Iran

[DougMacG]

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2020/04/09/Records-show-Iran-lied-about-making-nuclear-weapons-scientists-say/7361586436298/?ts_tn_int=7

https://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/Shahid_Mahallati_April_8_2020_final.pdf

April 9 (UPI) -- A non-profit global science and security group says in a new report that Iran has built a plant to produce nuclear weapons despite its insistence that all its atomic endeavors are wholly peaceful.

The Washington, D.C.-based Institute for Science and International Security said the 30-page report is based on documents from the Iran Nuclear Archive that were seized by Israel two years ago.

The analysis, posted Wednesday, said Tehran has "clearly" been dishonest with the International Atomic Energy Agency, which relies on government cooperation and onsite inspections. "Iran should declare this site to the International Atomic Energy Agency and allow its inspection, since the facility was designed and built to handle nuclear material subject to safeguards under Iran's comprehensive safeguards agreement," wrote scientists David Albright, Sarah Burkhard and Frank Pabian.
The report says Iran created the Shahid Mahallati Uranium Metals Workshop, near Tehran, to research and develop uranium metallurgy related to building nuclear weapons -- particularly components for weapons-grade uranium, the key explosive material in Iranian nuclear weapon cores.

The group said Iran told the IAEA more than four years ago it hadn't done any metallurgical work intended for nuclear weaponry and wasn't willing to discuss any similar activities "that did not have such an application."

RELATED IMF should think carefully on Iran aid
"The activities at Shahid Mahallati and [another plant] Shahid Boroujerdi are a dramatic contrast to that statement," the report added. "Highlighting once again that Iran furthered its nuclear weapons capabilities far more than was known prior to Israel's seizure of the Nuclear Archive, permitting Iran today to build nuclear weapons faster than previously believed.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2020/04/13/now_is_the_time_to_shatter_irans_proxy_forces_115197.html

[Crafty_Dog]

Is Iran on the Brink of a Coronavirus Coup?
by A.J. Caschetta
The Hill
April 14, 2020
https://www.meforum.org/60693/is-iran-on-the-brink-of-a-coronavirus-coup

=============================

"We Can't Even Count Anymore" – How Iran and the WHO Let Coronavirus Proliferate
by Potkin Azarmehr
Special to IPT News
April 14, 2020
https://www.investigativeproject.org/8369/we-cant-even-count-anymore-how-iran-and-the-who

[G M]

Hopefully the end of both the Mullahs and the ChiComs.

Is Iran on the Brink of a Coronavirus Coup?
by A.J. Caschetta
The Hill
April 14, 2020
https://www.meforum.org/60693/is-iran-on-the-brink-of-a-coronavirus-coup

=============================

"We Can't Even Count Anymore" – How Iran and the WHO Let Coronavirus Proliferate
by Potkin Azarmehr
Special to IPT News
April 14, 2020
https://www.investigativeproject.org/8369/we-cant-even-count-anymore-how-iran-and-the-who

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2020/04/13/the-islamic-revolution-vs-donald-trump/

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.nationalreview.com/2020/04/iran-uses-the-pandemic-to-further-provocations-in-the-gulf/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=NR%20Daily%20Monday%20through%20Friday%202020-04-20&utm_term=NRDaily-Smart

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.meforum.org/60713/iran-shows-off-drones-that-can-reach-israel?utm_source=Middle+East+Forum&utm_campaign=ab2eb63c6a-MEF_Frantzman_2020_04_22_01_00&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_086cfd423c-ab2eb63c6a-33691909&goal=0_086cfd423c-ab2eb63c6a-33691909&mc_cid=ab2eb63c6a

[Crafty_Dog]

Trump Ups the Ante With Iran in the Persian Gulf
6 MINS READ
Apr 27, 2020 | 10:00 GMT
An Iranian warship takes part in celebrations for “National Persian Gulf Day” in the Strait of Hormuz on April 30, 2019.
An Iranian warship takes part in celebrations for “National Persian Gulf Day” in the Strait of Hormuz on April 30, 2019.

(ATTA KENARE/AFP via Getty Images)
HIGHLIGHTS

Regardless of any public threats made by U.S. President Donald Trump, Iran will likely continue its aggressive maritime strategy in retaliation against U.S. sanctions and Washington's military presence in the Persian Gulf.

To avoid prompting a U.S. response, Tehran may initially focus these efforts on ramping up pressure against commercial targets in the region.

But Iran will eventually return to harassing U.S. naval ships in order to assess how far the White House has shifted its response posture and risk tolerance.

Iran’s nuclear activities and support of militias in Iraq, meanwhile, could still trigger the next spike in U.S.-Iran tensions as well.
Iran and the United States may be heading toward another round of confrontation, even as both countries deal with significant COVID-19 outbreaks at home. Following a recent incident where 11 Iranian ships harassed U.S. vessels transiting the Persian Gulf, U.S. President Donald Trump tweeted April 22 that he had "instructed" the U.S. Navy to destroy any Iranian vessels harassing U.S. ships. It remains unclear the extent to which, if at all, the United States will adjust its rules of engagement in response to Iran's latest maritime provocations. But the exchange highlights how Washington and Tehran’s current hawkish streak and inclination toward public threats could lead to another round of miscalculation and/or escalation between the two rivals.

The Big Picture

Despite COVID-19 and the global economic and humanitarian impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, the ongoing rivalry between Iran and the United States continues to simmer. Following the latest spike in tensions in the Persian Gulf, Tehran and Washington could be entering into another cycle of escalation that culminates a short-term flare-up in tensions.

Iran Won't Back Down

Iran is not likely to shy away from maintaining its aggressive strategy in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz and Gulf of Oman. For Iran, this approach is effectively indispensable at the current time, both for strategic and defense purposes. Under the weight of U.S. sanctions, Tehran has sought to remind the United States and its regional partners of the economic and security costs of Washington's maximum pressure campaign. And incidents in the Persian Gulf help do just that by illustrating the risk of the United States maintaining a physical presence in the region. Attacking commercial traffic in the Persian Gulf also helps highlight the cost of the White House's anti-Iran strategy to the global economy and U.S. regional partners.

In fact, Iran's actions over the last month show that Iran may be assessing it needs to use this strategy even more. COVID-19 has only worsened Iran's economic crisis, and the United States is now attempting to block Iran's request to the International Monetary Fund for pandemic aid. While Washington has argued that its sanctions do not cover humanitarian-related trade, such as medical supplies and pharmaceuticals, Iran has argued that sanctions are disrupting those flows regardless due to banks and suppliers not wanting to deal with Iran in any fashion for fear of also stoking the White House's financial ire. As a result, many banks and financial institutions have decided that the rewards of doing business with Iran is not worth the risks.


Prior to the most recent harassment of U.S. vessels, there were several incidents in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman in recent weeks that are likely attributable to Iran. On March 27, the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations reported a suspicious approach to one of its vessels in the Persian Gulf. On April 14 — the day before the Pentagon reported that U.S. ships had been harassed — a tanker was boarded in the Gulf of Oman and shifted course toward Iran before being released.

The latest spate of incidents in the Persian Gulf are reminiscent of Iran's activities in the summer of 2019, which ultimately culminated with the attack on Saudi Arabia's Abqaiq and Khurais oil processing facilities. Last year's actions suggest that Iran's tolerance for risk incurred from continuing its activities is high. However, in light of the economic fallout from COVID-19, instead of initially responding by continuing to harass U.S. armed forces' ships, Iran's naval operations may instead focus more on attacking commercial activities, particularly if Iran assesses that Trump's twitter directives are legitimate. In addition, Iran will consider expanding its tactics against commercial interests and the United States in the region beyond just naval harassment, just as it did last summer when it struck Saudi Arabia and ordered its powerful proxy network of Iraqi militia groups to attack U.S. troops in the country.

A Recalculated Maritime Strategy

But at some point in the future, Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) will likely challenge Trump's threat in order to assess the extent to which the United States has changed its rules of engagement — especially if Trump is re-elected in November. In practice, the IRGC has a large gradient of activities that could be defined as harassing U.S. ships and would likely scale up its response from a low level. Nevertheless, even if Iran does not want to trigger a major response, the strategy is rife with the risk of miscalculations. 

With the price of Brent crude at around $20 per barrel and the global oil market oversupplied by as much as 20 to 30 million barrels per day, Iran's lever in attempting to close the Strait of Hormuz or knock out a significant amount of Saudi Arabian or Emirati oil production for several months simply will not have the same global economic consequences that it would during normal global economic conditions, which could allow the United States to be more aggressive.

Washington and Tehran’s current hawkish streak and inclination toward public threats could lead to another round of miscalculation and/or escalation between the two rivals in the Persian Gulf.

On top of the COVID-19 crisis, an aggressive campaign by Iran against commercial interests in the region will cause considerable economic pain for U.S. allies in the region, such as Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Iran has shown that it is willing to attack economic targets in these nearby countries, as well as vessels shipping their energy products. Even if Iran does not launch an attack, a more aggressive U.S. strategy against Iran during the current global economic environment and fragile situation in the Middle East could thus drive a further wedge between the United States and its regional allies. Indeed, Iran's attacks last year ultimately led, at least for a short-time period, to members of the Gulf Cooperation Council trying to defuse tensions with Iran themselves and more Iranian aggression could reopen another such period of potential rapprochement.

