Venezuela

[DougMacG]

Heritage index of Economic Freedom, the last 3:
...
178  Cuba
179  Venezuela
180  North Korea

How to make a nation richer or poorer is not a mystery.
-----------------------------------------------

Socialism started in the ballot box, but people thought they were only voting to take away other people's rights, the rich, the capitalists, and they did.   

How did they take the rest of the freedoms?
https://dogbrothers.com/phpBB2/index.php?topic=1307.msg117063#msg117063
Nothing says freedom like "give us all your guns".

And now it's lights out, water not running, food shelves empty, the currency is worthless and your free health care can't buy a band aid.  All that remains is the continuing admiration of the American Left.  Capitalism is out, mission accomplished.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/14178/venezuela-monroe-doctrine

[Crafty_Dog]

https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/02/venezuela-is-armed-to-the-hilt/?fbclid=IwAR2GbVdQw9HM6HTjl4kJVPhDOYIJgb6T_sXVVndgZ2AxT_slmwJ61waQzYA

[Crafty_Dog]

It’s time to take a break from my search for the meaning of the nation and turn my focus to specific countries. I will start with Venezuela, which has been experiencing a political and economic crisis for several years.

I spent a good deal of time in Venezuela in the 1990s. The reason for my being there was not clear, then or now, but it gave me some perspective on what’s happening in the country today. My first flight into Maiquetia airport was at night. On the approach, I could see a mountain, all lit up with what appeared to be lights lining the streets of the capital, Caracas. As we landed and deplaned, I realized that it was not Caracas at all that I was looking at.

It turned out that I was quite a distance from the capital, and the marvelous city I thought I had been watching was actually a shantytown, or a barrio. The mountain was actually a hill and the lights were lining the jagged paths between the settlements. They were powered by stolen electricity, as hundreds of illegally attached cables hung from electrical wires, running into the barrio randomly scattered. The possibility of catastrophic fire seemed a certainty, yet the residents managed to live their lives, diverting water in pipes and handling sewage the best they could. The barrios housed the unemployed and criminals, but it was also the place where working stiffs raised families. They mingled with the rest of the city during the day and then went back to the barrio and their families at night.

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On occasion, I was invited to have lunch at one of the most beautiful places I have been in my travels. It was an exclusive club, historic and meticulously maintained, that overlooked the city. The men and women were dressed to perfection in a way that spoke of old money. I was told that this was the club of the “owners of the valley.” I was also told that Caracas had once belonged to only a few families. On my visits, I could see business being conducted at one table, politics at another, and the next generation being introduced to each other at the third. I remember the hush that enveloped the club. There were no loud voices, nor any tension to be seen. It was a place of casual power.

I also had the opportunity to visit the state-run oil company, PDVSA, which was the engine powering the Venezuelan economy. The facility was well-maintained. The people who worked there were engineers, marketers, financial managers and public affairs personnel. But when I spoke with the people at the top, the illusion of technocracy vanished. These were not the owners of the valley or inhabitants of the barrio. They were tough, smart politicians who knew surprisingly little about the petroleum business but a great deal about how PDVSA fit into the rough-and-tumble world of Venezuelan politics. That was why they were there. A few floors down you could talk to a petroleum engineer who graduated from Texas A&M. On the top floor were what I would call the well-connected “hard men” who ran the company.

Some were clearly part of the established elite, but others had muscled their way to the top in alliance with the elite, an alliance that was clearly tilting to the hard and not particularly quiet men. But the entire edifice was built on two foundations. One was the experts who kept the oil flowing. The other were those living in the barrio, needed for the grunt work of the economy but excluded from any of the pleasures.

There is much more to Venezuela, from Lake Maracaibo to the deep jungle that covers much of the country. But in the 1990s, the barrios, the descendants of the owners of the valley, the hard men who controlled PDVSA, and the technocrats who kept it running seemed to me its center. But the center couldn’t and didn’t hold.

Hugo Chavez became president through the support of the people of the barrios. But the barrios had their own political leaders – the heads of the gangs that controlled the neighborhoods. Chavez couldn’t win the support of the barrios without the approval of the gang leaders, and so Chavez had no choice but to deal with them.

The people of old money were beyond Chavez’s reach. Much of their wealth was in the United States, where they also had citizenship. Many of them worked with Chavez; having gone through many chapters of Venezuelan history, they saw Chavez as just another chapter.

Chavez, however, had trouble bridging the gap between political promises and social reality. He came to power speaking for the barrios, but his debt to the powers in the barrios was substantial. They wanted money, and they wanted it now. Chavez didn’t fully trust the military command structure (he blamed them for not preventing the 2002 coup). He therefore needed the barrio toughs, who would support him only to the extent that he funneled aid to them. A new ecosystem emerged, dominated by the alliance of Chavez and the rulers of the barrios. The problem for Chavez was getting money to maintain this system.

Gutting the old money that remained had to be done gently. It maintained the all-important international financial relationships Venezuela had always relied on, so Chavez had to turn to the same source that the old political elite used, PDVSA. But Chavez’s need for money was more intense than in the old regime. He had to keep the barrios happy, and that was expensive.

Chavez started diverting more and more money from PDVSA, and in so doing, he cut into the standard of living of its employees. They were at first hopeful about Chavez, then resigned to more of the same, then frightened by the empowered barrios and the people sent to squeeze PDVSA. There was a vast diaspora of PDVSA employees, who can now be found in oil companies around the world. The problem this left for Chavez was that without PDVSA’s professionals, the company declined. The harder Chavez squeezed, the less he got. His supporters expected rewards he increasingly could not deliver.

The barrios were restless, and the middle class and the old money had fled. Enter the Cubans. In exchange for discounted oil, Cuba acted as a bodyguard for Chavez’s regime. The Cuban operatives were tough, trained and not eager to be obvious. And so, his regime, now led by Nicolas Maduro, survives to this day, supported by the Cubans and those in the barrios who still expect to be rewarded for their loyalty.

In the end, the barrios of today are similar to those I saw when I first arrived. The owners of the valley now sit in clubs in California or France, having timed their exits wisely. It was the deterioration of PDVSA that did the regime in. But Chavez had no choice. He was elected by promising more than he could deliver to men who didn’t like to be disappointed.

Perhaps the best ending in this story is the tale of the hard men at PDVSA and their political allies. In 2002, they arranged a coup d’etat against Chavez. Chavez was held on an island off the Venezuelan coast, until he suddenly showed up back at Miraflores Palace. The story goes that the coupsters had been arguing over what cabinet positions they would take. They didn’t make certain Chavez was safely under guard, so Chavez got back onto the plane and had himself flown back to the capital. The coup failed, and Chavez continued to rule until his death in 2013.

And that story tells us a great deal about the realities of Venezuela

[Crafty_Dog]

second post

Brazil and Colombia: Responses to the Venezuelan Crisis

As countries that share borders with Venezuela, Colombia and Brazil are most vulnerable to the fallout from the crisis.
By
Allison Fedirka -
May 9, 2019   
Download this article as PDF

Summary

Colombia and Brazil have adopted similar approaches to Venezuela and likely will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. Both countries have followed the United States’ lead in opposing the Maduro government but for different reasons. Their responses to the crisis stem from their individual interests and the geopolitical forces driving their behavior.

Venezuela has been mired in an economic and political crisis for years. Hyperinflation, corruption, oil sector mismanagement and plummeting energy exports have spelled disaster for the country’s economy. The U.S. has led the international response against President Nicolas Maduro, but two of Venezuela’s neighbors – Brazil and Colombia – have been critical partners in the campaign to remove Maduro from office. Their role in opposing his government stems from the fact that they are the most vulnerable to the mass migration and general instability resulting from the crisis. They have approached the issue in similar fashion so far, calling for Maduro’s removal but rejecting military intervention.

But what’s really driving their responses to the crisis? And why have they been among the region’s most vocal opponents of the Maduro government? Before we can answer these questions, we need a geopolitical basis for understanding South America’s place in the world and Brazil’s and Colombia’s most pressing geopolitical interests. South America is a region that gets little attention in geopolitical discussions, in part because the continent lies on the edge of the global system. It interacts with major geopolitical players but generally doesn’t drive major shifts, disruptions and developments. This doesn’t mean, however, that the basic rules of geopolitics aren’t at play in South America. In fact, they can help us identify the interests of neighboring countries and foreign powers in a country like Venezuela and, therefore, how they may respond to the unfolding crisis. Using models developed by some of the top geopolitical theorists, this Deep Dive will lay out a framework for understanding South America’s connection to the global system and the Brazilian and Colombian reactions to the upheaval in Venezuela.

South America’s Model Behavior

Geopolitically, South America is part of the periphery of the global system. Located in the Southern Hemisphere, which accounts for roughly one-third of the world’s landmass and one-tenth of its population, the continent is fairly removed from the rest of the world. It’s separated from the Eastern Hemisphere by the Pacific and Atlantic oceans and connected to Central America by a short 140-mile (225-kilometer) border between Colombia and Panama.

In analyzing the behavior of South American nations, there are two common pitfalls. First, many tend to dismiss events on the continent as unimportant based on the erroneous belief that the periphery doesn’t matter. Second, there is a tendency to overemphasize politics and political leaders and treat them as geopolitically relevant. To avoid these pitfalls, we need to look at how some of the founding fathers of geopolitical theory – Alfred Thayer Mahan, Halford Mackinder and Nicholas Spykman – framed South America in the global context.

As a former U.S. naval officer, Mahan believed that if a country could dominate the world’s oceans, it could dominate the world. This view served as the basis for the expansion of U.S. interests across the Western Hemisphere at the turn of the 20th century – which included the creation of a security perimeter that stretched into the Caribbean. The first step in this project was to reduce Spanish influence in the Caribbean so that the U.S. could emerge as the dominant power there, which was accomplished in part through the Spanish-American War. The second was to control the Isthmus of Panama, a strategic land bridge between the Caribbean Sea and Pacific Ocean. The U.S. supported construction of a canal at the isthmus, which opened in 1914, so that it could control transit between the Pacific and Atlantic oceans, a power that had enormous economic value.

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In contrast, English geographer Mackinder took a more European approach to geopolitics. He focused on land power rather than sea power as the determinant of a nation’s global status. Mackinder formulated the heartland theory, which defined the center of Eurasia as the world’s heartland and argued that the dominant global power would come from this region. Its coastal areas – much of Europe, the Middle East and East Asia – were seen as secondary powers and areas beyond Eurasia, including the entire Western Hemisphere, as largely irrelevant. Mackinder updated his model following the two world wars, elevating North America and the North Atlantic to a status almost equivalent to that of the heartland. South America, however, still played a minimal role in Mackinder’s updated model.

Spykman believed that Mackinder overemphasized the importance of the heartland and instead posited that the center of global power was in the rimland, the coastal areas around Eurasia. He viewed the Caribbean Sea and surrounding areas as the American Mediterranean because of their central location in the Western Hemisphere. He also believed that the dividing line between north and south in the Western Hemisphere was not the Isthmus of Panama but the northern edge of the Amazon. According to Spykman, then, the northern part of South America, including Colombia and Venezuela, was essentially part of North America and included in the American Mediterranean. He believed the U.S. needed to dominate the Caribbean to establish regional security and that the construction of the Panama Canal further increased the importance of the Caribbean and the Pacific Ocean in U.S. strategy. For Spykman, the U.S. faced few challenges in the Western Hemisphere, but any threat to its domination of the hemisphere come from the southern cone.

There are two important takeaways from these three models. First, the Caribbean, which includes the northern coast of South America, plays a key role in U.S. maritime security. This explains why the U.S. has intervened in Caribbean conflicts and why developments in South America can be critical to U.S. interests. Second, the northern nations of South America represent a borderland between North and South America. Conflicts and instability in this region threaten to draw in countries from both continents, and the Venezuelan crisis is one key example of this.

Brazil’s Territorial Integrity

Geographically, Brazil is defined by three key features: its large size, its natural boundaries and its north-south divide. Brazil is the fifth-largest country in the world by landmass and has long faced the challenge of filling and controlling that space. Portugal was forced to colonize northeast Brazil (rather than use it as a trading post) and move south for both security and economic reasons. Shortly after the Portuguese arrived in the Americas, other European powers followed. While it had an agreement with Spain on how to divide their respective territories, no such deal existed with the U.K., France and the Netherlands – all three of which challenged Portuguese claims in the New World. The colony also needed land, labor and resources. Portuguese pioneers therefore pushed west for land on which to grow sugar cane and to find indigenous populations for enslavement.

Natural geographic barriers, however, limited Portuguese expansion beyond Brazil’s current borders. But in terms of security, its geography actually worked in its favor. Natural barriers insulated the country from the rest of South America and protected it from external threats. In the north, the Amazon’s dense forest and vast size prevented major military incursions from Venezuela, Colombia and Peru. Farther south, the massive Pantanal swamp fortified borders with Bolivia and Paraguay. In the east, the Atlantic Ocean protected Brazil from outside powers. The one area of geographic vulnerability is its flat southern border, though Uruguay provides some strategic depth there as a buffer state.

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Brazil’s north-south divide is a result of its climate, unevenly distributed natural resources and river systems. The south, which has a more hospitable climate than the northeast, is the location of the country’s major population centers and the vast majority of its wealth. Its two major river systems – the Parana River and the Amazon River – split the country between north and south. The Amazon system passes through dense jungle and flows into the North Atlantic, while the Parana system generally flows south where it merges with the Rio de la Plata, though some of its tributaries flow directly into the South Atlantic. The two systems do not cross paths and have fostered their own economic and population centers with little connection between them.

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These geographic features play critical roles in the models developed by the pioneers of Brazilian geopolitical theory, Carlos de Meira Mattos, General Golbery do Couto e Silva and Therezinha de Castro, in the mid-20th century. All three theorists emphasized the importance of territorial integrity – which is most at risk in the sprawling Amazon basin – and Brazil’s control over the South Atlantic.

