Author Topic: Latin America  (Read 87595 times)

Crafty_Dog

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Stratfor: Honduras- crisis could fuel migration
« Reply #150 on: June 06, 2019, 04:13:17 AM »
In Honduras, a Political Crisis Could Fuel Migration
A tire fire burns at the doors to the outer entrance of the U.S. Embassy in Tegucigalpa on May 31, 2019.
(ORLANDO SIERRA/AFP/Getty Images)

Highlights

    Government decrees authorizing labor force readjustments in the education and health sectors have sparked ongoing protests against Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernandez.
    The country has few major transportation routes, so even small protests can have an outsized effect on the economy.
    The security situation in Honduras will rapidly deteriorate if the protest wave continues to gain momentum, and the economy will suffer — something that could send more migrants north within months.

Editor's Note: This security-focused assessment is one of many such analyses found at Stratfor Threat Lens, a unique protective intelligence product designed with corporate security leaders in mind. Threat Lens enables industry professionals and organizations to anticipate, identify, measure and mitigate emerging threats to people, assets and intellectual property the world over. Threat Lens is the only unified solution that analyzes and forecasts security risk from a holistic perspective, bringing all the most relevant global insights into a single, interactive threat dashboard.

Protests continued June 5 in various parts of Honduras, including Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula after June 2 incidents in which protesters set fire to 62 trucks and shipping containers on trucks headed to Puerto Castilla for export to the United States, La Prensa reported. In the June 2 incident, protesters closed a bridge on the CA-13 highway, forcing trucks to stop near the village of Guadalupe Carney. On May 31, protesters in the capital of Tegucigalpa burned tires outside the exterior entrance leading to the visa appointment waiting room at the U.S. Embassy. The fire left scorch marks to the exterior stone wall, but did little damage before being extinguished.

The Big Picture

As Honduras nears the 10-year anniversary of the removal of President Manuel Zelaya, its current president, Juan Orlando Hernandez, now sees opposition to his governance surging into the streets. Should the current wave of protests in the Central American country gain momentum and turn into a lengthy insurrection against its president, it could send more Honduran migrants north toward the United States, with implications for that country and its southern neighbor, Mexico.
See Security Challenges in Latin America

Honduran government decrees authorizing labor force readjustments in the education and health sectors drove the protests. But even though Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernandez promised June 3 to reverse them, the protests have spread to a broader cross section of the political left.

These demonstrations are the latest chapter in the long-running series of left-wing protests against the Hernandez government. His government won a highly contested election in November 2017, which the left accused him of rigging. Frequent corruption cases involving the president's associates have dragged down his approval ratings since he took office in 2013, and U.S. law enforcement agencies reportedly are investigating allegations of cocaine trafficking against him.

Demonstrations in Honduras can be highly violent and often involve property damage or loss of life when protesters go after the drivers of vehicles stopped at roadblocks. They have also damaged businesses in marches through San Pedro Sula, Tegucigalpa, El Progreso and La Ceiba.

The security situation in Honduras will rapidly deteriorate if the protest wave continues to gain momentum, and could send more migrants north within months.

The targeting of U.S. interests by left-wing protesters is not surprising given U.S. support for the Hernandez government. Other foreign countries and companies seen as supportive of the government could also be targeted or sustain unintended damage from public unrest. If the demonstrations grow, they could interfere with supply chains and hurt foreign companies with personnel and facilities inside the country. Since the country has few major transportation routes, even relatively small protests can cut off major logistical corridors and lead to food and fuel shortages.

The protests could continue to June 28, the 10th anniversary of the 2009 Honduran coup. They could even gain momentum and turn into a lengthy insurrection against the president. The security situation in Honduras will rapidly deteriorate if the protest wave continues to gain momentum, and could send more migrants north within months. An even more depressed Honduran economy will keep pushing people abroad, and the logical place they would go to find low-wage jobs is the United States. This in turn could prompt the United States to put even more pressure on Mexico, whether in the form of tariffs or other measures, to stem migration from Central America.

Crafty_Dog

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Stratfor: Honduras- crisis could fuel migration 2.0
« Reply #151 on: July 03, 2019, 09:12:48 AM »
Highlights

    Mexico has promised the United States it will reduce the surge in migration across their shared border under threat of U.S. tariffs.
    The number of Hondurans seeking asylum or employment in the United States will likely remain stubbornly high amid persistent political and economic instability there.
    The United States will use any continued migrant surge fueled by Honduran unrest to try to extract concessions from the Mexican government, which will, in turn, try to delay making them — if it can.

Though Central Americans for years have accounted for an increasing percentage of overall migrants crossing the U.S. border illegally, their numbers grew dramatically in early 2019. In May 2019 alone, about 130,000 people were arrested trying to cross the border. The composition of migrant flows also shifted, with the number of individuals in families apprehended at the border by U.S. authorities growing from 105,000 during all of 2018 to almost 330,000 during the first five months of 2019. Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador are currently the main sources of illegal immigration to the United States that pass illegally through Mexico. Honduras is the second-largest source of migrants entering the U.S. illegally.
The Big Picture

A deal in June with Mexico to reduce the number of immigrants crossing illegally into the United States caused the White House to back off from a threat to slap tariffs on imports from Mexico. Under the deal, Mexico agreed to step up its efforts to prevent migrants from crossing its territory to the U.S. border. But with swelling unrest in Honduras likely to worsen the economy and spark more migration through Mexico to the United States, Washington may well return to its tariff threat.

A Migrant Surge Spawns a Tariff Threat

In May, U.S. President Donald Trump threatened to enact tariffs of up to 25 percent on all Mexican imports within months unless Mexico took immediate steps to reduce illegal migration from Central America through its territory. Almost certainly intended as a negotiating tactic to help the Trump administration further its aims on curbing illegal immigration, the threat would have had major consequences for Mexico's economy had tariffs been enacted.

A line graph showing apprehensions at the southern U.S. border

To stave off economic damage, the Mexican government agreed in June to deploy 15,000 troops to reinforce key crossing points along the U.S.-Mexico border and to send 5,000 troops to guard the Guatemala-Mexico border, a key crossing point for Central Americans entering Mexico. The two nations agreed that if migrant apprehensions on the U.S. side of the border weren't significantly reduced by early September, then talks on additional measures to curb illegal immigration would begin.

A line graph showing people detained or turned away at the U.S.-Mexico border

Nearly a month after deferring tariffs against Mexico, the Trump administration is likely crafting its response to the new Mexican security measures. The White House demanded that Mexico reduce migrant crossings so that Customs and Border Protections arrests on the U.S. side of the border fall to around 20,000 per month. The Trump administration probably settled on this number because it would equal the record-low number of arrests seen in late 2016 and early 2017. It is unlikely, however, that this number will decline to anywhere near this amount within three months.

Unrest in Honduras Will Fuel the Migrant Surge

Honduras will become a major contributing factor complicating Mexico's ongoing negotiations over immigration with the United States. The roots of that instability are the 2009 coup against former President Manuel Zelaya and a closely contested 2017 presidential election, compounded by drought and crop failure. Throughout May and June, Honduras' left-wing public sector health and education unions and Zelaya's Liberty and Refoundation Party (Libre) mounted extensive nationwide protests against President Juan Orlando Hernandez and his ruling National Party. The protesters are not trying to overthrow Hernandez, whose power bases, such as the army and police, remain loyal to him. Instead, Libre is trying to position itself as a viable contender for power in Honduras' November 2021 presidential election. Hernandez is an increasingly unpopular figure, with high-profile corruption cases and frequent blackouts in major cities such as Tegucigalpa, the capital, and San Pedro Sula diminishing his low approval rating.

Libre and its political allies are largely focused on pressuring the president and showing their strength through street demonstrations and roadblocks. The opposition can mount such protests for months at a time, though their intensity ebbs and flows. Numerous triggers for renewed left-wing protests exist, such as ongoing corruption scandals and often heavy-handed police tactics with protesters.

The White House could use rising or even steady migration driven by Honduran unrest to press Mexico to accept a "safe third country" agreement or else be slapped with tariffs.

Such demonstrations will disrupt the flow of goods, fuel and laborers between virtually all major cities in the country. Lengthy demonstrations will also hit key exports such as textiles and automotive wiring harnesses. Extensive disruptions to daily life will cause greater economic pain for the country's informal labor force, which accounts for around half of all laborers. The informal labor force depends on untaxed, largely menial labor and is largely employed in the service industry. Prolonged demonstrations will exacerbate the already-heavy incentives for informal laborers to leave the country. So as protests stifle economic activity, they will drive more migrants north.

The trend of rising migration is likely to develop in late 2019 and early 2020, just as Mexico is again trying to deflect the threat of tariffs from the United States. At their next meeting with White House officials, representatives of the Mexican government will likely tout achievements made in sealing the border and deploying a long-term security presence there, deterring more and more migrants. The White House meanwhile will likely make additional demands of Mexico, the most important of which will be that Mexico sign a "safe third country" agreement with the United States, which will designate Mexico a safe place for migrants seeking asylum and make it difficult for them to request asylum in the United States, and will likely threaten Mexico with tariffs again if it does not.

The Mexican government will try to delay agreeing to such a deal until after the November 2020 U.S. presidential election in case Trump loses and the subsequent president decouples trade policy with Mexico from the question of illegal immigration. But Mexico may not be able to delay making concessions to the United States until then if the pace of illegal border crossings swells too quickly.

Crafty_Dog

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Argentina leads in counterterrorism
« Reply #152 on: July 22, 2019, 12:29:10 PM »


Argentina: Latin America's New Leader in Counterterrorism
by Joseph M. Humire
The Gatestone Institute
July 17, 2019
https://www.meforum.org/58965/argentina-latin-americas-new-leader-in-counterterrorism


Crafty_Dog

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WSJ: Chile, Argentina
« Reply #154 on: October 28, 2019, 05:07:48 AM »

Chilean Capitalism on Trial
Market policies have been successful. So why are people taking to the streets?
By Mary Anastasia O’Grady
Oct. 27, 2019 4:41 pm ET
Opinion: Chile’s Capitalism Is Under Attack
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Opinion: Chile’s Capitalism Is Under Attack
Opinion: Chile’s Capitalism Is Under Attack
On October 19, 2019, Chilean President Sebastian Piñera declared a state of emergency to protect property and human life as protests and riots rocked the country. Image: Fernando Bizerra Jr/Zuma Press

At press time it was too early to call a winner in Argentina’s presidential election Sunday. But Peronist Alberto Fernández and his vice-presidential running mate, former President Cristina Kirchner, were widely expected to defeat the re-election bid of center-right President Mauricio Macri.

Primary results in August indicated that voters blame the incumbent for high inflation, the rising cost of public services and anemic economic growth. Yet a Fernández-Kirchner win implies a return to the left-wing populism that has long undermined Argentine living standards. Mrs. Kirchner’s government (2007-2015) was notoriously corrupt and used its power to deny due process to its political enemies.

Mr. Macri made many mistakes, but he aimed for a more market-oriented economy and to restore the rule of law. His loss could turn out to be bad news for millions of Argentines who yearn for greater freedom.

Yet no one expects Argentina’s center-right, if it loses, to go rampaging through the streets, burning cars, stealing, blocking roads and destroying public transportation. That kind of politics is the specialty of the left. It has been on display this month in Chile, where left-wing terrorists savaged Santiago and cities around the country with violence.

This happened in a nation that, as the newspaper La Tercera reported on Oct. 5, has seen the poverty rate fall below 9%, down from 68% in 1990. Income inequality has also been coming down.

There is still plenty of work to do. But civilized societies settle questions of governance at the ballot box and through independent institutions, not with firebombs. So why is the democratically elected Chilean President Sebastián Piñera back on his heels, with little support from “democrats” in the media, academia and politics, after weeks of violence in the nation’s streets? It’s a double standard that deserves attention.

The uprising in Chile began Oct. 7 when groups of students in Santiago jumped subway turnstiles to protest a fare increase. In the days that followed, peaceful protests and further incidents of lawlessness spread throughout the country. On Saturday over a million demonstrators poured into the streets of Santiago to voice grievances—reportedly everything from the high cost of living to income inequality and climate change.

Yet it is unlikely that the eyes of the world would be on Chile if not for the perpetrators of violence, who took advantage of the moment to wreak havoc and demand a new constitution. Subway stations were destroyed, and supermarkets and other stores were looted and burned. Some 18 people died, most of them caught in fires during the looting.

Mr. Piñera was forced to declare a state of emergency and put the army on the street to protect property and life. But empathy isn’t the president’s strong suit, and in the absence of an effective communications team the narrative is now controlled by his adversaries.

The central government already subsidizes nearly half the public transportation fare in Santiago. What’s more, student fares didn’t go up. The independent commission charged with setting the prices announced an increase of 3.75% for peak riders on the metro; off-peak fares were reduced.

Fare increases are never popular. But the hard left has spent years planting socialism in the Chilean psyche via secondary schools, universities, the media and politics.

Even as the country has grown richer than any of its neighbors by defending private property, competition and the rule of law, Chileans marinate in anticapitalist propaganda. The millennials who poured into the streets to promote class warfare reflect that influence.

The Chilean right has largely abandoned its obligation to engage in the battle of ideas in the public square. Mr. Piñera isn’t an economic liberal and makes no attempt to defend the morality of the market. He hasn’t even reversed the antigrowth policies of his predecessor, Socialist Michelle Bachelet. Chileans have one side of the story pounded into their heads. As living standards rise, so do expectations. When reality doesn’t keep up, the ground is already fertile for socialists to plow.

The violence has another explanation. To chalk it up to spontaneity requires the suspension of disbelief. As one intelligence official in the region told me Friday: “It takes a lot of money to move this number of people and to engage them in this level of violence.” The explosive devices used, he said, were “far more sophisticated than Molotov cocktails.”

Foreign subversives are suspected of playing a key role, with Cuba and Venezuela at the top of the list. The São Paulo Forum, a group of hard-left socialists put together by Fidel Castro in 1990 after the fall of the Berlin Wall, espouses this radicalism.

The actual list of assailants, we don’t know. But Chile has been hit by a well-organized enemy out to bring down the democratic government. That’s something that should alarm all free societies in the region.

Write to O’Grady@wsj.com.

Crafty_Dog

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Argentina chooses Peronism yet again
« Reply #155 on: October 28, 2019, 05:09:41 AM »
second post


Argentina’s Peronist Repeat
The ill-governed nation hands the government back to the left.
By Editorial Board
Oct. 28, 2019 7:29 am ET
Presidential candidate Alberto Fernandez celebrates his victory after election results in Buenos Aires, Argentina October 27, 2019. Photo: agustin marcarian/Reuters

The cliche is that democracies get the government they deserve, but we’re not sure Argentina deserves the left-wing government it elected Sunday. Argentines routed incumbent Mauricio Macri, but in electing Alberto Fernández as the next President and Cristina Kirchner as Vice President they are trusting the same Peronist Party that has ruined the economy before.

Mr. Macri inherited a mess from Mrs. Kirchner, who was President from 2007-2015 following four years of her husband’s rule. Inflation was rampant, and the rule of law debased as the Kirchners confiscated foreign assets. The Kirchners put their domestic adversaries in jail and tried to silence the press.

Yet Mr. Macri was never able to turn the economy around. He tried to be a political conciliator and refused to engage in reprisals. He freed the exchange rate, lifted capital controls, and resolved a longstanding dispute with international creditors who had refused to accept haircuts on government bonds.

But his policy of gradual economic reform wasn’t enough to fix deep-seated fiscal and structural problems. In 2015 government spending as a percentage of gross domestic product was nearly double what it was throughout the second half of the 20th century. Yet Mr. Macri never took on spending or inflexible labor laws in any serious way, and the pressure for high taxes remained.

To attract investment, Argentina also needed to restore confidence in the peso. Yet the money base grew rapidly, and the central bank was forced to prop up the currency with high interest rates. Inflation for 2017 was about 25%.

A rising price level continued to erode the living standards of the Argentine middle class even as the country’s private and public debts increased. An historic drought in the southern hemisphere in the summer of 2017-2018 didn’t help by damaging all-important agricultural exports.

In May 2018 Mr. Macri went to the International Monetary Fund for a $50 billion standby loan, which was unpopular at home and didn’t reassure anyone abroad. By September 2018 the peso had lost half its value from the start of the year. The peso fell again when Mr. Macri lost the first round of presidential voting in this year’s August primary. Inflation jumped as Argentines fled pesos for dollars. Mr. Macri rejected as too risky economic advice to control inflation by dollarizing the economy, and now he finds himself out of power and his country at even greater risk of left-wing policies.

The Peronists campaigned largely against Mr. Macri’s record, but their trademark is more of the same: spend-and-tax policies, onerous labor regulation and easy money. The party does have a wing that is more pragmatic than the Kirchner left if Mr. Fernández can maintain enough political control. Another difference this time is that Mr. Fernández is courting the Chinese as creditors instead of the IMF. The Argentine left is anti-American, but as Malaysia and other countries have learned, China’s terms are hardly generous.

We wish Argentines the best, but whoever said insanity was doing the same thing over and expecting better results might have had this once prosperous nation in mind.

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Stratfor: Could there be a Cold War Reboot in Latin America
« Reply #156 on: November 29, 2019, 11:15:00 AM »
Could There Be a Cold War Reboot in Latin America?
Scott Stewart
Scott Stewart
VP of Tactical Analysis, Stratfor
8 MINS READ
Nov 26, 2019 | 09:00 GMT

HIGHLIGHTS

Russia is working with former Soviet allies in Latin America to undermine U.S. influence and distract Washington from Moscow's activities elsewhere. 

In doing so, Moscow is using online propaganda to stoke the anti-government rhetoric now fueling protests in Ecuador, Chile, Bolivia and Colombia.

Russia will likely deploy similar tactics to weaken other U.S.-allied governments in Latin America, placing Western businesses and organizations operating in the region increasingly at risk.

South America is again in flames. A wave of anti-government protests has ravaged the streets of Ecuador, Chile, Bolivia and Colombia in recent months. Such chaos, of course, isn't new to the region. From the 1960s to the 1990s, terrorist and insurgent groups instigated a series of vicious Cold War proxy battles. But in this iteration, which I'm calling the "Cold War 2.0" in Latin America, it's not armed proxy groups in play but already existing social tensions that Moscow is adeptly weaponizing to sabotage Western power structures in the region.

Indeed, with threats to Russia's periphery more daunting than ever, it can be argued that the Cold War never really ended for Moscow. But regardless of whether Russia's current actions in Latin America constitute a second Cold War, or if they're instead merely a reinvigoration of the original struggle, it's apparent that many of the same actors are actively involved in the unfolding unrest in Washington's backyard — and largely, for the same reasons.

The Big Picture

U.S. efforts to stem Russia's influence in its borderlands have compelled Moscow to reassert its geopolitical heft around the world. In Latin America, this can be evidenced by Russia's attempts to protect the Venezuelan government from the U.S.-backed opposition movement, while working to dismantle more Western-allied governments elsewhere in the region. 

The Soviet Legacy in Latin America

In its push to establish a global communist utopia, the Soviet Union encouraged exporting its revolution abroad to "liberate" workers around the world. But as the United States and its allies banded together to contain communist expansion, the Soviet Union began to feel threatened by the alliance structures that surrounded it, as well as the presence of U.S. troops and weapons on its periphery. In response, the Soviets embraced the Cuban Revolution and attempted to place nuclear missiles in Cuba — a gambit that ultimately led to the Cuban Missile Crisis. But even after the Soviets removed their missiles from Cuba, they continued to use the island as a beachhead in the Western Hemisphere from which to expand their influence from Canada to Chile — supporting communist parties in the Americas, while also training, financing and arming a host of Marxist terrorist and insurgent groups across the region.
 
Moscow's efforts in South and Central America, in particular, were largely conducted through their battle-hardened Cuban allies, as evidenced by the revolutionary Ernesto "Che" Guevara's ill-fated foray into Bolivia in the late 1960s. The Soviets viewed such activities as a way to not only expand world communism, but to counter U.S. anti-communist efforts elsewhere. By creating problems in Washington's own backyard, Soviet actions also helped distract the United States and its resources from those other efforts. Growing communist influence in the region embroiled the U.S. government in a series of efforts that involved high-profile events such as the 1954 coup in Guatemala; the failed 1961 Bay of Pigs Invasion in Cuba; the 1973 coup in Chile; and support for the Nicaraguan Contras in the 1980s.

Russia's Current Activities

Fast forward to the present, however, and the U.S. threat to Russian influence has only become more acute. The peripheral security buffer that once protected Russia from Europe has significantly eroded following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Former Warsaw Pact member states such as Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania have since become NATO members, as have the former Soviet-occupied Baltic states of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania.

Growing fears of entrapment in Russia ultimately paved the way for the rise of President Vladimir Putin in 2000. But despite Putin's promises of restoring the country's past power, Russia's strategic buffer has continued to take hits. The fall of pro-Russian leaders in Ukraine in the wake of the 2014 Maidan protests and the 2005 Orange Revolution, in particular, have only ratcheted up Russian unease. To help offset the loss of such a crucial borderland, Putin has annexed Crimea and invaded southeastern Ukraine. But Russia still undoubtedly feels the sting of having lost the strategic depth of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Bloc that had long shielded the country's soft underbelly.

