Author Topic: Military Science, Military Issues, and the Nature of War  (Read 417418 times)

Crafty_Dog

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Re: Military Science, Military Issues, and the Nature of War
« Reply #1350 on: June 10, 2024, 04:25:25 PM »
Brain fart.  You are correct.


Crafty_Dog

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WSJ: The Military Academies and a Biden Power Grab
« Reply #1352 on: June 13, 2024, 04:46:18 PM »
The Military Academies and a Biden Power Grab
Trump may do the same thing if the Supreme Court doesn’t intervene.
By Richard A. Epstein
June 13, 2024 5:48 pm ET


A lame-duck President Trump appointed Heidi Stirrup to a three-year term on the Board of Visitors to the U.S. Air Force Academy in December 2020. Joe Biden became president the following month, and his administration launched a frontal assault on the independent status of the board, along with its counterparts at the Army’s and Navy’s academies.

First, without any statutory authorization, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin usurped the boards’ system of internal governance by suspending all board activities while he conducted a “zero-based review” of their operation—a review that could have gone on without that suspension. Next, Mr. Austin assumed the authority to delegate the business of the boards to subcommittees, none of whose members had to be member of the boards.

Then in September 2021, he terminated all remaining Trump appointees on one day’s notice. No other administration, including Mr. Trump’s, has ever purged rival members of the boards, who by statute are required to exercise their independent judgment and offer balanced perspectives on the academies’ activities not only to the president but to Congress, the service academies and the public at large. Press secretary Jen Psaki clumsily justified this crude sacking by complaining that they didn’t back Mr. Biden’s victory on Jan. 6, 2021, or share his “values.”

Ms. Stirrup sued. On the merits, she had the government dead to rights. Six members of the boards were appointed by the president for staggered three-year terms, along with five by the Senate president pro tem and four by the House speaker for one-year terms. If they exercised significant executive authority, their appointments would be unconstitutional under Buckley v. Valeo (1976), in which the Supreme Court held that Congress had no constitutional power to make executive appointments (apart from the Senate’s advice-and-consent role).

In addition, Wiener v. U.S. (1958) held that President Dwight Eisenhower couldn’t replace members of the War Claims Commission, a judicial body, appointed by President Harry S. Truman. Ms. Stirrup’s view was that she had independent powers similar to those of the war-claims judges.

In an unpublished June 7 opinion, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ducked Ms. Stirrup’s case by holding that the government had rendered the case moot by running out the clock in litigation. By the time the case reached the circuit, her term would have ended.

She responded that the live threat of similar actions in the next administration kept the case alive under Roe v. Wade (1973), which rejected a claim of mootness for disputes “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Roe in turn relied on Moore v. Ogilvie (1969), which applied this same test to allow a plaintiff’s challenge to ballot access, even though the disputed 1968 election was over.

The D.C. Circuit ignored both by citing Dearth v. Holder (2011), which conferred standing on a disappointed Canadian who hoped to reapply for a gun permit. The court misread the case to conclude that mootness applied where only “the same complaining party” was involved in both cases. But Dearth didn’t address the converse situation approved by Roe and Moore, where the same issue could recur with different parties.

That massive judicial failure to address the merits leaves everything hanging for next year, when a President Trump could replay the Biden gambit. But why wait? No new information is needed to decide this question of law now. Nothing is gained and much is lost by waiting for this unfortunate episode to recur.

If it took Ms. Stirrup’s appeal, the Supreme Court could easily craft a clear and enforceable remedy: It simply has to tell the president not to remove Board of Visitors members during their terms of office, period. The gaping omissions by the D.C. Circuit cry out for judicial correction, which should address not only standing but all the structural issues raised by Wiener and Buckley that the circuit court shoved under the rug.

Mr. Epstein is a law professor at New York University, a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, and an emeritus professor at the University of Chicago. He was on the legal team representing Ms. Stirrup in the D.C. Circuit.



