Author Topic: The Prisoner's Dilema; Game Theory  (Read 12160 times)

Crafty_Dog

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The Prisoner's Dilema; Game Theory
« on: April 11, 2007, 05:46:25 PM »
Although this subject could easily be part of the Evolutionary Psychology thread, I give it its own thread because I think it worthy.
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First, a description of the PD:  

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prisoner's_dilemma

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Next, an article and a high IQ friend's comments:

Human Nature Redux

By DAVID BROOKS
Published: February 18, 2007
>
Sometimes a big idea fades so imperceptibly from public consciousness you don't even notice until it has almost disappeared. Such is the fate of the belief in natural human goodness.

The Way We Live Now

This belief, most often associated with Jean-Jacques Rousseau, begins with the notion that "everything is good as it leaves the hands of the Author of things; everything degenerates in the hands of man." Human beings are virtuous and free in their natural state. It is only corrupt institutions that make them venal. They are happy in their simplicity, but social conventions make them unwell.

This belief had gigantic ramifications over the years. It led, first of all, to the belief that bourgeois social conventions are repressive and soul-destroying. It contributed to romantic revolts against tradition and etiquette. Whether it was 19th-century Parisian bohemians or 20th-century beatniks and hippies, Western culture has seen a string of antiestablishment rebellions led by people who wanted to shuck off convention and reawaken more natural modes of awareness.

It led people to hit the road, do drugs, form communes and explore free love in order to unleash their authentic selves.

In education, it led to progressive reforms, in which children were liberated to follow their natural instincts. Politically, it led to radical social engineering efforts, because if institutions were the source of sin, then all you had to do was reshape institutions in order to create a New Man.

Therapeutically, it led to an emphasis of feelings over reason, self-esteem over self-discipline. In the realm of foreign policy, it led to a sort of global doctrine of the noble savage - the belief that societies in the colonial world were fundamentally innocent, and once the chains of their oppression were lifted something wonderful would flower.

Over the past 30 years or so, however, this belief in natural goodness has been discarded. It began to lose favor because of the failure of just about every social program that was inspired by it, from the communes to progressive education on up. But the big blow came at the hands of science.

From the content of our genes, the nature of our neurons and the lessons of evolutionary biology, it has become clear that nature is filled with competition and conflicts of interest. Humanity did not come before status contests. Status contests came before humanity, and are embedded deep in human relations. People in hunter-gatherer societies were deadly warriors, not sexually liberated pacifists. As Steven Pinker has put it, Hobbes was more right than Rousseau.

Moreover, human beings are not as pliable as the social engineers imagined. Human beings operate according to preset epigenetic rules, which dispose people to act in certain ways. We strive for dominance and undermine radical egalitarian dreams. We're tribal and divide the world into in-groups and out-groups.

This darker if more realistic view of human nature has led to a rediscovery of different moral codes and different political assumptions. Most people today share what Thomas Sowell calls the Constrained Vision, what Pinker calls the Tragic Vision and what E. O. Wilson calls Existential Conservatism. This is based on the idea that there is a universal human nature; that it has nasty, competitive elements; that we don't understand much about it; and that the conventions and institutions that have evolved to keep us from slitting each other's throats are valuable and are altered at great peril.

Today, parents don't seek to liberate their children; they supervise, coach and instruct every element of their lives. Today, there really is no antinomian counterculture - even the artists and rock stars are bourgeois strivers. Today, communes and utopian schemes are out of favor. People are mostly skeptical of social engineering efforts and jaundiced about revolutionaries who promise to herald a new dawn. Iraq has revealed what human beings do without a strong order-imposing state.

This is a big pivot in intellectual history. The thinkers most associated with the Tragic Vision are Isaiah Berlin, Adam Smith, Edmund Burke, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, Friedrich Hayek and Hobbes. Many of them are conservative.

And here's another perversity of human nature. Many conservatives resist the theory of evolution even though it confirms many of conservatism's deepest truths.

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Interesting article.  I think that using evolutionary psychology to justify the Statist leviathan contains a number of very serious problems.  Politicians should not be seen as altruistic Platonic Guardians; rather, they would simply be ambitious, probably ruthless human beings seeking to maximize their own genetically-mandated fitness criteria, just like everyone else.  The best system would be one that harnessed our self-interested behavior towards value creation at the societal level.  Of course, Adam Smith discussed this a long time ago.

