Author Topic: Privacy, Big Brother (State and Corporate) and the 4th & 9th Amendments  (Read 563161 times)


Crafty_Dog

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SCOTUS gives IRS broad new power
« Reply #1201 on: May 21, 2023, 06:56:34 AM »
Supreme Court Rules IRS Can Secretly Grab Bank Records of Outside Parties
The IRS building is seen in Washington on Sept. 28, 2020. (Erin Scott/Reuters)
The IRS building is seen in Washington on Sept. 28, 2020. (Erin Scott/Reuters)
Matthew Vadum
By Matthew Vadum
May 19, 2023Updated: May 20, 2023
biggersmaller Print

0:00
6:27



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The Supreme Court has ruled unanimously in a delinquent taxpayer case that it is lawful for the IRS to secretly summons the bank records of third parties.

In other words, the nation’s highest court recognized that the Internal Revenue Service is not required to notify third parties who are not under investigation when seeking a summons for banking records thought to be relevant to the tax delinquency of another person.

One lawyer who briefed the Supreme Court said the new ruling gives the IRS “startlingly broad authority to pry into the financial records of people who may be only remotely connected to a delinquent taxpayer.”

The ruling, a victory for the Biden administration, came after the administration’s attempts to strengthen IRS enforcement efforts became an issue in the midterm congressional elections. The Inflation Reduction Act, which President Joe Biden signed into law in August 2022, allocated almost $80 billion to the IRS to hire an extra 87,000 agents. Democrats say the IRS has long been underfunded, but Republicans say the extra money will be used to harass taxpayers.

At oral arguments on March 29 the justices had seemed sympathetic to the claim of the wife of a man who owed substantial taxes that the IRS went too far in pursuing her bank records without prior notice. At the same time, they acknowledged the agency needs effective tools to attempt to collect delinquent accounts.

Chief Justice John Roberts wrote the court’s opinion (pdf) in Polselli v. IRS, court file 21-1599, which was issued on May 18.

The IRS claims Remo Polselli owes $2 million in assessed taxes and penalties and issued summonses without notice seeking financial records from banks. His bank records as well as those of his wife, Hanna Polselli, and law firms that performed work for them were sought.

The Biden administration said the IRS does not need to provide notice to third parties and that having to do so would give delinquent taxpayers “a head start in hiding assets.” Besides, the administration argued, persons involved in the process have access to the courts to combat alleged abuses.

Petitioner Hanna Polselli and the law firms argued that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit departed from a 2000 ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, creating a circuit split the Supreme Court needed to resolve.

The 6th Circuit held that the disputed summonses were lawful because they were covered by an exception in the tax code pertaining to third-party record keepers. The 6th Circuit rejected the 9th Circuit’s holding that the exception applies only when the targeted taxpayer has a recognized legal interest in the records.

But the Supreme Court disagreed with Polselli and affirmed the 6th Circuit ruling.

“Congress has given the IRS considerable power to go after unpaid taxes,” Roberts wrote.

“One tool at the Service’s disposal is the authority to summon people with information concerning a delinquent taxpayer. But to safeguard privacy, the IRS is generally required to provide notice to anyone named in a summons, who can then sue to quash it. Today’s case concerns an exception to that general rule.”

The IRS is allowed to request the production of “books, papers, records, or other data” from “any person” who possesses information concerning a delinquent taxpayer, Roberts wrote.

“Given the breadth of this power, Congress has imposed certain safeguards” and generally has to give notice of the summons to any person identified in the summons, who is then entitled to bring a motion to quash the summons. But notice does not have to be provided if the summons is issued in aid of the collection of an assessment made or judgment rendered.

“In other words, the IRS may issue summonses both to determine whether a taxpayer owes money and later to collect any outstanding liability. When the IRS conducts an investigation for the purpose of ‘determining the liability’ of a taxpayer … it must provide notice … But once the Service has reached the stage of ‘collecting any such liability,’ … —which is a distinct activity—notice may not be required.”

Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson filed a separate opinion concurring with the Supreme Court’s judgment. Justice Neil Gorsuch joined her concurring opinion.

Congress has “recognized that there might be situations, particularly in the collection context, where providing notice could frustrate the IRS’s ability to effectively administer the tax laws,” Jackson wrote.

“For instance, upon receiving notice that the IRS has served a summons, interested persons might move or hide collectable assets, making the agency’s collection efforts substantially harder.”

But when writing the tax code, Congress balanced the interests of the IRS and the taxpayer and “did not give the IRS a blank check, so to speak, to do with as it will in the collection arena,” Jackson wrote.

The Epoch Times reached out to Shay Dvoretzky, counsel for Polselli, and the U.S. Department of Justice, which represented the IRS, but had not received a reply from either as of press time.

Paul Sherman, counsel for the Institute for Justice, a nonprofit public interest law firm, expressed alarm at the new ruling. The group filed a friend-of-the-court brief in support of Polselli.

“The Supreme Court’s ruling grants the IRS startlingly broad authority to pry into the financial records of people who may be only remotely connected to a delinquent taxpayer.

“That ruling raises serious Fourth Amendment concerns. Thankfully, the Court stressed that its ruling was narrowly focused on the statutory question before it. In a future case, the Court should address the constitutional limits on the government’s power to demand access to people’s most sensitive financial information.”

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which also filed a friend-of-the-court brief in support of Polselli, declined to comment.

Crafty_Dog

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DougMacG

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Lost Privacy, 23 and me info for sale
« Reply #1203 on: October 09, 2023, 10:12:11 AM »
https://arstechnica.com/security/2023/10/private-23andme-user-data-is-up-for-sale-after-online-scraping-spree/

A quarter of a million pages of federal regulations alone - all the way down to what light bulb can you read under - and nothing that even warns about this.
« Last Edit: October 09, 2023, 10:30:49 AM by DougMacG »

Crafty_Dog

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WT: Curtaily Big Tech's privacy abuses
« Reply #1204 on: November 07, 2023, 04:25:42 AM »
Curtailing Big Tech’s privacy abuses

Just how far companies can go to use AI to track our every move

By Joseph R. Pitts and Ed Towns

The House Energy and Commerce Committee’s Innovation, Data and Commerce subcommittee recently held a hearing on the need to better protect Americans’ data privacy rights in the new artificial intelligence era, particularly from the Big Tech behemoths.

The committee is right: Artificial intelligence, while poised to bolster efficiency, innovation, and economic growth, should be allowed to grow only if Americans can maintain their rights and retain control of their sensitive information.