Crafty_Dog

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FO: DARPA asks for Crisis Manufacturing plan
« Reply #1353 on: June 14, 2024, 08:45:40 AM »


1) DARPA ASKS PRIVATE SECTOR FOR “CRISIS MANUFACTURING” TECH: The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) announced it is accepting submissions for “crisis manufacturing” technical solutions and strategies in the event of a pandemic, natural disaster, or armed conflict.

According to DARPA, the technologies and strategies should enable critical industry production to surge production to at least ten times in under 30 days of the beginning of a crisis.

Why It Matters: This is an additional indicator that the U.S. government is seriously concerned about a near-term crisis or conflict with a peer or near-peer adversary. Recent government reports and lawmakers have increasingly called to rehabilitate the U.S. defense industrial base, and highlighted that the industrial base is likely incapable of maintaining sufficient military production during a crisis or conflict. – R.C.



Body-by-Guinness

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Addressing US’s Lack of Irregular Warfare Capacity
« Reply #1356 on: June 19, 2024, 08:18:38 PM »
DOD needs to drop the social justice fetish and create a capacity for irregular war:

THE ART OF IRREGULAR WARFARE CAMPAIGNING: A JOB FOR WHICH HEADQUARTERS OR AGENCY?

Articles
Tue, 06/18/2024 - 9:54pm
The Art of Irregular Warfare Campaigning: A Job for Which Headquarters or Agency?

By Paul Burton

 

      Irregular Warfare (IW) Campaigning is the art of using available resources by the Department of Defense and other Agencies in a series of linked actions, over an extended period, to eventually gain a marked advantage over your adversary, who will also be referred to as peer competitors. This long-term strategy requires continuity of desired end states through both political administrations and military command rotations. This was done by and large during the Cold War, albeit with course adjustments; the key was that the majority of America never questioned that the Soviet Union was our number one enemy. This basic common focus during the Cold War helped facilitate a unity of purpose and effort from different organizations, if not a unity of command and priority of tasks. So, the question is what agency or headquarters should take the lead in IW campaigning in the present multi-polar complex world?

      Campaigning for conventional warfare is complex, but campaigning for IW is rocket science.  Presently, we are without a school to teach this type of rocket science, and an organization to launch the rocket. The complexities of IW campaigning require staffs and agencies that understand IW. It necessitates that the organizations conducting the campaign design to make a mental and cultural shift from the last 30 years from what they have done. For example, there are only a couple of individuals on active duty that served in junior positions during the Cold War and the concepts of IW are not taught in sufficient breadth and depth by the Department of Defense (DOD) and the other agencies to staff the organizations that will be conducting the campaigns. It also implies that the executing organizations will underwrite risk and failures. Additionally, there is the age-old problem of different guidance and doctrine from different organizations and time periods. The new JP 1-1 published August 2023, states “Campaigning is the persistent conduct and sequencing of military activities aligned with other instruments of national power to achieve prioritized objectives over time through global campaigns, combatant command (CCMD) campaigns, and associated families of contingency plans. Combatant commanders (CCDRs) campaign to deter attacks, assure allies and partners, compete below armed conflict, prepare for and respond to threats, protect internationally agreed-upon norms, and, when necessary, prevail.” This implies that the CCMD is responsible for the regional IW campaign drawing on interagency support across the instruments of national power to win the campaign. Ultimately, the CCMD has the responsibility for their theater, but which sub-unified commander should be the main effort and in what phase? Additionally, should the DOD be a supporting agency short of armed conflict? This necessitates an agency that both understands the roles and missions of DOD resources and can appropriately assign objectives to the DOD in support of broader IW objectives.

       The first rule of campaigning is you start where you are not where you want to be. If your competitor has the operational initiative when the campaign starts, you must build capacity and capability to regain the initiative and enter their decision-making cycle. Easier said than done; however, the construct of time, space, scale, and sequencing provides a framework to accomplish this. In today’s environment, this construct must be synchronized in the following domains: air, land, sea, cyber, space, and human. Time is defined as the length of time for the campaign which drives the resources to achieve effects in the phases of the campaign. Two points of refinement. First, the new JP-5.0 says you don’t have to have phasing, but I beg to disagree. Phasing helps synchronizes your sequencing, provides intermediate objectives to accomplish to move to the next phase, helps define decisive points and decision points, and I never met a commander who did not want a phased operation. Secondly, phasing helps synchronize the transition of the designation of which HQ is the main effort. For example, if the Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) a sub-unified command, was the supported command for the first three phases of a five-phase operation; preparation, build, and employ the TSOC would most likely try to transition the responsibility of being the supported command to a HQ with more and different resources during the stability and transition phase of a campaign.