One of Several Flashpoints

Nevertheless, while Trump's tweet and Iran's recent maritime activities represent another flashpoint, Iran's nuclear program and the actions of Iranian-backed militias in Iraq remain perhaps the two most incendiary triggers for the next round of escalation between Washington and Tehran. Iran's nuclear program continues to stockpile more low-enriched uranium and the next report from the United Nations' International Atomic Energy Agency – likely to be out in June – is expected to show a significant increase in those stockpiles.

The United States has a critical decision to make at the end of the month on whether or not it will extend sanctions waivers for Iraq to continue importing Iranian natural gas for its domestic energy and electricity needs. If the current waivers are not extended, Iraq could be facing severe power shortages as the summer heats up, providing even more reason for Iranian-backed militias to target U.S. troops and trigger a wider proxy conflict in the country.

[Crafty_Dog]

second post

How the U.S. Could End the Iran Nuclear Deal Once and for All
By JAMES S. ROBBINS
April 28, 2020 4:59 PM


Though the Trump administration has already withdrawn from the deal, there is still a clear path to scuttling it at the U.N.
Is the United States still a participant in the Iran nuclear deal? Well, yes and no.

The U.S. is seeking to maintain an international conventional-arms embargo on Iran that’s set to expire in October. The embargo was included in the enabling resolutions that the United Nations Security Council passed as part of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), otherwise known as the Iran nuclear deal. Its restrictions on small-arms sales to Iran expire this year, with its ban on the sale of missile parts and other weapons extending another three years.

The State Department is promoting a new Security Council resolution that would extend the embargo indefinitely, which is certain to face opposition from Russia or China, both of whom have veto power. It would be smarter to simply activate the “snapback” mechanism in the JCPOA, restoring the entire pre-agreement U.N. sanctions regime and killing the deal for good.

Critics might object that President Trump withdrew the United States from the JCPOA two years ago, so Washington has no standing to engage its snapback provision. But it’s not that simple.

The Obama administration could have tried to craft a binding, entirely self-contained multilateral treaty, which would be more clear-cut — a country would either be a signatory to the treaty or not. But Obama’s team knew it lacked the influence to craft a deal that the U.S. Senate would approve as a formal treaty, or even the minimal political clout to change the existing sanctions regime. So instead negotiators came up with what amounted to an executive agreement to use temporary loopholes in existing U.S. law to lift American sanctions, and crafted an omnibus 104-page Security Council resolution, UNSCR 2231, to clean things up on the U.N. side. And whatever the status of the JCPOA, UNSCR 2231 is still operative, and the United States, as a U.N. member state, is still a participant in it.

There are several ways in which the JCPOA can self-destruct under UNSCR 2231. Article 26 tells us that Iran would consider the re-introduction of sanctions “as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part.” The United States has already re-imposed sanctions, and Iran has been enriching uranium well beyond the limits of the agreement, meaning both conditions for the deal’s destruction have been met.

NOW WATCH: 'AOC Praises Crash of U.S. Oil Market'

Article 10, meanwhile, notes one means of resolution, in which any “JCPOA participant State” can bring a complaint. Critics claim this means that the U.S. can’t scuttle the JCPOA, because it is no longer such a participant state. But that’s not quite right, either. The dispute-resolution mechanism detailed in Article 36 allows “any of the E3/EU+3,” including the U.S., to refer a case of “significant non-performance” of duties under the JCPOA to a Joint Commission and Advisory Board for a series of reviews over 30 days. If the “complaining participant” is not satisfied with the outcome of this process, it may “notify the UN Security Council that it believes the issue constitutes significant non-performance.”

5
Here is the beautiful part: Once that notification occurs, Article 37 gives the Security Council 30 days to consider a resolution to “continue the sanctions lifting” — i.e. to leave the deal in place. If it fails to pass such a resolution in that time period, “the provisions of the old UN Security Council resolutions would be re-imposed.” This is the so-called “snap back” that we have heard so much about. And because it kicks in automatically unless the Security Council passes a continuing resolution, the veto power that Russia and China hold as permanent Security Council members is irrelevant, and the veto power that the U.S. similarly holds is decisive.

The United States has every right under UNSCR 2231 to bring the matter of Iranian non-compliance to the Joint Commission. For that matter, Iran could file a complaint against the United States on the same grounds. The fact that Iran has not yet done so tells us that it knows where that process would lead, and is a great argument for the U.S. to start the clock ticking immediately. Presented with a poison pill, pro-Iranian members of the Security Council may decide that extending the current arms embargo is the lesser of two evils. But either way, the Trump administration will win.

[Crafty_Dog]

The Real Threats Behind Iran's Military Satellite Launch
by Potkin Azarmehr
IPT News
May 1, 2020
https://www.investigativeproject.org/8387/the-real-threats-behind-iran-military-satellite

[Crafty_Dog]

http://carolineglick.com/the-final-days-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal/

[Crafty_Dog]

Jonathan Schanzer: Iranian Missiles "Likely to Be the Cause of the Middle East's Next War"
by Gary C. Gambill
May 12, 2020
https://www.meforum.org/60908/schanzer-the-cause-of-the-middle-easts-next-war

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/05/25/the-twilight-of-the-iranian-revolution?utm_source=nl&utm_brand=tny&utm_mailing=TNY_Magazine_Daily_052520&utm_campaign=aud-dev&utm_medium=email&bxid=5be9d3fa3f92a40469e2d85c&cndid=50142053&hasha=52f016547a40edbdd6de69b8a7728bbf&hashb=e02b3c0e6e0f3888e0288d6e52a57eccde1bfd75&hashc=9aab918d394ee25f13d70b69b378385abe4212016409c8a7a709eca50e71c1bc&esrc=Auto_Subs&utm_term=TNY_Daily

[Crafty_Dog]

   
    For Iran, a US Withdrawal Is a Blessing and a Curse
By: Caroline D. Rose

Next month, a U.S. delegation will board a plane to Baghdad to discuss with Iraqi leaders the prospect of reducing Washington’s military footprint on Iraqi soil. It would have been an unthinkable idea at the beginning of the year, when U.S.-Iran tensions came to a head after the assassination of Qassem Soleimani, the leader of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Even then, the Iraqi parliament voted on a bill that would have sent the U.S. packing had it ever been executed. But where the parliament failed, the coronavirus pandemic, a mounting recession and global uncertainty may succeed in getting Washington to withdraw from the region – something it had tacitly wanted to do anyway, at least on its own terms – more quickly. Ready and waiting to capitalize on its departure is Iran.

Despite Iran’s own problems in managing the coronavirus outbreak, its foreign policy seems to be having a moment in the sun. Over the past three months, the IRGC and its Shiite proxies have taken advantage of the international distraction and Washington’s absence to launch successive attacks on American targets. Indeed, it appears as though Iran is getting what it wants: a path to project power in the Levant. But it won’t be that easy for the IRGC. U.S. force reduction will not necessarily translate to sanctions relief or give way to an unobstructed march to the Mediterranean. Plenty of constraints remain, even in the absence of the U.S.
 
(click to enlarge)

Cutting the Cord

Since 1979, the Levant, particularly Iraq, has been a battleground for political and military influence in the Middle East. Boxed in by the Zagros Mountains and with difficult maritime access due to the Strait of Hormuz, Iran crafted a policy by which it projects power abroad primarily through proxy forces to its west. And since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the United States has stood in its way.

Fast-forward to 2020. As the world tried to make sense of the ongoing pandemic, Iran resumed its attacks on the U.S. and its anti-Islamic State coalition partners. Just this week, the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad’s Green Zone was struck by a rocket, very likely launched by an IRGC-aligned militia. Iran also upped the ante in the Persian Gulf. In April, 11 Iranian fast boats harassed a warship from the U.S. 5th Fleet, edging so close that the U.S. threaten to shoot the Iranian ships out of the water if they came within 100 meters again. U.S. aggression has proved almost entirely rhetorical. Washington has long wanted to leave; Iranian attacks and a global viral outbreak gave it an excuse to cut the cord. The Pentagon thus began pulling forces from coalition bases, reducing troop counts or withdrawing altogether. In just four months, the U.S. has drawn down from more than five bases, including the strategically important base in al-Qaim, which straddles the Syria-Iraq border.

And instead of beefing up American operational presence in the Persian Gulf – something you may expect to happen in the wake of maritime provocations – the Pentagon signaled a large-scale plan that actually reduces the official number of overall personnel in the region, and is reportedly considering scaling down the 5th Fleet’s presence in the Persian Gulf by one aircraft carrier strike group, withdrawing two Patriot missile defense systems, air defense systems and jet fighters from Saudi Arabia, while mulling a reduction in the Multinational Force and Observers peacekeeping mission in the Sinai Peninsula.

Iran has acted quickly to increase its military hold in Iraq and Syria, beefing up its defensive presence and smuggling capabilities along the al-Qaim highway. Recent satellite imagery from ImageSat International shows an Iranian tunnel project under the Imam Ali military base in Abu Kamal, Syria, on the Syria-Iraq border. Tunnels between pro-Iran proxy strongholds in western Iraq and IRGC locations in eastern Syria strengthen Iran’s strategy to expand its influence west, allowing IRGC forces and their proxies to store vehicles, shelter personnel, transport advanced weapon systems, and smuggle arms from the east to the Mediterranean.

