Summary
Amazon is both a direct retailer and a near indispensable platform for competing resellers.
In that latter capacity, it sets the rules and it can tilt the game in its favor and extract most of the value and valuable data and information.
That information allows it to start competing businesses by picking off its merchants' best-selling products.
It's difficult to see how this can be stopped bar action by competition authorities.
The year 2017 was certainly the year of big tech rising. FANG stocks, like Amazon (NASDAQ:AMZN), Facebook (NASDAQ:FB) Google (NASDAQ:GOOG) (NASDAQ:GOOGL), Apple (NASDAQ:AAPL), Microsoft (NASDAQ:MSFT) and Netflix (NASDAQ:NFLX), have risen sheer inexorably:
And there seems to be good reasons for most if not all the rise of the shares of these companies. Facebook and Google have basically cornered the online ad market and they are now responsible for nearly all of its growth. From Business Insider (our emphasis):
The 10 leading ad-selling companies accounted for 73% of total revenues in Q4 2016, according to the report. So who are these 10 companies that grab the largest share of these revenues? The report didn't say. But analysts for the Pivotal Research Group, cited by Reuters, reported the only two names that really matter: Facebook and Google. In terms of the industry growth, so in terms of the 22% or $12.9 billion year-over-year increase in total internet advertising revenue, Facebook and Google together grabbed 99% of the growth! They're sitting at the sweet spot. Everyone else is fighting for crumbs.
And of course this sets up a virtuous cycle as their platforms become more useful for advertisers and less intrusive for users and it allows them to gather even more data about its users, the input for even better targeted ads, etc.
This data then serves other purposes as well. It's a giant treasure trove for AI applications that can kick these virtuous cycles into overdrive.
The position of Amazon seems only slightly less untouchable. Its leading position in cloud computing brings in the dough, and its ever expanding online (and increasingly offline) retail business doesn't actually have to make a profit.
This allows the company to keep investing in cementing its advantage (like robot technology for automated warehouses, etc.) and riding economies of scope as it expands its reach.
And of course, Amazon has also accumulated a wealth of data about its users which will enable it to put through machine learning and work into AI applications, turning it into gold.
The positions of the other three companies mentioned seem less unassailable to us. While Apple has a booming service business, most of its revenue depends on its sales of its iPhone, which is an already mature market.
One or two relatively less successful new models could quite dent the financials here. Mind you, this is not what we're predicting (we are in fact long in Apple for the SHU portfolio), but it could happen.
Microsoft increasingly depends on its booming cloud business for growth, but it's still distant second behind Amazon here. Netflix also faces considerable competition from Amazon (and others) and could stumble on a variety of issues (lack of a hit series, content cost, mispricing subscriptions, not to mention misbehaving stars).
Again, we don't predict this happening; we merely point out that their position is less unassailable than those of Facebook, Google or Amazon. These three are the top three real big tech commandeering companies, and even in theory it's simply difficult to imagine what could unseat their positions.
Amazon
Amazon is such a juggernaut that it flattens whole retail sectors, malls, and the retail landscape and in doing so it is amassing ever more power. The way it treats its warehouse employees has also come under scrutiny.
Amazon is already generating 30% of all (online + offline) retail sales growth in the US and (from the Atlantic):
Last year, Amazon sold six times as much online as Wal-Mart, Target, Best Buy, Nordstrom, Home Depot, Macy’s, Kohl’s, and Costco did combined
Source: ILSR
Losses
Amazon has incurred losses on many ventures, but this only serves as a way to flatten the competition and establish a dominant position and hook customers in. It sells at prices and gives perks (free shipping, etc.) which few if any competitors can match.
Equally, Amazon's access to cheap finance allows it to undercut the competition and amass resources with which to expand its advantage and platform.
For instance, it has allowed it to amass a distribution network and fulfillment centers which have been automated by its purchase of Kiva Systems.
