Russia/US-- Europe

[ya]

The list of countries (global south) queing up to join BRICS keeps increasing. Amazingly US policies brought Russia and China together and now China & India trying to improve relations with each other. US hegemony is based on the carrot and stick approach, BRICS on mutual respect. Even Turkey has applied !, more EU countries would join if allowed. Mark my words, EU countries will join sooner or later.

[Crafty_Dog]

November 1, 2024
View On Website

Black Sea Region: Divided, Not Quite Conquered
The clash between East and West is on full display in Bulgaria, Georgia and Moldova.
By: Antonia Colibasanu

Recent elections in Bulgaria, Georgia and Moldova signal a shifting power balance in the Black Sea region, where a clash between Western and Russian interests is fueling instability across Eurasia. Even if the struggle for influence in these countries is contained to Europe’s borderlands, it offers a warning for the rest of the Continent.

Moldova’s pro-Western leanings could advance NATO and EU interests, enhancing regional stability and countering Russian military and economic ambitions. Conversely, Georgia’s recent tilt toward Russia and Bulgaria’s mixed allegiances complicate NATO's Black Sea strategy, undermining security cohesion and increasing regional vulnerability. The positions of all three countries also affect energy security and trade corridors, with Bulgaria's energy dependency, Georgia's transit routes and Moldova's location critical for Western relations with Russia and China. Ultimately, these elections will shape the Black Sea’s security dynamics, determining whether the region aligns more closely with Western allies or drifts into Russia’s sphere of influence.

Bulgaria, Moldova & Georgia

(click to enlarge)

Bulgaria

Bulgarians are increasingly frustrated by the country’s fragmented politics. Its coalitions inevitably comprise many small parties or alliances with little in common except a temptation to withdraw their support and bring the government down. After seven elections in less than four years, voters are disillusioned with the process, and voter turnout has suffered as a result. (Turnout rose 4.5 percent from previous elections, but it is still at just 38.9 percent. While the increase is encouraging, the low turnout indicates voters are tired of continuous elections.) On top of this, Bulgaria is a member of NATO and seems perpetually locked in a debate over its role in regional security.

In this week’s elections, a record eight parties cleared the threshold to make it into the parliament. The center-right GERB party (Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria), led by Boyko Borissov, who served as prime minister from 2009 until 2021, secured the most votes, but at just over 26 percent it is well short of a majority. In fact, GERB would need the support of at least four other parties to govern. Among its potential allies are PP-DB (We Continue the Change – Democratic Bulgaria), a pro-European liberal coalition that finished second with 14 percent; the radical pro-Russian Revival party, which placed third with 13 percent; and the centrist party that supports the rights of ethnic Turkish and Muslim communities, DPS (Movement for Rights and Freedoms – A New Beginning), whose 11 percent landed it in fourth place. Most important, about a third of the votes went to populist parties, so compromise will likely be hard to come by.

While issues like political stability, anti-corruption policies and economic reform also featured in the campaign, the election results underscore Bulgaria’s indecision over Russian influence and supporting Ukraine. The leaders of GERB support Bulgaria’s alignment with the European Union and NATO but also balance their Western ties with pragmatic relations with Russia. They have given their rhetorical support to Ukraine in its fight to defend its sovereignty against the Russian invasion, but when it comes to delivering weapons, ammunition or aid to Ukraine, they have been much more circumspect. Since the start of the war, GERB has cautiously supported energy diversification, though Borissov previously enabled Russian interests, notably by facilitating the TurkStream pipeline, which bypasses Ukraine to deliver Russian gas to Europe.

Historically, Bulgaria has contributed to Black Sea security through NATO, participating in initiatives like the NATO Maritime Coordination Center in Varna and multinational naval drills. However, at times Russian pressure has limited Bulgaria’s commitments, exemplified by past refusals to support a permanent NATO Black Sea presence. GERB’s cautious approach, led by Borissov, prioritizes diplomacy over military build-ups to avoid escalating regional tensions, though this risk-averse stance may hinder NATO’s strategic objectives at a time when Russian influence in the Black Sea is growing.

Meanwhile, Bulgaria faces deep structural challenges, namely economic inequality, corruption and a shrinking workforce. These factors, along with political fragmentation and pro-Russian sentiment, weaken Bulgaria’s reliability as a NATO and EU partner in the Black Sea, complicating Western efforts to counter Russia’s hybrid and military threats in the region.

Georgia

In Georgia’s parliamentary elections, the incumbent party had no problem winning a majority – but it faces widespread questions about the vote’s legitimacy. The Georgian Dream party, led by Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze and supported by billionaire founder Bidzina Ivanishvili, has been in office since 2012. The party was originally pro-European but started aligning itself with Russia in recent years while also consolidating its rule. Even though nearly 90 percent of Georgians favor EU membership, Georgian Dream has remained neutral on the Russia-Ukraine war and refused to join Western sanctions against Moscow. Instead, the Georgian government has maintained and even strengthened economic ties with Russia. The Georgian tourism sector received a boost in 2023 when the country resumed direct flights with Russia at a time when other countries were cutting ties. Georgian Dream also permitted large numbers of Russians fleeing war mobilization to relocate to Georgia.

In addition, the Georgian government's legislative agenda has resembled Russian measures. In 2023, Georgian Dream proposed legislation that would compel nongovernmental organizations and media that get more than 20 percent of their funding from abroad to register as "foreign agents." The bill, which bore similarities to legislation Russia has used to stifle dissent, was withdrawn in the face of large protests, only to be reintroduced and signed into law (over a presidential veto) in 2024. Also this year, the country placed the electoral commission under government control, restricted voting rights for Georgians living abroad and abolished gender quotas for parliament.

Unsurprisingly, the country’s Oct. 25 parliamentary elections – which saw Georgian Dream win with 53 percent of the vote – were marred with claims of fraud and foreign interference. The pro-Western president, Salome Zourabichvili, accused Russia of meddling in the vote, rejected the results and encouraged citizens to protest. Several international bodies, including the EU and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, alleged numerous irregularities, including voter intimidation and violence at polling stations, vote-buying and misuse of state resources. The EU and several European officials called for an independent investigation. The government ordered a recount, but a few days later the country’s electoral commission said a partial recount had confirmed Georgian Dream’s victory.

With Georgian Dream securing another term, the country’s EU ambitions are likely on hold. Although the bloc granted Georgia candidate status in late 2023, concern in the EU has been growing for some time about Georgia’s democratic backsliding and anti-Western rhetoric from Georgian Dream’s leaders. Instead, Russia and China will probably gain ground. The government has welcomed Chinese investments in strategic ports, the latest being the Anaklia deep-sea port, where a Chinese consortium now holds a 49 percent stake.

Moldova

On Nov. 3, Moldova will hold a presidential runoff between the pro-European incumbent, Maia Sandu, and Alexandr Stoianoglo, a pro-Russian former prosecutor general. In the first round on Oct. 20, Sandu secured approximately 42 percent of the vote compared with Stoianoglo’s 26 percent. On the same day, Moldovans narrowly approved a measure to embed the goal of EU membership in the constitution, with 50.4 percent in favor and 49.6 percent opposed. Despite the double-digit margin in the first round of the presidential race, voters will likely turn the runoff into an unofficial second referendum on the country’s pro-EU trajectory, resulting in a tight finish.

Western media have largely framed Moldova’s close EU referendum result as evidence of Russian-backed disinformation swaying public opinion against EU integration. However, the vote also reveals a pronounced societal divide within Moldova. Support for EU integration splits geographically, with Moldova’s north and south voting overwhelmingly against the EU, while central regions, particularly Chisinau, strongly supported EU membership. This divide reflects not only political but also economic divisions: Rural and peripheral areas, more dependent on Russian resources, view EU integration as a threat to their stability. Economic hardship compounds these divisions, as low wages and meager pensions leave many Moldovans vulnerable to influence and frustrated with perceived government neglect.

