Russia-Turkey, Georgia, Caucuses, Central Asia

[Crafty_Dog]

As Russian forces consolidate their gains in Ukraine over the flat protests of Western leaders, the specter of Russian revanchism is keeping much of Eastern Europe on edge. But lumbering tanks and legions of insta-separatists aren’t the only concern. Ukraine isn’t Russia’s only target.

Perhaps most alarming are the warning signs going off in Georgia, a steadfast Euro-Atlantic partner where a pro-Western political consensus has long been a foreign-policy calling card. A long-standing opponent of Russian military adventurism, Georgia sought escape velocity from Russian regional dominance by courting membership in Euro-Atlantic structures and earned a reputation as an enthusiastic and credible Western partner. But

    Western quiescence in the face of Russian territorial aggression is starting to have an effect.

Western quiescence in the face of Russian territorial aggression is starting to have an effect. After decades of acrimony in which Georgians have watched Russian proxies occupy 20 percent of their territory and ethnically cleanse some 300,000 of their compatriots, certain groups are starting to ask if maintaining close ties to the West is worth all the loss. Increasingly, Georgians are beginning to think that it isn’t.

The groups spearheading Russian influence operations in Georgia fly beneath the international radar under the cloak of local-language media and the oft-repeated surety of pro-Western sentiment. But they can be seen protesting in Tbilisi streets, preaching in Georgian churches, and holding improbably well-funded campaign rallies ahead of elections. The evidence shows that Russian influence in Georgia is growing stronger. (In the photo, a Stalin impersonator poses at a memorial service for the Soviet dictator in his Georgian hometown of Gori.)

But at Washington roundtables and in private conversations, Western officials and experts tend to downplay the possibility of Russian-exported propaganda taking root in Georgia. The root of this complacency is tied to regular polling from the U.S.-funded International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) that has consistently showed public support for Euro-Atlantic integration at between 60 and 70 percent. Successive governments have relied on this popular approval to justify their Western-facing foreign-policy agendas.

So support for Euro-Atlantic integration is broad. But is it deep? Those who have spent time with ordinary Georgians say the reality, as is often the case, is far more complex.

There, in a scene in the popular Georgian soap opera Chemi Tsolis Dakalebi (My Wife’s Best Friends), revelers at a wedding reception are interrupted by an announcement that Georgia has just been awarded a long-coveted “MAP” (membership action plan), a prelude to NATO membership. The announcement shocks the crowd into a stunned silence, which then gives way to raucous cheers. One character, while clapping and celebrating along with the others, turns to another partygoer and asks: “What’s a MAP?”

While the scene colorfully illuminates NATO’s outsized social, and even civilizational, pull among Georgians, it also suggests a harsher truth: that Georgian society’s Western moorings may be more emotive than well-informed. The headline numbers from public opinion polls don’t tell the whole story. Look deeper into the data, and the picture is much more worrisome.

According to an NDI poll last August, integration with the West was at best a tertiary issue for Georgians. Instead, “kitchen table” issues dominated respondents’ concerns, with worries about jobs (63 percent) and poverty (32 percent) eclipsing other issues. NATO and EU integration came in far behind at 10th and 17th, respectively. And of 21 issues polled, Georgians picked NATO and EU membership as the top issues the government spent too much time discussing.

But most concerning, buried deep in the survey results, were signs of growing support for joining the Eurasian Union, a Moscow-led EU “alternative.” A full 20 percent favored the idea of Georgian membership. This percentage has risen steadily from 11 percent in late 2013 to 16 percent in mid-2014. Who are these Georgians who would surrender their country’s sovereignty to the same power that keeps a steely grip on Georgian territory and carves other neighboring states with impunity?

Part of the answer can be found in a budding segment of the nongovernmental sector, consisting of innocuously named pro-Russian groups like the “Eurasian Institute,” “Eurasian Choice,” and “The Earth Is Our Home.” Many of these organizations pop in and out of existence as needed — the “Peace Committee of Georgia” one week, something else the next — but they are often tied to the same group of pro-Russian ideologues and policy entrepreneurs who make regular pilgrimages to Moscow and, according to Georgian officials in the ruling party and the opposition, almost certainly receive Kremlin funding. Their common message isn’t high-church Russian apologia or Soviet nostalgia, but rather “Eurasianism” and “Orthodox civilization” — Kremlin shorthand for Putinism. Appeals to Georgian social conservatism, economic vulnerability, and lingering anger over past government abuses are winning converts within a population increasingly impatient with Georgia’s unrequited love affair with the West.

In mid-2014, Eurasianist groups made headlines for their raucous opposition to an anti-discrimination bill making its way through the Georgian parliament. Their opposition centered on language in the bill banning discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, which opponents claimed was tantamount to promoting non-heterosexual lifestyles. But they didn’t come to the protests alone — accompanying the pro-Russian activists were unmistakably garbed clerics from the Georgian Orthodox Church.

The church, too, was nonplussed over the anti-discrimination bill and called for language protecting sexual minorities to be ejected. One of the oldest existing Christian churches in the world, the Georgian Orthodox Church is both a touchstone for Georgian nationalism and reliably polls as the most trusted institution in the country. But the church’s common cause with the Eurasianists was not limited to tactical alliances over anti-gay rhetoric. Although nominally in favor of Georgian membership in the European Union, influential factions within the Orthodox hierarchy openly stoke religious nationalism and express admiration for Russia.

Today, church representatives are increasingly seen as a vanguard for reactionary activity. In mid-2013, clergy members were on the front lines of a horrifying anti-gay pogrom in central Tbilisi. Church officials have justified protests against and attacks on Georgian Muslims. And church leaders have called the West “worse than Russia,” sometimes describing the 2008 Russian invasion as a kind of heavenly intervention against Western integration. Such language is echoed by Georgia’s Eurasianist NGOs.

The growing profile of pro-Russian organizations and the sharpening anti-Western stance of the church is converging with a third leg in an emerging pro-Russian triad: the revitalization of anti-Western political parties.

    Since the 2012 change in power, pro-Russian politicians have risen from the darkest margins of Georgian political life into an increasingly viable political force.

Since the 2012 change in power, pro-Russian politicians have risen from the darkest margins of Georgian political life into an increasingly viable political force.

Onetime pro-Western advocate turned pro-Russian political agitator Nino Burjanadze has fashioned a political coalition aimed squarely at breaking Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic consensus. In presidential and local elections in 2013 and 2014, respectively, Burjanadze managed to get about 10 percent of the vote, armed with Eurasianist rhetoric and fueled by massive influxes of what was likely Russian money. And the rapidly growing Alliance of Patriots — a populist party with anti-Western leanings, which recently held a major rally in Tbilisi — won almost 5 percent in June 2014. If these numbers hold, parliamentary elections in 2016 could very well yield a very differently oriented Georgian government. A 15 percent result would be more than enough to send pro-Russian deputies into parliament in force, shattering cross-partisan foreign-policy unity and potentially playing kingmakers in coalition talks.

Irakli Alasania, Georgia’s former defense minister, has Russia on his mind. “There are very active pro-Russia groups and thousands of protesters who are against Western integration,” he told me recently, referring to the Alliance of Patriots rally. He expressed worry that the current government is downplaying a growing Russian threat. With his own Free Democrats now part of the parliamentary opposition, the ruling Georgian Dream coalition’s ranks of solidly pro-Western parties has noticeably thinned, and the leverage of socially conservative, protectionist factions within the coalition has increased.

But this is probably only the beginning. If trends hold, Georgia’s foreign-policy consensus — long taken for granted in the West — could begin to unravel in earnest. Although Georgian Dream, to its credit, has managed to skate the knife’s edge between geopolitical pragmatism and Euro-Atlantic enthusiasm, it is increasingly losing popularity among once-hopeful voters. As things stand, parliament in 2016 looks like it will be very different from today’s parliament. The pro-Western opposition United National Movement will likely see its 51 seats slashed by half or more. In its place is likely to be a collection of openly anti-Western deputies from Burjanadze’s coalition and the Alliance of Patriots. If it stays together, Georgian Dream may well remain the largest parliamentary bloc, but the introduction of large anti-Western groupings into parliament could compel it to dilute, or even abandon, its pro-Western policies out of political necessity.

This trajectory ought to be a cause for deep concern. Even a Georgia that tried to split its orientation between the West and Moscow would likely sink into the quicksand of Russian dominance, as have each of the other paragons of this strategy — Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Kazakhstan. This result would mean the consolidation of Russian geostrategic supremacy over the Caucasus and, with it, a complete Russian monopoly over trans-Eurasian energy and trade flows.

    There are ways the West could throw a much-needed lifeline to Georgian liberals.

There are ways the West could throw a much-needed lifeline to Georgian liberals. While the association agreement with the European Union signed last June is surely a welcome symbol, and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area has great future potential, the real prize for most ordinary Georgians is the prospect of visa-free travel to the EU. If this is introduced this year, as widely hoped, this could be a real boon for Western credibility. And if not outright NATO membership, other strong gestures, such as U.S. major non-NATO ally status, would be a relatively painless upgrade that would enshrine what is essentially the status quo while recognizing Georgia’s long-outsized dedication and contributions to the Euro-Atlantic space.

What is clear is that the days of taking Georgia’s pro-Western consensus for granted are quickly coming to a close. Russian influence is resurgent across its periphery, from Eastern Europe to the Caucasus to Central Asia, and Georgia remains a long-coveted prize. It may have taken successive military interventions, information warfare, and influence operations, but Moscow looks to be turning a corner in its bid to regain Georgia — both by hook and by crook.

[Crafty_Dog]

 Why Russia Will Send More Troops to Central Asia
Analysis
April 11, 2015 | 12:59 GMT
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Russian soldiers take part in the August 2014 Indestructible Brotherhood joint military exercises at the Ala-Too training ground in Kyrgyzstan. (VYACHESLAV OSELEDKO/AFP/Getty Images)
Summary

Russia is making a concerted effort to increase its military and security presence throughout Central Asia, just not for the reasons it would have you think. Though the Kremlin is concerned with the threat of spillover violence from Islamist militancy in Afghanistan — its purported motive for deploying more troops — it is far more alarmed by what it sees as Chinese and Western encroachment into lands over which it has long held sway. It is this concern that will shape Moscow's behavior in Central Asia in the years to come.
Analysis

Central Asia has played an important role in the projection of Russian military power since the Russian Empire's expansion in the 18th and 19th centuries. During this period, Russia established military outposts as it competed with the British Empire for influence in the region. By the mid-19th century, Russia had brought modern-day Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan into its empire. In the early 20th century, the countries were incorporated into the Soviet Union.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia retained a military presence in Central Asia and played a major role in regional conflicts, such as the 1992-1997 Tajik civil war. Today Russia still has military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Kazakhstan is a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, a military bloc dominated by Moscow. And while Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are not members of the bloc, they do have important security and military ties with Russia through arms purchases.

Concerns of Militancy

Russia's long-standing influence in Central Asian military affairs frames several of the country's recent moves. On April 2, the base commander of Russia's 201st military base in Tajikistan said Russia would increase the number of troops stationed there from 5,900 to 9,000 over the next five years and add more military equipment through 2020. Then on April 3 an unnamed source in the General Staff of the Russian armed forces told Kommersant that Russia was prepared to grant Tajikistan $1.2 billion in military aid over the next few years. Russian military specialists were reportedly dispatched to Turkmenistan's border with Afghanistan on March 24 as well. Turkmen officials have yet to confirm this, but local media report that Ashgabat requested Russian assistance to protect the Afghan border.

Officially, these developments are tied to growing concern over violence spilling over from Afghanistan into Central Asia. It is a legitimate fear for many Central Asian governments as NATO and the United States draw down their forces in Afghanistan. Regional governments have voiced discomfort with the increased militant presence in northern Afghanistan, including the Taliban and the Islamic State.

Russia has echoed this fear. Russian President Vladimir Putin's special representative for Afghanistan alleged that Islamic State fighters in the north are training thousands of militants near the Tajikistan and Turkmenistan borders. Collective Security Treaty Organization summits have focused on the issue, and Tajikistan urged the bloc to do more to counter the threat at the April 1-2 Dushanbe summit.

Despite a definite uptick in militant attacks in northern Afghanistan, no concrete evidence has emerged of attacks over the border in Central Asian states. Central Asia's last major wave of regionwide militancy was 1999-2001, when the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan conducted attacks in the Fergana Valley in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. The U.S. intervention in Afghanistan following 9/11, however, wiped out much of the group. Surviving elements then dispersed throughout the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area.

Since then, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan have seen some attacks by Islamist militants. But many were related to political dynamics, not the movement in Afghanistan. A spillover of Afghan militancy is possible, but so far the threat is minimal.
More Pertinent Factors

Because Islamist spillover from northern Afghanistan is still a relatively minor threat, Russia's push into Central Asia may have other motivations. Moscow is engaged in a tense standoff with the West over Ukraine, just one theater in the competition for influence along the former Soviet periphery. Central Asia is another key region in this contest. The region possesses sizable oil and natural gas resources that are attractive to the European Union as it seeks to diversify energy supplies and end its dependence on Russia. Europe has already pursued Turkmenistan to join the Trans-Caspian pipeline project.

The United States has also been active in Central Asia, particularly from a security standpoint. The United States no longer uses Central Asian military bases that had been logistical centers for operations in Afghanistan, such as the Kant Air Base in Kyrgyzstan or the Karshi-Khanabad Air Base in Uzbekistan. These bases, however, have left a regional legacy. Washington maintains some security operations that include counternarcotics training with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

The United States has also expressed interest in increasing its commitment. The commander of U.S. Central Command, Gen. Lloyd Austin, said the United States was willing to provide military equipment and technology to support Turkmenistan's efforts to secure its border with Afghanistan. The United States also announced in January that it would grant over 200 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles to Uzbekistan previously used in the U.S. Northern Distribution Network in Afghanistan. Such gestures point to a U.S. desire to develop more cooperative security relationships with Central Asian states.

Moscow's military and security expansion efforts stem partly from its concern about these gestures. But Russia has not limited itself to deploying military personnel. Moscow has expanded the scope and membership of its Eurasian Union to include broader cooperation on issues including border controls. Kazakhstan is already a member, and Kyrgyzstan will soon join. Russia increased the number of exercises held by Collective Security Treaty Organization members. It also called on Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to cooperate more with the security bloc, though both have been hesitant.

However, Moscow's ability to solidify its position in Central Asia will be limited. Russia has a weak economy. Already, many Central Asian migrants who once worked in Russia have left, causing a decline in Russian remittances to the region. The West, and particularly the United States, will continue to have influence in the region. China, too, will continue to make economic and energy inroads.

Meanwhile, instability in the region will probably increase. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan both have potential succession crises in the offing. Moreover, demographic growth and competition over water resources are likely to threaten the region's security. Russia will see its position in Central Asia tested in the coming years. Islamist militancy is just one concern among many for Moscow and Central Asian governments.

[Crafty_Dog]

I have posted many times on this matter of the geopolitical significance of central Asia gas and how Russia needed it in order to control Europe:


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Russia Carries On With Turkish Stream Pipeline
Analysis
May 22, 2015 | 16:10 GMT

Russian energy company Gazprom has made it clear that it intends to move forward with the construction of the Turkish Stream natural gas pipeline as quickly as possible, whether or not the project can overcome political obstacles in Europe. Earlier in May, Gazprom notified a subsidiary of Italian energy firm Saipem that it could begin laying pipes for the planned 63 billion-cubic-meter pipeline in the Black Sea and also resumed a contract with Germany's Europipe for 150,000 metric tons of pipe for the project. Russia said it plans to start constructing the underwater portion of the pipeline in June.

Gazprom has already told Europe that it plans to cease using its current export route through Ukraine in 2019 and shift those natural gas supplies to the Turkish Stream pipeline. But the Europeans believe Russia will not follow through with its plans if Europe does not build the infrastructure necessary to deliver gas from Turkey to the markets currently serviced by the Ukrainian route. Meanwhile Russia has invested enough and has sufficient supplies available to at least begin construction on the first of Turkish Stream's four parallel pipelines, each with a capacity of about 16 billion cubic meters. Russia is banking on Europe caving in by the time Gazprom is ready to start constructing the other pipelines. Even if Europe does not compromise in the medium term, Gazprom can use a smaller version of Turkish Stream to supply the small but growing Turkish natural gas market.

Analysis

One of Russia's tools for influence in Europe is its status as the dominant producer of natural gas and oil for the Continent. Moscow also uses its pipeline networks to exert influence over transit states such as Belarus and Ukraine as well as European countries further downstream.

For much of the 2000s, Russia's primary export route into Europe was a main line through Ukraine that branched out as it headed west toward Austria, Italy, Germany and other major consumers. This meant that whenever Russia and Ukraine had a dispute that led to a cutoff of natural gas to Ukraine, as occurred in 2006 and 2009, it invariably impacted the supply of energy to the rest of Europe. To avoid repeating this scenario, Moscow mustered enough financial and political support to build the Nord Stream pipeline, which now delivers natural gas across the Baltic Sea directly to Germany, Gazprom's largest European customer.

South Stream was meant to be the southern route that would bypass Ukraine by delivering natural gas across the Black Sea directly to Bulgaria and then to Central and Southeastern Europe. The financial and political support for South Stream came more slowly than support for its northern counterpart, but by the end of 2013, South Stream had enough resources to begin awarding contracts for pipe-laying, pipe fabrication and other construction-related services. However, the crisis in Ukraine halted the project before all the contracts had been awarded, and what little political support it had in Southeastern Europe evaporated under strong political pressure from the European Commission and more dominant European countries. At the same time, Russia spiraled into another major financial crisis, leaving funding for such large projects in question. 

South Stream was canceled in December 2014. Almost immediately, it was replaced with the Turkish Stream plan, which is being designed to send the same amount of natural gas to Turkey as its ill-fated predecessor, almost directly across the border with Bulgaria. For Russia, Turkish Stream achieves the same goal as South Stream, but without the political constraints of transporting gas to EU member Bulgaria. And in return for its support of the new project, Turkey is hoping to get a 10.25 percent discount on its energy supply from Russia.
Turkish Stream

Russia is now using the contractors and subcontractors it enlisted for South Stream to accelerate the development of Turkish Stream. The contracts with Europipe and Saipem are just two of many that are likely to be migrated from the canceled project to its replacement. Gazprom is also likely prioritizing work on the first of the four planned parallel pipelines, each of which would carry about one-fourth of Turkish Stream's planned capacity. Gazprom hopes to have the first pipeline finished by December 2016.

Neither the Russian government nor Gazprom have the financing in place for the entire Turkish Stream project. Instead, they have opted to take a piecemeal approach. With oil and natural gas prices low, financing the later portions of Turkish Stream could be a challenge for Gazprom until Russia's economy improves.

Even before Russia envisioned Turkish Stream, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, for Gazprom to concurrently finance both South Stream and another planned energy project, the Power of Siberia pipeline to China — the combined cost of which would exceed $100 billion. This was one of the main reasons Gazprom sought international financial partners for both projects. Russia has secured significant financing from China for the Power of Siberia project, though Gazprom has complained that China has been slow in delivering the money. Russia has also swapped the order in which it initally planned to construct the two pipelines to China, choosing to prioritize the Altai pipeline, which will transport natural gas from western Siberia to the border with China between Kazakhstan and Mongolia. Choosing to construct this shorter pipeline first gives Gazprom more flexibility in financing Turkish Stream given limited Western capital.

Getting foreign participation from Europe is even more difficult for the Turkish Stream project than it was for South Stream. Even if the West relaxes sanctions on Russia, business confidence in long-term contracts with Russia will remain relatively low, meaning that Russia must offer fairly high rates of return. Politically, Turkish Stream is highly unpopular in Europe. The Europeans are making every effort possible to develop alternatives, such as the Trans-Anatolian, Trans-Adriatic and Trans-Caspian pipelines, which could transport natural gas from Turkmenistan to Europe. Companies in Europe are throwing their support and finances behind some of these other projects.

A major worry for Moscow is that Russia will build Turkish Stream but have no means of transporting Europe's natural gas beyond the Turkish border. Right now, almost all of Europe's natural gas transportation infrastructure goes either from Northwestern Europe, bringing natural gas from the North Sea into Central and Southeastern Europe, or from Ukraine westward or southward. None of the infrastructure is designed to bring natural gas from the extreme southeast to other markets. In essence, Turkey and Bulgaria are at the end of Eurasia's natural gas supply chain networks. Moving natural gas to the north and west was a problem with South Stream as well, but Russia eventually found partners to extend the pipeline all the way into Central Europe. Because of the European Union's Third Energy Package, Gazprom cannot build and operate pipelines in Europe, so it must wait for the Europeans to develop the infrastructure. The Trans-Adriatic and Trans-Anatolian pipelines are designed to solve this problem for natural gas from the Caspian region, but the initial capacity for the Trans-Adriatic is exempt from Europe's open access rules, meaning Gazprom cannot use it anytime soon.
Differences Between Nord Stream and Turkish Stream

A similar process existed for the construction of the Nord Stream pipeline. Gazprom began awarding the construction contracts and building the pipeline well before Moscow and Berlin finalized the political agreement for the project and before Gazprom had hammered out the final details concerning the onshore distribution networks. However, there are two major differences between Nord Stream and Turkish Stream.

First, Germany is Europe's wealthiest economy, and its industrial base provided the money needed to finance and build the infrastructure for Nord Stream. There is no equivalent sponsor country for Turkish Stream. The biggest consumer in the immediate region is obviously Turkey, which currently gets half of its Russian natural gas through Ukraine — notably, close to the same amount it could get through one of Turkish Stream's four planned pipelines, about 15 billion cubic meters. Turkey would not need to build a lot of infrastructure, since Turkish Stream would tap into existing pipeline networks north of Istanbul that deliver natural gas southward via the Ukrainian route. Italy could gain from the project, but it is already tied into other networks and is not heavily reliant on Russian natural gas. Economic constraints on many of the countries in Southeastern Europe, including Turkey, limit the financial backing available for projects such as Turkish Stream. Russia's best hope is that Western Europe would provide loands or other menas to incentivize the construction of networks to link to the planned Russian pipeline, but doing so would undermine the Europeans' policy of support for Ukraine and is thus politically unpopular in the European Union.

