India, India-China, India Afpakia, India-Russia

[Crafty_Dog]

Strat's take on it:
=====================

It can be difficult to separate the important from unimportant on any given day. Reflections mean to do exactly that — by thinking about what happened today, we can consider what might happen tomorrow.

A months long standoff on top of the world is finally drawing to a close. On Aug. 28, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs released a statement saying that a "disengagement" of troops has begun on the Doklam Plateau. Doklam — a disputed territory between China and Bhutan — was the site of the confrontation between Indian and Chinese troops as India intervened there in June to halt a Chinese road construction project. India feared the road would have eased China's ability to bring troops closer to the neighboring state of Sikkim and to India's Siliguri corridor, which links the Indian mainland with its northeastern wing. The drawdown highlights how the costs of war outweighed the benefits of aggression for both sides, for now.

Still, the timing of the draw down is conspicuous. China will host the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) summit on Sept. 3. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi — who was already a no-show during China's Belt and Road Initiative summit — has not confirmed attendance. This is problematic since China would prefer to use BRICS to showcase its harmonious ties with member nations — something which Modi's absence would almost certainly undercut. So it's possible Modi used the threat of his absence as a bargaining chip to goad China into an agreement in which Indian troops backed off in exchange for China's promise to stop building its road. China confirmed neither, but India's decision to back down suggests the affirmative.

In any case, Doklam is a small part of a much bigger story. India and China share a 4,057-kilometer (2,521-mile) border known as the Line of Actual Control, and nearly all of it is in dispute. For instance, in the northwest lies Aksai Chin, a territory in Kashmir that India claims but China has administered ever since capturing it from India in 1962, when the two countries fought a short, sharp border war in which China emerged the victor. Then to the northeast is Arunachal Pradesh. China captured much of the area in 1962 but subsequently withdrew. China, however, still claims Arunachal Pradesh as "South Tibet," and Chinese troop incursions along the poorly demarcated border are not uncommon.

For India, these vulnerabilities compelled a shift in strategy. Initially, India had intentionally built few roads in the border region to blunt the movement of Chinese troops during another potential invasion. But in 1997, India instituted the China Study Group to propose the construction of border roads, partially in response to China's own infrastructure activities along the border. Many of these roads are incomplete, and Doklam has only drawn attention to their importance. Prior to the standoff, in fact, Modi had prioritized the construction of these 73 strategic roads.

India's desire to bolster infrastructure along a contested border suggests border confrontations with China will continue. This is part of the natural friction that arises when two large countries share a boundary that unfolds across the indomitable chain of the world's tallest mountains. But how that tension manifests is important to watch. A standoff is one possibility. But so are less drawn out measures such as the recent scuffle that took place near Pangong Lake in Aksai Chin. These will also continue.

The more interesting question is whether India and China can continue preventing their disputes (of which Doklam is only one part) from spilling over into other aspects of their overall relationship. So far, this compartmentalization has broadly held. For instance, the two countries issued a joint proposal calling for the World Trade Organization to banish $160 billion in farm subsidies in the United States, European Union, Canada, Japan and Switzerland. And on June 20 — after the standoff began — China's East Hope Group signed a $300 million deal to set up a solar power manufacturing plant in Gujarat, India. Finally, the navies of both countries will participate in the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium in November.

But will this compartmentalization continue to hold? China's cooperation with Pakistan, in particular, has placed unique stresses on China-India relations. The advent of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, China's refusal to sanction the Pakistan-based militant Masood Azhar and China's refusal to approve India's membership to the Nuclear Suppliers Group are all irritants that are compelling India to strengthen its ties with the United States and Japan, and to undermine China by promoting freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. It remains to be seen whether contentions can be contained within the security sphere, or if they will work to sabotage the countries' broader relationship. So even as the Doklam standoff winds down, India and China's strategic rivalry will only ramp up.

[ya]

Nice article, with lessons for future conflicts...YA

https://warontherocks.com/2017/08/countering-chinese-coercion-the-case-of-doklam/

China’s Coercion Playbook

China used the same playbook in Doklam as it has in other territorial disputes, especially Vietnam and the Philippines. This playbook usually involves four elements. The first step is to develop a larger or more permanent physical presence in areas where China has already has a degree of de facto control — whether that means new islands in the South China Sea or roads in the Himalayas. Using its military to build infrastructure in the Doklam area was likely an attempt to consolidate China’s control along its southwestern border, including this disputed area where it has patrolled for some time.

This consolidation usually goes hand-in-hand with the second element, coercive diplomacy. Here, China couples its threats or limited military action with diplomatic efforts designed to persuade the target state to change its policies or behavior. The strategy is to put the onus on the other side, often in a weaker position militarily, to risk confrontation over these gradual changes to the status quo. The goal is to ensure the target country does not counter China’s consolidation attempts, and ideally to compel them to engage in bilateral negotiations. It is in such talks that China can then leverage its stronger physical position to secure a favorable settlement.

China has used this model of coercive diplomacy not only against weaker claimants in the South China Sea, but also against the United States. In the 2009 U.S. Naval Ship Impeccable incident, for example, it used coercive diplomacy and other elements of its playbook against U.S. maritime surveillance operations. The Doklam case carried the added enticing prospect of opening new channels of diplomatic communication — and influence — with Bhutan, with which China currently lacks formal diplomatic relations.

Third, China uses legal rhetoric and principles to present its position as legitimate and lawful, thereby staking a claim to a broader legitimizing principle in territorial disputes. In the case of Doklam, China portrayed the Indian response as a violation of Chinese sovereignty — it claimed Indian troops entered Chinese territory through the Sikkim sector of the Sino-Indian border and had been “obstructing Chinese border troop activities.” China declared its road construction was entirely lawful, designed to improve infrastructure for the local people and border patrols. China’s policy position was that the border was delimited in 1890, formally reaffirmed several times since, and reinforced by the routine presence of Chinese troops and herders. Its legal argument thus rested in part on the first element of the playbook: the physical presence that it sought to make permanent with the road at Doklam.

Lastly, China leverages its government-controlled media to highlight its narrative and issue threats. These tend to involve warnings about not underestimating Chinese resolve and the Chinese people’s determination to protect their sovereignty just because China has restrained itself so far. The Chinese media was replete with such articles, warning India, for example, not to “play with fire” lest it “get burned.” They cautioned the Indian government not to be driven by nationalism and arrogance, to avoid miscalculation and repeating the mistakes of the 1962 war. This is not just a war of words; research shows that escalating threats in the media can be a precursor to China’s use of force.

While other countries may also seek to impose a territorial fait accompli — such as Russia in Ukraine — China always follows its multi-pronged playbook. It consistently demonstrates a preference for ambiguity, risk manipulation and controlling the narrative to win without fighting. Any use of coercion — which involves threats and use of force — carries the risk of escalation to conflict, even if China has previously managed to resolve most of its disputes without war. How China advances its claims in South and East Asia will determine whether those regions remain peaceful and stable.

Thwarting Coercion With Denial

China’s playbook, however, did not go according to plan this time, because it did not account for India’s unexpectedly swift and assertive response to its road-building. India did not simply voice displeasure or threaten to punish China if it continued to pursue its territorial claims as the United States and Southeast Asian countries have done in the South China Sea. In those cases, China used its coercive playbook effectively, forcing its adversaries to either back down or raise the ante. And as China’s uncontested gains have shown, its adversaries have generally lacked the capabilities, and especially the political resolve, to escalate crises.

But in this situation, India thwarted China’s coercion through denial — blocking China’s attempt to seize physical control of the disputed territory. By physically denying China’s bid to change the status quo, India created a stalemate, which suited its strategic policy. It did not acquiesce to a Chinese fait accompli, and it did not have to summon the capabilities or resolve to reverse China’s position, which would have risked a general war. India was able to do this because of a local military advantage and its broader policy of standing up to China. As a result, China did not have the option of proceeding under the guise of peaceful legitimate development, per its playbook; pressing its claims on Doklam would have required it to ratchet up military pressure. The stalemate thwarted Chinese coercion — but as long as it lasted, it was pregnant with risks of escalation and conflict.

Disengagement, But Dangers Persist

The immediate risks of conflict have receded, but the border dispute remains unresolved, and the broader Sino-Indian relationship remains fraught. First, on Doklam, while China has backed down for now, its statement that “China will continue fulfilling its sovereign rights to safeguard territorial sovereignty in compliance with the stipulations of the border-related historical treaty” suggests it has not changed its position on the border tri-junction. Indeed, during the standoff, China reportedly offered financial inducements to cleave Bhutan away from its traditional relationship with India — it has other ways, and continued ambitions, to press its claims.

Second, the India-China relationship remains tense, and prone to military risk, especially if China seeks to reassert itself after a perceived slight at Doklam. This could include an incursion somewhere along the India-China Line of Actual Control — indeed, such actions have already been reported. Or China might pursue a “cross-domain” response, for example with punitive cyber attacks or threatening activity in the Indian Ocean.

Third, over the longer term, India should be wary of learning the wrong lessons from the crisis. As one of us has recently written, India has long been preoccupied with the threat of Chinese (and Pakistani) aggression on their common land border. The Doklam standoff may be remembered as even more reason for India to pour more resources into defending its land borders, at the expense of building capabilities and influence in the wider Indian Ocean region. That would only play into China’s hands. Renewed Indian concerns about its land borders will only retard its emergence as an assertive and influential regional power.

The Lessons of Doklam

With the crisis only just being de-escalated, it is too early to derive definitive lessons from Doklam. However, a few policy implications are already apparent. First, Chinese behavior in territorial disputes is more likely to be deterred by denial than by threats of punishment. China will continue the combination of consolidating its physical presence and engaging in coercive diplomacy, lawfare, and media campaigns unless it is stopped directly. This is what India did at Doklam — it directly blocked Chinese efforts to change the status quo. Denial in other areas would require different military tasks — for example, in the Indian Ocean, it may involve anti-submarine warfare and maritime domain awareness.

Second, denial strategies may be effective, but they have their limitations. Denial is inherently risky. Countering China’s playbook involves risks of escalation — which most smaller adversaries, and at times even the United States, are unwilling to accept. Moreover, denial strategies can only serve to halt adversary action, not to reverse what the adversary has already done. As Doklam shows, India could convince China not to proceed with its road-building — but China did not relinquish its claims or its established pattern of presence in the area. Denial by itself offers no pathway to politically resolving the crisis.

Third, the agreement to disengage suggests that Beijing’s position in crises can be flexible, and perhaps responsive to assertive counter-coercion. Domestic audiences, even those in autocracies, often prefer sound judgment to recklessly staying the course. If the Doklam standoff had escalated to a shooting war, anything short of a decisive victory might have put Xi Jinping in an unfavorable position at the 19th Party Congress and hurt the PLA’s image with the Chinese people. But short of that, the Chinese government was always in the position to sell Doklam as a non-event, something the decreasing domestic media coverage suggests it was preparing to do. Beijing will frame the disengagement agreement as further proof of Chinese strength, especially relative to India. As the stronger power, China could magnanimously agree to a mutual disengagement for now while reserving the right to move forward when it sees fit.

Finally, the Doklam agreement, even if it is temporary, tells us that when China confronts a significantly weaker target, such as Bhutan, it will only be deterred by the actions of a stronger third party — in this case, India. Had India not acted, China would likely have been successful in consolidating its control and extracting territorial concessions from Bhutan. Third-party involvement may not be as easy in other cases — India had a privileged position in Bhutan. Such a strategy may also have significant second-order effects. In the near term, it is potentially escalatory — China argued that India has no basis for interfering in this bilateral dispute, and had many options for escalating the crisis at a time and place of its choosing. More broadly, such third-party involvement could intensify geopolitical competition between China and other powers such as the U.S. or India, if they intercede in other countries’ disputes with China. The lesson of Doklam for the United States is that arming small states and imposing incremental costs may not be enough. Washington may have to accept the greater risks associated with intervening more directly if it hopes to counter Chinese expansion in East Asia.

 

Oriana Skylar Mastro is an assistant professor of security studies at Georgetown University. She can be contacted through her website: www.orianaskylarmastro.com. Arzan Tarapore is an adjunct researcher at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation, and a PhD candidate at King’s College London.

[G M]

Wait? You mean strongly worded letters aren't enough? Unpossible!

Nice article, with lessons for future conflicts...YA

https://warontherocks.com/2017/08/countering-chinese-coercion-the-case-of-doklam/

China’s Coercion Playbook

China used the same playbook in Doklam as it has in other territorial disputes, especially Vietnam and the Philippines. This playbook usually involves four elements. The first step is to develop a larger or more permanent physical presence in areas where China has already has a degree of de facto control — whether that means new islands in the South China Sea or roads in the Himalayas. Using its military to build infrastructure in the Doklam area was likely an attempt to consolidate China’s control along its southwestern border, including this disputed area where it has patrolled for some time.

This consolidation usually goes hand-in-hand with the second element, coercive diplomacy. Here, China couples its threats or limited military action with diplomatic efforts designed to persuade the target state to change its policies or behavior. The strategy is to put the onus on the other side, often in a weaker position militarily, to risk confrontation over these gradual changes to the status quo. The goal is to ensure the target country does not counter China’s consolidation attempts, and ideally to compel them to engage in bilateral negotiations. It is in such talks that China can then leverage its stronger physical position to secure a favorable settlement.

China has used this model of coercive diplomacy not only against weaker claimants in the South China Sea, but also against the United States. In the 2009 U.S. Naval Ship Impeccable incident, for example, it used coercive diplomacy and other elements of its playbook against U.S. maritime surveillance operations. The Doklam case carried the added enticing prospect of opening new channels of diplomatic communication — and influence — with Bhutan, with which China currently lacks formal diplomatic relations.

Third, China uses legal rhetoric and principles to present its position as legitimate and lawful, thereby staking a claim to a broader legitimizing principle in territorial disputes. In the case of Doklam, China portrayed the Indian response as a violation of Chinese sovereignty — it claimed Indian troops entered Chinese territory through the Sikkim sector of the Sino-Indian border and had been “obstructing Chinese border troop activities.” China declared its road construction was entirely lawful, designed to improve infrastructure for the local people and border patrols. China’s policy position was that the border was delimited in 1890, formally reaffirmed several times since, and reinforced by the routine presence of Chinese troops and herders. Its legal argument thus rested in part on the first element of the playbook: the physical presence that it sought to make permanent with the road at Doklam.