Instead of arming Marxist groups with weapons, this time Moscow's arming anti-government protesters with rhetoric to counter U.S. interests in Latin America.

The loosening grasp on its borderlands is now again compelling Russia to resort to its old tricks in Latin America. This has notably included propping up Nicolas Maduro's failing regime in Venezuela over the past year with the help of Moscow's Cuban partners. Cuba has been a key security partner of Venezuelan regimes since shortly after former Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez came to power in 1999. The vast web of Cuban intelligence operators and assets that has infiltrated Venezuelan society since then have informed the Maduro regime about potential threats while keeping the opposition divided and squabbling. Meanwhile, Russia's financial, military and technical intelligence support — not to mention the close protection from Russian military contractors — have been critical to the Maduro regime in recent years as well. In fact, I would go so far as to say that Maduro would have long been ousted had it not been for Russia's and Cuba's help.
 
But the activities of Russia and its Cuban partners in Latin America are not limited to Venezuela. On Nov. 13, officials arrested four Cubans in Bolivia for allegedly financing anti-government protests in support of the country's former socialist president, Evo Morales. An ally of the Russian-backed Maduro regime, Morales was forced to seek refuge in Mexico after his victory in an apparently fixed election sparked widespread protests. In recent weeks, the Organization of American States (OAS) has also accused Cuba and Venezuela of helping instigate the anti-government protests in Ecuador, Chile and Colombia. Just as the Soviets bankrolled Cuban paramilitary efforts in Latin America during the first Cold War, it is clear that Russia is still funding these efforts, as both Cuba and Venezuela are severely cash-strapped and could not conduct these external operations alone.

Using Social Angst for Political Gain

The Soviets and Russians have had ample experience using protests to undermine their Western opponents' place in power. In the United States, there's evidence of Moscow's hand in both the anti-war protests of the 1960s and anti-nuclear protests of the 1980s, as well as the anti-hydraulic fracturing movement and the Occupy Movement in more recent years. And, of course, there's Russia's intervention in the 2016 Brexit referendum followed by the U.S. presidential election that same year.

Indeed, over the decades, Russia has become increasingly adept at tapping into very real social sentiments and issues to achieve its own political goals. In concert with its Cuban and Venezuelan allies, Russia has proven adept at amplifying the tension along very real social fault lines within these countries. Russia is not simply fabricating issues underpinning the unrest out of thin air; rather, it's simply providing the "spark" to ignite the underlying economic and social grievances that have quietly been brewing just beneath the surface in these countries for years.

Russia also now has vast experience using social media to disperse disinformation on the internet, just as it did ahead of the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom and the U.S. presidential election in 2016. In recent years, Moscow has also deployed similar online propaganda campaigns in Germany, Ukraine and the Baltic states. And there are signs it's attempting to do the same ahead of the next U.S. election in 2020.  We can thus expect to see these disinformation tools used elsewhere in the region to support socialist allies and oppose governments that are democratic, more free-market-oriented or otherwise allied with the United States.

Foreign Stakeholders in the Crosshairs

Given the socialist, anarchist and anti-capitalist bent of many of the anti-government movements, protesters have unsurprisingly already begun targeting commercial interests in the region. More than 100 stores owned by Walmart's subsidiary in Chile, for example, have so far been looted and burned amid escalating anti-capitalist demonstrations in the country. As protests rage on across the continent, U.S. and European businesses operating in these countries will likely continue to be targeted, including potentially mining and energy companies, hotels, banks and airline offices. U.S. diplomatic facilities and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operating in the region could also come under fire. A number of businesses and NGOs have already pulled their personnel out of Bolivia following the U.S. Department of State's recent travel warning, which also urged American citizens living there to leave.
 
Given Russia's imperative to undermine growing U.S. influence closer home, as well as globally, Moscow will do everything in its power to ensure the protests continue apace right outside Washington's door. Businesses and organizations across South America will thus need to closely monitor the dynamics of the unrest in Latin America as it evolves and potentially escalates in the coming weeks. Otherwise, they may soon find themselves caught in the crossfire of another Cold War proxy battle.

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GPF: Latin America's place in the world
« Reply #158 on: July 05, 2020, 09:17:20 AM »
June 17, 2020   View On Website
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    Latin America’s Place in the World
The region operates on its own timeline.
By: Allison Fedirka

Whether they like it or not, most countries are drawn into the international system in one way or another. For this reason, introducing the concept of “international insertion” into the study of international relations may seem redundant or unnecessary. But it plays an important role in the study of Latin America’s international relations, in particular, because it helps explain the region’s geopolitical realities, which are founded in its place at the periphery of the global system.

The concept involves identifying the ways in which a country can become more involved in the global system. In geopolitics, not all countries are created equal; some are more powerful than others, but the behavior of all is governed by their attempts to acquire and maintain power. Powerful states that are able drive the global system are considered the center of gravity, and weak states that do not have the means to influence the global system exist on the periphery, orbiting around the center. Geography determines whether a country is part of the periphery or the center because these are the things that determine a country’s power potential. Although technological advances have offered countries ways to overcome their limitations, many Latin American states remain on the margins of the geopolitical system.

This is because the region operates on its own geopolitical timeline. Equally important is the power dynamic that has been hardwired into these states over time. Geography may have placed these countries in the periphery, but their political, economic and military conditions, developed over long periods of time, have kept them there.
 
(click to enlarge)
Defining Latin American History

With these principles in mind, we can begin to deconstruct Latin America’s geopolitical history by first defining time periods and then studying the lasting impact of political, economic and military events that occur during these periods. There are three distinct epochs – long geopolitical cycles each consisting of different eras – in Latin American history: the pre-Columbian epoch (1000-1492), the colonial epoch (1492-1810) and the U.S. epoch (1898-present). The period from 1810 to 1898 is considered an anomalous era that does not fit into the epochs that came before or after. Each epoch also has a critical era that helped permanently shape the region.

During the pre-Columbian epoch, Latin America had well-developed civilizations that operated completely independently of the European and Asian systems. Due to the technological limitations of the time, geography significantly dictated the needs and capabilities of regions and civilizations. Nonetheless, it was during this time that indigenous civilizations in the Americas reached their peak of sophistication. This epoch’s final era, the empires era (1400-1500), saw the rapid, parallel emergence of the Aztec and Inca empires. Both empires quickly expanded by conquering and absorbing new civilizations. They served as the centers of gravity in Mesoamerica and the Pacific-Andean region and avoided major conflict because geographic barriers ensured little to no contact between them. Smaller, organized civilizations that shared a common language also existed east of the Andes in present-day Colombia, the Amazon and the Rio de la Plata Basin. But none of them achieved empire status because the landscape, resources, climate and livelihoods did not support the establishment of large cities, much less the expansion of territorial control. The arrival of Spanish conquistadors brought the pre-Columbian epoch and the empires era to an abrupt end.
 
(click to enlarge)

The colonial epoch marked Latin America’s first opportunity to integrate into the larger global system. But the arrival of the Europeans did not immediately open up the region to the world. Rather, Latin America interacted with just two European powers – the Spanish and the Portuguese – which sought to maintain exclusive control over their newfound territories, particularly with regard to trade. Viceroys were allowed to trade directly with the European colonial power that controlled these territories for most of the epoch. The ruling powers continued to expand their control over local civilizations, imported African slaves and incorporated them into their empires either by using them for labor or through social and marital links.

The final era in this epoch – the Bourbon era (1714-1810) – had the most lasting impact. After the War of the Spanish Succession, Spain quickly moved to recover its position as a European power. To do so, the crown introduced a series of changes that would become known as the Bourbon reforms. Many of these reforms focused on Spain’s relationship with the colonies and were aimed at reducing the power of local populations, consolidating control and optimizing earnings. This led to administrative reforms that established the general borders that roughly represent the region’s nations today. The reforms finally allowed for trade among Spanish colonies – rather than just between Spain and the colonies – but not with areas outside of the Spanish empire. So even though the barriers between the Eastern and Western hemispheres had been broken, Spain’s centralization of power and trade restrictions limited Latin America’s global interaction. Despite the opportunity to integrate into the larger global system, it failed to do so. Resentment over these reforms sowed the seeds of the independence movement that would later grip the region.

The independence and accommodation era is an anomaly because it marks a unique period in which no single power (or two combined powers) dominated the region. While it’s true that transitions between epochs are often opaque, a unique characteristic in Latin American epochs is the presence of a dominating power. But during this era, no prevailing power existed, and neither the U.S. nor the Europeans could control the region.

Latin American countries faced three challenges during this time. The first was potential resettlement by European powers.

Spain had launched a handful of failed attempts to regain territory, Brazil remained a monarchy and France tried to replace the Mexican government multiple times. European recolonization, therefore, could not be ruled out. The second challenge was establishing territorial boundaries with neighboring countries. As fledgling nations tried to consolidate control over their territory, war between the newly formed states was always a possibility. The third challenge was the possibility of civil war or domestic unrest, which was prevalent in all these countries as interests and visions for the future clashed. Ultimately, this meant that Latin American countries were unable to establish regional power centers and were left relatively weak compared to their counterparts in the north.
 
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The arrival of the U.S. epoch marked the return of domination by a power that would regulate the region’s interaction with the rest of the world. In 1898, the U.S. emerged as the Western Hemisphere’s regional power. It had established full access to the Pacific coast, settled its border with Mexico, unified after a civil war and expelled Spain from the Caribbean. Most important, it had developed a world-class navy that enabled the country to defend coastal approaches, intimidate foreign aggressors and enforce its foreign policy, including the Monroe Doctrine, which until this point had about as much weight as the paper it was written on.

This epoch kicked off with the Roosevelt era (1898-1945), so named for the strong influence Theodore Roosevelt had over it. It was characterized by aggressive U.S. military posturing and involvement in the region in order to keep European powers out of the Western Hemisphere and establish U.S. dominance. Its highlights include U.S. intimidation of German vessels away from Venezuela, support for Panama’s independence, building of the Panama Canal, dominance over Cuba through measures like the Platt Amendment, military expeditions in to Mexico, and waging the Banana Wars across Central America and the Caribbean.

After this era, U.S. power continued to grow, creating more constraints on the region’s behavior. The U.S. presented the entire Western Hemisphere as its sphere of influence, limiting its interaction with outside powers and further isolating the region from the world.

Out of Synch

Latin America’s geopolitical time scale does not synch with the global cycle. The first global epoch started in 1492, with the European discovery of the Americas and forays into Africa and Asia, and ended in 1992. Europe was the center of gravity (indeed, it is known as the European epoch) as different European countries took turns at the seat of power. For Latin America, however, the age of “global opening” during this time remained fairly limited to interactions with Spain and Portugal.

Latin America’s colonial epoch coincided with much of the European epoch but not all of it and ended about 100 years earlier. During the independence era, the region was far too consumed with problems at home and abroad to join the global system from a position a strength. In the 20th century, the distinction between the global and Latin American epochs persisted but became subtler after the Roosevelt era. Latin America’s U.S. epoch predates the North America epoch (1992-present) by roughly 100 years. And appears to generally coincide because of the shared trait of U.S. domination. However, the epochs follow different time scales and are measured differently (regional vs. global).

That Latin America’s cycles do not align with those of the rest of the world makes it incredibly hard for the region to tap into the global system. Latin America was operating on its own geopolitical timetable prior to European arrival, and the colonial period failed to fully bring the region into the global system and synch its cycles with those of the rest of the world. Latin American epochs tend to feature one or two powers that overwhelm the countries or civilizations of the region and limit their ability to interact with other regions, reinforcing the geographic limitations that have relegated this part of the world to the periphery. And so far, technology has not been enough to bring it into the fold.   




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GPF: Washington's new economic strategy in Latin America
« Reply #159 on: September 23, 2020, 09:08:00 AM »
September 23, 2020   View On Website
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    Washington’s New Economic Strategy in Latin America
Nearshoring is as much a geopolitical issue as an economic one.
By: Allison Fedirka

A few weeks ago, the head of the U.S. National Security Council – not a State Department official, as would normally be the protocol – introduced the Western Hemisphere Strategic Framework, Washington’s new economic strategy for its half of the world, while in Miami. Then, for the first time ever, Washington successfully lobbied the Inter-American Development Bank to take on a U.S. official as its head – a position typically reserved for non-U.S. and non-Brazilian members who have less voting power in the bank. Later still, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo made history as the first secretary to visit Suriname and Guyana.

Developments such as these belie the ordinarily passive approach the U.S. takes to managing relations with its southern neighbors. Washington has long held the upper hand and so has rarely needed to tinker with a system that works in its favor. But as it debuts its new economic strategy for the region, it will resurrect memories for countries that have been hurt by these kinds of initiatives in the past. The U.S. may see new-found potential in its relationship with Latin America, but the same cannot necessarily be said for Latin America.

A National Security Issue

The increase in the United States’ commercial interest in Latin America owes largely to a shift in focus from military conflict in the Middle East to economic conflict with China (and, to a lesser extent, Russia).

The U.S.-China trade war has changed supply chain security from a purely economic issue to a national security issue. In short, China’s role as a global manufacturing hub – especially for medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, microchips and other electronics – is now considered a threat. Consequently, Washington has begun to consider new locations for U.S. companies whose factories are currently in China. With its geographic proximity, relatively cheap labor force and firmly established ties, Latin America is an obvious candidate.
 
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The potential relocation of factories is as much a geopolitical question as it is an economic one. Companies generally go where it makes the most economic sense, but when there are geopolitical interests at stake, it is up to the governments to create incentives and frameworks that compel other actors to produce the desired results.

Washington’s latest hemisphere-wide economic initiative, Back to the Americas, means to address mutual economic-security needs, most notably by relocating U.S. manufacturing companies to Latin America. The relocation would be supported by U.S. investments in infrastructure in host countries that would, in theory, drive economic growth. At the end of July, Mauricio Claver-Carone, then the White House senior director for Western Hemisphere affairs and now the IDB president, said that up to $50 billion in investments could enter the region through Back to the Americas through the participation of four U.S. government departments as well as the U.S. Agency for International Development, the U.S. Trade and Development Agency, the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation and the Export-Import Bank. It builds on the Growth in the Americas initiative, which launched in 2018 and expanded its scope in December 2019 to focus largely on using private sector investment in infrastructure projects to create new jobs and increase economic growth. A key component to achieving these goals is the reduction of regulatory, legal, procurement and market barriers to investment by host country governments.
 
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The timing is hardly coincidental: China has steadily enlarged its economic footprint in Latin America over the past two decades. Beijing used the region to help meet its demand for hydrocarbons, metals and food supplies. From 2000 to 2019, Chinese trade with the region grew from $12 billion to nearly $315 billion. It is currently the top trade partner of Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Peru and Argentina. (In every country except Argentina, China replaced the U.S.) According to the Inter-American Dialogue, Chinese state loans to the region exceeded $140 billion from 2005 to 2019, though the amounts have significantly dropped since 2015. China has also made substantial investments in mining and agriculture, power generation, utilities and infrastructure, though again the pace has slowed over the past three years.

The Back to the Americas initiative aims to preserve the U.S. foothold in the region and keep foreign competition at bay. The recently announced Western Hemisphere Strategic Framework, however, rests on five pillars: securing the homeland, advancing economic growth, promoting democracy and the rule of law, countering foreign influence and strengthening alliances with like-minded partners. Relocating manufacturing to the Americas not only takes the supply chain out of China’s hands but also helps diversify it. The finished products made for U.S. consumption may also allow the U.S. to regain some of the space it has lost to China in Latin America. If Washington can encourage Latin American countries to create environments conducive to U.S. interests by giving them money, there may be less need for Chinese financing and more transparency with financial activities, and these countries can more easily access funding from northern financial institutions.

What Washington Has to Offer

But U.S. ambitions will face several obstacles. Local governments may find themselves in the uncomfortable scenario of having to choose between Beijing or Washington, including over how they adopt 5G technologies. Many will seek a balance that will allow them to reap the benefits of siding with one without alienating the other.

Unlike China, the U.S. doesn’t have state-owned enterprises that can do its bidding, or seemingly endless discretionary spending for overseas projects. There will be some funding by the U.S. government along with additional money from places like the IDB, which contributes about $12 billion in infrastructure funding annually, but private enterprise will play a greater role. The U.S. government can incentivize companies, but it can’t force them to participate in its plans. Companies could simply decide the market isn’t right for them.

More importantly, the U.S. strategy requires buy-in from participating countries. This is why it contains provisions that may meet the region’s needs. By targeting infrastructure projects, the U.S. is effectively addressing the long-standing economic development challenge of huge infrastructure investment gaps faced by every country in the region. A 2019 study by the IDB estimated that the region’s infrastructure investment gap is the equivalent of 2.5 percent of gross domestic product (roughly $150 billion) per year. U.S. investments alone can’t solve these problems, but neither can the host countries without large outside capital injections, which U.S. companies can offer.

Infrastructure development also addresses the region’s interest in improving its overall trade competitiveness. Poor transportation and logistics facilities play a major role in raising the price of domestically produced goods to the point that they struggle to compete in global markets.
 
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Furthermore, the focus on manufacturing aims to diversify the region’s economic activity away from natural resource extraction. Reducing dependence on commodities would inoculate local economies to price shocks and potentially lead to higher-value goods being produced.

Not every Latin American country has the same relationship with the U.S., of course, and those most likely to participate will be countries that have traditionally allied with the U.S. or whose economies are too integrated with the U.S. not to participate. Panama and Costa Rica, for example, are already working to address domestic regulatory measures to meet U.S. requirements, while Ecuador admitted it has an economic need to enact reforms that will facilitate economic cooperation with the U.S.

The poster child for what this initiative could look like in practice is Colombia, which is predisposed to keep a close relationship with the U.S. and has already thrown its support behind the project. Colombia’s ambassador to the U.S. openly acknowledged that Bogota wants to benefit from U.S. nearshoring efforts and welcomes it as an opportunity to reindustrialize. In some ways, it has been preparing all year. In February, the government launched a new national logistics policy that focuses on reducing logistics costs by simplifying bureaucratic procedures and improving road and fluvial transportation infrastructure. The objective of the plan is to incentivize foreign direct investment, boost exports and create economic opportunities. This was followed in the summer by new tax breaks and other measures to attract up to $11.5 billion in non-hydrocarbon foreign direct investment by 2022. In direct response to Back to the Americas, ProColombia has conducted a targeted campaign to identify companies interested in moving to Colombia from China.

Concerns

The U.S. has a long and complicated history with Latin America when it comes to cooperation, particularly when geopolitical agendas are so closely tied to economic ones. There is a camp that looks at increased U.S. interest in the region with skepticism. Though they share a desire to see value-added goods hold a greater share of exports, they believe the U.S. manufacturing initiative runs the risk of producing low-value-added exports by exploiting local workforces. There is also concern that increased trade with the U.S. could render the region a depository for U.S. goods. Similar initiatives in the past have damaged domestic industries in the region, prompting governments to pursue costly import substitution schemes and to impose strict regulatory environments to prop up local industry and employment.

The other major issue is that there are strings attached. The U.S. government and companies alike will be looking for certain security and political guarantees from their partners. Ultimately, the ability to offer attractive investment environments to U.S. investors will fall to the Latin American governments themselves. Past instances where countries in the region have carried out reforms to participate in U.S.-supported economic programs ended poorly. For example, President John F. Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress purported to enhance economic cooperation to improve Latin America’s per capita GDP, establish democratic governments, achieve price stability, enact land reform and improve other economic and social planning. Washington spent $1.4 billion annually from 1962 to 1967 on this program but failed to produce the desired economic development. Similarly, the Washington Consensus was introduced to the region to help solve the debt crisis and boost growth. It required countries to implement northern-formulated, structural economic reforms that clashed with many of the region’s political and social systems. This led to its failure and rejection, most notably in Argentina.

Hence why this is as much a geopolitical initiative as an economic one. The economic question can be answered only after there are clear sectors, projects and numbers to work with. The current economic environment favors the U.S., but complicated pasts are hard to overlook. All governments will also have to evaluate participation in these plans against national needs. The fact that the U.S. has renewed interest in the region has geopolitical significance considering the U.S. has managed to muscle through its agenda but not with strong results.   




Crafty_Dog

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WSJ Biden's troubling Latin agenda
« Reply #160 on: February 08, 2021, 08:55:47 PM »
Biden’s Troubling Latin Agenda
Funding for political activism and abortion won’t create jobs in the region.

By Mary Anastasia O’Grady
Feb. 7, 2021 4:16 pm ET


When developed countries support equality before the law and property rights in poor countries, the left labels them imperialists. But use U.S. taxpayers’ resources to promote the termination of unborn life in poor countries, and progressives call it “health” spending. A similar language game is played when international socialists organize political factions under the banner of “democracy” to consolidate power.

