Author Topic: India, India-China, India Afpakia, India-Russia  (Read 207132 times)

ya

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Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #700 on: March 23, 2024, 08:26:13 AM »
Lets discuss a bit, China's problems with India.

1. Northern Land Borders: Only India and Bhutan have unsettled borders with China in the North. They dont want to settle the land borders, so that India stays distracted in the mountains and not focus on the Indian Ocean region, where lies major vulnerability for the Chinese.
2. China's Indian Ocean vulnerability Most are aware of the Malacca strait choke point, from where China's shipping lanes can be choked, all export/import of goods  mostly comes to a stop, if that were to be blocked.

However, there are other choke points.
a) As you come out of the Malacca straits, Chinese ships have to pass to the south of the Andaman Nicobar islands (which belong to India). Its a major naval base (Andaman Nicobar command). So called 10 degree channel.

b) Recently, Maldives (muslim state on the south west of Sri Lanka)), tried to kick out India and replace them with China, forgetting that they are completely reliable on India for their economy, tourists and even fresh water!. No doubt a lot of money exchanged hands after their new President was elected. China thought they gained a major foothold in the Indian Ocean (no base as yet). Problem is that India activated a new naval base in the Minicoy islands (India owned) between Minicoy and Maldives, the so called 8 degree channel. this creates a new choke point.

c) Further north of Minicoy are major naval bases in the Lakshdweep islands (India owned), so called 9 degree channel, which is another choke point.

d) Look south of the Maldives, there lies Diego Garcia a part of the Chagos Islands, a major US base.

e) Even if Chinese subs were to cross south of these choke points, India has additional listening stations in Madagascar, Seychelles, Mauritius etc, These islands have many Indian origin people due to historical trade routes and relations are very close with India.

China is in no position to exert force in the Indian Ocean, unless they are dealing with small nations such as Phillipines, Vietnam etc.
« Last Edit: March 23, 2024, 02:26:19 PM by ya »

ya

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Re: Inidan nuke capable missile tests
« Reply #701 on: March 23, 2024, 08:33:46 AM »
India Adds Firepower to a Missile Program Focused on China
India tested a missile capable of carrying multiple nuclear warheads, the latest advance in its homegrown Agni-V program
By
Rajesh Roy
Follow
March 11, 2024 1:49 pm ET

NEW DELHI—India has successfully conducted the maiden flight test of an indigenously developed ballistic missile capable of carrying multiple warheads, Prime Minister Narendra Modi said Monday, a development that enhances the country’s nuclear deterrence against rivals China and Pakistan.

The intercontinental ballistic missile called Agni-5, which in Sanskrit means “fire,” is equipped with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles, or MIRV technology, that allows it to launch multiple attacks in one go across different locations, according to two senior serving government officials.


India has been developing and testing its Agni series of missiles for more than a decade as it looks to catch up with China’s military strength. It first tested the Agni-5 series in 2012, and since then has been adding technological advancements to it and retesting. The country has said its Agni-5 program is in line with India’s stated policy to have a credible minimum deterrence and its commitment to no first-use of nuclear weapons.

In 2019, India successfully tested a missile capable of destroying a satellite in space, technology also held by only a few powers.

The surface-to-surface Agni missile is capable of striking targets of more than 5,000 kilometers, or 3,100 miles, with a high degree of accuracy. That trails the capabilities of China’s longest-range missiles.

Still, this puts Beijing and its neighborhood within the direct target range of India’s Strategic Forces Command, the dedicated tri-services nuclear force under the direct control of the prime minister, said New Delhi-based defense analyst N.C. Bipindra.

The MIRV-capable ballistic missile can target multiple strategic sites about 1,500 kilometers, or 930 miles apart, and “that is a significant nuclear strike capability for any nation to have,” he said. He added that Agni-5 development was largely focused on China, which New Delhi now views as the most serious military threat to India.


So why is MIRV capability important in the Indian context: China has an advantage in the number of nuclear warheads over India and also has access to larger kiloton nuclear bombs. MIRV capability neutralizes this edge, because each missile can carry multiple war heads (3-10), many of which will serve as decoy missiles. No body can be sure of shooting down tens of nuclear capable missiles. Expect more such tests, possibly also from submarine based missiles. The Agni V missiles brings all parts of China under missile reach. No place to hide.

ccp

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Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #702 on: March 23, 2024, 09:10:31 AM »
Thank you
This is stuff we never see
in the usual media
I know nothing of any of this.

You could be a guest on cable media

You could be the India/China expert equivalent to Gordon Chang.

We could all learn a lot about Asia......


ya

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Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #703 on: March 23, 2024, 06:45:14 PM »
I am not so smart, just read smart people :-D but thanks.

BTW, India is undergoing general elections in May 2024. Modi is expected to sweep the polls by the largest number of seats ever. The west is still not recognizing the Modi juggernaut, for they continue to diss him. Here's a typical election song for Modi, one of many. Modi has pushed Indian nationalism and Hinduism. Many of the visuals are from holy places that Modi visits, or the huge crowds that come to see Modi.
https://youtu.be/nndR8gHEsBw

ya

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« Last Edit: March 26, 2024, 02:25:16 PM by Crafty_Dog »

Crafty_Dog

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Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #705 on: March 26, 2024, 02:28:57 PM »
I'm not sensing congruity between the headline and the content of that article.

ya

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Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #706 on: March 30, 2024, 03:13:07 PM »
India-US relationship had a bad week. My comments in green.

"US-India partnership had a bad week. Kejriwal row (corrupt politician, possible CIA). CAA controversy (US comment on India offering citizenship to minorities in muslim countries). Biden letter to Pakistan (Biden congratulating pak PM). US embassy invites Kashmiris to Iftar party (Basically inviting anti-India elements). Jaishankar (India's Foreign Minister) says India and Russia take good care of each other."

DougMacG

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Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #707 on: March 30, 2024, 05:10:10 PM »
India-US relationship had a bad week. My comments in green.

"US-India partnership had a bad week. Kejriwal row (corrupt politician, possible CIA). CAA controversy (US comment on India offering citizenship to minorities in muslim countries). Biden letter to Pakistan (Biden congratulating pak PM). US embassy invites Kashmiris to Iftar party (Basically inviting anti-India elements). Jaishankar (India's Foreign Minister) says India and Russia take good care of each other."

Current US President can't figure out who are friends should be.   Hopefully PM Modi knows we have a new President coming soon.

ya

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Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #708 on: April 06, 2024, 09:16:02 AM »
Yesterday, Indian defense minister, Rajnath Singh again reiterated, that POK is ours. When asked about the timing of taking POK back, he said the when the people of POK themselves demand to merge with India. This has now been repeated several times. The strategy is clear, that India develops Indian Kashmir massively, such that the people in POK demand to merge with India. There have been several agitations already demanding that. When India is ready, the signal will be given to the people of POK to demand merger.

There have also been reports in the Guardian that India/Indian proxies have killed over 20 high level terrorists in Pak. This is the softening of  Pak, so that the trouble makers are eliminated before the big move for POK. When asked about that, he did not deny it. Even Modi has recently said that we will enter the homes of Paki terrorists and kill them there.

It would not surprise me if this happens in Modi's next term. He is 73 yrs old, his term is of 5 years. I am guessing he wants to retire as the best PM of India, which will include taking back POK.

ya

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Re: India/Indian Ocean (and India-afpakia and India-China)
« Reply #709 on: April 07, 2024, 06:34:42 AM »
With the election season heating up in India, everyone is waiting for the BJP (Modi's party) to issue their manifesto. The important thing is that they have completed about 90 % of the major promises made in the previous 2 election manifestos. Everyone is waiting to hear comments about POK. A second hot topic is to register all citizens (NRC bill). This would be key to preventing illegal immigration from Pak, Bangladesh, Myanmar border etc. Infact the NRC might be a pre-requisite to taking back POK, because of all the jihadis who will be trying to come in.

