Ukraine

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2021/12/biden-rules-out-sending-troops-ukraine-least-now/187386/

[Crafty_Dog]

second

https://patriotpost.us/alexander/84770?mailing_id=6331&utm_medium=email&utm_source=pp.email.6331&utm_campaign=alexander&utm_content=body

[DougMacG]

"Ukraine received formal written promise from the Russians to respect Ukrainian territorial integrity."

   - Oops:  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Annexation_of_Crimea_by_the_Russian_Federation

"cf Chinese promise to respect Hong Kong integrity for 50 years after the Brits returned it, but I digress"

   - Relevant?  Yes.  Russia (also) lacks trustworthiness.  US lacks a competent party needed to enter an agreement. 

Frankly, I don't know who are our friends and allies anymore.  Depends on the enemy and depends on who is in power in the respective countries.  'Finlandization' of Ukraine sounds acceptable but what happens if we give on this now and they keep taking?  US lacks the will to do anything about anything.

[Crafty_Dog]

""Ukraine received formal written promise from the Russians to respect Ukrainian territorial integrity."

"- Oops:  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Annexation_of_Crimea_by_the_Russian_Federation"

Can you find citation for the Russian promise in exchange for the return of their nukes?

[DougMacG]

See if this helps:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_and_Ukraine  (USe thius to access the other links.)

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukraine held about one third of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, the third largest in the world at the time, as well as significant means of its design and production.
 Dahlburg, Decemb. "Ukraine Votes to Quit Soviet Union : Independence: More than 90% of Voters Approve Historic Break with Kremlin. The President-elect Calls for Collective Command of the Country's Nuclear Arsenal". LA Times. Retrieved April 15, 2014.

Formally, these weapons were controlled by the Commonwealth of Independent States.[4] In 1994 Ukraine agreed to destroy the weapons, and to join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).[5][6]
 Hanley, Jeremy (June 22, 1993). "Nuclear Weapons". Hansard. UK Parliament. Column 154. Retrieved September 9, 2018. The Minister of State for the Armed Forces (Mr. Jeremy Hanley): ... Some weapons are also possessed by Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus, but these are controlled by the Commonwealth of Independent States.
 William C. Martel (1998). "Why Ukraine gave up nuclear weapons : nonproliferation incentives and disincentives". In Barry R. Schneider, William L. Dowdy (ed.). Pulling Back from the Nuclear Brink: Reducing and Countering Nuclear Threats. Psychology Press. pp. 88–104. ISBN 9780714648569. Retrieved August 6, 2014. There are some reports that Ukraine had established effective custody, but not operational control, of the cruise missiles and gravity bombs. ... By early 1994 the only barrier to Ukraine's ability to exercise full operational control over the nuclear weapons on missiles and bombers deployed on its soil was its inability to circumvent Russian permissive action links (PALs).
 Alexander A. Pikayev (Spring–Summer 1994). "Post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine: Who can push the Button?" (PDF). The Nonproliferation Review. 1 (3): 31–46. doi:10.1080/10736709408436550. Archived from the original (PDF) on August 8, 2014.

In exchange for giving up its nuclear weapons, Ukraine received financial compensation, as well as the security assurances of the Budapest Memorandum.[9]
 Budjeryn, Mariana (September 1, 2016). "Was Ukraine's Nuclear Disarmament a Blunder?". World Affairs. 179 (2): 9–20. doi:10.1177/0043820016673777. ISSN 0043-8200. S2CID 151341589.
---------------------------------------------
https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-explainer-budapest-memorandum/25280502.html

With tensions rising in Crimea and pro-Russian forces controlling the peninsula's main airports, Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk has called on Russia to "not violate the Budapest Memorandum." So what is the "Budapest Memorandum" and what does it have to do with Crimea?

What exactly is the "Budapest Memorandum"?

The "Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances" is a diplomatic memorandum that was signed in December 1994 by Ukraine, Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom.

It is not a formal treaty, but rather, a diplomatic document under which signatories made promises to each other as part of the denuclearization of former Soviet republics after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Under the memorandum, Ukraine promised to remove all Soviet-era nuclear weapons from its territory, send them to disarmament facilities in Russia, and sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Ukraine kept these promises.

In return, Russia and the Western signatory countries essentially consecrated the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine as an independent state. They did so by applying the principles of territorial integrity and nonintervention in 1975 Helsinki Final Act -- a Cold War-era treaty signed by 35 states including the Soviet Union -- to an independent post-Soviet Ukraine.

Which principles in the Helsinki Final Act, reiterated in the "Budapest Memorandum," are relevant to the current situation in the Crimea?

In the "Budapest Memorandum," Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States promised that none of them would ever threaten or use force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine. They also pledged that none of them would ever use economic coercion to subordinate Ukraine to their own interest.

They specifically pledged they would refrain from making each other's territory the object of military occupation or engage in other uses of force in violation of international law.

All sides agreed that no such occupation or acquisition will be recognized as legal and that the signatories would "consult in the event a situation arises which raises a question concerning these commitments."

Is there anything legally binding about the "Budapest Memorandum" regarding Russia's obligations to respect Ukraine's territorial integrity?

"That's actually a much more complex question than it may sound. It is binding in international law, but that doesn't mean it has any means of enforcement," says Barry Kellman is a professor of law and director of the International Weapons Control Center at DePaul University's College of Law.

"The 'Budapest Memorandum' follows the Helsinki Final Act and essentially reiterates its provisions. There are confidence building measures and then a host of other broader obligations – primarily negative obligations. Don't interfere."

Kellman concludes that there are a host of other sources of international law that oblige Russia to respect Ukraine's territorial integrity -- including the provisions of the CSCE treaty and the UN Charter.

[Crafty_Dog]

YES!!!

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xITopRyqyYc

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pw0ypSr1SGY&t=1s

https://dailycaller.com/2021/12/09/daniel-just-a-reminder-that-biden-and-merkel-practically-invited-a-russian-invasion-of-ukraine/?utm_source=piano&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2360&tpcc%3D=newsletter&pnespid=r7V1Fi1XKbMFy.iQqyqqFMuV5w2zBJ9pIezlxLs2.kFm_dxd98t7ZHjz1zwp39tOSj4nMwor

https://dailycaller.com/2021/12/08/joe-biden-nord-stream-2-russia-ukraine-energy-policy/?utm_source=piano&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2360&tpcc%3D=newsletter&pnespid=t75iGiZOP.gRyOucpC.uAc2P4U70V5F6MPLhzvpxtxJmW3wrzXlJ3mMpH4cpEUEz3tYmcKqW

[Crafty_Dog]

December 10, 2021
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Ukraine, War and American Doctrine
Thoughts in and around geopolitics.
By: George Friedman
During the Vietnam War, an American doctrine emerged whereby wars were primarily political and waging wars signaled to other powers that the U.S. was ready to fight wherever challenged. I call it “political war” because the intent was focused not on destroying the enemy but on establishing American credibility. It was characterized by an irrational confidence in America’s ability to rapidly defeat an enemy with minimal effort and loss. The United States failed to understand the will of the enemy, frequently because its leaders focused on warfighting technology as the measure of power, and in any case the war did not begin with a clear definition of victory.

From Vietnam to Afghanistan, the United States engaged an enemy far more willing than Washington to absorb casualties. Since the wars were not existential matters for the United States, its commitment was limited. For the North Vietnamese and the Taliban, the war was a moral absolute. It would be fought whatever the cost and with whatever weapons were available. Some wars ended in outright defeat, some (the exception being Desert Storm) ended in U.S. retreat and withdrawal. Few of these engagements convinced potential enemies of American power. Instead, they caused adversaries to misread American power and increased the risk that the U.S. would choose another elective war.

All nations go to war at some point in history, but the United States has spent most of the 21st century at war. The desire to use war as a signal of power, coupled with not understanding the amount of power needed to wage a successful war, raises the question of whether the U.S. has an interest in intervening in Ukraine if the Russians invade. I doubt a full-fledged invasion of Ukraine intended to occupy the entire country is in the offing, but thinking of such an invasion helps us to define current warfighting doctrine.

The United States has two strategic imperatives. First, it must maintain relations with Canada and Mexico, the two nations that could provide a base for a ground attack on the United States. Second, since the first is reasonably secure, it must make certain that it maintains control over the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, the only places that would facilitate offensive action against the United States.

Obviously this requires the U.S. to control the seas via naval, air and space power. But the challenge is subtler than that. World War II was for the United States a struggle to secure the seas. This is obvious in the Pacific but was also the case in the Atlantic. The American concern after the fall of France was that Britain might be forced to capitulate to Germany, and that capitulation would mean that the Royal Navy was to become a German navy. The Royal Navy was a challenge to the U.S. Navy, so this meant either a naval war in the Atlantic or even German control of the Atlantic.

That would have been catastrophic for the U.S., which responded by maintaining open sea lanes to Britain and supplying Britain with needed equipment. Even the land aspects of the war were partly designed to shift German resources away from the navy; the invasion of France was part of the strategy. U.S. strategy was ultimately to fight in Europe to prevent German threats to the United States.

During the Cold War, the United States feared a Soviet invasion of Western Europe and seizure of German and French ports – i.e., the Soviets forcing their way into the Atlantic. For the U.S., defending Europe was essential to securing the Atlantic, and so Washington spent a great deal of time during the Cold War securing the Atlantic for eastern-moving convoys. The GIUK gap around Greenland, Iceland and the United Kingdom was a prime focus of the United States. If the Soviets broke through, they could block reinforcements to NATO and likely win the war. The fate of Europe was of interest to the United States, but the fate of the Atlantic was existential. The battle would be fought in Europe, but the ultimate objective would be the Atlantic.

Any U.S. military doctrine must therefore exclude hostile powers from the Atlantic and Pacific. (That’s precisely what the United States is doing in the South China Sea.) Because Washington has no challenger in the Atlantic right now, and since a new doctrine must focus on existential needs and focus on achieving military ends, it would seem that at the moment Russia cannot challenge U.S. control of the Atlantic.

The Soviet Union cracked in 1991. The buffer zones surrounding Russia spun out of Russian control. Moscow’s own imperatives and doctrines require that it demonstrate a return to power in Ukraine. Here again, the U.S. is concerned less about the territory involved than about losing credibility if it doesn’t act. Credibility is not trivial, nor has it proved a successful basis for initiating conflict. But for Russia, the Ukrainian border is about 300 miles from Moscow and while no threat exists at this moment, the speed with which a third power such as the United States could appear in Ukraine and threaten the heartland should not be discounted. The Russians cannot discount it, and therefore want to preclude the possibility by controlling Ukraine.

U.S. strategy hasn’t really changed, but the geography has. The Cold War doctrine was to maintain sea lanes to Europe by blocking Soviet naval and air power and defeat Russia with overwhelming and replaceable force. But that was when the Soviet border was well west of Ukraine. There are two avenues of advance by Russia if it decides to take Ukraine. One is the North European Plain through Belarus and Poland. The other is through the Carpathian Mountains in the south. So long as Poland is well defended and the Russians remain east of the Carpathians, the probability of Russia posing a threat to Europe, and by extension the Atlantic, is low.