 
(click to enlarge)

Related, Iran has been engaging more in the Israel-Palestine conflict. With reduced American presence in Sinai – the traditional buffer between Israel and Arab countries – Iran has begun rallying Palestinian militant groups such as Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, both sympathetic to Iran, to confront Israel, all while increasing its own military exchanges with Israel through Hezbollah and cyberattacks on Israeli water installations.

Remaining Challenges

And yet, Iran isn’t without challenges. In light of the drawdown, Saudi Arabia, for example, has begun to rethink its Iran strategy. With an oil price crisis, creeping global recession and sudden withdrawal of Patriot systems, Riyadh wants to find a quick, cost-effective way to keep Iranian aggression at bay. Saudi officials have therefore sanctioned talks with Iran, with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman nominating Iraq’s new prime minister to act as mediator. Even so, discussions between the two have long proved fruitless, and diplomacy should be seen only as a measure of first resort. Indeed, Riyadh has already made plans to replace the two U.S. Patriots with its own missile defense system, increase military training exercises with U.S. advisers and secure a Boeing contract of 1,000 air-to-surface and anti-ship missiles – all to curb Iranian attacks.

Israel, too, will be one of Iran’s largest impediments. Already it has increased strikes on IRGC and Hezbollah equipment storage locations and bases in Syria by sevenfold. It has also intensified its border patrols, destruction of cross-border tunnels, and cyberattacks on Iranian entities. This week alone, Israel conducted a cyberattack on Iran’s Shadi Rajaee port facility, causing a major backlog in terminal arrivals and maritime traffic. With reduced U.S. presence in the Levant, Israel will likely up the ante in attacks on IRGC factions in Syria and Lebanon. (Notably, Israel and the Arab Gulf states have entered a quiet alliance against Iran, sharing intelligence and engaging in back-channel talks.)

Just as daunting are the internal challenges Iran will face in sustaining the political and military influence it’s built in the region. Since the fall of 2019, massive political movements have emerged in Lebanon and Iraq protesting economic conditions, unemployment, corruption and rising inflation. A key feature of these protests has been mounting resentment of foreign interference – particularly by the U.S. military and Iranian proxies. In Iraq, elements of the nationalist Sadrist movement have been especially loud in their opposition to Iran, with some even attacking Iranian consulate buildings and IRGC-sponsored militia headquarters. In Lebanon, much of the anti-Iran sentiment has been directed at Hezbollah, a major beneficiary of Iranian political, military and financial support (even though sanctions have put a dent in aid in recent years). With the U.S. withdrawn, protesters will hone in on Iranian intrusion even more.

Syria is perhaps even more problematic. The country has been one of Iran’s strongest Arab allies for decades, and its presence in Syria depends overwhelmingly on President Bashar Assad remaining in power. There are signs, however, that Iran is struggling to keep influence there. Rumors have begun to circulate that Russian President Vladimir Putin, another staunch Assad ally, is unhappy with the Syrian government. Since 2015, Moscow has helped Assad stay in power, providing aid, airpower and infrastructural investment that has allowed the regime to regain a majority of rebel-held provinces. If Russia decides its gambit in Syria is no longer worth the cost, either withdrawing its forces or looking to an alternative source of power to unify the country, Iran is at risk of losing its proxy influence in Syria.

Then there is the U.S., which will still have plenty of in-theater capabilities in the Middle East. The U.S. 5th Fleet and air defenses aren’t going anywhere. The Air Force still maintains multiple squadrons of fighter jets in Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and other undisclosed locations. And though the U.S. is reducing its physical footprint in the Middle East, it will increase its reliance on economic statecraft – sanctions, oil embargoes and foreign aid – as its primary mechanism to pressure Iran into financial and political collapse. Washington has already proposed extending the U.N. arms embargo on Iran, plans to sanction Iranian officials and companies that support the Assad regime under the Caesar Act, and is considering a blockade on Iran-Venezuela mutual assistance over recent Iranian oil shipments.

So while Iran may seem well suited to take the reins of the Middle East when the U.S. is away, the reality is more difficult. Its recession has gotten worse. Oil exports have crashed. The rial has been put on life support. The cost of living has skyrocketed. And there is a network of enemies and tenuous friendships that stand in its path to the Mediterranean. The U.S. departure from the Middle East may not create a proverbial power vacuum, but it will dramatically shift the regional balance of power in ways that will constrain Iran.   

[Crafty_Dog]

Iran’s Pre-Deal Deceptions
Tehran denies U.N. inspectors access to two nuclear sites.
By The Editorial Board
June 9, 2020 7:19 pm ET

The Islamic Republic long has been deceitful about its nuclear ambitions, but for years the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has given the regime cover in public. Maybe not anymore.

“The Agency notes with serious concern that, for over four months, Iran has denied access to” two sites in the country, says an IAEA report sent to member states Friday and shown to the press. It adds that for nearly a year the Islamic Republic has failed to clarify “questions related to possible undeclared nuclear material and nuclear-related activities.”

The IAEA is particularly concerned about the location of an undeclared metal disk made of uranium and the use of other undisclosed nuclear material for research in the early 2000s. The report notes Tehran’s habit of scrubbing or destroying facilities.

The foundation of Barack Obama’s 2015 nuclear deal was ostensibly an honest accounting of Iran’s nuclear misdeeds. Yet the report, and Tehran’s intransigence, make clear the country has been hiding nuclear facilities and material. The evidence raises anew the suspicion that the regime’s plan was to reap the accord’s economic rewards, then—assisted by hidden materials and research—move to produce a weapon once the deal’s restrictions expire.

A separate IAEA report sent Friday noted that Iran had increased its uranium stockpile, though the government has stopped short of weapons-grade enrichment. On June 1 Tehran also told the agency it was now preparing new centrifuges at the Natanz facility, after it began injecting uranium gas into Fordow’s centrifuges last year.

Critics of President Trump’s “maximum-pressure” sanctions say the violations prove the strategy has failed. But this is an expected response to increased economic pressure. Tehran’s escalations are calculated to scare other signatories without pushing them out of the 2015 deal. Mr. Trump has generated significant new leverage to renegotiate a new nuclear accord that also addresses the regime’s regional activity and missile program.

But it’s unlikely Iran will act before the 2020 U.S. presidential election. It’s no secret Tehran wants Mr. Trump to lose. Iranian hackers have targeted the President’s re-election campaign, according to Google and Microsoft. And Joe Biden has said he would re-enter the 2015 nuclear deal before pursuing a new agreement.

No matter who wins, it would be unwise to throw away the new leverage built by maximum pressure. And it would be downright foolish to ease sanctions on Iran amid its IAEA dispute. The nuclear watchdog’s frank report should startle both candidates. There’s no way to negotiate a new deal, or return to the old one, without a real accounting of the country’s nuclear materials and research.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://pjmedia.com/columns/p-david-hornik/2020/07/07/report-in-devastating-blow-israel-sets-back-irans-nuke-program-two-years-n610794

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/total-iranian-intelligence-breakdown-analysis-634605

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/explosions-power-outages-reported-near-tehran-634574

[Crafty_Dog]

https://americanmilitarynews.com/2020/07/video-at-least-7-iranian-ships-on-fire-latest-in-pattern-of-unexplained-fires/?utm_source=breaking_email&utm_campaign=breaking_mailchimp&utm_medium=email&utm_source=Master+List&utm_campaign=9940fed239-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2020_07_15_03_33&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_9c4ef113e0-9940fed239-61658629&mc_cid=9940fed239

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/16224/iran-nuclear-rewards

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/16261/iran-maximum-pressure

[Crafty_Dog]

Recommended to me by a highly knowledgeable peron:

https://www.powerlineblog.com/archives/2020/07/the-explosions-rocking-iran.php

[Crafty_Dog]

The U.S. ‘Snaps Back’ at Iran and the U.N. With Restored Sanctions
4 MINS READ
Aug 21, 2020 | 18:16 GMT
HIGHLIGHTS

Iran will wait until after U.S. elections to decide whether to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in response to the United States' move to restore all U.N. sanctions. Europe, China and Russia, meanwhile, will forgo any large arms sales to Iran due to the expanded sanctions risk, despite not officially recognizing the U.S. action. On Aug. 20, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo notified the United Nations that the U.S. government was "snapping back" all sanctions on Iran, citing Tehran's significant non-compliance with the 2015 nuclear deal. The letter comes nearly a week after the U.N. Security Council rejected Washington's proposed resolution to indefinitely extend the U.N. arms embargo on Iran. Only the Dominican Republic sided with the United States on extending the arms embargo, which is currently set to expire on Oct. 18....

Iran will wait until after U.S. elections to decide whether to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in response to the United States' move to restore all U.N. sanctions. Europe, China and Russia, meanwhile, will forgo any large arms sales to Iran due to the expanded sanctions risk, despite not officially recognizing the U.S. action.

What Happened

On Aug. 20, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo notified the United Nations that the U.S. government was "snapping back" all sanctions on Iran, citing Tehran's significant non-compliance with the 2015 nuclear deal. The letter comes nearly a week after the U.N. Security Council rejected Washington's proposed resolution to indefinitely extend the U.N. arms embargo on Iran. Only the Dominican Republic sided with the United States on extending the arms embargo, which is currently set to expire on Oct. 18.