Abortion and democratic socialism are two causes the Biden administration plans to champion in the Northern Triangle of Central America—Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador. Sovereignty, respect for local cultural norms, and the economic aspirations of millions of have-nots have never been high ideals in Washington. But now the condescending ideologues are resupplied. The problem is likely to get worse.

Latin Americans have reason to distrust President Biden, who had special responsibility for the region during the Obama administration. One notable disaster in that time was Colombia’s surrender to the narco-trafficking group FARC. The agreement was cooked up in Havana with U.S. help. Colombians rejected it in a referendum, but then-President Juan Manuel Santos pushed it through anyway, with backing from Team Obama.


FARC leaders got amnesty and unelected seats in Congress, but the agreement has been a disaster for the South American nation. The cocaine business has exploded anew, FARC honchos have been caught in drug deals, and coca-growing regions are again immersed in bloody conflict. The discredited Mr. Santos has been reduced to lobbying the U.S. to take Havana off its list of state sponsors of terrorism.


In Central America, Biden administration foreign-policy makers want to reproduce a version of the United Nations’ International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (a k a CIGIG) that would span all three countries in the Northern Triangle.

Helping countries develop independent, transparent and accountable institutions is a worthy foreign-policy goal. But CICIG was none of that.

The commission prosecuted some criminals. But without checks, Commissioner Iván Velásquez gained absolute power and used it to unleash a reign of terror against Guatemalan society. What was billed as a way to help the country fight organized crime and build a credible judicial system was weaponized by the left. James Comey’s FBI going after Trump supporters had nothing on Mr. Velásquez. The most corrupt entrepreneurs and politicians stayed out of jail by cheering his misdeeds.

CICIG abuses gained international attention when lawyers for the Russian migrant family of Igor Bitkov, whom it targeted, testified at a Helsinki Commission hearing in Washington in 2018. They told of the gross mistreatment of the family, allegedly at the behest of Vladimir Putin.


Mr. Biden, who claimed to be an expert on CICIG, never condemned the collapse of due process or the cruelty the commission used to force confessions. He never even spoke up for the Bitkovs, whose 3-year-old son was thrown into an orphanage when they were jailed.

Guatemalans deserve an accounting. Instead Biden stenographers in the media are busy sanitizing his role in the CICIG story. The Bitkov family, still stuck in the corrupt Guatemalan legal system, remains a symbol of the dearth of empathy inside the Beltway.

But Joe cares deeply about the region—or so we are told. He will prove it now by pumping $4 billion into a variety of Northern Triangle social and activist political organizations. It won’t generate jobs beyond the aid industry.

An equally important agenda item for Mr. Biden is the export of abortion to the developing world. To that end, on his eighth day in office he signed an executive decree to allow U.S. taxpayer dollars to fund abortion providers operating overseas. This from the guy who pledges dignity for poor nations.

Plenty of Americans object. In a January Marist poll 77% of respondents said they oppose U.S. financing to “support abortion in other countries,” well above the 53% who said they are pro-life.

Some of these Americans may have an innate sense of respect for other cultures. In the developing world there is a strong belief that abortion doesn’t only take a life but that taking away the rights of the unborn undermines the ethical foundations of society.

This creed is captured in a recent “Culture of Life Africa” video. The 16-minute production features people across the continent pleading with Mr. Biden not to bring abortion to their shores. Honduras recently passed a constitutional amendment (requiring four-fifths approval in two different legislative sessions) prohibiting abortion.

In Honduras and many other poor countries where abortion remains illegal, organizations like International Planned Parenthood can now use U.S. government funds to promote their industry. Mr. Biden doesn’t need to share the moral convictions of pro-life nations. But his contempt for their views is troubling.

Crafty_Dog

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WSJ: Honduran president investigated for taking drug bribes
« Reply #161 on: February 09, 2021, 07:31:36 AM »
MEXICO CITY—U.S. prosecutors are investigating the president of Honduras for accepting bribes to protect drug traffickers who shipped tons of cocaine to the U.S., according to a court filing.

The latest filing came in the criminal case of an alleged Honduran drug trafficker, Geovanny Fuentes Ramirez, who prosecutors say paid President Juan Orlando Hernández large bribes to fund the Honduran leader’s 2013 presidential campaign in exchange for protection of his drug business.

While the Honduran leader has been implicated in several drug trials in the U.S., the filing marks the first time American prosecutors have made public that they are investigating the president.

The Honduran government denied the allegations. “The claim that Pres. Hernández supposedly accepted drug money from a Geovanny Daniel Fuentes Ramírez, or gave protection or coordination to drug traffickers is 100% false,” said Honduras’ government Twitter account. The allegations, the government said, were “based on lies of confessed criminals who seek revenge or to reduce their sentences.”

Mr. Hernández wasn’t named in the court filing by name. Rather, he was described as CC-4, or co-conspirator four, in a court document filed late Friday in the Southern District of New York.

The document said the U.S. investigation was targeting “high-ranking officials, such as CC-4,” identified as the brother of Juan Antonio “Tony” Hernández, the president’s younger brother. The younger Hernández is awaiting sentencing in New York after being convicted in 2019 of trafficking 200 tons of cocaine to the U.S.

President Hernández, who was also named as an unindicted co-conspirator in his brother’s trial, hasn’t been charged with any crime.

One of the poorest countries in the hemisphere, Honduras poses a difficult challenge for the Biden administration. The new administration says it wants to focus on lowering corruption and improving the rule of law as part of a drive to lower illegal migration from the so-called Northern Triangle countries of Central America—Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador.

As part of the policy, the Biden administration has promised to commit some $4 billion to spur economic development and fight the root causes of migration. But the case of Mr. Hernandez shows how difficult it will be to tackle issues like corruption.


“The Juan Orlando Hernández case is the most challenging example faced by the administration in implementing its signature policy,” said Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington-based think tank. “At the end of the day, you need good partners to implement those plans.”

During the Trump administration, allegations about corruption in Mr. Hernández’s administration took a back seat to the issue of migration, in which the Honduran government was seen as a strong partner in trying to deter waves of migration, say analysts and some U.S. officials.

“There was this laserlike focus on the migration issue,” in Central America that came at the expense of corruption and governance problems, a veteran U.S. State Department Latin America official said in a recent interview.

Dealing with the allegations against President Hernández will be a priority for the Biden administration, the former official said. He noted there is currently talk in the administration of creating a special envoy who would pay close attention to Central America.

In a prior filing in the same case involving the alleged Honduran trafficker, Mr. Fuentes Ramírez, prosecutors said Mr. Hernández had told the alleged trafficker that “he [the president] wanted to shove the drugs right up the noses of the gringos.”

The newly introduced court documents say the Honduran government has provided only “limited records” sought by the U.S. in the case of the president’s brother, Juan Antonio “Tony” Hernández. Honduras hasn’t honored requests for the extradition of other charged co-conspirators and potential witnesses against the president and Mr. Fuentes Ramirez, U.S. prosecutors say.

In exchange for large bribes, the president promised to protect Mr. Fuentes Ramirez from arrest and extradition, prosecutors said. The president also promised to help Mr. Fuentes Ramírez, who was arrested in Miami last year, to transport cocaine with the help of the Honduran armed forces, prosecutors said. The court filing alleges the president instructed Mr. Fuentes Ramírez to work with the president’s brother, Juan Antonio Hernández.


Mr. Hernández was elected president in 2013 and was re-elected in 2017 amid widespread allegations of fraud which generated weeks of street protests. He is expected to finish his term in January 2022.

Write to José de Córdoba at jose.decordoba@wsj.com

ccp

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Re: Latin America
« Reply #162 on: February 09, 2021, 07:50:02 AM »
"As part of the policy, the Biden administration has promised to commit some $4 billion to spur economic development and fight the root causes of migration. But the case of Mr. Hernandez shows how difficult it will be to tackle issues like corruption."

 :roll:

DougMacG

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Re: Latin America
« Reply #163 on: February 09, 2021, 11:15:32 AM »
"As part of the policy, the Biden administration has promised to commit some $4 billion to spur economic development and fight the root causes of migration. But the case of Mr. Hernandez shows how difficult it will be to tackle issues like corruption."

 :roll:

Biden tackling corruption.  Here we go again.

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FDI: Latin America
« Reply #164 on: March 19, 2021, 03:08:56 PM »
March 19, 2021
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Foreign Investment in Latin America
Investment in the region has been trending down for about a decade.
By: Geopolitical Futures

(click to enlarge)

For emerging and developing economies, foreign direct investment plays a crucial role in financing major development projects and growing their economies. This is especially true of Latin America. FDI into Latin America hit historical highs between 2011 and 2012, totaling almost $220 billion and accounting for 14 percent of the global total. But since then, FDI has been trending downward, and in 2019 it dropped by 7.8 percent. The trend wasn’t universal: While Argentina (43.9 percent), Mexico (22 percent) and Brazil (11.5 percent) saw large drops in 2019 compared to 2018, Colombia and Peru saw FDI increases of 24.1 percent and 37.1 percent, respectively.

Final figures for 2020 are not yet available, but FDI plummeted as countries struggled with the economic consequences of pandemic-induced lockdowns. Colombia and Brazil saw large drops in the first half of 2020, with respective declines of 50 percent and 45 percent, or $8.86 billion and $37.26 billion. Argentina and Chile also experienced significant declines. But Peru suffered the worst, with FDI dropping by 72 percent, to approximately $7.3 billion. Mexico fared better, with foreign investment dropping by only 6 percent, to $24.66 billion. Continued low FDI has been forecast for 2021, a trend that is expected to reverse only in 2022.

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GPF: Russia in the Caribbean
« Reply #165 on: March 31, 2021, 07:03:25 PM »
March 31, 2021
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Brief: Russian Influence in the Caribbean
With such a sensitive history, the U.S. is ever mindful when Russia engages the region.
By: Geopolitical Futures
Background: For the United States, the Caribbean Basin plays a critical role in securing maritime access that serves its commercial and defense purposes. Though Washington has been the unquestioned regional power for some time, there have been a few instances in which it has felt threatened enough to act there. (Remember the Cuban missile crisis?) With such a sensitive history, the U.S. is ever mindful when Russia engages the region.

What Happened: Russia’s deputy prime minister is leading a high-level delegation on a two-country tour of the Caribbean. On Tuesday, he met with Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro in Caracas, where they signed 12 agreements on cooperation in 20 strategic areas. He also held conversations with Venezuela’s vice president and oil minister. On Wednesday, he arrived in Cuba for the 18th Session of the Cuba-Russia Intergovernmental Commission in Havana. The two sides will discuss the economy, financing, energy, transportation, agriculture, heath and communications.

Bottom Line: When it comes to agreements such as those signed in Venezuela – and those potentially signed later in Cuba – the devil is in the details, which haven’t yet been made public. Russia keeps close ties with Cuba and proved its ability to work with Venezuela on strategic areas such as military and energy. It’s unclear to what extent these agreements will change or strengthen that cooperation in concrete terms. But it’s quite clear that Washington will try to figure out if it means greater Russian influence in its backyard.

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Russian Plane Violates Colombian Airspace
« Reply #166 on: April 20, 2021, 01:21:00 PM »
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Brief: Russian Plane Violates Colombian Airspace
It may have been a surveillance mission or a warning.
By: Geopolitical Futures
Background: Russia has long been eager to expand its influence in Latin America, but the region’s distance from Moscow and proximity to the United States mean it has historically been under American influence, with few opportunities for Russia to break through. Nonetheless, the Kremlin’s activities in the region can still cause alarm in Washington and among U.S. allies, a fact Moscow is keen to exploit, especially at a time when the situation on Russia’s own borders is tense and Western pressure on the country is high.

What Happened: Colombia’s Defense Ministry said it scrambled fighter jets to intercept a Russian Il-96 that had flown from Moscow with no specific destination. The plane’s tail number is assigned to Russia’s Federal Security Service, and according to some sources it had permission to fly over Colombian waters, but it veered off course and into Colombian airspace. The plane promptly responded to Colombian calls to leave its airspace. After the incident, the Colombian Foreign Ministry delivered a note of protest to Russia’s ambassador. The foreign minister said Bogota wanted guarantees from Moscow that it would not repeat these “serious and systematic violations of Colombia’s airspace.”

Bottom Line: Similar violations of Colombian airspace by Russian aircraft occurred in 2013, 2019 and 2020, but relations between Russia and the West are particularly bad right now. The Kremlin may have been trying with this incident to remind the U.S. of its presence in Latin America. This may also have been a reconnaissance flight for the benefit of the Venezuelan government, a Kremlin ally with a fraught border situation with Colombia. Neither scenario would please Washington.

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Re: Latin America
« Reply #167 on: April 21, 2021, 06:08:01 AM »
Uruguay in the Spotlight
It’s not every day that this small nation gets drawn into the geopolitical fray, but here we are.
By: Allison Fedirka

After a comparatively hands-off approach to Latin America after the Cold War, the United States is in the process of reengaging with the region. What that engagement looks like depends on geostrategic locations, especially in the South Atlantic, and especially with countries that have already made gestures to suggest an opening for improved ties. No other country than Uruguay fits the bill.

Their new courtship started earlier this month. On April 6, the head of U.S. Southern Command paid a two-day visit to Uruguay – the first of its kind in five years. A week later, the U.S. National Security Council’s senior director for the Western Hemisphere, Juan Gonzalez, and the Department of State’s acting assistant secretary for Western Hemisphere affairs, Julie Chung, did the same. They met with the president, the foreign minister, the interior minister, the defense minister and the head of the Secretariat of Strategic State Intelligence. Gonzalez said the two sides agreed to plan a new meeting in Washington at an unspecified date, suggesting the U.S., which has no shortage of problems and challenges, is interested in making the time for tiny Uruguay.

Its value to the U.S. lies in its geography. Uruguay covers only about 68,000 square miles and has a population of just 3.5 million people, who reside mostly in the capital of Montevideo and along the Rio de la Plata coastline. The country is flat and full of fertile soil but, unlike many of its neighbors, lacks the mineral deposits so many other countries lust after. (This helps explain why Europeans originally declined to settle there.) What Uruguay brings to the table is not what is inside the country’s borders but the borders themselves. The Uruguay River empties into the Rio de la Plata at nearly the same point as the Paraguay River, giving its inland territories access to the Atlantic Ocean. In total, Uruguay’s coastline measures 410 miles and its continental shelf 350 nautical miles. This gives a small country, nestled between regional giants Brazil and Argentina, an outsized reach into the South Atlantic.

Uruguay Continental Shelf
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Uruguay’s position as a buffer state between those two giants makes it attractive to outside powers looking for a partner. Since the arrival of Europeans in the early 1500s, Uruguay has passed back and forth between Spanish and Portuguese hands several times. The country’s flat land and lack of any natural barriers made fighting easy but made establishing clear lines of defense extremely difficult. Even after Argentina and Brazil became independent, fighting for control over Uruguay lasted until Lord John Ponsonby had the idea to create a state and end the fighting. To this day, much of Uruguay’s foreign strategy is based off that balancing act between its two stronger neighbors.

Uruguay
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Outside powers often take advantage of this situation. Third-party interest in Uruguay goes back to the country’s foundation. Fighting between Argentina and Brazil came to a close thanks to mediation by the United Kingdom. The U.K. was seen as an acceptable mediator because it had supported the independence movements in South America and opposed the former colonial powers of Spain and Portugal. A newly independent state helped establish peace in a region with which the U.K. could increase trade and to which it could sell goods. The creation of Uruguay meant the U.K. could access Montevideo, a major commercial hub along South America’s Atlantic Coast, without having to directly engage with the more powerful Argentine and Brazilian governments. Uruguay still serves as an alternative entryway into South America that sidesteps Argentina and Brazil. This position can be useful to an outsider seeking to secure its presence in the region.

As the U.S. tries to shore up influence in the Western Hemisphere in the face of competition from other powers, it will need to address the South Atlantic. Washington faces some logistical challenges for monitoring and policing South Atlantic waters due to its sheer size and distance. Having a reliable partner in the region would help immensely by essentially expanding the reach of U.S. operations.

Uruguay’s location and stability are perfect in that regard. Brazil’s size makes it hard for bilateral agendas and priorities to align, not to mention that Brazil’s political crises make it difficult to build on any strategic partnerships at this time. Argentina is fraught with economic uncertainty and social unrest, and is increasingly flirtatious with China. But Uruguay has plenty going for it. The country is one of the most politically and economically stable countries in South America. But it’s not so well off that it wouldn’t want to benefit from more U.S. engagement, particularly given the economic problems facing its major trade partners Brazil and Argentina.

On the security front, the concept of U.S.-Uruguayan cooperation is not new. As the U.S. started to become a power at the beginning of the 20th century, it started to use its Navy to lay claim to the Western Hemisphere and discourage European interference. However, the Navy was also used to help regulate conflicts among Latin American countries. In 1904, for example, Uruguay’s president asked the U.S. to send warships to dissuade Argentina from moving against the sitting government. In 1940, the U.S. floated the idea of establishing a military base in Laguna del Sauce. Strong opposition in Uruguay, which feared Brazilian and Argentine responses to a U.S. base, quickly killed the idea. A subsequent attempt to resurrect it in 1944 also failed. Instead, the U.S. ushered in the Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance Treaty, which served as a collective security pact among its signatories, including Uruguay. This was followed by a 1952 security agreement between Uruguay and the U.S. that still serves as the legal blueprint for current cooperation. Over the past decade, there have been several calls in Uruguay to modernize its defense agreements with the U.S. to better reflect the post-Cold War world. Now that the U.S. has shown an interest in Uruguay, the calls may only grow louder.

The indications from Washington suggest reengagement will feature support for Uruguayan-led security efforts. The most immediate threat the U.S. faces in the South Atlantic is Chinese involvement in infrastructure projects and the presence of Chinese fishing fleets. The U.S. already expressed its concern on both scores, though given its fraught history in the Cold War, it’s hard to believe the U.S. will be allowed to build bases there. Better, according to the SOUTHCOM commander, to keep things light, with forces able to come and go quickly with the help of partners. He also suggested that SOUTHCOM increase its intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capacity in the region and tie it to improved security cooperation with partner nations.


(click to enlarge)

There may also be an added economic component. In a subtle nod, the White House declared a Pan American Day earlier this month. The name harkens back to a concept the U.S. formally introduced to the region in 1890 through the First International Conference of American States. (It would later evolve into the Pan-American Union and then the Organization of American States.) The initial purpose of this mechanism was to promote and facilitate trade within the Americas by collecting and disseminating information concerned with production, commerce and customs law. The overarching strategy behind it was the economic well-being of the Americas and keeping southern countries disinterested in outside powers. An economic component would further help curb Chinese influence in the region.

More broadly, the United States' development of closer ties to Uruguay serves as a litmus test for its reengagement with the Western Hemisphere. On the security front, the U.S. needs a sort of blueprint for engaging with the region beyond counter-narcotics operations and in a way that does not create a backlash against the U.S. The timing also opens the possibility of revisiting existing security agreements by creating an environment in which these countries can increase ever so slightly their requirements for cooperation given that, this time, Washington is approaching them and not the other way around.

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GPF: Colombia
« Reply #169 on: May 12, 2021, 05:07:43 AM »

May 12, 2021
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Colombia: A Canary in a Coal Mine?
Latin American governments can no longer ignore the problems they had pre-pandemic.
By: Allison Fedirka
Over the past year, the COVID-19 pandemic has understandably commanded the world’s attention. So it was sometimes easy to forget that every country on every continent had its fair share of social, political and economic problems, but now that the pandemic is becoming more manageable for many (though, tragically, not all), countries can no longer ignore them. Not only did they not go away, in many cases the pandemic and its associated countermeasures made their problems worse. Social unrest has been particularly hard to mollify; doing so typically requires either financial measures a government cannot currently afford or structural changes it cannot hope to pass quickly.

Take Colombia. The recent wave of protests there is in some ways an extension of those that were essentially put on hold when the pandemic hit. Among the grievances were communal violence, the peace deal with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia rebel group, corruption, poverty and so on. Not being able to gather in public, demonstrators weren’t able to demonstrate, creating a false sense of security for the government, even as it failed to address the protesters’ concerns.

As far as protest culture goes, Latin America is something of a connoisseur. Public demonstration is a trusted tool for citizens and politicians alike to air their views, issue demands and pressure their audience into negotiation. The demands of protesters can vary greatly, from getting a bonus welfare payment to negotiating better wages to serious or frivolous social causes. Yet the effective protests that the government can address tend to share a common element: a clear group of participants with a clear demand that can be met through a specific course of action. What makes the latest protests in Colombia distinct is that the protesters have used the government’s latest tax proposal as a springboard to take issue with socio-economic structures of the country more broadly. In that sense, the government is having to do more than recover from a pandemic; it’s having to reassess essential economic and political relationships with the society it governs.