AI is pulling their data — including their sensitive information — from all corners of the web in an attempt to build and refine large corporations’ business models and user profiling algorithms.

Facebook’s Cambridge Analytica scandal highlighted this point well. The social media giant allowed Cambridge to collect millions of users’ data without their consent so the company could perfect its political digital advertising modeling. It used AI to make its digital campaigning tools even more targeted and powerful.

Less known but equally problematic is the example of Clearview AI, a U.S. company that collected photographs of children and adults for mass surveillance, facial recognition, and personal sale. This case study demonstrates just how far companies can go in using AI to track our every move.

While AI has become the technology whipping boy of the past few years, one of the testimonies Congress heard last month made a compelling point: The problem isn’t AI. It’s the lack of a comprehensive federal data privacy standard.

Even absent AI, for the past decade, unscrupulous companies have used and abused the fact that Congress has yet to define, enact and enforce privacy protections for today’s smart technology. Americans’ personal information is being continuously seized and monetized on too many digital channels as a result.

Drivers are victimized the second they get in their cars, especially their autonomous vehicles. These cars’ built-in sensors, cameras, microphones and GPS trackers are capturing unprecedented data about each user in what could become a $2 trillion revenue stream for the automotive industry. That’s a problem on its own, but it’s especially a concern when many of these car manufacturers have been found to have significant data security vulnerabilities.

Teenagers and families are often affected when they log in to social media websites and apps, where their information has sometimes been found to be tracked and mined without their consent.

Because minor privacy rules and statutes have not been updated meaningfully since 2013, even children are seemingly harmed by the absence of a federal privacy standard. We may have seen this when SchoolCare, a technology company used by over 3,000 schools nationally to connect students with health care services, sold itself to Findhelp, a social care company. A 2022 data breach that affected the information of 2 million minors followed. The Fourth Amendment protects Americans’ persons, homes and property from undue searches and seizures. But in this digital age, shouldn’t the same protections be extended to their digital presence and property? Shouldn’t we have property rights over our data and have the authority to say who can (or can’t) use it, and under what terms? The answer, of course, is yes, and the takeaway from Wednesday’s hearing was that Congress needs to create a federal privacy standard. While some pending bills, such as Sens. Marsha Blackburn and Richard Blumenthal’s Kids Online Safety Act, appear poised to pass and remedy small portions of this growing problem, a more comprehensive solution should also be considered. Some hearing participants spoke fondly of the framework presented in the American Data Privacy Protection Act, a bill that had resounding bipartisan support (and an impressive number of Democratic and Republican co-sponsors) last year but never received a rollcall vote. Perhaps Congress should consider resurrecting and reconsidering this framework in the upcoming lame-duck session. Truthfully, however, it doesn’t matter which solution members choose. All that matters is that it’s comprehensive enough to tackle the data privacy challenges that Americans have faced over the last decade — with not only AI but also the fast-moving digital economy more generally. The fate of their rights, their peace of mind, and their data security depend on it.

Joseph Pitts, a Republican who represented Pennsylvania in Congress from 1997 to 2017, and Ed Towns, a Democrat who represented New York in Congress from 1983 to 2013, served together on the House Energy and Commerce Committee

Body-by-Guinness

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CVS Customers (Among Others) Don’t Need No Stinkin’ Privacy
« Reply #1205 on: December 17, 2023, 09:05:34 AM »
One of the outcomes of my various medical travails is that I now use the pharmacy in the hospital a couple miles from home, for several reasons:

• They appear to have a more direct track to obtaining drugs. During the various Covid etc. supply chain “interruptions” I had no trouble snagging the sundry drugs I take such as Creon, which allows my pancreas-free bod digest protein, among others, while my wife who uses a national chain (freaking CVS, more on them in a bit) had difficulties.

• They are nicer. Think I mentioned I can’t take NSAIDs any more unless I want to part ways with my kidneys, too, and so am take various pain meds, which it seems like causes the chain pharmacists to assume I’m shady or something as I always get an off vibe. Well my chart is attached to my meds at the hospital so no explanations needed, and no askance glances received.

• No ‘effin’ robocalls. CVS in particular has a system in place that not only endlessly pesters you about refills and such, but which they also make quite difficult to opt out of. I don’t like doing business with companies that seem to assume out the gate I belong in a memory ward, if not being an outright candidate for protective restraint. The latter would also make it easier for ‘em to force feed me their nostrums.

And now:

• They are constrained by HIPPA and have lawsuit averse beancounters working for ‘em providing impetus NOT to release my medical records without a modicum of concern over my privacy, unlike the companies, including freaking CVS, noted below. 

https://science.slashdot.org/story/23/12/16/0549247/us-pharmacies-share-medical-data-with-police-without-a-warrant-inquiry-finds?utm_source=rss1.0mainlinkanon&utm_medium=feed

Body-by-Guinness

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Cato Seeks 702/FISA Data
« Reply #1206 on: February 22, 2024, 05:14:21 PM »
We were founded under principles of federal checks and balances. Where FISA is concerned, there are none:

Cato Seeks Injunction To Obtain DOJ Internal FISA Audits
Cato @ Liberty / by Patrick G. Eddington / Feb 22, 2024 at 11:49 AM
Patrick G. Eddington

Maximum public transparency has never been achieved during prior congressional debates over the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Section 702 electronic surveillance program. In an effort to break that pattern, the Cato Institute today filed a motion for a preliminary injunction (along with my declaration) against the Department of Justice (DOJ) over a long‐​standing Cato Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request seeking internal DOJ audits of the Section 702 program.

As I’ve noted previously, throughout its 15‐​year history, the Section 702 program has been responsible for violations of Americans’ Fourth Amendment rights at scale. Executive branch officials claim that the number of US‐​person‐​related queries of the Section 702 database have dropped from almost 3.4 million in 2021 to a mere several hundred thousand in 2022—still a radically high number of queries that generally appear to have had little if any connection to a genuine national security threat.

And there is one additional critical fact about the Section 702 program’s abuses that has never received significant press coverage or congressional attention.

The actual internal DOJ audits of the Section 702 program remain secret; only summaries of them have ever been made public. Accordingly, American citizens and Congress have no way of comparing DOJ claims about alleged reductions in violations with what the original audits themselves reveal about those violations.

In an effort to remedy that problem, in June 2023 Cato filed a FOIA request seeking the release of the Section 702 database audits available as of the date of the request. Instead of promptly processing Cato’s request, the DOJ sat on it for months.

