Russia/US-- Europe

[G M]

Ummm , , , none of which applies to anything Stratfor has ever said.

In a nearby thread, you spoke of thinking like a gambler-- and gamblers "think in bets"-- they realize there is not only one possible outcome.

Sttratfor/RANE are big on parroting the party line.

[Crafty_Dog]

Nice try at evading the point.

Strat/RANE has not ever said anything like this "Did Putin get cancer again? Fall down the stairs and Biden his pants?" 

[G M]

Nice try at evading the point.

Strat/RANE has not ever said anything like this "Did Putin get cancer again? Fall down the stairs and Biden his pants?"

True.

[Crafty_Dog]

Thank you.

[Crafty_Dog]

Out of such blusters and such posturing escalations can come , , ,

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/head-of-rt-calls-for-lindsey-graham-s-assassination-after-edited-video/ar-AA1bOE7G?ocid=msedgntp&cvid=33312f15b4444c3fa10044969d0650b1&ei=10

[G M]

Definite FAFO territory. And the rest of us will be drug in.

Out of such blusters and such posturing escalations can come , , ,

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/head-of-rt-calls-for-lindsey-graham-s-assassination-after-edited-video/ar-AA1bOE7G?ocid=msedgntp&cvid=33312f15b4444c3fa10044969d0650b1&ei=10

[G M]

https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/latest-headlines-digest-the-wests

[G M]

https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/latest-headlines-digest-the-wests

https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/col-douglas-macgregor-bakhmut-catastrophe-ukraine-f-16s-wont-make-difference

[Crafty_Dog]

Poland Hardens Its Defenses Against Russia
But leaders in Warsaw worry about Western European weakness and U.S. staying power.
By Jillian Kay MelchiorFollow
May 30, 2023 3:38 pm ET





Russia’s invasion of Ukraine left Poland more vulnerable. Most of the country’s northern and eastern borders—some 730 miles—is adjacent to Ukraine, Belarus (a client of Moscow) or Russia itself (the exclave of Kaliningrad). Warsaw has steeply increased defense spending to strengthen its military.

But leaders here worry whether the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is up to the task. “We need to adjust our security policy toward this challenge,” Radoslaw Fogiel, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the lower house of Poland’s Parliament, says of the alliance. He and his colleagues express concern about Western Europe’s military weakness and America’s staying power.

Since 1994 Alexander Lukashenko has ruled Belarus, but demonstrations erupted after the rigged presidential election in 2020. Mr. Lukashenko needed Mr. Putin’s help to quell the protests, and Russia’s president hasn’t let him forget the favor. Mr. Lukashenko is like an ocean swimmer fighting a deadly undertow; he’s frantically paddling, but Mr. Fogiel wonders “if he didn’t cross the point of no return already.”



In April Mr. Putin said a 28-point plan for integrating Russia and Belarus is 74% complete and “we will certainly continue this effort without slowing down.” He touted the two countries’ collaborations on energy and electricity, cultural issues, economics, security and defense.

That last item has Poland particularly alarmed. This month Moscow and Minsk signed an agreement to deploy tactical nuclear weapons to a storage facility in Belarus. Last month Belarus’s Defense Ministry reported that the country’s troops had finished training to use tactical nukes. Mr. Putin has moved S-400 surface-to-air and Iskander short-range missile systems to Belarus and stationed thousands of Russian troops there under the guise of training. Mr. Lukashenko hasn’t dispatched Belarusian troops to Ukraine, but Russian tanks rolled from Belarus toward Kyiv in February 2022, and the Russians have fired missiles at Ukraine from Belarusian soil.

As the Kremlin reaches westward in Ukraine and Belarus, Poland aims to strengthen its deterrence and defense. Last year lawmakers passed a bill mandating a minimum of 3% of gross domestic product for defense spending. This year military spending will be closer to 4%, at around 98 billion zloty, or more than $23 billion, plus up to some $11 billion more this year from a separate Armed Forces Support Fund. Poland has been buying tens of billions of dollars of military equipment from the U.S., the U.K. and South Korea.

Contrast Poland’s hardening of its defenses with Western Europe. Germany and France were among the countries that failed last year to reach NATO’s benchmark of spending at least 2% of GDP on defense, according to the alliance’s recent estimates. Popular Mechanics defense reporter Kyle Mizokami forecasts that Poland is now on track to have “more tanks than the U.K., Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Italy combined” by 2030. Wladyslaw Teofil Bartoszewski, deputy chairman of the lower house’s Foreign Affairs Committee, says Poland would like to buy more German Leopard tanks, but Berlin couldn’t deliver them before 2027: “They do not have the industrial capacity.”

Europe’s defense companies won’t ramp up manufacturing unless they’re confident of long-term increases in military spending. A commitment now may prove a bargain. “If we are losing Ukraine, which is absolutely out of my imagination, can you imagine our investments when the Russian army will be, you know, in Belarus and Brest and Lviv?” Gen. Rajmund T. Andrzejczak, Poland’s highest-ranking officer, said at a foreign-policy and defense conference in Warsaw in May. (Brest, Belarus, and Lviv, Ukraine, are near the Polish border.)

Warsaw is uneasy about America’s long-term commitment to the region. Mr. Bartoszewski criticizes the Western European attitude that “we don’t have to spend the money because [America] will defend us. . . . Imagine a President DeSantis comes and says: ‘No. I won’t.’ ”

Bogdan Klich, a former defense minister who is now chairman of the Polish Senate’s Committee on Foreign Affairs and the European Union, says that despite Ukraine’s bipartisan support in the U.S., “everything depends on who is the president.” He fears a second Trump administration would undermine NATO’s political and military unity.

Mr. Bartoszewski suggests that the Biden administration’s “disgraceful evacuation of the American soldiers from Afghanistan” helped convince Mr. Putin that he could invade Ukraine without serious consequences. Had the U.S. failed to support Ukraine, China might have concluded that the Americans wouldn’t defend Taiwan either. “America, by showing strength in Europe, helps American interests in the Pacific,” he says.

“If the U.S. wants Europe to be united in whatever happens in the struggle with China we cannot afford ourselves to have a threat in our backyard,” says Mr. Fogiel. The war in Ukraine is “a real opportunity to contain, to defeat Russia, for a very small percent of our defense budget, with no American presence on the ground.” For the U.S., in short, it’s “a bargain.” For Poland, it’s an urgent necessity.

Ms. Melchior is a London-based member of the Journal editorial board.

[Crafty_Dog]

Ruling the skies. NATO started Air Defender 23, the largest air force exercise in the alliance’s history. More than 20 countries, 10,000 personnel and about 250 aircraft will launch from bases in Germany, the Netherlands and the Czech Republic. Japan and NATO-aspirant Sweden are among the attendees. The exercise ends on June 23.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://babel.ua/en/news/95104-the-us-senate-blocks-the-sale-of-himars-batteries-to-hungary-because-it-does-not-approve-of-sweden-joining-nato?fbclid=IwAR28DHsLkmHgmUW1jPOtTNCvs_qUGnTJSg7jn7ZocnfCV48tLClSvWlhgto

[Crafty_Dog]

Poland Is Set for a Turbulent Pre-Election Period
11 MIN READJun 15, 2023 | 17:07 GMT





People wave EU and Polish flags during an anti-government rally organized by the opposition in Warsaw, Poland, on June 4, 2023.
People wave EU and Polish flags during an anti-government rally organized by the opposition in Warsaw, Poland, on June 4, 2023.