If anyone is interested, the 2019 manifesto is https://www.bjp.org/manifesto2019 page 11-12 has the national security aspects (all done).  They talk about the CAA (Citizenship Amendment Bill) which has irked the US for no reason. This is where they give citizenship to non-muslim refugees (Indians) from India before it was partitioned (Afghanistan Pak, Bangladesh), after 75 years of independence!. Removal of article 370/35 A from Kashmir, which was thought to be "permanent" and a source of corruption and Paki interference. Since the removal of article 370, there is now peace in Kashmir, violence has died down and development is proceeding at a rapid pace.

In election rallies, Modi speaks of his "guarantee" that he will do what he says.


ya

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Re: India/Indian Ocean, India-China, India Afpakia
« Reply #711 on: April 07, 2024, 07:10:45 PM »
This is just an attempt to needle India and keep it focussed on the land border, away from the Indo-Pacific which is China's weak point.

ya

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Re: India/Indian Ocean, India-China, India Afpakia
« Reply #712 on: April 14, 2024, 06:36:09 AM »
The BJP released their 2024 Election Manifesto. No direct mention of POK (but that would not be a good idea, as it would give the timing away). The below national defense related items were listed.

1.Continuing Zero Tolerance towards Terrorism: This is directed at Pak. They remind the readers of 2 previous surgical strikes against Pak.
2. Theaterization of Military Commands: For better efficiency. This will help in the next big war, and is China oriented. They have to be prepared for a two front war with Pak-China, along the NW borders, Eastern borders and in the sea.
3. Robust Infrastructure along the borders. They specifically  refer to India-Pak, India-China and India-Myanmar borders.
4. Reinforcing fight against drugs: This is Pak oriented, who sends a lot across their border.
5. Implementing the new Indian Penal Code: India used the old British rules, these have been updated to present times to deal with Terrorism and anti-national elements.
6.Implementation of the CAA: This is the new Citizenship act, where minorities (non muslims) of previous Indian territories (Pak, Afgh, Bangladesh) who sought shelter in India are given citizenship in India.
7. Enhance capabilities of armed forces and central armed forces (police) to deal with any threats.
8.National Forsensics Mission: To speed up crime related decisions.
9. To protect India's (Bharat) security interests in the Indian Ocean. This is China focussed.
10. Safeguarding India's Digital Sovereignty: This relates to internet based threats. India has low tolerance for misuse of FaceBook etc. Tik-Tok and tons of Chinese apps are banned.
11. Developing Robust Cybersecurity Policies.

Overall, all this is needed before we can fight China, but should the opportunity arise POK will be taken. Modi and the defense minister have said that many times. When the people of POK start demanding to merge with India, we will know its time.


ya

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Alexander Dugin on India
« Reply #713 on: April 20, 2024, 04:27:31 AM »
I was impressed with the understanding of India by Alexander Dugin, a Russian thinker close to Putin. His understanding of things is very close to that of the Indian mind. Have not seen any other Western commentator, and definitely no American commentator with this level of accuracy. Dugin by the way says Russia should side with China!, which may be the correct response for Russia.

https://twitter.com/Agdchan/status/1781435242865123423


« Last Edit: April 20, 2024, 12:25:03 PM by Crafty_Dog »

Crafty_Dog

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Re: India/Indian Ocean, India-China, India Afpakia
« Reply #714 on: April 20, 2024, 11:00:08 AM »
That was a very interesting read.

I will be mulling it over at length.

Given Dugin's essay, it seems on point to post this here:

https://amgreatness.com/2024/04/20/the-u-s-department-of-state-how-can-you-praise-what-you-hate/
« Last Edit: April 20, 2024, 12:26:02 PM by Crafty_Dog »

ya

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Re: India/Indian Ocean, India-China, India Afpakia
« Reply #715 on: April 20, 2024, 03:16:33 PM »
Wokeness is destroying America., will leave it at that!.

DougMacG

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Re: Alexander Dugin on India
« Reply #716 on: April 21, 2024, 09:00:26 AM »
https://twitter.com/Agdchan/status/1781435242865123423]https://twitter.com/Agdchan/status/1781435242865123423


Yes.  VERY interesting post, especially with the endorsement of ya that he has his history and perspective essentially right.

So many angles to it.  First to me is, why can't WE do that, and why don't other developing countries follow their model.

The parallels to Russia are interesting. 

ya

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Re: India/Indian Ocean, India-China, India Afpakia
« Reply #717 on: May 02, 2024, 07:34:17 PM »
Biden just insulted India and Japan, said their economy is stagnating because they dont take in immigrants and are xenophobic.

fact: India has the fastest growing economy in the world. US had made adverse comments when India gave citizenship to non-muslims from Pak and Afghanistan!. India gets a lot of illlegal immigration from Bangladesh & Myanmar (muslim Rohingyas).

« Last Edit: May 02, 2024, 07:38:11 PM by ya »

DougMacG

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Re: India/Indian Ocean, India-China, India Afpakia
« Reply #718 on: May 03, 2024, 05:17:20 AM »
Pres. Dumbsh*t.  He wasn't bright enough to be President before his decline.

We don't have any economic growth for people already here.  The growth their experiencing is debt, bankruptcies and inflation, amidst decking wages and having the Bottom Rung of the economic ladder chopped off.

Crafty said it, the strength from immigration comes from e pluribus unum, one out of many, assimilation. It's not happening with these new arrivals. Ask the people on Martha's vineyard.

He doesn't know what's happening here unless you think rape up tenfold is good, things aren't going well. he doesn't know what's happening there. A sign of wisdom would be to keep his mouth shut and not let the ignorance flow out.

What's the biggest threat in the world, the expansionism of China. Who are the biggest allies that could help in that fight, India and Japan. Insulting them over nothing is beneath stupid.  And then they publish it at the White House website?

How is assimilation going in Sweden, Denmark and Northern Europe? Unless rape is your metric, and debt, crime and inflation, things aren't going well.

Or ask Laken Riley how she thinks the new migrants are assimilating.
« Last Edit: May 03, 2024, 05:30:25 AM by DougMacG »

ccp

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the worst liar in chief in my memory
« Reply #719 on: May 03, 2024, 07:49:41 AM »
According to one googled site the world economy grew over 3% most of the best in Asia and Africa.

That is better than US GDP growth.

For God sakes if we had a media that would fact check and call out BIDEN.  :x :x :x

https://www.statista.com/chart/31587/real-gdp-growth-top-6-economies/

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_real_GDP_growth_rate

https://finance.yahoo.com/news/25-countries-highest-gdp-growth-223951959.html

ya

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Re: India/Indian Ocean, India-China, India Afpakia
« Reply #720 on: May 04, 2024, 05:52:40 AM »
Here are the demographics of India vs China. In the long run, India will beat China


Crafty_Dog

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WSJ: India isn't the new China yet
« Reply #721 on: May 09, 2024, 04:03:08 PM »


India’s Economy Isn’t the New China (Yet)
Its ascent is evident, but its per capita GDP is only a little more than half of Indonesia’s.
Sadanand Dhume
May 8, 2024 12:32 pm ET



Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi delivers remarks in New Delhi, April 24. PHOTO: PIB /PRESS INFORMATION/ZUMA PRESS
Is India on the cusp of a long-awaited economic takeoff? America’s corporate titans appear to think so. JPMorgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon recently praised Prime Minister Narendra Modi for having “done an unbelievable job.” Tim Cook, on whose watch Apple began making iPhones in India, called the country “an incredibly exciting market.” Warren Buffett said India holds “unexplored” opportunities for Berkshire Hathaway. Elon Musk said he looks forward to visiting India later this year.