What Happened

In the final weeks of 2020, Bogota confirmed plans to introduce major tax reforms in 2021 to stabilize and ignite growth in the economy. One of the main goals of the reforms was to reduce fiscal gaps and ensure the country’s capacity to service debt. It satisfied the government’s need to maintain investor confidence in markets and ensure economic stability. (Credit rating agencies and other financial institutions had made statements saying Colombia’s investment grade status could be at risk without fiscal reform.) Foreign direct investment, after all, plays an important role in the Colombian economy. The middle and working classes, however, felt differently. They believed the higher taxes and reduced discounts created a greater burden on middle-class and poorer citizens and not enough burden on the wealthy. Nationwide protests erupted April 28 and have continued ever since.

Foreign Direct Investment in Colombia
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Inflation Rates in Colombia
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But the protests were never really about the tax reforms. If they were, protesters may have gone home when the government withdrew the bill on Monday. (It’s points like this that protests in Latin America tend to calm down.) But they didn’t. They continued to rally, compelling Bogota to dispatch security forces to maintain order in urban areas and eliminate blockades to allow for the free passage of cargo, and persuading President Ivan Duque to invite representatives from the opposition, private business and local governments to talk about the reforms and reshape them going forward. But complaints from across the political spectrum came forward. Some were concrete, others abstract, but there was no designated leader and no organizing body to unify the demands. It’s become nearly impossible for the government to resolve the protests effectively or quickly.

The dominant rhetoric around the demonstrations also hints at something deeper. Naturally, people from various parties have blamed different groups for infiltrating the protests and instigating violence. Such accusations are common practice in Latin America – and sometimes they’re even true. More telling, though, are two comments by leading politicians from opposing sides of the aisle. On the conservative end, former President Alvaro Uribe called on people to resist the “dissipated molecular revolution,” a term adopted by conservative academics in the region to explain dynamics observed in Latin American protests. It makes two main points: First, that political groups gradually change how individuals think and lead them to reject existing shared societal values. Second, protests bring the state to a point of extreme disorder such that the government has an excuse for a strong security response.

The voice on the other end of the political spectrum is opposition leader Gustavo Petro, who said that the protests mark the beginning of the end of neoliberalism in Colombia. The next phase, he says, will be marked by repression.

Both comments suggest that a large segment of the population now questions the neoliberal economic model in place, and new ideas are emerging. The significance of this claim should not be overlooked. A state’s ideas about the domestic economy are intimately linked to its politics, and thus its foreign and trade policies.

Hard Road Ahead

This is hardly Colombia’s only deep-rooted issue. The country’s politics and security services are still adjusting to the 2016 peace deal with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The war with the FARC lasted more than 50 years and left countless scars on society, and a piece of paper alone doesn’t translate into political and social harmony. In addition, the government is still in talks with the National Liberation Army, and it’s still combating dissident FARC groups that remain active in the black market and drug trade.

There’s also the decade long deterioration of the Venezuelan state and economy, which acts as a drain on the Colombian government’s attention and resources and has sucked the region into the U.S.-Russian power struggle. Finally, Bogota must prepare its economy, which has benefited greatly from the production and export of hydrocarbons, for a world of moderate oil prices and transition toward renewables. For better or worse, addressing these issues requires a break with the status quo.

A restructuring of the government’s relationship with society doesn’t have to be catastrophic. Take Chile, which started a similar process in fall 2019. A decision to raise metro fares sparked mass violent protests across the country, followed by a series of government concessions and reforms. The process included major issues, like restructuring military funding, and culminated in the initiation of a process to change the country’s Pinochet-era constitution. Chile still has social and economic issues to address, but unlike Venezuela, its history illuminates a path for remaking the social contract without complete collapse or complete rejection of current models. It will take time before it’s clear whether Colombia can do the same.

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GPF: Reengaging the Northern Triangle
« Reply #170 on: May 24, 2021, 07:08:57 AM »
Not to worry, Co-Prez Kommiela is on the case!

May 24, 2021
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Reengaging the Northern Triangle
Washington can’t ignore the overtures China is making in El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala.
By: Allison Fedirka

In recent years, there’s been a periodic and predictable exchange between the United States and the Northern Triangle countries – Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala. A group of immigrants heads north to the U.S. to escape poverty and insecurity, whereupon U.S. policymakers argue either that the immigrants should be stopped in their tracks or that conditions should be improved in their home countries so that they don’t need to migrate in the first place. This rote episode inevitably falls into the background of international affairs, only to resurface a few months later when another “caravan” forms. Occasionally, some security assistance or added consular support would be introduced, but nothing really happens that alters the relationship between the U.S. and the Northern Triangle or that upsets the regional balance of power.

But the status quo is beginning to change, however slowly. Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala certainly continue to call for greater cooperation and funding from Washington, but they are also entertaining overtures from China, a tactic Washington will be unable to ignore.

Obsession

The United States has a long-standing obsession with Central America. Presidents since the mid-1800s have prioritized having a strong U.S. presence there. It’s why the U.S. spearheaded the construction of the Panama Canal and why it paid so much attention to the region during the Cold War. The obsession, of course, stems from Central America’s geostrategic value. The countries form the western flank of the Caribbean basin. They occupy a place where the North American landmass narrows, greatly reducing the distance between the Pacific and Atlantic coasts. (Most of the countries here are bicoastal.) Control and influence over this region and its maritime approach remain critical to U.S. strategy for securing its maritime borders.

Consequently, rivals seeking to unnerve or agitate the United States look to Central America as a point of vulnerability. The Soviets certainly did so during the Cold War, which was a much hotter conflict for the region than the name implies. Indeed, Central America served as a brutal front for fighting between the two global powers. The U.S. kicked things off in 1954 by supporting a coup in Guatemala, though the primary years of action did not occur until the 1980s when domestic political unrest created an opening for the Soviets. What followed was 36 years of civil unrest in Guatemala, 12 years of civil war in El Salvador and the U.S. using Honduras as a staging ground for troops that participated in 12 years of fighting during Nicaragua’s revolution. The details vary by country, but the results were the same: structural economic damages, a poor security atmosphere that rewarded illegal behavior and weak political institutions monopolized by elites.

This is precisely why so many migrants are so eager to flee to the United States, and it’s precisely why China is uniquely able to capitalize. The U.S. and the Northern Triangle broadly understand that investment and aid are necessary to improve socio-economic conditions, but they don’t agree on how much or where it should go, and there are often strings attached. For example, Northern Triangle countries are currently seeking as much as $30 billion in financing, yet Washington’s most recent offer was just $4 billion and was accompanied by calls for political and economic reforms. Washington believes it cannot trust that the funds will be used effectively. (Its concern isn’t entirely misplaced. The U.S. has open court cases against top Guatemalan officials for corruption and top Honduran officials for drug trafficking, and lawmakers are debating how to respond to the El Salvadorian legislature’s vote to replace five supreme court judges and the attorney general. This makes it hard for both sides to engage in good faith.)

A Few Grand Gestures

The U.S. has had little reason to change its approach to the Northern Triangle – that is, until China began to court the region more earnestly and vice versa. Washington has been particularly worried about El Salvador. In 2018, the government decided to recognize China over Taiwan, when Beijing expressed an interest in developing La Union port. More recently, when the president removed the supreme court judges, Washington sent an envoy to San Salvador who was ignored by the president. More, a week later, the legislature ratified an agreement with China for the construction of a stadium, library and water treatment facility. Vaccine diplomacy has also been put in play with several shipments of China's Sinopharm delivered to El Salvador.

Washington has fewer options to manage the situation now than it did during the Cold War, when the specter of communism “justified” all sorts of sordid behavior. (Indeed, over the years, details of U.S. actions and operations in the Americas during the Cold War have come to light and clearly show its role in the violence and instability in the region.) Being too heavy-handed will only alienate the region and likely push it further into China’s sphere of influence. Even using clandestine approaches through civil society groups and nongovernmental organizations is difficult. Previous attempts to leverage aid programs as a solution have been pursued by U.S. presidents from John F. Kennedy to Barack Obama, and all of them failed.

Foreign Direct Investment | Central America
(click to enlarge)

Constraints such as these have led many to propose that the U.S. increase trade, near-shoring and general economic engagement with the Northern Triangle. Crucially, these proposals intersect with the broader U.S.-China trade war. The U.S. already has the upper hand in trade with these countries, all of which have moderate to high dependencies on exports. They’re attractive candidates for near-shoring activities, especially given their close proximity and relatively cheap labor, but security is a strong impediment. Additional financial firepower could also be acquired by leveraging relationships with Taiwan, which values the diplomatic recognition it has received from Guatemala and Honduras.

Northern Triangle Trade Trends
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It’s a bit of a double-edged sword. But putting trade and economic projects at the fore plays directly into the broader U.S.-China trade and economic wars. There’s been lots of hype about increased Chinese presence in Latin America, but the degree and type of influence vary drastically by location. Northern Triangle countries have few natural resources that would be attractive to China. And Beijing’s push for shifting manufacturing production to higher-tech, value-added goods would not find many buyers in the region. Even so, China is a giant market that could offer preferable terms to increase its share of trade, which is relatively small in these countries, and gain space in their economies.

Notably, China has become a bit more judicious with the types of infrastructure projects it invests in. But given the strategic value of these countries to the U.S., the geopolitical gains could well make up for any financial losses. There is, of course, the traditional danger of a country getting caught in a debt trap, but tomorrow’s problems would not be enough to discourage the Northern Triangle from today’s gains. China’s ability to conduct business in legal gray areas is compatible with the patronage systems still employed by Northern Triangle countries, thereby allowing them another source through which to funnel money to support networks. There also exists the longer-term potential threat of China introducing a digital footprint in these countries by helping develop surveillance technology or telecommunications systems.

The U.S. faces a pressing need to consider how it wants to reengage the Northern Triangle in light of this competition. Right now, Washington holds the upper hand on the economic front and is the dominant hemispheric security power. However, China is more than capable of undermining Washington’s position with just a few grand gestures. Beijing’s foothold in the region is small for now, but it’s too strategically valuable not to be at least targeted, especially considering that the U.S. threshold for tolerating risk there is so low.

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WT: China in Latin America
« Reply #171 on: October 18, 2021, 03:21:02 AM »


Beware shiny object syndrome over Taiwan

China is eroding American influence in the Western Hemisphere

By Tom Basile

Communist China’s military and rhetorical escalation against Taiwan is testing the Biden Administration’s response to America’s most dangerous geopolitical adversary. While speculation runs rampant about President Xi Jinping’s next move and breathless commentators discuss the possibility of war over the island nation, the CCP continues advancing a truly global strategy.

America has ‘shiny object syndrome’ when it comes to foreign policy, and China knows it. Our media outlets love the intrigue and suspense of a possible US-China standoff. Our hapless politicians never miss an opportunity to fixate on a single issue while ignoring broader perspectives and bigger problems.

For all the talk about Taiwan, there is little discussion or action over China’s incursions into the Western Hemisphere, where the CCP is eroding American influence right in our backyard.

We’re used to thinking about communist power in this hemisphere as isolated in places like Cuba or Venezuela. The Chinese have quietly changed that, doing things that never make a Presidential debate or the nightly news. Their military power, debt-trap diplomacy, and economic coercion are spreading like a virus.

In July, former Costa Rican President Luis Guillermo Solís cautioned in an op-ed that “Central America seems particularly fertile ground for Chinese expansion.” He warned of the Chinese capitalizing on the region’s division between the Nicaraguan dictatorship, compromised states like Guatemala and Honduras, El Salvador teetering on the brink of autocracy, and the effects of COVID-19 and systemic issues in several other nations.

Since 2007, Chinese private and state investment in Central America has amounted to more than $2.3 billion in Mexico, $2 billion in Costa Rica, and $500 million in Panama. The Chinese are dumping money into Honduras, Guatemala and this year announced a $550 million infrastructure deal with El Salvador.

On the telecom front, Huawei controls 37% of the cellular market in Costa Rica and is also a major player in Belize. China does not separate business and political objectives. Even so-called private enterprises are utilized to advance political agendas.

Moving into South America, the People’s Liberation Army has constructed and controls a space command center in Argentina. According to Reuters, the station played a “key role in China’s landing of a spacecraft on the dark side of the moon” in 2019. Argentina signed a cooperation agreement in 2015 that could lead to the CCP building military bases there.

Both Columbia and Peru have purchased Chinese military hardware, and the new Marxist regime in Peru is likely to strengthen ties with Beijing.

Among China’s principal goals is controlling strategic minerals. They’ve made large investments in ownership of lithium mines critical to producing electric vehicles, renewable energy, and wearable tech. China is also investing in the energy sector in Chile, Brazil, and Peru.

China recently announced a massive all-cash deal involving a lithium brine operation in Argentina amounting to more than $770 million. In each of these scenarios, whether the CCP’s activities involve mining, energy, military, or aid in the form of loans or grants, the regime is buying influence even with traditional US allies. Certainly, there are signs of structural cracks in the China juggernaut: mounting debt, lower productivity, and an energy crisis. But the Biden administration shouldn’t expect that to impact China’s global strategy. Unlike Soviet Russia, China has bought a lot of friends to help them weather the storm and grow their influence, even as economic growth slows with Mr. Xi’s tightening grip on society.

The United States leaned into its anti-Soviet, anti-communist strategy during the first Cold War, and it needs to do the same now. Taiwan may be a sexy story for our digital age soothsayers, but it’s one shiny object. A weak Joe Biden and Washington in disarray will continue to ignore the CCP’s reach at their own peril. So far, we’ve been like a moth to a flame, unaware of the mortal danger that lies ahead.

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GPF: Long Term Strategy for Latin America
« Reply #172 on: November 01, 2021, 03:50:53 AM »
Ultimately this flaw of this piece is that it takes seriously the "deal with the root causes" meme.   That said there are a number of relevant observations in this piece-- principally in its description of the problems.

November 1, 2021
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A Long-Term US Strategy for Latin America

The pandemic created unprecedented problems in the region at a time when Washington’s ability to help is severely constrained.
By: Allison Fedirka

When U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken admitted last month that the U.S. had a mixed record on improving civilian security in Latin American countries, the region did a double-take. Security cooperation, even direct intervention, has been the cornerstone of U.S. engagement with Latin America. When it works, it’s a low-cost approach that leaves spare resources and energy for Washington to project power across the globe. But the economic and social disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic has wreaked havoc across the region, interacting with existing security threats to pose new challenges to the United States. The U.S. is responding with a new approach that also emphasizes social and economic development projects, which it hopes will not only reduce immediate security threats but also support longer-term goals like reducing power vacuums, strengthening the region’s economic ties with the U.S., and securing the U.S.-aligned regime structure.

Past the Tipping Point

Nearly all the countries in Latin America were poorly equipped to deal with the pandemic. Large segments of the population lacked access to adequate health care; few workers could perform their jobs remotely; and governments lacked the funds for massive social spending or recovery projects. The region’s economy contracted nearly 8 percent in 2020 – well above the 3 percent global average – and economists expect it will take nearly a decade to recover. Making matters worse, many of these countries were facing severe socio-economic difficulties even before the pandemic, like organized crime, forced displacement, lack of formal employment and natural disasters. The pandemic pushed many states past the tipping point.


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Latin American governments’ difficulties meeting the needs of their population had three major consequences. First, organized crime groups stepped in to ensure economic activity, food distribution and other public needs, especially in remote areas. These groups also offered employment opportunities at a time when jobs were hard to come by. As organized crime gained a stronger hold in these areas, attacks on local communities, turf wars and displacement increased. Second, public trust in government was severely damaged. Nearly all leaders in the region saw their popularity drop, with several facing calls for impeachment. With their power diminished and populations disgruntled, politicians became vulnerable to the influence of foreign powers offering economic relief or political support.


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Finally, migration pressures in three separate areas overflowed and collided in Central America, en route to the United States. The Northern Triangle region (El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras) is most familiar to Americans because of its prominence during the Trump administration. A second wave involves people from Hispaniola fleeing Haiti’s latest political crisis. There are also migrating Haitians who previously settled in South America, primarily Brazil and Chile, after the 2010 earthquake. Deteriorating conditions in those countries have pushed the migrants north toward the United States. Finally, Venezuelans have been leaving their country in droves in recent years. Many of them settled in Colombia, but with Bogota saying it cannot host any more and other governments in the region prioritizing their own citizens, many Venezuelan migrants are now looking to make the trek north as well.

The simultaneous occurrence of increased migration, stronger organized crime and regionwide political instability poses a formidable security threat to the United States. Though elements of this activity have always been present to some degree in the region, the current magnitude and scope go well beyond previous levels. An adequate U.S. security response would require a massive mobilization of resources at a time when the U.S. is trying to reduce military commitments, manage an unprecedented economic recovery and unify a deeply divided public. Furthermore, these types of operations provide only short-term relief at best. Washington needs a strategy that also addresses long-term threats while minimizing costs.

A New Approach

In recent weeks, the U.S. government has signaled a shift in its engagement strategy with Latin America that integrates a much stronger socio-economic focus to complement security efforts. The first clue came in early October when Mexican officials announced the end of the Merida Initiative, the linchpin policy for U.S.-Mexican security cooperation, and the start of a new stage of cooperation. Shortly thereafter the two countries held their High-Level Security Dialogue, which ended with a joint statement declaring the decision to take a more holistic approach to security. The parties pledged more indirect efforts like working with at-risk youth, reducing drug use and jointly combating arms trafficking. Mexico City had long lobbied for this approach, but Washington had resisted.

Similarly, on Oct. 25, the U.S. government announced a new strategy for combating drug trafficking in Colombia. The objective is to strengthen the government’s presence in rural communities, support the incomes of legal businesses and eliminate coca production. There are other indications of a shift in U.S. strategy in other parts of Latin America. During an Oct. 20 speech in Quito, Blinken said the U.S. had focused too much on addressing the symptoms of organized crime and relied too much on working with security forces rather than addressing root causes. Many communities have come to rely on organized crime to stimulate economic activity. It’s difficult to convince people to leave organized crime without providing them an alternative source of income, especially when their former “employer” relies on violence to keep people in check. The Biden administration wants to correct this, Blinken said, and to create economic opportunities that will weaken organized crime over time.

Migration is another area where a security-focused approach may provide temporary relief but not a permanent solution. People leave their countries for many reasons. Addressing physical insecurity and political turmoil must be part of the solution, but unless the economic situation improves, those problems will invariably return.

Foreign Threats

A final element of Washington’s new approach has less to do with Latin American instability itself than with what hostile powers could do with it. In June, the U.S. said fighting corruption, both domestically and internationally, was a core interest for U.S. national security. Corruption and authoritarian government go hand in hand, Washington argues, and undemocratic regimes divert resources away from economic growth. This is directly relevant to the post-pandemic economic and political landscape in Latin America.


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Disillusionment with Latin American governments’ inability to deal with the pandemic’s fallout has added fuel to preexisting questions about democratic governance. This trend poses a long-term threat to the U.S., which promotes and relies on democratic regimes worldwide. It also raises the possibility that governments in the region will look to nondemocratic powers like Russia or China for assistance if that gives them a better chance of holding on to power. By stressing the links between corruption, economic development and democracy, Washington is trying to make the case for like-minded, pro-U.S. governments in the region.

Funding plays a critical role in any economic development project, and for that the U.S. has relied on its International Development Finance Corp. Washington set up the DFC in late 2018 as part of its response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. In Latin America, DFC efforts have focused primarily on providing financing for small and midsized businesses. The DFC can also invest in large infrastructure projects, and it encourages the participation of foreign partners.

Its strength is also a potential weakness: its dependence on private-sector cooperation to execute development projects. The DFC offers longer investment horizons, U.S. government funding upfront, protection against currency inconvertibility, and insurance against expropriation and political violence, all in an effort to attract investors. Without private participation, the DFC lacks the funds to make a serious difference in Latin American economies. The potential benefit of this model, however, is that it allows U.S. companies to gradually increase their presence in Latin America, boosting economic growth in a sustainable way while reinforcing long-term economic ties with the United States.

By giving socio-economic development a more prominent role in U.S. strategy toward Latin America, the U.S. is redefining how it engages with the hemisphere. Security operations will always be needed to deal with immediate threats, but a sustainable approach requires attention to the underlying causes of instability and violence. Doing so now, before the scale of the threats is too great or the costs too high, is key to Washington’s continued ability to project power around the globe.

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China making a move in Panama
« Reply #173 on: November 03, 2021, 05:54:47 AM »
Grey zone skirmish with the PRC

At stake: Control of the Panama Canal

By Ron MacCammon

A growing U.S.-People’s Republic of China (PRC) gray zone skirmish in Panama could have real national security implications for the United States. In the next few months, there are significant port and canal decisions that will be a bellwether gauging if China can continue to outmaneuver the United States in Latin America through its use of soft power, incentive-based bargaining, and the argument of a declining America. At stake is strategic control of the Panama Canal.

The port decision focuses on Hutchison Whampoa and its 25-year port concession set to expire in January 2022. Hutchison is a Chinese multinational, Fortune 500 conglomerate with a ports and related services division operating in 26 countries. They also manage five of the 10 busiest container ports in the world. While China does not operate the canal, Hutchison manages the ports of Balboa and Cristobal on both sides of the isthmus and the concession for Margarita Island, Panama’s largest Atlantic port. Hutchison is rumored to have deep ties spanning decades with Beijing.

