Author Topic: Iran  (Read 455661 times)

ccp

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and Obama
« Reply #1300 on: August 24, 2022, 10:26:50 AM »
 et al   sabotaged Israel's plan to take preemptive military action

now the bunkers must be so hardened that Israel from what I can gather could not really
destroy them

what I don't understand is how we were told Iran was only months away from nuclear bomb grade
 material

yet we here they probably have and are just trying to get them in missiles I think

Like Bolton always said

if you don't like Iran now
just imagine what they will be like with nucs on missles




Crafty_Dog

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Biden's appeasement gets sneakier yet
« Reply #1301 on: August 27, 2022, 03:41:55 AM »
Biden's appeasement of Iran continues:
till More Dangerous New Concessions by Biden Administration for a Nuclear Deal with Iran's Mullahs
by Majid Rafizadeh  •  August 27, 2022 at 5:00 am


Newly leaked information from inside Iran, obtained by Iran International, reveals that the Biden administration has made even more concessions to revive the nuclear deal, which have not been revealed to the public. According to the report, "the US guarantees that its sanctions against IRGC would not affect other sectors and firms: e.g. a petrochemical company shouldn't be sanctioned by US because of doing business with IRGC."

The Biden administration seems to have been bragging that Iran's leaders have dropped a key demand: removing the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) from the US foreign organizations terrorist list. But if other sectors that are linked to the IRGC can freely do business under the nuclear deal, then the designation of the IRGC as a terrorist organization, as well as the sanctions against the IRGC, are merely cosmetic.

The IRGC has a large stake in almost every industrial sector in Iran, which includes the energy sector, mining, telecommunications, gold, shipping and construction. Private sector competitors are not permitted in these sectors because the more closed the economy, the more easily the IRGC can monopolize it.

As a result, any economic growth in these sectors will directly benefit Iran's military, the IRGC and its elite Quds Force branch, and Iran's militia and terror groups across the Middle East. Since Iran's economy is predominantly controlled by the IRGC or the state, additional revenues will likely be funneled into the treasury of the IRGC and the office of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

The other critical concession being reportedly made is that "the participants note the firm commitment of the US President [without mentioning Joe Biden by name] for returning to JCPOA compliance as long as Iran remains committed to the deal." This probably means that future US presidents are obliged to continue with the implementation of the nuclear deal. But why should the US guarantee the implementation of the nuclear deal if it is not even a legally binding treaty, approved by two-thirds of the Senate, in accordance with Article II, section 2 of the US Constitution? In addition, it is illegal for any president to commit future presidents to anything that has not been approved as a formal treaty by two-thirds of the Senate.

This is a much worse deal than the 2015 nuclear deal. Because, first, the US or EU3 (France, the United Kingdom and Germany) cannot call for reinstating sanctions on Iran unilaterally even if they believe that the Iranian regime is violating the nuclear deal. In the previous nuclear deal, at least, any single party to the deal could unilaterally trigger the snap-back sanctions clause. In addition, with the new deal, restrictions on the regime's nuclear program could be lifted only two years after the agreement is signed; and the Iranian regime will not be obliged to reveal its past nuclear activities, which had military dimensions; and Russia will be trusted to store Iran's enriched uranium, a task for which Moscow will be paid.

Reportedly, another concession that the Biden administration has made to Iran is that the IAEA is expected to halt its investigation into the regime's past nuclear activities.

"This shift to appeasement was never going to solve any of the world's issues with the Islamic Republic. The regime's problem with the West is the West's very existence, which obstructs its path to a global caliphate." — Reza Pahlavi, eldest son of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and an advocate of secular democracy for Iran, Wall Street Journal, August 8, 2022.

The Biden administration's policy towards the Iranian regime has been one of capitulation and giving concessions, and it appears determined to enrich and empower what the State Department has called "the world's top state sponsor of terrorism," whose core policy since its Islamic Revolution in 1979 has been to "export the revolution," as anchored in "Death to America" and "Death to Israel". Pictured: A member of the Islamic Basij volunteer militia burns an American flag in Tehran, Iran, on July 16 2022. (Photo by Atta Kenare/AFP via Getty Images)

Since assuming office, the Biden administration's policy towards the Iranian regime has been one of capitulation and giving concessions to the ruling Islamist mullahs of Iran. So far, they include suspending some of the anti-terrorism sanctions on Iran-backed Houthis, then revoking the designation of Yemen's Houthis as a terrorist group; disregarding Iran's oil sales to China; shipping oil to Syria, Lebanon's Hezbollah and Venezuela in direct violation of US sanctions; ignoring the Iranian regime's crackdown on protesters, smuggling weapons to the Houthis and Venezuela; attempting to murder US former officials and citizens on American soil, and taking more foreign hostages.

Crafty_Dog

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Iran prepares to take out Israel after the Biden deal is signed
« Reply #1302 on: August 28, 2022, 02:31:11 AM »
Khaled Abu Toameh: Iran Prepares to Take Out Israel – Right after Iran Deal Is Signed
Uzay Bulut: Turkey Accuses Sweden, Finland of 'Supporting Terrorism', Meanwhile Releases Turkish Hizbullah Terrorists from Prison
Iran Prepares to Take Out Israel – Right after Iran Deal Is Signed
by Khaled Abu Toameh  •  August 24, 2022 at 5:00 am

The mullahs appear convinced that once the Biden administration capitulates completely to their demands for reviving the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, they will be able to step up their already significant efforts to eliminate Israel and export their Islamic Revolution to Arab and Islamic countries. Iran already occupies four Arab countries: Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq.

Iran's mullahs appear to be so confident that the Biden administration has turned its back on its Arab allies in the Middle East that they are issuing direct threats not only against Israel, but also against any Arab country that dares to cooperate with the Israelis.

Meanwhile, the mullahs are busy trying to open a new battlefront against Israel, this time in the West Bank.

The mullahs appear to be so emboldened by the Biden administration's weakness that they are now openly talking about using the West Bank as a launching pad to attack Israel and kill Jews.

Under pressure from the Iranian regime, Hamas and Islamic Jihad representatives held a meeting in the Gaza Strip earlier this week to discuss ways of stepping up the "resistance" against Israel.

In an attempt to appease their masters in Tehran, Hamas and Islamic Jihad issued a joint statement after the meeting in which they pledged to step up the "armed struggle" against Israel "until the liberation [of all of Palestine]," a euphemism for the destruction of Israel.


Iran's mullahs appear convinced that once the Biden administration capitulates completely to their demands for reviving the 2015 nuclear deal, they will be able to step up their already significant efforts to eliminate Israel and export their Islamic Revolution to Arab and Islamic countries. Iran already occupies four Arab countries: Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq.(Image source: iStock)

As the Biden administration seems to be moving closer to reaching a new nuclear deal with Iran, the mullahs in Tehran are encouraging their Lebanese and Palestinian terrorist proxies to prepare for waging war on Israel.

The mullahs appear convinced that once the Biden administration capitulates completely to their demands for reviving the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, they will be able to step up their already significant efforts to eliminate Israel and export their Islamic Revolution to Arab and Islamic countries. Iran already occupies four Arab countries: Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq.

The mullahs are not oblivious to the growing voices in the Arab world that complain about the weakness of the US and how the Biden administration's policy of appeasement towards Iran is undermining the Americans' credibility and jeopardizing the security and stability of Arab and Islamic countries.

ccp

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Iran Israel
« Reply #1303 on: August 28, 2022, 09:36:02 AM »
still trying to figure out why the Mullahs hate Israel so much

as the relationship between Israel Iran is rather complicated.

https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/iran/2018-05-08/ty-article-magazine/how-israel-and-iran-went-from-allies-to-enemies/0000017f-f633-d887-a7ff-fef71e7f0000

After reading this I do not really understand the reasons
as Iran has not traditionally been so anti Jew or Israel:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Persian_Jews
https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/iran/2018-05-08/ty-article-magazine/how-israel-and-iran-went-from-allies-to-enemies/0000017f-f633-d887-a7ff-fef71e7f0000

--------------
Isn't there a thread Israel and its neighbors?  can't find it
this belongs there too
to bad there is not a way to simply click a button and post on an additional pertinent thread.
« Last Edit: August 28, 2022, 09:38:46 AM by ccp »

DougMacG

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Re: Iran Israel
« Reply #1304 on: August 28, 2022, 11:34:36 AM »
"... still trying to figure out why the Mullahs hate Israel so much"

"After reading this I do not really understand the reasons
as Iran has not traditionally been so anti Jew or Israel"
----------------------

I don't know either.  It seems to be in the Islamic religions to hate Jews.  Is the root of it territorial?

Israel offered them water technology (for free) that would really help the Iranian people:
https://www.sun-sentinel.com/florida-jewish-journal/fl-jjps-water-0627-20180619-story.html



G M

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Re: Iran Israel
« Reply #1306 on: August 30, 2022, 03:44:27 PM »
https://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Global-Viewpoint/2013/0124/Why-Middle-East-Muslims-are-taught-to-hate-Jews

https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/references-to-jews-in-the-koran


"... still trying to figure out why the Mullahs hate Israel so much"

"After reading this I do not really understand the reasons
as Iran has not traditionally been so anti Jew or Israel"
----------------------

I don't know either.  It seems to be in the Islamic religions to hate Jews.  Is the root of it territorial?

Israel offered them water technology (for free) that would really help the Iranian people:
https://www.sun-sentinel.com/florida-jewish-journal/fl-jjps-water-0627-20180619-story.html

Crafty_Dog

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Iran nuke deal makes war more likely
« Reply #1307 on: September 01, 2022, 06:27:55 AM »
A Deal Based on Lies: The Iran Nuclear Agreement Will Make War More Likely
by Richard Kemp  •  September 1, 2022 at 5:00 am

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These are the effects of the proposed nuclear deal brokered by the EU, Russia and China. Why is it brokered by the EU, Russia and China? Because the United States was outrageously banned from direct negotiations by Tehran. It is not outrageous that Iran demanded it, but that the US tolerated its own exclusion.

[T]he deal that is about to emerge will be even worse [than the 2015 deal]. The argument of the "bad" dealers is that it buys time for the West, with Micawberish optimism that "something will turn up". This thinking is clear from President Biden's preposterous hope that he can "lengthen and strengthen" the deal once it has been struck.

While in office, Obama declared that Iran would not be allowed to build nuclear weapons on his watch. He must have known that the only way to prevent that was through military action or perhaps crippling sanctions, but was unwilling to do either and the result was the JCPOA, which kicked the problem down the road onto someone else's watch.

Tehran can legitimately commence operation of advanced uranium enrichment centrifuges in two years, all the while working flat out to develop nuclear-capable ballistic missiles that, along with Iran's terrorist activities, are not covered at all in the agreement.

The "buying time" argument, and indeed an argument for any agreement, only works if you do not understand Iran and are naive enough to believe the regime will honor what it agrees to.

The reality that the optimistic and the unschooled fail to grasp is that the regime in Tehran will ignore constraints imposed by the deal that it does not like.

Tehran will continue to develop the nuclear capability that it sees as its right — deal or no deal — at the speed it wants until it is physically stopped from doing so. Whatever shape Biden's deal takes there are only downsides for the West and the Middle East and only upsides for Tehran.

More than that, according to Israeli prime minister Yair Lapid, Tehran will receive $100 billion a year as a result of lifted sanctions.

Released from sanctions, Iran will be used as an economic refuge by Moscow to evade its own international sanctions.

Under the draft deal, Iran will be able to retain the uranium that it has been illicitly producing since the original JCPOA, enriched beyond any requirements for a peaceful nuclear programme.... t seems likely that Russia — despite its own repeated nuclear threats — will be handed control of this existing uranium stockpile.

This chilling scenario — for which the world will pay a very high price — is about to be made more likely by the ill-judged actions of governments in America and Europe, which lack the resolve and courage to apply sufficient economic pressure and military deterrence to put a stop to Iranian nuclear ambitions. Instead, as they did in response to Russian aggression, they are again opting for appeasement, the opium of the faint-hearted.


Under the proposed renewed nuclear deal, Iran can legitimately commence operation of advanced uranium enrichment centrifuges in two years, all the while working flat out to develop nuclear-capable ballistic missiles that, along with its terrorist activities, are not covered at all in the agreement. Pictured: Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi speaks during a press conference in Tehran on August 29, 2022. (Photo by STR/AFP via Getty Images)
As Western governments quake in the face of Russian nuclear threats, they are on the verge of striking a deal that will give Iran that same power over them.

Even after six months of war in Europe, they cannot seem to grasp the parallels between the two. Putin risked invading Ukraine because of Western weakness and appeasement, naively welcoming Russia back into the family of nations after it devoured large parts of Ukraine in 2014, while at the same time filling its war chests with ever more billions of euros from energy exports to Europe.

Crafty_Dog

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More on Biden appeasement of Iran nukes
« Reply #1308 on: September 03, 2022, 04:21:50 AM »
The Biden Administration's Nuclear Deal Is the Biggest Gift to the World's 'Top State Sponsor of Terrorism'
by Majid Rafizadeh
September 3, 2022 at 5:00 am

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The main beneficiaries of the increased revenues will most likely be the office of Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and more importantly the IRGC's elite branch the Quds Force, which carries out extraterritorial operations to advance the revolutionary principles of the Islamic Republic abroad.

A considerable part of the economy and Iran's financial systems are owned and controlled by the IRGC and the Office of the Supreme Leader.... This economic haven means that state and non-state actors, such as the Houthis, Hezbollah, the Shiite militias in Iraq and Bashar Assad's Syria, will be the next major beneficiaries of Biden's sanctions relief and new nuclear deal.

The Biden administration will more likely contribute to more tensions between Iran and other countries in the region, and lead to further regional insecurity, destabilization, humanitarian tragedies, and most likely a major war.

Biden's new nuclear deal is the biggest gift that one could give to the world's "top state sponsor of terrorism": unlimited nuclear weapons, no inspections past present or future, the missiles to deliver them, enriched uranium to be held by Russia and returned to Iran or wherever they both decide, "$100 billion per year to spread terror around the globe" -- in short, assured expansion of the "Revolution" not only throughout the Middle East but further, straight into America's soft underbelly, Venezuela.