Russia cannot leave Ukraine in the position it is. Doing so is potentially too dangerous. The United States cannot fight a land war on the doorstep of Russia. With the amount of force Russia can quickly bring to bear, the U.S. mission would, at best, fail. At worst, it would be defeated. This is dictated by geography. If the U.S. intervenes, it must do so on the western reaches of the Carpathians and the plains of Poland. It cannot go farther west.

This is a rather ruthless application of a doctrine. Ukraine has a right to self-determination. But the maturity of American foreign policy rests not on testing the justice of the cause but on the price and probability of victory. No matter what the politics or morality might be, the recognition of geography, capability and interest must take priority over indulging in military action likely to fail. What we have learned is that the U.S. is powerful but not omnipotent. The idea that the U.S. must fight for political right on the assumption of omnipotence is juvenile. The great comfort is that Russia is as afraid of losing as I am, so it likely is an academic exercise

[Crafty_Dog]

Invading Ukraine Is a Trap for Vladimir Putin
Russia can’t be an empire without it, but it can’t even be a great power if it overreaches.
By Christopher A. Hartwell
Dec. 10, 2021 5:49 pm ET


Russia has stepped up its belligerence toward Ukraine, with troop movements, frequent attacks through state propaganda channels and direct threats from Russian leadership. The likelihood of a major European war is at its highest since the end of the Cold War.

If Russian aggression toward Ukraine does expand militarily, however, it could spell the end of the authoritarian experiment that Vladimir Putin has fostered for the past two decades. In any scenario, it will also result in a much-diminished Russia.

Historically, Ukraine has suffered under Russian domination since it broke free from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the 17th century. It was eventually absorbed into the Russian empire, then the Soviet Union. The Holodomor, the deliberate starving of millions of Ukrainians under Stalin’s orders, weighs heavily in modern Ukrainian narratives—and made Ukrainians highly suspicious of Russian attempts to portray the two as “brother Slavs.”

More-recent events have further diminished any idea of Slavic solidarity, as Russia has waged war on Ukraine since the latter broke away from the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union in 2014. The aggression has been both overt (illegally annexing Crimea and invading the Donbas region) and covert (including sabotage, propaganda and cyberattacks). Unseen in much of the West, and erroneously referred to as a civil war or an effort by separatists, the conflict has been directed and sustained by Russia.

But the origin of Russia’s current saber-rattling is different from that of the events of 2014-15. Mr. Putin’s seizure of Crimea in 2014 was done from a position of weakness, as an opportunistic move that proceeded as the West, especially the U.S., pulled back from Central and Eastern Europe. Today Russia is in a better position economically and strategically than it has been since 2016, aided by U.S. policy. President Biden’s refusal to impose sanctions against the Nord Stream 2 pipeline handed Mr. Putin a geostrategic win that, coupled with the restrictions placed on America’s own energy producers, has also created a cudgel with which to strike Western Europe. Simply put, Mr. Putin has many more diplomatic and military levers for pressure that didn’t exist even two years ago.


So why Ukraine, and why now? Most analyses focus on the prospect of Ukraine’s joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. But another key issue can be found in Russian domestic politics. An unpopular Mr. Putin is a dangerous Mr. Putin.

His 2000 war with Chechnya, 2008 invasion of Georgia, and 2014 seizure of Crimea were all popular, raising the president’s approval ratings from low levels. In 2021 Mr. Putin’s popularity has been declining precipitously, first and foremost because of Moscow’s egregious mishandling of the Covid pandemic. With an estimate of excess mortality close to 800,000 since the start of the pandemic (the official report of Covid deaths is 278,000), Russia has been hit badly by the virus. At the same time, Russian disposable income declined more than 10% from 2014 to 2020. With his popularity waning, Mr. Putin has been anxious to rally Russians around the flag.

Unfortunately for him, Ukraine is also a much stronger actor, both economically and militarily, than it was in 2014. Unlike Russian actions before seizing Crimea and Donbas, the current Russian military buildup is out in the open, giving Ukraine time to respond. Any direct military strike would inflict massive harm on Russia in a manner similar to what the U.S.S.R. suffered in Afghanistan, but with the added complication of being on Europe’s doorstep, with clear supply lines from NATO countries. While there is little hope of direct NATO intervention, the threat of guerrilla war and bloody, protracted insurrection for years may serve as a deterrent to any rash moves.

Russia can’t be an empire without Ukraine. But Russia will cease to be a great power if it tries to acquire the rest of Ukraine. Moscow is simply far too dependent on primary commodities, and Covid has weakened popular support for a regime that can deliver “international prestige” but little else. Any armed incursion into Ukraine will push the still-fragile Russian economy to the brink and likely over the edge.

It is thus imperative that the West present a united front against Russia and continue to ratchet up the costs of any aggression. This means, against the instincts of Mr. Biden and likely the German Foreign Ministry, not handing Mr. Putin an easy win for his belligerence. To paraphrase Winston Churchill, sacrificing Ukraine to keep Europe’s unstable equilibrium would be to choose dishonor without necessarily preventing war.

Mr. Hartwell is a professor of international business policy and head of the International Management Institute at the ZHAW School of Management and Law in Zurich and a professor at Kozminski University in Poland.

[Crafty_Dog]

Not that I agree with his support of Ukraine into NATO, but respect for the man and his articulation of his POV.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jDoqsWsML8g&t=43s

[Crafty_Dog]

December 20, 2021
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The Russian Treaty Proposal
By: George Friedman

We have been operating with a model of Russia. Having lost its non-Russian territories with the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia is missing the buffers that protected it. Its national imperative is to recover those border states, either formally or informally. They could be either occupied by Russian forces or, at the very least, governed by native governments that exclude the presence of Western powers and coordinate with Moscow. The Russians achieved this in the South Caucasus through diplomacy and the stationing of Russian peacekeepers in the region. They have been increasing their power in Central Asia. But the critical region for Russia is in the west, facing Western Europe, the United States and NATO. There, the loss of Belarus and Ukraine posed a critical problem. The eastern border of Ukraine is only about 300 miles (480 kilometers) from Moscow, and Ukraine is allied with the United States and European powers, informally if not as part of NATO.

Russia’s strategy to this point had been to avoid direct military intervention against hostile forces and use hybrid measures to build influence and gain control. This is what happened in the Caucasus. This is also what happened in Belarus, where a contested election left President Alexander Lukashenko in a weak position, and Moscow used its power to assure Lukashenko’s position and control events in Minsk. The surge of refugees toward the Polish border put Poland on the defensive and created a sense of crisis in Poland. As for Belarus, it was simply the arena chosen by Russia, a satellite taken softly.

As Russia was reclaiming its buffers, we turned our attention to Ukraine, which, as I said, is the key buffer. It is vast, it threatens Russia directly, and from Ukraine, Russia could threaten the West as well. Indeed, between Belarus on the North European Plain and Ukraine’s control of the Carpathian Mountains, Russia could not only defend itself but also threaten an attack on Europe from the Baltic to the Black seas.

The Russians mobilized forces along Ukraine’s borders – from the east, north and south – and, without making overt threats, created a situation in which an invasion of Ukraine seemed possible. I wrote last week doubting that the Russians would try a complex occupation of a hostile country because the possibilities of failure, even against minimal resistance, were real and because the Russians could not predict American actions. If it intervened, the U.S. would likely intervene on land, but it also possesses arsenals of anti-tank missiles launched from air or ships in the Baltic and Black seas. How this conflict would evolve is unknown, and the United States might not choose a military counter. But Russia could not know this, nor could it risk acting on intelligence, which is frequently mistaken.

For the Russians to complete rebuilding the Soviet Union, they have to first neutralize the United States without military action. The best strategy for this is to neutralize NATO, whose military forces are limited but still significant. More important, an American response to Russia without the availability of NATO territory, and without the political backing of NATO allies, would complicate the military and political dynamic of U.S. action. The U.S. had already indicated its caution by threatening the Russian banking system if there were a war in Ukraine, rather than threatening military action.

Therefore, before Russia even considered military action in Ukraine, it had to neutralize the (already cautious) U.S. politically, and the key to that was to paralyze NATO and particularly Germany. Germany sees Russia as a crucial source of energy, a trading partner that might grow in significance, and a problem to be avoided. Even more important to it is Europe, of which NATO is a crucial element – not so much as a military force, but as another force holding Europe together. As the dominant power in Europe (outside of Britain), Germany has a national imperative to maintain its dominant economic position, which gives it major influence on the behavior of the Europeans on military matters.

For Germany, a war would therefore not suit its needs. It would risk a conflict that could severely weaken Europe’s economy at a delicate moment. Germany sees Poland as a difficult problem since it is in NATO, but Poland’s posture toward Russia does not suit Germany’s interests. Germany would of course like a buffer against Russia in Belarus and Ukraine, but not if it means massive economic cost and increasing American power in Europe. The U.S. dominates NATO, and an extended conflict would maximize American military considerations and minimize German economic concerns. In short, while there may be an array of positions on Russia’s moves in Europe, Germany, the leading power, needs to avoid war and will pay a price for this. Russia’s neutralization of the United States leads through NATO, Europe and particularly Germany. If they have divergent views, a unilateral American defense against Russia becomes very risky.

Thus, we get to the extraordinary document that Russia delivered last week. The document is targeted at NATO. The key clause is Article 5: “The Parties shall refrain from deploying their armed forces and armaments, including in the framework of international organizations, military alliances or coalitions, in the areas where such deployment could be perceived by the other Party as a threat to its national security, with the exception of such deployment within the national territories of the Parties.”

In other words, Russia is demanding the right to limit the deployment of U.S. troops in NATO countries if the Russians feel threatened by that deployment. The immediate effect would be that, while Poland could build its strength, the U.S. would have to withdraw from Poland if Russia felt threatened, which it says it does. Of course, if the Russian Federation reintegrated former Soviet territories within its political system, which I think is a possibility, then Russia would be freed from Article 5.

There are other clauses that guarantee the United States will reject the document. It is therefore an interesting question why the Russians crafted it. It may be designed as a negotiating platform, but it is too skewed to the Russian interest to be a workable platform for Washington. Another possibility is that it is for domestic Russian consumption, showing that Russia speaks to the U.S. as a powerful equal to be respected. Or it might be that after the Americans’ initial response to Russian threats – that their banking system would be hurt – the Russians read the U.S. as unwilling to respond in Ukraine.

The key from my point of view is that no one wants a war in Ukraine because it would be long and bloody, and the geographic advantage would go to Russia. A proposal on the table, regardless of how preposterous, can give cautious nations an opportunity to capitulate while appearing to prefer a diplomatic course to irrational military responses. Much of Europe is unwilling to fight for Ukrainian independence. The United States, concerned with the free spread of Russian power through military force, might choose an intervention. This proposal might well be seen in Europe as a “basis of discussion,” limiting American options.

An invasion of Ukraine would be filled with risks for Russia. Failure or prolonged resistance would turn Russia from a reemerging power into a nation to be discounted. Russian President Vladimir Putin obviously knows this document will be rejected, but within its context, rejection will get back to counteroffers, and it is possible that NATO and the U.S. will give some ground in exchange for scrapping some of the egregious Russian demands. Or Putin wants everyone to see this in terms that are not mentioned – as an ultimatum – and to panic.