This is where the Venezuelan crisis could have implications for Brazil’s broader geopolitical imperatives. Venezuela is just north of the Amazon, one of the most poorly integrated regions of Brazil. In fact, Roraima state isn’t even connected to Brazil’s electrical grid and gets its power from Venezuela. If Venezuela’s political crisis leads to military conflict or foreign military intervention, it could result in foreign forces pushing against Brazil’s borders. Any spillover into Brazilian territory could destabilize the area and disrupt connections to ports, making it even harder to reach and control this region. In the past, Brazil has opposed foreign involvement in management of the Amazon and permitted development and mining projects there because the government wants to maintain control over the whole region that falls within Brazil’s borders. This strategy helps Brazil repress any potential internal rebellion and provides strategic depth should an attack or blockade be waged on coastal areas.

Venezuelan migrants fleeing the crisis are also a challenge for Brazil. The flow of migrants toward and across the Brazilian border risks creating a borderland between the two countries that could pull the outer reaches of Brazil further away from its core. Another concern is that migrants who settle along the Brazilian border will compete with Brazilians for resources and jobs. Thus, early relief efforts involved flying Venezuelan migrants to areas farther south and settling them in larger cities. Brazil is also wary of delivering foreign humanitarian aid to Venezuelans from Brazilian territory, concerned that it could invite other kinds of external involvement in regional affairs. Brazil has therefore refused to deliver humanitarian supplies from other countries (including the United States) to Venezuela, insisting on providing only its own support.

Trade is another issue. Brazil has direct access only to the Atlantic Ocean, but its top trade partner, China, is a country that can be reached by sea only through the Pacific. To access the Pacific, therefore, it depends on sea lanes that run past Venezuela and the Caribbean to the Panama Canal. Any potential disruptions in this route – as a result of a conflict in Venezuela or a blockade to further isolate Maduro – could have major implications for the Brazilian economy.

Colombia’s Geographic Constraints

Unlike Brazil, Colombia is a bicoastal nation, meaning it has access to both the Pacific and Atlantic oceans. But this status is not nearly as advantageous as one might expect. When the Panama Canal opened in 1914, it became the most important corridor between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans in the Western Hemisphere. Colombia never developed into a good alternative to the canal because its various mountain ranges dissect the country, making overland transportation between coasts difficult. In addition, the vast majority of Colombia’s exports and imports transit through the Atlantic Ocean, so Pacific ports and infrastructure have been relatively neglected.

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Colombia’s two defining geographic features are the Andes Mountains and the Magdalena River. The Andes comprise roughly half of Colombia’s territory. (The other half is composed of the Amazon and Orinoco basins.) Just beyond the country’s Atlantic and Pacific coastlines, three distinct ranges of the Andes run across the entire length of the country’s territory, stretching from Ecuador to Venezuela. The majority of its population resides in different mountain valleys, which are poorly connected by land. The Magdalena River, however, helps integrate these disjointed parts of the country. An estimated 70-80 percent of the population lives near this river or one of its tributaries. It also facilitates the transport of goods between the interior and the Caribbean port cities of Barranquilla and Cartagena, both of which are relatively close to the Venezuelan border.

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Colombia has several geographic constraints that are difficult to overcome despite the country’s strategic location. According to leading Colombian geopolitical thinker Julio Londono Paredes, it was South America’s general disjointedness and difficult terrain that gave North America a substantial power advantage over its southern neighbor. Londono Paredes believed the formation of five confederations including Gran Colombia – which united present-day Colombia, Venezuela and Ecuador into one entity from 1819 to 1831 – were necessary to ensure peace in South America.

But without such a union, Colombia remains weak in relation to other large Caribbean countries, particularly Mexico and Venezuela. Both countries have influence over the region in ways that Colombia does not. Mexico has historical ties to Central America (many Central American nations belonged to the same viceroy as Mexico during colonial times) and has used these links to help protect its interests on the western edge of the Caribbean. Venezuela’s islands in the southern Caribbean Sea give the country strategic depth and influence over sea lanes. Venezuela is also situated farther east along the Caribbean coast, giving it greater access to the sea and beyond.

Colombia has overcome some of these challenges by aligning with the United States on a number of issues, including how to handle Venezuela. The U.S. welcomes Colombia as a close ally in a region where it has had few in the past, and Colombia’s alignment with the U.S. gives it a boost in the regional power balance.

It’s an advantage Colombia needs given that it shares borders with five different countries and has three three-country borders. Colombia has had territorial disputes with each of its neighbors in the past, but tensions have run deepest with Venezuela, whose disputes over land and sea borders with Colombia have focused on resource-rich areas. The Venezuelan crisis threatens to reignite these tensions. Mass migration has forced Colombian authorities to dedicate more resources to border security, though thus far, it hasn’t prevented irregular crossings. For the most part, Colombia has welcomed the migrants, but it has also struggled to cope with the sheer number of Venezuelans, about 1.5 million in total, who have fled across the border. In fact, the influx has cost Colombia 0.5 percent of gross domestic product (or roughly $1.5 billion) per year, according to Colombian President Ivan Duque. Organized crime and drug trafficking are also concerns as groups involved in illicit activities operate more or less with impunity along the Colombia-Venezuela border, raising the possibility of military involvement from both sides. The country’s two major ports, Barranquilla and Cartagena, are close to the Venezuelan border, so any spillover violence or instability could disrupt some of Colombia’s most important trade hubs.

Considering all these variables, it makes sense that Colombia has taken the strongest stance against Maduro of any country in the region. It has joined the U.S. and several other nations, including Brazil, in recognizing opposition leader Juan Guaido as interim president. Bogota doesn’t want the crisis to escalate into a full-blown civil war, but unlike other countries in the region, it can’t completely rule out military intervention because of the history of border disputes between the two countries, as well as the risk that the violence might spill over into Colombian territory.

Colombia needs U.S. support to protect its interests. Brazil, on the other hand, doesn’t have that same dependency on the U.S. For now, however, both Brazil and Colombia will cooperate with U.S. efforts to orchestrate Maduro’s departure because it aligns with their own national interests.

[Crafty_Dog]

How to Liberate Venezuela
The free world needs to squeeze the power behind Caracas’s police state: Cuba.
By Mary Anastasia O’Grady
May 12, 2019 3:20 p.m. ET
Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro speaks in Havana, Dec. 14, 2016 Photo: yamil lage/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

Venezuela’s fearsome intelligence service struck another blow against the democratic opposition last week by arresting Edgar Zambrano in Caracas. In detaining the vice president of Venezuela’s National Assembly, the thugs surrounding presidential pretender Nicolás Maduro not only put another hostage in their dungeon but also thumbed their noses at U.S. ultimatums to respect the rights of the opposition—or else.

They know that while the U.S. says the use of force is on the table, President Trump is loath to use it. With the rest of the region opposed to military intervention, Mr. Maduro’s minions feel safe from outsiders. They would feel far less secure if the international community put pressure where it belongs: on their homeland, Cuba.

Interim President Juan Guaidó remains free, but the regime now holds some 870 political prisoners, according to the Venezuelan nongovernmental organization Foro Penal. Since a failed uprising April 30, Mr. Maduro’s henchmen have doubled down on repression. The opposition is powerless to respond. Mr. Guaidó said Saturday he would seek U.S. military support.

Rescuing Venezuela starts with the recognition that the country is occupied. Russian military support is troubling—as is the Venezuelan-Iranian relationship, which I wrote about in November 2014. Tehran has likely planted sleeper cells throughout the country.

Yet it is Havana that has the most to lose if Mr. Maduro goes down. And it is Havana that is executing an aggressive daily ground game to protect him. This must first be acknowledged by the democracies that have recognized Mr. Guaidó as the rightful chief executive under the Venezuelan constitution. Then, to follow through, they need a strategy to squeeze the Cubans.

Cuban-born writer Carlos Alberto Montaner described the secret behind Mr. Maduro’s survival in a May 5 column for Miami’s El Nuevo Herald. “Loyalty and obedience emanate from respect or fear and Maduro is neither respected nor feared,” Mr. Montaner wrote. “Not only is this the attitude of the opposition. It is shared by military leaders, the regime’s apparatchiks and those people who serve them. That’s why Maduro only trusts ‘the Cubans.’ They made him the heir of the ‘eternal Commander’ ”—Hugo Chávez—“and they keep him in power.”

The main levers of power Cuba wields in Venezuela are its sophisticated intelligence apparatus and its crack military counterintelligence. The former head of the Venezuelan intelligence service, Manuel Christopher Figuera, trained and worked closely with Cuba. It was a mark of Cuban power that after he turned against Mr. Maduro during the April 30 showdown with Mr. Guaidó, he was forced to flee for his life and now is in hiding.

Cuba is thoroughly invested in Mr. Maduro’s survival because it needs Venezuelan subsidies. The money-grubbing Castros have wrecked the Cuban economy. What hasn’t been stolen has been destroyed through decades of brutal repression.

As Cuban-American economist Carmelo Mesa-Lago observed in March, Castro’s Cuba has been a dependency for 60 years. The Soviet Union poured $65 billion into the island from 1960-90. With the dissolution of the Soviet empire, aid to Cuba dried up and the 1990s were an extremely difficult period. But Venezuela picked up the subsidy slack when Chávez came to power in 1999. “At its peak in 2012, Venezuelan aid, subsidies and investment amounted to $14 billion, or close to 12% of gross domestic product,” Mr. Mesa-Lago wrote.

“Cuba is now facing its worst economic crisis since the 1990s,” Mr. Mesa-Lago explained. It refuses to reform its sclerotic economy—because economic power gives way to political power. Now its Venezuelan sugar daddy is cutting back on aid. Oil shipments to the island have been halved in recent years, and Caracas no longer has unlimited resources to pay the Castro regime for the tens of thousands of Cuban doctors, teachers, sports trainers and managers of ports and airports—not to mention security forces—in Venezuela.

Things will go from bad to worse for Havana if Mr. Guaidó is allowed to hold elections. This is why the Cubans are ruthlessly cracking down on the opposition while making the absurd proposal to the Lima Group that Havana ought to mediate a compromise solution. As if the fox ought to decide the fate of the hens. Defectors repeatedly testify that Cubans are behind the Venezuelan police state. It’s why the U.S. and its allies must shift their focus to Havana.

The Trump administration has been adding sanctions against the Cuban regime. Ships that carry oil from Venezuela to Cuba can no longer enter U.S. ports; Americans can now sue in U.S. courts over property confiscated by Cuba; and the ceiling on remittances from the U.S. has been reduced. Havana is feeling some heat. But it isn’t enough.

To persuade Cuba to exit Venezuela, the price of staying has to be higher than any benefits it still receives. That’s a hemispheric project, and it’s the best way to liberate Venezuela from tyranny.

[ccp]

"Cuba is the main player in Venezuela.  Anyway, if we want to discuss, let's take it to the Venezuela thread."

yes they have thousands of troops there
I hope we don ' t militarily intervene in V because we are worried about kooba

that said Russia and China may be supporting Kooba as proxies to stir up trouble
and protect investments in V

just surmising
otherwise except for the humanitarian travesty thanks to Maduro and mafia soldiers and his Kooban mafia allies I am trying to figure why the heck we are considering our intervening militarily.

Another possibllity is the military option is just a bluff to pressure Maduro to hide in the mountains looking on how to escape to a villa in Switzerland or something

To me the murderous drug cartels south of our border are a far bigger threat.
I wish we could send in the tanks and drones to blast them to hell where they belong for what they do to us and the South of the border countries peoples

[Crafty_Dog]

My understanding is that there are 20-25,000 Cuban troops/intel officers etc and that without them Gordo Maduro would be gone in a matters of days.

[ccp]

"My understanding is that there are 20-25,000 Cuban troops/intel officers etc and that without them Gordo Maduro would be gone in a matters of days."

So do we invade Kooba?

[Crafty_Dog]

https://apnews.com/8a18145f858e41e88475360b9a7decee

[Crafty_Dog]

https://thehill.com/policy/international/445127-top-us-commander-says-maduro-mafia-poses-threat-beyond-venezuela

[DougMacG]

https://thehill.com/policy/international/445127-top-us-commander-says-maduro-mafia-poses-threat-beyond-venezuela

As it turns out, Cuba helping to enforce the tragedy in Venezuela, was also a threat beyond their own borders.  Of course the communist, socialist, militarist oppressionists are a threat beyond their own borders.  Good to see people in high places recognizing real threats.

[ccp]

you mean Kooba still stirring up trouble?

but the Nobel prize winner (for peace) told us this just wasn't so that all we need to do is be friends?

I just don't get it.   

[Crafty_Dog]

Russia in Venezuela. Russia is withdrawing key defense advisers from Venezuela and Russian state defense contractor Rostec has cut its staff in Venezuela from 1,000 to just a few dozen, according to a Wall Street Journal report. The report also suggested that, after Rostec had completed construction of a helicopter training center in March, other projects such as the construction of a Kalashnikov production facility had been put on hold because the company doubted the Maduro government’s ability to pay up. Rostec told Interfax news agency on Monday that there was no truth to the report – that its presence in the country hadn’t changed. Russia’s ambassador to Venezuela also said the story was unfounded, telling RIA Novosti there had been no talk of backing out of commitments or cutting back Russian personnel. In the absence of reliable information either way, we would add that it would not make sense for Russia to withdraw in this manner now, especially considering the resilience the Maduro regime has exhibited in recent months.

[Crafty_Dog]

Corruption Lies at the Heart of Venezuela's Chaos
By Eduardo Salcedo-Albaran
Board of Contributors

Numerous people wearing caps in the colors of the Venezuelan flag take part in a protest against the government of President Nicolas Maduro on Venezuela's day of independence.
(RAFAEL BRICEÑO SIERRALTA/NurPhoto via Getty Images)
Contributor Perspectives offer insight, analysis and commentary from Stratfor’s Board of Contributors and guest contributors who are distinguished leaders in their fields of expertise.

Highlights

    Venezuela is suffering from unique humanitarian, economic and institutional crises, but the common root of all three problems is the country's widespread corruption.
    Officials in President Nicolas Maduro's government have absconded with billions of dollars from the public budget by abusing the official exchange rate.
    As the links between the humanitarian disaster and graft become more evident, it will increasingly become harder to stabilize Venezuela in the long run.