The main beneficiaries of increased revenues from a renewed nuclear deal will most likely be the office of Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and more importantly the IRGC's elite branch the Quds Force, which carries out extraterritorial operations to advance the revolutionary principles of the Islamic Republic abroad. Pictured: IRGC members on parade, marking the anniversary of the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, on September 22, 2018, in Tehran. (Photo by Stringer/AFP via Getty Images)
The Biden administration's new nuclear deal with the ruling clerics will lift economic sanctions against the Iranian regime the moment the deal enters into effect.

At that moment, the Iranian regime will receive approximately $90 billion. The Biden administration will also instantly be lifting sanctions on the Iranian regime's energy sector, which will also significantly boost the regime's oil and gas revenues.

The ruling mullahs will be able to ramp up their oil exports to pre-sanctions levels, roughly quadrupling their oil sales, thereby bringing billions of dollars in additional revenues to the theocratic establishment. For example, after the implementation the 2015 nuclear agreement (known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action - JCPOA) under the Obama administration, crippling sanctions were lifted and Iran rejoined the global financial system. Iran's oil and gas industries had a fresh start, the regime increased its oil exports from 1 million barrels per day (bpd) to approximately 4 million bpd.

Oil and gas revenues, as is no secret, are crucial for the ruling mullahs: Iran reportedly has the second-largest natural gas reserves and the fourth-largest proven crude oil reserves after Saudi Arabia, Canada and Venezuela. The sale of oil accounts for nearly 60% of the regime's total revenues and more than 80% of its export revenues. Several Iranian leaders have spoken about the country's major dependence on oil exports. Former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, for instance, acknowledged in 2019 that "Although we have some other incomes, the only revenue that can keep the country going is the oil money."

The Biden administration's removal of sanctions will, in addition, help the ruling mullahs increase their revenues by attracting foreign investments in their energy sector and other industries. After the 2015 nuclear agreement under the Obama administration, for example, Tehran succeeded in signing major agreements with some of the world's largest aviation, oil and gas corporations. The energy producer Total signed an agreement with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) "for the development of phase 11 of South Pars, the world's largest gasfield". Another agreement was sealed with Royal Dutch Shell, which signed a provisional agreement with NIOC "to further explore areas of potential cooperation". The Iranian regime also signed a deal with Boeing -- the first business deal Tehran concluded with an American aviation corporation since the 1970s. Iran also began negotiating to purchase planes from the European company Airbus.

Not only will the Biden administration help the Islamist mullahs to become vastly wealthier, but it will also help the Iranian regime to gain global legitimacy as it rejoins the international financial system. The main beneficiaries of the increased revenues will most likely be the office of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and more importantly the IRGC's elite branch the Quds Force, which carries out extraterritorial operations to advance the revolutionary principles of the Islamic Republic abroad.

A considerable part of the economy and Iran's financial systems are owned and controlled by the IRGC and the Office of the Supreme Leader. The IRGC alone controls between a third and half of Iran's gross domestic product. The IRGC owns several major economic powerhouses and religious endowments, such as Astan Quds Razavi in the northeastern city of Mashhad.

This economic haven means that state and non-state actors, such as the Yemeni Houthis, Lebanese Hezbollah, the Shiite militias in Iraq and Bashar Assad's Syria, will be the next major beneficiaries of Biden's sanctions relief and new nuclear deal.

The Biden administration's nuclear deal will also help the IRGC and Quds Force to more powerfully interfere in other countries, support terror and militia groups that target Americans and their allies, and attempt to kill Americans on US soil. The Biden administration will more likely contribute to increasing tensions between Iran and other countries in the region, and lead to further regional insecurity, destabilization, humanitarian tragedies, and most likely a major war.

Biden's new nuclear deal is the biggest gift that one could give to the world's "top state sponsor of terrorism": unlimited nuclear weapons, no inspections past present or future, the missiles to deliver them, enriched uranium to be held by Russia and returned to Iran or wherever they both decide, "$100 billion per year to spread terror around the globe" -- in short, assured expansion of the "Revolution" not only throughout the Middle East but further, straight into America's soft underbelly, Venezuela.

Dr. Majid Rafizadeh is a business strategist and advisor, Harvard-educated scholar, political scientist, board member of Harvard International Review, and president of the International American Council on the Middle East. He has authored several books on Islam and US Foreign Policy. He can be reached at Dr.Rafizadeh@Post.Harvard.Edu

Crafty_Dog

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The new Russian-Iranian alliance
« Reply #1310 on: September 14, 2022, 07:47:26 AM »
Iran and Russia: The New Alliance
by Judith Bergman  •  September 14, 2022 at 4:00 am

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Significantly, Russia and Iran's cooperation extends to the military and space fields, with Russia recently helping Iran to launch a new satellite into space.

Iran's Khayyam satellite "will greatly enhance Tehran's ability to spy on military targets across the Middle East... [and give] Tehran "unprecedented capabilities, including near-continuous monitoring of sensitive facilities in Israel and the Persian Gulf." — The Washington Post, August 4, 2022.

"Iran could share the imagery with pro-Iranian militia groups across the region, from the Houthi rebels battling Saudi-backed government forces in Yemen to Hezbollah fighters in southern Lebanon and Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria." — Unnamed Middle Eastern official, The Washington Post, June 10, 2021.

"As Iran perfects its missile arsenal... alongside its growing UAV capability throughout the Middle East –being able to sync those capabilities with satellite capabilities and surveillance will only increase the lethality of the Iranian threat." — Richard Goldberg, former Iran analyst in the Trump administration's National Security Council, The Washington Post, August 4, 2022.

Iran has also become a major developer and producer of drones.... Most recently, Iran claimed that it had developed a long-range suicide drone "designed to hit Israel's Tel Aviv, Haifa."

Despite this acknowledged "profound threat" emanating from the mutually beneficial alliance between Russia and Iran, the Biden administration nevertheless has been making dangerous concessions to revive the nuclear deal, which would only deepen the threat and benefit not only Iran, but also Russia.

Let us hope that the new "Iran nuclear deal," reportedly "off the table for the time being" is off the table for good.


Russia and Iran's cooperation extends to the military and space fields, with Russia recently helping Iran to launch a new satellite into space. Pictured: Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iran's President Ebrahim Raisi hold a meeting in Tehran on July 19, 2022. (Photo by Sergei Savostyanov/Sputnik/AFP via Getty Images)
Iran and Russia have been strengthening their alliance recently, growing it gradually to such an extent that the Wall Street Journal wrote on August 27 that the two countries were "forging tighter ties than ever," as both countries face continued international isolation.

In recent months, Russia and Iran have signed a multitude of agreements, especially in trade, oil and gas, and military cooperation.

In June, an agreement on the establishment of mutual trade centers in St. Petersburg and Tehran was signed, to generate further trade between the two countries in the sectors of energy, transportation, electronics, agriculture, food, pharmaceuticals and construction, by helping Iranian and Russian businessmen establish contacts and conduct financial transactions.

Crafty_Dog

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Gatestone: Russia will use nuke-armed Iran to better threaten the West
« Reply #1313 on: October 03, 2022, 04:26:22 AM »
Russia Will Use Its Ally, a Nuclear-Armed Iran, to Better Threaten the West
by Con Coughlin
October 3, 2022 at 5:00 am

As one of the signatories of the original Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the flawed nuclear deal negotiated by the Obama administration, Russia, as well as China, will ultimately have a say in any new agreement that emerges from the Vienna talks.

Rather than seeking to curb Iran's nuclear ambitions, Beijing and Moscow are more interested in forming an alliance with Iran to counter what they denounce as America's unilateralism, and thwarting "draconian" US sanctions.

Given Moscow's open hostility towards the West, it is abundantly clear that the Kremlin wants to exploit the weakness of the Biden administration to ensure the negotiations provide an even more unsatisfactory deal than the one signed off by Barack Obama in 2015, one that completely fails to address the very real threat Iran's nuclear weapons will pose to the wider world.

From Moscow's perspective, having a nuclear-armed Iran, one that is Russia's ally, will greatly enhance its ability to challenge the West.

In return, Iran has formed a new "axis of evil" with Moscow, providing it with weaponry, such as sophisticated drones, to support its war effort in Ukraine, while at the time providing assistance to Tehran to evade the effects of Western sanctions.

While these two despotic regimes seem determined to forge an ever closer alliance, however, their objectives are completely at odds with the demands of their respective citizens, whose primary concern is securing their freedom, not supporting the military aspirations of the ruling elites.

There is growing concern in Washington that US President Joe Biden is preparing to sign a new deal with Tehran once the midterm elections have been concluded, and that his officials are prepared to sign a far weaker version of the deal than that originally agreed to in 2015.

That would be a grave miscalculation on the part of the Biden administration.

This should be the moment when the US and its allies are intensifying the pressure on both Iran and Moscow, not capitulating to their interests with a weak nuclear deal which will only encourage them to indulge in further acts of aggression against the West and its allies.

More at https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/18950/russia-ally-nuclear-iran

Crafty_Dog

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WSJ: Support the Iranian women, not the mullahs
« Reply #1314 on: October 03, 2022, 05:30:38 AM »
second

The Islamic Republic’s impasse has once more exploded in the streets. The triggering event was the killing of Mahsa Amini by Iran’s morality police last month. But the tension—the rot in the Islamic system depressing the country—lies much deeper. For the clerical regime, it’s an insoluble predicament.

Among the casualties of this uprising may be the White House’s desperate quest to restore Barack Obama’s nuclear deal. Even before the streets erupted, Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, wasn’t biting at the new agreement proffered in Vienna this summer. When beset by regime-shaking domestic discontent, Iran’s theocracy tends to scorn diplomatic mediation. Repression at home produces truculence abroad.

One of the persistent problems with American policy toward Iran has been mirror-imaging. The Islamic Republic’s foreign minister, Hussein Amir-Abdollahian, revealed that Tehran had received word from the Biden administration, after the protests had started, that it remains committed to reviving the nuclear deal—that the “will and goodwill” to do so remain.

It isn’t hard to imagine Western functionaries believing that Iran’s internal turmoil gives them a diplomatic opening. When presidents and prime ministers get into trouble at home, they often look for foreign-policy triumphs. With the same logic, the clerical oligarchs would now be prone to come to terms to refurbish their domestic appeal. All this misses the fundamental fact that Iran’s theocrats, who claim to know the mind of God, pay little attention to public opinion.

For nearly two decades, arms control has dominated the Western approach to Iran. It is predicated on two assumptions. First, that the other side is pragmatic and can shelve ideological impulses for the sake of an agreement. Second, that the Iranian government is a responsible stakeholder and can be trusted with residual nuclear assets. Even when a revived accord’s sunset provisions expire, the logic goes, Iran’s theocrats would be too allured by commerce to do anything rash.

Such assumptions about the Islamist regime have always been wrong. We have clung to them either because of our poverty of mind (secularists don’t analyze the religious well) or because we fear the daunting alternatives. Devising a patient policy of undermining the Islamic Republic, as America once did against the Soviet Union, exceeds our imagination and political will. By default, we offer concessions.

As surreal as it may seem to Mr. Biden’s Iran team, the administration’s urgency for a new nuclear agreement may well be seen by many within Iran’s ruling elite as a Western trap. “Washington is always trying to weaken Iran’s stability and security although it has been unsuccessful,” a foreign ministry spokesman opined after the Amini protests started.


This isn’t mere rhetoric, an excuse to give the regime some comfort in a land seething with anti-theocratic sentiment. Conspiracy-obsessed, Mr. Khamenei and his henchman have always seen sinister Western hands lurking behind oppositionists, especially those who seek greater personal freedom and democracy. The regime has its own lexicon: demands for democracy without clerical oversight are seditious innovation, and calls for relaxation of cultural strictures are apostasy.

In Iran, state and society now exist on different planes. The divine republic may be smug, corrupt and cruel (as more-sensitive members of the clergy acknowledge), but the theocracy genuinely believes it is following God’s blueprint. A restless citizenry chanting “Mullahs get lost!” and “We don’t want your Islamic Republic!” rejects it all. Even if the regime can wait out the protesters, killing as few women as possible, it can’t escape the fundamental challenge: If the hijab falls, so does the theocracy.

What is most striking about the regime’s response so far is its relative lack of violence. Revolutionary Guard commanders worked out a riot-control plan after crushing the massive pro-democracy Green Movement in 2009. The regime effectively deployed this hit-hard-quickly approach in nationwide protests in 2017 and 2019. In the latter clash, which was a violent eruption of the poor, the Revolutionary Guards reportedly used automatic weapons. Hundreds died.

That hasn’t happened yet against the thousands of women protesting. Like all declining dictatorships, the clerical regime has had a failure of imagination—in this case, about how to handle protesting women. Islamic societies treat women as legally inferior to men. Their protection is at the core of male identity and pride. To slaughter women in large numbers, or to rape them in police detention, puts severe pressure on the traditional Islamic pillars that give this regime legitimacy. The religious state could fall because women are forcing their men into action.

The Biden administration has now run into this buzzsaw of sexual politics and faith. If the president were wise, he would throw his lot in with Iranian women. Mr. Biden wasn’t going to stop the Iranian bomb in Vienna. Aligning American policy behind the rebels at least gives the administration a chance at regime change. It also gives the White House a chance to restore American dignity.

Mr. Gerecht is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Mr. Takeyh is a senior fellow at Council on Foreign Relations.

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Gen Keane
« Reply #1315 on: October 06, 2022, 08:42:01 PM »

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Re: Iran
« Reply #1317 on: October 26, 2022, 02:18:11 PM »
October 26, 2022
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Iran’s Islamic Republic Will Survive – For Now
The regime has cracks but isn’t ready to break.
By: Hilal Khashan

Protests in Iran continue for the sixth consecutive week following the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini while in custody of the morality police. Some observers see the demonstrations as a sign of the Iranian regime’s looming demise. Their persistence and expansion to all regions of the country have presented the government with the most significant challenge to its authority and legitimacy since the widespread demonstrations over the 2009 presidential election. Still, it would be wrong to assume the regime’s fall is immediate.

The leaders of Iran’s Islamic Revolution built a formidable internal security apparatus that has proved time and again capable of crushing protests – irrespective of their size or duration. Though the regime has been weakened by sanctions and its international isolation, the protests do not pose a threat to its survival. It seems that Iranian officials, who consistently blame foreign enemies for conspiring against the Islamic Republic, are confident that the major powers, namely the U.S., still believe Tehran can be transitioned from foe to friend.