Mindful of the looming April 19, 2024, expiration of the Section 702 authority, on February 8, Cato filed suit in federal district court in DC to compel disclosure of those records. With the DOJ still having failed to respond to Cato’s request, today Cato filed a preliminary injunction in the DC circuit court seeking expedited processing and release of the Section 702 query audits on or before March 29. We expect a decision from the court sometime next month.

Had the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) done its job—i.e., actually pushed the DOJ to make the full audits public—Cato would never have been forced to file the FOIA request and the subsequent legal actions in this case.

Instead, HPSCI chair Mike Turner (R‑OH) has been at war publicly and privately with other House GOP and Democratic members on the Judiciary Committee over their efforts to renew the Section 702 program only if it has a warrant requirement for the search of stored US persons data and a ban on the purchase of such information from data brokers. Turner’s actions should cause all House members to reevaluate whether or not the HPSCI should have any jurisdiction over surveillance programs that put Americans’ Fourth Amendment rights at risk.

https://www.cato.org/blog/cato-seeks-injunction-obtain-doj-internal-fisa-audits

Crafty_Dog

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WSJ loves Section 702
« Reply #1207 on: March 29, 2024, 03:46:44 PM »
Doubling up BBG's post here:

Body-by-Guinness


The WSJ Hearts 702
« Reply #96 on: March 28, 2024, 07:25:11 PM »

Oddly given their reputation the WSJ editorial board comes out in favor or renewing broad surveillance tools:

WSJ Ed Board Knifes Fourth Amendment, Betrays Journal's Reporters and Readers

Cato @ Liberty / by Patrick G. Eddington / Mar 27, 2024 at 12:19 PM

Patrick G. Eddington

Financial Surveillance
I’ve been in Washington over 30 years, but sometimes even I can be stunned by the short memories and shortsightedness of members of the Fourth Estate. Today’s example is the editorial board of the venerable (and usually pretty sane) Wall Street Journal.

The ostensible topic of their latest pronouncement (paywall) was the recent terrorist attack in Moscow, which appears to have been the work of violent Salafist terrorists. After offering some fairly standard pre‐​Trump era Establishment fare on the need for still more US military action in the Islamic world, the WSJ ed board ended its piece by stating,

The ISIS comeback also argues for the House to overcome its disagreements and reauthorize Section 702 authority to surveil foreign communications even if it accidentally catches some Americans in the sweep. The House Intelligence bill contains enough safeguards without adding bureaucratic and political obstacles to rapid surveillance of real threats. Americans don’t want another attack on U.S. soil like last week’s horror show in Moscow.

Item 1: The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Section 702 telecommunications intercept program does not “accidentally” sweep up the communications of US persons with no connection to criminal activity. The very structure and operational characteristics of both the 702 program and the global telecommunications system guarantee that the emails, text messages, and the like of innocent Americans are inevitably captured and stored in a vast database for years. It is a database that agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have repeatedly been found to have used to conduct warrantless digital fishing expeditions on Americans not wanted for any crime.

That means that the communications of Journal reporters (especially those traveling to or reporting from overseas) are very likely getting swept up via the 702 program. The same thing is almost certainly happening to the digital letters to the editor or op‐​eds submitted to the Journal by Americans overseas or who visit the Journal’s website to read its news coverage, etc. All of that, and literally millions of communications of other Americans are available for perusal by FBI agents with access to the 702 database. To be a cheerleader for a surveillance program that’s likely collecting the communications of its reporters and readers is probably not what those reporters or readers view as a legitimate government function or use of their taxpayer dollars.

Item 2: Multiple bills have been introduced to impose an actual warrant requirement for any federal law enforcement access to that stored data, but the most recent one introduced is a bipartisan Senate bill that, while not going as far as many privacy and civil liberties advocates would like, would be a vast improvement over where we are now with the 702 program. The House Intelligence Committee bill championed by the WSJ ed board would, if enacted, largely be another classic example of the old Capitol Hill game of “Let’s not but say we did” when it comes to surveillance reform. The Journal ed board seems not to recognize that the House and Senate Intelligence Committees have long been “organizationally captured” by the various intelligence and law enforcement entities they were created to oversee in 1978. Both committees are cheerleaders for mass surveillance, not our protectors from it.

Item 3: The Journal ed board is engaged in a form of magical thinking with respect to mass surveillance. No mass surveillance program has ever stopped a terrorist attack on America. That was the case with the 702 program’s progenitor, the infamous STELLAR WIND program. It was also the case with the PATRIOT Act’s Section 215 telephone metadata mass surveillance program. And while the FBI and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) continue to make incredible claims about the program’s effectiveness, the actual FBI internal audits of the 702 program have never been released. Cato is trying to remedy that information deficit via a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) lawsuit currently before D.C. Circuit Judge Tanya Chutkan.

The WSJ ed board could’ve enlightened its readers with all of these publicly available, sourced facts. Instead, it chose to fearmonger in favor of a program that is not and never has been Fourth Amendment compliant in the way the Founders intended, a program that almost certainly sweeps up the communications of its own reporters, editors, and readers. How the mighty have fallen.

DougMacG

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Big Brother will control your car
« Reply #1208 on: April 29, 2024, 01:52:48 PM »
https://uk.news.yahoo.com/cars-obey-speed-limits-automatically-134437613.html?guccounter=1

"When fitted, the technology will send a warning beep or the steering wheel will vibrate when drivers pass the speed limit. If the driver does not take action, the accelerator will ease up, reducing the speed to keep in line with the limit."

Feature will be offered as an "option".  Driver can switch it on and off.  Sure.  Here we go again with Lucy and the football.  How many things were sold to us that way?

Is anyone here a golfer?  When you rent a golf cart today, they might tell you to stay on the cart path. Don't get close to the green or tees. Then if you do, the GPS senses it and shut's off your vehicle. It only allows you to switch to reverse and back out. 

The central planners want central control of your vehicle, all vehicles.

A friend made fun of the age of my car.  I didn't think to tell him, I prefer vehicles built before they had a government shutoff switch.
« Last Edit: April 29, 2024, 01:54:57 PM by DougMacG »

Crafty_Dog

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Re: Privacy, Big Brother (State and Corporate) and the 4th & 9th Amendments
« Reply #1209 on: April 29, 2024, 06:21:21 PM »
This is a big part of the push for EVs.

DougMacG

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Re: Privacy, Big Brother (State and Corporate) and the 4th & 9th Amendments
« Reply #1210 on: April 30, 2024, 06:51:22 AM »
This is a big part of the push for EVs.

Like the Left said under Trump,  RESIST!