How justified is the hype? First, the glass-half-full story: The International Monetary Fund estimates that India’s economy grew a robust 7.8% in the fiscal year that ended March 31. When Mr. Modi first took office in 2014, India was the world’s 10th-largest economy by gross domestic product at market exchange rates. It’s now the fifth-largest economy, behind only the U.S., China, Germany and Japan. The IMF estimates that by 2027 India will become the world’s third-largest economy, after the U.S. and China.

India has also dramatically reduced poverty over the past two decades. At a conference on the Indian economy at George Washington University last month, Oxford economist Sabina Alkire estimated that 415 million people in India exited poverty between 2005 and 2021. In 2015-16, 27.7% of Indians were poor, according to the United Nations Development Program’s Multidimensional Poverty Index, which measures health, education and living standards. By 2019-21 this had fallen to 16.4% of the population.

The World Bank takes an even more optimistic view of poverty reduction, estimating that in 2021, despite the pandemic, only 12.9% of India’s population was living on $2.15 or less a day, the global benchmark for extreme poverty. Indian economists Surjit Bhalla and Karan Bhasin wrote this year that “India has eliminated extreme poverty.” Regardless of whom you believe, there’s no doubt that the extreme deprivation with which India was once synonymous has diminished greatly and is on track to disappear entirely.


There are other reasons for optimism. The Modi government has presided over a large infrastructure buildout. Economists Arvind Subramanian and Josh Felman estimate that India has built 34,000 miles of national highway since 2014, and that India’s infrastructure—including ports and airports—“has been transformed.” A combination of widespread internet access, the proliferation of cellphones, and a massive rollout of bank accounts has also improved the government’s ability to deliver welfare payments to the needy.

India’s service exports have continued to boom. Messrs. Subramanian and Felman estimate that India’s share of global highly skilled services nearly doubled, from around 3% in 2005 to 5.8% in 2022. JPMorgan Chase now employs about 60,000 people in India. Toss in a youthful workforce—the median Indian is 28—and a surge in companies seeking alternative investment destinations to China, and the case for India’s impending takeoff is complete. In a speech at George Washington University, India’s chief economic adviser, V. Anantha Nageswaran, described achieving a near-term 10% annual growth rate in dollar terms as “not particularly daunting.”

Despite this progress, India still faces many challenges. Here’s the glass-half-empty version of the story: India’s economic performance looks much less impressive when contrasted with that of other countries. India’s per capita GDP ($2,730) is about 1/30th of America’s ($85,370) and about one-fifth of China’s ($13,140). Indermit Gill, chief economist at the World Bank, estimates that at current growth rates it will take 75 years before per capita GDP in India reaches a quarter of the U.S. figure.

And there’s no guarantee this will happen. According to World Bank research, most poor countries hit a wall at 10% of U.S. per capita GDP. At current growth rates, it could take decades for India simply to catch up with Indonesia, which has a per capita GDP of $5,270.

China benefited during a period of Western openness to trade. The global environment is much less benign now, and India has made it harder for its companies to become part of global supply chains by choosing to remain outside large trade blocs such as the 15-member Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and the 11-member Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. Nimbler Asian rivals such as Vietnam, Malaysia and Singapore are part of both. Mr. Modi has failed to solve India’s central economic challenge: moving tens of millions of subsistence farmers to more productive factory jobs.

Mr. Modi says he wants India to be a developed economy by 2047, when the country will celebrate 100 years of independence. Is it possible? The jury remains out on that question.


ya

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Re: India/Indian Ocean, India-China, India Afpakia
« Reply #722 on: May 09, 2024, 05:50:58 PM »
Mr.Dhume is a well known India basher, sort of like a democrat who cant stand Republican achievements.

"Despite this progress, India still faces many challenges. Here’s the glass-half-empty version of the story: India’s economic performance looks much less impressive when contrasted with that of other countries. India’s per capita GDP ($2,730) is about 1/30th of America’s ($85,370) and about one-fifth of China’s ($13,140). Indermit Gill, chief economist at the World Bank, estimates that at current growth rates it will take 75 years before per capita GDP in India reaches a quarter of the U.S. figure.

And there’s no guarantee this will happen. According to World Bank research, most poor countries hit a wall at 10% of U.S. per capita GDP. At current growth rates, it could take decades for India simply to catch up with Indonesia, which has a per capita GDP of $5,270."

There is much that can be discussed re: this passage of his. Fair to say, India will be the 3rd largest economy within the next 3 years, ahead of Germany and Japan. Thats good enough for the present.

Crafty_Dog

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Re: India/Indian Ocean, India-China, India Afpakia
« Reply #723 on: May 09, 2024, 07:44:27 PM »
Thank you.

ya

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Re: India/Indian Ocean, India-China, India Afpakia
« Reply #724 on: May 12, 2024, 05:30:36 AM »
Now the US changes its tune on India. First, India was villified for buying Russian oil, now the US claims, they wanted India to buy Russian oil all along. Apparently India is a loyal country to America.
American Amb Garcetti
https://twitter.com/i/status/1789536197657641184

Crafty_Dog

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FO: India-Iran deal with implications for China's belt strategy
« Reply #725 on: May 13, 2024, 09:06:44 AM »
India’s shipping minister Sarbananda Sonowal left for Iran today, where experts expect him to sign a ten-year access deal for Iran’s Chabahar Port. (This will allow India to bypass Pakistani territory for trade but also set India at odds with the U.S. by connecting the International North-South Transport Corridor’s final leg between Chahbahar and western Indian ports.- J.V.)

GPF:

China-India trade. China narrowly surpassed the United States as India’s top trade partner in fiscal year 2023-24, according to data collected by think tank GTRI. Chinese exports to India increased by 3.24 percent to $101.7 billion, while Indian exports to China increased by 8.7 percent to $16.67 billion. The U.S. was India’s biggest trade partner during the previous two fiscal years.
« Last Edit: May 13, 2024, 09:26:28 AM by Crafty_Dog »

ya

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Re: India/Indian Ocean, India-China, India Afpakia
« Reply #726 on: June 03, 2024, 09:17:57 PM »
India starts counting 600 million votes, all will be counted within 12-24 hrs. Modi expected to win.

added: Modi's BJP and Allied Parties (NDA) win, will form govt.
« Last Edit: June 04, 2024, 09:35:48 AM by ya »

ya

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Re: India/Indian Ocean, India-China, India Afpakia
« Reply #727 on: June 03, 2024, 09:27:45 PM »
Tale of 2 markets


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Re: India/Indian Ocean, India-China, India Afpakia
« Reply #728 on: June 04, 2024, 10:11:23 AM »
India starts counting 600 million votes, all will be counted within 12-24 hrs. Modi expected to win.

added: Modi's BJP and Allied Parties (NDA) win, will form govt.

My reaction, I wish we had a Modi.

WSJ, NYT (reported by John Ellis) are putting a different spin on it: Modi poised for a "severe setback":

"Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Hindu nationalist party appeared to be set for a severe setback amid a strong fight from a revived opposition, early Indian election results showed. The ruling Bharatiya Janata Party alliance should still get the largest share of seats in the 543-seat lower house of parliament and form the government, but Modi’s party appeared to be struggling to hold on to an outright majority after a campaign in which the prime minister pledged to win more seats than ever. His party won 303 seats in 2019. The early trends could yet change in several seats. Final results are due late Tuesday. The results were in sharp contrast to exit polls over the weekend that showed that Modi’s party could top the seats it won in the last general elections, and that a BJP-led bloc of allies could win a two-thirds majority. Indian exit polls have been known to be wildly wrong in the past."