In any case, the key piece of Russian reconstruction – Ukraine – is on the table, and the document so completely confuses the issues, by demanding fundamental shifts in how the U.S. operates, that something may be conceded under European pressure. Putin has nothing to lose from this document and something to gain. I would assume the American response will be to refuse talks based on the document.

[Crafty_Dog]

Ukraine: Former President Petro Poroshenko Named Treason Suspect
2 MIN READDec 20, 2021 | 18:18 GMT





What Happened: Ukraine’s deputy prosecutor general notified former Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko that he is officially suspected of treason and of financing terrorist activities related to coal purchases from Ukraine’s separatist-controlled Donbas region from 2014-2015, Bloomberg reported Dec. 20. Poroshenko is scheduled to speak with investigators about the charges on Dec. 23.

Why It Matters: Poroshenko’s domestic backers and Ukraine’s Western partners will widely deride the charges as politically motivated, which risks jeopardizing Western support for Ukraine. Ukraine's current Zelensky administration is aware of this risk, so it is unlikely that the charges will result in Poroshenko’s conviction or in major repercussions. But the investigation will help Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky fortify his political base by allowing him to claim that he fulfilled his 2019 campaign promise to prosecute former administration officials, including Poroshenko. The case also enables Zelensky to tie Poroshenko to pro-Russian Opposition Platform — For Life party leader Viktor Medvedchuk, who is a suspect in the same case.

Background: The charges coincide with Moscow's military build-up near the Russia-Ukraine border amid Moscow's diplomatic push for "security guarantees" from the United States and NATO. Zelensky repeatedly suggested during the 2019 presidential campaign that he would prosecute former administration officials for corruption. Despite defeating Poroshenko in Ukraine's 2019 presidential election by nearly 50 percentage points, Zelensky backers still see Poroshenko as the president's biggest political rival.

[Crafty_Dog]

The Strategic Case for Risking War in Ukraine
An invasion would be a diplomatic, economic and military mistake for Putin. Let him make it if he must.
By John R. Deni
Dec. 22, 2021 12:31 pm ET
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Ukrainian reservists participate in a military exercise near Kyiv, Ukraine, Dec. 18.
PHOTO: SERGEY DOLZHENKO/SHUTTERSTOCK

As Russia continues its destabilizing military buildup around Ukraine, the U.S. and its allies have made clear they prefer to resolve the crisis through diplomacy. This reflects not simply the preference of the Biden administration when it comes to national-security matters but also the West’s desire to avoid inflaming and escalating the situation through military action.

This makes good sense. Any Russo-Ukrainian war is likely to be bloody for the combatants, result in a wave of refugees heading west, and further destabilize an already precarious regional security situation. Nonetheless, as diplomatic efforts unfold, there are good strategic reasons for the West to stake out a hard-line approach, giving little ground to Moscow over its demand to forsake Ukrainian membership in Western institutions and halt military activity in Central and Eastern Europe. Rather than helping Russian President Vladimir Putin back down from the position he’s taken, the West ought to stand firm, even if it means another Russian invasion of Ukraine.

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Russia’s efforts to destabilize and undermine the Ukrainian government by keeping alive the smoldering war in the Donbas region haven’t returned Kyiv to Moscow’s orbit. Instead, Ukraine has used the past several years to boost its military capabilities gradually, strengthen its ties to the West, and improve its economy. It’s unclear why Mr. Putin has chosen this moment to demand assurances that Ukraine won’t become a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the European Union. Perhaps the Kremlin believes time isn’t on its side as Ukraine continues to slide closer to the West. Or Mr. Putin might assume Washington is more willing to accommodate Russia’s demands, given the intensifying American rivalry with China. Or it could even be that Mr. Putin hopes to bolster his declining public support with a jingoistic foreign adventure.

Regardless, Mr. Putin’s tactics have placed the West in a reactive mode, hoping to avoid a war in Europe that could result in tens of thousands of casualties. The death and destruction could far outpace that of the relatively more limited war in Donbas, where as many as 14,000 have died since 2014. But Mr. Putin’s price for turning down the heat is anathema to Western values of national self-determination and sovereignty. Moreover, a NATO-Russia agreement preventing Ukraine from seeking membership would violate a 1975 Helsinki agreement on security and cooperation in Europe—signed by Moscow—which said European states have the right to belong to any international alliance they choose.

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Mr. Putin therefore appears to have taken quite a risk—and the West ought to exploit his gamble by maintaining a hard-line stance in diplomatic discussions. In the best case, Mr. Putin is forced to back down, losing face domestically and internationally, even if his state media spins it as a victory or claims the buildup was merely part of an exercise.


In the worst case, if Mr. Putin’s forces invade, Russia is likely to suffer long-term, serious and even debilitating strategic costs in three ways. First, another Russian invasion of Ukraine would forge an even stronger anti-Russian consensus across Europe. Although the EU has shown a remarkable degree of solidarity in maintaining its limited sanctions on Russia since the 2014 invasion of Ukraine, there are cracks in the edifice. Germany’s new left-leaning government hasn’t yet found its footing on Russia. Italy, Austria, Hungary and even France have shown a willingness to consider opening up to the Kremlin, despite the Russian forces in Crimea and Donbas. And NATO’s attention and resources remain split between Russia on the one hand, and instability and insecurity emanating from across the Mediterranean Sea on the other. Russian tanks crossing into Ukraine would focus minds and effort.

Second, a Russian reinvasion of Ukraine would likely result in another round of more debilitating economic sanctions that would further weaken Russia’s economy. Disconnecting Russia from the tools of global finance and investment—such as the Swift banking-payment system—would make it difficult for Moscow to earn money from its oil exports. Similarly, a ban on Western institutions’ trading of existing Russian debt in secondary markets would limit Moscow’s ability to finance development. Over time, a stronger, more effective round of sanctions would hasten Russia’s economic decline relative to the West, reduce its power overall, and make it far more expensive for Mr. Putin to intimidate and destabilize his neighbors.

Third, another Russian invasion of Ukraine, even if militarily successful in the short run, is likely to spawn a guerrilla war in those areas of Ukraine occupied by Russian forces. This will sap the strength and morale of Russia’s military while undercutting Mr. Putin’s domestic popularity and reducing Russia’s soft power globally.

If Russian forces enter Ukraine yet again, Kyiv is likely to lose the war and the human toll will be extensive. The long-term damage suffered by Moscow, however, is likely to be substantial as well. The seemingly impetuous Mr. Putin has maneuvered his way into a strategically risky position, and the West ought to leverage the Kremlin’s mistake and drive a hard bargain in any diplomacy.

Mr. Deni is a research professor at the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and author of “Coalition of the Unwilling and Unable: European Realignment and the Future of American Geopolitics.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dhTPnpWz9iY&t=16s

[Crafty_Dog]

Four Scenarios of Rising Russia-Ukraine Tensions

Russia’s buildup of troops along the Ukrainian border has reignited speculation regarding the future of the Donbas conflict and Moscow’s intentions in eastern Ukraine more broadly. For now, the Kremlin’s primary motivation is to increase its leverage in impending European security talks with the United States and NATO amid Moscow’s push for “security guarantees.” These concerns have been particularly acute amid Moscow’s months-long expressions of dissatisfaction with the situation in Ukraine. But Moscow’s opening position, which Russia’s foreign ministry unveiled on Dec. 17, contains demands against NATO expansion to the former Soviet Union or even to develop bilateral military cooperation with these countries, both of which have already taken place and are non-starters for the alliance. The documents’ unacceptable content and rapid disclosure by Russia are indicative of their use as an ultimatum, after which Moscow will likely conduct long-planned steps continuing its military buildup or possibly threatening a hotter Donbas conflict.
 
Against this backdrop, there are four main scenarios for the future of the conflict in Ukraine, starting from the most likely to the least likely:
 
Scenario #1 (Very Likely): Russia maintains tensions but refrains from a military intervention amid negotiations. 
 
In our baseline scenario, Russia’s demands for security guarantees and disputes over the Minsk agreements will keep tensions in eastern Ukraine elevated. Moscow will also keep troops and equipment at the border, but a Russian invasion will not materialize. Seeing a credible military threat against Ukraine as leverage against the United and a critical lever to slow its declining influence over Kyiv, Russia will maintain its buildup of forces, infrastructure and equipment near Ukraine’s borders to pressure the West to make concessions. While the U.S. and European leaders will hold talks with Russia, NATO will not formally disavow the prospect of Ukraine’s membership in the alliance. Discussions on limiting the eastern deployment of certain NATO weapons systems and incident avoidance and management measures with the alliance will dissuade Russia from conducting a military incursion in 2022. Informal acknowledgment by the West that Ukraine is far from NATO membership (even if the alliance does not formally rule it out) could provide a sufficient “out” for Moscow to save face on the international stage. However, Moscow will continue to insist on Kyiv enacting the Minsk Protocol on its terms as a necessary precondition for avoiding a return to hot conflict in the Donbas. While Western leaders will reassure Russia that the Minsk agreement should be enforced, Kyiv's opposition and the separatists’ intransigence will make a real change on the ground unlikely. Ukrainian President ​​Volodymyr Zelensky’s administration, however, may engage in cosmetic initiatives toward enacting the agreements (including, for example, new laws regarding the Donbas’ special/autonomous constitutional status) that will have no effect on the situation on the contact line. The failure of any real progress will encourage Moscow to authorize the separatists to frequently violate the cease-fire as they have in previous months, while Russia will continue to keep many of its troops and military equipment near the Ukrainian border to keep the threat of a short-notice intervention credible and to deter the Ukrainians from responding forcefully to separatist cease-fire violations.
 
Scenario #2 (Likely): Russia raises the stakes by escalating the Donbas conflict, short of an overt military incursion.
 
In this scenario, the Kremlin will determine that it is not receiving sufficient concessions on security guarantees and its interpretation of the Minsk agreements, and will seek tangible ways (short of a new military incursion) to push Kyiv and Washington to make concessions. This will most likely take the form of more cease-fire violations by the Donbas separatists, possibly "offensive" ones with heavy weapons or drones, intended to provoke Ukraine. While monitors from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) report high levels of daily violations, most of these are not characterized as escalatory, but instead designed for deterrence and to project readiness. Increased reports of combative probing maneuvers — particularly those which approach, let alone cross, the Line of Contact separating separatist and government troops — could signal that combat forces are making preparations to return to war. Authorizing the separatists to further increase provocative cease-fire violations would seek to further put Kyiv in a bind. If the Ukrainian military responds forcefully to separatist shelling, Moscow can portray Kyiv as the aggressor and justify Russian intervention, such as a long-planned incursion or invasion. But if Ukraine does not step up its counter-shelling, the Ukrainian military will suffer disproportionate casualties and face accusations of failing to establish deterrence, which will be politically damaging for the Zelensky administration.
 
