Author Topic: Venezuela  (Read 339506 times)

Crafty_Dog

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Re: Venezuela
« Reply #650 on: March 31, 2023, 12:06:37 PM »
March 31, 2023
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Colombia’s Interest in Ending the Venezuelan Crisis
Resolution of the crisis could improve Bogota’s regional standing.
By: Allison Fedirka

Venezuelans will have an opportunity to resolve their country’s political crisis during the 2024 presidential election. However, several things would need to go right. The Colombian government is hard at work to make sure that they do.

Colombia has a fundamental interest in Venezuela’s stability and economic well-being. Declining living conditions in Venezuela have sparked a mass emigration to Colombia, or through it en route to other destinations. At immense financial, administrative and security costs to itself, Colombia, a country with a population of a little over 50 million, hosts nearly 2.5 million Venezuelans. Others enter Colombia to buy cheaper goods, which they then consume or resell in Venezuela, leading to shortages of some goods in border towns. And the pervasive lawlessness has propped up Colombian militant groups, most notably the National Liberation Army (ELN).

At the same time, Colombia wants to reap the rewards of being Washington’s preferred partner in the U.S.’ Caribbean strategy. Bogota worries that a U.S.-Venezuela rapprochement would divert U.S. aid to support humanitarian and reconstruction efforts in Venezuela, while private investors could sideline Colombia for new opportunities across the border.

To ensure that it has a place at the table, Colombia is positioning itself as a regional leader and the protector of other Latin American states impacted by the Venezuelan crisis. When President Gustavo Petro took office last year, he immediately restored diplomatic ties with Venezuela, opening a direct line to the Maduro government. He plans to host a meeting in April of U.S., Latin American and European officials to discuss Venezuela, with the goal of establishing a working group to outline a technical and political roadmap for sanctions relief. Informally, Washington has said it will attend the event, which it has helped coordinate.

The end goal is to get the Venezuelan government and opposition back to the negotiating table so that they can agree on how to conduct next year’s elections and end the political gridlock. Previous talks in Mexico stalled after both sides insisted on preconditions. The Maduro government (and the opposition) wanted the lifting of sanctions on the state oil company, PDVSA, which Washington rejected. The opposition demanded that the government release political prisoners and hold fair elections. Colombia is offering itself as an interlocutor that can break the stalemate. It understands the importance of getting U.S. and European buy-in for a reset, since they will need to recognize the legitimacy of any election and they will be critical sources of investment for Venezuela’s reconstruction.

Colombia also stands to improve its standing with other South American countries hosting Venezuelan refugees. Colombia has been hardest hit, but others have also incurred extra expenses from providing for the influx of refugees and migrants. Despite their best efforts, Latin American governments have not received significant funding from international organizations to help with the refugee and migrant flow. The crisis has also damaged some bilateral relationships, such as between Peru and Ecuador, and Chile and Bolivia. If Colombia can claim credit for helping to resolve the Venezuelan crisis, and ending the migration problem, then its reputation among its neighbors will get a boost.

Venezuelan Immigrants in Latin America
(click to enlarge)

Historic Migration Episodes
(click to enlarge)

There are also signs that Bogota is working to link the Colombian and Venezuelan energy sectors. This would ensure Colombia’s direct involvement in reconstruction efforts and keep it from being completely bypassed for future investments. Both governments have recently talked about the need to boost natural gas production, where energy-rich Venezuela has a key role to play. Colombia’s Ecopetrol has asked the U.S. to waive sanctions to allow it to negotiate with PDVSA. Colombia is also studying purchases of gas from Venezuela and considering buying the Monomeros fertilizer plant from PDVSA. Finally, Ecopetrol also has an advisory contract to export and distribute natural gas from Colombia. In the past, Venezuela was a major oil supplier to Central American and Caribbean nations heavily dependent on energy imports. Though it will take years and billions of dollars in investment to restore Venezuela’s oil and gas production potential, now is the time to start envisioning such projects.

Venezuela's Crude Oil Production and Exports
(click to enlarge)

For its part, the Maduro government has taken some steps to justify the lifting of oil sanctions. Earlier in March, the government announced that it had uncovered a major corruption scandal involving the disappearance of between $3 billion and $5 billion from PDVSA. The sum represented 12 percent of 2022 revenue and led to the dismissal of several officials, as well as the resignation of Oil Minister Tareck El Aissami. President Nicolas Maduro immediately ordered PDVSA’s restructuring and announced the reorganization of the country's National Superintendence of Cryptoassets. In addition to needing all the funding it can get, the Maduro government is eager to portray itself as trustworthy and transparent so that sanctions might be eased.

Colombia’s intentions and strategy are clear, but execution requires it to overcome two main challenges that are beyond its control. First, it needs Venezuela to reduce its involvement with rebel groups like the ELN. This is hard for Caracas to do, given the financial and strategic benefits of the relationships. Second, it needs the U.S. to agree to lift sanctions. On March 27, Colombian Foreign Minister Alvaro Leyva met with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to coordinate plans related to the upcoming summit on Venezuela. (He also said that Colombia would not pull any surprises and that Maduro may be present.) Some members of the U.S. government remain skeptical of the Colombian strategy given the ELN’s relationship with drug trafficking and the Maduro regime, while others said sanctions will be lifted only once democracy is restored in Venezuela. In any case, Colombia is setting itself up to lead the crisis resolution effort, and it stands to reap economic benefits associated with Venezuela’s eventual reconstruction.

Crafty_Dog

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GPF: Venezuela-Iran
« Reply #651 on: June 16, 2023, 03:46:44 PM »
Allies. Iran and Venezuela signed 19 agreements on mining, petrochemistry, transport and agro-industry during Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi’s visit to Caracas. Raisi is on a tour of Latin America that will also include stops in Nicaragua and Cuba. 

Crafty_Dog

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MY: Venezuela-Guyana
« Reply #652 on: December 03, 2023, 06:33:07 AM »

ccp

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Guyana
« Reply #653 on: December 03, 2023, 09:05:38 AM »
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guyana

interesting only ~ 800K population one of the least populated on Earth

official language is English

reading through the Wikipedia just noticed the libs will
point out :

don't say gay in Guyana!

border dispute is mentioned in the Wikipedia info.

« Last Edit: December 03, 2023, 09:15:59 AM by ccp »


Crafty_Dog

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WSJ: Venezuela breaks another promise
« Reply #655 on: December 04, 2023, 09:42:53 AM »
second

enezuela Breaks Another Promise
It misses a deadline to release prisoners and reinstate the opposition under a deal that eased U.S. sanctions.
By
The Editorial Board
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Dec. 3, 2023 6:11 pm ET




Well, that was predictable. On Nov. 30 the Maduro regime in Venezuela ignored the U.S. deadline to lay out a process to reinstate opposition candidates for a 2024 presidential election. Will the Biden Administration take it lying down?

In return for that Maduro promise, made Oct. 17 with the democratic opposition, the Biden Administration eased sanctions for six months on the export of Venezuelan oil and new investment in the country. The U.S. also lifted bans on dealing with the government-owned mining company and on trading some Venezuelan securities.

At the time Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that the U.S. had “conveyed our expectation and understanding that” by Nov. 30 Venezuela would “define a specific timeline and process for the expedited reinstatement of all candidates” who had been banned from running. He added that opposition candidates had the right to run on “a level electoral playing field” that includes “freedom of movement” and guarantees of “their physical safety.”

He also said that Venezuela had to “begin the release of all wrongfully detained U.S. nationals and Venezuelan political prisoners.” Mr. Blinken warned that “failure to abide by the terms of this arrangement will lead the United States to reverse steps we have taken.”

The Blinken deadline passed on Thursday. Venezuela released five political prisoners in October but it still holds some 270, including three Americans that the State Department deems wrongfully detained. The regime also hasn’t reinstated banned presidential candidates, including the popular Maria Corina Machado.

Instead, on Thursday the Maduro government issued a statement, along with the official opposition, that instructed banned candidates to solicit the Maduro-controlled Supreme Court between Dec. 1 and Dec. 15 for a reversal of the prohibition on their right to run. The regime’s statement reminded applicants that they are censored and must not be disrespectful toward the state.

The weak opposition may feel it has no choice other than to go along with this game-playing by Mr. Maduro. But the U.S. has no such excuse. The State Department statement late Friday called sending banned candidates to beseech a politicized court “an important development,” without elaboration. The statement said it is “deeply concerned” by the regime’s failure to release prisoners, and it promised to say more in the coming days.