I wouldn't mind driving an electric car.  But not as my only vehicle and not one that connects to the internet or can be controlled or hacked remotely.

DougMacG

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Big Brother, Kill Switch
« Reply #1211 on: May 01, 2024, 07:06:36 AM »
https://frontline.news/post/kill-switch-to-be-mandated-in-cars-by-2026-with-software-deciding-if-you-re-too-impaired-to-drive

If you're too impaired to drive ... also if you're too conservative to drive or going somewhere not approved by the regime.

How many programs start small and innocent and then become monstrous?  All of them, always.

Body-by-Guinness

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Re: Privacy, Big Brother (State and Corporate) and the 4th & 9th Amendments
« Reply #1212 on: May 08, 2024, 09:57:09 AM »
I've long wondered how many of thes apps/utilities/social media platforms have spooks lurking about the backend:

Christopher F. Rufo
Signal’s Katherine Maher Problem
Is the integrity of the encrypted-messaging application compromised by its chairman of the board?
/ Eye on the News / The Social Order, Technology and Innovation
May 06 2024
/ Share
The encrypted-messaging service Signal is the application of choice for dissenters around the world. The app has been downloaded by more than 100 million users and boasts high-profile endorsements from NSA leaker Edward Snowden and serial entrepreneur Elon Musk. Signal has created the perception that its users, including political dissidents, can communicate with one another without fear of government interception or persecution.

But the insider history of Signal raises questions about the app’s origins and its relationship with government—in particular, with the American intelligence apparatus. Such a relationship would be troubling, given how much we have learned, in recent years, about extensive efforts to control and censor information undertaken by technology companies, sometimes in tandem with American government officials.

First, the origin story. The technology behind Signal, which operates as a nonprofit foundation, was initially funded, in part, through a $3 million grant from the government-sponsored Open Technology Fund (OTF), which was spun off from Radio Free Asia, originally established as an anti-Communist information service during the Cold War. OTF funded Signal to provide “encrypted mobile communication tools” to “Internet freedom defenders globally.”

Some insiders have argued that the connection between OTF and U.S. intelligence is deeper than it appears. One person who has worked extensively with OTF but asked to remain anonymous told me that, over time, it became increasingly clear “that the project was actually a State Department-connected initiative that planned to wield open source Internet projects made by hacker communities as tools for American foreign policy goals”—including by empowering “activists [and] parties opposed to governments that the USA doesn’t like.” Whatever the merits of such efforts, the claim—if true—suggests a government involvement with Signal that deserves more scrutiny.

The other potential problem is the Signal Foundation’s current chairman of the board, Katherine Maher, who started her career as a U.S.-backed agent of regime change. During the Arab Spring period, for instance, Maher ran digital-communications initiatives in the Middle East and North Africa for the National Democratic Institute, a largely government-funded organization that works in concert with American foreign policy campaigns. Maher cultivated relationships with online dissidents and used American technologies to advance the interests of U.S.-supported Color Revolutions abroad.

Maher then became CEO of the Wikimedia Foundation in 2016, and, earlier this year, was named CEO of National Public Radio. At Wikipedia, Maher became a campaigner against “disinformation” and admitted to coordinating online censorship “through conversations with government.” She openly endorsed removing alleged “fascists,” including President Trump, from digital platforms, and described the First Amendment as “the number one challenge” to eliminating “bad information.”

According to the insider, a woman named Meredith Whittaker, who became president of the Signal Foundation in 2022, recruited Maher to become board chair because of their mutual connections to OTF, where Maher also serves as an advisor, and to nonprofits such as Access Now, which “defends and extends the digital rights of users at risk around the world,” including in the Middle East and North Africa. Whittaker, like Maher, is highly ideological. She previously worked in a high position at Google and organized left-wing campaigns within the company, culminating in the 2018 “Google Walkout,” which demanded MeToo-style sexual harassment policies and the hiring of a chief diversity officer.

So what does all this mean for American users—including conservative dissidents—who believe that Signal is a secure application for communication? It means that they should be cautious. “Maher’s presence on the board of Signal is alarming,” says national security analyst J. Michael Waller. “It makes sense that a Color Revolutionary like Maher would have interest in Signal as a secure means of communicating,” he says, but her past support for censorship and apparent intelligence connections raise doubts about Signal’s trustworthiness. David Heinemeier Hansson, creator of the popular Ruby on Rails web-development framework, agrees, saying that it had “suddenly become materially harder” to trust the Signal Foundation under Maher’s board leadership.

For those who believe in a free and open Internet, Maher’s Signal role should be a flashing warning sign. As she once explained, she abandoned the mission of a free and open Internet at Wikipedia, because those principles recapitulated a “white male Westernized construct” and “did not end up living into the intentionality of what openness can be.” The better path, in her view, is managed opinion, using, alternately, censorship and promotion of dissent—depending on context and goal—as the essential methods.

We’re entering a dangerous period in political technology, and Maher is in the thick of it. Under her ideology, “Internet freedom” is a tactic, not a principle, and “fighting disinformation” means speech suppression, including here at home. When people tell you who they are, believe them.

Christopher F. Rufo is a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute, a contributing editor of City Journal, and the author of America’s Cultural Revolution.

https://www.city-journal.org/article/signals-katherine-maher-problem

DougMacG

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Privacy, Protonmail
« Reply #1213 on: May 09, 2024, 11:45:10 AM »
https://protos.com/protonmail-hands-info-to-government-but-says-its-not-google/
----------------

Protonmail hands over the info per subpoena.

I don't know if they did the right or the wrong thing but this doesn't seem as private and secure as presented.

What do others think?

Protonmail is Swiss and the subpoena was from Spain.  (Nothing to do with American laws.)

Crafty_Dog

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Re: Privacy, Big Brother (State and Corporate) and the 4th & 9th Amendments
« Reply #1214 on: May 09, 2024, 07:32:54 PM »
 :-o

ccp

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Re: Privacy, Big Brother (State and Corporate) and the 4th & 9th Amendments
« Reply #1215 on: May 10, 2024, 05:19:15 AM »
"I don't know if they did the right or the wrong thing but this doesn't seem as private and secure as presented"

I dunno either.
If because the person was a suspected tax cheat I would not like it.
If the person was conspiring to murder Jews or launch a terrorist attack I would be ok with it.

If some rich Spanish connected woman wanted to know if her husband was cheating - you guessed it.