[Doug]  Let's see.  If he wins reelection and has a bloc of allies who win a 2/3rds majority in Parliament, how is that a "severe setback"?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
'Results are due late Tuesday.'  Isn't late Tuesday in India now?  Oh here it is, with NYT negative spin:

https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/06/03/world/india-election-results
Prime Minister Narendra Modi claimed a third term in office on Tuesday as early results in India’s general election delivered a far narrower than expected victory for the country’s most powerful leader in generations.

Mr. Modi, who would be only the second Indian prime minister to secure a third consecutive term, hailed “a historical feat in India’s history,” even as his party appeared likely to lose a significant number of seats in Parliament, meaning it would need to rely on smaller parties in its coalition to form a government.

The outcome was a surprising setback for Mr. Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party, which exit polls had suggested would again win an outright majority on its own. The B.J.P. was still set to win a plurality of parliamentary seats.

More than 640 million people voted in seven phases across more than six weeks, making India’s election the largest democratic exercise in the world. The campaign coincided with a deadly heat wave in the north that frequently sent temperatures shooting over 110 degrees Fahrenheit.

Here’s what to know:

India has a parliamentary system in which any party that wins a majority, or any coalition that cobbles one together, can form a government. In the 2019 election, the B.J.P. won 303 of the 543 seats in Parliament, and Mr. Modi’s party predicted it would win 400 this time around, well over the 272 it needed to rule on its own. But early results indicated that it would win about 240 seats.

Two regional parties were poised to play kingmakers. The Telugu Desam Party, the largest partner in Mr. Modi’s National Democratic Alliance coalition, was leading in 16 constituencies in the southern state of Andhra Pradesh on Tuesday. The second B.J.P. partner, Janata Dal-United, is in the eastern state of Bihar.

One of the biggest surprises was in the northern city of Ayodhya, where Mr. Modi had inaugurated a contentious Hindu temple in January, a capstone of his Hindu nationalist agenda. The B.J.P. was poised to lose its seat there, a sign, according to some supporters, that the party’s focus on pro-Hindu policies had given the opposition a rallying cause.

The main opposition party, the Indian National Congress, was doing better than expected, indicating a sharp turnaround for the once dominant political force. The Congress-led opposition coalition united out of fear that a third Modi term would wipe it off the political map and push India toward one-party rule. Congress and its allies tapped into local grievances in the hope of winning back competitive seats.

Mr. Modi’s management of India’s deeply unequal economy became an election issue. The opposition tried to paint Mr. Modi as a friend to the nation’s billionaires who has failed to create enough jobs, and it promised new cash transfers and paid apprenticeships. Mr. Modi reminded voters what he has delivered, including water connections and roofs over homes.

ya

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Re: India/Indian Ocean, India-China, India Afpakia
« Reply #729 on: June 04, 2024, 07:22:39 PM »
Modi won 3 five year terms in a row. The only other PM to do that was Nehru, the congress leader post Independence. Looks like the Hindus did not come out to vote, mostly complacency. The muslim block vote was very high.

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Re: India/Indian Ocean, India-China, India Afpakia
« Reply #730 on: June 05, 2024, 06:33:19 AM »
Modi won 3 five year terms in a row. The only other PM to do that was Nehru, the congress leader post Independence. Looks like the Hindus did not come out to vote, mostly complacency. The muslim block vote was very high.

"Looks like the Hindus did not come out to vote, mostly complacency."


I wonder... people take the very good treatment they are getting for granted (?) - until it's gone.  Much like here.

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GPF: India's watershed election
« Reply #731 on: June 07, 2024, 08:34:48 AM »

June 7, 2024
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India’s Watershed Election
The BJP’s disproportionate hold on power seems to have been an exception to the rule.
By: Kamran Bokhari

India’s 2024 general elections have shaken the trajectory the planet’s most populous nation has been on for nearly three decades. Right-wing Hindu nationalism, which grew more popular under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party, is now in decline, reinforcing the theory that the fifth-largest economy in the world is far too diverse for any single political force to dominate. India will now be bogged down by internal political and economic issues that will limit its ability to project geopolitical influence.

Though it remains the country’s single-largest party, the BJP won only 240 of 543 seats in the lower chamber of the Indian legislature – down from the 303 seats it won in 2019. Modi was able to secure a rare third term as prime minister but not without crucial support from allies in the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance, which holds a combined 293 seats. The BJP’s main rival, the Indian National Congress – once on the precipice of political oblivion – won 99 seats, nearly double the 52 it won in the last election, while its partners in the coalition of some two dozen parties known as I.N.D.I.A. now collectively control 234.

India | General Election Results, 2024

(click to enlarge)

The BJP’s losses are important. India, of course, is a Hindu majority nation, but considering 36 percent of the national vote was cast in favor of the BJP, its Hindu nationalist ideology has clearly lost some of its resonance. The party lost voters despite Modi, just months ago, inaugurating a major and controversial temple timed to animate his party’s appeal ahead of the vote. Still, even in its heyday the BJP’s popularity was largely centered in the “Hindi belt” of central and northern India – and it could not even retain support there. In the two states with the most seats in parliament – Uttar Pradesh (80) in the north and Maharashtra (48) in the west – the BJP lost pretty badly. In Uttar Pradesh, a former BJP stronghold, the party lost nearly half its seats, slipping from 62 to 33. In Maharashtra, where the financial hub of Mumbai resides, it fell from 23 to 9 seats.

India's General Election Results, 2024

(click to enlarge)

The apparent waning of its ideological appeal aside, the BJP lost so much ground because India’s otherwise phenomenal economic growth failed to trickle down to average Indian citizens. Inflation and unemployment generated widespread anxiety despite the fact that India’s economy has enjoyed an annual growth rate of 8 percent. This growth has actually led to great economic disparity: On one side are the billionaire elites and a growing middle class, which has attracted a legion of international firms to bring their business to India, and on the other are half a billion people nearing or falling below the poverty line of $3.65 per day.

Until this week, Modi had successfully balanced these two realities. To the outside world, he was a leader with a large mandate who could steer the country toward the reforms that would nurture greater investment, profit and growth. This explains why in the lead-up to the election he and the BJP were expected to emerge even stronger. The elections have placed a damper on those expectations, given that now the BJP must rely on allies in the face of an energized opposition. The new balance of power in parliament creates the kind of political uncertainty that could discourage foreign companies and investors who have been eyeing India as a potential alternative to doing business in China. In fact, since India embraced market reforms in the 1990s, the biggest concern to foreign business has been that India, with its myriad political stakeholders at the national and regional levels, is too complex to deal with. The rise of the Modi-led BJP was seen as a solution of sorts to that problem. Its religious nationalist ideology was seen as problematic, but the hope was that the party would find ways to balance between its economic imperatives and its ideational compulsions.

What this election has done is underscore the serious limits to which ideology can translate into political capital for the BJP. Many voters have been deeply concerned about the toxicity of the party’s religious nationalism and its implications for stability and security in the country for some time. More important, however, they have shown that bread and butter issues matter more to them than ideology. Though still the strongest political force in Indian politics, the BJP will now need to act in a way so as to prevent further weakening of its position, which necessitates tempering the emphasis on ideology, while holding on to its base, which requires the opposite.

Now it will be all the more under pressure to create jobs, which entails pushing through reforms. This task wasn’t easy when its standing in parliament was much more robust and now has become even harder. The BJP will have to adapt to a situation that demands political and policy compromises that will hamper its efforts on two key fronts: delivering on governance and upholding its commitment to ideology.