Second, Nord Stream was built in an entirely different geopolitical environment. Germany has become relatively assertive in negotiations with the Kremlin over the future of Ukraine. Nord Stream was planned and built without this tension as a backdrop. Moreover, Brussels has a greater political imperative to protect Ukraine's integrity and prominence. Its role as a transit state is key, because if Russia disrupts natural gas supplies to Ukraine, the Europeans will get involved, making the consequences more daunting for Moscow. Nord Stream was also built during a time of high energy prices, meaning high returns on investments in energy projects. Now that oil and natural gas prices are low, similarly high returns are unlikely.

Building the entire Turkish Stream pipeline project will be a complicated and protracted process, and the project may never reach its full potential. However, Russia's approach reveals a nuanced, low-risk plan for the pipeline. The capacity of the first of four planned pipelines is roughly equivalent to all of the natural gas that Russia delivers to Turkey through Ukraine. Moreover, the pipeline network that carries supplies from Ukraine to Turkey is already filled to capacity. Turkey is one of Russia's most important natural gas markets in the long term, and its natural gas demand has more than doubled over the past 10 years. By the mid 2020s, Turkey's natural gas demand could amount to the entire volume carried by the first two legs of Turkish Stream, and it will almost certainly need the amount of natural gas carried by the first leg even sooner.

This means that moving forward with Turkish Stream serves dual purposes: If the Europeans build the necessary infrastructure for Russia to tap into, then Moscow will have no problem accelerating the rest of the project. If not, then the new pipeline will still allow Russia to expand its export potential to the rapidly growing Turkish energy market.

[Crafty_Dog]

 How Turkmenistan Can Alter the Russia-West Standoff
Geopolitical Diary
June 25, 2015 | 23:32 GMT
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On Thursday, Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak expressed interest in potentially increasing Russia's natural gas imports from Turkmenistan. The same day, the Kazakh parliament ratified an agreement on the delineation of the Caspian Sea boundaries between Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. While seemingly mundane and unrelated, these two events are interconnected and reflect Turkmenistan's potential to fundamentally alter an important element of the standoff between Russia and the West.

Turkmenistan's importance stems from two factors: its energy resources and its location. The country produces 77 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year and exports 44 bcm annually. Its natural gas reserves, an estimated 17.5 trillion cubic meters, are among the world's largest, making it a major global natural gas producer and exporter capable of becoming an even more important energy player down the road.

But it is Turkmenistan's location that has elevated the country in the standoff between Russia and the West. Situated astride the Caspian Sea and between major energy consumers to the east and the west, Turkmenistan has become a key component of the "Southern Corridor" energy route that the European Union has been giving increasing consideration to as a means of reducing Europe's dependence on Russian energy. This route, which would facilitate the transport of energy supplies from the Caspian region through the Caucasus and Turkey and onward to Europe, is explicitly meant to avoid Russia, both as a supplier and transit route for energy.

Until now, Azerbaijan has been the only meaningful contributor to the Southern Corridor, primarily through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and South Caucasus pipelines, which have been transporting oil and natural gas respectively for the past decade. But the volumes that Azerbaijan exports to Europe are relatively small, and even the slated expansion of production and exports from the Shah Deniz II natural gas field, which is set to come online in 2018, is expected to add only around 10 bcm of natural gas supplies to Europe. But if another legitimate natural gas producer — like Turkmenistan — were to add to the natural gas supplies from Azerbaijan, the possibility of real diversification from Russia would go up considerably.

This consideration spawned an intense European diplomatic offensive over the past few months in an effort to persuade Turkmenistan to contribute to the Southern Corridor. The European Union is particularly interested in the Trans-Caspian Pipeline, which would be a relatively short conduit connecting Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan along the Caspian Sea.

However, two major issues stand in Europe's way. One is the legal status of the Caspian Sea, with maritime boundaries in dispute among the littoral states of Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. It has been a thorny issue for decades, and numerous summits and meetings have led to little concrete movement toward a legal resolution. But recent developments, including today's bilateral ratification between Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan over their border and statements by Kazakh Foreign Minister Erlan Idrissov that a "breakthrough" could be reached on the legal convention at the next Caspian summit in Astana in 2016, show that this issue may not be an obstacle for long.

The other, more difficult, issue is Russia itself. As it does in the rest of Central Asia, Moscow has political, social, economic and security influence over Ashgabat. Combined with Turkmenistan's self-imposed isolationism, centralized political system and wariness of Western involvement, Russia's leverage has made Ashgabat cautious when it comes to working with Europe, especially on strategic projects that threaten Russian interests and could provoke Moscow's ire.

But Turkmenistan is not willing to do Russia's bidding unconditionally. Ties between Ashgabat and Moscow have been strained since 2009, when a pipeline blast ruptured a major energy connection between the two countries. Previously, Turkmenistan had been sending more than 90 percent of its natural gas to Russia. But after that incident, Ashgabat sped up work on alternative pipeline projects, redirecting much of its exported natural gas to China. Though Turkmenistan is still reluctant to openly and officially commit to any Southern Corridor projects with Europe, Ashgabat has been more willing to discuss the matter and show that it is at least interested. Russia's pronouncement that it is open to increasing imports from Turkmenistan again is likely an acknowledgment that Ashgabat has other options — as well as that Turkmenistan's strategic importance has increased in light of Russia's weakened position and the West's more assertive actions in challenging Moscow in its near abroad.

Turkmenistan's decision to either remain aloof from Europe's attempts to diversify from Russian energy or to commit officially to participating in the Southern Corridor could have significant consequences. Ashgabat is likely to hold its cards close to its chest as long as it can, but watching for any indications of which direction Turkmenistan is leaning will be tremendously important to gauging the fate of the broader conflict between Russia and the West.

[Crafty_Dog]

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Russia Quietly Encroaches on Georgia
Analysis
July 28, 2015 | 09:00 GMT

Protesters wave Georgian flags in the village of Khurtaveli, close to the breakaway Georgian territory of South Ossetia, July 17. (VANO SHLAMOV/AFP Photo)

Summary

With Russia's help, the disputed territory of South Ossetia is encroaching more deeply into Georgia, but the expansion is unlikely to escalate into a major conflict. On July 10, Russian-backed South Ossetian forces unilaterally placed border markers close to the Georgian villages of Tsitelubani and Orchosani. The newly occupied area incorporated 1,605 meters (almost a mile) of the BP-operated Baku-Supsa pipeline. Though this symbolic show of power is important in its own right, it is part of a larger trend: The South Ossetians have slowly been pushing their boundaries southward into Georgian territory over the past several years. The drive is prompted by several factors, including Russia's insecure military position in South Ossetia, which lacks geographic depth and is threatened by the West's increased military activities in the Black Sea region. However, despite the slow advancement into Georgian territory, Russia is unlikely to stage a major military campaign any time soon.

Analysis

Since the war between Georgia and Russia-backed South Ossetia ended in 1992, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, there has been no clearly demarcated line between Tbilisi-controlled and separatist-controlled territory. After the war, Tbilisi governed large parts of the territories that belonged to the South Ossetian autonomous republic during Soviet times, including most of the strategically important Akhalgori region. Although skirmishes along the dividing line occasionally took place, they did not devolve into something serious until 2008, when war broke out between Georgia and Russia. In August 2008, South Ossetian and Russian forces occupied the Akhalgori region and pushed past the demarcated border to occupy land controlled by Tbilisi. Since then, the South Ossetians, with Russian help, have been actively building defensive infrastructure to fend off any possible Georgian assault.

Following the 2008 war, the Russians began creeping into Georgian territory rather than forcefully advancing on it. In 2010, reports surfaced alleging that Russian forces had pushed the border 2 kilometers southward in the Akhalgori region. Authorities quickly denied the reports, but Tbilisi had to admit that the border had indeed advanced farther into Georgian territory since the 2008 war, particularly near the Perevi village in eastern South Ossetia. In March 2013, Russian and South Ossetian forces fenced in five villages, comprising some 100 hectares. Later, in May and September of the same year, the Russians moved farther south and occupied the mainly Georgian-populated villages of Ditsi and Dvani. In Dvani alone, the border moved by some 600 meters. But these moves were dwarfed this year by Russia's July 10 advance into the Georgian-populated villages of Tsitelubani and Orchosani.

Russia's Strategic Motivations

Moscow had military superiority over Georgia in the war of 2008. However, Russian forces faced an important strategic challenge thereafter: how to defend South Ossetia, which unlike the other breakaway territory of Abkhazia, does not share a long border with Russia. Instead, South Ossetia is almost completely surrounded by Georgian territory. And Tskhinvali — the capital of South Ossetia and a strategically important city on the route north to the major Caucasian pass Djava — is very close to the Georgian border, which inhibits the Russian forces from having geographic depth for effective defense. Furthermore, there are no major rivers or mountain ranges running along the contact line between the Georgian and separatist regions. In fact, there is no geographic barrier at all until Gori — a strategically important city at the center of the country. Moving southward provides the Russians with a necessary geographic depth, which, along with the development of defensive infrastructure, would buy them time if conflict broke out again. Nevertheless, the Russians would still find the lack of natural obstacles problematic if it came to open warfare.

The timing of the July 10 advance is also interesting because of the evolving political situation and rising Western military influence in the South Caucasus amid the broader standoff between Russia and the West. Georgia's integration efforts with the European Union present a major problem for Russia. In addition, Moscow is especially worried about the increasing military cooperation, constant defense meetings and military drills taking place between Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkey — intended to protect the major infrastructure projects running through all the three countries. Russia is also likely uncomfortable with the fact that the Georgian military has been holding joint military drills with U.S. and NATO forces more and more regularly over the past several months. In fact, many previous Russian pushes southward also took place as Tbilisi made major steps toward integration with the European Union and NATO, so it is unsurprising that the most recent push would coincide with the NATO-sponsored military drills dubbed Agile Spirit that are currently taking place in Georgia.

Although tactical border movements seem like an unusual political response, they are important when it comes to ensuring Russia's defensive capabilities in South Ossetia. A NATO training center is set to open in Georgia later this year, which will enhance Tbilisi's military capabilities and boost the Western military presence on Georgian soil. It is within this context that Russia is working to also expand its capabilities in the area. And this improvement aligns with Russia's broader regional policies; at the beginning of this year, the Kremlin announced it would strengthen its bases in South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Armenia. It also recently provided Armenia with a $200 million loan for military purchases.

Georgia can be divided roughly into two parts, east and west, connected only through the east-west highway. The section of the BP-operated pipeline that falls within the recently-seized territory may be important for Russia, but the highway, which serves as a major trade route for land transportation from Azerbaijan to the Black Sea ports and east Turkey, is no less important. Because two BP-operated pipelines, the Baku-Supsa and Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, roughly run along this major highway, Russian posturing there sends a clear message to the West that Russia has a great deal of control over energy as well as Caspian and European trade. Though so far energy flows through the Baku-Supsa have not been hindered, and BP and Western governments alike seem relatively calm, by advancing southward Russia has acquired an additional tool for influencing regional governments and BP in the South Caucasus region.

Thus, Russia's recent moves in South Ossetia are motivated by its security and strategic concerns in the territory and are part of its overall military strategy in the South Caucasus. Though a major Russian military operation into Georgia is very unlikely at the moment, it is clear that both sides, Georgia and South Ossetia with Russian support, are trying to improve their position within the given restraints. Georgia is trying to connect to its NATO and Western allies and is trying to improve its own military capabilities. South Ossetia, on the other hand, is integrating security efforts with Russia and is trying to gradually nudge the border outward to increase the depth of its territory, enabling Tskhinvali to better defend itself.

[Crafty_Dog]

Summary

Heightened militancy along Afghanistan's northern border in recent months is gaining attention, both within Central Asia and outside the region. And world powers are becoming more focused on stopping it. At a recent Commonwealth of Independent States summit on Oct. 16, Russian President Vladimir Putin said the bloc's member states could create a joint task force to patrol the border. Meanwhile, Russian officials have hinted that Moscow may return its forces to the Afghanistan-Tajikistan border. Other countries, including Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, appear to be seeking their own approaches to tackling the border threat that could involve the United States. These developments indicate that the border between Afghanistan and the Central Asian states could heat up in the coming months, both militarily and politically. However, the threat of rising militancy is only one factor among many — not the least of which is the U.S.-Russia standoff — that will determine how the conflict plays out.
Analysis

The borders between Afghanistan and the Central Asian countries of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have long been important from a security standpoint for countries inside and outside the region. Historically, they did not exist as concretely as they do now; rather, constant warfare in the region meant that frontier areas frequently changed hands. However, beginning in the 19th century, the spread of the Russian Empire into Central Asia and the British Empire into what is now Afghanistan solidified the country's modern political borders. Then, in the early 20th century, the transition from the Russian Empire to the Soviet Union led to the official closure of Afghanistan's borders for the first time in history, creating significantly different political and cultural identities among the ethnic Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmens in Afghanistan and within the Soviet Union.

But though the border was officially closed, ties were far from severed between the ethnic groups. Because of the geography of the area, interaction and movement between the peoples of Central Asia and Afghanistan were difficult to stop. This was exemplified by the large movement of people from Tajikistan to Afghanistan and back during the Tajik Civil War of 1992-1997 and once again with the rise of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), whose members frequently traveled in and out of Afghanistan during the militant group's rise in the late 1990s and early 2000s.

But the militancy problem was soon resolved, at least temporarily, with the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks. The intervention effectively destroyed much of the IMU and sent the rest of its members into the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area, at which point the militant group ceased to pose an existential threat to regimes in Central Asia. In the ensuing decade, there were only a few sporadic attacks attributed to the IMU (and even those reports were questionable) within Central Asia. However, with the drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan and with the subsequent rise of the Islamic State throughout the Middle East and South Asia, the border between Central Asia and Afghanistan is once again a hot spot and a source of significant preoccupation for external powers.

The increased presence and activity of militant groups, especially the Taliban and the Islamic State, are of particular concern. In late September, Taliban forces took the strategic northern Afghan city of Kunduz, and there have been several shootouts and attacks on or near Afghanistan's border posts with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Security officials from Central Asia have claimed that as many as tens of thousands of Islamic State- or Taliban-affiliated militants are operating in northern Afghanistan and that their numbers and materiel are only growing.
Russia's Stake

This is especially worrisome for Russia, which is the dominant external power in Central Asia and the leader of the Commonwealth of Independent States political grouping, which counts several Central Asian states as members. At the bloc's Oct. 16 summit in Astana, Putin announced that the group's leaders had agreed to create a joint task force to defend the bloc's borders in case of crisis. While the specifics of the task force, including how it would be composed or where it would be deployed, were not given, the announcement was clearly made with Afghanistan in mind. Discussion on the country dominated the summit. Putin's announcement also came after several Russian security officials hinted that Russia could redeploy troops to Tajikistan's border with Afghanistan, where Russian troops served as border guards until 2005.

While this talk indicates the serious possibility that Russia's security presence in Central Asia will grow, not all countries in the region would be supportive of such an increase. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are members of the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) military bloc, and the latter two countries host Russian military bases. But Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan traditionally have been much more resistant to joining Russia-led alliances or integration projects. Indeed, Stratfor has received reports that the two countries have decided to shun Russia's border task force initiative and may instead pursue a bilateral agreement on joint border security related to Afghanistan.

There are several recent developments that would seem to corroborate these reports of a bilateral agreement between Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. One is the meeting between the two countries' presidents in Tashkent on Oct. 8, during which they discussed security cooperation and the countering of international terrorism. Another is Turkmenistan's public rebuttal of Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev's statement, which he made alongside Putin prior to the Commonwealth of Independent States summit, that there had been a growing number of security incidents along the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan border. This comment was accompanied by statements by the Russian and Kazakh leaders that Central Asian countries and Russia need to work together to jointly counter the threat of Islamist extremism coming out of Afghanistan, something Turkmenistan implicitly suggested it does not agree with.
Turning to the United States

As it turns away from Russia, Turkmenistan appears to be turning toward another foreign power, the United States, to counter the threat from Afghanistan. On Oct. 15, a delegation led by Turkmen Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov traveled to Washington to discuss economic and security issues. The visit followed reports that Turkmenistan had requested increased U.S. military aid, which was acknowledged by U.S. Central Command Gen. Lloyd Austin but has not been confirmed by Ashgabat. Uzbekistan also received military assistance from the United States earlier this year in the form of more than 300 mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles, in what was the largest transfer of U.S. military equipment to a Central Asian country ever seen; however, Uzbekistan also recently held security consultations with Russia.

Therefore, concerns about a spillover of militant activity from Afghanistan into Central Asia appear to be becoming more politicized as larger opposing powers are drawn into the mix. In fact, concrete evidence has yet to emerge of a true rise in Islamist militant activity within Central Asia itself. And both Russia and the United States have interests in the region that go beyond the immediate security situation, though stemming the spread of militancy from Afghanistan is certainly a legitimate concern for both. Russia, for its part, is interested in remaining the dominant military and political power in Central Asia and in keeping other external players out. The United States is interested in challenging Russian primacy and influence throughout the former Soviet periphery. The Central Asian states, too, may have ulterior motives for playing up security threats, since it could give them pretense to crack down on opposition elements at home.

This is not to say that the threat of militancy spilling over from Afghanistan into Central Asia is not a real one: Militancy and instability in northern Afghanistan are certainly on the rise, and Turkmenistan allegedly deployed as much as 70 percent of its military along the Afghan border. But the fact remains that the numerous other complex and opaque strategic considerations in play will likely make the Afghan border an important locale for wider struggles in the coming months and years.

[Crafty_Dog]

Summary

After a decades-long standoff, Armenia and Azerbaijan may be making diplomatic progress toward resolving their bitter dispute over the breakaway territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. Both countries claim the semi-autonomous region, which lies along the southern half of their shared border, but since the end of a six-year war over the territory in 1994, Armenia has exercised control there and in seven adjacent regions also wrested from Azerbaijani rule. For 15 years, Russian support for Armenia has kept Azerbaijan from mounting another viable challenge to retake Nagorno-Karabakh. However, Russia's increasingly fragile position amid its standoff with the West and Azerbaijan's ability to leverage this change may soon prompt deals on several of the regions adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh.

Analysis

The dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan is one of several frozen conflicts in the former Soviet space that have persisted since the collapse of the Soviet Union. After the end of the war in the early 1990s, there was a period of relative calm. But over the past year, military clashes along the border have intensified as Azerbaijan has increased cross-border raids and shootouts.

In what may be a harbinger of changes to come, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov made an unannounced visit to Armenia on Nov. 9 in what some local media have billed as a "secret" trip to discuss Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia has played a significant role in the dispute, both as the main mediator in political negotiations between the two countries and as Armenia's de facto security guarantor. (Russia has 5,000 troops in Armenia.) But after years of defending Armenia's claims, Russia may be more open to negotiating with Azerbaijan now that Moscow is under increased pressure from the West.

Meanwhile, Azerbaijan is being seen as a potential alternative energy supplier to the Europeans, and Baku is using its newfound political clout to lobby Moscow to change its position on Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan has expanded economic and security cooperation and has cultivated a more active diplomatic relationship with Russia. At the same time, it is becoming more aggressive toward Armenia, conducting cross-border raids and initiating shootouts along the line of conflict more frequently.
A Diplomatic Resolution

Stratfor has previously laid out several potential directions the Nagorno-Karabakh standoff could go. As Azerbaijan grows bolder, it may reach an agreement with Armenia that gives it control of the regions surrounding the breakaway territory. If the diplomatic route fails, Azerbaijan may increase the scale of its military activities. And of course, there is always the possibility that the tense standoff will drag on, tensions unabated.

Recent developments suggest the three major parties involved are seriously considering the first scenario: a diplomatically brokered resolution to the conflict. On Nov. 11, several Armenian newspapers, referring to their own sources as well as to media reports from Russia, ran articles and commentaries framing Lavrov's recent visit to Yerevan as an appeal for Armenia to return five out of seven territories adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan. In exchange, Russia would place its own troops in these territories to guarantee that war would not resume and also to convince Azerbaijan to end its economic blockade of Armenia. Citing sources involved in the negotiation process, the Russian daily Kommersant added that the Lachin corridor — a key supply route into Nagorno-Karabakh from Armenia proper — would remain in Armenia's control, as would the region of Kalbajar. Azerbaijan, for its part, would end military hostilities and commit itself to peace talks.

Though neither country has confirmed these reports, there are several reasons to take them seriously. Of particular note is the specificity about the terms of the rumored negotiations. There have been alleged leaks pertaining to talks over Nagorno-Karabakh before, but none of them included this level of concrete detail. Moreover, Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan has on multiple occasions said that Armenia could accept relinquishing control of Nagorno-Karabakh's adjacent regions as long as a secure land link were maintained and international security guarantees were implemented — which would be the case according to the purported current deal. Russia has also recently been signaling its intention to deepen security ties with Armenia through the transfer of military helicopters and the establishment of a joint air defense system, which is an important prerequisite for Yerevan to even consider giving territorial concessions in the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. The leaders of Nagorno-Karabakh have also hinted to local media that the Russian military may use the airport in the breakaway territory's capital for counter-terrorism exercises.
Armenia's Reservations

Of course, the reports emerging in local media — no matter how credible the source may be — do not guarantee that Armenia will indeed relinquish control of the regions surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh. The dispute is still an extremely sensitive political issue in Armenia, where the public feels a strong sense of national ownership over the territory. The last Armenian president to seriously negotiate a change to the status quo, Levon Ter-Patrosyan, was even forced to resign by popular demand. To make any concession, Armenia's current government would need guarantees it could survive a negotiated settlement. But given Armenia's weak economy and increasing social unrest, making concessions to Azerbaijan could be particularly inflammatory at the moment. Even if the government could make a negotiated settlement over Nagorno-Karabakh politically feasible, there would be extremely challenging logistical issues, including the status of the roughly 500,000 mostly Armenian residents residing in the surrounding regions (the exact number of which is disputed).