But there have to be consequences for the regime’s failure to meet its commitments. Venezuelan democrats deserve better than more statements in the coming days.



Crafty_Dog

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WSJ: Venezuela covets Guyana's oil
« Reply #656 on: December 04, 2023, 09:46:16 AM »
third

Venezuela Covets Guyana’s Oil Fields
Would Biden stop the Maduro regime from invading a much weaker neighbor?
Mary Anastasia O’Grady
By Mary Anastasia O’Grady


Sunday’s referendum in Venezuela asked the electorate if it agrees that two-thirds of Guyana actually belongs to Venezuela. The dictatorship of Nicolás Maduro sought a “yes” vote and thought it had a lay-up.

Guyana was a British colony in 1899 when a Paris tribunal ratified its dominion over the Essequibo region. Caracas has long disputed the ruling. From early childhood Venezuelans marinate in the doctrine that the land was stolen from them. So approval on all five referendum questions—including one that proposed the creation of a new Venezuelan state—was the heavy favorite.

Late Sunday morning, the regime claimed robust turnout; by afternoon, the opposition posted photos of empty polling stations and reported high abstention. As we went to press, official results weren’t in. But it almost doesn’t matter. The failing Mr. Maduro seems intent on picking a fight with a neighbor. The only questions are how far he will go and what it will cost him.

The referendum was a call to Venezuelans to rally ’round the flag, which is the oldest trick in the tyrant’s manual for what to do when things are going badly. And they are.

The economy has collapsed since Mr. Maduro took office in 2013. Venezuelan living standards, once the envy of South America, are in the tank. Some 7.5 million people, or a quarter of the population, have emigrated, tearing families apart. Pressure is increasing on the dictatorship to lift the ban on the 2024 presidential candidacy of popular opposition leader Maria Corina Machado.

The other reason Mr. Maduro held the referendum is that the disputed Guyanese land corresponds to what is believed to be enormous oil reserves off its coast. Venezuela’s incompetence and corruption mean it can’t even extract the oil it has within its own borders. But Mr. Maduro sees the nation next door getting rich and reflexively needs to object. Envy, after all, is the mother of communism.

In 2015 Exxon Mobil made the first crude discovery in the Stabroek Block in Guyanese waters. The “gross recoverable resource,” according to the company, “is now estimated to be more than eight billion oil equivalent barrels” from more than a dozen successful wells. In all there are an estimated 11 billion oil equivalent barrels in Guyanese waters, and at least five other international oil companies are working in the area.

In September Guyana received bids for exploration and exploitation of eight new blocks. But unlike the existing wells, where Exxon, its partners, and some competitors are already bringing up crude, the oil resources in the recently auctioned blocks are off the coast of the Essequibo region. Mr. Maduro wants them.

In 1966 Venezuela and Guyana agreed to disagree about the territory in the Geneva Agreement. In March 2018 the United Nations used the authority provided by that accord to assign the case to the International Court of Justice in The Hague, which is expected to rule on the matter early next year.


Sunday’s referendum suggests that Venezuela, which more than once has asserted that the court has no jurisdiction to rule on the dispute, doesn’t like its odds and is prepared to take matters into its own hands. Last week a token number of Venezuelan military were rumored to have moved close to the border. Brazil put its military on high alert in the region. U.S. Army special forces leadership met with its Guyanese counterparts last week, but U.S. Southern Command declined to comment on Friday. The State Department didn’t respond to requests for comment.

The invasion of the Falkland Islands might have bought unpopular Argentine dictator Leopoldo Galtieri some support in 1982—if British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher hadn’t been so determined to wave the Union Jack.

Perhaps Mr. Maduro has that Galtieri adventure in mind since there is no Thatcher equivalent these days. Deterrence, particularly from the U.S., seems to be lacking.

Military aggression against a smaller sovereign nation won’t go over well, even among the usual Maduro allies. Brazil’s President Luiz Inacío “Lula” da Silva is a supporter of both the Cuban and Venezuelan military dictatorships. But he’s also an advocate of the peaceful resolution of cross-border disputes using international courts.

Nor can Mr. Maduro count on Havana to back him. Cuba has long leaned on the English-speaking Caribbean for support at the U.N. and in other international forums. Their first allegiance is to Guyana. Even China, which is making oil investments in Guyanese waters, doesn’t want an invasion.

Finally, one of the most important tests of jurisdiction is the self-determination of the local population. It’s unlikely that the Guyanese living in the Essequibo want to become Venezuelans.

Yet despite widespread disapproval of what the world seems to have already judged as a provocation against a peaceful neighbor, it would be unwise to underestimate the desperation building up in Caracas. If Mr. Maduro finds he has painted himself into a corner, desperate measures won’t be out of the question. Cuba, Brazil and China are unlikely to stand on principle.

Write to O’Grady@wsj.com.

DougMacG

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Crafty_Dog

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GPF: Venezuela-Gyuana-US
« Reply #658 on: December 18, 2023, 06:46:31 AM »
December 18, 2023
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A Border Dispute Pits US Interests Against Each Other
The repercussions from the Guyana-Venezuela standoff will be hemispheric.
By: Allison Fedirka
The leaders of Venezuela and Guyana met on Dec. 14 in St. Vincent and the Grenadines for talks meant to ease tensions along their shared border. Though the rhetoric was pleasant enough, the talks did little to improve their respective security postures. The Venezuelan legislature did, however, delay the approval of a law that would annex Esequiba, the resource-rich territory that is the source of the current standoff.

The dispute itself is hardly new. It dates back to the 1897 Treaty of Washington, which initially demarcated Venezuela’s and Guyana’s borders. (The boundaries wouldn’t be finalized until 1899.) In 1962, Venezuela stopped recognizing the border and asserted new territorial claims. The International Court of Justice is hearing those claims, but Caracas has said it would not honor any court decision that sides with Guyana. For Venezuela, this isn’t just a matter of national pride; it’s a geostrategic issue that could make or break the country’s direct access to the Atlantic Ocean and provide much-needed oil revenue to the government.

Guyana's Disputed Resources

(click to enlarge)

Even so, there are other factors that gave Caracas a new sense of urgency. President Nicolas Maduro is in talks with the United States and his own political opposition over democratic concessions that would weaken his hold on power but would, in theory, help the country through a longstanding political deadlock and revive its stagnant economy. The Esequiba issue is a way Maduro can improve his negotiating position by trumping up national interest without vilifying the United States and without violating the terms of the Barbados Accord, which laid the groundwork for elections in 2024. Adhering to the accord will go a long way toward the continued easing of U.S. sanctions. Washington has been easing sanctions against Venezuela for over a year now, and the results are starting to show in the country’s oil industry; the government has seen notable gains in production levels and revenue from export sales. This is why, on Dec. 3, Venezuela held a non-binding referendum that reasserted its sovereignty over Esequiba.



(click to enlarge)



(click to enlarge)



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Venezuela’s claim is also meant to remind the U.S. of its long-term business interests in Venezuela. The complaint emphasizes an agreement between Guyana and Exxon Mobile for oil exploration and production in the Stabroek block, which is believed to be one of the most promising offshore areas but parts of which fall directly off the coast of disputed territories. Guyana has been awarding concessions and accepting bids in waters that have not been established as its own. The government was able to continue so long as Venezuela didn’t challenge it. Guyanese crude production has increased, and exploration investments are expected to rise after the latest licensing round for eight offshore blocks. Put simply, Caracas knows that instability and uncertainty will threaten the bottom lines of Guyana and the U.S. companies it does business with.

Meanwhile, the Maduro government has approached Western energy companies to recommence operations at dormant offshore natural gas projects and exploration for new blocks on the Deltana Platform, near its maritime border with Guyana. These companies include BP, Chevron and Melbana Energy. Other potential candidates include Repsol, Eni and Maurel & Prom. Venezuelan officials have also traveled to Moscow, almost certainly to discuss energy trade and cooperation.

The signal is clear: While Maduro is open to working with the West, he isn’t afraid to pressure U.S. companies, nor is he unwilling to work with Russia. All of this has put the U.S. in a complicated position.

The Venezuela-Guyana border standoff also pits one U.S. interest against another. On the one hand, Washington wants to compel a political transition in Venezuela. Its end goal is to install a new and preferably pro-U.S. government in Caracas, stabilize the country to stem the flow of immigrants and create a safe economy for Western energy investment. Achieving all these goals would directly or indirectly help create a more secure Western Hemisphere for the United States.