Cracks in the Regime

Since its establishment in 1979, the Islamic government in Iran has failed to establish a modern, industrialized state. Instead, it has created a vast military establishment and propaganda machine that have deluded its people and the outside world into believing it is capable of remaining independent, dominating the region and waging war.

The Iranian regime is run by an aging leadership, with mediocre administrative and economic competencies, and obsolete public service institutions. Its policies, applied using heavily coercive methods, stalled the country’s development. But despite this failure, the regime claims it is in the position to challenge the U.S., the world’s uncontested superpower, and continue its subversive regional activities. After suffering for years under severe sanctions and isolation, the nuclear deal, signed under the Obama administration, gave Tehran new hope that it could revive its economy and become the regional power it claims to be. Instead of correcting its past mistakes, however, the regime doubled down, expanding its regional adventurism and increasing its internal repression. In 2018, the Trump administration reinstated the sanctions, challenging the regime’s ability to continue its policy of expansionism.

It’s against this backdrop that the protests of the past six weeks have unfolded. They have produced a new force in Iranian society. For several decades, many have believed that the presidency has alternated between two political currents: conservative and reformist. But Amini’s death has led to a new, leaderless opposition that rejects the political establishment and distrusts the reformers’ ability to change a medieval-minded, dogmatic religious system. The protesters object to the dominance of the conservatives and reformists over the political arena and see no point in reforming a failed system.

The new generation doesn’t relate to the revolution of their parents’ era against the now-defunct shah regime. It aspires to remove the shackles of the ayatollahs’ regime that isolated them from the outside world. They deny Tehran’s accusations about foreign interference in the protest movement, while also criticizing Western countries for watching their suffering and only verbally condemning the regime’s heavy-handed tactics.

Government officials have been critical of the uprising, led by young women, saying they were influenced by social media. The deputy commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps even said that the average age of those detained because of the unrest is 15. However, their demands for greater freedom are supported by much of the rest of Iranian society.

Protest Activity in Iran, October 24

(click to enlarge)

The demonstrators, who have chanted slogans like “We are in the last days of the dictator Khamenei,” have also enjoyed widespread support of Iranians abroad. On Oct. 22, thousands of Iranians residing in Europe converged in Berlin to hold their own demonstration against the supreme leader in solidarity with the protesters at home. In addition, an Iranian-American activist compared the veil, which triggered the massive protests, to the Berlin Wall, threatening to bring down the regime. In her opinion, if Iranian women could say no to those who tell them what to wear, they could also say no to a dictator.

The protesters’ resolve in the face of the excessive force used by security forces has compelled President Ebrahim Raisi to call for a review of certain laws that limit personal freedoms, especially those related to women’s dress. It’s unlikely that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei would have given in in this way, fearing that it could undermine the regime’s Islamic foundations. But the protests have gained momentum, spreading throughout the country, especially to regions dominated by ethnic and religious minorities – mainly the Kurds in the west and the Baluchis in the east, where the Basij paramilitary forces killed more than 90 demonstrators in late September who were protesting the rape of a girl by a policeman. The demonstrations also spread to Tehran’s notorious Evin prison, despite the public prosecutor’s assertion that the clashes at the facility, which killed eight prisoners and wounded dozens, had nothing to do with the violence that ensued after Amini’s death.

Regime Will Endure

The unrest has revealed the regime’s defensiveness and brought the country to an impasse. Still, a regime that launched a successful revolution of its own knows how to stifle one if it needs to. The country has seen unrest before; it experienced some 4,000 protests in 2021 and more than 2,200 in the first half of this year. The current demonstrations are still largely spontaneous and lack a visible leadership with a clear plan to establish an alternate system. The protesters agree on the need to overthrow the religious regime but differ fundamentally on the role of ethnic and religious groups if the regime collapses. The politically dominant Persians will not recognize minority groups’ cultural differences and demands for regional autonomy.

Meanwhile, the regime has supporters of its own who have also organized rallies. Pro-government protesters have praised the security forces and railed against the women who burned their headscarves, accusing them of doing the U.S.’ bidding. They apparently believe in Raisi’s claim that only when Iranians recognize the conspiracies hatched by the enemies of the Islamic Revolution can they confront them through national unity and cohesion.

The Green Revolution that took place in response to the rigged 2009 presidential election was crushed by the IRGC. It could be said that that movement inspired and eventually led to the protests we’re seeing today. The government, however, remains robust, with its survival dependent on the IRGC. The IRGC took precautionary measures to prevent security forces from failing in front of the demonstrators, which explains their use of excessive force against the protests. The Iranian interior minister said the government was in complete control of the situation but warned that jeopardizing Iran’s security would negatively affect the stability of the Gulf states, which is inseparable from Iran’s own peace and stability.

U.S. Opposes Regime Change

The current wave of unrest has spread to provinces that have rarely seen anti-government demonstrations since 1979, including Baluchistan, on the Pakistani border, and Gilan, Mazandaran and Golestan. In the past, the regime could count on the passivity of these provinces at times of anti-regime discontent in Tehran and other Persian regions. The dilemma of Iran, however, is that you can’t change it from within. The successor to the Islamic Republic would be a secular regime with the same domestic and regional roles that existed during the shah’s rule. If the current regime collapses, national politics, especially concerning minorities, will not change dramatically, and Iran’s regional posture will remain the same, albeit without the interest in exporting the regime’s ideological system of governance.

If the government is overthrown, elements of some ethnic groups may try to secede or establish autonomy as they did during the 1979 revolution. In 1945, Azerbaijanis and Kurds took advantage of the Soviet army’s presence in northwestern Iran and declared the Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan and the Kurdish Mahabad Republic, which surrendered to the Iranian military after the Soviet withdrawal in 1946. After the shah’s departure, ethnic groups such as the Kurds, Turkmen and Arabs tried to secede from Iran, and the Azerbaijanis tried to establish autonomy.

The U.S. has avoided escalation against Iran, fearing its disintegration, as happened in Yugoslavia in 1992, which created havoc in the Balkans. Despite Washington imposing sanctions on people responsible for killing Amini and providing Iranians with free internet access through the Starlink network, its reaction does not reflect the seriousness of the situation. The Biden administration could have used more effective measures if it wanted to get rid of the regime, starting with reactivating the Magnitsky Act and taking the matter to the U.N. Security Council.

The U.S. special envoy to Iran, Robert Malley, expressed Washington’s position, saying the U.S. demanded respect for human rights but didn’t seek regime change. The State Department, meanwhile, continued its anti-Iranian rhetoric without taking any practical measures on the ground. What has prevented the U.S. government from responding more forcefully is its desire to reach a new nuclear deal and avoid more tensions with Iran – especially while it searches for alternative energy sources to Russia. Washington has been similarly silent on Iran’s frequent bombing of sites in northern Iraq.

Iran isn’t ready to establish a democratic, non-sectarian state that respects its citizens and does not interfere in its neighbors’ affairs. The likely successors to the existing regime would oppose any change in Iran’s borders and its national fabric. Persian opposition groups wouldn’t even agree to allow minorities to teach their mother tongues in schools, let alone enjoy any kind of autonomy. If the regime collapses, these factors would set the stage for a violent conflict.


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GPF: Russia-Iran pipeline
« Reply #1319 on: November 10, 2022, 07:58:44 AM »
New pipeline. Russia and Iran signed a memorandum of understanding on building a pipeline known as Tabesh to transport oil products. The pipeline, which will have a capacity of 150,000 barrels per day, will stretch about 1,000 kilometers (620 miles) from Rafsanjan to Mashhad and will have two pumping stations and three terminals. Moscow has been strengthening cooperation with Tehran since its invasion of Ukraine.

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Iranian missiles to Russia for use in Ukraine
« Reply #1320 on: November 15, 2022, 12:10:34 PM »
Iran's Missiles Keep Russian Invasion of Ukraine Alive
by Ioannis E. Kotoulas
IPT News
November 15, 2022

https://www.investigativeproject.org/9285/iran-missiles-keep-russian-invasion-of-ukraine

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With its invasion of Ukraine stalling, and Ukrainians liberating as much as half their seized territory, Russia is turning to Iran to procure missiles to continue its campaign against Ukraine's civilian infrastructure.

Russia reportedly wants powerful Iranian Fateh-110 and Zolfaghar short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM). The Fateh-110 can travel up to 300 kilometers. Its guidance system and movable fins help steer it toward a target. The Zolfaghar carries a smaller warhead but can travel up to 700 kilometers.

"The Iranian missiles are important to the Russian war effort," military analyst Savvas Vlassis of Greek international security website Doureios Ippos, told the Investigative Project on Terrorism, "because the Russian Air Force has not affected substantially the course of the war. Iran appears willing to support the Russian war effort with a considerable number of [short range ballistic missiles], especially the Fateh-110 3rd or 4th generation missiles carrying a 500 kilogram warhead. Russia has depleted the greater part of its stockpile of ballistic and cruise missiles, therefore they need the Iranian missiles to keep the pressure on Ukraine."

"Iranians have to find a working balance between helping their Russian allies and preserving their own military capabilities against their rivals," Vlassis said.

The Russian army already has used Iranian drones extensively in its attacks, causing havoc with a series of strikes on densely-populated Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure.

Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, a confidante of Russian President Vladimir Putin, met in Tehran Nov. 8 with Ali Shamkhani, the secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council. Patrushev reportedly met with other high-ranking Iranians, including hardline Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, to discuss cooperation between Tehran and Moscow. The two sides stressed the need to further enhance strategic relations.

"The most decisive response to U.S. sanctions ... is the cooperation of independent countries," Raisi said. The meeting also covered cybersecurity and "measures countering the interference of Western security services in the internal affairs of both countries," according to an Iranian press communique.

Iranian Missiles in Ukraine

The Iranian missiles are expected to be delivered to Russia before the end of the year. According to reports by Ukrainian intelligence agencies, Iran will also supply additional drones, more than 200 Shahed-136 and Arash-2 kamikaze drones, and Mohajer-6 reconnaissance and combat UAVs.

Iran initially denied its involvement in the Ukraine war in both official statements and contacts with the EU despite the fact that its drones, notably the one-way attack Shahed-136 model, were undeniably identified in the deadly attacks. As the evidence grew too much to credibly deny, Iran's Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian finally admitted Nov. 5 that Iran has provided drones to Russia. Iranian officials tried to downplay their involvement, claiming that the drones were sent to Russia months before the Ukrainian war and therefore the Iranians were unaware of Russian intentions to use them. However, evidence from Ukrainian military intelligence suggests otherwise, as many drones were dispatched after the start of the invasion in late February.

Interestingly enough, conservative circles criticized the change in official rhetoric. They worry about possible repercussions of Iran's active support of the Russian invasion. The Iranian government should have not allowed Moscow to use the Iranian drones against Ukraine in the first place," argued Massih Mohajeri, editor of Jomhouri-e Eslami (Islamic Republic) newspaper.

In reality, not only was Iran aware, it has also dispatched personnel to Russian-held territories of Ukraine to train Russian troops, according to an Oct. 12 report by the Institute for the Study of War and reports by Ukrainian media.

In addition to helping an ally, Iran's supply of drones and rockets targeting population centers provide a testing ground for weapons that could be used in a future attack against Israel.

On this point, Iran is menacingly candid. A newspaper affiliated with Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), designated by the United States as a foreign terrorist organization, on Monday published an open threat in Hebrew language on its front page. The Sobh-e-Sadegh newspaper warns that a new hypersonic missile reportedly developed by Iran could reach Israel in "400 seconds."

Hypersonic missiles can evade defense systems with their great speed and maneuvers. Such a weapon could first dismantle Israel's aerial defense system, laying the ground bare for massive drone attacks. "The new missile can pass through all missile defense systems, and I don't think that the technology capable of intercepting it will be achieved in the decades to come," triumphantly declared General Amir Ali Hajizadeh, commander of the IRGC's Aerospace Force. "It can target the enemy's anti-missile systems, and its production marks a huge generational leap in the development of a new generation of missiles."

Hajizadeh's bloody record includes the downing of an Ukrainian airliner in 2020, killing all 176 passengers and crew.

Russia is actually losing this war due to superior Western military technology provided to the Ukrainian side. After almost nine months of a conflict that the Russian side thought would only last a week, Russia is now running out of high-precision weapons. Russian frontline units suffer up to 500 casualties daily and morale among the troops is collapsing, while 400,000 conscription-aged men have fled the country.

The Putin regime is in clear danger and holding on to power is intricately connected with some kind of success in Ukraine. As the once unbelievable prospect of a Russian tactical defeat in Ukraine is becoming clear, Iran is coming to the aid of Russia with its deadly missiles.

IPT Senior Fellow Ioannis E. Kotoulas (Ph.D. in History, Ph.D. in Geopolitics) is Adjunct Lecturer in Geopolitics at the University of Athens, Greece. His latest book is Geopolitics of the War in Ukraine.

Copyright © 2022. Investigative Project on Terrorism. All rights reserved

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RANE: Whither the protests in Iran?
« Reply #1322 on: December 02, 2022, 03:00:19 PM »
Where Are the Protests in Iran Headed?
8 MIN READDec 1, 2022 | 20:40 GMT



The mass protests in Iran are highly unlikely to change the country's political system, but their persistence will drive domestic instability, harden the government against social reforms, and damage Iran's foreign relationships. Over the past two months, Iran has seen large-scale anti-government protests following the in-custody death of a young woman who was arrested for improperly wearing her hijab. The government has responded with a heavy-handed crackdown, resulting in clashes with security forces that activists say have so far killed over 400 protesters. But thousands of Iranians have nonetheless continued to take to the streets nationwide, even in the face of violence and repression. This resilience — along with the size and geographic scope of the demonstrations — has drawn a significant amount of international attention and solidarity. It has also stoked questions about the movement's political consequences. While an end to the Islamic Republic remains unlikely, the protests will probably endure at a low level and have a slow-moving effect on the country's political system and social policies over time.

On Sept. 16, a 22-year-old Iranian woman named Masha Amini died after morality police arrested her in Tehran earlier that week for allegedly violating Iran's strictly enforced dress code by improperly donning her hijab. The demonstrations over her death have since spread to all 31 Iranian provinces. Clashes on the street have so far killed over 50 members of Iran's security forces; the Iran Human Rights NGO estimates at least 448 people have been killed in the unrest, including demonstrators.