If negotiations do proceed, other external powers, notably Turkey and the United States, will likely try to shape any diplomatic resolution to align with their own strategic interests. Both Ankara and Washington are increasingly focused on the Caucasus region, as demonstrated by the U.S. naval chief's recent visit to Azerbaijan and by Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu's plan to visit Baku in his first foreign trip since the formation of a new government in Turkey.

That being said, it cannot be ignored that the diplomatic activity related to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has seen a marked uptick in recent months, and there are increasingly detailed elements of the negotiations that are being leaked to the local and Russian media. The constraints on both Russia and Armenia also suggest that these countries cannot maintain their position on preserving the status quo on the conflict indefinitely. Therefore, the likelihood that control of the regions adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh will change hands is increasing, and the parameters of a potential deal — if one is able to be made — are becoming slowly but increasingly clear. 

[Crafty_Dog]

Summary

The standoff between Russia and the West is once again heating up, but this time tensions are centered on the Caucasus. On Nov. 11, Russian President Vladimir Putin instructed his government to sign an agreement with Armenia to create a joint missile air defense system in the region. Not long after, the Armenian government confirmed that Russian Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev is expected to visit Armenia in late November to officially sign the air defense system deal.

The move, though reminiscent of Moscow's actions in Central Asia and Belarus in previous years, comes at a time when Russia is being forced to respond to a wider array of challenges than ever before. Threats are rising from the Near East, while the West is ramping up its military activities in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh moves closer to changing its political status. And as Russia increases its military presence in Armenia, its competition with major regional powers for influence in the South Caucasus will intensify, adding to the growing list of issues Russia must contend with outside its borders.

Analysis

Russia has been pursuing the creation of a joint air defense system with Belarus and several Central Asian countries for some time. If constructed, the system would help Moscow better prepare for a range of threats growing beyond Russia's borders, including NATO's military buildup in Eastern Europe and rising terrorism in Afghanistan.

Putin's Nov. 11 order would create another similar system in Armenia that would protect the airspace far south of the Russian border. It would most likely involve air defenses and Russian combat jets deployed in Russia's Southern Military District. But it would also be located in a geopolitically complex region where many other regional players have significant strategic interests. An expanding military presence will put Russia in direct competition with Turkey's ambitions in the South Caucasus and Georgia's cooperation with NATO and U.S. forces. It will also put the brakes on Azerbaijan's goal of retaking its separatist Nagorno-Karabakh region and seven adjacent territories.

For Armenia's part, the joint air defense deal comes at an opportune time. Its government has received mounting criticism from Armenian politicians and media amid a growing belief that the country's membership in the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization and its reliance on Russia as a security guarantor have yielded few results, particularly as Azerbaijan pursues a more assertive military posture around Nagorno-Karabakh. Under the new agreement, Armenian air defenses will be strengthened, and the country will likely see new air defense equipment, radios, radar systems and combat helicopters deployed to its territory. Armenian Minister of Territorial Administration and Emergency Situations Armen Yeritsyan also recently announced that the Stepanavan Airport, located a mere 20 kilometers (about 12 miles) from the Armenia-Georgia border, will host Russian Mi-24 and KA-32 heavy helicopters starting in 2016. While these aircraft do not amount to a projection of Russian force because of their limited range, they do reflect the Kremlin's broader policy of boosting its air capabilities in Armenia — a process that dates back to January 2014, when Russia announced that it would strengthen Armenia's Erebuni Airport with Mi-24P, Mi-8MT and Mi-8SMV helicopters. Along a similar vein, Nagorno-Karabakh's president has said Russian forces may use his region's Stepanakert Airport for air operations, an offer that may be in response to the recent uptick in air cooperation between Armenia and Russia.

Russia's growing military presence in the South Caucasus will be especially worrisome to Turkey and Azerbaijan, Armenia's longtime rivals in the region. The two countries have ramped up their joint military exercises with Georgia over the past year, posing a heightened threat to Armenia, whose strategic position is already weak. Since Turkey already had less ability than Russia to project power into the South Caucasus, the Kremlin's recent moves will only increase the gap between Russian and Turkish influence there, thus intensifying their competition for sway in the wider region. Meanwhile, Russia's stronger aerial presence in Armenia could alter the military balance of power between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Azerbaijani politicians have already voiced concerns about the air defense agreement, and on Nov. 11 — the same day Putin gave his orders to sign the deal — Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev visited his country's S-300 anti-aircraft missile brigade, the unit responsible for Azerbaijan's aerial defenses.

The timing of the deal is significant for a number of reasons. First, it signals Russia's response to recent developments in the ongoing standoff between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. As talks progress on Armenia handing over to Azerbaijan several regions adjacent to the breakaway territory, Russia will boost its military presence in the South Caucasus to ensure the security of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh and to make any further territorial concessions more politically palatable to Yerevan. Second, as Russia becomes more involved in the Syrian conflict, Moscow is keen to increase its ability to monitor its southern borders — a goal that a military presence in Armenia, with its proximity to the Middle East, is ideally suited to achieve.

Beneath these more immediate motives, the Kremlin also has several deeper, long-term strategic interests in mind. From Moscow's perspective, Georgia is moving closer — perhaps dangerously so — to the West. The country recently opened a NATO training center, and it continues to hold regular exercises with U.S. forces. In June and July, Georgia signed deals with France to procure an advanced system that would guarantee its air defense. Given the fact that Georgia was placed under a Western military embargo after the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, these events indicate an important turnaround taking place in relations between Georgia and the West. They also show that the air superiority Moscow heavily relied on to win its last conflict with Georgia may no longer be so assured.

Maintaining an advantage in air capabilities will remain a high priority for Moscow and will continue to drive Russia's military buildup in the South Caucasus. The Kremlin's latest air defense deal with Armenia is just another part of that effort as Moscow looks to counter rising threats from the Near East and Western encroachment upon the Russian periphery.

[G M]

Becomes today's headlines....

http://news.sky.com/story/1593241/putin-downing-of-jet-a-stab-in-the-back

I'm sure Putin will be fine with this.

[ppulatie]

Nothing to see here.  It was only Russia.

I wonder if we will ever get the real story on this. I would trust the Turkey version as much as I would trust either the Russian or US version.

[Crafty_Dog]

My initial read is that whereas the Russians felt free to march into our HQ in Baghdad and give us one hour to get the fk out of their way, they now know better with the Turks.  This ain't the first time they fuct with Turkish airspace and they were warned plenty this time.

[Crafty_Dog]

I have underlined on this forum this matter of gas pipelines in this region for many years now.
===================

Forecast

    Turkish demand for energy will keep rising as the country industrializes, leaving Turkey reliant on energy imports for the foreseeable future.
    Turkey will leverage its substantial negotiating power in TurkStream talks with Gazprom to secure significant discounts on Russian natural gas.
    Turkey will continue to pursue other pipeline projects as part of its longer-term strategy to position itself as a regional energy transit hub to gain influence with its neighbors.

Analysis

Editor's Note: Stratfor closely monitors the ebbs and flows of world energy. Aside from production, the transportation of crude oil, natural gas and petroleum products is of paramount concern for oil-producing nations. For energy consumers, transit routes are indispensible lifelines. A huge amount of the world's energy is transited through pipelines, across the Eurasian landmass in particular. In this periodic series we will examine some of the most geopolitically significant pipelines running through Europe and Asia. In this installment, Stratfor examines TurkStream, the successor to South Stream, from the Turkish perspective.

Europe and Russia continue to spar for political influence in Eurasia in the latest battle over Russia's TurkStream pipeline project, formerly known as Turkish Stream. But as the two major powers pursue loftier goals of power and containment, Turkey — a country with regional aspirations of its own — is quietly maneuvering to secure its position as a crucial energy transit hub at the crossroads of the Middle East, Europe and Asia.
A Growing Need for Energy

Turkey's position on Russia's TurkStream pipeline is far more straightforward than that of Europe or Russia. In short, Turkey lacks energy resources and has always relied on significant imports to meet the demands of its economy. As Turkey continues to industrialize and take its place as a regional power, its energy needs will only grow, and perhaps quite rapidly.

Russia maintains a comfortable hold on its position as Turkey's largest supplier of natural gas. In 2014, Russian natural gas accounted for 55 percent of Turkish natural gas consumption. Ankara is uneasy about Turkey's heavy reliance on Russian natural gas, particularly in light of the two countries' greater competition for influence in the Black Sea and the Caucasus. These concerns are only deepened by the fact that Turkey lies at the end of the supply chain routing Russian natural gas through Ukraine, putting it at risk of supply shortages in the event that Russia cuts off flows to Ukraine. But no alternative supplier currently exists to satisfy Turkey's domestic consumption.

Given its lack of options, Turkey will most likely choose to support the TurkStream project in the end. Still, it will probably hold out on finalizing any deal until it can pressure Gazprom, Russia's state-owned natural gas company, into granting Turkey heavy discounts on Russian natural gas in exchange for its backing.
Larger Goals Drive Ankara's Strategy

Beyond the immediate benefit of guaranteeing cheaper natural gas for Turkish consumers, the TurkStream pipeline will play into Turkey's longer-term aspirations of establishing itself as a key energy transit hub at the intersection of Europe, Asia and the Middle East. Turkey hopes to then use its newfound role to reshape its partnerships and reassert its influence in the wider region.

With this objective in mind, Ankara has long promoted the majority of energy transit projects that would pass through Turkey. Some of these projects include the Blue Stream II, which would have transported Russian natural gas to the Levant; the ill-fated Nabucco pipeline, which would have sent Azerbaijani natural gas to Central Europe; and most recently, the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) and Trans-Adriatic Pipeline, which will send Azeri natural gas to Europe. In each case, Turkey stood to benefit by collecting both transit fees and natural gas supplies from the pipelines running across its territory.

Interactive
Interactive: Veins of Influence

The TurkStream pipeline would offer a similar opportunity at a time when Turkey is gaining a greater ability to take advantage of its strategic location. In previous years, a number of geopolitical constraints have undermined Turkey's value as a potential energy transit state. Western sanctions against Iran, for example, have tabled the option of sending Iranian natural gas to Europe, while the state of relations between Moscow and Brussels has largely determined the success or failure of several proposed routes. But the recent agreement between Iran and the West could pave the way for exporting Iranian natural gas to Europe by the mid-to-late 2020s, while Moscow and Brussels have begun to put their full political thrust behind the TurkStream and TANAP projects, respectively. With these developments, Turkey may now be in a better position to leverage its location to push for pipelines that traverse its borders.

With several alternative pipeline routes to Europe in play, Russia is seeing its own options narrow. The European Union is continuing to push forward with all of its Southern Gas Corridor projects, for which Turkmenistan has long been viewed as a potential source of natural gas. Although the controversial issue of piping natural gas across the Caspian Sea historically has been a deal-breaker for any Trans-Caspian route, Moscow has signaled that the Caspian countries may well sign a deal establishing maritime rights during the upcoming 2016 Caspian Summit. Meanwhile, the possibility of Iran emerging as a new European supplier in the wake of Russia's South Stream failure has left the Kremlin scrambling to find a viable transit alternative to Ukraine, and quickly. Turkey may be the only logical partner Russia has left.

None of this is to say Turkey will not be taking a risk by backing the TurkStream project. Turkey remains heavily dependent on Russian natural gas, although it has asserted that TurkStream will not increase its reliance on Russian supplies. Ankara has argued that it will merely be swapping Russian natural gas imported via Ukraine with imports sourced from TurkStream and that Russia's increased dependence on Turkey as a transit state will balance their energy relationship somewhat.

But the TurkStream project also will not prevent Turkey from seeking other alternatives, and it has not affected the construction of the TANAP project. Ultimately, the power in the TurkStream negotiations lies with Ankara, which will use its advantage to pursue its own regional ambitions. Meanwhile, Russia, lacking any other southern corridor options, will have little choice but to meet Turkey's demands.

[Crafty_Dog]

Forecast

    As Russia's financial circumstances worsen, many of the country's Muslim republics will try to attract outside investment by implementing Islamic finance tools and establishing joint banks with Muslim countries, despite federal regulations.
    Fearing the potential political and social consequences, the Kremlin will try to keep the regions' Islamic financing and Persian Gulf ties to a minimum unless they funnel through Moscow.
    The prospect of the Muslim republics growing distant from the Russian government or being influenced by foreign states will continue to trouble Moscow, particularly since many of those regions pose the greatest internal threats to Russian security.

Analysis

As Russia's economy continues to stagnate, the country's 83 regions are being forced to compete with one another for outside investment to stay afloat. The quest for funding was a popular theme at the recent St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, where regional governments and corporations tried to woo foreign partners and financiers. Some regions have focused their campaigns on Asia and Europe: The Kaluga and Kaliningrad provinces, for example, have signed investment deals with Bavaria, and Kaluga's governor visited Vietnam earlier in the year seeking funding. But four of Russia's Muslim republics — Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Chechnya and Dagestan — have set their sights on Muslim states in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, a strategy that has put Moscow on edge.

Making Ends Meet

Russia's Muslim population is growing rapidly, thanks to high fertility rates and an influx of immigrants from predominantly Muslim Central Asia. Now nearly 13 percent of Russians are Muslim, and most live in the country's eight autonomous Muslim republics: Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Chechnya, Karachay-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Ingushetia, Dagestan and Adygea. Under Russian law, these regions — autonomous republics because of their non-Russian majorities — can choose their own languages, constitutions, presidents and security structures. Moscow granted the regions these freedoms, albeit begrudgingly, in the wake of the North Caucasus wars in an effort to quell secessionist sentiment and instability.

The Muslim republics' economies vastly differ from one another. Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, for instance, are two of the most developed regions in Russia because of their oil and agricultural wealth. Both regional governments control their own energy firms, which provide the bulk of the regions' budgets, as well as their own banking systems. In fact, according to Forbes, Tatarstan's two largest banks rank among Russia's most reliable banking institutions. Chechnya and Dagestan, meanwhile, are still struggling to overcome the damage caused by nearly two decades of war with Russia, as are their neighbors in the North Caucasus. Economic growth in these republics relies on federal subsidies, which have been substantial in recent years. Over the past decade, Kremlin funds have made up 80 to 90 percent of the Chechen and Dagestani budgets and more than half of the other North Caucasus regions' budgets. Similarly, the banking systems of Chechnya and Dagestan are dependent on Russia's federal banking system, a stark contrast to the independent banks of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan.

Despite their economic differences, Russia's Muslim republics have been uniformly hurt by the collapse in global oil prices. Growth has slowed in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, while the North Caucasus regions have seen their subsidies halved amid the Russian recession. For the past two years, Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov has even had to dip into his administration's private reserves to make up for his region's budgetary shortfalls (though, admittedly, the reserves were built with funds gained by docking civil servants' salaries). Moscow has not stepped in to address the issue, leaving Russia's regions to look for external investment and financial support on their own.

Finding Financiers in the Muslim World

Some of Russia's Muslim republics have more experience in finding outside backers than others. Tatarstan and Bashkortostan have been fairly successful in maintaining the interest of foreign investors for the past 10 years; Tatarstan is considered Russia's best region for investment, while Bashkortostan is among the top 10. Each has industrial and high-tech economic zones and enough independence from Moscow to strike deals with foreign partners. By contrast, the republics of the North Caucasus have attracted very little foreign investment over the years.

Across the board, though, Russia's Muslim republics are weighing the merits of adopting Islamic lending laws to solve their financial predicament. Unlike conventional finance rules, these laws prohibit lenders from charging interest. Instead, loans more closely resemble investments in specific projects, deriving profit from those projects' success. Islamic financing mechanisms are also often backed by physical assets, making them less risky than their conventional counterparts. From the republics' perspective, the use of Islamic financing would draw the interest not only of Muslim consumers at home but also of other Muslim states.

But their plan has hit a snag: Islamic financing has been legally banned in Russia because it does not require interest payments as traditional financial instruments do. Some Islamic finance tools that resemble profit-sharing agreements between lender and borrower have also been prohibited because they are technically classified as "commercial activities," which Russian banks cannot participate in. Some banks, including federal ones, have found loopholes to skirt the law. Others, such as those in the Muslim republics, have simply ignored it outright, issuing transactions under Islamic banking guidelines or negotiating with foreign financial groups to start implementing them.

The Kremlin, meanwhile, has neither fully supported nor blocked the regions' use of Islamic financing. In March, the Central Bank of Russia approved a roadmap for Tatarstan to begin exploring Islamic banking mechanisms as a test case. The government has yet to change Russian laws on the matter, however, and according to Tatar banks, Russian banks have stalled talks on joint projects with Tatar banks and foreign lenders over the past year. So Tatarstan has struck out on its own. Last year, the region's largest bank, AK Bark, began to issue Islamic bonds that come with far lower rates and fees than its eurobonds do. At the same time, Tatar insurance operator Alliance began to sell an Islamic financial product called Halal Invest.

Tatarstan is hoping that its use of Islamic finance will pull in investment from members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), with which the region has had close ties for some time. In the past few years, funding from the Gulf states has indeed risen dramatically, jumping from $60 million in 2011 to $760 million in 2015. Most of the new money has been funneled toward the Smart City being built in Tatarstan's capital, Kazan. The special economic zone will host biomedical, hospital and academic research centers, along with information technology development labs, employing some 50,000 people in total. By venturing into Islamic financing, Tatarstan is attempting to secure even more resources for its cornerstone project. To that end, it has entered into talks with Saudi Arabia's Islamic Development Bank, which has promised to make Tatarstan the Islamic finance hub of Russia within the next few years.

Chechnya has not been far behind. Like Tatarstan, Chechnya has sought partnerships with the Gulf states — including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates — over the past few years. Kadyrov has discussed several construction projects in Grozny with Saudi and Emirati officials, though both delegations expressed concern over the region's lack of Islamic money-transfer systems. In response, the Chechen president announced early in 2016 that his region would open an Islamic bank and consult with an Emirati investment firm to establish a joint venture with a GCC partner. A high-ranking Saudi delegation is scheduled to visit Chechnya in the coming months to revisit investment talks.

Bashkortostan and Dagestan have been slower to follow in Tatarstan and Chechnya's footsteps. Bashkortostan has close ties to Tatarstan and has opted to wait and see whether its efforts to create a viable Islamic financing system pan out. Similarly, Dagestan has put off creating its own system until it sees how nearby Chechnya's fares.

Russia Moves to Minimize the Gulf's Clout

The question now is whether Russia will allow Gulf state financing to continue. For years, Moscow avoided making deals with the Gulf states because of its complicated relationships in the region. But when its ties to the West began deteriorating in 2014, Russia began to look for other partners. After sapping up its major investment avenues in China, the Kremlin finally began to reach out to the GCC. Between 2014 and 2015, the Gulf states pledged some $25 billion in funding for Russia — but Moscow kept those funds tightly controlled through the Russian Direct Investment Fund.

Now that the Gulf states are reaching deeper into Russia by bypassing Moscow and negotiating directly with the regions, the Kremlin is faced with a dilemma. On one hand, it cannot afford to prop up the Muslim republics on its own. On the other, it also cannot allow the regions to fall into disrepair for fear of the instability it may cause, and it is unwilling to alienate its rapidly expanding Muslim population. But from Moscow's perspective, the rise of Islamic financing is worrisome for a couple of reasons. For one, the Sharia principles inherent in Islamic financing do not mesh with those of Russia's banking system. Moreover, the GCC is interested in promoting Sharia principles more broadly within the republics' communities — something that runs counter to Russia's history of clamping down on strong, independent Islamic ideologies among its people. The Kremlin will accept the Gulf states' money — if it chooses to do so — only as long as it can ensure that the funds go to projects that will not undermine its hold on the Muslim republics.

In addition, Moscow is concerned that the diversification of the republics' investment and business options could further distance them from the federal banking system, or by the same token, grant them greater independence. Nearly all of Russia's Muslim republics have experienced bouts of secessionism, though some have been stronger than others. The Kremlin, therefore, will be careful not to give the regions too much room to establish robust and independent financial systems. Indeed, Tatarstan's two biggest banks have already complained that Russia's federal banks, VTB and Sberbank, are aggressively trying to expand in the region, pressuring Tatar banks to give up some of their business in the process.

The Kremlin is also wary of GCC states gaining direct avenues of influence in Russia's Muslim republics. Concerns about color revolutions and infiltration by other states have led the Kremlin to enact a series of draconian laws that label any foreign money entering Russia a "foreign agent." Moscow has also begun monitoring all Russian entities that do business with foreign corporations. Because the Kremlin does not consider the Gulf states allies, it will likely scrutinize partnerships involving their firms even more closely. That said, not all GCC companies have political agendas. Though Mazcorp, for example, maintains deep ties with Abu Dhabi's royal family, the Saudi-based Islamic Development Bank comprises 56 member states and cannot easily be used by Riyadh to advance its goals abroad.

Russia is especially distrustful of ties forged between the GCC and certain Muslim republics, such as Chechnya. For more than two decades, Moscow has firmly maintained that the GCC states (alongside the United States) instigated the First and Second Chechen Wars. The Kremlin claims that Saudi Arabia, in particular, implanted its Wahhabist doctrine in the region and provided arms, supplies, training and support — largely through various charities and humanitarian organizations — to Chechen militants. June negotiations between Kadyrov and Saudi Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's aide have undoubtedly rekindled Moscow's fears. During the talks, the two discussed Saudi Arabia and other Arab states participating in joint training at Chechnya's International Special Forces Training Center.