There are several additional potential signposts for this scenario. The most obvious would be restrictions on the movement and activities of OSCE monitors. OSCE monitors have access to most areas of eastern Ukraine, and the imposition of significant or prolonged limits on their movement would signal that separatist/Russian forces may be moving personnel and equipment as part of preparations for a return to war, or at least signal this possibility. Another would be increased public statements by high-ranking Russian officials such as Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and others calling for the protection of the hundreds of thousands of people in eastern Ukraine who have received Russian passports since 2019. Such statements could signal that Russia is diplomatically preparing to justify an impending military escalation. The risk would particularly increase if President Vladimir Putin repeatedly makes such statements, as it would suggest that Russia is providing legal grounds to justify its right to intervene. Finally, an increase in sensationalist anti-Ukrainian messaging in Russian media stressing alleged crimes against humanity by the Ukrainian government like genocide could indicate that Russian authorities are using propaganda to morally justify a resumption of the conflict by the separatists.
 
The constant “offensive” cease-fire violations, along with the signposts described above, would serve the Kremlin’s goal of suggesting that the status quo (of Ukraine not enacting the Minsk agreements on Moscow’s terms and lack of a European security accord) is insufficient for containing the conflict, justifying a theoretical intervention by Moscow with military force to adjust it. With these and other steps, Moscow would be raising the stakes as part of a bid to get more concessions from the West without actually having to resort to higher-cost options like an incursion or invasion, as Moscow can signal it is on the verge of resorting to those steps through a worsening of the Donbas conflict.
 
Scenario #3 (Unlikely): Russia conducts a new military intervention in Ukraine.
 
In this low probability, high impact scenario, Moscow would use the failure to secure legal guarantees in security talks with the West and the stagnation of the Minsk agreements to justify an incursion or invasion of Ukraine. Russia’s buildup could prompt additional Western military and other support for Kyiv while security talks fail to give the Kremlin even rhetorical or symbolic concessions on its biggest demands. Moscow could conclude that the best time for a military incursion against Ukraine is now rather than in 10 or 20 years, calculating the Ukrainian defense capabilities, national identity and democratic values, as well as the country’s relative stability and prosperity, are likely to continue trending upward. As a Slavic nation with deep cultural and historic ties to Russia, this trajectory would create a dangerous precedent for Putin’s governance model in Russia itself, as many younger Russians will point to Ukraine as evidence that democracy is possible in Russia, and could argue that the standoff with Ukraine contradicts Russia’s national interests. The Kremlin's original goal was to use the Minsk agreements as a tool to get influence over the whole of Ukraine and the occupation of the Donbas as an instrument to destabilize the country by empowering regionalist movements and pro-Russian political forces. But Russian leadership likely believes that a political or diplomatic resolution is slipping away, and that Ukraine will slide permanently into the United States’ security orbit.
 
An important constraining factor on Moscow’s willingness to conduct a military escalation is economic, in particular its desire to avoid new sanctions and preserve economic ties with the West, including Russia’s Nord Stream 2 pipeline with Germany. But years of domestic propaganda and a thoroughly sterilized political environment following a renewed wave of repressions mean that domestic opposition to an escalation would be insignificant, and while more sanctions would certainly pummel the Russian economy’s already weak growth prospects, it is doubtful economic measures alone would deter Russia due to the national security implications and ideological significance the Kremlin has ascribed to Ukraine.
 
The most likely version of this scenario would be an attempt to seize and occupy large pieces of Ukraine. This, in turn, contains multiple sub-variants, as Russia could seek to establish a land corridor to Crimea or significantly expand the size of the separatist republics. Western response measures would include sanctions on Russian sovereign debt, dollar transactions, and energy projects and other measures that would severely cripple the Russian economy. Given the harsh nature of the West’s response to any such invasion, arguably the most likely scenario could be a massive seizure of all of Ukraine east of the Dnieper river, and possibly even the port city of Odessa to secure the entire Black Sea coast. This large territory would most likely be used to create a loyal Ukrainian puppet state (that Moscow would insist is the “real” Ukraine) loosely modeled off Alexander Lukashenko’s Belarus, and joining it as the third nation to the Union State with Russia.
 
Alternative versions of this scenario could involve more limited use of force with an attempt at significant political interplay. One could be preemptive missile strikes on key Ukrainian military installations and infrastructure, such as airfields and arms depots. These strikes would demonstrate that the Ukrainian military will not be able to effectively oppose a Russian invasion, after which Moscow would issue Kyiv an ultimatum to back down to avoid unnecessary bloodshed. Another variant could involve limited incursions into Ukraine by Russian troops meant to destroy large formations of the Ukrainian army to force a political settlement or possible regime change in Kyiv without having to immediately occupy large pieces of Ukraine for an extended period. The advantage of these variants is that they allow Russia to achieve its geopolitical goals at a potentially lower human, economic and political cost than an invasion and occupation. Additionally, a further swelling of Russian troops on the border, possibly followed by a mobilization of reservists, could give Ukraine precious time to conduct its own emergency mobilization that would increase Russian casualties, but Ukraine cannot afford – politically or economically – to mobilize unless an impending Russian invasion is all but certain.
 
For Russia to resort to this option, Moscow would likely need to bring significantly more equipment and troops to the border. Russia would likely also opt to pass through some of the escalation signals described above in the second scenario.
 
Scenario #4 (Very Unlikely): Russia significantly lowers tensions and pulls back large amounts of troops and equipment from the Ukrainian border.
 
In this highly improbable scenario, Russia would be satisfied with concessions from Western leaders and Kyiv’s recommitment to the Minsk agreements, and would draw down its troops and remove equipment from the Ukrainian border to demonstrate that appeasement works and should continue. The West would probably not cave to all of Moscow’s demands, but confronted with the continuation of Russia’s military buildup, Western leaders could make commitments that Ukraine (and Georgia) will not be admitted to the NATO alliance for several more decades. Pro-Kremlin outlets could spin such a concession as a political win and a step toward regional security and stability. Moscow would cast the statement as a war-averting concession while reiterating that Russia reserves the right to return the troops or take preemptive steps against Ukraine at any point, thereby threatening to simply start the crisis anew should Western leaders appear to backtrack on the declaration in the coming years. This scenario would cause an upheaval in Ukrainian politics and major domestic instability, as the country has sought to join NATO since 2014. Many Ukrainians would likely interpret the sudden blockage of this path to Euro-Atlantic integration as a betrayal, empowering pro-Russian forces capitalizing on disenchantment to argue for improving ties with Moscow, further enraging nationalists and supporters of Ukraine’s European cours

[Crafty_Dog]

Where Russia Once Triumphed, Ukrainians Prepare to Resist Putin
Poltava is among the areas that Putin says were wrongly cleaved from Moscow’s control
Tourists pose in front of a mosaic that honors Peter the Great’s victory in Poltava.
By James Marson


POLTAVA, Ukraine—A decisive Russian military victory here in 1709 allowed Moscow to dominate much of this country for nearly three centuries.

If Russian President Vladimir Putin wants to pull it off again with the tens of thousands of troops he has amassed around Ukraine, he will have to reckon with people like 39-year-old archaeologist Anatoliy Khanko.

Mr. Khanko is a veteran of the war that Russia whipped up in Ukraine’s east in 2014 to hinder its neighbor from integrating with the West. While the U.S. and its allies have been fretting that Mr. Putin will order a forceful military thrust to rein in Ukraine again, Mr. Khanko has been laying plans to send his wife and small child westward so he can wage a partisan war from the woods around Poltava.

“Even if they get to Poltava, they won’t be here for long,” said Mr. Khanko, who sports a buzzcut and long black beard.


Anatoliy Khanko is a veteran of the war that Russia whipped up in Ukraine’s east in 2014.
Mr. Putin has described Ukraine as an artificial country glued together by Soviet leaders and named Poltava, some 100 miles from the modern border, among historical Russian lands that he says were wrongly cleaved from Moscow’s control. The city lies on the main highway westward from Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-largest city, to Kyiv, the capital.

But there are thousands of veterans in this region alone, and while the powerful Russian army would likely overrun Ukrainian forces, holding the territory would come at a huge cost, Mr. Khanko said. A recent national survey by a Kyiv pollster showed that one-third of Ukrainians are willing to take up arms if Russia launches an all-out war.

“I know what I am fighting for, but how will Putin sell it to Russians when tens of thousands of graves appear across the country?” Mr. Khanko said. “For what?”


A statue of the 18th-century Russian Gen. Alexander Suvorov, which was moved to the Poltava aviation museum from outside a Kyiv military school in 2019.

Souvenirs and battlefield images for sale near the Poltava Battle Museum.
Western and Ukrainian officials say there is little clarity whether Mr. Putin is planning a major military offensive to secure Ukraine in his sphere of influence or seeking to use the threat of war to pry concessions from the West.

Russia has denied it has any plans to invade, but it wants the U.S. and its allies to abandon its support for Ukraine’s military and withdraw a pledge to make Ukraine a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. On Thursday, in his annual end-of-year media session, Mr. Putin said Russia wanted to avoid conflict but it required immediate security guarantees from the U.S. and its allies.



A military buildup along the Ukrainian border is further straining ties between Russia and the U.S., after clashes over cybercrime, expulsions of diplomats and a migrant crisis in Belarus. WSJ explains what is deepening the rift between Washington and Moscow. Photo Composite/Video: Michelle Inez Simon
One thing Mr. Putin has been clear about is his broad ambitions for Ukraine, a former Soviet republic that declared independence in 1991. Ukrainians and Russians, he has said repeatedly, are one people torn apart by the Soviet collapse.

In a recent 7,000-word essay on Ukrainian history, Mr. Putin wrote about the Battle of Poltava in 1709, saying that most locals sided with Moscow against Swedish forces and Cossacks under a Ukrainian leader named Ivan Mazepa.

Yevheniya Shcherbyna, a 33-year-old tour guide at the museum of the battle, sees things differently.


The Holy Dormition cathedral in Poltava housed food and clothing to be sent to Ukraine’s army at the start of the conflict with Russia in 2014.

A children's choir singing carols at the cathedral during this month’s St. Nicholas Day celebrations.
“The information war started 300 years ago,” she said, citing the production of paintings, engravings and statues glorifying the Russian victory.

The battle was a defeat for Ukraine, she said, but later generations continued the fight to this today.

The museum last year opened an exhibit detailing what it calls Russian myths about the battle.

“For Putin, the mythology of the Battle of Poltava is the foundation of the idea that we are one nation,” said Oleh Pustovgar, a Poltava historian. “It is important for Russia not to let Poltava out of the brotherly embrace.”

After Swedish Defense Minister Peter Hultqvist last month said his country could send troops on a training mission to Ukraine, Russia’s embassy recalled the battle.

“We would like to remind Mr. Hultqvist that he is not the first military leader in Sweden who is trying to intimidate Russia with the power of his heroic army by planning to send his military to Ukraine,” the embassy wrote on Facebook.


Poltava, a quiet provincial capital of around 280,000 inhabitants, saw a surge of patriotic activism after 2014 that was sparked by a revolution that toppled a pro-Russian president and the subsequent war.

Mr. Khanko led a unit of protesters from this town during the revolution in Kyiv that ended in dozens of deaths, including one from his group.