Lastly, China leverages its government-controlled media to highlight its narrative and issue threats. These tend to involve warnings about not underestimating Chinese resolve and the Chinese people’s determination to protect their sovereignty just because China has restrained itself so far. The Chinese media was replete with such articles, warning India, for example, not to “play with fire” lest it “get burned.” They cautioned the Indian government not to be driven by nationalism and arrogance, to avoid miscalculation and repeating the mistakes of the 1962 war. This is not just a war of words; research shows that escalating threats in the media can be a precursor to China’s use of force.

While other countries may also seek to impose a territorial fait accompli — such as Russia in Ukraine — China always follows its multi-pronged playbook. It consistently demonstrates a preference for ambiguity, risk manipulation and controlling the narrative to win without fighting. Any use of coercion — which involves threats and use of force — carries the risk of escalation to conflict, even if China has previously managed to resolve most of its disputes without war. How China advances its claims in South and East Asia will determine whether those regions remain peaceful and stable.

Thwarting Coercion With Denial

China’s playbook, however, did not go according to plan this time, because it did not account for India’s unexpectedly swift and assertive response to its road-building. India did not simply voice displeasure or threaten to punish China if it continued to pursue its territorial claims as the United States and Southeast Asian countries have done in the South China Sea. In those cases, China used its coercive playbook effectively, forcing its adversaries to either back down or raise the ante. And as China’s uncontested gains have shown, its adversaries have generally lacked the capabilities, and especially the political resolve, to escalate crises.

But in this situation, India thwarted China’s coercion through denial — blocking China’s attempt to seize physical control of the disputed territory. By physically denying China’s bid to change the status quo, India created a stalemate, which suited its strategic policy. It did not acquiesce to a Chinese fait accompli, and it did not have to summon the capabilities or resolve to reverse China’s position, which would have risked a general war. India was able to do this because of a local military advantage and its broader policy of standing up to China. As a result, China did not have the option of proceeding under the guise of peaceful legitimate development, per its playbook; pressing its claims on Doklam would have required it to ratchet up military pressure. The stalemate thwarted Chinese coercion — but as long as it lasted, it was pregnant with risks of escalation and conflict.

Disengagement, But Dangers Persist

The immediate risks of conflict have receded, but the border dispute remains unresolved, and the broader Sino-Indian relationship remains fraught. First, on Doklam, while China has backed down for now, its statement that “China will continue fulfilling its sovereign rights to safeguard territorial sovereignty in compliance with the stipulations of the border-related historical treaty” suggests it has not changed its position on the border tri-junction. Indeed, during the standoff, China reportedly offered financial inducements to cleave Bhutan away from its traditional relationship with India — it has other ways, and continued ambitions, to press its claims.

Second, the India-China relationship remains tense, and prone to military risk, especially if China seeks to reassert itself after a perceived slight at Doklam. This could include an incursion somewhere along the India-China Line of Actual Control — indeed, such actions have already been reported. Or China might pursue a “cross-domain” response, for example with punitive cyber attacks or threatening activity in the Indian Ocean.

Third, over the longer term, India should be wary of learning the wrong lessons from the crisis. As one of us has recently written, India has long been preoccupied with the threat of Chinese (and Pakistani) aggression on their common land border. The Doklam standoff may be remembered as even more reason for India to pour more resources into defending its land borders, at the expense of building capabilities and influence in the wider Indian Ocean region. That would only play into China’s hands. Renewed Indian concerns about its land borders will only retard its emergence as an assertive and influential regional power.

The Lessons of Doklam

With the crisis only just being de-escalated, it is too early to derive definitive lessons from Doklam. However, a few policy implications are already apparent. First, Chinese behavior in territorial disputes is more likely to be deterred by denial than by threats of punishment. China will continue the combination of consolidating its physical presence and engaging in coercive diplomacy, lawfare, and media campaigns unless it is stopped directly. This is what India did at Doklam — it directly blocked Chinese efforts to change the status quo. Denial in other areas would require different military tasks — for example, in the Indian Ocean, it may involve anti-submarine warfare and maritime domain awareness.

Second, denial strategies may be effective, but they have their limitations. Denial is inherently risky. Countering China’s playbook involves risks of escalation — which most smaller adversaries, and at times even the United States, are unwilling to accept. Moreover, denial strategies can only serve to halt adversary action, not to reverse what the adversary has already done. As Doklam shows, India could convince China not to proceed with its road-building — but China did not relinquish its claims or its established pattern of presence in the area. Denial by itself offers no pathway to politically resolving the crisis.

Third, the agreement to disengage suggests that Beijing’s position in crises can be flexible, and perhaps responsive to assertive counter-coercion. Domestic audiences, even those in autocracies, often prefer sound judgment to recklessly staying the course. If the Doklam standoff had escalated to a shooting war, anything short of a decisive victory might have put Xi Jinping in an unfavorable position at the 19th Party Congress and hurt the PLA’s image with the Chinese people. But short of that, the Chinese government was always in the position to sell Doklam as a non-event, something the decreasing domestic media coverage suggests it was preparing to do. Beijing will frame the disengagement agreement as further proof of Chinese strength, especially relative to India. As the stronger power, China could magnanimously agree to a mutual disengagement for now while reserving the right to move forward when it sees fit.

Finally, the Doklam agreement, even if it is temporary, tells us that when China confronts a significantly weaker target, such as Bhutan, it will only be deterred by the actions of a stronger third party — in this case, India. Had India not acted, China would likely have been successful in consolidating its control and extracting territorial concessions from Bhutan. Third-party involvement may not be as easy in other cases — India had a privileged position in Bhutan. Such a strategy may also have significant second-order effects. In the near term, it is potentially escalatory — China argued that India has no basis for interfering in this bilateral dispute, and had many options for escalating the crisis at a time and place of its choosing. More broadly, such third-party involvement could intensify geopolitical competition between China and other powers such as the U.S. or India, if they intercede in other countries’ disputes with China. The lesson of Doklam for the United States is that arming small states and imposing incremental costs may not be enough. Washington may have to accept the greater risks associated with intervening more directly if it hopes to counter Chinese expansion in East Asia.

 

Oriana Skylar Mastro is an assistant professor of security studies at Georgetown University. She can be contacted through her website: www.orianaskylarmastro.com. Arzan Tarapore is an adjunct researcher at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation, and a PhD candidate at King’s College London.

[Crafty_Dog]

stratfor


U.S. President Donald Trump's new plan for the war in Afghanistan is huge, at least for Pakistan. So huge that on Aug. 30, for the second time in a week, Pakistani Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi chaired a meeting of the National Security Committee, arguably the highest point of coordination between civilian and military leadership in the country. The purpose of both meetings: crafting a policy response to Trump, who in his speech announcing a new Afghan strategy Aug. 21 publicly accused Pakistan of harboring terrorists. But what's almost more threatening to Pakistan is Trump's request for Pakistani archrival India to play a greater role in the war in Afghanistan.

Pakistan is not without friends. China, the country's strongest ally, has responded positively to Islamabad's overtures by highlighting Pakistan's sacrifices in the war against terrorism. On Aug. 28, China's special envoy to Afghanistan met with Pakistan's foreign secretary in Islamabad, where the pair emphasized the futility of seeking a military solution to Afghanistan in lieu of a diplomatic one. Meanwhile, Pakistan's foreign minister is delaying a meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson as he prepares a tour through China, Russia and Turkey to court more support.

Pakistani ties to the Taliban serve a strategic interest for the country by denying India a foothold in post-war Afghanistan and by countering Indian encirclement. Now, Pakistan's ties to the Taliban can also be used as a bargaining chip. Statements from Pakistan's foreign minister suggest the country may be willing to coordinate negotiations with the terrorist organization, provided the outcome is in Pakistan's interests. By dangling the carrot of negotiations, Pakistan could be able to push the United States into condemning alleged Indian human rights violations in Jammu and Kashmir. However, the more India's presence in Afghanistan grows, the more Pakistan will resist pushing the Taliban toward the negotiating table. Without such negotiations, Trump may lose his chance to cut a deal and find a diplomatic solution to the United States' longest war.
Stratfor

[Crafty_Dog]

India: Falling Short of Great Power
Aug 31, 2017

Summary

India dominates much of the subcontinent it occupies. In terms of land mass, population, economic activity and military capabilities, no other country in the region comes close. And yet, as much as India towers over the region by metrics, it cannot project power in the region proportionate to its size. In this Deep Dive, we’ll explain why this is the case and what would be required for India to reach its potential.

A Corridor to the Core

A country’s core is the area that is critical for geopolitical survival, where the key components necessary to sustain life intersect. India’s core lies within the Indo-Gangetic Plain, where the Ganges River meets the southern foothills of the Himalayas. Before independence, when colonial India included present-day Pakistan, the core extended westward to include both sides of the Indus River. The flat terrain is hospitable to settlement and agriculture, and its proximity to the Ganges ensures a freshwater supply. The humid, subtropical climate is much more hospitable than other climates found outside the plain: deserts, mountains, tropics, monsoons and arid steppes.

Strong geographic barriers fortify nearly all the boundaries of India’s core, making it difficult to attack. The Himalaya Mountains in the north and Arakan Mountains in the east clearly demarcate the region from the rest of the Asian continent. They are also difficult to traverse. Though they do not completely eliminate the possibility of attack, they make logistics and sustained fighting difficult, costly and often short-lived. To the west, the smaller Aravalli Mountains and Thar Desert protect the core by cutting off a large portion of the Indo-Gangetic Plain. To the south, the Vindhya Mountains extend up to the Chota Nagpur Plateau, creating a light land barrier. The remaining landmass below this southern line is surrounded by the Indian Ocean. Nearly every major empire to rule present-day India set up its base of power in this core area because of its hospitable climate and high degree of protection from foreign land invasion.
 
(click to enlarge)

But there is one place where the core is highly vulnerable to land invasion: the flat corridor between the Thar Desert and Himalayas in Punjab. As far back as Alexander the Great’s India campaign, foreign powers have exploited this land passage to invade India. The Ghaznavids, a Turkic people from Central Asia, passed through valleys in modern-day Afghanistan in the 11th and 12th centuries and invaded India through this corridor. Other great empires that ruled over India after invading through this point include the Mughals (1526-1857) and Sultanate of Delhi (1206-1526). Lesser-known Persian and Afghan dynasties like the Ghorids, Lodhis and Durranis did the same.
Looking at the rise and fall of empires in India, it becomes clear that whoever wants to command the country must first cut off this point of entry through the Thar-Himalaya corridor. Failure to do so leaves the core vulnerable to foreign threats. Present-day India had this imperative fulfilled upon gaining independence in 1947. The national borders New Delhi inherited from independence and partition cut off passage through the corridor – as much as a national border can. Though an international border is not the same as a geographic barrier, India has a means of restricting entry into the country in this area through traditional border controls. In areas where India lacks a universally recognized international boundary, fighting continues. A case in point is Kashmir, which was not included in the legally established boundaries after British rule.

Managing Diversity

Throughout its history, Indian governance was characterized by foreign rule over hundreds of small states or principalities. Muslims ruled over the Hindu majorities during the Delhi Sultanate and the Mughal Empire, and the British ended up ruling over both. Even before the sultanate, ruling Turkic peoples mixed in with the local population. Unlike the previous empires, independent India is now fully governed by its own people, and the territorial integrity of the country is largely solidified.

India’s long history as a subject of foreign empires created the government’s main domestic challenge: effectively managing the country’s extreme diversity. India has never been a truly unified country or empire. It existed as a hodgepodge of kingdoms, clans and local rulers, each with their own unique identity. During the periods of great empires, the ruling powers consolidated control over the territory by arranging some type of allegiance from each group. Past empires used extensive military force to establish, maintain and grow their presence on the subcontinent. They followed a basic framework in which the ruling power acted as an overlord of the larger territory while local monarchs, clans or community leaders had a high degree of autonomy in running daily life and state affairs.

The current shape of the Indian administration has its roots in the way the British Empire built its control over the subcontinent. When India achieved national independence, the new country needed to shore up its political identity. As a British colony, the subcontinent existed as a series of administrative provinces and princely states. The provinces had fallen under direct British rule, while the princely states were semi-sovereign territories that allied with the British government. Each of the 565 princely states that existed at the time of independence could opt in to the new nation-state if it so chose. The states formed after independence corresponded to the British administrative divisions of the territory. The partition of India and Pakistan into two separate nation-states uprooted millions of people, leading to large-scale and at times fatal communal violence. The trauma that resulted from this still lives on today and is evident in the two countries’ tense relationship. What emerged was a country whose national borders were not created by natural geographic or demographic divisions. Instead, it was a conglomeration of eclectic identities and territories accustomed to having a large degree of autonomy under one national, administrative rule.
 
(click to enlarge)

Much like its historic empires, modern-day India consists of many states acting autonomously, with minimal control given to the central government. India remains an unwieldy collection of semi-autonomous states and union territories. As a result, the country has maintained a diverse population over centuries. Indian states are allowed to choose their own official language, which has resulted in 22 official languages throughout the country, with many more unofficial languages widely spoken. Hindi is the predominant language group, with roughly 422 million native speakers, but outside of the Hindi core, linguistic minorities have majority status within many states. For example, Bengali is spoken natively by 83 million people and is the official language of West Bengal, Tripura, and the Andaman and Nicobar islands. Telugu, with 74 million native speakers, is the official language of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana. Many Indians are unable to effectively communicate in a shared language, which creates problems for national cohesion.

Another diversity problem for India lies in religion. Hindus are the most populous religious group in 27 states, but some provinces have majority or sizable non-Hindu populations. Islam makes up a majority in Lakshadweep and Jammu and Kashmir; it is a sizable minority in Assam (30.9%), West Bengal (25.2%), Kerala (24.7%), Uttar Pradesh (18.5%) and Bihar (16.5%). Communal violence is common. The biggest conflict was in 1947 during partition, but since then, there have been smaller-scale communal riots, such as the 1984 massacre of Sikhs. Prior to British rule, communal riots were scarce. The Muslim minority ruled over a Hindu majority almost uninterrupted from the 10th century to the 19th.

