Author Topic: Military Science, Military Issues, and the Nature of War  (Read 437570 times)

Crafty_Dog

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Re: Military Science, Military Issues, and the Nature of War
« Reply #1350 on: June 10, 2024, 04:25:25 PM »
Brain fart.  You are correct.


Crafty_Dog

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WSJ: The Military Academies and a Biden Power Grab
« Reply #1352 on: June 13, 2024, 04:46:18 PM »
The Military Academies and a Biden Power Grab
Trump may do the same thing if the Supreme Court doesn’t intervene.
By Richard A. Epstein
June 13, 2024 5:48 pm ET


A lame-duck President Trump appointed Heidi Stirrup to a three-year term on the Board of Visitors to the U.S. Air Force Academy in December 2020. Joe Biden became president the following month, and his administration launched a frontal assault on the independent status of the board, along with its counterparts at the Army’s and Navy’s academies.

First, without any statutory authorization, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin usurped the boards’ system of internal governance by suspending all board activities while he conducted a “zero-based review” of their operation—a review that could have gone on without that suspension. Next, Mr. Austin assumed the authority to delegate the business of the boards to subcommittees, none of whose members had to be member of the boards.

Then in September 2021, he terminated all remaining Trump appointees on one day’s notice. No other administration, including Mr. Trump’s, has ever purged rival members of the boards, who by statute are required to exercise their independent judgment and offer balanced perspectives on the academies’ activities not only to the president but to Congress, the service academies and the public at large. Press secretary Jen Psaki clumsily justified this crude sacking by complaining that they didn’t back Mr. Biden’s victory on Jan. 6, 2021, or share his “values.”

Ms. Stirrup sued. On the merits, she had the government dead to rights. Six members of the boards were appointed by the president for staggered three-year terms, along with five by the Senate president pro tem and four by the House speaker for one-year terms. If they exercised significant executive authority, their appointments would be unconstitutional under Buckley v. Valeo (1976), in which the Supreme Court held that Congress had no constitutional power to make executive appointments (apart from the Senate’s advice-and-consent role).

In addition, Wiener v. U.S. (1958) held that President Dwight Eisenhower couldn’t replace members of the War Claims Commission, a judicial body, appointed by President Harry S. Truman. Ms. Stirrup’s view was that she had independent powers similar to those of the war-claims judges.

In an unpublished June 7 opinion, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ducked Ms. Stirrup’s case by holding that the government had rendered the case moot by running out the clock in litigation. By the time the case reached the circuit, her term would have ended.

She responded that the live threat of similar actions in the next administration kept the case alive under Roe v. Wade (1973), which rejected a claim of mootness for disputes “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Roe in turn relied on Moore v. Ogilvie (1969), which applied this same test to allow a plaintiff’s challenge to ballot access, even though the disputed 1968 election was over.

The D.C. Circuit ignored both by citing Dearth v. Holder (2011), which conferred standing on a disappointed Canadian who hoped to reapply for a gun permit. The court misread the case to conclude that mootness applied where only “the same complaining party” was involved in both cases. But Dearth didn’t address the converse situation approved by Roe and Moore, where the same issue could recur with different parties.

That massive judicial failure to address the merits leaves everything hanging for next year, when a President Trump could replay the Biden gambit. But why wait? No new information is needed to decide this question of law now. Nothing is gained and much is lost by waiting for this unfortunate episode to recur.

If it took Ms. Stirrup’s appeal, the Supreme Court could easily craft a clear and enforceable remedy: It simply has to tell the president not to remove Board of Visitors members during their terms of office, period. The gaping omissions by the D.C. Circuit cry out for judicial correction, which should address not only standing but all the structural issues raised by Wiener and Buckley that the circuit court shoved under the rug.

Mr. Epstein is a law professor at New York University, a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, and an emeritus professor at the University of Chicago. He was on the legal team representing Ms. Stirrup in the D.C. Circuit.



Crafty_Dog

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FO: DARPA asks for Crisis Manufacturing plan
« Reply #1353 on: June 14, 2024, 08:45:40 AM »


1) DARPA ASKS PRIVATE SECTOR FOR “CRISIS MANUFACTURING” TECH: The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) announced it is accepting submissions for “crisis manufacturing” technical solutions and strategies in the event of a pandemic, natural disaster, or armed conflict.

According to DARPA, the technologies and strategies should enable critical industry production to surge production to at least ten times in under 30 days of the beginning of a crisis.

Why It Matters: This is an additional indicator that the U.S. government is seriously concerned about a near-term crisis or conflict with a peer or near-peer adversary. Recent government reports and lawmakers have increasingly called to rehabilitate the U.S. defense industrial base, and highlighted that the industrial base is likely incapable of maintaining sufficient military production during a crisis or conflict. – R.C.



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Addressing US’s Lack of Irregular Warfare Capacity
« Reply #1356 on: June 19, 2024, 08:18:38 PM »
DOD needs to drop the social justice fetish and create a capacity for irregular war:

THE ART OF IRREGULAR WARFARE CAMPAIGNING: A JOB FOR WHICH HEADQUARTERS OR AGENCY?

Articles
Tue, 06/18/2024 - 9:54pm
The Art of Irregular Warfare Campaigning: A Job for Which Headquarters or Agency?

By Paul Burton

 

      Irregular Warfare (IW) Campaigning is the art of using available resources by the Department of Defense and other Agencies in a series of linked actions, over an extended period, to eventually gain a marked advantage over your adversary, who will also be referred to as peer competitors. This long-term strategy requires continuity of desired end states through both political administrations and military command rotations. This was done by and large during the Cold War, albeit with course adjustments; the key was that the majority of America never questioned that the Soviet Union was our number one enemy. This basic common focus during the Cold War helped facilitate a unity of purpose and effort from different organizations, if not a unity of command and priority of tasks. So, the question is what agency or headquarters should take the lead in IW campaigning in the present multi-polar complex world?

      Campaigning for conventional warfare is complex, but campaigning for IW is rocket science.  Presently, we are without a school to teach this type of rocket science, and an organization to launch the rocket. The complexities of IW campaigning require staffs and agencies that understand IW. It necessitates that the organizations conducting the campaign design to make a mental and cultural shift from the last 30 years from what they have done. For example, there are only a couple of individuals on active duty that served in junior positions during the Cold War and the concepts of IW are not taught in sufficient breadth and depth by the Department of Defense (DOD) and the other agencies to staff the organizations that will be conducting the campaigns. It also implies that the executing organizations will underwrite risk and failures. Additionally, there is the age-old problem of different guidance and doctrine from different organizations and time periods. The new JP 1-1 published August 2023, states “Campaigning is the persistent conduct and sequencing of military activities aligned with other instruments of national power to achieve prioritized objectives over time through global campaigns, combatant command (CCMD) campaigns, and associated families of contingency plans. Combatant commanders (CCDRs) campaign to deter attacks, assure allies and partners, compete below armed conflict, prepare for and respond to threats, protect internationally agreed-upon norms, and, when necessary, prevail.” This implies that the CCMD is responsible for the regional IW campaign drawing on interagency support across the instruments of national power to win the campaign. Ultimately, the CCMD has the responsibility for their theater, but which sub-unified commander should be the main effort and in what phase? Additionally, should the DOD be a supporting agency short of armed conflict? This necessitates an agency that both understands the roles and missions of DOD resources and can appropriately assign objectives to the DOD in support of broader IW objectives.

       The first rule of campaigning is you start where you are not where you want to be. If your competitor has the operational initiative when the campaign starts, you must build capacity and capability to regain the initiative and enter their decision-making cycle. Easier said than done; however, the construct of time, space, scale, and sequencing provides a framework to accomplish this. In today’s environment, this construct must be synchronized in the following domains: air, land, sea, cyber, space, and human. Time is defined as the length of time for the campaign which drives the resources to achieve effects in the phases of the campaign. Two points of refinement. First, the new JP-5.0 says you don’t have to have phasing, but I beg to disagree. Phasing helps synchronizes your sequencing, provides intermediate objectives to accomplish to move to the next phase, helps define decisive points and decision points, and I never met a commander who did not want a phased operation. Secondly, phasing helps synchronize the transition of the designation of which HQ is the main effort. For example, if the Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) a sub-unified command, was the supported command for the first three phases of a five-phase operation; preparation, build, and employ the TSOC would most likely try to transition the responsibility of being the supported command to a HQ with more and different resources during the stability and transition phase of a campaign.

      Space is the operational geometry of the campaign and the first thing you should do is get out an old-fashioned map, so you can understand the tyranny of distance. During GWOT, the U.S. and allied forces dominated space, but in a peer competition, control of space will be contested, making it more important than ever. Projecting effects and scale in the area of operations, for the IW campaigns in each theater, will not have equal resources placed against the problem, forcing prioritization and sequencing at the national level. In peer competition is about the level of advantage achieved at the desired space at the appropriate and necessary time. Every theater in IW is a theater of operation, including USNORTHCOM, which complicates the ability to force project.

      Scale is the term I use instead of troops, which is stated in the Joint Publication, because it is about the effect that can be achieved to gain a marked advantage or decisive point. Leveraging a cyber or space asset is not a troop. The Joint Doctrine is generally written for conventional campaigns and in IW campaigning the executor must apply art to the Joint Doctrine to effectively conduct the operation. Managing the scale is important not only because long term nature of IW campaigning and multi-theater requirements, but also because the goal is not to escalate into conventional combat operations. The scale applied is critical in maintaining the threshold of success to a level which does not induce a peer to launch conventional combat operations.

      Sequencing is not in the Joint Publication; however, it is vital for the following reasons:

First, to achieve the desired effect at the appropriate time, you must flow or leverage resources into the area of operations to support the campaign intermediate objectives. Second, the HQ in charge of the campaign must weigh resources that can counter the peer competitor or adversarial capability while building our own capacity and capability. Thirdly, in an environment of limited resources, especially air and sea deployment assets, wargaming should partially drive sequencing to mitigate risks and exploit adversarial weakness. The days of building huge ISBs with unlimited resources are probably in the past. Finally, sequencing is a larger concept than just flowing resources into the area of operation. It is about imposing costs on the peer competitor or setting a condition to provide United States or Partner Nations interagency with the ability to politically and diplomatically exploit the action to erode, degrade and de-legitimize our peer competitors.

      So, what agency or Headquarters should take the lead in IW campaigning? It is my opinion that the Theater Special Operations Commands should take the lead in the IW Line of Effort (LOE) in supporting the broader Theater Campaign Plan. The Theater Command should be the HQ that leverages the sub-unified commands to support IW activities that are not Special Operations Forces (SOF) missions. For example, disrupting a peer competitor’s fishing operations that is stealing fish protein from a partner nation’s waters is not a mission for SOF.  It could be the job of the naval sub-unified command. Additionally, the Theater Commands are better resourced to coordinate with other US and Partner Nation agencies to accomplish broad military and political objectives; however, one of the resources they presently lack are IW thinkers and planners. Undoubtably, the question will be asked, what about global and transregional plans?

       Clearly, the TSOCs can coordinate across theaters with each other, and USSOCOM should have a role in the inter-theater sequencing and distribution of resources through the Service components. In a perfect world, the State Departments Policy and Plans would outline flawless objectives for the next 50-year peer competitor challenge, but it did not happen during the 20-year GWOT, and it won’t happen now. This leaves only one agency with both capacity and capability available for the United States, the DOD, and within DOD it must be regional commands with Joint Staff oversight for prioritization and synchronization of resources.

This is the fourth article in a series of articles on Irregular warfare.

The opinions expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not reflect any organizations viewpoint.

 
About the Author(s)
Paul Burton
Paul Burton is a retired Special Forces Colonel and is still active in the community


Body-by-Guinness

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As Rome Burns, the Military Fiddles w/ “Clean Energy”
« Reply #1357 on: June 20, 2024, 05:29:01 AM »
This is a fine example illustrating the blithe willingness of the MSM to abandon critical faculties in favor of parroting bureaucratic ideals sans context, the big picture, opposing views, et al. One would think a piece about using the military as a “clean energy” proving ground might perhaps maybe ask if the military’s ability to win a war—hell, a battle—is enhanced or degraded by this effort, whether the resources devoted to these projects could be better spent on more pressing needs, whether political fashion rather than demonstrated need is driving this process, and so on.

When the press corp serves as little more than a cheerleader for the latest fad while proving unable to grasp the military in its larger context it ceases to have any utility at all, deserves nothing more than contempt, and indeed deserves to go the way of the WaPo, CNN, MSNDNC, and all the other contemptible “news” organizations that have abandoned every tenet of journalism:

How US military bases became proving grounds for clean energy technology

The Hill News / by Saul Elbein / Jun 20, 2024 at 6:16 AM

The cost and security advantages of renewable energy are driving their adoption on U.S military bases — a development with significant long-term implications for the civilian market.

The military’s demand for inexpensive, hard-to-disable power for its constellation of bases has driven it to collaborate with civilian contractors in exploring a new generation of “off the shelf” clean tech.

Military bases have played a similar role since the Obama era in helping to “de-risk” other frontier technologies that are now a growing bulwark of the power system — like the once-exotic pairing of solar and wind power with large-scale batteries.

