Author Topic: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)  (Read 162646 times)



Crafty_Dog

  • Administrator
  • Power User
  • *****
  • Posts: 69122
    • View Profile
GPF
« Reply #502 on: January 06, 2021, 02:18:18 PM »
Pulling out the big guns. The U.S. appears to be trying to speed up India’s military (especially naval) modernization drive. The U.S. Navy is reportedly giving its Indian counterpart three medium-caliber naval guns from its own inventory. India has been signing an array of bigger, longer-term deals with the U.S. and partners like France and Israel, but it’s notable to see something in the space that can actually happen quickly.

ya

  • Power User
  • ***
  • Posts: 1517
    • View Profile
Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #503 on: January 06, 2021, 06:29:02 PM »
India-China border standoff completes 9 months. No withdrawal by either side.
Indian sources claiming intercepts and reports suggests Chinese conscripts suffering tremendously in the cold. They have limited high altitude/winter experience.
India has 20 years high altitude experience from the Siachen glacier.

ya

  • Power User
  • ***
  • Posts: 1517
    • View Profile

DougMacG

  • Power User
  • ***
  • Posts: 18124
    • View Profile

Crafty_Dog

  • Administrator
  • Power User
  • *****
  • Posts: 69122
    • View Profile
GPF
« Reply #506 on: February 11, 2021, 06:40:58 PM »
Deal on the Himalayas. India and China reached yet another agreement on pulling back troops from the Line of Actual Control, the two countries’ tense de facto Himalayan border. The unforgiving topography of the area limits the potential for escalation, but also perpetuates low-level instability. Periodic flare-ups will continue so long as both sides continue infrastructure development near the contested zones – and so long as China has a strategic interest in keeping India focused on the front rather than its maritime domain.

DougMacG

  • Power User
  • ***
  • Posts: 18124
    • View Profile
Re: GPF, India China border
« Reply #507 on: February 11, 2021, 06:55:45 PM »
"...and so long as China has a strategic interest in keeping India focused on the front rather than its maritime domain."

 - Funny that I thought the exact opposite, China wants to focus on its other front.

Wouldn't you think that conflict with China increases India's interest in militarizing its navy?
-------------------------
Aug 2020:
https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1329579/india-china-latest-indian-navy-warship-ladakh-clash-world-war-3
India deploys warship to South China Sea in warning to Beijing
INDIA has deployed a warship to the South China Sea following the bloody clash with Beijing in the Ladakh region.

ya

  • Power User
  • ***
  • Posts: 1517
    • View Profile
Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #508 on: February 11, 2021, 08:39:10 PM »
The China initiated aggression on the Indian border, did not pay any dividends to them. No gain in territory, turned public opinion in India against China, lost a ton of contracts and business in India. India came closer to the US and Quad countries, India raised military spending, updated a lot of weapons, redoubled infrastructure spending at the border, increased maritime security and updated the Andaman Nicobar island commands etc. Finally, they are now forced to eat humble pie and start the withdrawal first, followed by the Indian side.

Looks like they overestimated their strengths and realized,  a 2 front war with India and Taiwan was a no-win situation.
India is fully aware of its maritime strengths in the Indian Ocean, it just choses to not flex in that area. Were a mountain war to start, India could put pressure on the Malacca Straights and choke Chinese traffic. China has a lot of money, but even they would not have the resources to maintain their 1000 + mile long supply lines to the Ladakh region.

G M

  • Power User
  • ***
  • Posts: 26643
    • View Profile
How to contain China w Xi-Den in the White House
« Reply #509 on: February 11, 2021, 09:20:00 PM »
How to contain the PRC while Xi-Den occupies the White House

1. India, Australia and Japan formally recognize the Republic of China and sign a mutual defense treaty.

2. India helps the ROC (Taiwan) become a nuclear power. No need for ICBMs, tactical nukes to incinerate an invasion fleet and return fire to the PRC is all that is required.

3. Japan can position JSDF assets in the ROC and help with air defense missions.

4. Australian forces can use decades of war fighting experience to train up ROC troops (Foreign Internal Defense).

Protecting India, Japan and Australia (And the greater Asia-Pacific) from PRC aggression starts at the shores of Taiwan.

« Last Edit: February 11, 2021, 10:09:42 PM by Crafty_Dog »

ya

  • Power User
  • ***
  • Posts: 1517
    • View Profile
Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #510 on: February 12, 2021, 06:16:46 AM »
India does not have the financial or military heft to support Taiwan in this way. India does not even teach Pak a serious lesson, let alone China. There is a defensive mindset in India, does not want to spend on weapons...development is more important..yada yada..The question is why is the world's sole super power not doing any of this ?.

Crafty_Dog

  • Administrator
  • Power User
  • *****
  • Posts: 69122
    • View Profile
Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #511 on: February 12, 2021, 06:30:55 AM »
Because our President in on the Chinese payroll and he got into office thanks to the censorship of the Goolag Oligopoly allies of the Chi Coms?

DougMacG

  • Power User
  • ***
  • Posts: 18124
    • View Profile
Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #512 on: February 12, 2021, 08:09:10 AM »
ya: "India does not have the financial or military heft to support Taiwan in this way. India does not even teach Pak a serious lesson, let alone China. There is a defensive mindset in India, does not want to spend on weapons..."