Moldova’s population also includes both Romanian- and Russian-speaking communities, with significant Russian, Ukrainian and Gagauz minorities. Russian-speaking regions, particularly semi-autonomous Gagauzia, where 94 percent voted against the EU referendum, lean toward Russia due to shared language and historical ties. Romanian-speaking communities and urban regions, more exposed to Western culture, are generally more EU-oriented, creating a cultural and linguistic divide that informs political preferences. Generational divides further shape perspectives. Younger Moldovans, especially those living in cities or abroad, favor EU integration for its economic opportunities and political reforms. In contrast, older Moldovans, especially in rural areas or those who have worked in Russia, often feel nostalgic for Soviet stability and fear that EU integration could erode traditional values and pull Moldova into conflicts like the Ukraine war.

Moreover, Transnistria remains a decisive factor in Moldovan elections. This breakaway region, with a predominantly Russian-speaking population, operates under de facto Russian control, supported by a Russian military presence. Moscow uses Transnistria’s “frozen conflict” status as leverage, implicitly threatening activation if Moldova aligns with the West. Some factions fear that EU integration could provoke conflict with Transnistria or even Russia. Similar concerns extend to semi-autonomous Gagauzia, amplified by Russian propaganda warning that EU alignment could lead to military escalation, as seen in Ukraine.

Regardless of the election outcome, Moldova’s internal divisions will probably deepen. A narrow win by Sandu or Stoianoglo would likely trigger a prolonged political standoff, especially with parliamentary elections set for next year. This scenario could heighten clashes between pro-Russian and pro-European factions, delay policy implementation and increase the risk of social unrest, particularly if economic conditions worsen. Such instability would invite further interference from Russia or the EU, polarizing society and complicating Moldova’s path forward.

Conclusion

With Bulgaria taking a pragmatic approach between Western and Russian interests, Georgia leaning pro-Russian and Moldova in political gridlock, the Black Sea region faces increasing geopolitical instability. This situation undermines the formation of a cohesive pro-Western security coalition, limiting NATO and EU capacity to establish a robust regional deterrent against Russian actions. China, meanwhile, is set to expand its influence in the region, pursuing both political and economic goals.

Russia and China have distinct but complementary objectives in the Black Sea area. Russia prioritizes strategic dominance and uses its presence to manage regional security dynamics and resist NATO influence. In contrast, China’s interests are economically driven, seeking to establish infrastructure footholds, such as in Georgia's Anaklia port and others, as part of its Belt and Road Initiative. This economic investment provides China with trade routes to Europe that bypass Russian territory, subtly expanding its influence in Eurasia. Together, Russian military and Chinese economic activities challenge Western influence, positioning both countries as influential, albeit in different spheres, in the Black Sea’s geopolitics.

Bulgaria’s accommodating stance toward Russia – evident in its fragmented coalition politics and energy policies – further weakens NATO’s Black Sea cohesion. Though a NATO member, Bulgaria’s political instability and dependence on Russian energy complicate its commitment to regional security measures, such as NATO-led demining and Black Sea defense protocols. This tepid support reduces NATO’s operational flexibility against Russian assertiveness.

Russia now stands poised to strengthen its foothold along Georgia’s coast, with Georgia’s pivot toward Moscow likely to limit its cooperation with NATO and the EU, thus diminishing Western influence along the eastern Black Sea. Russia, which already controls Georgia’s breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, could use a friendlier Georgian administration to expand its military and intelligence presence in the country. Meanwhile, Georgia’s openness to China provides Beijing with a strategic Black Sea maritime entry point.

In Moldova, internal fractures and the unresolved Transnistria conflict enable Russia to sustain hybrid pressure through disinformation, economic leverage and influence operations aimed at undermining pro-Western governance. This strategy not only complicates Moldova’s EU integration but threatens broader Western relations in the Black Sea region. The disunity among Black Sea states weakens collective regional defense, giving Russia greater latitude to influence these states economically and politically and distancing them from the West. And as Black Sea cohesion falters, NATO’s leverage in countering Russian threats declines, affecting maritime security, energy trade routes and the security framework of Eastern Europe – heightening security challenges for NATO’s eastern flank.

[Body-by-Guinness]

A fine, woebegone neocon unleashing his inner TDS demons in the most passive/aggressive manner he can get away with and still sound like he knows what he’s talking about. Likely presages the general neocon reaction to Trump assuming power and telegraphs their foreign policy doomsaying and utter inability to remember that Trump actually did a pretty good job of managing despots around the planet despite sundry Russian agent fictions, but why let reality get in the way of a good public snit?

How to start World War III in 8 easy steps
The Hill News / by Alexander J. Motyl / Nov 8, 2024 at 1:05 PM

No one wants World War III, of course. But, ironically, the policymakers and pundits who say they want it least are those most likely to start it.

Call it the law of unintended consequences, or think of the road to Hell as being paved with good intentions.

There are eight steps that are pretty much guaranteed to lead to a monumental Western war with Russia. Judge for yourself just which step we’re on at present.

First, start by ignoring the fact Vladimir Putin has, over the last quarter-century, progressively dismantled all of Russia’s democratic and semi-democratic institutions. Ignore that he has replaced them with one-person rule, abetted by a criminal and corrupt elite that qualifies as fascist by any reasonable definition. Instead of focusing on Russia’s transformation into a fascist state and regarding it as a worrisome phenomenon, excuse Putin’s behavior on the grounds that he’s only doing what the Russian people want and that Russian fascism poses no threat to Russia’s neighbors or to the West.

Second, continue by ignoring the clear signals of imperialist intent emanating from the Kremlin since the USSR fell apart in 1991. Downplay the striking similarity between the Kremlin’s concern for Russian-speakers living in the former Soviet republics and Adolf Hitler’s concern for the rights of ethnic Germans in Czechoslovakia and Poland.

Completely ignore the central place that imperialism and territorial expansion have played in the political agendas, self-legitimation strategies and propaganda of every Russian state for centuries.

Third, ignore history, ignore regime type and ignore personality. In other words, ignore Russia; ignore Russian politics, society and culture; and, above all, ignore Putin and his criminal past and present. Arm yourself only with the half-baked theories of the “realist school” of international relations. Pretend that this school of thought holds all the answers to all the questions because its gross simplification of reality is in fact accurate.

Then excuse Putin’s aggressive behavior toward Ukraine on the grounds that he was terrified of the possibility of Ukraine’s possible membership in NATO in 2045. Pretend that he was somehow compelled to forestall that theoretical eventuality by launching a full-scale genocidal war more than two decades in advance. Reinforce this belief by electing European prime ministers — and an American president — with openly Russophile stances.

Fourth, regard Ukraine as a big place with nice people and corrupt leaders, and not as a strategically important component of Western security. Ignore that its continued existence as a sovereign state ensures the West’s survival as a community of nations. Pretend that Putin’s obsession with Ukraine has no geopolitical implications, either now or in the future, and that the West need not worry about what he would do next were Russia to defeat and swallow Ukraine. Reinforce this belief by supporting policymakers with openly pro-Putin stances.

Fifth, regard Putin as a run-of-the-mill rational leader who desires only to stay in power and maintain Russia’s security and who therefore acts in accordance with universally shared rationality assumptions and not with Russian imperial ideology and fascism. Explain his destruction of the Russian military and economy by arguing that his idea of rationality sometimes differs from that held by the West, without explaining why, how and when these differences manifest themselves.

Sixth, compel Ukraine to agree to any kind of cease-fire or peace that precludes a Russian defeat in the hope and expectation that Putin will happily accept it, will recognize Ukraine’s right to exist as a sovereign state and will abandon all imperialist aspirations in order to rejoin the international community. Dismiss Ukrainian fears of continued Russian aggression as the feverish ravings of nice people in a big place who don’t appreciate the wisdom of realist theory and are suicidally inclined to downplay the likelihood of Putin’s using a nuclear device.

Seventh, complete steps one through six and then patiently wait for Russia to become a soft and cuddly state committed to world peace. Express shock and surprise when Russia reasserts its fascist values, rearms and relaunches its genocidal war — against Ukraine and those countries of the West that dared to agree with Ukraine’s assessment. Then blame the resultant world war on the possibility of Ukraine’s membership in NATO in 2045.

Eighth, repeat steps one through seven, place all your hopes in a newly elected American president with unrealistic expectations regarding the war, and remain puzzled by the fact that all your good intentions didn’t prevent a direct clash between Russian and NATO troops.