In order to restore U.N. sanctions on Iran, the United States is making the controversial argument that it remains a "participant state" to the JCPOA, despite formally withdrawing from the deal in 2018. Washington claims that because of this, it still has the authority to bypass the deal's dispute resolution mechanism and trigger the snapback sanctions process under U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, should it believe Iran is demonstrating "significant nonperformance" in adhering to the terms of the agreement.

The U.N. Security Council's other permanent members — France, Germany, Russia and the United Kingdom — have opposed this justification, arguing the United States relinquished its authority to unilaterally trigger such sanctions when Washington announced that it was "ceasing [its] participation in the JCPOA" in May 2018.

What It Means for Iran and Its Partners

While its rhetoric against the United States will be harsh, Iran will restrain its response to the new U.S. sanctions for fear of alienating Europe and a potential new U.S. administration. Rather than having the United States re-enter the JCPOA entirely, Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden would likely instead focus on securing an initial agreement with modest sanctions relief for Iran, setting the stage for a longer process of talks to cover more contentious issues, such as nuclear enrichment and Tehran's missile programs. But extreme actions by Iran before the U.S. election in November, such as withdrawing from either the JCPOA or the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, would make launching outreach with a Biden administration far more difficult. Such drastic moves would also risk pushing Europe toward the United States, and could potentially prompt European countries to trigger the snapback sanctions themselves. In the interim, Iran is thus likely to announce a more modest response in line with the incremental moves it's made over the last two years following Washington's previous sanctions threats, such as resuming additional nuclear activities barred by the JCPOA.

Russia and China may still be willing to sign some defense deals with Iran, but they will be narrow in scope and largely only cover sales not included in the U.N. arms embargo, such as missile defense systems. Even sales that are allowed to go through will be selective, as Moscow and Beijing seek to avoid undue escalation in the Middle East that could alienate their relationships with Israel and Arab Gulf monarchies. Technology transfer and cooperation to help Iran continue to build its own domestic defense capabilities will still occasionally occur, but Tehran's financial isolation and limited resources will ultimately constrain its ability to buy large weapons systems from China and Russia.

Even if the U.N. arms embargo expires in October, Russian and Chinese defense companies will be concerned about U.S. sanctions cutting off their access to international financial transactions. Russian and Chinese banks and other financial institutions will also avoid processing any defense-related transactions due to similar concerns.

Both China and Russia have publicly opposed U.S. sanctions on Iran's oil sector, but most of their companies have still been careful to keep their business ties to Iran below the level that would trigger such sanctions.

Under the threat of expanded U.S. sanctions, Russia and China will be willing to transfer some technology components that could be embedded in Iranian military platforms. Such transactions, however, will likely be narrow enough to ensure they can be done covertly in order to avoid catching Washington's attention.

While sales of larger systems (such as fighter jets) to Iran are unlikely, defense agreements with Russia and China that have long delivery dates — and dates that can be delayed indefinitely — are possible as a symbolic show of support.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/16437/iran-us-bomb-target

[DougMacG]

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/16437/iran-us-bomb-target

And vice versa.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://freebeacon.com/national-security/iran-caught-stockpiling-enriched-uranium-needed-for-bomb/

[Crafty_Dog]

October 2, 2020   View On Website
Open as PDF



    Iran’s Nuclear Dilemma

For many Iranians, the nuclear program is a key part of restoring the country’s past glory.
By: Hilal Khashan

Nationalism is a powerful force in Iran's political consciousness. But in recent centuries, military defeats, external occupations and foreign interference have tempered its citizens’ sense of historical and cultural pride. One of the more recent examples of foreign meddling is Operation Ajax, a U.S. plot to take down Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh in 1953 after he nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and replace him with the shah. This event registered as an example of Western domination and helped motivate Iranians to reclaim their past glory.

The Iranian nuclear program is a continuation of this long-standing endeavor. Iranians, regardless of their political leanings, believe becoming a nuclear power is part of their national redemption story. They argue that they are surrounded by enemies who have violated their territorial integrity time and again. Even if they accept a new political deal that restricts their nuclear activity, they likely won’t abandon their goal of becoming a nuclear power altogether.

The Evolution of the Nuclear Program

During the Cold War, the United States considered the shah a component of its Soviet containment strategy. Iran, which saw the Soviet Union as its main security concern outside its own borders, was strategically located, forming with Turkey) the northern tier that would prevent the Soviet Union from encroaching on the oil-rich Persian Gulf. The shah recognized benefits of partnering with Washington. As part of President Dwight Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace program, Iran signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with the U.S. in 1957. In 1959, the shah ordered the establishment of a nuclear research center at Tehran University, and nine years later, Iran’s U.S.-provided 5MW atomic reactor became operational. With Anglo-American backing, he sought to make Iran a regional power and the security broker of the Persian Gulf.

The shah secured technical expertise and enriched uranium to establish Iran’s nuclear program. Until his ouster in 1979, Iran collaborated with the U.S., France, India, Argentina, South Africa and Germany to help build the Bushehr nuclear reactor. The shah spent $6 billion to construct nuclear facilities and planned to spend another $30 billion to build 20 nuclear reactors. The annual budget of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, which he founded in 1974, totaled $1.3 billion, second only to the National Iranian Oil Company. Even though Iran signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Agreement in 1968, there was no doubt that the shah’s ultimate goal was to develop nuclear weapons.

Many Iranians, especially poorer rural folks who migrated to cities during the shah’s economic modernization campaign, saw no point in squandering the country’s oil resources on such an outlandish project. After the revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, citing Islamic jurisprudence’s view that manufacturing atomic weapons is immoral, ordered the dismantling of the country’s nuclear program and allowed Iranian scientists to emigrate to foreign countries.

Khomeini seemed convinced that his revolution would soon spread throughout the Islamic world. He and the mullahs in Tehran did not expect Iraq to invade in September 1980, despite the fact that Iran had been provoking Iraq by planting explosives, launching cross-border shelling, attempting to assassinate senior officials, and encouraging Shiites to overthrow the Baathist regime. After they saw the damage weapons of mass destruction could do in the Iran-Iraq War, leaders came to regret dismantling the nuclear program and purging the armed forces after the revolution, both of which weakened the country against Iraq. They concluded that they must create a deterrent military capability consisting of conventional arms and weapons of mass destruction.

The war bloodied Iran, ravaged its economy and engendered a determination among the elite to acquire nuclear technology. Iran emerged militarily weak and had difficulty replenishing its depleted conventional military hardware with modern equipment. It sought to accelerate its nuclear program to achieve a deterrent capability and expand its ballistic missile program to offset a lack of sophisticated aircraft.

In 1989, Iran and the Soviet Union signed their first atomic deal. And in 1993, after Germany declined to resume the construction of the Bushehr nuclear reactor, Boris Yeltsin announced that Russia would complete it. Since the 1990s, however, the Iranians have toned down their public push for nuclear capabilities, recognizing that the international community is hell-bent on preventing Iran from acquiring an atomic bomb.

Motivations

Iran says that its nuclear ambitions are driven by a need for energy security, but considering the country’s enormous oil and gas deposits, that argument is unconvincing. (The cost of generating electricity from these supplies is less than 20 percent of the cost of generating electricity from nuclear power.) In truth, Iran believes it needs to become a nuclear power in order to be seen as an equal of one of its rivals, Israel. It also wants to improve its strategic outlook relative to Turkey, Central Asia and Pakistan. Iran borders hostile countries in Central Asia and shares porous borders with Pakistan in Baluchistan, and it believes that the best way to keep them at bay is by acquiring nuclear capabilities.

For the Iranian people, history goes a long way in explaining the need for a nuclear program. Since the rise of the Safavid dynasty in 1501, Iran has felt isolated. The defining Battle of Chaldrian in 1514, in which the Ottomans soundly defeated the Persian army, shocked the Safavids and created a perennial security complex for them. Then, after a series of defeats at the hands of czarist Russia, Iran lost Transcaucasia to the Russians following the signing of the 1819 Treaty of Gulistan. In the 20th century, Iran’s strategic vulnerability became worse after an uneven encounter with Russia and Great Britain.
 
(click to enlarge)

Iranians thus view their modern history as a history laden with defeat and abuse at the hands of foreign powers. They remember the 1890 tobacco concession deal in which Nasir al-Din Shah gave a British company a monopoly over the country’s tobacco industry for a ludicrously low price, and the 1901 D’Arcy concession that gave a British businessman the right to dominate the country’s oil industry. They also remember the Russian occupation of Tabriz in 1908. Iranians believe acquiring nuclear weapons would protect the country against future foreign meddling in their domestic affairs.

For Iran’s ruling conservatives, the nuclear program is necessary to maintain the country’s regional standing. They realize that the legitimacy Iran garnered through Khomeini’s revolution is eroding and believe the nuclear standoff with the U.S. is providing the regime with a new source of legitimacy.

U.S. and Israeli Concerns

Israel is adamant that it will not allow the Iranian nuclear program to continue. Over the past few years, agents apparently associated with Israel’s Mossad intelligence agency assassinated four Iranian scientists and wounded one more. Last July, a mysterious explosion caused by either a bomb or cyberattack destroyed a centrifuge workshop producing enriched uranium at the Natanz nuclear facility, 200 miles south of Tehran. Even though Iran has pledged to rebuild the plant deep inside the mountains, it was a major setback for the Iranian nuclear program that would require at least two years to overcome.
In May 2018, the U.S. withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal and reinstated crippling sanctions on the country. President Donald Trump believes the sanctions will force Iran to dismantle its nuclear and ballistic missile programs and end its support for its proxies throughout the Middle East. But Iran is too invested to back down. Iranians have seen their country withstand many challenges in the past and seem to believe that they will persevere again.   