On the other hand, the U.S. cannot support Venezuela if it is threatening to annex lands that are not considered Venezuelan territory under international law. And neither can Washington allow Venezuelan threats toward that end to go unchecked. Thus, on Dec. 7, Washington conducted flyovers in Guyana under the pretext of military drills to communicate to Caracas that it would not tolerate any military action. It was mostly a formality; Venezuela knows that an offensive move would force Guyana to seek the support of powerful allies like the U.S. and jeopardize the sanctions relief it has received and the regional political ties it has forged since 2019.

Washington’s response to the dispute may be an indication of how it will manage future Western Hemispheric affairs. The Monroe Doctrine, which essentially asserts Washington’s right to oppose forays into the Americas, is now 200 years old. Though its eponymous president likely never intended one of his Congressional speeches to be the bedrock of American foreign policy, it has remained in force in various iterations over the years and has been the foundation of U.S.-Latin American security ties since the beginning of the 20th century. But it is in dire need of an overhaul. New political paradigms require new political frameworks. Economics has replaced security as the driver of hemispheric relations; China, Russia and Iran don’t pose as big a security threat to the American mainland as do their commercial interests in Latin America.

Washington understands that its policies ought to reflect as much. It needs to decide how (and whether) it will intervene when two Western Hemispheric countries disagree; how to answer economic security threats from rivals like China; and how it will engage other members of the hemisphere.

For now, a Venezuelan military incursion into Guyana seems unlikely. But if things come to a head, the repercussions will be hemispheric, especially as the Global South becomes more important.

Crafty_Dog

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WSJ: Maduro plays Biden for a sucker
« Reply #659 on: January 29, 2024, 06:48:27 PM »
enezuela’s Maduro Tricks Biden—Again
Caracas reneges on its vow to let an opposition leader run for president.
By
The Editorial Board
Follow
Jan. 29, 2024 6:35 pm ET


The world is full of surprises, but not in Venezuela. The country’s declaration Friday that popular opposition leader Maria Corina Machado can’t run for president was predictable to everyone except the Biden Administration.

Nicolás Maduro, a dictator who took office when Hugo Chávez died in 2013, is supposed to face an election this year. Ms. Machado, who won the opposition’s primary in October with some 90% of the vote, would be a heavy favorite in a fair election given the way Mr. Maduro has destroyed the economy. Which is why the government is blocking her run this year and for the next 15 years.


In October the Maduro government and the opposition signed the Barbados Agreement, a pledge to work toward a free presidential election. The dictatorship made no concessions, but the Biden Administration immediately lifted Trump-era oil and gas sanctions for six months. It also warned that Venezuela had a Nov. 30 deadline to show progress toward removing the government’s ban on opposition candidates, including Ms. Machado.

The regime has since done nothing but harass the opposition and especially members of Ms. Machado’s team. Last Wednesday State Department assistant secretary for the Western Hemisphere Brian Nichols described Caracas foot-dragging as an “extremely difficult moment” and called the harassment “extremely worrying.”

On Thursday Venezuela’s president of the national assembly said Ms. Machado won’t be allowed to run. The next day Mr. Maduro’s hand-picked Supreme Court echoed that declaration, upholding the ban, with charges that she had engaged in conspiracies against the regime. The only “conspiracy” is that she opposes the regime.

On Saturday the State Department said the ruling is “inconsistent with the commitment” made in Barbados. No kidding. State noted that Ms. Machado “neither received a copy of the allegations against her nor was afforded the opportunity to respond to those allegations.” It said the U.S. is “reviewing our Venezuela sanctions policy, based on this development and the recent political targeting of democratic opposition candidates and civil society.”

There isn’t much to review. Mr. Maduro learned his politics from Fidel Castro and isn’t about to step aside. The U.S. was naive to think he’d allow a free election, and the only realistic response is to restore the sanctions.


Crafty_Dog

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WSJ: Sen. Rubio: Biden goes flaccid on Maduro
« Reply #660 on: February 05, 2024, 05:30:29 PM »
Biden Goes Soft on Nicolás Maduro
Venezuela’s dictator promised a free election, then banned his leading opponent.
By Marco Rubio
Feb. 5, 2024 5:54 pm ET


‘They’re not getting a free pass for actions they take that are in contradiction to the commitments that they’ve made to move toward free and fair elections.” So said Secretary of State Antony Blinken of Venezuela’s narco-regime when I questioned him in October about President Biden’s decision to lift sanctions on Caracas. I’ll hold Mr. Blinken to his words: We must restore sanctions on Venezuela immediately.


Dictator Nicolás Maduro told Mr. Biden in October that he would permit a free and fair presidential election this year. Instead, Mr. Maduro has banned his leading opponent, María Corina Machado, from running for the next 15 years, while his thugs have persecuted her team and vandalized her campaign headquarters.

Mr. Biden has responded by restoring sanctions only on Venezuela’s state-owned gold-mining company. He’s waiting until April to restore sanctions on Venezuela’s oil and gas sector, allowing Mr. Maduro to spend two months shoring up his tyranny. Even after the April deadline, the dictator would be free to sell some sanction-free natural gas and trade off his regime’s debt.

This is an outrageously weak response from a president. For one, this sanction doesn’t help the people of Venezuela. The meager growth that Venezuela’s economy experienced last year has been more than offset by the empowerment of its oppressive regime. There are more political prisoners in Venezuela’s jail cells than before the Biden administration initiated its negotiations.

Mr. Biden’s decision embarrasses the U.S. The more we fail to enforce red lines, the more our adversaries are likely to attack. Our weakness in the Middle East has cost the lives of three Americans, with many more injured. We must re-establish our international credibility, and fast. If emboldened, Mr. Maduro might invade nearby Guyana, which could jeopardize the security of America’s oil and bauxite supply chains.

We have a lot to lose from strengthening such a dangerous regime. Venezuela is one of the main points for U.S. adversaries, including Iran, Russia and China, to enter our hemisphere. The country provides a stronghold for narco-terrorists who produce drugs and spread violence.

So why the inaction? Mr. Biden is hamstrung by socialist sympathizers in his party who believe the Venezuelan migrant crisis is the result of sanctions, not Mr. Maduro’s repressive regime and America’s open border. Mr. Biden must decide whose interests he will serve. Those of the American people or those of his party’s ideologues?

If we continue to appease Mr. Maduro, our hemisphere will become more dangerous and more anti-American. Restoring sanctions would be no silver bullet, but it would be a step in the right direction. I urge Mr. Blinken to hold fast to the commitments he made last October. If not, I will ask him to come before Congress to explain the reason for Mr. Biden’s unconscionable delay.

Mr. Rubio, a Republican, is a U.S. senator from Florida.

Body-by-Guinness

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Ignore Our Lies or We'll Flood Your Borders
« Reply #661 on: February 06, 2024, 04:59:48 PM »
Perhaps this is why Biden is such a squish where Venezuela is concerned:


How Venezuela’s dictatorship is weaponizing the US border crisis
The Hill News by Arturo McFields, Opinion Contributor / Feb 6, 2024 at 10:55 AM//keep unread//hide

The Venezuelan dictatorship, with 25 years in power, continues to bet on increasing forced migration as a useful strategy for blackmailing President Biden's administration against reimposing sanctions against the regime.

Venezuelan Vice President Delcy Rodríguez has threatened to immediately revoke migrant repatriation flights and review any existing bilateral cooperation mechanism in the even that sanctions return. The threat comes from a regime that took the most prosperous economy in Latin America and forced more than 7 million of its own citizens to emigrate in abject poverty and desperation.

Over the last year, the U.S. had relaxed many of the sanctions against Venezuelan gold, gas and oil in a bid to ensure free elections and help stabilize the nation's deteriorating economy. It seemed like a reasonable proposal, but the dictatorship is not willing to risk two decades of Chavismo and the resultant ill-gotten gains.

Last month, the Supreme Court of Justice, controlled by the regime of Nicolas Maduro, banned the main opposition leader, María Corina Machado, from running for office for 15 years. The ruling closed the doors to any possibility of democratic change and reignited a desire among its 28 million citizens to emigrate.