Some protesters are demanding gradual changes to the Iranian government's social policies and treatment of women, including liberalizing the strict dress code that led to Amini's arrest. Others are calling for a total overhaul of the country's current system of governance, arguing that Iran's four-decade-old Islamic theocracy does not represent the interests of Iranians.

Pro-reform protests are common in Iran. But the current rash of demonstrations is more geographically widespread than usual and more intersectional between multiple Iranian social classes and groups, revealing broad anti-government sentiment.

Unity between Iran's political authorities, legal institutions and security apparatus will help the government maintain its crackdown on the movement and defend itself against protesters' growing calls for sweeping political change. Iranian legislative, judicial and executive authorities are united in their resolve to quelch the anti-government demonstrations without offering reforms. For Tehran, enacting some of the reforms protesters are demanding would risk signaling that other protest demands — including the downfall of the political system — are also within reach and set a dangerous precedent of caving into demands that could fuel future protests. Out of self-preservation, the Iranian government is thus unlikely to pursue meaningful reforms beyond some surface-level adjustments to how the country's morality police operate. Security forces — including local police, Basij militia forces, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) — have remained cohesive and aligned with government imperatives and orders to dispel the unrest. President Ebrahim Raisi's government and Iran's powerful unelected ruling elite are both heavily conservative and support a more hard-line position on issues like women's rights and freedom of the press. Most of the country's elected lawmakers and unelected leaders are also against offering minimal concessions that could appease some of the demonstrators. It would take cracks within Iran's ruling elite, signs of solidarity between security forces and protesters, and obvious policy disagreements between elected legislators and unelected politicians, for demonstrations to be able to force authorities to introduce reforms — none of which are currently happening.

In Iran, elected officials — which include members of parliament and the president — can influence domestic policy. But their decision-making power is limited within the country's political system, which largely favors unelected bodies like the Supreme National Security Council, Guardian Council and the Expediency Council. These unelected councils — which are composed of clerics and led by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei — oversee major decisions impacting Iran's economy, government institutions, foreign policy and national security.

Sporadic protests in Iran will likely keep cropping up over the next year, but may not survive a severe crackdown from Iran's security forces. The evolution of the movement will hinge on Iranians' determination to continue protesting in the face of crackdowns and arrests in the coming months. Grassroots energy driven by long-standing social and economic grievances is propelling the protests and making it difficult for the government to extinguish them altogether. But while they may persist for several more months, the demonstrations will likely eventually subside amid the government's unrelenting crackdown. Authorities will continue to restrict internet access and block popular social media sites in order to disrupt protesters' attempts to organize and generate more support for their cause. Iranian security forces will also continue to physically restrain and arrest demonstrators (and journalists) in the hopes of deterring future rallies and squelching dissent. This — along with the protest movement's lack of clear leadership — will keep demonstrations scattered and limit their size, thereby reducing their power to force the government to initiate reforms.

Iranian authorities have arrested an estimated 15,000 demonstrators, activists and journalists over the last two months, removing some of the movement's organizing power and likely spooking some would-be protesters from participating.

The 2009 Green Movement protests were the last substantial demonstrations in Iran motivated by similar social and political factors. The movement was sparked by allegations of election fraud after incumbent candidate Mahmoud Ahmadinejad defeated a reformist candidate in Iran's 2009 presidential race. The Green Movement protests lasted for approximately six months before government crackdowns disbanded them. According to opposition estimates, only 72 Iranians were killed in clashes between security forces and demonstrators in those six months, compared with the hundreds who have so far been killed in just the two months since the demonstrations over Amini's death began. This indicates that the current wave of protests may be facing a harsher crackdown by Tehran and increased resolve by protesters.

Even if the current wave of protests eventually dies down, the ground will remain fertile in Iran for social and political movements to demand reforms in the future. The influence of Iran's reformists, who generally push for more socially liberal policies, has been reduced in recent years amid electoral losses and efforts by unelected conservative officials to disqualify them from running for office. Reformist political figures are almost sure to channel the sentiment being seen on the streets to bolster their support in future elections, as well as inspire new reformists to run for office. Iran's conservative and hardliner leaders, meanwhile, will point to the current unrest as evidence that reformist leaders pose a national security threat and may disqualify popular ones from standing in elections. This, along with efforts to silence reformists through arrests or co-optation, will help conservatives and hardliners maintain their hold on power in the short term. However, without substantial social and political reforms, new waves of protests could emerge in the future — inspiring a new generation of reformist leaders seeking to change Iran's political system.

Instead of parties, Iran's political system has factions that range from reformist (the most socially liberal) to hardline (the most socially conservative). Reformists in Iran believe that in order for the country's political system to survive and thrive, it needs to evolve through the gradual introduction of social, economic and political changes.

The IRGC — the most powerful of Iran's armed forces — has expanded its political influence in recent years, with IRGC and other military-affiliated officials holding more cabinet positions and frequently running in elections. If Iran's religious leadership appears incapable of stamping out the current unrest, the IRGC could seek to place its members in more positions and call for harsher policies in response. It could also try to replace some of Iran's more overtly religious institutions with more secular, military ones in an effort to protect the country's overall governance system from attacks on its clerical aspects. This ultimately would not structurally change the Iranian government, but would gradually alter how the government presents itself domestically.

The protests will worsen Iran's relations with the West, making progress on issues like Tehran's nuclear program all the more unlikely.

The Iranian government has been blaming external forces and foreign media for inspiring the protests. Western governments have also been imposing new sanctions on the Iranian entities involved in the heavy-handed crackdown on demonstrations. This is exacerbating Iran's fraught foreign relationships, especially with the United States and Europe. Increased tensions between Tehran and the West will further dim prospects for any breakthroughs in stalled negotiations to restore the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. The current wave of anti-government protests will also make Tehran all the warier of appearing weak by conceding to external powers over issues like the country's nuclear program.

U.S.-Iran nuclear negotiations have been frozen for months, and show no sign of resuming anytime soon. Iran, meanwhile, has been steadily advancing its nuclear development beyond the limits established in the 2015 deal.


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RANE: Well, we're fuct now
« Reply #1324 on: December 14, 2022, 03:30:42 PM »
In Addressing Iran's Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Activities, the U.S.'s Options Are Slim
11 MIN READDec 14, 2022 | 19:20 GMT



Iran's expanding missile and drone program, along with its increased weapon transfers to Russia, are hardening the U.S. position in nuclear negotiations to the point where restoring the 2015 nuclear deal (or reaching any successor agreement) may become politically infeasible — raising the risk of an Iran-U.S. nuclear crisis and potential military confrontation. In recent weeks, Iran has made announcements highlighting the acceleration of its nuclear and missile programs, both of which concern Western governments and show that the United States' strategy of separating Iran's nuclear program from the rest of its national security agenda is becoming increasingly untenable. On Nov. 10, the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' aerospace unit said Iran had successfully developed hypersonic missiles — which theoretically could carry a nuclear warhead — and claimed the missile would be able to ''breach all the systems of anti-missile defense.'' On Nov. 22, the International Atomic Energy Agency said that Iran had begun enriching uranium to 60% at its Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant and that Tehran intended to install 14 cascades of its advanced IR-6 centrifuges. Iran has also been sending missiles and drones to Russian troops fighting in Ukraine, causing further alarm in the United States and Europe.

Iran appears to be developing a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV), which is a warhead that can fly at hypersonic speeds and remain maneuverable. This makes them far more difficult to counter compared with ballistic missiles, which follow a specific path.

Prior to enriching uranium to 60% at Fordow, Iran had only been enriching uranium to 60% at its Natanz plant. Fordow is an underground facility, making it more difficult for Israel or the United States to attack and destroy.

White House National Security Council spokesman John Kirby said on Dec. 9 that Iran and Russia had seen ''an unprecedented level of military and technical support that is transforming their relationship into a full-fledged defense partnership,'' citing both Iranian-Russian plans to jointly manufacture drones in Russia and Russia training Iranian pilots to fly Russian Sukhoi Su-35 fighters.

Iran has aggressively advanced and deployed its drone and missile programs since the United States left the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018. Ballistic and cruise missile (and more recently drone) technologies have long been a crucial component of Iran's national security strategy. And in recent years, the importance of these weapons to Iran's national security agenda has only grown. Iran's missile and drone programs enable it to project force beyond its border and compensate for shortcomings in Iran's conventional air force and army. Iran also needs to develop its ballistic and now hypersonic missile capabilities in case it decides to develop nuclear weapons, because in order to have the reliable deterrent that nuclear weapons provide, Iran would need to have a delivery system. Moreover, Iran's drone and missile programs are critical in increasing the military capacity of the various foreign militias Tehran supports in the region (like Houthi rebels in Yemen) against better-equipped adversaries.

Iran's air force and army largely still depend on old Western systems sold to the country before its 1979 Islamic Revolution. Iran's air force, for example, is heavily reliant on F-4 and F-14 fighters developed over 50 years ago.

Iran has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to deploy its arsenal of ballistic and cruise missiles against U.S. and Israeli interests, including the January 2020 attack on an Iraqi air base hosting U.S. troops and the March 2021 attack on an Israeli ship in the Arabian Sea. Iran's drones (and missiles) have also been used either directly or indirectly to target Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, including the 2019 attack claimed by Yemen's Houthi rebels on Saudi Arabia's Abqaiq oil processing facility (which is arguably the world's most important oil facility, with a processing capacity of about 7 million barrels per day, or roughly 7% of the global oil supply).
The United States is becoming increasingly concerned about Iran's drone and missile program and the broad threat it could pose to U.S. interests in the Middle East and elsewhere, given Tehran's demonstrated willingness to not only use such weapons but provide them to other countries like Russia. Prior to 2015, the United States' primary concern with Iran beyond its nuclear program was Tehran's financial, logistical and small arms support of militias and terrorist groups carrying out physical attacks against U.S. troops in the Middle East and U.S. regional partners, such as Israel. Washington has always been concerned about Iran's missile development — particularly ballistic missiles that could be used in a fully functional nuclear weapon. But Tehran's increased use of drones and missiles (coupled with the U.S. drawdown of troops in the Middle East) over the past five years has pushed it up on Washington's list of priorities. Moreover, Iran's transfer of weapons to Russia has been a significant focal point in the United States this year, with the U.S. Pentagon and State Department both making several public announcements about Iran sending weapons to Russia and Russia training Iranian pilots. For Washington, Iran's recent arms exports to Russia demonstrate that Tehran's drone and missile program, which had once predominantly been a concern about regional stability, could have broader implications. And this emerging reality is making it more difficult for the United States to segment Iran's ballistic and drone programs from Iran's nuclear program in its talks with Iran, given that the former is now clearly having a much more significant impact on Washington's primary interest: the ongoing war in Ukraine.

On Nov. 14, the U.S. State Department's Iran envoy said the United States was not pushing for renewed nuclear talks with Iran due to Tehran's recent drone sales to Russia, as well as the Iranian government's heavy-handed domestic crackdown on ongoing protests over the death of a young woman in police custody.

On Oct. 17, a U.S. State Department official said Iran was violating a U.N. Security Council resolution by sending drones to Russia for use in Ukraine.

But Iran's nuclear program remains a critical part of its national security and one the United States cannot overlook, as Iran's nuclear breakout time is likely down to just a few months. Despite ostensibly saying it has no nuclear weapon ambitions, Tehran appears to be trying to gain as much of the technological capabilities needed to build a nuclear weapon and enrich uranium to 90%, or weapons-grade. Since the JCPOA broke down in 2018, Iran has enriched uranium to 60% — well above the 20% threshold generally considered the top end of enrichment needed for most civilian applications. Iran has also started efforts to produce uranium metal, which Western diplomats say has no civilian use. Iran has begun researching and installing more advanced and efficient centrifuges as well, which could enable Tehran to more rapidly enrich uranium to weapons grade if wanted. Even if Iran agrees to dismantle these centrifuges in the future as part of a new deal, the know-how it's currently developing would still reduce the country's nuclear breakout time in the future. But Iran also uses the threat of its nuclear program to draw Western attention away from other issues, including its missile and drone strategy. By having a provocative nuclear program, Iran hopes to narrow the scope of any talks with the West over sanctions relief to the nuclear issue, which is likely of less importance to Tehran than its other activities. Washington's growing attention on Iran's transfer of drones and missiles to Russia is thus only granting Tehran a greater incentive to escalate the nuclear issue further.

Iran's enrichment to 60% is of particular concern to the West as there is very little work (measured in separative work units used to measure the amount of effort needed to enrich uranium to a certain level) to enrich uranium to 90% once it is already enriched to 60%.
While Washington is currently focusing more on Iran's growing defense relationship with Russia, an Iran-U.S. nuclear crisis is probably bubbling under the surface, as negotiations remain stalled and the JCPOA likely no longer adequately addresses U.S. concerns. The JCPOA is technically in force despite the U.S. withdrawal and Iran suspending its compliance, which means that many of its sunset clauses are starting to go into effect. One of the key sunset clauses that expire in October 2023 is the U.N. ban on the transfer of ballistic missile technology to and from Iran (i.e. Iran's sales of missiles to Russia). Under the deal, the United States is also supposed to remove (and not just suspend the application of) sanctions on Iran in October. Washington wants none of these sunsets to occur, making a simple re-entry into the JCPOA difficult. Moreover, from a proliferation standpoint, the technical conditions prior to the signing of the JCPOA have changed because Iran has more advanced centrifuges, has enriched uranium to higher levels and has seen Washington exit the deal before — something that Tehran will be more concerned about as the 2024 U.S. election approaches, which yield a new White House administration. These make some of the technical conditions that the JCPOA has included more difficult to revert to. There may still be a brief window to revive the JCPOA (and largely ignore some of the sunset clauses) during the first few months of 2023, before the October deadline for those clauses to take effect start looming ever larger over negotiations. But the United States is unlikely to seize that window due to its growing concerns with Tehran's missile and drone programs and weapon transfers to Russia. The embattled 2015 deal is thus highly unlikely to be restored and more likely to become, at best, a blueprint to start from in drafting up a new Iran-U.S. nuclear agreement.

