Author Topic: US-Africa  (Read 13851 times)

DougMacG

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US-Africa
« on: February 17, 2008, 04:47:30 PM »
A largely untold story that Bush brought to light with his current trip there...

http://www.heritage.org/Research/Africa/wm1817.cfm

February 15, 2008
President Bush's Trip to Africa:
Solidifying U.S. Partnerships with the Region
by Brett D. Schaefer and Anthony B. Kim

President George W. Bush is scheduled to embark today on his second trip to Africa. The five-day visit includes stops in Benin, Tanzania, Rwanda, Ghana, and Liberia and will promote significant Bush Administration initiatives that address HIV/AIDS; combat terrorism; and promote development, good governance, and economic freedom in Africa. Indeed, the Bush Administration has demonstrated unprecedented attention and dedication to the region, including creating the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR); increasing U.S. official development assistance to sub-Saharan Africa fourfold; offering a new, more effective way to provide development assistance in the Millennium Challenge Corporation; and setting up a new combatant command dedicated to Africa.

President Bush's trip is the culmination of seven years of efforts to improve U.S. relations and create trade and development partnerships with African nations. These efforts have generated real improvements in the region. A great deal more can be achieved in the coming years, and America should continue to play a leading role in helping African nations take the steps necessary to improve economic growth and development and in expanding partnerships in the region.

In a contentious election year, Africa is an issue on which there is substantial agreement and significant potential for cooperation between Republicans and Democrats. The President's trip is a well-timed effort to emphasize the strides that have been made. Congress should work with the President to ensure that his initiatives continue to succeed beyond 2008.

Real Outcomes from America's Successful Engagement with Africa

Africa no longer sits on the margin of U.S. foreign policy interests. U.S engagement with the region has been moving increasingly toward closer ties as Washington "recognizes the evolutionary change the continent is undergoing."[1] President Bush has met more African heads of state than any other U.S. President. He "has focused on ways to reshape the landscape and reframe the debate" on U.S. policy towards Africa with "emphasis on partnership and cooperation" that can produce positive, measurable results. [2] In recent years, the U.S. has successfully partnered with many African nations to combat the spread of disease, encourage economic development and growth, and elevate the stature of the region as a priority in U.S. foreign and national security policy.

Helping Africa Fight Diseases. The HIV/AIDS pandemic and other diseases like malaria and tuberculosis have undermined economic progress in Africa, threatening people's livelihoods and productivity, lowering life expectancy, and increasing child mortality. Recognizing the grave challenge that disease presents to the continent, President Bush has made fighting HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis a priority for his Administration.

The most prominent effort is the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, more commonly known as PEPFAR. Announced in 2003, the five-year, $15 billion initiative is the largest commitment by any country for an international health program dedicated to a single disease. While PEPFAR is global in scope, it has a strong focus on Africa: Twelve of the 15 focus countries are located there, including Botswana, Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.[3]

PEPFAR included among its original goals providing treatment to 2 million people infected with HIV; preventing 7 million new infections; and providing care for 10 million persons, including orphans and at-risk children.[4] Over the past five years, the program has made it possible for 1.4 million people in Africa to receive life-saving treatment,[5] with a special emphasis on preventing infant infections. In his 2008 State of the Union Address, President Bush urged Congress to double funding for the program to $30 billion over the next five years to treat 2.5 million people; fund prevention efforts for 12 million people; and provide care for another 12 million, including 5 million orphans or vulnerable children.[6]

In addition to PEPFAR, the five-year, $1.2 billion President's Malaria Initiative, which aims to halve the mortality rate of the disease over five years in 15 African countries, has brought real benefits to people in Africa. Through public-private partnerships, more than 6 million insecticide-treated bed nets are being distributed, and about 25 million people have already benefited from them.[7] The U.S. has also been the largest donor to multilateral efforts to combat disease, including providing more than 27 percent of funds for the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.[8] Congress should support the President's efforts to combat disease in Africa, as these programs have demonstrated significant achievements.

Partnering with Africa for Economic Growth and Development. In parallel with PEPFAR and the Malaria Initiative, the Bush Administration dramatically increased U.S. assistance to sub-Saharan Africa and created the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) in 2004. The MCC administers the Millennium Challenge Account, an innovative approach to providing U.S. development assistance to sub-Saharan Africa.

From 2000 to 2006, the United States doubled its development assistance to $21.5 billion and quadrupled its development assistance to sub-Saharan Africa to $5.6 billion.[9] The U.S. is also the world's leading provider of humanitarian and food assistance, which has saved millions of lives in Africa and elsewhere. In 2006, the U.S. provided more than $3 billion in humanitarian assistance in more than 50 countries and more than $2 billion in food aid in 82 developing countries.[10]

However, the Bush Administration recognizes that the level of aid funding is not necessarily a measure of effectiveness. Despite hundreds of billions of dollars in foreign assistance, most African countries are little better off today than they were decades ago.

The bulk of economic evidence shows that, while there may be a role for assistance and donor nations, the key to development lies in the hands of the governments of developing countries. African countries must first remove obstacles to development by adopting policies that bolster free markets and entrepreneurship, good governance, and the rule of law. These conclusions closely adhere to the evidence provided in the Index of Economic Freedom, an annual study by The Heritage Foundation and The Wall Street Journal that looks into countries' economic policies to measure their level of economic freedom and finds that, "in pursuing sustainable prosperity, both the direction of policy and commitment to economic freedom are important."[11]

Based on this understanding, the Bush Administration proposed a new way of providing development assistance that encourages recipients to adopt sound economic policies. The MCC targets assistance toward low-income and lower-middle-income countries with a demonstrable record of investing in people and promoting policies that bolster economic growth and the rule of law. The overarching goal is to help countries graduate from the need for foreign assistance.