The canal decision centers on a 50-year concession for a new water management system. This system will address the increasingly constrained water levels caused by drought and overuse that have worried canal officials for years. Multiple PRC companies have expressed interest in this project. With these two contracts, China would have an enormous lever of power to affect transshipment cargo operations. Beijing could use these companies as political agents to disrupt canal operations during a hot gray zone confrontation, exerting strategic control over this critical maritime chokepoint.

Panama has always been a small country with an oversized profile because of the canal and its long history with the United States. The canal bridges the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. It has been the force behind Panama’s emergence as a maritime and air logistics hub with a substantial global banking and services center. It is still relevant after more than a century in operation and factors in around 6% of international trade. The United States is the top customer, with 68% of canal traffic beginning or ending at a U.S. port, while China is 16%. The U.S., via treaty with Panama, guarantees permanent neutrality of the canal, with fair access for all nations and nondiscriminatory tolls. With that in mind, the PRC maneuvers carefully, but it is emboldened.

Panama robustly turned toward China during the presidency of Juan Carlos Varela (2014-2019).

Panama broke diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 2017. It fully embraced the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the PRC’s global infrastructure development strategy that invests in countries to expand Chinese economic and political influence. In Panama, many infrastructure projects were proposed during the Varela years, including a 4th bridge across the canal, a high-speed rail system to the interior, and a cruise terminal. From the outset, questions were raised about contract transparency and the necessity of some projects. Corrupt payments to Varela officials once only whispered allegations are now openly accepted as matter-of-fact.

The Chinese BRI template for Latin America is well established: they get major infrastructure projects approved with inflated costs through a process designed to be opaque and enable fraud and corruption. Lax enforcement of key provisions is a program hallmark as labor stipulations, costs and timelines are rarely upheld. By the time the actual costs and beneficiaries surface, the government that signed the deal is out of office. The new government finds the projects do not generate the promised benefits, and the country is more deeply in debt.

Panama, like many nations, has a history of highlevel corruption. It seems each administration seeks new and innovative ways to monetize their time in office. With Laurentino Cortizo and the return of the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) in 2019 after a decade in political exile, relations with China have cooled. Many projects envisioned have been canceled or restructured. This has been primarily attributed to the impact of Covid-19 on the Panamanian economy. Still, there is noise members of the Cortizo administration have been attempting to renegotiate the terms of some contracts in their favor. The PRD is the party of Omar and Martin Torrijos, of Balbina Herrera and Ernesto Perez Balladares. They are the party of the canal treaty, and the government deposed during the U.S. 1989 invasion. They know how to find an advantage, but even some ‘old’ PRD members find the ‘new’ PRD tactics unseemly.

Many Panamanian elites are U.S.-educated, and the cultural ties between the countries are strong. Still, there is concern about the Biden administration and whether the U.S. can keep its historic leadership role. The U.S. open borders policy has resulted in thousands of migrants pushing through Panama. Many Panamanians are tired of the daily news coverage of migrants begging for food and water, the increase in petty crimes and the draining of already scarce public resources to support their crossing. The Afghan debacle, the cultural chaos, and the overall perception of weak U.S. leadership contrast negatively with an aggressive China open for business. Panama also knows there are other countries courting BRI projects, and Panama has few other realistic options for financing their infrastructure projects. With the disruption of global supply chains from COVID-19, increased shipping costs, and the PRC’s formidable drive to invest in Panamanian infrastructure, the significance of these pending decisions has only increased for the United States. A broad-based engagement strategy that advances both U.S. and Panamanian interests are needed, or the Chinese will look like the better option. None of this is news. In recent years, many frank assessments have been published highlighting Chinese maneuvering in Panama, but the Biden administration continues to project indifference, and their policies lack relevancy. For example, some Panamanian officials quietly expressed doubts about the sincerity of a recent high-level U.S. delegation. They described meetings as full of tired rhetoric and typical promises, which is not a good sign. So time is short, and decisions are pending. Real diplomacy is needed to reassure a traditional partner, or we could wake up one morning wondering how strategic control of the Panama Canal was lost to the People’s Republic of China.

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MY: Honduras elections bad for US, good for China
« Reply #174 on: November 29, 2021, 02:49:59 PM »
https://michaelyon.locals.com/upost/1358007/significant-for-us-security
====================
WSJ

The outcome will also determine whether the small Central American nation continues to recognize Taiwan or switches allegiance to China, as promised by Ms. Castro.

Ms. Castro, who represents the Libre party, is the wife of Manuel “Mel” Zelaya, a controversial former Honduran president. The military in 2009 ousted Mr. Zelaya, who was then an ally of Venezuela’s strongman Hugo Chávez, after he tried to change the constitution to allow re-election, a move they feared would lead him to stay in power for good.

When Mr. Hernández was elected in 2012, however, he changed the constitution and subsequently ran for re-election.

Many voters were in the mood for change. Poverty has soared to a record 74% of the population in 2021 from 59% in 2019. The economy contracted 9% in 2020, the result of the pandemic and the devastation caused by back-to-back hurricanes, Eta and Iota, which hit the country in November 2020.


“I voted for Xiomara Castro because I think she can change this country,” said Bernardo Paredes, a vegetable seller and father of four children in a working-class suburb near San Pedro Sula, the country’s second-largest city. “These last few years have been difficult. We saw a lot of corruption and increased poverty.”


U.S. officials had been worried about the election following the 2017 vote, when election agency officials suspended the count for 36 hours after initial returns showed Mr. Hernández losing. He eventually won, but many Hondurans believe the vote was rigged.

Honduras has since made changes to its system for counting votes.

Mr. Asfura, who is mayor of the nation’s capital, Tegucigalpa, was dogged by allegations of corruption. In 2020, anticorruption prosecutors accused him and another politician of diverting $1.2 million in public funds. But a higher court, controlled by allies of the ruling party, shelved the case, citing procedural errors. He has denied the charges.

As the candidate of the National Party, Mr. Asfura was also burdened by his ties to Mr. Hernández, whom U.S. prosecutors in court papers say turned Honduras into a sanctuary for drug smugglers who paid millions of dollars in bribes in exchange for protection by Honduras’s government. Mr. Hernández’s brother Juan Antonio was found guilty of drug trafficking in New York and is now serving a life sentence in prison.

Mr. Hernández has denied any involvement in drug smuggling and says the accusations are the work of criminals seeking revenge or reduced sentences.


Poverty has soared to a record 74% of the population in 2021 from 59% in 2019; voters in Tegucigalpa on Sunday.
PHOTO: MOISES CASTILLO/ASSOCIATED PRESS

Ms. Castro has vowed to work with the United Nations to tackle corruption in Honduras. In recent years, the country set up an agency staffed with some outside prosecutors trained by the Organization for American States, but Honduran politicians ended its mandate after prosecutors brought several high-profile cases against officials.

She has also vowed to use referendums for major policy decisions, a tool that other leftist governments in the region have used to consolidate power.


“They don’t respect private property,” said Bernabé Cruz, an 86-year-old merchant who voted for the National Party. “I spent about 30 years selling on the streets of downtown San Pedro Sula to have a business in which I have invested $41,000.”

The National Party sought to paint Ms. Castro as a radical who would turn Honduras into another Venezuela. But many in Honduras’s business class and the Catholic Church, fed up with corruption, went against the ruling party, say analysts.

Before the vote, Msgr. Ángel Garachana, president of the Episcopal Conference of Honduras, called on Hondurans to “vote to kick out established networks of corruption.”

Ms. Castro’s call to establish diplomatic relations with mainland China would end Honduras’s long diplomatic alliance with Taiwan, which China considers a renegade province. Honduras is only one of 15 countries that retain formal ties with Taipei. Taiwan’s government has said it would respect the outcome, but called on Hondurans to be wary of what it called false promises by China for economic aid. The U.S. has also pressed Honduras to keep its ties to Taiwan.
« Last Edit: November 29, 2021, 02:55:53 PM by Crafty_Dog »

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GPF: Chile
« Reply #175 on: December 02, 2021, 02:20:22 PM »
N GEOPOLITICS
In Chile, a Political Revolution 30 Years in the Making
9 MIN READDec 2, 2021 | 21:00 GMT





A protester holds a piece of cloth reading "New Constitution or Nothing" during a demonstration in Santiago, Chile, on Oct. 22, 2019.
A protester holds a piece of cloth reading "New Constitution or Nothing" during a demonstration in Santiago, Chile, on Oct. 22, 2019.

(PEDRO UGARTE/AFP via Getty Images)

For over 30 years, Chile’s predictable politics and free-market economics have made it a beacon of stability in an often turbulent region. Recent developments, however, suggest that may soon change.

In May, Chileans elected a left-wing body to draft the country’s new constitution — a concession offered by the government after massive demonstrations in 2019 saw calls for social and political change. And on Dec. 19, Chileans will head back to the polls to elect either a solidly left- or right-wing president after more moderate candidates were eliminated in the first round of the presidential vote on Nov. 21.

The polarized presidential race, along with the ratification of a new constitution (and the appointment of a heavily slanted assembly to draft it), reflects the extent to which Chilean politics have changed in recent years. But this shift has been a long time coming.

30 Years of Centrist Politics

Chile transitioned to democracy in March 1990 with the election of President Patricio Aylwin, ending the 17-year reign of General Augusto Pinochet’s repressive military dictatorship. Aylwin kept the 1980 constitution, which favors private sector procurement of infrastructure projects and social services. He also continued economic liberalization and fiscal discipline, which began under the Pinochet regime with heavy influence from U.S. economic schools of thought. Aylwin led a coalition of center-left political parties that would go on to govern Chile for 24 of the past 31 years.

In response to growing left-wing influence in Alwyn’s coalition, Chilean politics shifted to the center-right in 2010, seeing pro-business Sebastian Pinera elected for two separate presidential terms in 2010 and 2018. During this period, Chile’s political spectrum oscillated between center-right and center-left coalitions, with the former promoting free-market ideals and the latter implementing social programs benefiting the poor and the growing middle-class. The dominance of the two centrist blocs kept Chile’s political risk relatively low, as neither was interested in fundamentally changing the pro-market policies that had helped fuel the country’s rapid economic growth following the ousting of the military dictatorship. 

Chile’s GDP grew an average of 5% per year between 1990-2020. With fiscally disciplined governments at the helm, the Chilean economy benefited from low public-sector debt and low inflation rates. Leveraging its long coastline and access to Pacific markets, the country signed free trade agreements with global economic powerhouses such as the United States and China. Foreign capital also flowed into the country to take advantage of the abundant copper supply. Domestic investment, meanwhile, flourished under government subsidies.


During this three-decade boom, Chile’s middle class grew and its poverty rate fell from 40% to 10%. But many still felt that the country’s free-market system was essentially unequal, as the windfall of foreign investment largely benefited the wealthy while increasing the cost of living for everyone else.

The Chilean government sold land and water rights to private firms and placed the country’s pension system, healthcare and education sectors under the care of the private sector — which charged sky-high service fees. Exorbitant out-of-pocket health and education bills, in turn, drove many middle-class Chileans into massive debt — fueling fears that they may end up living in poverty like their parents.

The Breaking Point

Beginning in 2009, a series of widely publicized scandals over price-fixing of basic necessities like chicken and toilet paper sullied Chileans’ views on private sector dominance. The scandals also contributed to the growing perception that the country was being ruled by a corrupt political elite. Student groups and blue-collar workers protested over perceived societal inequalities, while Mapuche Indigenous collectives began to organize to reclaim their ancestral lands from foreign firms.

Student protests over a subway price hike and police violence served as the catalyst for
massive nationwide demonstrations that began in October 2019 and lasted up until early 2020. Chile’s protest movement saw violent clashes between the country’s militarized police force and protesters, damage to critical infrastructure and the looting of shops and businesses. Over 1.5 million people, just under 10% of Chile’s population, attended a protest on Oct. 25, 2019, calling for the resignation of President Sebastian Piñera.

Though the protests were originally organized by youth leaders, several subsets of society joined, including Indigenous groups. Members of the now-large Chilean middle class also took to the streets, frustrated at paying premium rates for road and water use.

Chile’s Mapuche Peoples

Despite making up 12% of Chile’s population, the Indigenous Mapuche peoples are not formally recognized by the current constitution or the state. Their presence in the country has contributed to societal divides along racial lines. The private sector’s continued refusal to sign over land rights has pushed the Mapuche to resort to violence against business infrastructure, specifically the logging industry.

 

To quell the protests, the Chilean Congress approved a referendum to rewrite the country’s constitution in October 2020. During the referendum campaign, the anti-establishment left took advantage of the public's discontent to push a message of societal change and a broadened social safety net, growing a following among youth and the middle class.

While protests came to a stop, societal tensions remained strong. Chile’s economy shrunk 5.8% in 2020 amid the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, exacerbating the existing inequalities. The upper class was able to continue working remotely, while the nearly 6 million Chileans with informal jobs in the service sector (most of whom middle- and low-wage workers) struggled to make ends meet.

Against this backdrop, Chilean voters appointed a left-wing body to draft the new constitution in May 2021, fueling fears among the business class about the country’s economic future. In the face of a constitutional rewrite, center-right voters have also grown more extreme in their commitment to protecting Chile’s free-market principles.

One Country, Two Visions

In the aftermath of the pandemic, Chile has seen two political movements on opposite ends of the spectrum gain significant public backing. On the left, the student and Indigenous leaders have become prominent political figures, pulling the ideology of the Concertacion coalition further from the center. And on the right, many voters have abandoned the traditional center-right coalition in favor of the far-right Republican Party, which defends pro-business policy and is starkly against immigration.

These developments are representative of two competing visions for Chile’s future. The first is the leftist dream of a country where the government would provide an expansive safety net by reallocating services such as education, health care and the pension system into the public sector — even if it means greater global isolation and less foreign investment. Funding this vision would require raising taxes and tariffs on industry at the risk of violating several free trade agreements (most notably the Trans-Pacific Partnership) and prompting global powers like China to reduce their reliance on the country’s exports. Ownership of Chile’s natural resources — including water and land rights — would also be restored to the state and Indigenous communities, stripping private firms of these assets.

The right-wing's dream, by contrast, is of a country that remains globally open to business but closed to immigrants. Under this vision, social services and land rights would remain in the hands of private firms, which would ensure Chile retains its liberalized trade and global economic reach. Additionally, the state would increase security measures in an effort to combat the growing influence of regional criminal groups in the country. Chile would also adopt nationalistic policies, including stricter immigration laws, as Chileans seek to protect their jobs and resources from regional waves of migrants. Politicians would likely acquiesce on some social issues, such as formally recognizing Mapuche Indigenous and ensuring gender parity among leadership, but would refrain from substantive action to reallocate resources.

An Uncertain Future

This clash of visions will be on full display during the Dec. 19 presidential runoff election, with Gabriel Boric from the “Apruebo Dignidad” (I Approve Dignity) coalition representing the left-wing’s dream of expanded social services funded by corporate taxes, and Jose Antonio Kast from the Republican Party representing the right-wing’s dream of a free-market economy with fewer illegal immigrants.

But regardless of who wins the presidential race, the proposed constitution is likely to fall in line with the leftist vision for Chile, given the ideological composition of the body currently drafting it.
The new constitution, which the assembly is expected to unveil in late 2022, will probably strip away many private sector benefits and address pressing issues of Indigenous representation, land and water rights. After the draft is ready, Chile will then hold a final referendum to reject or approve the draft. This will provide another trigger for political clashes, as the extreme-right camp will likely rally against the ratification of the draft, in favor of keeping the Pinochet-era constitution and its private-sector protections.

Households, companies and investors in Chile — once one of the most stable countries in South America — will increasingly find themselves in the throes of uncertainty.





These upcoming events portend a period of political and social instability in Chile with increased economic and security risks. The country’s growing polarization will make it harder for politicians to reach agreements, which will almost certainly disrupt and potentially stall the policymaking process. In the short term, this is likely to pose an increased threat to the country’s macroeconomic policy and demonstrations will heighten the threat of the country’s security outlook. Political polarization may also inhibit lawmakers’ ability to face long-term challenges such as ensuring sustainable economic growth and adapting to endemic COVID-19. It could threaten the country’s ability to take full advantage of the global energy transition as well, as the growing threat of climate change increases global demand for Chile’s abundant copper and lithium resources, which are key to electric vehicle production. But legislative gridlock resulting from clashes between increasingly polarized left- and right-wing politicians may threaten Chile’s ability to move up the value chain beyond raw materials exports.

Chile will also likely see the reemergence of frequent protests as the two visions compete. Should the far-right gain political prominence (by, for example, Kast winning the presidential election), the country’s far-left student movement and Indigenous groups are likely to reignite nationwide demonstrations. And if the new leftist politicians are unable to deliver policy or collaborate often with centrists, Chile’s extreme-left anarchist, Marxist and Indigenous groups are likely to increase the frequency of targeted attacks against the state and industry — furthering the country’s instability. As a result, households, companies and investors in Chile — once one of the most stable countries in South America — will increasingly find themselves in the throes of uncertainty.

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GPF: US vs China in Central America
« Reply #176 on: December 06, 2021, 04:11:13 AM »
December 6, 2021
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The US-China Competition in Central America: Key Countries

Washington and Beijing will take a targeted approach that focuses on their strengths.
By: Allison Fedirka

The competition between the United States and China for influence over Central America and the Caribbean isn’t exactly news, and the reason for the competition is pretty well established. But what often gets overlooked in the discussion, especially when the region is incorrectly lumped together as one big grouping, is how the competition will unfold. The U.S. and China will take a targeted approach that focuses on a few select countries and plays to their respective strengths. It’ll be an uneven competition, to say the least.

The Caribbean
(click to enlarge)

China, of course, is constrained by distance and a less established political history with the region, so it has a smaller margin of error. As important, its domestic economy is in a precarious state. While the government has managed to stave off crisis, it faces growing pressure in this balancing act. Beijing understands that it must wield its financial influence judiciously, as evidenced by the decision of China’s top two policy banks not to sign new financing commitments with Latin American governments last year. With an eye to getting the most bang for its buck, Beijing will focus on strategic telecommunications and port projects that align directly with its strategic objectives.

But it must be careful. China doesn’t want to do so much that it provokes a security response from the U.S. Beijing has worked to improve institutional ties with several militaries in the region, but its steps in this regard have been small and incremental, laying the groundwork for future cooperation and intelligence collection opportunities.

For its part, the U.S. has always maintained a strategy that integrates the regional economies with its own, especially by addressing macroeconomic development and nation-building. Washington has been trying, for example, to revitalize the Dominican Republic-Central America free trade agreement by working closely with foreign governments and U.S. businesses, which also play a vital role in the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), a key mechanism Washington uses to give loans and fund major projects in these countries. These efforts also align with U.S. near-shoring initiatives, business standards and best practices.
The strategy meets Washington’s strategic needs, shares the financial burden with the private sector and creates a structure for long-term economic leverage in the region. But notably, the U.S. has little choice in the matter: A lack of economic development is one of the biggest drivers behind violence and migration in the region. It’s a security issue the U.S. must address regardless of Chinese activities.

U.S. DFC Projects in Latin America, 2019-2021
(click to enlarge)

Though China and the U.S. are the principals in this particular competition, it’s the regional countries largely setting the terms of engagement. They know that the U.S. needs them in its camp because losing control of the region means losing control of the ability to project power farther afield. They also know that China (correctly) sees them as a bridge between the Pacific and Atlantic whose maritime and transportation hubs facilitate Chinese access to world markets. They also help Beijing keep a closer watch on U.S. activities.

For Central American and Caribbean countries, it’s a question of survival. They are generally poor, underdeveloped countries that require outside assistance. With their deep pockets, the U.S. and China are ideal benefactors in that regard. But the individual governments in the region set the terms for engagement and price of participation, and define the areas where help is needed.

Different Categories

The countries that will play a role in the competition can be roughly grouped together into five sets that are determined by their existing ties with the U.S. and the opportunity they present to China: Panama and Costa Rica; Nicaragua and Cuba; Guatemala; Honduras and El Salvador; and Jamaica and the Dominican Republic.

Panama and Costa Rica have deeply rooted economic and security ties with the U.S. They also stand out for their relative stability, development and economic status. Washington prioritizes closer ties with them compared with the others, largely because of the Panama Canal. These long-standing ties make the U.S. well-equipped to secure its influence and to push back on China. In Costa Rica, China has executed some highway projects but has struggled to win bids for other endeavors. Some, such as a planned oil refinery, have been scrapped altogether. China also has limitations in Panama. Two major Chinese banks – ICBC and Bank of China – operate in Panama, and Chinese businesses have grown their presence near the canal and special economic zones, but the Panamanian government canceled a $4.1 billion Chinese-funded high-speed rail project and insisted on redefining the parameters for FTA negotiations.