Moscow will likely continue to put national security and Russian unity ahead of the needs of its growing Muslim population, no matter how dire the regions' financial situations become. Though the Kremlin cannot force its Muslim republics to ignore the opportunities presented by Islamic financing and investment, it will do what it can to insert itself in the process to rein in their budding relationships with the rest of the Muslim world.

[DougMacG]

http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/10/14/what-erdogans-pivot-to-putin-means/

Obama handling of Syria continues to become more incoherent and more damaging to American interests. Putin has not only, thanks to White House dithering and irresolution, managed to reinsert Russia into Middle East politics in a spoiler role and his gains have not just included a deepening and commercially beneficial relationship with Iran and the weakening of the European Union and Merkel’s leadership in it over the refugee issue; he has also, thanks to the incoherence of American policy, managed to drive a thick wedge into NATO by further alienating Turkey from the West and, especially Washington.

As for what a naive and vainglorious President Obama once (back in those days when he collected Nobel Peace Prizes and was hailed as the second coming of Abraham Lincoln by a clueless and infatuated press corps) identified as a central goal of his foreign policy—the reconciliation of America with the Muslim world—his callous abandonment of the Syrian Sunnis to their increasingly genocidal foes has done as much, if not more, to tarnish America’s reputation among Sunni Arabs than anything any of his predecessors managed to do going back to Harry Truman.

The issues in Syria are difficult and the alternatives are few, but President Obama’s Syria policy is one of the shabbiest and sorriest displays of serial ineptitude that has unfolded in world politics in all these many years. That his emissaries and representatives attempt to cover the nakedness of their policy with grandiose rhetorical denunciation of the crimes that Obama’s incompetence has enabled merely underscores the horrifying moral and political emptiness of the President’s approach to world politics.

[Crafty_Dog]

Picking Up Where the West Leaves Off
Analysis
December 9, 2016 | 09:00 GMT Print
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Members of Poland's and Lithuania's special operations forces descend from a helicopter during joint military exercises in Croatia in 2009. As the Russia-West conflict intensifies, the countries stuck in the middle will increase their cooperation. (STRINGER/AFP/Getty Images)
Forecast

    Shifting European and U.S. politics will weaken the West's support for states along Russia's periphery, or at least give that impression.
    As Western countries become more divided and Russia's position strengthens, Eurasian countries will band together and increase their cooperation with one another.
    Ukraine and Georgia will be particularly energetic in their pursuit of regional integration as they look to their neighbors for strength and protection.

Analysis

This year has rattled Western politics to their core. The Brexit vote laid bare the deep rifts crisscrossing the Continent, while far-right and anti-establishment parties across Europe have gained momentum. Across the Atlantic, the United States witnessed a similar political upheaval in the surprise November election of Donald Trump as the country's next president. With several more votes scheduled for 2017 in many of the European Union's biggest member states, including France, Germany and now perhaps Italy, next year is shaping up to be just as turbulent as the last.

The effects of these sweeping changes will ripple beyond the United States and Europe. Russia, in particular, could have a chance to gain the upper hand in its tense standoff with the West, which has been ongoing since Ukraine's Euromaidan uprising in 2014. Not only will the upcoming transitions in the United States and Europe weaken the West's resolve to maintain its sanctions against Russia, but they will also shift the West's attention inward to its own divisions. This may give Moscow room to strengthen its influence among the nations in its periphery.

The states that lie between Russia and Europe will no doubt feel the impact of the political upsets occurring outside their borders. Countries that once belonged to the Soviet Union have watched the changes underway with growing unease, and they are likely re-evaluating their stances toward the competing giants looming on their eastern and western flanks. All of them, from those in Eastern Europe to those in the Caucasus, will have to prepare for a new geopolitical environment in which Russia may no longer be able to be ignored and the West may no longer be able to be counted on.
An Eastern European Union?

As these countries reassess their situations, they will likely turn to each other for help. Ukraine will be particularly important to watch: For the past three years, it has relied on the West's backing in its spat with Russia over the eastern region of Donbas. But now, as the European Union fragments and as the incoming U.S. administration weighs its commitment to NATO allies and its collaboration with the Kremlin, Ukraine cannot be sure that Western economic, political and defense aid will continue.

And so it will look to its neighbors as an insurance policy in the event that NATO and the United States scale back their military presence in Central and Eastern Europe. Neither Poland nor the Baltic states are in a position to fully replace EU or NATO forces, but they could form a supplemental alliance of sorts with Ukraine. In fact, Ukraine has already begun to ramp up its joint training and military exercises with Poland and Lithuania, and it will probably continue to do so in the coming year.

Mutual defense may not be the only thing Ukraine seeks from its neighbors. Poland and the Baltic states have made great strides in diversifying their energy portfolios away from Russian natural gas by building liquefied natural gas import terminals and pipeline interconnectors throughout the region. Ukraine, which is also working to reduce its dependence on Russian energy by reversing natural gas flows from Poland, Hungary and Slovakia, will likely try to join their burgeoning energy network in the years ahead. After all, greater energy connectivity with Poland and the Baltics — including a planned pipeline linking Ukraine and Poland with a capacity of 5 billion cubic meters that will be complete by 2020 — could give Kiev more opportunities for energy diversification.
Cooperation in the Caucasus

The nascent Ukrainian bloc is not the only one of its kind. Like Ukraine, Georgia has become concerned by the potential withdrawal of Western aid. Tbilisi is currently engaged in a dispute with Moscow over the breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and it has tried to integrate more closely with the European Union and NATO. Both organizations, however, have repeatedly put off Tbilisi's requests for membership plans. As their focus turns inward in the years ahead, Georgia's aspirations for deeper integration with Europe will be put in even greater jeopardy.

Georgia, too, will respond to the West's distraction by cozying up to two of its key neighbors and allies, Azerbaijan and Turkey. Tbilisi has already forged sturdy economic and energy ties with Baku and Ankara that will likely grow stronger in the coming years. Georgia serves as a vital transit state for oil and natural gas flowing from Azerbaijan to Turkey through the South Caucasus Pipeline, and construction is underway on the Trans-Anatolian and Trans-Adriatic pipelines. The two projects will bring an extra 16 bcm of natural gas from Azerbaijan's Shah Deniz II field to Turkish and European markets by 2018 and 2020, respectively. Along with the pipelines will come new transportation links, with the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway scheduled for completion in 2017.

The three countries, meanwhile, have also begun to expand their defense cooperation. Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkey now hold trilateral military exercises that will probably increase in scope and frequency next year. Georgia's chief of staff of the armed forces has already announced that the biggest exercises the three nations have ever held will take place in summer 2017.

The Ukrainian and Georgian blocs will undoubtedly encounter many challenges in the months ahead. Turkey's reluctance to directly challenge Russia will heavily influence the political dynamics of the Caucasus, while volatility in Ukraine could hamper Kiev's efforts to form a Baltic alliance. At the same time, Europe and NATO will by no means halt their activities in the region. But as the West becomes a more reluctant partner to the Eurasian states on Russia's doorstep, they will have little choice but to lean on each other for support.

Lead Analyst: Eugene Chausovsky

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZjQLVwCNW-8

Stratfor

Analysis

Russian Ambassador to Turkey Andrei Karlov was shot and killed Dec. 19 at an art exhibition in Ankara, where he was delivering a public address. Turkish security forces subsequently killed the gunman, reported to be Mert Altintas, a member of the special forces department of the Turkish National Police and part of Karlov's security detail. Three others were wounded in the attack.

Witnesses reported hearing the gunman shout that he was seeking revenge for Russia's actions in Aleppo, saying in Turkish "We die in Aleppo, you die here." There are many possible motives for the attack on Karlov: Most obviously, it could have been an angry Turkish citizen upset by the recent rebel defeat in Aleppo; it could have also been a jihadist plot seeking retribution for Russian action against terrorist groups in Syria. Regardless, if confirmed that the attacker was a member of the Turkish National Police, which was heavily infiltrated by Gulenists prior to the coup, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan may further clamp down on the Gulenists, whether the attacker actually had links to the group or not.

The attack comes at a bad time: Moscow and Ankara have only recently restored diplomatic ties after Turkey downed a Russian aircraft in November 2015. Though the attack will strain relations between the two countries, however, it is not likely to rupture them altogether. Moscow will lean heavily on Ankara for intelligence-sharing and will demand more autonomy in protecting its assets. Yet neither country is keen to backtrack on the economic and diplomatic progress made over the past year. And now that Turkish forces are active deep within Syria, Ankara needs to maintain a working relationship with Moscow now more than ever. Turkey's foreign minister is scheduled to attend a meeting in Moscow tomorrow with his Russian and Iranian counterparts to discuss Syria. Russian officials have confirmed that the meeting will still take place.

If the attack on the Russian Ambassador is in fact an angry response to Moscow's involvement in the retaking of Aleppo, it is a violent aberration of recent anti-Russia protests, which have been mostly peaceful, at diplomatic buildings worldwide. In fact, pressure is mounting on Russia for a range of reasons. There has been an uptick in thwarted terrorist plots and threats in Russia over the past few months. On Aug 1, the Islamic State called for attacks against Russia. In November, Russian security forces conducted several raids that appeared to link radicalized Central Asian militants and plots against major Russian cities. On Dec. 15, Russian authorities broke up a group allegedly plotting attacks against targets in Moscow. The plots are probably not directly linked to today's assassination, but taken together, they clearly demonstrate the growing threats Russia, and its citizens, face. Moscow is unlikely to shift its approach in Syria in response.

[Crafty_Dog]

Editor's Note: Transcripts are generated using speech-recognition technology. Therefore, Stratfor cannot guarantee their complete accuracy.

Video Transcript:

Colin Chapman: An important but perhaps less well-noticed meeting took place in Turkey this week between the Russian foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, and his Turkish opposite number. Syria was high on the agenda of what was called the "Joint Strategic Planning Group." It took place ahead of the Friends of Syria dialogue, to be held also in Istanbul this weekend. Attending were representatives of Western and Arab governments.

Welcome to Agenda. I'm Colin Chapman, this week in Jakarta, and I'm joined by Reva Bhalla, Director of Global Analysis. Reva, Russia and Turkey have diametrically opposed views on Syria, and before he left to go home, Mr. Lavrov said, "If [Syrian President Bashar] al Assad's departure is the priority, the cost of such a geopolitical approach will be more casualties." There's some truth in this, isn't there?

Reva Bhalla: Well of course, Colin, Russia has an interest in preserving its Alawite allies in Damascus, but Putin also has a very clear point. No matter what negotiations are held in Istanbul, in Paris, in Washington, what have you, no negotiation is going to preclude the eventual descent into civil war for the northern Levant. And this is a very familiar history for this region, and so Russia can clearly see the trajectory of the events. It's also not going to get its wish, though, of preserving an allied regime in Damascus — certainly not one that's capable of governing the entire country.

Colin: Now, Syria was the main item on the agenda, but it wasn't the only one. There was a lot of talk about other issues. Lets go through them one by one. For example, the Caucasus where there has been a change of government in Georgia, which will have some impact on Turkey.

Reva: Right, so Turkey and Azerbaijan in particular are very uncomfortable with the political evolution that has taken place in Georgia with the rise of [Georgian Prime Minister Bidzina] Ivanishvili, who made his millions in Russia. Now, Turkey does not want to see its southern corridor energy projects that run from the Caucasus through Turkey and possibly onward to Europe be sabotaged by any sort of political transition that we see in Georgia, especially with pro-Russian tendencies. And so Turkey is basically trying to feel out what is happening in Georgia, its trying to figure out what the Russians' intentions are, how far is it willing to go, and it doesn't want to see these projects obstructed. So far, nothing has been derailed but Turkey is certainly on alert.

Colin: Then there's Cyprus. In the wake of the banking debacle in which a lot of Cypriots and Russians lost their shirts, the Cyprus government and the Russians appear to be talking about offshore oil developments, but that's not particularly good news for Turkey, is it, which has still got many outstanding issues about the future of Northern Cyprus.

Reva: Turkey has been very uncomfortable with this realignment of forces that has taken place in the eastern Mediterranean, with Israel and Cyprus trying to exploit their natural gas reserves and growing close together, putting their own sordid history aside, also aligning with Greece and with Russian backing. And also remember this is Turkey's western maritime flank. It does not want to see a potentially hostile alignment of forces develop. And so Turkey came late to this game but it also wants to desperately scuttle any energy projects that are taking place in the eastern Mediterranean that could strengthen the ties among these countries. And so it doesn't want Cyprus' bailout negotiations with Russia to entail any promises of future energy rights transferred to Russia as Cyprus tries to exploit its own natural gas reserves, certainly not while the Northern Cyprus status is in limbo.

So Turkey, especially over the past few weeks, has been kind of desperately trying to find anybody to mediate the Cypriot conflict. Of course, the Europeans have bigger distractions and are not exactly engaged in the issue, so Turkey is going directly to Russia, again trying to gauge its intentions and trying to get Russian assurances that its not going to go too far. Now Russia, on the other hand, has a strategic interest in building on its existing cultural and religious ties and business ties to this region to further its stake hold in the eastern Mediterranean and use that as well to make sure it can integrate itself into any energy projects that attempt to circumvent Russia's energy hold on the Continent.

Colin: Finally, Turkey is pretty shackled to Russia for its energy requirements — I think the figure is some 70 percent dependency. So logic dictates that these two should really be coming to some kind of friendly agreement. Turkey, of course, is still a long way from ever joining the European Union. Do you think that Turkey is now more or less reconciled to the idea that it has to draw closer to Moscow in its future?

Reva: In short, no, they cannot. As much as Turkey is uncomfortable with being so beholden to Russia through these energy links, it can't escape it. If you just look at Turkish power consumption, expected to rise 30 percent just over the next decade, Turkey cannot avoid getting a stable supply from Russia. Of course, it's going to be pursuing alternative sources of energy, but there are major political complications to trying to develop energy resources and transporting them from northern Iraq, of course as well with Iran. It will be getting natural gas from Azerbaijan with Shah Deniz II fields coming on-line but it still will not be enough to compensate for the huge amount of natural gas that Turkey gets from Russia.

And so Turkey has tried to see the silver lining in this dynamic and has used that in its political rhetoric to tell Russia, "Look, we have this huge energy dependency with you, that's a good thing because that means you don't have to be worried about us encroaching on your turf and overlapping spheres of influence." And so we've already seen this as Turkey has tried to extend its influence in Central Asia, bit by bit. It's trying to show that it's not an intruder and so it's shown that through things like [Recep Tayyip] Erdogan, the prime minister, saying "Allow us into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. We are one of you, we can forget about the Europeans," even though of course Turkey is extremely dependent on European trade. Nonetheless, Turkey is using the political rhetoric to say, "Look, we don't need Europe, we want to be part of your organization. Don't look at us as an intruder. We are one of you." Now, whether the Russians see it that way is of course a whole other question.

Colin: Reva, thank you very much. And that's Agenda for this week, thanks very much for being with us.

[Crafty_Dog]

Apparently the assassin shouted ""Aloha Snack bar" which means he was not a Muslim

[ccp]

Yes i heard that too.  I thought he looked Hawaiian.   

[G M]

Apparently the assassin shouted ""Aloha Snack bar" which means he was not a Muslim

Islam is a religion of peace. If a muslim says or acts otherwise, it is to be ignored and hidden.


MARC:  Accidentally I inserted the following here instead of in my own post-- sorry.

OTOH it should be noted that it seems quite clear that Russia has and is committing terrible war crimes in Syria and off the top of my head I would say that a fair case can be made that the ambassador was a fair target for a fair grievance.

[G M]

It is tragic that Russia doesn't hold it's self to the high standard of conduct displayed by the Islamic culture of the Middle East.

[bigdog]

http://warontherocks.com/2016/12/the-coming-of-the-russian-jihad-part-ii/

[G M]

http://warontherocks.com/2016/12/the-coming-of-the-russian-jihad-part-ii/

Russia should be more welcoming to muslims, like we for the Tsarnaev family.

[Crafty_Dog]

Summary

This year promises to be a good one for Russia. The country's beleaguered economy is poised to pull out of recession, though its financial problems are far from resolved. Furthermore, upheaval in the European Union and a new presidential administration in the United States could spell an end to, or at least a reduction in, economic sanctions imposed three years ago by the European Union and the United States. For former Soviet countries such as Ukraine, Moldova and particularly Georgia, these changes will require a recalibration of their foreign policy. Facing dim prospects for further integration with the European Union and NATO and uncertain of the new U.S. administration's policies, the government in Tbilisi is rethinking Georgia's relationship with Moscow.
Analysis

Long before the Brexit vote and the U.S. presidential election, Georgia had begun looking for ways to restore its relationship with Russia as its progress with the West stalled. Various trade discussions have been underway between Moscow and Tbilisi for the past year, and the two governments are in regular contact.

A Sign of the Times

Recent developments in Georgia's energy sector suggest that Russia's influence in the country is growing. In late December, Tbilisi and Moscow reached a new agreement allowing the transit of Russian natural gas through Georgia to Armenia. Though a previous deal granted Georgia a 10 percent portion of the natural gas moving through its territory in exchange for its transit, the new arrangement stipulates that Moscow will offer Tbilisi a monetary payment for the service. (The rest of the deal's terms are confidential, according to the Georgian government.) By paying Tbilisi in cash, Moscow will have more leeway to increase the volume of natural gas transported under the agreement. Rumors are swirling, moreover, that Russian energy giant Gazprom has offered to buy 25 percent of the Georgian Gas and Oil Corp., which controls the pipeline that carries natural gas to Armenia. If the deal goes through, it will give Russia its largest presence in Georgia's energy sector since 2006.

As Tbilisi explores deeper economic ties with Moscow, Georgian politicians and voters are weighing their options for integration with Western institutions such as NATO and the European Union. On Jan. 24, lawmakers began debating whether to add a provision to Georgia's Constitution obliging the country's leaders to pursue membership in those organizations as the country's primary foreign policy objectives. Voters are roughly divided over the issue; the most recent polling data shows that 53 percent of Georgians favor European integration — a near 10 percent drop from the year before. Up to 31 percent of Georgians, meanwhile, support improving relations with Russia — almost a 10 percent increase over the previous year.
Reaching Out to the Breakaways

The changes in Russia, Europe and the United States seem to be affecting the relationship between Georgia and its breakaway territories, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well. Abkhaz and Russian officials resumed talks with their Georgian counterparts to prevent conflict at the demarcation line in Abkhazia in late 2016. At the same time, officials from South Ossetia reported that the territory's leaders planned to open a new trade post on the demarcation line near Akhalgori, a sign that Georgia may resume trade with the region. Tbilisi also floated the idea of changing the country's constitution so that foreigners entering Abkhazia or South Ossetia without first notifying Tbilisi (most of whom are Russian) would face a fine rather than prosecution. In addition, the Georgian government is considering reaching out to leaders in Abkhazia through diplomatic channels. Considering the dire conditions of infrastructure in the breakaway territory, leaders in the Abkhaz capital of Sukhumi will likely welcome Tbilisi's efforts, with Moscow's tacit approval.

Georgia may even consider reinstating diplomatic ties with Russia, which were severed during the short-lived war between the two countries in 2008. Georgia's special representative for Russian issues said Jan. 30 that he has not ruled out the possibility of renewing relations. Keeping the lines of communication with Russia open is especially important for Tbilisi as it tries to avoid losing more territory to the approximately 10,000 Russian troops currently positioned in its breakaway regions.

Tbilisi will try to maintain some flexibility in its foreign policy as Russia's sway increases, not only in the region but also among the Georgian people, and as the political circumstances in the United States and Europe evolve. Still, Georgia will not revise its stance toward the West anytime soon. The country remains steadfast in its commitments to the European Union and NATO, with which it has signed numerous partnership agreements over the years. But given the European Union's inward focus and the uncertainties surrounding the new U.S. administration's policies toward the South Caucasus region, Tbilisi has little choice but to keep its options open.

[Crafty_Dog]

Note the role of natural gas routes, the importance of which is something I have underlined in this part of the world for several years now:

There are new signs that trade is beginning to tie Russia and Georgia closer together. On Feb. 13, Georgia's special representative for talks with Russia said both countries had agreed Feb. 7 to establish three trade routes, which would wind through the breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and through the Larsi mountain pass (east of South Ossetia). Moscow also reportedly agreed to demands made by Georgia's government in Tbilisi to station international observers to monitor goods traversing the Russian-Abkhazian and Russian-South Ossetian borders. Additional observation posts will likewise be placed on demarcation lines between the breakaway territories and the rest of Georgia.

New trade along these routes would lead to better economic relations between Russia and Georgia. Currently, trade between the two stands at $800 million, making Russia Georgia's third-largest trade partner. And this is not the only development: Tbilisi and Moscow recently reached an agreement that allows Russian natural gas destined for Armenia to transit through Georgia. Many in Georgia, however, see the deal as a disadvantage for the government. In previous arrangements, Russia paid Georgia for the transit with 10 percent of the natural gas. Under the new deal, Russia pays the transit fee with cash and Georgia must buy the natural gas separately. With Georgia likely to increase its natural gas imports, Tbilisi will come to rely more on Russia to meet its future energy needs.

Moreover, Moscow's agreement to station trade observers on the borders between the breakaway territories and Russia is a notable nod to Tbilisi that at one time would have been impossible. After the short-lived Russia-Georgia War in 2008, Moscow cut diplomatic ties with Tbilisi, and they have not been restored. But now, the Kremlin seems to be sending signals to the Georgian government that it's willing to reconcile, at least economically.

There are also indications that pro-Russia sentiment is growing in the country. Recent polls show 53 percent of Georgians favor European integration — a near 10 percent drop from last year. Some 31 percent, meanwhile, support improving relations with Russia — an almost 10 percent increase over the previous year.