Bemoan reality’s unwillingness to act according to your notions — and blame World War III on your critics.

Alexander J. Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers University-Newark. A specialist on Ukraine, Russia and the USSR, and on nationalism, revolutions, empires and theory, he is the author of 10 books of nonfiction, as well as “Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires” and “Why Empires Reemerge: Imperial Collapse and Imperial Revival in Comparative Perspective.

https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4980828-how-to-start-world-war-iii-in-8-easy-steps/

[Crafty_Dog]

"but why let reality get in the way of a good public snit?"

 

[Crafty_Dog]

November 7, 2024
View On Website
Open as PDF

Trump’s Approach to Europe
By: George Friedman

I intended to expand on my column from earlier this week on the conflict in the Middle East, but instead I think I’ll address the foreign policy consequences of the U.S. election, which Donald Trump decisively won.

On the campaign trail, Trump focused on ending U.S. involvement in the Ukraine war. He has repeatedly said that the war is a European affair and that the responsibility for defending Ukraine is thus a European one, not an American one. He has, however, left open the possibility of extending U.S. support if it’s in the U.S. interest.

The conventional wisdom is that Ukraine is of vital interest to the United States. Trump doesn’t agree with this. Ukraine is of moderate interest but does not affect the future of the United States. For the Europeans, the appearance of Russia in Ukraine is a vital issue since Ukraine is in Europe. The conventional wisdom is not altogether false but does not weigh the necessities effectively.

But Trump considers Ukraine a European war because a Russian victory directly threatens Europe, not the U.S. heartland. Europe has a gross domestic product of over $27 trillion, while the U.S. GDP is just slightly higher at $29 trillion, so why can’t Europe pay for the conflict itself? It’s true that Europe does not possess the military assets needed to do so, but Trump sees this as just another excuse for having the U.S. foot the bill. For decades, this was a feature, not a bug, in the system. The structure of European defenses was created early in the Cold War. It was a time when Europe was shattered by World War II, when the U.S. was concerned that its own interests would suffer if Europe fell to the Soviet Union. The terminus of that train of thought is to pay whatever is necessary to defend Europe.

But time passes. Europe is now prosperous, heavily populated and, in theory, fully capable of defending itself. Yet European countries have not rebuilt their militaries, collectively or individually, to perform that task, and the U.S. continues to bear the financial brunt of the Continent’s defense. Thus is the crux of Trump’s argument: Put simply, he believes Europe is acting in bad faith. It isn’t entirely new – Republicans have made such claims for years, and Trump himself noted it in his first presidency – but it isn’t without merit.

Equally important is something Trump has not said: that there is no such thing as “Europe” except as a geographic concept. It is large, and it contains a multitude of nation-states and nations of people that are linked, sometimes willingly, by a network of transnational organizations. This state of play breeds unpredictability and disunity. The basic idea of relationships between nations is somewhat at odds with the reality of Europe. This is an important point because when Trump talks about Europe and NATO, what he is really talking about is the U.S. relationship with Europe. His stance on Ukraine, then, is meant to force Europe to take responsibility for the war and, if it can’t, to prove that its inability to do so means that the threat Russia poses isn’t real.

Trump is skeptical of other alliances, too, and he said he will likely reexamine all of them, particularly legacy alliances without clear purpose, with the ultimate objective of minimizing U.S. exposure to wars. But changing entrenched policy is extremely difficult. Personally, I don’t believe he will abandon the war in Ukraine outright; I believe he will have the U.S. remain in a supporting role while Europe takes the lead. Time will tell if he can impose his will.

[Crafty_Dog]

Top supplier. Russia became the top supplier of natural gas to the European Union in September for the first time since May 2022, according to a calculation by Russia’s RIA Novosti using Eurostat data. European purchases of Russian gas in September were valued at 1.4 billion euros ($1.47 billion), an increase of a third over the previous September. Roughly 40 percent of the supplies is liquefied natural gas and 60 percent is pipeline gas.

[Crafty_Dog]

A bit glib in some respects.  It certainly makes sense that after the fall of the Soviet Empire that those countries would never want to be in that position again.   It makes sense that America would not want to have to face Warsaw Pact size capabilities again.   It makes sense that it would be our armaments that would be bought.   Having serious weapon and ammo capabilities is not a bad thing for living in a dangerous world.

https://x.com/i/web/status/1859931875474858248

[Crafty_Dog]

European Views on US Global Posture
Perceptions aren't consistent with reality.

By Antonia Colibasanu -April 24, 2024
Open as PDF
The notion that all countries operate within constraints is one of the main pillars of geopolitics. It came up repeatedly during my recent visit to the United States, where I attended several talks on European and Russian affairs. Though we at GPF try to stay out of the D.C. bubble, it’s nonetheless important for us to know what those in the bubble are saying, especially since Europe right now appears so consumed by what’s happening in Washington.

I traveled to the U.S. with a delegation of experts and policymakers from Romania. Analysts and officials from other parts of Europe, including Germany and Poland, were also in attendance. The main topics on the agenda were security and, of course, Ukraine. The event coincided with heated discussions in the U.S. Congress over aid packages for Ukraine and Israel. Though the situation in Israel is potentially hugely impactful for American politics, the conflict in Ukraine is the main focus for many policymakers in Europe. After all, the war there has shifted NATO’s containment line and transformed Eastern Europe into a literal battleground.

Considering that Kyiv is hugely dependent on military aid from Washington, European lawmakers are making concerted efforts to learn more about the constraints within which U.S. politics and politicians operate. Europeans typically have a narrow view of U.S. politics, mainly focusing on the presidency and the administration, which they perceive as ultimately responsible for maintaining the United States’ global leadership role and, by extension, the Western security structure.

That’s because the Europeans tend to believe the U.S. political system mirrors those in Europe, where foreign policies are forged by governments and primarily driven by urgent security threats to their borders. The Europeans thus get either nervous or excited every time another U.S. presidential election comes around, believing that a change in the presidency could alter how Washington interacts with the world. In doing so, they misjudge the way U.S. politics works, believing falsely that the presidency overrides every other institution in the United States, especially when it comes to strategy and foreign policy.

In fact, the U.S. president isn’t as powerful as many assume – and that’s by design. The nation’s founders didn’t want to assign too much authority to one person in the political hierarchy. They instead built a system of checks and balances, splitting power among three branches of government: the legislative (Congress), the executive (the president) and the judiciary (the courts). This division of powers guarantees that no branch can overpower the others. Congress enacts legislation, which the president can veto, which Congress can in turn override with two-thirds majorities in both houses. Congress also controls the federal budget, and thus can limit funding for the president’s agenda. The president is commander-in-chief of the military but cannot declare war; that power belongs to Congress. The president also appoints federal judges and other officials, but the Senate must confirm the appointments. The courts, meanwhile, interpret laws and can strike down legislation that they rule unconstitutional. All this means that a president’s powers are limited by the legislative and judicial branches of government – even if his party holds a majority in Congress.

The president thus has a limited ability to wield power over U.S. foreign policy. Moreover, the United States’ global posture isn’t a product of its politics or policymaking to begin with. America’s evolution as the leader of the Western world was largely driven by economic interests and the idea that global markets, mobility and interconnectivity would bring profit to U.S. businesses and drive economic growth and development. The role of the private sector – sometimes in coordination with the government – is central to the country’s global standing. Though interactions between companies and politicians are complex, one of the ways in which businesses influence foreign policy is by lobbying representatives in Congress to pursue policies that meet their interests abroad. This pressure resulted in legislation that made it possible for administrations to implement strategies that, over time, turned the U.S. into an economic leader and superpower. This role enabled the government to maintain domestic stability and pursue growth.

Still, the United States’ approach on Ukraine is often perceived in Europe as a reflection of the administration’s global priorities. During my visit to Washington, Congress was discussing a new Ukraine aid package, which was finally passed on Saturday. Many of the Europeans present at the talks tied the matter to America’s leadership role in the world. To many Americans, however, aid for Ukraine is treated more as a matter of domestic politics than foreign affairs. Recent polls indicate Americans are equally split between thinking the U.S. is doing too much for Ukraine and wanting the U.S. to do more.