On the opposite end of the spectrum are Nicaragua and Cuba. The U.S. isn’t especially close to either of them, has sanctions against them and, as a result, has minimal influence over them. Russia is the main foreign influence in both countries, though China has notably grown its presence in Cuba, particularly in the telecommunications sector. (Three Chinese companies – Huawei, ZTE and TP-Link – control all Cuban internet.) China also funded the primary undersea cable connecting Cuba to South America via Venezuela, established an artificial intelligence center on the island and shared its security systems designed to monitor and crack down on public dissent. These tools make it difficult for the U.S. to support opisthion forces inside Cuba and pose a potential security threat via electronic monitoring.

Guatemala is in its own category, characterized as it is by a relatively low level of Chinese involvement. Relations with the U.S. and Mexico dominate Guatemala’s foreign and domestic agendas. The country is one of Washington’s main partners for migration security efforts, a tool that can be used to pressure Mexico for similar cooperation when needed. At the moment, the U.S. and Mexico are actively cooperating on development efforts in Central America. Mexico views its relationship with Guatemala as critical for addressing migrant flow and faces the added challenge of a porous border that the central government has struggled to control. These two relationships, though complicated and problematic at times, are critical to Guatemala’s existence, leaving China precious little space to act.

Honduras and El Salvador are the two countries most in play for influence. Both have contentious relations with the U.S. over differences in security, rule of law and politics, and their distance farther south makes them less critical to migration and security operations. More important, they’re far more open to China. The recent election of Xiomara Castro as Honduras’s next president put potential ties with China in focus. Castro has pledged to open diplomatic relations with Beijing (even if one of her vice presidents walked her statements back some). This marks the start of many back-and-forth signals as Honduras seeks concessions from its more powerful suitors. Influence early in the Castro government matters because it will soon fill key posts in various institutions, including multiple Supreme Court judges, come 2023. The U.S. has increased diplomatic visits, used private business to build favor with the Honduran business community and has dangled $4 billion to aid in development projects pending assurances on corruption. Huawei is present in Honduras, and China has worked on two hydroelectric projects in Honduras. However, there is still much space for China to grow.


(click to enlarge)

Importantly, the U.S. has recently lost political ground to China in El Salvador. Ties between the two have been on a steady decline since Nayib Bukele became president. Now the U.S. relies heavily on Mexico-Northern Triangle cooperation to influence El Salvador. China has used the momentum from this friction to build its presence. It’s a major player in the country’s telecommunications industry and is developing La Union port with an accompanying special economic zone. The port raises concerns over hosting Chinese vessels and setting terms to potentially freeze out U.S. and European companies. Washington’s worst-case scenario is for China to use the port to create a foothold in the region and as a base for building out influence elsewhere. If China has good ties with El Salvador and Honduras, it could theoretically pursue the construction of a dry canal from the Atlantic to the Pacific wholly under its control, or so the thinking goes.

Then there is Jamaica and the Dominican Republic, which have decent ties with the U.S. but are equally open to economic cooperation with China. (Their location in the Caribbean make them slightly harder for China to access since there’s no direct access from the Pacific.) In Jamaica, China’s most notable gains include the China Merchants Port Holdings acquisition in 2020 of the Kingston container port and Chinese company JISCO’s purchase of the Alpart bauxite mine.

The U.S. has prioritized energy supplies and countering China in telecommunication efforts. For years, Washington has been trying to help find sources of affordable energy for both countries. The U.S. persuaded the Jamaican government to sign a declaration on 5G cooperation that respects open market competition and the rule of law. The U.S. satellite internet company Viasat announced a joint project with the Central America Bottling Corp (CBC) to provide low-cost internet to remote communities in Latin America. CBC will help distribute the necessary small satellites to create the hot spots. Jamaica (and Guatemala) will be the first beneficiaries, with others to follow.

Northern Triangle Trade Trends
(click to enlarge)

What to Watch For

For now, the U.S. seems to have the upper hand. It’s still the dominant trade partner for most countries in the region and the leading source of foreign direct investment. Execution is also proving a challenge for China whose state-owned enterprises and banks deliver on only a fraction of the promised projects. From 2002 to 2018, only about half of the 150 transportation infrastructure projects China pledged to have interests in had entered construction. Still, so long as China makes its overtures, the U.S. will have to respond with initiatives of its own. Washington can’t shut China out of the region entirely, but it can curb Chinese influence in strategic and sensitive areas.

A few upcoming events will gauge the progress of each side in the months ahead. In Honduras, the U.S. military has a forward operating location at the Palmerola airport, which will begin operating as a commercial international airport in the coming months. Some (not all) in President-elect Castro’s party have called for the expulsion of the FOL. Any moves to change its status is an opportunity for China. In mid-January, the Panamanian government will decide whether to grant a concession to Cristobal Port to Hutchison Ports PCC, a subsidiary of a Hong Kong-based holdings company. The company asked for an extension of the contract, but Panama City has the option to open a bidding process, which would signal a nod to the U.S. if Panama goes with the latter.

Crafty_Dog

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Stratfor: Honduras
« Reply #177 on: December 06, 2021, 05:37:09 PM »
Honduras: Incoming Government Reneges on Diplomatic Switch From Taiwan to China
2 MIN READDec 3, 2021 | 19:45 GMT





What Happened: Salvador Nasralla, one of Honduras’ three incoming vice presidents, stated that Honduras would not seek to switch diplomatic relations from Taiwan to China in order to maintain close trade relations with the United States, South China Morning Post reported Dec. 2.

Why It Matters: Incoming Honduran President Xiomara Castro’s original campaign platform included a diplomatic switch from Taiwan to China, so Nasralla’s remarks likely reflect disagreement between high-level officials in the incoming Honduran government. The United States is also likely to court Castro with proposals for cooperation in exchange for retaining relations with Taipei, likely pushing for more investment and economic development programs.

Background: In mid-October, Honduras’s two strongest-polling political parties – the Liberty and Refoundation Party and the Savior Party of Honduras – announced an alliance to support Castro’s presidential bid in the country’s Nov. 28 election. This agreement effectively ended Nasralla’s own presidential bid and made him one of three vice presidents in exchange for his party’s support for Castro.
« Last Edit: December 06, 2021, 06:05:50 PM by Crafty_Dog »

DougMacG

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Re: Latin America turning Red
« Reply #178 on: December 10, 2021, 05:49:23 AM »
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2021/12/10/beyond_the_border_crisis_a_red_curtain_stretches_southward_146860.html

How does anyone vote for their country to go the way of Venezuela!?

I guess we could ask voters here that too.

Crafty_Dog

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El Salvador
« Reply #179 on: December 11, 2021, 05:58:03 AM »
U.S. Accuses El Salvador’s Government of Cutting a Deal With Gangs
U.S. Treasury imposes sanctions on two Salvadoran government officials for their alleged participation in secret talks with imprisoned MS-13 and 18th Street gang leaders

The U.S. Treasury said it was imposing sanctions on Osiris Luna, El Salvador’s deputy justice minister and prisons director, for participating in the secret negotiations.
PHOTO: RODRIGO SURA/SHUTTERSTOCK
By Santiago Pérez
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Dec. 8, 2021 11:25 pm ET
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The administration of El Salvador’s President Nayib Bukele secretly negotiated a truce with the imprisoned leaders of the country’s top criminal gangs in exchange for financial and prison benefits, including sex workers and cellphones, the U.S. Treasury said on Wednesday.

The accusation by the U.S. government is the latest sign of rising tension with the impoverished Central American nation, where rampant violence and endemic poverty have led to mass migration to the U.S.


Salvadoran gangs also have an extensive presence in U.S. communities, according to the U.S. government, which has criticized Mr. Bukele’s measures to cement power by weakening institutions and the rule of law.


The U.S. Treasury said it was imposing sanctions on Osiris Luna, El Salvador’s deputy justice minister and prisons director, and Carlos Marroquín, head of a welfare agency, for their participation in the secret negotiations.

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The government “provided financial incentives to Salvadoran gangs MS-13 and 18th Street Gang (Barrio 18) to ensure that incidents of gang violence and the number of confirmed homicides remained low,” the U.S. Treasury said in a statement.

As part of the secret deal, the gangs “received privileges for gang leadership incarcerated in Salvadoran prisons, such as the provision of mobile phones and prostitutes,” the Treasury said.

The deal also secured the gang’s political support for Mr. Bukele’s ruling party in midterm elections earlier this year, the Treasury added.

Mr. Bukele denied the accusations on Twitter. “How can they put out such an obvious lie without anyone questioning them?” he said in a post.

A spokesman for Mr. Bukele didn’t respond to a request for comment. Messrs. Luna and Marroquín couldn’t be reached for comment.

The U.S. sanctions block all property and financial interests that Messrs. Luna and Marroquin have in the U.S. and U.S. citizens are prohibited from any transactions with them.

The 40-year-old Mr. Bukele, who enjoys high approval ratings, has denied reports by the local news publication El Faro that his administration negotiated with gangs to cut down on homicides, which have fallen sharply during his time in office.


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Gatestone: China in Latin America
« Reply #181 on: December 23, 2021, 02:32:24 AM »
https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/18050/china-latin-america

That datum about China's % of Ecuadorean debt caught my atttention.

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ET: Chinese influence programs in Latin America
« Reply #182 on: December 25, 2021, 06:10:55 AM »
THINKING ABOUT CHINA
US and China Compete for Influence Through Law Enforcement in Latin America
Antonio Graceffo
Antonio Graceffo
 December 24, 2021 Updated: December 24, 2021 biggersmaller Print
News Analysis

Latin America is the new frontline in the battle for influence between the United States and the Chinese regime.

The current threat includes the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) law enforcement partnership program in the developing world, particularly, Latin America.

The CCP’s international law enforcement cooperation (LEC) consists of providing materials, equipment, inexpensive digital tools, training to foreign police officers, as well as consultation on judicial legislation. Focusing on the developing world, these programs include installing Xinjiang-style surveillance systems.

Through LEC, autocratic regimes are partnering with the CCP to increase their surveillance and social control over their own people. The program may not pose an immediate or direct threat to the United States, but it does pose a threat to the development of democracy and the maintenance of freedoms throughout the developing world.

This trend is particularly worrying in Latin America, as it brings CCP surveillance right to the U.S. southern border and Caribbean coast. For this reason, the commander of the U.S. Southern Command, Admiral Craig Faller, identified China as the greatest threat to U.S. interests.

In its 2008 and 2016 Latin America policy white papers, Beijing stressed the importance of “judicial and police cooperation.” At the 2019-2021 forum for China and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), the CCP prioritized fighting organized crime and corruption. The increasing presence of Chinese companies in the region, as well as international crime such as drug and human trafficking, have become pretexts for the CCP to get more involved with local law enforcement and security forces.

Chinese organized criminal gangs expanding in Latin America have motivated local governments to organize joint operations with Chinese counterparts. In June 2010, Brazil’s Secretary of Justice Romeu Tuma Júnior was fired for being an agent of the “Chinese mafia.” In 2016, Chinese security forces cooperated with local authorities in Argentina to counter the Chinese triad Pi Xiu. Similar cooperation has taken place in Panama and other nations, as well.

Increased Chinese investment has positioned a growing number of Chinese people and business interests in dangerous places. The CCP public-private partnership structure provides government support for private firms, which makes the country richer.

Apart from financial subsidies and soft loans from state-owned banks, this support extends to physical security. Consequently, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and security forces conduct training, preparing to engage on foreign soil to rescue citizens or to protect Chinese businesses. Chinese petroleum and mining firms operate in remote regions of often war-torn or unstable countries, sometimes encroaching on indigenous land, making them vulnerable to violent attacks or kidnaping for ransom. The PLA had to intervene when Chinese workers were attacked in South Sudan. In Yemen and Libya, the PLA had to evacuate Chinese citizens. These types of risks also exist in Venezuela and other parts of Latin America, such as when Chinese oil projects came under attack in northern Ecuador.

As part of the LEC, Chinese companies have donated police vehicles and equipment to countries in Latin America, particularly in the Caribbean. In the Colón Free Trade Zone in Panama, Huawei’s “Safe City Technology” has been installed, including facial recognition cameras, similar to those used to oppress the Uyghurs in China’s Xinjiang region. ZTE has helped Venezuela control its populace through smart ID cards. A team of ZTE employees is now stationed in CANTV, the Venezuelan state-run telecommunications company. Argentina decided to buy surveillance tech from ZTE.

Epoch Times Photo
A display for facial recognition and artificial intelligence on monitors at Huawei’s Bantian campus in Shenzhen, China, on April 26, 2019. (Kevin Frayer/Getty Images)
In 2017, China sold 51 Chery Tiggo armored vehicles to the Uruguayan national police, and donated two Marcopolo omnibuses and 10 armored trucks. China also provided the police with 4,000 surveillance system components, 1,000 of which were deployed on the Brazilian border. The rest went to the capital, Montevideo, as part of the national response system. In addition to surveillance technology, Uruguay is also deploying Chinese biometric systems. Chinese security products now make up 53 percent of the Uruguayan market.

Through international police exchanges and training, the CCP strives to “normalize” technology-based social control systems. Addressing the 86th Interpol General Assembly, CCP leader Xi Jinping said that the Chinese model is a more efficient system that should be used for global security and social management.


Non-democratic actors are following China’s lead, adopting a cybersecurity law that is modeled after Beijing’s. Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro regime also used Chinese training and technology to build a social management system. Since 2008, 80 countries have adopted China’s domestic surveillance tools.

The dissemination of the CCP’s security model throughout the world is having a negative impact on human rights and rule of law, as well as the security of U.S. citizens at home and abroad. In order to counter the negative influence of the CCP’s international law enforcement cooperation, the U.S. State Department has offered the International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEAs). The goal of the State Department academies is to enhance the skills of foreign criminal justice partners of the United States, as well as improve coordination in combating international crime.

The Academy’s vision is to enhance democracy by supporting the rule of law, and to use improved legislation and law enforcement to better the functioning of free markets in order to maintain social, political, and economic stability. Over the past 20 years, 60,000 officers from 85 different countries have graduated from ILEAs.

While the U.S. State Department is offering a high-quality law enforcement alternative, partnership with China is often accompanied by loans, grants, and investments—making the battle for influence all the more difficult.

Views expressed in this article are the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.

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Re: Latin America
« Reply #183 on: December 27, 2021, 05:45:39 AM »
December 27, 2021
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Chile’s New President and the Polarization of South America
Has the pandemic turned the region left again?
By: Allison Fedirka

Last week, Chile held a presidential election that featured two candidates on absolute opposite ends of the political spectrum. On the far right was Jose Antonio Kast, a law-and-order type politician who stands for free markets and opposes abortion and illegal immigration. He was defeated in the second round by Gabriel Boric, the first far-left candidate to win the presidency in 50 years. And though the contest may seem unusual, it actually encapsulates a broader trend in South America already taking place: a return to greater polarization in its politics. In a region where political ideology, economic models and foreign policy alignment are intricately linked, this trend reshapes the landscape as the U.S., China and others vie for influence there – even if economic constraints help temper extreme swings.

Dead Consensus

The COVID-19 pandemic hurt Latin America worse than most other regions. The region accounts for just over 8 percent of the global population, but as of the end of 2021, it accounted for approximately 18 percent of confirmed cases worldwide and 30 percent of deaths. Poor health infrastructure, insufficient vaccine availability and the inability of much of the labor force to work online conspired to wreck the region. A third of registered jobs lost globally were from Latin America, and the regional average loss of income was double the global average. Inflation in the region’s five largest economies is also outpacing the average inflation rate of emerging economies. Unsurprisingly, poverty is at a 12-year high, and extreme poverty at a 20-year high. Economic and development gains from the past decade have been wiped out in the past two years. The International Monetary Fund, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development and other institutions believe South America won’t rise to pre-pandemic economic levels until 2023-24 at the earliest.

More, wealth distribution has only gotten worse as the pandemic increased inequality, reduced the size of the middle class and made it harder to access basic goods. A problem for any region, wealth distribution has been particularly contentious here since the colonial era. Residual class systems, restricted upward mobility and so on are ultimately the basis for the region’s characteristic fluctuation between two economic models – one favoring a conservative, business-forward and free market framework, and one favoring strong public spending, support for the lower class and a pervasive government presence. Extreme economic disruption often requires an extreme solution, and in this part of the world this has tended to engender greater political-economic polarization.

It’s difficult to overstate how dramatically colonialism affected – and in some ways still affects – the region’s political identity. After independence, its countries had no industrial capacity for producing finished goods. They lost their largest trading partners (their colonizers), and they incurred monstrous debt from funding their wars for freedom. And though they were able to secure flexible financing from European powers happy to stick it to Spain, their trade relationships remained largely unchanged: They provided raw materials for Europe, which in turn sold them finished goods. It was a neo-colonial arrangement that favored political leaders and business elites, often at the expense of the peasants and working class.

South America’s dependence on raw materials, with their wildly volatile markets, paved the way for its penchant for government intervention. Any time commodity prices crater, it’s bad for regional governments, but the stock market crash in 1929 was especially pivotal. Then came World War II. With northern industries going offline or reverting to the production of wartime materials, South America had less access to manufactured goods, and what did arrive was extremely expensive. Regional governments thus had to look for new ways to grow their economies, and in their search, most began to look inward and adopt import substitution models, which require a strong hand of the state to regulate the import of finished goods, provide production subsidies to spur domestic consumption and devise other programs that facilitate the development of national industry.

Heavy-handed economic governance and market manipulation were antithetical to the new U.S.-imposed economic order in the wake of World War II. That order introduced strong ideological and political alignment to a new global economic order, particularly related to debt. Formulated at Bretton Woods, the new system helped regulate exchange rates, curtail speculative capital flows, promote foreign direct investment and discourage the formation of closed, controlled trade blocs. Even after the Bretton Woods system formally ended, its key institutions – the IMF and the World Bank – are still in place and thus allow Washington to continue to influence global economic policy, funding and general affairs. The IMF currently serves as the lender of last resort to countries in an effort to help stabilize the global economy. (The reception of funds is often conditional on meeting IMF criteria, which often align with U.S. views. The World Bank serves as a major source of development assistance to middle-low and low-income countries.)

So if South American countries are unduly reliant on debt to develop their economies, and if the U.S. is disproportionately influential in international lending, then the U.S. holds a fair amount of sway over the economies of the region. In the debt crisis of the 1980s, for example, U.S.-led institutions such as the U.S. Treasury Department and IMF offered a solution: the adoption of fiscal reforms, privatization, market deregulation and free-market trade in exchange for loans and investments in what was known as the Washington Consensus. It became clear that the region’s political and economic institutions were not as developed as those prescribing the policies, which naturally failed to yield the same results. Critics in the countries argued the policies did more harm than good, and in some cases, the economic and social pressure pushed governments out of power.

Compounding the issue was that the Washington Consensus coincided with the end of the Cold War and thus aligned the economic, political and foreign policies of the U.S. and Latin America. So when these countries rejected the Washington Consensus economic model, they de facto rejected their alignment with Washington, giving way to a wave of anti-U.S. sentiment at the turn of the century. Fifteen or so years later, there were signs that the so-called Pink Tide was receding as more pro-market, pro-U.S. leaders were elected into office. The pandemic interrupted this cycle between the left and right in Latin America, creating extreme economic problems and general rejection of any government (independent of political alignment) in charge during the past two years.

New Competition

Thanks to the pandemic, South American governments have to do more to stabilize their economies with less. In short, they can’t support vulnerable populations and spur needed economic growth, so they must rely on private business, trade partners and foreign investment. Other things such as cargo availability and pricing are out of their hands.

All of this comes as the U.S. is reengaging the region. In the wake of the Cold War, Washington was the undisputed power in the Western Hemisphere; no other country was making significant moves in the region. This is now changing. Migration from the northern triangle, near-shoring initiatives, and Chinese and Russian advances (particularly economic) into the region have forced the U.S. to pay greater attention to Latin America.

This new competition for influence during an economic downturn presents some opportunities for these regional governments. Economic competition by outside powers means countries are able to seek better terms for economic deals. For governments that rely on outside money, this is a good position to be in. There are, however, some constraints in what they can do. First, most countries can’t afford to completely alienate themselves from the U.S. or China. They may seek better terms, but most will be unwilling to put all their eggs in one basket. At the same time, outside powers like the U.S. often tie economic arrangements to political and ideological alignment. It’s hard to sell lenders on expensive packages of welfare spending.

When push comes to shove, many South American leaders find themselves taking a more measured approach because they have to. Ecuador’s President Lenin Moreno abandoned the hardline tactics for economic opportunity. Peru’s President Pedro Castillo has been unable to govern at all, let alone enact his ambitious reforms. Chile’s new president will find himself in a similar situation.

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Nicaragua-China
« Reply #184 on: December 28, 2021, 02:20:06 AM »
Nicaragua seizes former Taiwan embassy and gives it to China

Outgoing diplomats wanted to donate to church

ASSOCIATED PRESS

MANAGUA, NICARAGUA | The Nicaraguan government has seized the former embassy and diplomatic offices of Taiwan, saying they belong to China.