Stephen Quartz, who I believe is still at CalTech, has performed a number of interesting experiments with people placed in game situation with the following rules:  Person A starts the game with $5.  He can decide how much of this to share with Person B.  Whatever he decides to share, that amount will double before it gets to Person B.  Person B can then decide if he wants to give any money back to Person A.  The game can be played with an unknown number of iterative rounds, but it is truly fascinating when both players are told in advance that the game will have, say, 10 rounds of play.  (By the way, the players are complete strangers to one another and do not communicate with each other during the game).

If one knows how many rounds are going to be involved in the game, it is easy to "defect" during that round and keep all of the winnings to oneself.  Knowing this, the other player will defect a round earlier.  And so on and so on...a regression to the first round takes place and the game theoretical solution would end up with Person A simply pocketing the $5 and walking away, operating under the assumption that any money given to Person B will never be seen again.  However, virtually no one actually plays this way.  A typical game begins with Person A making an initial offer of $2.50 to the other player.  If the other player gives the (now $5) same amount back or something close to it, a tentative "trust potential" has been formed.  MRI scans performed on the brains of the players have revealed that blood flow to pleasure centers is enhanced when a cycle of trust has been completed.  We really seem to enjoy cooperative, win-win arrangements when we can find them.  The game generally continues through the full number of rounds, with Person B sharing 50% of the final pot with his new "partner".

The Hobbesian gimmick used by some Socialists to justify their social engineering programs does not reflect the true nature of the human animal, a social primate equipped with an intuitive sense of cooperation and a finely-honed ability to keep track of favors given and received

« Last Edit: June 21, 2013, 09:04:40 PM by Crafty_Dog »

bigdog

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Re: The Prisoner's Dilema
« Reply #1 on: June 21, 2013, 08:05:28 PM »
The PD is one of the most basic and useful games within the larger universe of game/formal/social theory. As such, this article should go here:

http://www.whiteoliphaunt.com/duckofminerva/2013/06/the-relational-sociology-of-rational-choice-theory.html

Crafty_Dog

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Re: The Prisoner's Dilema; Game Theory
« Reply #2 on: June 21, 2013, 09:07:49 PM »
BD:

I modified the name of the thread to make it clearer that your post does indeed belong here.


bigdog

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Re: The Prisoner's Dilema; Game Theory
« Reply #4 on: June 05, 2017, 02:01:25 PM »
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/game-theory-trumps-climate-negotiations-mohamed-el-erian?trk=v-feed&lipi=urn%3Ali%3Apage%3Ad_flagship3_feed%3BRm5%2B%2BlvB052j9iThCTHNrA%3D%3D

"They would find themselves locked with the U.S. in a 'prisoner's dilemma' -- that is, a scenario in which both parties end up in a worse situation than they would have otherwise realistically attained had they cooperated in a credible fashion."

G M

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Re: The Prisoner's Dilema; Game Theory
« Reply #5 on: June 05, 2017, 02:04:03 PM »
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/game-theory-trumps-climate-negotiations-mohamed-el-erian?trk=v-feed&lipi=urn%3Ali%3Apage%3Ad_flagship3_feed%3BRm5%2B%2BlvB052j9iThCTHNrA%3D%3D

"They would find themselves locked with the U.S. in a 'prisoner's dilemma' -- that is, a scenario in which both parties end up in a worse situation than they would have otherwise realistically attained had they cooperated in a credible fashion."

Can you post the relevant parts of the article for those who do not wish join linkedin? Thanks.

Crafty_Dog

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Re: The Prisoner's Dilema; Game Theory
« Reply #6 on: June 05, 2017, 09:13:54 PM »
Of course the counter argument is that continuing to play win-win when the others are playing zero sum is a failing strategy.

bigdog

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Re: The Prisoner's Dilema; Game Theory
« Reply #7 on: June 06, 2017, 12:47:52 AM »
Of course the counter argument is that continuing to play win-win when the others are playing zero sum is a failing strategy.

The PD game has a specific design, so altering strategy and etc. would be a different game. So, in the context of the game, this is not an effective counterargument.