Over the past four years, the MCC has created remarkable policy reform competition, known as "the MCC effect," among countries that wish to qualify for an MCC "compact agreement" or a "threshold program."[12] By increasing transparency in compiling and disseminating economic statistics and competing with each other for MCC grants, these countries have been motivated to pursue real policy improvements.

The reforms brought about by "the MCC effect" have encouraged entrepreneurial activities and created more favorable conditions for economic growth and development. Of the MCC's 16 compact agreements, nine are with African nations, including three of the five countries on the President's trip (Benin, Tanzania, and Ghana). The nine African compacts total nearly $3.8 billion, which accounts for 70 percent of the MCC's total grants to date.[13] Additional threshold programs totaling $100 million have been channeled to the seven African countries among the MCC's 18 threshold countries.[14]

To ensure the MCC's mission to "reduce poverty through sustainable economic growth in the developing world," President Bush requested in his fiscal year (FY) 2009 budget $2.23 billion for the MCC, an increase of $680 million over the level enacted for FY 2008.[15] Congress should fulfill this request to ensure the initative's continued success.

Enhancing Economic Growth Through Trade and Investment. Seizing on another powerful anti-poverty tool, the Bush Administration has expanded trade with Africa by opening the U.S. market through the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). Trade and investment flows dwarf official development assistance. For example, in 2006, trade and investment with sub-Saharan Africa from the U.S. alone totaled more than $80 billion. In comparison, total development assistance to sub-Saharan Africa from all donors that year was only $39.9 billion.[16]

Moreover, trade and investment are more effective at promoting economic growth because they directly contribute to private-sector development without a government or nongovernmental organization (NGO) intermediary. In this manner, trade efficiently spurs economic growth, increases entrepreneurial opportunities, and creates new and better-paying jobs.

AGOA, which was enacted in 2000, has been the cornerstone of America's trade and investment policy with sub-Saharan Africa. By encouraging trade and investment, AGOA has helped enable African nations to take advantage of opportunities to improve growth through integration into the global economy.

Through AGOA, many African goods receive zero-tariff access to the U.S. market.[17] In response to these lower costs, two-way trade between the U.S. and Africa has grown by almost 140 percent since the introduction of AGOA, including an increase of more than 90 percent in non-oil/gas trade.[18]

For Africa to benefit fully from trade, however, tariff and non-tariff barriers must be eliminated more broadly. The U.S. has pressed other nations in the World Trade Organization to adopt measures through the Doha Round to remove anti-development practices that inhibit trade between developing countries and between developed and developing countries. As noted by National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley:

    The United States is also seeking to open markets through the Doha Round of trade negotiations. Doha represents a once-in-a-generation opportunity to help millions in the developing world rise above poverty and despair. And the President is committed to concluding an ambitious Doha Round agreement this year.[19]

Congress should support U.S. efforts in the Doha round by agreeing to provide fast track status to the trade reforms resulting from the Doha negotiations.

Recognizing Africa's Increasing Strategic Importance. Africa is no longer a distant region whose instability and problems can be ignored by the U.S. As articulated in the National Security Strategy, the need to expand and ensure America's access to energy resources, prevent the spread of terrorism in weak or failed states, and address transnational health and environmental concerns has transformed Africa from a strategic backwater into a priority region for U.S. economic, political, and military interests. America has become increasingly involved in the region since the end of the Cold War, with more than 20 U.S. military operations in Africa between 1990 and 2000 and another 10 since 2000. These concerns and operations, combined with a rising expectation by many in America and other countries that the U.S. should intervene in internal and regional African conflicts more frequently and actively, make it likely that the U.S. will become more involved in the region in coming years.[20]

In recognition of Africa's rising importance, President Bush announced on February 6, 2007, that the United States will create a new, unified combatant command for Africa (AFRICOM) to oversee security, enhance strategic cooperation, build partnerships, support nonmilitary missions, and conduct military operations as necessary. The unique challenges facing Africa led the Administration to set up a new type of interagency command for the continent. The President made clear that he sees the new command as having more than simply military responsibilities: "The Africa Command will enhance our efforts to bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals of development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth in Africa."[21] The new command will draw heavily from the U.S. State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and other federal bodies for expertise.

Creating an independent command for Africa elevates the foreign policy and national security issues critical to the region in U.S. policy circles. This move is merited by the region's increasing importance to U.S. national and economic security. President Bush has demonstrated foresight in calling for an Africa Command, and Congress should support it.

Conclusion

President Bush's second visit to Africa is an excellent opportunity to highlight the many successful efforts and programs initiated and expanded by the Bush Administration that benefit both the United States and the people of Africa. America's constructive engagement with Africa and the President's appreciation of the region's growing importance should be noted and supported by Congress.

There is substantial agreement by both sides of the political aisle on the need to forge close relations with African countries and work together to promote economic growth, stability, and good governance. Congressional action to support these programs is critical to maintaining America's efforts to replace poverty with prosperity in the continent. Congress should support these initiatives and programs so that America can continue its efforts to guide Africa into a brighter future.
« Last Edit: February 20, 2008, 08:18:17 AM by Crafty_Dog »

Crafty_Dog

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Re: US-Africa
« Reply #1 on: February 20, 2008, 08:27:32 AM »
I must admit that it is quite nice to see our President visit countries where the people seem genuinely warm towards America and towards him.