The weaponization of migration has been part of the old Marxist toolkit since the days of Fidel Castro and the Mariel boatlift. In 1977, President Jimmy Carter tried to promote dialogue and democracy in Cuba, easing sanctions with good faith. All the while, Fidel Castro increased repression and corruption in the Caribbean nation.

This story seems to be repeating itself.

Last year, the communist regimes of Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela carried out massive joint operations to promote irregular emigration to the U.S. Cuba provided the migrants, Venezuela the Conviasa airline and Nicaragua the gateway to begin the northward journey toward the U.S. border.

Although this immigration scheme was scaled back due to a timely U.S. response, the Nicaraguan dictatorship has opened other routes to take migrants to the border. Even last December, a charter flight headed to Nicaragua was caught trafficking 276 Indian nationals at an international airport in France.

Manuel Orozco, a researcher at the Inter-American Dialogue, has said that Nicaraguan dictator Daniel Ortega wanted to open the immigration valve for 100,000 people, obtaining millions each month in income taxes on remittances. This is a risky but profitable business.

All around the world, the communist model has been a resounding failure. But migrants fleeing communist systems have generated resounding success. In Nicaragua, during the first six months of 2023, the Ortega regime collected more than $2 billion in remittances. The worse the tyrant, the better forced emigration is for his economy.

In Venezuela, it is clear that the migratory hemorrhage requires something more than walls to stop. A foreign policy and security strategy is needed to address the weaponization of immigration by dictatorships like those of Cuba, Nicaragua or Venezuela, but actions are also needed to prevent the emergence of new tyrannies or failed states like Haiti.

We recently saw an extraordinary example of leadership in Ecuador. The country has not yet emerged from the crisis caused by drug trafficking and gangs, but it is receiving timely international cooperation to avoid a total disaster. Even a divided U.S. Congress presented a bipartisan statement .

Another positive example was the immediate response to the governance crisis in Guatemala. Corrupt power groups wanted to prevent the transfer of leadership to the new president, Bernardo Arevalo. Strong international pressure and the leadership of the U.S. prevented a tragedy there. These have been good recent examples of what can be done to prevent new migration crises.

If we limit ourselves to believing that the migration crisis is solved at the border, we are only addressing part of the problem — the symptoms, but not the disease. Dictatorships, narco-states and corruption are issues that require an urgent and comprehensive response. It is critical for the U.S. to take care of its so-called backyard, promoting democracy, security and prosperity. This is not an expense, but an investment.

Arturo McFields Yescas is an exiled journalist, former Nicaraguan Ambassador to the Organization of American States, and a former volunteer in the Peace Corps of Norway.

https://thehill.com/opinion/immigration/4443814-how-venezuelas-dictatorship-is-weaponizing-the-us-border-crisis/

Crafty_Dog

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Re: Venezuela
« Reply #662 on: February 06, 2024, 05:05:05 PM »
I had not thought of that angle.

Good find.

Crafty_Dog

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WSJ: Biden appeases Venezuela too
« Reply #663 on: February 12, 2024, 06:05:44 AM »
Maduro Plays the Migrant Blackmail Card
Venezuela dares the U.S. to reimpose oil and gas sanctions. Will Biden give in?
Mary Anastasia O’Grady
WSJ
Feb. 11, 2024 3:52 pm ET


Delcy Rodríguez, Venezuela’s vice-dictator, warned Washington on Jan. 30 that her government will refuse to accept deported migrants if the U.S. reimposes oil and gas sanctions: “If they make the mistake of intensifying the economic aggression against Venezuela . . . repatriation flights for Venezuelan migrants will be immediately revoked as of Feb. 13.”

This is an act of desperation on the part of an illegitimate government and it’s been complemented by Venezuelan saber-rattling on the Guyanese border. Caracas is feeling the heat from the international community—including left-of-center democracies—to hold a free and fair election this year. Unfortunately, given President Biden’s record of giving in to criminal regimes, there’s reason to fear that the threats will achieve their intended outcome of more sanctions relief. But there’s also a slim margin of hope that they won’t. It depends on whether Mr. Biden is serious about democracy for Venezuela.

Mr. Biden’s timid foreign policy telegraphs trepidation to despots who want to harm America. The president’s January 2022 suggestion that Russia might get away with a “minor incursion” into Ukraine is one example. More recently, there’s his unwillingness to respond effectively to Iranian-backed attacks on U.S. assets. Isolationist Republicans are part of the problem.

Russia, China and Iran also smell U.S. weakness in the Western Hemisphere. Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping hold sway over Venezuelan strongman Nicolás Maduro. The government promised a competitive vote in 2024 when it signed an October agreement—brokered by Norway—with the opposition at a meeting in Barbados. No one thought Venezuela was serious, except perhaps the Biden administration. The ink wasn’t dry when the U.S. announced that for six months it would lift sanctions on oil and gas investments and sales from Venezuela. Those sanctions had been in place since the Trump administration. Secretary of State Antony Blinken gave Caracas until the end of November to set a “timeline” to reinstate banned presidential candidates and free political prisoners.

When Venezuela blew through that deadline, the U.S. gave it a pass. Days of delay turned into weeks and months. In January the U.S. got its answer: Mr. Maduro’s hand-picked Supreme Court disqualified popular opposition candidate Maria Corina Machado with absurd allegations of conspiracy against her country. The regime has also arrested members of her team.

Ms. Machado won the opposition’s primary last year with more than 90% of the vote and is the heavy favorite to beat Mr. Maduro in a level contest. If the regime can eliminate her candidacy, it hopes a multicandidate field will emerge, fragmenting the opposition. This is an age-old tyrant’s trick to hold on to power while claiming victory at the ballot box. Meantime, Venezuela hasn’t yet issued a campaign calendar. Until it does, international observer teams are unable to organize their missions or launch exploratory visits ahead of the vote.

The good news is that the State Department said in January it is prepared to reimpose the sanctions in April on Venezuelan oil and gas. The bad news is that it said this will happen “absent progress” by Caracas toward a legitimate election. Those words, coming from a U.S. administration that has a history of making excuses for the regime, don’t boost confidence.

Caracas is so used to bullying Mr. Biden and watching him back down that it is trying again with Ms. Rodríguez’s warning on migrants. But blocking entry of Venezuelans into their own country would be a violation of international law. It might give Mr. Maduro a brief feeling of righteous revenge but that’s unlikely to last if the U.S. responds by ending flights between American and Venezuelan airports. Mr. Maduro’s self-imposed isolation from the largest economy in the world would reaffirm Venezuela’s reputation as a rogue state. The right response is to call his bluff.

If Mr. Biden sees an opportunity to throw some crumbs to Washington oil lobbyists in an election year, he could renew the sanctions relief and blame Ms. Rodríguez. But he’d be going against world opinion. On Thursday the European Parliament passed a resolution (446-21) saying it won’t recognize the election if Ms. Machado isn’t allowed to run. The European Union also wants sanctions on Venezuela’s Supreme Court and its security forces for abuses of power against government opponents.

Last week the website of Brazil’s pro-Cuba President Inácio Luiz “Lula” da Silva announced Brazil’s continuing support for implementing the Barbados agreement. Even Juan González, President Biden’s lefty National Security Council adviser for Latin America, said last week that “all candidates must be eligible to compete.” He added that Ms. Machado is “the opposition candidate.”

Yet if that generated any optimism among the Venezuelan opposition it evaporated when Mr. González suggested from Bogotá that Colombian President Gustavo Petro, a former left-wing terrorist, play the role of mediator between the Venezuelan dictatorship and the opposition. Apparently Raúl Castro isn’t available.
« Last Edit: March 05, 2024, 10:28:24 AM by Crafty_Dog »

Crafty_Dog

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Venezuela doing a Putin on Guyana
« Reply #664 on: February 15, 2024, 03:54:51 PM »
https://michaelyon.locals.com/upost/5271290/coming-soon

All as Biden gives Wall Street the right to buy Venezuelan bonds, a half million work permits to V'n illegals, V. refuses to take back V. illegals, and breaks promise about elections by blocking opposition candidate.

Crafty_Dog

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GPF: Venezuela's "transition"
« Reply #665 on: February 19, 2024, 01:39:54 PM »
Could benefit from a goodly dose of cynicism , , ,

February 19, 2024
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Washington Remains Committed to Venezuela’s Transition
But its resolve isn’t absolute.
By: Allison Fedirka

It’s no secret that the United States wants regime change in Venezuela. Since 2019, Washington has intensified its efforts toward that end by boosting support for the political opposition, backing a parallel government and employing sanctions against the state’s most lucrative businesses. But none of these efforts has produced Washington’s desired result – and any future ones will likewise encounter strict limitations.