These changes are improving relations between Georgia and its breakaway territories as well. Abkhazian and Russian officials resumed talks with their Georgian counterparts to prevent conflict along Abkhazia's demarcation line in late 2016. At the same time, officials from South Ossetia have said the territory's leaders plan to open a new trade post on the demarcation line near Akhalgori. Overall trade with the breakaway region may even resume. Tbilisi floated the idea of changing the country's constitution, too, so that foreigners entering Abkhazia or South Ossetia without first notifying Tbilisi (most of whom are Russian) would face a fine rather than legal prosecution.

Russian-Georgian relations are clearly progressing at the time when geopolitical situation in the former Soviet periphery is in flux. Divisions in the European Union are growing. A new U.S. presidential administration appears more open to working with Russia. So for many former Soviet countries, including Georgia, rethinking the relationship with Moscow is now vital.

[Crafty_Dog]

Putin and Erdogan: Addicted to Power
Geopolitical Weekly
April 11, 2017 | 08:00 GMT Print
Text Size
Not only do the pasts and motivations of the Russian and Turkish leaders have a great deal in common, but their geopolitical destinies are also deeply intertwined. (OZAN KOSE/AFP/Getty Images)

By Reva Goujon

Absolute power is both reviled and revered. Most in the West will look aghast at blatant power grabs, smirk at narcissistic acts of self-promotion and regularly admonish leaders engaging in tyrannical behavior. But many others will just as easily look in awe at a leader who embodies sheer power. When a country's politics have been more volatile than just, people will more naturally crave a leader who oozes confidence and manifests strength. They will more willfully submit to propaganda, wanting to neither see nor hear stories of evil that can tarnish the image they hold of their protector.

This dichotomy defines two highly consequential leaders of our time: Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, two men who not only have pasts and motivations with a great deal in common, but whose geopolitical destinies are also deeply intertwined.
Born With a Vengeance

    Men ought either to be indulged or utterly destroyed, for if you merely offend them they take vengeance, but if you injure them greatly they are unable to retaliate, so that the injury done to a man ought to be such that vengeance cannot be feared.

    — Niccolo Machiavelli

Putin and Erdogan were born — and rule — with a vengeance rooted in their personal and national upbringings.

Erdogan's most formative years took place in the grimy district of Kasimpasa, on the edge of the Golden Horn waterway dividing European Istanbul, where poor residents looked up the hill with reproach at the wealthy and hip Taksim district, the symbolic center of the Europeanized elite. Erdogan was raised in a conservative family and attended a religious high school, a social environment that made him leery of prideful secular Turks drinking raki in the bars lining Istanbul's streets. He earned his street smarts making extra money selling Turkish snacks in the rough districts of Istanbul, but he always had bigger ambitions. A childhood friend of Erdogan's noted in the documentary "The Making of a Sultan: The Rise of Erdogan" that the young Tayyip, who loved reciting poetry, would stand in empty boats at the docks and deliver speeches to an imaginary audience, honing his oratory skills. Erdogan would later put those skills to use in rallying millions of conservative Turks who were sick of being sidelined from power by Westernized secular elites and who wanted their turn at the country's helm.

Putin, meanwhile, was raised in a dilapidated apartment building in the war-battered city of St. Petersburg (what was then Leningrad). There was no hot water, and only a single stinking toilet. The communal kitchen was always overcrowded with families squabbling over what little food there was to eat. Early accounts of Putin paint him as a thuggish kid, learning early on that an oversized image of strength was key to survival as he scrapped with other kids in rough neighborhoods. One of the few but more revealing anecdotes from Putin's childhood is written in his carefully curated autobiography, First Person.

    There, on that stair landing, I got a quick and lasting lesson in the meaning of the word cornered. There were hordes of rats in the front entryway. My friends and I used to chase them around with sticks. Once I spotted a huge rat and pursued it down the hall until I drove it into a corner. It had nowhere to run. Suddenly it lashed around and threw itself at me. I was surprised and frightened. Now the rat was chasing me. It jumped across the landing and down the stairs. Luckily, I was a little faster and managed to slam the door shut in its nose.

For young Volodya, even a cornered rat will find a way to fight back in a last gasp for survival. This was a lesson that both leaders carried with them in internalizing their national histories.
The West Is Not the Answer

Erdogan, born in 1954, and Putin, born in 1952, grew up in shaky postwar years, never forgetting what it meant to have their countries ravaged from within by insurrection and from beyond by bigger Western powers. Neither fully buy into the idea that their countries will have brighter and more stable futures simply by copying and pasting a template from the West. Not only is this approach unnatural, in their view, but it is also dangerous. For Erdogan, it is even impious.

Several statements made by Erdogan early in his political career reveal his belief that Turkey's national spirit stems from its Islamic heritage, and that the Turkish Republic's embrace of secularism following the fall of the Ottoman Empire was more an aberration than a logical decision in state-building. In a 1996 interview with the daily Milliyet newspaper, a defensive Erdogan is repeatedly asked by the fiercely secular journalist Nilgun Cerrahoglu what his Welfare Party (the predecessor to the Justice and Development Party) actually stood for when it came to religion. Erdogan responded, "Time will tell," and said his party's worldview rested on a system that "depends on the values of our native culture and the spirit of the nation. It is an understanding based on Islam."

Erdogan acknowledges that, pragmatically, Turkey must trade and cooperate on security with the West through mechanisms like its customs union with the European Union and through NATO. But he, along with many of his Kemalist counterparts, lives with the trauma of the draconian Treaty of Sevres that ended the Ottoman Empire and harbors a deep distrust toward Western powers that he accuses of hoping to divide and weaken Turkey. Still, that is where the common ground between Erdogan and the Kemalists ends. Erdogan fundamentally disagrees with the idea that Turkey's national identity is somehow rooted in the West. His is a view that polarizes at least half of his countrymen, who look to the West for inspiration to grow and modernize Turkey. Erdogan nonetheless believes that others, even his most ardent opponents, will eventually come to agree with him once they rediscover their Muslim roots.

Putin shares Erdogan's paranoia of the West. Putin once said that,

    "... the collapse of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster of the century. As for the Russian nation, it became a genuine drama. Tens of millions of our co-citizens and co-patriots found themselves outside Russian territory. Moreover, the epidemic of disintegration infected Russia itself."

From his KGB posting in 1985-89 in Dresden, where he was charged with stealing Western technology to help Russia catch up with the West, he saw the fall of the Berlin Wall, witnessed the spread of NATO and the European Union into former Warsaw Pact countries, personally fended off riots against his Soviet outpost and then returned to a country in chaos following Mikhail Gorbachev's experiments in liberalization (glasnost and perestroika). He saw the West walk over a weak and embattled Boris Yeltsin, who tried and failed first to prevent NATO from launching a war against Russian-allied Serbs in 1998 and then to secure a role for Russia in the Kosovo peacekeeping mission that followed the war. Putin's Russia needed to be saved, and Putin designated himself as its savior. While Erdogan saw his mission to save Turkey from Western secularists, Putin first went after Russia's oligarchs, who had used an economic opening with the West to plunder the country.
Democracy: A Tool and a Nuisance

For those who carry a deep conviction that they are saving their nation from tragedy and sin, the concept of democracy tends to hold little weight. For Erdogan and Putin, democracy is a tool for gaining power — and a nuisance to navigate once you have it.

In the same 1996 Milliyet interview, Erdogan famously said that "democracy is a means, not an end." He also casually noted that "democracy is a tramway — you climb on to get where you want to go, and then you climb off." His repeated assertion that "laws are made by human beings" implies that laws can easily be lifted to comport with his own vision for the republic. Similarly, Erdogan's inheritance of Turkey's EU accession bid was used as a means to assuage Western onlookers and his own political opponents that Turkey would still keep a foothold in the West, even though Erdogan likely had little expectation of fully adhering to the bloc's democratic norms to complete the accession process.

Putin has also has shown his repugnance for Western lectures on democracy. As he has asserted time and time again, "democracy cannot be exported from one country to another, like you cannot exports revolutions or ideology." In Putin's view, democracy must be a product of a society's developments with its own nuances and timeline. In other words, Russia cannot be rushed and Putin is not about to allow overzealous experimentation in democratization and economic liberalization to shatter Russia once again.

But democracy was a useful tool to build an empire. Indeed, both leaders took similar paths to rise to power and are employing similar tactics to hold onto it. Both worked diligently to mask their more politically unpalatable pasts. Putin commissioned documentaries and biographies to tone down misgivings over his KGB history while Erdogan took care early on to cultivate an image as a "middle-path" Muslim, not an avowed Islamist bent on radically transforming the government. While Putin used his position as deputy mayor and his allies in St Petersburg in the late 1990s to quietly work his way through the corridors of the Kremlin elite, Erdogan placed himself in the public spotlight and passed his first big popularity test as mayor of Istanbul from 1994 to1998.

Both men understood deeply the power of patronage. At the start of their political careers, Putin reined in rapacious oligarchs to earn the people's trust and Erdogan won hearts and minds in Istanbul when he brought clean water to the city, removed trash collecting on the streets and expanded road networks. Both reached the pinnacle of power at the turn of the century, Putin as president in 2000 (after briefly serving as FSB chief and then prime minister) and Erdogan as prime minister in 2003 (his party rose to power in 2002, but Erdogan was temporarily banned from politics by the military-backed establishment). As soon as they reached the top, they worked rapidly to build up networks of loyalists beneath them. They knew that keeping power meant creating deep dependencies in critical institutions and industries as well as on the streets. They were to be seen as the protectors of their people with the power to both punish and reward.

The price of patronage, of course, was unquestionable loyalty. After gutting the oligarchs, Putin made powerful allies in resurrecting national champions in oil, natural gas, nickel, aluminum, steel, diamonds and gold. Erdogan, meanwhile, commissioned massive infrastructure projects with hefty line items and multiple regulatory layers where side sums could be pocketed at every turn. With the procurement and contracting for these projects centered on himself, Erdogan was able to cultivate a powerful network of construction magnates whose wealth depended almost entirely on the quality of their relationship with the Turkish leader. Both presidents accumulated fantastic wealth over the years (by several estimates, Putin is believed to be among the wealthiest people in the world) and have shamelessly displayed their power through oversized presidential palaces built in their names. Some may find it confusing that leaders can ride to power on an anti-corruption crusade and yet, once in power, openly embody the corruptive rot they once vowed to eliminate. But an authoritarian leader can live with such contradiction as long as he has accumulated enough wealth and power to buy allies as needed and convince those beneath him that the loyal will reap the rewards of his rule.

For Putin and Erdogan, laws that get in the way of power can be changed. When Putin reached his presidential term limit in 2008, he installed his subordinate, Dmitri Medvedev, as president while he took the lesser position of prime minister. A loyal Medvedev dutifully signed a constitutional amendment the same year extending presidential terms from four years to six. Putin predictably returned to the presidency in 2012 and, assuming he can win again in 2018, could remain president for a fourth term until 2024.

Erdogan is in the process of engineering his own executive pirouette to consolidate power. When Erdogan reached his three-term limit as prime minister in 2014, he took the less powerful role of the presidency and installed Ahmet Davutoglu as prime minister. Though Davutoglu was long considered an ardent backer of Erdogan, even he grew tired of being politically bulldozed by the president and eventually resigned in 2016. With Binali Yildirim, a more willing executor of his political will, now in place as prime minister, Erdogan is inches away from radically transforming the country's political system and extending his tenure in the process.

On April 16, Turks will vote in a referendum that calls for placing the weight of executive power in the president's hands. Through the proposed constitutional changes, the prime minister's role would be abolished, a vice presidency would be created, parliamentary and judicial oversight over the presidency and his Cabinet would be diminished, and the president (instead of having to remain politically neutral under the existing law) would be allowed to head up his own political party, thus ensuring that lawmakers and deputies understand that their political futures rest directly on their loyalty to the president. Should the public approve these changes, Erdogan would become the acting executive. He would then be eligible to start from a clean slate in 2019 when his current term ends, able to run for the presidency and serve two more terms, potentially staying in power until 2029. (Erdogan is set on remaining president through 2023, the highly symbolic 100th anniversary of the Turkish Republic.)
Hold on Tight

Erdogan and Putin are well beyond the power-building phase of their careers. They are now deep in the act of consolidation, employing whatever creative and heavy-handed tactics are needed to keep them in control. This entails everything from constitutional engineering to drastic steps in controlling the media and silencing the opposition. The two leaders are deeply haunted by their recent memories of the Arab Spring, Euromaidan and Gezi Park uprisings. The specter of social upheaval was not their cue to start reforming and appeasing a growing number of dissidents. On the contrary, it provided the impetus to clamp down and use every opportunity — be it a failed coup or a spectacular terrorist attack — to try to eliminate any whiff of dissent while they still have the power to do so. Both hold deep convictions that if they are not there to navigate their countries through troubled waters in the coming years, their nations' very existence will be at stake. If this sounds like gross egoism, take a step into the mind of an authoritarian personality. For all the effort that goes into making our leaders appear like the common man, they are anything but. As neuroscientist Nayef al-Rodhan explains in his article "The Neurochemistry of Power: Implications for Political Change," the primary neurochemical involved in the reward of power is dopamine, the same chemical transmitter responsible for producing a sense of pleasure. "Power activates the very same reward circuitry in the brain and creates an addictive 'high.'" People wired to crave and seek power are in essence feeding an addiction. And if they feel that power slipping, they become more paranoid, less empathetic and more ruthless in how they govern.

Putin and Erdogan are two authoritarian peas in a pod, ruling over territories that are spread across Europe and Asia. Stretched between East and West, the duality of their nations often collides with their worldview, but solipsistic personalities in high power are also wired to stamp out uncomfortable realities that do not conform to their versions of reality. If the West thinks that lectures on human rights will remold them into democratic visionaries, it is deeply mistaken. These leaders are dripping with power and will go to extreme lengths to insulate themselves from competitors at home and abroad. But they are still political mortals at the end of the day. And the problem with remaining in power for a generation is that it increases the risk of encountering a generational wave of resistance. Erdogan saw the Gezi protesters as young hooligans who needed more discipline and direction in life. He will not hesitate to crack down in full force again.

Putin is facing mass protests in the lead-up to Russia's 2018 election as well, and this time, the demonstrations are dominated by young people who lack the historical memory of much harsher Soviet days. For them, Putin is not a protector from chaos; he is the only dictator they've ever known. This is a generation that has social media at its fingertips to rapidly consume and circulate information. A student at a school outside the city of Bryansk, southwest of Moscow, secretly recorded a debate between students in the class and their principal and teachers before leaking it on social media. In the recording, the students flatly rejected the government's nationalistic reasoning on taking Crimea by force and their teacher's defense of the government's crackdown on opposition activists. An excerpt from the recording reads as follows:

    Principal: So you think that life in this country got worse with the arrival of Putin and Medvedev?

    Student 1: No, but they've stayed too long. They've just been there [in power] for too long.

    Student 2: Yeah.

    Principal: Did you live in some other era that I somehow missed? Under whom did you live well? And under Putin and Medvedev things got worse for you?

    Student 2: We've studied history.

    Principal: Naturally.

    Student 2: Well…

    Principal: What does "well" mean? I'm asking you, specifically you: Under what ruler did you live well? What do you mean "well"?

    Student 2: We've only ever had one ruler, actually.

    Principal: You said that things have become worse. But you never lived through the hard years of the 1990s. When, forgive me for saying this, everyone carried around a blade and a firearm, and the country was in chaos. And this was when I was studying in college! This was when it was scary to go out into the street after eight at night. You didn't see this.

The conversation shows a stark contrast between generations: One with a visceral reaction to a much darker past that makes it deeply distrustful of social upheavals and fiercely loyal to a strongman leader; the other, far less risk averse, has only a distant memory from history books and simply is not willing to buy into fear-mongering propaganda designed to keep a few politicians in power. This is perhaps the challenge that neither Putin nor Erdogan may be fully prepared for in their extended political year

[Crafty_Dog]

•   Russia: The parliament of the Georgian breakaway region of Abkhazia ratified an agreement to establish an information and coordination center that gives Russian law enforcement special powers to operate in Abkhazia. Reports meanwhile suggest that Russia is making moves to take control of South Ossetia, another breakaway region, and that, farther east, Azerbaijan has pulled out of NATO exercises. Russia is looking for leverage over the United States in response to new economic sanctions, and the Caucasus is a good place to start. We need to understand Russia’s plan for the region

[Crafty_Dog]

•   Russia: Roughly 400 Russian troops held a military drill in Georgia’s breakaway region of Abkhazia. This follows several moves we are watching in the Caucasus and tracks with our Aug. 3 Reality Check. How far in advance was this drill scheduled? Is it part of the general trend we are seeing of Russia making moves here, or is it just a regularly scheduled program?

[Crafty_Dog]

I have been hammering the themes in this piece around here for years:
===========================================

For Russia, an Opportunity in US Sanctions
Aug 29, 2017
By Ekaterina Zolotova

The standoff between the West and Russia got more complicated when Washington imposed new sanctions against Moscow. The Europeans were quick to criticize the sanctions. Germany’s foreign minister raised concerns about U.S. intentions, France questioned the sanctions’ legality, and the European Commission president made threats that he later had to walk back. Suddenly, to the Kremlin, the sanctions looked less like a setback and more like an opportunity. If Russia can play the victim, it may be able to drive a wedge between the U.S. and the EU, more sympathetic as Brussels may prove to be.

There’s just one problem: Sanctions are just one way the U.S. is pushing back against Russia.

Russia has long been a major supplier to the European energy market. Put another way, Russia’s economy depends on its sales to Europe’s energy market. So Moscow took notice when recently the U.S. delivered its first shipment of liquefied natural gas to Lithuania, a country that at its nearest point is just more than 400 miles (650 kilometers) from Moscow. In fact, U.S. natural gas shipments have been appearing all over Europe lately in the wake of the American shale gas boom. This is the sort of encroachment that Russia is compelled to respond to. The challenge for Moscow is to do so without appearing threatening to Europe and thus pushing it closer to the United States. One place it might be able to do that is the Caucasus, specifically around Georgia and its breakaway republics, the very place where Russia announced its return to history in 2008.

Breakaway Territories

Russia has always kept a close eye on the Caucasus. This complex region has historically been riven by conflict. The most recent was, of course, a war between Russia and Georgia in 2008 over the breakaway Georgian republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Russian troops are still stationed in the republics. In fact, South Ossetia’s military was integrated into the Russian military in July as part of a 2015 agreement that provides for the formation of common defense and security between Russia and South Ossetia. The South Ossetian military is small, and its incorporation will not significantly affect the strength of the Russian army. It does, however, attest to Russia’s long-term plan to absorb a united Ossetia. Whether it can is another question, leaving open the possibility that Moscow will have to make do with a restive republic that is militarily if not politically beholden to the Kremlin.

Russia also plans to strengthen its position in the Caucasus by focusing on energy agreements. It wants to create a vast space for cooperation in Eurasia – with Moscow in the dominant spot, of course. The most important part of this plan for Russia is to establish control over the region’s oil and gas pipelines. Doing so will give Moscow control over energy supplies to Europe even if the supplies are not directly sourced in Russia.

The recently introduced sanctions, as well as the conflict in Ukraine, have delayed Russia’s plans to increase the supply of energy resources to Europe. The Caucasus, through which Europe also receives energy resources, gives Moscow a way to get back on track The Caucasus is poised to become a larger provider of European energy because several countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus (especially Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan) are rich in natural resources, including oil and natural gas. And the EU is eager to diversify its energy supply – relying too much on one supplier puts it at risk of disruption. The European Union currently receives almost 40 percent of its oil supplies from the countries that make up the Commonwealth of Independent States, a Russian-led confederation of states that generally cooperates on economic matters. Russia accounts for 27 percent, while Kazakhstan provides almost 7 percent and Azerbaijan about 4 percent.
 
Europe gets oil from this region through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and the Baku-Supsa pipeline, and natural gas flows through the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline. All of these pipelines transit Georgian territory. That’s a source of strength for the Georgian government, but it’s also a vulnerability.

In late July, the Russian armed forces advanced the borders of South Ossetia slightly, putting a small stretch of the Baku-Septa pipeline within South Ossetia’s territory. This gives South Ossetia – or really, Russia – the ability to cut off supplies, or at least siphon off what it wants. Georgia could avoid this stretch of the pipeline, but not without incurring the added cost of loading the natural gas onto trucks or trains and shipping it overland.

Russia’s Reply

Herein lies Russia’s reply to U.S. actions.  The U.S. ramped up natural gas deliveries to Europe, so Russia took hold of part of a Georgian pipeline that supplies gas to Europe. The U.S. led seven other countries in Noble Partner 2017, a large-scale military drill in Georgia, so Russia launched its own military drills in the North Caucasus and South Ossetia, which included about 16,000 Russian servicemen. And Russia completed the accession of South Ossetia’s army into Russian forces.

Georgia wants stronger ties with NATO. To strengthen them, it has to distance itself from Russia. But as long as Russia has leverage over the oil and gas passing through Georgian territory, it can’t do that. Georgia was the first country to abandon the post-Soviet identity and try to escape from Russia’s sphere of influence, but it can’t exist isolated from the Caucasus region. This, plus its dependence on energy supplies, obligates Georgia to cooperate with Russia in the energy sector in the Caucasus.

Russia has demonstrated to the U.S. that it can counter U.S. energy imports to Europe and continue to have significant control over the energy flows between the Caspian region and Europe. Recognizing the potential of the Caucasus region, the EU has been participating in the development of its energy sector. So it is important for Russia to maintain and strengthen its influence in the Caucasus. Russia has the ability to influence regional authorities as well as BP, which operates in the South Caucasus. The timing and energy focus of Russia’s pivot to the Caucasus indicate that this is part of Moscow’s response to U.S. sanctions.

It is in Russia’s interest to increase control over the pipelines passing through the territory of Georgia, but every move Russia makes to achieve that goal makes Europe more suspicious of its intentions, thus making it harder to drive a wedge between European countries and the United States.