Regionalism is compounded by disparities in economic development. Wealth is far from equally distributed. According to India’s Ministry of Statistics, rich states like Maharashtra and New Delhi boast per capita net state domestic products of $2,094 and $4,376, respectively. Meanwhile, a poor state like Uttar Pradesh registers just $757 as its per capita NSDP.

Economic activity is also not equally represented throughout the country. Some regions of India have a developed services-oriented economy like Mumbai or Hyderabad, which is a major IT hub. Others have limited and unreliable access to basic infrastructure such as electricity and water. The country’s industrial sector also reflects the wide range of wealth generation in the country. There is basic textile manufacturing in Tamil Nadu state and high-value defense industry production in Karnataka state.

This divergence in economic activity and standards of living creates multiple population groups with very different needs and demands from the same government. All compete for the government’s attention and resources. Historically complicating these competing interests for the Indian government has been its limited ability to exercise control at the national level, as local government initiatives can easily usurp or bypass national ones.
 
(click to enlarge)

Prime Minister Narendra Modi is attempting to kill two birds with one stone by using economic reforms to centralize power and win public favor through economic growth. In an effort to crack down on black market cash and formalize the economy, the government has linked the ability to exchange cash for good currency with formally registering with the government for income taxes. The new Goods and Services Tax streamlines the tax process such that the final prices of goods are cheaper and more tax revenue ends up funneling into national accounts rather than state or local accounts. Reforms underway regarding real estate ownership and the gold market also will simultaneously formalize the economy while targeting potential business power centers or groups that could pose a challenge to the central government.

Be the Regional Hegemon

In the event that India consistently manages its unity and diversity for an extended period of time, it can begin to project outward and will set its sights on becoming the regional hegemon. This matters to India because of the country’s strategic need to secure resources and better protect its territorial integrity. But for India, hegemony demands that it be able to project influence over each of the four nation-states bordering it within the subcontinent – Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh.

India’s main strategic concern is its ability to maintain access to its northeastern states. These states are separated from the mainland by the Siliguri Corridor, a strip of land that at its narrowest measures just 17 miles (27 kilometers) wide and, due to its positioning with respect to the Dolam Plateau, makes it vulnerable to attack from the north. A small part of Chinese territory dips down between Nepal and Bhutan close to this corridor. Nepal and Bhutan are critical buffer states between India and China, so New Delhi and Beijing compete for influence in these countries. In the past, Indian-Chinese competition for these two territories has resulted in war. These conflicts are usually short-lived, since the mountainous terrain makes it logistically costly and difficult to sustain warfare over an extended period of time. Instead, India’s leading strategies to maintain influence in these buffer states revolve around building strong political and economic relationships.
 
(click to enlarge)

Control of Pakistan would help India meet two strategic objectives. The first is access to water resources from the Indus River Valley. The Indus River Valley lies in Chinese, Indian and Pakistani territory. From India’s point of view, control over Pakistan is necessary to ensure water and hydroelectricity to its northern cities.

As a question of national security, India has a strategic objective to control, or at the very least definitively subordinate, Pakistan. Since partition, relations between India and Pakistan have been antagonistic. The arrangement accentuated the Muslim-Hindu divide between the two countries. This has manifested in the form of military skirmishes and terrorist attacks against India.
 
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India’s relationship with Bangladesh is the most stable compared to the others. Unlike Nepal and Bhutan, Bangladesh does not directly border China. Nor does it have a neighboring power it can use to play off India. Instead, India almost entirely surrounds Bangladesh, aside from a short 169-mile border with Myanmar, of which about 130 miles are on land rather than at sea. Additionally, India controls the upper portion of the Brahmaputra River, which provides Bangladesh with a significant source of freshwater. This gives New Delhi even greater leverage over Dhaka. The relationship helps mitigate the risk to the Siliguri Corridor and provides India strategic depth. If infrastructure were better, India’s northeastern states would benefit from sea access via the Brahmaputra River through Bangladesh. Such access would also help support further economic development in these states, which are among India’s poorest. Additionally, controlling Bangladesh helps shore up India’s border with Southeast Asia. This border area is not often as dynamic or noted as India’s other borders, but the China-Burma-India theater of World War II illustrates its strategic value to India. The theater was established to prevent and push back the Japanese advancement in Asia, which at one point reached modern-day Myanmar and directly bordered British India.

Control the Indian Ocean

India also has its sights set on becoming the predominant military power in the Indian Ocean. The country has an extensive coastline stretching 4,671 miles, making it impossible to ignore surrounding waters. The Indian Ocean region, including the Bay of Bengal, Arabian Sea and Laccadive Sea, remains a strategic interest for India. New Delhi also pays close attention to areas from the Andaman Sea to the Strait of Malacca, the Gulf of Aden to the Suez Canal, and the Strait of Hormuz to the Persian Gulf. This latter group of maritime bodies represents major entry or exit points into the Indian Ocean region and coastal waters of India, and given the natural geographic defenses surrounding most of India, the coast is one of the only areas vulnerable to attack and possible invasion. British colonization of the subcontinent did begin, after all, with coastal entry into the country.

The Indian Ocean region plays a vital role in India’s economy and national security. India has a difficult time engaging in land-based trade. Generally, land-based trade has higher transportation costs than maritime trade, and this is even more true for terrain as challenging as India’s mountain ranges. Even the ancient Silk Road’s main trajectory skirted north of the Himalayas; any access points to India were secondary or tertiary branches of the main route. Because of this, India will always need to use maritime routes for trade.

It sits in the advantageous position of having access to energy imports from the Middle East and access to Asian markets for selling goods. Even Europe is a market India can tap at its convenience, thanks to the Suez Canal. Approximately 95 percent of India’s trade by volume and 70 percent by value is carried out via maritime transportation, according to India’s Ministry of Shipping.

India’s navy is in the early stages of modernization and still needs to grow and increase its capabilities before it could come close to fulfilling this imperative. India’s military has only recently become capable of providing baseline security to immediate coastal waters. But although New Delhi lacks the ability to project power into the oceans, its strategic interests mean it must monitor the ocean, even if there is little it can do to affect it. In the meantime, the country’s strategy to ensure that its security interests are being met in the region is to ally itself with strong navies from sympathetic countries like the United States, Japan and, to a lesser degree, Australia.

Conclusion

There’s no denying India’s potential to dominate and project power across the subcontinent it occupies. Reaching that potential, however, depends on the country’s ability to overcome the constraints that keep it from fulfilling its imperatives. Maintaining and managing the country’s unity in the face of so much diversity has been a challenge for all Indian governments. The current strategy to achieve this revolves around economic reforms and efforts to build nationalism, particularly among the Hindu population. The problems, tensions and national interests in the border states will persist as India tries to manage its imperatives. But the better India can manage domestic diversity, the more resources it will have at its disposal to deal with international issues. India must achieve its imperatives in succession. First, it needs to create a sense of nationhood among the people and develop a coherent economic system. Once the core of India is under a centralized authority, it can pursue its security imperatives at land and at sea.

The post India: Falling Short of Great Power appeared first on Geopolitics | Geopolitical Futures.

[ya]

I used to subscribe to Stratfor and was generally impressed with it, perhaps because I had no first hand knowledge of the topics they wrote about. Wrt India, since I know the subject matter somewhat, I find there writing quite superficial and also inaccurate. Not sure they have reporting strength on India. As an example:
"Control of Pakistan would help India meet two strategic objectives. The first is access to water resources from the Indus River Valley. The Indus River Valley lies in Chinese, Indian and Pakistani territory. From India’s point of view, control over Pakistan is necessary to ensure water and hydroelectricity to its northern cities." This is quite a misleading statement, infact India controls most of the river waters already and has been quite generous with giving Pak water as a lower riparian thro the Indus water treaty. Current thinking is that India should abrogate the treaty if Pak does not behave.

[G M]

I used to subscribe to Stratfor and was generally impressed with it, perhaps because I had no first hand knowledge of the topics they wrote about. Wrt India, since I know the subject matter somewhat, I find there writing quite superficial and also inaccurate. Not sure they have reporting strength on India. As an example:
"Control of Pakistan would help India meet two strategic objectives. The first is access to water resources from the Indus River Valley. The Indus River Valley lies in Chinese, Indian and Pakistani territory. From India’s point of view, control over Pakistan is necessary to ensure water and hydroelectricity to its northern cities." This is quite a misleading statement, infact India controls most of the river waters already and has been quite generous with giving Pak water as a lower riparian thro the Indus water treaty. Current thinking is that India should abrogate the treaty if Pak does not behave.


Your ground truth knowledge is very useful. Thanks.

[ya]

All 6 Indus valley system rivers originate or pass through Indian Kashmir before they enter Pak, 1-2 of them originate close to the border with Tibet (China). Ironically, the map is courtesy of Strat...dark green is India. If India wants they could block waters to Pak, though the flows are such that is difficult to do so without diverting the rivers. The situation is exactly reverse of what the author says, Pak is paranoid that India is choking them. Looks like the author got a bit confused with the labeling perhaps from this Strat map, (It shows the poorly placed label: Pak administered Kashmir, over Indian Kashmir)

[ya]

With the BRICS conference next week,  something to lighten the atmosphere. This from the South China Post...

[Crafty_Dog]

9/12/17

Crossing the Line of Actual Control
A woman works in the fields of Arunachal Pradesh, a territory India controls but China claims as part of Tibet.
(SABIRMALLICK/iStock)



    Pakistan's involvement in Kashmir will make it harder for India and China to resolve their disagreement over the strategically significant territories of Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh.
    The enduring border dispute will further strain security ties between China and India and could spill over into other parts of their relationship.
    Confrontations between the two nuclear powers will become more frequent along the Line of Actual Control as China asserts its claim to disputed territories more aggressively, and as nationalism gains traction on both sides of the border.

The Line of Actual Control (LAC), the 4,057-kilometer boundary that runs between China and India along the arc of the world's highest mountains, has caused its share of strife. Over the years, the LAC has sparked standoffs, skirmishes and war between the two expanding nuclear powers. To try to keep the peace, Beijing and New Delhi began a dialogue in 2003 called the Special Representatives Meeting on the India-China Boundary Question. Yet 19 rounds of talks later, China and India still disagree on the location of the border between them — and over which side rightfully controls the territories of Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh.

Despite their enduring differences, India and China largely have managed to keep their border disputes from spilling over into other aspects of their relationship, such as trade. But that may start to change. As China forges deeper ties with India's nuclear archrival, Pakistan, and as each side of the LAC tries to emphasize its sovereignty along the contested border, New Delhi and Beijing could have a harder time avoiding conflict.

A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing?

For Beijing, control of Arunachal Pradesh boils down to a matter of national security. One of China's main geopolitical imperatives is to secure a buffer on its western flank that, along with the Pacific Ocean on the east, would protect its densely populated core territory. Annexing the Kingdom of Tibet in 1950 enabled Beijing to realize that goal, so long as it could maintain control over its western buffer by thwarting challenges to its sovereignty. The Dalai Lama presented one such challenge. The prominent monk participated in a failed uprising against Beijing in March 1959. (His role in the revolt doubtless is one of the reasons the Chinese government views the Dalai Lama not as a spiritual figure but as a separatist whom it often describes as a "wolf in sheep's clothing.") After that, he fled to India — the birthplace of Buddhism, no less — where he received a warm welcome.

The Dalai Lama's presence was a boon for India. Hosting the exiled religious leader, for example, enabled New Delhi to draw international attention to the issue of Tibetan sovereignty, a tactic it still uses today. But India's support for the Dalai Lama vexed China, all the more so because New Delhi has long held control of Arunachal Pradesh and, with it, the strategic town of Tawang. As an important site in Tibetan Buddhism, Tawang represents an essential piece of China's strategy to assert its sovereignty over Tibet. Beijing often cites the town's significance in Tibetan Buddhism to support its claim to Tawang, and it probably won't give up its quest for control of the town anytime soon. China, in fact, may be disputing India's claim to Arunachal Pradesh, a territory Beijing would likely struggle to control, as a bargaining tactic to secure Tawang. Yet considering that relinquishing the town would give China greater access to India's vulnerable Siliguri corridor, New Delhi would hardly entertain the idea.

Kashmir: The Crown of India

Along the Western reaches of the LAC, India has its own bone to pick with China in the 38,000-square kilometer territory of Aksai Chin. New Delhi claims the area as part of Kashmir, a region whose control it has contested with Pakistan, as well, ever since the Partition of 1947. Today, India's authority in Kashmir extends to the regions of Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh, collectively known as Jammu and Kashmir, while Pakistan administers two other constituent territories, Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan. (New Delhi also claims another territory, the Trans-Karakoram Tract, which Islamabad ceded to Beijing in 1963.) Recognizing China's authority over Aksai Chin is a dangerous prospect for the Indian government, since doing so could signal to Pakistan that New Delhi's claims to its portion of Kashmir were similarly negotiable. In response, Islamabad could increase the military pressure on New Delhi along the Line of Control, where India and Pakistan have been fighting intermittently for decades.

A Tale of Two Disputes

And Pakistan isn't the only factor preventing New Delhi from making a compromise in Aksai Chin. Renouncing India's claims to the region could come at a prohibitive cost for Prime Minister Narendra Modi's political career. Members of the opposition and of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party alike would condemn the action as appeasement, a sign of weakness when India is trying to establish itself as a rising global power. The country, after all, is trying to exercise greater sovereignty in its border regions by building 73 new strategic roads to serve them. At the same time, China probably won't yield to India's demands over Aksai Chin, since it knows Pakistan would oppose the gesture and since a vital road, the G219 highway, runs through the region. Beijing would give New Delhi a portion of Aksai Chin at most as part of a border negotiation.

Succession, Not Secession

Because each side administers a territory that the other claims, compromise is the only solution to the dispute along the LAC. But neither Beijing nor New Delhi has much leeway to meet the other's demands. The situation likely will become even more tense as succession looms for the 81-year-old Dalai Lama. China has promised to observe the Tibetan Buddhist traditions to find a successor, which dictate that the reincarnated Dalai Lama must be born in Tibetan territory and approved by the central government. The process could come back to haunt Beijing if the 15th Dalai Lama is born in Tawang, thereby further shifting the spiritual center of gravity in Tibetan Buddhism to India. To try to weaken Beijing's power over his successor, meanwhile, the Dalai Lama has hinted that he may opt for emanation — that is, choosing the next Dalai Lama himself — rather than reincarnation.