      Space is the operational geometry of the campaign and the first thing you should do is get out an old-fashioned map, so you can understand the tyranny of distance. During GWOT, the U.S. and allied forces dominated space, but in a peer competition, control of space will be contested, making it more important than ever. Projecting effects and scale in the area of operations, for the IW campaigns in each theater, will not have equal resources placed against the problem, forcing prioritization and sequencing at the national level. In peer competition is about the level of advantage achieved at the desired space at the appropriate and necessary time. Every theater in IW is a theater of operation, including USNORTHCOM, which complicates the ability to force project.

      Scale is the term I use instead of troops, which is stated in the Joint Publication, because it is about the effect that can be achieved to gain a marked advantage or decisive point. Leveraging a cyber or space asset is not a troop. The Joint Doctrine is generally written for conventional campaigns and in IW campaigning the executor must apply art to the Joint Doctrine to effectively conduct the operation. Managing the scale is important not only because long term nature of IW campaigning and multi-theater requirements, but also because the goal is not to escalate into conventional combat operations. The scale applied is critical in maintaining the threshold of success to a level which does not induce a peer to launch conventional combat operations.

      Sequencing is not in the Joint Publication; however, it is vital for the following reasons:

First, to achieve the desired effect at the appropriate time, you must flow or leverage resources into the area of operations to support the campaign intermediate objectives. Second, the HQ in charge of the campaign must weigh resources that can counter the peer competitor or adversarial capability while building our own capacity and capability. Thirdly, in an environment of limited resources, especially air and sea deployment assets, wargaming should partially drive sequencing to mitigate risks and exploit adversarial weakness. The days of building huge ISBs with unlimited resources are probably in the past. Finally, sequencing is a larger concept than just flowing resources into the area of operation. It is about imposing costs on the peer competitor or setting a condition to provide United States or Partner Nations interagency with the ability to politically and diplomatically exploit the action to erode, degrade and de-legitimize our peer competitors.

      So, what agency or Headquarters should take the lead in IW campaigning? It is my opinion that the Theater Special Operations Commands should take the lead in the IW Line of Effort (LOE) in supporting the broader Theater Campaign Plan. The Theater Command should be the HQ that leverages the sub-unified commands to support IW activities that are not Special Operations Forces (SOF) missions. For example, disrupting a peer competitor’s fishing operations that is stealing fish protein from a partner nation’s waters is not a mission for SOF.  It could be the job of the naval sub-unified command. Additionally, the Theater Commands are better resourced to coordinate with other US and Partner Nation agencies to accomplish broad military and political objectives; however, one of the resources they presently lack are IW thinkers and planners. Undoubtably, the question will be asked, what about global and transregional plans?

       Clearly, the TSOCs can coordinate across theaters with each other, and USSOCOM should have a role in the inter-theater sequencing and distribution of resources through the Service components. In a perfect world, the State Departments Policy and Plans would outline flawless objectives for the next 50-year peer competitor challenge, but it did not happen during the 20-year GWOT, and it won’t happen now. This leaves only one agency with both capacity and capability available for the United States, the DOD, and within DOD it must be regional commands with Joint Staff oversight for prioritization and synchronization of resources.

This is the fourth article in a series of articles on Irregular warfare.

The opinions expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not reflect any organizations viewpoint.

 
About the Author(s)
Paul Burton
Paul Burton is a retired Special Forces Colonel and is still active in the community


Body-by-Guinness

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As Rome Burns, the Military Fiddles w/ “Clean Energy”
« Reply #1357 on: June 20, 2024, 05:29:01 AM »
This is a fine example illustrating the blithe willingness of the MSM to abandon critical faculties in favor of parroting bureaucratic ideals sans context, the big picture, opposing views, et al. One would think a piece about using the military as a “clean energy” proving ground might perhaps maybe ask if the military’s ability to win a war—hell, a battle—is enhanced or degraded by this effort, whether the resources devoted to these projects could be better spent on more pressing needs, whether political fashion rather than demonstrated need is driving this process, and so on.