Another topic of discussion was the security situation around the Black Sea. In 2022, a bill was introduced in Congress that would authorize the National Security Council to direct an interagency strategy to increase coordination with NATO and the European Union, deepen economic ties, and strengthen the security and democratic resilience of partners in the Black Sea region in accordance with U.S. values and interests. The bill was passed in 2023 and has become of increasing interest to the business community in both the U.S. and the Black Sea region.

Western businesses increasingly see opportunities here, especially with the Ukraine war and sanctions on Russia disrupting more traditional routes through which they conduct trade around the world. The Danube has become an alternate trade route linking the so-called Middle Corridor (which connects Southeast Asia to Europe through Central Asia and Turkey instead of Russia) to Germany’s North Sea coast. New rail and road projects linking Romania’s port of Constanta to Gdansk in Poland also have been discussed to help integrate European markets and build a strong containment line in Eastern Europe.

The future of these and other infrastructure projects will depend on how states and businesses address the fallout of the war, its duration and the strategies of both Russia and Ukraine for rebuilding after its conclusion. Any investment plans in Ukraine will need to take into account Russia’s long-term strategy, announced in 2023, to counter Western influence around the world. Thus, the Black Sea region can’t be decoupled from the future of Ukraine – as some suggested during my trip to Washington. Should Ukraine be forced to negotiate ceding parts of its territory to Russia, Kyiv could fall under Russian influence in the longer term – which wouldn’t require a massive investment from Moscow considering the socio-economic realities in Ukraine today. The biggest risk many grappled with was that Ukraine could become a failed state, a black hole between Europe and Russia that Moscow could eventually control.

[Crafty_Dog]

Third

https://gilbertdoctorow.com/2024/11/22/11-minutes-to-berlin-14-minutes-to-brussels-19-minutes-to-london-russias-new-hypersonic-medium-range-ballistic-missile-shows-what-it-can-do/

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2024/11/21/xrcx-n21.html?fbclid=IwY2xjawGu8IRleHRuA2FlbQIxMAABHddehV7rmqyMc-GPOq02Csf-gjSbbEVLoikRaPWUF6gRWmZGAs7K758lzg_aem_i58x1NP5Tcd1p7-mqiX6_A

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/sweden-joins-danes-guarding-chinese-ship-in-cable-probe/ar-AA1uCTKU?ocid=msedgntp&pc=HCTS&cvid=40f733dc926e48a78c7807c3bf04886a&ei=27

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2024/11/senior-nato-official-says-prepare-wartime-scenario-as/

[ccp]

Europe, again may drag us into a war!   

Nazis, Communists, Fascists never ends

[Crafty_Dog]

Chinese Ship’s Crew Suspected of Deliberately Dragging Anchor for 100 Miles to Cut Baltic Cables
NATO warships surround Yi Peng 3, a Chinese bulk carrier at the center of an international probe into suspected sabotage
By
Bojan Pancevski
Follow
Updated Nov. 29, 2024 4:31 am ET


A Chinese commercial vessel that has been surrounded by European warships in international waters for a week is central to an investigation of suspected sabotage that threatens to test the limits of maritime law—and heighten tensions between Beijing and European capitals.

Investigators suspect that the crew of the Yi Peng 3 bulk carrier—225 meters long, 32 meters wide and loaded with Russian fertilizer—deliberately severed two critical data cables last week as its anchor was dragged along the Baltic seabed for over 100 miles.

Their probe now centers on whether the captain of the Chinese-owned ship, which departed the Russian Baltic port of Ust-Luga on Nov. 15, was induced by Russian intelligence to carry out the sabotage. It would be the latest in a series of attacks on Europe’s critical infrastructure that law-enforcement and intelligence officials say have been orchestrated by Russia.

“It’s extremely unlikely that the captain would not have noticed that his ship dropped and dragged its anchor, losing speed for hours and cutting cables on the way,” said a senior European investigator involved in the case.

The ship’s Chinese owner, Ningbo Yipeng Shipping, is cooperating with the investigation and has allowed the vessel to be stopped in international waters, according to people familiar with the probe. The company declined to comment.

The damage to undersea cables occurred in Swedish waters on Nov. 17-18, prompting that country’s authorities to open a sabotage investigation. Russia has denied wrongdoing.



Investigators suspect the Yi Peng 3 cut the BCS cable by dragging its anchor

They say the ship continued on this path with its anchor dropped, cutting the C-Lion 1

The position of Yi Peng 3 surrounded by NATO vessels as of Nov. 27

2

3

Source: Marine Traffic; Kpler; staff reports, Dr Benjamin Schmitt
Daniel Kiss/WSJ
Investigators have established that the ship dropped anchor but remained under way in Swedish waters on Nov. 17. The dragging anchor cut the first cable between Sweden and Lithuania shortly afterward, according to two people familiar with the investigation. The company that operates the cable in Lithuania said the outage took place at around 10 a.m. local time.

During that time, the ship’s transponder, which charts its movements on the so-called Automatic Identification System, shut down in what is known as a “dark incident” in marine traffic jargon. The ship then continued even as the dragging anchor greatly reduced its speed, according to satellite and other data reviewed by investigators.

Investigators say that at around 3 a.m. the following day, having traveled about 111 miles, the Yi Peng 3 cut the second cable between Germany and Finland. Shortly afterward, the ship started zigzagging, raised anchor and continued. Danish Navy ships then set out to pursue and intercept the Yi Peng 3, ultimately forcing it to anchor in the Kattegat Strait, which connects the Baltic and the North seas.

A review of the vessel’s anchor and hull showed damage consistent with having dragged its anchor and severed cables, people familiar with the investigation said.

“Given the mild weather conditions and manageable wave heights, the likelihood of accidental anchor dragging appears minimal,” according to an analysis prepared for The Wall Street Journal by Kpler, an analytics company that provides real-time data on international shipping.

While such incidents have been handled confidentially in the past, the damage to the internet cables last week quickly prompted public interventions from top European leaders.


The Yi Peng 3, left, is monitored by a Danish naval patrol vessel. Photo: mikkel berg pedersen/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
The crew of Yi Peng 3, which is captained by a Chinese national and includes a Russian sailor, hasn’t so far been questioned, according to people familiar with the probe, but a member of a Danish pilot ship briefly boarded the ship before it was anchored in the Kattegat Strait.

Several Western law-enforcement and intelligence officials said they didn’t think the Chinese government was involved in the incident but that they suspected Russian intelligence agencies were behind the sabotage.

“These are absurd, unsubstantiated accusations,” the Kremlin press office told the Journal. The same Western officials who point fingers at Russia were silent when Ukraine blew up the Nord Stream gas pipelines, the press office said in reference to the 2022 sabotage of the conduit for Russian gas to Europe.

“I would like to reiterate China’s consistent support working with all countries to maintain the security of international submarine cables and other infrastructure in accordance with international law,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning told reporters on Wednesday.

The Chinese bulk carrier is now guarded by a small flotilla of North Atlantic Treaty Organization ships belonging to Denmark, Germany and Sweden.

Previously neutral, Sweden is one of the newest members of NATO, having joined the military alliance in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Under international maritime law, NATO ships can’t force the Yi Peng 3 to sail into one of their ports. Swedish and German authorities are negotiating with the ship’s owner to obtain access to the vessel and question its crew.

You may also like

Tap For Sound
Underwater fiber-optic cables, carrying transactions worth trillions of dollars a day, are central to the U.S.-China tech war. WSJ explains the battle for influence beneath the waves. Illustration: Ksenia Shaikhutdinova
German police also dispatched the Bamberg, a patrol vessel, to investigate one of the incidents with underwater drones. Swedish and Danish ships have also examined the sites on the seabed.

European authorities must tread carefully because of their commitment to the freedom of navigation and upholding international law that underpins global trade, according to several European politicians, as well as security and law-enforcement officials familiar with the probe.

Since the launch of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin has been accused by Western officials of waging a shadow war on NATO territory in Europe to destabilize the West, including orchestrating attacks on undersea pipelines and data cables in the Baltic and the Arctic.

In October last year, a Chinese-registered vessel called Newnew Polar Bear cut the Balticconnector gas pipeline and a telecommunication cable connecting Finland and Estonia with its anchor, according to people familiar with the investigation into the case. Some officials briefed on the investigation said Russian sailors were aboard the Chinese ship at the time of that incident.