And while normal companies suffer when they acquire another company at a steep premium, Amazon's stock actually went up when it acquired Whole Foods earlier in the year; on the day actually by roughly the same amount as the acquisition cost ($13.4B), making it essentially free. Perhaps investors know something that competition watchdogs have yet to wake up to this. From ILSR (PDF):
Between October 2014 and October 2016, Amazon’s market capitalization - the total value of its outstanding stock - rose from about $140 billion to about $380 billion. In the eyes of investors, Amazon is now worth nearly twice what Wal-Mart is worth, even though the latter generated $80 billion in profit over the last 5 years, while Amazon cleared only a little more than $1 billion.2
It's only gotten worse since. Apparently, investors see something that competition authorities seem to be blind to. Chamath Palihapitiya, a Silicon Valley venture capitalist, argued that ILSR:
“We believe there is a multi-trillion-dollar monopoly hiding in plain sight.”
Indeed, as Amazon is becoming the first place for shoppers to look for stuff, it is becoming the indispensable gateway for suppliers to sell. And by selling through Amazon, they become captive to its terms and conditions, and the multiple ways in which Amazon can tilt the game in its favor. It is like Wal-Mart (NYSE:WMT) owning all shopping malls.
Indispensable Gateway
Market share figures really do not capture the market power the company has amassed. Its market power is simply hidden in plain sight - hidden because Amazon actually produces very meager margins and profits (apart from its cloud business). Here is an extensive report from the ILSR:
Today, half of all U.S. households are subscribed to the membership program Amazon Prime, half of all online shopping searches start directly on Amazon, and Amazon captures nearly one in every two dollars that Americans spend online.
Since competition policy, especially that in the US, focuses on companies raising prices for consumers as a sign of monopolistic behavior, this is a pretty efficient decoy. The company actually does the opposite.
But it is not the actual slice of the market that is the most worrying part of Amazon's market power, even if this is growing pretty fast. It's its control over an increasing part of the infrastructure of sales. From the ILSR (our emphasis):
Amazon increasingly controls the underlying infrastructure of the economy. Its Marketplace for third-party sellers has become the dominant platform for digital commerce. Its Amazon Web Services division provides the cloud computing backbone for much of the country, powering everyone from Netflix to the CIA. Its distribution network includes warehouses and delivery stations in nearly every major U.S. city, and it’s rapidly moving into shipping and package delivery for both itself and others. By controlling this critical infrastructure, Amazon both competes with other companies and sets the terms by which these same rivals can reach the market.
That is, companies that want to reach the market increasingly have to rely on Amazon. Basically everything Amazon does is targeted at becoming the indispensable gateway for online sales (and increasingly offline sales as well), creating the famous flywheel that Jeff Bezos likes to invoke as its business model.
Third-party sellers broaden Amazon's sales, make the platform more valuable for shoppers, and allow it to gain knowledge of new segments and amass invaluable data in order for it to extract much of the value from these third-party sellers, or even enter these segments itself and eliminate them.
Half of worldwide Amazon sales are generated by third-party sellers, but buyers wouldn't know it, as they are almost completely anonymous on Amazon's platform. And apart from invaluable data and amassing buyers fortifying its platform, Amazon also gets a cut (15% to 50% in some cases) with zero effort.
Take for instance LeTravelStore.com. It did very well online until more and more people skipped online search and went straight to Amazon. For the owners, it became clear that if you want to sell online, you have to go through Amazon.
But that wasn't a success either, as Amazon restricted its interaction and building relationships with customers, and the company closed. It's not alone. From ILSR:
They can either continue to be independent, hanging their shingles out on search engine byways less and less traveled by shoppers, or they can set up shop as third-party sellers on Amazon’s site, forfeiting much of their knowledge, revenue, and autonomy to their most powerful competitor.
Or take Nike (NYSE:NKE), or Hachette, From Fast Company:
Last week, Amazon offered to police the many counterfeiters that sell fake Nike shoes on its site as a bargaining chip to get Nike to agree, for the first time, to offer a full line of its products to Amazon. Similarly, when the publisher Hachette resisted Amazon's demands in negotiations over book pricing, it found the buy-buttons removed from all of its titles, putting thousands of books off-limits to both buyers and sellers.