When the press corp serves as little more than a cheerleader for the latest fad while proving unable to grasp the military in its larger context it ceases to have any utility at all, deserves nothing more than contempt, and indeed deserves to go the way of the WaPo, CNN, MSNDNC, and all the other contemptible “news” organizations that have abandoned every tenet of journalism:

How US military bases became proving grounds for clean energy technology

The Hill News / by Saul Elbein / Jun 20, 2024 at 6:16 AM

The cost and security advantages of renewable energy are driving their adoption on U.S military bases — a development with significant long-term implications for the civilian market.

The military’s demand for inexpensive, hard-to-disable power for its constellation of bases has driven it to collaborate with civilian contractors in exploring a new generation of “off the shelf” clean tech.

Military bases have played a similar role since the Obama era in helping to “de-risk” other frontier technologies that are now a growing bulwark of the power system — like the once-exotic pairing of solar and wind power with large-scale batteries.

Now, military labs and bases stand out as proving grounds and early adopters of many forms of renewable energy that are promising but still prohibitively costly.

These include geothermal power, small modular nuclear reactors, long-term energy storage and electric vehicle (EV) fleets that double as roving, grid-buttressing batteries.

Experts told The Hill that Defense Department sponsorship of renewable energy pilot projects across the U.S. military base system was a major force pushing toward the evolution of "standard-issue" clean tech solutions — lowering costs and facilitating future adoption by cash-strapped municipalities.

Military bases serve as good sites for adoption of these developing technologies in part because they resemble small towns, but lack some of the hurdles that can slow down decisionmaking in town governments. If a base commander is on board with a pilot project, it can be implemented without first being debated by a city council.

One major reason the military is adopting such projects is because it sees climate change as contributing to a significantly more dangerous world. Another: Its commander in chief told it to.

In December 2021, President Biden signed Executive Order (EO) 14057, which directed the federal government to use “its scale and procurement power” to convert to a balance of 100 percent carbon-free electricity — with at least 50 percent of its electricity coming from clean sources at any given time.

The measures the military is taking to shift to such energy sources are controversial to the GOP — at least, as long as they’re tagged as being about the climate.

The draft version of the mammoth annual defense policy bill released last week by the GOP-controlled House Appropriations Committee would ban the agency from using any of its funds to implement any Biden-authored “climate change initiatives,” including EO 14057 — thereby saving $661 million, or 0.07 percent of the defense budget.

Lawmakers' position on the efforts is more bipartisan, however, when the climate change language is taken out and the focus is put on cost or reliability. The House Appropriations Committee quietly dropped an attempt by Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene (R-Ga.) to ban agency funds for being used to purchase EVs or charging stations, for instance.

The Defense Department has found that the electric vehicles produce less on-base pollution and have a lifetime cost significantly “lower than comparable” gas-burning cars — which is a primary reason why the agency is trying to electrify its base fleets.

A number of nonclimate benefits make EVs close to ideal for the commuter fleet on a military base, Michael Wu, co-founder of consultancy Converge Strategies, told The Hill.

Base vehicles — whether sedans used for commutes, vans used for deliveries or Defense Department Education Activity school buses — tend to drive short, predictable distances each day, before returning to a set location.

That means they don’t run into the issues with range or speed that have hampered military attempts to roll out electric tactical vehicles.

It also means that they can be used to bolster the base grid itself. The way base vehicles are used makes them “a really good test case” for vehicle-to-grid technologies, in which EV electric batteries can return power to the grid during a disruption, said Wu, who served as adviser to the assistant secretary of the Air Force on distributed energy and energy resilience issues.

Right now, he said, “we have a totally one-way system, both for transportation and for electricity. You generate electricity at a power plant — it goes out everywhere to end-consumers in the same way that our transportation system sends out oil that goes out and it gets distributed to gas stations.”