[Crafty_Dog]

Answering the Question of Iran
The U.S. can’t truly leave Iraq without dealing with Iran.
By: Allison Fedirka

Earlier this week, the U.S. special representative for Iran said Washington would keep putting additional pressure on Iran in the days and weeks ahead. He also said that Iran had reached a moment where it recognized it could not indefinitely withstand such pressure and would have to either sign a new nuclear deal with Washington or abandon its regional strategy – that is, using proxies to carve out a sphere of influence to the Mediterranean Sea. The U.S. and Iran spar verbally all the time – and sometimes violently – but there’s reason to believe there’s bite behind Washington’s barks, and that tensions may soon intensify again.

The U.S. wants to reduce its global military footprint, especially in the Middle East, as it pivots to the Indo-Pacific. The ideal outcome would be a light security presence in certain hotspots that can be quickly scaled up in case of emergency. Though Washington has already done much in that regard, Iran’s presence in Iraq complicates the withdrawal. The U.S. doesn’t want to leave a country it has been at war with for nearly 20 years just to see Iran gain more political and security control there than it already had. Tehran’s nuclear ambitions, moreover, threaten to destabilize the region, and an unstable region will be more difficult to vacate. Squaring away the U.S. military departure from Iraq along with the Iraqi economy’s reconstruction efforts means finding a way to reduce the threat of Iranian influence. In other words, time is winding down to settle the status of Iran.
 
(click to enlarge)

In light of an uptick in rocket attacks conducted by Iran-backed Shiite militias against U.S. targets, there are now signals coming out of Iraq suggesting what the U.S. plan is. A strong military response by the U.S. is a nonstarter; it would be counterproductive to withdrawal efforts. But Washington can use political pressure, economic incentives and smaller-scale security moves to support Baghdad cracking down on the militias. For example, Washington appears ready to follow through on its threat to relocate its embassy in the Green Zone if security there remains suspect. There were also reports from Kurdistan late last week that U.S. coalition airstrikes against the Islamic State in northern Syria also hit targets belonging to the Popular Mobilization Forces, the loose collection of Iraq’s Shiite militias, in Anbar province. (The PMF initially confirmed the story but later denied it.)

Baghdad seems to have acquiesced to U.S. demands. Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi called for the creation of a military and security commission to investigate the recent rocket attacks, particularly those targeting U.S. assets. National Security Adviser Qasim al-Araji will oversee the investigation and report results directly back to the prime minister in 30 days. However, curbing Iranian influence among Iraqi militant groups will rely on the Iraqi federal government’s ability to stand on its own against militias sympathetic or financially beholden to Tehran – something the Iraqi government has been unable to do thus far.

Meanwhile, there are signs that Israel, a critical ally in the U.S. coalition against Iran, is also increasing pressure on Tehran. It has taken more responsibility for military strikes against Iranian proxy forces, largely because they are positioned along Israel’s borders. Just last week, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu accused Hezbollah, the Lebanese militia, of maintaining a missile storage facility in a suburb of Beirut, which, if true, could lead to an Israeli attack. (Tactically, Israel is in a tough spot. It cannot afford to sit idly by, but attacking a site such as the one Netanyahu identified would cause mass civilian casualties and all but guarantee war.) For its part, Lebanon is trying to maintain the status quo with Israel, as evidenced by its agreement to reengage with U.S.-mediated maritime and land border talks. But talks have broken down before, and there’s no guarantee that these won’t either.

Two other developments together suggest that a move against Iran may be near. The French Foreign Ministry announced Oct. 1 that the European-led maritime surveillance mission’s mandate to operate in the Strait of Hormuz has been extended through 2021. Though the mission is not directly part of the U.S. pressure campaign and these waters have been relatively quiet in the past few months, that the statement was made at all shows that the potential for escalation still exists.
More directly related is the Oct. 6 statement from an official of Iran’s Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance that Tehran was struggling to pay overtime, bonuses and pensions. The government had been selling surplus properties to acquire the needed funds to make ends meet, but the parliament temporarily stopped the practice on legal grounds. Whatever the case may be, the government is clearly hurting financially, and though it has the tools to temper public unrest, political patronage and protection come much easier with a fuller treasury.

It’s not entirely clear what more, if anything, the U.S. has in store for its maximum pressure campaign against Iran. Washington relied nearly exclusively on economic and diplomatic sanctions lately, so much so that it’s hard to imagine what else is left to sanction. It’s also unclear if Israel is truly prepared to move on Iran beyond airstrikes in Syria – or what would have to shift to change Israel’s mind. What is clear is that the U.S. has to settle the Iran question before it vacates Iraq, and that in the meantime, the Iranian people will bear the brunt of the suffering.

[Crafty_Dog]

November 13, 2020
View On Website
Open as PDF

    
US Sanctions on Iran in 2020
By: Geopolitical Futures

(click to enlarge)

As a part of the Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign against Iran, the U.S. government has imposed new sanctions on Iran throughout 2020. The sanctions were aimed at forcing Tehran to give up its nuclear ambitions, end support for its proxy forces in Iraq, Lebanon and Syria, and halt its efforts to become a major Middle East military power. The campaign has primarily targeted Iran’s oil industry (last year, 30 percent of the government budget relied on petroleum exports), but also non-oil sectors like shipping, finance and banking, arms and the Iranian cyber program.

The sanctions have exacerbated Iran’s ongoing recession, causing its gross domestic product growth to plummet and the currency to reach record lows. This week, the State Department’s special representative to Iran and Venezuela, Eliot Abrams, announced that the U.S. plans to impose more sanctions on Iran every week until Jan. 20 when a new administration takes office, in an effort to dissuade any future effort to revive the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.nationalreview.com/news/rush-limbaugh-trumps-legal-team-promised-blockbuster-stuff-and-then-nothing-happened/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=NR%20Daily%20Monday%20through%20Friday%202020-11-23&utm_term=NRDaily-Smart

[ccp]

wrong thread?

[Crafty_Dog]

Yup, let's try again:

https://www.nationalreview.com/2020/11/stubborn-facts-facing-biden-on-iran/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=NR%20Daily%20Monday%20through%20Friday%202020-11-23&utm_term=NRDaily-Smart

[ccp]

always a big mouth lib under every crack nook and cranny
https://www.axios.com/israeli-military-prepares-trump-iran-0d0a5725-c410-4f5c-a0ea-9c6f9add4966.html

[ccp]

before DJT leaves the WH

not sure what next is in store
may be big though:

https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/iranian-nuclear-scientist-assassinated-near-tehran-report-650457

[DougMacG]

...
https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/iranian-nuclear-scientist-assassinated-near-tehran-report-650457

Israel has done good work on this front.  Who knows what happened in this case.

[G M]

...
https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/iranian-nuclear-scientist-assassinated-near-tehran-report-650457

Israel has done good work on this front.  Who knows what happened in this case.

https://nypost.com/2020/11/29/irans-mohsen-fakhrizadeh-killed-hit-squad-report-says/

[Crafty_Dog]

An Extremely Puzzling Assassination
by Potkin Azarmehr
IPT News
December 1, 2020

https://www.investigativeproject.org/8648/an-extremely-puzzling-assassination

Share: Facebook Twitter WhatsApp Telegram Send Print Addthis
 

 


Iranian state media was suspiciously quick to report and show images of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh's killing.

Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, said to be Iran's senior-most nuclear scientist, was assassinated Nov. 27. Iranian media announced Fakhrizadeh had been killed within 30 minutes of the attack.

It is unprecedented for Iranian state media to acknowledge an incident of this gravity so quickly. Fakhrizadeh was a mysterious figure who was rarely seen or photographed in public but the reports of his death quickly included several pictures of him never seen previously, as if they were ready to announce the news.

Moreover, the regime's rapidly changing and improbable narratives of how he died, cast doubts on anything that has previously been officially stated about Fakhrizadeh.

The flurry of rapidly changing and even contradictory narratives put out by the Iranian regime and top officials raise doubts about who killed Fakhrizadeh and why. Iran's past record of falsely blaming internal killings on Israelis and the CIA, or its pattern of complete silence, denial and Internet shut downs when other alleged acts of "terrorism" occur only add to the questions about this man's death.

For seasoned Iran watchers, the pattern of contradictory narratives to hide the real truth is a familiar one. It happened when Iran shot down Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752 and would not immediately acknowledge its own missiles hit the plane. It happened last month when a top al-Qaida official was assassinated in Tehran, but the mullahs denied it ever happened.

In 2012, Iran tried to frame Majid Jamali Fashi as an Israeli spy who murdered the Iranian quantum field theorist Masoud Alimohammadi, who likely was killed by an Iranian government hitman. The Iranians similarly framed Mazyar Ebrahimi as an Israeli assassin for killing other Iranian nuclear scientists when he says he was tortured into a confession.

