardian of Persian Gulf security. Their political conflict during the shah’s rule became an ideological conflict after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, which Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini planned to export throughout the region. It now plays out in places like Syria and Yemen, where both Riyadh and Tehran are trying to influence regional power dynamics.

Iran's Sphere of Influence
(click to enlarge)

Saudi Misconceptions

In 2007, Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah welcomed the arrival of Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad at the Gulf Cooperation Council summit in Doha. The Gulf countries wanted Ahmadinejad to make clear that Iran had no intention of damaging regional security. Instead, he condescendingly stated repeatedly that the Gulf was Persian and urged GCC states to take advantage of Iran’s vast range of scientific and technical innovations. The summit was a fiasco, and since then, Saudi Arabia has frequently accused Iran of breaching U.N. conventions on national sovereignty and non-intervention in other countries’ domestic affairs.

Gulf Cooperation Council Countries
(click to enlarge)

According to the Saudis, Iran’s meddling is done through proxies like the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq, Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthi rebels in Yemen. However, Riyadh has exaggerated the ties between Iran and the Houthis, making it appear as if Tehran controls the rebels’ actions. In reality, the Houthis are a homegrown movement that emerged in 1992 from the economically marginalized Zaydi sect, which ruled Yemen for a millennium and went to war against the Yemeni government on numerous occasions after a 1962 coup led to the establishment of a republican state. Thus, whereas Tehran created the PMF and Hezbollah, the Houthis existed prior to Iran’s support and do not take orders from Tehran. After the war began in 2014, they even initially sought the support of Saudi Arabia, which chose instead to maintain its ties with the Yemeni government.

Coming to the Table

The first round of talks between Saudi Arabia and Iran occurred in Baghdad last April – though Riyadh denied that the discussions took place. Chief among the issues that need to be resolved is Yemen, where the protracted conflict has tarnished Saudi Arabia’s reputation as a regional power. Houthi ballistic missiles and drones have hit targets in Saudi Arabia, including Aramco’s oil installations. It squandered $700 billion on the war while turning to local and international banks for money and shelving most infrastructure projects related to its Vision 2030 initiative.

While the two countries negotiate this and other issues, Iran is also in talks in Vienna with the U.S., EU and others over the 2015 nuclear deal. It’s no coincidence that the two negotiations are happening simultaneously. The U.S. is keen to avoid reaching a new nuclear deal that the Saudis oppose, as they did the previous one. The Saudis, meanwhile, want to avoid being left in the dark, as they were during secret talks in Oman between the U.S. and Iran that paved the way for the 2015 deal. They understand that Iran wants to negotiate bilaterally and refuses to discuss relations with Riyadh during the Vienna talks to avoid facing international pressure.

Riyadh has two principal reasons for wanting to communicate with Tehran. First, the kingdom is concerned about the consequences of the U.S. withdrawal from the Middle East and about the economic and security ramifications of its own involvement in the Yemeni war. Second, Riyadh cannot count on its GCC partners to back its Iran policy. Saudi Arabia severed diplomatic relations with Iran in 2016 after Iranian demonstrators, angry at the execution of a prominent Shiite cleric, set the Saudi embassy in Tehran on fire. Unwilling to embroil themselves in a full-scale conflict with Iran, the GCC states, with the exception of Bahrain, decided not to follow suit. Instead, they merely recalled their ambassadors in Tehran and canceled a few flights as a gesture of solidarity.

Iran’s main reason for coming to the table is that it’s desperately trying to relaunch its economy, which has been devastated by sanctions and needs a respite from regional and international crises, without compromising its core political objective of regional preeminence. It wants to end U.S. sanctions and is also interested in halting the Gulf countries’ quest for political and economic normalization with Israel, driven in part by their concerns over the specter of Iranian regional hegemony. The Iranians worry that hostilities with most GCC countries will eventually allow Israel to fill the vacuum left by the U.S. exit from the Middle East.

Iran prefers to include Iraq, Qatar and Oman – with whom it shares good relations – in the talks to guarantee compliance with the terms of any agreement. The critical stumbling block is Iran’s meddling in its neighbors’ affairs. It’s keen on getting Saudi Arabia to inform the U.S. that it ironed out this matter with the Iranians – without making a solid commitment to Riyadh.

The French Connection

Complicating this scenario are the French, who are trying to replace the U.S. as the most influential Western power in the Middle East. When the U.S. announced that National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan would visit Riyadh this week to discuss Yemen, French President Emmanuel Marcon immediately called Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman to talk about the deteriorating security and humanitarian situation in Yemen. (The developments came as the Houthis closed in on Marib, Yemen’s hydrocarbon-rich region.) In Lebanon, French cooperation with Iran suddenly made it possible for Lebanon’s political factions to form a Cabinet and end the yearlong stalemate.

France has been a staunch defender of Iran in Europe and in the Vienna talks, primarily because of lucrative business deals the two countries have signed. Before the U.S. imposed sanctions on Iran under the Trump administration, Tehran signed a deal with Airbus worth $25 billion to purchase 118 aircraft and another with French oil firm Total worth $5 billion to develop the South Pars 11 gas field. Paris expects the deals to be reactivated after the sanctions are lifted. In addition, Iran earlier this month pressured Iraq to sign a $25 billion contract with Total to develop oil projects in southern Iraq.

Aware of the opportunistic relationship between France and Iran, Riyadh started economic talks with Paris despite Mohammad bin Salman’s previous reservations concerning the difficulty of making deals with France. The Saudi investment minister recently visited Paris to explore business opportunities with French companies.

What to Expect

Saudi Arabia’s King Salman recently addressed the U.N. General Assembly and expressed hope that talks with Iran would build confidence and reestablish their pre-1979 relations. The government in Tehran has done its best to minimize their points of contention, saying that the negotiations have gone well. But there’s a massive gap between what the Iranians say and what they do. Tehran promised Riyadh it would use its influence with the Houthis to halt their attacks on Saudi territory, but the frequency of their missile and drone strikes hasn’t declined. More troubling is that the Houthis have stepped up their offensive on Yemen’s oil-rich regions to improve their bargaining position ahead of a negotiated settlement to end the war.

Both the Saudis and the Iranians don’t expect a quick fix. The Saudis fear that Iran hasn’t abandoned its historical claim to regional predominance, while the Iranians reject Saudi stereotypes that view them as apostates and violators of the faith. It’s unlikely therefore that they can resolve their long-standing political differences; at best, they can work out an interim agreement with no winner or loser to deal with their pressing domestic issues and improve how the outside world perceives them.

[Crafty_Dog]

Colombia Uncovers Another Iranian Foreign Assassination Campaign
by Potkin Azarmehr
IPT News
October 1, 2021

https://www.investigativeproject.org/9018/colombia-uncovers-another-iranian-foreign

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/17825/nuclear-armed-iran