Crafty_Dog

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Re: Privacy, Big Brother (State and Corporate) and the 4th & 9th Amendments
« Reply #1216 on: May 10, 2024, 06:53:45 AM »
A thought:

Once we start going on a case-by-case basis, the bright line will be vaporized.   There may be costs to it, but I'm thinking a bright line is worth it to have the privacy of our communications from the Surveillance State.

Body-by-Guinness

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Cell Phone Companies Sell Customer Location Data
« Reply #1217 on: May 13, 2024, 06:03:57 PM »
This is galling. I try to lock down all my devices re location data; not sure how effective this is is your cellphone company sells your data:

FCC Fines Major U.S. Wireless Carriers for Selling Customer Location Data
FCC fines wireless carriers $200M
•Krebs on Security / by BrianKrebs / Apr 29, 2024 at 5:06 PM
The U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) today levied fines totaling nearly $200 million against the four major carriers — including AT&T, Sprint, T-Mobile and Verizon — for illegally sharing access to customers’ location information without consent.



The fines mark the culmination of a more than four-year investigation into the actions of the major carriers. In February 2020, the FCC put all four wireless providers on notice that their practices of sharing access to customer location data were likely violating the law.

The FCC said it found the carriers each sold access to its customers’ location information to ‘aggregators,’ who then resold access to the information to third-party location-based service providers.

“In doing so, each carrier attempted to offload its obligations to obtain customer consent onto downstream recipients of location information, which in many instances meant that no valid customer consent was obtained,” an FCC statement on the action reads. “This initial failure was compounded when, after becoming aware that their safeguards were ineffective, the carriers continued to sell access to location information without taking reasonable measures to protect it from unauthorized access.”

The FCC’s findings against AT&T, for example, show that AT&T sold customer location data directly or indirectly to at least 88 third-party entities. The FCC found Verizon sold access to customer location data (indirectly or directly) to 67 third-party entities. Location data for Sprint customers found its way to 86 third-party entities, and to 75 third-parties in the case of T-Mobile customers.

The commission said it took action after Sen. Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) sent a letter to the FCC detailing how a company called Securus Technologies had been selling location data on customers of virtually any major mobile provider to law enforcement officials.

That same month, KrebsOnSecurity broke the news that LocationSmart — a data aggregation firm working with the major wireless carriers — had a free, unsecured demo of its service online that anyone could abuse to find the near-exact location of virtually any mobile phone in North America.

The carriers promised to “wind down” location data sharing agreements with third-party companies. But in 2019, reporting at Vice.com showed that little had changed, detailing how reporters were able to locate a test phone after paying $300 to a bounty hunter who simply bought the data through a little-known third-party service.

Sen. Wyden said no one who signed up for a cell plan thought they were giving permission for their phone company to sell a detailed record of their movements to anyone with a credit card.

“I applaud the FCC for following through on my investigation and holding these companies accountable for putting customers’ lives and privacy at risk,” Wyden said in a statement today.

The FCC fined Sprint and T-Mobile $12 million and $80 million respectively. AT&T was fined more than $57 million, while Verizon received a $47 million penalty. Still, these fines represent a tiny fraction of each carrier’s annual revenues. For example, $47 million is less than one percent of Verizon’s total wireless service revenue in 2023, which was nearly $77 billion.

The fine amounts vary because they were calculated based in part on the number of days that the carriers continued sharing customer location data after being notified that doing so was illegal (the agency also considered the number of active third-party location data sharing agreements). The FCC notes that AT&T and Verizon each took more than 320 days from the publication of the Times story to wind down their data sharing agreements; T-Mobile took 275 days; Sprint kept sharing customer location data for 386 days.

Update, 6:25 p.m. ET: Clarified that the FCC launched its investigation at the request of Sen. Wyden.

https://krebsonsecurity.com/2024/04/fcc-fines-major-u-s-wireless-carriers-for-selling-customer-location-data/

Body-by-Guinness

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Remember Kids, Your Printer Can Tattle on You
« Reply #1218 on: June 22, 2024, 08:39:02 PM »
My day job has me managing the print contract for a ~30K student university so I can rattle on about print minutia at length and indeed since taking over the contract have saved millions over previous spend a nickel at a time. I also know, though many don’t, most printers print small, hard to detect, individual patterns that allow those in the know to identify the specific printer an impression was created with and, IIRC, the date & time the piece was printed. Keep that in mind when knocking out your next anti-establishment political treatise:

https://hackaday.com/2024/06/22/in-future-printer-documents-you/
« Last Edit: June 22, 2024, 10:27:43 PM by Body-by-Guinness »

Crafty_Dog

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Re: Privacy, Big Brother (State and Corporate) and the 4th & 9th Amendments
« Reply #1219 on: June 23, 2024, 12:45:55 PM »
 :-o

Body-by-Guinness

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Making a Dishrag of the 4th Amendment
« Reply #1220 on: July 18, 2024, 01:55:50 PM »
I’m not a fan of this source, but read it to track of left wind/neocon/Never Trump views in the security world. This piece, however, does a good job of describing the breadth on domestic surveillance running contrary to the 4th amendment as well as the snooping tools used:

Time for U.S. Intelligence to Ask: How Did We Alienate so Many Americans?
Just Security / by Former U.S. Representative Bob Goodlatte / Jul 18, 2024 at 10:00 AM
For the sake of national security, the intelligence community must take stock of the underlying reasons why it is losing the trust and goodwill of the American people and their representatives in Congress.

Consider the recent, intense debate over the reauthorization of Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). In that legislative struggle, the Biden Administration, the intelligence community, and its champions on Capitol Hill invested everything they had to defeat an amendment offered by House leaders of both the  conservative Freedom Caucus and the Progressive Caucus. This unprecedented, pan-ideological reform coalition sought to add a warrant requirement for situations in which federal agencies inspect the communications of Americans caught up in the surveillance, pursuant to Section 702, of foreign threats on foreign soil.

The U.S. intelligence community (IC) turned to tactics that had worked well in the past. The IC and others opposed to the amendment turned to Russian nuclear space weapons. Members were herded into SCIFs – secure compartments safe from wiretapping – to hear classified briefings on other threatening developments. FBI Director Christopher Wray warned that a warrant requirement would have “real-world consequences” in a world bristling with terror threats.

U.S. intelligence won the vote in April – but this time only by a whisker – a vote of 212 to 212, which meant the warrant requirement failed by a single tie-breaking vote.. While barely scraping out a win on warrants, the intelligence community lost ground elsewhere. It wanted Section 702’s next reauthorization to be set five years from the vote. Congress dialed that back to two years, a short window that has already sparked a fresh debate about the reach of U.S. intelligence programs.