Newnew Polar Bear was allowed to proceed toward Arctic Russia because authorities in Sweden, Denmark and Norway didn’t want to halt the ship without sound legal backing, according to officials.


The Chinese ship made calls at Russian ports such as Nakhodka. Photo: tatiana meel/Reuters
But in the case of Yi Peng 3, the Danish Navy decided to intervene quickly to stop the ship after the second cable was damaged, people familiar with the investigation said.

Yi Peng 3 had operated solely in Chinese waters from December 2019 through early March 2024, when it suddenly changed its pattern of operation, said Benjamin L. Schmitt, senior fellow at the University of Pennsylvania’s Kleinman Center for Energy Policy.

The Chinese ship then started carrying Russian coal and other cargo, making calls in Russian ports such as Nakhodka on the Sea of Japan, several trips to the Port of Murmansk in the Barents Sea and a trip to the Baltic Sea. At present, the ship is loaded with Russian fertilizers, according to Kpler data.

“While this alone is not enough to provide evidence of Russian involvement, the fundamental change in the ship’s operating region to Russian ports after years operating solely in Chinese waters should be a key area of investigation for European authorities,” Schmitt said.

The cable connecting Sweden and Lithuania was repaired on Nov. 28, said a spokesman for Arelion, the company that operates it. The second cable, connecting Finland and Germany, was restored on Nov. 29, according to Cinia, the owner.

[Crafty_Dog]

Second

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/would-you-survive-72-hours-germany-and-the-nordic-countries-prepare-citizens-for-possible-war/ar-AA1uXnSy?ocid=msedgntp&pc=HCTS&cvid=5cd02377c9374430ba8e1292a1ee754f&ei=57

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/we-re-going-to-take-back-the-baltic-states-they-re-ours/ar-AA1v4l3b?ocid=msedgdhp&pc=U531&cvid=c9cc27095b7a415ab671c19b4ce9186b&ei=22

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20241206-%F0%9F%94%B4-romania-s-top-court-annuls-first-round-of-presidential-vote-won-by-far-right-s-calin-georgescu

https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/cynical-overtakes-sacred-as-the-west?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=1351274&post_id=152681648&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&token=eyJ1c2VyX2lkIjo1ODg4MTI0MCwicG9zdF9pZCI6MTUyNjgxNjQ4LCJpYXQiOjE3MzM2MjQyNzUsImV4cCI6MTczNjIxNjI3NSwiaXNzIjoicHViLTEzNTEyNzQiLCJzdWIiOiJwb3N0LXJlYWN0aW9uIn0.2avj4DXZCUq9wCy5t7B1qscEw9XjYJNfBkv1-4tMQfg&r=z2120&triedRedirect=true&utm_medium=email

[Crafty_Dog]

December 12, 2024
View On Website
Open as PDF

Romania Takes an Election Mulligan
Foreign interference aggravated political divisions but didn’t create them.
By: Antonia Colibasanu

Romania’s 2024 presidential election was annulled earlier this month due to foreign interference. In the first round, held on Nov. 24, independent candidate Calin Georgescu led with 23 percent of the vote, followed by Elena Lasconi of the Save Romania Union with 19 percent. But certain irregularities and intelligence reports revealed hybrid mis- and disinformation attacks that favored Georgescu. By Dec. 4, President Klaus Iohannis declassified reports identifying a “foreign nation” as the culprit, later confirmed to be Russia. On Dec. 6, the Constitutional Court annulled the results under Article 50 of the Constitution, citing significant amounts of fraud, and ordered a rerun. Both Georgescu and Lasconi criticized the decision, but preparations for a new election are underway, with Iohannis remaining in office for now.

It is reasonable to believe that Russia has supported disinformation campaigns in Romania, a strategically important state on NATO’s frontline and a key U.S. partner in the Black Sea region. As a host of U.S. troops and a staunch supporter of Ukraine, Romania plays a vital role in regional stability. U.S. forces stationed in Romania operate from key locations, including the Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base near the Black Sea, a critical hub for NATO operations and logistics. These deployments are, in no uncertain terms, meant to deter Russia.

Its U.S. partnership aside, Romania has indigenously fashioned itself into a security hub for Eastern Europe. Hosting one of NATO’s new multinational battlegroups, which was established in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Romania plays a vital role in bolstering the alliance's defense architecture. The country is a key location for NATO’s ballistic missile defense system and a hub for enhanced air policing missions, with allied air forces operating from Romanian bases to secure Eastern European airspace. Its contributions to NATO's integrated air and missile defense are equally critical in integrating advanced capabilities such as multirole F-16 fighter jets, Patriot missile systems, and the Control and Reporting Center in Bucharest through NATO's southern Combined Air Operations Center in Torrejon, Spain.

In recent years, Romania has significantly increased its defense expenditures, committing 2.5 percent of its gross domestic product to defense for 2025 and investing in modernization initiatives to address pressing security challenges, particularly along the Black Sea coast. As part of these efforts, Romania has upgraded its naval capabilities by acquiring two minesweepers from the United Kingdom, retrofitting four missile ships and signing a $128 million contract with Raytheon for four naval strike missile systems to enhance coastal defense. Furthermore, Romania plans to acquire 54 K9 Thunder self-propelled howitzers from South Korea in a $920 million deal, marking a major upgrade in its artillery capabilities. These efforts are supported by a direct loan agreement with the United States to further modernize military infrastructure and equipment.

Romania has also taken steps to become a regional center for defense innovation. South Korea's Hanwha Aerospace plans to build an armored vehicle production facility in partnership with Romanian state-owned defense firm Romarm and aerospace research company INCAS to support systems like K9 howitzers and Redback vehicles. Germany's Rheinmetall has expanded its operations in Romania by acquiring a majority stake in Automecanica Medias SRL for local production of Lynx armored fighting vehicles.

In short, Romania is a strategic pillar along the new Western containment line – which explains why Moscow would see it as hostile to its interests and why it would be a target for disinformation campaigns. A politically destabilized Romania, where public trust in the government is low, would weaken its commitment to Western policies, ultimately undermining the U.S.-Romania partnership and thus the broader Western alliance.

Russia has an urgent need now more than ever to intensify its efforts to disaggregate its enemies to the west. With its military struggling to win the war in Ukraine, destabilizing Romania serves two purposes: It undermines Romania’s ability to support Ukraine logistically and politically, and it disrupts alternative trade routes such as the Danube and Black Sea corridors that are vital to sustaining Ukraine’s economy. Backing candidates who promote isolationist or anti-Western policies aligns with Russia’s broader objective to fracture NATO and the European Union and thus weaken regional resistance to its efforts in Ukraine.

However, Moscow’s disinformation efforts are more about emphasis than they are about wholesale lies. The Kremlin has been amplifying issues that already resonate with the public. By focusing on topics that are inherently appealing or contentious, Russia ensures its propaganda is both subtle and believable, making it far easier for the general public to accept and internalize. This approach significantly enhances the effectiveness of its campaigns, especially among groups that are eager to consume them.

One such group is the anti-establishment, extremist and sovereigntist movement. In Romania, social distress and political polarization have created a fertile environment for these kinds of movements to gain traction. (It’s a similar story throughout much of Europe.) There is widespread perception that the country's institutions are fragile and largely dysfunctional, with leadership dominated by clientelists rather than civil servants. Many believe the state is controlled by politicians who prioritize their own economic interests over public welfare, fueling further disillusionment and creating an opening for anti-establishment narratives to thrive.

The COVID-19 pandemic, meanwhile, aggravated social disparities and amplified frustrations over inequality. Political discourse increasingly emphasized the influence of the "global elite" in setting rules for everyone. This narrative, adopted and amplified by anti-establishment movements, became a cornerstone of insurgent political campaigns, resonating strongly with a disenchanted electorate. Notably, communist nostalgia remains a potent force in Romanian society, providing another layer of support for these movements. By framing their messages around themes of social injustice and inequality, these groups tap into the lingering sentiment about the communist era, a time perceived by some as marked by security and stability.