Now, military labs and bases stand out as proving grounds and early adopters of many forms of renewable energy that are promising but still prohibitively costly.

These include geothermal power, small modular nuclear reactors, long-term energy storage and electric vehicle (EV) fleets that double as roving, grid-buttressing batteries.

Experts told The Hill that Defense Department sponsorship of renewable energy pilot projects across the U.S. military base system was a major force pushing toward the evolution of "standard-issue" clean tech solutions — lowering costs and facilitating future adoption by cash-strapped municipalities.

Military bases serve as good sites for adoption of these developing technologies in part because they resemble small towns, but lack some of the hurdles that can slow down decisionmaking in town governments. If a base commander is on board with a pilot project, it can be implemented without first being debated by a city council.

One major reason the military is adopting such projects is because it sees climate change as contributing to a significantly more dangerous world. Another: Its commander in chief told it to.

In December 2021, President Biden signed Executive Order (EO) 14057, which directed the federal government to use “its scale and procurement power” to convert to a balance of 100 percent carbon-free electricity — with at least 50 percent of its electricity coming from clean sources at any given time.

The measures the military is taking to shift to such energy sources are controversial to the GOP — at least, as long as they’re tagged as being about the climate.

The draft version of the mammoth annual defense policy bill released last week by the GOP-controlled House Appropriations Committee would ban the agency from using any of its funds to implement any Biden-authored “climate change initiatives,” including EO 14057 — thereby saving $661 million, or 0.07 percent of the defense budget.

Lawmakers' position on the efforts is more bipartisan, however, when the climate change language is taken out and the focus is put on cost or reliability. The House Appropriations Committee quietly dropped an attempt by Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene (R-Ga.) to ban agency funds for being used to purchase EVs or charging stations, for instance.

The Defense Department has found that the electric vehicles produce less on-base pollution and have a lifetime cost significantly “lower than comparable” gas-burning cars — which is a primary reason why the agency is trying to electrify its base fleets.

A number of nonclimate benefits make EVs close to ideal for the commuter fleet on a military base, Michael Wu, co-founder of consultancy Converge Strategies, told The Hill.

Base vehicles — whether sedans used for commutes, vans used for deliveries or Defense Department Education Activity school buses — tend to drive short, predictable distances each day, before returning to a set location.

That means they don’t run into the issues with range or speed that have hampered military attempts to roll out electric tactical vehicles.

It also means that they can be used to bolster the base grid itself. The way base vehicles are used makes them “a really good test case” for vehicle-to-grid technologies, in which EV electric batteries can return power to the grid during a disruption, said Wu, who served as adviser to the assistant secretary of the Air Force on distributed energy and energy resilience issues.

Right now, he said, “we have a totally one-way system, both for transportation and for electricity. You generate electricity at a power plant — it goes out everywhere to end-consumers in the same way that our transportation system sends out oil that goes out and it gets distributed to gas stations.”

A future base grid, by contrast, is more likely to be two-way — a complex flow of power in and out of batteries, some of which may occasionally be driving. The Defense Innovation Unit is currently working with seven vendors in a pilot attempt to roll out chargers across its bases.

Last fall, Northern Virginia contractor Leidos won a deal to provide charging infrastructure to 49,000 EVs — and associated energy storage — at Air Force bases around the country.

Products like that help the military break its reliance on the current workhorse of its backup power system: the polluting, often-unreliable diesel generator, Wu added.

EVs reflect two of the main reasons renewables are appealing to the Defense Department. First, they are comparatively cheap, so their adoption frees up money for fighting wars in a world where the warming climate functions as a “threat multiplier.” They also help free the agency from dependence on fossil fuels, with their geopolitical choke points and fluctuating prices.

But perhaps even more important is the security renewables could offer: the assurance that a base besieged by a foreign adversary or cut off by natural disaster or cyberattack could manufacture its own power.

The fear of such disconnection — combined with growing wariness about Chinese dominance of solar panel and battery supply chains — is driving Defense Department interest in other solutions, like nuclear power and geothermal energy, said John Conger of the Center for Climate and Security, who oversaw military bases, energy and the environment at the agency throughout the Obama administration.

Biden officials often put their clean energy aspirations in the context of a new Cold War, even when discussing domestic energy. While America's foreign and domestic bases used to be thought of as safe from attack, a heightened strategic competition with China means that military “installations are no longer a sanctuary,” Ravi Chaudhary, assistant secretary of the Air Force for energy, installations and environment, said last year.

Chaudhary was introducing a half-dozen new Defense Department geothermal energy proposals that seek to tap the heat of the earth for clean, on-demand energy.

Geothermal energy is a particularly promising solution for the military — virtually every base in the country is on top of subterranean resources they could use for heating and cooling, and many could use it for power.

But it’s only one of several types of clean energy the Defense Department is exploring or building out.

The agency is in contract disputes over a proposal to put a nuclear “microreactor” at Eielson Air Force Base in Alaska. It’s funded development of technologies to tap the power of waves at the Navy’s Wave Energy Test Site in Oahu, Hawaii.

And in California, Marine Corps Air Station Miramar runs a base-scale microgrid off a combination of solar power and — as a backup — methane gas that would otherwise be emitted from a local landfill. During rolling blackouts amid a stifling heat wave in August 2020, some San Diego neighborhoods drew power from the station.

These projects are all largely speculative, and they suffer from being bespoke — built to order, and therefore expensive.

Solar power was in a similar stage in 2009, when the Obama administration announced something that had never been tried before: a new 14-megawatt solar project at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada.

When it was inaugurated, then-President Obama promised the base would stand as “a shining example of what's possible when we harness the power of clean, renewable energy to build a new, firmer foundation for economic growth."

At the time, this seemed like a lofty idea. In modern terms, the solar installation was small. It was also primitive: Without battery backup, heavy cloud cover could throw the base back into reliance on diesel generators.

But it helped lay both the technological and financial foundation for what came later. The deal for the $100 million facility rested on a trade: The Air Force didn’t have to pay any upfront money for the solar plant, and the solar developer, SunPower Corp, didn’t pay anything to lease the land.

Instead, the financial foundation of the project rested on a “power purchase agreement” — a contract under which the Air Force base committed to buy a predetermined amount of electricity from the local utility, the Nevada Power Company, which drew additional electricity from the new solar project. This agreement, in turn, helped SunPower Corp get the loans necessary to build the project and supply Nevada Power — putting more renewable energy on the grid.

This power purchase model is now standard for the wind and solar industry — and it provides a financial template for startup industries like geothermal. And in the past 15 years, solar has gone from exotic to essential — both for the grid as a whole and for the military.

In January, California’s Edwards Air Force Base became home to the biggest solar farm in the U.S. — which was bolstered by the biggest battery plant in the world. At 1.6 gigawatts, it is more than 100 times larger than the 2009-era Nevins project, and represents the biggest public-private partnership in Defense Department history, according to the agency.

It’s also a significant source of revenue for the department. The project, built in conjunction with renewables developer Terra-Gen, is enormous: 1.3 gigawatts, enough to power nearly a quarter million homes — 25 times the base population — which means the excess will be sold in the rest of energy-hungry California. Under the terms of the lease, the Defense Department could receive as much as $75 million for the power produced on base.

This model — identifying a need and putting out a request for bids to the civilian market — is the key strategy followed by the Defense Department as it helps develop various forms of technology.

The practice dovetails with a broader philosophy surrounding military contracting: the principle that wherever possible, military gear should have civilian applications — or simply be repurposed civilian technology.

Long gone are the days when the Defense Department was a major spender on American research and development — and for all its considerable size, the agency isn’t big enough to justify entire supply chains.

Therefore, “almost everything we do has a dual-use component,” Casey Perley, executive director of the Army Applications Lab, told The Hill.

Whether it’s a solar plant, a geothermal borehole or a small modular reactor, the Defense Department gets new resources by committing to buying power for an extended period of time, “which allows the contractor to borrow money to do that,” Conger said.

That also makes the military an important source of early defense-contract funding for renewable technologies — or companies — getting off the ground.

In the case of the proposed small modular reactor at Eielson Air Force Base, Conger added, the Defense Department “is not buying the reactor, they're buying the power, and that is enough of an anchor that they can put out bids.”

There is a lot of inefficiency baked in to this approach, Neta Crawford, a political scientist at Oxford University’s Cost of War Institute, argued: While military bases are analogous to civilian small towns — albeit run under a command-and-control system — much of the military tech suite is poorly designed for civilian use.

Crawford sees the agency’s funding of clean technology as essentially parasitic to the broader climate fight. “We have every technology we need to make a rapid transition,” she told The Hill.

The Defense Department, she argued, “is siphoning resources for their favorite tech,” when direct spending from the Energy Department would be more useful for civilian needs.

In terms of the military’s carbon footprint, there’s a powerful argument that the best thing the Defense Department could do for the climate is stand down, said Crawford.

The biggest contributor to military emissions is the jet fuel burned in the cargo fleet that keeps the dispersed empire of American military bases supplied, she argued.

“We have over 700 bases," she said. By contrast, "China, which is supposed to be our primary enemy, has one overseas base. Which is in Djibouti — where we also have a base," she added.

"We have tens of thousands of people still based in the Persian Gulf to protect for the most part oil that we shouldn't be burning.”

For all its spending on clean energy, and its particular progress around small-scale grids, Crawford argued, the U.S. needs to have a serious conversation about “right-sizing” its military.

Even on its own terms, the process by which the military helps develop technology on bids from civilian markets has its own hiccups. Last fall, the Air Force accepted a bid from Oklo, a nuclear power startup chaired by Sam Altman of OpenAI, the tech company that built chatbot ChatGPT.

But the Eielson project — which seeks to replace the base’s coal plant with a 20 MW nuclear plant, or one of just slightly higher capacity than the 2009-era Nevins solar plant — is currently stalled, as a competing bidder challenges the project in court.

These growing pains, Wu said, are part of the process that new technologies need to follow. For small nuclear reactors in particular, “once you get the first one done, the next 10 will come relatively quickly. But the first one or two are gonna be very, very difficult.”

For nuclear in particular, he argued, the business problem is compounded by the problem of getting the public comfortable “with those things in their, you know, closer to their backyard, and not in the middle of the Pacific Ocean,” powering an aircraft carrier or submarine.

But he added that the argument for nuclear power gets easier to make with every additional reactor that gets built — and the military’s mandate for reliable, always-on and uninterruptible power helps get prototype projects funded that would otherwise be too expensive for civilian markets.

That, in turn, helps push the price down for the next generation of projects, pushing the industry toward the military’s ultimate goal of off-the-shelf, standardized solutions.

“There are more than 500 [Defense Department] installations worldwide,” Wu said. “A lot of these technologies cannot be as bespoke as they are today.”

https://thehill.com/policy/defense/4730423-military-bases-clean-energy-technology/

ccp

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Body-by-Guinness

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Schlichter Feels a Draft
« Reply #1359 on: June 24, 2024, 02:20:47 PM »
If, like me, you’ve run into various chattering class draft rumblings, Kurt Schlichter spells out their meaning:

https://townhall.com/columnists/kurtschlichter/2024/06/24/do-you-feel-a-draft-n2640804


Crafty_Dog

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WSJ: AI Drones threaten US Forces
« Reply #1361 on: July 05, 2024, 06:36:15 AM »
AI Drones Threaten U.S. Forces
Swarms of cheap versions of a technology we invented could overrun the American military.
By Owen West
July 4, 2024 3:25 pm ET


When it comes to weapons, the Pentagon favors quality over quantity. The theory is that expensive high technology is superior to mass production. For 30 years this was supported by battlefield evidence.

Then America’s adversaries reduced costs and scaled drones. The kamikaze drone has emerged as the most startling change in warfare in decades, disproving the Pentagon’s thesis. Ukraine set a target to manufacture a million drones this year to keep up with Chinese and Iranian supplies to Russia—and it’s telling that Russia replaced its defense minister with an economist fixated on drones.

Cheap drones will soon be equipped with artificial intelligence, boosting their effectiveness. This improvement represents an opportunity for the U.S., which has superior AI engineers and a wide global technical lead over the rest of the world.

Unfortunately, the Pentagon hasn’t adapted. The nation is facing a capital squeeze, with debt service set to exceed the defense budget, but the military is also paralyzed by its obsolete business model. Most of its procurement budget is rigidly dedicated to a defense oligopoly that can’t produce at low cost.

In the two decades following 9/11, half of the Fortune 500 disappeared. The free market produces creative destruction. In contrast, the defense industry remains unchallenged. In 2000 the top U.S. military contractor, Lockheed Martin, reported a loss in commercial telecommunications. In 2001, after winning the F-35 program, it divested from telecom. Rather than compete against innovators, Lockheed decided it was more profitable to use the enormous barriers to entry in military supply, focusing on government contracts that covered all costs plus a regulated profit. Two decades later, the $2 trillion F-35 is one of the costliest defense programs in U.S. history.

The military’s five prime contractors resemble power utilities. Having mastered a complex regulatory system, they maximize profit when production costs are highest, stuffing fees into obscure line items. Asked why a bag of bolts costs $90,000, the Air Force secretary said in April that overpricing was a “systemic issue.”