  - All true but I wonder if India's mindset about defense will be expanding given the latest standoff with China, the growing ambition and military capabilities of PRC, and the loss of ally Trump in the US.

ya

  • Power User
  • ***
  • Posts: 1517
    • View Profile
Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #513 on: February 12, 2021, 09:39:28 AM »
Yes, a new emphasis on increased military spending and preparedness is visible. As soon as China calms down, military spending will turn down. Having said that it is clear, that India will not back down due to a threat of military aggression from China. China knows, that they would have suffered great pain, in any war on the Indo-China border, which is why they were forced to sheepishly  pullback their tanks first.

Like in a B movie western, China will be back again, perhaps after they have settled the Taiwan issue.

G M

  • Power User
  • ***
  • Posts: 26643
    • View Profile
Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #514 on: February 12, 2021, 01:25:22 PM »
India does not have the financial or military heft to support Taiwan in this way. India does not even teach Pak a serious lesson, let alone China. There is a defensive mindset in India, does not want to spend on weapons...development is more important..yada yada..The question is why is the world's sole super power not doing any of this ?.

All Taiwan needs is the expertise. Taiwan already has nuclear power plants and the intellectual horsepower. It wouldn't be difficult.

G M

  • Power User
  • ***
  • Posts: 26643
    • View Profile
Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #515 on: February 12, 2021, 01:26:41 PM »
Yes, a new emphasis on increased military spending and preparedness is visible. As soon as China calms down, military spending will turn down. Having said that it is clear, that India will not back down due to a threat of military aggression from China. China knows, that they would have suffered great pain, in any war on the Indo-China border, which is why they were forced to sheepishly  pullback their tanks first.

Like in a B movie western, China will be back again, perhaps after they have settled the Taiwan issue.

Yes. They will push until they hit resistance. Then wait and try again.

Crafty_Dog

  • Administrator
  • Power User
  • *****
  • Posts: 69122
    • View Profile
GPF: China dismantling in the Himalayas?
« Reply #516 on: February 15, 2021, 02:01:48 PM »
Deconstruction in the Himalayas. China is reportedly dismantling a bunch of military infrastructure in the part of the Himalayas where Beijing and New Delhi recently agreed to pull back troops. According to Indian media, Chinese troops have taken apart a helipad, a jetty and several structures, including observation posts.


ya

  • Power User
  • ***
  • Posts: 1517
    • View Profile
Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #517 on: February 15, 2021, 04:37:36 PM »
The Chinese soldiers are in a hurry to go back to their Oxygen enriched barracks and eat Chicken Kung pao and humble pie. :-D The disengagement is going fine so far. The agreement was to take apart all construction in the region of the Pangong Tso lake bank since April 2020, when they started their intrusions.

Interestingly India's last outpost is just before finger 4 see ITBP post in picture, from there to finger 4 there is no road and its just a single file walk way carved into the mountainside. India's claim line is till finger 8 and the Chinese have a post just after F8  called Sirijap. Chinese claim line is till F4. During the Kargil war with Pak, India moved away its forces and could not afford to raise objections to Chinese motorable road building from finger 8 to finger 4. As a result of that, Indians patrol from Finger 4 to 8 by foot, whereas the Chinese could just cruise in their humvees. Since April 2020, they were not allowing Indian patrols beyond the narrow ledge after Finger 4. Now they have had to remove the jetty as well as other posts they had created in the fingers region. The region between F4-8, will not be patrolled by both sides for the present.

« Last Edit: February 15, 2021, 04:45:00 PM by ya »

ya

  • Power User
  • ***
  • Posts: 1517
    • View Profile
Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #518 on: February 19, 2021, 04:27:00 AM »
China is finally acknowledging some casualties, offering medals to 5 killed in the Galwan barbaric attack incident. Indian army general says Chinese casualties were 2x Indian casualties (around 45) Lots of meltdown in Chinese media, Indian media talking about China running away from the battlefield in Ladakh !

Crafty_Dog

  • Administrator
  • Power User
  • *****
  • Posts: 69122
    • View Profile
GPF: India's Trump Card Against China
« Reply #519 on: April 13, 2021, 05:00:39 AM »
April 13, 2021
View On Website
Open as PDF

    
India’s Trump Card Against China
Moving into the spotlight is the strategically invaluable Andaman and Nicobar Islands.
By: Phillip Orchard

Despite its enormous potential, India is by no means an inevitable counterweight to Chinese ambitions in the Indian Ocean. The country's immense domestic needs and its preoccupation with land-based threats have prevented it from turning its attention fully to the maritime realm. And the more China races ahead with its breakneck military expansion, the harder it will be for India to catch up.

But it's a mistake to look at Indian and Chinese maritime capabilities as an apples-to-apples comparison. India doesn't need to match China destroyer for destroyer or missile for missile because India has some extraordinary geographic advantages in its favor – ones that also happen to make it particularly attractive as a partner with other powers in the region. And the strategically invaluable Andaman and Nicobar Islands, India's great trump card in its intensifying competition with China, is moving into the spotlight.

India's Point of View

For a country with more than 4,500 miles (7,200 kilometers) of coastline, India has never been particularly ambitious in the maritime sphere. This is, in part, because for much of its history it didn’t have much reason to be. Geographically, India is protected by the near-impenetrable Himalayas to its north, harsh subtropical regions to its east and deserts to the west. Its long coastline makes it vulnerable to seaborne threats, sure, but few powers have ever been capable of exploiting this vulnerability. Buffered by the vast waters of the Arabian Sea, the Bay of Bengal and the open ocean, India is blessed with abundant strategic depth when it comes to naval threats. And at any rate, any invading power would confront India’s demographic immensity, which makes direct subjugation by force nearly impossible.