Protesters took to the streets here as well, using a crane to pull down the city’s statue of Lenin.

Russia fomented separatist protests in cities across Ukraine’s south and east in 2014, but patriotic groups here quickly quashed efforts of instigators they said weren’t locals.


Ivan Petrenko is a retired army colonel who served in the Soviet army in Afghanistan.
As supplies of fighters, commanders and weapons from Russia transformed demonstrations in the east into an armed conflict, Poltava residents sent aid to Ukraine’s threadbare army. Food and clothes piled up in an Orthodox cathedral here, soon filling an office, spilling down a staircase and taking up around one-third of the building, recalls Archbishop Fedir, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine’s leader in the region.

“Ukraine has weak state institutions, but we can organize ourselves quickly,” he said.

Others like Mr. Khanko, the archaeologist, went to fight, many as part of volunteer units.

“I used to know how to dig up,” he said. “But I learned how to dig in.”

Activists raised Ukrainian and nationalist flags atop a monument to the Russian victory in the center of town. A statue to Mr. Mazepa, the defeated Cossack leader, was erected after years of delays. At the aviation museum, new displays were added to commemorate locals killed in the current war alongside exhibits to Soviet heroes.

There is some support here for ties with Russia, mainly among older residents with ties to the ex-Soviet air force base.

The city’s mayor, Oleksandr Mamai, who draws support mainly from elderly voters, caused a storm when he echoed the Kremlin’s narrative in a recent television interview, saying the U.S. was fighting Russia in Ukraine, setting “brother against brother.” Political opponents want him removed.



Oleksandr Koba, who helped topple the Lenin statue, said elderly ladies cursed him in the days afterward. “You pulled down our Lenin,” he recalls them saying. Mr. Koba has organized pop-up street museums and performances to showcase Ukraine’s history and Soviet villainy, including the Holodomor, a forced famine that killed millions in the 1930s.

The conflict has brought some economic pain. Exports to Russia collapsed, a process that began even before the war when Moscow banned milk imports from the region.

At the souvenir shop near the museum, a seller complained that some of the craftspeople who make trinkets and traditional embroidered shirts have left to look for work in European Union countries.

Russia has justified its interventions in Ukraine by claiming, with scant evidence, that Russian speakers face repression there.


A military buildup along the Ukrainian border is further straining ties between Russia and the U.S., after clashes over cybercrime, expulsions of diplomats and a migrant crisis in Belarus. WSJ explains what is deepening the rift between Washington and Moscow. Photo Composite/Video: Michelle Inez Simon
Ihor Petrichenko, a deputy of Mr. Mamai’s from an opposition party, said many in the town switched from speaking Russian to Ukrainian after 2014, but he largely stuck with Russian to make a point.

“I don’t need Putin to protect me,” he said.

After returning from the front, Mr. Khanko and other veterans launched camps to teach teenagers basic military tactics and survival skills, as well as patriotic history.

He acknowledges the West wouldn’t send troops to help if Russia invades, but hopes for weapons deliveries.

Ivan Petrenko, who helped set up a motorized infantry battalion from scratch in 2014, said Mr. Putin had underestimated Ukrainians then. A retired colonel who served in the Soviet army in Afghanistan, he said Russia has been buoyed by the U.S.’s recent flight from Kabul—but that Ukrainians would stand firm.

“We won’t be a second Afghanistan,” said Mr. Petrenko. “This is our land, and we’ll fight for it.”

[Crafty_Dog]

December 28, 2021
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Russia, US and Ukraine: The State of Play
By: George Friedman

When nations negotiate, a quiet settles in before the threats begin. Such is the case now between the U.S. and Russia, which will soon hold talks over the status of Ukraine and any number of other issues. Moscow has published its list of demands – more of a wish list, really – to try to set the agenda. But in the end, agendas are set by reality. A quick recap of Russia’s year is a good place to begin establishing that reality.

Russia has been trying to reclaim the buffers it lost after the collapse of the Soviet Union. These buffers, the most important of which are in Eastern Europe, insulate Russia from potential attack. In the past, these attacks have tended to emerge unexpectedly, so Russia wants to have them before a threat emerges. It doesn’t necessarily need the buffers to be part of the Russian Federation; it just needs to make sure they are not hostile (or occupied by hostile powers).

Thus, Russian activities in the past year were predictable. When war broke out in the South Caucasus between Azerbaijan and Armenia, Russia dispatched a peacekeeping force and, with its enormous influence in the region, constructed a system of relationships dominated by Russia. In Central Asia, Moscow built a network of airfields, a process that only accelerated as the U.S. withdrew from Afghanistan. In Belarus, Russia completely dominates Alexander Lukashenko’s government.

These were important steps for Russia’s reclamation of its buffers, but none of them are as important as Ukraine. Its sheer size allows an enemy force to maneuver, and that maneuverability forces a defender to disperse forces. In war, Ukraine gives Russia time. It spent the year – and really years before it – focused on this moment.

Moscow understood from the beginning that it had to reach an accommodation with Washington. It also understood that the United States, like all countries, comes to the table only when it has to. Washington has been content with the structure of the former Soviet Union. Russia has not. So Russia had to put American interests in the region, particularly in Ukraine, at risk.

The very obvious massing of Russian forces around the Ukrainian border was the logical next step. Deployed as they were, the massed armored forces appeared to be in a position to rapidly overrun Ukraine. The problem, of course, was that though a country as large as Ukraine could be overrun, it could not be overrun rapidly.

Militarily, the United States is in a militarily difficult position. It has no significant force in Ukraine, and any infusion of forces could lead to a long and potentially indecisive war. NATO has no stomach for this kind of confrontation on its doorstep. Apart from limited militaries, the NATO model has morphed into the EU model, and the EU model has morphed into a model whose motto is peace and prosperity. A rapid deployment with few casualties is possible, but the kind of battle Russia offered is of no interest to the EU model, save for a few countries, most notably Poland. The Russian calculation was that the U.S. would not act, and if it did, it would split the Europeans. NATO would exercise and plan in Brussels, but ultra-caution would limit collective action.

From the American point of view, there is no short-term interest in intervening in Ukraine, let alone fighting another potentially losing war at long distance with questionable allies. But there is a long-term danger. The American strategy in the Cold War was to prevent Russia from imposing hegemony over Europe. Such a hegemony would wed Russian resources and manpower to European technology and manufacturing, creating a massive superpower that could challenge the U.S. in the Atlantic. This was a long-range threat, but long-range threats had to be dealt with early and cheaply. The Soviet threat was always there, but it was blocked at relatively low cost and was therefore politically acceptable in the West, especially when they were draped in anti-Soviet ideology and the principles of liberal democracy.

European Division, 1990
(click to enlarge)

The current situation in Ukraine recreates this long-range threat. The Russians view the United States as unpredictably ruthless – it never knows when the U.S. will take action, and its experience in the Cold War showed a U.S. willing to deploy massive force. Russia had to force the United States to limit its presence in Ukraine without risking a dramatic response. It had to demonstrate its power with a not fully credible force to compel a negotiation but not a massive response. And Washington could not go into talks without demonstrating a credible response to the Russian threat. It’s delicate on both sides.

Ultimately, both sides understood the weakness of the Russian strategy relative to the United States. Armored fighting vehicles such as those Russia sent to the Ukrainian border eat an enormous amount of fuel. An armored division in the U.S. military uses about 600,000 gallons of fuel per day when on the move, and Russia is deploying multiple divisions, which would have to be followed by an endless line of refueling vehicles, coming from vast fuel storages. At best, this is complicated. At worst, it’s a prime candidate for a war of attrition as the U.S., weary of Russia’s anti-aircraft capability, fires cruise missiles from afar. (Russia can, of course, shoot some down, but the losses would be huge.)

The Russian decision to carry out multidivisional armored warfare will depend on how confident it is that the U.S. would get involved, how confident Moscow is that the U.S. would choose a winning strategy, how confident it is in its own defensive systems, and how confident it is that it can politically withstand even a temporary defeat. The Russians have not engaged in multidivisional offensives since 1945. They cannot live with the loss of buffers. They cannot live with defeat.

War is filled with vulnerabilities, many of which are discovered at inconvenient times. The price Russia would pay in the event of a failed invasion is significant in terms of domestic politics and international credibility. The price the U.S. would face by a defeat would be less. Its credibility would be hurt, but a geopolitical imperative would not be lost.

The Russians know this far better than I do. So the coming negotiations will break down here and there; Russian forces will be on full alert, but Russia can’t afford a defeat and can’t be certain of victory. In the end, the thing that the Russians will have gained is that they sat down across from the Americans as equals, and the rest of the world will have seen it. There will be consequences to America for conceding the point, and the Europeans will proclaim the end of American power for the hundredth time. And history will go on.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://abc6onyourside.com/news/nation-world/us-warships-stay-in-mediterranean-amid-ukraine-russia-fears?fbclid=IwAR1eJ5H8nmzQKjeAErpk31uUiY0Gt-y6QFtIfMKbU9HSEgoET30baKbumIk

[Crafty_Dog]

Editor’s Note: Last month, major news outlets were reporting that Russia was amassing troops at its border with Ukraine; an important buffer country, in an effort to reclaim former Soviet Union territory. When you understand how the pieces are lining up, you can predict these kinds of developments, as we did back in December, 2018.
 
Today, we are sharing an excerpt of that original forecast with you (see below). We are proud to provide you with the accurate and in-depth analysis you’ve come to expect from Geopolitical Futures, keeping you ahead of the mainstream and better informed on what’s to come.

From our 2019 Forecast,
The World in 2019: A Year on the Edge

 


Ukraine and Belarus are the two places with the potential for a U.S.-Russia confrontation. Ukraine is at risk of falling apart. Russian influence in Belarus will threaten Poland.
Ukraine is caught in the crossfire of the U.S., the EU and Russia. Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream are expected to be completed in 2019. These pipelines, which connect Russia’s supply of natural gas to the EU and Turkey, circumvent traditional and lucrative natural gas transit routes through Ukraine, giving Moscow further leverage over the government in Kiev. The conflict in eastern Ukraine is frozen but still volatile, and it’s unclear whether Ukraine can govern what’s left of its territory. Russia is better prepared for intervention there than the West is, but Moscow is betting that Ukraine’s internal dysfunctions will eventually bring much of the country, if not the government itself, back into its orbit. At the same time, Ukraine is preparing for a presidential election, slated for March. Polls show no clear frontrunner, so there’s a real chance the political conflict that follows will entangle outside powers, just as it did after the 2014 elections.




Belarus is also concerning. For years, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko has juggled relations with the West and Russia, leaning further east or west as necessity dictates. Right now, he is engaging more with the West, much to the chagrin of Russia, which is concerned about increased U.S. military presence in Poland and Romania. Lukashenko has intimated that if a permanent U.S. military base is installed in Poland, Minsk and Moscow may have to respond together. (He has insisted, however, that Russian troops will not be stationed in Belarus.)

In Belarus, as in Ukraine, we do not expect the situation to come apart at the seams – but the competitive forces on both sides are creating tremendous pressure, which, in the shorter term, makes precise developments unpredictable.