The military has expressed some interest in producing cheap AI drones. The flagship effort is called Replicator, capitalized with less than 0.2% of the defense investment budget. Replicator’s self-described “poster child” is a loitering bomb that is estimated to exceed $100,000 to build. There aren’t sufficient funds to mass produce at that price.

Change will require three steps. First, the defense secretary must insist that a million cheap AI drones are vital, as former Defense Secretary Robert Gates did when he declared “war on the Pentagon” to spend more than $40 billion on armored trucks. Drone scale can be achieved by shifting $20 billion over three years to new entrants.

Second, reallocation must be guided by an investment committee. This is standard procedure in major corporations, and the secretary of defense has an in-house equivalent, led by the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office. The problem is, the military doubts CAPE’s ability to optimize the portfolio, and Congress is openly hostile. CAPE must be empowered to make strategic decisions.

Third, Congress must authorize the secretary of defense to pivot on spending. Modern enterprise management is stymied by more than 1,000 regulations added since 9/11. Congress has additionally upended the budget with more than 50 continuing resolutions since 2010, creating a “use it or lose it” environment that handicaps new initiatives.

AI drones will put our forces at risk, from ships to infantry. Just as the armored blitzkrieg caught Europe off-guard in World War II, so has the proliferation of drone munitions today. America holds a distinct advantage in AI, but harnessing that advantage requires investment risk. That can happen only if generals and the defense secretary acknowledge that America’s expensive military machines risk being overrun by swarms of cheap versions of a technology that we invented.


Mr. West is a former Marine and partner of Goldman Sachs. He served as assistant defense secretary for special operations, 2017-19.

ccp

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Re: Military Science, Military Issues, and the Nature of War
« Reply #1362 on: July 05, 2024, 08:58:15 AM »
instead of multi billion dollar aircraft carriers how about subs that can release missiles capable of releasing a hundred drones?

or ICBMs tipped with brigades of drones as well as some with nucs?

just imagining


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The Cost of Student Loan Forgiveness
« Reply #1363 on: July 07, 2024, 07:06:39 PM »


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Re: The Cost of Student Loan Forgiveness
« Reply #1365 on: July 07, 2024, 10:27:29 PM »
What we could have had:

https://x.com/jerryhendrixii/status/1809731414079746114?s=61

Sick. Almost everything they do reminds me of why I could never vote for them no matter the alternative.

I wanted us to start a post called, 100 reasons to vote against Joe that come ahead of his age. worse. Exhibits one and two will be student loan forgiveness and his choice of Kamala Harris as Vice president. Third is his failure to rebuild the military. And fourth, I was going to start with his cancellation of the Keystone Pipeline. The withdrawal from afghanistan. The weakness he showed Putin that led to the invasion. Likewise for hamas. 9% inflation in 2022. 1% growth. Time permitting, it won't be hard to get to 100 reasons I would never vote for this guy ahead of his age problem.

Body-by-Guinness

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Artillery Asshattery
« Reply #1366 on: July 23, 2024, 11:07:36 AM »
Read this and weep. Our war planners were worried that their explosives weren't environmentally friendly and so switch to a kinder, gentler explosive which, alas, was far more expensive and had environmental issues of its own. But no worries! We could purchase old school explosive for our shells ... from Russia and China. What's that you say? They are geopolitical foes and hence can't be trusted not to interrupt the supply chain? Well it's a good thing we have one 1940s era artillery plant we can count on in the US, while Poland runs its explosive manufacturing plant 24/7.

Jeepers, I wonder if Russia will target the Polish plant much like they overran the Ukrainian plant in Crimea? It's almost like they have a plan, unlikely the one we sorely miss:

https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/ukraine-crisis-artillery/

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Preventing China's air dominance
« Reply #1368 on: July 24, 2024, 12:36:07 PM »
Preventing China’s air dominance

Is Pentagon’s continued funding of F-35s throwing good money after bad?

By Kenneth M. Rapoza

With the NATO Summit and the focus on President Biden’s health and gaffes behind us, we should reflect on a significant shortcoming: China.

China came up in the NATO conversation, but mostly in the context of Beijing’s support for Russia in the war in Ukraine. What was seldom mentioned was that China’s rise isn’t just an American problem, but an international one. Chinese troops are training on NATO member Poland’s eastern border in Belarus; China encourages the Houthis (which damages freedom of navigation in the global commons), and China is openly building up its military and championing its “inevitable” air superiority through its still-developing sixth-generation fighter aircraft. China is advancing on land and sea and in the air.

Of these developments, China’s sixthgeneration fighter aircraft is the greatest threat to U.S. strategic interests in the Pacific and the collective West. Information on the jet, which is projected to be ready by 2035, is limited but causes concern. China appears to be focusing on direct attacks and high-altitude maneuverability. It also seems to focus heavily on integrating artificial intelligence and having a “system of systems” to coordinate with other military assets. The result is a focus on cheap, plentiful, disposable, high-tech assets coordinated by an air superiority jet.

Cheap Chinese drones are already sinking ships in the Red Sea and forcing the expenditure of vast sums of money to intercept drones. If your adversary thinks the rules of the game are about to change, you would be well advised to match them — or quit.

The U.S. does have a plan to match China, the Next Generation Air Dominance Platform, which would focus on a “family of systems” using the “loyal wingman” AIassisted drones accompanying fighters.

Unfortunately, the U.S. NGAD may soon fall victim to budget pressures. According to Gen. David Allvin, Air Force chief of staff, budget]deliberations for NGAD “are still underway; there’s been no decision. We’re looking at a lot of very diffi cult options.” In July, Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall said he was committed to designing and building the new fighter, but costs had to be cut. Defense contractors were supposed to make bids this year, but that’s no longer certain.

There is hope, however. “NGAD is alive and well,” Mr. Kendall told defense industry media earlier this month. “I can tell you that we are looking at the NGAD concept to see if it’s the right concept. We’re looking at whether we can do something that’s less expensive.”

The “less expensive” alternative to date has been the F-35, aka “Fat Amy,” to America’s top guns. The F-35 has been active for over 30 years. Its most expensive variant costs about $115 million. The Government Accountability Office has released multiple reports over the years highlighting various issues with the F-35 program, including cost overruns and modernization delays.

The F-35 aircraft represents a growing portion of the Air Force’s tactical aviation fleet — with around 450 in action currently. The Defense Department plans to buy nearly 2,500 F-35s at an estimated program life cycle cost exceeding $1.7 trillion, out of this amount, $1.3 trillion is associated with just operating and modernizing the F-35s we have.

Thankfully, Congress is raising alarms about the F-35’s waste. Rep. Adam Smith of Washington, the top Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee, and Rep. Donald Norcross, New Jersey Democrat, said revamping Fat Amy is too expensive. Rep. John Garamendi, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee’s Subcommittee on Readiness, said in a hearing on April 28, 2023, that contractors such as Lockheed Martin and Pratt & Whitney were not meeting their obligations and prices and deliveries were unpredictable. In 2022, he called the program a “waste of money.”

The debate over NGAD isn’t just about the F-35 or even air doctrine. It touches on the posture of the U.S. defense establishment and whether American airpower will focus on expensive crewed vehicles or cheaper drones like the RQ-11 Raven.

“Does it make sense to try to intercept $20,000 drones with $130 million fighter aircraft shooting million-dollar missiles?” asked retired Marine Corps Col. Thomas X. Hammes, a distinguished fellow at National Defense University, at an event at the Atlantic Council during NATO week this month in Washington, according to the event video.

“We’ve got to work out that cost benefit. This is the whole revolution of the small, smart and many compared to the few and exquisite,” he added. “Our few and exquisite are great in a really localized fight against somebody who will play by the rules. But if you’ve got to base your F-35s so far back to be out of the range of the drone that they can’t reach the battle space, then that’s a useless, wasted asset. We’ve got to figure out how to go cheap.”

He is correct. If the U.S. cannot embrace the lower-cost methods of fighting future wars to counter enemies that openly hope to financially outmaneuver us, then we are heading for defeat. That will require embracing future systems such as NGAD and drone-centric projects and admitting that without them further funding, the F-35 may be throwing good money after bad.

Kenneth M. Rapoza, a U.S.-China indus-trial analyst, was a senior contributor for the BRIC countries for Forbes and a staff reporter for The Wall Street Journal in Brazil.

ccp

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Military spending time reviewed MOfH medals from wounded knee
« Reply #1369 on: July 24, 2024, 03:11:05 PM »
from the Assoc. Depressed:

event took place 134 yrs ago.

everyone very long dead.

I doubt a single person could name anyone who won a medal of honor......

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/pentagon-panel-to-review-medals-of-honor-given-to-soldiers-at-the-wounded-knee-massacre/ar-BB1qzls3?ocid=msedgntp&pc=DCTS&cvid=83d6a0cb66b2472aabc8eba8adf00a3a&ei=10



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The Future of Warfare
« Reply #1370 on: July 25, 2024, 05:30:25 PM »
Note: the piece makes clear the US may not be the first to get to this future state:

Something WICKED This Way Comes: The Future Singularity of Asymmetric Warfare Innovations

Robert J. Bunker

Author’s note: This short essay provides a projection of the future operational environment (2035-2050)—through the fictional Project WICKED—and its impact on US Army warfighting through the lens of Fourth Epoch War theory. This OSINT fusion-based theory has been utilized since the early 1990s to support US LE, MIL, and GOV activities including Minerva (DoD), Futures Working Group (FBI/PFI), and Los Angeles Terrorism Early Warning Group (LA Sheriff’s) programs.

WICKED
The Nuevo-Krasnovian armored formation was decimated before early warning systems even detected an attack had begun. Armed ground and air droids stealthily and quickly swarmed the unit in the dead of night from all sides, hitting it with a flurry of standoff munitions, kamikaze attacks, and directed energy and hyperkinetic fires then vanished as quickly as it had appeared. The specter of burning tanks and broken crewmembers bore graphic testament to another success of the US Army’s new distributed AI battle management system (Project WICKED). Since 2043, prototypes incorporating this system were integrated with innovations in electrical power generation and management and five-dimensional (inter-dimensional domain reality) fusion. The system was finalized in 2049 with the human neural interface allowing mandated human on-the loop C2 monitoring of AI targeting and engagement without excessive OODA loop degradation—thus passing JAG review for ‘conduct of war’ compliance. ‘Something wicked’ had indeed appeared—and it had UNITED STATES PROPERTY stamped upon it.

The modern world and dominance of conventional (symmetric) warfighting systems operated by human combatants—main battle tanks, capital warships, fighters and strategic bombers—is rapidly approaching its twilight. This ‘gold standard’ of military innovation and technology is completing its functional weapons systems life cycle as it transitions from institutionalized to ritualized usage on the more advanced mid-21st century battlefield. This battlefield has disparate elements now readily recognizable and the mosaic forming portends a form of conflict inherently alien to our modern comprehension of state-on-state warfighting.   

Asymmetric Warfare Innovations

While asymmetric warfare is typically viewed as unorthodox and even insurgent in approach—leveraging weakness against a superior force using innovative applications of technology and tactics—it also possesses an advanced warfighting component. This is the circumstance behind the contemporary suite of asymmetric warfare innovations, derived from a synthesis of technology and CONOPS (concepts of operations), now forming. However, the disruptive innovation taking place is a level of magnitude above that of 1920s-1930s revolution in military affairs (RMA) perceptions. That level of operational change, resulting in blitzkrieg tactics, carrier operations, et al., existed within the modern paradigm of warfare. The level of disruptive change we are now witnessing is out-of-paradigm change equivalent to the shift from the Classical to Medieval or Medieval to Modern epochs of Western civilization. These shifts have been characterized respectively as ‘The Dark Ages’ and ‘The Renaissance’ in their societal, state institutional, and military impacts. We are within a post-Modern shift that will witness modern (legacy) nation-state mass industrial force structures becoming ineffective on the battlefield as asymmetric warfare innovations mature and are increasingly fielded by states and non-state entities.

While human combatant utilized and controlled infantry weapons still form the baseline of the conduct of warfare, the following innovations will become increasingly impactful. Reminiscent of the gradual force structure shift between the proportion of medieval ‘pike’ to modern ‘shot’ in Early Modern armies, eventually advanced technology replaces the legacy artifacts that had been the mainstay of warfare:

Drones and Droids: Uncrewed systems, semiautonomous and autonomous, have been fielded which can operate on/in land, sea, and air. Static platforms and smart facilities can be militarized, with gun turrets controlled virtually by personnel thousands of miles away, as is already done with Reaper drones. Non-state actors have already weaponized cheap consumer drones.  UAS are actively proliferating with tens-of-thousands of ISR and hunter-killer drones being fielded collectively in the Russo-Ukrainian War.   

Artificial Intelligence: With advances in computer science such as heuristic programing, weak AI systems have become increasingly capable. AI’s ability to take over C2 functions for autonomous systems can now better navigate OODA (observe-orient-decide-act) loop iterations vis-à-vis human C2teleoperated systems, challenging human ‘in’ (or at least ‘on’) the loop oversight requirements.  Further, the potential of AI residing throughout a swarm of droids as a decentralized hivemind suggest its control would be highly resilient in real world combat versus a single AI computer controlling a network of integrated weapons systems.       

