Author Topic: Ukraine  (Read 151295 times)

G M

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #700 on: July 18, 2022, 09:04:42 PM »
Sorry, not taking that seriously.  Russki propaganda to the contrary, they wanted Kiev and failed.  Period.

Either way, the war is decided.

ya

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G M

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DougMacG

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Re: Ukraine- A must read!
« Reply #703 on: July 25, 2022, 08:50:26 AM »
https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/rickards-needless-death-and-misery

Rickards is right.


Key point from the article:
"A negotiated settlement that cedes Russian control over Crimea and the Russian-speaking parts of eastern Ukraine is probably the most realistic solution available to end the war."


If so, wouldn't it be better (for all parties) to get to that point sooner rather than later.

If this is a worthwhile US war effort, which US General was assigned to win it, what defines a win and how is that going?  When did Congress declare war and when will the President (if we had one) report to the American people on the war effort?

The purpose of American involvement, from my point of view, is to cede no expansion to the evil Putin-Russia.  That failed effort Nov 2020 and was made official on Jan 6, 2021.  Complete conjecture but everyone can see, this would not have happened under Trump or some other strong Republican President.

The turning points against the Soviet Union were the American election of 1980, the standoff in Reykjavik over missile defense, and the words spoken at the gate of the Berlin wall. 

To thwart Russia here, the Biden team and the Euros have used tactics without strategy.  We waste our arsenal, including status of the dollar, without a plan to win.  In doing so we make our enemy look like a genius.  Wait out the Americans, as learned in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan.

In Iraq, Gen Colin Powell said (wrongly), we break it, we fix it.  (We didn't break it; it was already broken.) Doesn't that mean Russia must rebuild Ukraine?  Maybe the UN Security Council can order that...

How is it that the UN "Security Council" has not condemned this hostile and criminal action by Russia?  The last 'sanction' available to the free world against Russia, remove their status as "permanent member" of the UN Security Council.  If that cannot be done, close down the group and re-form it in a true peace seeking form.  Candidate and President DeSantis can announce it, not one thin dime to this rogue, obsolete organization until it is reformed - with Russia getting the same status as Uganda, if that.
« Last Edit: July 25, 2022, 08:53:57 AM by DougMacG »

G M

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Re: Ukraine- A must read!
« Reply #704 on: July 25, 2022, 09:52:42 PM »
"If this is a worthwhile US war effort, which US General was assigned to win it, what defines a win and how is that going?"

Looking for a winning General in the US would be like looking for a virgin at a Vegas Stripper Convention. The last time the US really won a war, your dad was wearing a uniform.



https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/rickards-needless-death-and-misery

Rickards is right.


Key point from the article:
"A negotiated settlement that cedes Russian control over Crimea and the Russian-speaking parts of eastern Ukraine is probably the most realistic solution available to end the war."


If so, wouldn't it be better (for all parties) to get to that point sooner rather than later.

If this is a worthwhile US war effort, which US General was assigned to win it, what defines a win and how is that going?  When did Congress declare war and when will the President (if we had one) report to the American people on the war effort?

The purpose of American involvement, from my point of view, is to cede no expansion to the evil Putin-Russia.  That failed effort Nov 2020 and was made official on Jan 6, 2021.  Complete conjecture but everyone can see, this would not have happened under Trump or some other strong Republican President.

The turning points against the Soviet Union were the American election of 1980, the standoff in Reykjavik over missile defense, and the words spoken at the gate of the Berlin wall. 

To thwart Russia here, the Biden team and the Euros have used tactics without strategy.  We waste our arsenal, including status of the dollar, without a plan to win.  In doing so we make our enemy look like a genius.  Wait out the Americans, as learned in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan.

In Iraq, Gen Colin Powell said (wrongly), we break it, we fix it.  (We didn't break it; it was already broken.) Doesn't that mean Russia must rebuild Ukraine?  Maybe the UN Security Council can order that...

How is it that the UN "Security Council" has not condemned this hostile and criminal action by Russia?  The last 'sanction' available to the free world against Russia, remove their status as "permanent member" of the UN Security Council.  If that cannot be done, close down the group and re-form it in a true peace seeking form.  Candidate and President DeSantis can announce it, not one thin dime to this rogue, obsolete organization until it is reformed - with Russia getting the same status as Uganda, if that.

G M

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https://www.theamericanconservative.com/when-the-lies-come-home/

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS
When the Lies Come Home
After lying for months, the media are preparing the public for Ukraine’s military collapse.

shutterstock_2110835969-scaled-e1655401568466-700x443
(Bumble Dee/Shutterstock)
Douglas Macgregor
Jun 17, 2022
12:00 PM
Diogenes, one of the ancient world’s illustrious philosophers, believed that lies were the currency of politics, and those lies were the ones he sought to expose and debase. To make his point, Diogenes occasionally carried a lit lantern through the streets of Athens in the daylight. If asked why, Diogenes would say he was searching for an honest man.