Many folks in the circles I often hang out in grumble about foreign aid, but my understanding is that on a % of GDP basis it is actually quite low.  Apart from the fuzzies of it all, it occurs to me that for reasons of geo-political good will that American generousity could be a good thing.

Crafty_Dog

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Re: US-Africa
« Reply #2 on: February 21, 2008, 06:08:29 AM »
This from the WSJ could just as easily have gone in the Media Matters thread:

Geldof Praises Bush
February 20, 2008
President Bush is visiting Africa, and the Washington Times's Fishwrap blog reports he is being joined by Bob Geldof, "an Irish rock and roll singer and longtime social activist who has helped, along with U2 rocker Bono, raise awareness about need in Africa":

Mr. Geldof has remained closely engaged with African affairs since then, and he spoke off the cuff to reporters today who were waiting for a press conference with Mr. Bush and Rwandan President Paul Kagame.
Mr. Geldof praised Mr. Bush for his work in delivering billions to fight disease and poverty in Africa, and blasted the U.S. press for ignoring the achievement.
Mr. Bush, said Mr. Geldof, "has done more than any other president so far."
"This is the triumph of American policy really," he said. "It was probably unexpected of the man. It was expected of the nation, but not of the man, but both rose to the occasion."
"What's in it for [Mr. Bush]? Absolutely nothing," Mr. Geldof said.
Mr. Geldof said that the president has failed "to articulate this to Americans" but said he is also "pissed off" at the press for their failure to report on this good news story.
"You guys didn't pay attention," Geldof said to a group of reporters from all the major newspapers.
Apparently they still aren't paying attention. Apart from the Times, the only press reference we could find to Geldof's comments was an editorial in the conservative Investor's Business Daily.

For the past 2½ years or so, we've been hearing endlessly that Americans hate President Bush, that even those who don't hate him disapprove of him, that even those who don't disapprove of him are tired of him, and that his presidency is an unqualified failure. Now comes a surprising dissent from that view, and hardly anyone pays attention. It's a man-bites-dog story, but the press corps looks more like a herd of sheep.

Crafty_Dog

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WSJ: Sudan
« Reply #3 on: December 13, 2009, 12:38:23 PM »
In his Oslo address Thursday, President Obama mulled the trade-offs in dealing with repressive regimes. "There's no simple formula here," he said. "But we must try as best we can to balance isolation and engagement, pressure and incentives, so that human rights and dignity are advanced over time."

From Nobel theory, we move to practice in Sudan. As a candidate, Mr. Obama stood with the human rights champions of Darfur and pledged tougher sanctions and a possible no-fly zone if a Sudanese regime infamous for genocide didn't shape up. His tone has changed in office.

Unveiled in October, the Administration's Sudan policy emphasized carrots for the regime to ease up in Darfur and implement a peace deal in southern Sudan; any sticks were relegated to a secret annex. The President's special envoy to Sudan, retired Major General Scott Gration, was reluctant even to allude to tougher sanctions. He said that "cookies" and "gold stars" are preferable to threats and that Darfur was experiencing only "remnants of genocide."

President Omar al-Bashir, whose Islamist National Congress Party took power in a 1989 coup, got the message and decided to test the limits of this new indulgence. Almost immediately the regime hardened its stance on implementing the peace accord. Brokered by the Bush Administration in 2005, the deal calls for political reforms, including free parliamentary elections now scheduled for April, and a referendum on independence for the south in two years. Long before the ethnic cleansing in Darfur turned into a Hollywood cause célèbre, a two-decade war between the Muslim north and the Christian and oil-rich south took two million lives.

On Monday, police in the capital Khartoum beat and arrested opposition leaders who were pressing parliament to adopt the necessary laws to hold the April elections. Time is running out to pass them. The Bashir regime now refuses to overhaul the national security and criminal laws as also stipulated in the 2005 deal. Its recalcitrance means the election and referendum, assuming both come off, would be tainted. This could in turn end up restarting the civil war.

At the same time, the preference for diplomacy over pressure has encouraged the hard men in Khartoum to stoke the flames in Darfur, ignoring an arms embargo and challenging the U.N.-African Union peacekeeping force there.

In the man-bites-dog story of the year, the U.N. last week took the Obama Administration to task over its lax efforts to enforce the arms embargo, while praising the Bush Administration. "In contrast to that leadership of 2004 and 2005, the United States appears to have now joined the group of influential states who sit by quietly and do nothing to ensure that sanctions protect Darfurians," Enrico Carisch, who was the top U.N. investigator of violations of the arms embargo until October, said in written testimony before a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on Africa.

The Sudanese aren't even the hardest of cases. Concerted American pressure forced this regime to cut ties with al Qaeda in the 1990s, end aerial bombing and support for slave-hunting militias in the south and accept the 2005 peace deal.

