What's Ahead for Belarus-Russia Integration?
11 MIN READMar 13, 2023 | 21:53 GMT
Russian President Vladimir Putin (right) meets with his Belarusian counterpart Alexander Lukashenko in Sochi, Russia, on Sept. 26, 2022.
Russian President Vladimir Putin (right) meets with his Belarusian counterpart Alexander Lukashenko in Sochi, Russia, on Sept. 26, 2022.
(GAVRIIL GRIGOROV/SPUTNIK/AFP via Getty Images)
Russia's influence over Belarus will likely grow in the coming years, although Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko will probably seek to slow Moscow's integration efforts to preserve his place in power. On Feb. 17, Lukashenko met his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin in Moscow to discuss the two countries' strategic integration within the Union State, which Minsk defines as a confederation of states and Moscow views as a more binding federation. Then on Feb. 20, investigative journalists from numerous Western media outlets reported that they had obtained a 2021 internal strategy document detailing the Kremlin's plan to use the Union State to take ''full control'' of — or even ''absorb'' — Belarus by 2030. The document, allegedly prepared by Russia's security agencies, military and other government bodies, outlines how Russia will use Union State integration to manage Belarus' foreign policy in the interests of Russia, increase the Russian military's presence on Belarusian territory, ensure the supremacy of the Russian language over the Belarusian language, and give Belarusians Russian citizenship. If confirmed, the moves outlined in the report would align with Russia's policy toward Belarus since the Union State's inception in 1999.
Russia and Belarus agreed to 28 integration programs in their 2021-2023 Union State agreement. At a press conference after his talks with Putin on Feb. 17, Lukashenko claimed that the two countries had completed ''about 80%'' of the programs focused on deepening economic integration, including ''key tasks in the tax and customs spheres.'' But Lukashenko noted that the ''measures in the humanitarian sphere,'' which relate to education and media, have yet to be implemented.
On Feb. 25, Svetlana Tikhanovskaya — the now exiled Belarusian opposition leader who opposed Lukashenko in the 2020 presidential election — said that the leaked strategy document contained no new information, and reflects ''the policy that Russia has been pursuing in Belarus for a long time, since the end of the 18th century.'' Tikhanovskaya added that it is ''expressed as a fight against our national language, symbols, culture, history, and instead in glorifying everything Russian.'' Therefore, she concluded, everything related to the Union State is a ''threat to the sovereignty of Belarus.''
Competing Visions of the Union State
Lukashenko and former Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed the Union Treaty in December 1999, less than a month before the latter's sudden resignation. The treaty was formed on the basis of preexisting treaties from 1995 that foresaw the creation of a customs union between Belarus and Russia. From the beginning, Lukashenko and Yeltsin had competing objectives for integration. Yeltsin's administration sought to ensure that Belarus would remain a reliable ''buffer'' between Russia and the West. At the time, Belarus was the only former Soviet state willing to engage in much deeper integration beyond the relatively limited mandates of the Commonwealth of Independent States and Collective Security Treaty Organization. As a Slavic nation, Belarus was also an easy and ideologically attractive target. By creating a common legislature, flag, coat of arms, anthem, constitution, army, citizenship and currency with Belarus, Russia ultimately hoped to attract others to join the Union State (namely Ukraine and Kazakhstan), though this never happened. Lukashenko, for his part, likely hoped that signing the Union Treaty would tie his otherwise weak economy to the stronger Russian one, particularly as Belarus' European neighbors were already limiting cooperation amid the president's increasingly brutal crackdowns on dissent in the mid-1990s. Lukashenko also reportedly hoped that him winding up in the hypothetical position of head of the Union State would enable him to effectively succeed the already ailing Yeltsin as Russia's de facto leader, although Putin's rise prevented that goal from being realized. Ultimately, the Union Treaty is ambiguous regarding the fundamental question of whether the Union State is, as favored by Minsk, a supranational confederation of states, or, as Moscow seeks, a regular federation or an EU-style union.