It's a humanitarian, economic and institutional crisis that has grabbed the world's attention. According to the United Nations refugee agency, more than 4 million Venezuelans left their country between 2015 and June 2019, seeking refuge in Colombia, Peru and Brazil. In the economic field, the International Monetary Fund projects that Venezuela's hyperinflation will reach a whopping 10 million percent this year. And in terms of institutions, the country has had two presidents since January: Nicolas Maduro, who is supported by the Venezuelan security forces but lacks diplomatic recognition from most of the West, and Juan Guaido, who enjoys Western support but lacks local military support.

But lost amid Venezuela's dire humanitarian, economic and institutional crises is the underlying cause that is fueling the country's chaos: corruption. Deeply ingrained at all levels of Maduro's government, corruption is devouring Venezuela's wealth as it exacerbates Caracas' other problems and complicates the prospect that the country will overcome its woes for some time to come.

Bringing Up the Rear

Since 2015, Venezuela has plumbed the depths of Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI), ranking 168 out of 180 countries and scoring no more than 17 or 18 points out of 100. By way of comparison, Burundi — whose long-time president has drawn criticisms for hanging on to power and clamping down on the opposition — ranked higher than Venezuela, earning 22 points in 2017.

In last year's CPI, in fact, Venezuela had Afghanistan (16 points), South Sudan (16) and Chad (19) to share for company. All three are countries that are characterized by weak and small economies, and none of them boast massive oil reserves — unlike Venezuela.

High levels of opaqueness, egregious public mismanagement, legal uncertainty, an overconcentration of power in Maduro's hands and a profound lack of checks and balances lie at the root of Venezuela's low CPI. Today, the country provides the perfect institutional conditions to foster graft on a macro scale unseen anywhere else in the Western Hemisphere. Even so, Venezuela's CPI score doesn't reflect the magnitude of the country's situation and the scandalous sums of money that have gone missing from the budget during the past decade. Indeed, no other country in the Americas has witnessed such a convergence between massive injections of cash due to booming oil prices and cases of money laundering, corruption and drug trafficking involving high-level officials.

Today, Venezuela provides the perfect institutional conditions to foster graft on a macro scale unseen anywhere else in the Western Hemisphere.

In a recent report, the Venezuelan chapter of Transparency International reviewed cases of corruption and money laundering against Venezuelan officials and businesspeople in the United States, Colombia, Andorra and other countries in which Maduro's government has used the financial system to channel and launder profits gained through corruption.

And because of Maduro's extensive powers, the Venezuelan judiciary focuses on partial prosecutions that benefit the regime, meaning that real cases of graft involving the government never make it before a judge. As a result, it is only foreign jurisdictions that prosecute money laundering cases related to corruption in Venezuela.

Absconding With Billions

Brazil's "Lava Jato" (Car Wash) scandal, one of the biggest cases of transnational corruption ever recorded anywhere, drew international attention because of the huge bribes that changed hands — some of which reached $100 million. The Brazilian case, however, pales in comparison to what has happened in Venezuela.

To understand the magnitude of Venezuelan corruption, consider the amount of the public budget that went missing when authorities manipulated and abused official exchange rates to overpay loans to privileged companies involved in corruption. In one scheme that occurred in December 2014 and May 2015, Venezuela's national oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), acquired a loan of $41 million — corresponding to 7.2 billion Bolivars — from a certain firm before paying it back for a huge markup of $600 million, according to an indictment at the Southern District of Florida. According to the prosecution, payments like these went to companies that then used other fictitious firms to channel the money to friends and conspirators of officials inside PDVSA and Maduro's government. Ultimately, the shady dealings allowed officials in the national oil company and the government to abscond with $1.2 billion from the Venezuelan public budget as part of two loans.

But this is just one case. In another that the Southern District of Florida is also hearing, officials allegedly engaged in improper conduct that cost the budget more than $2.4 billion. Together, these two cases account for $3.6 billion in lost funds for Venezuela's public budget.

As the Democratic Republic of the Congo has shown, the convergence of massive corruption and abundant natural resources will almost inevitably degenerate into a situation in which people are victimized on a widespread scale. With Venezuela's crisis set to deepen — to the extent that it might result in famine and send millions of refugees streaming into the country's neighbors — the spotlight will soon fall more on the causal links between the humanitarian catastrophe and unprecedented corruption. Such a perfect storm of endemic corruption and humanitarian disaster will throw formidable obstacles in the way of any stabilization effort in the country or the region — thereby hindering even further the chances of a regime change promoted by the United States.

Eduardo Salcedo-Albaran is the director of Scientific Vortex Foundation Inc., a transnational research group and nonprofit that develops concepts, methodologies and inputs for public policy under integrative science principles. He is currently developing transdisciplinary research on transnational criminal networks in Colombia, Peru, Guatemala and Mexico.

[DougMacG]

https://www.realclearenergy.org/articles/2019/08/14/venezuela_china_russia__oh_my_110466.html
Extend  the waivers indefinitely.
-------------------------------------
Denny S, Hope all is well, please check in with us.
-------------------------------------
American reporting of Venezuela has been relatively quiet as at least 20 Democrats propose various elements of the Venezuela plan for the US economy.
-------------------------------------
How rich did they used to be?
"By 1950, as the rest of the world was struggling to recover from World War II, Venezuela had the fourth-richest GDP per capita on Earth. The country was 2x richer than Chile, 4x richer than Japan, and 12x richer than China!"
https://money.visualcapitalist.com/richer-poorer-venezuela-economic-tragedy/

[G M]

You can vote your way into socialism, but you usually have to shoot your way out. This is why they disarmed Venezuela and want to disarm Americans now.

https://www.realclearenergy.org/articles/2019/08/14/venezuela_china_russia__oh_my_110466.html
Extend  the waivers indefinitely.
-------------------------------------
Denny S, Hope all is well, please check in with us.
-------------------------------------
American reporting of Venezuela has been relatively quiet as at least 20 Democrats propose various elements of the Venezuela plan for the US economy.
-------------------------------------
How rich did they used to be?
"By 1950, as the rest of the world was struggling to recover from World War II, Venezuela had the fourth-richest GDP per capita on Earth. The country was 2x richer than Chile, 4x richer than Japan, and 12x richer than China!"
https://money.visualcapitalist.com/richer-poorer-venezuela-economic-tragedy/

[Crafty_Dog]

Oct. 2, 2019


What Moscow Really Wants From Venezuela


Russia has both economic and domestic political reasons for supporting the Maduro government.


By Ekaterina Zolotova


Throughout Venezuela’s ongoing political crisis, Russia has been among its staunchest supporters. Last week, Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro visited Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow, hoping for some reassurances of the Kremlin’s continued support for his administration amid the ongoing turmoil in his country and international pressure for him to step down. In September, the United States imposed new sanctions (against four shipping companies registered in Cyprus and Panama) aimed at stopping Venezuelan oil exports headed for Cuba. The U.S. also promised last week to provide the Venezuelan opposition with $52 million in aid. The European Union, meanwhile, introduced sanctions against seven members of the Venezuelan security and intelligence forces. Russia, however, hasn’t wavered in its support for Venezuela. Indeed, Moscow has not only foreign policy reasons to maintain strong relations with Caracas but domestic ones, too.
The two countries are long-time allies, but their ties peaked around 2012. Moscow considered Venezuela among its main strategic partners, provided generous loans and supplied a wide range of goods. Several Russian companies were involved in the development of Venezuelan oil fields, Russian-made KAMAZ trucks were in wide supply, and Russia participated in a pro-government housing construction program in Venezuela. But geopolitical tensions, as well as tough sanction policies against both Russia and Venezuela, significantly complicated Russia-Venezuela relations. High inflation and the risk of default in Venezuela also affected the willingness of Russian investors and exporters to do business with Venezuela and the ability of Venezuelan companies to sell their goods to foreign customers.
Nonetheless, the Kremlin has chosen to seek greater cooperation with Caracas for several reasons. First, from an economic perspective, Russia and Venezuela have much to gain from maintaining close ties. Both have large markets and production potential.


 

(click to enlarge)


Trade between the two has fluctuated over the years, however. When it comes to oil, Russian companies of course have an interest in Venezuela – the country, after all, has the largest oil reserves in the world, exceeding 300 billion barrels, according to OPEC. Some Russian oil companies have therefore invested in the Venezuelan energy sector. But in recent years, many Russian oil companies have left Venezuela, put off by the political uncertainty, security risks and general low quality of Venezuelan oil, not to mention the threat of sanctions. Yet a small group of companies, including Rosneft and Gazprom Neft, remains, despite U.S. threats to impose new penalties. In early September, for example, Washington said it was considering sanctions against Rosneft for its involvement in the Venezuelan oil sector; Rosneft, however, continues to purchase oil and develop fields in Venezuela.
Russia also sees Venezuela as a potential market for Russian wheat (wheat exports to Venezuela in 2018 increased by 33 percent year over year), mechanical engineering products and medical supplies. Such products could provide some relief from the scarcity issues plaguing Venezuela since the crisis began. For its part, Venezuela sees Russia as a potential buyer of its agricultural products. Russia already buys food products from other Latin American countries – these tend to be cheaper than Russian food products despite logistical costs and tariffs. In fact, Uruguay and Argentina account for 7 percent and 5 percent respectiely of Russian dairy imports. In addition, Argentina is the second-largest supplier of cheese to Russia after Belarus.
The Kremlin also has domestic political reasons for wanting to increase cooperation with Venezuela. It sees an opportunity to boost its approval rating by backing the Maduro government because Russian public opinion tends to be favorable toward Venezuela, and Latin America in general. A survey released in February by the Russian Public Opinion Research Center found that 57 percent of respondents were interested in current events in Venezuela. It also found that 20 percent of Russians see the deteriorating political and economic situation in Venezuela as a result of actions by other countries, particularly the United States. When it comes to the Venezuelan opposition and anti-government protesters, 15 percent said they felt indifferent, 12 percent felt distrust and 11 percent condemned them. Thus, if Moscow were to refuse to help Maduro, it might experience some backlash from the Russian public. Moreover, the amount of support Russia has provided – food supplies and a small number of troops for nonmilitary support – doesn’t carry a huge financial burden for Moscow anyway. Considering that it, too, has seen a recent wave of anti-government protests, it has been inclined to help Caracas in its time of need.


 

(click to enlarge)


In addition, Russia has an interest in increasing its presence in the Western Hemisphere, in the United States’ own backyard. It has done so primarily by getting close to Cuba – given its proximity to the U.S. – a country the Russian prime minister is scheduled to visit later this week for the first time since 2013. But maintaining strong relations with Venezuela could also help the Kremlin boost relations with Cuba. It has been difficult for Russia to gain a substantial foothold in Venezuela, partly because the U.S. would react strongly to any Russian military involvement in the country. For this reason, not to mention the expense and logistical requirements, it’s extremely unlikely that Russia would set up a military base in Venezuela, but it did send roughly 100 troops there in March, and a group of Russian military personnel arrived in Venezuela a week ago to carry out maintenance on Russian-made equipment.
Venezuela used to be one of the largest buyers of Russian weapons; it had purchased Russian tanks, Grad multiple rocket launchers, Pechora-2M missile systems, S-300 air defense systems and many others. But today, Venezuela is no longer considered a major market for Russian arms. In the past, these goods were purchased mainly using Russian loans, and Moscow can no longer rely on Caracas to pay back its debts given the state of its economy. Moscow too is short on funds and reluctant to offer loans it can’t be sure will be paid back. Thus, Russia’s defense-related activity in Venezuela today is limited mostly to fulfilling old contracts and maintaining assets that have already been delivered under previous agreements.
Russia has unquestionable long-term economic and geopolitical interests in Venezuela. But its ability to increase its presence there is limited, in part by its own economic obstacles, which include falling oil prices, reduced federal budget revenue and deteriorating living conditions for the Russian people. Still, Moscow will continue to make gestures of increased cooperation with an eye toward strengthening ties in the long term, not only because of the potential economic benefits but also because the Kremlin knows this is a popular policy position at home.

[Crafty_Dog]

By Jessica Donati, Andrew Restuccia and Ian Talley
Jan. 27, 2020 10:22 am ET

The Trump administration’s bid to replace Venezuela’s authoritarian leader Nicolás Maduro hit a roadblock after a meeting with Russian officials in Rome last year—and has never recovered.

U.S. envoy Elliott Abrams arrived at the Westin Excelsior hotel hoping to persuade Russia to withdraw its support for Mr. Maduro and to recognize Juan Guaidó as Venezuela’s legitimate leader. Russian deputy foreign minister Sergei Ryabkov instead demanded the U.S. back down from military threats and lift the economic sanctions intended to force Mr. Maduro’s hand.


Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow in September. PHOTO: SERGEI CHIRIKOV/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

In the months that followed, the U.S. campaign spiraled into a foreign-policy debacle, thwarted by familiar adversaries, Russia and Cuba, as well as allies, Turkey and India—all countries that one way or another helped Venezuela sidestep U.S. sanctions, according to current and former U.S. officials and Venezuelan opposition activists. The European Union watched from the sidelines.


The Trump administration, confident Mr. Maduro would fall, didn’t foresee Russia leading the way for other countries to eclipse the sanctions. In turn, administration reluctance to impose sanctions on Russian enterprises and others kept Venezuela’s oil and gold flowing to buyers.

This month, in a sign of how much the opposition is floundering, Venezuela security forces blocked Mr. Guaidó from entering the National Assembly building, where he was seeking re-election as leader. Mr. Guaidó, in a blue suit, tried and failed to scale the spiked iron fence.

Russia now handles more than two-thirds of Venezuela’s crude oil, current and former administration officials said, including helping to conceal export destinations. The lifeline has helped Mr. Maduro slow the economy’s free fall, consolidate his grip on power and weaken the opposition.

Almost half of the $1.5 billion in Venezuelan crude exported to India in the nine months after the U.S. sanctions was purchased by an Indian joint venture with Russia’s oil giant, Rosneft, according to a Wall Street Journal analysis of data compiled by trade database Import Genius.