The BJP’s hold on power over the past two election cycles seems to have been an exception to the rule of coalition governments. A return to that past means that domestic political economic issues will constrain India’s desire to play major league geopolitics.

ya

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Re: India/Indian Ocean, India-China, India Afpakia
« Reply #732 on: June 08, 2024, 07:34:49 AM »
Not sure, if Biden has had time to congratulate, but China says"Congratulations to Prime Minister @narendramodi, BJP and the National Democratic Alliance on the election victory. We look forward to a healthy & stable China-India relationship."



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« Last Edit: June 12, 2024, 09:21:26 AM by Crafty_Dog »

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WSJ: India could help US against China
« Reply #735 on: June 20, 2024, 05:22:35 PM »


India Could Help the U.S. to Tech Victory Over China
A promising partnership with a country that has a massive market and an impressive pool of talent.
Sadanand Dhume
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Sadanand Dhume
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June 19, 2024 4:20 pm ET




Can India help the U.S. win its race against China for technological dominance? The Biden administration seems to think so. Following national security adviser Jake Sullivan’s visit to New Delhi, the White House on Monday released an ambitious fact sheet listing current and proposed areas of U.S.-India cooperation on “critical and emerging” technologies, including semiconductors, fighter jet engines, space flight, telecommunications, biotechnology and artificial intelligence.

The statement doesn’t mention China. But shared concerns about Beijing’s ambitions underpin the effort, the initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology, which was launched last January. “To put it bluntly and boldly, it’s first and foremost about derisking and diversification from China,” Rudra Chaudhuri, the director of Carnegie India, says in a phone interview.

Those concerns are well-founded. Over the past four decades, China has transformed itself into a science and technology powerhouse. According to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, China leads the U.S. in research in 53 out of 64 critical and emerging technologies, including advanced aircraft engines, electric batteries, machine learning and synthetic biology.

In the Leiden global university science rankings, Chinese universities occupy 10 of the top 20 spots, while only five U.S. universities make the top 20. China in 2020 graduated 1.4 million engineers, seven times as many as graduated from U.S. institutions the same year.

Chinese tech companies, including CATL (electric batteries), BYD (electric vehicles) and Huawei (telecommunications), have global reach and global ambitions. “The old science world order, dominated by America, Europe and Japan, is coming to an end,” the Economist magazine declared recently.

Much of the U.S. response to China’s challenge depends on coordination with technologically advanced allies in Western Europe and East Asia. The U.S., for instance, is working with the Netherlands, home to the semiconductor chip manufacturing machine maker ASML, to ensure that the West retains its technological edge.

At first glance, India seems an unlikely technology partner. It counts only one university in Leiden’s top 200. It spends a fraction of what China and the U.S. spend on research and development. In the 2020-21 fiscal year, India’s government and private sector combined spent less on research and development than Huawei or Microsoft alone spent on R&D in 2021. Among the top 100 tech companies by market capitalization, not one is Indian; 58 are American, and nine Chinese. The Netherlands, with 1/80th of India’s population, has five companies in the top 100.

Yet Washington sees value in strengthening bilateral cooperation. In a phone interview, Sameer Lalwani, a scholar at the U.S. Institute of Peace, outlined three broad reasons. First, if the U.S. aligns its tech standards with India, it will become harder for Chinese companies to break into the Indian market and the so-called global south more broadly.


Second, the U.S. seeks to harness Indian tech talent. For decades, many of India’s best scientists have made a beeline for the U.S. But several factors make India’s domestic ecosystem worth engaging with as well, including the country's vast pool of engineers, homegrown success in space exploration and digital infrastructure for electronic payments, and a burgeoning tech startup scene.

Third, the U.S. believes that technology collaboration will boost Indian military capabilities and deepen trust necessary for military cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. GE Aerospace and India’s Hindustan Aeronautics are negotiating to co-produce fighter jet engines that will enable India to deter Chinese border incursions. American MQ-9 drones in India’s arsenal could easily mesh with U.S. tracking of Chinese naval vessels in the Indian Ocean. Carnegie’s Mr. Chaudhuri says that using India as a manufacturing base for military equipment could enable the U.S. to export arms more cheaply to parts of Asia and Africa.

Optimism isn’t entirely unwarranted. In recent years, India has signaled that it wants to belong to a U.S.-aligned technology bloc. It has barred Chinese firms Huawei and ZTE from its 5G networks and participated in the U.S.-led “rip and replace” program, which removes suspect Chinese equipment from U.S. communications infrastructure. Apple subcontractors Foxconn and Pegatron have invested in India, and the Modi government is encouraging Tesla to follow suit.

India’s military maintains historically close ties with Russia, but the importance of that relationship has declined sharply. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimates that only 36% of Indian arms imports between 2019 and 2023 were from Russia, down from 76% a decade earlier. Russia’s growing dependence on China will likely accelerate India’s quest to seek more reliable partners in the West.

Still, there’s no guarantee that the U.S.-India tech initiative will succeed. India expects the U.S. to treat it like an ally by waiving export controls on sensitive technologies, but critics in Washington point out that New Delhi doesn’t always behave like an ally. They point to India’s refusal to condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine, an alleged Indian assassination plot against a New York-based Sikh separatist, and the Modi government’s clampdown on domestic critics. Mr. Lalwani of the U.S. Institute of Peace says Washington’s bet on New Delhi is based on the belief that “India is a positive international actor.” For the new tech collaboration to achieve its potential, India will need to reassure skeptics that its future lies with the democratic world.

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Modi-Putin
« Reply #736 on: July 10, 2024, 06:03:40 PM »
« Last Edit: July 10, 2024, 07:01:32 PM by Crafty_Dog »

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WT: Modi-Putin
« Reply #737 on: July 11, 2024, 08:45:25 AM »


Modi’s friendly visit to Moscow poses conundrum for U.S.

BY ANDREW SALMON THE WASHINGTON TIMES

It is one of the biggest conundrums facing U.S. foreign policy strategists: The world’s biggest democracy, while postured against China, embraces Russia.

While the leaders of Japan, South Korea and New Zealand huddled in Washington with their North American and European counterparts on the sidelines of the NATO summit, Indian President Narendra Modi wrapped up two days with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow.

Mr. Modi traveled on to Vienna on Wednesday for meetings with Austrian Chancellor Karl Nehammer, leaving Mr. Putin with some grounds for satisfaction.

While the summit did not gain the extraordinary global coverage of Mr. Putin’s trip to North Korea last month, the optics were good: The two men hugged at one point and were filmed on an amicable visit to Mr. Putin’s private stables.

Meanwhile, the deals done offered the Russian leader another breach in the wall of economic sanctions that a frustrated West has sought to erect around his economy as a response to the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

The summit was “historic and gamechanging,” Russia’s charge d’affaires Roman Babushkin told Indian media on Wednesday.

Indian has expanded its consumption of Russian oil and gas — at discounted prices — and deals were signed to increase sales.

Discussions were also held on the sale of Russian coal. The two countries agreed to settle international payments using their respective currencies, bypassing the U.S. dollar.

Another agreement was signed on space cooperation — India this year soft-landed a probe on the moon, while a similar Russian effort failed.

India has historically acquired the bulk of its arms from Russia, and last week, a Moscow manufacturer revealed a joint project with India to manufacture ammunition for India’s T72 and T90 tanks.

However, Moscow’s armorers are now working all out to supply troops in Ukraine and despite the summit, the status of one major bilateral deal remains unclear. India has reportedly ordered six squadrons of Russian S-400 air defense missiles, though only four have been delivered so far.

While India under Mr. Modi has declined to criticize Russia’s invasion of Ukraine or condemn it in United Nations votes, Mr. Putin did not escape the summit completely unscathed when the Indian leader made an oblique but pointed reference to the war.