For instance, they have criticized the privatization of state-owned industries, arguing it undermines the country's self-sufficiency – a key priority during communist times. By reminding people of the common perception that communism allowed the state to provide jobs and control prices, these campaigns appeal to segments of the electorate that feel left behind in the transition to a market economy. Both Georgescu and the other main populist, anti-establishment leader, George Simion, frequently allude to Ceausescu-era rhetoric about national pride and independence, particularly in criticizing foreign influence in the Romanian government's economic and political decisions.

Georgescu's political platform thus aligns rhetorically and thematically with other anti-establishment movements across Europe. But it also stands apart in a few important ways. First, it draws heavily on the Christian nationalist rhetoric of Romania’s interwar Iron Guard, a far-right movement banned in Romania, similar to how fascist groups are outlawed in Germany. Georgescu’s rhetoric emphasizes traditional values, nationalism and a return to Romania’s cultural roots. This has appealed to a certain segment of voters.

Second, Georgescu incorporates language and ideas reminiscent of Ted Kaczynski’s critiques of industrial capitalism and modern technology. Better known as the Unabomber, Kaczynski was an American anti-technology theorist who carried out a terrorist bombing campaign between 1978 and 1995 that targeted academics, business people and airlines, killing three and injuring 23 others. In his book “The Great Renaissance”, Georgescu repeatedly cites Kaczynski’s manifesto, “Industrial Society and Its Future,” and adopts similar critiques of the "hypercomplexity" of modern society and the industrial capitalist system, which he views as incompatible with human freedom and autonomy. In his presidential campaign, Georgescu often blamed the Western elite for the people’s problems, positioning himself as a messianic figure meant to liberate the Romanian nation.

Georgescu's emergence also marks a first for European anti-establishment movements. Unlike the other populist and nationalist movements, Georgescu’s platform embodies a neo-Marxist and extreme-left platform that has gained traction in Romania over the past decade. And because his critiques are not exactly unique to Romania alone, it’s possible that other populist movements across Europe may draw inspiration from his platform, potentially fueling the rise of extremist ideologies that incorporate the fringes of both far-left and far-right perspectives.

Romanian authorities might successfully counter foreign electoral interference in this instance, but the entire episode shows two things. First, it doesn’t erase the extremist platform existing in Romania, and the way the government handles the current crisis could reveal how democracies will tackle similar circumstances in the future. Second, and perhaps more important, this incident reveals that there is fertile ground in Europe for such ideologies to take root and grow. It not only threatens to weaken the Western alliance but also poses a significant challenge to its foundational liberal values.

[Crafty_Dog]

December 13, 2024
View On Website
Open as PDF

How Russia Defends Its Baltic Lifeline
Sabotage and satellite navigation jamming are key pieces of Moscow’s arsenal.
By: Ekaterina Zolotova

European authorities are pretty sure someone is deliberately cutting their undersea cables and scrambling ships’ navigation systems in the Baltic Sea, and they are pretty sure Russia is involved. They are probably right. With its war against Ukraine occupying most of Russia’s military resources, and Sweden and Finland’s accession to NATO threatening to turn the Baltic Sea into a “NATO lake,” Moscow is apparently turning to hybrid attacks to protect its position in the Baltic region.

In November, two undersea fiber optic cables (one between Lithuania and Gotland Island, the other between Germany and Finland) suddenly went offline less than 24 hours apart. Finding that the cables had been severed, investigators quickly zeroed in on a Chinese bulk carrier that had left Russia’s port of Ust-Luga a couple of days earlier and that was in the vicinity of the cables when they shut down. They believe Russian officials induced the ship’s crew to drag its anchor along the seabed for more than 160 kilometers (100 miles) to sabotage the cables. Lending credibility to their suspicions, a nearly identical incident occurred in October 2023 involving a Chinese container ship dragging its anchor and damaging telecoms cables linking Estonia to Finland and Sweden as well as a Finland-Estonia gas pipeline. Meanwhile, European ships operating in the Baltic Sea are increasingly reporting issues with their navigation systems. European officials have accused Russia of jamming navigation satellite signals and falsifying (or “spoofing”) automatic identification system data, which shows ships’ locations to reduce the likelihood of collisions.

Baltic Sea Cables
(click to enlarge)

Since Peter the Great, Russian leaders have placed huge importance on controlling the Baltic region to further Russia’s economic security, well-being and defense. The Baltic Sea offers Russia’s shortest route to the Atlantic Ocean, and in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war, the route is only growing in importance. Less Russian oil and gas are reaching Europe via pipeline, increasing Moscow’s reliance on its Baltic ports and tankers to move its energy exports to more distant markets. The remaining ports in western Russia are either along the Arctic, where ships must contend with extreme weather and sea ice, or the Black Sea, where they risk Ukrainian attacks.

Russia’s navy faces two additional challenges. First, within days of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Turkey closed the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits to Russian (and Ukrainian) warships, as is its right under the 1936 Montreux Convention. Second, the fall of the Assad regime has cast doubt on the future of Russia’s naval base at Tartus, Syria. Both factors undermine the ability of the Russian navy to operate in the Mediterranean. Meanwhile, Moscow has grown more concerned about the security of its presence in Kaliningrad, a Russian exclave sandwiched between Poland and Lithuania and accessible by land only via the Baltic countries. The main port in Kaliningrad hosts Russia’s Baltic Fleet and is the country’s only Baltic port that is free from ice year-round.

Cargo Turnover of Russian Sea Ports by Basin

(click to enlarge)

Most worrisome to Moscow is that NATO’s dominance in the Baltic region is increasing alongside Russia’s dependence on the sea. With Finland and Sweden having joined NATO in response to the Russia-Ukraine war, members of the trans-Atlantic alliance now control 95 percent of the Baltic coastline. Additionally, NATO and its members have conducted several significant military exercises in the Baltic Sea this year. Last month, 15 NATO countries sent more than 4,000 personnel and 30 ships to participate in Finland’s annual Freezing Winds exercise, which practiced cooperation and defense of the Finnish coast and maritime areas. In October, NATO held its annual Neptune Strike exercise, some of which took place in the Baltic and North seas and involved 22 alliance members, approximately 15,000 personnel, and around 20 surface vessels and submarines. And in the summer, Baltops, NATO’s annual drill in the Baltic Sea region, featured 20 countries, more than 50 ships, 80 aircraft and helicopters, and 9,000 personnel. Separately, the U.S. in November inaugurated a new air defense base in northern Poland near the Baltic coast – a project some two decades in the making.

Moscow vowed a “symmetrical response” to meet these developments, but because of NATO’s dramatic military advantage over Russia in the Baltic region, its response has instead been highly asymmetrical. It is important for Russia not to provoke a military conflict in the Baltic region, considering its budget-draining war against Ukraine, which draws its forces to the south, as well as restrictions on its access to foreign capital and components necessary to support a rapid military build-up in the area. Thus, the mysterious sabotage of European undersea cables, as well as Russian electronic warfare in the Kaliningrad and Leningrad regions. Colloquially known as the “Baltic jammer,” the latter Russian response creates confusion for vessels trying to navigate the area. It also helps Russia’s “shadow fleet” of tankers evade Western sanctions by concealing their location and movements. Moscow also commonly conducts electronic warfare exercises in border areas, especially during NATO exercises.

Access to the Baltic Sea is critically important for Russia, both for national defense and for its economic security. Sanctions and the emergence of new challenges in other regions have only made the preservation of its Baltic access more urgent for Moscow. NATO’s dominance of the Baltic Sea deters the Kremlin from risking direct confrontation, but Russia has other tools to frustrate, preoccupy or warn off its Western adversaries.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/dec/13/europe-must-adopt-wartime-mindset-to-stop-putin-says-nato-chief

[Crafty_Dog]

Lots of interesting details here:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mVtf7emuqvo

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_qteyCWzmt4

[Crafty_Dog]

(10) THIRD NORDIC CABLE DAMAGED: The Finnish police are investigating another foreign ship after a power cable between Finland and Estonia was damaged this week. A Chinese ship reportedly crossed over the affected area just prior to the initial outage.

[Crafty_Dog]

Trump’s Return Leaves Europe on Its Own
The Continent can no longer count on the U.S. for unconditional security support.
By William A. Galston
Jan. 14, 2025 2:44 pm ET

Europe is beset by troubles, and the policies of the incoming Trump administration will deepen them.