The left-right surveillance reform coalition posted other wins. Congress passed Rep. Chip Roy’s amendment putting the FBI under a microscope, requiring quarterly reports on the number of times the bureau searches, or “queries,” the communications of Americans in Section 702 databases. It also reduced the number of FBI personnel who can query Americans’ communications under Section 702 The practice of “abouts” collection, in which an American could be surveilled for a mere third-party mention, was moved from programmatic suspension to termination by a successful amendment offered by Rep. Ben Cline.

The House also passed the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act in a standalone vote with bipartisan support, 219-199. This bill would require the FBI and other federal agencies to obtain a probable cause warrant before purchasing Americans’ personal data, including internet records and location histories. Passage of this bill by the House validates it and gives it momentum in the Senate.

The response from the intelligence community and its defenders to these reverses and near losses has been incredulity.

Such reverses have occurred, some in the intelligence community assert, because of “bad faith attacks” by “U.S. lawmakers on the far left and the far right.” We are told these ill-informed attacks explain why the poll numbers show declining appreciation by Americans of the vital role played by intelligence agencies. David V. Gioe, Michael S. Goodman and Michael V. Hayden have written in Foreign Policy about a University of Texas at Austin (UT) & Chicago Council on Global Affairs study that shows “a growing number of Americans thought that the intelligence community represented a threat to civil liberties.” Some 17 percent thought so in 2022, up from 12 percent in 2021. They conclude: “A nontrivial percentage of Americans feel that the intelligence community is an insidious threat instead of a valuable protector in a dangerous world – a perspective that jeopardizes the security and prosperity of the United States and its allies.”

The word “insidious” was nowhere in the poll’s question. The question forced respondents to pick one choice, ranging from appreciating the “vital role” of the intelligence community in national security, to seeing it as a threat to Americans’ civil liberties. One can believe, as we do, that the United States and its allies need the protection of U.S. intelligence in a dangerous world growing more dangerous, while also believing that some elements of the intelligence community – the FBI being the primary bad actor – are, indeed, running roughshod over Americans’ civil liberties. These are not mutually exclusive descriptions.

The Imperative of Listening to Concerns from the Left and Right

This misperception shows how the intelligence community, which listens for a living, would do well to absorb the concerns of well-informed critics.

In the run up to this year’s Section 702 debate, Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines and other leaders of the intelligence community met with us, as well as other civil liberties groups, from the left-leaning American Civil Liberties Union to the right-leaning Americans for Prosperity. These invitations were appreciated. Surveillance reformers came away well briefed about the concerns of the intelligence community, but none of us felt that our substantive concerns were taken to heart. Perhaps it is time for a longer, and more in-depth dialogue, one that could also include Members of Congress and key staff,  advancing the effectiveness of U.S. intelligence by removing the contentious issues of civil liberties violations.

We keenly wish intelligence community leaders to understand that such issues are real and painful. This is important to know because when one of the 18 intelligence agencies, or bad actors within those agencies, misuses the immense surveillance capabilities they’ve been entrusted with, it degrades and threatens the vital mission of U.S. intelligence – as the UT poll suggests.

For example, five years after the fact, it has yet to sink in just how awful and dangerous the FBI’s behavior was in 2016-17. Many on Capitol Hill – including some who are deeply critical of Donald Trump – remain dismayed by the tactics used against Trump campaign associates.

If this sounds like a right-wing talking point, you may not have absorbed the facts in DOJ Inspector General Michael Horowitz’s report on “Crossfire Hurricane.” Horowitz reported “17 significant ‘errors or omissions’ and 51 wrong or unsupported factual assertions in the applications to surveil [Trump aide Carter] Page.” The FBI’s actions misinformed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) into issuing four surveillance orders, one can reasonably say essentially against a presidential campaign and then against a new administration, by portraying as invaluable intelligence a document it knew or should have known was a shoddy political opposition research paper. At least one DOJ official was marketing this “intelligence” with the media. And when the FISC wanted to know if Page was a CIA asset, an FBI lawyer provided a doctored document hiding that exonerating fact from the court (the lawyer later pleaded guilty).

Conservatives were also alarmed by the 2020 letter signed by a Who’s Who of recently retired intelligence officials that the Hunter Biden laptop story had the “classic earmarks of a Russian intelligence operation.” The letter cast doubt on the authenticity of the Biden “laptop” (the letter itself puts that in scare quotes) and provides a bottom-line conclusion: “our experience makes us deeply suspicious that the Russian government played a significant role in this case.” Hunter Biden has since admitted the laptop was his, and the Justice Department just prosecuted him successfully based on some of the correspondence captured on that laptop. Based on what is currently known, their letter should have at a minimum been more highly caveated.

Former intelligence officials have a right to speak on any topic. Warnings about Russian disinformation and attempts to control our politics are real – and Russian involvement with political uses of the laptop has not been disproven in this very case. But these recent officials cannot help but reflect badly on the U.S. intelligence agencies they so recently led when they draw conclusions based on incomplete information days before an election. 

The left also has its reasons for distrust. Progressives are concerned that non-violent protesters have been targeted for improper surveillance for simply exercising their First Amendment rights. Liberals voiced outrage when it was revealed that the Department of Defense warrantlessly purchased sensitive personal information on Americans from a Muslim dating app. People of all political persuasions are concerned that the FBI used Section 702 data to warrantlessly spy on political commentators, Members of the U.S. House and Senate, 19,000 donors to a Congressional campaign, journalists, and a state judge who had the temerity to report a local police chief’s civil rights violations to the FBI.

Such incidents are not internet conspiracies. They are established by information gleaned from mandated reporting and from the courts. For example, the FBI earned a rare rebuke – eventually made public – from the secretive Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) and Judge James E. Boasberg for “widespread violations” of the querying procedure of the Section 702 database against Americans. The FISC also revealed the FBI used warrantless NSA data for a wide range of purely domestic cases, though not explicitly contrary to then-existing policy. These cases include health-care fraud, bribery and other crimes posing no threat to national security.

How Use of Emerging Technology Exacerbates Mistrust

This leads to another realization we wish the intelligence community to absorb. There are now so many ways to warrantlessly surveil Americans that, for all practical purposes, the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution might as well be a dishrag. Consider the routine practice by federal agencies ranging from the FBI to the IRS, DEA, Department of Homeland Security and Department of Defense of buying and warrantlessly accessing Americans’ digital data scraped from apps and sold to the government by shadowy, third-party data brokers.