Finding an honest man today in Washington, D.C., is equally challenging. Diogenes would need a Xenon Searchlight in each hand.

Still, there are brief moments of clarity inside the Washington establishment. Having lied prolifically for months to the American public about the origins and conduct of the war in Ukraine, the media are now preparing the American, British, and other Western publics for Ukraine’s military collapse. It is long overdue.

The Western media did everything in its power to give the Ukrainian defense the appearance of far greater strength than it really possessed. Careful observers noted that the same video clips of Russian tanks under attack were shown repeatedly. Local counterattacks were reported as though they were operational maneuvers.

Russian errors were exaggerated out of all proportion to their significance. Russian losses and the true extent of Ukraine’s own losses were distorted, fabricated, or simply ignored. But conditions on the battlefield changed little over time. Once Ukrainian forces immobilized themselves in static defensive positions inside urban areas and  the central Donbas, the Ukrainian position was hopeless. But this development was portrayed as failure by the Russians to gain “their objectives.”

Ground-combat forces that immobilize soldiers in prepared defenses will be identified, targeted, and destroyed from a distance. When persistent overhead intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, whether manned or unmanned, are linked to precision guided-strike weapons or modern artillery systems informed by accurate targeting data, “holding ground” is fatal to any ground force. This is all the more true in Ukraine, because it was apparent from the first action that Moscow focused on the destruction of Ukrainian forces, not on the occupation of cities or the capture of Ukrainian territory west of the Dnieper River.

The result has been the piecemeal annihilation of Ukrainian forces. Only the episodic infusion of U.S. and allied weapons kept Kiev’s battered legions in the field; legions that are now dying in great numbers thanks to Washington’s proxy war.

Kiev’s war with Moscow is lost. Ukrainian forces are being bled white. Trained replacements do not exist in sufficient numbers to influence the battle, and the situation grows more desperate by the hour. No amount of U.S. and allied military aid or assistance short of direct military intervention by U.S. and NATO ground forces can change this harsh reality.

The problem today is not ceding territory and population to Moscow in Eastern Ukraine that Moscow already controls. The future of the Kherson and Zaporozhye regions along with the Donbas is decided. Moscow is also likely to secure Kharkov and Odessa, two cities that are historically Russian and Russian-speaking, as well as the territory that adjoins them. These operations will extend the conflict through the summer. The problem now is how to stop the fighting.

Whether the fighting stops in the early fall will depend on two key factors. The first involves the leadership in Kiev. Will the Zelensky government consent to the Biden program for perpetual conflict with Russia?

If the Biden administration has its way, Kiev will continue to operate as a base for the buildup of new forces poised to threaten Moscow. In practice, this means Kiev must commit national suicide by exposing the Ukrainian heartland west of the Dnieper River to massive, devastating strikes by Russia’s long-range missile and rocket forces.

Of course, these developments are not inevitable. Berlin, Paris, Rome, Budapest, Bucharest, Sofia, Vilnius, Riga, Tallin, and, yes, even Warsaw, do not have to blindly follow Washington’s lead. Europeans, like most Americans, are already peering into the abyss of an all-encompassing economic downturn that Biden’s policies are creating at home. Unlike Americans who must cope with the consequences of Biden’s ill-conceived policies, European governments can opt out of Biden’s perpetual-war plan for Ukraine.

The second factor involves Washington itself. Having poured more than $60 billion or a little more than $18 billion a month in direct or indirect transfers into a Ukrainian state that is now crumbling, the important question is, what happens to millions of Ukrainians in the rest of the country that did not flee? And where will the funds come from to rebuild Ukraine’s shattered society in a developing global economic emergency?

When inflation costs the average American household an extra $460 per month to buy the same goods and services this year as they did last year, it is quite possible that Ukraine could sink quietly beneath the waves like the Titanic without evoking much concern in the American electorate. Experienced politicians know that the American span of attention to matters beyond America’s borders is so short that an admission of defeat in Ukraine would probably have little or no immediate consequences.

However, the effects of repeated strategic failures in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria are cumulative. In the 1980s, General Motors wanted to dictate the kind of automobiles Americans would buy, but American consumers had different ideas. That’s why G.M., which dominated the U.S. market for 77 years, lost its top spot to Toyota. Washington cannot dictate all outcomes, nor can Washington escape accountability for its profligate spending and having ruined American prosperity.