That outside powers have dominated the subcontinent in centuries past is a result mainly of its internal divisions. Its primary occupiers – various Muslim dynasties from the 11th century to the 18th century and the Europeans shortly thereafter – succeeded because they managed to turn India against itself, exploiting the competition among different factions and power centers to cultivate coalitions of collaborators who would support their largely commercial objections.

As a result, India has generally focused inward since it became independent. Its viability as a modern nation-state has depended on its governments’ ability to manage internal divisions. External geopolitics, with the exceptions of the periodic blowups with Pakistan and occasional border clashes with China, took a back seat to more immediate concerns. But the demands of this endeavor are changing, as is India’s broader strategic environment, forcing New Delhi to look increasingly to the far seas.

Its most vital lifelines flow from the west. To fuel growth and development, India’s economic interests have expanded far beyond the subcontinent. The country has well over a billion mouths to feed, and sustaining the level of economic growth and modernization necessary to support this population has given India a voracious appetite for commodity imports such as energy. In 2019, around 47 percent of the total energy India consumed came from imports, including more than 80 percent of its oil supplies. As a result, the country has been quickly expanding its naval presence around critical chokepoints near the Arabian Peninsula and Horn of Africa – waters known to be teeming with pirates, rebels and explosive risks rooted in Middle Eastern rivalries.

Indian interests in eastbound sea lanes are growing too as the country seeks to boost its status as a manufacturing and export power. Already, around 40 percent of India’s trade passes through the turbulent waters of the Strait of Malacca, which has plenty of pirates of its own – and, more concerning for India, Chinese ambition. As China moves to address its own strategic concerns to the east, secondary issues to its southwest are becoming more important, making India more of a potential threat, however unwittingly, and vice versa. China needs to find ways to bypass chokepoints in the East and South China seas, so it needs to build deep-water ports, pipelines and rail lines in India’s backyard. And to prepare for a potential conflict that blocks its maritime chokepoints, it also needs to develop naval forces to keep its backup outlets open and counter enemy forces coming from the west – an effort that will require a network of bases and logistics facilities on India’s periphery to support them.

Thus, India now has good reason to fear both Chinese encirclement and Chinese domination of more distant waters on which India increasingly relies. And this means India now has very good reason to invest considerably more in developing the capabilities to secure trade routes and sustain the regional balance of power with China.

But India has had a hard time shifting resources from its army and air force to the navy. While it’s been touting grand plans for a 200-ship navy by 2027 (up from 130 today) and quietly laying the groundwork for its own “string of pearls” in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, the navy still received just 15 percent of last year’s budget, compared with 23 percent for the air force and 56 percent for the army (the bulk of which goes to pensions). The navy’s share of the pie is actually down from 18 percent in 2012. India's struggle to shift focus to the maritime realm might be one motivator behind China's moves in the Himalayas and with Pakistan. The more India stays bogged down in conflicts on land, in other words, the less it can shift focus to the sea.

The Metal Chain

China has little reason to fear India as a major threat to its interests in, say, the South China Sea or around Taiwan. But India doesn't need to achieve military parity with China to become a problem. It simply needs to leverage its geographic advantages and the growing interest in cooperation from external powers like the U.S. This puts the spotlight squarely on the strategic godsend that are India's Andaman and Nicobar Islands.


(click to enlarge)

The archipelago, featuring some 572 islands (just 38 of them inhabited) stretches from just 100 miles north of the northern tip of Indonesia's Sumatra island through the heart of the Andaman Sea toward Myanmar. The islands are, in effect, the gateway to the Strait of Malacca. In the view of Chinese defense planners, the more apt metaphor for the islands is a “metal chain.”

For India, developing the capabilities needed to threaten Chinese access to Malacca from the Indian mainland would be difficult and expensive, requiring rapid leaps forward in its submarine, aircraft carrier, air force and missile programs, as well as in India’s military logistics and surveillance capabilities. Threatening Chinese access to Malacca from the Andaman and Nicobars is more straightforward. The archipelago is the proverbial “unsinkable aircraft carrier.” Indian bases there are ideally placed for conducting surveillance operations, deploying anti-ship missiles and radar stations, stationing supply depots, refueling fighter planes, and so forth.

The islands, moreover, make India immediately attractive as a partner for powers like the U.S. that already have the capabilities to maximize their strategic value – something that could allow India to keep China at bay without breaking the bank by trying to match China’s spending on the People's Liberation Army. India’s growing ties with Australia are particularly notable in this regard, given how Australia's Cocos Islands could play a similar role in blocking Chinese egress through the Sunda and Lombok straits. The Andaman and Nicobars also could facilitate deeper military cooperation with Southeast Asian countries that historically are leery of provoking China without the ability to defend themselves. In 2018, India and Indonesia reached a tentative reciprocal access agreement giving India access to a port on the Indonesian island of Sabang, located just southeast of the southernmost Andaman and Nicobar island.