The justification for this practice is that Americans waive away their rights to this data when they sign the terms and conditions of a given social media platform or an app. Americans accept these terms because they know companies only want this anonymized information to place ads in their digital feeds. Until recently, few were aware that their own government is purchasing personal information that is more intimate than a diary. Some people, after all, lie to their diaries or omit some details. But our digital trails reveal everything about us.

Federal agencies collect bankruptcy information, employment history and income, credit histories, consumer purchase histories, and consumer interests. They acquire records about our ethnicities, voting registration, travel records, and attorney-client information. They purchase information about our medical and mental health, religious activities, browsing histories, and library records, communications with friends, expressions of political views, our associates, and details about our sex lives. All of this data is easily de-anonymized and searchable by name.

The authors of a report released by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence admitted that such data “could be used, for example, to identify every person who attended a protest or rally based on their smartphone location or ad-tracking records.” Such information could also be used, the report acknowledged, to “facilitate blackmail, stalking, harassment, and public shaming.”

As more Americans learn about this practice, they are understandably alarmed. Eighty percent of Americans in a recent YouGov poll say Congress should require government agencies to obtain a warrant before purchasing location information, internet records, and other sensitive data about people in the U.S. from data brokers. Yet these data purchases continue apace, and without any judicial oversight.

Shortly after the House of Representatives passed the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act, 219-199, to require warrants before the government can purchase Americans’ data, Director Haines issued a directive requiring agencies to formulate internal guidelines and reporting requirements on commercially acquired data. This is a welcome development. An associated report acknowledges that such data can be de-anonymized – that is, it can reveal information specific to individual Americans who’ve done nothing to justify having their entire lives X-rayed.

Data purchasing is just one example of why the Fourth Amendment is increasingly a dead letter. Add to this an 11th hour amendment to Section 702 that expands the definition of an electronic service provider to include almost every business with access to “communications equipment.” Such a broad definition could force employees and even custodial workers to insert thumb-drives to sweep Americans’ data, under compulsion and lifetime gag orders. At this writing, Congress is considering  narrowing the definition of entities that must comply with government surveillance orders – but chooses to do so with secret legislation, preventing the rest of Congress and the American people from knowing the boundaries of this change. And the House Intelligence Committee so far is refusing even to allow this modification.

At the local level, private and public cameras are being linked to create comprehensive surveillance networks. Federal grants are proliferating cell-site simulators, often called Stingrays, that ping cellphones for location tracking and sometimes extraction of content from cellphones across a wide area. These are useful investigative tools. Many murderers, robbers, and rapists have been successfully prosecuted by evidence from surveillance cameras and Stingrays. The danger is that the networking of all these tools, with comprehensive data scraping from social media and apps, will be combined with ubiquitous facial recognition software and AI to create a Chinese-style Panopticon, in which everyone can be directly monitored by the government without being directly aware of it.

And, of course, when all else fails, the intelligence community can rely not on legislation but on Executive Order 12333. Sens. Ron Wyden and Martin Heinrich revealed that the CIA has engaged in collection of Americans’ data for years under 12333. The absence of statutory authority for such programs means they have no judicial oversight whatsoever.

What motivates U.S. intelligence to push for such capabilities? FBI Director Wray warns that China is targeting American infrastructure in a warlike way. Cyber attacks, election interference and other malign influence operations by adversarial foreign nations, new non-state terrorist threats, and other dangers have proliferated. In the UK, GCHQ Director Anne Keast-Butler reveals that Russia is not only preparing aggressive cyberattacks on Western targets but is also fomenting acts of physical sabotage. We understand that U.S. intelligence needs robust tools to track and counter such threats. But Americans left and right should fear the use of these awesome powers of surveillance to be targeted at a lawful protester, or to warrantlessly examine the personal communications of a U.S. senator or a judge.

Granted, most people in the intelligence community are dedicated and hard-working civil servants, and are assuredly not seeking to create a panopticon for political interference or harassment of people or organizations they don’t like. But a panopticon is coming – and is in many ways already here – as technology weaves together its elements. And when an American Panopticon is established, it is inevitable that bad apples and rogue agencies will use it for purposes at odds with our democracy. There is nothing hackneyed about calling such threats “Orwellian.”

Two years before the next round of debate over Section 702, an earlier, deeper, and more wide-ranging conversation needs to take place between the intelligence and civil liberties communities. It is in the best interests of U.S. intelligence and its mission to keep Americans safe from escalating foreign threats that we discuss ways to ensure that powerful technologies and programs come within some recognizable version of the American constitutional system. Congressional passage of measures like the Section 702 warrant requirement and the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act would be a good first step. 

IMAGE: Members of the House (Select) Intelligence Committee listen during a hearing at the Cannon Office Building on March 12, 2024 in Washington, DC.  (Photo by Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images)

The post Time for U.S. Intelligence to Ask: How Did We Alienate so Many Americans? appeared first on Just Security.

https://www.justsecurity.org/97812/intelligence-alienate-americans/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=intelligence-alienate-americans

Crafty_Dog

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Tracking via phones
« Reply #1221 on: July 25, 2024, 02:33:16 PM »

Body-by-Guinness

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Privacy Post-Murtha: What 1st Amendment Protections Count?
« Reply #1222 on: July 26, 2024, 12:31:36 PM »
Not a fan of this site, but it’s the first place where I’ve read about this fix the DOJ will supposedly introduce:

Dept of Justice Promises to Declassify Standard Operating Procedure for Coordinating with Social Media Platforms

Just Security / by Justin Hendrix / Jul 26, 2024 at 10:04 AM

Co-published with Tech Policy Press.

After the US Supreme Court punted, just last month, on First Amendment questions concerning how U.S. law enforcement agencies should interact with social media companies, the Department of Justice is now days away from declassifying its operating procedures for handling such matters. That outcome is the result of a multi-year investigation by the Department’s Office of Inspector General (OIG), which released a report earlier this week.

Background

In late June, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Biden administration in Murthy v Missouri, a case that concerned whether the federal government violated the First Amendment rights of citizens by allegedly coordinating with social media platforms to remove disfavored speech. In a 6-3 ruling, the Supreme Court reversed the decision by the Fifth Circuit, finding that the plaintiffs did not have standing to bring the case, since the evidence failed to connect any specific moderation decision by the platforms to inappropriate government influence.

The case’s path to the Supreme Court started on May 5, 2022, when Missouri Attorney General Andrew Bailey filed a lawsuit accusing Biden administration officials of either coercing or colluding with tech companies in a “coordinated campaign” to remove disfavored content. Among the defendants named in the suit were the Section Chief of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Foreign Influence Task Force (FITF), and a special agent in the San Francisco division of the FBI who regularly interacted with social media platforms. The suit alleged that “communications” that influenced Meta’s decision to temporarily limit the propagation of a story about Hunter Biden’s laptop ahead of the 2020 election emerged from the FITF.