The United States has no good diplomatic options to address Iran's growing nuclear and non-nuclear activities, and its focus on the Ukraine war and Iran's role in it is likely to ensure that diplomacy fails to reach a new agreement. There are two main diplomatic options the United States can pursue beyond the JCPOA, but neither is good. First, the United States could try to use the 2015 nuclear deal as a starting point to negotiate another broad deal where it would offer similar sanctions relief in exchange for similar restrictions on Iran's nuclear program. The White House may try to include Iran's missile and drone program in talks, but Tehran has repeatedly ruled out such inclusion and will likely continue to do so. There is virtually no trust between Washington and Tehran, and Tehran won't agree to similar conditions on its nuclear program without substantial guarantees from Washington that it won't exit the deal. In order for this option to actually yield an agreement, the United States might have to settle for fewer restrictions on Iran's nuclear program, making it more difficult to sell at home. But such an agreement would also allow Iran to save face and say it gained concessions from the United States. The United States' other option is pursuing a limited agreement with Iran similar to the 2012 Joint Plan of Action that preceded the JCPOA. In such an arrangement, Washington would try to freeze Iran's nuclear activities at current levels or at levels significantly higher than the 2015 JCPOA (such as at 20% enrichment). The United States would only offer limited sanctions relief in exchange for placing a cap on Iran's nuclear program. While this may provide a temporary fix from Washington's perspective, it wouldn't necessarily reduce Iran's breakout time significantly. The United States also proposed such a limited agreement as an interim deal in 2021, which Iran quickly rejected. A narrow agreement, however, would allow the U.S. to tie broader sanctions relief to non-nuclear issues in addition to nuclear issues in the future.

Should diplomatic efforts fail, the United States will face increased calls from Iran hawks both at home and in Israel to escalate against Iran, potentially even militarily. With Iran's nuclear breakout time probably at no more than six months, Iran hawks in Israel and the United States will likely propose covert and overt options to disrupt and push back Iran's nuclear program, even if temporarily. The Biden administration will likely try to keep the Iran nuclear issue on the back burner to maintain its focus on the Ukraine war, but Iran's nuclear advancement may make this impossible. There remain several triggers that could lead to more aggressive U.S. action, including Iran announcing it will enrich uranium to 90%, Iran rejecting IAEA inspections under the Additional Protocol, Iran withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and Iran announcing more advancements in uranium metal production. In Israel, former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's expected return to office will also likely lead to an even more hawkish position and call for strikes on Iran. Even if Biden avoids those calls during his presidency, military escalation in the future under a different administration — potentially as early as 2025, if the Republicans gain the White House — will become more likely.



ccp

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report Iran has the bomb
« Reply #1327 on: March 01, 2023, 07:28:09 AM »
https://www.newsmax.com/world/globaltalk/iran-nuclear/2023/03/01/id/1110586/

well Obama sabotaged Israel from bombing the nuclear bomb making facilities

so the Left can blame the Trump now as though Iran was not building bombs during Obama (remember reports about hardened deep underground facilities

yet we have no problem providing Ukraine support

I know different situations

but as John Bolton said

if you think iran is dangerous now just imagine if what it will be like with the nuclear bombs .

WELL WE ARE HEAR IF REPORT IS TO BE BELIEVED

Israel is screwed.


Crafty_Dog

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Remembering a CIA coup that never was
« Reply #1328 on: March 08, 2023, 08:55:53 AM »
Remembering a CIA Coup in Iran That Never Was
Mohammed Mossadegh was not a democrat or democratically elected, nor was he toppled by nefarious foreigners
BY
PETER THEROUX
MARCH 05, 2023
Keystone/Getty Images

https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/israel-middle-east/articles/cia-coup-in-iran-that-never-was-mossadegh?fbclid=IwAR15vW7lm4-q0B0yrNU9pY6hytC_w0lFsIP4aG67P8IZcx5VjX5Hvp4xG1Y

‘The prime minister had a deep strain of decency, but was an inept visionary who overplayed his hand’KEYSTONE/GETTY IMAGES
When anti-regime protests spread like wildfire throughout Iran in mid-October of 2022, the regime’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was quick to lay the blame on the usual foreign suspects. “I say explicitly that these riots and this insecurity were a design by the U.S. and the occupying, fake Zionist regime and those who are paid by them,” he told a class of cadets at a police college in Tehran. He suggested that the ultimate goal of the U.S. and Israel was regime change in Iran.

This elicited a response on Twitter from Iranian rapper Hichkas, who defended foreign support for the uprising, saying that it represented solidarity, not collaboration. He ended his riposte with a taunt that was retweeted or liked more than 50,000 times:

“And you can shove that Mossadegh tale you’ve lived off of for a lifetime.”

The rebellious young hip-hop star was connecting dots that Khamenei had only implied: that in 2022, the United States and its allies were once again seeking to overthrow an Iranian leader, just as in the summer of 1953 the United States had cooperated with players inside and outside Iran to help end the political career of the doomed nationalist prime minister, Mohammed Mossadegh.

For anyone who needs a reminder of the significance of that episode, whose 70th anniversary falls this year, let Columbia University’s professor Hamid Dabashi provide one, from his book Iran: A People Interrupted:

As Iranians never get tired of repeating (for this is the defining trauma of their modern history), the CIA, aided by British intelligence, mounted, paid for, and executed a military coup, overthrew the democratically elected government of Mosaddeq, and brought the corrupt Mohammed Reza Shah back to power.
This Ivy League encapsulation of the events of August 1953 in Iran contains at least four remarkable untruths, though “As Iranians never get tired of repeating” is not one of them.

First, the CIA did not mount or execute a coup. Second, Mossadegh was not democratically elected. Third, the shah was not yet corrupt. Fourth, he was not brought back to power, because he had never left it: Assassinations were a fact of life in 1950s Tehran, and having survived an attempt on his life in 1949, Mohammed Reza chose to wait out Mossadegh’s fall in Baghdad and Rome but never abdicated.

What actually happened in the land which once harvested prime ministers more promiscuously than Henry VIII harvested queens was this: After Shah Mohammed Reza’s Prime Ministers Mohammed-Ali Foroughi, Ali Soheili, Ahmad Qavam, Mohammed-Reza Hekmat, Ebrahim Hakimi, Abdolhossein Hazhir, Mohammed Saed, and Ali Mansur, came Ali Razmara, who was assassinated in March 1951. Following the brief caretaker premiership of Hossein Ala, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi wanted Seyyed Zia Tabataba’i, but in deference to the aged Qajar aristocrat Mohammed Mossadegh, had him offered the job, feeling confident he would decline. To everyone’s surprise, Mossadegh accepted, and the Majlis concluded a brief poll to endorse him. Then the shah gave Mossadegh the job. Again, the sequence of events is significant: The shah chose a prime minister, the parliament consented, and the shah appointed him.

Between 1953 and 1979, the shah would appoint and dismiss 10 more prime ministers, including Mossadegh twice. Not even the most overheated Iran historian describes these changes as coups.


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Between 1953 and 1979, the shah would appoint and dismiss 10 more prime ministers, including Mossadegh twice. Not even the most overheated Iran historian, in Islamic Iran or American academia, describes these changes as coups. The difference is that when Mossadegh’s second government went down in flames in August 1953, there were some American would-be arsonists in the wings who may or may not have shared responsibility, but who insisted on claiming the lion’s share of the credit, however implausibly or unwisely.

Constitutionally, appointing prime ministers in imperial Iran was the sole prerogative of the shah. As Gholam Reza Afkhami wrote, “The Constitution … gave the Crown and only the Crown the power to appoint or dismiss the ministers (Article 46, Supplementary basic Law) …” In George Lenczowski’s Iran Under the Pahlavis we read that “The Shah’s authority embraced the right to appoint and dismiss the prime minister and ministers.” However, according to Afkhami, “over the postwar years it had become the accepted practice for the shah to ask the Majlis to express its preference before he appointed a prime minister.”

Article 46 of the Supplemental Constitutional Law of the Iranian constitution in force at the time was blunt: “The Ministers are appointed and dismissed by the decree of the King.“ The poll noted above to align king and legislature behind a prime minister was “a tentative consent of the majority of the Majlis which was ascertained in the form of a vote of investiture known in Iran as raye tamayel (“vote of inclination”), prior to the issuance of Royal farman appointing the prime minster,” as Iranian American scholar Sepehr Zabih put it in The Mossadegh Era. Mossadegh scholars Darioush Bayandor and Christopher de Bellaigue call it a straw vote or straw poll.

The Iranian parliament’s role in the choice of a prime minister was similar to, but weaker than, the U.S. Senate’s role in confirming presidential appointments, such as, among others, Supreme Court justices, some cabinet posts, and ambassadors. Yet despite this even stronger legislative role, no one refers to “the democratically elected Justice Samuel Alito,” the “democratically elected Secretary of State Anthony Blinken,” or “the democratically elected Ambassador Pamela Harriman.”

This fetishistic formulation, applied to Mossadegh is even odder, for reasons that are worth examining. First, though, it’s worth retracing Mossadegh’s steps on his way out of power.

The story of Mossadegh’s departure from power is notorious among Middle East scholars, on par with the JFK assassination or abdication of Edward VIII. Hence retelling it is a little laborious, with sensationalism vying in a death match with numbing familiarity.

Once in power, Mossadegh quickly achieved national hero status by getting a bill through the Majles nationalizing the Iranian oil industry. However, negotiations with the British Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, AIOC, went in circles over details such as management and future compensation to the British. As the U.S. worked with the British toward a solution, the Brits were annoyed by the Washington upstart’s idealism towards Mossadegh, while Washington was peeved by London’s anachronistic, patronizing greed.

The U.S finally dispatched Averell Harriman to work with Mossadegh toward a resolution. The canny old man’s posturing and slippery illogic inclined the Americans to sense that he plainly did not want an agreement. As the Iranian prime minister himself conceded, he was wary of “my fanatics” in the Iranian polity who would kill him for making concessions. Harriman went home empty-handed, and Eisenhower soon replaced Truman.

The British, having been talked out of military action by the Yanks, pulled AIOC staff out of Iran. The British pullout and boycott, combined with the lack of domestic Iranian expertise to produce or market oil, proved catastrophic for the economy, as increased production in Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia made the renamed National Iranian Oil Company, NIOC, irrelevant. Mosaddegh and his advisers were blind to these realities amid the nirvana of unanimous domestic support for their anti-imperialist bluster. Worse, his decision to end the oil talks were a signal event for Washington, who now joined London in seeing the prime minister as unstable and untrustworthy.

As the political and economic tides turned against him, Mossadegh sparred with the shah over who had the right to appoint the minister of war. This demand was a red line for the shah, who prized the military as his key constituency. The prime minister resigned in protest, but his brinkmanship got him what he wanted, his job back along with power over the War Ministry. He was quick to rename it the Ministry of Defense and appoint himself to head it, cut its budget by 15%, purge the services of 136 officers, install men loyal to himself, including his nephew General Vossuq (whom he named assistant minister), and obtain six months’ emergency powers, including the power to legislate. He then dismissed the Supreme Court, and, lacking support in the Majles, sought to dissolve it, too—a power that the constitution reserved to the shah.

This was the beginning of the end for the prime minister who spoke eloquently of democracy but, when given opportunities to exercise it, always showed a dictatorial bent. Claiming to seek legitimacy not from the legislature but from “the people,” Mossadegh set up a national referendum on dissolving the Majles, with no secret ballot: Yes and no votes were cast in different locations. Mossadegh’s stacked referendum gave him a landslide victory, which cost him the support of the Shia clergy, the National Front coalition, and even family members. Sattareh Farmanfarmaian, his niece, wrote in her memoir, Daughter of Persia, of how “wretched” she felt over this betrayal. Majles Speaker Ayatollah Kashani denounced him, and his former National Front allies called him a “worse dictator than Reza Shah.”

READ MORE BY PETER THEROUX
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A Most Unwanted Man
Xiyue Wang’s imprisonment in Iran and later activism have been awkward for regime-aligned Princeton officials eager to get rid of their former student
BYPETER THEROUX
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Two new books on Iran bring the lives of ordinary people and ruling ayatollahs into sharper relief
BYPETER THEROUX
Having lost nearly all political support except the communist Tudeh party, and with even his pro-oil nationalization supporters split, Mossadegh found himself with a reduced base composed of radical supporters and an increasingly united front opposing him: the clergy, the military, and the bazaar, with the U.S. and Britain now both solidly behind the monarch. Most importantly, the absence of a functioning Majles offered the shah an opening to remove his unpopular prime minister.

Previously, the shah had rejected repeated advice, domestic and foreign, to fire Mossadegh, though it was within his constitutional powers. There had already been 14 recess appointments or dismissals of prime minister, which Mossadegh knew well, but he boasted that the shah would not “have the guts” to dismiss him. His bluff backfired. Absent a parliament, Mossadegh could now be removed from power. All it took was royal will.

Despite the cresting of the feud between Mossadegh and the now less-deferential young shah, the latter hesitated to oust his prime minister. The British succeeded in persuading Eisenhower to connive against Mossadegh. Hands-off Ike bucked the conversation down to the working level, which was the Dulles brothers, Alan and John Foster, and the operational components of the CIA. London favored some form of a palace coup, using its network of Iranian agents, who with the rupture of Tehran-London relations had been passed to the local CIA station for handling.

The agency was barely six years old and years away from having its own headquarters in Langley. Still, it had already adopted practices like the secretive use of cryptonyms to conceal identities.

Long since declassified, TPBEDAMN was an anti-communist covert influence program in Iran. KGSAVOY was the shah, and TPAJAX was the plan for the rather tame machination—far removed from a British military invasion—to remove Mohammed Mossadegh from power legally and constitutionally, by persuading the shah to use his prerogative to replace him.

Enter RNMAKER, true name Kermit “Kim” Roosevelt, Teddy’s grandson and no stranger to the sandbox. In his book Arabs, Oil, and History (1949), he devoted a chapter to Iran, which in his telling is one of the “fringe lands,” as a Muslim but non-Arab country in the suburbs of the Middle East (there are Iranians who would punch him in the nose for this alone). On a trip through Iran, Kim is lectured by ragged tribals about bad royal priorities: “Why does [the shah] not give away some of his lands? Or spend what he spends for a B-17 on a program to combat trachoma?” Our good listener and deft name-dropper tells us that on a recent visit to the country, “The shah had told me much the same thing … As long as Iranian people are ill-fed, ill-clothed, ill-educated and just plain ill there could be no real security against outside aggression.”

