The Risks of Kazakhstan's Slow Drift From Russia
12 MIN READOct 28, 2022 | 21:21 GMT
Kazakhstan will seek to maintain its current alignment with Russia despite rising bilateral tensions, but Moscow's lack of levers to reverse its declining economic and political influence over Astana could eventually push Russia to threaten to use coercion — or potentially even military action — against the country. In the months since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, numerous events have suggested that the bilateral relationship between Russia and Kazakhstan is worsening. On March 6, a little over a week after Moscow launched its invasion, Kazakh officials approved a pro-Ukraine, anti-war rally in Almaty (Kazakhstan's largest city). Later that month, Kazakhstan then banned Russian military propaganda symbols in public, before canceling traditional May 9 Victory Day parades. At the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in June, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev said that his country would not recognize the independence of Moscow's statelets in eastern Ukraine — a stance furthered on Sept. 26 when Kazakhstan's foreign ministry stated that it would not recognize Russia's annexations in eastern Ukraine. Most notably, crude oil flows in the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) pipeline (which exports more than 80% of Kazakhstan's oil and is the single largest source of Kazakh government tax revenues) have experienced four unexpected shutdowns so far this year, at the behest of Russian officials on dubious grounds — fueling speculation that Russia may be trying to demonstrate to Kazakhstan the risks associated with failing to maintain positions in line with Moscow's.
Among Kazakhstan's other actions that rankled Moscow was Kazakh President Tokayev's acceptance of anti-war Russians and those fleeing mobilization, saying his country must ''take care of'' and ''provide safety to'' those escaping the ''hopeless situation'' in Russia, allowing Kazakhstan to become a primary destination for Russian citizens.
Kazakhstan has also provided humanitarian aid to Ukraine and has maintained contact with Ukrainian officials, including President Volodymyr Zelensky, amid the ongoing war.
Additionally, Kazakhstan is attracting money and investment previously destined for Russia, as on Oct. 19, Prime Minister Alikhan Smaiylov told reporters that another 56 international companies that have left Russia in recent months had ''expressed their willingness to settle in Kazakhstan,'' and the country hopes to attract 300 large foreign companies moving out of Russia.
The CPC pipeline was first suspended in March, when the consortium said a storm had damaged two loading moorings, an explanation that drew skepticism from independent observers. CPC deliveries were again interrupted in June following what Russian officials said was the discovery of World War II-era anti-ship ordnance in the area, an explanation widely viewed in Kazakhstan as politically motivated and related to Tokayev's failure to endorse Russia's war. In July, a Russian court then ordered the pipeline to halt flows due to alleged environmental violations, but the ruling was overturned days later. And finally, on Aug. 23, the pipeline was forced to cut flows significantly due to additional unplanned repairs on two of its three mooring points.
Kazakhstan will likely seek to avoid, minimize or downplay any conflict with Russia to protect the two countries' close economic ties and avoid provoking Moscow. Despite recent frictions, there is no indication that Kazakhstan would formally disavow or openly reduce its political and economic alignment with Russia, which remains one of its largest trading partners. Kazakhstan will also remain a member of both Russia's defense bloc, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and Russia's customs union, the Eurasia Economic Union (EAEU). This is because leaving these organizations would immediately destabilize Kazakhstan's economy and create distance from Russia to which Moscow would likely respond with coercion in the future. In fact, mutual trade between Kazakhstan, Russia and the three other ex-Soviet states in the EAEU (Armenia, Belarus and Kyrgyzstan) has grown by 5% in the first eight months of 2022, according to Kazakhstan's prime minister. Furthermore, Kazakhstan will selectively enforce Western sanctions on Russia to avoid falling under secondary sanctions and remain an avenue for economic activity intended to evade Western sanctions on Russia; Kazakh authorities may, for example, ignore gray export schemes to move Western goods to Russia by means of the country. Additionally, despite Tokayev's limited reforms and pro-democratic rhetoric, Kazakhstan is likely to remain an authoritarian state with a poor human rights record, as political power will remain firmly in the hands of the ruling party for the foreseeable future — reassuring Moscow that neither Tokayev nor another political force will engage in sudden action that could jeopardize its influence over the Kazakh government. Moscow will likely carry out propaganda operations to weaken the opposition to Tokayev and allow the Kazakh leadership to cast itself as sufficiently nationalist in exchange for maintaining the two countries' close economic and political ties.