Mr. Obama can summon up tough rhetoric. "Yes, there will be engagement; yes, there will be diplomacy—but there must be consequences when those things fail," he said in Oslo. But the world's rogues might be forgiven for missing the nuances. So far, they've seen only the engaging side of this American President.

bigdog

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Thoughts on ease of overthrow of governments in Africa
« Reply #4 on: November 27, 2012, 06:56:09 AM »
http://themonkeycage.org/blog/2012/11/23/the-unbelievable-lightness-of-some-african-states/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+themonkeycagefeed+%28The+Monkey+Cage%29

From the article:

What is striking and surprising here is just how easy it can be to take over some African states, or large parts of them.  The post-independence historical record provides numerous examples where dozens or a few hundred armed men have done it.  This is generally just assumed to be the way things are in Africa, but when you think about it it is actually really puzzling.  Being the president in African countries (and many others besides) can be an incredibly lucrative deal.  Why don’t these rulers, in their own self-interest, take some of that money and use it to build crack units, presidential guards, or strong and loyal army divisions that would protect their hold on power against two dozen putchists, or a hundred or a couple thousand rebels armed with rifles and maybe some mortars?
« Last Edit: November 27, 2012, 07:53:28 AM by Crafty_Dog »

Crafty_Dog

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WSJ: Americans at War in Africa
« Reply #5 on: October 07, 2013, 08:11:13 AM »
Americans at War in Africa
Two weekend raids show al Qaeda is a long way from defeated.


The tide of war against al Qaeda is expanding, as two weekend raids by U.S. commandos illustrate. The raids show the skill and reach of American special forces, but also the enduring nature of this conflict with Islamists and the need to counter its African expansion.

Special forces and U.S. intelligence scored a major victory in snatching Abu Anas al-Libi outside his home in Tripoli in Libya. Al-Libi is wanted as one of the plotters behind the 1998 bombing of U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania that killed 224 and injured more than 4,000 innocents. The al Qaeda leader had resettled in Tripoli after the fall of Moammar Gadhafi, taking advantage of the new government's weakness.
[image] Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

This image provided by the FBI shows Abu Anas al-Libi on their wanted list October 5, 2013.

Al-Libi ought to be an intelligence gold mine if the Obama Administration is willing to extract it. U.S. officials are saying he is likely to be tried eventually in U.S. criminal court. But for now he is probably on a U.S. Navy vessel, where he can be interrogated safe from American civilian due process.

Al-Libi ought to be brought to Guantanamo as an illegal enemy combatant and tried by military commission. But it apparently offends the Obama Administration's political sensibilities less to keep captured killers on board a ship for weeks instead. That's also how the Administration dealt with Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame, a Somali member of al Qaeda who was captured in April 2011 and kept incommunicado at sea for some two months. Secret prison, anyone?

The benefit of capturing such men, as opposed to firing a missile from a drone, is to gain intelligence to stop future attacks. The Obama Administration has captured very few al Qaeda operatives and as a result we know less than we should about the ways that al Qaeda is decentralizing and expanding in Africa. Let's hope it doesn't offer al-Libi a Miranda warning.

Navy SEALs were less successful in a raid on the al-Shabaab branch of al Qaeda in Somalia. They withdrew after taking fire and as a precaution against causing civilian casualties. The U.S. hoped to capture a leader of al-Shabaab, which carried out last month's attack on a shopping mall in Nairobi that killed at least 69 people.

Success or not, the Obama Administration deserves credit for undertaking both raids. These are high-risk missions and not every one will work as well as the grab in Tripoli. But it's vital to U.S. security to take these risks. We learned on 9/11 that terrorists can strike the U.S. if they are allowed to create sanctuaries even half a world away.

The Administration has seemed reluctant to act forcefully against al Qaeda in Africa lest it undermine President Obama's claim that the terror network is defeated. The raids are a tacit admission that Mr. Obama has been overselling victory, but we're nonetheless glad to see the U.S. going back on offense.

=====================

stratfor


Summary

The two U.S. special operations forces raids to capture high-value targets in Libya and Somalia both occurred on Oct. 5 but do not seem to have been directly connected. The operations were most likely the consequences of distinct intelligence efforts, and their timing so close together was incidental. Still, the operations illustrate that while the United States is avoiding larger and longer engagements, the use of limited special operations with smaller dispersed footprints and specific targets continues.
Analysis

The target of the operation in Tripoli, the Libyan capital, was Nazih Abdul-Hamed al-Ruqai, also known as Abu Anas al-Libi. He has been sought by the United States for his involvement in the 1998 embassy attacks in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam and was one of the original names on the FBI's Most Wanted Terrorists list when it was created in October 2001. Apart from his role in the embassy attacks, al-Libi had been tied to the al Qaeda core since its relocation to Sudan in 1994, having operated close to Osama bin Laden. That Washington has a solid legal case against al-Libi made his capture a more attractive option than killing him with a drone strike in a populated city.

After the 1998 attacks in East Africa, al-Libi lived in the United Kingdom for some time, where he avoided prosecution due to a lack of evidence. He finally fled to Afghanistan in 2000 before law enforcement teams raided his house. After the 9/11 attacks and the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, al-Libi allegedly escaped to Iran, only to return to Libya in 2010, prior to the Libyan civil war that led to the end of Moammar Gadhafi's rule. Al-Libi likely took advantage of the amnesty offered to jihadists by the Gadhafi regime, managed by the former dictator's son, Seif al-Islam.