In a subsequent book, Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran, published in 1979, Roosevelt detailed the course of his plotting. Like Stephen Kinzer’s 2003 book All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, which relies heavily on Roosevelt, it is overly padded and suffers from what H.R. McMaster would call strategic narcissism—the tendency to put the United States at the center of everything, deserving of both glory and blame, whether rightly or wrongly. Fittingly, McMaster uses the term, in his book Battlegrounds, to describe the posture toward Iran adopted by President Obama (who we shall see would also weigh in on the Mossadegh affair).

A good example of this world view occurred in the movie Shakespeare in Love, where we see the cast of Romeo and Juliet taking a break in a tavern. When the portly actor who plays the nurse is asked by a fellow drinker, “So what’s the play about, then?” he starts to explain, “Well, you see, there’s this nurse … “

This gets to the heart of the narratives around Mossadegh’s political demise. The isolated prime minister was entirely correct in his complaints to everyone from the shah to Harriman that he was being plotted against. Ray Takeyh writes that Mossadegh’s coming ouster was “the worst-kept secret in Iran.” While Roosevelt strategically and narcissistically spins tales of CIA plotting in Washington and London and secret meetings with the shah, the Iranian army brass was already assessing its options against Mossadegh, and had even approached the British Embassy in Tehran for support. Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi in Qom, Ayatollah Behbehani in Tehran, and Ayatollah Kashani, who had been dismissed from his Majles speaker post by Mossadegh, had already lined up against him.

One of the best accounts of the movement to oust Mossadegh is in Ervand Abrahamian’s Iran Between Two Revolutions, and in a dozen dense pages he scarcely mentions the CIA. Having inherited the (still closed) British Embassy’s human intelligence network, the CIA station in Tehran, in the person of Roosevelt, held secret meetings and moved some money around. Yet the already-existing network, meeting in the capital’s Officers Club, lacked neither motivation nor money. Abrahamian notes that Roosevelt’s support did help Major General Fazlollah Zahedi—the declared candidate to replace Mossadegh—win over key allies such as Imperial Guards Commander Nassiri, Air Force Chief Gilanshah, gendarmerie Chief Colonel Ardubadi, secret police Chief Mu’tazed, and the senior tank commanders of the Tehran army garrison.

The TPAJAX plan unfolded on the night of Aug. 15. Colonel Nassiri arrived at Mossadegh’s house with the royal edict, or farman, signed by the shah. This one dismissed Mossadegh as prime minister, another appointed Zahedi to replace him. Despite the weird circumstances—it was nearly midnight, and Nassiri was accompanied by two truckloads of soldiers—this was a legal and constitutional action. But because it was the worst-kept secret in Iran, Mossadegh had been tipped off. Tudeh had penetrations of the Imperial Guard and the military, according to Bayandor, and Abrahamian even names the leaker, one Captain Mehdi Homayouni. (Mossadegh may have had multiple sources—senior Tudeh leader Noredin-Kianuri claimed in his memoirs that he too had personally tipped off Mossadegh.) Mossadegh signed a receipt for the edict but refused to comply, and his men placed Nassiri under arrest.

The plan had failed, and the Americans had no plan B. Roosevelt was asked to return to Washington but preferred to stay in Tehran. The CIA passed a memo to Eisenhower conceding the failure and assessing that the U.S. would “probably have to snuggle up to Mossadegh.” The U.S. ambassador, Loy Henderson, who like the shah had sat out the operation abroad, returned to Tehran to meet on the 16th with Mossadegh, who denied having ever seen the royal edict dismissing him, but went on to say that even if he had and if it were real, he would have ignored it. When Henderson gave his account of the meeting to the media, he pointedly omitted the title of prime minister when referring to Mossadegh. Despite all the confusion and contradiction, the underlying fact was that Zahedi was the legitimate prime minister of Iran.

That was Roosevelt’s focus for the next couple of days. He arranged for photostats of the two farmans to be circulated to local newspapers, who published them. Skeptics of the Roosevelt legend point out that the only papers the CIA could suborn were low-circulation organs in south Tehran and thus of limited citywide influence.

On Aug. 19, demonstrations and counterdemonstrations broke out in Tehran, eventually converging on the radio station and Mossadegh’s house in Kakh (Palace) Street, which was defended by tanks. If Mossadegh’s fall is analogous to the JFK assassination, 109 Palace Street was Dealey Plaza. Violence broke out, and dozens were killed. The former prime minister’s house was damaged by gunfire. In the late afternoon, a tearful Mossadegh heard the public radio broadcast of Zahedi’s victory speech saying that Mossadegh’s “coup” had failed. He learned, but refused to believe, that his relative, the police chief Col. Daftary, had turned against him. When his house was overrun, he fled and turned himself in to Zahedi’s government the next day. He was treated respectfully.

Before flying home, the shah sent telegrams to Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi and Ayatollah Behbehani. The more senior ayatollah responded with elaborately polite hopes that the shah could now put an end to the country’s ills and bring glory to Islam. He closed, “Do return as Shiism and Islam need you. You are the Shiite sovereign.”

More than one Iranian historian has derided Roosevelt’s memoir as “prophecy made after the fact,” and Afkhami complained that “[t]his false history, fostered by pro-Mosaddeq Iranians and liberal and leftist westerners, has diminished Mosaddeq, demonized the shah, and turned Iranians into traitors or wimps.”

The highly detailed, if also highly redacted, U.S. government histories of the so-called coup make the same point. While rich on details of secret travels and meetings, money changing hands, successive British and American drafts of the TPAJAX plans, and intragovernmental communications, all of them—the National Security Archives’ “Secret History of the Iran Coup, 1953” of 2000, “Zendebad, Shah!” by the CIA history staff, partially declassified in 2017, and “Planning and Implementation of Operation TPAJAX, March-August 1953,” an archive of documents published by the Office of the Historian of the State Department, all concur that it is impossible to establish who, if anyone, was directing the protests and mob actions on the fateful and chaotic day.

In retrospect, Roosevelt did himself no favors in Countercoup. He places himself at the center of the action, including instances that stretch the imagination. He gives us a shah who spends long evenings listening to him and gushing with praise, as well as a remarkable instance of him lying to the monarch: In a final meeting before the ruler left Tehran and Nassiri would start enforcing the two royal edicts, Roosevelt lacked a message from Eisenhower, so he made one up. “Since [Eisenhower] had failed to send one, I put into words what he must surely be feeling,” he wrote. His fabricated message from the president to the king was, “If the Pahlavis and the Roosevelts working together cannot solve this little problem, then there is no hope anywhere!” That he chose to publish it just as the shah was overthrown provided the nascent Islamic Republic and its partisans with yet more reasons to hate America. Eisenhower, who had died a decade prior, would have been furious.

It is unsettling that the cult of democratic Mossadegh exists, even in the United States. When I asked a friend of mine who served as the CIA’s chief of Iran analysis—albeit more in the Qassem Soleimani than the Mohammed Mossadegh era—to explain this bizarre interpretive slant, he blamed “bias” and “an overinflated view of U.S. power and influence,” which he called “bullshit.” He added, “Whatever the wisdom of U.S. and UK involvement in his ouster—which was likely near at hand even absent foreign involvement—his removal from power sparked mostly public indifference and some celebration. His contemporaries, including many former supporters, were glad to see him go. Mossadegh’s fictional status as a victimized, heroic advocate of democracy was only later cynically conferred by those who sought and supported the decidedly undemocratic dictatorship that rules Iran today.”

Reuel Gerecht, another former CIA observer, but from the operational side, put it this way: “Look, the focus on ’53 among Iranians is primarily a reflection of, one, left-wing, tier-mondiste critique of American power after the Vietnam War went south—starting in the West before it started in Iran—and two, the growing dissatisfaction among Iranian leftists, most tellingly the Islamic left, with the course of the revolution. Imagining Mossadegh triumphing allowed them to see a democratic Iran where the Shah and Khomeini, Khamenei, Rafsanjani, et al, get deleted.”

Back home, there is a thread that runs through the Mossadegh literature, from Roosevelt’s and Kinzer’s wildly tendentious accounts, down to Shahzad Aziz’s In the Land of the Ayatollahs Tupac Shakur Is King, and even the Cambridge History of Iran. The thread combines hindsight versus historical context to connect American villainy, lack of Iranian agency, and an alarmist view of the future, always panicking about the folly of Washington’s next terrible moves but never Tehran’s. And then there is the purely magical phenomenon of those who loathe the CIA and its operatives yet who naively take Kim Roosevelt’s self-centered memoirs at face value. American spies overthrow democratically elected governments, but they never tell a lie.

The enduring myth is that the CIA dispatched its serpent, Kim Roosevelt, into a democratic Iranian Garden of Eden, and everything bad that happened over the next half-century can be attributed to this original sin.


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The enduring myth is that the CIA dispatched its serpent, Kim Roosevelt, into a democratic Iranian Garden of Eden, and everything bad that happened over the next half-century can be attributed to this original sin. (The “original sin” metaphor is everywhere—The New York Times even worked it into Ardeshir Zahedi’s obituary). On this, the tier-mondistes, American progressives, and Qajar memoirists all agree. A quick sampling:

Not only did Kinzer blame Mossadegh’s fall for the Islamic Revolution, he wrote that “From the seething streets of Tehran and the other Islamic capitals to the scenes of terror attacks around the world, Operation Ajax has left a haunting and terrible legacy.” His book is a warning against the U.S. projecting power—fair enough—but not satisfied with blaming the September 11 attacks on the Mossadegh action, his reissued 2018 edition contains a new and unhinged preface titled “The Folly of Attacking Iran.” In it, he slays vast legions of straw men, such as “the idea of attacking Iran and seeking to decapitate its regime,” which, he judiciously informs us, is “dangerous.”

I served in two of the most hawkishly anti-Iran administrations, Bush 43 and Trump, and while we heard out a foreign ally or two talk about hitting Iran’s nuclear program, no one spoke of anything more than that, and in fact no U.S. president, as we have seen, has ever agreed with those foreign allies, or done more than a single targeted attack against an internationally sanctioned Iranian terrorist.

In a similar but also unhinged and infinitely more turgid work, Going to Tehran, the team of Flynt and Hillary Leverett castigate Washington for overthrowing the democratically elected prime minister. The entire book makes the case for the U.S. to fold to the ayatollahs and for the U.S. president actually to go to Tehran, something the Tehran regime would never dream of allowing. Leverett is a former CIA analyst who has been wandering toward Code Pink territory for years now.

Obama repeats the “democratically elected” canard more than once in his memoir A Promised Land, unsurprisingly from the leader who would use the feckless John Kerry to negotiate the weak JCPOA and seek a legacy of accommodation with the regime. Those who recall Obama’s speech to the Muslim world in Cairo will remember that he not only mentioned Mossadegh but used Kinzerian wording.

Also unsurprisingly, Princeton University’s unsavory Hossein Mousavian, who served as Iran’s ambassador to Berlin during the Mykonos Café massacre of dissidents, wrote in his Iran and the United States (in which he denies that Tehran ordered the Mykonos killings or the Khobar Towers bombing), “the 1953 coup that toppled Iran’s first democratically elected government.” His whole book pleads the wounded innocence of the Islamic Republic.

Dabashi, unsurprisingly, lines up with Mousavaian on Mossadegh, with the difference that he opposes the Islamic regime, though he shares the mullahs’ hatred for Israel. He outdoes Kinzer in alarmism, lobbing brickbats not only at “warmongers” but at “native informers, imperial strategists”—Azar Nafisi and Ken Pollack—Bernard Lewis, and “self-loathing Oriental” Fouad Ajami. (He also thinks Salman Rushdie is Pakistani.)

Even innocuous books by writers with no apparent agenda repeat the error. Akbar Ganji, Mark Bowden, and Scott Peterson have all done it. I have a gripe with the monumental Cambridge History of Iran, whose chapter “The Pahlavi Autocracy” by Gavin R.G. Hambly tells us that “Iranians have never had the slightest doubt that the C.I.A. … organized the conspirators and paid the pro-Shah mobs … By 1982 this tenacious rumor had been fully confirmed and is now incontrovertible.” Hambly footnotes Roosevelt’s book, seeming to take its contents at face value.

For neutrality, readers must turn to the relatively obscure work of Diarioush Bayandor—fittingly, a resident of Switzerland—who possesses the most impartial moral sense among all Mossadegh historians. In his fastidiously sourced Iran and the CIA: The Fall of Mossadegh Revisited (2010), he delivers the verdict, that while “It is fair to conclude that even if the Shah’s dismissal order was not stricto sensu unconstitutional … it was a feature of a foreign scheme to bring about a change of government” and thus was of questionable legitimacy.

However harsh that is—and it is distinctly harsh, considering that at no time did the shah ever breach the laws of his country, while Mossadegh did promiscuously, and unapologetically—facts remain: Mossadegh was not democratically elected. He was not a democrat. He was not overthrown by the CIA, but by domestic forces he had repeatedly manipulated or misunderstood, and who welcomed a foreign hand of unmeasurable and uneven utility.

The controversy lives on in late prime minister’s story as told on stage and screen. The film Mossadegh, directed by Roozbeh Dadvand, recounts the man’s final days in under 30 beautifully shot minutes, but the opening title cards contain the jarring untruth that Mossadegh was “overthrown from power by U.S. and British forces.” Reza Allamehzadeh’s moving play Mossadegh concluded with his trial. When the military prosecutor tried to shame Mossadegh for his foreign minister’s having proclaimed that Iran no longer wanted a king (by then His Majesty had fled Tehran), Mossadegh brought the audience to its feet with the taunt, “And where was this king for anyone to want or not want him?”

Sentimentality toward Mossadegh is understandable. His nationalization project boosted the morale of a proud and often-humiliated country. He did seek a system with a weaker king, although more to gain power for himself than to pass it on to the people. He undoubtedly won hearts and minds with small acts of integrity like making his aristocratic mother pay her back taxes. Even more endearing is the incident when his daughter reported to him an altercation with a policeman who didn’t buy her “Do you know who I am?” defense. She demanded her father act, and he did—rewarding the cop with a promotion for his honesty. But character is fate. The prime minister had a deep strain of decency, but was an inept visionary who overplayed his hand.