A future base grid, by contrast, is more likely to be two-way — a complex flow of power in and out of batteries, some of which may occasionally be driving. The Defense Innovation Unit is currently working with seven vendors in a pilot attempt to roll out chargers across its bases.

Last fall, Northern Virginia contractor Leidos won a deal to provide charging infrastructure to 49,000 EVs — and associated energy storage — at Air Force bases around the country.

Products like that help the military break its reliance on the current workhorse of its backup power system: the polluting, often-unreliable diesel generator, Wu added.

EVs reflect two of the main reasons renewables are appealing to the Defense Department. First, they are comparatively cheap, so their adoption frees up money for fighting wars in a world where the warming climate functions as a “threat multiplier.” They also help free the agency from dependence on fossil fuels, with their geopolitical choke points and fluctuating prices.

But perhaps even more important is the security renewables could offer: the assurance that a base besieged by a foreign adversary or cut off by natural disaster or cyberattack could manufacture its own power.

The fear of such disconnection — combined with growing wariness about Chinese dominance of solar panel and battery supply chains — is driving Defense Department interest in other solutions, like nuclear power and geothermal energy, said John Conger of the Center for Climate and Security, who oversaw military bases, energy and the environment at the agency throughout the Obama administration.

Biden officials often put their clean energy aspirations in the context of a new Cold War, even when discussing domestic energy. While America's foreign and domestic bases used to be thought of as safe from attack, a heightened strategic competition with China means that military “installations are no longer a sanctuary,” Ravi Chaudhary, assistant secretary of the Air Force for energy, installations and environment, said last year.

Chaudhary was introducing a half-dozen new Defense Department geothermal energy proposals that seek to tap the heat of the earth for clean, on-demand energy.

Geothermal energy is a particularly promising solution for the military — virtually every base in the country is on top of subterranean resources they could use for heating and cooling, and many could use it for power.

But it’s only one of several types of clean energy the Defense Department is exploring or building out.

The agency is in contract disputes over a proposal to put a nuclear “microreactor” at Eielson Air Force Base in Alaska. It’s funded development of technologies to tap the power of waves at the Navy’s Wave Energy Test Site in Oahu, Hawaii.

And in California, Marine Corps Air Station Miramar runs a base-scale microgrid off a combination of solar power and — as a backup — methane gas that would otherwise be emitted from a local landfill. During rolling blackouts amid a stifling heat wave in August 2020, some San Diego neighborhoods drew power from the station.

These projects are all largely speculative, and they suffer from being bespoke — built to order, and therefore expensive.

Solar power was in a similar stage in 2009, when the Obama administration announced something that had never been tried before: a new 14-megawatt solar project at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada.

When it was inaugurated, then-President Obama promised the base would stand as “a shining example of what's possible when we harness the power of clean, renewable energy to build a new, firmer foundation for economic growth."

At the time, this seemed like a lofty idea. In modern terms, the solar installation was small. It was also primitive: Without battery backup, heavy cloud cover could throw the base back into reliance on diesel generators.

But it helped lay both the technological and financial foundation for what came later. The deal for the $100 million facility rested on a trade: The Air Force didn’t have to pay any upfront money for the solar plant, and the solar developer, SunPower Corp, didn’t pay anything to lease the land.

Instead, the financial foundation of the project rested on a “power purchase agreement” — a contract under which the Air Force base committed to buy a predetermined amount of electricity from the local utility, the Nevada Power Company, which drew additional electricity from the new solar project. This agreement, in turn, helped SunPower Corp get the loans necessary to build the project and supply Nevada Power — putting more renewable energy on the grid.

This power purchase model is now standard for the wind and solar industry — and it provides a financial template for startup industries like geothermal. And in the past 15 years, solar has gone from exotic to essential — both for the grid as a whole and for the military.

In January, California’s Edwards Air Force Base became home to the biggest solar farm in the U.S. — which was bolstered by the biggest battery plant in the world. At 1.6 gigawatts, it is more than 100 times larger than the 2009-era Nevins project, and represents the biggest public-private partnership in Defense Department history, according to the agency.