Swarm Networks: Drones/droids deployed for combat have been primarily utilized in ones and twos and slightly larger groups under human control. Netwar perceptions have for decades projected mass fielding of these systems and their ability to swarm (like bees) against a target and then immediately dissipate their concentration of force. Thousands of  drones creating integrated images in the sky have taken place in China and the American military has experimented with a hundred drone swarm. Future military drone swarms comprised of up to hundreds of thousands are envisioned.

Electrical Power: Internal combustion engines and turbines cannot hope to power the weapons systems, shielding, cloaking, sensing and related technologies for the military vehicles and platforms being developed. All-electric power systems will allow energy to be immediately directed to a specific capability such as shielding and then dynamically shifted to other onboard capabilities. High-tech fuel cell arrays which store and release electrical energy will become mainstays. Warships will be among the first weapons platforms to utilize these dynamic power systems in their basic design.   

Directed Energy: Mechanical based weaponry (combustive; explosive based) derived from firearms, bombs, and similar munitions is giving way to directed energy systems which can be utilized both offensively and defensively. Laser, high-powered microwave (HPM), radio frequency (RF), and millimeter wave (MW) weaponry is gradually being fielded. Defensively, active stealth technology (visibility masking) is being developed as is energy shielding which generates specific frequencies to pre-detonate incoming munitions and/or negate specific beam weaponry frequencies.

Five Dimensional Fusion: The present multi-domain structure of land, air, sea, space, and cyberspace will witness inter-dimensional domain realities being fused by means of virtual, augmented, and mixed reality technologies. Humans increasingly virtually interact in cyberspace and AI based machines are extending into human space via augmented reality. An overlap is spanning the operational environment across inter-dimensional domains along with stealth space (defensive bastion) and narrative space (influence operations) components.

Human Neural Interface: Wetware and appliance interfaces blur the line between humans and machines as cyborg-type dualities emerge. Humans are increasing fitted with artificial hip and knee joints, pacemakers, insulin pumps, and hearing aids.  RFID (radio frequency detection) tags, microchips, and artificial (bionic) limbs are also being implanted. Brain-to-machine interfaces will allow the accessing and control of informational systems and increased cognitive capabilities, achieving faster processing speeds.

Projected Evolutionary Trajectories

The ongoing integration and fielding of asymmetric warfare innovations into state military (and non-state paramilitary) force structures will result in a quantum leap in operational environment lethality from both a destructive and disruptive capabilities metric. Just as the medieval knight became obsolete on the ‘advanced’ early modern battlefield, the modern human-crewed tank will become obsolete on the ‘advanced’ post-modern battlefield. Neither legacy system (configured around the energy foundation of the earlier civilizational form—animal and mechanical respectively) survive the warfighting requirements of a more sophisticated level of warfare.   

The trajectories of this battlefield shift will be inherently unpredictable. Attributed to William Gibson, “The future is already here – it's just not very evenly distributed” pretty much sums up where we are. The pieces are in play and a new warfighting mosaic is forming with tiles randomly flipped and moved into position as the final image appears. A ‘guestimate’ of the projected impact on modern large-scale operations is as follows:

A decade or so out (2035): Technological innovations will be initially utilized singularly to benefit legacy military systems (e.g. electrical power generation for human-crewed battle tanks) or as stand-alone cost-effective advanced weaponry. For example, commercial UAS fitted with IEDs with FPV human controlled guidance are currently wreaking havoc on tanks, AFVs, and infantry personnel in the Ukraine war. Combinations of these innovations will be incorporated into extending the functionality of legacy systems (as ‘bolt ons’) but innovation synthesis will see drone and swarm network capabilities being increasingly deployed together.

Mid-21st century (2050): The synergistic effect of these technological innovations on the operational environment are pronounced. As innovations are integrated, higher-level synergistic effects occur. Greater battlefield effectiveness in directed energy weaponry, active stealthing, and energy shielding when placed on autonomous platforms due to advanced fuel cell and power management systems being more efficiently controlled by subordinate AI routines is expected. The opening vignette signifies integration of these asymmetric advanced warfare innovations into the US Army’s notional Project WICKED. Synergistic synthesis of innovations will result in new systems such as distributed AI battle management. The fielding of similar systems by allied as well as opposing states and entities will eventually be an ‘extinction event’ for all legacy conventional forces.

While the vignette optimistically positions the US Army as the alpha predator of the 2050 battlefield, this dominance is by no means assured.  Epochal level change has historically devastated status quo state forms along with the military systems they field, with heavily armed non-state and mercenary forces dominating during the initial deinstitutionalized period. The US Army must master the advanced form of warfighting now emergent and escape this brutal historical trap to retain the mantel of premier land power force—any other outcome is simply unacceptable. 

https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/something-wicked-way-comes-future-singularity-asymmetric-warfare-innovations


Body-by-Guinness

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SEALs & Others Fired for Refusing the Jab Re-enlisted
« Reply #1372 on: July 26, 2024, 11:53:12 AM »
The asshatttery of the current admin is on full display, given current recruiting issues, et al:

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-13668593/navy-seals-covid-vaccine-religious-biden-administration-settlement.html

ccp

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The Bradley vehicle
« Reply #1373 on: July 27, 2024, 10:36:23 AM »
I remember when the program was controversial and Bradley's were considered dogs with problems.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bradley_Fighting_Vehicle


From this circa 1979 :

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/f7/XM2_Bradley_circa_1979.png

to this circa 2024:

https://www.thedefensepost.com/2024/05/03/us-army-new-bradley-variant/


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GPF: David and Goliath
« Reply #1374 on: July 30, 2024, 01:44:15 PM »


David, Goliath and Modern Warfare
The biblical story of David leads to several conclusions about the development of weapons and the nature of warfare.

By Jacek Bartosiak -July 20, 2021Open as PDF
Most of us know the story of David and Goliath, but few know what the story can teach us about modern warfare.

The Philistines’ strategy was to disarm the Hebrews by destroying their metallurgical works. This prevented the Hebrews from producing their own modern weapons and made them dependent on the Philistines for civilian production, such as in agriculture. Thus, the key to the power of the Philistines was their industrial power, which of course gave them serious economic power. This is a characteristic example of a military-industrial complex in ancient times.

The two main offensive weapons in those days were a heavy iron spear, well suited for close combat, and a light throwing spear. Both weapons were only as effective as the user. Targeting and missile control required a combination of a good eye and skilled hands. These constraints limited the weapons’ innovative potential.

The task of Goliath and his offensive mission was to throw the javelin and attack with the spear. When Goliath went into battle, “He had a helmet of brass upon his head, and he was armed with a coat of mail.” Goliath was therefore burdened with a fundamental weakness: a defensive weapon system that protected against the enemy but limited his mobility. The weight of the armor meant that the fighter could not move with the agility and speed required on the battlefield. This would not be a problem if his enemy were also burdened with such weight, but he wasn’t.

David was not a professional fighter, so he was not weighed down with established beliefs about weapons or tactics. He was free to choose the technology and tactics best to defeat the enemy.

David was mobile. He could easily have been killed if he had entered Goliath’s firing zone. But Goliath, laden with armor, moved very slowly. He couldn’t move forward fast enough to catch David within his blast radius. It was an unequal fight. David was perfectly safe as long as he could maintain discipline and follow his plan. In such a fight, only Goliath took the risk. One of them would go on to be king, and the other died.

The Life Cycle of Weapons Systems

The biblical story of David leads to several conclusions about the development of weapons and the nature of warfare. Breakthrough technologies often feel less advanced than the old ones. For example, in the 14th century, firearms seemed completely ineffective against fortifications. In the 20th century, battleships seemed to be the pinnacle of technology, while the planes that flew in front of them were considered a primitive weapon against such powerful ships.

It should be remembered that each weapons system (and its entire family) has a life cycle. A weapon appears when an offensive weapon is required, and ends its life when it has become so complex that it needs to be defended rather than used for an attack. Thus, the whole cycle has taken place when the cost of defending the weapon eclipses its offensive capabilities and makes it impossible to buy other necessary weapons or disrupts the civilian economy. Such was the result of Goliath’s defensive armor. And this may be the result of the end of the stealth technology cycle (and of the controversial F-35 aircraft, for example), which is the very expensive armor of modern aircraft.

Armed forces that have not had significant military successes in the past are less likely to miss the moment when the end-of-life process of a given type of weapon begins. Winning wars creates the illusion that certain technologies will always be effective. This illusion is mixed with the interests of the military, political and industrial leadership and of specific politicians and interest groups in the political and social system. All these subconsciously allied forces create a sense of technical greatness by focusing on technology as a “miracle.”

There is even a feeling of invincibility within an army or armed forces. The French victory in World War I led to a technological, organizational and leadership defeat in 1940. History shows that losing a war – ideally, of course, without complete destruction of the country’s potential or being occupied – is the best impulse for change.

U.S. ground forces after their defeat in Vietnam showed all the symptoms of a defeated army, and the Israeli army in October 1973 showed the damage caused by the too-easy victory of 1967. Today, one wonders where the American campaigns of recent years and the technological domination in the fields of asymmetric war might have led the U.S. in terms of a future in which systematic warfare breaks out between the great powers.

At the peak moment for ancient weapons, just before their defeat, the latest generation of war technology appears invincible. Knights in full armor, fortifications with massive artillery power, battleships, intercontinental ballistic missiles – all of these weapons came and went as the last word of technology. And it remained so until events on the battlefield made them a mere burden. The technologies that replace them have one thing in common: They simplify the battlefield and allow for a return to the heart of war – passionate offensive action.

The length of the weapon’s cycle is determined by the rate at which the opponent takes countermeasures against it and the ability of the user to design methods of defense against these countermeasures. An effective military is a military that constantly rejects aging systems and outdated operational concepts, integrating new ideas and personnel without the simultaneous social upheaval resulting from the shift in the balance of power brought about by the reform. All powers in the past with an effective military have dealt with this phenomenon for a while. None has been able to do so permanently. The lesson from the wars between the Hebrews and the Philistines is still valid and will continue to have educational value in the future.

Protecting White Elephants

In the short run, the state may bear the cost of defending increasingly expensive systems that are moving toward obsolescence. It can also do this in asymmetric conflicts (as has often been the case in the past 30 years), when a much weaker opponent (technologically and organizationally) wants to inflict losses on “white elephants,” i.e., very expensive hardware units, in an effort to cause a political (not military) effect in a society unfriendly to war. Then, states defend their systems as much as they can so as not to lose on this “distorted” or “atypical” asymmetric pitch, where information perception rules. But in the long run it is unsustainable anyway, so asymmetric wars are often won by the weaker side.

In any case, looking at this phenomenon in the long term, the power that wins is the one that is able to redefine its strategic interests and introduce the weapons it can afford.

The costs of designing, developing and manufacturing weapons are increasing with the growing need for the enemy to find a remedy to our weapons. And so the race between defense and attack is in full swing. The complexity, sophistication and even rising costs of defending a weapon system give the illusion that a weapon so advanced, so demanding in terms of requiring expenditure, knowledge, personnel, energy, man-hours and so on, must be the best of the best. In fact, most often it is otherwise, and this phenomenon is a symptom of the increasing weakness and sensitivity of the weapon to the enemy’s influence.

Here is an example: The presence of the Aegis air defense system in an aircraft carrier’s combat group is less a symptom of aircraft carrier advancement and more a sign of the times that an aircraft carrier today is a fairly easy (and tempting) target. When a given type of weapon is heading toward obsolescence, it is still used (as was the case with cavalry for a long time in the 20th century), while its combat effectiveness and maintenance costs soar until the point where maintenance becomes an impossible burden.

Goliath was equipped with so much armor that he could not throw his spear the several dozen meters required for the battlefield; cavalry became so heavy with armor and guns that the horses could not run; a lot of money was spent on battleships so that six or nine large guns from these ships could fire several hundred kilograms of explosives for several kilometers. In all these cases, we have certainly already dealt with the phenomenon of obsolescence, when the weapon is still able to survive on the battlefield but no longer makes sense and costs too much. And it even becomes dangerous to other units or formations useful in combat that, instead of fighting, have to protect the white elephant.

Weapons do not want to leave the arena of history, just as people do not want to die. Weapons affected by the phenomenon of obsolescence are able to survive on the stage of history, exposing those who continue to force them in their service to great damage.

The story of David and Goliath therefore has a very important lesson to teach us, both about the fight against Goliath and Saul’s attitude to David’s innovation. This is a difficult lesson for people who are aware of the constraints that restrict the playing field.

To learn more, please visit strategyandfuture.org

Crafty_Dog

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WSJ: Rebuilding the Navy
« Reply #1375 on: July 30, 2024, 02:30:14 PM »


https://www.wsj.com/articles/rebuilding-the-u-s-navy-wont-be-easy-defense-ships-national-security-4d470f12?mod=latest_headlines

Rebuilding the U.S. Navy Won’t Be Easy
But it can be done with the help of shipbuilding allies and more money to train defense-industry workers.
By Seth Cropsey
July 30, 2024 5:27 pm ET





Gift unlocked article

An Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer transits the Suez Canal, Dec. 18, 2023. PHOTO: AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGE
The U.S. Navy is a ship without a rudder. The longer the service is allowed to decay, the more precarious America’s strategic situation will become. Turning things around won’t be easy. The best solution would be to retain every combat ship in the current fleet and encourage allies to pitch in with their own industrial bases. This expansion will require substantial funding, particularly in the workforce.