Washington’s interest in Venezuela lies in its interest in securing the Western Hemisphere. Venezuela’s position in the Caribbean basin, its ties to Cuba, its anti-U.S. alignment and its status as a major drug trafficking country make it uniquely suited to potentially disrupt hemispheric security. For the U.S., a secure Caribbean engenders maritime trade, reduces illicit business flows and keeps adversaries at a comfortable distance. Instability in Venezuela, then, threatens vital U.S. interests. Under the government of President Nicolas Maduro, Venezuela has grown markedly less stable, and it shows no sign of stabilizing – not with the U.S. sanctions regime against it, and not with its few allies financially unable to assist it. The status quo will continue to spur emigration, social unrest, nationalist sentiment and political radicalization, so Washington wants to make sure whoever replaces Maduro isn’t indifferent or hostile to U.S. considerations.

Sanctions have been Washington’s tool of choice for forcing Caracas’ hand. The U.S. first employed them in 2014 to target high-profile individuals. In 2018, Washington added state-run companies such as oil firm PDVSA and various financial transactions to the list. This latter round proved particularly costly to the Venezuelan economy, so the next year the U.S. began to allow select energy companies to conduct business with Venezuela under specific conditions. It was not until October 2023 that the U.S. government issued a six-month suspension of all sanctions against Venezuelan state-owned companies and financial transactions – a result of a political agreement between the Maduro government and the opposition known as the Barbados accords, which also called for free and fair elections. Yet at the beginning of 2024, Maduro disqualified the candidacy of the winner of the opposition's primary, calling into question his fealty to the Barbados accords. In response, the U.S. reimposed sanctions on Minerven, the state-run gold company, and threatened to reimpose sanctions on the oil industry by April 18 if no conclusive progress has been made.

Notably, American businesses are against the sanctions. Heavyweights like Chevron, Fidelity Investments, T. Rowe Price and Greylock Capital have much to gain in Venezuela and have thus advocated easing sanctions, arguing that it’s in Washington’s best interest that private U.S. firms are free to counter foreign competitors.

Last year, for example, Russian prospecting company RosGeo signed an agreement with PDVSA that develops technical advising, vocational training and geophysical prospecting for oil and gas deposits. This opens the door for Russian ships to conduct studies off the Venezuelan coast in the Caribbean basin. Certain Wall Street financial firms warned that investors from Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Cyprus – all places known for funneling Russian money – had purchased billions of dollars worth of Venezuelan bonds. In response, the U.S. government allowed bond purchases to continue instead of sanctioning them again with the gold mining licenses.

Also factoring into Washington’s Venezuela policy is the need to preserve other relationships in the region. ExxonMobil, for example, has said it plans to drill in Guyana this year. And though it said it would do so in uncontested waters (Venezuela disputes the ownership of some offshore oil wells) the announcement nonetheless triggered Venezuela to again deploy a small number of troops to Guyana’s border. Washington is all but forced to side with Guyana, but it has no interest in a military intervention, which would alienate Washington from the rest of Latin America. To help share the responsibility of stabilizing Venezuela, Washington turned to Colombia and Brazil. Brasilia led talks at the start of this year to help reduce border tensions between Venezuela and Guyana. And Colombian politics, not to mention its close ties with both the U.S. and Venezuela, makes Bogota a key player in facilitating a political resolution in Venezuela.

This latter point is particularly important because Venezuela’s domestic political landscape is among the biggest constraints to improving bilateral ties with the U.S. The Maduro government came to office as the hand-picked successor of Hugo Chavez. Maduro still holds a grip on power through a series of economic, illicit, political and security networks, and he still controls virtually the entire state apparatus. But the country’s dramatic economic decline created political fissures within the once-united Chavista camp centered on Maduro supporters, traditionalists and reformers. Maduro supporters agree with the government’s more aggressive foreign policy and are generally content to turn a blind eye to the domestic crackdowns that have occurred to keep political support in line. Traditional Chavistas criticize Maduro for corruption and mismanagement. They favor a return to the political and economic structures that are consistent with Chavez’s original intentions. This camp finds its support largely among the military and lower classes. The reformists support a more pragmatic approach. Many of them studied overseas and come from the middle class and business class in Venezuela. Their pro-business stance leads to a more pragmatic and technocratic approach to governance.

Then there is the opposition, led by Maria Corina Machado. She presents as a technocrat in that she studied finance and public policy both domestically and overseas, but her activism took off in 2013 after Chavez’s death. She is a harsh critic of Maduro and traditional Chavismo. Her political platform calls for systematic reform by reducing the role of state companies, lowering welfare payments, promoting the private sector and weakening the executive’s power. In terms of political capital, she has no rival in the opposition. Her hardline stance has endeared her to the public but has made her a target for the regime.

If the U.S. wants to engage Venezuela, it needs to engage all three groups. It can’t afford to completely circumvent those who control state institutions, nor can it ignore the institutional reformists who, along with the pro-democracy open-economy opposition, would be the vanguard of a political transition, which needs to find a way to allow Maduro to save face. Machado’s rhetoric indicates that she understands Maduro’s position and that there is a greater need to move forward than to retaliate.

All these moving pieces will weigh on Washington’s decision on whether it will renew sanctions on Venezuela’s oil sector come April 18. As the political drama unfolds, the U.S. will adjust its calculus – for instance, by determining if it will punish Venezuela for imprisoning political activists and expelling U.N. human rights officials. Washington remains committed to a political transition in Venezuela that includes allowing opposition candidates to run for office, announcing electoral calendars and formally inviting election observers from the European Union. But its resolve is not absolute; even the U.S. must operate within its constraints.

DougMacG

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Bidenomics in Venezuela
« Reply #666 on: February 26, 2024, 06:34:40 PM »
If you converted a million dollars into bolivars in 2013 — when Nicolás Maduro first came to power — and left it in an interest-accruing Venezuelan bank for the past decade, your current balance would be about 3 cents.

These policies have these consequences.

Don't let anyone here say what Venezuelans said then, it can't happen here.  Yes it can.

https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/venezuelas-currency-is-so-worthless-theres-no-point-hiding-pins-zrd7xrjxf

Crafty_Dog

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GPF: Venezuela's Elections
« Reply #667 on: May 01, 2024, 05:38:23 AM »

May 1, 2024
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Don’t Expect Too Much From Venezuela’s Elections
The slow transition continues.
By: Allison Fedirka

The Venezuelan opposition has unexpectedly united around a single candidate: Edmundo Gonzalez. And though this is good news for a movement that has long been hindered by its inability to set aside its differences, much remains in the way of true regime change, which should still be seen as a long-term goal rather than a plausible outcome of the July 28 elections.

It’s fair to say that in the past Venezuela’s opposition has stood in the way of its own success. Ideological disagreements aside, personality-based divisions have prevented the opposition from presenting a unified front, leading to declining resources, manpower and electoral weight. In fact, the opposition boycotted elections from 2018 to 2021 on the grounds that they were unfair, and as a result, the ruling government ran uncontested, keeping a strong hold on elected posts. The movement returned to elections in 2021, but President Nicolas Maduro has since declared it illegal for the leading candidate, Maria Corina Machado, to be on the ballot this year, reviving concerns that the opposition would fall into its old habits and leave itself no better off than it was before.

But it seems as though the opposition has learned its lesson and is eager to see more success at the July 28 polls. Despite being the most popular opposition candidate, Machado stepped out of the race and threw her support behind Gonzalez, a candidate that could actually make it onto the ballot. Other influential opposition figures such as Henrique Capriles and Juan Guaido also back Gonzalez. As of today, the Maduro government and election observers recognize Gonzalez’s candidacy. This effectively challenges the Maduro government to honor its commitment to free and fair elections.

It does not guarantee electoral success. Despite Venezuela’s many economic challenges, the government remains in control and has managed to keep the opposition at bay through political imprisonment, intimidation and media influence. It’s highly motivated to win since losing would result in exile or prison for many prominent officials. Maduro himself relies heavily on a network of power brokers, each contributing to the economy’s – and thus the regime’s – well-being. While the different factions of the government don’t always agree (particularly when it comes to the legacy of former President Hugo Chavez), their shared interests are strong enough to force cooperation. Arguments for a negotiated transition that protects Maduro and his cronies have been made, but they don’t see them as viable because the opposition is unable to guarantee that it will make good on its promises.