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GPF: The Evolution of Regime Change in Iran
« Reply #1329 on: March 10, 2023, 12:03:37 PM »
March 10, 2023
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The Evolution of Regime Change in Iran
There will be a lot of moving parts in a post-Khamenei transition.
By: Kamran Bokhari

The Islamic Republic of Iran turned 44 years old about a month ago despite being in the throes of evolutionary regime change for over a decade. The unprecedented scale of nationwide protests last year, sparked by the killing of a young woman who ran afoul of the country’s dress code, only added fuel to the fire. Though the demonstrations were never enough to truly threaten the regime, they did force it into a more defensive position by, for example, softening the anti-hijab law. And after the poisoning of some 1,000 schoolgirls by what many assume were religious extremists, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said the perpetrators should be given the death penalty.

The problem is that there’s only so much Tehran can do to placate the public. If it compromises too much on issues like the hijab mandate, it risks emboldening the masses into pressing for greater change. The government understands that years of public dissent are increasingly a threat to the clerical establishment. Meanwhile, it has expended many resources on a national security strategy to maintain and expand Tehran’s sphere of influence throughout the region.

The 2011 Arab Spring uprising in Syria challenged this strategy and forced Tehran to dedicate even more resources to prop up the Assad regime. Around the same time, the United States tightened its sanctions campaign against Tehran to halt its efforts at developing a nuclear weapon. Things got so bad that Tehran could no longer balance its foreign policy objectives with the imperative to manage its domestic political economy. And so, in late 2013, the government of then-President Hassan Rouhani entered talks that culminated in the 2015 nuclear agreement with the U.S.

Tehran hoped that winning a degree of sanctions relief without entirely surrendering its nuclear weapons program would allow it to improve economic conditions at home while still allowing it to support its proxies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and Afghanistan. That effort, too, was quashed when the Trump administration nixed the nuclear agreement. Since then, Iran has been the target of several covert Israeli operations at home and in Syria. It’s little coincidence that at the same time it has experienced periodic unrest in response to economic disrepair.

Iran’s plan to manage these problems was to try to revive the nuclear deal with the Biden administration. Yet the process has stalled thanks to the COVID-19 pandemic, the 2021 election of hardliner Ebrahim Raisi in what is considered the most sham election in the history of the Islamic Republic, domestic political compulsions of the Biden White House, and most recently Iran’s support for Russia in the Ukraine conflict.

Under the circumstances, it’s highly unlikely that a new nuclear agreement will be reached. Iran’s economic conditions are likely to worsen. Since the beginning of the year, for example, the Iranian rial has lost 30 percent of its value, while inflation has reached 50 percent. The economic crisis has major implications for the political power struggles taking place at almost every level of the Iranian government.

The Iranian regime is a maze of institutions wired together in a complex, theocratic-republican architecture. Broadly speaking, the Iranian political system consists of three power centers: the clergy, led by the supreme leader; the military, dominated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps; and the government, headed by the popularly elected president. These three power centers have for decades shared and competed for power.

Iranian Political Power Structure
(click to enlarge)

The power of elected leaders has declined since the mid-2000s, when the clergy and the IRGC began packing the legislature with hardline loyalists and when Khamenei and then-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had a public spat in 2009.

Though the clerics still have considerable authority, their power has declined too, mostly because the major clerics were founders of the country in 1979 and have since died off. But in some cases, those with better religious credentials have been sidelined in favor of those who are more loyal to Khamenei. It’s not an exaggeration to say Iran is Khamenei’s republic. He’s been at the helm for nearly 35 years, during which he has presided over appointments to top clerical, political and military posts and maintained oversight through elaborate mechanisms. (The 96-year-old Ahmad Jannati is the only other cleric from the time of the regime’s founding still holding office. Since 1980, he has headed the 12-member Guardian Council, which vets candidates for public office and has veto power over legislation, and in 2016 became chair of the Assembly of Experts, a clerical body that has the power to appoint, monitor and dismiss the supreme leader. That he heads the two most powerful clerical institutions underscores how the regime has run out of clerics to fill top positions.)

It was under Khamenei’s watch that the IRGC emerged as the single-most important institution in the country. Originally conceived of as an elite ideological military force responsible for regime preservation, it has since gained immense power and influence in the absence of trust for conventional intelligence, law enforcement and military apparatuses. It has become extremely powerful because Khamenei and the clerics have become utterly dependent on it for their political survival.

In the past few decades, the IRGC has gained control over domestic security, telecommunications, oil exports, industrial and service sectors, missile development and the nuclear weapons program. The parliament is well-populated by IRGC veterans, as are the Cabinet and provincial governments. And now that the clergy is in decline, the IRGC is well-positioned to fully dominate the whole of Iranian politics once Khamenei dies.

When that happens, a constitutionally mandated provisional leadership council comprising the president, the head of the judiciary and a cleric from the Guardian Council takes over until the Assembly of Experts elects a new supreme leader. This has never happened. Khamenei is only the second supreme leader in history; when Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini died in 1989, Khamenei was president, and the top clerics rallied around him. Whoever succeeds Khamenei will be a weak cleric and thus a puppet of the IRGC.

Simplified Organizational Chart of Iran's Executive Branch and Intelligence Services
(click to enlarge)

Even so, the IRGC faces significant challenges, most prominently from the country’s regular armed forces, the Artesh, which is a numerically superior force. So far, the two militaries have been held together through a joint staff command structure that is nominally under the Ministry of Defense but reports directly to Khamenei. How the IRGC and Artesh work with one another in a post-Khamenei era, with the IRGC already having an outsized role in the republic, will be critical to the regime’s survival.

Indeed, what has helped the regime manage the latest wave of unrest is the fear of a power vacuum and uncertainty of the unknown. There are plenty of Iranians who want the regime gone but fear the anarchy that might follow. This could benefit the IRGC, the ultimate guarantor of security in the country, but only if it is seen as operating within the parameters of the constitution.

Given the public anger toward the clerics for its brutal imposition of Shitte Islamist ideology, the IRGC could strengthen its position by adopting more moderated stances on social issues. After all, the group is nowhere near as theocratic as the clerical establishment, even if many of its superior officers are more ideological. And this is to say nothing of the everyday difficulty of governance, nor of the million-strong ideological militia known as the Basij. There are simply too many moving parts to this regime that will have to adjust to the fast-approaching post-Khamenei era.

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RANE: Iran to halt arms to Houthi?
« Reply #1331 on: March 17, 2023, 06:49:43 AM »
Iran: Tehran Pledges to Halt Arms Shipments to Yemen's Houthi Rebels
2 MIN READMar 16, 2023 | 14:54 GMT





What Happened: Iran will halt covert arms shipments to Houthi rebels in Yemen as a part of the deal signed between Iran and Saudi Arabia on March 10 to reestablish diplomatic relations, The Wall Street Journal reported on March 16. Iranian and Saudi diplomats are reportedly trying to reach a new agreement before the March 22-23 start of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.

Why It Matters: If Iran follows through on the deal, the subsequent decrease in arms supplies to Yemen will put more pressure on the Houthis to reach a cease-fire with the Yemeni federal government. Additionally, Saudi Arabia would likely move forward with re-opening its embassy in Tehran, which would facilitate warmer relations between the two countries. However, Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has not publicly endorsed the Iran-Saudi Arabia agreement, opening up questions about whether or not the group will follow through with it. If IRGC resistance or other hurdles prevent Iran from reducing support to the Houthis, the deal with Saudi Arabia would likely fall apart.

Background: Gulf Cooperation Council countries have been quietly probing the possibility of easing ties with Iran throughout the years, but U.S.-Iran tensions and Iran's support for Yemen's Houthis have largely prevented such reconciliation.


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Re: Biden negotiating secret Iran deal
« Reply #1335 on: April 22, 2023, 02:55:09 PM »

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Re: Iran
« Reply #1336 on: May 02, 2023, 01:57:20 AM »
U.S. must expedite delivery of KC-46A aerial refueling tanker to Israel

Deterring Iran from nuclear weapons capability is vital national security interest

By Rep. August Pfluger, Rep. Rob Wittman, Chris Stewart and Michael Makovsky

Iranian has arrived at the nuclear threshold. It has already enriched uranium to just shy of weapons grade and could make a bomb’s worth of fissile material in just days. It is essential that the United States and its partners work together to deter and prevent Iran from advancing any further. One critical component of that deterrence is the new KC-46A aerial refueling tanker and ensuring that Israel receives, and is ready to fly, these aircraft as soon as possible.

Deterring Iran from achieving nuclear weapons capability is a vital U.S. national security interest. Each of the last four presidents has pledged to prevent a nuclear Iran because they understood that if the brutal regime in Tehran were to acquire such a dangerous weapon, it would threaten the existence of U.S. regional partners, trigger a proliferation cascade, endanger the free flow of energy, and distract from other U.S. priorities, such as competing with Russia and China.

The United States has the necessary capability to target Iran’s nuclear facilities, but the Biden administration appears unwilling to launch a strike. Yet the United States can contribute to deterrence against Iran, with minimal cost to itself, by enhancing Israel’s ability to launch a preventive strike against Iranian nuclear facilities. The KC-46A tanker would provide the single greatest boost to Israeli capabilities against Iran and demonstrate U.S. support for its Israeli partner.

Currently, if Israel needs to launch a strike against Iran, it will face a trade-off between having its aircraft carry more fuel to extend operations or larger payloads to strike more targets. Midair refueling solves this problem by enabling aircraft to carry more and larger payloads and sufficient fuel to complete the missions.

Israel’s ability to operate at range, however, is limited because it operates roughly 50-year-old Ram refueling tankers, with limited refueling capacity and speed, not to mention defenses. The advanced and largely autonomous KC-46A would be a major upgrade. It can refuel three jets simultaneously in three to four minutes and has cutting-edge defensive systems.

Israeli KC-46As would not only benefit Israel’s refueling operations but, since they are interoperable with U.S. aircraft, would also expand U.S. capabilities in the Middle East — without the United States having to pay to station and maintain tankers in the region.

The United States has already agreed to sell Israel these modern tankers. In September 2021, the Pentagon announced a $927 million foreign military sale contract with Boeing to provide Israel with four KC-46As. But the first aircraft is not expected to arrive before 2025, after Iran could have acquired nuclear weapons capability.

Nor does it appear that Israeli pilots have been given the opportunity to train on flying or refueling the KC-46 to ensure that they are ready to use it as soon as it is delivered. For example, despite U.S. KC-46A aircraft participating in the recent Juniper Oak military exercise, the largest ever U.S.-Israeli drill, they did not refuel Israeli aircraft, a missed opportunity to promote interoperability and training.

The clear benefit to U.S. national interests and regional security that Israeli operation of the KC-46A would provide is why the Mach-1 Caucus is proud to sponsor a bipartisan and bicameral bill encouraging the secretary of the Air Force to prepare Israel to fly this advanced tanker as soon as possible.

As former military aviators, or having had lead oversight role of our military’s air capabilities, the Mach-1 Caucus believes that it is critical for the Air Force to begin immediately training Israeli pilots to fly, maintain and refuel the KC-46A.

Beyond ensuring that Israeli KC-46A, F-15I and F-35 pilots get trained on the KC-46A as soon as possible, it is also critical for the United States to expedite the tankers’ delivery. With Boeing producing roughly two of the aircraft each month and having already delivered 68 tankers to the Air Force, expediting the delivery of two KC-46As to Israel does not impose an undue burden on the U.S. acquisition process.

It would, however, provide immense benefit for Israeli refueling operations and CENTCOM in-theater capabilities. The bill, therefore, requires the Department of Defense to forward-deploy at least one KC46A in Israel until it receives its first tanker in 2025, which would serve as a powerful and consistent deterrent against Iran.

Airpower, not just our own but that of our partners as well, is a vital component of regional security. The United States should provide Israel with KC-46A tankers and train its pilots without further delay to ensure this uniquely capable partner can continue to defend itself and U.S. interests. August Pfluger is a congressman representing the 11th District in Texas; he is a member of the House Mach 1 Caucus. Rob Wittman is a congressman representing the 1st District in Virginia; he is chairman of the House Armed Services Committee Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee. Chris Stewart is a congressman representing the 2nd District in Utah; he is a member of the House Appropriations Committee, Defense Subcommittee. Michael Makovsky is president and CEO of the Jewish Institute for National Security of America

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Re: As usual, the Euros backstab
« Reply #1338 on: May 06, 2023, 08:30:56 AM »
https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/19617/eu-appeasement-iran

The euros are going to do what they see as being in their best interest. The FUSA-Dumpster Fire still thinks it's a superpower. No one else thinks so.

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WSJ: China and Russia encourage Iran to go nuke
« Reply #1339 on: May 09, 2023, 08:58:23 AM »
China and Russia Encourage Iran to Go Nuclear
An aloof U.S. leaves a regional vacuum that the Islamic Republic is exploiting brilliantly.
By Reuel Marc Gerecht and Ray Takeyh
May 8, 2023 5:33 pm ET


Iranian-built centrifuges from a uranium enrichment plant in Iran, June 6, 2018. PHOTO: /ASSOCIATED PRESS
Iran has secured great-power patronage for the first time in four decades. Tehran now possess advanced centrifuges, a growing stockpile of highly enriched uranium, and a cadre of decent physicists and nuclear engineers. The clerical regime likely has no significant technical hurdle left to clear on its way to a nuclear weapon. Iran’s developing alliances with Russia and China have aided its atomic progress.

During Barack Obama’s presidency, as Iran’s nuclear program gained speed, the U.S. and Europe piled on sanctions, sometimes with the approbation of China and Russia. Today, geopolitics—as well as realpolitik nuclear calculations—are much friendlier to the Islamic Republic. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine made it crystal clear that Vladimir Putin doesn’t care for a world order led by Europe and the U.S. China, too, has retreated from being “a responsible stakeholder” in a liberal trading system. Instead it is trying to construct its own version of an East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, much of it designed to give Beijing dominion over Taiwan.

This revisionist alliance has ended Iran’s strategic loneliness. Russia, China and Iran all want to diminish American power. They recognize that they need to help each other militarily and economically to achieve common goals. This is why the Islamic Republic has supplied drone technology and artillery shells to Russia for use in a conflict that, at first glance, has no revolutionary Islamic interests. It is becoming increasingly hard to believe that Russia, which appears ready to deliver advanced Sukhoi Su-35 fighters and more sophisticated air-defense systems to Iran, is averse to sharing nuclear expertise and technology with the clerical regime—assuming Tehran is lacking something in its nuclear engineering.