In the meantime, relations between India and China seem to be entering a more contentious phase. Beijing continues to test its neighbors' limits and military responsiveness by asserting control over disputed territories, including those in the South China Sea and the Doklam Plateau, more and more brazenly. As China looks to hone its own military response, it may temporarily suspend its infrastructure projects as it has in the past. But once it resumes construction on these ventures — such as the road it was trying to extend through Doklam when its latest standoff with India began — China will provoke another confrontation. And the growing nationalist movements in both countries suggest that the next border dispute is not a question of if but of when.

[Crafty_Dog]

Earlier this year, the leaders of Germany and India announced that they had taken their countries' relationship "to a new level." And to be sure, over the past few decades collaboration between the two has deepened on many different fronts. But Germany's interest in India isn't merely a byproduct of the Asian century, as the 21st century is now so frequently called. Rather, it has been building gradually over time, laying a sturdy foundation for the partnership that both countries are beginning to take more and more seriously.

The Trade Ties That Bind

For the most part, Indo-German relations have centered on trade and development since World War II. In 1956, the two states created the Indo-German Chamber of Commerce (IGCC), marking an important step in solidifying the links between their economies. Boasting several offices across India, the IGCC now offers a range of services including counseling on investments and market entries, courses on industrial training and the recognition of professional degrees and qualifications. It is also the largest German chamber of commerce in the world, spurring deeper cooperation between India and Germany ever forward.

A few decades after the IGCC's founding, the partners became even more closely intertwined with the establishment of the Indo-German Economic Commission in the 1980s. Created in part to lend support to Indian economic reforms, the new commission came not a moment too soon: The Soviet Union, then India's primary ally, collapsed in 1991, opening the door to the liberalization of the Indian economy. In light of these events, it is hardly surprising that Indian Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao chose Germany for his first trip abroad that year in order to promote his nation's value as a trade partner and destination for foreign investment.

Despite his efforts, Germany was more interested in focusing its attention on China and its Southeast Asian neighbors, which had opened up their economies more quickly than India and were thus better integrated into the global market. That is, at least, until a financial crisis swept across Asia in 1997. Compared with many of its eastern peers, India escaped the downturn relatively unscathed, and Germany's interest in the subcontinent began to grow. Berlin's instincts proved to be good when India, like China, became one of the fastest-growing economies in the world in the 2000s. According to the World Bank, India's gross domestic product climbed even quicker than China's in 2015-16.

This isn't to say, of course, that the relationship between the Indian and German economies is balanced. Germany is a nation based on exports that caters to the needs of an import-reliant India. As a result, it is one of New Delhi's most important trade partners. India, on the other hand, ranks only 25th among German export destinations.

But there is much room for growth on both sides. Over the past decade, India has diversified away from the onetime mainstay of its exports — natural resources — and has begun offering products that German consumers demand, particularly in the areas of engineering, chemistry and textiles. At the same time, Indian investments in Germany have jumped remarkably in recent years. Indian corporations have channeled several billion dollars into the German IT, automotive, pharmaceuticals and biotech industries, and as of last year, over 200 Indian firms — many in the software sector — had set up shop in Germany.

Creating Fertile Ground for Growth

This prospering partnership will doubtless pay off for both parties in the long run. Backed by the wealth of the German economy, India can now provide for many of the reform schemes Prime Minister Narendra Modi's administration has advocated, including the Digital India, Make in India and Skill India programs. For instance, the Make in India Mittelstand project got its start in September 2015 to encourage German Mittelstand (or small to medium-sized enterprises) to do business in India; 80 of these firms are now making their way into the Indian market.

At the same time, Indian companies' need for technology, training and know-how has risen as the country's economy has grown. Vocational education is now a top priority for the Indian government as it seeks to bridge the gap between industry and academia in order to provide various industries with more skilled labor. New Delhi has worked closely with the private sector in this regard, and India's higher education system hopes to use Germany's dual education system — a combination of theory and practice made possible by collaboration between schools and businesses — as a model for its own institutions. India's first University of Applied Sciences, designed with the German system in mind and with the help of German partners, opened in 2016, and similar projects are in the making.

Germany, for its part, has just as much to gain in exchange for its knowledge and resources. The country not only has the opportunity to invest in and profit from India's rapidly growing market, but it also gets greater access to an increasingly well-qualified workforce — something its own aging labor pool desperately needs. Conveniently, the majority of Indian students tend to pursue fields that play to Germany's strengths in manufacturing and exports, such as science, technology, engineering and mathematics. These fields are also weaknesses in the German education system, which does not produce enough qualified workers within them to meet the demands of the German economy.

Considering this rather perfect match, it's no wonder that Indian exchange students and researchers have traveled to Germany in droves over the past few years. Since 2006, the number of Indian students enrolled in German universities has nearly quadrupled to reach 13,537, nudging India up to second place on the list of countries with the most students in Germany by 2016. The two nations recently signed a partnership deal in higher education that will strengthen these ties even further by supporting joint research and collaboration between students and doctoral candidates.

By all accounts, science and technology will become a central focus of this cooperation in the years ahead. A number of Indo-German tech institutes have already sprung up since the Indo-German Committee of Science and Technology was founded in 2003, providing a space for joint research in water and waste management, land use, energy, scientific applications and innovation. Many of these institutions also coordinate with businesses and promote networking between Indian and German scientists.

New Delhi and Berlin have complemented these academic initiatives with several high-level committees, projects and working groups intended to explore issues related to science and technology. Chief among them are the biannual Indo-German Government Consultations, which began in 2011 and have since spawned 26 bilateral deals in energy, industry, vocational training, security, agriculture, science and culture. These meetings, which bring the countries' heads of state together with high-level delegations of ministers and representatives from an array of sectors, are unique: Neither India nor Germany has such prominent panels in science and technology on such a regular basis with other countries, signaling just how important they believe their budding partnership to be.
Partners of a Different Kind

Germany has even more to gain from the relationship than a boost in business. India's politics and culture more closely align with Europe's values than China's do, spurring the perception on the Continent that New Delhi may be a more reliable partner than Beijing. And with the exception of Japan, no other country on the Asian landmass more closely shares Germany's understanding of international relations and foreign policy than India. Both states value human rights, believe in international institutions and hope for a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council someday — a goal on which they have worked together to craft a joint strategy. And in a world that seems to be reorienting itself toward nationalism and bilateral deals, these kinds of political affiliations will play a bigger role in shaping the decisions of nations.

India, too, has political motives for building an enduring relationship with Germany. New Delhi considers the European leader to be a source of constant stability, even when political and financial crises strike. And if India is to achieve its ambition of becoming an economic and political power capable of joining other mighty nations on the global stage, it will need partners like Germany on its side.

When India and Germany officially signed onto a strategic partnership in May 2000, it wasn't clear how strong the relationship would become. But over the past 17 years, the rather vague promise to work together more often has become a flourishing relationship that encompasses nearly every aspect of international cooperation. If the past decade is any indication of those still to come, the Indo-German partnership will be a force to be reckoned with in the not-so-distant future.

[Crafty_Dog]

Highlights

    If India increases its involvement in Afghanistan, Pakistan will strengthen its opposition to pushing the Taliban into negotiations.
    Pakistan will continue supporting the Taliban to prevent an alliance between Afghanistan and India.
    Islamabad and Washington's threats against one another will limit the punitive measures both sides impose.

In the war in Afghanistan, Pakistan plays both sides. On the one hand, the country aids the United States in its fight against the Taliban. Pakistan offers NATO forces access to the port of Karachi to transit supplies to their bases in landlocked Afghanistan and tacitly allows the CIA to conduct drone strikes against militant hideouts in the semi-autonomous Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Yet on the other hand, Pakistan has nurtured the Taliban for more than 20 years. Pakistan's government in Islamabad supports the group as a means to many ends, including stabilizing Afghanistan, opening trade and energy routes to Central Asia, formalizing the Durand Line, and establishing a government in Kabul hostile to archrival India. By assisting both the United States and the Taliban throughout their nearly 16-year conflict, Pakistan has managed to benefit from an alliance with Washington, collecting over $33 billion in aid since 2002, while also pursuing its security objectives.

But the new U.S. plan for the war in Afghanistan has cast doubt on Islamabad's strategy. President Donald Trump's administration not only has threatened to crack down on Pakistan for supporting militant organizations, but it also has called on India to assume a larger role in rehabilitating Afghanistan's economy. The revised policy probably will spur Islamabad to change its approach in Afghanistan, though likely not in the way Washington intended. Instead, it will harden Pakistan's resolve against the United States and the effort to negotiate an end to the enduring war.
From Militancy to Politics

Despite the U.S. administration's admonishments, Pakistani militancy is as much a problem for Islamabad as it is for Washington. Pakistan has been working to circumscribe the militant groups operating within its borders since long before Trump rebuked the country in an address Aug. 21. In April 2016, for example, Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency proposed plans to deradicalize scores of militants and bring them more under the control of the country's security apparatus. As part of that campaign, Islamabad allowed the Jamaat-ud-Dawa — a charity organization under U.N. sanctions for its links to the militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba — to form a new political party, the Milli Muslim League (MML).

Combating militancy with politics is easier said than done, though. The process has been rife with controversy, exposing the historical divide between Pakistan's military and civilian leaders. Pakistan's Interior Ministry asked the country's electoral commission to block the MML's registration over concerns that the party's ties to and ideological affinities with Lashkar-e-Taiba, the group blamed for the deadly attacks in Mumbai in 2008, would invite criticism from foreign governments. But though the MML's registration is still pending, it hasn't let administrative matters get in its way. The party's candidate, officially running as an independent, placed third in the recent special elections in Lahore, and the MML plans to participate in Pakistan's general elections next year as well.
Pakistan Picks Its Battles

The MML's emergence demonstrates the Pakistani army's commitment to addressing militancy in the country. Its priorities in this endeavor differ from those of the United States, however, and as it tackles the problem, Islamabad will continue to resist pressure to attack the militant groups Washington has targeted. In Pakistan's view, after all, all militant groups are not created equal. Groups such as the Afghan Taliban and its ally the Haqqani network help Pakistan's army advance its objectives in Afghanistan. They are assets to Islamabad's foreign policy, and the Pakistani government treats them as such. Islamabad's accommodations, moreover, discourage these groups from attacking Pakistan, enabling the country to focus its scarce resources on the organizations that pose a more serious threat to its security, including the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan and the Islamic State's Khorasan chapter.

Beyond these considerations, Islamabad's stance on militants also figures into its strategy toward India. Pakistan has relied on militant groups to compensate for its smaller military relative to that of its eastern rival since the partition in 1947, employing them as proxies against India while maintaining plausible deniability in the event of an attack. The policy has endured even after both countries became nuclear powers.

Considering its aims in Afghanistan, Islamabad will push back against Washington's new strategy in the war against the Taliban. Pakistan's recently appointed prime minister already has rejected Trump's suggestion that India take on a greater political or military role in Afghanistan, and pressing the idea will only strengthen Islamabad's resistance to it. At the same time, pushing the proposal will make Pakistan less likely to heed Washington's calls to try to encourage the Taliban into negotiations. (That some members of the Taliban have urged the organization to distance itself from Pakistan raises questions about how much sway Islamabad has with the militant group regardless.) The United States, of course, has various tools at its disposal to ramp up the pressure on Pakistan, including revoking the country's non-NATO major ally status, further cutting its aid package or sanctioning Islamabad. But Pakistan has its own options to make Washington think twice about taking punitive action.
U.S. Aid to Afghanistan

The Costs of War

In fact, Pakistan already has started employing some of these deterrents since Trump made his address on Afghanistan in late August. Islamabad turned down a visit from the U.S. acting assistant secretary of state for Central and South Asia, who was leading a delegation of officials eager to hash out U.S.-Pakistan coordination in Afghanistan. Pakistan's foreign minister instead embarked on a three-nation tour to China, Turkey and Iran in hopes of increasing their diplomatic support for his country. He later delayed a meeting originally scheduled for August with his U.S. counterpart, Rex Tillerson, until the week of Oct. 2. More recently, Pakistan announced that it would adopt stricter protocols on U.S. diplomats to require a mutual agreement before American officials could visit the country and to prohibit lower-ranking U.S. functionaries from meeting with high-level Pakistani officials, such as the prime minister. The country also has floated the possibility of shutting down NATO supply routes, though it probably won't follow through on the threat unless Washington first makes good on one of its own.

Since the United States began its war in Afghanistan a decade and a half ago, the conflict has defined the U.S. relationship with Pakistan. Washington has encouraged Islamabad to focus on anti-militancy operations in Balochistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, two hotbeds of unrest in Pakistan, in support of the war effort. But the U.S. outreach — which includes a sizable military aid package — has given Pakistan's powerful armed forces even more influence in the country's domestic politics, yielding unintended consequences. The Pakistani military will use its sway over the country's foreign policy to keep India and Afghanistan from forging an alliance that could encircle Pakistan and threaten national security. And in the process, it will scuttle U.S. plans for drawing down its longest-running war.

[Crafty_Dog]

India, Afghanistan, Iran: An Indian ship containing wheat destined for Afghanistan is headed for the port of Chabahar in Iran, from where it will be transported over land to Afghanistan. This route is being touted as a way to do trade with Afghanistan without needing to go through Pakistan. We need to find out who owns the ship. This will be our first step in determining whether this move is just propaganda or whether the countries could really be setting up an alternative route that bypasses Pakistan.

•   Finding: Little information is available on this shipment. India’s External Affairs Ministry spokesman confirmed that the first shipment of wheat arrived Nov. 1 at Chabahar port. It was shipped on a vessel called BEHSHAD owned by the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines. The next step is to monitor the overland transportation of the wheat and confirm that it has crossed the Afghan border and arrived at its destination.

[Crafty_Dog]

•   India, Russia: Russia suspects that India violated the terms of a weapons agreement and allowed the United States to visit and observe Russian submarine technology. Russian media outlet Kommersant claimed that there were technical specialists among the U.S. observers. India is the largest destination for Russian military products, receiving 38 percent of all of Russia’s arms exports. What does this allegation say about U.S.-India and Russia-India relations?