The United Arab Emirates has imported around $1 billion in gold from Venezuela since gold sanctions were imposed in late 2018, according to Venezuela trade records. U.S. intelligence officials say the actual amounts are far higher, based on evidence that Venezuelan gold is leaving the country masked as originating from Colombia, Uganda and elsewhere. The exports land in Turkey, the U.A.E. and other gold-trade hubs.

The Turkish Embassy in Washington denied any oil or gold trade with Venezuela that breached U.S. sanctions. “The allegations do not reflect the facts, and they are only speculative and hearsay,” a spokesman said.

The Russian Embassy in Washington declined to comment. It referred to past foreign-ministry statements criticizing the U.S. for interfering in Venezuela’s affairs. Officials from India and the U.A.E. didn’t respond to requests for comment.

Administration officials acknowledge President Trump’s frustration and say the White House continues to press for Mr. Maduro’s ouster. Mr. Trump, pointing to America’s superior economy and military, suggested in a recent interview with the Journal that the U.S. had the resources to outlast Mr. Maduro. “We have a lot of options,” the president said.

Yet with an election, impeachment and attention turned to the Middle East, Venezuela has for now moved to a back burner, an administration official said.

The stalemate allows Mr. Maduro to take a star turn as David to America’s Goliath. He makes speeches and appearances nearly every day to show he remains comfortably in charge. He chided Mr. Abrams and other U.S. officials, saying they misled Mr. Trump that a regime change would be easy.

“They’re trying to save their jobs because Trump is furious with the lies they’ve fed him on Venezuela,” Mr. Maduro said in a recent address. “They failed, and Venezuela triumphed.”

Mr. Maduro’s hold on the presidency has been costly for what was once Latin America’s most-prosperous economy. Hyperinflation, high infant mortality rates and a shortage of medical supplies contribute to the humanitarian crisis there. Food, electricity and water shortages have driven an exodus of 4.5 million people.

Mr. Abrams, the U.S. envoy, acknowledged this month that the yearlong U.S. effort to remove Mr. Maduro hit unexpected obstacles. “We underestimated the importance of the Cuban and Russian support for the regime,” he said. “The Russian role in the economy, particularly the oil economy, is larger and larger.”


Elliott Abrams, the U.S. envoy to Venezuela. PHOTO: ERIK S LESSER/EPA/SHUTTERSTOCK
Mr. Guaidó, in an interview, sounded a similar note. “I think we did underestimate things,” he said. He called on countries to help block gold exports from Venezuela. “You have to try to bring pressure on those who support the regime,” he said. “Sanctions today are the only real tool we have.”

Mr. Guaidó’s approval rating had fallen by more than 20 points to 38%, according to Venezuelan pollster Datanalisis. Allegations against opposition members, including accepting bribes from Maduro cronies, have eroded confidence.

Despite the setbacks, administration officials said there are no plans to abandon Mr. Guaidó. Vice President Mike Pence last month summoned senior administration officials to a meeting in the White House’s Situation Room. U.S. officials later hosted a conference with opposition leaders to try to reinvigorate them, people familiar with the gathering said.

Mr. Guaidó’s backers see Russia as their principal obstacle and want the U.S., Europe and other allies to take a harder line on sanctions loopholes.

“Russia in my view has become the most important partner of Maduro,” said Carlos Vecchio, the Venezuela ambassador to the U.S. for Mr. Guaidó. “A multilateral approach on sanctions is critical.”

The EU hasn’t introduced sanctions or prevented Maduro officials from traveling to the eurozone to raise money and support.


Charles Shapiro, a former U.S. ambassador to Venezuela who is now president of the nonpartisan think tank World Affairs Council of Atlanta, said the Trump administration’s predicament showed the difficulty of regime change without military force.

“And if you use military force,” he said, “there are all sorts of other problems.”

The U.S. has warned officials in Russia, Turkey, the U.A.E. and India about sanctions violations in private meetings, U.S. officials said, but hasn’t moved to blacklist companies or individuals suspected of breaking the sanctions.

Policy options have split the administration. Some officials believe sanctions on Russia’s oil firm Rosneft and other companies doing business with intermediaries could close loopholes that have allowed Mr. Maduro to survive.

Others say they could undermine U.S. interests elsewhere, including Iran. India agreed to stop importing Iranian crude as part of Washington’s pressure campaign against Tehran, but it continues to import Venezuelan oil. India pays for the deliveries in gasoline, a trade that the nation says doesn’t violate U.S. sanctions.

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo hasn’t ruled out negotiations with Mr. Maduro.

“We will continue to tweak our policy to get the strategy just right, but we’ve seen no evidence that Maduro is remotely interested in having free and fair elections,” Mr. Pompeo said recently about direct talks. “As far as our strategy, the tack we’ll take, I’m sure that will change over time.”

Long road
Mr. Guaidó, 36 years old, was virtually unknown in Mr. Trump’s circles before he came to Washington with a delegation in December 2018. Administration officials and opposition leaders made a plan to put Mr. Guaidó in charge, and Mr. Pence was given a central role.

Administration officials targeted Venezuela, in part to punish Cuba and win support among Cuban Americans, a potent Republican voting bloc in Florida. Republican Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida and Mauricio Claver Carone, the National Security Council’s head for Latin American affairs, had roles in forging Venezuela policy.

[Crafty_Dog]

I thought Guaido looked very uncomfortable at the SOTU.

I've also wondered how things have held on so long given the reports of hyperinflation, no drinking water, people rooting through garbage and the like:

February 7, 2020   View On Website
Open as PDF



    ‘Wild Capitalism’ in Venezuela
By: Allison Fedirka

In a development that would have been unheard of just a few years ago, the government in Caracas is slowly and quietly loosening its control over the Venezuelan economy. Markets are opening, regulations are being relaxed, and foreign countries are participating in its flailing state oil company. Various Venezuelan media have dubbed this unexpected period of transition “wild capitalism” and “chaotic capitalism,” but whichever name sticks, the strategy of the government is clear: adapt or die. It’s a fairly pragmatic response to the actions of the U.S., which hoped that economic pressure, widespread public protests and international support would bring an end to the Maduro administration. Instead, Caracas has simply become more creative and resourceful as it seeks to remain in power – this time by integrating its informal economy with its formal one.

Economic Pressure

For nearly 20 years, the United States has opposed the Venezuelan government on political and security grounds. But Washington grew more impatient as the Venezuelan economy tanked, thanks largely to low oil prices, high social welfare spending and economic mismanagement. The social instability that followed was a perfect opportunity for the U.S. to tackle what it saw as a security threat head on to try to facilitate regime change. It employed a strategy of heavy economic pressure for three reasons. First, U.S. military intervention in Latin America is risky, unpopular and historically counterproductive. Second, the strategy corresponds with a broader shift in national strategy away from military action as the force to bring about change. Third, the U.S. is the largest economy in the world and formerly Venezuela’s single biggest customer, so changes in trade patterns would disrupt the Venezuelan economy.

Initially, things went according to plan. Increasingly heavy sanctions aggravated the underlying weaknesses of the country’s economy. Working conditions and quality of life went from bad to worse for the vast majority of Venezuelans as hyperinflation, power outages and food shortages became commonplace. The economy has contracted for the past six years, losing roughly two-thirds of its gross domestic product from 2013 to 2019, according to the International Monetary Fund. Projections for 2020 remain bleak as GDP is expected to contract by another 10 percent.

Emigration – particularly among oil industry experts – was a problem even during the Chavez administration, but economic decay over the past two years has accelerated the trend. As of this year, an estimated 4.7 million people – out of a population of 28.4 million – have fled the country.
 
(click to enlarge)

Washington also enacted a political strategy of supporting Maduro’s enemies to capitalize on public discontent and usher in a new government, culminating with Juan Guaido, the president of the opposition-led National Assembly, declaring himself the president in 2019. For a brief moment, it seemed that pressures were aligning such that the U.S. would deliver the intended results.

Except it didn’t. Economic restrictions and lack of availability of goods expanded a robust parallel market that became essential for procurement of basic public goods. Before the U.S. levied its sanctions, economic hardship taught Venezuelans the value of acquiring and saving strong foreign currency, namely the U.S. dollar. Those who could established bank accounts in the U.S. Meanwhile, early expatriate Venezuelans, many of whom were educated and/or wealthy enough to find work abroad, provided a steady flow of U.S. dollars directly to their fellow Venezuelans. Indeed, remittances to Venezuela have risen sharply since 2016, totaling an estimated $3.7 billion-$4 billion in 2019, according to Ecoanalisis. (The increase owes to both the number of transactions and value of transactions.) According to a Consultores 21 survey, some 40 percent of the population has received remittances at some point in time and another 32 percent receive remittances on a regular basis. When government restrictions made it harder to get or use U.S. dollars, more informal or electronic means were employed to get dollars into the country. This rendered the local bolivar essentially worthless as bartering and foreign currencies have become the preferred choice for commercial transactions.
 
(click to enlarge)

Rather than fight the dollarization of the economy, the Maduro government embraced it. It relented on some currency controls and allowed a freer circulation of dollars because doing so would help to normalize the economy. After all, a recent Ecoanalitica report estimated that over half of the country’s transactions occur in U.S. dollars and that there are likely more dollars circulating in the country than bolivares. Changes in fiscal policy now allow for some purchases of foreign currency with a 25 percent value-added tax. This allows for fees and goods to be purchased and sold in foreign currency on a larger scale, making them more accessible to those with foreign currency. Businesses have also resorted to dollar-denominated transactions. Over the past few months, banks have begun to offer custodial services for holding billions of U.S. dollars and euros in cash for businesses that want to avoid ties with the government and thus evade sanctions. This may not be much help to those without access to dollars, but it has lowered inflation in the dollar-denominated economy while giving more access to more people for basic goods.

The Maduro government has eased off other areas of the economy too. It has let imports in and lifted restrictions on certain exports. Goods can now be shipped out of Cabello Port in Carabobo without the requisite red tape. Price controls have also been lifted on many goods, and companies have been allowed to invest what small funds they have.

But the most notable changes pertain to state-run oil company PDVSA. The lack of funds to repair dilapidated equipment, improve production and support business operations like refining has led PDVSA to look for support from foreign oil players, particularly Rosneft, to conduct its business. The government is also in talks with Spain’s Repsol and Italy’s ENI on how to partner or take a share in the company in exchange for capital and assistance in a scheme of virtual privatization.

Saving Face

All these measures demand a certain political flexibility to mitigate whatever risks they could pose, considering they fly in the face of Maduro’s previous policies. By allowing for reform, he has tacitly admitted that those policies have failed.

Caracas has made sure to sell the changes without losing face. In some cases it downplayed them. In others, such as dollarizing the economy, it simply passively allowed it to happen. The government has also attempted to employ traditional revolutionary rhetoric when publicly speaking of the changes, framing them as measures necessary to help the poor in Venezuela and respond to economic attacks. (The regime’s roots are buried deep in Hugo Chavez’s legacy; echoing him lends Maduro some legitimacy.)

Still, Venezuela is long past the point where it can downplay or ignore its plight. When Maduro opened the judiciary session this year, he acknowledged that the U.S. isn’t entirely to blame for everything wrong in the country – a pretty significant rhetorical departure for him – adding that more work was needed to transform the country. He received a standing ovation.

But Maduro still has to tread carefully. He shares a delicate balance of power with Diosdado Cabello, the head of the Constituent Assembly (the pro-government legislature) and current #2 in the governing PSUV party, and Vladimir Padrino Lopez, the minister of defense. (Economic liberalization would be particularly galling to a dyed-in-the-wool Chavista such as Cabello.) There are also two competing legislatures that would be involved in whatever economic change is made into law.

Which is to say that Maduro’s hold on power is still precarious. “Wild capitalism” hasn’t solved any problems – things are still very expensive, and not everyone benefits from access to foreign currency – and Maduro risks alienating his supporters by seemingly turning his back on the legacy of Chavismo. This means he is still vulnerable to losing power and opening a path for a more moderate Chavista to step in, rather than someone like Guaido who marked a complete departure from the regime. This is the opposite of what the U.S. had in mind.   

[Crafty_Dog]

U.S. Charges Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro With Drug Trafficking
Trump administration charged more than a dozen other current and former Venezuelan officials with money laundering and other offenses; $15 million reward

Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro speaking at a news conference in Caracas on March 12.
PHOTO: MANAURE QUINTERO/REUTERS
By Aruna Viswanatha, José de Córdoba and Ian Talley
Updated March 26, 2020 12:50 pm ET
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U.S. authorities charged Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro with drug trafficking and offered a $15 million reward for information leading to his arrest, in a sweeping set of actions that targeted more than a dozen current and former Venezuelan officials and escalated the Trump administration’s effort to unseat the leftist regime.

Prosecutors unsealed a series of criminal cases in New York, Florida and Washington on Thursday that they described as the product of a decadelong investigation and accuse Mr. Maduro and others of coordinating with a Colombian drug-trafficking guerilla group to flood the U.S. with tons of cocaine for the past 20 years.

Attorney General William Barr described the Venezuelan regime as “plagued by criminality and corruption,” saying that it was dominated by a “system constructed and controlled to enrich those at the highest levels of the government.” He spoke at a Thursday press conference held online because of the coronavirus pandemic.

While Mr. Maduro remains in control of Venezuela, the U.S. and nearly 60 countries last year recognized the then-president of the country’s national assembly, Juan Guaidó, as the country’s legitimate president.

The Venezuelan government didn’t have an immediate reaction to the indictments. In the past, Venezuela has rejected any U.S. accusations of drug trafficking, corruption or support for terrorist groups as part of a U.S. plot to destabilize the Maduro government.

The indictment comes at a time when Venezuela and the Maduro government are reeling from the global collapse of oil prices and U.S. economic sanctions that have shriveled the country’s crucial oil shipments.

The country, already five years into a depression that last year saw economic growth contract by 35%, also faces the threat of the global coronavirus pandemic amid a collapsed health-care system and a population suffering from widespread malnourishment.