(WOJTEK RADWANSKI/AFP via Getty Images)

Poland's government will implement controversial policies to disrupt the opposition ahead of a tight election in October, but pressure from the European Union and especially the United States will likely prevent Warsaw from taking an overly authoritarian turn. On May 29, Polish President Andrzej Duda signed into law a controversial bill that establishes a new special parliamentary panel with special powers to investigate Russian influence in the country. The bill has triggered an uproar at home and abroad, with critics arguing that the government could use the panel to ban opposition figures from running in Poland's general election later this year. In response to the backlash, Duda proposed amendments on June 2 that would make it easier to appeal the panel's verdicts, as well as prevent the special commission from penalizing those with alleged links to Russia (like banning them from office). But the changes have done little to ease people's concerns, with roughly 500,000 protesters taking to the streets of Warsaw on June 4 to voice their anger over the bill. On June 7, the European Commission also opened an infringement proceeding requesting Poland to block the law.

The Polish general election will see the ruling nationalist Law and Justice (PiS) party compete against a host of opposition parties led by former prime minister Donald Tusk. According to Polish law, the election must take place on or before Nov. 11.
The bill grants the new parliamentary panel extensive powers to investigate actions taken ''under Russian influence'' from 2007-22. It also states that the panel's members will be chosen by the country's legislature, where Duda's ruling PiS party enjoys a narrow majority. The lower house of Poland's parliament narrowly approved the bill on May 27, overturning a previous rejection in the upper house.
Under the new changes proposed by Duda, the special commission would only be able to issue recommendations regarding individuals it found to have acted under Russian influence.
A May 29 poll showed 61% of Poles found the new law to be ''a pre-election ploy to discredit political opponents.''
In response to the bill being signed into law, the U.S. State Department issued a statement on May 29 expressing concern that the new Polish parliamentary panel ''could be used to block the candidacy of opposition politicians without due process'' and therefore ''interfere with Poland's free and fair elections.'' Shortly after, the European Commission released a similar statement and threatened to take legal action against the law, which it did on June 7.
The Polish government's decision to set up a panel to investigate opposition figures comes against the backdrop of the ruling party's declining popularity. Since taking control of the Polish government in 2015, the PiS has consolidated its grip on power by expanding its influence over the country's media and judiciary, while simultaneously imposing generous subsidies and welfare policies (including a popular child benefit program) to increase popular support. This has put Warsaw on a collision course with Brussels by weakening basic democratic values and the rule of law in the country, which has seen the European Commission impose record fines on Poland and withhold billions of euros of post-pandemic recovery funds and cohesion funds earmarked for the country. Warsaw's standoff with Brussels has fueled tensions both within the PiS, as well as between the ruling party and its main junior coalition partner (the far-right and eurosceptic United Poland party), over whether to backtrack on controversial reforms to unlock EU funds. And this — combined with the government's perceived mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic, unpopular anti-abortion laws in 2020, and rampant inflation brought on by Russia's ongoing war in neighboring Ukraine — have contributed to the PiS's sliding polling numbers in recent years.

The PiS remains the most popular party in Poland, but the once significant gap between the ruling party and opposition parties has steadily eroded in recent years. The PiS is currently polling at about 35%, compared with about 47% in April 2020.
The latest controversy surrounding the government's move to establish a parliamentary panel tasked with ''combating Russian influence'' has helped further galvanize support for the opposition coalition led by Tusk's Civic Platform (PO) party, which is now polling just a few points behind the PiS. Support for the PO party reached 31% in a June 5 Kantar poll (up from about 20% in April 2020); the parties in the PO-led coalition are currently polling at a combined 41%.
In the hopes of shoring up support, the Polish government on May 14 announced a 60% increase in monthly child subsidies from next year (boosting the ''500+'' social benefit program that was crucial in helping the PiS being elected in 2015), though this failed to translate into any meaningful bump in the ruling party's polls.
The EU-Poland Standoff on Judicial Reforms

In 2018, Poland created a controversial disciplinary chamber that supervises the work of judges and prosecutors as a part of broader judicial reforms. The European Union has argued the chamber undermines the independence of Poland's judiciary by enabling the government to pressure judges. In July 2021, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ordered Poland to abolish the chamber, which Warsaw refused to do. The CJEU then imposed a daily 1 million euro fine on Poland for failing to comply with its order, which was reduced to 500,000 euros per day in April 2023 after the body was replaced with a ''chamber of professional responsibility.'' As Poland is yet to pay its fines, the European Commission has decided to withhold 360 million euros worth of EU funds earmarked for Poland. In addition, Brussels has also suspended about 35 billion euros worth of COVID-19 recovery funds destined for the country, as well as the transfer of 76.5 billion euros worth of funds under the 2021-27 EU budget, over Warsaw's failure to roll back recent judiciary reforms and reinstate dismissed judges.

The PiS-led government will promise further spending increases and maintain a confrontational stance within the European Union, while using Russia to discredit the opposition ahead of a tight general election later in the year. With its prospects for being re-elected for a third term uncertain, PiS and its allies will increase efforts to gain a greater lead over the opposition. The government will attempt to consolidate its base through financial promises and appeals to traditional values, while retaining a foreign policy aimed at presenting itself as the defender of Polish sovereignty. In the lead-up to the general election, this will see Warsaw maintain its hawkish stance against Russia, highlighting Poland's central role in the Western alliance with Ukraine. But it will also see the Polish government take an even more confrontational and uncompromising stance against the European Union, making a resolution to Warsaw's long-standing dispute with Brussels over rule of law violations all the more unlikely ahead of the vote. In addition, the PiS-led government will seek to undermine support for opposition candidates by suggesting they have connections to the Kremlin, as evidenced by its move to establish a special commission tasked with rooting out Russian influence prior to the 2023 election. While Duda's proposed amendments to the legislation would effectively remove the new body's capacity to prevent officials from seeking office, the government will likely still use the commission as a political tool to discredit the opposition and stigmatize key candidates ahead of the election, particularly Tusk.

Poland has emerged as a key member of the Western alliance formed in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The Eastern European country is Ukraine's third-largest donor and military supplier, behind only the United States and the United Kingdom (which are comparatively much wealthier nations). Poland has also hosted more than 3.5 million refugees from neighboring Ukraine since the start of the war in February 2022.
Ahead of the 2023 general election, Polish Prime Minister Jaroslaw Kaczynski has so far promised to increase childcare benefits to 500 zlotys ($200) per month, which would cost the state about $15 billion per year (or roughly 10% of the government budget). The government has also promised to provide free medicine for children and senior citizens, and to grant free access to highways and expressways across the country.
But pressure from the United States — which Poland depends on for crucial military, economic and energy support — will limit Warsaw's room for action against the opposition ahead of the election. Polish politics will become increasingly tense in the coming months as the government seeks to disrupt the opposition, which in response will frame the upcoming general election as a battle for democracy and rally its supporters to stage mass demonstrations against any attempt from Duda's government and his PiS to smear their political challengers. Against this backdrop, international pressure (particularly from the United States) will somewhat limit the government's ability to repress its opponents in the lead-up to the election. Warsaw will likely maintain a confrontational approach with Brussels as a way to showcase strength domestically, even at the cost of further delaying the disbursement of pandemic recovery funds. But compared with the European Union, the United States has considerably more leverage at its disposal to contain the PiS's antidemocratic tendencies, thanks to Washington's deep economic, military and energy ties with Warsaw. With approximately 10,000 U.S. armed forces currently stationed in Poland, Warsaw sees its close security partnership with Washington as essential in deterring a possible Russian invasion, especially as the war in neighboring Ukraine rages on with no near end in sight. Imports of U.S. liquified natural gas (LNG) over the past year have also been pivotal in reducing Poland's reliance on Russian gas supplies — another key strategic objective of the Polish government. If the Polish government takes drastic measures against political opponents that could see the country become more decisively authoritarian, the United States could threaten to cut or scale back the crucial support it currently provides to the country. To avoid such a scenario, Warsaw will thus likely seek to avoid taking action that could excessively undermine Poland's democratic credentials ahead of the election.