[ya]

Might be fake news...Govt of India also denies it. Looks like the French want to sell their own subs!.

https://www.rt.com/news/409722-india-russian-submarine-visit/

Also re the wheat shipment to Afghanistan, this is the first that I am reading that it may not have reached.. looks like fake news. Even pakistani media is not claiming that!

[Crafty_Dog]

Maps and photos in article will not print here:

China and India faced off last year in a tense military standoff on the Doklam Plateau on the disputed Line of Actual Control (LAC) high in the Himalayas. Although the impasse was temporarily resolved in late August through a negotiated drawdown, it has been clear all along that the LAC will remain a contentious border because both countries will continue to seek an advantage in this difficult terrain.

Recent reporting, particularly in the Indian press, has highlighted how India and China are bolstering their infrastructure and forces along the LAC, including through the stationing of additional ground units near the plateau. Satellite imagery acquired by Stratfor working with its partners at AllSource Analysis helps illuminate the scope of these developments by looking at the air and air defense aspects of this strengthening of forces. Specifically, the analysis looks at four critical air bases, two Chinese and two Indian, that are within range of the Doklam Plateau. The imagery confirms that both China and India are pursuing a wide-ranging strategic buildup that has only accelerated in the wake of the Aug. 27 agreement.
China, India and the Doklam Plateau: The buildup behind the scenes
The View From India

On the Indian side of the border, imagery of the Siliguri Bagdogra air base and the Hasimara Air Force Station depicts how India has moved to reinforce its air power close to the Doklam Plateau. Siliguri Bagdogra normally hosts a transport helicopter unit while Hasimara was the base for MiG-27ML ground attack aircraft until they were retired at the end of 2017. Since the Doklam crisis of mid-2017, however, the Indian Air Force has greatly increased the deployment of Su-30MKI warplanes to these air bases as can be seen from the imagery. The Su-30MKI is India's premier fighter jet, and it will soon be capable of striking land targets with the advanced BrahMos cruise missile. Furthermore, Indian reports indicate that a squadron of the recently purchased Rafale multirole fighters may soon be home-based at Hasimara. The dispatch of these top-of-the-line Indian jets and airfield improvements at both stations highlight India's determination to improve its force structure near the Doklam Plateau.
India: Hasimara Air Force Station
India: Siliguri Bagdogra air base
On the Chinese Side

An even greater level of activity is visible from imagery of the Chinese air bases near Lhasa and Shigatse. This expansion may indicate a greater buildup by the Chinese, but it could also reflect the more advanced facilities at these bases. Furthermore, unlike India, China's lack of air bases close to the LAC forces it to concentrate more of its air power at these airports.

Imagery of the two air bases shows a significant presence of fighter aircraft (which peaked in October) and a notable increase in helicopters, as well as deployments of KJ-500 airborne early warning and command aircraft, components of the HQ-9 long-range surface-to-air missile system and Soar Dragon unmanned aerial vehicles at Shigatse Peace Airport. The Chinese made a number of major airfield upgrades at Shigatse immediately after the end of the crisis. A new runaway was constructed by mid-December, nine aircraft aprons measuring 41 meters by 70 meters were built along the main taxiway and eight helipads were set up in the northeast corner of the airfield. This construction, along with the deployment of new equipment in greater numbers, highlights how China has undertaken a serious effort to improve its capabilities close to the LAC.

The imagery shows that the Chinese and Indian buildups have only accelerated in the aftermath of the Doklam crisis. Now it is only a question of time until a new flashpoint along the LAC emerges, and as the increased activity shows, both sides will have greater capabilities to bring to bear next time.
China: Shigatse Peace Airport
China: Lhasa Gonggar Airport

[Crafty_Dog]

India’s One Belt, One Road-Block
Jan 26, 2018

 
By Jacob L. Shapiro

It’s been a busy week for Indian foreign policy. In the past, that statement would have been an oxymoron. The Himalayas isolate India from developments in the rest of the world. Internal diversity makes it hard for India to govern itself, let alone to influence others (though the irony of an American writing that a few days after the U.S. government shutdown is not lost on me). The scope of India’s poverty makes China look like a uniformly rich society by comparison.

For all these reasons, India has been a minor player on the world stage in modern history. India was the “jewel in the crown” of the British Empire, a vast land of resources for the British to appropriate. The British controlled India not so much by force as by playing its diverse groups against each other. After the British left and an independent India emerged, India was a relatively insignificant actor in the Cold War, engaged in a nuclear arms race with Pakistan and fought a few skirmishes with China. Overall, though, the impact of India’s actions was confined to the Indian subcontinent.
 
(click to enlarge)

But now India has arrived at an unprecedented moment in its history. At home, the Bharatiya Janata Party, with its clear vision of what a united India’s interests are in the world, is in a strong position. Abroad, fear of China’s heavy-handed attempts to gain influence have many looking to India as, if not a savior, then the only counterweight to China’s demographic, economic and military heft. India is trying to make the most of this chance. Even so, the reason many Asian countries trust India to counter China is because they do not think India is as great a threat to them as China because of its fundamental weaknesses. India is limiting China at the invitation of others.

An Alternative to China

Most foreign media this week focused on Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s rousing introductory speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos and on the renewed competition between China and India around Doklam. These issues aren’t especially important. Davos is a nice conference for world leaders to enjoy themselves while accomplishing nothing that will have much effect on the world. In Doklam, the geography makes the prospects of an India-China war remote at best. If China and India were to fight over a disputed border region, it would be in Nepal or Tibet; Doklam is political grandstanding.
 
(click to enlarge)

And there are other, more consequential areas that India is seeking to make its presence felt than Davos and Doklam. The first is in the vast buffer region between China and Russia. China covets this area, which is made up mostly of Kazakhstan and Mongolia. Beijing’s One Belt, One Road initiative is, at its core, a strategy for China to develop new markets for its excess supply of goods and raw materials and to build the prosperity of China’s vast, impoverished interior. China’s investment, however, often comes with strings attached: Chinese workers, or preferential arrangements for Chinese companies. These are strategic areas of the world that China wants to influence and even control.

India is far less ambitious. Its goals are to make money and thwart Chinese plans, which it can do merely by offering an alternative to China. On Jan. 24, the Mongolian government announced that construction on the country’s first oil refinery would begin in April – funded by India in a deal reached in 2015. Meanwhile, on Jan. 25, Kazakhstan announced plans to implement visa-free 72-hour transit for Indian citizens. Kazakhstan debuted this pilot visa regime with China, and a Kazakh government official noted that the arrangement was so successful at attracting Chinese investment that the country decided to extend it to India as well.

The same dynamic applies to Southeast Asia, where China has also pushed its One Belt, One Road initiative. For China, the most important country in the region is the Philippines because a close relationship with Manila would give Beijing access to the Pacific. India is active there too. A Philippine government official said Jan. 23 that India had pledged over $1.25 billion in investment for 2018, money that is expected to create more than 100,000 jobs in the country. For perspective, in 2016, $1.25 billion would have made India the second-largest foreign investor in the Philippines, behind the Netherlands and immediately ahead of the United States, Australia and China.
In Southeast Asia, though, India has greater ambitions. On Jan. 25, India hosted the leaders of all 10 countries that make up the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to promote “maritime security” in the region. The day before that, India announced that it had agreed with Indonesia to increase bilateral defense cooperation through joint exercises, arms deals and high-level visits of officials. This is in addition to India’s recent support for the resurrection of the Quad, an amorphous alignment of India, Japan, Australia and the U.S. whose chief goal is to limit Chinese expansion, and India’s more liberal deployment of its naval forces for military exercises on the Pacific side of the Indo-Pacific.

Dose of Reality

All this sounds impressive, and on a certain level it is, especially for a country with a history of global involvement like India’s. But these developments should not be oversold. India is hosting ASEAN leaders and throwing investment money around the region, but China’s clout is still overwhelming by comparison. China accounted for 14 percent of total ASEAN trade in 2014 and 15.2 percent in 2015 (the latest year for which stats were available). India, on the other hand, accounted for 2.7 percent in 2014 and 2.4 percent in 2015, meaning that not only is India’s share of ASEAN trade much lower than China’s, but it is decreasing. In the long term, India may well provide a balance for some of these countries, but they need a counterweight to China now, and India’s ability to help is limited.

In the past week, there was also an internal development that underscores India’s geopolitical handicap. Shiv Sena, an important political party in India’s western state of Maharashtra, announced Jan. 23 that it was breaking with the BJP in upcoming general and state elections. Shiv Sena has not indicated that it plans to withdraw from India’s coalition government, and by all accounts the breach is not ideological but political. The party supports the BJP’s vision of a united, Hindu India, even if it did not appreciate the way the BJP took Shiv Sena’s support for granted. But the deeper issue is that Shiv Sena started not as a Hindu nationalist party but as a pro-Marathi party. (Marathis are the dominant ethnic group in Maharashtra.)

Shiv Sena is not returning to its pro-Marathi roots – or at least it’s given no indication that it will. But its break with the BJP underscores just how fleeting the BJP’s level of control is. India is, after all, a democracy, and the BJP government is as susceptible to being voted out of office as any political party is in a democracy. The BJP has consolidated power at home and projected power abroad because of its strong political position, but nothing says that position must be permanent. Beneath the veneer of strength of the BJP’s governing coalition are the divisions that the British used to control India, the same divisions that have long prevented India from harnessing its demographic and economic potential.

In a sense, India’s foreign policy is still passive. The hallmark of power is not that countries will take your money and use it to build refineries, or that foreign leaders will visit and eat your food at interesting summits about maritime security. The real test of power is whether a country can make other countries do what it wants. And for all the activity involving India this past week, none of it suggests that India is amassing that kind of power. Instead, India is thwarting Chinese power. It is doing this because it wants to, but more than that, because other countries want it to. India is playing on the world stage, and that is notable – but it is playing at the invitation and with the blessing of others. It is not master of its fate.

[Crafty_Dog]

India Struggles With Its Strategy to Becoming a Great Power
By Sarang Shidore
Senior Global Analyst, Stratfor
Sarang Shidore
Sarang Shidore
Senior Global Analyst, Stratfor
Recent conflicts are raising questions about the evolution of India's strategic game plan in this fast-changing world.


    India's grand strategy has evolved significantly since independence more than 70 years ago, but the country has had mixed success in achieving its objectives.
    The rise of China and a dangerous impasse with Pakistan pose new challenges to New Delhi and are pushing a reluctant India into a closer partnership with the United States.
    Despite key successes, India's economic problems are huge, and they remain the biggest barrier to rising to great power status.

Asia, and more specifically India, has emerged as a critical theater in a new era of great power competition. The contest between a U.S.-led alliance on one side and Russia and China on the other is reshaping India's grand strategy to becoming a world power. The world's second most populous country, which sees itself as one of humankind's great civilization-states, hopes to be secure and prosperous and one day spread its influence into all corners of the world. But recent conflict with China in the disputed Doklam area of Bhutan and with Pakistan in Kashmir has brought New Delhi's choices into sharp focus. And these conflicts are raising questions about the evolution of India's game plan in this fast-changing world.

The Big Picture

Stratfor's 2018 Second-Quarter Forecast notes that the competition between India and China will continue to play out and that the India-Pakistan rivalry will be further strained over Kashmir. This will lead India to forge a closer security partnership with the United States.

Empires, Colonialism and Partition

Geography and history have greatly influenced India's strategy and geopolitical objectives. India has long been recognized as one of the major centers of human civilization. Its size as a subcontinent, giant population and extensive diversity have given it a distinct identity in world history. However, it was rarely unified politically, except for in three periods: the Maurya, Gupta and Mughal dynasties, which each lasted roughly one to three centuries.The last of these was followed by British colonial rule, which lasted for nearly 200 years and introduced India to European norms and practices.

The arrival of European modernity led to two great ruptures in Indian history: colonialism and nationalism. Colonialism, which embodied many racist and exploitative practices, also laid the foundations of a modern nation-state. And nationalism motivated the Indian freedom struggle for a sovereign republic, with nonviolent mass resistance as its philosophy under the leadership of Mohandas Gandhi, known most prominently as Mahatma Gandhi.

Indian nationalists under Gandhi envisioned a pluralist India, but they were challenged by Muslim nationalism led by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, demanding self-determination on the basis of religious identity. Differences between Indian and Muslim nationalists could not be bridged, and the gap led in 1947 to the partition of British India into two independent nation-states: India and Pakistan. In 1971 a third nation-state was born on the subcontinent when Bangladesh split off from Pakistan.

Ambitious Aspirations

Ever since independence in 1947, India has had three geopolitical objectives. Two are common to all nation-states: security and prosperity. India must physically protect the country and its 1.3 billion citizens. The South Asian nation also aims to lift many of those people out of poverty and to create a modern, wealthy society.

The third objective, however, is unique to a massive and ancient nation such as India. Acutely self-aware of its present and past, India seeks to create a world order that reflects the vitality of its civilization. In this sense, Indian aspirations parallel those of China, Europe and the United States.

Meeting these objectives requires a grand strategy, which is the way that a nation puts its resources to use in military, political, economic and other arenas to achieve its national goals. But ever since independence from Britain, constraints on resources have hampered India's highly ambitious objectives and its grand strategy. Given its beginnings as a poor and fragile post-colonial state, India had to start with basics. For the first few decades after independence, its grand strategy rested on four pillars: unity and territorial integrity, regional primacy, economic self-reliance, and non-alignment.

This strategy has evolved over time as domestic and international conditions have changed. Economic self-reliance was discarded for global integration, and non-alignment morphed into the more flexible doctrine of strategic autonomy, with a pronounced tilt toward the United States. However, both of these pillars are likely to come under pressure in the future. But unity and territorial integrity and regional primacy will persist as key elements of the strategy.

Holding it Together

India was a state before it became a nation — a situation common to many nationalist projects. Independence left India with a relatively thin government overseeing an enormously diverse population with six religions and 22 major and hundreds of minor languages. Therefore, independent India saw unity and territorial integrity as the most fundamental and essential pillar of its strategy. The challenge was particularly acute because of the wounds of partition, which had left a trail of mass slaughter in an enormous population exchange with Pakistan.