India, though, is still in the early stages of modernizing the military infrastructure enough to maximize their strategic value. At present, the islands are home to seven air and naval bases. But India began a series of much-needed improvements – for example, lengthening runways to be able to handle fighter jets or long-range reconnaissance aircraft and expanding port infrastructure to handle large warships – only over the past few years. India has also been somewhat reluctant to open up the islands to foreign partners. Reciprocal access agreements it signed with the U.S., France, Japan and Singapore in recent years, for example, reportedly did not include the Andaman and Nicobars.

But there's been a renewed sense of urgency in New Delhi to tap into the islands’ strategic potential more effectively. At the height of the crisis in the Himalayas last summer, there were several calls in Indian media to put the Andaman and Nicobars to work, and India subsequently held naval exercises around the islands to signal to China that aggression in the Himalayas could backfire in ways that could truly hurt China. In August, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi deemed the islands’ development a strategic priority and announced a new development plan. The same month, India announced the completion of a submarine optical fiber connectivity project in the area. In October, a U.S. long-range sub hunter became the first U.S. military aircraft to make a refueling pitstop. In December, India test-launched supersonic anti-ship Brahmos missiles from the islands. In March, Japan announced a $36 million grant for the development of energy storage systems on South Andaman.

Nothing will happen quickly. India's budgetary problems remain, and the pandemic isn't going to help. It's leery of giving China any more reason to try to militarize one of its Belt and Road ports on India's doorstep. There's some evidence that Indonesia and, in particular, Malaysia aren't exactly thrilled about the trajectory toward militarization of the Strait of Malacca, and India has an interest in handling Southeast Asian suspicions carefully. And India, in general, is still embracing the concept of strategic alignment with outside powers – something it historically has typically eschewed – only slowly.

Even so, on the question of whether and just how much India will emerge as a major player in the burgeoning competition over the Indo-Pacific, the Andaman and Nicobars are the center of gravity. Watch them closely.

Crafty_Dog

  • Administrator
  • Power User
  • *****
  • Posts: 69122
    • View Profile

ya

  • Power User
  • ***
  • Posts: 1517
    • View Profile
Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #521 on: June 15, 2021, 05:49:47 PM »
Some may remember the Galwan incident where the Chinese treacherously attacked Indian troops with barbaric weapons. The Chinese hid their casualties. Now more details are coming out.

https://chanakyaforum.com/when-the-hunters-became-the-hunted-the-galwan-valour/

Crafty_Dog

  • Administrator
  • Power User
  • *****
  • Posts: 69122
    • View Profile
D1: Development on the border India-China
« Reply #522 on: July 04, 2021, 02:08:33 PM »
China has added 35,000 troops to its disputed border region with India over the past 12 months, including an HQ-9 air defense system, according to Indian intelligence and military officials, the Wall Street Journal reported Friday from New Delhi.

Why this matters: "Those moves have been matched by India, which has sent tens of thousands of its own troops and advanced artillery to the region, the officials said." Though they did not say if, like China, India has "dug underground bunkers and tunnels" for its troops.

Bigger picture: "India and China have held about a dozen rounds of talks between military and diplomatic officials since the confrontation last year in an effort to de-escalate tensions. Those talks led to the pullback of troops from both sides at one friction point at Pangong Tso, a glacial lake at an altitude of about 14,000 feet." But both countries are still very keen on maintaining a foothold in the region. Read on, here.

Crafty_Dog

  • Administrator
  • Power User
  • *****
  • Posts: 69122
    • View Profile

ya

  • Power User
  • ***
  • Posts: 1517
    • View Profile
Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #524 on: July 08, 2021, 05:57:35 PM »
To me, it appears that China is preparing for war with Taiwan. If that happens, they dont want India to take advantage of the situation and claw back territory and hence they are upping their defenses.

ccp

  • Power User
  • ***
  • Posts: 18353
    • View Profile
From nuclear weapons thread posted here too
« Reply #525 on: July 09, 2021, 04:22:37 AM »
".New satellite images published recently reveal that China is building more than 100 new nuclear missile silos in its western desert."

will this not lead to India following suit?

ya

  • Power User
  • ***
  • Posts: 1517
    • View Profile
Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #526 on: July 10, 2021, 08:21:46 AM »
Not sure how accurate that news it..I have seen some alternate interpretations of that. Can we be sure that those missiles are for India ?. They would hit Indian population centers, at which point India will respond by hitting Chinese cities. Could it be they are not for use against India...

Crafty_Dog

  • Administrator
  • Power User
  • *****
  • Posts: 69122
    • View Profile
Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #527 on: July 10, 2021, 09:42:39 AM »
With the new hypersonic technology , , ,

Crafty_Dog

  • Administrator
  • Power User
  • *****
  • Posts: 69122
    • View Profile
GPF: India-China- Himalayas
« Reply #528 on: July 19, 2021, 12:45:17 PM »

Competition over the Himalayas. China is reportedly building a new fighter aircraft base near the so-called Line of Actual Control, the disputed de facto border in the Himalayas between China and India. The Indians, for their part, reportedly have plans for as many as four airports and 37 helipads in the westernmost parts of the disputed region.

ya

  • Power User
  • ***
  • Posts: 1517
    • View Profile
Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #529 on: July 19, 2021, 07:02:43 PM »
China realized that they could not win over India, in the last standoff. They are now correcting their weaknesses and will try again.