During his first term, Donald Trump insisted that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s European members pay more for their own defense. While 23 NATO nations are now in compliance with the target of spending 2% of gross domestic product on defense, they remain far short of what it would take to defend themselves without America’s security guarantee.

Europe wasn’t always this weak. In 1988, West Germany’s army had nearly half a million soldiers; today, Germany’s active-duty army numbers only about 180,000. The army in the 1980s was equipped with more than 2,000 battle-ready tanks; today, only a few hundred are operational. After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, reunified Germany largely disarmed. So did countries throughout Western Europe. Governments gave priority to social programs over defense.

Shortly after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced a reorientation of Germany’s defense posture. It didn’t last long. Berlin’s 2025 budget included a modest increase of $1.3 billion for defense, and spending on military aid to Ukraine was cut in half from 2024’s level. This year Germany will give all families, regardless of income, a benefit payment of more than $3,000 per child—payable for offspring as old as 18 and in some cases 25. Annually, Germany will spend as much on that benefit alone as on defense. The country last year spent only 2.12% of its GDP on defense, compared with 27% on its social safety net.

Germany’s economic affairs minister has defended Germany’s expansive welfare state as necessary to “keep the country together” amid internal political strife and the rise of the populist right. If he’s correct, this bodes ill for the future of Germany’s willingness to contribute more to defense. Mr. Trump, meantime, insists the 2% defense spending threshold is too low. Something has to give, and it may be America’s security guarantee for European countries that can’t or won’t make hard fiscal choices.

Europe and the U.S. are also likely to collide on trade. Campaigning last fall, Mr. Trump said that “our allies treat us actually worse than our so-called enemies.” He elaborated: “In the military, we protect them, and then they screw us on trade.” His policies may trigger a trade war with the European Union.

The EU isn’t in a strong negotiating position. Its members are divided about the best response to Mr. Trump’s threats. France and Germany, its traditional leaders, are hobbled by weak governments. French President Emmanuel Macron’s disastrous decision to call elections last summer left him without a parliamentary majority. Mr. Scholz’s center-left Social Democratic Party is expected to lose next month’s German election to the center-right Christian Democrats and their allies, the Christian Social Union, after which it could take months to negotiate a new coalition.

Meanwhile, the crown jewel of European manufacturing—its automobile industry—is in crisis. In 2011 Europe produced 26% of all cars globally, well ahead of China and the U.S. Now China leads with 33% of the world’s production, while Europe’s share has fallen to 19%. The U.S. share remained roughly stable during this period.

European car manufacturers have lost their technological lead to China. European governments pushed electric vehicles, but the auto industry was slow to make the transition. This technological lag was sustainable as long as European exports of gasoline-powered vehicles to China remained robust. But now that China is rapidly shifting to EV production, Europe’s exports to China are shrinking. Worse, Chinese EVs now lead the world in technology and price, and China’s production capacity has outstripped its domestic demand.

This will likely result in a surge of Chinese exports, which higher U.S. tariffs will divert to Europe. This in turn will force Europe to choose between raising tariffs on Chinese imports, provoking Chinese countermeasures, and permitting the evisceration of its own auto industry.

In recent decades, Western European nations have made a series of bets that haven’t paid off. They assumed that they could remain economically competitive while government spending and regulatory burdens increased. They assumed that relations with Russia would remain manageable and that the flow of cheap Russian energy would continue. They assumed that they could absorb a record flow of immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa without disrupting social stability. Above all, they assumed that the trans-Atlantic alliance would endure indefinitely and that the U.S. would never tire of bearing a disproportionate burden for Europe’s defense.

As these bets failed, Europe’s citizens became dissatisfied with the dominant parties of the center left and center right and turned to right-wing populist-nationalists. For different reasons, voters in the U.K. and U.S. did as well.

Joe Biden is the last U.S. president for whom the trans-Atlantic alliance was a visceral commitment. Mr. Trump’s return to power proves that for most Americans, the postwar world is no longer living history. Everything depends on what replaces it.

[Crafty_Dog]

(9) RUTTE: NATO EXPECTS NEW CONFLICT IN 4-5 YEARS: Speaking at the NATO Defense Committee meeting yesterday, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte reiterated that NATO must “adopt a wartime mindset” to “deal with the dangers coming our way in the next four to five years.”

Why It Matters: NATO’s timeline for a direct military conflict with Russia has decreased from possibly 10 years away, to now four to five. Estonian intelligence officials had previously said possibly as few as three years, primarily due to Russia’s accelerated ability to reconstitute its military. – M.S.

(14) ROMANIA BOLSTERS NATO DEFENSE IN SLOVAKIA, BULGARIA: The Romanian Army deployed anti-tank detachment to Slovakia and a reconnaissance unit to Bulgaria as part of efforts to increase NATO defense along what it calls its “Eastern Flank” against Russia. This follows the deployment of an air defense detachment to Poland.
(15) FORMER SOVIET OFFICER ARRESTED, SENTENCED IN LATVIA: A retired Soviet intelligence officer was arrested and recently sentenced to eight years in prison for espionage and possession of explosives. According to Latvian authorities, the man had been scouting potential targets in critical infrastructure, and passed that information back to Russian intelligence.

[Crafty_Dog]

Trump Can Make Russia Pay to Rebuild Ukraine
The West has frozen $300 billion of Moscow’s assets, but Europe has stood in the way of using them.
By Niall Ferguson and Chris Miller
Jan. 16, 2025 5:12 pm ET

The key to securing Europe at less cost to U.S. taxpayers may be sitting in European bank accounts. The West has frozen around $300 billion of Russian foreign-exchange assets, but European obstinacy has prevented these funds from being used to compensate Ukraine for war damages. President-elect Trump should insist that the Kremlin’s reserves be mobilized to fund Ukraine’s reconstruction and future arms purchases.

Russia has caused more than $150 billion in direct damage to Ukraine and nearly $500 billion in economic losses, according to the World Bank. Ukraine will need external funds of this magnitude to rebuild, and more in the meantime to rearm itself with continued purchases of Western weapons.

Mr. Trump doesn’t want the U.S. to foot this bill, especially with America’s military already spread thin in the Middle East and Asia. European budgeters are planning to increase their own defense spending, as Mr. Trump demands, so they’ll be stretched thin as well. The obvious solution is to use the frozen Russian assets.

The Group of Seven has already agreed to tap the profits from interest produced by the frozen assets. But because of European opposition, aided and abetted by the inept diplomacy of the Biden administration, tapping these profits unlocked only a $50 billion loan for Ukraine and left the underlying assets untouched. This isn’t enough.

Five factors make now the ideal time to use these funds to compensate Russia’s victims.

The first is Mr. Trump’s return to the White House. President Biden always accepted the lowest common denominator among allies, letting foot-dragging leaders such as Germany’s Olaf Scholz offer speeches rather than substance. Mr. Trump knows how to exert leverage—and Europeans know that if they don’t act, he’ll turn the screws.

Second, the assets have changed. When the war started, most Russian reserves were in the form of foreign-government securities held by European custodians. Now, according to the Hoover Institution’s Philip Zelikow, the securities have largely matured into cash. Up to a third may be held in dollars or British pounds—potentially giving Washington and London the ability to act unilaterally.

Third, it’s clear that the reserves can be mobilized in ways consistent with international law. Ukraine is owed reparations from Russia. Lee Buchheit, an expert in sovereign-assets law, proposed in 2023 that Western countries could lend to Ukraine cash secured by Kyiv’s right to receive these reparations. Assuming Russia refuses to pay, the West could set off the foreign reserves against this obligation.

Alternatively, Mr. Zelikow proposes moving the assets to a trust fund to compensate Ukraine for war damages, the same way that Saddam Hussein’s foreign reserves were used to rebuild Kuwait after the Gulf War. Allied powers did something similar after the world wars, using German assets to pay for reparations. The European excuse that international law prohibits moving on the reserves no longer holds water.

Fourth, Russia has less ability to retaliate economically. Any assets that Western firms still own in Russia are increasingly beyond their control. Income is difficult or impossible to repatriate. The Kremlin is already using strong-arm measures against these firms, and in most cases, they have already written down their value. Moscow can’t do much more damage than it already has.