Al-Libi has been known to associate with several organizations that were involved in Libya's civil war, although he did not seem to be involved in al Qaeda in East Africa's operations. Given U.S. activities in Libya, especially increased intelligence gathering after the September 2012 attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, al-Libi had probably been under surveillance. With the decimation of the core al Qaeda group, al-Libi was likely trying to either stay below the radar in Libya, or to pursue his jihadist ambitions to the extent possible, especially with the opportunities provided in post-Gadhafi Libya. He was probably still attempting to establish an operational base by navigating local militias. That he got caught suggests that he failed to develop an infrastructure or to latch on to an existing one. This should not be a surprise since the scale of jihadism in Libya is much smaller than in other places.

A separate, failed raid took place earlier Oct. 5 in the coastal Somali town of Baraawe, which is still under the control of al Shabaab. The raid targeted Abdulkadir Mohamed Abdulkadir, commonly known as Ikrima, a leader of Kenyan terrorist group al-Hijra, also known as the Muslim Youth Center. The group is affiliated with al Shabaab, having openly pledged allegiance to them, and has been implicated in a series of bombings in Nairobi as well as the recruitment of youths in Kenya to join al Shabaab in Somalia.

The attempt to capture Ikrima came two weeks after the Westgate Mall attack in Nairobi, an attack that involved both al Shabaab and al-Hijra. Ikrima allegedly arranged safe houses and equipment for the militants who attacked the mall. His capture would have removed an important operative from al-Hijra, disrupting the group's ability to plan attacks in Kenya, while also eliminating an important backer of Ahmad Abdi Godane's transnationalist faction within al Shabaab. The consolidation of al Shabaab's leadership after Godane's attempts to weed out opponents has resulted in a stricter hierarchy that could be easier to disrupt. The capture of Ikrima could also have delivered useful intelligence on the whereabouts or activities of other important al Shabaab militants.

Both targets have indirect or past links to the al Qaeda in East Africa network, but their activities have never been directly connected, and it is unlikely that the raids, despite occurring on the same day, were related. It is more likely that the raids occurred together because of the availability of intelligence and operational constraints.

« Last Edit: October 07, 2013, 08:32:40 AM by Crafty_Dog »

Crafty_Dog

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WSJ: The African Terror Front
« Reply #6 on: March 15, 2016, 06:13:13 PM »
The African Terror Front
The threat is spreading faster than Western efforts to contain it.
March 15, 2016 7:28 p.m. ET
11 COMMENTS

Americans have long associated the fight against Islamist terrorism with the Middle East, as Sunday’s attack in the Turkish capital of Ankara reminds us. But that geographical horizon is also increasingly out of date. Witness the expanding grip of jihadists in Africa—and the Obama Administration’s belated but increasingly urgent attempts to fight it.

This is apparent from the March 5 air strike, by manned and unmanned U.S. planes, on an al Shabaab training camp in Somalia that killed an estimated 150 terrorists. Four days later U.S. Special Forces assisted the Somali military in taking down another Shabaab camp. In both cases Pentagon officials cited intelligence suggesting an imminent threat of attacks by the al Qaeda-allied group, whose name means “the youth.”

Ostensibly, U.S. Special Forces are in Somalia to train and assist the African Union Mission in Somalia, or Amisom, which helps Somalia’s federal government. Shabaab is a menace to all of East Africa, with outrages including the 2013 attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi and last year’s rampage at Kenya’s Garissa College that massacred 148 Christian students.

But Shabaab is also a menace to the West. A Shabaab member tried to kill Danish cartoonist Kurt Westergaard in 2010 with an ax in revenge for drawing the prophet Mohammed. Shirwa Ahmed of Minneapolis became the first known American suicide bomber when he drove a truck bomb into a Somali government compound, killing 20. An estimated 40 U.S. citizens have traveled to Somalia to join Shabaab, which has called for attacks on U.S. shopping malls. If Islamic State can radicalize the San Bernardino killers from afar, Shabaab can do the same.
Al Shabaab militants parade new recruits after arriving in Mogadishufrom their training camp south of the capital on October 21, 2010. ENLARGE
Al Shabaab militants parade new recruits after arriving in Mogadishufrom their training camp south of the capital on October 21, 2010. Photo: feisal omar/Reuters

The Obama Administration has sent 300 troops to Cameroon to fight the Islamist terrorists of Boko Haram in neighboring Nigeria, and it’s an open secret that the U.S. operates a drone base in Garoua in northern Cameroon. A U.S. air strike last month near the Libyan city of Sabratha killed an Islamic State leader and 48 terrorist comrades, and the Pentagon is reported to be drawing up plans for a broader air campaign against Islamic State in Libya.

In 2013 the U.S. set up a drone base in Niger, which has borders with Nigeria, Algeria, Mali and Libya—all of which have had major jihadist uprisings. Niger may become particularly important in the fight against a resurgent al Qaeda in the Maghreb, which has recently perpetrated attacks on Western targets in Burkina Faso, Mali and, on Sunday, in the Ivory Coast.

Altogether, the U.S. operates surveillance flights from about 12 small sites in Africa. Camp Lemonnier, in Djibouti, the only permanent U.S. base in Africa, is home to several thousand personnel. The question is whether this is enough.

The Bush Administration established the U.S. Africa Command in 2007 as one of the Pentagon’s six geographic combatant commands, but it is still only 2,000 military, civilian and contractor personnel, most stationed in Germany. If you judge by his recent interviews, President Obama considers his intervention in Libya to be the biggest mistake of his Presidency, and the White House has resisted calls to launch major strikes on Islamic State’s Libya bases.