Crafty_Dog

  • Administrator
  • Power User
  • *****
  • Posts: 69122
    • View Profile
GPF: India-Russia meet over Afpakia
« Reply #530 on: September 14, 2021, 01:11:05 AM »
Russia and India. The secretary of Russia’s security council and the national security adviser for India’s prime minister are participating in security consultations in New Delhi. Their respective governments discussed the prospects for cooperation and agreed to coordinate their approaches on Afghanistan.

Crafty_Dog

  • Administrator
  • Power User
  • *****
  • Posts: 69122
    • View Profile
GPF: India-China
« Reply #531 on: September 14, 2021, 01:12:30 AM »
second

China and India. The Chinese military on Monday posted a video of high-altitude drills meant to simulate a battle with Indian troops in the two countries' disputed Himalayan border region. Things have been relatively quiet along what's known as the Line of Actual Control, especially compared to last summer, but the region will remain unstable until both sides back off infrastructure improvements that are making a major escalation possible

Crafty_Dog

  • Administrator
  • Power User
  • *****
  • Posts: 69122
    • View Profile
Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #532 on: October 08, 2021, 02:53:38 AM »
   
Daily Memo: Chinese General Dies, NATO Lodges Espionage Allegations
The harsh conditions involved with high-altitude Himalayan operations may have played a role in the death.
By: Geopolitical Futures

High altitude. A Chinese general formerly in charge of China’s Western Theater Command, which oversees the disputed Himalayan border with India, reportedly died last week. The general, Zhang Xudong, stepped down from command in June, and there's some speculation that the harsh conditions involved with high-altitude Himalayan operations played a role. His replacement stepped down after just two months, also apparently due to health issues, and several other commanders are reportedly dealing with similar problems. (If true, this puts to rest speculation that the rapid succession of leadership changes reflected dissonance between the People’s Liberation Army and President Xi Jinping’s inner circle.) Bottom line: The practical difficulty of operations in the Himalayas is hard to overstate, sharply limiting the risk of a major escalation in the theater between China and India.

ya

  • Power User
  • ***
  • Posts: 1517
    • View Profile
Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #533 on: October 08, 2021, 06:03:50 AM »
This I think is a crucial reason why the Chinese withdrew, apart from the generals, the soldiers were getting knocked off too. India has been holding the heights against Pak for 20 years or so, they have it figured out (logistics, food etc). During the stand off, in a swift move, the Indians occupied several previously vacant peaks that overlooked Chinese positions. This shocked the Chinese to the core, soon therafter the withdrawals began. Furthermore, many of the Indian mountain regiments have soldiers born and brought up in the mountains or used to living at high altitudes. China imports the Hans from the plains, and it takes weeks to get acclimatized to altitude and the cold is another issue. This might also be reflected on the Chinese push to have camps all over the LAC so that soldiers get used to living there. Another factor, that the Chinese run into is that Indians feel they are fighting for their motherland with a lot of religious/cultural support for that thinking. The godless Chinese do not have that mental support.
« Last Edit: October 08, 2021, 06:06:22 AM by ya »

ya

  • Power User
  • ***
  • Posts: 1517
    • View Profile
Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #534 on: October 11, 2021, 06:09:10 AM »
Yesterday, the India-China border talks ended in a stalemate. China is still on its high horse and not making any progress.


Crafty_Dog

  • Administrator
  • Power User
  • *****
  • Posts: 69122
    • View Profile
India-China)
« Reply #535 on: November 02, 2021, 01:49:19 PM »
ndian drills near China. The Indian army’s 50th Parachute Brigade on Monday started a three-day airborne exercise and combat maneuvers in eastern Ladakh, close to the border with China. This is India’s first airborne exercise in the area. The drills come on the heels of India announcing the successful test of its Agni-V intermediate-range ballistic missile, which can reach China without being based in India’s northeast territory.

ya

  • Power User
  • ***
  • Posts: 1517
    • View Profile
Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #536 on: November 02, 2021, 05:40:46 PM »
This is in response to unusual behaviour on the part of China, who has positioned troops close to the border and is raising permanent structures etc. Something is not right...have to wait and see how the situation develops.

Crafty_Dog

  • Administrator
  • Power User
  • *****
  • Posts: 69122
    • View Profile
Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #537 on: November 09, 2021, 04:55:42 PM »
GPF

High-altitude buildup. India over the past year or so has built at least 73 "operationally significant" pieces of infrastructure on its side of the de facto Himalayan border with China, known as the Line of Actual Control. China has been building infrastructure on its side at a similarly rapid pace. So long as both sides continue making it easier to fight in the harsh conditions of the high Himalayas, the otherwise inherently low risk of meaningful escalation in the standoff will continue to tick up. In recent days, China reportedly held a new round of high-altitude exercises.

ya

  • Power User
  • ***
  • Posts: 1517
    • View Profile
Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #538 on: November 30, 2021, 06:28:02 AM »
India's largest export to the US is CEO's.


ccp

  • Power User
  • ***
  • Posts: 18353
    • View Profile
Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #539 on: November 30, 2021, 10:24:20 AM »
are they all liberal Democrats?

if not we never hear about it.


ya

  • Power User
  • ***
  • Posts: 1517
    • View Profile
Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #540 on: December 08, 2021, 04:40:56 AM »
India's Chief of Defense Staff (top of the totem pole), dies in helicopter crash along with family. He was a tough general who taught Pak many a lesson. If Pak is to blame...war is in the offing.


ya

  • Power User
  • ***
  • Posts: 1517
    • View Profile
Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #542 on: February 05, 2022, 10:57:23 AM »
China ups their game on the India-Tibet border. Robotic machine guns.

https://twitter.com/i/status/1490025314008764417

Crafty_Dog

  • Administrator
  • Power User
  • *****
  • Posts: 69122
    • View Profile
GPF: China messing with Nepal
« Reply #543 on: February 08, 2022, 09:50:33 AM »
Chinese interference. China is encroaching on Nepal near their shared border, according to a Nepalese government report leaked to the BBC. The report marks the first official claim of Chinese interference in Nepalese territory by the Nepalese government. It accuses Beijing of conducting surveillance operations, restricting religious activities, limiting grazing for Nepalese farmers and attempting to construct a canal and road in Nepal.