Judging by the regime's previous track record in situations of such high sensitivity, one would have expected the internet to be shut down within minutes of Fakhrizadeh's death. But pictures and videos of the scene were also immediately posted online by eyewitnesses without any security prevention or interference.

The killing quickly became headline news around the world, with the narrative that yet another "Iranian nuclear scientist" was assassinated by a foreign secret service agency, likely to be the Israelis. To back this conclusion, the mainstream media all pointed to the fact that the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had mentioned Fakhrizadeh by name three times in 2018 while unveiling Iran's nuclear archive, which Israel shipped out from a secret outpost in Tehran's outskirts. "Remember his name," Netanyahu said.

Who was Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, full name Mohsen Fakhrizadeh Mahabad, and what exactly happened in Absard, 70 kilometers east of Tehran, in this green picturesque small town with its yellowish hills overlooking the Alborz mountains?

Little is known about Fakhrizadeh's life before 1979. He was born in 1957, in the religious city of Qom, the main hub of Iran's Shia seminaries.

After the 1979 revolution, he obtained a Master's degree in solid state physics from Khajeh Nassir Toosi University of Technology in Tehran.

He then got involved with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and various military and defense projects. Since 2005-2006, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had asked to interview Fakhrizadeh, but Iran refused to make him available.

A UN Security Council resolution in 2007 identified him as a senior scientist in Iran's Ministry of Defense and Logistic of Armed Forces and as the former head of the Physics Research Center (PHRC) at Lavizan-Shian, an alleged undeclared nuclear site northeast of Tehran, where 140 metric tons of topsoil reportedly were removed to sanitize the site before an IAEA inspection.

More recently, Fakhrizadeh became the head of the AMAD project and then finally its successor, the Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research, or known by its Persian acronym SPND.

Iran's official narrative of his assassination has changed substantially in just a few days, raising questions about what happened. The contradicting versions raise fundamental doubts about what exactly happened and who was responsible for Fakhrizadeh's assassination.

Initially, a truck driver interviewed by state media claimed he saw a blue Nissan pickup truck van explode, followed by a gunfight from both sides of the road. He then saw one of the assailants lying on the road shooting at him, which prompted him to reverse away from the scene. He told state TV that five or six people were involved in the shootout.

Fereydoon Abbasi-Davaani, the former head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, gave a more detailed account on Iran's state television about a Nissan pickup truck stopping in front of Fakhrizadeh's convoy and exploding to stop Fakhrizadeh's car, and then an assault squad consisting of two snipers and four gunmen in a Hyundai Santa Fe opened fire. Four motorcycles were also reportedly used by the assailants.

The pro-regime Iranian documentary filmmaker, Javad Mogouei, who knew one of Fakhrizadeh's bodyguards, then posted more details of what had happened on his Instagram account. Mogouei said there were 12 assailants in total, and only four bodyguards were protecting Fakhrizadeh and his family members. Mogouei also claimed that one of the bodyguards, Haamed Asghari, was killed after he threw himself on Fakhrizadeh trying to protect him.

Iranian news media also reported the death of the bodyguard and praised his ultimate sacrifice and martyrdom to protect the country's top scientist.

State TV also interviewed Iran's defense minister, Brigadier General Amir Hatami, who claimed Fakrizadeh was targeted "Because he had recently innovated a Corona test kit which was instrumental in our struggle against the coronavirus and they didn't want us to succeed in this struggle."

While the narrative of the 12 enemy assailants against only four heroic bodyguards explained the why the "enemy" won the day against an "invincible" Iranian security service, due to their superior numbers, it also raised questions as to how 12 attackers could have gotten away so quickly and disappeared into the thin air.

There is just one road between Absard and the nearest towns in both directions. How could 12 attackers manage to kill Iran's top scientist in broad daylight and get away with it, in a high security designated area where many of Iran's top rank revolutionary guards have their weekend homes?

Pictures of Fakhrizadeh's Nissan Teana raise other questions. Taken from different angles, the pictures show a car that seemed remarkably intact with a few bullet holes in its windshield and the small rear window. The images do not match the dramatic shootout described by Iranian state media.

Later, official news denied that bodyguard Haamed Asghari had been killed, saying he suffered slight injuries as a result of his heroic action and will soon leave the hospital.

This report was followed by a completely revised narrative published by the official Fars News Agency. It claimed that there were no assailants at the scene, but Fakhrizadeh was killed by a remote controlled machine gun with Israeli military markings that was on the back of the Nissan pickup truck.

Later, Iran's Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), Ali Shamkhani made a bizarre claim that Iran "knew Fakhrizadeh was going to be assassinated and when and where the hit was to take place and we were ready for it. However, they used a new professional specialized technique unknown to us."

At the same time, the regime issued posters of four Arab separatists wanted in conjunction with the assassination.

Based on all the above, there can be many different scenarios as to what actually happened. Was he killed by a highly elite foreign agency? Or is it possible that it was yet another internal purge that got rid of Fakhrizadeh?

Without committing to any of the possible scenarios, there are definite advantages for the regime from Fakhrizadeh's death. One is that if the Islamic Republic is keen to get back to renegotiating the nuclear deal, given the possibility of a new administration in the United States, they no longer have to worry about a precondition of letting the IAEA interview Fakhrizadeh.

Claiming Israel was behind the assassination also provides Iran with the justification to further violate the nuclear accords by enriching more uranium, for Iran lobbyists and Israel haters like the former CIA chief John Brennan to accuse Israel of violating international laws, and to justify possible Iranian retaliatory missile launches.

As the world collectively bemoans this "criminal act" and almost gives a license to Iran to retaliate against Israel, the only ones really smiling today are the mullahs in Iran.

IPT Senior Fellow Potkin Azarmehr is a London-based investigative journalist, business intelligence analyst, and TV documentary maker who was born in Iran. He regularly contributes to several newspapers and television stations on Iran and Middle East related news. You can follow him @potkazar.

[Crafty_Dog]

A New Iranian Law Could Bring the Nuclear Issue to a Crisis Point Under Biden
6 MINS READ
Dec 3, 2020 | 23:26 GMT
Members of Iranian forces pray around the coffin of slain nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh during his burial ceremony at Imamzadeh Saleh shrine in northern Tehran on Nov. 30, 2020.
Members of Iranian forces pray around the coffin of slain nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh during his burial ceremony at Imamzadeh Saleh shrine in northern Tehran on Nov. 30, 2020.

(HAMED MALEKPOUR/TASNIM NEWS/AFP via Getty Images)
HIGHLIGHTS

The Iranian parliament's ratification of a new bill expanding Iran's nuclear program reflects growing pressure by Iranian hawks on Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and their expectation of early engagement with the incoming Biden administration to address bilateral issues. If the law is implemented entirely it would bring the Iran nuclear issue on the cusp of a crisis within the first 100 days of the Biden administration because the moves that Iran makes under the law would be aimed at significantly reducing Iran's nuclear breakout, the time Iran would need to produce enough weapons-grade material for one device....

The Iranian parliament's ratification of a new bill expanding Iran's nuclear program reflects growing pressure by Iranian hawks on Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and their expectation of early engagement with the incoming Biden administration to address bilateral issues. Conservatives and hard-liners who have led parliament since February 2020 elections secured passage of the bill less than a week after the assassination of Mohsen Fakrizadeh, but its rapid approval and minor modifications by the Guardian Council suggest that conservative factions are seeking to weaken their moderate rivals ahead of June presidential elections, assessing that any suspension of long-standing sanctions will demonstrate to voters that a more hard-line strategy was successful. Nonetheless, ambiguities in the law and political options available to the powerful Supreme National Security Council and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei suggest that Tehran will choose how to exercise provisions of the law depending on progress with the United States and Europe over the sanctions impasse.

Elements of the legislation call for an increase in nuclear activities such as renewed efforts to increase uranium enrichment beyond the 20 percent threshold while denying International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors access to Iranian nuclear sites should talks not meet Iranian expectations.

During a Dec. 2 Cabinet meeting, Rouhani said that the bill was "harmful to diplomatic efforts."

Iran is slated to hold presidential elections on June 18, 2021; Rouhani cannot run due to term limits.
Highlights Of Iran's Strategic Action Plan For Lifting Sanctions

The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) is required to boost uranium enrichment levels to 20 percent and produce at least 120 kilograms annually at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant.

The AEOI must boost enriched uranium production per month by 500 kilograms.

The AEOI must install and start injecting uranium gas into at least 1,000 IR-2m centrifuges at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant within three months.

The AEOI is required to start "operations" at a uranium metal plant in Isfahan within five months.

The AEOI is required to start rebuilding the Arak Heavy Water Reactor within four months.

If the United States does not lift sanctions and so allow European customers to purchase Iranian oil within two months, the Iran government is required to stop implementing the provisional Additional Protocol allowing IAEA access to sites.

If the law is implemented entirely it would bring the Iran nuclear issue on the cusp of a crisis within the first 100 days of the Biden administration because the moves that Iran makes under the law would be aimed at significantly reducing Iran's nuclear breakout, the time Iran would need to produce enough weapons-grade material for one device.

Most of the more time-consuming and difficult work in producing enriched uranium that could be used in a nuclear bomb is done in the initial enrichment up to 20 percent. After uranium is enriched to 20 percent, getting to higher enrichment levels needed for a device, such as 90 percent, can be done relatively quickly. Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Iran's enrichment was capped at 3.67 percent and thus far it has only moderately exceeded that by boosting enrichment to 4.5 percent.