President Daniel Ortega’s government broke off relations with Taiwan this month, saying it would recognize only the mainland government.

Before departing, Taiwanese diplomats attempted to donate the properties to the Roman Catholic archdiocese of Managua.

But Mr. Ortega’s government said late Sunday that any such donation would be invalid and that the building in an upscale Managua neighborhood belongs to China.

The Nicaraguan Attorney General’s Office said in a statement that Taiwan’s attempted donation of the building was a “manuever and subterfuge to take what doesn’t belong to them.”

Taiwan’s Foreign Relations Ministry condemned the “gravely illegal actions of the Ortega regime,” saying the Nicaraguan government had violated standard procedures by giving Taiwanese diplomats just two weeks to get out of the country.

It said Taiwan “also condemns the arbitrary obstruction by the Nicaraguan government of the symbolic sale of its property to the Nicaraguan Catholic church.”

Msgr. Carlos Aviles, vicar of the archdiocese of Managua, told the La Prensa newspaper that a Taiwanese diplomat had offered the church the property, saying, “I told him there was no problem, but the transfer was still in the legal process.”

The Central American country said in early December it would officially recognize only China, which claims self-ruled Taiwan as part of its territory.

“There is only one China,” the Nicaraguan government said in a statement announcing the change. “The People’s Republic of China is the only legitimate government that represents all China, and Taiwan is an inalienable part of the Chinese territory.”

The move increased Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation on the international stage, even as the island has stepped up official exchanges with countries such as Lithuania and Slovakia, which do not formally recognize Taiwan as a country. Now, Taiwan has 14 formal diplomatic allies remaining.

China has been poaching Taiwan’s diplomatic allies over the past few years, reducing the number of countries that recognize the democratic island as a sovereign nation. China is against Taiwan representing itself in global forums or in diplomacy. The Solomon Islands chose to recognize China in 2019, cutting diplomatic ties with Taiwan.

Taiwan depicts itself as a defender of democracy, while Ortega was reelected in November in what the White House called a “pantomime election.”

“The arbitrary imprisonment of nearly 40 opposition figures since May, including seven potential presidential candidates, and the blocking of political parties from participation rigged the outcome well before election day,” U.S. President Joe Biden said in a statement in November.

Nicaragua established diplomatic relations with Taiwan in the 1990s, when President Violeta Chamorro assumed power after defeating Ortega’s Sandinista movement at the polls. Ortega, who was elected back to to power in 2007, had maintained ties with Taipei until now.


Nicaragua President Daniel Ortega’s government cut off relations with Taiwan this month and is only recognizing the Chinese government. ASSOCIATED PRESS

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Argentina meeting with Putin, Xi
« Reply #186 on: February 03, 2022, 12:48:00 PM »
Gateway to Latin America. Argentine President Alberto Fernandez met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on Thursday. They discussed cooperation on health, science, technology and infrastructure, according to the Argentine ambassador to Russia. Fernandez said he hoped Argentina would become Russia’s gateway to Latin America. He will next travel to China for a meeting with President Xi Jinping. On Tuesday, Argentina’s National Committee of Atomic Energy announced it signed a contract with China National Nuclear Corp. for the construction of a nuclear power plant in Buenos Aires province.

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Stratfor: Russia-Latin America
« Reply #187 on: February 11, 2022, 04:45:18 PM »
Is Russia’s Renewed Outreach to Latin America All for Show?
4 MIN READFeb 10, 2022 | 20:33 GMT





People walk past a mural of the Venezuelan and Russian flags that reads "Together we will defeat COVID-19" in Caracas, Venezuela, on March 4, 2021.
People walk past a mural of the Venezuelan and Russian flags that reads "Together we will defeat COVID-19" in Caracas, Venezuela, on March 4, 2021.

(YURI CORTEZ/AFP via Getty Images)

Despite its renewed outreach to Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela in recent weeks, Russia remains unlikely to significantly increase its economic and military cooperation with these countries due to Moscow’s secondary interest in Latin America. On Feb. 9, Nicaragua’s government announced the beginning of negotiations to implement energy, medical and nuclear projects with Russia’s state-owned nuclear corporation Rosatom. The announcement comes after Russian President Vladimir Putin held three separate phone calls with Cuban President Miguel Diaz-Canel, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega and Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro between Jan. 23-26 to discuss boosting strategic cooperation in areas including the economy, education and defense. Amid the growing standoff between Russia and the West over Ukraine, a top Russian diplomat also recently suggested that Moscow could send a military deployment to Cuba and Venezuela if the United States continues to expand its military presence in Eastern Europe.

When asked on Jan. 14, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov also stated that Russia could neither confirm nor exclude the possibility of Russia placing troops in Latin America, after Putin previously stated he would take unspecified military measures if the United States and its allies failed to heed Moscow’s requests concerning military cooperation in Ukraine.
To mitigate the impact of their isolation from global markets, the governments of Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela will likely seek to increase their economic ties with Russia. But they will remain more hesitant toward significantly ramping up defense cooperation. The Cuban, Nicaraguan and Venezuelan governments will probably advocate for increased trade relations with Moscow and increased Russian investment in an effort to improve their economic conditions and increase internal stability against domestic and foreign challenges. However, these Latin American regimes will likely seek to limit the scope of any new defense cooperation for fear of weakening their sovereignty and internal autonomy.

Over the years, the United States has imposed a trade embargo on Cuba and heavy sanctions on Venezuela’s oil-driven economy. Washington has yet to impose sanctions targeting Nicaragua’s economy, but in response to the country’s deteriorating democracy under President Ortega, the administration of U.S. President Joe Biden has threatened to enact such sanctions in coordination with the European Union and Canada, as well as push Nicaragua out of the Central American Free Trade Agreement.
Nicaragua and Venezuela are among the many Latin American countries that have either purchased or received donations of Russia’s Sputnik V COVID-19 vaccine for their national inoculation efforts.
On Feb. 9, Colombian President Ivan Duque asked Moscow to reassure Bogota that its military assistance to Venezuela will not be used against Colombia. High-ranking members of Venezuela’s army have also voiced concerns in private forums that the presence of Russian troops would undermine the country’s sovereignty.
Russia, for its part, will likely continue cooperation with Latin American authoritarian regimes to counteract what it perceives as the United States’ growing presence in Ukraine and other countries the Kremlin views as under its sphere of influence by demonstrating it can do the same with countries in Washington’s backyard. Russia will likely maintain bilateral relations with Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela — using public military stunts as retaliatory measures against the United States and NATO’s collaboration with Ukraine. To maintain a low-cost form of leverage against the United States, Moscow will also likely keep hinting at the possibility of deeper cooperation with these countries through formal agreements on defense issues.

In December 2018, two Russian bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons landed in Venezuela as a show of military support for Maduro’s regime, which at the time was fending off mounting pressure from the U.S.-backed opposition movement. 
But Russia’s efforts to preserve its influence in Latin America will likely remain modest overall, as Moscow lacks the will and the resources to significantly expand its presence in a region of the world where it does not have key geopolitical interests. Russia ultimately does not view Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua — which are located on the other side of the world — the same way it does countries within its periphery like Belarus, which it supports financially and politically. The Kremlin is thus unlikely to significantly increase trade relations or financial assistance to governments in Latin America. But without significant financial aid from Moscow, regional authoritarian regimes are also unlikely to risk triggering more sanctions and pressure from the West by allowing Russian troops or strategic weapons systems to be deployed to their countries.

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GPF: Latin America in a time of transition
« Reply #188 on: May 11, 2022, 09:44:18 AM »
ay 11, 2022
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Latin America in a Time of Transition
The political pendulum is swinging left at a time when options are shrinking.
By: Allison Fedirka

The world is in a transition period, leaving the post-Cold War era, which began in 1991, and entering a new era. This transition period is characterized by volatility and uncertainty about what’s to come. The four main actors governing the geopolitical system – the U.S., China, Russia and Europe – are experiencing dramatic changes that will ripple across the globe. No corner of the world will be spared, and this includes oft-overlooked regions like Latin America, where the political struggle between left and right is affecting the region’s alignment with the world powers.

Geopolitical Timeframes
(click to enlarge)

In America’s Shadow

Latin America’s worldview is shaped by its proximity to the U.S. and its history of colonization and wars for independence. The colonial period marked the moment when Latin America was connected with the rest of the global system, particularly Europe at the time. The hierarchical structure of Spain’s colonial system and its exploitation of its colonies’ resources created highly stratified societies, where wealth and power were concentrated in the hands of a small upper class. Since the beginning of the struggle for independence, when elites tended to favor the status quo and the poorer populace supported independence, these socio-economic divisions have been cemented in Latin American politics. The competition between the wealthy business class and the poorer working class created distinct, opposing political movements and a tendency for political leadership to flip-flop dramatically between right and left. Even in the post-Cold War period, characterized by integration and globalization, the region’s two largest trade blocs, Mercosur and the Pacific Alliance, have been shaped and divided by opposing attitudes toward global trade.

Latin America's Largest Trading Blocs
(click to enlarge)

Located squarely in the U.S. sphere of influence and peripheral to most Northern Hemisphere dynamics, Latin America rarely dictates or triggers events of global import. However, its actions influence the U.S. to some degree because of its proximity. Washington must attend to instability and insecurity anywhere in the Western Hemisphere, lest a crisis emerges that diverts U.S. resources and reduces its ability to project power abroad. Conversely, this gives hostile powers an interest in using Latin America to pressure or distract the United States.

Since the start of the 20th century, the U.S. has set the conditions for engagement with the Western Hemisphere. This was when the U.S. emerged as the uncontested hemispheric power, with secure borders, a blue water navy, an industrialized economy, accumulated wealth and access to world markets. For the first half of the century, the U.S. took an extremely hands-on approach to controlling hemispheric affairs and regulating the presence of outsiders. When the Cold War began, Latin America experienced a resurgence of labor unions, socialist parties and popular action coalitions. The Western Hemisphere was divided along the same U.S.-Soviet ideological lines, resulting in targeted, covert American interventions in the hemisphere. With the Soviet Union’s fall, however, the U.S. was able to divert its attention elsewhere, leaving Latin America largely on its own. Eventually, this opened the region to the influence of outside powers, namely China and Russia.

The New Era

As we move into this new era, it’s prudent to consider how Latin America’s left-right political pendulum will manifest and what it could mean for U.S. engagement. Many of the region’s political institutions, financial frameworks and political parties emerged from the realities of the Cold War and post-Cold War settings. Many of its democracies didn’t come into existence until the late 20th century, after the fall of military regimes. This transition phase coincides with political discussion in Latin America about the need to modernize institutions; Chile, for example, wants to update its Pinochet-era constitution. It’s also a moment when the first generations born into democracy are making up a larger and larger share of the voting population and are seeking political renovation or reinvention.

Politically, a new flavor of the progressive left appears to be taking root. This pendulum swing generated and continues to generate concern in the U.S. and among those on the right in Latin America that the region is falling back into anti-American and anti-market attitudes. However, these fears are unfounded. The new left faces a fundamentally different reality compared with the left that took the region by storm at the start of the 21st century. The previous left was characterized by radicalism, nationalism, rejection of the neoliberal economic order and an emphasis on the struggles of the masses. It funded its ambitious government programs with revenues from a commodity supercycle. The new left, however, is a product of the region’s political evolution, pandemic fallout and broader geopolitical shifts taking place globally. Its focus is narrower: on supporting the youth population, environmentalism, gender equality and tackling wealth inequality through structural reform.

Meanwhile, there’s a general disenchantment with politics throughout the region. The old left failed to make good on its promises and struggled with unfavorable economic conditions. Countries that followed those years by electing right-leaning governments tried to restore economic balance and prosperity after the commodity boom, but structural changes require time and political capital that are scarce during a crisis. Then the pandemic came. It wrecked economies and governments that lacked the resources to weather the storm. The region now faces another lost decade, and people are looking for new solutions.

The new left faces an electorate with high expectations for its governments and their ability to improve voters’ material well-being. However, slowing growth or recessions and dollar-denominated debt limit the ability of governments to meet their demands. The current commodity boom does little to reduce their financial strain. Though a momentary influx of revenue is possible, the boom is the result of trade imbalances, supply chain disruptions and geopolitical volatility, all of which make the mid-to-long-term prospects uncertain at best. Whoever is in power will need to devise solutions based on a new market reality that is still not clear, and in a way that satisfies public demands.

On the international front, the U.S. is again shifting its approach to engagement, this time focusing on economics. It's shifting away from its post-Cold War practice of frequent military interventionism (which paid relatively little attention to Latin America) to a strategy based on economic coercion and cooperation. Washington is increasingly engaged in economic warfare, including in its approach toward Latin America. The U.S. has also taken note of Russia’s and China’s increased presence in the hemisphere, and is engaging the region economically, where it has the upper hand over its rivals. Washington’s goal is to reduce foreign influence and align the region with the U.S. agenda through economic carrots or sticks, depending on the country. This strategy complements Latin America’s response to the end of the post-Cold War era, namely, a renewed focus on shared prosperity. Instead of pursuing regional agendas or integration, Latin American countries are acting more independently, which opens room for them to redefine bilateral relations with the U.S. and others.

The question is what the intersection of the region’s political shifts and U.S. behavior will look like in practice. In the past two eras, their placement on the political spectrum determined whether Latin American countries were pro- or anti-U.S. The new left, however, could be different. This version is not as radical or ideologically driven as its predecessors. It looks to be taking a more pragmatic approach to meeting economic and social needs. Further, whichever way a given country goes, its political and economic room to maneuver is small and shrinking at the moment.

The proposal and the implementation of reforms are not the same thing, and early indications are that any emerging left-wing leaders will not radicalize if elected. In Chile, the Constitutional Assembly rejected some more extreme government proposals, like stringent environmental protection measures in the mining sector, a major driver of growth. Other far-reaching measures risk rejection during an upcoming public referendum. Political opposition has blocked Peru’s president, Pedro Castillo, from delivering any major changes. Separately, there appears to be a loosening of foreign alignments. In Honduras, President Xiomara Castro is improving relations with the U.S. and has opted for continued ties with Taiwan over closer relations with China. Argentine President Alberto Fernandez is also showing more openness to doing business with the U.S., despite strong ties with China.

Latin America’s new left is rising as the world enters uncharted territory. In many ways, it will have less room to maneuver, but opportunities – especially in foreign alignments – can always be found during transitional periods

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Biden wants Carib and S American countries to come for Summit
« Reply #189 on: May 11, 2022, 03:03:04 PM »
they are not excited and may not show up if invited

and hey why is not Cuba Nicaragua and Venezuela not being considered to attend says Sanders from Barbados

https://www.politico.com/news/2022/05/11/biden-americas-summit-boycott-threats-00031717


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AMLO: Fukk OAS. New Regional Order is in order
« Reply #191 on: June 10, 2022, 10:08:15 AM »
New American order. The Organization of American States has exhausted its utility in the current global climate, Mexico’s foreign minister said. He said new regional tendencies are emerging and called for the creation of a working group to build a new regional order that is mutually beneficial and upholds noninterventionist principles.

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GPF: China-Latin America
« Reply #192 on: June 10, 2022, 06:04:59 PM »
June 10, 2022
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Exerting Economic Influence in Latin America
China has become the top trading partner for certain countries but the U.S. is still the largest source of investment.
By: Geopolitical Futures
Competition for Influence in Latin America

(click to enlarge)

In recent years, the U.S. has leaned more heavily on using economic engagement and economic warfare to exert influence over other countries. In Latin America, Washington’s marquee policies in that regard are the Cuba embargo and the running sanctions on Venezuela. But it also pursues a lower-profile, parallel strategy in the Western Hemisphere. Through the International Development Finance Corporation, the U.S. provides direct funding for various development projects and assurances to private U.S. businesses Washington would like to have more involved in the region. The primary purpose in this region is to foster the growth of small and medium-sized enterprises, as well as local-level infrastructure work.

Though the U.S. is Latin America’s largest trade partner writ large, there are countries in which China has an edge. These include Brazil, Peru and Chile, where China has bought up soy, cooper and China. U.S. trade with top partners such as Colombia, Ecuador and Mexico consists more of manufactured goods, and while U.S. foreign direct investment into the region still surpasses China’s. It’s notable, however, that China used financing and loans to exert its influence in Latin America for much of the 21st century but in the past few years has started to focus more on mergers and acquisitions instead.


Crafty_Dog

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GPF: Colombia
« Reply #194 on: June 27, 2022, 05:59:53 AM »
June 20, 2022
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No Break With the US After Colombian Election
But Bogota is mindful of the potential for a longer-term change in U.S. policy.
By: Allison Fedirka
Colombia has elected a new president, and the moment of truth has arrived. The most remarkable thing about the Colombian election was not the result but the electorate’s rejection of the political mainstream. Two anti-establishment candidates – leftist Gustavo Petro of Humane Colombia and Rodolfo Hernandez of the right-wing League of Anti-Corruption Governors – emerged from the May 29 runoff, signaling Colombian voters’ loss of faith in the political status quo.

Like much of the world, Colombia is undergoing a profound socio-political transition, with potential effects for the Caribbean region and U.S. foreign policy. In the lead-up to the runoff, U.S. political and business leaders fretted over the impact a victory by the leftist Petro might have on economic relations or the impact a victory by Hernandez would have on U.S. security cooperation. In both cases, there was concern the new leader in Bogota might pursue a rapprochement with Venezuela and distance itself from Washington. Interestingly, Colombia itself worries that the U.S. and Venezuela might reconcile and leave it out in the cold.

In truth, all three states face constraints that will prevent either the U.S. or Colombia from straying too far from the other. Bogota, however, remains mindful of the potential for a longer-term shift in U.S. policy.

Winds of Change

Colombia is vital for stability and security in the Caribbean and parts of South America. Deeply rooted strategic interests have bound Bogota and Washington together since the early 19th century. Three large mountain ranges and valleys make it difficult for the Colombian state to enforce its writ in every corner of the country, let alone connect them. Lawlessness is rampant in rural areas, where local economies are underdeveloped. To confront this challenge, Bogota needs a strong partner, and it has traditionally relied on Washington for security and financial support.

Social Leaders and Human Rights Defenders Assassinated in Colombia
(click to enlarge)

The U.S. priority is defending its place as the hegemon of the Caribbean. Though the U.S. dominates the northern rim of the Caribbean on its own, having an ally along the southern rim helps it secure the sea. Of course, Colombia benefits from a stable Caribbean as well. Colombia also provides a strong foothold for the U.S. to engage with the rest of South America. Most notably, it has proved to be an essential ally in the U.S. effort to counter and isolate Nicolas Maduro’s regime in Venezuela.

The war in Ukraine renewed U.S. interest in repairing relations with Venezuela. Forced to expend more and more resources on the conflict and countering Western sanctions, Russia’s ability to continue to prop up the Maduro regime has waned, creating an opportunity the U.S. could exploit. At the same time, the urgent U.S. interest in getting more oil onto international markets gives Washington an excuse to back down from its staunch anti-Maduro stance and engage with the regime. Washington has held direct talks with the regime, supports the resumption of a national dialogue between the regime and the (skeptical) political opposition, and has loosened oil sanctions on Venezuela to permit limited exports to Spain and Italy. Realistically, given the level of disrepair in Venezuela’s oil industry after years of mismanagement, a larger removal of sanctions would do little to immediately put significant additional quantities of oil on the market. Additionally, Venezuelan crude oil is heavy and requires special refining capabilities. Nevertheless, the current environment is the most conducive to a U.S.-Venezuelan reconciliation in years, and Washington’s interest in edging out Russia, China and Iran for influence in Venezuela compels it to cautiously move forward.

Colombia is understandably alarmed by indications of a U.S.-Venezuelan rapprochement. Washington needs a strong partner on the southern rim of the Caribbean basin, and the two South American neighbors are both in valuable locations. Colombia’s roughly 1,400-kilometer (870-mile) Pacific coastline and proximity to the Panama Canal give it the superior position, but it lacks reliable infrastructure connecting its Atlantic and Pacific areas, and the U.S. already has strong ties with Panama. Bogota is also worried about having to compete with Caracas for public and private funding from the United States. Any significant U.S.-Venezuelan rapprochement would eventually include costly humanitarian and reconstruction efforts and would open up attractive private investment opportunities in Venezuela. As a major beneficiary of U.S. funding and investment, Colombia does not want competition, especially not from next door.

Domestic Agenda

In addition to these unfavorable international circumstances, President-elect Gustavo Petro also must address three interconnected regional and domestic issues: relations with Venezuela, peace agreements with narco-terrorist groups and an inclusive economic recovery. As a candidate, Petro expressed his desire to restore diplomatic relations with the Maduro regime as a first step toward normalization. (Relations soured in 2019 when Colombia threw its full support behind Juan Guaido, Maduro’s challenger for president.) Both candidates recognized Colombia’s need to get Venezuela’s help controlling migration and combating illicit cross-border trade. A new administration from a party outside the mainstream provides the opportunity for a political reset.