“When innocent children are killed, the heart bleeds and that pain is very terrifying,” Mr. Modi said — a pointed reference to a Russian missile strike on Kyiv’s Children’s Hospital on Monday. “A solution is not possible on the battlefi eld. I assure you that India and the global community favors peace.”

Mr. Putin maintained his customary poker face while listening, but smiled and nodded in response to Mr. Modi’s comments.

India’s energy partnership with Russia meant India could control the sharp global hikes in oil and diesel prices, Mr. Modi said, “and help the citizens of our country by providing them with stability for which I would like to express our gratitude.”

Western officials — which have cultivate India as a counterweight to a rising China in Asia — have been careful not to criticize India’s relationship with Russian in public.

“India is a strategic partner with whom we engage in a full and frank dialogue, and that includes on our concerns about the relationship with Russia,” U.S. State Department spokesman Matthew Miller told reporters this week when asked about Mr. Modi’s visit to the Kremlin

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WSJ: India-Russia
« Reply #738 on: July 19, 2024, 10:34:10 AM »


The India-Russia Relationship Is Less Than Meets the Eye
As Moscow grows more dependent on China, India has no choice but to draw closer to Washington.
Sadanand Dhume
July 17, 2024 2:54 pm ET

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s high-profile visit to Moscow last week set off a firestorm of criticism in the West. But if you look beyond the hyperbole used to describe India-Russia relations, it becomes obvious that there’s less to the connection than meets the eye. As a weakened Russia grows more dependent on China, India has no choice but to draw closer to the U.S.

That Mr. Modi’s first visit to Russia since 2019 drew rebukes should surprise no one. By choosing Russia rather than a neighboring country for his first bilateral official visit in his third term as prime minister, Mr. Modi elevated the trip’s significance. Thanks to partially overlapping dates with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s summit in Washington, Mr. Modi’s Moscow sojourn appeared designed to undermine the Biden administration’s efforts to isolate Russia after its invasion of Ukraine.

To make matters worse, images of Mr. Modi hugging Vladimir Putin, riding in a golf cart around the Russian strongman’s private residence, and accepting Russia’s highest civilian award—the Order of St. Andrew the Apostle—coincided with horrific pictures of a Russian strike on a children’s hospital in Kyiv. In a meeting with Mr. Putin, Mr. Modi said that “when innocent children are killed, the heart bleeds and that pain is very terrifying.” But this oblique criticism, which didn’t directly blame Russia for the attack, did nothing to calm critics.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky tweeted after the hospital strike that the Modi-Putin hug was “a huge disappointment and a devastating blow to peace efforts.” Former Trump national security adviser H.R. McMaster tweeted that it’s “time to reassess the relationship with India based on much lower expectations.”

In a rare note of public caution, U.S. Ambassador to India Eric Garcetti said that the U.S.-India relationship was “not yet deep enough” to be taken for granted. The British TV personality Piers Morgan was blunter. “Shame on you,” he tweeted, while sharing a video of Mr. Modi accepting the award from Mr. Putin.

Why would India risk upsetting its Western partners to please Moscow? The reasons are complex. As Indian foreign minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar has pointed out, India views the Eurasian landmass as dominated by three major powers: China, India and Russia. India’s longstanding rivalry with China—including border tensions that have lasted more than four years—drives its efforts to prevent Moscow from drawing closer to Beijing.

India’s dependence on Russian arms looms large in the relationship. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimates that only 36% of Indian arms imports between 2019 and 2023 were from Russia, down from 76% between 2009 and 2013. But India’s large inventory of Soviet and Russian weapons means it’s still dependent on Moscow for spare parts and ammunition. India has saved about $13 billion by buying steeply discounted Russian oil since 2022, according to ICRA, a rating agency. India also sourced about a quarter of its imported fertilizer from Russia last year.


Domestically, India hasn’t fully shed its old Cold War habit of measuring its independence by its ability to thumb its nose at America. Even today, some of India’s foreign-policy commentators view Russia in a sentimental light, as the friend that helped India stare down an unfriendly U.S. in the 1971 India-Pakistan war, the conflict that led to the birth of Bangladesh. Dealing with Russia can also seem simpler than dealing with the U.S. Mr. Putin raises no pesky questions about democratic backsliding or human rights, and the Russian media tamely takes its cues from the Kremlin.

Russophile Indian pundits hold an almost mystical view of Russia as an eternal great power. Indian foreign-policy scholar Zorawar Daulet Singh says Russia is “too proud, too independent and too militarily powerful to ever submit to China.” Mr. Jaishankar, the foreign minister, calls India’s “special and privileged strategic partnership” with Russia the “one constant in world politics.”

The trouble with these formulations is simple: They’re untrue. India may wish to prevent Russia from becoming a Chinese satellite, but New Delhi lacks the economic and technological heft to stop it. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has already made Russia too dependent on China to be a reliable long-term partner for India.

As a recent Center for Strategic and International Studies report noted, “Beijing has dramatically eased the pressure caused by sanctions on the Russian defense industrial base.” China has supported Russia’s war effort by supplying Moscow with semiconductors, ball bearings, machine tools and drones, among other items. China has also become the top importer of Russian oil. (India is second.) Two-way trade between China and Russia ($240 billion) dwarfs India-Russia trade ($65 billion, mostly oil). Chinese banks and electric-vehicle manufacturers have rushed to fill the void left by the West’s sanctions. Last December, about one-third of Russia’s foreign trade was settled in yuan.

Contrary to what India would like to believe, there are no constants in international politics. Working with Washington may require more effort than working with Moscow, but no country matters more than the U.S. to India’s economic and military modernization in the face of growing Chinese power. The sooner India realizes its bet on Moscow is mistaken, the better off it will be.

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GPF: India move in on Southeast Asia
« Reply #739 on: July 29, 2024, 07:12:34 AM »


July 29, 2024
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India Moves in on Southeast Asia
China’s decline has given New Delhi an opportunity.
By: Victoria Herczegh

Last week, the foreign ministers of India and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations met in Vientiane to discuss ways to enhance political, security and economic relations and to address regional issues, including China’s assertiveness and the crisis in Myanmar. In his address, India’s top diplomat said ASEAN was the cornerstone of India’s vision for an open, stable and prosperous Indo-Pacific region.

It was, to some extent, in keeping with precedent. India-ASEAN relations have been on sound footing since 1995. But things started to change during China’s economic explosion in the early 2010s. Its unprecedented growth was attractive to ASEAN’s ambitious developing members (Indonesia and Thailand), while poorer countries (Cambodia and Myanmar) saw trade with the rising superpower as a remedy to their economic and financial problems. Though it was easier to do business with China than with India, where efficient economic reforms were introduced much later, Beijing also began working against India by entering into small regional networks and partnerships, integrating itself into as many economic schemes as it could. China outmatched India to become the top trade and security partner for ASEAN – a position that seemed secure and fruitful for both sides.

Then came India’s own rapid economic ascent. Though its rise was slower than China’s, India is now seen the world over as a viable competitor to China, one capable of defeating the East Asian giant and leading economic growth by the end of the decade. Indeed, China is not as reliable as it once was, its economic decline marked by unkept promises on investment and dozens of unfinished or stalled infrastructure projects all over Southeast Asia. Beijing’s assertive military presence and disputed territorial claims in the South China Sea have also strained ties with the bloc. India has thus seized the opportunity to improve its standing with ASEAN, openly advocating “ASEAN centrality” as the best way to promote stability and growth in the region.