In 2020, the United States agreed to install a permanent military presence in Poland through an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). The U.S. military is currently building an Aegis Ashore ballistic missile defense facility in the country as well. Other U.S. assets in Poland include an Armored Brigade Combat Team, a Combat Aviation Brigade, a Combat Sustainment Support Battalion, and a hub for U.S. Air Force drone operations. Poland, which increased its defense budget to 4% of GDP in 2023, is also scheduled to receive new U.S. deliveries of key military equipment, including 250 M1A2 Abrams tanks, 18 HIMARS rocket artillery systems, 32 F-35 stealth fighter-bombers, MQ-9 Reaper ground-attack drones, and 800 AGM-114R2 Hellfire air-to-ground missiles.
The United States replaced Russia as Poland's top LNG supplier in 2023. Washington and Warsaw are also collaborating to build modern U.S. nuclear power plants in Poland.
A further deterioration in the rule of law in Poland will increase socio-political tensions in the country and exacerbate tensions with the European Union, further delaying EU funds that will undermine economic growth, while increased public spending will put upward pressure on inflation. The government's expansionary fiscal policies will amplify inflationary pressures in Poland, thus prolonging the cost-of-living crisis in the country as high consumer prices continue to erode citizens' purchasing power. Moreover, the government's continued stand-off with the European Union over rule of law issues means EU funding will most likely remain frozen for Poland in the coming months. This will weaken economic growth and undermine the investment outlook in the country, while also increasing borrowing costs for the government as Warsaw tries to make up for missing EU funds with public spending amid higher interest rates. Additionally, Warsaw will continue to oppose EU climate laws while attempting to block the European Union's recently agreed migration and asylum pact in order to boost its popularity at home, which will further exacerbate relations with the bloc even if it does not manage to stall legislation. Finally, while eventual responses from opposition parties to any attempt from the government to suppress political dissent will largely remain peaceful, rising socio-political tensions could trigger waves of social unrest in the country, causing disruptions and possibly escalating into sporadic episodes of violence.

Poland has one of the highest inflation rates in the European Union (13% year-on-year as of May 2023). The country's core inflation rate — which excludes more volatile energy and food prices — remained at a staggering 12.2% year-on-year as of April. Although falling, inflation in Poland is still set to remain high due to the tight labor market (as evidenced by the country's record-low unemployment), minimum wage hikes, and the government's pre-election expansionary fiscal policies. Poland's inflation rate is expected to be the highest in the European Union next year, with the European Commission projecting a 6% average inflation rate in 2024.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/senior-russian-official-putin-has-green-light-sever-undersea-commo-cables?utm_source=&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=1581

[G M]

https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/senior-russian-official-putin-has-green-light-sever-undersea-commo-cables?utm_source=&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=1581

I think I pointed out a long time ago about the foolishness of fcuking around with the world’s largest nuclear power. It’s very different from playing whack-a-mole with haji in Durka-durka-Stan.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.eurasiareview.com/17062023-nato-ukraine-defense-council-to-be-established/?fbclid=IwAR0RmwnLIhfLUgM2G69BBJUgPpDpREWd0fQEJxLZfZXR4fhI6srJ4ZYI-9U


https://l.facebook.com/l.php?u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.polskieradio.pl%2F395%2F9766%2FArtykul%2F3190795%2Cpolish-lawmakers-pass-resolution-in-support-of-ukraine%25E2%2580%2599s-nato-bid%3Ffbclid%3DIwAR3IkFw9yvDArMzOLVUGlv-ojFrjTHlMMTGnNl8RGce60pcWeAWXUrYHxiM&h=AT0Huv1AzzSUJh5ecKGMnzXRO879Bsbhf-d3Db4OUW6hN1KbED6mfT5ryG_C7bQTYwIeYJecc7idIiRnlnpCRD27GvDLcepVGinQ7RkxOm28mHc8-ng-4ULlHDX_KKBPuA&__tn__=%2CmH-R&c[0]=AT30MdrXJhClVImJP1GmNBDeCI36maUYIX3127hC3udIxXoVGHz-_NnnG_rBqg-Id5A1A-FMPj2CTCmYB8Q9cSGr-nfRdJ6EBGhkacC9XPDso2YAZUSaajFjhVQzBTkrRg_dSEmElLoMvAFFMqVweZTDZvWrxbzeI5nD561Q8a-_gw14pBJtpN43f3Tf9t-bL_xIKymSH8SzZ8vRtSTjZw

[G M]

https://www.eurasiareview.com/17062023-nato-ukraine-defense-council-to-be-established/?fbclid=IwAR0RmwnLIhfLUgM2G69BBJUgPpDpREWd0fQEJxLZfZXR4fhI6srJ4ZYI-9U


https://l.facebook.com/l.php?u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.polskieradio.pl%2F395%2F9766%2FArtykul%2F3190795%2Cpolish-lawmakers-pass-resolution-in-support-of-ukraine%25E2%2580%2599s-nato-bid%3Ffbclid%3DIwAR3IkFw9yvDArMzOLVUGlv-ojFrjTHlMMTGnNl8RGce60pcWeAWXUrYHxiM&h=AT0Huv1AzzSUJh5ecKGMnzXRO879Bsbhf-d3Db4OUW6hN1KbED6mfT5ryG_C7bQTYwIeYJecc7idIiRnlnpCRD27GvDLcepVGinQ7RkxOm28mHc8-ng-4ULlHDX_KKBPuA&__tn__=%2CmH-R&c[0]=AT30MdrXJhClVImJP1GmNBDeCI36maUYIX3127hC3udIxXoVGHz-_NnnG_rBqg-Id5A1A-FMPj2CTCmYB8Q9cSGr-nfRdJ6EBGhkacC9XPDso2YAZUSaajFjhVQzBTkrRg_dSEmElLoMvAFFMqVweZTDZvWrxbzeI5nD561Q8a-_gw14pBJtpN43f3Tf9t-bL_xIKymSH8SzZ8vRtSTjZw

What could possibly go wrong?