Installing more advanced centrifuges will increase the throughput capacity and reliability of Iran's enrichment program. The JCPOA allowed Iran only to use older first-generation centrifuges with smaller capacities prone to failures.

Under the JCPOA, Iran was converting the Arak Heavy Water Reactor to a light-water reactor; reversing that redesign would alarm the West because the original design would have produced plutonium as a byproduct that could be used in a nuclear weapon.

The production of uranium metal would also be alarming because uranium metal's main application is in nuclear warheads — bringing into question whether Iran would restart the weapons side of its nuclear program, which Fakhrizadeh had headed and which by all publicly available information has been largely suspended for nearly two decades.

 The suspension of the Additional Protocol would also leave the United States and Europe unable to monitor all of these developments, making the situation very reminiscent of 2011 and 2012, when a strike on Iran's nuclear facilities was a very realistic possibility before talks between Iran and the United States began.

The Biden administration will likely try to negotiate with Iran for an initial 'compliance-for-compliance' deal in early 2021 to avoid a crisis, but escalation is likely if Biden is unable to quickly enter talks and offer concessions. The incoming Biden administration has said that it wants to open talks with Iran, but it will be under significant pressure from the Republican Party — which will want to maintain oversight of any sort of sanctions relief akin to the review act it had over the JCPOA — not to negotiate with Iran under threat. Even a deal that sees Iran reenter the JCPOA will be controversial because Iran hawks want to use sanctions leverage to extract other concessions, such as on Iran's missile program and support for regional proxies. Those issues have become more critical in their eyes due to Iran's expanded use of that strategy over the last five years. Nevertheless, Iran has made it clear it will not negotiate on nonnuclear issues without a U.S. suspension of sanctions. The dramatic increase in Iran's nuclear program is designed to increase the number of concessions Iran can make on its nuclear program so that it does not have to make as many concessions on other issues that Iran views as more critical to its national security. If the Biden administration does not, or is unable, to prioritize negotiations with Iran despite increased nuclear activity, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and other hard-liners in Iran will likely push for an even more aggressive regional strategy akin to incidents seen in 2019 to make the Iran question a higher U.S. priority.
 
The strategy is inherently risky, as moving forward with enrichment to 20 percent and starting the production of uranium metal are the types of moves that will not only push the European Union, France, Germany and the United Kingdom's — all members of the JCPOA — position closer to that of the United States, it would also increase the potential for military and covert actions against Iran. Even China and Russia would express some level of concern. Iran's moderates and reformists fear the provocative moves will do just that, unite Europe with the United States against Iran. The moves would also result in Israel — and possibly the United States — pumping even more resources into covert actions designed to degrade Iran's nuclear program. While the assassination of Fakrizadeh may have had only a limited impact on Iran's nuclear program right now, the June and July explosions at the Khojir missile complex and Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant — likely carried out by Israel — had a more direct impact on actual operations, and are examples of how deep into Iran's missile and nuclear programs Israeli covert capabilities have penetrated. If Iran starts implementing aspects of the bill before Jan. 20, outgoing U.S. President Donald Trump could also sign off on a preemptive strike on an Iranian facility such as Isfahan, Natanz or Fordow to stop it.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.nationalreview.com/2020/12/blame-america-first-crowd-resurrects-an-old-myth/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=MJ_20201204&utm_term=Jolt-Smart

As Democrats return to power, beware their warped history of the late Iranian PM Mohammad Mossadegh.

For the “blame America first” crowd, the ouster of Iranian prime minister Mohammad Mossadegh in 1953 has long been a useful crutch. Now that a new administration is preparing to put Democrats back in the White House, this crutch is once again being trotted out as an excuse for rejecting the Trump administration’s successful approach to the Middle East — an approach that united Israel with the Arab world while isolating Iran — and returning to failed Obama-era policies.

Who was Mossadegh? It depends on whom you ask, and which Mossadegh you’re asking about. The Mossadegh that accrued enough political power and respect to be appointed prime minister in 1951 was a fierce Iranian nationalist motivated by noble goals: to reclaim Iranian’s most valuable natural resource, oil, and to modernize and democratize his country. For Democrats with an indefensible policy agenda to defend, this is who he remained until the bitter end.

But one must reckon with Mossadegh’s behavior during as well as prior to his premiership to get a fuller picture of both the prime minister, and the events that led to his removal from power. After nationalizing the oil industry, long controlled by the British through the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Mossadegh refused to negotiate in good faith over what the British role would be moving forward or otherwise compensating them for their losses. The British responded by threatening to boycott European companies doing business with the Iranians and intercepting Iranian oil tankers, devastating the Iranian economy.

The U.S.’s role in this was as a mediator. It cautioned the British against military action, declined to participate in a plan to remove Mossadegh from power, and continued to aid Iran through economic aid packages.



While Mossadegh presented himself and his present-day American admirers portray him as a staunch believer in republicanism, the Mossadegh of history sought to consolidate power in himself. In August 1952, for example, Mossadegh demanded that he be granted “emergency powers” that the New York Times called “full dictatorial powers,” and that an Iranian senator said practically amounted to “the death of the constitutional regime.” Even Mossadegh’s son-in-law opposed this transparent power grab, which was initially rebuffed but later approved by the Iranian parliament. This, combined with his earlier demand that he be allowed to appoint the minister of war — the Iranian constitution granted this power to the shah, Iran’s monarch — demonstrated that Mossadegh was only a committed democratic advocate if all the powers of Iran’s democracy were invested in him.

Iran’s simultaneous slide toward economic ruin and dictatorship — which can be directly attributed to Mossadegh’s mismanagement and ambition, respectively — led to a decay in support among the once-broad coalition he had commanded. This was especially true of his middle-class supporters, who suffered enormously from his botched nationalization effort, and of religious leaders, who resented his goal of modernizing Iran. That the times were a-changin’ for the prime minister became clear in February 1953, when the shah of Iran announced that he would be leaving the country for undisclosed medical reasons. This act was seen by the public as a sign of a rift between their monarch and Mossadegh and resulted in widespread protests in support of the shah.

That July, Mossadegh again confirmed what should have been obvious by that point: His primary objective had become holding on to power. When anti-Mossadegh forces appeared to be reaching a critical mass in parliament, he had his supporters there resign. Without a quorum, Mossadegh maintained that a referendum was needed to determine what to do next. A plebiscite described by Ray Takeyh, a scholar at the Council on Foreign Relations, as characterized by “boycotts, voting irregularities, and mob violence” ratified Mossadegh’s decision to dissolve parliament.


Mossadegh’s falling star at home and the succession of the Truman administration by that of Dwight D. Eisenhower resulted in a shift in U.S. policy toward Iran. The instability of Mossadegh’s government, the U.S. rightly worried, could lead to a Communist takeover. This confluence of factors led to the development of TPAJAX, a joint operation planned by the U.S., U.K., and a group of high-profile Iranian officials, generals, and religious leaders fed up with Mossadegh. The existence of this last group is particularly important to recall. While those who invoke Mossadegh’s name today would have you believe that Mossadegh’s removal was solely the consequence of U.S. meddling, this couldn’t be further from the truth. General Fazlollah Zahedi — once a minister in Mossadegh’s cabinet — Ayatollah Abdel Qassem Kashani, and most crucially, the shah, were not merely accessories to the plan, but its anchors.

The key to the operation was getting the shah to dismiss Mossadegh as prime minister, an action within his constitutional power, but that he was nevertheless hesitant to take. The U.S.’s chief role in Mossadegh’s removal was convincing the monarch, largely through intermediaries such as his sister, to take this necessary step

What is often overlooked is that the U.S.’s planned “coup” (can it be called a coup if it was carried out by constitutional means?) failed. Mossadegh was tipped off about the plan, and instead of heeding the shah’s dismissal, he had the officer who was sent to inform him of his unemployment arrested. Zahedi, the muscle behind the operation, went into hiding. So did the figure that lent it legitimacy, the shah.


This news was greeted with much gnashing of teeth in Washington, where the operation was seen as an abject failure. General Walter Bedell Smith, then serving as an undersecretary of state, informed President Eisenhower that the U.S. would “probably have to snuggle up to Mosaddegh if we’re going to save anything there.”

CIA operatives on the ground continued to publicize the shah’s constitutional dismissal, as well as to disseminate other anti-Mossadegh materials. But it was Iranians, not Americans, who ultimately succeeded in achieving TPAJAX’s objectives. In the days after Mossadegh’s decision to ignore his dismissal, chaos reigned in Iran. Communists and radical members of Mossadegh’s party, the National Front, poured into the streets to call for the abolition of the monarchy, among other changes. This triggered a backlash from both religious and military leaders and average Iranians. The latter were more loyal to the shah than the prime minister, who had brought so much political and economic hardship upon them. Loy Henderson, the U.S. ambassador to Iran, still speculated that these events “would probably have little significance.”


How wrong he was. Civilian crowds incited by Kashni and other religious leaders came out in even greater numbers than the radicals had. Mossadegh ordered the military to restore order, but most troops sided with their countrymen and the shah, bringing, in a stunning turn of events, an end to Mossadegh’s premiership on August 19, just six days after the shah’s failed dismissal of him.