[ccp]

Trump appears to be doing the political correct POTUS response to every "disaster"

offer help before and during and after
probably plan to shower Fed money to Texas ( or the Ryans will for sure)

go to seen and look grim
maybe give someone a hug for the cameras

etc ad nauseum

If he did not do this we know what the media will do to him

It will be interesting to see how CNN spins this to make him look BAD.

Perhaps they will now say these efforts are all political instead   

[Crafty_Dog]

wrong thread 

[Crafty_Dog]

The North Caucasus: Russia’s Soft Underbelly
Oct 26, 2017

Summary

In last week’s Deep Dive on the South Caucasus, we explained how the region’s unforgiving, mountainous terrain has served as both borderland and battleground for empires. This Deep Dive will focus on the North Caucasus, the relatively flat region above the Greater Caucasus mountain range whose terrain has made it vulnerable to Russian domination. Moving forward, however, the weakening of Russia and the re-emergence of political Islam means the region will likely pose a security threat to the Kremlin.

The Region

In sharp contrast with the South Caucasus, the North Caucasus is not composed of separate sovereign states. Instead the North Caucasus is an integral part of Russia, divided between two of the Russian Federation’s eight districts – the North Caucasian Federal District and the Southern Federal District. Most of the region belongs to the North Caucasian district, which split from the Southern district in 2010, a year after the end of the Second Chechen War. With the Southern district lying largely to the north, the North Caucasian district is the only Muslim-majority district in the federation.
 
(click to enlarge)

The North Caucasus stretches from the Caspian Sea in the southeast to the Sea of Azov in the northwest. The westernmost part of the area, composed of Krasnodar region and the enclave of Adygea, lies within the Southern district. Krasnodar consists mainly of flat lands, which allowed Russia to more easily slavicize the territory after the forced exodus of its Circassian inhabitants in the late 19th century. The rest of the North Caucasus region – the North Caucasian district – has maintained its distinct Muslim identity and hence was configured into a single federal district. This district runs from Krasnodar to the Caspian Sea and consists of the republics of Karachay-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria, North Ossetia, Ingushetia, Chechnya and Dagestan. The region of Stavropol – sandwiched between Krasnodar in the west and Dagestan in the east, and sharing borders with each of the other republics in the south – and North Ossetia are the only majority ethnic Russian and Orthodox Christian units within the North Caucasian district.
 
(click to enlarge)

This current administrative arrangement of the North Caucasus is the outcome of the Russians’ centuries-long struggle to subdue this region. Until the North Caucasus was brought to heel during the time of the czarist regime in the late 19th century, the region was what noted Caucasus and Central Asia scholar Marie Bennigsen Broxup referred to as a “barrier” that separated Russia from the heart of the Muslim world. At the same time, the mountainous terrain kept major Muslim powers to the south, such as the Ottoman Turks and the Safavid (and later Qajar) Persians, from truly accessing this region. Though both the Turks and the Persians had sought to expand into the Caucasus region, neither side was able to move past the South Caucasus.

By the 18th century, both the Ottomans and the Persians lacked the modern political, economic and military capabilities Russia and the other Europeans had acquired. Furthermore, they were embroiled in a bitter rivalry in the Middle East, and the Turks were heavily committed in Europe where they were starting to lose territory. Ultimately, the Ottomans and Persians were unable to seize the massive Greater Caucasus mountain range. The Russians, however, had no such trouble. Though a lengthy undertaking, Orthodox Christian Russia was much better positioned to eventually occupy the North Caucasus.

Russian Conquest

From a strategic point of view, Russia must control at least the North Caucasus, and ideally the South Caucasus, because these areas are buffer regions; should they fall into hostile hands, the entire Russian core would become vulnerable. These areas, however, have historically proven difficult to control because of both the terrain and the locals.
 
(click to enlarge)

Ivan the Terrible’s 1556 conquest of Astrakhan (an area of the North Caucasus that lies along the northwestern tip of the Caspian Sea) sparked Russian interest in the region. During this initial thrust into the North Caucasus, which lasted until 1604, the Russians reached as far as Dagestan, thanks to the flat terrain in the region’s northern half. This invasion did not last, however. The Ottomans, who were still a powerful force at the time,  supported the Dagestanis against the Russian incursion. The Russians were forced to pull back to Astrakhan.

From 1604 to 1783, the region was more or less left to its own devices. Russia had turned its focus to Europe, and the Turks were tied down in their wars with the Persians. This relative isolation allowed Islam, which had been present in the area since the 8th century, to spread rapidly through the central and western parts of the North Caucasus – in large part because of the halt of the Russian efforts to penetrate the area and the support of the Ottoman Turks and the Crimean Tatars.

Under Catherine II, Russia was able to project power into the North Caucasus. From 1783 to 1824, Russia engaged in a systematic campaign to conquer the region. Between 1785 and 1791, the Russians faced massive resistance from the forces of the Ottoman-backed Chechen Sufi leader Sheikh Mansour, who managed to unite much of the North Caucasus. After a major defeat at the hands of these Muslim warriors, on the banks of the Sunzha River in 1785, the Russian army, buoyed by its victory in the Napoleonic Wars, was able to come back and subdue the resistance. Though ultimately defeated, the uprising established among the locals that Islam could serve as both a unifying force and the basis of armed resistance.

This experience led to a series of jihad-inspired campaigns that continued until the establishment of the Soviet Union in 1922. During this time, the North Caucasus saw the decline of the traditional feudal elite and the rise of Sufi orders, further entrenching Islam within the political fabric of the North Caucasus. The U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff College scholar Robert F. Baumann explains how Russian efforts to complete their conquest of the region were complicated, as religious fervor proved to be an effective mobilizer of anti-Russian resistance. But though Islamic resistance made the conquest of the region more costly to the Russians, it failed to block the conquest completely.

The ramifications of the Russian conquest of the North Caucasus is not dissimilar to that of British and French colonialism in India and Africa, respectively. As former CIA and national security official Paul Henze notes in a 1996 article, Russian colonialism brought order and development to the North Caucasus – an otherwise chaotic region of tribal highlanders cut off from the rest of the world. Indeed, Moscow provided the region with modern infrastructure in the form of roads, railroads, ports and urban centers, but only after a long campaign to suppress local dissent.

Unlike most other European powers that sought colonies in distant lands, the Russians sought to control a land much closer to home. Indeed, the Caucasus was on Russia’s doorstep, and thus, it was imperative that the Russians fully assimilate the area. They spent a great deal of time trying to convert the people of the region to Orthodox Christianity, operating on the assumption that conversion would aid in assimilation. Ultimately, that policy backfired. Despite the fact that there were many ethno-linguistic groups that inhabited this region, a majority of them had been Muslim for centuries.
 
(click to enlarge)

Affinity to religion varies considerably across the region. Islam plays an important role in the identity and ideology of the Chechens and the Dagestanis in the east. Yet, as one moves west, religious fervor tends to taper off. Beyond Islam, there is little commonality among the various peoples of the North Caucasus. They are divided along clan, ethnic, linguistic and territorial lines, and the Russians sought to exploit these differences.

At the social level, traditional feudal Muslim elites and religious scholars sought to preserve their power through two sets of laws. The former emphasized customary laws, while the religious leaders sought to increase their influence by promoting Shariah, or Islamic law. Until the arrival of the Russians, these two competing forces were largely able to coexist.

According to Loyola University historian Michael Khodarkovsky, Russia pursued a complex strategy in its effort to take over the North Caucasus region. In some instances, the Russians found allies. But in others, they resorted to force, especially in terms of the takeover of lands and expulsion of the locals. In need of local partners, Russia would often co-opt the feudal Muslim elite, transforming them into loyalists of Moscow through assimilation. Elites from the North Caucasus were sent to study in Moscow, where many embraced Orthodox Christianity and Russian culture. Yet these individuals did not help promote assimilation in the North Caucasus, as few returned home. By the latter half of the 19th century, the Russians realized they needed people to represent Russian interests in the North Caucasus, and Moscow began to support locals who held grievances toward the landed gentry.

The attempts to convert people of the region to Orthodox Christianity undercut the more crucial interests of securing loyalty to the empire. Attempts at conversion were obviously anathema to the Muslim clergy, but they also triggered opposition from within the traditional elite quarters. For the Russians, who saw conversion as part and parcel of their efforts to advance their imperial interests within the region, it was difficult to alter course. In addition to the need to secularize the process of assimilation, there was ambiguity on how the North Caucasus would be controlled by Moscow. Should it be fully absorbed into the empire as a full-fledged province or should it be treated as a colony?

As the Russians searched for the best way to administer the North Caucasus, the region experienced another outbreak of major resistance. The leader of this campaign was Imam Shamil, who in the mid-19th century established the Caucasian Imamate, an Islamic polity that sought to liberate the area from the Russians. The Russians were forced to recognize that the region’s legal traditions had to be incorporated into their new system of governance. But here the Russians found themselves caught in the existing duality between customary and Islamic laws. Siding with the clergy would have helped undermine the tendency toward armed religious resistance, but the Russians needed local interlocutors who would be willing to adopt Russian customs and thus preferred the local economic and political elites.

As a result, throughout the czarist era, Russia struggled with how best to manage the North Caucasus. The empire eventually succeeded in creating a pro-Russian elite class in the region because, for many local elites, the only path toward European modernization was through Russification. Yet the masses remained loyal to Islamic teachings, and the gulf between the elites and the masses widened. By the late 19th and early 20th centuries, however, the elites and the masses would find common cause through the fusion of religious identity with ethnic nationalism.

The Soviet and Post-Soviet Eras

Already isolated from the rest of the world by geography and Russian subjugation, the North Caucasus became more or less completely cloaked behind the iron curtain of communism and the Soviet Union. Well aware of the struggles their czarist predecessors had to face in the North Caucasus, the Soviets divided the region, lumping its various pieces into different Soviet Socialist Republics. The main Soviet Socialist Republic in the North Caucasus combined Chechnya and Ingushetia to form the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Furthermore, the Soviets maintained a sophisticated and efficient coercive security establishment led by the KGB, allowing them to subdue this historically restive region.

Yet the Chechens openly expressed their discontent and, under the leadership of the nationalist guerilla leader Hasan Israilov, mounted an insurgency against the Soviet regime between 1940 and 1944. To suppress opposition, Soviet leader Josef Stalin ordered the mass displacement of people from the region after accusing the Chechens of having collaborated with the Nazis during World War II. In 1944, some 650,000 people from the region – most of whom were ethnic Chechens – were forced to relocate to Central Asia. The Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was dissolved and its areas gerrymandered. It was not until the era of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev that efforts to make amends with the Chechens began. In 1956,  the Chechens were returned to their homes. Two years later, the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was restored. 

The region generally remained calm for the next three decades, only to erupt yet again in the early 1990s when 15 republics declared independence and the Soviet Union dissolved. The South Caucasus divided into three independent republics — Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia — along with a few disputed territories. But the Russians were not willing to allow the North Caucasus, especially Chechnya, which declared independence in 1991, to become sovereign entities. Two back-to-back wars ensued, the first lasting from 1993 to 1996 and the second from 1999 to 2009.

Initially, the Chechen wars were dominated by nationalists, who subscribed to the Sufi religious creed, seeking an independent Chechnya. Gradually, however, Salafists assumed greater control of the fighting against Russian forces. These jihadists eventually moved beyond the goal of establishing an independent Islamic Chechnya to pursue broader, transnational agendas including creating a regional Islamic state that would encompass the broader North Caucasus region. Inspired by al-Qaida and aided by the influx of many Arab foreign fighters, Chechen jihadists modeled themselves after the historic religious warriors who resisted Russians in the North Caucasus since the Russian incursions began in the 16th century. In 2007,  a regional movement called the Caucasus Emirate was founded.

With the rise of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, the Caucasus Emirate group has essentially become irrelevant. Many Chechen militants and those from other parts of the North Caucasus moved to Syria and Iraq to join the jihadist regime. This weakening of the Chechen insurgency in the late 2000s allowed the republic to establish a stable regime led by the Kadyrov clan, which has kept peace for at least a decade. The key to this stability is Russian President Vladimir Putin’s dedicated support of the Kadyrov regime.

If history is any guide, the peace in Chechnya and the wider North Caucasus right now is likely the calm before the next storm. The Islamic religion and the Islamist ideology remain social and political drivers and have forced Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov to increase the role of religion in public life in the republic. This trend, coupled with the declining Russian political economy, suggests that the region will likely see the revival of a Muslim insurgency seeking to exploit Russia’s weakening. If Russia can’t control this area then the other historic players — Turkey and Iran — are in even less of a position to do so. 

[Crafty_Dog]

As long time readers here know, for many years I have been underlining the rarely mentioned importance of Central Asian natural gas as an alternative for Europe to being supplied by Russia and as a motive for understanding geopolitical actions-- wish this piece had a map:
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How Central Asian Energy Complements the Southern Gas Corridor
Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov attends an opening ceremony for the East-West natural gas pipeline in 2015.
(IGOR SASIN/AFP/Getty Images)
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By Robert M. Cutler for Euractiv

It took the EU several years to move in a Central Asian direction for energy security after the US-sponsored project for a Trans-Caspian Pipeline (TCP) for natural gas fell apart in the late 1990s. Nevertheless, first through the 2004 Baku Initiative and then with the 2007 Strategy for a New Partnership with Central Asia, it began to take those steps.

The EU followed through with practical effect in 2011 when it initiated negotiations with Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan on TCP construction. Last June the Council of the European Union, evaluating the first decade of the EU Strategy for Central Asia, concluded that "the EU will continue to seek to extend the Southern Gas Corridor to Central Asia, and to further promote the EU's multilateral and bilateral energy cooperation" with the countries involved.

Key in this policy are not only the TCP but also the White Stream pipeline, planned to transport Turkmenistan's gas from the South Caucasus directly to EU territory, from Georgia under the Black Sea to Romania. The gas would then flow through existing infrastructure in Ukraine, Slovakia and Czechia to Germany and neighbouring countries. It can also feed new infrastructure being created, such as the Bulgaria-Romania-Hungary-Austria pipeline (BRUA).
Recent Developments Accelerate

Events since spring 2017 have greatly accelerated this development. In April 2017, the Georgian Oil and Gas Corporation acquired 10% of the two different White Stream and TCP promoter companies. In May Georgia's prime minister Giorgi Kvirikashvili explained that his country was "working intensively on the project of transporting gas from Turkmenistan to Europe, the White Stream project, which brings new opportunities for the diversification of Europe's energy supply."

Days later Kvirikashvili's advisor Giorgi Vashakmadze declared that the EU "has a special interest in the projects of the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline and the White Stream", and in June the Council of the European Union reaffirmed the goal of extending the Southern Gas Corridor into Central Asia. Later that month Maroš Šefčovič, Vice-President of the European Commission welcomed Georgia's accession to the Energy Community and singled out its role in extending the Southern Gas Corridor to additional supply countries.

These developments set the stage for further events in the region itself. In August the leaders of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan signed for the first time an agreement to bring Caspian energy resources to Europe. In December, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov sensationally announced agreement among the five littoral states over the text of a Convention establishing a Caspian Sea legal regime.

Azerbaijani deputy foreign minister Khalaf Khalafov specifically clarified that "rights for laying pipelines are foreseen in the draft Convention" and that "those countries through whose sectors [the pipelines] will run" are the ones that "will coordinate the issue." The final excuse hindering TCP construction has thus disappeared.

Just last month Šefčovič reaffirmed "the Trans-Caspian Pipeline [as] an important, complementary element of the Southern Gas Corridor in order to connect the significant gas reserves of Central Asia to the European markets." The TCP is on the EU's List of Projects of Common Interest, qualifying it for preferential financial regulatory treatment by European institutions. Gas from the TCP's first string looks like reaching Greece and possibly Italy for European distribution in 2020. Gas transiting the second string would arrive in Romania as early as 2022.

For this to happen, necessary steps must be taken expeditiously. Georgia's energy ministry detailed such a step-by-step road-map late last year to the Energy Community (PowerPoint here). According to it, an adequate solution is found to problems of Turkmenistan's policy of selling gas at its border and banning production sharing agreements.

In this road-map, the Government of Georgia will provide early-stage financial investment usually made by oil and gas majors relying on production sharing agreements. It will enable the project promoter companies to conduct engineering and other studies necessary for obtaining a construction permit. They will identify all capital and operational costs, enabling the promoter, in possession of the construction permits, to announce transportation tariffs for gas delivery to be levied on (presumably European) shippers. On that basis, the shippers can then negotiate sale-purchase agreements with Turkmenistan.
How Turkmenistan's Gas Will Come to Europe

The idea that gas from Europe's east should have two entry-points to Europe arose during competition between the Nabucco and South Stream projects. The European Coordinator's 2009 report on implementing the Caspian Development Corporation also adopted this idea. (He even suggested continuing the White Stream pipeline to Trieste, in order to secure different markets for White Stream and Nabucco.) The TCP follows this idea by aiming at two entry-points for Turkmen gas to Europe, one for each of the pipeline's two strings.

The TCP's first string, carrying 16 billion cubic metres per annum (bcma), would pass from Azerbaijan through the South Caucasus Pipeline (now being expanded from SCP to SCPx), then via Turkey's east-west Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline (TANAP) to Greece, whence to Italy by way of the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). With comparatively modest incremental outlay, yielding excellent cost/benefit ratios, this system can handle gas from the TCP, significantly enhancing the EU's advantages from the SGC.

The TCP's second string, also for 16 bcma, runs across the Black Sea. It costs less than the Turkish route and targets a different market, satisfying the increasing import needs of Germany and its neighbours. Gas from the TCP's second string, instead of entering Turkey and Greece, would transit Georgia, landing in Romania. The White Stream pipeline would be laid under the Black Sea, using economical and widely available ultra-deep-sea technology. From there, Turkmen gas would reach Central Europe by two routes.

The first route for gas from TCP's second string, once landed in EU territory (Constanța, Romania), may utilise capacity from the Bulgaria-Romania-Hungary-Austria pipeline (BRUA) pipeline now under construction. Another intra-European route from Constanța will have larger capacity. This second route would go north by reverse-flow through the Trans-Balkan Pipeline, after Gazprom's contracts with Romania and Ukraine expire in 2019, then through Ukraine's gas transmission system for subsequent distribution to Poland, Austria and, by the Bratstvo pipeline, to Slovakia, Czechia and Germany.
Central Asian Gas Brings More Than Just Gas to Europe

Turkmenistan has always sought to export larger volumes, in search of higher revenues through economies of scale. That is why the country constructed at its own expense the domestic East-West Pipeline (EWP), which transmits the gas up to Turkmenistan's coast on the Caspian Sea. Finished in 2015, the EWP is now capped and filled with gas awaiting further westward transmision.

The East-West Pipeline was designed and built to carry 30-40 bcma. Together with offshore production, that is the quantity Turkmenistan seeks to export. So it is very likely that prospects for TCP's second string will need to be made clear before Turkmenistan commits quantities for the first string. The Georgian ministry's road-map provides a way to accomplish this.

Together with the TANAP/TAP system, the TCP and White Stream projects meet criteria of competition, market integration, security of supply and diversification, required for designation as Projects of Common Interest. They will increase transit capacity of Eastern Partnership countries Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine. They will likewise increase competition and security of supply, and significantly stimulate economic growth, in Georgia and Ukraine.

White Stream and TCP complement the Southern Gas Corridor. They will increase volumes of gas that can be transited to Europe. White Stream especially will create new ways for gas to reach Central and Eastern Europe via Romania. It will support new European infrastructure such as the Bulgaria-Romania-Hungary-Austria pipeline (BRUA) and the utilisation of Ukraine's gas storage facilities to Europe's benefit.

[DougMacG]

wish this piece had a map:
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trans-Caspian_Gas_Pipeline
The Trans/Caspian gas pipeline would run under the Caspian Sea from Türkmenbaşy to the Sangachal Terminal, where it would connect with the existing pipeline to Erzurum in Turkey, which in turn would be connected to the Southern Gas Corridor, thus taking natural gas from Turkmenistan to Central Europe.

[Crafty_Dog]

Excellent Doug, thank you 

[Crafty_Dog]

North Caucasus, Russia: TASS reported that Russia’s National Guard is going to deploy aviation assets to support operations in the North Caucasus and other Russian areas. We have been paying close attention to the situation in the North Caucasus, which is an important area for Russia from a geopolitical perspective because of the access it affords to Moscow. Let’s find out what kinds of operations these are, and exactly where they are. Do they pose a serious threat to stability in the North Caucasus?

[Crafty_Dog]

Turkey: Turkish and Uzbek officials are meeting to discuss Afghanistan, and they have a conference set up on the subject that will be held at the end of March in Tashkent. This is not the first Turkish activity we’ve seen in Central Asia in the past couple of weeks. Considering that Turkey has invaded Syria, is active in the Balkans and is turning back Italian ships in the Eastern Mediterranean, it has a lot on its plate right now. We have a good handle on what Turkey is doing in these other areas but not in Central Asia. How do these moves fit with Turkey’s strategy?

•   Finding: Turkey is very active in Central Asia. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, it supported pan-Turk policies in many former satellite states in an effort to establish influence over their Turkic populations. Turkey now influences them through bilateral projects and investments. The government in Ankara wants to become Eurasia’s hub for energy transport while Central Asian countries want transport routes that go through places that are not Russia. Still, Turkey’s bilateral relations with the countries of Central Asia are slow to evolve, and the share of oil and natural gas from Central Asia remains small.

===========================

North Caucasus, Russia: TASS reported that Russia’s National Guard is going to deploy aviation assets to support operations in the North Caucasus and other Russian areas. We have been paying close attention to the situation in the North Caucasus, which is an important area for Russia from a geopolitical perspective because of the access it affords to Moscow. Let’s find out what kinds of operations these are, and exactly where they are. Do they pose a serious threat to stability in the North Caucasus?