India first set out to rapidly amalgamate hundreds of monarchies left over from the British Empire. Most were small and joined voluntarily; those that did not, such as Hyderabad, were annexed. In 1961, Portuguese-ruled Goa came under Indian control. And claims by India and Pakistan on another monarchy, called Kashmir, eventually led to three wars between the two.

Unifying hundreds of millions of Indians into an overarching national identity was more challenging. India's deep commitment to democracy, federalism and pluralism was fundamentally an idealist project inspired by the freedom movement. But it was also a pragmatic approach for ensuring unification by granting its citizens participation, local control and wide latitude in expressing their cultural identities.

Defying the many predictions of its imminent demise, India has succeeded remarkably well in maintaining its unity and defeating the few secessionist challenges that have arisen. The overwhelming majority of Indians see no contradictions between their local and national identities. This was by no means an inevitable outcome; it came about because of the inclusive nature of the freedom movement and India's federal constitution. However, intermittent Hindu-Muslim tension, violence in Kashmir and insurgencies in its central forests and the northeast indicate that the unification of the homeland is incomplete.

Securing the Backyard

All great powers seek their own sphere of influence. Historically, it has been difficult for an aspiring state to become a true great power with an unfriendly or hostile backyard. India strives for regional primacy to ensure a ring of security around the country. But, fundamentally, regional primacy is also about the drive for a sphere of influence encompassing the subcontinent and the region around the Indian Ocean.

India has reacted badly to unfriendly great powers intruding in its backyard, especially when they have struck alliances with neighbors. Previously, this great power was the United States, when it formed an alliance with Pakistan during the Cold War. In recent times, the intruder has been China.

India has been largely unsuccessful in its quest for regional primacy. Though its cultural influence is strong throughout the region, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh have historically maneuvered between India and an external power, most recently China. And Pakistan, a nuclear-armed power, is allied with Beijing, ruling out any possibility of bringing it into India's sphere. Only the smaller states of Bhutan, Nepal, Maldives, Mauritius and the Seychelles have been under India's shadow for a considerable time. But Nepal has been moving of late to triangulate between India and China, and the Maldives recently made a strategic U-turn with India watching on helplessly.

Reform, Indian-Style

In the years after independence, India's embrace of economic self-reliance initially led to some successes. Economic growth, at essentially zero for a century during colonial rule, picked up, and an industrial base was created. However, growth sputtered from the mid-1960s onward when the government doubled down on its infamous "license raj" — the high tariffs and excruciating red tape and bureaucratic control over the economy.

Reform began slowly in the 1980s but accelerated after 1991. In the years since, India has integrated substantially with global markets in key areas, has reduced tariffs to relatively low levels and has created export-driven global successes in information technology, automobiles, biotech, pharmaceuticals and select engineering goods. The post-reform gross domestic product has grown nearly fivefold to $2.4 trillion in over 25 years. The ratio of trade to GDP, a measure of global integration, has risen from about 15 percent in 1990 to peak at 56 percent in 2012. Renewable energy has expanded rapidly, as well, and the Indian diaspora, particularly in the United States, has helped kick off a startup culture back home.

However, the government has failed to create the needed jobs and to build adequate infrastructure. Agricultural distress is severe, water resources are stressed, and climate change is a gathering threat. Millions of Indian households remain undereducated, unelectrified and unhealthy. The expected dividend from having a youthful population is looking more like a demographic disaster. And many Indian businesses are seeing few gains from free trade agreements. All this is putting pressure on the country's commitment to the global-integration strategy.

A Reluctance Toward Alliances

From its inception in 1947, India saw the Cold War as a detriment to regional peace and its development. The principle of non-alignment helped carve out a third way in international politics. It was partly fueled by the idealism of the freedom movement. But lacking economic or military heft, New Delhi also saw non-alignment as a grand strategic play to enhance its influence across Asia and Africa. Anti-colonialism, nuclear disarmament and economic justice became the norm in Indian discourse.

However, the sobering reality of the Cold War caught up with India. When the dust had settled after three wars between 1962 and 1971 — one with China and two with Pakistan — India had effectively abandoned non-alignment and tilted toward the Soviet Union. In 1974, it conducted its first nuclear test, and weaponized sometime in the 1980s.

The winding down of the Cold War opened up a path for a strategic reversal, and a largely realist India now supports a flexible doctrine of strategic autonomy. It has increasingly tilted  toward the United States, and that inclination is reflected in a sharp increase in defense deals, military exercises and expressions of common interests in the Indo-Pacific. But India continues to reject formal alliances and opposes foreign military bases on its soil.

And strategic autonomy is not without constraints. First, India has mostly failed to develop an indigenous defense industry, meaning that it must rely on foreign powers to equip its military. Russia remains its largest defense partner, but the United States, Israel and France are also key suppliers. Second, the shift to global economic integration has resulted in deep interdependence with other major powers.

Three Core Relationships

In the decade ahead, India's grand strategy must contend with three key countries: Pakistan, China and the United States. These relationships are also tied to the evolving global order.

Pakistan

Despite having many cultural commonalities, India's relationship with Pakistan is highly adversarial and has tremendously destructive potential. The roots of the hostility go back to colonial politics. The clash is not just over territory but also over ideology and increasingly over religion. Despite occasional bursts of progress toward a settlement, a vicious zero-sum game has come to characterize this cold war-like rivalry.

Though nuclear deterrence is a powerful damper on escalation, paradoxically it also lets Pakistan use its unconventional warfare to aid militancy in Kashmir and conduct lethal attacks, such as in Mumbai in 2008. India has generally failed to deter Pakistan in this area, and the resultant frustration is leading to more assertive tactics by New Delhi. These in turn have lowered the Pakistani threshold for nuclear use. A new crisis is extremely likely within a decade, and a major conflict entirely plausible.

China

For centuries, India and China lacked a history of conflict due to the near-impassable Himalayan barrier. But since their 1962 war, they have been strategic competitors. Overall, their rivalry is marked more by balancing games and minimally by hot conflict. China understands that India is the only nation with the population and size that could potentially challenge it in the long term. It worries about future Indian interdiction of vital energy supplies in the sea lanes of the Indian Ocean, suspects that India intends to create unrest in Tibet and is wary of greater Indo-U.S. security ties.

New Delhi on the other hand sees China as an aggressive power bent on encirclement through penetration into India's intended sphere of influence. It perceives long-standing Chinese nuclear, missile and economic assistance to Pakistan, especially with the $62 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, as a major strategic challenge. China has been mostly neutral in past India-Pakistan conflicts, but it may not be so the next time. Unresolved territorial disputes and incursions on its border are two other major issues. And, last but not least, a Chinese economy five times the size of India's represents a power differential that rankles.

India's four grand strategic pillars provide an unambiguous recipe on Pakistan — co-opt when possible and balance or contain if not — though the results have been decidedly mixed. However, on China the grand strategy itself leads to ambiguities. India's power is perhaps sufficient to deter China and protect the homeland, but it is insufficient for anything more. Containing China is impossible; balancing it on India's terms is extremely difficult. Engagement carries risks too. It's tricky to seek and accept membership in the Chinese-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization but block full Chinese membership in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation.

India's global integration strategy too doesn't provide ready answers on China, which has become an economic behemoth. Such a strategy requires that a capital-starved India attract Chinese investment and work with Beijing's gigantic Belt and Road Initiative where it can. But fears of Chinese encirclement militate against such a compromise, and India also has to be careful to not provoke excessive Chinese opposition to its global goals.

Thus, India finds itself in an unenviable position on China. For now, it will likely muster all the friends it can, with the United States and Japan as key partners. The "Quad" — a counter to the Belt and Road Initiative being considered by Australia, the United States, India and Japan — is only an idea so far, but it has the potential to gel. Strategic ties with Vietnam and Taiwan also have a bright future. In the medium term, India's joint focus with its partners will primarily be on maritime and power projection activities in the region of the Indian Ocean.

Naval acquisitions spending, currently at 25 percent of India's defense acquisitions budget, is likely to increase, but overall defense spending is hamstrung by modest tax revenues. Therefore, the South China Sea will remain an overstretch. The Bay of Bengal, northern and coastal Myanmar and East Africa are more plausible as future arenas for Indo-Chinese friction, as are Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh. However, New Delhi will likely try to separate its security competition with Beijing from areas of mutual convergence.

The United States

Meeting the Chinese-Pakistani challenge would logically require an ally with sufficient heft. Enter the United States. If the United States were simply another great power rivaling China, India and the United States would have few problems consummating their security ties. But matters are not so simple. The United States is still the sole superpower with interests across the globe. China is the only potential rival to the United States, but they are in the most consequential bilateral economic relationship in history. This means U.S. priorities do not entirely coincide with Indian interests.

India's global integration strategy too doesn't provide ready answers on China, which has become an economic behemoth.

U.S. and Indian views do converge on the stability of the Indian Ocean region and the Indo-Pacific. But Washington has important interests in Pakistan and is hostile to Iran. The United States is also facing a coordinated global challenge from China and Russia.

However, India has deep defense ties with Russia, which, though drifting of late, will likely persist for the foreseeable future. And it needs Iran for energy and connectivity projects. New Delhi also occasionally gets anxious about an imagined grand global bargain between Washington and Beijing that sacrifices Indian concerns.

All these factors limit the formation of a comprehensive Indo-U.S. alliance. Any such alliance, however informal, also implies that India will have to accept a junior role. It will find it difficult to do so. But, as China rises, India's strategic autonomy doctrine is under steadily increasing pressure. Much will depend on the future trajectory of the
U.S.-China relationship.

Home and the World

India's grand strategy also has global objectives. While emerging as a global power is a distant dream, India still has sufficient influence to try to seek a better distribution of power in global institutions of trade, security, development, finance and climate action. India will deepen its participation in coalitions — the SCO, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum and the BRICS group, which also includes Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa — and other organizations to counter this institutional disadvantage. Brazil will be an important partner in these efforts. and India will also have to engage with China.

India will also place greater stress on its soft power, which is considerable, in order to lend legitimacy to its grand strategy. Afghanistan has been a success story in this regard. And the updated version of non-alignment's push for influence will be reflected in initiatives such as the International Solar Alliance, scholarships to India’s quality universities and greater development aid and disaster relief. But ambitious infrastructure initiatives such as the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor are capital-constrained and unlikely to gain much traction.

In the end, grand strategy, which relies on using its available resources to pursue national objectives, can only take India so far. Until India finds the elusive formula to achieve much greater prosperity, it will fall short in achieving its goals. Moreover, it has to do this while maintaining its unity, which in turn depends on the survival of its pluralist traditions. Ultimately, the journey to becoming a great power begins at home.

[Crafty_Dog]

By Phillip Orchard

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is flying to Wuhan for a weekend of soul searching with Chinese President Xi Jinping along the banks of the Yangtze. The last-minute trip is Modi’s second of three to China scheduled to take place within the span of a year. It’s also just the latest bit of high-level outreach from New Delhi to Beijing, which makes sense: Neither leader has a shortage of grievances to air with the other – and both have ample interest in preventing tit-for-tat confrontation from putting the two emerging powers on a collision course.

Over the past year, Indian and Chinese jostling for position in South Asia has picked up considerably. In July and August, Chinese and Indian forces engaged in a standoff over the disputed Doklam border region in the high Himalayas. Since then, China has continued cozying up to pro-Beijing governments in South Asian countries firmly within India’s traditional sphere of influence, from Sri Lanka to Nepal to the Maldives. China’s tool of choice in its effort has been its sprawling One Belt, One Road infrastructure initiative, with Beijing winning the rights to build strategically located deep-water ports, among other projects, throughout India’s periphery.

India sees this as an excuse for China to encircle it with de facto Chinese naval bases. (In India’s view, its fears were validated this week when China’s defense minister told his Pakistani counterpart that Beijing was ready to provide security for OBOR projects such as Pakistan’s Gwadar port.) In response, New Delhi has been sounding the alarm that participating countries risk becoming overly indebted to the Chinese, poking holes in Beijing’s narrative that OBOR is a force for the common good. India has been similarly busy in China’s backyard, deepening defense and economic cooperation with states that pose strategic problems to Beijing, such as Vietnam, the Philippines and Singapore. Most alarming to Beijing, India has joined Japan, Australia and the U.S. in taking early steps toward reviving “the Quad,” an alliance aimed at managing Chinese assertiveness and economic coercion in the broader Indo-Pacific region.

Yet, over the past three months, India has also been moving to defuse tension. New Delhi has dispatched a series of high-level officials to Beijing. It canceled a pro-Tibet conference headlined by the Dalai Lama in New Delhi. It quietly backed down after China threatened to take action to prevent India from intervening in a political crisis in the Maldives. Most notably, on April 26, it announced that it would not invite Australia to take part in major trilateral naval exercises with the U.S. and Japan in June, a setback for the Quad.

All this speaks to the uneasy trajectory of Sino-Indian relations. Realistically, neither country has much interest in duking it out for supremacy in the Indo-Pacific. Yet, as illustrated by the sense of urgency with which India has been seeking to head off a major confrontation, underlying forces are pushing the two sides into a self-perpetuating cycle of zero-sum competition anyway. And the deeper China and India sink into this spiral, the harder it will be for either side to pull out.

Unlikely Rivals

It’s a matter of course that two rising border rivals – both just beginning to get a taste for power projection – would increasingly bump up against each other as they attempt to carve out protective buffers and lock in their newfound gains. But historically, and for the most part still today, neither China nor India poses a major threat to the other’s homeland.

There is literally a huge barrier to war between the two countries. To move a substantial force between China and India, one option would be to cross the forbidding Himalayas. If, say, India were to effectively occupy Tibet, or China were to occupy Nepal, this would certainly pose a problem. But the logistics of warfare at 14,000 feet (4,300 meters) is exceedingly difficult, meaning both could feel reasonably secure with these regions existing as buffers, perhaps host to occasional shows of machismo that fall far short of risking all-out war. The other option is to sail more than 3,000 nautical miles through the turbulent waters flanking the Malay Peninsula and the Bay of Bengal. Attacking China this way is a non-starter for India. For China, it’s true that the pace of the People’s Liberation Army Navy modernization has been extraordinary, as illustrated by this week’s launch of sea trials for China’s first indigenous aircraft carrier. But China’s buildup is primarily intended to dominate its littoral waters and secure access through the first island chain, and it’s a long way from developing the combined air-sea battle capabilities needed to really challenge India from the sea.