Importantly, some segments of the Venezuelan public do not wish to see regime change. The government clearly has not solved the root causes of the country’s economic problems, but it has successfully navigated around them and found temporary solutions. The government is still an important employer, even if wages remain depressed. (Many employees have to find side jobs, and Caracas has embraced that need through the creation of VenApp, a platform that connects potential gig workers with government service and repair work.) With the help of foreign private firms and the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization, Venezuela has managed to improve food self-sufficiency enough to ease its dependence on imports. Caracas has also learned from other countries under U.S. sanctions to keep daily life livable. The traditional grocery stores in major cities, for example, now face competition from Iranian shops that offer low prices for comparable goods due to wholesale prices and different product origins. Anecdotal reports even suggest the same grocery list can be purchased at Iranian markets for less than half the price at traditional supermarkets. None of these measures permanently fix the Venezuelan economy, but they might be enough for those who stand to lose a lot from an unknown economic future brought about by regime change.

The opposition’s failure to recognize these realities causes it to underestimate the strength of the forces it competes against. Gonzalez, among others, clearly stated that the opposition’s main objective is to restore democratic institutions, values and practices in the country. Its ability to do so is predicated on three elements: free and fair elections, the assumption of electoral victory and an orderly transition with no retaliation. Historically, the regime has guaranteed none of these conditions. Even so, the opposition remains committed to these ideals, putting it on an unlevel playing field against a government that has more resources but fewer reservations about how they are used.

Moreover, the Maduro regime’s ability to manipulate the electoral system should not be ignored. The decision to declare Machado ineligible for the 2024 ballot marks only the most recent instance of electoral malfeasance. A few years ago, when the opposition won a supermajority in the National Assembly, the government, threatened by the fact that their enemies now had the ability to rewrite the constitution and impeach officials, simply created a new, parallel legislature composed of regime loyalists. (This legislature remains in place today.) The government can thus be expected to try to shape the election’s outcome to its liking. In fact, rumors have already emerged that Caracas plans to run a Chavista candidate in an effort to split the opposition vote.

Hovering over the elections is the United States. Washington’s behavior toward Venezuela suggests it sees regime change as a long-term goal, not one that will be achieved this summer. It lifted sanctions on Venezuela under the condition that the government honors the Barbados Agreement, which calls for free and fair elections. The omission of Machado from the ballot put Maduro’s compliance with these agreements in question. The U.S. responded by first reimposing sanctions on Venezuelan gold operations. After a few months, when it became clear the government was not going to change its ways, Washington adjusted its approach to oil sanctions, reflecting a desire to balance regime change with U.S. interests. In April, for example, Washington announced the planned revocation of Special License 44, which allowed U.S. companies to invest in and export Venezuelan oil. By May 31, the U.S. will go back to how it conducted oil business with Venezuela. There will be full sanctions in place against doing business with Venezuelan oil operations, but companies can apply (and often receive) special waivers to engage. This will inevitably reduce the revenue available to the Maduro regime, but importantly the waivers allow the U.S. to keep its foot in the door. Washington needs to ensure economic access to Venezuela down the line and cannot take itself out of the market entirely, especially now that European and Russian companies and others are looking for a way in. The U.S. is more than willing to wait for regime change rather than push for something immediately, especially if doing so reduces the chance of revolution or a civil war that would jeopardize its interests.

Venezuela’s elections in July need to be viewed as part of the broader transition process, not a watershed moment in their own right. The fact that the Maduro regime and the U.S. are talking, that Caracas signed the Barbados Agreement, and that the opposition is getting its act together all prove that a transition is underway. But they also reveal the constraints to regime change, which, barring an unforeseen event, will come slowly.

Crafty_Dog

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FO: Southcom visits Guyana
« Reply #668 on: May 13, 2024, 09:03:44 AM »
U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHOM) officials visited Guyana last week to discuss “ongoing security cooperation and security assistance”. A pair of F/A-18F Super Hornets conducted a flyover of the country, likely in response to threats against Guyana from the Venezuelan military.

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Venezuela: An Opportunity for Change?
« Reply #670 on: July 08, 2024, 03:19:12 PM »
Likely too much to wish for, but more hope than that sorry country has seen for quite some time:

Machado: A Beacon of Hope in Venezuela’s Political Crisis

The Beacon / by Alvaro Vargas Llosa / Jul 8, 2024 at 5:53 PM

Politicians who talk about “rendezvous with history” make me cringe. Still, it is hard to argue that the presidential elections that will take place in Venezuela on July 28 are anything but that. The opposition (or, more accurately, the resistance movement) is currently at its strongest. It is united behind one of Latin America’s most formidable leaders, María Corina Machado, a woman of classical liberal persuasion who enjoys approximately 70 percent popular support. Conversely, the tyrant governing the country and his entire administration have never been weaker.

They have weakened to the extent that even Nicolás Maduro’s allies in Latin America, such as Brazil’s Lula da Silva and Colombia’s Gustavo Petro (in many respects a Chavista himself), have distanced themselves from Caracas’ attempts to rig the election weeks before the vote in various ways. These efforts have included barring Machado’s right to run for office.

Lest my enthusiasm misleads anyone, let me be clear: The entire system works against the opposition in Venezuela. Nicolas Maduro has already violated what was agreed upon in Barbados in October of 2023 under international supervision. This agreement was between the Venezuelan dictatorship and the Democratic Unitary Platform to ensure that the presidential election would be free and fair.

After winning the primaries by a landslide, Machado was barred from running. The person chosen by her party as a stand-in, Corina Yoris, was subsequently also prevented from registering as a candidate. After several maneuvers and counter-maneuvers, the united opposition decided to support one of the few candidates allowed to register, Edmundo González, a well-respected 74-year-old diplomat who, nevertheless, was largely unknown to the public.

Since then, Machado has crisscrossed the country, drawing large crowds wherever she goes. The National Electoral Council has not updated the electoral register (which is another violation of the Barbados accords), meaning that millions will not be able to vote, including, crucially, the immense majority of the eight million Venezuelans who have had to leave the country in recent years and loathe the regime. Additionally, neutral international observers, including those from the European Union, have been banned on election day—yet another violation of the Barbados Accords.

Given all of this, what are the grounds for optimism? In the context of Venezuela, optimism doesn’t mean that Maduro will accept his defeat on election night. He will try to rig the election, for sure. But with an almost guaranteed three-to-one difference in favor of González, it will be impossible for Maduro to manipulate the tally as easily as he has done in the past.

The opposition has put up a vast network of local observers and teams of well-trained people who will be vigilant of any suspicious act or incident on election day and, through various means, will be putting out lots of information to keep Venezuelans and the rest of the world informed. The fraud will be blatant and grotesque, likely unleashing a process, including internal resistance and international pressure, that the dictatorship will not find easy to counter. Many Venezuelans and the international community believe that the dynamics triggered by a massive opposition win on July 28 can produce cracks in the dictatorship, render Maduro’s orders ineffective, and set in motion some form of transition.

Machado and her collaborators (many of whom are in prison or under diplomatic protection in the Argentinean embassy) have given guarantees that they will negotiate a peaceful transfer of power with any credible faction of the regime willing to accept the opposition’s victory. This includes allowing Chavismo to continue to exist as a political force in a pluralistic liberal democracy.

Those like María Corina Machado, who have been fighting for freedom for decades, deserve to keep the hope alive that things will be different this time.

The post Machado: A Beacon of Hope in Venezuela’s Political Crisis appeared first on The Beacon.

https://blog.independent.org/2024/07/08/machado-a-beacon-of-hope-in-venezuelas-political-crisis/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=machado-a-beacon-of-hope-in-venezuelas-political-crisis

Crafty_Dog

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Lethal Minds Journal: Venezuela
« Reply #671 on: July 17, 2024, 08:49:47 AM »


Navigating Dual Economic Paths: Venezuela's BRICS Membership and Dollarization


Venezuela's dual economic strategies of joining the BRICS alliance and embracing dollarization aim to stabilize the economy and diversify international alliances. Joining BRICS seeks to reduce dependency on Western economies and attract new investment opportunities, while dollarization addresses hyperinflation and stabilizes purchasing power. These strategies offer a balanced approach to short-term stabilization and long-term economic growth, but challenges such as high living costs and structural issues persist. The potential election of María Corina Machado could further enhance investor confidence through significant economic reforms, though her candidacy faces legal obstacles. It is also more likely that this dual economic strategy will further exacerbate Venezuela’s already collapsing economic situation.