The risk here—as with the Administration’s half-hearted antiterror fights in Yemen, Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan—is that the U.S will keep playing catch up against a threat growing faster than we can destroy or even contain it. The U.S. treated Boko Haram as mostly a local threat until it pledged allegiance to Islamic State last year. Then-U.N. Ambassador Susan Rice dismissed French pleas to act until Mali was nearly overrun by al Qaeda; it was saved thanks to François Hollande’s decision to send troops.

The U.S. can’t counter every potential terrorist threat in Africa, but that doesn’t mean it can’t do more. An aggressive campaign against Islamic State-controlled territory in Libya would remove a clear danger to Africa and Europe and signal that the U.S. won’t tolerate terrorist groups seeking statelets of their own. Strikes against Shabaab in Somalia and Boko in Nigeria would strengthen legitimate governments.

All of this requires greater resources—a reminder that global security depends on a well-funded U.S. military with the ships, planes and manpower to meet current and emerging threats. That’s a far cry from what Mr. Obama will bequeath his successor, who will have to rebuild America’s strengths lest the Mideasternization of Africa become a template for the spread of jihad everywhere





Crafty_Dog

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Stratfor: West Africa's coup contagion
« Reply #11 on: February 07, 2022, 03:10:57 PM »
Putting West Africa’s ‘Coup Contagion’ in Context
undefined and Stratfor sub-Saharan Africa Analyst at RANE
Clara Brackbill
Stratfor sub-Saharan Africa Analyst at RANE, Stratfor
8 MIN READFeb 7, 2022 | 22:31 GMT





Demonstrators in Ouagadougou, Mali, hold up photos of military leaders Assimi Goita (who seized power for the second time in a May 2021 coup) and Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba to show support for the country’s junta on Jan. 25, 2022.
Demonstrators in Ouagadougou, Mali, hold up photos of military leaders Assimi Goita (who seized power for the second time in a May 2021 coup) and Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba to show support for the country’s junta on Jan. 25, 2022.

(OLYMPIA DE MAISMONT/AFP via Getty Images)

The lackluster international response to the wave of coups sweeping West Africa may encourage opportunistic military leaders to overthrow fragile governments elsewhere in the region, but internal dynamics lay the groundwork for military coups. In West Africa, this means other states are at risk of military takeovers and the resulting security and financing challenges. On Feb. 1, less than a week after military forces successfully seized Burkina Faso’s government, reports of gunfire near a compound where Guinea-Bissau’s president was holding a meeting set off alarm bells that yet another coup was underway in West Africa, which has seen five successful government takeovers in the past year and a half. Security forces ultimately quashed the attempt to overthrow the Bissau-Guinean government, but the incident nonetheless added to growing fears of a “coup contagion” in the region: During his opening address at a summit of West African leaders to discuss Burkina Faso’s military takeover, Nana Akufo-Addo — president of Ghana and current chairman of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) — said on Feb. 3 that Mali’s August 2020 coup had been “contagious” by prompting subsequent coups in neighboring Guinea and Burkina Faso.

Since August 2020, military forces have seized control of the governments in Chad, Mali, Guinea and Burkina Faso, inciting claims by regional leaders that West Africa is in the midst of a “coup season”:

In August 2020, a group of colonels in Mali ousted President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita and subsequently agreed to a civilian-led 18 month transitional period before elections. But in May 2021, military leaders clashed with the interim president and carried out a second putsch. The current junta, led by Colonel Assimi Goita, recently announced that it will delay elections until 2026. In response to the election delay, ECOWAS severed diplomatic ties with Mali and imposed a series of sanctions.
Chad is a unique case. After President Idriss Deby was killed visiting troops in the north in April 2021, a military council dissolved parliament, which was supposed to assume power in the event of the president’s death. Deby’s son, General Mahamat Idriss Deby, was named interim president and — backed by parliament — is currently leading Chad through an 18-month transitional period. France has thrown its support behind Deby since the transition.
In Guinea, a special forces commander Colonel Mamady Doumbouya led a coup against President Alpha Conde on Sept. 5 following backlash against Conde’s efforts to change the constitution in order to circumvent term limits and run for a third term. ECOWAS has since suspended Guinea’s membership in the bloc and imposed sanctions on the country.
On Jan. 25, a military coalition in Burkina Faso led by Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Damiba toppled President Roch Kabore. ECOWAS suspended Burkina Faso’s membership in the bloc, but has not imposed sanctions.
Although ECOWAS and the European Union have implemented sanctions regimes against some of the new military juntas, the measures have not elicited compliance, which limits their deterrent effect. The external response to recent West African junta actions has varied widely, falling far short of the resounding pro-democracy message that several regional leaders have advocated for. The ECOWAS and EU sanctions imposed following Mali’s recent election delay have marked the most severe response, followed by the similar ECOWAS sanctions package levied against Guinea’s coup leaders in late 2021. But although these sanctions have inflicted financial pain on both countries and their citizens, neither junta has acquiesced to the bloc’s demands for a swift return to civilian rule or given any indication that sanctions will compel them to participate in negotiations. Chad and Burkina Faso’s coups, by contrast, didn’t trigger any sanctions. The result of this disjointed and lackluster response is low deterrence — meaning opportunist military leaders already considering political overthrows in other African nations are unlikely to reconsider based purely on the threat of inciting regional and international repercussions.