 

[Crafty_Dog]

Seymour Hersh: Partners In Doomsday​
SUNDAY, JUN 18, 2023 - 12:30 PM
Authored by Seymour Hersh via Substack

As Ukraine begins a counter-offensive and Biden's hawks look on, new rhetoric out of Russia points to a revival of the nuclear threat...
I was planning to write this week about the expanding war in Ukraine and the danger it poses for the Biden Administration. I had a lot to say. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman has resigned, and her last day in office is June 30. Her departure has triggered near panic inside the State Department about the person many there fear will be chosen to replace her: Victoria Nuland. Nuland’s hawkishness on Russia and antipathy for Vladimir Putin fits perfectly with the views of President Biden. Nuland is now the undersecretary for political affairs and has been described as “running amok,” in the words of a person with direct knowledge of the situation, among the various bureaus of the State Department while Secretary of State Antony Blinken is on the road. If Sherman has a view about her potential successor, and she must, she’s unlikely ever to share it.

Biden is believed by some in the American intelligence community to be convinced that his re-election prospects depend on a victory, or some kind of satisfactory settlement, in the Ukraine war. Blinken’s rejection of the prospect of a ceasefire in Ukraine, voiced in his June 2 speech in Finland that I wrote about last week, is of a piece with this thinking.

Putin should rightly be condemned for his decision to tumble Europe into its most violent and destructive war since the Balkan wars of the 1990s. But those at the top in the White House must answer for their willingness to let an obviously tense situation lead into war when, perhaps, an unambiguous guarantee that Ukraine would not be permitted to join NATO could have kept the peace.

Ukraine’s counter-offensive is going slowly in its early days, and so news of the war briefly disappeared from the front pages of the New York Times and the Washington Post. The newspapers’ fear of another Trump presidency seems to have diminished their appetite for objective reporting when it delivers bad news from the front. The bad news may keep coming if the Ukraine military’s limited air and missile power continues to be ineffective against Russia.

It is believed within the American intelligence community that Russia destroyed the vital Kakhovka dam on the Dnipro River. Putin’s motive is unclear. Was the sabotage aimed at flooding and slowing the Ukraine Army’s pathways to the war zone in the southeast? Were there hidden Ukrainian weapons and ammunition storage sites in the flooded area? (The Ukraine military command is constantly moving its stockpiles in an effort to keep Russian satellite surveillance and missile targeting at bay.) Or was Putin simply laying down a chip and letting the government of Volodymyr Zelensky understand that this is the beginning of the end?

Meanwhile, there has been an escalation in rhetoric about the war and its possible consequences from within Russia. It can be observed in an essay published in Russian and English on June 13 by Sergei A. Karaganov, an academic in Moscow who is chairman of the Russian Council on Foreign and Defense Policy. Karaganov is known to be close to Putin; he is taken seriously by some journalists in the West, most notably by Serge Schmemann, a longtime Moscow correspondent for the New York Times and now a member of the Times editorial board. Like me, he spent his early years as a journalist for the Associated Press.

One of Karaganov’s main points is that the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine will not end even if Russia were to achieve a crushing victory. There will remain, he writes, “an even more embittered ultranationalist population pumped up with weapons—a bleeding wound threatening inevitable complications and a new war.”

The essay is suffused with despair. A Russian victory in Ukraine means a continued war with the West. “The worst situation,” he writes, “may occur if, at the cost of enormous losses, we liberate the whole of Ukraine and it remains in ruins with a population that mostly hates us. . . . The feud with the West will continue as it will support a low-grade guerrilla war.” A more attractive option would be to liberate the pro-Russian areas of Ukraine followed by demilitarization of Ukraine’s armed forces. But that would be possible, Karaganov writes, “only if and when we are able to break the West’s will to incite and support the Kiev junta, and to force it to retreat strategically.
“And this brings us to the most important but almost undiscussed issue. The underlying and even fundamental cause of the conflict in Ukraine and many other tensions in the world . . . is the accelerating failure of the modern ruling Western elites” to recognize and deal with the “globalization course of recent decades.” These changes, which Karaganov calls “unprecedented in history,” are key elements in the global balance of power that now favor “China and partly India acting as economic drivers, and Russia chosen by history to be its military strategic pillar.” The countries of the West, under leaders such as Biden and his aides, he writes, “are losing their five-century-long ability to siphon wealth around the world, imposing, primarily by brute force, political and economic orders and cultural dominance. So there will be no quick end to the unfolding Western defensive and aggressive confrontation.”

This shakeup of the world order, he writes, “has been brewing since the mid-1960s. . . . The defeat in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the beginning of the Western economic model crisis in 2008 were major milestones.” All of this points toward large-scale disaster: “Truce is possible, but peace is not. . . . This vector of the West’s movement unambiguously indicates a slide toward World War III. It is already beginning and may erupt into a full-blown firestorm by chance or due to the incompetence and irresponsibility of modern ruling circles in the West.”

In Karaganov’s view—I am in no way condoning or agreeing with it—the American-led war against Russia in Ukraine, with the support of NATO, has become more feasible, even ineluctable, because the fear of nuclear war is gone. What is happening today in Ukraine, he argues, would be “unthinkable” in the early years of the nuclear era. At that time, even “in a fit of desperate rage,” “the ruling circles of a group of countries” would never have “unleashed a full-scale war in the underbelly of a nuclear superpower.”

Karagonov’s argument only gets more scary from there. He concludes by arguing that Russia can continue fighting in Ukraine for two or three years by “sacrificing thousands and thousands of our best men and grinding down . . . hundreds of thousands of people who live in the territory that is now called Ukraine and who have fallen into a tragic historical trap. But this military operation cannot end with a decisive victory without forcing the West to retreat strategically, or even surrender, and compelling [America] to give up its attempt to reverse history and preserve global dominance. . . . Roughly speaking it must ‘buzz off’ so that Russia and the world could move forward unhindered.”

To convince America to “buzz off,” Karaganov writes, “We will have to make nuclear deterrence a convincing argument again by lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons set unacceptably high, and by rapidly but prudently moving up the deterrence-escalation ladder.” Putin has already done so, he says, through his statements and the advance deployment of Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus. “We must not repeat the ‘Ukrainian scenario.’ For a quarter of a century, we did not listen to those who warned that NATO aggression would lead to war, and tried to delay and ‘negotiate.’ As a result, we’ve got a severe armed conflict. The price of indecision now will be higher by an order of magnitude.

“The enemy must know that we are ready to deliver a preemptive strike in retaliation for all of its current and past acts of aggression in order to prevent a slide into global thermonuclear war. . . . Morally, this is a terrible choice as we will use God’s weapon, thus dooming ourselves to grave spiritual losses. But if we do not do this, not only Russia can die, but most likely the entire human civilization will cease to exist.”

Karaganov’s notion of a thermonuclear weapon as “God’s weapon” reminded me of a strange but similar phrase Putin used at a political forum in Moscow in the fall of 2018. He said that Russia would only launch a nuclear strike if his military’s early warning system warned of an incoming warhead. “We would be victims of aggression and would get to heaven as martyrs” and those who launched the strike would “just die and not even have time to repent.”

Karaganov has come a long way in his thinking about nuclear warfare by comparison with his remarks in an interview with Schmemann last summer. He expressed concern about freedom of thought in the future and added: “But I am even more concerned about the growing probability of a global thermonuclear conflict ending the history of humanity. We are living through a prolonged Cuban missile crisis. And I do not see the people of the caliber of Kennedy and his entourage on the other side. I do not know if we have responsible interlocutors.”

What should we make of Karaganov’s warming of doom? Do his remarks in any way reflect policy at the top? Do he and Putin kick around the idea of when or where to drop the bomb? Or is it nothing more than an expression of Russia’s decades old inferiority complex when looking to the gleaming West, where it finds—as we see in the Biden Administration today—endless hostility toward Russia.