While in the past Lukashenko has used his skepticism regarding integration with Russia to bolster his domestic popularity, his government's growing international isolation and economic reliance on Russia are making it difficult to resist further integration. The issue of Union State integration had been largely stagnant since the late 2000s. But in 2019, it suddenly resurfaced amid a flurry of meetings between Russian and Belarusian leaders, prompting Belarusians to take to the streets in Minsk to protest against closer ties with Moscow. In February 2020, Lukashenko once again put the topic on pause by forcefully rejecting the idea and asserting that Russia did not seek to integrate with Belarus, but ''absorb'' it — something he would ''never'' allow. Lukashenko hoped this position would frame him as the guarantor of Belarus' sovereignty ahead of the country's August 2020 presidential election. But when the election did not go according to plan and mass protests swept Belarus, Moscow didn't rush to Lukashenko's aid. Eventually, Lukashenko did crush the protest movement without overt Russian intervention. However, Belarus' total reliance on Russia for external credit forced Lukashenko to agree in September 2021 to 28 ''Union State programs'' intended to unify Russia's and Belarus' policies, legislation and regulations in nearly all key policy areas related to the economy. In this way, Russia hoped to cement its influence in Belarus through bureaucratic alignment.
Lukashenko likely permitted Tikhanovskaya to participate in the 2020 presidential election to give it a veneer of competition and legitimacy compared with the country's previous ones, thereby enticing Europe to continue working with his regime. Instead, the election resulted in mass protests and expanded EU sanctions amid widespread claims of fraud.
This past January, Lukashenko held a cabinet meeting on integration with Russia and the implementation of programs of the Union State. During the meeting, he assured his cabinet members that ''the loss of some part'' of Belarus' sovereignty remained ''out of the question,'' once again suggesting the potential threat that Union State integration posed to Belarusian sovereignty.
Given Belarus' already deep economic reliance on Russia, the Kremlin's future aspirations for integration will likely focus on social and institutional issues. All the Union State programs authorized for 2021-2023 primarily pertain to greater economic alignment; in addition to steps such as harmonized monetary and tariff policy formalized in 2022, by the end of 2023, Russia and Belarus are supposed to agree to a common gas market, unified consumer protection rules and unified nuclear energy policy. This will bring Belarus' economic integration with Russia to near completion, with Russia already serving as the country's main trading partner. Starting this year Moscow will thus likely seek to deepen integration with Minsk in spheres increasingly unrelated to the economy. To this end, the September 2021 agreement specifically acknowledges that the two sides will ''intensify efforts to deepen cooperation in the fields of education, healthcare, science, and culture.'' Russia probably believes that it can use Union State integration to make itself a vital part of Belarus' media landscape, economy, legal and regulatory spheres to the point where Belarusian society would not be able to function normally without it. This would then reduce the risk of Belarusians eventually pushing for a more pro-Western leader by effectively making it impossible to uproot Russian influence in Belarus. Lukashenko, however, will remain loath to allow Russia such a greater role in his country's society and institutions, which would also risk further blurring the lines between Belarusian and Russian identity.
Russia accounted for 41.1% of Belarus' exports and 56.6% of its imports in 2021. The countries' mutual trade turnover rose 15% in 2022 in the aftermath of Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
In the coming years, Lukashenko's priority will be the survival of his regime, which will see his government selectively accelerate or delay particular integration policies. Lukashenko's primary goal is to maintain maximal control of Belarus for himself and his inner circle, rather than among political leaders and bureaucrats in Moscow. The integration to which Lukashenko has agreed up to this point serves this purpose: the country's heavily sanctioned economy can only continue to function thanks to support provided by Moscow. Lukashenko likely believes that the regulatory alignment with Russia that he's so far overseen will help his government maintain economic stability by outsourcing bureaucracy to Moscow and improving efficiency. But Lukashenko probably views anything other than further economic and some military integration as a threat to his rule, as Russian control over the Belarusian education system, media, security and defense spheres could lead Moscow to conclude that Lukashenko is expendable and easily replaced by an even more pro-Russian leader. However, stonewalling all integration with Russia would risk collapsing the Belarusian economy and turn Moscow sharply against Lukashenko. This will likely compel the Belarusian president to allow slow integration in the economic, legal and regulatory spheres, which he believes would be less politically risky. To get Moscow on board with this approach, Lukashenko will claim that quicker integration is unpopular in Belarus, risks undermining his regime and could inadvertently unnecessarily burden Russia — arguments Moscow will accept, for now.