Following the announcement that Mali’s election timetable would be delayed until 2026, ECOWAS (and later the European Union) halted financial flows, instituted border closures and froze state assets. The sanctions have since led to widespread shortages of goods and increased prices in Mali. On Feb. 2, the country’s finance ministry also said it wouldn’t be able to meet two treasury bond payment deadlines, citing Mali’s severed economic ties with West African and European countries. But despite the economic fallout, the junta has given no indication that it plans to hasten the path to elections. In Guinea, a similar sequence of events transpired, culminating in sanctions against coup leaders and their families and still no election timeline.
Following the coup in Burkina Faso, the European Union, the African Union and the United Nations have only verbally condemned the takeover. ECOWAS also suspended the country’s membership, but delegates from the regional bloc are in negotiations with junta leaders over an electoral timeline).
International observers did not sanction Chad following the coup.
Internal factors, including economic hardship, turbulent political legacies and fractured military forces, lay the foundation for opportunistic military leaders to carry out political overthrows. Of the five recent coups, each is unique in its context and drivers. Nonetheless, three similarities permeate each case. According to peer-reviewed academic studies, the probability of a government overthrow is significantly influenced by economic well-being, with highly impoverished countries more likely to experience coups than wealthy countries. Countries that have previously experienced a coup are also at greater risk (meaning a nation that has experienced a military takeover in its history is more likely to experience it again). And countries with a more disjointed security apparatus are more likely to experience military putsches as well. All three of these factors apply to each of the West African countries that have seen coups since August 2020. Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Mali are among the poorest nations in the world. They have also all experienced coups prior to 2020. And each of the recent overthrows in these countries occurred at the hands of internal security forces, highlighting the significance of internal military fissures.


Given the prevalence of these commonalities and the lack of effective international deterrence measures, some West African leaders may respond to threats with outsized force in the hopes of staving off a potential assault on their power. Recent takeovers have many West African leaders looking over their shoulders, attempting to shore up domestic support so that theirs is not the next country in political turmoil. This will likely compel heads of state to meet dissent — whether from opposition parties, members of their security establishment or otherwise — with more force than they might otherwise under regular circumstances. The use of such outsized force against dissenters, however, could backfire by raising the risk of an overthrow rather than lowering it.

The recent surge in military takeovers and the potential for more means that the region will struggle to defend itself against ongoing insurgencies and may face financial repercussions. Mali and Burkina Faso’s newly crowned junta leaders will likely struggle to contain the jihadist insurgencies in their countries, just as their predecessors did. But, unlike their predecessors, Malian and Burkinabe coup leaders may not have access to the same regional and international security support due to the manner in which they seized power and/or refusal to adhere to election timetables. If militant groups operating in Mali and Burkina Faso are able to expand their spheres of influence and ramp up the frequency and intensity of attacks, their increased capabilities could result in attacks in relatively stable states along West Africa’s coast, like Ghana and Ivory Coast. Both Ghana and Ivory Coast have seen attacks in shared border areas with Mali and Burkina Faso, but have so far been able to protect their interiors and capitals from major violence. This, however, could change if the regional security situation deteriorates further. Additionally, countries in the region that have previously experienced high investor confidence could suffer from a downturn in interest if the international community perceives West Africa as unstable. Ghana has been historically viewed as West Africa’s investment hub, but regional instability (along with the country’s rising debt problem) could jeopardize that status.

Niger is particularly at risk of becoming the site of West Africa’s next coup. While a few regional states suffer from relatively high poverty rates, tumultuous histories and low-intensity dissonance within their security forces, Niger stands out as particularly high risk for a military uprising. On top of extremely high poverty rates and a history of violent revolts, the Nigerien security forces are deeply divided along ethnic fissures. While the combination of these factors does not guarantee that President Mohamed Bazoum will be overthrown, it does mean that the risk to his administration is heightened.

Niger has the fourth lowest GDP per capita in the world, and a poverty rate well above those of Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Mali.
Since independence in 1960, Niger has had four coups. In March 2021, security forces attempted and failed to overthrow civilian president Mahamadou Issoufou, two days before he handed power to current President Mohamed Bazoum.
Niger’s population is composed of several ethnic groups — the largest of which is the Hausa, which makes up 56% of the population, followed by Zarma-Songhai (22%), Tuareg (8%) and many other smaller groups. Although several administrations have tried to create a national identity within military forces, ethnic tensions — particularly between the Tuareg minority and Hausa majority — continue to create deep divisions. Minority groups frequently claim that military appointments are made based on ethnic affiliation.

ccp

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Tunisia
« Reply #12 on: May 07, 2022, 10:26:51 AM »
went from dictatorship to democracy

and back to dictatorship  :-o

https://dnyuz.com/2022/05/07/as-tunisias-democratic-experiment-unravels-economic-collapse-looms/

same old story
corrupt court system , politicians , media , "oligarchs"

and the rest just left to fester

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GPF: Sec Treasury Yellen in Africa
« Reply #13 on: January 16, 2023, 04:56:47 PM »
Africa tour. U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen on Tuesday will embark on a 10-day tour of Africa, where she will meet with officials from Senegal, Zambia and South Africa. The trip will focus on U.S. efforts to expand food security, trade and investment in African countries. It’s seen as a counter to China’s growing presence there and comes after reports that a Chinese apparel company closed its operations in Ethiopia due to losses incurred from Ethiopia’s suspension from the U.S.’ Africa Growth and Opportunity Act. The trip also follows Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang’s own tour of the continent.