Crafty_Dog

  • Administrator
  • Power User
  • *****
  • Posts: 69122
    • View Profile
The Geopolitics of India
« Reply #544 on: April 02, 2022, 10:42:14 AM »
Is India, a Close Ally of the US, About to Side With China? (theepochtimes.com)


Is India, a Close Ally of the US, About to Side With China?


April 1, 2022 Updated: April 1, 2022

According to a recent article in Asia Times, India has grown “increasingly skeptical about American policies and statesmanship.” The United States once presented a compelling picture to the world.

Today, however, the picture that the United States now presents is the opposite of convincing, according to the article. The United States has become a “battleground of tribalism and culture wars.” Once an attractive prospect, this “aging superpower” is in decline, with “dwindling influence globally.”

Because of this, India is looking elsewhere for support and potential business. By elsewhere, I mean China.

As the Asia Times piece noted, India now realizes “that it has no real partnership with the US or the European Union” and that its relationships with the two were, and still are, “transactional.”

For both the United States and the European Union, maintaining good ties with India cannot be emphasized enough. After all, India is the fastest-growing major economy in the world. Some authors argue (rather convincingly) that India will become the next great superpower. This fact is not lost on China.

Chinese state-run media Global Times recently published an intriguing piece.

“China and India,” it reads, “share common interests on many fronts.” It then went on to condemn those in “the West” who criticized India “for reportedly considering buying Russian oil at a discounted price.”

Back off, it continued, this “is India’s legitimate right.” The piece finished by calling on Beijing and New Delhi to “mend their fraught relations.”
Will New Delhi accept the invitation?

Don’t be surprised if it does.

But why would India embrace China?

Two years ago, Chinese and Indian troops began engaging in hostile face-offs at various locations along the Sino-Indian border. In June 2020, both sides engaged in hand-to-hand combat. Lives were lost. Three months later, for the first time in 45 years, both sides exchanged gunfire. Since then, tensions have been extremely high.

But, as we all know only too well, politics is a fickle business. Yesterday’s enemy has the potential to become tomorrow’s friend.

If India does embrace China, one must remember that the embrace would be borne more out of desperation than desire. China and the United States are the two biggest players on the world stage. If one begins to lose its pulling power and the other increases its own, then it’s only natural that India reconsiders where its loyalties lie.

Moreover, India now finds itself in a position of genuine power, with both Beijing and Washington knocking on its door. In the past, India was only too willing to open the door to the United States. However, times appear to be changing.

According to M K Bhadrakumar, a former Indian diplomat, Narendra Modi, India’s 14th and current prime minister, “is looking in all directions—Russia and China included—for partnerships.”

India, one must remember, has very close ties with Russia.

Vir Sanghvi, a well-respected Indian author, recently wrote the following: “When it comes to this [Ukraine] conflict, our hands are tied.”

Why?

Because “Russia is our major supplier of weapons.” Moreover, he added, it “isn’t just the arms we have ordered from the Russians. It is also spares, ammunition, and maintenance for our existing equipment. To stand against Russia would be to debilitate our armed forces. We have no real choice but to avoid criticising the Russians.”

Epoch Times PhotoIndia’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi attends a meeting with Russia’s President Vladimir Putin in New Delhi, India, on Dec. 6, 2021. (Sputnik/Mikhail Klimentyev/Kremlin via Reuters)

Xinhua, another mouthpiece of the Chinese regime, recently argued that “China-India diplomatic relations will significantly ease and enter a recovery period.” During this period, “China and India will realize the exchange of visits of diplomatic officials in a relatively short time.”

Staring into their crystal ball, the authors believe “Chinese officials will go to India first.” Shortly after, India’s foreign minister “will come to China.”

As unpalatable as the above lines may sound, India and China are neighbors. Meanwhile, the United States is situated on the other side of the world. Within the realm of social psychology, the proximity principle suggests that individuals form interpersonal relations with those close by (think flatmates, work colleagues, etc.).

In geopolitics, perhaps the proximity principle also plays a role.

The US Has Lost Its Appeal

In 2018, the scholar Gordon Adams wrote that since the end of World War II, American diplomacy “has been essential to multinational agreements on trade, climate, regional security, and arms control.” The United States could “claim to be at the center of a “rules-based international order.” Why? Because it was.

“Those days,” wrote Adams, “are gone.”

Indeed. In the four years since this piece was written, China has grown significantly stronger. On the other hand, the United States appears to have grown weaker, at least in India’s eyes.

According to the aforementioned Sanghvi, a man with his finger on India’s geopolitical pulse, up until very recently, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), India’s biggest right-wing party, spouted largely pro-U.S. philosophies.