It’s also a significant source of revenue for the department. The project, built in conjunction with renewables developer Terra-Gen, is enormous: 1.3 gigawatts, enough to power nearly a quarter million homes — 25 times the base population — which means the excess will be sold in the rest of energy-hungry California. Under the terms of the lease, the Defense Department could receive as much as $75 million for the power produced on base.

This model — identifying a need and putting out a request for bids to the civilian market — is the key strategy followed by the Defense Department as it helps develop various forms of technology.

The practice dovetails with a broader philosophy surrounding military contracting: the principle that wherever possible, military gear should have civilian applications — or simply be repurposed civilian technology.

Long gone are the days when the Defense Department was a major spender on American research and development — and for all its considerable size, the agency isn’t big enough to justify entire supply chains.

Therefore, “almost everything we do has a dual-use component,” Casey Perley, executive director of the Army Applications Lab, told The Hill.

Whether it’s a solar plant, a geothermal borehole or a small modular reactor, the Defense Department gets new resources by committing to buying power for an extended period of time, “which allows the contractor to borrow money to do that,” Conger said.

That also makes the military an important source of early defense-contract funding for renewable technologies — or companies — getting off the ground.

In the case of the proposed small modular reactor at Eielson Air Force Base, Conger added, the Defense Department “is not buying the reactor, they're buying the power, and that is enough of an anchor that they can put out bids.”

There is a lot of inefficiency baked in to this approach, Neta Crawford, a political scientist at Oxford University’s Cost of War Institute, argued: While military bases are analogous to civilian small towns — albeit run under a command-and-control system — much of the military tech suite is poorly designed for civilian use.

Crawford sees the agency’s funding of clean technology as essentially parasitic to the broader climate fight. “We have every technology we need to make a rapid transition,” she told The Hill.

The Defense Department, she argued, “is siphoning resources for their favorite tech,” when direct spending from the Energy Department would be more useful for civilian needs.

In terms of the military’s carbon footprint, there’s a powerful argument that the best thing the Defense Department could do for the climate is stand down, said Crawford.

The biggest contributor to military emissions is the jet fuel burned in the cargo fleet that keeps the dispersed empire of American military bases supplied, she argued.

“We have over 700 bases," she said. By contrast, "China, which is supposed to be our primary enemy, has one overseas base. Which is in Djibouti — where we also have a base," she added.

"We have tens of thousands of people still based in the Persian Gulf to protect for the most part oil that we shouldn't be burning.”

For all its spending on clean energy, and its particular progress around small-scale grids, Crawford argued, the U.S. needs to have a serious conversation about “right-sizing” its military.

Even on its own terms, the process by which the military helps develop technology on bids from civilian markets has its own hiccups. Last fall, the Air Force accepted a bid from Oklo, a nuclear power startup chaired by Sam Altman of OpenAI, the tech company that built chatbot ChatGPT.

But the Eielson project — which seeks to replace the base’s coal plant with a 20 MW nuclear plant, or one of just slightly higher capacity than the 2009-era Nevins solar plant — is currently stalled, as a competing bidder challenges the project in court.

These growing pains, Wu said, are part of the process that new technologies need to follow. For small nuclear reactors in particular, “once you get the first one done, the next 10 will come relatively quickly. But the first one or two are gonna be very, very difficult.”

For nuclear in particular, he argued, the business problem is compounded by the problem of getting the public comfortable “with those things in their, you know, closer to their backyard, and not in the middle of the Pacific Ocean,” powering an aircraft carrier or submarine.

But he added that the argument for nuclear power gets easier to make with every additional reactor that gets built — and the military’s mandate for reliable, always-on and uninterruptible power helps get prototype projects funded that would otherwise be too expensive for civilian markets.

That, in turn, helps push the price down for the next generation of projects, pushing the industry toward the military’s ultimate goal of off-the-shelf, standardized solutions.

“There are more than 500 [Defense Department] installations worldwide,” Wu said. “A lot of these technologies cannot be as bespoke as they are today.”

https://thehill.com/policy/defense/4730423-military-bases-clean-energy-technology/