The Suez Canal is one of the world’s busiest maritime highways, connecting the Mediterranean and Red seas and creating a shortcut for ships sailing from the North Atlantic to the Indian Ocean. This route is the center of the broader Eurasian trade system on which American power relies. It has helped the U.S. become one of the wealthiest, most powerful nations in the world. It has also enabled the construction of alliances across Eurasia, as powers ranging from Germany and Poland to South Korea and Japan are far less threatened by a U.S. that seeks commercial access and upholds freedom than by a China or Russia that demands a monopoly on commerce.

Since 2023 the Houthis have harassed ships exiting and entering the Suez Canal but sunk few vessels. Well-trained American and allied surface combatant crews have intercepted scores of missiles and drones, and U.S. Navy strike fighter squadrons have bombed Houthi missile launch sites. Nevertheless, insurance premiums for the Suez route have increased, and the Suez Canal Authority has lost almost 70% of its shipping traffic despite lower transit fees.

Countering the Houthis would take several months of intense pressure. The U.S. would need to deploy a surface action group of up to five warships, alongside a Marine expeditionary unit. Ideally a Wasp or America class “lightning carrier,” a flat-decked amphibious assault ship with a squadron of Marine F-35s, would work alongside a maritime patrol squadron and Navy SEAL units supported by U.S. Air Force and Space Force reconnaissance and communications.

The campaign would take about six months, considering the dispersion of Houthi assets, the Houthis’ ability to redeploy launchers, and the limitations White House casualty sensitivity would impose on operations. Interdiction, search and seizure of Houthi-bound shipping would prevent weapons smuggling from Iran. The U.S. warships could intercept missiles launched at commercial shipping, provide convoy escorts, and strike Houthi command-and-control sites.

The issue is that the U.S. Navy can’t spare these ships.

The number of ships in the Navy has shrunk since its Trump administration high of 296 and, as per construction and procurement funding, won’t reach more than 300 ships until 2032. Maintenance and repair delays have piled up rapidly. Only 60% of the attack submarine fleet is deployable at any given time. The rest is tied up in maintenance. Two supercarriers are out for an additional year-plus due to unspecified turbine damage. The U.S. is retiring surface warships faster than it can build them. Its new ships, most notably the Constellation class frigates, carry half the firepower of an Arleigh Burke class destroyer at around two-thirds of the price. The Navy has also struggled in vain for nearly two decades to retain talent.

Sea control is nonnegotiable for a dominant maritime power. The U.S. needs to deploy its forces from North America and shift them between different parts of Eurasia. If it can’t maintain a strong naval presence, it will be forced to follow the British rental-cum-alliance model, and its credibility across Eurasia will decline rapidly.

This decline comes at the worst possible geopolitical moment. Russia continues to prosecute its war of conquest against Ukraine, hoping to alter dramatically the European balance of power and shatter the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Iran and its proxies are mounting attacks on Israel as China prepares for war. Beijing is pursuing the largest military buildup since World War II. Its navy already outnumbers ours. It has gone from fielding one experimental carrier to multiple purpose-built carriers in under 15 years and will soon deploy its first catapult-equipped carrier. It is also expanding its nuclear arsenal and improving its submarine capabilities.

America’s response to these worrying global developments should be a revitalization of American shipbuilding, aided by cooperation with allies. South Korea has several high-quality naval yards that produce top-line small and medium-size warships, along with submarines. Though U.S. Navy requirements differ from those of other countries, there is much to gain from contracting with yards that can deliver warships on time and at or under budget.

The U.S. will still have to build some of its own ships. Foreign firms can’t supply the missile-armed surface combatants, submarines, amphibious warships and carriers that are required to project power. Accomplishing a large-scale naval expansion will require an enormous workforce training program that brings in a new class of technicians. Without this, the naval industrial base workforce will shrink to ineffectiveness and desuetude in another 15 years, given its ageing personnel. I have been hearing this concern from companies in the naval shipbuilding industry for well over a decade. Training takes time, as does the construction of new yards and equipment.

In the interim, the U.S. can turn to its more robust aerial industrial base, using a flood of new maritime patrol aircraft to maintain maritime awareness and heavy bombers to conduct strikes. This will mean negotiating with allies to ensure use of air bases—a difficult, but worthwhile step.

Finally, and most important, strong U.S. naval leadership is needed to explain the causes of the navy’s sinking fortunes, detail its consequences for American prosperity and security and argue forcefully for remedies—beginning with a strategy to deter war in the Pacific. From the White House to the Pentagon, such leadership is critical to retaining a strong U.S. position in the world.

Body-by-Guinness

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Ones Willing to Employ Brutal Tactics are Most Likely to Write the History
« Reply #1376 on: July 31, 2024, 05:36:38 PM »
This author certainly does some strutting on the classical studies front, and embraces a seeming omniscience that some will be put off by, but makes valid points using sources I’m acquainted with. Conservative would do well to mull these points in light of how “Progressives” have opted to launch various battles.

A lot of formatting here that did not convey. Source URL at bottom:

War is Not Just

By L. Lance Boothe

 
Let us discuss war as it is, not as we would like it to be. Regulating war is pointless, and our time and energy would be better spent fighting war quickly, decisively, and with single-minded ruthlessness rather than fretting over ethics. Acting as if law applies to war is a foolish hinderance on its conduct. War drives toward extremes. War should go to these extremes as quickly as possible where it is fought in such a vicious manner that it persuades enemies and neutrals alike that war with us is not worth waging. After all, the victor writes history – “What I have written I have written,” the infamous Pontius Pilate declared[1] – and in so doing the narrative is established.

The justness of the cause in war depends on perspective. As the Athenians told the Melians in 416 B.C. according to Thucydides, “justice is only a factor in human decisions when the parties are on equal footing. Those in positions of power do what their power permits, while the weak have no choice but to accept it.”[2] Melian independence meant nothing to Athens. The Athenians pursued their own interests. They were justified in their own eyes. Subsequently, Athens made quick work of Melos, killing every man on the island and enslaving the rest. “History teaches us what human beings are like in reality rather than what we would like them to be,”[3] affirming Niccolo Machiavelli’s observation that “a man who wants to act virtuously in every way necessarily comes to grief among so many who are not virtuous.”[4] Likewise, “history shows that some men are willing to do evil in order to accomplish good”[5] – good, certainly as they see it, whether in pursuit of self-interest (defensive, economic, or ideological), dominating the uncivilized (bringing order to chaos), or just not being afraid to do the Lord’s work (ensuring others reap what they sow). That post-modern man[6] cannot seem to come to grips with the paradox of doing evil to achieve good demonstrates a failure in appreciating the human condition. Thus, betraying a profoundly anti-human sentiment, which seeks to alter our nature – selfish and cruel, yet altruistic and just. And when we think we are better than our ancestors and making high-minded ethical progress to alter human nature through law and social contract, the verdict of history says we are not.

Carl von Clausewitz, the West’s foremost apostle of war, claims “war is merely the continuation of policy by other means.”[7] The “continuation of policy” part from his most famous aphorism means pursuit of power. As Clausewitz elaborates, the object of war is to impose one’s will on the enemy – thus the realization of power. [8] The “by other means” part is euphemism for using violence to achieve the “policy,” or stratagem, to gain power. Clausewitz expounds on this point with unerring logic throughout the rest of his work – a book oft cited, yet seldom read (particularly by those who claim soldiering as their profession). His logic:  the end in war is power over one’s enemy; to achieve that end, one uses unmitigated violence; therefore, the end is not justified by the means, power is its own justification. War is about power. Let us hold that thought for now.

Back to Niccolo, when but a young lad under the tutelage of the Dominican firebrand Girolamo Savonarola and on his way to a privileged position in the clerisy, an abrupt lesson in power at the hands of the Pope and the Florentine establishment forever altered Niccolo’s course. Thus, opening his eyes to the world as it really is, not as he thought it to be. After watching his mentor, the moral crusader Savonarola, put to death by the Grandees of Florence, it dawned on Machiavelli that the establishment is not interested in morality, only power. When morality became inconvenient to their ends, it was swept aside. And a poor, austere, and pious monk went to the gallows for the inconvenience of his sanctimony. Machiavelli looking on wept. Thereafter, Machiavelli put away childish things as St Paul admonishes,[9] and Niccolo sought to understand and explain how power and its corollary war works.

Machiavelli is best known for his opus magnum The Prince, a work generally considered amoral. Many readers assume The Prince provides a window into Niccolo’s soul. Perhaps.  Though such perceptions do the man and realpolitik little justice. But of more interest and less renown than The Prince are Machiavelli’s writings on the art of war.[10] Once the reader gets beyond the dialogue format and anachronism of 16th Century and ancient warfare, Machiavelli’s insistence on the superiority of the Roman way of war reveals much. For Machiavelli war is amoral. War is an endeavor only taken out of necessity “for the acquisition of glory.”[11] The ancients found glory necessary. Glory conveys power. The ambition of the powerful drives societies to excel through violence (a truth Machiavelli discovered at the end of Savonarola’s rope). And this brings us back to the cold, hard logic of war.

When we last left Clausewitz, a Machiavellian adherent, his most famous aphorism was invoked. Let us summarize his logic in a few simple syllogisms. Power is to impose one’s will on another. In war, combatants seek to impose their will on each other, ergo the objective of war is power. Violence is used to obtain power. In war, violence is killing. Killing breaks the will of one’s enemy to resist. Therefore, killing is war. In war, violence occurs to impose will, ergo war is killing to attain power.

Killing has precious little to do with morality. In fact, by the commands of the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, killing is forbidden. Thou shall not kill.[12] This command is unequivocal, literally written in stone. To look to the Judeo-Christian ethos for justification in killing is a fool’s errand. Regardless, in some military and policy circles this errand has become a Grail Quest; enter “Just War Theory.”

The twin pillars of the theory are jus ad bellum and jus in bello – a right to war and the right conduct of war. Accordingly, for a war to be “right” it must be waged by legitimate authority for a true cause and with right intentions, which, of course, conveys the “right” on one participant (or group thereof) to slaughter their opponent(s). As to the second pillar, the slaughter must be governed. After all, let us not be the base creatures that we are. The brutality of war must be mitigated; therefore, war should and must be governed by rules.

Where did all this high-mindedness originate? Stepping back in time, again, we come to the 5th Century A.D. and the diocese of St Augustine of Hippo. In his opus magnum, The City of God, Book XIX, Chapter 7 to be exact, the regal St Augustine declares,

the wise man, they say, will wage just wars. Surely, if he remembers that he is a human being, he will rather lament the fact that he is faced with the necessity of waging just wars; for if they were not just, he would not have to engage in them, and consequently there would be no wars for a wise man. For it is the injustice of the opposing side that lays on the wise man the duty of waging wars; and this injustice is assuredly to be deplored by a human being, since it is the injustice of human beings, even though no necessity for war should arise from it.

For St Augustine, war is necessary, but not, and you are making it necessary for me to fight you because you are unjust! In fact, your injustice compels me to a duty to wage war against you, ergo you are forcing me to slaughter you against my better nature; such is the wisdom of St Augustine. Machiavelli and Clausewitz would find this reasoning specious. Julius Caesar would smile.

St Augustine is considered the greatest mind of Christianity. According to eminent scholars, an incalculable intellectual and moral debt to St Augustine has incurred as the man who is “the true creator of Western theology,” laying “the foundation of Western culture” and standing “between the ancient world and the Middle Ages as the first great constructive thinker of the Western Church, dominating like a pyramid antiquity and succeeding ages.”[13] For Eduard Norden, the foremost Latinist of his time, “[St Augustine’s] philosophic-historical work remains one of the most imposing creations of all time; it posits a capacity and originality of mind which none other possessed either in his own day or for a thousand years after.”[14] High praise, indeed, coming from the esteemed Norden. So, upon a few sentences from St Augustine, and the magnificent edifice of his creation, hangs all the law and the prophets for “Just War” theorists.

Surely, there is more than an appeal to the authority of a great theologian upon which to concoct an elaborate schema to moralize the immoral and govern the ungovernable that is war?  Unfortunately, no. Tossing around a couple Latin phrases and attaching self-serving criteria to them no matter how voluminous, erudite, and pious, does not a valid construct make. A few sentences penned over 1500 years ago from a great man, and far be it for us to cast judgement on either the man or his work, do not make war just, nor explain who has legitimate authority to wage it. Inferring, as St Augustine does, that only the proper authorities should have a monopoly on violence does not make it so, much less confer on them an exclusive right to war – jus ad bellum.