Now, though, Modi’s party views the United States negatively. Sanghvi noted, “Joe Biden is seen as antagonistic—if not to India, then to the sort of India that Modi’s supporters want to create.”

After the disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan, the United States’ image has taken a significant beating. Today, whether you like to admit it or not, everything revolves around branding.

Online dating is an obvious example. How you present yourself to a prospective partner (or partners) matters. It matters a lot.

Similarly, LinkedIn, basically a glorified social media platform, is a place to sell your brand: your expertise, experience, etc.

The world of international politics is no different. For those who say that the United States is not a brand, you’re right. However, you’re also wrong. Definitionally speaking, the United States is nothing like Coca-Cola or IKEA, two of the most recognizable brands on the planet.

On the other hand, the United States is just like Coca-Cola and IKEA. After all, what is soft power but the ability to convince another nation (or citizens of another nation) to “buy into” your brand? It involves convincing people to “buy into” your policies and ideologies to subscribe to your vision.

The United States, once the leader in soft power, appears to have lost its edge. For this, it may very well pay a costly price. Losing India to China, once unthinkable, is a distinct possibility.

As the author Shekhar Gupta wrote just a few days ago, there’s no room for morality when it comes to India’s foreign policy stance. Instead, the only thing that matters is acting in the best interest of the Indian people. For Modi and his colleagues, this could mean embracing China and rejecting the United States.

Views expressed in this article are the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.

Crafty_Dog

  • Administrator
  • Power User
  • *****
  • Posts: 69122
    • View Profile

Crafty_Dog

  • Administrator
  • Power User
  • *****
  • Posts: 69122
    • View Profile
GPF: India's defiance of Washington's Russia Strategy
« Reply #546 on: April 18, 2022, 06:04:22 AM »
pril 18, 2022
View On Website
Open as PDF

    
India’s Defiance of Washington’s Russia Strategy
New Delhi has resisted calls to stop doing business with the Russian economy.
By: Allison Fedirka
Under normal circumstances, India would have little reason to care about what happens in Ukraine. The current circumstances, however, are far from normal. The war in Ukraine has put U.S.-Indian relations back into the spotlight as Washington lobbies all of its major allies to join its economic assault on Moscow. So far, India has resisted. The U.S. wants to use the Ukraine conflict to bring India into alignment with the West on issues that don’t relate to China, but New Delhi is unwilling to impose its own sanctions on Russia and recently even agreed to purchase millions of barrels of Russian oil. Its defiance is important less because of India’s ability to prop up the Russian economy and more because of what it says about the state of U.S.-Indian relations. Still, strategic constraints will compel Washington not to take punitive measures against New Delhi for its noncompliance and to seek mutually acceptable accommodation instead.

Difficult to Manage

Alliances derive their strength from shared interests among members. For the U.S. and India, their mutual desire to contain Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific is the cornerstone of their partnership. But their lack of alignment on other issues can make it difficult to manage. For India, formalizing military or political alignments is seen as risky because the country fears that doing so could make it vulnerable. For much of India’s modern history, the sub-continent fell under the control of a foreign power. Today, the country finds itself between three major powers (Russia, China and the U.S.) and sharing borders with two formidable enemies (Pakistan and China) – all while trying to find its place as a major player in its own right within the region. And while New Delhi agrees on the importance of containing China, the U.S. and India’s distinct geographies, histories and economics result in diverging interests over secondary issues.

The Ukraine matter is a case in point. For the U.S., the Russian threat didn’t end with the Cold War, and a Russian victory in Ukraine would mean a win over the West. But India sees Russia as much less of a threat than the U.S. does. During the Cold War, Russia was a reliable trade and defense partner for India and helped keep China in check. New Delhi has a pragmatic approach to foreign relations and has managed to maintain ties with various partners without fully committing to any single one. It thus has cultivated good relations with Moscow while attempting to strengthen ties with the U.S. of late – and it’s unwilling to veer too far away from this balance.

But the war in Ukraine has complicated India’s position. The U.S. fears that India’s continued willingness to do business with Russia could undermine the U.S. strategy to force Moscow into concessions through economic isolation. India’s noncompliance can best be seen through its energy sector. Since the start of the invasion, India has been on a spending spree, buying up Russian oil at a discounted price compared to international markets. India has ordered an estimated 13 million to 14 million barrels of oil from Russia since the end of February, compared to the 16 million barrels it purchased from Russia all of last year. As the world’s third-largest oil importer, India relies on foreign supplies to meet approximately 80 percent of its needs. Though Russia supplies only 1-2 percent of the oil consumed in India, the main attraction at the moment is the low price – a key consideration given that India spent approximately $100 billion on oil imports in the last fiscal year. Under the current terms, Indian imports of Russian oil don’t violate U.S. sanctions, but Washington fears New Delhi’s continued purchases of Russian exports could prove to be an economic lifeline for Moscow.

India's Top Oil Suppliers by volume
(click to enlarge)

India has had similar problems with other energy suppliers in the past. Iran and Venezuela together accounted for 20 percent of India’s oil imports in 2016, but were both subject to U.S. sanctions in recent years. In these cases, however, Washington issued waivers that allowed India to continue importing from these countries during a transition period and increased its own energy exports to help fill the gap. The U.S. has told India that it will help support its efforts to diversify its suppliers again, but that could prove more difficult this time around. The U.S. government is currently using its strategic reserves to boost its own domestic supplies, and private companies have resisted Washington's calls to increase production. Washington’s urging of Saudi Arabia to increase production hasn’t worked either. And the U.S. has already committed to helping European markets find alternative sources, so whatever supplies it’s able to export will need to be shared among all its partners.