Crafty_Dog

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Re: The Prisoner's Dilema; Game Theory
« Reply #8 on: June 06, 2017, 11:19:07 PM »
Sorry, not following.  Please expound.

bigdog

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« Last Edit: June 15, 2018, 11:08:16 PM by Crafty_Dog »

DougMacG

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Re: The Prisoner's Dilema; Game Theory
« Reply #10 on: June 14, 2018, 06:19:54 AM »
quote author=bigdog
http://nautil.us/blog/larry-david-and-the-game-theory-of-anonymous-donations
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Thought provoking post and good to see you here Bigdog!  

There are other reasons for anonymous donations.  Upon Prince's death I heard stories of amazing contributions he made here that were not publicly known.  In his case and just guessing part of the motive, that as a black kid from the inner city to give major support to music, his passion, in the prosperous area where he lived could have invited criticism louder than the praise or credit he would receive.  Why aren't you doing this or that with your money instead?!

For all donors but especially the very large private donors, every donation invites even more solicitation.  People want to find and 'buy' into a cause they choose and not be sold, constantly.  One friend/acquaintance runs a foundation for family of the world's largest privately held company.  No matter your means, saying no to good causes happens all the time and can't be fun.  Time is the other limiting resource.

ccp

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Re: The Prisoner's Dilema; Game Theory
« Reply #11 on: June 15, 2018, 08:46:02 AM »
Doug writes :

"For all donors but especially the very large private donors, every donation invites even more solicitation"

I have wondered if this is the case with Soros who never saw a liberal cause he would not donate to .
Some savvy business types all need do is form some sort of leftist (Democrat Party )  cause entity , approach him, and get cash .

I assume he has some sort of criteria but OTOH when he gives to the likes of antifa I think not .

DougMacG

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Re: The Prisoner's Dilema; Game Theory
« Reply #12 on: June 15, 2018, 10:16:59 AM »
Doug writes :

"For all donors but especially the very large private donors, every donation invites even more solicitation"

I have wondered if this is the case with Soros who never saw a liberal cause he would not donate to .
Some savvy business types all need do is form some sort of leftist (Democrat Party )  cause entity , approach him, and get cash .

I assume he has some sort of criteria but OTOH when he gives to the likes of antifa I think not .

I think Soros is very selective with his money, he just doesn't make choices we like or that work out for him and his causes.  If he happened to be right on issues and causes and players, then his choices would probably be great.
 Fortunately or unfortunately, shedding light on Leftist causes does not attract more followers. 

People make bad and less than optimal choices with charitable giving too.  cf. United Way in my experience and Clinton Foundation.

Crafty_Dog

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Re: The Prisoner's Dilema; Game Theory
« Reply #13 on: June 15, 2018, 11:08:47 PM »
Big Dog:

I enjoyed that "Larry David" piece.


Crafty_Dog

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WSJ: Uke War calls for revival of Deterrence Theory
« Reply #18 on: August 22, 2023, 03:11:50 PM »
Ukraine War Calls for a Revival of Deterrence Theory
Fear of Russian escalation has paralyzed the West. What’s needed is forceful localized countermoves.
By Sorin Adam Matei
Aug. 22, 2023 2:31 pm ET

ed port infrastructure on the Danube River in the Odesa region, Ukraine, July 24. PHOTO: UKRAINIAN GROUND FORCES/ZUMA PRESS
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine last year came as no surprise to the West. But the Kremlin’s recent ability to escalate without pushback is surprising. Last month Russian jet fighters in Syria harassed U.S. drones and damaged one. Russia’s attack on a Ukrainian grain warehouse in Reni damaged a Romanian commercial ship 600 feet from its North Atlantic Treaty Organization border. NATO has been asleep at the wheel as Russia abuses and provokes its members. A new twist to deterrence theory demands that this aggression be met with sharp, consistent and measured force.

Principles of deterrence inspired by game theory—a mathematical model used to predict the actions of hostile actors—governed the delicate dance between the U.S. and Soviet Union during the Cold War, helping stave off nuclear armageddon. For every major action, there was a commensurate reaction. Yet American neglect after 1989 of the simple and familiar game-theory rule—immediate response to any pushback—prepared the ground for Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. NATO and the U.S. failed to respond commensurately to the savaging of Moldova in 1992, of Georgia in 1993 and 2008 and of Crimea and Donbas in 2014. As a result, the U.S. and its allies continue to trail as Russia improves its hand and increases the stakes each round.