What constitutes legitimacy? Ink on paper? Perhaps 535 + 1 self-serving politicians as found in our res publica? Or is it a potentate ennobled as First Citizen? Or the Pope in Rome? Or a shaman blowing sounds of the rainforest onto the heads of silly rich people at Davos? Speaking of Davos, perhaps just being fabulously wealthy conveys legitimacy. After all, he who has the gold, makes the rules. If none of this seems terribly legitimate, then maybe legitimacy can be found in We the People. Of course, that can never go off the rails – recall the Melian Dialogue mentioned previously? Let us consider something a bit more recent like Gaza. There a terrorist organization gets voted into power through the people exercising democracy in true Islamic fashion – one vote, one time, one way. Hamas terrorists then proceed to murder any opponents to their rule and go on to commit the most horrific atrocities in recent memory; all with the acquiescence of Palestinians living in Gaza who – of their own volition – put Hamas in power. The uncomfortable truth, which we need to get comfortable with, is that everyone is justified in their own eyes. This is nowhere more apt than with Hamas in specific and with governments in general, elected or not. Those in power are going to do whatever they want to do, and under the color of law (or not), calling it legit. As the Athenians explained to the Melians, “we…know that people always seek to rule whenever they can. It is in their very nature.”[15] We would do best before appealing to the authority of a mob to remember Oliver Cromwell’s rebuke to the Rump Parliament (ironically, that he installed):  an immovable legislature is more obnoxious than an immovable king; “you have sat too long for any good you have been doing ... In the name of God, go!”[16] The last time our Congress bothered to abide by the Constitution and issue a declaration of war was 11 December 1941, yet how many wars have we fought since? Like Cromwell’s Rump Parliament, the incumbents of our Congress have sat too long for any good they have done, so in the name of God, do go. We can lie to ourselves but let us not lie to each other. The legitimacy of Congress is but a veneer, and a weak one at that, and the imprimis of its members who too often demonstrate scant willingness to be ruled by law, the very law they make, hardly confers on them a right to war through resolutions authorizing the use of force.

As if the first pillar of Just War Theory was not questionable enough, the second stands in the realm of delusion compounded by hypocrisy. Clausewitz exposes it best:

  Kind-hearted people might of course think there was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine this is the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be exposed:  war is such a dangerous business that the mistakes which come from kindness are the very worst. The maximum use of force is in no way incompatible with the simultaneous use of intellect. If one side uses force without compunction, undeterred by the bloodshed it involves, while the other side refrains, the first will gain the upper hand. That side will force the other to follow suit; each will drive its opponent toward extremes, and the only limiting factors are the counterpoises inherent in war.

  This is how the matter must be seen. It would be futile – even wrong – to try and shut one’s eyes to what war really is from sheer distress at its brutality…To introduce the principle of moderation into the theory of war itself would always lead to logical absurdly.[17]

Before fixating on Carl’s reference to “limiting factors” from the “counterpoises inherent in war,” know that he is talking about the physical limitations of muzzle loading firearms and operations at the speed of foot and galloping horse on the conduct of war, not high-minded constraints imposed on combatants by some council, synod, or convention. Declarations from these assemblies seeking to govern war are the naïve constructs of sincere men with misplaced sensibilities, most of whom would not know war if they found themselves in one. The counterpoises inherent to modern warfare are far different in speed, scope, autonomy, and lethality than whose of the 19th Century, and the tender sensibilities of well-intentioned people reflected in conventions or treaties are not going to limit them. Their counsel in matters of life and death need not be countenanced. For as Clausewitz points out, in war, their type of folly is the worst.[18] To overcome war’s peril requires us to be clear eyed, calculating, ruthless, and lucky.

Unilaterally constraining our actions and prohibiting the use of certain weapons in the face of enemies who employ all means at their disposal in war and operate without constraint courts disaster and invites defeat. Does any serious American citizen believe Hamas acts with restraint? Or Vladimir Putin? How about the Communist Chinese when they decide to invade Taiwan? Do we really believe that Iran will not use nuclear weapons, if they had them? Who do we believe they would target, just combatants? Of course not, so let us put away ill-conceived notions about fair play and rules in war. It is important, nay, essential to our survival, to see our adversaries as they really are, and accept that they will do their worst, forcing us to up the ante.

In battle, reality reigns supreme. War is an act of force, and there is no limit to its application.[19] Our policymakers and military leaders must stop acting as if the battlefield (or target area) is inundated with innocents to be avoided. As the Hamas-Israel War is exposing, this perception is unmoored from reality – 75% of Gazan Palestinians support Hamas (up 5% since the war began) and “more than 90% believe that Hamas did not commit any atrocities against Israel civilians during its October the 7th offensive.”[20] History shows that war has always been the nation, tribe, or clan in arms. Clausewitz proves right again. We fool ourselves to believe otherwise. Such cognitive dissonance is particularly pernicious in the danger to which it exposes our soldiers. When policymakers and military leaders become preoccupied with collateral damage (euphemism for killing the “wrong” people), rules of engagement, and unrealistic convention prohibitions, they mire soldiers in a Sisyphean feat. This wastes lives and ordnance and compounds the task at hand, risking mission failure, or at best, garnering inconclusive results. This seems all too often the point. Utopians seek to ban mankind’s most brutal manifestation by making war too hard to wage as they suppose. Disabusing Utopian notions and exposing their pusillanimity is a topic for another time. Suffice it to say, the human experience is tragic, and no amount of regulation will change this fact – a Hobbesian world it is, and a Hobbesian world it shall remain[21] – and power accepts no challenge to it, discarding any rule which stands in its way. Nowhere is power more manifest than in war. Nor is war a court of law with due process governing its administration. There is no presumption of innocence on the battlefield and no protection of rights. There are those doing the fighting (that is to say the killing), those in the way, and those supporting the combatants either directly or indirectly, tacitly or otherwise, and everyone is fair game – welcome to the jungle.

The hard truth is despite our best intentions and efforts to mitigate war’s savagery, we will always be compelled to apply greater force. War is a zero-sum game as General of the Army Douglas MacArthur reminds us. “In war there is no substitute for victory.”[22] If the worst general in American history can figure it out, we have no excuse. We knew this at one time. It led our forefathers to firebomb cities, culminating in two atomic strikes to end the most destructive war in world history. These men did what had to be done so that we could enjoy liberty and prosperity today, establishing the United States as the most powerful country on earth. Let us be thankful that they were willing to do evil to accomplish good.

Also, let us be honest. Those who would impose restrictions on war, with few exceptions, endanger someone else’s kid or spouse. Their hypocrisy is deplorable. And when the chips are truly down and their power (or life) is at stake, whatever piques of conscience they may have had that led to their remonstrations on war and somber calls for restraint are conveniently discarded in the name of expediency. Black sites, drone strikes on US citizens (their constitutional rights be damned!), indefinite incarceration with imperceptible due process for those captured abroad, and “righteous” strikes on those who are merely suspect, producing collateral damage within sovereign nations where no war is declared as our Constitution mandates, smacks of such hypocrisy and conceit of power that any pretext to the rule of law is appalling and darkly comical. Power is capricious and arbitrary indeed. War is dangerous and ugly enough. Let us not compound it with hypocrisy.

For the moralists of jus ad bellum et jus in bello doctrina, put away the sanctimony. While no doubt St Augustine had the solace of his conscience as he starved to death under Vandal assault on his beloved Hippo Regius, had it been within his power and ability at the time to carpet bomb the invaders, collateral damage within Numidia would have been the last thing on his mind. Lacking power to save himself, St Augustine perished, and with him the way of life he cherished. War is a rough schoolmaster indeed.[23] The US military is not composed of theologians or warrior monks, nor would we want it to be. The men and women in service to our country are ordinary people placed at times into the extraordinary circumstance of war where they are called upon to do evil to accomplish good. St Augustine would appreciate the paradox and so ought we.

Power respects power, and in war, might is right. Fight war quickly and ruthlessly, as it will devolve into brutality anyway, and in the process the message will be sent to adversaries, neutrals, and even friends alike that war with us is not worth waging.

 
[1] John 19:22 (KJV)

[2] Thucydides, How to Think About War, selected, translated, and introduced by Johanna Hanink (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019), pg. 169.

[3] Ibid., pg. 276.

[4] Arthur Herman, The Cave and the Light (New York: Random House, 2013), pg. 261.

[5] Ibid., pg. 277.

[6] Post-modernism is characterized by broad skepticism, subjectivism, or relativism; a general suspicion of reason; and an acute sensitivity to the role of ideology in asserting and maintaining political and economic power. “In postmodern times…humans turned their gaze inwards, looking at themselves in the mirror: in there, inside the subjective experience of reality, the constructed Truth was created. They renounced the metaphysical, the objective and even Truth with a capital T altogether: the time of Great Narratives ended, and individual freedom, creativity and self-fulfillment became the new Holy Grail.” https://thecorrespondent.com/343/post-postmodern-human-aware-of-everything-willing-to-change-nothing

[7] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), pg. 87.

[8] Ibid., pg. 75.

[9] 1 Corinthians 13:11 (KJV)

[10] Machiavelli wrote his political treatise The Prince in 1513 as a guide on how to acquire and keep power based on his experience as foreign secretary in Florence during the Medici dynasty. His work The Art of War written in 1521, one of the few published during his lifetime, is presented as a dialogue between humanists regarding war. The Roman Army is deemed the model of military excellence to be emulated if warfare is to be successful. Clausewitz considered Machiavelli’s The Art of War authoritative, and it has since achieved a prominent place in writings on the theory and conduct of war.

[11] Niccolo Machiavelli, The Art of War, translated by Neal Wood (Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 1965), pg. 19.

[12] Exodus 20:13; Deuteronomy 5:17; Matthew 5:21; Mark 10:19; Luke 18:20; Romans 13:9; James 2:11 (KJV)

[13] Hugh Nibley, The World and the Prophets (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book Co., 1987), pg. 80.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Thucydides, How to Think About War, pg. 185.

[16] https://www.parliament.uk/about/living-heritage/evolutionofparliament/parliamentaryauthority/civilwar/overview/rump-dissolved/

[17] Clausewitz, On War, pg. 75-76.

[18] Ibid., pg. 75.

[19] Ibid., pg. 77.

[20] https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/969; https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2024/03/22/poll-hamas-remains-popular-among-palestinians/; https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/poll-over-70-palestinians-still-maintain-hamas-correct-to-commit-oct-7-atrocities/; https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2024/mar/22/over-70-palestinians-say-oct-7-hamas-attack-israel/; https://allarab.news/over-70-of-palestinians-approve-of-hamas-invasion-on-oct-7-recent-poll-shows/

[21] Thomas Hobbes is a 17th Century philosopher, scientist, and historian who is best know for his treatise on political philosophy Leviathan in which he argues the main purpose of government is to provide security for society. Social contract between government and the governed is the best way to regulate liberty to ensure domestic tranquility and order. Men are selfish and debased creatures whose existence would descend into the chaos of anarchy without the constraints of government (and religion). Hobbes contends that life for most of humanity without peace and order is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short,” deriving the term Hobbesian world or existence. His decidedly negative view of mankind and how government should be organized to avoid civil war and guarantee order is shaped by his experience with the English Civil Wars and subsequent Long Parliament of which he wrote a history. Hobbes concludes that war comes more naturally to humans than political order. 

[22] MacArthur, Douglas. Farewell Address to Congress, 19 April 1951; https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/douglasmacarthurfarewelladdress.htm

[23] Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, translated by C. F. Smith (Cambridge: Loeb Classic Library Harvard University Press, 1920), III:LXXXII.

About the Author(s)
Lewis Lance Boothe
Lewis Lance Boothe is a specialist in Field Artillery weapon systems, munitions, organization, and operations and the senior Concepts Developer in the Concepts Development Division of the US Army Fires Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.  Mr. Boothe is a retired Field Artillery Officer and veteran of Afghanistan, Iraq, Albania, and Bosnia.

https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/war-not-just


ccp

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Re: Military Science, Military Issues, and the Nature of War
« Reply #1378 on: August 04, 2024, 07:27:41 AM »
General Keane was making that point on Great One's Saturday night show yesterday.
In case you missed it.


Crafty_Dog

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Re: Military Science, Military Issues, and the Nature of War
« Reply #1379 on: August 04, 2024, 03:22:55 PM »
Keane would make for a truly great Sec. Def.

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DEI In Action
« Reply #1380 on: August 05, 2024, 04:12:31 AM »
DEI has turned out military into a paper tiger. As a result stupid errors like this are occurring:


$450 Million B-1B Lancer Crash Attributed to Crew Failures and 'Degradation of Airman Skills'
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 A U.S. Air Force B-1B Lancer assigned to the 37th Bomb Squadron takes off in support of a Bomber Task Force mission at Ellsworth Air Force Base
A U.S. Air Force B-1B Lancer assigned to the 37th Bomb Squadron takes off in support of a Bomber Task Force mission at Ellsworth Air Force Base, S.D., May 20, 2024. (Alec Carlberg/U.S. Air Force)
Military.com | By Thomas Novelly
Published July 25, 2024 at 12:07pm ET

A B-1B Lancer valued at more than $450 million that crashed in South Dakota at the start of this year missed the runway by 100 feet, a mistake accident investigators attributed to the aircrew's shortcomings as well as the poor training culture within units at Ellsworth Air Force Base.

The scathing crash investigation report shared with Military.com pointed to "failure to perform standard crew resource management," along with adverse weather conditions, ineffective flying operations supervision, lack of awareness, and "an unhealthy organizational culture that permitted degradation of airmanship skills" as contributing factors in the Jan. 4 crash.

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That incident led Ellsworth to temporarily close down its runway and relocate roughly 250 crew members and Lancers to Dyess Air Force Base near Abilene, Texas.

