February 19, 2025
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El Salvador’s Newfound Value to the US
It’s about more than immigration.
By: Allison Fedirka
There may be more than meets the eye behind U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s recent visit to El Salvador. Headlines focused on the common themes used to frame U.S. interests in Central America – migration flows and countering Chinese influence. And though these topics were certainly discussed, they alone don’t quite capture Washington’s newfound interest in the country.
Until recently, El Salvador has been plagued by violence and political infighting stemming from the country’s civil war (1979-92). During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were heavily involved in El Salvador. The U.S. backed the oligarchs and conservative dictatorship, while the Soviets found support among the country’s poor and rural residents. Their differences manifested in the various military factions, militia groups and political parties that waged the civil war. It’s no coincidence that the conflict ended when the Soviet Union did.
Yet the groundwork had been laid for political violence. The peace agreement that ended the civil war was a political document focused largely on bringing rebel groups into the political arena. And though it also included judicial and security reforms, provisions for civil rights and some policies for limited land redistribution, it ultimately failed to address the social and economic grievances that lead to violence in the first place. Meanwhile, just as the civil war was ending, the U.S. began to deport Salvadorans en masse. During the conflict, scores of Salvadorans fled north to escape the violence, and some of them, facing the difficulties of starting new lives, joined violent gangs, and those who did were targeted for deportation. El Salvador was ill-equipped to receive them, especially the ones who had experience in criminal activities. As a result, gang activity thrived as the state struggled to rebuild. Ironically, this environment is a root cause of a lot of Salvadoran immigration to the U.S. even today.
Enter Nayib Bukele, the edgy and conservative young businessman who won the presidency in mid-2019. Bukele rose to power as an anti-establishment candidate with a ton of popular support. His administration has managed to consistently maintain a public approval rating of 80-90 percent, according to CID Gallup and other polling agencies. His popularity allowed him to reform laws that govern the legal system and replace many officials in the judiciary, including those on the Supreme Court. He then lulled the gangs into a false sense of security by giving them the impression he intended to negotiate peace agreements like previous administrations. He then changed course, declared a state of emergency (renewed many times) and executed a massive crackdown on crime with sweeping arrests that were exempt from due process because of the state of emergency. From 2020 through 2023, the country’s prison population rose from roughly 37,200 to more than 105,000.
His security achievements have been met with mixed reactions from neighbors in the Western Hemisphere. Critics say his success came through numerous human rights violations and note that, for all the many incarcerations, he has yet to fully address the country’s poverty and economic inequality, which tend to spawn crime. Others are intrigued by the possibility of getting similar results in their home countries. Officials from Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Peru, Argentina and others have expressed an interest in the Bukele model, even if they don’t have the political capital, institutional control or legal leeway to see it through. Still, there are elements in the example set by El Salvador that could be useful to regional governments, many of which could be willing to weather the criticisms of the plan if it meant reducing criminal activity – and spurring social and economic development.
Such is the case in El Salvador. With street violence nearly gone, the government has more bandwidth to think about economic development. Bukele’s security successes allow him to better showcase the country as a destination for investment and economic projects. Earlier this month, for example, the country hosted a meeting of the Ibero-American Business Council, which described El Salvador as an attractive destination for new investments and strategic alliances. The Inter-American Development Bank has also recognized the country’s improved security environment, offering to support local companies and allocating $1 billion in financing for the country’s economic vision. Meanwhile, Bukele is trying to loosen regulations to allow the mining of large, untapped gold resources, and he’s looking to continue to develop special economic zones near major port areas.
Politically, Bukele has also signaled a strong turn toward the United States. This is a notable development in a region that is often suspicious of U.S. foreign policy. (After all, it was only six years ago that the government in San Salvador elected to end its recognition of Taiwan in favor of China.) Bukele himself offered to host the deportees the U.S. plans to send back to Latin America as well as violent American criminals. Though Washington may not take Bukele up on his offer – it’s not even certain that it’s legal – the president has sent a clear message to the U.S. that he wants to stay on good terms with the new administration, and that it will do what it can in terms of migration.
The tacit return that Bukele would get from his offer would be for the U.S. to be more selective in its deportations of Salvadorans. Remittances play a large role in El Salvador’s economy, equal to about 25 percent of the country’s gross domestic product, and about 90 percent of remittances come from the United States. The country simply cannot afford to lose a major source of income. The other return – which, importantly, Bukele would receive only if the U.S. takes him up on his offer – is the money the government would get from the U.S. by hosting deportees.
There is, of course, the question of whether El Salvador can deliver on its promises, but for Washington’s part, the interest is clear. For one thing, it wants to counter Chinese influence in the country. When El Salvador dropped its recognition of Taiwan in 2018, Beijing began to cut the government checks totaling $500 million, most of which were earmarked for what could be called development assistance – a soccer stadium and tourist attractions – rather than major economic game changers. Where Chinese interest in El Salvador has raised concerns for the U.S. is La Union port. This deep-water coast in Fonseca Bay is surrounded by areas that fall under the government’s special economic zones aimed at driving national economic development. It is also close to Honduras and Nicaragua, which border the bay. While China does not control the projects, its interest in the economic zones and the port make the U.S. uneasy.
There is also the question of curbing northbound immigration from Central America and, relatedly, the prospects of seeing what parts of El Salvador’s security success can be replicated in other Central American countries. The Biden administration may have valued the security Bukele brought to El Salvador, but human rights concerns limited the degree to which it could reward him. The Trump administration has made immigration a top priority, so it is unclear whether it will be similarly constrained.
Finally, there is Washington’s renewed interest in controlling sea lanes and having alternative routes to critical chokepoints in the Western Hemisphere. Over the past four years, it has become clear that water levels at the Panama Canal cannot be guaranteed (even though a reservoir project is in the works to try to make water levels more reliable in the long term). El Salvador envisions developing La Union as a regional logistics hub that contributes to port connectivity along the Pacific coasts of Central and South America. There is also the potential for connecting to the Atlantic coast through Honduras and Nicaragua via the Fonseca Bay. Honduras has only one deep-water port, Puerto Cortes, which lies along the Caribbean Sea. The government also recently canceled plans related to special economic zones. Partnering with El Salvador could thus give Honduras access to special economic zone benefits and deep-water ports in the Pacific. In exchange, El Salvador could get easier access to the Pacific. Similar cooperation could also arise with Nicaragua, which has struggled for decades to develop a trade route that connects its coasts, and though there is a proposed canal route under study, the ambitious engineering and funding needed raise questions about its feasibility. In theory, improved trade and economic conditions in these three countries would improve the local economy, thereby removing some migratory pressure on local populations.
A new U.S. administration has the potential to change U.S. foreign policy, even in the once-predictable Western Hemisphere. In this context, El Salvador is positioned to help Washington pursue geopolitical objectives that have been out of reach for decades.