In another case, filed in federal court in Miami, prosecutors accused the sitting chief justice of Venezuela’s Supreme Court, Maikel José Moreno Pérez, with taking millions of dollars in bribes related to cases he was overseeing and spending the funds on luxury goods and real estate in southern Florida.

The case against Mr. Maduro is the first time that the U.S. has charged a sitting head of state since Florida prosecutors indicted Panamanian strongman General Manuel Noriega in 1988 on drug trafficking and money-laundering charges. The U.S. invaded Panama the following year.

Mr. Noriega was tried in Miami and convicted of drug trafficking and money laundering. He served a long prison sentence in the U.S. before being extradited to Panama, where he died in 2017.

Mr. Maduro is unlikely to ever be in U.S. custody and face the charges inside a U.S. courtroom, but the Justice Department uses such “name and shame” cases to publicize allegations of wrongdoing that prosecutors believe they can prove to the standard of criminal cases—beyond a reasonable doubt.

U.S. officials said Thursday they remained optimistic that they would be able to eventually prosecute some of the officials, who could face arrest if they travel overseas.

[Crafty_Dog]

•   On March 28, Russian state oil company Rosneft announced the end of its operations in Venezuela. The company said it will receive a liquidation payment worth 9.6 percent of its capital.

[Crafty_Dog]

A New Path to Venezuelan Democracy
The U.S. State Department proposes Maduro and Guaidó both step aside and make way for free elections.
By Elliott Abrams
March 31, 2020 5:00 am ET

As the coronavirus spreads around the world, it’s easy to forget the Venezuelan people’s suffering at the hands of Nicolás Maduro’s regime. The Trump administration hasn’t. Today we are announcing a Democratic Transition Framework to help Venezuelans escape from the national crisis that falling oil prices and the coronavirus have now deepened.

We present this framework as a path for Venezuela to emerge from years of repression and political conflict. It proposes that both Mr. Maduro, the former president who has clung to power, and Juan Guaidó, the interim president, step aside so that the elected members of the National Assembly from both sides can create a Council of State to serve as the transitional government, which would hold free and fair presidential elections. In last year’s negotiations, the team representing Mr. Guaidó and the National Assembly proposed this path forward toward the restoration of democracy.

Democracy isn’t only about elections. A new, balanced and independent National Electoral Council is also critical, and an independent Supreme Court must replace the current one, which is but an arm of the Maduro regime. A vibrant democracy also demands a free and independent media with an end to the regime’s pervasive censorship.

The U.S. doesn’t support any particular political party in Venezuela. We support a return to democracy and believe that every party—including the regime’s party, the PSUV—should be able to compete on a level playing field in free and fair elections. This means an end to the unjust prosecutions that have left dozens of members of Parliament in exile, four in prison, and many more barred from running for office—including Mr. Guaidó, who would continue as president of the National Assembly until new parliamentary and presidential elections. The U.S. will recognize the results of a free and fair election, no matter which party wins; what we oppose is the abuse of state power that enables one party to rule indefinitely.

For the Maduro regime, the deep cuts in income due to falling oil prices compound the crisis of a medical system that it pushed into slow collapse over two decades. U.S. pressure hasn’t prevented food or medicine from reaching Venezuelans. The purpose of sanctions is to deprive the regime of the income it uses for repression—or steals through vast corruption—and force the regime to agree to presidential elections. Mr. Maduro has never negotiated in good faith about that central issue. National Assembly elections alone do not constitute a political solution.

The military will play an essential role in bringing about peaceful change and shaping Venezuela’s future. Venezuelan soldiers, along with police officers, are suffering as civilians are; they can barely afford to feed their families and can’t afford medical care or medications. Venezuela faces a great security challenge from drug traffickers, terrorist groups and criminal gangs, and it needs security forces that are better paid, trained and equipped to secure the nation’s borders and maintain peace. The military and police must abandon the role the Maduro regime has forged for them—carrying out the repression of the Venezuelan people. The military must also join in expelling the Cuban intelligence agents who spy on them and all citizens and serve as the regime’s true shield. The armed forces’ support of the Democratic Transition Framework would be a key step in this direction.

Free and fair presidential elections are the path out of Venezuela’s crisis. Because Mr. Maduro cannot be trusted to organize them, establishing the Council of State is an essential step. We are prepared to work with all Venezuelans and with other nations and lift sanctions when the necessary conditions are met. The Democratic Transition Framework paves the best path to a restoration of democracy through fair participation of all parties, and an end to the brutality, repression and political turmoil that have marked Venezuela’s recent past.

Until that objective is achieved, our pressure will strengthen. We look forward to the day when elections have been held, a new democratic government is in place, and sanctions can be lifted. We look forward to restoring once-close Venezuela-U.S. relations, to helping Venezuelan migrants and refugees displaced by the crisis return to their beloved country, and to seeing Venezuela’s children able to share again in their country’s natural bounty.

Mr. Abrams is special representative for Venezuela at the U.S. State Department.

[Crafty_Dog]

In Venezuela, the U.S. Offers Sanctions Relief for a Power-Sharing Deal
4 MINS READ
Apr 1, 2020 | 17:46 GMT
HIGHLIGHTS
In a notable shift from its hardline anti-Maduro rhetoric, Washington has called on both sides of Venezuela's political battle to step aside for a new transitional government and free elections....

The Big Picture

The U.S. State Department has called on both sides of Venezuela’s ongoing political battle to stand down and make way for a new transitional government and democratic elections, marking a notable shift from Washington’s more hardline, pro-opposition rhetoric. But the United States' primary goal of undermining elite support for President Nicolas Maduro nonetheless remains in place.

See Venezuela's Unraveling

What Happened

To break Venezuela’s ongoing political stalemate, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced a plan on March 31 that outlines a path to a power-sharing framework and free elections in exchange for the potential removal of U.S. sanctions. Dubbed the "Democratic Transition Framework," the proposal specifically calls for both President Nicolas Maduro and U.S.-backed opposition leader Juan Guaido to step aside for the formation of a new “inclusive transitional government acceptable to the major factions” without either leader. Elected by the country’s opposition-controlled National Assembly, this transitional government would remain in power until it oversees free elections, ideally held in six to 12 months.

To put the plan into motion, the United States has offered the quick removal of sanctions on individuals who resign from their posts within the Maduro regime. The removal of broader U.S. sanctions on Venezuela’s oil industry and state-owned energy company Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), however, are contingent on Maduro himself leaving office, as well as the withdrawal of all Cuban and Russian forces currently deployed in the country. In a separate statement, the U.S. Special Representative for Venezuela, Elliot Abrams, notably added that the proposal does not have a mechanism to reject the U.S. Department of Justice’s recently announced indictment of Maduro and other Venezuelan officials over so-called "narco-terrorism" charges.

Why It Matters

The fact that the new proposal is less overtly Guido-centeric marks a notable shift in tone for the United States, and could indicate that Washington has concluded that its former hardline rhetoric against the Maduro regime has failed to quickly oust the leader from office as intended. But the core of the White House’s strategy in Venezuela is still the same — that is, driving a wedge between Maduro and his loyalists in both the United Socialist Party and the military so that they eventually turn on the leader in some fashion. The U.S.-led push to oust Maduro was always going to inherently require a transitional government; this plan just formally plots the course to reach that end.

However, Washington’s move to indict a number of Maduro’s allies less than a week ago — and that the newly proposed transition plan does not include dropping those charges — could backfire on this goal by hardening solidarity among the regime’s top indicted officials who now all find themselves in the same boat. It will thus be critical to monitor whether non-indicted officials begin to come out against Maduro in response to the new U.S. plan, and if those who do have enough political sway to encourage other officials to follow suit.

While the proposed power-sharing deal marks a notable shift in tone, Washington's primary goal of undermining elite support for President Nicolas Maduro nonetheless remains the same.

There’s also a chance Maduro would still be eligible to run in the new elections: While Pompeo stressed Maduro would "never again" rule Venezuela in his statement, Abrams also noted that he could "theoretically run." Indeed, there is significant concern among Venezuela hawks in the United States that the new proposal could effectively pull the rug out from Guaido’s feet, and it remains unclear whether there's a different opposition figure who could replace him to challenge Maduro.

What’s Next

The U.S. offer for a transition will entice some non-indicted officials to turn against Maduro, but those pathways have always been there. So far this year, Maduro’s security forces also have continued to successfully block attempts by Guaido’s opposition movement to access the National Assembly building. Stratfor thus maintains its assessment that Maduro’s government will remain in power through the end of 2020, despite the mounting financial strain brought on by U.S. sanctions, the collapse in oil production and now coronavirus-related drops in global oil prices and demand. The more likely timetable for those fissures to metastasize into pushing out Maduro is 2021 or 2022, with the long-term health of Venezuela’s oil industry and oil prices still the most important force that could eventually result in a government transition.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/32853/this-venezuelan-patrol-ship-sunk-itself-after-ramming-a-cruise-liner-with-an-reinforced-hull?xid=fbshare

https://cdrsalamander.blogspot.com/2020/04/the-law-of-gross-tonnage-applies.html?spref=fb

[Crafty_Dog]

   
    Rosneft Leaves Venezuela
By: GPF Staff
 
(click to enlarge)
Russian oil company Rosneft announced last week that it would cease all its operations in Venezuela. The decision was not a surprise; the U.S. had imposed sanctions against two Rosneft subsidiaries – TNK Trading International and Rosneft Trading – for continuing to buy oil from Venezuela despite sanctions against such purchases. The move could, however, negatively affect the company's image as well as its performance. Moscow remains heavily dependent on oil sales, and the recent fluctuations in oil prices have hit the country's finances hard.

But Russia isn't leaving Venezuela completely. Rosneft's Venezuelan assets have been sold to a Russian state-owned company, which will acquire shares in the Petromonagas, Petroperija, Boqueron, Petromiranda and Petrovictoria oil fields as well as Rosneft's trading operations. Venezuela is one of Russia's few remaining partners in Latin America, so Moscow was prepared to buy up Rosneft's assets to help support the Maduro regime. Moscow also owns a 49.9 percent stake in U.S.-based Citgo, giving it some leverage in future talks with Washington.   

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2020/05/01/ex-green-beret-led-failed-attempt-to-oust-venezuelas-maduro/

[DougMacG]

https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2020/05/01/ex-green-beret-led-failed-attempt-to-oust-venezuelas-maduro/

Too bad to bungle this.  Failed overthrow attempts probably make Maduro stronger.

[Crafty_Dog]

I'm not getting how he is still in power.  Weren't we told many months ago that inflation was over 1,000,000%?

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2020/05/06/heres-the-career-info-for-the-former-green-berets-involved-in-venezuela-raid-debacle/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Army%20DNR%205.6.20&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Army%20-%20Daily%20News%20Roundup

[DougMacG]

https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2020/05/06/heres-the-career-info-for-the-former-green-berets-involved-in-venezuela-raid-debacle/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Army%20DNR%205.6.20&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Army%20-%20Daily%20News%20Roundup

This is unbelievably sad and tragic.  It answers one of my biggest questions in life.  In the Soviet Union, in Saddam's Iraq, in Communist China, in Cuba, in North Korea, in Venezuela, why don't the people rise up and throw out the thugs?  And then 60 well armed, well trained people do that and fail.  Now you are either dead or captured for trying and have made the next attempt even less possible to succeed.

It reminds me of: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dujail_Massacre

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/33322/breaking-down-the-absolutely-batshit-botched-coup-attempt-against-venezuelas-maduro

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2020/05/08/ex-green-beret-pitched-venezuela-plot-to-colorado-investors-last-year-claiming-links-to-trump-insider-and-dc-consultants/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Army%20Times%205.8.20&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Army%20-%20Daily%20News%20Roundup

[Crafty_Dog]

How Cuba’s Spies Keep Winning
They’ve infiltrated another attempt to unseat Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro.

By Mary Anastasia O’Grady
May 10, 2020 3:40 pm ET

The failed landing on a rugged stretch of Venezuelan coastline last week by a band of mercenaries hoping to unseat Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro is another tragedy for the beleaguered nation.

The predawn mission was meant to capitalize on the element of surprise. But the irregular soldiers were immediately confronted by Venezuelan troops because their operation had been thoroughly penetrated by Cuban-backed Venezuelan intelligence. Some were killed in the fighting and more may have been executed. Among the captured are two Americans.

The debacle is demoralizing for an enslaved nation suffering dire privation and brutal repression. It is also an opportunity to reflect on Cuba’s asymmetric-warfare capabilities and the sophistication of its intelligence apparatus, which over more than a half-century has run circles around the U.S. Beyond the killing, the fiasco will deepen suspicion and distrust among the members of the opposition—particularly of “friends” who claim to have broken with the dictatorship.

The U.S. government has said it had no “direct involvement” in the seaborne operation. Jordan Goudreau, a former Green Beret who was the ring leader of the plot, did receive some interest in his services from advisers to U.S.-backed interim Venezuelan President Juan Guaidó. But Mr. Guaidó’s communications team has put out a statement insisting that the interim president never agreed to launching the operation.

Mr. Goudreau, who heads the U.S.-based security firm Silvercorp, apparently planned to provoke a military uprising, detain Mr. Maduro, and put him on a plane to the U.S.

There is near universal agreement that it was a reckless endeavor. Yet it is only the latest in a string of desperate attempts to try to bring down the dictatorship. And while the methods have varied, the common denominator in all the quashed uprisings has been how effectively Cuban-led intelligence has disrupted the plans. In some cases the plots may even have originated with state-security agents, who recruited eager patriots and mercenaries and set them up to be killed. This also reinforces a sense of futility among would-be rebels.

Whether it’s inside the military or among the ranks of the opposition, many Venezuelans now conclude that Cuban moles are everywhere and it’s too risky to put confidence in anyone. This is key to Havana’s control strategy in Venezuela. It is also standard practice on the island.

The struggle to liberate Venezuela is a proxy war between the U.S. and Cuba, which is backed by its allies Russia, Iran and China. The conflict drags on because Cuba has the edge where it matters.