(click to enlarge)

To a lesser extent, the U.S. has also taken issue with India’s purchases of Russian fertilizers and defense equipment. Russia is one of the largest global suppliers of fertilizers, which are exempt from U.S. sanctions because of a global shortage and their importance in food production. Prior to its invasion of Ukraine, Russia banned the export of fertilizers through the end of June and limited the countries to which its supplies could be sent. India is among the approved destinations – though it received only 8.5 percent of its fertilizer imports by value from Russia in 2020.

Washington had concerns over India’s procurement of Russian defense equipment even before the war in Ukraine began. During the Soviet era, India acquired much of its military equipment from the USSR. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Russia is still India’s top arms supplier, accounting for just under half of all arms imports. But this figure is down from 69 percent between 2012 and 2017, as Russia’s share in India’s arms imports has steadily declined over the past decade. That’s in part because India is developing a national defense industry initiative, which will increase its self-sufficiency in arms, and recently announced it would stop importing over 100 defense-related goods from Russia by the end of this year. Notably, the U.S. has not applied the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act to India since its introduction in 2017. Under the act, any country that signs defense deals with Russia, Iran or North Korea may be subject to sanctions.

Levers and Constraints

The U.S. does have some economic levers it can use to influence India’s behavior. Trade between the two countries totaled $113.4 billion in 2021 – one-third U.S. exports to India and two-thirds U.S. imports from India – making the United States India’s largest trade partner. Exports to the U.S. account for 18.9 percent of India’s total exports and the equivalent of 3.5 percent of gross domestic product. The U.S. is also a major contributor of foreign direct investment, spending roughly $41 billion in India in 2020. In 2021, it ranked as India’s second-largest source of FDI behind Singapore. The services sector was the top beneficiary (16 percent), which includes outsourcing, R&D and tech testing. This was followed by computer software and hardware, which receives 14 percent of total FDI. For India, technology remains a top priority for trade and FDI as many of the government’s economic development initiatives rely on getting access to or funding for technology from places like the U.S. and the EU.

U.S. - India Trade
(click to enlarge)

However, the U.S. faces three strategic constraints that prevent it from bringing its full economic power to bear on India. First, its Indo-Pacific strategy for containing China requires India’s participation. And given that the U.S.-China rivalry will likely remain for years to come, Washington needs New Delhi on its side in the long term. Second, it’s in the U.S.’ interest to maintain a relatively stable and functional India to counter China. Imposing economic punishments for India’s unwillingness to toe the line on Russia could be destabilizing for New Delhi, and that would only benefit Beijing. Last, India plays an important role in the foreign policies of the U.K. and Australia – the former of which is relying on commonwealth states to boost trade to offset the economic losses from leaving the EU. Australia, meanwhile, signed an interim free trade agreement with India earlier this month. The pact, which covers over 90 percent of goods traded between the two countries, is part of Australia’s strategy to reduce its dependence on China. The U.S. wouldn’t want to do anything to weaken these relationships with India, especially because the U.K. and Australia are both members of the Five Eyes, Washington’s most important security alliance.

When it comes to trade with Russia, there’s plenty of space for the U.S. and India to find mutually acceptable accommodation. New Delhi has shown that it’s willing to work toward self-sufficiency in the defense sector, meaning its purchases of Russian military goods will diminish over time – although this will likely be a long process. Besides, Washington has already given New Delhi some leeway here by not imposing sanctions over its Russian arms purchases. India’s other main imports from Russia are fairly low and focus on strategic sectors essential to keeping the Indian economy running – i.e., fertilizers and energy. As long as this remains the case, the U.S. will tolerate the limited commercial exchange between India and Russia.

Crafty_Dog

  • Administrator
  • Power User
  • *****
  • Posts: 69122
    • View Profile
India cancels 48 Russki helicopters
« Reply #547 on: April 18, 2022, 10:51:08 AM »
And speaking of Russian weapons, India's air force just canceled a deal to buy 48 Russian Mi-17 helicopters from Moscow, India Today reported Saturday. Officials in New Delhi reportedly stressed that the decision has nothing to do with Russia's disastrous first few weeks of the war in Ukraine; instead, the decision allegedly centers on India's desire to make defense equipment indigenously rather than rely on facilities in Kazan, Russia, which is where Mi-17s are produced and manufactured. A bit more to that,

======================
also see

https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/make-in-india-iaf-mi-17-choppers-russia-1938341-2022-04-16

Crafty_Dog

  • Administrator
  • Power User
  • *****
  • Posts: 69122
    • View Profile
GPF: Russia-India
« Reply #548 on: April 19, 2022, 08:49:49 AM »
Russia-India trade. Indian state-owned refineries announced plans to buy as much Russian oil as possible, assuming that big discounts and direct contracts will be offered. Meanwhile, India resumed the export of tea and food products, including rice, fruit, coffee, seafood and confectionery goods, to Russia last week. According to Indian media, these transactions are being carried out in rubles and rupees “to the extent possible.”