Tokayev and Putin hold regular phone calls and in-person meetings. Tokayev has said he has a close relationship with his Russian counterpart, and on Aug. 19 assured Putin that there were ''no grounds to make any pessimistic forecasts regarding the future of our cooperation.'' Putin has also suggested that personal contacts with the Kazakh president could quickly resolve any real strain in bilateral relations.
Tokayev is all but certain to secure a new seven-year term in Kazakhstan's Nov. 20 snap election, which is likely Putin's main reassurance in the future strength of Moscow's relations with Astana.
However, Kazakhstan's deepening ties with regional powers like China and Turkey indicate a relative decline in Russia's economic and political influence over Astana. Despite its close ties with Russia, Kazakhstan has long had a ''multi-vector'' foreign policy that aims to build ties with other regional and global powers. Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, this policy has become particularly active.
Specifically, recent high-level meetings with China and Turkey suggest Kazakhstan is trying to offset its reliance on Russia in the security and economic spheres by bolstering support from Central Asia's two other powers. During an Oct. 12 meeting in Astana, Tokayev and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan signed numerous documents pledging to increase their counties' cooperation on foreign policy and investment, trade and economics, transport and logistics, military industry, energy, and agriculture. Notably, Erdogan stressed that the security and territorial integrity of Kazakhstan is of particular importance to the Turkic states. The summit with Turkey came just a month after Tokayev met with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Kazakhstan, during which Xi said China plans to support Kazakhstan by ''protecting its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.'' After the Sept. 14 meeting, Tokayev awarded Xi with Kazakhstan's highest state award for the Chinese leader's efforts to strengthen and develop bilateral political, economic and cultural ties.
Kazakhstan is growing as an alternative transit route for freight between China and the European Union called the Trans-Caspian Corridor. The new corridor is used to ship goods across the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan, where those goods can then be transported through Turkey and Georgia via railways, before ultimately reaching southeastern EU countries or ports in Bulgaria and Romania by shipping routes in the Black Sea. According to the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route Association, cargo shipments across Central Asia and the Caucasus are expected to reach 3.2 million metric tons in 2022, a sixfold increase over the previous year. The increasing popularity of the Trans-Caspian Corridor will help expand logistics capabilities through Kazakhstan and help ensure lower and more predictable transportation costs to the country. Facilitating trade directly between China and Europe also reflects Kazakhstan's growing economic independence from Russia.
Following Russian halts of the CPC pipeline, Kazakhstan has been seeking to diversify its oil export routes, which Tokayev called a ''strategic task'' for Kazakhstan's government — and one that will deprive Russia of revenues. Tokayev instructed the government to develop the Trans-Caspian Corridor by improving port infrastructure on the Caspian not only for general transit but also for transporting oil exports, and ordered a study into building a pipeline across the Caspian Sea.
China is helping develop Kazakhstan's infrastructure and transportation routes including the Trans-Caspian Corridor, which are largely intended to help bypass Russia. Kazakhstan remains a major destination for Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) investment. New BRI investments in Russia, meanwhile, have fallen since the Ukraine invasion, underscoring China's growing interest in Central Asia as an alternative transit corridor to Europe. Chinese companies are also quickly expanding their foothold in other sectors of Kazakhstan's economy, including the country's automotive market — eating into Russian firms' share of the Kazakh market.
In addition to promoting alternative transit corridors, Turkey is helping Kazakhstan beef up its defensive capabilities, which would complicate Russian military action against the country. In May, Kazakhstan signed a deal to begin manufacturing its own medium-altitude, long-endurance Turkish-designed ANKA attack drones, making Kazakhstan the first production base of such drones outside of Turkey.
While the initial effect of Tokayev's domestic reforms will be limited, they will also generate tensions with Moscow. Many of the formal changes to Kazakhstan's political system in recent months have been largely cosmetic. However, Tokayev's rhetoric and actions suggest he's attempting to increase popular participation in the political process, likely in an effort to avoid a repeat of the widespread social unrest that shook the country in January amid a lack of civic or political alternatives for dissent. Tokayev has also been pushing to distance Kazakhstan from Russian culture and identity. During an Oct. 6 address, Tokayev claimed that ''only an independent state will retain its language, land, and religion,'' hinting at the threat of Russia attempting to dictate policies in the areas on Kazakhstan. In a not-so-veiled reference to the events in Ukraine, Tokayev also said that the basis of Kazakh statehood is the integrity of its territory, and called ''democracy, the rule of law and equality'' the main priorities of the ''just Kazakhstan'' he seeks to create. The Kazakh president's embracement of liberal Western ideas (like democracy and separation of powers) will make Russia concerned that the country could become more vulnerable to political change, as more active civil participation could upset political networks Moscow is used to dealing with. In the long term, a more democratic political system would likely also give rise to increasingly nationalist and populist governments that are more likely to see Kazakhstan's close ties with Russia as a barrier to the country's independence and future development.