Navigating Dual Economic Paths: Venezuela's BRICS Membership and Dollarization
Venezuela's recent economic maneuvers highlight a strategic blend of short-term stabilization and long-term positioning. By joining the BRICS alliance and embracing the US dollar, Venezuela addresses its economic challenges on multiple fronts. This complex strategy, involving significant economic shifts, aims to stabilize the nation's economy, diversify its international alliances, and ultimately secure a more resilient economic future.

In 2023, Venezuela applied to join BRICS, which includes Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. This move represents a significant shift in Venezuela's geopolitical and economic strategy. By joining BRICS, Venezuela seeks to diversify its economic ties, access financial support, and realign geopolitically. Aligning with BRICS opens new markets and investment opportunities, reducing Venezuela's dependence on Western economies and the US dollar. This shift supports Venezuela's stance on greater sovereignty and reduced Western influence. BRICS countries have a history of collaborating on various development projects and financial initiatives, offering mutual support to member nations. For Venezuela, joining this alliance could mean access to a new pool of financial resources and technological cooperation, which are crucial for its economic recovery and growth. The diverse economic landscapes of BRICS nations provide a broad platform for Venezuela to tap into, ranging from technological advancements in India and China to natural resources and agricultural opportunities in Brazil and Russia. Geopolitically, aligning with BRICS supports Venezuela's efforts to reduce Western influence and enhance its sovereignty. This realignment allows Venezuela to forge stronger ties with nations that share a common interest in promoting a multipolar world order, thereby reducing the dominance of any single global power.

This shift could also provide Venezuela with more leverage in international negotiations and economic dealings, enhancing its strategic position on the global stage.

Conversely, Venezuela's decision in 2020 to allow the use of US dollars addresses pressing economic issues that require immediate solutions. The severe devaluation of the Bolivar, Venezuela's national currency, has led to hyperinflation, making it nearly impossible for citizens to afford basic necessities. To combat this, the Venezuelan government allowed the use of US dollars in everyday transactions.

Nicolas Maduro  after being sworn in for his second term as  president of Venezuela on Jan. 10, 2019.

Nicolas Maduro after being sworn in for his second term as president of Venezuela on Jan. 10, 2019. (Yuri Cortez / AFP/Getty Images)
Dollarization has stabilized purchasing power for Venezuelans, making it easier for them to buy goods and services. This move has brought a semblance of stability to an economy that was otherwise spiraling out of control. Businesses, too, have benefited from this decision, as it has facilitated smoother international transactions and debt settlements. The stability provided by the US dollar has enabled businesses to operate more effectively, contributing to the revival of economic activity. However, the process of dollarization has led to a situation where living costs in Venezuela have become higher than in the USA. The economic collapse, driven by political instability, mismanagement, and a significant drop in oil prices, resulted in hyperinflation and a devalued Bolivar. Many businesses and individuals in Venezuela turned to the US dollar, which, while bringing stability, also caused prices of goods and services to remain high, resulting in a higher cost of living. For example, a family of four faces estimated monthly costs of around $2,564 without rent, and a single person’s estimated monthly costs are about $1,112 without rent. The minimum wage in Venezuela is around $6, and the average salary is approximately $175.99. These high costs, coupled with low wages, have exacerbated economic disparity.

The black market for US dollars in Venezuela has flourished due to currency controls and a shortage of US dollars. The black-market exchange rate is significantly higher than the official rate, making it difficult for many Venezuelans to afford goods and services. For example, in 2019, the official exchange rate was around 60 Bolivars per US dollar, while the black-market rate was around 10,000 Bolivars per US dollar. This discrepancy highlights the challenges Venezuelans face in accessing stable currency through official channels. Additionally, Venezuelans have increasingly turned to cryptocurrencies for remittances, recording over $460 million in the last 12 months.

Cryptocurrencies provide an alternative means of transaction, particularly for sending and receiving money from abroad. This surge in crypto remittances reflects a broader trend in Latin America, driven by economic difficulties and migration. However, the Venezuelan government's own cryptocurrency, the Petro, has not gained significant popularity despite being promoted as a solution to the economic crisis. Many Venezuelans prefer other cryptocurrencies, which they find more reliable and accessible. This preference for alternative cryptocurrencies over the Petro highlights the challenges the government faces in implementing its digital currency strategy.

These seemingly divergent approaches—dollarization and joining BRICS— complement each other when viewed through their respective lenses of short-term and long-term benefits. Dollarization acts as a practical solution to stabilize the economy and relieve immediate pressures. By allowing the use of US dollars, the government has provided a temporary relief mechanism that stabilizes the economy and ensures citizens can access essential goods and services. In contrast, joining BRICS represents a strategic effort to reduce dependency on the US dollar and foster diverse economic partnerships. This long-term strategy aims to integrate Venezuela into a broader economic network that can provide sustainable growth and resilience against external economic shocks. The combination of these strategies reflects a nuanced understanding of Venezuela's economic environment and geopolitical dynamics.

Venezuela's dual strategy avoids the pitfalls of contextual bias by recognizing the broader implications of its economic strategies and avoiding narrow, short-term assessments. Simplifying daily transactions through dollarization effectively manages immediate economic challenges, while aligning with BRICS paves the way for future economic stability and growth. Venezuela’s approach blends aspects of different economic models, tailored to its unique context rather than blindly imitating any one system. This pragmatic approach considers the specific needs and challenges of the Venezuelan economy, integrating elements from both capitalist and socialist models to create a balanced economic strategy. Managing strategic visibility on the global stage avoids undue attention from adversaries. By aligning with BRICS and reducing dependency on the US dollar, Venezuela strengthens its geopolitical position while maintaining a degree of strategic ambiguity. Leaders focus on initiatives that align with strategic goals, avoiding unnecessary tasks that detract from meaningful progress. This focus ensures that the government's efforts are directed towards achieving long-term economic stability and growth.

By joining BRICS and adopting dollarization, Venezuela attempts to address its economic challenges with a balanced approach. While dollarization offers short-term stability, BRICS membership positions Venezuela for sustainable long-term growth. This pragmatic strategy, if managed well, can help Venezuela navigate current crises and work towards a more resilient economic future. Effective management and continuous adaptation of these strategies will be crucial for Venezuela to stabilize its economy and secure a more sustainable path forward.

Analyst Comment: What Does This Mean for Expats and Investors?
Prospective expats, digital nomads considering Venezuela as a destination to stretch their money further, and foreign investors evaluating the market must consider significant factors.

While dollarization provides some stability, the cost of living can be unexpectedly high, with goods and services often priced in US dollars and inflated due to persistent hyperinflation. Additionally, Venezuela's ongoing economic instability, high crime rates, and lack of infrastructure can impact the quality of life for expats and digital nomads.

The severe brain drain and reduced local capacity for innovation and growth further exacerbate these challenges.

From a foreign investment perspective, Venezuela presents a challenging environment. Despite attempts to stabilize the economy through dollarization, persistent hyperinflation driven by structural issues and instability of the Bolivar undermines confidence in the market. Significant public debt and chronic fiscal deficits indicate potential financial instability, deterring long-term investment. The ongoing emigration of skilled professionals due to economic hardship exacerbates the brain drain, reducing the local capacity for growth and innovation.

These factors collectively make Venezuela a high-risk destination for both foreign investors and individuals looking to relocate, who may seek more stable and predictable environments. Careful assessment of these risks is crucial in determining whether the potential benefits outweigh the broader economic and social challenges.