The U.S. played an important and necessary precipitating role in Mossadegh’s removal then, but not the caricaturized one that is weaponized by people such as Marik von Rennenkampff, a State and Defense Department official in the Obama administration. In an op-ed for The Hill, von Rennenkampff conveniently ignores Mossadegh’s abuses of power and diplomatic intransigence, as well as the considerable Iranian opposition to him. Instead, he pins the 1979 Revolution and hostage crisis and all subsequent U.S.–Iranian hostilities on the Mossadegh imbroglio, casting the U.S. not only as the party responsible for the initial iciness between the two countries, but also as the primary aggressor over the last 40 years. He even goes so far as to dismiss the hostage crisis as merely “decades of anger boil[ing] over.” It is worrying that von Rennenkampff once held positions of some significance within the U.S. government. Even more alarming is that his historically and morally backwards perspective on American–Iranian affairs may once again be returning to power alongside Joe Biden.

After all, Biden’s old boss, President Barack Obama, was fond of promulgating a simplistic and anti-American telling of the Mossadegh ouster. In 2009, the newly minted president claimed that “in the middle of the Cold War, the United States played a role in the overthrow of a democratically elected Iranian government.” Other Democrats, including Hillary Clinton and Madeleine Albright, have made similar assertions. Why? To justify their illogical but dogged attempts to cozy up to Iran’s evil, explicitly anti-American regime at the expense of our relationships with Israel and the Arab world, both of which are much more natural fits as U.S. allies in the region.

With Democrats returning to power, Americans should beware of the revival of the Mossadegh myth. The people who will be wielding the levers of power in the executive branch will not hesitate to interpret history in the most uncharitable way possible to the country they serve if they believe it will help them fit their square peg into an obviously round hole.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/16840/terrorism-iran-europe

[Crafty_Dog]

https://webmail.earthlink.net/wam/index.jsp?x=1464068706

[Crafty_Dog]

https://dailycaller.com/2020/12/24/house-democrats-letter-return-iran-deal/?utm_source=piano&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2360&pnespid=mLhmraNeHQONlAyUkImvg5Y1LTnGCXXAvqeeyEFw

[Crafty_Dog]

https://townhall.com/tipsheet/bethbaumann/2021/01/02/iran-is-planning-its-revenge-for-the-death-of-soleimani-n2582445

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/16903/beating-drum-iran-mullahs

[Crafty_Dog]

What to Make of the Latest Uptick in Iranian Aggression
5 MINS READ
Jan 4, 2021 | 22:09 GMT
HIGHLIGHTS
Security risks, including threats to tanker traffic, in the Persian Gulf and Iraq will remain heightened after U.S. President-elect Joe Biden takes office, despite his intent to enter negotiations with Tehran. The uptick in Iranian nuclear and naval activity since Dec. 31 risks provoking a military response in the region from foreign actors, including a potential U.S. strike on Iranian soil. On Jan. 3, Acting U.S. Secretary of Defense Christopher Miller announced that the USS Nimitz would forgo its redeployment away from the Middle East due to “recent threats issued by Iranian leaders against President Trump and other U.S. government officials.” Although the Pentagon did not specify what Miller was alluding to, the comments come after a Dec. 31 statement made by Iranian President Hassan Rouhani was initially translated as saying Trump would be ousted from “life.” Iranian officials have since this was a mistranslation, specifying that Rouhani was referring to Trump’s...

Security risks, including threats to tanker traffic, in the Persian Gulf and Iraq will remain heightened after U.S. President-elect Joe Biden takes office, despite his intent to enter negotiations with Tehran. The uptick in Iranian nuclear and naval activity since Dec. 31 risks provoking a military response in the region from foreign actors, including a potential U.S. strike on Iranian soil.

On Jan. 3, Acting U.S. Secretary of Defense Christopher Miller announced that the USS Nimitz would forgo its redeployment away from the Middle East due to “recent threats issued by Iranian leaders against President Trump and other U.S. government officials.”
Although the Pentagon did not specify what Miller was alluding to, the comments come after a Dec. 31 statement made by Iranian President Hassan Rouhani was initially translated as saying Trump would be ousted from “life.” Iranian officials have since this was a mistranslation, specifying that Rouhani was referring to Trump’s “political life.”
The reversal of the USS Nimitz’s plans comes amid a series of recent Iranian acts of aggression:

Dec. 31: A suspicious object suspected to be a limpet mine was found on a tanker near Iraq’s Al Basrah Oil Terminal (ABOT). Iran is believed to have been behind the incident.
Jan. 1: Iran notified the International Atomic Energy Organization (IAEA) that it planned to begin boosting uranium enrichment levels to 20 percent at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant. The IAEA confirmed on Jan. 4 that Iran had begun the process.
Jan 4: Iran ostensibly detained the South Korea-flagged Hankuk Chemi tanker, which was transiting the Persian Gulf en route to the United Arab Emirates, for allegedly polluting the waters.
Jan 5-6: Iran’s army is planning to hold two-days military exercises involving multiple unarmed aerial vehicles.
The tanker incidents signal that Iran remains willing to restart attacks against oil and gas infrastructure if the Biden administration does not include sanctions relief in negotiations. In doing so, Iran hopes to increase the cost of maintaining sanctions to the United States and its allies. By forcing both a security and nuclear crisis, Iran’s leaders are seeking to ensure the busy Biden administration prioritizes negotiations with Tehran upon taking office. If such pressure successfully yields sanctions relief, Iran’s conservatives and hardliners will then reap the political benefits in the upcoming June 18 presidential election — granting them more say in future talks with the West, as well as any potential economic and political reforms accompanying the relaxation of sanctions that could threaten their interests.

Boosting enrichment to 20 percent is one of the steps mandated under a new law the Iranian parliament recently passed that aims to ramp up Iran’s nuclear program over the next six months.
In 2019, Iran launched several attacks against tankers in the Persian Gulf and Saudi Arabian oil infrastructure. The last significant attack occurred in September 2019, against Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq and Khurais oil processing facilities.
Iran’s high-risk/high-reward strategy will increasingly threaten the physical security of targets in its immediate periphery by raising the risk of punitive strikes from the United States and Israel. Washington and Israel will view the increase in uranium enrichment levels to 20 percent as particularly worrisome, as stockpiling of uranium enriched to that level would substantially reduce the time needed to make a weapon. In his remaining few weeks in office, Trump appears to be more willing to conduct a physical strike against Iran than his successor. Any actions that directly target U.S. interests or result in American casualties in the coming days — such as the harassment of U.S. vessels transiting the Persian Gulf, or the deaths of U.S. soldiers in Iranian-backed militia attacks in Iraq or Syria — are most likely to prompt a response from the outgoing Trump administration. Even after Biden takes office, Israel will also still consider unilateral action against continued Iranian acts of aggression, particularly against Iran’s nuclear program.

Maritime traffic will face an increased risk of being targeted over the next few months, particularly tanker traffic linked to Western countries or countries viewed as backing the U.S. position against Iran. Specific threats would include unsafe approaches by Iranian vessels, armed boardings to detain crewmembers, and the use of limpet mines.
Iran is less willing to directly carry out frequent attacks onshore Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates for fear of further weakening Iran’s fraught negotiating capital with those states, as well as emboldening U.S. demands that Iran’s missile and drone program be included in talks. But infrequent attacks against these neighboring countries akin to those seen in 2019 remain possible.
Iran will also likely bolster its capacity to carry out cyberattacks in the region, including against both commercial and government targets. Less frequent, Iran-backed hacks against targets beyond the Middle East also cannot be ruled out.
Iran’s aggressive strategy may initially unlock some sanctions relief, though it will come at the cost of hardening the international community’s position against Tehran in longer-term negotiations. Over the last two years, Iran has demonstrated that it is willing to use its missile and drone capabilities to target commercial interests in the region. The continued use of such tactics will push European countries into broader alignment with the United States on the need for broader ongoing talks with Iran in order to ink a new nuclear deal, as well as discuss other concerns beyond just Tehran's nuclear program. This desire to include other issues in talks will make full normalization between the West and Iran difficult to achieve without a significant change in policy. Iran is hoping that the fear about broader conflict and its nuclear ambitions will at least keep the United States and European countries’ most effective countermeasure — broad sanctions — reserved for Tehran’s nuclear program in order to avoid having to make more significant concessions on other parts of its national security.

In a Jan. 3 interview with CNN, incoming National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said that Iran’s ballistic missile program should be included in “follow-on” negotiations.
 

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/16975/iran-nuclear-extortion

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/16987/europe-iran-nuclear-antics

[Crafty_Dog]

Setting the terms for Iran. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said Iran needed to return to full compliance with the terms of the nuclear deal before Washington would consider coming back. Meanwhile, the head of U.S. Central Command arrived in Israel to discuss Iran with Israel Defense Forces leadership.

==============

So far Blinken seems to be better than feared from Xiden.

[ccp]

I have great idea
that fits into to the democrat plan

we close down fracking
we convert to solar over the next 30 yrs
and in meantime secure a promise from Iran they will not go nuclear
and in return we will buy their oil

and of course throw in 2.5 billion in 20 dollar bills
flown over in hollywood jets

Hollywood would get to shoot a movie in Tehran and the Ayatollah can have a bit celebrity party

John kerry and Susan rice and obama's daughters

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/17010/iran-agents-us