For far too long, the Western foreign-policy establishment has gained comfort from the notion that Russia and China didn’t want a nuclear Iran. But Vladimir Putin would have no objections to a nuclear crisis in the Middle East if it diverted attention from his war in Ukraine. Unlike the U.S., Russia has lived with nuclear-armed states on its periphery for decades. The only thing new about an Iranian bomb would be the convulsive shock it would deliver to U.S. interests in the Middle East and beyond. For 20 years, American administrations have insisted that Iran would never be allowed to go nuclear. When it does, what’s left of America’s writ in the Middle East will evaporate.


China’s need for Middle Eastern oil has also roiled the region. Xi Jinping has shown few signs that he has any problem with Mr. Putin’s war to absorb Ukraine, which destabilized China’s second-largest trading partner, the European Union. Just before his invasion, Mr. Putin visited Mr. Xi and then proceeded with his assault.

An Iranian bomb could hasten U.S. withdrawal from the Middle East. The American political class has been allergic to the idea of military strikes against the clerical regime’s nuclear sites. It isn’t hard to envision them rationalizing that an Iranian bomb means little to the overall balance of power. A growing conventional wisdom in Washington counsels a shift of focus to Asia.

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman may be an impetuous, brutal man, but he made a sensible calculation with his recent Chinese-brokered compact with Tehran. He understands that the clerical regime is about to go nuclear and is trying to make amends with Iran’s friends—the mass murderer of Sunni Muslims in Syria and the Palestinian rejectionists. The minuscule Gulf principalities, always inclined toward appeasement, will probably follow with their own concessions. Without the U.S., the Middle East is sorting itself out.

In all of this maneuvering, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei stands out. A man of humble origins who rose through the Islamic Republic’s eat-the-weak political system, he has steered his country through a gantlet of lethal enemies. When he remarked recently that “the U.S. wanted to put an end to the nuclear issue in accordance with its own plans of using the pressure of sanctions, but it failed” he was being, as he often is, coldly factual. Iran’s never-ending internal troubles may yet unseat him and his regime, but the cleric has done what only great rulers do: He has taken a weak hand and played it brilliantly.

Mr. Gerecht, a former Iranian-targets officer in the Central Intelligence Agency, is a resident scholar at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Mr. Takeyh is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

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Gatestone: Iran' Taqiyya
« Reply #1341 on: June 09, 2023, 06:37:25 AM »
Taqiyya: Iran Actually Boasts About Deceiving the West in Nuclear Talks
by Raymond Ibrahim  •  June 9, 2023 at 5:00 am

Iran's Supreme Guide, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei "used the Islamic concept of 'Taqiyya' to describe the regime's decision to accept the 2015 JCPOA nuclear deal with the West. Taqiyya means the permissibility to deny or conceal one's real beliefs to secure a worthy goal." — iranintl.com, May 20, 2023.

"Khamenei's emphasis on "expediency" as the third principle in foreign policy was particularly notable, as he urged flexibility "in necessary instances" and circumventing "tough barriers" to continue a set course." — iranintl.com, May 20, 2023

If it was not clear what "heroic flexibility" meant then, it probably should be clear by now. Reports consistently document that Iran has been cheating since day one.

"[Khamenei] said that when a revolution hits a tough rock on its path, it need not break its head against it; the wisest course would be to try and go around it." — Amir Taheri, "Iran: Heroic Flexibility Returns," June 4, 2023.

" [A]l- Taqiyya is with the tongue only, (not the heart)." — Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti in his book, "al-Durr al-Manthoor Fi al-Tafsir al- Ma'athoor," quoting Ibn Abbas.

Taqiyya is actually all around us. Iran pretends that its nuclear program is just for peaceful purposes. Some Muslims pretend to convert to Christianity (past and present), or a Muslim gunman gains entrance into a church by feigning interest in Christian prayers.

It should not be surprising, therefore, that Khamenei is relying on taqiyya once again. What is surprising is that the Biden Administration is falling for it – after being told it would be used – and allowing itself to be sucker-punched, or pretending to allow it.

In 1994, PLO leader Yasser Arafat, after he signed the Oslo Accord with Israel, justified his actions by saying, "I see this agreement as being no more than the agreement signed between our Prophet Muhammad and the Quraysh in Mecca"— referring to a truce, the Treaty of Hudaibiyah, which Muhammad broke as soon as he had regained power and was able to attack.

Similarly, Khamenei, by referring to taqiyya in Iran's agreement to a nuclear deal with the West, is signaling that Iran is only going along for "expediency" — until it finds itself in a position to realize its nuclear aspirations and renege.

s there a single authority representing the West at these international nuclear talks that knows — let alone cares about — any of this? Or is the fix already in?

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Deal w Iran coming?
« Reply #1342 on: June 09, 2023, 06:40:48 AM »
second

Iran, U.S.: Countries Reportedly Nearing Deal on Uranium Enrichment and Oil Exports
Jun 8, 2023 | 17:04 GMT


Iran and the United States are reportedly nearing a deal that would see Iran cease enriching uranium to 60% and above in exchange for access to frozen funds abroad and exporting up to 1 million barrels of oil per day, the Middle East Eye reported June 8. ...

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Re: Iran
« Reply #1343 on: June 09, 2023, 07:10:45 AM »
"Iran and the United States are reportedly nearing a deal that would see Iran cease enriching uranium to 60% and above in exchange for access to frozen funds abroad and exporting up to 1 million barrels of oil per day, the Middle East Eye reported June 8. ..."

did we not already go through this  :roll:

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Re: Iran
« Reply #1344 on: June 09, 2023, 10:49:48 AM »
Exactly so.

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Iran-Russia
« Reply #1345 on: June 10, 2023, 05:47:23 AM »
the are now lovers in bed with each other:

https://www.nbcnews.com/news/iran-helping-moscow-build-drone-factory-russia-us-says-rcna88542

so whoever runs the WH is making deals with Iran to trust they will stop nucs

wow, how smart :

https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-natanz-uranium-enrichment-underground-project-04dae673fc937af04e62b65dd78db2e0

so they will have access to even more money. Of course, Biden will claim the money is for food clothing child care and pride rights and trans surgery funds,  and other "humanitarian aid". 

not for more drones not for nucs only for food and medicine.

they think they can sell us this:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swampland_in_Florida




« Last Edit: June 10, 2023, 05:59:35 AM by ccp »

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GPF: Iran seeks to drive US from Middle East
« Reply #1346 on: June 14, 2023, 12:22:38 AM »
June 12, 2023
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Explaining Iran’s More Deadly Attacks
Tehran sees an opportunity to accelerate the departure of U.S. forces.
By: Caroline D. Rose

A recent intelligence leak indicates that Iran-aligned militias have been beefing up their strike capabilities against U.S. forces in eastern Syria. They are reportedly preparing for more drone and rocket attacks and are testing sophisticated explosive devices such as EFPs (explosively formed penetrators) for use against U.S. convoys. This corresponds with intelligence published earlier this year in The Washington Post that a joint center for the Syrian army, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and other militias linked to Iran, as well as Russian forces, is coordinating activity against U.S. forces in northeastern Syria.

Washington has been engaged in tit-for-tat strikes against Iranian militias for years, but Tehran’s renewed strategy is notable for the questions it raises about Iran’s broader strategy toward the U.S. in the region. And as its nascent reconciliation with former foes such as Saudi Arabia – ostensibly a U.S. ally – shows, that strategy is much less risk averse than it once was.

Over the past three years, successive militia strikes against U.S. forces have put pressure on the mission in Iraq and Syria. After a period of heightened tensions following the killing of IRGC commander Qassem Soleimani, the U.S. reduced its presence in the region, maintaining just 2,500 troops in Iraq and 900 in Syria, transferring many of its bases to Iraqi and Kurdish forces, and formally reclassifying its mission as an advise-and-assist operation.

The drawdown is in keeping with Washington’s long-term objective to disengage from the Middle East and concentrate on Russia and China. It’s also in line with public opinion. Continued strikes and mounting casualties have renewed the debate about having boots on the ground. Legislative pushes reassessing deployments under the 2001 and 2002 Authorization for the Use of Military Force in Iraq and Syria have gained greater traction in recent years; the most recent initiative in March to withdraw all U.S. forces from Syria in under 180 days was ultimately voted down 321-103 in the U.S. House of Representatives.

Even so, the U.S. has maintained its grip in both Iraq and Syria and has frequently responded with retaliatory strikes when Iran-aligned militias up the ante against their positions. But it has done so cautiously; amid a war in Ukraine, escalating tensions with China, and efforts to disengage from the Middle East, the last thing the U.S. wants is a major escalation. Washington has thus made sure to retaliate proportionately in the hopes that this will be enough to deter Iran and its proxies. So far, it hasn’t. If anything, Tehran sees a chance to pressure the U.S. even more.

And it has every reason to do so. Iranian grand strategy is to expand its influence from the Zagros Mountains to the Mediterranean Sea. Pursuant to that strategy, Iran has established significant economic, political and defense ties with local groups to maintain leverage and to fracture local security. Put simply, the arrival of U.S. forces in Iraq and eastern Syria is an obstacle to Iran’s goals.

But like the U.S., Iran has had to be careful not to escalate the situation, especially during nuclear negotiations and its campaign for sanctions relief. Iran and its proxies therefore resorted to using drones and rockets on fortified U.S. defensive positions. These assaults were designed to send messages to Washington without inflicting major casualties. Things changed, however, after the killing of Soleimani, and now Iran and its proxies are accepting larger risks and launching deadlier strikes on U.S. positions.

As Washington disengages from the Middle East, regional actors, most of which have been partners of the U.S., are trying to make amends with Iran as they seek to build a new regional security architecture. Iran’s presence in conflict-plagued states like Yemen, Syria and Iraq makes this necessary. Yet while Iran has made concessions on Yemen, it has not yielded to regional hopes that it reduce its influence in the Levant, preferring instead to tighten its grip over local proxy forces.

Tehran is ultimately seeking to exploit the geopolitical shifts underway, seeing where normalization with former enemies goes while maximizing pressure on the U.S. and its partners to conduct a speedy withdrawal. With a reduced U.S. presence in Iraq and Syria – and having tested U.S. responses to proxy and direct strikes – Iran is betting that its newer, deadlier attacks will lead to a more timely U.S. withdrawal than a major, direct confrontation.

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Gatestone: Biden's secret capitulation to Iran?
« Reply #1347 on: June 17, 2023, 06:48:13 AM »
The Biden Administration's Secret Capitulation to Iran's Regime
by Majid Rafizadeh  •  June 17, 2023 at 5:00 am

The Biden administration also reportedly wants to pump $17 billion dollars into the Iranian regime's treasury. These benefits will not only enable the mullahs' to finalize their nuclear weapons program, but also to send more arms to Russia to attack Ukraine, as well as to further enable the regime's ruthless expansion throughout the Middle East -- in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon and the terrorist groups in the Gaza Strip -- and throughout Latin America.

The US, intriguingly, seems hell-bent on supporting a regime that its own Department of State has called the "top state sponsor of terrorism."

Based on Iran's abysmal track record of complying with its own agreements, any deal in which Iran might promise to stop enriching uranium is just a sick joke.

"I continue to believe, Biden said on July 14, "that diplomacy is the best way to achieve this outcome."

Someone recently replied, "Neville Chamberlain believed that diplomacy was the best way, too."

The Biden administration, by keeping the American people and the Congress in the dark regarding these ongoing secret negotiations with Iran, appear to understand that is doing something malign. The countries disastrously affected by any "deal" with the Islamist regime of Iran are "only" the US, the Gulf States, Israel, Latin America and Europe. The Biden administration nevertheless appears determined to give the ruling mullahs of Iran the ultimate $17 billion gift: the deadly nuclear deal -- so that Iran will promise not to use their nuclear weapons on this administration's watch.


The Biden administration, intriguingly, seems hell-bent on supporting a regime that the State Department has called the "top state sponsor of terrorism," by rewarding Iran with a nuclear deal that will pave the way for it legally to obtain as many nuclear weapons as it likes. (Image source: iStock)

In spite of strong opposition from the Congress, the Biden administration has been holding​ ​secret talks in Oman to reward the ruling mullahs of Iran with a nuclear deal that will pave the way for Iran legally to obtain as many nuclear weapons as it likes, empower the ruling mullahs with billions of dollars, lift sanctions, allow it to rejoin the global financial system and enhance the theocratic regime's legitimacy on the global stage.

The Biden administration also reportedly wants to pump $17 billion dollars into the Iranian regime's treasury. These benefits will not only enable the mullahs' to finalize their nuclear weapons program, but also to send more arms to Russia to attack Ukraine, as well as to further enable the regime's ruthless expansion throughout the Middle East -- in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon and the terrorist groups in the Gaza Strip -- and throughout Latin America.

Crafty_Dog

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Iran's new 4G missile
« Reply #1348 on: June 30, 2023, 08:48:52 AM »


Iran Extends its Reach With the Fourth-Generation Khorramshahr Missile
2 MIN READJun 30, 2023 | 14:52 GMT


The fourth generation of Iran's Khorramshahr missile is the latest version of its long-range ballistic missiles, and it boasts a range of up to 2,000 kilometers (about 1,243 miles). With this reach, the new Khorramshahr could strike Israel and multiple U.S. military bases throughout the region, and Iran will use this silent threat to deter direct Israeli and American attacks on Iranian soil. The Khorramshahr category is Iran's most powerful missile system, able to carry a 1,800 kilogram (3,968 pound) warhead and, with its latest version, able to store fuel for longer, making it easier for Iran to deploy the missile in times of sudden escalations. But while Iran's missiles are advanced, they face formidable regional air defenses and countermeasures, like Israel's new aerial defense system, David's Sling, and the U.S. Patriot missile, which has recently demonstrated its capabilities against similar Russian-made missiles in Ukraine. To overcome such defenses, Iran's typical pattern of missile use is to utilize barrages in case of escalation, as it did when it attacked U.S. forces in Iraq in 2020 in retaliation for the U.S. assassination of Gen. Qassem Soleimani. Should Iran use the Khorramshahr in a currently-improbable military escalation against an Israeli, U.S. or Gulf Arab target, it would likely be part of a similar barrage, with Iranian proxies in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen also using short-range rockets, missiles, drones and cruise missiles to overwhelm their targets.

Iran's Ballistic Missile Arsenal

Crafty_Dog

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Gatestone: Iran deal requires congressional approval
« Reply #1349 on: July 09, 2023, 06:54:47 AM »