“This could be the clarion of a movement in Russia,” one longtime Kremlin watcher told me, “for a dangerous shift of policy or it could or the off-the-wall ramblings of a concerned but deeply Russian academic.” He added that any serious Nato political strategist should read and evaluate the essay.

Is the future of the world really only in Russia’s hands—and not in ours?

[ccp]

if we vote in trump

we will not need to worry about ukraine

besides the fact this would not have happened if he was prez

he will fix it in an hour

but he would not say how since he does not want to reveal his dealmaking strategy ahead of time.........

just ask him.

[G M]

Don’t worry, the one true branch of government will start a nuclear war with Russia if that it s what it takes to keep Trump out of office.

if we vote in trump

we will not need to worry about ukraine

besides the fact this would not have happened if he was prez

he will fix it in an hour

but he would not say how since he does not want to reveal his dealmaking strategy ahead of time.........

just ask him.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/putin-reveals-draft-treaty-ukrainian-neutrality-march-2022-which-nearly-ended-war?utm_source=&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=1587

[Crafty_Dog]

Zelenskyy Questions US Presidential Candidates Calling for Ukraine Peace Deal: ‘Are They Ready to Go to War?’
Ryan Morgan
June 19, 2023Updated: June 20, 2023


Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, in a recent interview with NBC News, pushed back on comments from Republican politicians who are hesitant to keep bolstering Ukraine’s military against Russia.

Zelenskyy joined NBC News to talk about Ukraine’s ongoing counteroffensive and his requests for additional weapons and aircraft for Ukrainian forces. During the Thursday interview, NBC correspondent Richard Engel asked Zelenskyy to respond to Republican presidential candidate Ron DeSantis’s characterization of the Ukraine-Russia conflict as a “territorial dispute” and fellow Republican candidate Donald Trump’s vow to quickly end the conflict and sue for peace between the two countries.

“If any candidate thinks supporting Ukraine is too costly, are they ready to go to war? Are they ready to fight? Send their children? Die?” Zelenskyy said. “They will have to do it anyway if NATO enters this war, and if Ukraine fails and Russia occupies us, they will move on to the Baltics or Poland or some other NATO country. And then the U.S. will have to choose between keeping NATO or entering the war.”


Zelenskyy said Ukraine continuing to fight is to the benefit of NATO nations like the United States.

“I wonder if those candidates realize the price Ukraine is paying in this war,” the Ukrainian president said.

Engel asked Zelenskyy whether he was worried if certain candidates winning the 2024 U.S. presidential election raised concerns for Ukraine.

“The American people will choose the most worthy president and we will support this choice. And that’s normal and fair,” Zelenskyy replied. “Of course some statements from representatives of specific groups and politicians calling for diminished support of Ukraine, yes that does worry us. I think that’s a big risk for Ukraine. It’s not the person at the top, it’s the change of policy we want to avoid. I believe that won’t happen.”

Trump, DeSantis, RFK Jr. Seek Ukraine Settlement
Rather than continuing to arm and fund Ukraine’s military, Trump and DeSantis have both called for a peaceful cessation of hostilities.

In a March response to a questionnaire from then Fox News host Tucker Carlson, DeSantis said the United States has many pressing national security concerns but “becoming further entangled in a territorial dispute between Ukraine and Russia is not one of them” and “peace should be the objective.”

Following his initial comments about Ukraine, DeSantis told Fox News host Piers Morgan that the Russian decision to invade Ukraine was “wrong” and labeled Russian President Vladimir Putin a “war criminal,” but stood by his position that the United States should not get further involved in the conflict.

DeSantis also questioned the idea that Russia poses a threat beyond Ukraine, chalking up Russia’s progress so far in the war to a “loss.”

“I do not think it’s going to end with Putin being victorious. I do not think the Ukrainian government is going to be toppled by him and I think that’s a good thing,” DeSantis told Morgan in March.

Last month, DeSantis again addressed the Ukraine-Russia conflict, reiterating calls for a peaceful settlement.

Trump has repeatedly called for a peaceful settlement to the conflict, including during a contentious town hall interview with CNN in May. When CNN host Kaitlin Collins asked whether he wants Ukraine to win the war, Trump said, “I think in terms of getting it settled so we [can] stop killing all these people—Russians and Ukrainians. I want them to stop dying.”

During the CNN interview, Trump said he could bring about a peaceful settlement to the war in Ukraine within 24 hours. Trump also refused to call Putin a war criminal, saying that label “should be discussed later” but that doing so too soon would make it “a lot tougher to make a deal to make this thing stopped.”

Democratic presidential candidate Robert F. Kennedy Jr. has also called for a peaceful conclusion to the war in Ukraine.

“We will offer to withdraw our troops and nuclear-capable missiles from Russia’s borders. Russia will withdraw its troops from Ukraine and guarantee its freedom and independence,” Kennedy’s campaign website states. “[United Nations] peacekeepers will guarantee peace to the Russian-speaking eastern regions [of Ukraine]. We will put an end to this war. We will put an end to the suffering of the Ukrainian people. That will be the start of a broader program of demilitarization of all countries.”

Trump’s 24-Hour Commitment
During his interview with NBC, Zelenskyy also questioned Trump’s claim that he could reach a peace agreement within 24 hours.

“I don’t think there’s a single person in this world who could convince Putin to end the war. I don’t believe that’s possible,” Zelenskyy said.

Ukraine and Russia have been at odds since at least 2014, when then-Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych was ousted from power. Yanukovych was on generally friendly terms with neighboring Russia, and pro-Russian Ukrainians in the eastern Donbas region sought to separate from Ukraine with support from Russia. Forces of the post-Yanukovych Ukrainian government have been involved in low-level fighting in the Donbas region since then. Putin cited a need to protect these pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine as part of his reason for invading Ukraine in February of last year.

Prior to Yanukovych’s ouster, Ukraine had also given Russia access to the Crimean port of Sevastopol. After Yanukovych’s ouster, Russian forces annexed Crimea with relatively minimal resistance.

While relatively low-level fighting between separatists and Ukrainian government forces continued in the Donbas region throughout his presidency, Trump has said Russia would not have invaded Ukraine the way it did in February of last year had he still been in office.

From NTD News

[Crafty_Dog]

Putin’s to-do list

What would happen if Russia were to prevail in Ukraine?

By Clifford D. May

Western leaders have long misunderstood Vladimir Putin.

In 2001, President George W. Bush “looked the man in the eye” and “found him to be very straightforward and trustworthy.” Not exactly.

In 2015, President Barack Obama predicted that Mr. Putin would not want to “get bogged down in an inconclusive and paralyzing civil conflict” in Syria. Five hundred thousand slaughtered Arabs later, Mr. Putin has propped up his client, dictator Bashar Assad.

Angela Merkel made Germany dependent on Russian energy in the belief that Mr. Putin’s ambitions would drown in a river of euros. The chancellor was mistaken.

And after Mr. Putin dismembered Georgia in 2008 and annexed the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 (while inserting irregular forces into eastern Ukraine to wage an endless insurgency), American and European leaders went out of their way not to provoke him.

This may explain why President Biden, early in 2022, hoped Mr. Putin was planning only a “minor incursion” into Ukraine.