When it comes to traditional military capabilities, the U.S. soars above its adversaries. But Havana dominates in deception, human intelligence and propaganda. It’s been that way from the early days of the Cuban dictatorship. “The Cubans were underestimated for more than a quarter of a century,” former CIA Cuba analyst Brian Latell wrote in his 2012 book, “Castro’s Secrets.” The U.S. thought it was dealing with “bush-league amateurs” until Florentino Aspillaga Lombard, a highly decorated Cuban agent, defected in 1987. That’s when the U.S. began to understand that Castro’s Cuba had “developed a foreign intelligence service that quickly rose into the ranks of the half dozen best in the world.” Moreover, “in some covert specialties, particularly in running double agents and counterintelligence,” over decades, Mr. Latell wrote, “Cuba’s achievements have been unparalleled.”

It’s a mistake to think this is only about people like high-ranking Pentagon intelligence analyst Ana Belén Montes, who was exposed as a Cuban spy in 2001 after some 16 years working for the enemy. Cuba has myriad ways of spreading disinformation, combating critics, and widening its influence. Return access to the island for journalists and academics, for example, is denied when there is unfavorable coverage, which is presumably why yours truly cannot get a visa.

Blackmail is another method of manipulation. I have twice interviewed a Cuban defector who told me it was his job in Cuba to retrieve videocassettes from hidden cameras in hotel rooms and official residences where visiting dignitaries were staying. The goal was to capture on film compromising behavior that could be used to extort political favors or, for example, force a resignation. With heavy political and diplomatic traffic to the island from Europe and Washington, it’s a safe bet that at least a few have been compromised in this way.

The Guaidó team now says it balked at the Goudreau plan in part because it did not trust former Venezuelan General Cliver Alcalá, whose brother is Mr. Maduro’s ambassador to Tehran but who claimed to have switched sides. Mr. Alcalá was taken into custody in the U.S. on drug-trafficking charges in March. But that he got close to the Guaidó team in the first place is another credit to Cuba’s intel network—most likely in this case with a lot of help from Iran.

Write to O’Grady@wsj.com.

[Crafty_Dog]

May 19, 2020   View On Website
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    Why Venezuela's Maduro Isn’t Worse Off Than He Is
By: Allison Fedirka

The past few months have been a nightmare for economies that rely on oil. After the coronavirus pandemic sent prices plummeting, finance ministries had to triage planned revenue, major social and infrastructure projects were put on hold or aborted altogether, and the public started to lose its temper. All available evidence would suggest that oil-dependent Venezuela is, once again, on the brink of collapse. Yet President Nicolas Maduro finds himself in a comparatively stronger position now than when oil prices collapsed in early March. Since then, he has managed to navigate through extensive U.S. actions meant to cripple the Venezuelan economy and has weathered three key external events — the pandemic, the oil crash and a farcical coup attempt involving two Americans — maintaining his power however precariously.

Venezuela is strategically important to the U.S., at least within the parameters of hemispheric security and control of the Caribbean Sea, and it’s no secret that the Trump administration would like to see Maduro fall. Hence Washington’s general low-cost, low-effort policy of slowly tightening an economic vise around the country, which keeps its interests in play while waiting for the Maduro government to self-destruct or for the opposition to take over. The fall of the price of oil, however, gave Washington an opportunity to pitch new transition talks to Maduro and his opponents. On March 31, the U.S. State Department issued its proposed Democratic Transition Framework for Venezuela, in which it offered to begin lifting parts of the sanctions if members of Maduro’s United Socialist Party of Venezuela formed an interim government without Maduro to transition to new elections. Unsurprisingly, Maduro publicly rejected the plan.

He could afford to. Low oil prices didn’t damage the Venezuelan economy as badly as expected. Mostly that’s because the economy, particularly its hydrocarbon sector, was already in ruins. Food shortages have been rampant since at least 2012, the currency been in a state of hyperinflation since 2016, power shortages occur regularly and many citizens depend on the black market for survival. U.S. sanctions targeting high-level politicians and key business activities made things only worse. Oil production has been in decline since 2016 and has fallen dramatically since 2018. Most of the oil Venezuela does produce is sold at a discount and used to pay off debts or for domestic consumption. These problems were such that the drop in oil prices hurt the economy but not as badly as the drop hurt healthier economies.
 
(click to enlarge)

When it became clear the transition proposal was dead on arrival, the Trump administration called on Chevron, the only U.S. oil company still operating in Venezuela, to leave or give up its shares in its operations. It was meant to be retaliatory but in fact did little to hurt Maduro. Chevron produced only 34,000 barrels per day in 2019 — a drop in the bucket for a country that produces under 1 million bpd (and falling) in a bad year — and so it made sense for it to halt operations, which it did. However, Chevron kept its shares in joint ventures with state-run oil company Petroleos de Venezuela, meaning the company will keep its foot in the door in Venezuela, which has been the company’s only purpose in the country for the past couple of years. The truth is that the Chevron decision did little to undercut Maduro or hurt the Venezuelan oil sector writ large.
 
(click to enlarge)

The biggest danger to Venezuela is the price of domestic duel, which skyrocketed around the same time prices fell as supplies ran low. The shortages are due primarily to poor refining capacity. At the beginning of 2015, Venezuela refined 915,000 bpd of crude. By the start of 2020, it was refining just 135,000 bpd. Now, refining has never been Venezuela’s strong suit; it generally relied on U.S. facilities. But low gasoline prices were a fixture of Venezuela for decades, and raising the price is politically dangerous.

Thus Venezuela turned to Iran, a country with lots of experience and little to lose from angering the United States. In exchange for about $900 million worth of gold, Iran sent input chemicals for refining, pledged help to repair refineries and dispatched five tankers to delivery emergency fuel to Venezuela. That is a hefty sum of money for a country with few reserves, but solving the fuel crisis is necessary for Maduro to remain in power.

There are two other factors that explain why Maduro is relatively safe behind his heightened security. The first and most obvious is that the coronavirus pandemic discouraged people from protesting in public, and gave the military an excuse to patrol the streets and take control of the distribution of health equipment and food. The second was the May 3 “coup attempt,” if you can call it that. Dozens of people — including two Americans — launched an amphibious assault, only to be immediately snuffed out by authorities. The incursion was never a real threat to Maduro’s power, but since the alleged orchestrator was an American mercenary with a company based in Florida, Maduro had more than enough reason to publicly villainize the U.S., increase security even more and portray the government from a position of strength. Most important, it gave Caracas two U.S. prisoners who can be used in future negotiations.

The U.S. is in no rush to re-engage Venezuela. It’s written off Juan Guaido, the so-called other president of Venezuela who failed to serve his purpose of ushering in a new government. Washington is content to wait until it can capitalize on its reconstruction once there is a new government in place. Reconstruction comes down to who has the most money to pour into Venezuela, and to no surprise the U.S. was for the past few months the most well-suited to do so. Now, with low oil prices, a global recession and record-level unemployment in the U.S., Washington has no will and limited ability to fund Venezuela's reconstruction.

And so Maduro occupies his post relatively uncontested for now. The economy is still a mess, but time seems again to be on his side.   

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.nationalreview.com/2020/11/finally-maduro-is-listening/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=NR%20Daily%20Monday%20through%20Friday%202020-11-18&utm_term=NRDaily-Smart

[DougMacG]

https://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2020/11/23/starving-venezuelan-prisoners-kill-eat-prison-directors-rottweiler/

https://www.infobae.com/america/venezuela/2020/11/22/presos-venezolanos-mataron-a-un-perro-para-comerselo-los-familiares-denuncian-que-los-reos-se-estan-muriendo-de-hambre/

Should go in the Biden admin thread?

[Crafty_Dog]

No, this is the right thread.

[DougMacG]

This one should go in the (US) Monetary Policy thread since we seem bound and determined to follow them.

https://www.msn.com/en-us/money/markets/hyperinflation-pushes-venezuela-to-print-1000000-bolivar-bills/ar-BB1ei8Dj

Hyperinflation Pushes Venezuela to Print 1,000,000-Bolivar Bills

(Bloomberg) -- Venezuela said it will introduce new large-denomination bolivar notes as hyperinflation renders most bills worthless, forcing citizens to turn to the U.S. dollar for everyday transactions.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.theepochtimes.com/us-military-official-china-and-russia-may-be-collaborating-south-of-us-border_3738033.html?utm_source=morningbrief&utm_medium=email&email=craftydog@earthlink.net&utm_campaign=mb-2021-03-19

[Crafty_Dog]

March 22, 2021
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When Influence Reaches a Tipping Point
Russia in Venezuela is a great example of what we mean when we talk about “influence.”
By: Allison Fedirka

“Influence” and “presence” are among the most misused and overused words, even by us, in geopolitical analysis. We all know what they mean, and yet they don’t mean much if they aren’t properly explained. Influence can mean mutually beneficial business interests between two countries, or it could mean the infiltration of one country’s intelligence operatives by the intelligence agencies of another. Breadth and depth of “influence” matter, as does the strategic value of the area or industry influenced. Dominating a country’s military supply chain is not the same as dominating the culinary scene.

It’s therefore critical to understand when “presence” and “influence” reach a point where they spur a country to action. Russian influence in Venezuela is a case in point, especially because it will play a role in how the United States crafts its security relations with Colombia.

Venezuela has maintained strong ties with Russia for decades. Over the past few years, though, Russia has changed the way it engages with Venezuela, de-emphasizing its economic relationship (joint ventures and other energy-related projects) and prioritizing, albeit subtly, its security relationship. Growing U.S. sanctions against Venezuela, depressed oil prices, mounting domestic instability and financial difficulties for the Russian government meant Russia had to take a more pragmatic approach to its business ventures. (Hence, the departure of Rosneft in 2019.) Rather than abandon Venezuela’s energy sector, Russia shifted its engagement style. Russia maintained control of its Venezuelan assets by creating Roszarubezhneft, a parent company that took control over the security company Chop RN-Okhrana-Ryazan, which holds Russian energy assets in Venezuela through its 80 percent share in the National Petroleum Consortium. Russia also leveraged its energy expertise to install its people and its business practices in the highest levels of PDVSA management, giving Moscow the ability to shape the decisions and strategy of the Venezuelan state-owned oil company. This has helped Russia facilitate the sale of Venezuelan crude despite U.S. sanctions.

Changes are underway on the military front too. In the late 2000s and early 2010s, Russia was heavily engaged in financing Venezuela’s purchase and modernization of military hardware, including the iconic S-300 air defense systems and Su-30 fighter jets. Financial constraints facing both countries and deteriorating stability within Venezuela put an end to major hardware modernization initiatives. Russia could no longer ensure the safety of its equipment under the Maduro regime or, worse yet, in the event that pro-U.S. groups succeeded in replacing the regime.

Now Russia takes a more subtle, though still important, approach with Venezuela and military cooperation. Over the past three years, the Russian military has sent several strategic military planes to Venezuela for visits, including the nuclear-capable Tu-160 Blackjack bombers, AN-124 cargo plane and Il-62 passenger plane. More recently, at the end of 2020, it was reported that a Tu-154, which is registered to the FSB intelligence service, entered Venezuelan airspace. Its whereabouts are unconfirmed. More, some 100 Russian troops arrived in Venezuela back in 2019 – a size suitable for advisory activities rather than kinetic fighting. This year, there have been reports that Russia has provided anti-terrorist and insurgent training for the Venezuelan armed forces. And last October, President Nicolas Maduro announced the formation of a science and technology military council that included Cuban, Russian, Iranian and Chinese advisers.

Russian engagement with Venezuela is all the more relevant in light of the conditions and crises faced by the Maduro government. Maduro lacks the charisma and natural leadership demonstrated by his predecessor, the late Hugo Chavez. Maduro has instead constructed – sometimes deliberately, sometimes inadvertently – a governance structure that disseminates power to different groups, cohered by mutual dependence, to maintain power. This has created conditions in which Russian contributions and activities play critical roles in keeping Maduro in power. Russia’s work in the energy sector gives it control over one of the government’s most valuable assets, even if it is in disarray. Its assistance in exports also helps funnel in U.S. dollars to the Venezuelan government despite U.S. sanctions. Russia’s military training will equip Venezuela’s domestic forces with the skills needed to help better prevent and quell mounting internal unrest over deteriorating living conditions and general discontent with the government. With the military flights, Russia has demonstrated that it can move military personnel and equipment in and out of Venezuela with ease. (There have been suggestions that this cooperation could include an intelligence component as well.)

In short, the deterioration inside Venezuela allowed Russia to assume a more prominent role in keeping Venezuela’s economy afloat, its military prepared, and its intelligence informed. It controls the strategic assets and markets on which the government depends. Moscow doesn’t outright pull Venezuela’s strings, but it clearly has enough influence to affect outside actors.

Enter Colombia and the United States. Like many of its neighbors, Colombia started to modernize its military some time ago. The country’s defense industry has made some advances toward developing indigenous equipment like unmanned aerial vehicles, air-defense systems, patrol boats and amphibious ships. However, domestic production remains inadequate for its needs, so Bogota relies heavily on foreign imports. Its military and security forces face capability gaps due to outdated legacy systems and insufficient amounts of strategic equipment. Given the long-standing security relationship between the U.S. and Colombia, and the fact that the U.S. has been a major weapons supplier to Colombia in the past, a substantial U.S. role in Colombia’s modernization effort would be a natural fit.

The decision to purchase military systems and fleets comes with a host of domestic and international considerations. Given Russia’s influence in Venezuela, the reaction to potential U.S. arms sales needs to be factored in to the decision-making calculus since it could provoke a retaliatory response. In the case of Colombia, most of its security efforts focus on counterinsurgency and counter-narcotics operations. More recently, containment of any spillover effect from Venezuela’s instability has also been included in defense strategies. To do this effectively, Colombia must be able to reach and control remote areas of its porous borders, particularly with Venezuela, where these illicit groups and activities occur. Currently, the Colombian government plans to acquire a new fleet of fighter jets to support these efforts, and the U.S. is a frontrunner in the bidding. Follow-on deals for improved radar systems and air-defense are also likely in the future.