Read Next: Here's Kamala Harris' Record on Veterans and Military Issues

The B-1B Lancer, which was on a training mission, crashed roughly 100 feet shy of the runway, skidded more than 5,000 feet down the tarmac, and was then engulfed in flames from the crash. The four crew members all ejected, but two of them suffered injuries as a result. Both were medically treated and later released, according to Air Force Global Strike Command, which commissioned the crash investigation report. The Lancer was destroyed, and the damage to the aircraft and the runway was estimated to be more than $456 million.

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The report also points out that one crew member who was injured during the ejection was not wearing all the proper flight equipment. And the other injured crew member's weight was reportedly above both the ejection seat's recommended limit of 211 pounds and the Air Force's recommendation of 245 pounds. They weighed in at nearly 260 pounds during medical treatment, which "likely contributed to the severity of the injuries noted from the mishap."

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The B-1B was performing a training mission with another Lancer aircraft on Jan. 4 when both came in for low-visibility approaches toward the runway with low cloud cover. The first aircraft landed successfully amid dense fog, while the second Lancer came up short due to "a failure by the crew to properly manage the aircraft's airspeed and angle of approach," Air Force Global Strike Command detailed.

"Changes in local wind direction during landing should have prompted the crew to adjust throttles and maintain proper airspeed, but a lack of situational awareness and ineffective crew communication resulted in the aircraft falling below required airspeed to maintain a safe approach," the command said.

Col. Erick Lord, the accident board investigation president, pointed to the crew's shortcoming and harped on the one crew member's weight as examples of larger cultural problems within Ellsworth Air Force Base's 34th Bomb Squadron and the 28th Operations Support Squadron.

"The preponderance of the evidence revealed an ineffective and unhealthy culture, which directly contributed to the mishap," he wrote. "Specifically, the [34th Bomb Squadron's] overall lack of discipline, inadequate focus on basic airmanship skills, and failure to properly identify and mitigate risk, coupled with the [28th Operations Support Squadron's] ineffective communication, inadequate program management, and lack of supervisory oversight, set conditions that allowed this mishap to occur by directly leading to the mishap's cause and its three non-weather-related, substantially contributing factors."

Retired Col. J.F. Joseph, a Marine Corps pilot who is now an aviation consultant and expert witness, told Military.com in an interview that those crew members could receive any variety of punishment or administrative actions in the wake of the report, but noted that the statements about safety culture at the base are significant.

"There appears to be some degree of supervisory error that they're making comments on, and the basis for that is predicated on what we call safety culture," the former aviator said. "It sounds like what they looked at was essentially a top-to-bottom review, but it really seems as though they're focusing on the culture aspect of it."

Air Force Global Strike Command said the chain of command is "in the process of responding to the report and taking the appropriate corrective actions."

The last crash of a B-1B was more than a decade ago in August 2013, when a Lancer out of Ellsworth went down near Broadus, Montana, causing fire damage to private property and totaling the aircraft. Crew members aboard ejected and survived that mishap, a news release at the time detailed.

Related: B-1B Bombers and 250 Airmen Temporarily Moving from South Dakota to Texas Following Crash

Related Topics: Military Headlines Air Force Topics Ellsworth Air Force Base Aircraft
Thomas Novelly

Thomas Novelly Military.com
Thomas Novelly is a reporter for Military.com focusing on coverage of the Air Force and Space Force. He previously covered veterans, military bases and federal politics in South Carolina for The Post and Courier, where he was part of the reporting team for “Rising Waters,” a project that examined climate-driven flooding and was a finalist for the Pulitzer Prize. Prior to that, he was a breaking news reporter for the Courier Journal in Kentucky, where he received a Louisville Society of Professional Journalists award for Best Breaking News Story.  Read Full

https://www.military.com/daily-news/2024/07/25/report-unhealthy-culture-ellsworth-air-force-base-units-contributed-b-1b-lancer-crash.html
« Last Edit: August 05, 2024, 04:14:27 AM by Body-by-Guinness »

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WSJ: Tech Bros betting they can help win war with China
« Reply #1382 on: August 10, 2024, 03:54:44 AM »

Buy Side from WSJ

Tech Bros Are Betting They Can Help Win a War With China
Billions of dollars of venture capital is flowing into defense-tech startups focused on futuristic, AI-enabled weapons. Palmer Luckey’s Anduril is their biggest bet.

By Sharon WeinbergerFollow
 and Heather SomervilleFollow
 | Photographs by Philip Cheung for WSJ
Aug. 9, 2024 9:00 pm ET


Palmer Luckey was an executive at Facebook when he first spoke with venture capitalist Trae Stephens about starting a weapons company. “I’m actually building a ramjet in my swimming pool,” Luckey told Stephens over lunch, referring to a type of engine designed to power high-speed missiles and aircraft.

About a year and a half after that conversation, Luckey left Facebook, freeing him to pursue a defense company with Stephens, whose venture firm, Founders Fund, would become a major investor.

Luckey, now 31, is a new breed of startup founder and defense-company executive. He is rarely seen wearing anything other than his trademark flip-flops and Hawaiian shirts, lashes out on social media against “idiots” who criticize his company, and says he models himself after a character in a Japanese anime series.

His company, Anduril Industries—named after a magical sword from J.R.R. Tolkien’s “Lord of the Rings” novels—is central to Silicon Valley’s quest to take on weapons makers like Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman. Since its founding in 2017, Anduril has raised $3.7 billion in venture funding, including $1.5 billion announced this past week. The newcomers’ hope is that the Pentagon will eventually kill off what Luckey calls “old legacy zombie programs,” like expensive jet fighters and attack helicopters, and instead buy autonomous weapons, like drones and uncrewed submarines.

These weapons, Luckey argues, are needed for a potential conflict with China, which the Pentagon two years ago announced is the greatest danger to U.S. security. The U.S. military, Luckey and others say, needs large numbers of cheaper and more intelligent systems that can be effective over long stretches of ocean and against a manufacturing and technological power like China.

Anduril is so focused on a conflict with Beijing, Luckey says, that many teams inside the company are building only weapons that can be completed by 2027—the year Chinese President Xi Jinping has said his country should be prepared to invade Taiwan. The fictional sword for which Anduril is named is also called the “Flame of the West.”

“We keep our eyes on the prize, which is great-power conflict in the Pacific,” Luckey said in an interview at the company’s headquarters in Costa Mesa, Calif., south of Los Angeles.


The main building of the Anduril campus, a former Los Angeles Times printing facility, mixes tech-startup perks like a sleek gym and dimly lighted speakeasy-style bar with more typical weapons-industry paraphernalia, including displays of its drone aircraft and mini-submarine.

Anduril is part of one of the largest shifts to take place in the defense sector since World War II: the flow of venture-capital funding into defense-technology companies.

For decades, the U.S. government funded defense companies, like Lockheed Martin, to develop new weapons, ranging from stealth aircraft to spy satellites. But as the private-sector money available for research and development has outstripped federal-government spending, particularly in areas like AI, a new cohort of defense startups is using private capital to develop technology for the Pentagon.

The amount of private capital flowing into the venture-backed defense-tech industry has ballooned, with investors spending at least 70% more on the sector each of the past three years than any prior year. From 2021 through mid-June 2024, venture capitalists invested a total of $130 billion in defense-tech startups, according to data firm PitchBook. The Pentagon spends about $90 billion on R&D annually.

Riding a wave of private funding, hundreds of new companies have emerged in recent years, working on AI for the battlefield, drones, and even hypersonic missiles and aircraft.

There are now more than a dozen defense “unicorns”—privately held companies valued at $1 billion or more—including Anduril, Shield AI, Relativity Space and Epirus. Anduril is among the most visible and well funded of the group, and its success or failure will be a harbinger for the smaller defense and aerospace startups that have sprung up behind it.

Startups have so far captured just a tiny fraction of the Pentagon’s weapons-buying budget. Venture-backed companies for the past several years have received only about $5 billion annually in Defense Department awards, or roughly 1% of annual Pentagon contract spending, according to data compiled by defense-software company Govini.

One hurdle for the startups—perhaps the most significant—is proving they can manufacture weapons as well or better than traditional defense companies.

The grinding war in Ukraine, now more than two years old, and the threat of a widening conflict in the Middle East, may test whether betting on the Pentagon’s focus on a potential conflict in Asia is a winning strategy for startups. The U.S. industrial base has been slow to produce artillery shells and other heavy weaponry that a war with Russia requires, while startups with technology that could potentially help Ukraine, like drones, have struggled to adapt to a rapidly shifting battlefield.

Meanwhile, venture-capital enthusiasts worry the U.S. is moving too slowly to fund the sort of weapons needed—and companies to build them—for a potential war with China. Michael Brown, a former Pentagon official who was involved in early efforts to work with Silicon Valley, says the U.S. government isn’t spending nearly enough to pay for weapons needed to fight in Asia.


“I fear we would look back and say, what time did we squander?” said Brown, now a partner at the venture firm Shield Capital. “Because we should be rebuilding our munition supply. We should be getting more vendors in the fight.”

A subterrene and other crazy ideas
The Pentagon is credited with helping to create Silicon Valley by plowing money into tech companies in the 1950s and ’60s, investing in electronics and buying microchips used in nuclear-missile guidance systems, satellites, and computers. That investment, says Paul Bracken, an emeritus professor of management and political science at Yale University, led the Defense Department to become, in effect, the “mother of all venture-capital firms.”


The Pentagon helped kick-start Silicon Valley in the 1950s and ’60s by investing in electronics and buying microchips. Photo: Orlando /Three Lions/Getty Images

But starting in the 1980s, Silicon Valley rode a massive wave of venture-capital investment in the commercial computer and software industries that overshadowed military work.

Interest in military work revived slowly. In 2015, Elon Musk settled a lawsuit with the U.S. Air Force that would pave the way for his rocket company, SpaceX, to compete in the military-launch market. That same year, the Pentagon opened a Silicon Valley outpost, called the Defense Innovation Unit Experimental, to work with tech startups.

The venture capitalists were initially reluctant, but Luckey had good timing and a compelling, if unusual, story. Luckey says he’s dreamed of starting a defense company since he was 7 years old, inspired by the anime character Seto Kaiba from “Yu-Gi-Oh,” who developed virtual-reality tech for videogames, ran a weapons maker, and traveled in a dragon-shaped jet fighter. 

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“I someday would love to fly on my own fighter jet shaped like a dragon that I have designed and built, wearing a VR headset to pilot,” Luckey said.

Luckey frequently quotes his fictional hero: “You said technology has limits. Wrong.” Luckey leaves off the rest of the line, which ends “…when you’re as brilliant as Seto Kaiba.”

Luckey followed closely in Kaiba’s footsteps. At 19, he was living in a camper trailer in his parents’ driveway in Long Beach, Calif., building virtual-reality headsets for videogamers.  In 2014, Facebook—now known as Meta Platforms—bought Luckey’s company, Oculus VR, making him a billionaire.




Components of Anduril’s sentry towers, about 300 of which have been installed along the U.S.-Mexico border to automatically detect incursions.

In 2016, at the height of the presidential campaign, Luckey, a longtime supporter of Donald Trump, donated to an anti-Hillary Clinton group. Months later, Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook’s CEO, fired him. Some people close to Luckey attribute the ouster to his political views, an explanation the company has denied. Regardless, it freed Luckey to start Anduril, just as venture firms were starting to show interest in the defense business.

One of Anduril’s early contracts was a deal worth up to $400 millon to help secure the southern and northern U.S. borders with sentry towers that can automatically detect incursions. The company says it now has about 300 of these towers installed along the border with Mexico. In 2022, it won a contract with Special Operations Command worth nearly $1 billion to build counterdrone systems.

Anduril executives are aiming higher, targeting the kind of multibillion-dollar weapons programs now dominated by established defense contractors. Earlier this year, it took a step into that league, scoring one of two contracts to develop uncrewed jet fighters for the Air Force.

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Luckey encourages even more ambitious pursuits, including in a freewheeling exchange on a company Slack channel called “Crazy Ideas.”

His own crazy idea: a weapon for underground warfare.

“The next warfighting domain is the subterranean domain,” Palmer said. “I’m talking about the full three-dimensional volume of at least the upper crust of the planet as a place that you can move through and fight in.”

To prepare for this possibility, Luckey has Anduril looking at something called a subterrene—essentially an underground submarine that tunnels through the earth using electricity or an onboard nuclear reactor. Luckey learned about this vehicle in technical concept papers from the Cold War he found online. The underground vehicle has never been built, and when it was studied in the past, was found to be prohibitively expensive and of questionable value to the military.

Even Anduril’s top executives acknowledge that this sort of project is far-fetched, but say it reflects the sort of unconventional thinking that makes Luckey successful.

Matthew Steckman, Anduril’s chief revenue officer, says the company’s work on the subterrene concept doesn’t cost much, but if it does pan out, it would be “really freaking cool.”


Deep pockets and an iron grip

Startups like Anduril largely focus on weapons to deter China, because the Pentagon has defined it as the primary threat, and because a war with Beijing, they argue, would require the kinds of weapons that tech companies build. China has moved forward more quickly than Russia with advanced military technology like hypersonic missiles and AI-controlled weapons.