A question worth asking: Should Mr. Putin come out of this war looking and feeling like a winner — I’m hopeful about the current Ukrainian counteroffensive, but I rule nothing out — what would he do next? The answer, I assure you, will not be: “I’m going to Disneyland!”

Moldova is the lowest-hanging fruit. It’s not a NATO member, and its military capabilities are limited. Russia already occupies Transnistria, a strip of what used to be eastern Moldova between the Dniester River and the Ukrainian border. Moldova would probably fall to Mr. Putin within days.

Mr. Putin might want to formalize his control of Belarus, to which he recently deployed tactical nuclear weapons.

After that, perhaps a bolder move: The creation of a land bridge to Kaliningrad, a Russian territory — it was Konigsberg when it was captured from Germany in 1945 — 400 miles west of the Russian mainland.

Based in Kaliningrad is the Russian navy’s Baltic Fleet. Russian troops there are equipped with mobile nuclear-capable Iskander-M missiles, and sophisticated air defense systems. Russian tanks would roll west into Lithuania from Belarus and east into Lithuania from Kaliningrad. Mr. Putin would need to take only a ribbon of southern Lithuania — in particular, the main road running from Belarus to Kaliningrad.

But Lithuania is a NATO member, so Mr. Putin wouldn’t dare, right? Don’t be so sure. He’d likely call the invasion “a special military operation to restore Russian territorial contiguity at a time of increased NATO aggression against Russia.”

He might also charge that the Russian minority in Lithuania, roughly 7% of its 2.8 million population, is being oppressed and requires his help. Neighboring Latvia and Estonia, where ethnic Russians are close to a quarter of the population, could be dealt with later.

Mr. Putin could say to NATO: “I’m open to diplomacy — a land-for-peace deal. But if you’d rather wage war, you should understand that extreme measures will be considered.”

Now ask yourself: Which NATO members would be willing to risk a nuclear war with Russia over a ribbon of countryside in the southern Baltics? Turkey? Germany? France? Would most Americans support such a conflict?

It’s tough to see how NATO could survive if it failed to defend one of its members as pledged in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

For Mr. Putin, NATO’s collapse would be a huge victory, one that his communist allies in Beijing and his Islamist allies in Tehran would regard as a significant battle won in their war against the West.

And in both those capitals, as well as in nuclear-armed Pyongyang, a lesson would be learned: The U.S. and Europe cave in to nuclear blackmail.

There’s one more geostrategic reality I want to mention. Sandwiched between Lithuania on the north and Poland on the south is the Suwalki Gap, a narrow stretch of Polish land running from Belarus to Kaliningrad.

A rail link just north of this corridor links Kaliningrad to the Russian mainland. But it functions under an agreement between Russia and Lithuania, whose relations are now severely strained.

A year ago, Lithuania, complying with European sanctions, prohibited the transit of coal, metals and building materials.

Kaliningrad’s governor called that a “serious violation” of the agreement.

A Russian invasion and occupation of the Suwalki Gap would also trigger Article 5. And it would cut off Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia from their NATO allies, complicating any attempt to provide materiel and reinforcements in case of a Russian invasion.

Not just coincidentally, comrade, two years ago, Russian and Belarusian troops staged a military exercise to practice closing off the Suwalki Gap and attacking Lithuania.

Perhaps you’ll say that, after the war in Ukraine, Mr. Putin wouldn’t have the resources and manpower necessary for such aggressions. But if he’s been successful, Tehran and Beijing would be as helpful as possible. The morale of his troops would improve. And he’d have millions of Ukrainians whom he could draft and then — with bayonets pressed against their backs — use as cannon fodder.

This much we should understand by now: Mr. Putin’s mission, as he sees it, is to restore the Russian Empire, which, for less than a century, was rebranded as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

“If Russia is not defeated [in Ukraine], then it will just be a matter of time before it regroups, rearms, and that it will come for somebody next,” Lithuanian Prime Minister Ingrida Simonyte told a reporter last month.

In the Pentagon and at NATO headquarters in Brussels, geopolitical strategists should be imagining scenarios such as those described above. Defense plans based on deterrence rather than appeasement should be established. A good place to do that would be the next NATO summit. It’s scheduled for July in Vilnius, the Lithuanian capital.

Clifford D. May is founder and president of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and a columnist for The Washing-ton Times

[G M]

He will win.

I hope he gets Zelensky and his cartel in his grasp.

Putin’s to-do list

What would happen if Russia were to prevail in Ukraine?

By Clifford D. May

Western leaders have long misunderstood Vladimir Putin.

In 2001, President George W. Bush “looked the man in the eye” and “found him to be very straightforward and trustworthy.” Not exactly.

In 2015, President Barack Obama predicted that Mr. Putin would not want to “get bogged down in an inconclusive and paralyzing civil conflict” in Syria. Five hundred thousand slaughtered Arabs later, Mr. Putin has propped up his client, dictator Bashar Assad.

Angela Merkel made Germany dependent on Russian energy in the belief that Mr. Putin’s ambitions would drown in a river of euros. The chancellor was mistaken.

And after Mr. Putin dismembered Georgia in 2008 and annexed the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 (while inserting irregular forces into eastern Ukraine to wage an endless insurgency), American and European leaders went out of their way not to provoke him.

This may explain why President Biden, early in 2022, hoped Mr. Putin was planning only a “minor incursion” into Ukraine.

A question worth asking: Should Mr. Putin come out of this war looking and feeling like a winner — I’m hopeful about the current Ukrainian counteroffensive, but I rule nothing out — what would he do next? The answer, I assure you, will not be: “I’m going to Disneyland!”

Moldova is the lowest-hanging fruit. It’s not a NATO member, and its military capabilities are limited. Russia already occupies Transnistria, a strip of what used to be eastern Moldova between the Dniester River and the Ukrainian border. Moldova would probably fall to Mr. Putin within days.

Mr. Putin might want to formalize his control of Belarus, to which he recently deployed tactical nuclear weapons.

After that, perhaps a bolder move: The creation of a land bridge to Kaliningrad, a Russian territory — it was Konigsberg when it was captured from Germany in 1945 — 400 miles west of the Russian mainland.

Based in Kaliningrad is the Russian navy’s Baltic Fleet. Russian troops there are equipped with mobile nuclear-capable Iskander-M missiles, and sophisticated air defense systems. Russian tanks would roll west into Lithuania from Belarus and east into Lithuania from Kaliningrad. Mr. Putin would need to take only a ribbon of southern Lithuania — in particular, the main road running from Belarus to Kaliningrad.

But Lithuania is a NATO member, so Mr. Putin wouldn’t dare, right? Don’t be so sure. He’d likely call the invasion “a special military operation to restore Russian territorial contiguity at a time of increased NATO aggression against Russia.”

He might also charge that the Russian minority in Lithuania, roughly 7% of its 2.8 million population, is being oppressed and requires his help. Neighboring Latvia and Estonia, where ethnic Russians are close to a quarter of the population, could be dealt with later.

Mr. Putin could say to NATO: “I’m open to diplomacy — a land-for-peace deal. But if you’d rather wage war, you should understand that extreme measures will be considered.”

Now ask yourself: Which NATO members would be willing to risk a nuclear war with Russia over a ribbon of countryside in the southern Baltics? Turkey? Germany? France? Would most Americans support such a conflict?