Birkenstock, another shoe brand, fell into the same problem as Nike. And as strict as Amazon is with policies in its Marketplace, it is lax with others, like those involving counterfeited items. This is just another way for Amazon to gain leverage.
Keep in mind that Nike and Hachette aren't exactly small companies, but Amazon can waltz right over them nevertheless. As a side note, Speaker of the House Paul Ryan was one of its victims, as he has just had a book published by Hachette. Amazon restored his book to normal status (instead of delaying shipping and modifying search and recommendation algorithms), but not those of others.
In the book business, Amazon is extracting ever more value in annual negotiations about fees from publishers (the so-called "Gazelle project"). Those that don't play ball risk payback that will severely affect its sales.
Publishing house Melville House experienced the removal of buy buttons from all its titles on Amazon when the latter was shaking it down for another hike in fees.
Data
Amazon amasses a treasure trove of data from its own sales and those on Marketplace. From the ILSR:
The company uses its data on what we browse and buy to shape what we see and adjust prices accordingly, and its control over suppliers and power as a producer itself means that it’s increasingly steering our choices, deciding what products make it to market and what products we’re exposed to... Already there is evidence that Amazon is using its huge trove of data about our browsing and buying habits to selectively raise prices, and it’s also started blocking access to certain products and delaying shipping for customers who decline to join its Prime program.
The mechanisms involved aren't really all that different from those that provide Facebook and Amazon with their increasing return in the online ad market.
Instead of ever better targeted ads, the company can provide customers with ever better targeted products and services. In itself, this isn't bad, but the company has a lot of leeway to skew the process, just like Russian trolls can misuse Facebook or Twitter to skew political processes.
And there is another side to this. In skewing, Amazon can also tilt the production of goods and services itself and/or demand a premium for premium access, or even any access at all.
Amazon products
Another thing that Amazon increasingly does with all the data it has amassed both from its own sales and that of third-party sellers selling on its platform. From The Atlantic:
Some merchants have accused Amazon of secretly using Marketplace as a laboratory: After collecting data on which products do best, it introduces low-price competitors available through its flagship service.
Since half of all online shopping searches start directly on Amazon, it can heavily skew these searches in favor of its own (or preferred party) solutions. After all Amazon increasingly produces stuff itself, like books, audio books (Audible), TV shows, video games (via its platform Twitch), it has its own streaming music solution, groceries, etc. From ILSR:
Earlier this year, the company unveiled 7 of its own fashion lines, offering more than 1,800 items of apparel. It’s added hundreds of new products to its AmazonBasics brand, which now furnishes a wide range of household items, from computer cables to swivel chairs. On Amazon.com, many of these products rank as top sellers in their categories and show up first in search results. Amazon publishes books too, and it’s not uncommon for as many as half of the titles on its Kindle bestseller list to be its own.
And the Marketplace also serves as a great lab to figure out where to expand. From ILSR:
It also appropriates their product knowledge. Upstream Commerce recently tracked 857 apparel items first offered for sale by Marketplace sellers and found that, within 12 weeks, Amazon began selling 25 percent of their top-selling items. Another study by researchers at Harvard Business School also looked at patterns in Amazon’s entry into new product areas and found, “The likelihood of Amazon’s entry is positively correlated with the popularity and customer ratings of third-party sellers’ products.”
Other elements
The acquisition of Whole Foods gives Amazon another leg up in its competition with other retailers:
Another series of distribution centers often located in the best neighborhoods.
The ability to merge online and offline data to create an even bigger data advantage (readers might want to read up on the possibilities here, for instance, through our treatment of the same topic describing Alibaba's (NYSE:BABA) O2O strategy).