Colombia's Air Command Bases
(click to enlarge)

The acquisition of this equipment and capability by Colombia will likely aggravate Russia. Any reconnaissance or radar equipment risks making its low-profile military activities more visible. A new fighter jet fleet, depending on the defense contractor, could also make Russia and Venezuela feel more threatened. For example, Moscow would view the selection of F-16 Block 70 jets as a greater threat than the Gripen NG, which it believes to be an inferior aircraft to its Su-30s. Any perception that the U.S. is moving in to secure a stronger military posture with the Colombians – which the sale of F-16’s would do – could be grounds for a Russian reaction. The concern for the U.S. on this front is what that potential reaction would look like. Washington does not want to risk sparking a military spending spree with Russia in Latin America; nor does it want to see Moscow reinforce or send new security deployments to counter U.S. interests in sensitive areas overseas.

The U.S. has already subtly demonstrated its need to factor the Russian presence into its response to its Venezuela strategy. U.S. security officials have repeatedly warned this year that Russia and Iran are destabilizing Latin America and mentioned Colombia by name. They also noted actors based in Venezuela and Cuba as having a secondary role (Russia was cited among the primary culprits) in meddling with U.S. 2020 elections. These are low-level commentaries that signal a clear message that Russia’s place in Venezuela is noticed and seen as increasingly problematic. Russian activity in Venezuela is strong and in strategic areas such that it can affect decisions made not only by the Venezuelan government but also outside players like the U.S. and Colombia. Russian presence in Venezuela is making the U.S. and Colombia think more cautiously about how they will pursue military and defense ties in the future.

[Crafty_Dog]

   
By: Geopolitical Futures


Russia is back in Venezuela. Russia and Venezuela signed 12 cooperation agreements covering things like finance, energy, the military and medicines. The signings took place Wednesday during a visit by Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov to Caracas to meet with Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro.

[Crafty_Dog]

April 7, 2021
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Venezuela Passes a Security Test, for Now
Caracas can’t allow fighting among Colombian guerrilla groups to rage on inside its borders.
By: Allison Fedirka

Venezuelan soldiers started flooding into Apure, a state along the border with Colombia, just over two weeks ago. The deployments aimed to tamp down fighting among guerrilla groups from Colombia and regain control. The operations have so far destroyed at least nine guerrilla camps and resulted in dozens of detentions and dozens of deaths, including eight dead Venezuelan soldiers. Though the fighting seems to have quieted down for the moment, the strong military presence is likely to continue in the short term. The Venezuelan government will allow – even encourage – some degree of illicit activity by Colombian guerrilla groups on its territory. The spoils from such activities help to keep its military in line. But at a time when its authority is already being seriously questioned, Caracas can’t allow fighting among the guerrilla groups to rage on inside its borders.

Fractured Alliance

What’s unique about this wave of border violence is that the Venezuelan authorities are responding at all. Normally, the government turns a blind eye to activities by former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) or National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrillas in hard-to-govern parts of the country like Apure. In fact, over the past few decades the Venezuelan government has preferred to work with guerrilla and criminal groups in the border area to advance common interests. Ideologically, the FARC had much in common with the late Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and his Bolivarian Revolution. Both championed revolutionary socialism, and both were hostile to the Colombian government. The Venezuelan government sheltered the FARC from Colombian security forces, and in return it gained leverage over the Colombian government. Over time their shared political interests grew to include economic and security interests as well.

But what’s left of the FARC is not the same as the FARC of the early years. After more than 50 years of fighting and multiple failed peace talks, the Colombian government and the FARC finally signed a peace deal in 2016. Many FARC fighters, however, refused to put down their weapons, preferring to continue participating in the lucrative drug trade, fuel smuggling and illegal mining.

The Road to a FARC-Colombia Peace Agreement
(click to enlarge)

The remnants of the group tried to reconstitute it in 2017. By mid-2019, two distinct factions were jostling for position along the Venezuelan border. One is called Second Marquetalia (sometimes referred to as New Marquetalia) and is led by Jesus Santrich and Ivan Marquez, a former member of the FARC Secretariat and the group’s second-in-command at the time of its demobilization. Second Marquetalia consists of multiple “fronts” and runs operations primarily in Colombia’s Caribbean region as well as northern Antioquia and parts of the Venezuelan border. The other faction, sometimes called the 1st Front Dissidence, also consists of multiple fronts and is led by Ivan Mordisco and Gentil Duarte and operates primarily in eastern Colombia.

The leaders of both groups aspire to unite the factions, but neither side is willing to submit to the other. Yet they did manage to come to an understanding for a while, through an agreement that also involved the ELN, a long-standing player along the border, and the Venezuelan government. Eventually, however, their accord broke down because of disputes over the distribution of income and territory. Based on the recent Venezuelan operations, it appears Marquez and Santrich’s Second Marquetalia has come out on top, due in large part to its ability to keep the ELN and the Venezuelan government on its side.

Necessary Evil

The Maduro government has been working for months to stop or contain the escalation of fighting between the ex-FARC factions. In September 2020, Venezuelan forces attacked three camps belonging to the 10th front – part of the Mordisco-Duarte faction – in three sectors of Paez municipality in Apure state. At the end of January – a day after reported skirmishes between the two factions – the armed forces launched another operation, code named Jiwi 2021, against dissident FARC camps in Venezuela. Less than a week later, on Feb. 5, participants in Jiwi 2021 clashed with FARC elements near Puerto Ayacucho in Amazonas state. A third operation occurred Feb. 11 in the Pedro Camejo municipality of Apure state, during which eight guerrilla camps were destroyed as well as eight runways used by drug traffickers. In all of this fighting, including the most recent bout beginning March 21, the Venezuelan government has carefully chosen its words in describing its targets. Reports indicate that the target group is the 10th front and affiliated members – all part of the Mordisco-Duarte faction. Presumably, Caracas wants a return to the original framework led by Marquez and Santrich, thus preserving the relationship among the Venezuelan forces, the ELN and Second Marquetalia.

The government’s strong response reveals the scale of the threat that the infighting poses to the Maduro regime. The Chavez regime laid the foundation for strong ties between the government, the security forces and Colombian guerrillas like the FARC and ELN. Over the years, these parties have engaged in mutually beneficial black market activities. These activities in turn have become critical to the Maduro regime, which takes its share of the revenues and stays in the military’s good graces by letting it do the same. The nexus between these groups would be difficult to map out precisely, but there was enough evidence for the U.S. Justice Department in March 2020 to indict Maduro, several current and former Venezuelan officials, and members of the FARC’s leadership on narco-terrorism charges.

Besides the need to keep the money flowing, Caracas must use this moment to prove it can control its territory. The recent offensive comes as the public is seriously questioning, if not outright rejecting, the legitimacy of the regime. The economic situation in the country is precarious, and there have been multiple attempts – by regime critics and the U.S. – to sow divisions within the military’s ranks. The territory in question is remote and difficult to secure, but if the government fails to rein in the problematic FARC faction and show it can maintain control, it would severely damage the credibility of the government and the military. (Arguably, the fact that the government and military depend on relationships with foreign guerrillas and criminal gangs in the first place is evidence enough of a lack of government control, but an acceptance of criminal activity is not quite the same as anarchy.)


(click to enlarge)

To that end, Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino Lopez announced on April 5 the creation of special defense operation zones in three municipalities of Apure state. The government also sent in the Special Action Force of the Bolivarian National Police (FAES), which human rights groups consider to be a death squad. The mission of the FAES is unknown, but it likely includes intelligence collection, supporting the other forces, serving as the eyes and ears of Miraflores Palace, and of course brutal suppression. The heavy-handed response is proportionate to the risk the Maduro regime seeks to eliminate.

The Bigger Picture

All this instability serves the interest of the U.S. and Colombian governments. Indeed, on several occasions the Maduro government has claimed without evidence that Washington and Bogota are behind the fighting. However, U.S. efforts to usher in regime change have flopped. Washington failed to inspire civil-military action in early 2019, when opposition figure Juan Guaido claimed the title of interim president, and sanctions have weakened the regime but have not brought it down. Neither the U.S. nor Colombia has the political or economic capital to support a military offensive to depose Maduro, nor is it necessarily in their interest for the country to slide into civil war, or descend far enough into chaos that the U.S. felt a need to get involved militarily. The potential for the struggle within the remnants of the FARC to weaken the regime by eroding confidence and exposing fissures between the government and the armed forces is the best scenario for regime change outside of the recent U.S. efforts.

For now, it appears the Maduro regime and the Venezuelan armed forces have regained control of the territory and settled the dispute between the ex-FARC groups. But if attacks by the FARC groups resume, in Venezuela or Colombia, it could indicate an unraveling of the status quo and trouble for the regime. Another sign of trouble would be if Russia, which has a vested interest in the Maduro regime’s survival, increased its support, particularly militarily. Finally, Colombia’s response must be monitored. To date, the Colombian government has sent some military reinforcements to areas where people fleeing the violence have crossed the border, but it has steered clear of direct intervention. Any moves by the guerrillas or missteps by the Venezuelan military into Colombia that necessitate a response from Bogota could also upset the balance.

[DougMacG]

Could we just put this in our Bernie Sanders, Joe Biden US economic policy preview thread:

https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/venezuela-subtract-six-zeros-currency-second-overhaul-three-years-2021-10-01/

Venezuela subtracts six zeros from currency, second overhaul in three years
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

"It can't happen here."   - That's what they said there.

https://www.cnbc.com/2021/10/01/key-inflation-gauge-watched-by-the-federal-reserve-hits-another-30-year-high.html

Just getting started...

[Crafty_Dog]

January 26, 2022
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Venezuela Could Be the Next Front in the US-Russian Standoff
The real danger isn’t that Moscow will deploy forces but that low-level proxy conflicts will get out of hand.
By: Allison Fedirka

When elephants fight, it’s the grass that suffers. Few understand this better than Latin America, which has been drawn into disputes between great powers in North America and Eurasia before, and might again. The focal point of the latest standoff between the U.S. and Russia is Ukraine, in Russia’s own front yard, but Moscow sees an opportunity to level the playing field by supporting destabilizing forces in Latin America. Russian diplomats in recent weeks have talked up the possibility of deploying weapons in the region, but the likelier danger is that violence along the Colombian-Venezuelan border could escalate and draw in Moscow and Washington.

Shades of the Cold War

Russia and Venezuela have for years found kinship in their mutual disdain for the United States. Recently, however, there has been a clear shift, particularly from Russia, from a loose friendship to a closer alliance with bellicose undertones. It started when Russia’s deputy foreign minister, Sergei Ryabkov, proposed deploying military infrastructure to Venezuela and Cuba. Two weeks later, Russia's ambassador to Venezuela again raised the issue of Russian-Venezuelan military cooperation. Venezuela’s constitution prohibits the hosting of foreign bases, the ambassador noted, but it doesn’t rule out collaboration at ports. (He also compared the Venezuelan government’s 2019 political crisis to the sorts of color revolutions witnessed in Russia’s near-abroad, while Venezuela’s defense minister complained – without evidence – that NATO is gaining ground in Latin America and using Colombia – which is only an observer in the alliance and thus does not influence discussions or operations – as a pawn.) The Kremlin has also made it a point to draw attention to high-level talks between the two countries, including a call last week between Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Venezuelan counterpart, Nicolas Maduro.

This shift has not gone unnoticed in the U.S. and Colombia. Though neither has advocated a joint response to Russia’s moves, both have made clear that they reject the Kremlin’s influence in Venezuela’s affairs. Colombia, which closed its border with Venezuela over Caracas’ alleged support for Colombian guerrillas in the border area, said it would not be blackmailed by Russia into reopening the border. For its part, the U.S. said it would respond decisively if Russia deployed military hardware to the area, as Ryabkov suggested. It also warned in December about foreign interference in Colombia’s 2022 presidential election – a favorite Russian tactic. But otherwise, Washington’s response has been subdued. Immediately after Ryabkov’s remarks, the U.S. Air Force flew a reconnaissance aircraft over the Caribbean, but Washington did not widely publicize the move. Similarly, Washington has preferred not to put too much emphasis on Russian activities and collusion with the Venezuelan government and guerrilla groups, instead letting unofficial figures do most of the talking.

It’s all very reminiscent of the Cold War. Ryabkov’s remarks in particular called up memories of the Cuban Missile Crisis. But the idea of Russia moving significant military assets to Venezuela is impractical and should be considered a reminder of American vulnerabilities rather than a specific threat. This kind of deployment would require substantial funding and logistical capabilities that are already tied up in Russia’s near-abroad. Further, Venezuela’s general volatility discourages Russia (or anyone else) from placing major valuable assets there.

But Moscow doesn’t need to deploy major military assets to draw Washington’s attention to dangers closer to home. During the Cold War, the Cuban Missile Crisis was the exception. Most of the Soviet Union’s moves in Latin America involved supporting radical left-wing political and guerrilla movements – the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, the Tupamaros in Uruguay, and the original Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) – that threatened U.S. interests in the region. The strategy was extremely effective, even leading the U.S. on several occasions to sponsor coups in the region to bring pro-American governments to power.

Russia is more likely to repeat this strategy of supporting guerrillas and criminals in Latin America than it is to deploy major military assets. Both would divert U.S. attention and resources and give Russia leverage in negotiations, but the former involves far lower costs and risk.

Simmering Conflict

With that in mind, recent clashes near the Venezuelan border between Colombian guerrilla groups, and between those guerrillas and the Venezuelan military, take on new significance. Smuggling and crime is a mainstay of the Colombian-Venezuelan border area. Occasional struggles over territory have been known to occur. But since the start of 2022, the neighboring states of Apure, Venezuela, and Arauca, Colombia, have seen a notable increase in violence. In January alone, Colombia’s Arauca department has registered armed clashes in the municipalities of Saravena, Tame, Fortul, Arauquita and Arauca (as well as Cubara municipality in neighboring Boyaca department). The fighting has left at least 34 people dead and has displaced nearly 1,000 more. In the most notable incident, a car bomb detonated on Jan. 20 in Saravena in an attack the Colombian defense minister blamed on a dissident FARC group. The bombing was planned in and financed by Venezuela, he said.