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Re: US-Africa
« Reply #15 on: January 30, 2023, 09:26:03 AM »
 :cry: :cry: :cry:


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GPF: US re-engages with Africa
« Reply #17 on: January 05, 2024, 07:26:08 AM »
January 5, 2024
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The US Re-Engages With Africa
Washington is trying to regain ground it lost to Beijing and Moscow.
By: Ronan Wordsworth

After three decades of treating the African continent mostly as an afterthought, the U.S. is adjusting its strategy to curb the growing influence of its biggest rivals. The new approach was detailed in an August 2022 report, “U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa,” which described plans for a more pragmatic Africa policy and greater engagement in the realms of security and economics. Then, in December 2022, U.S. President Joe Biden hosted leaders and senior officials from 49 African countries in Washington. This new U.S. focus on pragmatic engagement across multiple sectors became increasingly evident throughout 2023.

From the Cold War to Wagner

After the first wave of decolonization dislodged European powers from Africa from the mid-1950s until the early 1960s, the global competition between two new superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, cast a shadow over the continent. To contain Soviet influence and communist ideology, the U.S. formed partnerships and provided financial and security aid to friendly African governments as well as groups opposed to pro-Soviet regimes. When the Cold War ended, Africa tumbled down the list of U.S. foreign policy priorities. In most cases where it became involved, Washington tended to stress adherence to Western ideals like democracy, transparency and human rights, which often clashed with the interests of authoritarian African regimes. With Washington offering less but demanding more, growing numbers of Africans questioned whether the U.S. could meet their countries’ needs.

Into this vacuum stepped Russia and China. The Chinese offered investment, but the Russians offered guns. Initially through the mercenary Wagner Group, Russian forces spread in and around the Sahel – in Mali, Burkina Faso, Libya, the Central African Republic and Sudan – and entrenched themselves in the national security infrastructure (not to mention lucrative mining concerns). Western-led efforts to isolate Russia over its February 2022 invasion of Ukraine spurred Moscow to dedicate even more attention and resources to Africa, where friendly governments help Russia resist international political pressure, evade sanctions and threaten U.S. allies in Europe with energy insecurity and mass migration. For the U.S., it was clear that a new strategy was urgently needed.

Trade, Investment and Diplomacy

Outlined during the U.S.-Africa Leaders’ Summit in 2022, the first major change was a U.S. commitment to invest $55 billion in the continent over the next three years. In year one, the U.S. and Africa signed hundreds of deals worth at least $14.2 billion. These included U.S. investments in minor infrastructure projects, local industrial development and green energy projects. Washington also established Prosper Africa, an initiative that connects U.S. and African businesses to facilitate trade and investment.

A potent example of the shifting U.S. policy is in southern Africa, where the U.S. (with EU support) is looking to counter Chinese dominance in the critical minerals sector. For well over a decade (and with minimal competition), Beijing has been snapping up African mineral rights and pouring money into African infrastructure. But now the U.S., through the G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment fund, is trying to catch up. The headline project, the Lobito Corridor, involves building a railway connection between the mineral-rich regions of the southern Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia’s copper belt and Angola. A memorandum of understanding was signed in October, and the African Development Bank promised to help raise $1.6 billion in financing, in addition to contributing $500 million itself. Upon its completion (which U.S. officials claim could be within five years), the corridor will support regional trade and provide an efficient route for the region’s minerals to reach the Atlantic coast and then U.S. and European markets.

Besides trade and investment, Biden administration officials also have traveled frequently to Africa. To name a few, Vice President Kamala Harris visited Ghana, Tanzania and Zambia; First Lady Jill Biden went to Namibia and Kenya; Secretary of State Antony Blinken met with officials in South Africa, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda in August; and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin stopped by Djibouti, Kenya and Angola in September. For the first time in decades, U.S. department heads and bureaucrats were instructed to step up their engagement with the continent.

Bases and Security Assistance

Managing security relationships posed a tougher test, but Washington’s newfound pragmatism is on display here too. When Niger suffered a military coup, the U.S. resisted pressure from allies, particularly France, to condemn the actions of the new junta. Its caution paid off. French military bases in the country were closed and French forces were expelled, while American troops at a U.S. drone base remain. (In another setback for Paris, U.S. mining company Global Atomic has moved into Niger’s uranium mining sector, which was previously dominated by French state mining company Orano.) Even the military junta’s outreach to Russia has not radically changed the U.S. approach.

Another example is the Central African Republic. Through the Wagner Group, the Russian security establishment has tightly bound itself to the regime of President Faustin-Archange Touadera and exerts significant control over the CAR’s economy. However, the government in Bangui evidently has not shut the door on the United States, because it is reportedly in discussions with U.S. military contractor Bancroft on the establishment of a military base. Bancroft would also train CAR forces, protect mining sites and provide security against armed groups in the country. The contractor has extensive experience in Africa and working with the U.S. military, having spent the past decade operating in Somalia, where it supported U.S. and government forces against the al-Shabab terrorist group. Considering this history, U.S. officials were likely aware of the discussions, though they deny having been involved. However, Russian media expressed surprise at the news. Many of the functions Bancroft would provide are already being managed by the Russian military, which has taken over Wagner’s contracts, making the potential deal a direct challenge to Moscow’s influence in Bangui.

After many years of detachment, the U.S. is making Africa a priority again. This is largely in response to China’s maneuvers to control the continent’s strategic minerals and Russia’s attempts to replace Western countries as security providers and to circumvent Western sanctions. The U.S.’ more pragmatic strategy is already bearing fruit, but it is unclear how successful it will be over the longer term.