Illegal Trade and Activity on the Colombian-Venezuelan Border
(click to enlarge)

Both candidates also agreed on the need to fully implement the 2016 peace deal with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and to open negotiations with other armed groups, such as the National Liberation Army (ELN). Even after the peace agreement with FARC, which ended a decades-long conflict and dismantled the group, organized crime, militancy and violence continue to plague the countryside. Many armed criminal groups find refuge and a thriving illicit trade across the border in Venezuela, meaning Caracas’ support will be needed to combat them.

It’s essential for Colombia to reduce organized crime not only for security reasons but also to attract mostly U.S. investment, which is needed to help the economic recovery. Petro’s economic agenda includes weaning the Colombian economy off natural resource exports and closing the wealth gap.

Tough Road Ahead

Colombia wants to shape the conditions under which any U.S.-Venezuelan reconciliation occurs, but its ability to affect U.S. policy in the region is limited. At the peak of the 2019 opposition movement in Venezuela, Colombia played a critical role in the U.S. strategy. But as that movement died out, so did Bogota’s immediate importance to Washington. A worst-case scenario for Colombia would see the U.S. inadvertently empowering the Maduro regime or ushering in a violent political transition, either of which would be very threatening to Colombia’s security. And yet Bogota can’t risk alienating Washington; the U.S. remains Colombia’s top trade partner, and U.S. private investors are its main source of foreign capital.

For its part, the U.S. can’t just swap Colombia for Venezuela. Regime change in Caracas is still a U.S. priority, and every sanctions waiver it issues is a lifeline to the Maduro regime. The U.S. can loosen the strings only so much before having to step back lest it empowers the regime it wants to see end. There are currently no signs Maduro is willing to step aside or hold fair elections. The foreign influence of non-U.S. powers in Venezuela has dipped, but it’s still a strategically valuable partner from which U.S. enemies like Russia and Iran can frustrate Washington. The U.S. would pay a high price to convince Venezuela to break these ties.

Venezuela’s openness to improved ties with the U.S. will depend on how Russia emerges from the Ukraine conflict. To a lesser degree, the outcome of Iran nuclear talks will also matter. Venezuela’s critical need right now is market access so it can revive its economy. Russia and Iran help facilitate Venezuela’s oil trade. Russian and Venezuelan officials met during the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum last week to discuss payment systems to circumvent sanctions, and Iranian ships have been providing regular crude shipments and some oil tankers. While this helps Venezuela stay afloat, neither partner can provide enough support to help it repair its economy. U.S. aid, investment and market access are currently the most promising options for Venezuela’s economic revival. Improving relations with Colombia is one way the Maduro regime could secure U.S. help.

Colombia, too, would like to improve relations with Venezuela. However, this conflicts with Bogota’s need to maintain good ties with Washington and continue receiving economic and security support. Likewise, the U.S. has no good alternatives for its Caribbean strategy. In other words, concerns over a U.S.-Colombia split are overstated.

Crafty_Dog

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Iran inflitrates Latin American politics
« Reply #195 on: June 29, 2022, 10:15:30 AM »
Iran's Infiltration of Latin American Politics Complicates "Aeroterror" Flight Investigations
by Maria Zuppello
Special to IPT News
June 29, 2022

https://www.investigativeproject.org/9205/iran-infiltration-of-latin-american-politics

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We're Number Two
« Reply #196 on: July 06, 2022, 06:05:33 AM »

Crafty_Dog

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Re: Latin America
« Reply #197 on: July 14, 2022, 04:08:56 PM »
China’s Stimulus Spending Will Buoy South America’s Mining Exports
8 MIN READJul 14, 2022 | 21:42 GMT





A miner works at the Kiara copper mine in Chile on June 22, 2021.
A miner works at the Kiara copper mine in Chile on June 22, 2021.

(GLENN ARCOS/AFP via Getty Images)

Chinese stimulus measures will likely ensure sustained demand for copper and iron ore despite the global economic downturn, enabling South American exporters such as Chile, Peru and Brazil to maintain high social spending and stabilize their governments. The Chinese government is estimated to spend over 3 trillion $450 billion in stimulus spending in the second half of 2022, including $75 billion in infrastructure funding, $160 billion in pledged State Council lending, and roughly $220 billion in possible advanced issuances of 2023 special purpose bonds quotas to local governments. The stimulus measures will mainly be directed towards infrastructure, including projects in the clean energy, transportation and information technology sectors.

China’s stimulus initiatives will likely maintain demand for copper and iron ore even as large economies, including China itself, enter into a period of slower economic growth. Western countries are currently experiencing high energy and food prices, which will lead to a reduction in domestic consumption and low economic growth. Even a mild recession in developed countries would likely result in a contraction of tourism, remittances and other forms of capital investment into South American economies, threatening their economies. However, China’s stimulus measures are likely to maintain government and private sector spending on initiatives that require significant amounts of metals and minerals, which many South American countries produce. This demand will probably remain steady even if the Chinese economy slows down, as the government will be incentivized to release more stimulus in an effort to bolster growth, which will benefit South American countries' exports of raw materials and somewhat mitigate the impact of the Western economic slowdown.

Disruptions and sanctions related to the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war are driving inflation to above 8% in heavily industrialized countries, such as Europe and North America, with the energy and agricultural sectors being among the most impacted.

China accounted for 54% of the world's copper consumption and imported 70% of global iron ore exports in 2020. As copper is the preferred metal for electrical wiring, it is in high demand in China, where companies use it for wiring in real estate, clean electricity projects and the industrial sector. Similarly, iron ore is converted into steel and used to build infrastructure and housing.

The price of copper and iron ore has risen substantially over the previous 18 months due to high demand in the construction and electrical industries following the COVID-19 slowdown, which initially depressed demand.

While Chinese stimulus is likely to maintain a baseline demand for copper and iron ore, the government’s efforts to curb the spread of COVID-19 could lead to fluctuations in demand. China has been undertaking an aggressive strategy to curb the spread of COVID-19, which led to months-long lockdowns in Shanghai and Jilin, along with dozens of other industrial and commercial hubs across the country. In recent weeks, China’s “zero-COVID” policy has led to decreased demand for South American metals and minerals as the commencement of the latest round of infrastructure activity was delayed. Though most lockdowns in Shanghai and elsewhere have been lifted, China’s continued zero-COVID policy and the emergence of a more contagious variant of Omicron, BA.5, increases the likelihood of new lockdowns and subsequent dips in demand for copper and iron ore, creating continued risk for South American exporters.

China’s copper imports decreased 17.2% in 2021 compared with record imports in 2020. While the first quarter of 2022 saw an increase of 2.6% when compared with the previous quarter, copper imports were down 8.8% in March when lockdowns were implemented. 55% of China’s copper imports come from Chile and Peru.

For iron ore, Chinese imports reduced 3.9% year-on-year in 2021 and 8.5% in the first quarter of 2022 compared with the first quarter of 2021. Brazil is China’s second-largest source of iron ore imports, after Australia.

In Chile, continued Chinese demand for copper could finance President Gabriel Boric’s campaign promise of increased social spending, and potentially the implementation of a new constitution. Copper exports are the backbone of Chile’s economy, accounting for roughly 10% of the country’s GDP and a majority of its export revenue. The government of President Gabriel Boric was elected on a platform that promised sweeping structural changes and now faces growing popular demand for increased state financing, including curbing high global food and fuel prices as well as debt forgiveness programs. The administration will likely rely heavily on export revenues from the copper sector to fund increased social welfare spending, even amid a potential global economic downturn. Additionally, Chile will vote on a new constitution on Sept. 4 that would demand increased public spending to guarantee people’s access to water and healthcare. Efforts to increase taxation of copper companies amid strong Chinese demand for the metal could serve as a crucial funding source for increased social welfare spending. However, any potential fluctuations in Chinese demand due to renewed COVID-19 lockdowns could limit the availability of that cash flow. This could force the Boric administration to issue abnormally large amounts of public debt to pay for the increased social services that Chileans are demanding, which would, in turn, constrict future spending.

Chilean Finance Minister Mario Marcel proposed a tax reform on July 1 seeking to increase royalties on companies producing over 50,000 tonnes of copper per year in an effort to fund expanded social programs. The increased royalties include a 1% to 2% tax for companies that produce between 50,000 and 200,000 tonnes of copper each year, and up to 4% tax on companies that annually produce upwards of 200,000 tonnes.

If approved in a Sept. 4 referendum, Chile’s constitution will increase environmental regulations on mining companies. The proposed draft also strengthens land rights for Indigenous groups, which could add another factor that would negatively impact mining operations near Indigenous communities.

In Peru, Chinese demand for copper could help the government avoid amassing large amounts of public debt while implementing food and fuel subsidies, potentially helping to stabilize the government. Peru is the world’s second-largest exporter of copper, which accounts for 4% of the country’s GDP. President Pedro Castillo’s government has faced widespread anti-inflation demonstrations in recent months and is under mounting pressure to decrease the price of food and fuels. These demands will likely only rise should Western nations enter into a recessionary period and result in decreased tourism to Peru from the world’s wealthiest countries, which would likely heavily impact the South American country’s economy. Sustained Chinese demand for Peruvian copper coupled with the metal’s high price is likely to help Peru’s government address demand for increased spending without the need to take on large amounts of foreign debt. Fiscal responsibility will likely help maintain investor confidence in the country, further insulating the Peruvian economy from the potential effects of a Western-driven recession. The export revenue from copper may also enable Castillo to ensure his political survival amid congressional attempts to oust him, using the funding to lower the cost of essential goods.

The rising cost of living in Peru spurred a strike and protest movement in early April, followed by a transit worker strike in late June. Protesters installed roadblocks that disrupted traffic nationwide during both strikes. The inflation-induced unrest in recent months has also seen looting in rural areas and the deaths of at least two civilians.

Peru's constitution allows the legislature to impeach a sitting president with a majority vote for various reasons, including a vague clause that allows the legislature to declare the presidency vacant if the current occupant suffers from permanent ''physical or moral incapacity.'' Since taking office in July 2021, Castillo has already faced two congressional impeachment votes.

In Brazil, the government will use sustained Chinese demand for iron ore to increase cash transfers and social spending, potentially decreasing the reliance on foreign debt. Brazil is China’s second-largest source of the mineral behind Australia, and is reliant on continued Chinese demand — exports of the mineral comprise just under 3% of Brazil’s GDP in 2021. In recent years, Brazil has struggled to fund its high fiscal spending due to the spread of COVID-19 and demand for a state-sponsored cash transfer program, amassing a large public debt. Both leading candidates running in Brazil’s October presidential election have pledged to increase social spending via a cash-transfer program and poverty alleviation initiatives. This means Brazil will almost certainly see increased public spending regardless of who wins. Sustained Chinese demand for the mineral could help provide some funding for expanded social services, especially if Brazil’s Congress lifts the country’s constitutionally-mandated spending cap as legislators appear keen to do. Additionally, export revenue from iron ore could potentially give the state additional revenue that would reduce the need to borrow in debt markets. But sporadic decreases in demand for iron ore due to China’s COVID-19 lockdowns make this less likely.

Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro and former Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva are the two frontrunners for the country’s October presidential elections. Bolsonaro has championed a cash-transfer program called Auxilio Brasil that both candidates have promised to maintain, despite a constitutionally-mandated spending cap.

Crafty_Dog

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Argentina
« Reply #198 on: August 08, 2022, 03:50:06 PM »


The Geopolitics of Argentina: The Superpower That Wasn’t
undefined and Director of Analysis at RANE
Adriano Bosoni
Director of Analysis at RANE, Stratfor
10 MIN READAug 8, 2022 | 18:17 GMT





Protesters wave an Argentine flag at an anti-government rally in Buenos Aires on July 9, 2022.
Protesters wave an Argentine flag at an anti-government rally in Buenos Aires on July 9, 2022.

(LUIS ROBAYO/AFP via Getty Images)

On Aug. 3, the Argentine government appointed its third economy minister in roughly a month, a testimony to the country’s seemingly never-ending saga of political volatility and economic decay. The new minister’s challenges are daunting: handle skyrocketing inflation amid dangerously low levels of central bank reserves, resurrect a fragile debt restructuring deal with the International Monetary Fund, restructure a massive network of subsidies and welfare payments that drains state revenue, and convince foreign investors that Argentina is a reliable country to do business. Like his predecessors, the new minister will probably fail to meet these challenges, prolonging the political, economic and social factors that have kept Argentina from reaching its full potential.

Argentina’s perennial cycles of economic turbulence are particularly baffling if we consider that, from a geopolitical perspective, the country has a lot going for it. In fact, Argentina shares many geographic and strategic commonalities with much more prosperous and stable countries like the United States and Australia, including a vast and resource-rich territory, protection from external aggression, and access to a large network of rivers and oceans that facilitate trade, along with a growing, educated and multicultural population. Argentina also has a legal and political system that (at least on paper) ensures a division of power, protects private property and promotes free markets. And yet, Argentina went from being one of the ten largest economies in the world at the beginning of the 20th century to barely making it to the top 30 at the beginning of the 21st century. While the reasons for Argentina’s economic decline are manifold, two stand out: the progressive erosion of the rule of law under both military and democratic governments, and the destructive expansion of populism.

An Advantageous Geography
While geography alone does not fully explain why a country should be prosperous, it is a good place to start thinking about why it could. Argentina is one of the world’s ten largest countries by territory and faces no significant threats of foreign aggression, a luxury that most other countries do not enjoy. The Andes, one of the world’s highest mountain ranges, protect Argentina’s entire western border and make an invasion from Chile virtually impossible. To the country’s south, there’s the vast South Ocean and almost uninhabited Antarctica. And to its east, there’s the Atlantic Ocean, which separates most of Argentina from the rest of the world, while the Rio de la Plata (the widest river in the world) offers enough buffer from potential aggression from neighboring Uruguay.

With three of its four borders secured, the main threats to Argentina’s territorial integrity come from the north, which explains why most of its post-independence wars in the second half of the 19th century (including with Brazil and Paraguay) took place in this area. But even in this case, Argentina’s northern borders are very far from its main population and economic hubs in the center of the country. These geographic features enabled Argentina to build a state after gaining independence from Spain in the early 19th century, and significantly expand its territory (including the conquest of Patagonia, a feat similar to the United States’ expansion to the west around the same time) without facing any meaningful external threats. Another benefit of this geography (and the lack of major quarrels with its neighbors) is that modern Argentina can afford to keep a very modest military budget, which frees up state resources to spend in other areas.

In addition to protection from external aggression, Argentina’s large territory offers significant natural resources that make it self-sufficient in two crucial areas: food and energy. The Pampas region in central Argentina has some of the most fertile lands on the planet, putting the country in a privileged position to produce massive amounts of food and other commodities. A large network of rivers, most notably the Rio de la Plata and its many affluents, and direct access to the Atlantic Ocean have traditionally made it cheap for Argentina to export its products. Argentina also has significant oil, natural gas and shale oil reserves, which makes Buenos Aires less exposed to global energy shocks compared with other import-reliant countries.

Argentina’s demography should also be conducive to economic growth: Like virtually every other country, Argentina’s fertility rate has fallen in recent decades. But it’s still above 2.1 births per woman, the so-called "replacement level" needed to maintain population stability (by contrast, fertility rates in countries like Spain or Italy are below 1.3). This means that Argentina’s population will continue to grow in the coming decades, and that while the country will still face the demographic challenges of an aging and shrinking workforce (and a potentially unsustainable welfare state), it will do so much later than most Western countries. Argentina also has lax immigration laws and a long history of welcoming foreigners, which means that "importing" workers to help offset its demographic decline will not be as politically risky for Argentina as it is in places like Europe.

A Weak Rule of Law
Argentina’s unprecedented economic decline reveals why advantageous geography alone is not enough to build a prosperous country. Some of Argentina’s problems can be traced back to its colonial roots. The Spanish colonizers left an uneven distribution of wealth (as lands were concentrated in few hands), an economic model based on the extraction of commodities with little to no incentive for private entrepreneurship (especially in manufacturing), a tradition of opaque decision-making from often corrupt political leaders, and a tendency for local warlords (or "caudillos") to resort to violence to pursue their political agendas.

Argentine leaders in the 19th century failed to solve most of these problems, and the transition to a sovereign republic left many of the economic and political structures of the colonial era virtually unchanged. These shortcomings became particularly acute in the mid-20th century when a series of coups led to military dictatorships that consolidated violence as a viable way to access and preserve power, abolished democratic institutions and severely weakened the rule of law while systematically violating human rights. Most of Argentina’s democratic governments in the late 20th century and early 21st century were only slightly better, as they circumvented, colluded with, or coerced the country’s legislative and judicial branches and used the state as a vehicle to benefit themselves and their political, social and economic allies.

This institutional weakness has impeded Argentina’s economic development and explains many of the country’s current problems. The absence of an independent and transparent judiciary that ensures everyone plays by the same rules has created an environment where property rights and contracts are selectively enforced (Argentina has a tendency to nationalize and sometimes expropriate everything from private companies to people’s bank savings; the government defaulting on its sovereign debt has also become a national sport.) This further contributes to a weak rule of law and creates inherent risks for both companies and households, which, in turn, undermines economic development by deterring investment and consumption.

Similarly, corruption prevents the laws of the economy from working freely and fosters an uneven distribution of wealth by concentrating economic resources in the hands of corrupt business elites and the public officials who back them. This has also given way to a large informal economy (which employs roughly half of Argentine workers), as companies and households often choose to perform their activities off the books because of selective control from the authorities or excessive taxation. As a result, Argentina’s formal economy has failed to reach anywhere close to its full potential.

In such a volatile political and economic context, it’s no surprise that Argentine governments tend to make abrupt policy changes that make it almost impossible for companies and households to plan long-term by forcing them to adapt quickly to ever-changing rules.

This highly uncertain policy environment tends to produce frequent economic crises by undermining domestic and foreign trust in both the Argentine economy and the Argentine government’s ability to control the situation. In response to those crises, the country’s leaders in Buenos Aires repeatedly make hasty decisions to try to turn things around (as most recently evidenced by the appointment of three economy ministers this past month), which, more often than not, exacerbates the fundamental challenges hindering Argentina’s progress by only casting more doubt about the country’s political and economic stability.

The Perils of Populism
But while Argentina’s weak rule of law and uncertain policy environment certainly haven’t helped, the expansion of populism is perhaps most to blame for the country’s enduring economic malaise.

Echoing similar trends that were taking place in other parts of the world at the time, in the 1940s former Argentine president Juan Peron realized that there were massive political gains to be made from extending economic benefits to the large sectors of the population that had been hitherto neglected by previous Argentine governments. In the decades since, most of Argentina’s governments (the majority of which have been led by Peronists, with the party winning 10 of the 15 presidential elections that took place between 1946 and 2019) have based their power on an ever-increasing network of clientelism and patronage that keeps a vast sector of the population dependent on assistance from the state to cover their basic needs.

The main goal of this system is to secure a critical mass of support from voters in presidential and congressional elections. With the false pretext of helping those in need, most Argentine governments in recent decades have kept large sectors of the population dependent on the state, to make sure that they kept voting for the leaders that guaranteed the continuity of the patronage system. But populism is expensive, which explains why expansionary fiscal and monetary policy frequently results in very high levels of inflation amid deep fiscal deficits; and corrupt and inefficient governments are unreliable, which also explains Argentina’s frequently high borrowing costs in debt markets and the never-ending saga of financial crises and sovereign defaults.

In their book "Why Nations Fail," Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson argue that "poor countries are poor because those who have power make choices that create poverty. They get it wrong not by mistake or ignorance but on purpose." This is painfully true for Argentina, a country where conscious political decisions and mismanagement are directly to blame for its economic decline. For about a century, Argentine governments have resorted to clientelism, corruption and authoritarianism, which has progressively weakened the rule of law, hindered economic development and increased poverty.

The problem is that once populism takes over a country, ending it or at least removing its most pernicious aspects becomes extremely difficult. Each month, roughly half of Argentina’s population currently receives direct payments from the state in one way or another. The government also subsidizes key services and goods, like energy and transportation, for most of the population. Even if done progressively, the lifting of these welfare payments and subsidies would almost certainly result in widespread social unrest and violence that would oust the government that lifted them. This means that even if the system’s shortcomings are evident, present and future Argentine governments will remain reluctant to change (let alone end) it.

Even if, as most opinion polls suggest, the conservative opposition defeats the incumbent Peronists in the presidential elections in October 2023, the new government will struggle to turn things around. Populism has built a time bomb at the heart of the Argentine economy that is virtually impossible to dismantle, which will likely perpetuate (and perhaps worsen) the country’s vicious cycle of political instability and economic volatility, regardless of a geopolitical context that should ensure prosperity.

DougMacG

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Re: Argentina
« Reply #199 on: August 09, 2022, 06:32:08 AM »
"The Geopolitics of Argentina: The Superpower That Wasn’t"

It's an interesting case study.  They ought to be a smaller US of the southern hemisphere.  Instead they have one eighth the GDP per capita of an underperforming US.

Rather than model our success, we copy their failures.