-------------------------------------------------
===========================

Also:



Is Russia Planning Another Assault on Ukraine?
By Ekaterina Zolotova
November 17, 2021
Ukraine is a critical part of Russia’s western buffer zone, which separates the Russian border from NATO forces. Moscow therefore has an interest in keeping Ukraine weak and destabilized so that it can more easily expand its own influence there while curbing the West’s.
 
China, Russia and the Strategy of Indirection
By George Friedman
June 29, 2021
The Russians are struggling to regain borders that they had more or less held since the 18th and 19th centuries. Threatening new territories is one thing. Trying to recover lost territory is another, especially when the territory is vast, as it is from Ukraine to Central Asia. What was lost in a year will take generations to recover. It’s more vulnerable than it appears. It has lost so much that regaining Eastern Europe is a dream, and it must resist American attempts to contain it on its current line.
 
Ukraine, War, and the American Doctrine
By George Friedman
December 10, 2021
The Ukrainian border is about 300 miles from Moscow and while no threat exists at this moment, the speed with which a third power such as the United States could appear in Ukraine and threaten the heartland should not be discounted. The Russians cannot discount it, and therefore want to preclude the possibility by controlling Ukraine.

[G M]

https://warontherocks.com/2019/11/promises-made-promises-broken-what-yeltsin-was-told-about-nato-in-1993-and-why-it-matters-2/

JFK almost had WWIII over missiles in Cuber.

Our “elites” want us to protect Ukrainian borders while dismantling ours.

[Crafty_Dog]

I am sympathetic to GM's point immediately above, but I post this in the interest of a well-rounded discussion:

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/18096/russia-putin-nato

Also, note Russian behavior in the recent posts in this thread:

https://firehydrantoffreedom.com/index.php?topic=1673.new#new

[DougMacG]

These don't equate for me.

"Our “elites” want us to protect Ukrainian borders while dismantling ours."
[/quote]

What we are allowing to happen at our southern border is treasonous, but not related to the questions of whether and how to assist Ukraine against Russia.

[G M]

Doug,

We can put our troops on the Uke/Russian border to protect Ukraine, but we can’t protect our own nation from invasion?

It used to be that NATO was a joke, dependents of America’s military might. Now our military is just a bloated version of the pathetic Western European militaries. President Dementia and our fake and gay military have no business in Ukraine. If Putin is a threat to Europe, Europe better step up.

[G M]

I bet the Ukrainian military would have loved to have all the weapons and equipment we left for the Taliban.

[G M]

Doug,

We can put our troops on the Uke/Russian border to protect Ukraine, but we can’t protect our own nation from invasion?

It used to be that NATO was a joke, dependents of America’s military might. Now our military is just a bloated version of the pathetic Western European militaries. President Dementia and our fake and gay military have no business in Ukraine. If Putin is a threat to Europe, Europe better step up.

http://ace.mu.nu/archives/be%20all%20that%20you%20can%20be.jpg

[Crafty_Dog]

Playing GM's URL of Reply 220 forward.

================================

https://coffeeordie.com/ukraine-national-resistance-law/?fbclid=IwAR06u2jPBefJUTfjgf0GifIblMRA0YLX5CQOuaKcJPOFJ7qH0h5N2Mw3_A4

===============================

WSJ

A Dangerous Moment for Europe
What will Biden give Putin to avoid an invasion of Ukraine?
By The Editorial Board
Follow
Jan. 7, 2022 6:45 pm ET


Ukrainian border guards watch as a special vehicle digs a trench on the Ukraine-Russia border close to Sumy, Ukraine, Dec. 21, 2021.
PHOTO: UKRAINIAN BOARD GUARD PRESS OFFICE/ASSOCIATED PRESS

The crisis created by Russia at Ukraine’s border is the most dangerous moment for Eastern Europe in decades, and not merely for the chances of a Russian invasion. Another, perhaps greater, risk is what President Biden might concede to Vladimir Putin to prevent an invasion.

On Friday NBC News reported that “U.S. officials are ready to propose discussions on scaling back U.S. and Russian troop deployments and military exercises in Eastern Europe.”

Citing current and former officials, the report said talks “could potentially address the scope of military drills held by both powers, the number of U.S. troops stationed in the Baltic states and Poland, advance notice about the movement of forces, and Russia’s nuclear-capable Iskander missiles in the Russian territory of Kaliningrad between Poland and Lithuania.”

Wow. The report quickly stirred consternation, and pushback from the White House. “Reports that the administration is developing options for pulling back U.S. forces in Eastern Europe in preparation for discussions with Russia next week are not accurate,” a National Security Council spokesperson said.


She added: “We’ve been clear that should Russia further invade Ukraine we would reinforce our eastern flank NATO Allies, to whom we have a sacred obligation. We are tightly lashed up with our NATO Allies as we address this crisis, on the principle of ‘nothing about you without you.’”


We’re glad to hear it, and NBC may have hyped its story. But Mr. Putin has put demands like these on the table as the price of standing down from invasion. Moscow has publicly called on NATO to rule out further expansion eastward—that is, to block Ukraine’s potential membership. The Kremlin also seeks to limit Western military activities such as the ones that NBC says the White House is considering rolling back.

Merely by threatening invasion, Mr. Putin has already gained an advantage. He’s the one making demands of the West, and he’s already won two virtual head-to-head meetings with Mr. Biden. The President has conceded to next week’s security talks, which will address Russia’s concerns about NATO. But Russia’s troops are massed on a neighbor’s borders. NATO has only token forces in Poland and the Baltics.

Mr. Biden offered “two paths” to Mr. Putin during a recent phone call. “One is a path of diplomacy leading toward a de-escalation of the situation, and the other is a path that’s more focused on deterrence, including serious costs,” a senior Administration official said afterward. “Those costs include economic costs, include adjustments and augmentations of NATO force posture in Allied countries, and include additional assistance to Ukraine to enable it to further defend itself.”

Yet Mr. Biden has held off significant deliveries of additional military aid to Kyiv. Assistance sent after Russian tanks begin rolling across the border may arrive too late. The White House apparently fears that making an invasion more costly would provoke the Russians before bilateral negotiations begin in Geneva. But Mr. Putin may interpret that reluctance as a sign of U.S. weakness.

Mr. Putin has long desired to rebuild a Greater Russia sphere of influence, and he clearly thinks the first year of the Biden Presidency is a moment of opportunity. It’s hard to know if this is partly a personal calculation about Mr. Biden and his will and capacities. But Mr. Biden’s willy-nilly flight from Afghanistan can’t have given Mr. Putin any greater fear about U.S. resolve.

***

No one wants a Russian invasion, but worse than a new war in Ukraine would be to let Mr. Putin intimidate NATO into a retreat from Eastern Europe in order to avoid an invasion in the short term. Mr. Putin would pocket that concession, use it to shore up his standing at home, and wait for the next opening to look for more. Would the Baltic states be next?

An invasion of Ukraine would be a tragedy for that country, but letting Mr. Putin dictate Western security terms would be worse for everyone

[G M]

https://media.gab.com/system/media_attachments/files/095/050/519/original/b8987712dfdb95bc.jpg



So, if Putin pushes into Ukraine, we should do what exactly ?

[Crafty_Dog]

Exactly so:

=========================


Negotiators for the United States are planning to show up to talks with their Russian counterparts Monday with proposals to discuss the placement of missiles and scope of military exercises in Europe, according to a senior administration official and others familiar with the plans.

The White House is looking to test whether Moscow is serious about ending the Ukraine crisis through diplomacy or is making unworkable demands as a delay tactic or pretext for a new invasion.

The bilateral talks in Geneva — with Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman leading the U.S. delegation and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov serving as lead representative for the Russians — come as Moscow continues to mass forces and materiel on the border with Ukraine, threatening to take military measures if Washington and its allies fail to address the Kremlin’s security concerns.

A timeline: Why the rifts between Russia and the West keep on growing

The Geneva talks will be followed by a special meeting of the NATO-Russia Council in Brussels on Wednesday and a session of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in Vienna on Thursday — chances for the United States to engage Russia together with its allies and partners.

What’s happening in Ukraine, and will Russia really invade?
In early December, U.S. intelligence agencies warned that Russia was planning a massive military invasion of Ukraine. Here’s why Moscow would do that. (Jason Aldag/The Washington Post)

“Our intention is to have an open, sincere and serious dialogue about European security with the Russians at the table. We want to be inclusive. We don’t want to go over anybody’s head,” U.S. Ambassador to the OSCE Michael Carpenter said in an interview.

The multicountry engagements at NATO and the OSCE are a priority for the White House, which has regularly reassured European allies and partners, including Ukraine, that it won’t negotiate “about them, without them.” But the Geneva talks are likely to be the most substantive and closely watched indicator of whether there is a diplomatic deal to be struck that will avert a renewed war in Europe.

“The way the Russians think, there’s only one venue that matters to them and it’s the bilateral one,” said a U.S. government official specializing in Russian affairs who, like others, spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the issue’s sensitivity. “The rest, from their point of view, is decoration.”


U.S. officials don’t know whether Russian President Vladimir Putin believes the time is right to invade Ukraine once again and attempt to pull the country back into Russia’s strategic orbit by force, or if he is undertaking a more nebulous gambit to extract security concessions from the United States and its allies by threatening Ukraine.

Six ways Russia views Ukraine — and why each should worry the West

In Geneva, U.S. officials will be looking to see whether their Russian counterparts emphasize demands the Kremlin knows are nonstarters — such as providing a legally binding guarantee that NATO will not expand eastward to include Ukraine — or instead focus on areas where there is room for negotiation.

“If the Russians come on Monday and they only want to talk about NATO expansion, then we are going to be at an impasse. I think the administration is prepared to push back — that this is not up for discussion,” said Andrea Kendall-Taylor, a Russia expert at the Center for a New American Security. “But if the Russians want to talk about conventional arms control issues, then there is a discussion to be had — and it would raise the prospect that there could be a diplomatic solution to the crisis.”


Ahead of the talks, top U.S. officials have stepped up their rhetoric about Russian threats.

On Friday, Secretary of State Antony Blinken listed grievances Washington has with Moscow, including Russia’s invasions of two neighboring states, election interference and attempted assassinations with chemical weapons, accusing the Kremlin of driving “the false narrative that NATO is threatening Russia.”

“That’s like the fox saying it had to attack the hen house because its occupants somehow pose a threat,” Blinken said. “We’ve seen this gaslighting before.”

Last month, the Russian Foreign Ministry published draft treaties laying out what Russia wants the United States and NATO to accede to. Parts of the texts were so unrealistic that many Western lawmakers dismissed the Russian approach as unserious. Among other things, Russia demanded the United States and its Western European military allies agree not to put weapons or forces in any of the former Warsaw Pact countries that are now members of NATO.


The drafts raised worries that Putin was looking to create a pretext for a new invasion of Ukraine once the proposals were inevitably spurned. What the Russians are willing to accept short of those demands remains unclear to American negotiators.

The U.S. government official who specializes in Russian affairs believes the Russians are still interested in a real dialogue and want to see whether Washington is willing to discuss any sort of commitment that constrains U.S. power, which for example could include placing limits on U.S. missile deployments in parts of Europe that could threaten Moscow.