The allegations in the suit sparked a wave of congressional investigations, and while its most lurid claims turned out to be flimsy or bogus on inspection, fair-minded experts generally agree that there should be clearer rules about how social media platforms interact with the federal government, particularly when it comes to law enforcement, security, and intelligence agencies. Missouri’s Attorney General was likely unaware at the time he filed his suit that the Justice Department’s Inspector General had already initiated a probe to look into the subject. This week, the OIG published the result of its effort in a report titled, “Evaluation of the U.S. Department of Justice’s Efforts to Coordinate Information Sharing About Foreign Malign Influence Threats to U.S. Elections.”

The Next Phase

The report says that OIG’s goal was to assess the effectiveness of the Justice Department’s system for sharing information related to “foreign malign influence directed at U.S. elections,” to evaluate “the Department’s oversight and management of its response,” and to help streamline or otherwise improve the department’s processes. The evaluation, which included fieldwork that commenced in October 2021 and concluded in April 2023, focused on “information sharing with social media companies to evaluate the aspect of the Department’s information-sharing system that the FITF developed following foreign malign influence directed at the 2016 U.S. presidential election.” During that election cycle, a substantial campaign by the Russian government gave rise to concerns over social media platforms as a vector for foreign influence.

The OIG report found that while the FBI had developed an “intelligence sharing model” (depicted in a graphic reproduced below) involving various actors in US law enforcement and intelligence communities and social media companies, there was in fact a significant gap in policies and guidance governing interactions between the government and the platforms. Until February 2024, when the OIG report says the Department of Justice issued a new standard operating procedure (SOP), there was no formal policy, which the OIG says created potential risks such as the perception of coercion or undue influence over private entities and, in turn, the speech of American citizens. The SOP, which is contained in a classified document, sets criteria for determining what constitutes foreign malign influence, lays out supervisory approval requirements for investigating it, and provides standard language for disclosures and guidance on engagement with social media companies, according to the OIG report.

While the OIG says that the operating procedure is an improvement, it notes the information’s classified nature is a drawback. “Because DOJ’s credibility and reputation are potentially impaired when its activities are not well understood by the public, we recommend that the Department identify a way that it can inform the public about the procedures it has put into place to transmit foreign malign influence threat information to social media companies in a manner that is protective of First Amendment rights,” the report says.

The report also notes that DOJ lacks “a comprehensive strategy guiding its approach to engagement with social media companies on foreign malign influence directed at U.S. elections,” a circumstance that resulted “in varied approaches to its information-sharing relationships with social media companies depending on where those companies were based,” a particular problem when firms are foreign-owned or located outside of the US.

While the OIG found that the FBI’s model for tracking foreign influence and sharing that information with social media companies primarily relied on identifying foreign actors rather than monitoring for specific types of content, the report does note that there were instances where the FBI did share “content” information, such as specific posts, with social media companies in order to alert them to specific themes or narratives that foreign actors intended to promote. This is a particularly fraught area, as it opens the door to the types of risks that were at the core of the original complaint in Murthy v Missouri.

The OIG report makes two recommendations “to address risks in DOJ’s mission to combat foreign malign influence directed at U.S. elections,” including that the department:

1. Develop an approach for informing the public about the procedures the Department has put into place to transmit foreign malign influence threat information to social media companies that is protective of First Amendment rights.

2. Develop and implement a comprehensive strategy to ensure that the Department of Justice’s approach to information sharing with social media companies to combat foreign malign influence directed at U.S. elections can adapt to address the evolving threat landscape.

The DOJ’s response to the OIG report, located in an appendix, notes that the department concurs with the first recommendation, and plans to address it “by making publicly available a detailed summary version of the SOP and posting that summary on DOJ’s website by July 31, 2024.” The response notes that the SOP emerged from the development of “a standardized approach” to sharing information on foreign influence operations that kicked off after the Supreme Court issued a stay of the Fifth Circuit injunction that temporarily prohibited contact between agencies such as the FBI and social media firms.

DOJ also concurred with the second OIG recommendation, and plans to address it with “additional actions by August 31, 2024,” including:

Development and Release of Strategic Principles. DOJ will set forth in a public manner the principles reflecting DOJ’ s strategy for sharing FMI information with social media companies to combat the evolving threat landscape.

Resumption of FBI’s Regular Meetings with Social Media Companies. As part of that strategy, FBI will resume regular meetings in the coming weeks with social media companies to brief and discuss potential FMI threats involving the companies’ platforms. FBI will conduct these meetings-as FBI did before pausing the meetings in summer 2023 due to the now-vacated Missouri injunction (see infra at 5)–in a manner that is entirely consistent with applicable first Amendment principles. As has been FBI’ s practice, FBI will conduct these engagements with social media companies located across the country, depending on the circumstances and nature of the potential threats.

Outreach by FBI Field Offices, to Social Media Companies. FBI will instruct FBI Field Offices in the coming weeks to conduct outreach– in coordination with the FBI’s Foreign Influence Task Force (FITF)– to any identified social media companies located in their areas of responsibility, to develop contacts at those companies and ensure they are aware of the SOP and DOJ’ s overall approach for engaging with social media companies regarding FMI threat information.

Engagements by Senior Officials. In the coming months, senior DOJ officials will highlight and explain, during public engagements with relevant stakeholders and the public, DOJ’s strategy for information sharing with social media companies to combat FMI directed at our elections.

Launch of DOJ Website Page. DOJ plans to launch a new section on its website dedicated to ensuring public awareness of DOJ’s strategy for engaging with social media companies regarding FMI. The website page will collect and highlight in a single location relevant resources, guidance, and other materials, including the summary of the SOP discussed above.

The OIG report notes that the relationship between the FBI and social media companies has been successful in disrupting multiple campaigns by foreign actors to interfere in US elections. Whether the DOJ, FBI, and other security and intelligence agencies can effectively quell public fears not about foreign interference but rather about their own government’s interference in elections is an open question; certainly, these recommendations and the DOJ’s responsiveness to them should help.

The post Dept of Justice Promises to Declassify Standard Operating Procedure for Coordinating with Social Media Platforms appeared first on Just Security.

https://www.justsecurity.org/98164/fbi-social-media-foreign-influence/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=fbi-social-media-foreign-influence