•   Finding:  Planning has been in the works since September 2017 to create two new districts this year for the National Guard: in the south of Russia, with the headquarters in Rostov-on-Don, and in the North Caucasus, in Pyatigorsk. The National Guard deployment is related to the 2018 World Cup in Russia, but there is no information yet on the operations or equipment.

[Crafty_Dog]

Uzbekistan, Russia: A delegation from the Uzbek armed forces visited Siberia to observe a Russian military compound in the Central Military District. On one hand, we have seen nascent signs of Uzbekistan improving relations with the U.S., and we’ve talked about how Russia’s declining influence in Central Asia has countries like Uzbekistan moving away from Russia. On the other hand, we have a story like this. Is this a sign of increasing cooperation between Russia and Uzbekistan?

Russia: Russia says it has arrested five members of the Islamic State in Dagestan. Instability in the North Caucasus is a serious tripwire for Russian security, and IS establishing a presence there would certainly qualify as instability. Is Russia facing a serious Islamist challenge in this region?

[Crafty_Dog]

Uzbekistan: Uzbekistan’s defense minister said the Commonwealth of Independent States, a grouping of former Soviet countries, should strengthen cooperation in the area of air defense. CIS initially set up an air defense system back in 1995. Uzbekistan is in the midst of trying to position itself as a regional leader in Central Asia and does not host any Russian military bases (an exception to the norm in the region). Uzbekistan has recently shown signs of closer collaboration with the U.S. as well. What is Uzbekistan’s end game here?

[Crafty_Dog]

Summary

Nearly four years ago, the Islamic State was on top of the world. After seizing large segments of Iraq and Syria, the group announced the establishment of a caliphate on June 29, 2014. Islamist extremists from all over rushed to join the group. Major militaries bent on destroying the group were not far behind. By the end of 2017, the Iraqi government was declaring Iraq “totally liberated” of IS, and the Russian General Staff was touting similar results in Syria.

The same year IS was making headlines in Iraq and Syria, a branch of the group was taking root in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. Its fate has been very different. In April 2017, when U.S. officials estimated there were 700 IS members in Afghanistan, the U.S. military made its intentions to dismantle the group known when it dropped the “mother of all bombs” on IS targets in Nangarhar province. A few months later, a U.S. airstrike in Kunar province killed the leader of the Afghan branch. By November, however, with the war still raging, the top NATO commander in Afghanistan said American forces had killed over 1,600 IS fighters in Afghanistan. In late December, IS blew up a cultural center in Kabul, killing 50 people. Other bombings followed, the largest of which killed almost 70 on April 22, 2018. A few days ago, on June 8, the top U.S. general in Afghanistan said anti-IS operations would intensify during the ongoing temporary cease-fire against the Taliban.

The Islamic State branch in Afghanistan benefited somewhat from the demise of IS in Iraq and Syria. As the latter crumbled, current and would-be foreign fighters – many of whom come from Central Asia – sought out the next battleground, which many decided was Afghanistan. Looking ahead, in much the same way that successes against IS in Iraq and Syria pushed the fight to Afghanistan, successes in Afghanistan could push the fight north, into Central Asia. Thousands of people from Central Asia are believed to have joined IS in Iraq and Syria, so in a way, this would be a homecoming.

Terrorist groups near the borders of several Central Asian countries are already growing more active. More than 15,000 IS fighters are at the southern borders of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, the secretary of the Security Council of Russia said in late May. There are reports of IS fighters concentrating in the northeastern Afghan provinces of Badakhshan, Takhar and Kunduz, all of which border Tajikistan. Specifics on the fighters are hard to come by, but Tajikistan’s State Committee for National Security believes they number about 7,000. This includes about 4,000 in Kunduz, an estimated 95 percent of whom are Uzbeks from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (which pledged its loyalty to IS in 2015). 

To be fair, many prognosticators – ourselves included – have been waiting for years for the turmoil in Afghanistan and Pakistan to drag down Central Asian states. Yet the Institute for Economics and Peace, which puts out a yearly Global Terrorism Index, placed only Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in the half of countries most affected by terrorism, and even those only barely. (Kazakhstan ranked the worst at 67 – the higher the ranking, the more effect terrorism has on the country – just behind Canada.) Incidents of terrorism actually dropped between 2002 and 2016 in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, according to the index. But think tank indexes don’t change geopolitics, and they can’t fix socio-political or economic stresses. What those indicators say is that Central Asia has a rather high chance to become a new hotbed for terrorists. This would be bad news not just for Central Asia but also for its neighbors, especially China and Russia. In this Deep Dive, we’ll look at the geopolitics and the internal stresses of the region, as well as how Russia and China are preparing to fight back.

An Islamic Arc of Instability

Central Asia is surrounded by a sort of Islamic arc of instability. In the south, it borders Afghanistan and Pakistan. To the east is the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, China’s most unstable region, where a plurality of the population – about 45 percent – is Muslim. And to the west, the restive Caucasus is separated from Central Asia by only the Caspian Sea. The southern section of the instability arc is the most contagious, so although the socio-economic vulnerabilities in each state are fairly comparable, the three that border Afghanistan – Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – are most immediately vulnerable to the spillover of IS and the Taliban.


(click to enlarge)

Tajikistan has the weakest army and the longest border with Afghanistan – more than 800 miles (1,300 kilometers) – of the Central Asian countries. It is simply incapable of securing its borders and stopping extremists from slipping into its territory. Turkmenistan’s border with Afghanistan is a little more than half as long as Tajikistan’s, but a nearly 500-mile border is not much more defensible. Turkmenistan is also attractive to Islamists because of its sparse population, weak military and the absence of Russian military bases, factors that combine to make it easier to put down roots and spread.

Uzbekistan, on the other hand, may be the best-prepared country in Central Asia to counter an influx of terrorists from Afghanistan. The border is less than 90 miles long and traces the Amu Darya river, a natural obstacle to clandestine crossings. Uzbekistan also has Central Asia’s largest active-duty military, according to a 2017 International Institute for Strategic Studies report, and it inherited a great deal of the Soviet Union’s military equipment when the USSR collapsed.

Farther north, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are shielded from the Afghan border, but they have another threat: Xinjiang. The Chinese state-run Global Times newspaper quoted unnamed sources in 2014 as saying some 300 Chinese Uighurs were fighting with IS in Iraq and Syria. And in the late 1990s, Chinese Uighurs in Xinjiang formed what is now known as the Turkistan Islamic Party, a terrorist group whose goal is to create a caliphate in Xinjiang and Central Asia. Moreover, Kazakhstan’s vast steppes are desirable terrain for jihadist groups, including those that could come from the south, because many areas are sparsely populated and hard to patrol. From there it is also possible to move into Russia and the Caucasus, where allies would not be difficult to find.

Turmoil Inside the Arc

The roots of extremism and terrorism in Central Asia can be clearly traced back to the 1990s, but that isn’t when the first wave of Central Asian terrorism began. The first terrorist movement there was actually the Basmachi movement, a Muslim revolt against the Bolsheviks and the Russian people under the banner of a “holy war,” starting in 1917. The movement was defeated by the Red Army in 1938, but Central Asian Islamism was not extinguished. In the Soviet Union, Muslims could not openly profess their religion and were instead forced to accept state atheism. The successes of Islamists in Afghanistan against the USSR in the 1980s, combined with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, breathed new life into Central Asian Islamism, and a number of groups emerged that began to cooperate with, for example, the Taliban movement.

The strict authoritarianism that took hold in the newly independent states of Central Asia in the mid-1990s was fuel to the Islamist fire. Government efforts to stop the spread of Islam and Islamist groups, which they perceived to be a threat to their power, had the reverse effect. Political opposition became violent resistance, and terrorist movements formed in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, bent on creating an Islamist state inside their territory.

The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, established in the late 1990s, became the largest terrorist group in the region. Its mission was to topple the regime of Uzbek President Islam Karimov, who died in 2016, and establish an Islamic state uniting the five states of Central Asia. The IMU was once aligned with al-Qaida but it formally switched loyalties to IS in 2015. Other groups include Hizb ut-Tahrir, the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan, Jamaat Ansarullah (originally from Tajikistan) and the Turkistan Islamic Party (formerly the East Turkestan Islamic Movement), which mostly threatens China. A newer group, Lashkar-e-Khorasan, has formed with the goal of creating a Central Asian caliphate, though it is not tied to IS, according to Andrei Serenko, a scholar at the Russia-based Center for Studies of Modern Afghanistan. Lashkar-e-Khorasan consists mostly of people from Central Asia.

The motivation of terrorists is a hotly debated topic, but religion alone is rarely a sufficient driver. Extremism usually spreads when there are unfavorable social or economic conditions and the legal avenues for political dissent prove ineffective. Central Asia in the 1990s is a case in point. In the first years of independence, Central Asian countries had poor economic performances, and parts of the population were marginalized.


(click to enlarge)

Much has changed in the two decades since. Macroeconomic indicators in Central Asia today are positive. The World Bank estimates that Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan all experienced gross domestic product growth of at least 5.3 percent in 2017 and expects 5 percent or better growth for each for at least the next three years, while the GDPs of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan grew by an estimated 4 and 4.6 percent last year, respectively. But their rapid modernization covers up demographic problems and widening social divisions. Poverty and unemployment – especially youth unemployment – are still an issue, even if official statistics don’t always show it. Many are trying to move abroad to find work. Most go to Russia, since Russian is still commonly spoken in post-Soviet states. Some become radicalized. Frustrated youths are the ideal target for jihadist recruiters, and Central Asia has plenty of them.

Pre-Emptive Action

For years, Central Asian extremists concentrated their efforts on Central Asia. But when the Islamic State declared its caliphate in Iraq and Syria in 2014, the most dedicated jihadists in Central Asia rushed to join the effort. Most of the fighters came from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

In early 2017, Russian President Vladimir Putin said there were some 9,000 people from Commonwealth of Independent States countries (the five Central Asian states plus Armenia, Belarus, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine) fighting in Syria. Uzbekistan led the way with 1,500 citizens fighting alongside IS. Tajik official data said about 1,150 of its citizens in recent years had gone to Syria or Iraq to join IS. Tajikistan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs says 519 Tajiks are fighting with IS, while 150 more have died and 36 were allowed to return home and avoid criminal prosecution. Kyrgyz authorities estimated that about 600 of their citizens joined extremist groups in Syria and Iraq; Kazakhstan puts its own estimate at 500; and Turkmenistan says 400. Reliable data does not exist – these estimates count only men, for instance – but the totals are in line with the upper end of most other estimates.

The flow of fighters started to reverse when IS began losing ground and running out of funds. The extremists who left for Iraq and Syria years ago return home battle-hardened, experienced and devout. Border authorities attempt to catch them, but some inevitably slip through the cracks. The fear inside the governments of Central Asia is that the returning militants will create sleeper terrorist cells in their countries, recruiting more fighters and ultimately unifying Islamist movements in the region.

Central Asian governments are also concerned that refugees from Afghanistan could become radicalized, or that Taliban or IS fighters could hide among them. However, the number of refugees in Central Asia is still small: At the start of 2017, 729 refugees were registered in Tajikistan, 653 in Kazakhstan, 339 in Kyrgyzstan, and 27 each in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

Central Asian governments have been taking pre-emptive action. Since fall 2015, Tajikistan has closed more than 1,500 mosques in an effort to combat religious extremism. Earlier this year, Russia and Tajikistan carried out joint anti-terrorism drills near the Afghan border. In May 2018, Collective Security Treaty Organization countries launched anti-terrorism drills in Kazakhstan. Uzbekistan, which strives for independence and neutrality, ratified the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Convention on Countering Extremism last June and rejoined SCO counterterrorism drills after a long absence. And the president of Kyrgyzstan said he is not opposed to opening a second Russian military base in the country.

Central Asia’s most powerful neighbors, Russia and China, are keeping a watchful eye on the situation and have been quick to offer help. Both share long borders with Central Asian states and realize that they could be next if terrorism started to spread in the region. In addition, China is cognizant of the threat to its One Belt, One Road projects through Central Asia.

Russia and China, in the framework of the CSTO and the SCO, are working out joint plans with partner states to combat the terrorist threat. After a seven-year hiatus, the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group, designed to help Afghanistan fight terrorism, drugs and crime, met in October 2017 in Moscow. The group met again this year in Beijing. In late April, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said Moscow was increasing the combat readiness of Russian military bases in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to prevent the spread of militants from northern Afghanistan to Russia’s allies in the CSTO.

Iran and the U.S. have also shown an interest in the stability of Central Asia, and Russia and China are wary of their intentions. Whether it’s conspiracy theory or legitimate fear, Russia seems particularly concerned that the U.S. could be encouraging unrest in Central Asia. Instability there could disrupt China’s One Belt, One Road initiative and distract Russia from interfering in areas more important to U.S. foreign policy. On the other hand, the U.S. will never forget what happened in 2001 when Islamism in Afghanistan grew powerful enough to reach even the United States. And as Central Asian governments have already shown in recent years, nothing gets Russian military bases in the region upgraded or joint drills carried out like hyping the threat of terrorism

[Crafty_Dog]

Makes points I have been making here for several years about the interplay of Central Asian gas and Russia's desire to be a monopoly to Europe.

https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/what-does-new-caspian-sea-agreement-mean-energy-market

[Crafty_Dog]

For years now I have underlined the geopolitics of natural gas in Central Asia:

Nov. 1, 2018
By Ekaterina Zolotova
To Reach Pakistan, Saudi Arabia Goes Through Turkmenistan


The Central Asian state could give Riyadh a way into the surging Pakistani natural gas market – and edge Iran out of it.


Energy pipelines carry more than oil or natural gas. They are powerful conduits for economic and political influence. In Pakistan, increasing demand for energy has caught the attention of several possible suppliers eager for the country’s business and fealty. Saudi Arabia, for example, has promised to sell Islamabad $3 billion worth of crude oil on a deferred payment plan as part of an investment deal. It’s a competitive offer for Pakistan, whose precarious finances mean the country needs all the credit it can get. But it’s hardly the only energy arrangement Islamabad is entertaining, and in the realm of natural gas, the kingdom may well be outbid. Iran and Russia have proposed building an offshore pipeline to accommodate Pakistan’s surging demand for natural gas. The three parties signed a preliminary agreement on the pipeline – which would run 1,724 miles (2,775 kilometers) from Iran to India by way of Pakistan – in September. And just like that, Saudi Arabia seemed cut out of Pakistan’s natural gas market.

The kingdom, however, has found another way into the Pakistani market: Turkmenistan. Riyadh recently announced that it would allocate more funds to build the Central Asian state’s portion of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India, or TAPI, natural gas pipeline. The investment is Saudi Arabia’s latest move to check Iran’s influence in Pakistan and the surrounding region, but it could also put Russia on the defensive.


 
(click to enlarge)


Too Promising to Pass Up

For Iran and Saudi Arabia alike, Pakistan represents an opportunity. It is the second-most populous majority-Muslim country (like Iran, Pakistan is an Islamic republic) and the only nuclear power in the Muslim world. It would be a valuable ally for either country, and it recently offered to mediate between them to try to resolve Yemen’s civil war. On the energy front, Pakistan is no less promising. Its rapidly growing market adds about half a million customers a year. To keep up with that demand, the government plans to more than triple its annual imports of liquefied natural gas to 37 billion cubic meters by 2030. Though Saudi Arabia is not a natural gas producer itself and has smaller reserves compared with Iran, it can’t afford to miss out on the rising demand for natural gas and LNG in Pakistan.

That’s where Turkmenistan comes in. The country has both ample natural gas reserves and serious problems with export and distribution. For most of their post-Soviet history, Russia was Turkmenistan’s largest natural gas customer – large enough to call the shots in the Turkmen natural gas industry. The government in Ashgabat tried to diversify its export destinations, starting shipments to China and pushing for a more direct route to Europe that would bypass Russia, but its efforts backfired. Nervous about losing control over Turkmenistan’s natural gas supply, Moscow blocked construction of the proposed Trans-Caspian pipeline. Russian natural gas giant Gazprom, meanwhile, gradually reduced its purchases of Turkmen gas until 2016, when it stopped them altogether. As a result, Turkmenistan has no way to move its natural gas west or north.
To the south, its luck hasn’t been much better. Iran, which also opposes building a pipeline under the Caspian Sea, has been embroiled in a dispute with Turkmenistan over natural gas for nearly two years. The trouble started in 2017, when Turkmenistan stopped sending natural gas to Iran, alleging that Tehran owed state-owned energy company Turkmengaz $1.8 billion. Iran sent Turkmenistan a formal complaint in January, and the case has since gone to the International Court of Arbitration. In the meantime, China is the only country buying Turkmen gas – an arrangement too close for Ashgabat’s comfort to its former setup with Russia, and one that isn’t quite paying the bills. The loss of energy export revenue has plunged the Turkmen economy into crisis, complete with high inflation and food shortages. The situation is so dire that Turkmen police have started fining people who come to the capital from other parts of the country to buy food.

Dueling Pipelines

Saudi Arabia can help Turkmenistan get its natural gas to new export markets through the TAPI pipeline. In return, Turkmenistan can keep Pakistan from relying too heavily on Iranian natural gas and, by extension, from becoming too receptive to Iran’s influence. Pakistan expects to receive its first gas shipments from Turkmenistan through TAPI in 2020 – that is, assuming the project reaches completion. The pipeline is set to run from Turkmenistan’s Galkynysh gas field right through Afghanistan’s Kandahar province, where the Taliban recently assassinated the local police chief, before passing into Pakistan and then India. The war in Afghanistan and the insurgent threat there have made construction of the pipeline risky and put off most investors.

And security may be only part of the problem. There’s also the possibility of international opposition to TAPI, namely from Russia. The project is a headache for Moscow. Once completed, the pipeline would further jeopardize Russia’s influence over Turkmenistan, an area it has had close ties with since the 19th century. That Turkmenistan has maintained its neutrality since the Soviet Union’s collapse – declining to join other regional countries in blocs and treaties with Russia, such as the Commonwealth of Independent States – is vexing enough for Moscow. In recent years, Russia has noticeably stepped up its efforts to ensure its presence in Central Asia. But because it’s in no financial position to lend money to Ashgabat, Moscow has relied instead on economic pressure to try to force Turkmenistan’s cooperation. The results have been mixed, and now it stands to lose not only sway with Turkmenistan thanks to TAPI but perhaps also profit: Gazprom is considering helping develop four natural gas fields in Iran and building an LNG plant, along with the offshore pipeline, to facilitate the shipment of Iranian natural gas to Pakistan.

Even so, the prospect of Saudi involvement in Turkmenistan seems to have renewed Russia’s interest in Turkmen natural gas, and Gazprom reportedly is thinking about resuming its imports from the Central Asian country. That means Moscow’s relationship with Riyadh and Tehran could change. Russia historically has been the only power that tends to maintain good relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia, selling weapons to both countries and trying to act as mediator between them. Their overlapping – if not conflicting – interests in Turkmenistan could become the basis of a dispute down the line.

[Crafty_Dog]

Highlights

    Turkey has moved closer to Russia while its relationships with the United States and the European Union have suffered.
    A Turkish realignment toward Russia is not likely to materialize given their vastly different strategic priorities and visions.
    For practical reasons, Turkey will take additional steps over the coming months to rekindle its alliance with the United States and its partnership with the European Union.

Turkey's relationship with Russia is historically fraught with suspicion and friction. Since the end of the Cold War, however, the two countries have established an important economic relationship, and they have set a bold, perhaps unreachable target of $100 billion in bilateral trade. Even so, this economic aspiration is counterbalanced by differing prerogatives in the strategic and geopolitical realm. Turkey, representing NATO's eastern flank, has partnered for decades with the United States and the European Union to contain Russian influence in Eastern and Central Europe, as well as the Caucasus. Recent developments in the Syrian civil war have resulted in a strange congruence of interests and seeming cooperation between Ankara and Moscow, but it would be a stretch to argue that this cooperation will deepen into an enduring strategic relationship.
Frayed Relations With the U.S.

Since 2012, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been at odds with the United States, under Presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump, for actively supporting Kurdish rebels in Syria to defeat the Islamic State. Turkey considers the Kurdish rebels in Syria an offshoot of the insurgent Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which the Turkish government, as well as the United States, NATO and the European Union, lists as a terrorist organization. In turn, Russia has, with the help of Iran, established a process not only of defeating the Islamic State in Syria but also of defeating all rebel groups fighting the pro-Russian government of Syrian President Bashar al Assad. The situation in Syria has left policy analysts wondering whether Turkey is actively distancing itself from its American and European partners to adopt a closer strategic relationship with Russia.

To be sure, there are many issues that have resulted in a deep schism between Turkey and the United States. U.S. backing of Kurdish rebels can be seen as merely the tip of the iceberg. In return, Turkey has concluded the purchase (if not the actual deployment) of a Russian S-400 missile system to bolster its air defenses in clear preference to the U.S.-made Patriot missile system. U.S. authorities have threatened their Turkish counterparts that if they deploy the Russian missiles the United States will not transfer more than 100 F-35 fighters to Turkey, mainly because the Russian crews who would operate the S-400 batteries would be in a prime position to gain information regarding the F-35's strengths and weaknesses. Further, Erdogan's government has arbitrarily detained U.S. citizens as bargaining chips to compel Washington to accede to Turkish policy demands, specifically regarding Syria. In return, the United States, in addition to sanctioning Turkish Cabinet ministers, has threatened further punitive measures against Turkey — measures that could seriously damage its already debt-ridden and fragile economy.

Instead of mending fences with the United States and requesting emergency financial assistance from the U.S.-dominated International Monetary Fund and/or World Bank, could it be that Erdogan is more interested in turning to new "allies" such as Russia and China to achieve his regional and wider foreign policy agenda? The purchasing of sovereign debt by China is just one avenue by which Beijing is advancing its global ambition of unseating the United States as the sole economic and military hegemon, and it would be quite attractive to Erdogan's government precisely because monetary loans from China are likely to carry fewer conditions than those obtained from the IMF and World Bank. Other than a historical security apparatus rooted in the Cold War, and limited trade relations, there is not much that binds Turkey and the United States together.