At first, India’s overtures made ASEAN member states somewhat wary. After all, China’s increased involvement in its affairs, however beneficial at first, ended up making the bloc vulnerable in security and economic terms. The revival of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue consisting of the United States, India, Japan and Australia, as well as the formation of AUKUS (a security partnership between Australia, the U.K. and the U.S.), has only increased ASEAN’s apprehension over being left behind amid new and changing great power competition. But it has since become clear that India, the U.S., Japan and Australia support ASEAN centrality in their respective Indo-Pacific strategies, and the bloc realizes that it may keep its regional influence and reap the benefits of the competition.

Today, ASEAN is one of India’s most important trading partners. Bilateral trade under the ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement reached $122.67 billion last year. The agreement, signed in 2009 after six years of negotiations, was meant to facilitate the free flow of goods and deeper economic integration. Most of India’s trade under the deal is directed at manufacturing powerhouses like Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia.

Moreover, India’s position on freedom of navigation and its allegiance to international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, aligns with ASEAN’s regional interests. In April, India delivered BrahMos missiles to the Philippines – the first batch of a $375 million deal with Manila. The agreement is India’s most valuable defense export deal to date, helping New Delhi see the region as a viable export market ripe for similar arrangements.

In turn, it demonstrates to ASEAN that India has what it takes to support its regional defense needs. Expanding defense cooperation agreements and offering technical assistance and training to ASEAN countries could help enhance the defense capabilities of these nations, thereby boosting security within the region and adding to India’s reputation as a reliable and influential military partner. (In May 2023, India held its first joint military exercises with ASEAN in which the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam provided ships.)

There are potential obstacles to greater cooperation and prosperity, of course. As an institution, ASEAN makes decisions based on consensus, which is sometimes elusive, other times impossible, especially with regard to the South China Sea. This may well encourage New Delhi to approach individual ASEAN member countries to promote cooperation on a case-by-case basis. On defense and security issues, members such as Cambodia and Malaysia will likely continue to favor China anyway. But in trade and investment, India may take a broader approach. Despite China’s downturn, it still wields substantial influence over ASEAN, and so far, India has reached out largely to the bloc’s more affluent members. Ignoring the others may only make its ambitious goals more difficult to achieve.

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GPF
« Reply #740 on: August 01, 2024, 05:52:22 AM »
Russia and India. A corvette from Russia’s Baltic Fleet and a frigate from India’s navy conducted joint exercises in the Gulf of Finland. The training is part of their broader joint dills, dubbed Indra 2024.

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GPF: The India model for the multi-polar world
« Reply #741 on: August 23, 2024, 07:14:09 AM »


August 23, 2024
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On Ukraine, India Stands Firm With Neutrality
New Delhi is pursuing a pragmatic approach, and others seem to be following suit.
By: Antonia Colibasanu

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Kyiv on Friday to meet with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is a calculated diplomatic move designed to underscore India’s steadfast neutrality on the Ukraine war. The trip comes on the heels of Modi’s visit in July to Moscow for a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, as well as India’s hosting of the Voice of the Global South Summit on Aug. 17, an event which notably excluded China and Pakistan.

No Indian prime minister has been to Ukraine since its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. Relations between the two countries flourished in the years immediately following the Soviet Union’s collapse but cooled after Kyiv signed a deal in 1996 to provide tanks to Pakistan and supported U.N. resolutions condemning India’s nuclear weapons tests and endorsing economic sanctions against it in 1998.

While their political relations stagnated, their economic ties continued to grow. In the 1990s, the Indian defense sector looked to Ukraine as an alternate supplier of components for MiG-29 fighter jets and other Soviet-era weapons, given Moscow’s failure to meet its commitments in the aftermath of the Soviet Union's disintegration. In 1994, India and Ukraine set up a joint commission focused on economic, scientific and industrial cooperation, which has become key in setting the agenda for their economic relations.

Prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, India was Ukraine’s second-largest export destination in Asia (after China) and its fifth-largest market overall, accounting for 4 percent of total exports. Military and technology were key areas of economic cooperation. The Indian navy uses more than 150 gas turbine engines manufactured by Ukraine’s state-owned Zorya-Mashproekt on a contract dating back to the early 1990s. India hopes to produce its own engines in the future, but the process is complex and time-consuming. In an attempt to limit its dependence on Ukrainian manufacturers, India has partnered with global companies like GE Marine, seeking to leverage the U.S. firm's expertise in gas turbine technology. India and Ukraine have also collaborated since 2009 on a project to upgrade about 105 AN-32 aircraft belonging to the Indian air force. The project has experienced delays due to the Ukraine conflict but is still making progress, with the majority of the work being done in India.

In terms of Indian exports to Ukraine, pharmaceutical products were among the most important prior to the war. Indian generic drug manufacturers built a strong presence in the country, and India was among Ukraine’s top three suppliers of pharmaceutical goods. For India, Ukraine’s official candidacy status for accession to the European Union, giving Kyiv wider access to the EU market, opens potential new investment opportunities. Ukraine's post-war reconstruction will also likely present promising business opportunities for Indian companies.

However, their potential for expanded bilateral relations is complicated by the fact that New Delhi has long maintained close ties to Moscow, a relationship that hasn’t faltered throughout Russia’s military campaign in Ukraine. India purchases more than 40 percent of its oil and 60 percent of its arms from Russia, in addition to substantial amounts of coal, fertilizer, vegetable oil and precious metals. The commander-in-chief of the Russian navy visited India just this week to discuss prospects for strengthening bilateral cooperation amid Russian efforts to build up its navy and increase its presence in the Indian Ocean. This year, Russia supplied India with two warships as part of a 2018 deal. The two countries have used rupees and other alternative currencies, including UAE dirhams, to facilitate payments despite tightening pressure from Western sanctions. One currency that they have tried to avoid is the Chinese yuan, as China is India’s main competitor in Asia.

For the most part, New Delhi has actually benefited from the Western sanctions regime, which encouraged Moscow to seek stronger ties with the country. However, India is pursuing a cautious approach when it comes to Russia: It needs to maintain good working relations with the West but also wants to entertain a closer relationship with Russia to prevent Moscow from ingratiating itself with Beijing. India also understands that the West has an interest in preserving New Delhi’s influence with the Kremlin so it can act as a counterweight to China. It’s a tricky strategy, but by visiting Kyiv this week, Modi wants to show that India has no interest in alienating the West and will maintain ties with Ukraine in the long term.

India’s approach is emblematic of a broader trend among countries of the Global South that prioritizes national interests over international alignments. These countries are navigating the increasingly rough waters of international diplomacy by maintaining their neutrality, while still trying to exploit short-term advantages and secure favorable long-term relationships. This strategy presents a challenge for China and Russia, both of which have been actively seeking to construct alliances that counter Western-dominated groupings like the G7. Beijing and Moscow are promoting various international platforms, including the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, as avenues to restore balance and equity in world affairs. Despite being a member of both organizations, India has chosen to maintain its distance, establishing its own platform, called the Voice of the Global South Summit, instead of going all-in on a China- or Russia-led initiative.

The global order is thus increasingly characterized by a complex web of national interests, as governments grow reluctant to champion one side over the other. Paradoxically, it reflects Russian President Vladimir Putin’s long-held vision for a multipolar world. Before the Ukraine conflict, the geopolitical landscape was dominated by superpowers like the United States, China and Russia that could exert considerable pressure on smaller nations. The increasing volatility between countries of the East and the West has exposed the limits of these power dynamics.

Many of these limits have to do with Russia’s loss of global posture and general weakening. The Russian economy has been severely hit not just by Western sanctions but by its failure to build a functioning war economy. Though economic data released by Moscow appear to show promising results, they merely reflect the country’s shift to an economy focused on meeting military needs and domestic production of goods that have become inaccessible due to sanctions. Limitations on energy exports, financial transactions and technology transfers have not only made it necessary for Russia to find alternative markets but also forced local consumers to accept “made in Russia” policies and adapt to consistently high inflation rates, which the Russian central bank has still not gotten under control. The war has also disrupted supply lines, forcing Russia to redraw routes into global markets.