Fifth, many European governments are finally warming to the idea. Europeans realize that Ukraine needs a long-term source of funds, and change is coming in the most important country, Germany. Mr. Scholz will likely be replaced in February by Friedrich Merz, who has rightly criticized Mr. Scholz’s bare-minimum support for Ukraine. Mr. Merz has yet to take a stand on the foreign-assets question, but mobilizing Russia’s reserves would fit with his vision—and his need to address Mr. Trump’s insistence that Europe contribute more to its own security.

The Trump administration has a unique opportunity to strike a better deal. Both sides of the Atlantic would benefit from transferring Mr. Putin’s cash to the victims of his aggression—the sooner, the better.

Mr. Ferguson is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and author of “Doom: The Politics of Catastrophe.” Mr. Miller is a professor of international history at Tufts University and nonresident senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

[DougMacG]

The frozen assets will no doubt be in the peace agreement negotiations.

[Crafty_Dog]

Transnistria's energy crisis. Russia will likely supply natural gas to Moldova’s breakaway region of Transnistria via Turkey, according to Russian newspaper Kommersant. The outlet reported that Cypriot company Ozbor Enterprises booked a section of the TurkStream pipeline with a capacity consistent with Transnistria’s gas needs, and that deliveries could begin as early as Feb. 1. The Russia-backed region has been experiencing an energy crisis since Russia’s Gazprom cut off supplies at the beginning of the month, citing unpaid debts. On Monday, contrary to the Kommersant report, Moldova indicated that officials from Transnistria had agreed to accept supplies from the European market.

[Crafty_Dog]

January 20, 2025
View On Website
Open as PDF

Europe: The Agony and Ecstasy of US Relations
The solutions to some of the Continent’s most pressing challenges are in Washington’s hands.
By: Antonia Colibasanu

One of the most pressing geopolitical issues Europe faces is its evolving relationship with the United States. This relationship will be critical as Europe navigates a complex geopolitical landscape shaped by two interrelated dynamics, over which Europe itself has little control: Washington’s stance toward Russia, particularly with regard to the war in Ukraine, and the nature of U.S.-China relations. Together, these factors will significantly impact European stability, security and autonomy.

To be sure, Europe has no shortage of challenges. There has been a marked increase in radical and populist political parties – right and left – that have aggravated an already fractured political landscape. Many of these groups have adopted a more conciliatory stance toward Russia, thus undermining collective efforts to maintain sanctions and to fully support Kyiv. Domestic criticism over Israel’s actions in Gaza remains, as does the general uncertainty surrounding the new balance of power in the Middle East. (The associated discontent over northbound migration is also a major source of concern.) And this is to say nothing of the instability in the European periphery – in the Balkans, in the Caucasus, in Moldova, across the Mediterranean and elsewhere. In this politically charged environment, Europe faces mounting pressure to reconcile its internal instabilities with its external obligations. The interplay of rising populism, economic discontent and foreign policy challenges underscores the fragility of European unity.

But the war in Ukraine stands alone in its ability to impact European politics, security and economic affairs. Yet it is the United States, not Europe itself, that seems to hold the keys to locking the conflict down. The level of U.S. commitment to Ukraine, then, will be a decisive factor in determining Europe’s strategic direction, especially as a new president takes office with a self-proclaimed mandate to end the war.

Either way, the U.S. will have to deal with Russia. Russia’s strategic imperative in the conflict, however, is more than a matter of territorial ambition. Sure, controlling Ukrainian territory achieves certain tactical objectives, but they are secondary to the broader goal of limiting U.S. influence in Europe and expanding Russia's own. For Moscow, pushing the U.S. out of Europe would be a major geopolitical victory because it would allow Russia to better align the Continent’s security and political order with its interests. Winning the war in Ukraine would, in theory, contribute to this goal. The problem is that Russia has not won the war; if anything, it has been significantly weakened by it.

Despite these challenges, Russia has shown a desire to discuss the stalemate directly with Washington. This is a deliberate strategy to bypass Ukraine and European powers. By sidelining them, Russia can undermine their agency and position itself as a primary negotiator on European security. This approach reflects its broader ambition of redefining power relations on the Continent, even as its current position remains compromised by its faltering campaign in Ukraine.

For Europe, this adds another layer of complexity to its strategic calculations. European leaders must navigate not only the immediate challenges of supporting Ukraine and managing the fallout of the war but also the broader implications of Russia’s long-term objectives. The outcome of this dynamic – whether through negotiations or continued conflict – will significantly influence the balance of power in Europe and its relationship with both the U.S. and Russia.

Meanwhile, the relationship between the U.S. and China looms large over Europe’s policy landscape. If tensions between the U.S. and China escalate – whether through economic decoupling, technological rivalry, or intensified security competition in the Indo-Pacific – Europe risks being caught in the geopolitical crossfire. Intensified U.S.-China tensions would not only strain European economies but also affect Sino-Russian relations and thus the outcome of the Ukraine war.

The prospect is already casting a shadow over much of the Continent. Beijing’s strategic interest in Europe revolves around preserving its access to the EU’s common market, a critical pillar of its economic ambitions and global influence. This priority underpins China’s efforts to cultivate bilateral relationships with specific European member states in an effort to undermine EU unity and prevent collective action that might restrict its market access. By offering economic incentives such as investments and trade deals, China has successfully forged closer ties with countries such as Hungary, Greece and others that are strategically significant, economically, politically or otherwise. In simple terms, to weaken Europe's cohesion is to weaken its leverage in negotiations.

At the same time, China has expanded its investments in European port infrastructure, including ports in countries that border the EU. These investments are part of a broader strategy to secure physical access to the European market and establish economic dependencies with peripheral states. By controlling key nodes in Europe’s supply chain, China can ensure it has uninterrupted access to trade and increase its political leverage over countries that benefit from Chinese investment.

China’s positioning in the Ukraine war reflects this strategic calculus. By presenting itself as neutral, Beijing avoids alienating the EU. By maintaining ties with Russia, it hedges its bets while benefiting from Russia’s international isolation. This delicate approach is driven by the need to avoid secondary sanctions that could harm China’s economy, particularly as it anticipates the possibility of increased U.S. tariffs on its exports. Beijing’s overriding goal is to prevent a united Western front that could threaten its economic stability. As U.S.-China tensions escalate, Europe remains a key battleground for influence.

China and Russia both rely on European disunity and fragmentation to advance their strategic objectives, recognizing that a divided Europe is less capable of collective action and more vulnerable to external influence. Russia exploits internal divisions through energy dependencies, information campaigns and direct political interference. China employs economic tools such as targeted investments, bilateral trade agreements and infrastructure projects to establish dependencies. Though their methods differ, they share a common goal: diminishing U.S. influence on the Continent, limiting NATO’s effectiveness and, ideally, reshaping Europe’s political and economic landscape to serve their own needs.

This is why it’s so important to monitor U.S.-European relations going forward. While the trans-Atlantic partnership remains a cornerstone of European stability, there is increased recognition in Europe of the need to pursue greater self-reliance in areas such as defense, energy security and technological innovation. The degree to which Europe can do so – while consolidating its position and resisting external attempts to exploit its divisions – will determine whether it emerges as a more unified and independent actor on the global stage. And how the U.S. responds to these efforts – whether by reinforcing its commitment to European security or recalibrating its approach – will shape the future of the trans-Atlantic relationship and its role in countering the influence of external powers like China and Russia. In this way, the U.S.-European relationship will become as much a source of strength as it is a point of tension.

[Crafty_Dog]

(9) POLAND’S LONG MISSILE TIMELINE SUGGESTS DELAYED WAR TIMELINE: Poland’s National Defence Minister signed a deal yesterday to acquire over 200 anti-radiation missiles from America, set for delivery between 2029 and 2035. Published inventories do not include any type of anti-radiation missile for Poland, a key component to suppressing enemy air defenses.
Why It Matters: The late delivery and negotiations of a key missile type suggest Poland is completely uncommitted to suppression of enemy air defense in the next five years or Poland does not believe they will need to suppress enemy air defenses until the 2030s. This is contrary to what many European and NATO officials are predicting for a war with Russia. - J.V.