It’s tough to see how NATO could survive if it failed to defend one of its members as pledged in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

For Mr. Putin, NATO’s collapse would be a huge victory, one that his communist allies in Beijing and his Islamist allies in Tehran would regard as a significant battle won in their war against the West.

And in both those capitals, as well as in nuclear-armed Pyongyang, a lesson would be learned: The U.S. and Europe cave in to nuclear blackmail.

There’s one more geostrategic reality I want to mention. Sandwiched between Lithuania on the north and Poland on the south is the Suwalki Gap, a narrow stretch of Polish land running from Belarus to Kaliningrad.

A rail link just north of this corridor links Kaliningrad to the Russian mainland. But it functions under an agreement between Russia and Lithuania, whose relations are now severely strained.

A year ago, Lithuania, complying with European sanctions, prohibited the transit of coal, metals and building materials.

Kaliningrad’s governor called that a “serious violation” of the agreement.

A Russian invasion and occupation of the Suwalki Gap would also trigger Article 5. And it would cut off Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia from their NATO allies, complicating any attempt to provide materiel and reinforcements in case of a Russian invasion.

Not just coincidentally, comrade, two years ago, Russian and Belarusian troops staged a military exercise to practice closing off the Suwalki Gap and attacking Lithuania.

Perhaps you’ll say that, after the war in Ukraine, Mr. Putin wouldn’t have the resources and manpower necessary for such aggressions. But if he’s been successful, Tehran and Beijing would be as helpful as possible. The morale of his troops would improve. And he’d have millions of Ukrainians whom he could draft and then — with bayonets pressed against their backs — use as cannon fodder.

This much we should understand by now: Mr. Putin’s mission, as he sees it, is to restore the Russian Empire, which, for less than a century, was rebranded as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

“If Russia is not defeated [in Ukraine], then it will just be a matter of time before it regroups, rearms, and that it will come for somebody next,” Lithuanian Prime Minister Ingrida Simonyte told a reporter last month.

In the Pentagon and at NATO headquarters in Brussels, geopolitical strategists should be imagining scenarios such as those described above. Defense plans based on deterrence rather than appeasement should be established. A good place to do that would be the next NATO summit. It’s scheduled for July in Vilnius, the Lithuanian capital.

Clifford D. May is founder and president of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and a columnist for The Washing-ton Times

[Crafty_Dog]

"He will win."

Maybe and maybe not.

"I hope he gets Zelensky and his cartel in his grasp."

Why do you root for his victory?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?

[G M]

"He will win."

Maybe and maybe not.

"I hope he gets Zelensky and his cartel in his grasp."

Why do you root for his victory?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?

I root for Zelensky to face justice.

[Crafty_Dog]

Russia invaded his country.  He and the Uke people fight back!  This is right and proper! 

[G M]

Russia invaded his country.  He and the Uke people fight back!  This is right and proper!

He was hired and installed into power by the CIA and he and his cartel stole billions of our money while feeding innocent people into the meat grinder.

It's like taking sides when Los Zetas murder another cartel.

[Crafty_Dog]

That meat grinder is Russia turning his country into rubble. 

Love ya man, but on this your thinking is not sound.  The fighting spirit of the Ukes proves you wrong.

[G M]

That meat grinder is Russia turning his country into rubble. 

Love ya man, but on this your thinking is not sound.  The fighting spirit of the Ukes proves you wrong.

Magical thinking about "Fighting spirirt".   

[Crafty_Dog]

They are showing up to fight.  Nothing magical about it whatsoever and should readily be acknowledged but for some reason you cannot.

[G M]

They are showing up to fight.  Nothing magical about it whatsoever and should readily be acknowledged but for some reason you cannot.

They are getting butchered like europe hasn't seen since WWI.

[Crafty_Dog]

The Russians too-- but you seek to change the subject.  Stay on point please.

[G M]

The Russians too-- but you seek to change the subject.  Stay on point please.

The point is the Uke offensive is a massive failure.

[Crafty_Dog]

Still off-point.

The point in this moment is that I have challenged your hostility to Uke success in general and Zelensky in particular and apparent rooting for Russian success.

[G M]

Still off-point.

The point in this moment is that I have challenged your hostility to Uke success in general and Zelensky in particular and apparent rooting for Russian success.

https://westernrifleshooters.us/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/7mtk8t-768x384.jpg



Putin is the least of the evils.

[Crafty_Dog]

Well, that does clarify 

As for "least of evils" I'm thinking your brand of humor and snark would get you defenstrated in short order.

[G M]

Well, that does clarify 

As for "least of evils" I'm thinking your brand of humor and snark would get you defenstrated in short order.

Murderous bastard Putin is, he actually appears to love Russia and his people.

Unlike our leaders…

[DougMacG]

" he actually appears to love Russia and his people".


What a scary, naive view. He loves himself and his power and that's it.

https://books.google.com/books/about/Freezing_Order.html?id=ARVJEAAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=kp_read_button&hl=en&newbks=1&newbks_redir=0&gboemv=1&ov2=1#v=onepage&q&f=false

Does he love the people he steals from, all of them? Does he love the people that he murders, everyone that gets in his way?

[G M]

Does he allow 3rd world savages to stream into Russia to rape, murder and replace the Russians?

No? How unprogressive!

" he actually appears to love Russia and his people".


What a scary, naive view. He loves himself and his power and that's it.

https://books.google.com/books/about/Freezing_Order.html?id=ARVJEAAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=kp_read_button&hl=en&newbks=1&newbks_redir=0&gboemv=1&ov2=1#v=onepage&q&f=false

Does he love the people he steals from, all of them? Does he love the people that he murders, everyone that gets in his way?

[Crafty_Dog]

Well, the Russians are failing to reproduce by quite a bit , , , all on their own.

[G M]

Well, the Russians are failing to reproduce by quite a bit , , , all on their own.

I guess they need some of that Somali magic that has made Minnesota the economic miracle it is today!

[Crafty_Dog]

You need to work on your logic a bit.

We are discussing your apparent enthusiasm for the Putin/Russia way.  To think it unsound and unsuccessful does not mean one is a Prof softy on US immigration patterns.

[G M]

You need to work on your logic a bit.

We are discussing your apparent enthusiasm for the Putin/Russia way.  To think it unsound and unsuccessful does not mean one is a Prof softy on US immigration patterns.

I am for anyone who stands against the GAE and it's fake and gay NATO minions. Putin builds churches and doesn't allow his country to be invaded by 3rd world savages.

[G M]

" he actually appears to love Russia and his people".


What a scary, naive view. He loves himself and his power and that's it.

https://books.google.com/books/about/Freezing_Order.html?id=ARVJEAAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=kp_read_button&hl=en&newbks=1&newbks_redir=0&gboemv=1&ov2=1#v=onepage&q&f=false

Does he love the people he steals from, all of them? Does he love the people that he murders, everyone that gets in his way?

Tell me about the Biden and Clinton crime families and Epstein, Doug.

[G M]

https://www.theburningplatform.com/2023/06/21/putin-says-a-political-solution-is-still-possible/

VodkaManBad!

[Crafty_Dog]

Will Ireland Join NATO?
Jun 22, 2023 | 17:31 GMT




Despite an ongoing debate, Ireland is unlikely to join NATO anytime soon, but the country will probably adjust its security doctrine to bring it closer to the alliance and improve its protection from Russia's unconventional aggression. On June 22, Ireland began a four-day public consultation to review the country's foreign, security and defense policies, including the specific question of NATO membership. The Consultative Forum includes academics, researchers, politicians, representatives from EU member states, and members of the general public. Once the debate is over, the forum will issue a report for Ireland's foreign ministry, which will then decide whether to make recommendations to the broader Irish government.