“The Russians are waiting to see what we’re going to offer, and they’re going to take it back and decide is this serious?” the official said. “Is this something we can sell as a major victory for security, or is it just, from their point of view, another attempt to fob us off and not give us anything?”

Russia planning massive military offensive against Ukraine involving 175,000 troops, U.S. intelligence warns

U.S. officials have also said they are proceeding on the “principle of reciprocity” and won’t cut deals unless the Russians address U.S. concerns.

[G M]

What would President Reagan have done if Mexico joined the Warsaw Pact?

[DougMacG]

What would President Reagan have done if Mexico joined the Warsaw Pact?

What would Reagan have done if the Soviet Union had pushed forward into Finland, Sweden, Norway, Austria, Switzerland?

Thwart them every step of the way, I hope.

[G M]

What would President Reagan have done if Mexico joined the Warsaw Pact?

What would Reagan have done if the Soviet Union had pushed forward into Finland, Sweden, Norway, Austria, Switzerland?

Thwart them every step of the way, I hope.

Thwart? Interesting way to spell war.

The Mexican government repressed and “disappeared” a lot of communistas between the 60s and the 80s. What if a Marxist government came to power in Mexico during the Cold War? Would the USG see it as an existential threat? Would every option be on the table to address it?

Of course.

Now we a screwing around on Vladi’s front porch and at a time where we are holding a very weak hand.
Everyone knows it.

How much kompromat does Putin have on president kid sniffer and his crackhead son?

[DougMacG]

What would President Reagan have done if Mexico joined the Warsaw Pact?

What would Reagan have done if the Soviet Union had pushed forward into Finland, Sweden, Norway, Austria, Switzerland?

Thwart them every step of the way, I hope.

Thwart? Interesting way to spell war.

The Mexican government repressed and “disappeared” a lot of communistas between the 60s and the 80s. What if a Marxist government came to power in Mexico during the Cold War? Would the USG see it as an existential threat? Would every option be on the table to address it?

Of course.

Now we a screwing around on Vladi’s front porch and at a time where we are holding a very weak hand.
Everyone knows it.

How much kompromat does Putin have on president kid sniffer and his crackhead son?

You noticed I didn't answer your question.   

Since Biden Klain or whoever is charge doesn't care what we think, the question to me is what should we do if we or President Pompeo for example was in charge, (and if our own border was secure, a different matter).

The backyard philosophy is fine but Putin isn't analogous to Reagan to me.  NATO isn't an offensive organization, they're barely a defensive one, and not analogous to the Soviets or Putin Russia today.

Yes, thwart.  Some things fall short of sending troops or launching warheads, like offering to supply LNG they may need in a conflict or break with Russia, for example.

Something has kept them from doing this to date.

My analogy is the French and Dutch helping the colonists against foreign rule.

What is THE lesson from WWII?  Intervene earlier against evil, don't let it grow and spread.  Is Putin-Russia a real threat?  Is Xi-China?  If so, sit back, stay home, let evil regimes grow larger and stronger?  Ideally no.

[G M]

What would President Reagan have done if Mexico joined the Warsaw Pact?

What would Reagan have done if the Soviet Union had pushed forward into Finland, Sweden, Norway, Austria, Switzerland?

Thwart them every step of the way, I hope.

Thwart? Interesting way to spell war.

The Mexican government repressed and “disappeared” a lot of communistas between the 60s and the 80s. What if a Marxist government came to power in Mexico during the Cold War? Would the USG see it as an existential threat? Would every option be on the table to address it?

Of course.

Now we a screwing around on Vladi’s front porch and at a time where we are holding a very weak hand.
Everyone knows it.

How much kompromat does Putin have on president kid sniffer and his crackhead son?

You noticed I didn't answer your question.   

Since Biden Klain or whoever is charge doesn't care what we think, the question to me is what should we do if we or President Pompeo for example was in charge, (and if our own border was secure, a different matter).

The backyard philosophy is fine but Putin isn't analogous to Reagan to me.  NATO isn't an offensive organization, they're barely a defensive one, and not analogous to the Soviets or Putin Russia today.

Yes, thwart.  Some things fall short of sending troops or launching warheads, like offering to supply LNG they may need in a conflict or break with Russia, for example.

Something has kept them from doing this to date.

My analogy is the French and Dutch helping the colonists against foreign rule.

What is THE lesson from WWII?  Intervene earlier against evil, don't let it grow and spread.  Is Putin-Russia a real threat?  Is Xi-China?  If so, sit back, stay home, let evil regimes grow larger and stronger?  Ideally no.

We just gave the global jihad Afghanistan and billions of dollars of weapons and equipment. The global jihad is expansionist and has taken root most places around the globe. Including Western Europe and the Attorney General’s Office of the State of Minnesota.

Russia? Not so much. Unlike our leadership, Putin actually seeks to preserve and protect Russia. He takes his National Security seriously. At this point, the American Military-Industrial Complex has long abandoned the concept of winning wars, replacing it with ensuring that defense contractors have steady revenue streams.

Losing Taiwan would have serious consequences globally, but especially profound ones to the US. The Ukraine? Not so much. Pick your fights carefully, especially when the other side has ICBMs.

[DougMacG]

"Pick your fights carefully".   - Yes.

I would add, pick your sit-this-one-out choices wisely too.

Iraq and Afghan:  There was a point where Baghdad had fallen, Saddam was pulled out his cowering hole and hanged.  We could have left.  Osama, in the end, was actually pulled out of Pakistan.  Very costly wars but easy to imagine how those two accomplishments might have happened with 1/10th the cost in lives and dollars and no gear or people left behind.

"Losing Taiwan would have serious consequences globally, but especially profound ones to the US. The Ukraine? Not so much."

Two different situations with some similarities, plus they might easily be linked if two US enemies join forces:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pacific_Fleet_(Russia)

Crucial question:  Which emboldens Xi more, if the US rolls over when Putin takes Ukraine, or if Russia does not take Ukraine because US and NATO flex a little muscle and influence?

Maybe Ukraine assistance 2022 is one for impotent Europe without us.  Someone should persuade Russia to leave its neighbors alone.

[G M]

"Pick your fights carefully".   - Yes.

I would add, pick your sit-this-one-out choices wisely too.

Iraq and Afghan:  There was a point where Baghdad had fallen, Saddam was pulled out his cowering hole and hanged.  We could have left.  Osama, in the end, was actually pulled out of Pakistan.  Very costly wars but easy to imagine how those two accomplishments might have happened with 1/10th the cost in lives and dollars and no gear or people left behind.

"Losing Taiwan would have serious consequences globally, but especially profound ones to the US. The Ukraine? Not so much."

Two different situations with some similarities, plus they might easily be linked if two US enemies join forces:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pacific_Fleet_(Russia)

Crucial question:  Which emboldens Xi more, if the US rolls over when Putin takes Ukraine, or if Russia does not take Ukraine because US and NATO flex a little muscle and influence?

Maybe Ukraine assistance 2022 is one for impotent Europe without us.  Someone should persuade Russia to leave its neighbors alone.

What emboldens Xi is the same thing that emboldens all
Of our enemies globall, our cut and run from A-stan and Grandpa Felonyfingers as Commander in Chief.

We lost to illiterate goat fcukers (I know a retired cop that trained the Afghan National Army, the Afghans really do that and think nothing of it). Let’s not rush into a fight with a nuclear armed “need peer”.

[Crafty_Dog]

What pushed the Soviet Empire over the cliff was our arming the mujahadeen with shoulder mounted rockets that took down Russian helicopters.

As best as I can tell the Ukes have the balls and the will to fight.  Let's enable them to do so-- as President Trump started to do.

[G M]

What pushed the Soviet Empire over the cliff was our arming the mujahadeen with shoulder mounted rockets that took down Russian helicopters.

As best as I can tell the Ukes have the balls and the will to fight.  Let's enable them to do so-- as President Trump started to do.

Or we could just agree to not bring NATO to Russia’s border…
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/guerrilla-tactics-offer-ukraines-best-chance-against-putins-invasion-force/

[Crafty_Dog]

In return for , , , what?

Or, as a freebie?

[G M]

In return for , , , what?

Or, as a freebie?

For him agreeing to leave the Ukes alone.

[Crafty_Dog]

The Russians already did that with the Budapest Accord (think I am remembering the name correctly-- in 1993?) and then invaded Crimea and the Donbass.

Ask the Kazakhis about Russia as a neighbor-- check out the recent entries on the Central Asia thread for a memory freshener , , ,

[G M]

The Russians already did that with the Budapest Accord (think I am remembering the name correctly-- in 1993?) and then invaded Crimea and the Donbass.

Ask the Kazakhis about Russia as a neighbor-- check out the recent entries on the Central Asia thread for a memory freshener , , ,

If Ukraine became a NATO member, then Article 5 applies to them, yes?

[Crafty_Dog]

Your point being?

[G M]

Your point being?

An attack on Ukraine is supposed to be treated as an attack on the US. So if Putin decides to move into the Ukraine then, either we got to war with Russia or NATO is shown to be worthless.

Does that strike you as going to a stupid place to do stupid things with stupid people?

[Crafty_Dog]

My reference to the Budapest Accord was a reminder to your comment that in return for not bringing Ukraine into NATO Putin would promise to leave Ukraine alone that Russian promises mean little.

It was not a call for bringing Ukraine into NATO.

We are in agreement that that would be a very poor idea-- quite The Three Ss. 

OTOH arming and supporting Uke resistance, hard sanctions, etc. seem to me a good and necessary response.

[G M]

https://www.theburningplatform.com/2022/01/16/false-flags-suddenly-no-longer-a-crazy-conspiracy-theory/#more-256935

[Crafty_Dog]

How to Halt Putin’s Ukraine Push
The U.S. needs unity and tough diplomacy. Economic sanctions won’t be enough.

By Walter Russell Mead
Follow
Jan. 17, 2022 5:20 pm ET


As the Ukrainian crisis deepens, there is only one option that would stop a Russian invasion—and that is the one that all the serious players in Washington say is off the table: dispatching an American and coalition force to defend Ukraine. Vladimir Putin is not ready for war with the U.S.; informing his gamble is a well-grounded conviction that America is not committed enough to Ukraine to defend it by force.

History may look back on this as a failure of nerve equal to the appeasement of the 1930s. Britain and France thought war was unthinkable until it became unavoidable. With troops off the table, the Biden administration hopes to whip up a mass of economic sanctions and political repercussions (up to arming Ukrainian insurgents) grave enough to warn Mr. Putin away from his intended prey.

“Hopes” is the operative word. In Washington, where trying to guess Mr. Putin’s intentions has become a bigger indoor sport than Wordle, even administration insiders doubt this approach will work. A worst-case scenario, in which Russia seizes much of Ukraine and the West invokes sanctions that fail to reverse the invasion, seems likely.

America’s Indo-Pacific allies in particular are watching with horror. A Russian occupation would expose the fragile underpinnings of world order and encourage China and North Korea to probe for weakness. And if America responds to Russian aggression by building up North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces and entering a prolonged confrontation with Moscow, what becomes of the U.S. focus on the Pacific?