Moreover, Beijing and New Delhi’s strategic orientations are in fundamentally different directions, in inherently poor positions to threaten the other’s critical interests farther afield. China’s core strategic problem is the series of maritime chokepoints to its east and south, which an outside naval power could use to sever China’s access to critical sea lines of communication. A powerful Indian navy could conceivably threaten Chinese oil imports from the Middle East or exports to Europe, but the Indian Ocean is vast, and India is a long way from having a navy capable of dominating critical sea lanes even if it had a reason to. India’s core strategic problem is its internal incoherence and the hostile nuclear power on its western border. If it had its way, India would mostly just be left alone to manage its internal fractures and keep Pakistan at bay.

The problem is that as China moves to address its primary strategic concerns to its east, secondary concerns to its southwest are becoming more important, making India, largely unwittingly, more of a potential threat. This is forcing India to respond in ways that further heighten the threat to China, which is forcing China to fix the Indian Ocean more firmly in its sights, which is forcing India to reach out to outside powers like the U.S., and so on. This cycle will only intensify as military developments diminish the significance of the geographic barriers that have largely preserved an uneasy peace.

Necessary Choices

China is finding little choice but to push into South Asia. It needs to find ways to bypass chokepoints in the East and South China seas, so it needs to build deep-water ports, pipelines and rail lines in India’s backyard. It’s under pressure to keep its domestic industries humming and its oligarchs happy to prevent destabilizing power struggles at home, so it needs to bribe, cajole or coerce local governments into awarding Chinese firms the rights to build them. Since it doesn’t have the trillions of dollars needed to fund the entirety of the initiative on its own, it needs to use every tool of state power at its disposal to win projects on the most favorable terms possible. Inevitably, some of these will have to be built in notoriously restive regions – some of which will become more unstable as OBOR projects exacerbate social and environmental tensions – so it needs to push for permission to use its security forces to do what security forces from weaker host states may not be able to do. And to prepare for a potential conflict that blocks its maritime chokepoints, China needs to develop the naval forces to keep its backup outlets open and counter enemy forces coming from the west – and this means it needs to establish bases and logistics facilities abroad to support them.

China has relatively little fear of India’s own military trajectory – a fact underscored regularly, including this week, by derisive commentary in Chinese state media – even if India would have a considerable home-field advantage if a conflict broke out in the Indian Ocean. But an India tightly aligned with the U.S. and its regional allies would rightfully be alarming to Beijing. Such an alliance would help make up for the dramatic shortfall in Indian capabilities, of course, while allowing India to expand its presence dramatically without taking on a long-term project of developing overseas bases and logistics facilities. A string of recent agreements with both the U.S. and France will aid in this regard. More important, it would ease the burden on the U.S. in a potential conflict with China, allowing the Americans to amass forces where needed while trusting partners like India and Australia to provide support from the flanks.

For India, the validity of China’s strategic fears is meaningless, as is the reality that China is currently too weak to project substantial power into the Indian Ocean. Whatever China’s intentions, India feels encircled by a country with a voracious appetite for power – one that happens to be arming New Delhi’s most dangerous rival and intent on building a bluewater navy – putting it at an intolerable long-term risk of a two-front war.

Still, New Delhi is caught between conflicting interests here and struggling somewhat to find its footing. It doesn’t want to push its neighbors into China’s orbit by trying to deny them the Chinese aid and investment their economies may need. But its influence with these states would suffer if it were seen as a pushover, incapable of countering Chinese coercion. Already, China has ample cause to think that if it pushes, India will be the first to back down. New Delhi needs the Quad to pose a credible deterrent and persuade China that its best interest is to rise within the established order. Yet, lately, the U.S. has proved to be something of an aloof and inconsistent security partner, and India can’t build a strategy around an outside power that may not show up in a crisis.

Thus, while neither country wants a fight, India wants it less. This will make India an exceedingly reluctant Quad partner, keen to avoid coordinated actions that make China feel backed into a corner. But it will be a Quad partner nonetheless. China can’t back down without sacrificing its core imperatives, and India’s lack of options in the matter will become increasingly apparent.

[Crafty_Dog]

    Despite the size and importance of the massive interconnected river system China and India share (along with Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh), no integrated structure exists for its management, and the bilateral agreements that govern it are far from sufficient.
    Political disputes, such as the 2017 standoff over the Doklam Plateau, could harm the waterways China and India share.
    Unless the countries agree to institute a basinwide mechanism for water management, the river systems they both depend on will be at risk.

Nearly a year after their standoff on the Doklam Plateau began, India and China are trying to get their relationship back on track. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi met with Chinese President Xi Jinping late last month in Wuhan with just that goal in mind, and though their summit was more spectacle than substance, it was nonetheless a necessary step toward resolution. The informal meeting gave the two leaders a prime opportunity to lay aside, however briefly, their countries' long-standing differences and focus on topics of mutual concern, such as climate change, food security and natural disasters. Yet one related issue was missing from the agenda: water. If Beijing and New Delhi fail to address the matter, the repercussions will likely be devastating for the region, its inhabitants and its environment.
From Yarlung Tsangpo to Brahmaputra

Along with thousands of kilometers of disputed border, a few important waterways run between China and India. The headwaters of the Indus River, for example, originate in China. In addition, the mighty Brahmaputra River, known in China as the Yarlung Tsangpo, flows through both countries on its way to the Bay of Bengal. That waterway links up with the Meghna and Ganges rivers in Bangladesh, forming a system that carries around 138 million liters (364.6 million gallons) during the flood season — a volume more than one and a half times that of the Amazon River. But as a 2016 report by the United Nations Environment Program and its partners found, The Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna Basin is also the world's most vulnerable delta, based on more than a dozen key indicators. 

Despite the size and importance of the massive interconnected river system, no basinwide integrated structure exists for its management, and the bilateral agreements that govern it are far from sufficient. Part of the problem is that China, which borders 14 countries and shares over 42 major water bodies, has refused to be a part of an institutionalized water management system. On its fast track toward development, the country has had to tackle the challenges of geography and water head on. China today has built more dams than the rest of the world combined as part of a resource management strategy designed to alleviate water scarcity in 11 of its provinces. For India, many of these constructions have downstream effects on its own water supply — especially China's South-North Water Diversion Project, which draws water from the Yarlung Tsangpo on the western line.

New Delhi, however, will have to take a balanced and strategic approach to negotiating with Beijing over the waterways they share. India, after all, has its own water management and development plans in the works, including the recently launched "National River Linking Project." Like China, it has strained relations with other neighbors over shared waters and has thrown its weight around in bilateral negotiations. As a result, India has caught flak from neighboring countries such as Bangladesh for its "hypocritical" demands of China. The Indian government probably will find working with Beijing on the water issue more useful for the region and for the future of shared waters than accusing China of infringing on its rights.

Water management depends on mutual trust and understanding.

Water Management

Beyond politics, a lack of concrete data across the river basins also muddies the waters between China and India. The two countries keep what information they do have a closely guarded secret, and in the absence of a transnational water management system, they have little legal recourse to question the other country. China in particular has struggled to balance the interests and demands of its downstream neighbors with its own national interests. It has, however, proposed diplomatic initiatives from time to time to ease tensions over shared water resources, including the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Mechanism. It also has reached an agreement with India and Bangladesh to share hydrological data about the Yarlung Tsangpo during monsoon season to alert the downstream states about possible flooding, one of the main problems in the river basin.

But water management depends in large part on mutual trust and understanding. The standoff between China and India last year on the Doklam Plateau strained their volatile relationship and, in turn, jeopardized their water security. In May 2017, China did not provide India the hydrological data as required, and though it cited technical issues, its omission nevertheless aroused suspicion in New Delhi of a political motive. A string of meetings between the two countries at various levels of government have since calmed the waters; the 11th meeting of the India-China Expert Level Mechanism on Transborder Rivers in March, moreover, ensured that Beijing would give New Delhi the necessary water data this year as usual.

Still, unless the countries agree to institute a basinwide mechanism for water management, the river systems they both depend on will be at risk. The lingering points of contention between India and China, including border disputes and Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative, will continue to spill over into their water-sharing arrangement. Historical trends indicate that water forms a small subset of the political dialogue, and it isn't likely to command much more attention anytime soon. Together with the challenges of climate change and population growth, these issues will increase the strain on the countries' water supply, public health and food security. Even so, as other countries around the world have demonstrated, cooperation is possible.

[Crafty_Dog]

India’s home minister is on a three-day visit to Mongolia. Which sort of makes sense: China makes a play for Nepal, India makes a play for Mongolia. The neutrality of Mongolia is a major facet of China-Russia relations. How far India can push in here is a useful gauge of Indian strengths and intentions.

India and the U.S. are reportedly preparing to sign two more bilateral military pacts that, among other things, would give India greater access to more advanced U.S. military technologies and platforms.

[Crafty_Dog]

The defense ministers of India and China are trying to regain each other’s confidence. China’s will soon travel to New Delhi, and India’s will take a goodwill tour of China next week. The ministers will also set up a hotline between their armies to reduce the risk of conflict breaking out. These mark the first high-level military visits since the standoff at Doklam, where it appeared the two militaries were on the brink of conflict. Token ministerial niceties aren’t enough to allay the deeply held concerns each side has of the other, but the countries appear to be setting aside their differences to manage matters at home and deal with the United States.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/india-inches-closer-united-states

[bigdog]

https://warontherocks.com/2018/11/ten-years-after-mumbai-the-group-responsible-is-deadlier-than-ever/

[Crafty_Dog]

China and India pretend they’re not playing a bigger game. Several stories from the past week illustrate the precariousness of the Indo-Pacific competition. The Chinese government has denied that it used Kenya’s port in Mombasa as collateral for its funding of a rail line that will connect the port to Nairobi. This comes a week after a leaked report from Kenya’s auditor general’s office showed that, when the rail deal was struck in 2013, the Kenyan government had agreed to waive its sovereignty over the port – which China built – if it fails to repay the loan.

 


 In Pakistan, meanwhile, the government insisted that the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) — one of China’s flagship Belt and Road Initiative projects — had no military purpose. This comes a week after a New York Times report claimed Beijing and Islamabad had a secret agreement to build fighter jets and other military assets in Pakistan as part of the CPEC deal.

On Thursday, official sources in India told PTI that New Delhi is not pursuing any new military facilities in the Maldives in exchange for some $1.4 billion in assistance it provided to help Male pay back massive loans from Beijing.

Chinese and Indian aid and investment in Indo-Pacific countries shouldn’t be seen solely as sinister “debt traps” to gain military advantage. Both countries have plenty of reasons to invest there that have nothing to do with their geopolitical competition. But the fact of the matter is that strategic location is the main factor drawing outside interest to countries like Kenya, Pakistan and the Maldives. The latest round of denials from Beijing and New Delhi merely illustrates just how much both countries are concerned about managing domestic political blowback in these states — and, therefore, just how flimsy any security strategy that hinges on fleeting political influence abroad would be.

[Crafty_Dog]

When it comes to military spunk, no Indian politician shows it off like Narendra Modi. The prime minister sometimes dons camouflage to celebrate Diwali, the Hindu festival of lights, with troops on the borders with China and Pakistan.

While inaugurating a film museum last month, Mr. Modi greeted the audience with a catch phrase from “Uri: The Surgical Strike,” a recent Bollywood hit about a 2016 military operation in which Indian soldiers entered Pakistani-controlled territory to take out purported terrorist training camps. The prime minister often cites the episode to contrast his muscular leadership with the allegedly feckless opposition.

Unfortunately, Mr. Modi’s spending priorities do not match his rhetoric. Last week’s federal budget—a stopgap exercise before national elections this spring—underscores his habit of choosing butter over guns.

The budget promises income support for poor farmers, increased outlays for a government health-insurance scheme, tax cuts for the middle class, and pensions for workers in informal businesses. Though the $60.9 billion earmarked for defense is the most ever in absolute terms—and an 8% increase over last year—defense outlays have dipped to a modest 2.1% of gross domestic product.

That decline is made worse because much of India’s military budget is consumed by salaries for its bloated 1.4-million-strong army, rather than for buying weapons and investing in new technologies. Inflation and a weakening rupee—India imports about two-thirds of its military hardware—crimp the budget further.

For the U.S., which is cooperating more closely with New Delhi as a hedge against Beijing’s expansionism, the long-term risks of India’s tight military spending ought to cause concern. Each year India falls further behind China’s rapidly modernizing military.

“India’s aspirations are always lofty,” says Ashley Tellis, an expert on Asian geopolitics at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington. “But there’s a huge disconnect with what would allow them to achieve those ambitions.”

On the surface, India’s military spending looks robust: It ranked 10th in the world in 2007, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. By 2017 it had climbed to fifth, behind the U.S., China, Saudi Arabia and Russia. India is also the world’s largest importer of arms.

Yet this may not be enough. Thanks to populist politics, defense spending has declined steadily, from 3.5% of GDP in the mid-1980s. China’s vastly larger economy allows it to allocate almost four times as much to defense as India—$228 billion in 2017.

Then there’s the quality of spending. Delhi’s Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses estimates that the approximately $14 billion India spends each year on defense-related pensions—including for civilians who work in state-owned defense companies and research organizations—exceeds what it spends on weapons. A generous pension plan enacted by the Modi government in 2015 accounts for some of the skew.

As recently as 2011, the military managed to hold personnel expenditures to 60% and leave 40% for weapons. According to IDSA, personnel costs now consume two-thirds of military spending. At the same time, the rupee has declined about 12% against the dollar over the past 13 months, meaning even less money to acquire expensive ships, aircraft and submarines from overseas. Take inflation into account and India’s generals and admirals command less resources this year than last.

“The Indian military is not getting the bang for its buck that the headline figures would suggest,” says Walter Ladwig, a military expert who teaches at King’s College in London. “The International Institute for Strategic Studies shows that India has surpassed the United Kingdom in defense spending, but meanwhile nearly 70% of the Indian army’s hardware is considered vintage.”