Ireland has been a neutral country since its independence in the early 20th century. But Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 triggered an intense domestic debate about Ireland's neutrality in general, and NATO membership in particular. Recent decisions by Sweden and Finland to abandon their neutrality and apply for NATO membership (which Finland obtained in April) have further fueled the debate in Ireland.

Ireland's coalition government is internally divided on the issue. Taoiseach Leo Varadkar (from the Fine Gael party) and Foreign Affairs Minister Micheal Martin (from the Fianna Fail party) have both defended the Consultative Forum while also promising that it will not necessarily result in Dublin applying for NATO membership. However, lower-ranking members of both parties have heavily criticized the forum and have warned against flirting with NATO accession. On June 18, Irish President Michael D. Higgins generated significant controversy when he said that Ireland is ''playing with fire'' and ''drifting'' towards NATO. Sinn Fein, Ireland's main opposition party, described the forum as a ''blatant attempt to undermine Irish neutrality.''

The debate over NATO membership will likely continue, but significant social, political and institutional obstacles will probably keep Ireland from joining the military alliance in the short-to-medium term. To abandon neutrality, Ireland must reform its constitution, which requires support from both houses of parliament. This will prove difficult considering the internal divisions on the issue among the country's largest political parties. Constitutional reforms also require a referendum, which would prove difficult to pass. Opinion polls suggest that public support for NATO membership has risen since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, but most also suggest it is still below 50%. Moreover, opinion polls indicate that Sinn Fein may win Ireland's next general election (which is scheduled for early 2025), which would further reduce the probability of NATO accession considering the party's staunch support of Irish neutrality. Even if Ireland overcomes all of its social and political obstacles to NATO membership, there would be economic disincentives. To begin with, NATO membership would probably result in a substantial increase in military spending to take Ireland closer to the alliance's target of spending at least 2% of GDP on defense (Ireland's defense spending is currently at 0.3% of GDP). Increasing defense spending may also force Ireland to modify its economic model, which is based on offering low taxes for multinationals. Because of all these factors, NATO membership is unlikely in the short-to-medium term.

Neutrality is a core part of Ireland's social and political identity, which explains why the issue is so controversial for politicians and the broader Irish society. And unlike Finland, which shares a massive land border with Russia, Ireland also lacks the same sense of urgency when it comes to a potential Russian conventional aggression.

According to an IPSOS poll published in the Irish Times on June 18, 61% of Irish voters want the country to remain neutral. However, the same poll showed that 55% of voters also support increasing military spending.

Even if Ireland is unlikely to join NATO in the foreseeable future, the country will probably still modify some aspects of its foreign policy to increase cooperation with the alliance. While the risk of a conventional Russian military aggression is low, Ireland is exposed to Russia's unconventional aggression due to its EU membership (Ireland participates in EU sanctions against Russia), its support for Ukraine (Ireland provides non-lethal assistance to Ukraine), and its close security and intelligence cooperation with the United Kingdom and the United States (both of which are hawkish on Russia). In particular, Irish authorities have expressed concern about Russian cyberattacks, as well as attacks against infrastructure, like the undersea fiber optic cables connecting Europe and the United States and the natural gas interconnectors between Ireland and Scotland. Facing these challenges, there are several things that the Irish government could do in the coming months to adapt the country's defense and security strategy to the current geopolitical climate without necessarily applying for NATO membership. For example, Irish officials have expressed interest in abolishing the country's so-called ''triple lock'' mechanism, according to which approval from the Irish government, the Irish parliament and the United Nations is required before more than 12 Irish military personnel can be deployed abroad. Dublin is also considering joining a NATO program to protect undersea infrastructure. Finally, Ireland is likely to announce further increases in defense spending, especially as the war in Ukraine is unlikely to end in the foreseeable future.

In July 2022, the Irish government announced that the country's defense spending will increase from 1.1 billion euros in 2022 to 1.5 billion euros by 2028, the largest increase in the country's history. The government also announced its intention to increase participation in the European Union's Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), which promotes military integration between EU member states.

In March, Martin asked the Irish Parliament if ''with the experience of recent years, can we genuinely and honestly say that the triple lock remains fit for purpose?'' He also said that the issue of modifying Ireland's neutrality should not be binary about NATO membership, because ''there is a more nuanced, informed and layered discussion to be had [about] unpacking and examining our long-standing policy of military neutrality, while at the same time, exploring the full spectrum of policy options that are available to us as a sovereign state and a committed member of the European Union.''

In June, the head of NATO's recently-created Critical Undersea Infrastructure Coordination center, General Hans-Werner Wiermann, told Irish media the military alliance had confirmed that Russian ships have carried out extensive mapping of undersea cabling and pipelines in European seas, adding that it was a ''fair assumption'' that they had also mapped infrastructure in Irish waters. Irish officials have expressed interest in cooperating with the Critical Undersea Infrastructure Coordination center.

[DougMacG]

" he actually appears to love Russia and his people".


What a scary, naive view. He loves himself and his power and that's it.

https://books.google.com/books/about/Freezing_Order.html?id=ARVJEAAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=kp_read_button&hl=en&newbks=1&newbks_redir=0&gboemv=1&ov2=1#v=onepage&q&f=false

Does he love the people he steals from, all of them? Does he love the people that he murders, everyone that gets in his way?

Tell me about the Biden and Clinton crime families and Epstein, Doug.

It's not a back and forth so leave my name out of it.

[G M]

" he actually appears to love Russia and his people".


What a scary, naive view. He loves himself and his power and that's it.

https://books.google.com/books/about/Freezing_Order.html?id=ARVJEAAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=kp_read_button&hl=en&newbks=1&newbks_redir=0&gboemv=1&ov2=1#v=onepage&q&f=false

Does he love the people he steals from, all of them? Does he love the people that he murders, everyone that gets in his way?

Tell me about the Biden and Clinton crime families and Epstein, Doug.

It's not a back and forth so leave my name out of it.

So the American Oligarchy is off limits....

[Crafty_Dog]

GM: 

There is an opportunity here for you to work on your interpersonal communication skills. 

What Doug is saying here is the same thing I am saying when I hit you with my lawyerly "Non-responsive" and "non-sequitur" responses.

Snark suitable for the Progs, the Woken Dead, and others of that ilk is not well received by us your comrades.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.nationalreview.com/news/stab-in-the-back-putin-vows-to-respond-decisively-to-wagner-armed-rebellion/?utm_source=email&utm_medium=breaking&utm_campaign=newstrack&utm_term=31892661

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/05/15/wagner-boss-russian-troop-positions-ukraine/

https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/special-report-emergency-situation?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=1351274&post_id=130558910&isFreemail=true&utm_medium=email

============

Looks like the raw material for a potential collapse of the Russian war effort.

Should this turn out to the be the case, things to look out for:

a) Andrew McCarthy gleefully razzing GM;

b) Biden and the Deep State crowing with the Pravdas spreading the message far and wide;

c) The Washington Wing of the GOP trying to get in on the credit;

d) those of us who predicted calamity having a lot of explaining to do.