From a military standpoint, the conflict in Ukraine has revealed notable vulnerabilities in the Russian armed forces. It has exposed shortcomings in Russia’s military strategy, logistics and morale, eroding Russia’s status as a military hegemon and prompting questions over its long-term capabilities. Russia’s global standing has taken a permanent hit, limiting its capacity to exert influence globally and forcing it to focus on growing its influence in the Global South, where it also appears to be failing.

Most countries have preferred to follow India’s lead in pursuing an independent foreign policy. India's response to the Ukraine conflict has been pragmatic and cautious, as it defends its strategic autonomy. It has sought to diversity its foreign policy, while continuing to value its relationships with both Russia and the West. And by establishing itself as a model for others, it’s positioning itself as a major player on the global stage.

ya

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Re: India, India-China, India Afpakia, India-Russia
« Reply #742 on: August 29, 2024, 03:58:18 AM »
The USA getting a lot of blame for the military coup in Bangladesh. Lot of commentators saying also an attempt to destabilize India

https://substack.com/home/post/p-147594342
« Last Edit: August 29, 2024, 04:33:31 AM by ya »

ccp

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Very interesting post Ya
« Reply #743 on: August 29, 2024, 05:45:58 AM »
Interesting theory posited in the article.
Wonder how much is true.

This is mentioned in article:

https://www.aeinstein.org/our-team

https://substack.com/@thinkbrics

BTW:

"Years before installing people with strong ties to the West as leaders of destabilized nations, western collectives tend to prop them up as visionaries on public platforms and media publications"

sound familiar with exactly what is going on now in the USA   :wink: :roll:

ya

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Re: India, India-China, India Afpakia, India-Russia
« Reply #744 on: September 14, 2024, 07:55:26 AM »
This happened recently. China withdraws from 4 areas on the India-China border so far (over the last 2 years). So the question is why is China doing this ?, this would improve relations with India. The logical answer is they dont want strained relations with India, when tensions increase elsewhere. Question is where is elsewhere ? Taiwan ? or is this in anticipation of NATO getting involved in Ukr-Russia war. Something that likely will worry the US a great deal is what happens if India-China resolve their border issues. Russia already has close relations with both China and India. This could change the trade relationships around the world. The global south is already strongly behind India.

« Last Edit: September 14, 2024, 08:24:44 AM by ya »

Crafty_Dog

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GPF: India's northeast borderlands at risk
« Reply #745 on: September 18, 2024, 02:10:07 PM »



September 17, 2024
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India’s Northeastern Borderlands at Risk
Ethnic conflict and upheaval in neighboring countries are a serious constraint on New Delhi’s rise.
By: Kamran Bokhari

Between discontented citizens and disputed borders, India’s northeast has long posed challenges for the government in New Delhi. The area is cut off from the rest of the country except for a narrow strip of land between Nepal and Bangladesh, and it has become even less secure amid India’s deteriorating relations with China, Myanmar’s implosion and, most recently, the collapse of Bangladesh’s regime. Already threatened by instability emanating from Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran to its west, the world’s most populous nation is now facing similar pressures from its east which, combined with the remoteness of the the states thereof, will seriously constrain New Delhi’s rise as a global player.

Internal Conflict

Indian Home Minister Amit Shah announced on Sept. 17 that New Delhi is negotiating to resolve an armed conflict between two ethnic groups in the northeastern state of Manipur. The state government, which is led by the country’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party, last week imposed a curfew in the Imphal Valley and surrounding districts and shut down public and private educational institutions throughout the state. This was in response to violent student unrest and renewed fighting between the Meitei majority and Kuki minority. At an event marking the first 100 days of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s third term, Shah said there would be no resolution unless both ethnic groups came to an understanding.

The conflict centers on economic benefits and quotas in jobs and education provided to tribal Kukis. It was triggered by a 2023 court ruling in favor of Meiteis’ push for “tribal” status, which would grant them the right to buy land in the hills and a guaranteed allotment of government jobs. More generally, however, the BJP’s right-wing Hindu nationalism has exacerbated tensions between the predominantly Hindu Meiteis, who control state politics in Manipur, and the largely Christian Kukis inhabiting the hills.

Administrative Regions of India

(click to enlarge)

Since the violence erupted last year, more than 225 people have died, and at least 60,000 have been displaced. But although it might look like a highly localized instance of ethnic strife, India’s central government is taking no chances. If not contained, the conflict in Manipur risks spreading to neighboring states such as Nagaland, Assam and Mizoram, where both Meiteis and Kukis also have significant populations. Adding fuel to the fire, refugees from the civil war in Myanmar are pouring into the hills of Manipur.

An Imploding Myanmar

Indeed, Indian authorities have pointed to the conflicts in Myanmar as a major factor fueling violence in Manipur. The region’s chief minister, Biren Singh, backed by the Meitei majority, has said that Kuki migrants fleeing Myanmar have worsened the situation. He accuses these migrants of engaging in drug trafficking and terrorism, further stoking Meitei fears that the state's demographics are shifting in favor of the Kukis.

Over the past few years, Myanmar’s once powerful military regime has lost control of large areas, with half a dozen rebel groups seizing territory along the borders of India, China, Bangladesh and Thailand. Sagaing, the largest of Myanmar’s three regions bordering India, shares a 250-mile border with Manipur. From the junta's perspective, rebel groups along the Indian border find sanctuary in Manipur and other northeastern states like Mizoram, Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh. Manipur is currently deporting thousands who entered the country illegally back to Sagaing.

Administrative Regions of Myanmar

(click to enlarge)

Though the Meitei-Kuki conflict is the most pressing security issue in northeastern India, the region has a history of ethno-nationalist insurgencies. The collapse of central authority in Myanmar thus poses a significant security threat to India because instability could spill over into its northeastern states.

Regime Collapse in Bangladesh

Meanwhile, the collapse of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s 15-year-old government in Bangladesh could set India back dramatically. Forced out by the military amid mass protests, Hasina's ouster has destabilized the political landscape of the Muslim-majority nation of 178 million. Her Awami League is unlikely to regain power soon, especially after weakening the Bangladesh National Party, its main rival. This vacuum has opened the door for the Jamaat-i-Islami and other Islamist parties, whose grassroots power was instrumental to Hasina’s downfall.

Wary of Islamist influence, the military establishment is expected to delay elections. The current interim government, led by economist and Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, is likely to give way to a right-of-center coalition of nationalist and Islamist forces, which worries India. The rise of Islamist groups in Bangladesh, mirroring the trend in Pakistan, poses a serious threat tp New Delhi, especially given the simmering tensions between Hindu nationalists and India's 200-million-strong Muslim population.

Regime change in Bangladesh, moreover, gives China an opportunity to enhance its influence. India is already locked in a border standoff with China along their 2,100-mile mountainous frontier. One of the hot spots of the standoff runs along the northern flank of India's northeast region, from Arunachal Pradesh (claimed by China as Zangnan or South Tibet) through the tiny Himalayan nation of Bhutan, and down to Sikkim. This belt of territory connects India’s northeast, which borders both Bangladesh and Myanmar, adding to New Delhi's growing security concerns.

This region, positioned between the eastern Himalayas and the Indian Ocean, is a fractious borderland facing growing geopolitical turbulence. Civil war in Myanmar, political upheaval in Bangladesh and escalating tensions with China along India’s northeastern frontier all converge to create a precarious security environment.