Increasing weapons funding will be essential if India’s defensive capabilities are to match its increasing commitments. On Mr. Modi’s watch, India has spoken more forcefully about freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and signed two long-pending agreements that make it easier to cooperate with the U.S. military. India has also helped revive the Quad, a consultative grouping of the region’s most powerful democracies—the U.S., Japan, India and Australia. Cumulative U.S. arms sales to India—virtually nonexistent two decades ago—have surpassed $18 billion.

Nobody in Washington expects New Delhi to match Beijing’s defense spending, but if India falls too far behind China, its allure as a democratic bulwark in the Indo-Pacific will diminish greatly. In India itself, policy makers will be tempted to kowtow to Beijing rather than stand up to it.

Mr. Tellis of the Carnegie Endowment believes that the next 10 to 15 years will be crucial. “For the U.S., that’s the million-dollar question,” he says. “If India continues along this path, does our bet on it become a failed bet?”

[ya]

Pak terrorist attack in India, 40 soldiers dead
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/army-to-decide-time-place-of-response-pm-modi-on-pulwama-attacks/articleshow/68017083.cms

I would not be surprised if India retaliates, elections are on the horizon and Modi is anyway a nationalist. Last time when pakis killed 18 in Uri, India launched surgical strikes on terrorist launch pads. This time 40 died, response has to be harder.

[DougMacG]

Interesting comment today by a former admiral of great experience on Hugh Hewitt:
Sorry I did not catch his name and can't find a transcript.

'By 2060 the world will be tri-lateral with the US, China and India.'

I also think so but don't see much yet for evidence of it coming.

Note that he omitted Russia, Europe, ...

[ya]

Re: India, it is common knowledge that India will make it into the top 3 economies within a decade. I dont expect poverty to disappear...but a 10 Trillion economy is in the cards. I read somewhere, India has already overtaken France and Russia in size of economy and will overtake the UK this year.

[DougMacG]

Thank you ya.  Also it seems India should be a natural ally of the US although there always seems to be something at least partly screwing that up.

Now that we are done with Pakistan maybe that partnership can grow.

[ya]

Waiting game going on in India. Waiting to strike Pak. Problem is that this time the pakis are on high alert, so a surprise attack or even a surgical strike is difficult. Public expectations are high so a small strike will not cut it. The hope is that Modi will give orders to occupy some territory or send a few cruise missiles to terrorist headquarters.

Note: This is the first time that the pakis are not playing their nuclear card. Usually they brandish it over every small thing. This means they know punishment is coming their way.

[DougMacG]

By one measure, purchasing power parity PPP, India already has the third largest GDP in the world.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_rankings_of_India#Economy

[ya]

Note 2: Pakis carried out a second strike at around the same time in Iran, I think 17 Iranis were killed. The Iranians are mad and this strike occured just before MBS (Mr Bone Saw) visited Pak (Pakis trying to impress their guest).

So pakis think they have their bases covered. In good books with MBS wrt to Iran and blackmailing the US about a potential Afghan withdrawal. Unfortunately, as usual their strategic brilliance (sarcasm) will show through.

[Crafty_Dog]

An American friend of distinguished military background who was in Pakistan in 1995 recommends this article:

https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/02/india-pakistan-american-foreign-policy-south-asia/ 

[ya]

The article gets it right on most things, but is very simplistic. It still reeks of US arrogance, e.g. that they can ask Pak to control their jihadis and in return India will keep its missiles on their side of the border etc.
Those days are long gone, the US could never control Pak, even when US interests were threatened !, infact the OBL episode showed how pak played with the US. In India, to take revenge and hit Pak back hard is a political imperative for the Modi govt, otherwise he will lose the election. What is likely to happen is that amongst other actions, India will undertake limited strikes in POK (Pak Occupied Kashmir), which India believes is territory they have a right to, and Pak will be forced to lie low because Pak proper has not been hit, while at the same time it would result in sufficient embarrassment for the Pak generals.

In anycase, the US is also not in a position to object to India striking Pak, the US sells weapons to India and if the Indians cannot use their weapons when they want, then why buy from the US.. The Pak nuclear bluff will be called, yet again, because Indian nuclear doctrine says that use of a nuclear device on Indian troops, even on paki territory (so called use of tactical weapons against the Cold Start doctrine) will result in a devastating nuclear counter response.

What the article does not capture is the anger in India at the moment, for decades India has suffered from a policy of a 1000 cuts by Pak. This is the reason a strike is inevitable.

[ya]

As luck would have it, shortly after I posted here, India bombs Paki terror camps deep inside Khyber Pakhtunwa  near Abbottabad of OBL fame. Developing story..

Note added: There seem to be two Balakots, one in pak occupied Kashmir (POK) and another in Khyber Pakhtunwa. Looks like the bombing was in POK. Also bombed Chakoti and Muzaffarabad training centers using 1000 kg precision guided bombs.

[G M]

I hope this isn’t meaningful in a Serbian Archduke sort of way.

[ya]

No worries

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/Dq_3uxqX0AEY3o8.jpg

[Crafty_Dog]

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/live-updates-india-carries-out-air-strikes-on-terror-camps-in-pakistan/liveblog/68161990.cms?fbclid=IwAR16QJ7HigB8b4JRZwwEmTRL3ObzsjhQMNMUBT8KLg2stQFZVHKNjHbx5-0

[ya]

Now that the dust has settled somewhat..this strike is important for several reasons. Several sacred cows were shot down.
1. In the last Kargil war, the Indian Airforce was asked to not enter Paki territory, for fear of escalation, with threat of nuclear war.
2. In the last surgical strike (response to Uri attack, 18 killed), India entered Paki territory at 5 places to take down terrorist launching pads. India had not officially entered paki territory since 50 years!. They could not acknowledge the surgical strike, for that would be a loss of face, and hence they could not avenge it either!.
3. In the current strike, which was in response to the Pulwama terrorist attack (40 soldiers killed), India not only used airpower (a major escalation), but bombed terrorist headquarters and training facility in Pak proper. This was another sacred cow, that India would not have the guts to bomb Paki territory, only POK (which is disputed territory). Pakis had emptied out the terrorist launch pads in POK after the Pulwama attack, since they knew there would be a response. They withdrew them to a major terrorist training center in Paki territory, which we were not supposed to hit. Infact they concentrated several hundreds of them there, along with their trainers. This is a huge loss for them.
4. India has claimed that they did a "non-military (target) strike, pre-emptively". If India had bombed eg ISI HQ, that would be a military target and a declaration of war. Instead, India bombed JEM head quarters which was in an isolated location, so civilians were not hurt. Now Pak is in a bind. They have acknowledged that Indian planes entered Pak, but have not accepted that they bombed JEM HQ. They cannot accept that, because supposedly there are no terrorist HQ in Pak. They cannot even acknowledge that Indian planes entered Paki territory for more than a few minutes, for then the question becomes what was the Paki airforce doing, especially since they were all alert with their radars switched on waiting for India to strike. So if India did not really enter Pak, and did not bomb JEM HQ, since that does not exist, how can they respond ?
5. Pak is stuck, there are no terrorists in India, so they cant do an equivalent bombing raid. They cannot hit military targets, for that would be their demise and they cannot cause a major terrorist act, for that would prove they are a terrorist nation and result in an even bigger response from India. So they are now doing some artillery fire at the border and venting. It is particularly galling for pakis, since their PM, Imran Khan just 2 days ago gave a speech indicating that Pak would retaliate if India did anything. So we wait for them to respond, dont think it will happen in the near future.
6. This may just be teh initial response from India, if Pak responds militarily, expect another serious escalation from India.

[ya]

Watch the body language of the Paki war cabinet after the attack,

sheepish, deep sighs
https://twitter.com/i/status/1100358565280198656

[ya]

In yesterday's happenings, a few paki F-16's moved towards the Indian border, ostensibly to bomb a military ammo storage and army depot. They never entered India, a mig-21 (Soviet era aircraft) got involved, shot an F-16, gave chase and was shot down over POK and captured. Paki's have beat him up a bit and paraded him around for propaganda purposes. Since pakis responded by hitting military targets, expect an Indian response. Western news media for some reason are parrotting the Pak story that 2 planes were shot down. India always acknowledges its own casualties, unless the pakis are being clever by half and including their own plane in the casualty figures.

Below is a link to the air situation..Pak is nearly completely devoid of planes, India has an air-advisory on the border areas, but otherwise things are normal.


https://www.radarbox24.com/@26.39187,75.91553,z6

[Crafty_Dog]

https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/heavy-firing-across-line-of-control-in-poonch/articleshow/68194642.cms?fbclid=IwAR2VDOl6FPj3Wp1J5oWTGQvfplFMeAUDwcKma1alYwbsq6M6K7rhmXo-6A0

[ya]

So here's the important news:
Indian mig-21 shot down an F-16, Indian pilot who was captured is being released in the next few hours. India lost a Mig-21, Pak lost a F-16 with 2 pilots.
Looks like things are descalating, since Pakis are returning the pilot promptly. India claims goals achieved with respect to JEM, several hundred terrorists and their trainers killed.

Implications:
- A new standard has been set, i.e. India will use air force to bomb terror camps in Pak. So any significant terrorist attack will be punished even if Modi govt is not there. The public will demand it. The nuclear bogey which Pak held over India's head has been demolished.
- Unfortunately for the Pakis, a lowly Mig-21 shooting down their F-16 is bad news in several aspects. a) USA is pissed, the F-16's were stipulated for use in bombing only against their own population (taliban). b) Lockheed-Martin will be upset, now they cannot sell their F-16 line to India, and perhaps not even the "F-21"which is really a souped up F-16. India is currently looking for a partner to make fighter jets in India and Lockheed is unlikely to be a contender.
- The threat of war and another humiliating strike in Pak remains in Pak's future.
- Rumor is the pakis are browning their shalwars since Indian Mirages were able to bomb Pak and return home safely. They could very easily also bomb military GHQ.

Unless Pak plays some trick and does nor release the Indian pilot, I expect de-escalation... unless India does one more strike against other terror groups.

[ya]

Caught on the wrong foot, what will Pak do now ?
Read more at: https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/panorama/caught-wrong-foot-what-will-720546.html
https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/panorama/caught-wrong-foot-what-will-720546.html

[Crafty_Dog]

India and Pakistan back away from the precipice, for now. Pakistan has released the Indian pilot of the MiG-21 that was shot down in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir on Wednesday, providing an opening for de-escalation. Pakistan reopened its airspace and said it accepted Moscow’s offer to mediate. (India hasn’t responded to the offer yet, but it’s unlikely to spurn Russia, its most important defense partner.) Notably, though, satellite images released by several sources suggest that India’s initial attack on an alleged terrorist training camp did little if any damage to the facility, undercutting India’s claims that 200-300 terrorists were killed in their sleep. To whatever extent the operation was motivated by domestic political factors (Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is facing a tough re-election fight in April and May), the apparent failure of the operation may keep public pressure high on New Delhi to demonstrate an ability to manage cross-border militant threats. But regardless of the success of the airstrikes themselves, that India launched the operation over Pakistani soil has already made an important point clear: The risk of matters escalating into nuclear war, which has deterred India from undertaking major cross-border operations following terrorist attacks in the past, won’t automatically keep India on such a short leash going forward.

[ccp]

seems like every several yrs or so we read the pakistan - india tensions increasing
some threats and shouts and talk about nucs.
Then it all dies down and drops off the radar.

[ya]

Re: the satellite images, there is a lot of misinformation floating around, much has been debunked on Indian fora. The govt has not released information, but they likely will as elections near. The reason to not release such information is that the govt does not want to politicize the military and for Pak to save face. If it becomes open knowledge that Indian planes bombed Pak territory and got away with it, the paki population will demand retribution and Imran Khan the paki PM and the army would need to do something stupid. The pakis are masters at hiding their losses and dead.

Same for the downed US F-16, the implications of which have not yet been fully appreciated*. At this time the message has gone through to the Pakistani GHQ and they know what happened. This is similar to the last surgical strike, where the govt did not release any info, but then slowly it leaked later on and even a block buster movie was made and released about a month ago.

The main point of this strike as CraftyDog points out was "The risk of matters escalating into nuclear war, which has deterred India from undertaking major cross-border operations following terrorist attacks in the past, won’t automatically keep India on such a short leash going forward.". Compare with the situation during the Taj terror bombing under the Congress govt, 174 dead, 300 wounded and no response from India. Infact, now the public will expect swift retribution after any major Pak terror act, independent of the govt in power and every time the response will be harder (atleast under the Modi govt). In Bollywood mad India, Modi who speaks colloquially, recently indicated , this bombing was just the movie trailer, with the actual movie to come later. Modi and current NSA Doval are hardliners. As a side note, since Modi has been in power, he has used Indian forces 4 times, a) Surgical strike on Pak, b) Surgical strike inside Myanmar, c) Doklam standoff with China, where China backed down, d) The current Balakot bombing.

In other news: at the Line of Control (LOC), artillery firefights are ongoing, albeit with higher calibre weapons. For the moment, I consider this venting by both sides, unless something significant gets hit, at which point things will escalate again.

*
Read more at:
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/68229883.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst

[ya]

In recent happenings: As a counter to media reports who indicate that the target was missed..
Maulana Ammar, brother of JEM Chief Masood Azhar wails immediately after the strike that their training facility and seminary was hit.
 
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/indian-jets-hit-school-of-jihad-says-azhars-brother-in-audio/articleshow/68238334.cms

In BBC interview with pak FM, interviewer indicates JEM magazine confirms strike on the training facility
https://youtu.be/0lxafFJLrqI

A lot of highranking JEM officials were there for graduation type speeches for the new class of recruits, paki ISI officials were present and also killed....perhaps even JEM Chief Masood Azhar (not confirmed) was halaled.

[G M]

In recent happenings: As a counter to media reports who indicate that the target was missed..
Maulana Ammar, brother of JEM Chief Masood Azhar wails immediately after the strike that their training facility and seminary was hit.
 
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/indian-jets-hit-school-of-jihad-says-azhars-brother-in-audio/articleshow/68238334.cms

In BBC interview with pak FM, interviewer indicates JEM magazine confirms strike on the training facility
https://youtu.be/0lxafFJLrqI

A lot of highranking JEM officials were there for graduation type speeches for the new class of recruits, paki ISI officials were present and also killed....perhaps even JEM Chief Masood Azhar (not confirmed) was halaled.

Nice!