See for instance how its ever denser network of fulfillment centers gives it a leg up in distribution. From Business Insider:
New and improved Amazon shipping options made it easy to get last-minute holiday gifts in time for the holiday. Customers use of Amazon's one-day, same-day, and two-hour delivery doubled this holiday, according to the company. This dovetails with Amazon's commitment to being the most convenient option to gain market share, at the expense of margin.
Another brilliant idea to rope in consumers was Amazon Prime, which provides a series of perks like streaming media (competing with the likes of Netflix). But perhaps its most important feature is free shipping. The benefits of this accumulate with use so it greatly reduces people's motivation to shop anywhere else (ILSR):
Less than 1 percent of Prime members visit competing sites while shopping on Amazon, and Prime members spend almost three times as much with the company as non-Prime customers do
Then there is its digital assistant, Alexa, which is a full frontal attack on brand power. Do you want batteries? Alexa doesn't give you the option of choosing between brands. And Alexa's reach is rapidly increasing. From Business Insider:
The Alexa app, which is required to set up Amazon's Echo devices and other products with the Alexa digital assistant built in, was the top app for Android and iPhone on Christmas day. Since app store rankings reflect what people are downloading almost in real-time, it's a strong indication that Echo products were some of the most popular gifts this Christmas.
From ILSR:
Amazon presents a vastly more dangerous threat to competition than Wal-Mart, because its ambition is not only to be the biggest player in the market. Its intention is to own the market itself by providing the underlying infrastructure—the online shopping platform, the shipping system, the cloud computing backbone— that competing firms depend on to transact business. In effect, Amazon is turning an open, public marketplace into a privately controlled one.
Already there is evidence that Amazon is using its huge trove of data about our browsing and buying habits to selectively raise prices, and it’s also started blocking access to certain products and delaying shipping for customers who decline to join Prime.
In summary, how Amazon squeezes the competition
Half of shoppers already begin their search on Amazon; Amazon has the ability to produce at a loss aided by cheap finance; and its fast and cheap shipping are becoming the norm. All of this gives independent sellers little choice but to join Marketplace.
Once they join, they have to accept the terms and conditions (like no interaction with customers outside Amazon's platform and little in the way of marketing or branding). Fulfillment terms are another point of leverage for Amazon.
Amazon's platform is strengthened by more third-party Marketplace sellers, and here Amazon gains knowledge of new verticals and transaction data which it can then use against these third-party sellers.
It can tilt the playing field (fulfillment, search and recommendation algorithms, or even removing the sell button or the seller altogether) in order to extract better conditions.
It can also use the seller data to see what sells best and to produce similar items (again tilting the field in its favor).
Amazon Prime is another powerful instrument to get even more people to its platform and stick with it, as the transport cost reductions are cumulative for instance.
Alexa can further reduce brand power of suppliers and make the shopping experience seamless and sticky.
This is by no means a complete picture, but you get the idea of the flywheel which Bezos likes to talk about. A bleak conclusion from Fast Company:
Amazon treated the book industry the same way companies like Wal-Mart once treated the territories into which they expanded: Use a war chest of capital to undercut prices, put competitors out of business, become the sole employer in the community, turn employees into part-time shift workers, lobby for deregulation, and effectively extract all the value from a given region before closing up shop and moving to the next one.
Conclusion
Amazon is both a retail competitor and a near indispensable platform for other retailers to sell on. But in that second capacity, Amazon has numerous ways to extract value and valuable data and information from these third-party sellers, and it has multiple ways at its disposal to tilt the playing field in its advantage. After all, it's Amazon's playing field. Amazon sets the rules, and Amazon controls the information and the customer interface.
The flywheel is all but unstoppable; Amazon is indeed a multi-trillion-dollar monopoly hidden in plain sight. Investors seem to realize this, but few others do - certainly not competition authorities, who happen to be the only ones who can do something about it. They, like consumers, are loving it.
Disclosure: I/we have no positions in any stocks mentioned, but may initiate a long position in AMZN over the next 72 hours.
I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.
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