Analyst Comment: Green Flag Scenario for Potential Investment in Venezuela

The potential election of María Corina Machado as President of Venezuela offers a promising environment for investors due to her commitment to significant economic reforms and market liberalization. Machado's agenda includes reducing government intervention, privatizing state-owned enterprises, and fostering a competitive market environment, which could drive economic growth and innovation. She plans to tackle hyperinflation by establishing an independent central bank to stabilize the Bolivar, thereby restoring confidence in the national currency and creating a predictable economic climate. Machado aims to diversify beyond oil into sectors like agriculture, manufacturing, and services, building a more resilient economic structure with multiple investment avenues. Re-engaging with international financial institutions and negotiating new trade agreements are key to opening new markets and attracting foreign direct investment. Machado's robust anti-corruption measures and improved governance efforts aim to create a favorable business environment, enhancing investor confidence. However, it is unlikely she will win since she is not officially on the ballot due to legal and political obstacles

Body-by-Guinness

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Will an Autocrat be Unseated?
« Reply #672 on: July 25, 2024, 12:17:29 PM »
I see this story firs appeared in the NYT. I confess that somewhat surprises me as there has to be a fear that the current Venezuelan gov must be contemplating stealing that election as the Old Gray Hag swears up and down it didn’t and couldn’t happen here among the would be autocrats running the country these days:

The ‘Iron Lady’ of Venezuela Threatens to Unseat Its Autocrat
July 24, 2024in News

She travels the country in white, rosaries swinging from her neck. Women cry in her arms, men beg her for salvation. Stripped of her bodyguard last week by the government, she traversed the streets unprotected.

As she climbed onto the windshield of her battered car — her makeshift stage — supporters jostled to touch her. One passed her a hand-drawn portrait. Inside the frameless image, María Corina Machado was shielded by the Venezuelan flag and the arms of Jesus Christ.


“María!” yelled one supporter, “help us!”

Ms. Machado, 56, the newest leader of Venezuela’s opposition, has struck fear into the hearts of the country’s ruling party. In a matter of months, she has emerged from the political sidelines to build a powerful social movement capable of bringing thousands of people to the streets — and perhaps millions to the ballot box.

She is not the one running for president, but she is the driving force behind the main opposition candidate, a little-known diplomat named Edmundo González.

The mobilization Ms. Machado has catalyzed follows years of political apathy in Venezuela, where the government of President Nicolás Maduro has crushed protests and arrested dissidents, helping to spur an enormous exodus from the country.

An effort backed by the Trump administration to install a young legislator named Juan Guaidó as interim president failed, and last year Mr. Guaidó fled to the United States.

Now, Ms. Machado, a conservative former member of the national assembly once rejected by her own colleagues, has not only corralled Venezuela’s fractious opposition behind her, but has also captivated a broad swath of the electorate with a promise for sweeping government change.

Even former critics say her movement is the country’s most important since the one built by Hugo Chávez, Mr. Maduro’s mentor and the founder of Venezuela’s 25-year-old socialist project.

A key difference is that “Chavismo coalesced around an ideological proposal for the country” — socialism — while “María Corina’s movement revolves around the people’s weariness with Madurismo,” said Andrés Izarra, who worked as Mr. Chávez’s communications minister before becoming a government critic and going into exile.

Under Mr. Maduro, the country has witnessed an extraordinary economic contraction — the largest outside of war in at least 50 years, economists say. While the economy has improved slightly in recent years, millions of people still cannot afford enough food or critical medications.

If Mr. Maduro stays in power, polls show that large numbers of Venezuelans plan to flee the country, a northward movement that could begin weeks before the U.S. presidential election.

“For the future of our children!” shouted one young woman as Ms. Machado’s car last week rolled through the city of Guanare, a six-hour drive west of Caracas, the capital.

That morning, Ms. Machado’s security adviser was the latest in a string of campaign members to be arrested by the government. To evade authorities, the opposition leader sped out of Caracas before dawn, her car windows still bearing the cracks from rock-throwing Maduro supporters.

By late afternoon, she had climbed onto her car’s roof in Guanare, wearing pearl earrings and a ponytail.

The cries of support reached a fever pitch. At her side, a man without shoes asked how he could help protect her.

In a barely audible speech delivered through a megaphone, Ms. Machado promised to revive the economy and bring children who had migrated back home.

Her popularity will be tested this Sunday, when the country holds a presidential election that could bring an end to 25 years of socialist rule.

Since taking office in 2013, Mr. Maduro has held elections to try to lend legitimacy to his government. He has often tilted the ballot box in his favor, banning popular competitors or outright inventing the results.

In January, a high court ruled that Ms. Machado was barred from the ballot. Then came a surprise: The government allowed her coalition to nominate a different candidate, and Mr. González became the consensus choice.

If the opposition wins, Mr. González, 74, will be president. But from Washington to Caracas, everyone understands that Ms. Machado is the driving force behind the movement.

In a joint interview, the pair declined to say what role Ms. Machado would have in a González administration. But Ms. Machado said that she believed they could win.

“Never in 25 years have we gone into an election in such a strong position,” she said.

As the vote nears, the nation is on tenterhooks. Polls show enormous support for the opposition. But Mr. Maduro has shown little interest in giving up power. Last week, he vowed at a campaign event that Venezuela would fall “into a blood bath, into a fratricidal civil war” if he didn’t win.

The eldest of four daughters in a prominent steel business family, Ms. Machado attended an elite Catholic girls’ school in Caracas and a boarding school in Wellesley, Mass. In a 2005 interview with The New York Times, she called her youth “a childhood protected from contact with reality.”

She trained as an engineer and then took a position in the family company, Sivensa, before working with her mother in a home for abandoned children.

She became a political activist in 2002, helping to found a voter rights group, Súmate, that eventually led a failed effort to recall Mr. Chávez. She was a darling of Washington — the U.S. government provided financial aid to Súmate — and became one of Mr. Chávez’s most detested adversaries.

But it wasn’t just the government that loathed her. Among colleagues in the opposition, she was often viewed as too conservative, too confrontational and too “sifrina” — Venezuelan for “snobbishly high class” — to become the movement’s leader.

She has said that the politician she most admires is Margaret Thatcher, the conservative icon known for her stubbornness and fealty to the free market. And Ms. Machado has long supported privatizing PDVSA, the state oil company, a move other opposition leaders say would put Venezuela’s most valuable resource in the hands of a few.

In 2012, when Ms. Machado was a legislator, she clashed with Mr. Chávez in a televised debate, accusing him of robbing everyday Venezuelans through expropriation.

Mr. Chávez mocked her. “Eagles don’t hunt flies,” he told her. He was the eagle. She was the fly.

For her bullish rhetoric, journalists and analysts began to call Ms. Machado her country’s “iron lady,” the nickname given to Ms. Thatcher.

Questions still surround Ms. Machado’s actions in 2002, when dissident military officers and opposition figures led a short-lived coup meant to oust Mr. Chávez. Ms. Machado was at the presidential palace during the installation of a new president, Pedro Carmona.

In the 2005 interview with The Times, Ms. Machado insisted that she and her mother were in the palace that day only to visit Mr. Carmona’s wife, a family friend — not to support the coup.

More recently, in a 2019 interview with the BBC, Ms. Machado called on “Western democracies” to understand that Mr. Maduro would only leave power “in the face of a credible, imminent and severe threat of the use of force.”

But today, Ms. Machado’s supporters say this battle-ready toughness is exactly what the country needs.

She has also moderated her tone, and now leads with an accompanying softness, cutting across political lines by promising to unite families separated by migration.

She is a mother of three adult children, all of whom live abroad.

Henrique Capriles, an opposition leader who has criticized Ms. Machado in the past, said that her political independence ultimately benefited her, allowing her to gain the trust of voters disenchanted by the rest of the opposition.

Still, he added that Mr. González, a quiet diplomat, might be better suited for the delicate task of dismantling the 25-year-old socialist system. Within power sectors like the armed forces, Ms. Machado is likely to be seen as an antagonistic figure looking to exact retribution on those associated with Mr. Maduro.

On the campaign trail, she has promised to “bury socialism forever” and create a nation where “the criminals and the corrupt go to prison.”

“Edmundo doesn’t generate fear,” Mr. Capriles said. “That’s not a weakness, it’s a strength.”

A decade ago, the government banned Ms. Machado from leaving the country, clearly viewing her lobbying in Washington as a threat. Now, it seems that keeping her at home may have been one Mr. Maduro’s biggest tactical errors.

Doris Lugo, 40, attended the event in Guanare, explaining that her husband and son had left the country in search of work.

“But soon they will return,” she said, confident that Mr. González and Ms. Machado would triumph.

“We have faith in God,” she added, “that the fly is going to trap the eagle.”

The post The ‘Iron Lady’ of Venezuela Threatens to Unseat Its Autocrat appeared first on New York Times.

https://dnyuz.com/2024/07/24/the-iron-lady-of-venezuela-threatens-to-unseat-its-autocrat/