Russia has followed a “zero determinant” strategy against Ukraine. While classical mathematical theories call for players to mirror each other’s moves with grand “tit for tat” countermoves, the aim of zero determinant is to confuse your opponent. You may strike first, offer cooperation, and then refuse to compromise. In Russia’s case, Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine and immediately opened negotiations, only to launch missiles intended to destroy Kyiv’s energy infrastructure, while characterizing Ukraine’s responses to aggression as acts of terror. This approach relies on cheating, and it works well against those who believe in following rules—like the U.S.

Cheating in the global security competition has been successful for Russia. The sudden high stakes of its opening moves leave opponents with only one choice: put up or shut up. When NATO fails to respond forcefully, Russia maintains its advantage by dangling the threat of using nuclear weapons after each escalation. Common sense improperly understood has convinced NATO allies to comply for fear that the alternative was the end of the world.

These rules have been engineered by Russia, and NATO shouldn’t accept them anymore. Luckily, a recent iteration of great-power deterrence theory offers an out. Instead of big, bold moves that have lately left the U.S. struggling to catch up, a new deterrence-theory principle that relies on unbending and localized responses might be more effective in combating current Russian aggression.

To understand that strategy, let’s examine how we arrived at a situation in which Russia—once the subject of NATO’s deterrence—has ended up deterring NATO in the conflict with Ukraine.

For the six months prior to the invasion, the U.S. and U.K. tried to deter Russia by direct warning. In November 2021 William J. Burns, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, traveled to Moscow in a bid to reveal NATO’s knowledge of Russian invasion plans. Mr. Burns warned Vladimir Putin that there would be a “huge price” should he continue in his plans to invade Ukraine. Yet the declaration fell flat since it wasn’t followed by military substantiation. Instead, the U.S. and U.K published Russia’s future attack plan, even at the risk of tipping their intelligence hands—an act without precedent. The NATO powers failed because they didn’t heed the doctrine of materially reminding the opponent of the risk of mutual assured destruction, which prevented a nuclear exchange throughout the Cold War.

When the U.S. government grudgingly acknowledged the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba in October 1962, President John F. Kennedy decided against direct air strikes, which would have neutralized Soviet missiles but risked full-blown war. Yet he remained steadfast in his intentions to push back the Soviets. Over 13 days, both Washington and Moscow incrementally beefed up their positions abroad and created a stalemate whereby one aggressive move from either party would ensure the destruction of both. This deadlock permitted negotiations and effectively prevented nuclear war. It was an early example of an unbending localized response.

After the Cold War, NATO allies felt their mere presence, regardless of military preparedness, would deter Russia from future belligerence. But NATO is mistaken in its assessment of Russia’s abilities and interests.

Since its invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia has bombed targets close to Romania’s border on the Danube, fired missiles over neutral countries, mined the Black Sea lanes, and downed NATO members’ drones. NATO has done little more than provide inadequate aid to Ukraine and stomp its feet in protest. Rather than fall for another Russian trick, NATO needs to employ an “unbending collective answer” to any Russian aggression.

How would this work? On hearing news of missile attacks against a port that shares a border with a NATO member, NATO should have declared an air-defense buffer zone within 100 miles of all NATO borders. After a NATO drone was intercepted and damaged over the Black Sea, NATO should have instituted a regular armed patrol of the zone where the drone was drowned. When Russia instituted a blockade of Ukrainian ports, NATO should have responded with a counterblockade on all points of entry and exit on the Black Sea. These are local, specific and immediate responses to Russian aggression.

Many would argue that such aggression would provoke Russia and cause another world war. But playing tit for tat—when done specifically—against a bully is rooted in cold math and has worked in the past. Bringing in old games might remind Russia of how things unfolded last time it threatened NATO.

Crafty_Dog

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Re: The Prisoner's Dilema; Game Theory
« Reply #19 on: January 14, 2024, 04:06:06 AM »
TTT