Moscow signaled its approval of Tokayev's internal changes during a Sept. 1 telephone conversation between Tokayev and Putin, during which the presidents agreed to maintain constant working contacts. This suggests the Kremlin does not believe the impending reforms pose an immediate threat to bilateral relations. But Putin's close relationship with Tokayev will not alone provide a strong enough foundation for Russia to maintain its influence over a country where people's values and interests are increasingly seen as at odds with those of Moscow, and could eventually backfire if Kazakhs begin to view their president as overly subservient to Russia.
Russia believes that maintaining close relations with Kazakhstan is indispensable for the success of the Kremlin's integration projects in the post-Soviet space. Russia also wants to avoid a repeat of the mass unrest that enveloped Kazakhstan at the beginning of the year (which prompted Moscow to intervene to restore order), as another intervention to halt an anti-establishment uprising would only risk further fueling anti-Russian sentiment among Kazakhs. But in mitigating that threat, Moscow will be skeptical of introducing political reforms in Kazakhstan — fearing that such changes will eventually get out from under Tokayev and the elites' control and take the country through events similar to Ukraine's Euromaidan revolution in 2014. Alternative arrangements to Tokayev's regime would risk Kazakhstan becoming too independent in the eyes of Moscow and would only leave Belarus among the major countries still squarely in Russia's political and economic orbit. ''Losing'' Kazakhstan similar to Ukraine would mean the loss of the rest of Central Asia and arguably equally catastrophic for the Kremlin. Therefore, maintaining Kazakhstan's internal stability is Moscow's first priority. The Kremlin's ultimate goal for its ideal future relationship with Kazakhstan may lay in emulating the close partnership Russia has with Belarus, drawing Kazakhstan into deeper integration and possibly through the Union State. Realizing this vision, however, is likely unattainable in the foreseeable future.
As a result, Kazakhstan's slow distancing from Russia could push Moscow to increasingly use threats and coercion, and potentially even military force, to bring Astana to heel. Moscow's ambitions could, albeit many years down the line, lead it to conclude that Astana is on a trajectory to become too distant from Moscow, and that, as it failed to do in Ukraine, Russia should act earlier, taking preemptive military action against the country to reverse — or impose a steep cost on — Kazakhstan's growing distance. Such ideas are often circulated in nationalist media in Russia, which have claimed that Tokayev's domestic agenda and multi-vector foreign policy are thinly disguised efforts to cement trends that will cause the decline of Russian influence in the country. Astana will not formally backtrack on previous agreements and documents governing its relations with Moscow. But in the future, Russia could point to Kazakhstan's internal political reforms and relations with other countries to justify an invasion, using very similar grounds to those it used to justify sending troops into Ukraine in February. The risk of Russia invading Kazakhstan — which would seek to topple the government or annex Russian-speaking areas in the north of the country — remains distant. But the likelihood of this scenario will increase if Astana continues to reduce its political and economic ties with Moscow, and especially if the war in Ukraine ends on relatively favorable terms for Russia. Russia may act sooner rather than later under the idea that the Kazakh government and military would not resist, which may not be the case in the long term.
Recent actions by the Kazakh officials and government suggest the country takes the theoretical possibility of a Russian military intervention seriously. In September, Tokayev signed a decree according to which an additional 441 billion tenges ($939.5 million) will be spent to support the nation's defense sector — a nearly 1.5-fold increase over last year's budget of $1.7 billion. On Aug. 26, the mayor of Almaty said that all Soviet-era bomb shelters for civilians would be restored, a move likely motivated by Ukraine's lack of shelters amid Russia's mass airstrikes on civilian infrastructure in urban areas. Media reports in Kazakhstan have said that around 300 bomb shelters were built in Almaty during Soviet times, but only about 100 are still usable.