Tension Areas Along the Colombia-Venezuela Border
(click to enlarge)

Besides the challenge the guerrillas themselves pose, the Colombian government faces the added difficulty of distinguishing them from the Venezuelan government. Several of the groups have direct ties to Maduro’s government, and many of them profit from illicit trade along the porous border and seek refuge from law enforcement in Venezuela. The National Liberation Army (ELN) has resided in Venezuela for decades and was strengthened by the dismantling of the FARC after its 2016 peace deal. With an estimated 2,500 members, the ELN has a stronghold in Apure and the support of the Maduro government, which not only ignores ELN activities but even supports the group directly via military operations. Former FARC members who rejected the 2016 deal are also still active, numbering about 5,200, and are split between three main groups: Gentil Duarte’s 10th Front, the 28th Front and Ivan Marquez’s Second Marquetalia. According to Colombia’s defense minister, the ELN and Second Marquetalia have aligned in a war against Duarte’s 10th Front and the 28th Front for control of territory and drug routes.

Why does this matter? First, because of the risk that the skirmishes could balloon into a proxy battle between great powers. In March 2021, a Russian soldier was reportedly involved in a Venezuelan military operation against a dissident FARC group in Apure, Venezuela. There are also unconfirmed reports that Russian private military contractors have trained Venezuelan troops. On the other side, the ELN claims that the 10th and 28th fronts are coordinating with Colombian and U.S. authorities, including the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. In November, the U.S. designated both the Second Marquetalia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army – which includes the 10th and 28th fronts – as terrorist groups, but from Cold War history we know this doesn’t preclude the possibility of collusion.

Military Operations Against Ex-FARC Factions | Venezuela
(click to enlarge)

A second concern is the nature and targets of the violence. Last June, a dissident FARC group attacked Colombian President Ivan Duque’s helicopter with small arms fire at Camilo Daza Airport in Cucuta. Earlier that month, the group detonated a car bomb inside a military base in Cucuta, injuring 36 people, including a few U.S. advisers. In both cases the Colombian government said funding and plans for the attacks originated in Venezuela. But even in the wake of the Cucuta car bombing, the U.S. took no major overt action; its only public response was to send the FBI to support the investigation. Months later, in September, Colombia arrested two Venezuelan soldiers on its territory. Bogota also raised the alarm about Venezuela violating its airspace – a fairly common occurrence.

And yet, both Venezuela and Colombia have kept their emotions in check. The reason is that neither is interested in a larger conflict with the other right now. The most notable action so far came when Colombia decided in October to send 14,000 security personnel to the border, primarily the Norte Santander department. Smaller security reinforcements were more recently dispatched to Arauca. Similarly, Venezuela has deployed more military assets in Apure department to support its allies among the Colombian guerrillas and to quell its opponents. Bogota and Caracas have endured periods of extreme domestic violence and instability, during which the neighboring country proved to be a good recourse for people in search of safety (and economic opportunity). A war would mean rupturing this mutually beneficial arrangement.

Moreover, direct conflict risks drawing in the U.S. and Russia. And while Bogota and Caracas value their relationships with Washington and Moscow, respectively, neither wants to enter a conflict where they would be at the mercy of their more powerful sponsors. Instead of a Colombia-Venezuela issue, it could transform into a new frontline between the U.S. and Russia. This unstable arrangement works for now, but the risk of a proxy conflict grows the longer the Venezuelan-backed guerrilla groups remain active in Colombia and U.S.-Russian relations remain tense.

[Crafty_Dog]

Iran Acquires 2.5 Million Acres of Venezuela
by Lawrence A. Franklin  •  September 21, 2022 at 5:30 am

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The land grant will ostensibly be used to grow staple crops... allowing water-starved Iran to better feed its population... Iran's current use of Venezuela, however... combined with Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), raise the possibility that Iran and its surrogate terrorist groups, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, might be using the vast acreage for military and terrorist operations.

The Maduro regime has apparently been so welcoming to Iranian intelligence agents that some of Hezbollah's long-established Latin American network at the tri-border nexus of Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay has been overtaken by Hezbollah activities on Venezuela's Margarita Island [a tourist area northeast of the country's mainland].

Iran, along with the Chinese Communist Party, is in the process of strengthening Venezuela's military against the US, for instance by deliveries of military drones, which are also considered a threat by Columbia.

Iran's alliance with Venezuela most importantly provides Tehran with opportunities to target US interests in Latin America and potentially the southern United States.

China, Russia and Iran were reported to be running military drills in Latin America last month. According to the Center for a Secure Free Society, this is a "strategic move that seeks to preposition forward deployed military assets in Latin America and the Caribbean."

Iran, along with Venezuela, seems to be using its influence with other Latin American governments to develop an anti-US coalition in America's backyard. In addition, Iran sent a destroyer, the Sahand, and a support vessel -- the intelligence-gathering Makran -- to Venezuela in the spring of 2021. The Makran set sail on the mission "with seven high-speed missile-attack craft strapped to its deck."

Iran's massive interference in Venezuela's affairs should raise concerns about the hemisphere's democracies and whether Caracas is still sovereign.

Iran and Venezuela also appear to have established an air bridge between Tehran and Caracas. The flights are manned by Iranian crews and enable both regimes to maintain secrecy in the possible global transport of weapons and terrorist operatives.

Tehran's cooperation with Venezuelan intelligence agencies, although less visible, is also intense. The Islamic Republic's support for Hezbollah terrorist operations is pervasive throughout Latin America.

Occasionally Iranians have been apprehended by US border guards illegally crossing America's long, porous border with Mexico. These illegal aliens could be fulfilling passive missions such as manning Iran's Hezbollah cells in the US, while others could be commissioned to execute intelligence or terrorist-support operations.

Latin America's Iranian Hezbollah network appears poised to strike democratic interests throughout the hemisphere.


Pictured: Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei meets with Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro in Tehran on June 11, 2022. (Image source: khamenei.ir)

Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro this June during a visit to Iran signed a multidimensional, 20-year cooperation treaty. The pact includes agreements on science and technology as well as deals on agriculture, communications, culture and tourism. The Maduro regime's startling provision of one million hectares (roughly 2.5 million acres; nearly 4,000 square miles) of farmland to Iran was kept under wraps until Iranian agrarian economist Ali Revanizadeh disclosed it to the Venezuelan media.

The land grant will ostensibly be used to grow staple crops, such as corn and soy beans, allowing water-starved Iran to better feed its population. Iran's current use of Venezuela, however (here, here and here ), combined with Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), raise the possibility that Iran and its surrogate terrorist groups, such as Hezbollah and Hamas , might be using the vast acreage for military and terrorist operations.

[Crafty_Dog]

Have not read this closely, but initial read does not impress

ober 17, 2022
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An Opportunity for the US and Venezuela

The political costs of mending ties with otherwise estranged regimes have rarely been lower.
By: Allison Fedirka

The COVID-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine, the current energy crisis and the looming economic recession are disrupting the geopolitical world order, even in places like the Western Hemisphere that were once thought to be comparatively immutable. Driving the process is, unsurprisingly, the United States, whose interests there remain unchanged but whose strategy for pursuing them has become more flexible. Nowhere is this more apparent than in Venezuela. Rumors of sanctions relief are circulating among U.S. policymakers, think tanks and investors, and White House officials claim new policies are under review, even as they insist no changes are in the offing.

The U.S. understands that it needs to revitalize its relationships in the Western Hemisphere. Geography dictates that U.S. security and prosperity depend largely on the relative well-being of its neighbors, an interdependent system predicated on the notion that hemispheric stability enables Washington to project power globally. The inroads U.S. competitors such as China and Russia have made in Latin America over the past few decades threaten to upend that stability. The U.S. National Security Strategy released last week acknowledged as much, so it only makes sense for Washington to reassess its ties with a country like Venezuela, which has been estranged from Washington for much of the 21st century and under the influence of China and Russia accordingly.

Incentives

Of course, Latin America has been experiencing political and ideological changes of its own. For a generation after the Cold War, the region was characterized by a fairly simple political alliance system: Democratic, free-market governments continued to align with the U.S. while governments with a more populist approach to governance and economic policy aligned with more autocratic regimes like Russia and China. Citizens and governments alike eventually concluded that this failed to meet their needs, so a new political blueprint emerged, one that allowed governments to pursue a more pragmatic economic policy and a foreign policy divorced from political ideology.

The circumstances within and without Latin America mean that the political costs for mending ties with otherwise estranged regimes have rarely been lower, while the incentives for new partnerships are all in place: for the U.S., a weak China and Russia, a need to stem northbound migration, the urgency of near-shoring for supply chain security, and greater cooperation in energy and food security; for many Latin American countries, a strong strategic partner in these trying and potentially more difficult economic times.

Washington’s success will depend partly on how flexible it is willing and able to be. For most of its history and especially since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has approached Latin America ideologically, seemingly prioritizing things like democratic values and moral obligation – which has limited who it engages in the region and how it engages them. But a newfound sense of flexibility has opened for Washington and the Cuban regime to reengage on select issues of common interest, and there is evidence that something similar is slowly and measuredly underway with Venezuela. Earlier this year, certain sanctions were eased to facilitate Chevron’s relationship with state-owned oil company PDVSA (even if nothing drastically changed Venezuela’s access to and engagement in international markets). In September, the Maduro government handed over wanted criminals to the U.S., while Washington cut a $367 million check to the Maduro government to help aid migrant flows. But perhaps the most telling development came early this month, when Venezuela released seven imprisoned U.S. citizens in exchange for two Venezuelans held in the U.S. Their release occurred roughly three months after the president of Venezuela’s National Assembly, Jorge Rodriguez, received a U.S. delegation that included its chief hostage negotiator, Roger Carstens.

Alignment

There are other potential areas of cooperation. One is the current energy crisis. The Maduro government needs to rescue its economy. It can’t do that without rehabilitating its oil industry, it can’t rehabilitate the oil industry without greater access to investment and international markets, and it can’t get access to either if it is still an American adversary. The U.S. government needs more reliable energy partners down the road. Demand for oil isn’t going down, and Washington has learned time and again the dangers of having Saudi Arabia and Russia be the arbiters of energy markets.

Another is hemispheric security. Colombia – a stalwart U.S. ally in the region – figures prominently in U.S. hemispheric security, thanks to its location along the southern rim of the Caribbean basin. Colombia’s most pressing national interests – stemming the flow of Venezuelan migrants and reducing insecurity caused by guerrilla groups – require the Colombian government to improve its relationship with Venezuela. Colombia thus reopened its border with Venezuela and requested President Nicolas Maduro to serve as guarantor in peace talks between Bogota and anti-government rebels. Maduro agreed. (Caracas’ buy-in is essential because Venezuela often shelters many of the rebel groups Bogota needs to make peace with.) Put simply, if the U.S. wants to maintain ties with Colombia, it needs to get on board with the Colombia-Venezuela rapprochement.

ELN and Other Guerrilla Presence in Colombia and Venezuela
(click to enlarge)

A third is immigration. The pandemic wreaked havoc on Latin American economics, and the return of almost-normal travel patterns resulted in an influx of migrants along the U.S.-Mexican border. Though the exodus of Venezuelans did not affect the U.S. initially, there has since been a notable increase in the number of Venezuelans reaching U.S. borders, many by land routes through Central America and Mexico. From October 2021 to August 2022, U.S. border officials picked up over 150,000 Venezuelans, more than three times higher than in the previous year. Unsurprisingly, the status of Venezuelans has recently been integrated into U.S.-Mexico cooperation mechanisms for migration border enforcement. (Notably, Mexico has said easing sanctions on Venezuela would do more to fight immigration than mere border enforcement.)

Venezuelan Migration Through Central America
(click to enlarge)

Naturally, this apparent alignment of interests between the U.S. and Venezuela has called into question the standing of the Venezuelan opposition. Over the past four years, Washington has softly backed away from its support for opposition forces led by Juan Guaido. Since declaring a parallel government in early 2019, the opposition has failed to gain control of government institutions and economic centers and has lost the faith of many public supporters. These days, the U.S. has been dangling the prospect of sanctions relief to both the government and the opposition to encourage them to break their political impasse and find a way to hold free and fair elections. (This looser backing of the Venezuelan opposition also puts the U.S. in closer alignment with other regional players like Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Peru and to a lesser extent Brazil and Ecuador that do not support the inclusion of Venezuelan opposition groups in formal regional affairs.)

Immigration and hemispheric security may not be major concerns for Venezuela, but they are pressure points for the U.S. that could compel Washington to rethink its stance on Venezuela. There's also a clear shared interest on the energy issue and a common desire for improved economic conditions. One way of laying the groundwork for these conditions is by lifting sanctions, which would have an obvious economic benefit for Venezuela and, for the U.S., could discourage illicit activities and migrants from heading to its southern border. Given the alignment of interests and geopolitical incentives for both the U.S. and the Maduro regime, the prospect of the U.S. easing sanctions on Venezuela in the coming weeks or months is not unreasonable

[DougMacG]

Strengthening Venezuela with Madura in charge is a no-win situation.  And since when is this administration concerned with who comes across our southern border?  Did the arrival of illegals on Martha's Vineyard get their attention?

Examine the Biden logic.  Shut down a pipeline from Alberta Canada, tank the Canadian dollar, then help the oppressive, totalitarian regime of Chavez-Maduro rebuild the wealth and strength of the regime.  What could go wrong.

[Crafty_Dog]

Venezuela Seeks to Leverage U.S. Energy Needs to Free Iran's Super-Influencer
by Maria Zuppello
Special to IPT News
November 29, 2022

https://www.investigativeproject.org/9290/venezuela-seeks-to-leverage-us-energy-needs-to

[Crafty_Dog]

Iran and Venezuela. Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi met with Venezuela’s new ambassador to Tehran. As Washington moves toward a rapprochement with Caracas, Raisi said the U.S.’ aim is to gain access to Venezuela’s energy resources and wealth. Iran and Venezuela have significantly increased bilateral cooperation over the past year, but Venezuela’s willingness to normalize relations with the U.S. may hinder attempts at further consolidation.