Other than a historical security apparatus rooted in the Cold War, and limited trade relations, there is not much that binds Turkey and the United States together.

On the other hand, Russia and Turkey have a significant economic partnership that not only spans a number of critical sectors but also makes Turkey increasingly dependent on Russia. Turkey derives 55 percent of its natural gas needs (natural gas produces 60 percent of its electricity) from Russia, for example. Both countries have also signed an agreement to build at least one Russian nuclear power plant in Turkey. Because of Turkey's potential as a transit hub for Russian natural gas to Europe — one that bypasses Ukraine — Moscow and Ankara are building the TurkStream pipeline, which could begin carrying Russian natural gas through Turkey to the European Union via Bulgaria as early as late 2019. The Russian domestic market is a vital destination for Turkish exports, including but not limited to cars, agricultural produce and textiles.

Further, the influx of 4 million to 5 million Russian tourists to Turkey in 2017 represents 12 percent of the country's total number of tourists and a significant source of revenue. To crown these vital areas of economic synergy, one must bear in mind that Turkey and Russia's bilateral relationship does not depend on shared values such as human rights and democratic governance, a factor that has further embittered Turkey's relationship with the United States and the European Union.
Signs of Improvement

Despite the economic ties, Turkey's supposed realignment toward Russia and China — a clear preference that would put it in the Eurasia camp and possibly out of NATO — is not likely to materialize. Turkey and Russia have vastly different strategic priorities and visions. In the immediate future, Turkey is ambivalent about a Russian- and Iranian-backed military assault on the last rebel-held town of Idlib in Syria. Erdogan has so far succeeded in preventing the operation from taking place. This may not last for much longer. Russia has a clear interest in ending the Syrian civil war and seeing al Assad's government fully in control of the country once again. This concern presents a number of problems for Turkey. The battle for Idlib would result in new waves of refugees destined for Turkey, which already hosts more than 3.5 million Syrians and isn't in a position to cope with more. In addition, it is highly likely that the extremist elements making up the remnants of the Syrian resistance that Turkey has actively supported (Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, and other Islamic State or former al Qaeda elements) would flee to Turkey and pose an internal security threat.

In the long term, Turkey has little to gain with a re-empowered al Assad government, which is likely to present a resentful posture against Erdogan, precisely because he tried to topple al Assad's government and replace it with a Sunni alternative. Strategically speaking, Turkey also remains largely isolated in the region, and in the event it does not patch up its relationship with its partners, it is likely to face increased security and economic challenges, which its NATO, U.S. and EU anchors so far have largely shielded Ankara from. Consider that Turkey has no real alternative to renewing and maintaining its military capacity independent of U.S.-made products — namely the F-35 fighter. It is for such reasons that Erdogan has recently initiated several overtures to begin rebuilding relationships with allies he has seriously strained. The freeing of U.S. cleric Andrew Brunson in mid-October was a clear attempt to de-escalate tensions with the United States and prevent further sanctions being levied against Turkey. More recently, the apparent murder of The Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul has resulted in Erdogan attempting to marginalize Saudi Arabia in the eyes of the United States and the European Union and to raise Turkey's profile as a more credible partner, by divulging precise intelligence in Khashoggi's death.

Turkey remains more distant toward its once stalwart alliance with the United States and partnership with the European Union than at any other point in recent history. However, in the coming months we are likely to witness more overt measures to rekindle and reaffirm these embittered ties, if only for pragmatic reasons.

[Crafty_Dog]

Highlights

    The North Caucasus is likely to see more protests and violence over land disputes between Chechnya and neighboring regions in the coming year.
    The Kremlin's ability to preserve stability in the region will be tested, and tensions there have the potential to spill over into greater Russia.
    Moscow will seek to contain problems in the North Caucasus through crackdowns and with concessions, but holding on to the loyalty of regional leaders and the general population could prove increasingly difficult.

The North Caucasus has long been a difficult region for Russia to control. Pockets of resistance have sprouted in the mountainous area between the Black and Caspian seas for centuries. That opposition runs from the Russian Empire's initial expansion into the North Caucasus in the early 18th century to the separatist conflicts in Chechnya at the end of the 20th century. After coming to power in 2000, Russian President Vladimir Putin helped restore relative calm to the region by granting greater autonomy to Chechnya, the home of two separatist wars. However, the actions of the Chechen president are now stirring up tensions with neighboring republics and threatening the stability that is crucial to Moscow.

The Big Picture

The militancy, violence and separatism of the North Caucasus have long posed problems for Russia. While the region has been dormant in recent years, signs indicate that it could become more active and problematic for Moscow in the year to come.

See The Fight for Russia’s Borderlands

The Land Between the Seas

The rocky terrain and complex ethnic diversity of the North Caucasus have long made it difficult for Moscow to effectively incorporate the region into the Russian state. But the strategic location of the region — consisting of the republics of Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia and Adygea — made its control imperative for Russia.

The area borders the South Caucasus states of Georgia and Azerbaijan, and it is close to regional powers Turkey and Iran. Significant deposits of oil have been found and exploited in Chechnya and Dagestan, which are also home to important energy transportation infrastructure. In addition, Islamist militants have contributed to a volatile security environment there. Groups such as the Caucasus Emirate have even periodically carried out attacks in the heart of Russia, including Moscow and St. Petersburg.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.defensenews.com/air/2019/04/01/us-stops-f-35-fighter-jet-parts-delivery-to-turkey/?fbclid=IwAR3rt522Zx0n260RKZa83Cuh6rRFSlzZY9KGYpGmZo71pJQpgCeO2cZHMT8

[Crafty_Dog]

November 11, 2019   Open as PDF



    In Central Asia, Can China Really Compete With Russia?
By: Ekaterina Zolotova

Chinese influence in Central Asia has increased markedly in recent years. For Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and even the relatively more closed-off Turkmenistan, China is becoming not only a major supplier of loans and investment but also a key trading partner. Some may interpret this as an indication that the influence of Central Asia’s historical benefactor, Russia, is diminishing. It seems, however, that Russia isn’t too alarmed by China’s growing influence in the region. That’s because, unlike China, Moscow’s interests in Central Asia are not just economic. Indeed, Russia has historical links to the region and security and political interests there, which will ensure that Moscow will be the dominant player in the region for years to come.

For Russia, maintaining influence in the post-Soviet Central Asian states is critical. These countries form a key buffer zone for Russia, separating the country from unstable areas of the Middle East and terrorist elements. Russia is concerned that terrorist and extremist influences could spread to its southern border and into the Caucasus through Central Asia and threaten to destabilize its southern and eastern regions.

Economic Influence

From an economic point of view, Russia looks at Central Asia as a region with potential. It sees Central Asia as a key route through which it could supply energy and other goods to growing markets like India, China and Pakistan, which, as they face increasing uncertainty from sanctions and the U.S. trade war, could become major consumers of Russian exports. But Moscow is facing increasing competition from Beijing in its historical sphere of influence. After the 2008 global economic crisis, Beijing began to more actively invest in and trade with the countries of Central Asia. China’s foremost interests in Central Asia are economic; Beijing sees these countries as a growing market for Chinese products, critical trade routes for the Belt and Road Initiative, and a source of needed natural resources. Chinese companies produce roughly 20 percent of Kazakh oil. More than 80 percent of Tajik gold deposits are operated by companies that receive Chinese capital, and more than 700 enterprises in Uzbekistan receive Chinese funding. China has also financed the development of Turkmenistan’s Galkynysh gas field and the construction of a gas pipeline through Kazakhstan. The estimated combined cost of these two projects exceeds $8 billion.
 
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Central Asian countries now owe billions of dollars in debt to China. Uzbekistan alone owes $3.4 billion (21 percent of the state’s external debt); Tajikistan owes $2.9 billion (48 percent of its external debt); and Kyrgyzstan owes $1.7 billion (42.5 percent of external debt). This is raising concerns that Central Asian countries could become ensnared in so-called debt traps, compelling these states to agree to hefty political or economic concessions in order to pay off large loans they can no longer service. In 2011, for example, Tajikistan agreed to lease 1 percent of its territory to China. And Turkmenistan has supplied gas to China at a price three times lower than the market rate.
 
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The growing Chinese economic influence here could challenge Russia’s historical role as the main benefactor for Central Asia. On economic grounds, Russia can’t really compete with China. Moscow is, however, maintaining a degree of economic influence by strengthening integration with Central Asia, particularly through the Eurasian Economic Union, which includes an integrated single market and common policies on several industries.

Ultimately, the two countries are unlikely to engage in open confrontation in the short term for a couple of reasons. First, Russia can’t afford a confrontation with China. After Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, China became the only major power that was willing to increase bilateral trade and economic ties with Russia; Russian foreign policy, after all, has long been oriented toward the east. Second, Russia has been a dominant economic force in Central Asia for decades. Its influence has been somewhat diminished as sanctions and economic troubles at home have eroded Russia’s ability to finance the region, but Central Asia and the Caucasus remain heavily dependent on Moscow in terms of both trade and remittances.
Strategic Interests

Moreover, although Russia continues to provide economic assistance to the region, this assistance stems from strategic interests rather than the promise of economic gain. Russia has written off hundreds of millions of dollars in Central Asian debt, including $240 million owed by Kyrgyzstan in 2017 and $900 million owed by Uzbekistan in 2016. For Moscow, developing good relations with these strategically located countries is more important than the potential economic benefit they could offer.
 
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These countries form a key buffer zone for Russia, separating the country from unstable areas of the Middle East where terrorism and extremism are rife. Russia has a sprawling border with Kazakhstan that’s difficult to protect, and the borders between the Central Asian states are not well defended. The attack carried out by Islamic State militants on the Tajik-Uzbek border last week showed that terrorist organizations have already gained a foothold in the region. This is particularly concerning for Moscow because the militaries and security forces of Central Asian countries are highly dependent on Russia for equipment and training.

Since the formation of the Collective Security Treaty Organization in 1992, Russia has been the primary security guarantor for three Central Asian countries: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. (Uzbekistan was also part of the CSTO but has withdrawn its membership.) Russia has military bases and facilities in Tajikistan and an air base in Kyrgyzstan, and is helping to strengthen these countries’ own military capabilities. In October, it donated to Tajikistan 320 million rubles ($5 million) worth of military equipment and weapons including a radar station for monitoring airspace and modernized armored reconnaissance and BRDM-2M patrol vehicles. Also in October, the Central Military District’s press service announced the transfer of the S-300 Favorit anti-aircraft missile system to the Tajik-Afghan border. In addition, Uzbekistan has purchased from Russia Typhoon armored vehicles, delivery of which will begin sometime this year, as well as Russian-made BTR-82A armored personnel carriers, Tiger armored vehicles and a Sopka-2 radar station. Russia also plans to supply 12 Mi-35M transport and combat helicopters to Uzbekistan.

Though there has been much talk of China’s growing military presence in Tajikistan (it recently opened a new military base on the Tajik side of their shared border, for example, and held drills with the Tajik military in August), its security operations in Central Asia are mostly carried out within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Whereas Russia wants to remain the dominant military player in the region, China is content to take a backseat and avoid competing with Moscow for regional supremacy. Moreover, Beijing shares many of Moscow’s security concerns in Central Asia and therefore doesn’t feel threatened by Russia’s willingness to support Central Asian countries. China actually has more reasons to cooperate than compete with Russia, at least in the short term.
Despite China’s growing economic and military power, Moscow and Beijing don’t see each other as direct rivals in Central Asia, at least for now. There is indirect competition between the two countries, but their current interests and priorities rarely overlap in such a way that would push them into direct competition. China’s interests in the region are mostly economic, so it will be involved there only inasmuch as it can benefit economically. The deployment of Chinese troops in Tajikistan and the launch of counterterrorism drills with Tajik forces are connected to Chinese concerns over the security of its own investments in Central Asia and elsewhere. Russia, however, has deeper ties in Central Asia, and its interests are more strategic than economic. In tough economic times, it may see increasing competition for influence there, but no country has been able to match Russia’s presence and impact in the region.   

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.wsj.com/articles/georgia-on-the-brink-11576801946?mod=MorningEditorialReport&mod=djemMER_h

[Crafty_Dog]

   
    Daily Memo: Clashes in the Caucasus, Pre-election Protests in Belarus
Cross-border shelling between Azerbaijan and Armenia continued on Wednesday.
By: Geopolitical Futures
Clashes in the Caucasus. Azerbaijan said it destroyed an Armenian military facility along the Azerbaijan-Armenia border as cross-border shelling, which began on July 12 in the Tovuz region, continued on Wednesday. In Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan, more than 1,000 protesters took part in a rally in support of the army, chanting slogans like “Our Karabakh” and “Glory to the army,” according to Russian news outlet RIA Novosti. Meanwhile, Armenian hackers attacked several Azerbaijani news websites, including Day.Az, Milli.Az, AMI Trend and the Azernews and hacked a database operated by the Azerbaijani navy, according to the Facebook page of the hacker group Monte Melkonyan Cyber Army.

Armenian Ambassador to Moscow Vardan Toganyan said Yerevan hoped Russia would use its influence in the region to help de-escalate the situation. However, Armenia’s Defense Ministry said the situation was under control and that it would not ask the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization, an alliance of six post-Soviet states, to intervene at this time. Yet, several countries have already commented on the latest round of fighting in the region. Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif spoke by phone with officials in Azerbaijan and Armenia to offer to mediate between the two countries. Turkey’s Defense Ministry said it was ready to support Azerbaijan’s armed forces against Armenian aggression. And helicopters from the Russian armed forces’ 102nd base in Gyumri were seen near the Armenia-Turkey border, though the Russian military said they were part of planned exercises being conducted in the Southern Military District.

[Crafty_Dog]

   
    Azerbaijan's Slow Drift Toward Turkey
This month’s flare-up may represent more than another clash between Armenians and Azerbaijanis.
By: Ekaterina Zolotova

On July 12, Armenian and Azerbaijani forces clashed in the Tovuz border region – far from the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh, where such clashes usually take place – and the sporadic violence has continued ever since. At first, the countries’ two larger neighbors with a geopolitical interest in the region, Russia and Turkey, did not interfere. On July 23, however, Russian forces took part in pre-planned exercises with Armenian troops. The Azerbaijani government promptly announced that it would host large joint air and ground exercises with Turkey. Armenia’s position against Turkey is fixed, a product of a century of bad blood, but Azerbaijan has traditionally attempted to balance between Russia and Turkey. This month’s flare-up, however, may represent more than another scuffle between Armenians and Azerbaijanis. It may instead mark the beginning of a gradual realignment by Baku away from balancing and toward Ankara.

Turkey’s Ascent, Russia’s Descent

Turkey’s and Russia’s interests intersect in the Caucasus. For Russia, having allies in the South Caucasus guarantees a degree of stability in its border regions. Moreover, Azerbaijan provides Russia with strategic access to the Middle East. Turkey, which is enmeshed in the gradual construction of a neo-Ottoman project to establish its dominance in the region, needs allies like culturally close Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan also has energy reserves, which are valuable for Turkey’s ambitions to become a regional gas center.

The Russian and Azerbaijani economies were bound together under the Soviet Union, and the two have maintained close economic, political and energy ties ever since. Their trade relationship is extensive, but Russia’s share of Azerbaijan’s total trade is diminishing: In the 1990s, Russia accounted for about 20-25 percent of Azerbaijan’s trade, but in the 2010s that share hovered around 8 percent. Turkey’s share, on the other hand, has been growing: Total trade between the two amounted to $4.5 billion in 2019 (an increase of 33 percent from the previous year, and higher than the Russian-Azerbaijani figure of $3.02 billion, which was itself the highest in the past 10 years). Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has said he wants bilateral trade with Turkey to reach $15 billion a year and to increase energy exports to Turkey.
 
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Speaking of energy, Russia and Azerbaijan are increasingly looking like competitors in the oil and gas sector rather than partners. Baku’s attempt to enter the European Union’s energy market through Turkey, bypassing Russia, makes Moscow nervous. Previously, Azerbaijan had used Russian pipeline networks to ship energy to Europe, which gave Russia control over the amount of Azerbaijani supplies in Europe. The construction of pipelines through Turkey, however, is not subject to Russian influence. Such projects, especially gas projects, have become important for Azerbaijan, which supplied 82 percent of its gas exports to Turkey in 2018. These include the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, which transports Caspian oil to the Turkish port in Ceyhan, and the South Caucasian gas pipeline from Baku through Georgia to the border with Turkey, both of which were completed over a decade ago. More recent endeavors include the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline, which will connect Greece, Albania and southern Italy, and the Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline, or TANAP, which was completed in 2018 and merged with the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline. Russia has the TurkStream gas pipeline to Turkey (commissioned in January of this year), which targets the same market as TANAP, but Moscow has struggled to maintain its share of the market. For example, in March 2019, Russia was the leader in gas exports to the Turkish market at 33 percent, but a year later, Azerbaijan had surpassed Russia with 23.5 percent. (In fact, Russia fell into fifth place, with 9.9 percent.)
 
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The other area in which Turkey is gaining ground on Russia is Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia traditionally acts as a mediator in the conflict, yet it continues to support Armenia, conduct exercises with its military, and supply Yerevan with weapons. Indeed, ever since Vladimir Putin became president again, he seems to have largely ignored the resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh while intensifying military cooperation with Armenia through the Collective Security Treaty Organization. (The need for Armenia’s full cooperation in the then-budding Eurasian Economic Union no doubt played a part.) Meanwhile, relations between Russia and Azerbaijan had cooled, thanks to a dispute over the Gabala radar station, Moscow's refusal to sell combat aircraft to Baku, and the ending of an agreement over the transit of Azerbaijani oil through Russian territory.

Turkey, on the other hand, broadly supports Azerbaijan, which it has pledged to back in the current conflict. Partly this is due to Ankara’s neo-Ottoman ambitions in the region that call for the imposition of “One people, two countries” there, and partly it’s due to historically tense relations with Armenia. (Turkey refuses to accede to Armenian demands to acknowledge the Armenian Genocide, and Armenia refuses to ratify the Treaty of Kars, which laid the groundwork for the modern borders of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey.) Turkey also partners with Georgia, which Ankara sees as a transit country and which relies heavily on energy supplies from Azerbaijan.

And then there are the economic factors at play. Since 2014, the Russian economy has been struggling with sanctions and with fluctuations in the price of oil, on which its health depends. The Kremlin has tried to implement the necessary structural reform to stimulate the economy, but its efforts have largely failed, hence its renewed attention on reanimating the economy rather than on finishing expensive boondoggles with other countries. The Turkish economy has its share of problems, but laying itself exclusively at the mercy of the oil markets isn’t one of them.

Russia is losing ground to Turkey in terms of investments as well. Azerbaijan has invested more than $17 billion in the Turkish economy, and Turkey has invested over $12 billion in the Azerbaijani economy. SOCAR, Baku’s state oil company, has new plans and projects that raise total investments in the Turkish economy to about $20 billion. Russia has invested only about $4.7 billion in Azerbaijan, while Azerbaijan has invested $1.2 billion in Russia.

Azerbaijan's Goals

Azerbaijan understands that larger and more powerful countries will always be interested in its affairs. But Baku has its own goals. It’s been independent for only a short time, and it has every intention of maintaining its sovereignty. Like other former Soviet republics, Azerbaijan has a host of economic problems, not least of which is its own dependence on energy exports. It needs allies that will buy its goods and thus fund its government.

But it’s in no hurry to fully commit to any one ally. (Not that anyone has asked it to.) It benefits more from balancing both sides; it’s not part of Europe’s or Eurasia’s formal architecture, but it still needs Russian trade, just as it still needs European energy customers. Turkey is an important economic partner in that regard. But any major move toward one side or the other heightens the risks of internal destabilization and losing all the economic benefits that come with balancing, not just for Azerbaijan but for the region as a whole, since it would necessarily pit Russia against Turkey. It’s simply more profitable for Baku to rely on Russia and Turkey and turn into a logistic hub between Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia.

The country can thus afford some tactical adjustments in the short term that will keep its foreign policy essentially intact. But it’s possible that will change as Russia loses ground to Turkey.   

[Crafty_Dog]

   
    Daily Memo: Clashes in the Caucasus
Azerbaijan and Armenia have both declared martial law.
By: Geopolitical Futures

Renewed fighting. Clashes erupted in the restive Nagorno-Karabakh region between Armenia and Azerbaijan on Sunday, as both countries declared martial law and accused each other of violating a cease-fire. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said Azerbaijani troops carried out an attack on the disputed region, while Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev accused Yerevan of committing provocations, for which it had been preparing for some time. Both sides also said the other was using mercenaries from Syria. In fact, the Armenian ambassador to Russia said that 4,000 mercenaries were transferred from the war-torn country with the help of Turkey to fight alongside Azerbaijani forces in the conflict.

There were signs prior to Sunday that tensions were escalating in the region. Reports in Armenian media indicated that Azerbaijani troops and equipment had assembled along the border. And on Friday, the U.S. embassies in Baku and Yerevan warned U.S. citizens not to travel to Nagorno-Karabakh and areas near the Absheron Peninsula in Azerbaijan. Clashes are fairly regular in this part of the world, but compared to the last outbreak of fighting in the Tavuz region in July, the number of casualties reported by both sides is more significant this time around. Azerbaijan’s military said that more than 550 Armenian troops were killed in the fighting and that 22 armored vehicles, 15 OSA anti-aircraft missile systems, 18 unmanned aerial vehicles, eight artillery installations and three ammunition depots were lost. Armenia’s Defense Ministry, however, said that the Azerbaijani armed forces lost about 200 troops, 30 armored vehicles and 20 drones. Turkey has reiterated that it fully supports Azerbaijan in the conflict and blamed Armenia for the escalation. Russia, which wants to maintain good relations with both parties, has said only that the conflict should be settled through diplomatic means.