Caught in this ugly predicament, Team Biden must improve the odds of deterring a Russian invasion and plan for the possibility—some think it’s a probability—that deterrence fails and Mr. Putin attacks. To do that, it must plan consequences that Mr. Putin will find serious, challenge his calculations about American weakness, and, without appeasement, make the peaceful option look more attractive.


When it comes to threats, Democrats and Republicans alike tend to overvalue the effect of economic sanctions and underestimate their cost. Europe depends so heavily on Russian oil and gas that sanctions are necessarily limited in their scope. Even very small, poor countries like Cuba and North Korea have been undeterred by sanctions more severe than any Russia is likely to face. Formal defense ties uniting Sweden, Finland and the U.S. with a commitment to defending the Baltic states, or the restoration of close defense relations between the U.S. and Turkey (which has sold Ukraine drones and has much to fear from a resurgent Russia), would impress Mr. Putin more.


Beyond that, President Biden must do more to restore U.S. credibility than saying “America is back.” Mr. Putin believes the American polarization he has helped promote is so bitter that our foreign policy is doomed to be erratic, changing with every presidential election, and ineffective, because our domestic disputes leave little energy or political capital for foreign affairs. As tensions with Russia mounted, Mr. Biden flew to Atlanta to make the most divisive speech of his presidency, confirming Mr. Putin’s dismissive ideas about American paralysis at the worst possible time.

To defend peace abroad, President Biden needs to make some peace at home. Resistance to Russia unites both progressive and conservative senators. A bipartisan Senate delegation arrived in Kyiv over the weekend. The administration can and should develop a Russia policy with bipartisan support and put that unity prominently on display.

Mr. Biden then needs to use all the considerable tools at his disposal to educate the American people about the new and dangerous world we inhabit. The holiday from history is over. Between China and Russia, America faces adversaries as powerful and relentless as any we faced in the Cold War. It is President Biden’s mission to get this message across.

Finally, he needs to open an effective back channel to explore a way forward. Mr. Putin isn’t wrong that Washington and Moscow need a relationship that acknowledges Russia’s new power. Quiet conversations between senior people on both sides are likely to be more effective than official exchanges.

These steps can improve the odds of a better outcome in Ukraine, and position the U.S. better should deterrence fail, but the final decision is out of our hands. American policy makers should reread their George Kennan. His 1946 Long Telegram provides an analytical framework that explains why the U.S.-Russia relationship is so volatile, why attempted resets with Mr. Putin have failed, and how best to manage an important relationship that will never be easy

[Crafty_Dog]

second post


OPINION  BUSINESS WORLD
Don’t Bail Out Putin
His Ukraine gambit is ultimately about enlisting the West in a scheme to prop up his rule.

By Holman W. Jenkins, Jr.
Follow
Jan. 14, 2022 6:23 pm ET


Good things come to strong, successful nations. Neighbors crave closer ties. Allies don’t object to being part of a “sphere of influence.” Vladimir Putin has given his neighboring peoples only reasons to run away from him. They wouldn’t clamor for NATO membership if not for the kind of regime Mr. Putin operates.

All nations have geographical vulnerabilities on paper, including the U.S. with its long land border with Mexico and Canada. But they worry about these vulnerabilities only when they need to. If it were in Mr. Putin’s interest, he would be first to emphasize that Ukraine is incapable of posing a military threat to Russia, that no aggressive enemy—and certainly not NATO—has the means or will to use Ukraine to attack Russia. Ukraine has no desire to put itself in such a position.


Mr. Putin is playing a weak hand not cleverly but noisily. Strong leaders don’t make continual spectacles out of themselves. Mr. Putin is forcing the Biden administration to play his game over Ukraine because he needs the U.S. to deliver him something of importance to his regime—bluntly, to prop it up. He wants the U.S. to acquiesce in a Russian “sphere of influence” not for Russia’s military security, but to make Mr. Putin seem powerful and inevitable to Russians at home.


He has created an awkward situation for himself in Ukraine twice over. Ukraine’s rapidly consolidating military power could roll up the Russian separatists in the country’s east, administering a defeat Mr. Putin might find it hard to survive. But even dragged down by the sterile wasteland of a separatist enclave, Ukraine still is muddling toward liberalization and integration with the West, with living standards looking up, a development that also threatens Mr. Putin’s survival.


To this self-created crisis in the west, now add instability in Kazakhstan. Mr. Putin will continue to face such challenges along the ex-Soviet periphery, from citizens who tire of repression and stagnation, which Mr. Putin will try to control with cyber threats, energy threats, corruption of foreign elites (such as former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder ) and by recurrently threatening to embroil NATO in his problems.

And so a moment of realism arrives. As economist and Russian oppositionist Vladimir Milov told a Hudson Institute podcast, “This idea that we can somehow make a deal with Putin and avoid costs, no. Costs will be only greater if you [in the outside world] miss the action right now”—i.e., fail to understand the game Mr. Putin is playing

It would be better if Mr. Putin had not heard messages that the West always prefers Putinesque stability to short-term risk. For once the Munich lesson holds: There’s no stable solution to Mr. Putin’s problems that Western appeasement can provide. His regime is on course only for deeper repression and more military adverturism. Yes, with enough ceremonial atmospherics, the U.S. might reach a token agreement that Mr. Putin could use to claim victory for now, but he will need more such victories. He will need Ukraine to remain a failing state. He will ratchet up tensions with the U.S. superpower to keep his people accepting of a society run for oligarch billionaires while the population shrinks and drinks itself to one of the shortest life expectancies in the developed world.

Though appeasement might seem preferable to the Biden administration, not to mention the Germans, the U.S. needs to think about its long-term health in a world where despots see brandishing nuclear weapons and cyber threats as a way to extort forms of payola from outsiders to sustain themselves in power against their own people. Mr. Putin is not different from Kim Jong Un in this regard or the mullahs in Iran. Mr. Putin is right about one thing only: Russia has natural attributes that should make it an influential power, a magnet in its region. These pieces would quickly fall into place if not for the nature of Mr. Putin’s rule.


Nothing here guarantees that, without some U.S.-bestowed victory, Mr. Putin won’t launch a fresh invasion of Ukraine. This would be a tragedy for Ukrainians and also the least good option for Mr. Putin. The benefits would be short-lived, possibly nonexistent. It suits Mr. Putin to pretend that he’s living in the 1940s, that globalization is optional, military geography isn’t. But his regime is nothing without its considerable degree of integration with the global economy, which he knows he puts in danger every time he tries to solve his domestic problems at the expense of straining relations with the U.S.-led global community.

The U.S. and its allies have always had the strong hand, in the unlikely event they were willing to play it. If Russian tanks in Ukrainian streets are seen on Western TV screens, there’s no telling what the mood shift might allow.

[G M]

Now do the Monroe Doctrine.

second post


OPINION  BUSINESS WORLD
Don’t Bail Out Putin
His Ukraine gambit is ultimately about enlisting the West in a scheme to prop up his rule.

By Holman W. Jenkins, Jr.
Follow
Jan. 14, 2022 6:23 pm ET


Good things come to strong, successful nations. Neighbors crave closer ties. Allies don’t object to being part of a “sphere of influence.” Vladimir Putin has given his neighboring peoples only reasons to run away from him. They wouldn’t clamor for NATO membership if not for the kind of regime Mr. Putin operates.

All nations have geographical vulnerabilities on paper, including the U.S. with its long land border with Mexico and Canada. But they worry about these vulnerabilities only when they need to. If it were in Mr. Putin’s interest, he would be first to emphasize that Ukraine is incapable of posing a military threat to Russia, that no aggressive enemy—and certainly not NATO—has the means or will to use Ukraine to attack Russia. Ukraine has no desire to put itself in such a position.


Mr. Putin is playing a weak hand not cleverly but noisily. Strong leaders don’t make continual spectacles out of themselves. Mr. Putin is forcing the Biden administration to play his game over Ukraine because he needs the U.S. to deliver him something of importance to his regime—bluntly, to prop it up. He wants the U.S. to acquiesce in a Russian “sphere of influence” not for Russia’s military security, but to make Mr. Putin seem powerful and inevitable to Russians at home.


He has created an awkward situation for himself in Ukraine twice over. Ukraine’s rapidly consolidating military power could roll up the Russian separatists in the country’s east, administering a defeat Mr. Putin might find it hard to survive. But even dragged down by the sterile wasteland of a separatist enclave, Ukraine still is muddling toward liberalization and integration with the West, with living standards looking up, a development that also threatens Mr. Putin’s survival.


To this self-created crisis in the west, now add instability in Kazakhstan. Mr. Putin will continue to face such challenges along the ex-Soviet periphery, from citizens who tire of repression and stagnation, which Mr. Putin will try to control with cyber threats, energy threats, corruption of foreign elites (such as former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder ) and by recurrently threatening to embroil NATO in his problems.

And so a moment of realism arrives. As economist and Russian oppositionist Vladimir Milov told a Hudson Institute podcast, “This idea that we can somehow make a deal with Putin and avoid costs, no. Costs will be only greater if you [in the outside world] miss the action right now”—i.e., fail to understand the game Mr. Putin is playing

It would be better if Mr. Putin had not heard messages that the West always prefers Putinesque stability to short-term risk. For once the Munich lesson holds: There’s no stable solution to Mr. Putin’s problems that Western appeasement can provide. His regime is on course only for deeper repression and more military adverturism. Yes, with enough ceremonial atmospherics, the U.S. might reach a token agreement that Mr. Putin could use to claim victory for now, but he will need more such victories. He will need Ukraine to remain a failing state. He will ratchet up tensions with the U.S. superpower to keep his people accepting of a society run for oligarch billionaires while the population shrinks and drinks itself to one of the shortest life expectancies in the developed world.

Though appeasement might seem preferable to the Biden administration, not to mention the Germans, the U.S. needs to think about its long-term health in a world where despots see brandishing nuclear weapons and cyber threats as a way to extort forms of payola from outsiders to sustain themselves in power against their own people. Mr. Putin is not different from Kim Jong Un in this regard or the mullahs in Iran. Mr. Putin is right about one thing only: Russia has natural attributes that should make it an influential power, a magnet in its region. These pieces would quickly fall into place if not for the nature of Mr. Putin’s rule.


Nothing here guarantees that, without some U.S.-bestowed victory, Mr. Putin won’t launch a fresh invasion of Ukraine. This would be a tragedy for Ukrainians and also the least good option for Mr. Putin. The benefits would be short-lived, possibly nonexistent. It suits Mr. Putin to pretend that he’s living in the 1940s, that globalization is optional, military geography isn’t. But his regime is nothing without its considerable degree of integration with the global economy, which he knows he puts in danger every time he tries to solve his domestic problems at the expense of straining relations with the U.S.-led global community.

The U.S. and its allies have always had the strong hand, in the unlikely event they were willing to play it. If Russian tanks in Ukrainian streets are seen on Western TV screens, there’s no telling what the mood shift might allow.

[G M]

https://jrnyquist.blog/2022/01/18/will-russia-invade-ukraine/