Lukashenko allowed his country to be used as the primary staging ground for Russia's invasion of Ukraine, under the pretext of the Union State military exercise ''Allied Resolve 2022.'' But Russia's current military contingent in Belarus is estimated at around 15,000 troops — a number still insufficient to pose an immediate threat to Lukashenko's rule, or to Ukraine, as several thousand more Russian security personnel would likely be needed to forcefully oust the Belarusian government or launch an attack on Ukraine from Belarus.
On Nov. 26, Belarusian Foreign Minister Vladimir Makei died under sudden and mysterious circumstances at the age of 64. Makei was one of the main architects of Belarus' previous foreign policy of balancing Russia and the West. He had also advocated, even since Russia's initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014, for a ''friendly approach'' to Ukraine and, in the lead-up to Russia's February 2022 invasion, stressed that no attack on the country would be launched from Belarusian territory.
Lukashenko will also seek to deepen his regime's ties with China as a way to counter Russia's near-total control over Belarus' economy. On March 1, Lukashenko traveled to China for meetings with high-ranking Chinese officials, including President Xi Jinping. During his visit, Lukashenko signed documents to increase Belarusian-Chinese cooperation in numerous areas, including trade, industry, agriculture, science and technology, health, tourism and sports. Particular emphasis was placed on plans to create a free trade and investment zone in Belarus for Chinese businesses later this year. Lukashenko's recent trip to Beijing aligns with his efforts to use China as a counterweight to Russia's growing economic influence. As Lukashenko is now even less capable of returning to his previous strategy of seeking economic benefits from both Russia and the West due to the latter's increasing sanctions on his regime, closer ties with Beijing have become critical in keeping his government from becoming totally reliant on Russia. Russia, for its part, would much prefer Minsk cozying up with China, its main strategic partner, over its adversaries in the West. Indeed, while Moscow seeks to ultimately secure total control over Belarus, deeper ties between Minsk and Beijing could serve to its benefit in the near term amid recent reports that China is ''strongly considering'' sending Russia lethal aid in Ukraine. Greater Chinese production of goods in Belarus and transit through the country to Europe would provide a clear avenue for Belarus to eventually transfer Chinese weapons to Russia, either after producing weapons domestically with Chinese support or claiming that it did. With no near end in sight to the war in Ukraine, speculation that China may use military-technical cooperation with Belarus as a way to provide military support to Russia will thus likely only grow in tandem with Beijing and Minsk's deepening bilateral ties.
Despite Lukashenko's efforts to slow the integration process, Russia's grip on Belarus will likely tighten in the years ahead. Unless Russia suffers a sudden and resounding defeat in Ukraine that triggers a drastic regime change in Moscow (which seems improbable at this point), Russia will continue its efforts to absorb Belarus, which Moscow sees as essential to protecting itself from potential Western aggression. In addition, the pro-democracy movement in Belarus that staged the massive 2020 protests is unlikely to pose a credible threat to Lukashenko's rule in the foreseeable future. The Belarusian opposition has not conducted any major protest activities in the past year and has been largely forced underground due to the severe risks involved with critiquing the Lukashenko regime or integration with Russia. Therefore, the Kremlin is likely confident in its ability to slowly squeeze Minsk into submission in the coming years without formal annexation or the use of force, which could cause instability and jeopardize the otherwise favorable trajectory of Russian control over Belarus. Therefore, annexation will instead likely remain a backup option for if something goes wrong.
On March 6, a Minsk court sentenced Belarusian opposition leaders Svetlana Tikhanovskaya and Pavel Latushko in absentia to 15 and 18 years in prison, respectively.