But when Russia, which the Pentagon regards as a secondary threat, launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, a number of the new Silicon Valley startups rushed to help Kyiv. Palantir Technologies CEO Alex Karp traveled to Ukraine personally just months after the invasion. A number of American startups sent drones, including Anduril, which provided Ghost, a small autonomous aircraft.

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Most of those efforts failed to gain traction.

In Ukraine, American drones were frequently jammed, failed to fly or suffered other setbacks on the battlefield. Palantir, which makes software used for targeting, has yet to score any major contracts in Ukraine, and Anduril’s Ghost had difficulty coping with Russian jamming, according to people familiar with the matter. It took Anduril about a year to produce an improved drone.

Palantir, like Anduril, derives its name from “The Lord of the Rings,” and shares a common investor: Founders Fund, the venture firm launched by PayPal co-founder and libertarian firebrand Peter Thiel.

The problem with Silicon Valley’s attempts to field weapons in Ukraine is that startups had, for the most part, never deployed their technology into a war zone, said Andrey Liscovich, the head of the Ukraine Defense Fund, which raises money to help send drones and other equipment to Kyiv’s military forces. “They’re not close to the end users,” he said, “and they can’t really test things in comparable environments, unfortunately.”


Another challenge for the tech companies is that the Ukraine war is heavily dependent on the mass production of artillery and ammunition. In 2022, Pentagon acquisition chief Bill LaPlante lashed out at traditional arms companies for slow production and defense startups for focusing on technology that couldn’t be used anytime soon. “The tech bros aren’t helping us that much in Ukraine,” he said.

In a statement to The Wall Street Journal last year, LaPlante said that he was criticizing “aspirational, often elusive technology,” and he lauded companies, including Palantir and Anduril, that had delivered tech to the battlefield, as well as SpaceX, whose Starlink satellites have been critical for Ukraine’s military.

For the startups, proving they can mass-produce will be critical. Anduril on Thursday announced plans for a series of new factories that it said could produce weapons in the tens of thousands. Rival executives have said such plans won’t make supply-chain problems go away.

“We don’t shy away from competition,” Chris Kubasik, CEO of defense giant L3Harris Technologies, told investors earlier this year when asked about the challenge of Anduril to its rocket-motor business. Kubasik said new entrants still rely on the same set of suppliers, many of whom are struggling to meet demand.

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Anduril will also need to convince its investors that it can eventually win enough Pentagon business to support its valuation, which is currently at much higher multiples of revenue than traditional defense companies.

The $1.5 billion funding round that Anduril announced this past week values the company at $14 billion—around 28 times the approximately $500 million people familiar with the matter say was its revenue last year, a figure the company doesn’t disclose. By comparison, Lockheed Martin, the Pentagon’s top defense contractor, is currently valued at about $131 billion, slightly less than twice its annual revenue.

Therein lies the difficulty for startups like Anduril, which says it wants to go public in the next five years. The billions of private capital dollars flowing into defense are subsidizing R&D in anticipation of big payoffs. If those startups go public, the companies will face pressure from investors to minimize costs and maximize profits, cutting into their ability to fund their own R&D.

Asked how Anduril would maintain its ability to plow money into innovation once it is subject to some of the same market forces that large defense companies face, Luckey points to the role of founders like himself, and Musk: big personalities with deep pockets and an iron grip on their companies. They can bend companies to their wills, he said, even if their investors are pushing for faster returns.

“I want my investors to get a return, but I am clearly not doing this because I think it’s the best way for me to make money,” he said. “There’s way easier ways to make money than to drag it out of the government.”

Doug Cameron contributed to this article.


Startup Anduril Industries is shaking up the U.S. defense industry. Founded by Oculus creator Palmer Luckey, Anduril is building AI-powered, autonomous weapons systems that it says will create a more nimble and cost-effective military. Photo Illustration: Alexander Hotz/WSJ
Write to Sharon Weinberger at sharon.weinberger@wsj.com and Heather Somerville at heather.somerville@wsj.com



ccp

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Re: Military Science, Military Issues, and the Nature of War
« Reply #1385 on: August 10, 2024, 04:25:10 PM »
shucks

Anduril is private   :-(

I also recently read railgun weapons are a bust - they require too much power to work.

https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/us-navys-railgun-nightmare-has-just-begun-212205

palantir is a drone company
unfortunately, I did not buy into when I had a chance.

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What does UN military do?
« Reply #1386 on: August 11, 2024, 09:46:21 AM »

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« Last Edit: August 13, 2024, 08:16:26 PM by Crafty_Dog »



Crafty_Dog

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FO
« Reply #1390 on: August 24, 2024, 10:25:06 AM »


(4) MSC PLANS TO SIDELINE 13% OF THEIR FLEET: The Military Sealift Command (MSC) plans to sideline 17 ships of their 125-ship fleet due to manning. The goal is to move the crews of those 17 ships onto shore and other ships to rebalance the sea-shore rotation.
The Military Sealift Command is awaiting the Chief of Naval Operations’ approval.

Why It Matters: The MSC carries out critical missions such as underway replenishment, cable laying and repair, hospital ships, and submarine and special warfare support. All of these missions are potentially threatened with increased reliance on less capable allies or forfeiting mission areas with few ships like the hospital ships. – J.V.

(5) Global Rollup
The U.S. and India signed a Status of Supply Arrangement to provide each other with critical national defense resources, including buying industrial resources from each other to alleviate supply chain disruptions. The U.S. has similar arrangements with its closest regional allies, such as the U.K., Japan, Australia, and Canada.



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People that Hate You Want You to Enlist so They can Toss You Into a Meat Grider
« Reply #1394 on: August 28, 2024, 08:32:28 AM »
Kurt starkly spells it out:

What Is Happening in the Ukraine War Should Scare the Hell Out of Us

Kurt Schlichter
 
Aug 26, 2024

There is a lot to criticize about America’s current military – and I’ve criticized it – but there’s another problem no one seems to want to talk about. It’s scary as hell. The United States is not ready for the kind of war we are seeing played out in Ukraine, a peer-to-peer conventional fight that is rewriting the rules of what we thought war was supposed to be. And, with leadership in the White House sitting in a rocker staring slack-jawed at Matlock reruns, we are not in a position to fix what will mean defeat in our next real war.

This is not solely about wokeness and how the officer corps has embraced the ridiculous shibboleths of the progressive left regarding race, gender, and the climate scam, but wokeness relates to the problem that the Ukraine War has revealed. When the leadership is focused on ridiculous frivolities like “white nationalism” and trans idiocy, it is not integrating the massive changes to how we fight that we need to compete on a modern battlefield.

And we do need massive changes. The old wisdom is that the military always fights the last war. Now, we’re trying to fight the last two wars. We are trying to refight the conventional Cold War model that won the Gulf War while also fighting the counterinsurgencies of the Global War on Terror. What we are not preparing to fight is the kind of war we are seeing in Ukraine.

The Russo-Ukraine War is a test bed for new technologies overlaid over old styles of warfare, particularly the static, dug-in trench warfare of World War I. What is different? A lot. For one thing, electronic warfare (EW) is an enormous new factor. You know all those awesome precision-guided munitions we saw America use in Iraq and Afghanistan? We gave many of them to Ukraine. According to open source reports – I do not know anything secret and would not write about it if I did – the Russians, who are very good at this sort of thing, have figured out how to use EW to defeat them. Remember, GPS is based on radio waves, which can be jammed, spoofed, or otherwise messed with. A missile that misses is useless. Imagine America going into a fight with its limited or completely defeated precision strike capabilities. Yeah, scary, right?

That assumes we have the precision ammunition. We don’t necessarily. We are giving away much of it to Ukraine and Israel, as well as blowing it off slap-fighting the Houthis. There is not an endless supply of this stuff. It’s slow to build and expensive, and hey, those many millions of Third World peasants the Democrats invited into America are the Democrats’ priority. And how fast will we burn through them if we do get into a fight? For that matter, how fast will we burn through our dumb bombs and dumb artillery shells? Everyone wants our 155mm shells; how many do we have? It better be a lot, because that stuff goes fast. People have no conception of how fast we would burn down our ammo stocks in a real war. Think days, not weeks or months.

Here’s what no one talks about because it’s not exciting or cool – America fights with logistics. We overwhelm the enemy with stuff, including stuff that goes “Boom!” In the Gulf War, we moved a city to the middle of the desert, then moved it forward in an attack. But we can’t do that today. Our military-industrial base has withered. The arsenal of democracy has become the gun-safe of democracy. We cannot just spin up to rearm once the next war – which is coming – starts. That goes for artillery tubes, tanks, planes, and ships – the Chinese Navy is now bigger than ours and growing exponentially faster. Maybe their stuff is not as good as ours ship-to-ship – though with the Chinese spies here in America running rampant stealing our secrets because the FBI is busy arresting grandmas for praying at abortion mills, their ships probably are our ships – but the enemy has something we do not have. It’s “quantity.”

The fighting in Ukraine diverges massively from how we train to fight. Look at the drone factor. Both the Russians and the Ukrainians are using drones as precision weapons – the web is full of videos of drones taking out tanks, fortifications, and individual soldiers. Our enemies know about it. Hamas used drones to take our IDF defenses on October 7th. Our bases in the Middle East are getting hit with cheap drones; we have taken dead and wounded from them. We’re not droning up like the enemy; we’re not prepared to defend against the swarms of them that are coming.

The Ukrainian and Russians are innovating, adapting, and improvising, finding new solutions to new problems. Our ossified military, which once relied on American ingenuity to win, cannot do that. At the procurement level, our methods of buying new weapons are guaranteed to provide the wrong system for too much money far too late. At the soldier level, innovation will be discouraged by a risk-averse officer corps with warfighting as its last priority. Do you think US troops are going to be able to obtain a bunch of cheap drones and make them into tank killers themselves without going through some arduous process? They innovated in Ukraine, though. Our future foe will be nimble, agile, and run circles around our bureaucracy.

Finally, the disaster in Ukraine is also highlighting another problem – casualties. Right now, we have the worst recruiting crisis in half a century, largely because the military has wholeheartedly allied itself with the enemies of the traditional Americans who once made up our military. Straight, white, Christian – you are the problem, and it is no secret that you are unwanted and that you will be actively discriminated against in favor of people with approved immutable characteristics. Of course, the potential recruits know it – we vets are warning them away from military service. They refuse to enlist. Why would they? To protect “allies” who lock people up for speaking freely? Die protecting Europe’s dictatorships that arrest people for dissent from the Russian dictatorship that arrests people for dissent? Serve under a leadership that hates you and hasn’t unequivocally won a major war in 30 years?

No thanks. Hard pass. That’s what happens when you have a military that is less General George Patton than Command Sergeant Major (sic) Tim Walz.

But, beyond the fact that the current administrations’ flunkies have made it perfectly clear that traditional recruits are unwanted and that their lives will be squandered, is what is happening in Ukraine. Those casualties are astonishing, and if we get into a real war, ours will be too. Think dozens or hundreds of dead a week, every week. Maybe more – a US Navy aircraft carrier has 5,000 sailors, and the Chinese plan to take ours out. Who wants to die in another poorly thought-out and unnecessary adventure pushed by people whose commitment to the fight is not blood but a Ukrainian flag in their username? After Kabul – for which no one was ever fired – does anyone imagine that potential troops do not understand that to the progressive ruling elite, their lives are meaningless?

We have learned nothing from the Ukrainian-Russian War and apparently nothing from any of the other conflicts and potential conflicts going on around the globe. Unless we change course it will catch up with us, but do you think Kamala Harris will do that? Do you think the thought of being commander-in-chief has ever crossed her Chardonnay-addled mind? Did her joy speech about how half of Americans are racist monsters who hate democracy and must be suppressed give you confidence? She’s there for the communism and the bratness.

When our enemies strike, taking advantage of the lessons of Ukraine  – and her weakness and incompetence will make that inevitable – our failed military is going to lose hard. You should be scared, but there is no way you are scared enough.

https://townhall.com/columnists/kurtschlichter/2024/08/26/what-is-happening-in-the-ukraine-war-should-scare-the-hell-out-of-us-n2643880

ccp

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Re: Military Science, Military Issues, and the Nature of War
« Reply #1395 on: August 28, 2024, 11:25:22 AM »
"They also believe they control the military through years of DEI."

that has been the goal.

no chance to have a winning fight against the counter revolution w/o the military on our side.

the only thing we control is the SCOTUS and a very slim threat majority in Congress

all other levers of US society controlled by them.

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The Problem of Resetoring Maneuver in Contemporary War
« Reply #1396 on: August 28, 2024, 11:41:10 AM »
This delves deep.  A very serious read.

understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Ukraine and the Problem of Restoring Maneuver in Contemporary War_final.pdf

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Re: The Problem of Resetoring Maneuver in Contemporary War
« Reply #1397 on: August 28, 2024, 01:36:28 PM »
This delves deep.  A very serious read.

understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Ukraine and the Problem of Restoring Maneuver in Contemporary War_final.pdf
I believe this is the link:
https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Ukraine%20and%20the%20Problem%20of%20Restoring%20Maneuver%20in%20Contemporary%20War_final.pdf

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Re: Military Science, Military Issues, and the Nature of War
« Reply #1398 on: August 28, 2024, 06:29:37 PM »
 8-)