In November, Americans will go to the polls. The election itself will do more than test the integrity of the American electoral process. The election is also likely to ensure that Biden is remembered for his intransigence; his refusal to change course, like Herbert Hoover in 1932. Democrats will recall that their predecessors in the Democratic Party effectively ran against Hoover for more than a half century. Republicans may end up running against Joe Biden for the next 50 years.
« Last Edit: July 27, 2022, 01:43:50 PM by Crafty_Dog »

Crafty_Dog

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #706 on: July 27, 2022, 01:45:55 PM »
"European governments can opt out of Biden’s perpetual-war plan for Ukraine."

Is this true?  If the Ukes are abandoned/fall, does not Putin have plans to keep going?

"However, the effects of repeated strategic failures in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria are cumulative."

THIS!!! 

I would add our failure to do anything about the Chi-Coms taking Hong Kong and the Chi-Coms militarizing the South China Sea to the list with Taiwan to follow-- unless China's internal problems intervene.

All the preceding said, just as I do not take our Pentagon and our Pravdas at face value, nor do I simply accept assertions of impending collapse by the Ukes at face value.  We are thick in the fog of war.
« Last Edit: July 27, 2022, 01:51:44 PM by Crafty_Dog »

G M

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #707 on: July 27, 2022, 01:49:36 PM »
"European governments can opt out of Biden’s perpetual-war plan for Ukraine."

Is this true?  If the Ukes are abandoned/fall, does not Putin have plans to keep going?

Going where?

With what?

Crafty_Dog

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #708 on: July 27, 2022, 01:53:37 PM »
Moldavia - Transnitia for example.

And in that you say "With what?" does that not cut against the argument of this piece?

G M

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #709 on: July 27, 2022, 01:59:09 PM »
Moldavia - Transnitia for example.

And in that you say "With what?" does that not cut against the argument of this piece?

Putin does not have infinite financial or military resources. Just consolidating and holding his gains in Ukraine will require a lot of resources.

Putin will use oil and gas to bring western europe to kneel, not military power.

NATO is done.

Putin is far smarter than the dolts running the west into collapse.

Crafty_Dog

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #710 on: July 27, 2022, 04:41:14 PM »
He recharged after taking Chechnya, recharged after taking Ossetia, recharged after taking Crimea, recharged after taking Donbas, and will recharge again even with just what he has taken of Ukraine.   

Indeed, from what he has already taken of Ukraine in this bite, he already has A LOT more resources-- including those of the Black Sea of the relevant coastline.

If/when he takes Odesa, Ukraine is done.

Official statements have been made of Moldova/Transnitia next.

Observation:  The center of the justification for aiding Ukraine is the international law principle of territorial integrity of nations.  Given how things are going, Taiwan must be ill at ease.


G M

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #711 on: July 27, 2022, 05:13:59 PM »
He recharged after taking Chechnya, recharged after taking Ossetia, recharged after taking Crimea, recharged after taking Donbas, and will recharge again even with just what he has taken of Ukraine.   

Indeed, from what he has already taken of Ukraine in this bite, he already has A LOT more resources-- including those of the Black Sea of the relevant coastline.

If/when he takes Odesa, Ukraine is done.

Official statements have been made of Moldova/Transnitia next.

Observation:  The center of the justification for aiding Ukraine is the international law principle of territorial integrity of nations.  Given how things are going, Taiwan must be ill at ease.

Taiwan better be getting ready, as should Australia.

Crafty_Dog

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GPF: George Friedman: Strange Events and the Future of the War
« Reply #712 on: July 28, 2022, 09:15:47 PM »
July 26, 2022
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Strange Events and the Future of the Russo-Ukrainian War
By: George Friedman

Russia and Ukraine have signed an agreement to permit the shipping of grain through the Black Sea to world markets. A few hours after the agreement was signed in Turkey, Russia attacked the Black Sea port in Odesa. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has also fired his security chief to investigate allegations of treason and dismissed his chief prosecutor and other officials – all while a U.S. congresswoman asks President Joe Biden to investigate Zelenskyy’s chief of staff for his alleged ties to Russia. The war is becoming complex.

The decision to permit shipments of wheat makes sense for the rest of the world. Ukraine is the fifth-largest exporter of wheat, accounting for a little under 10 percent of global supply, and the Russian blockade drove the price of grain up dramatically. Whatever sense the agreement makes, though, it is unheard of for two nations engaged in war to reach formal agreements on the side. Stranger still is that though Russia benefits from the agreement too, it is far more beneficial for Ukraine, which not only receives more revenue but also gains a sense of security for its Black Sea ports. The attack on Odesa was no doubt meant to remind Ukraine that such agreements can be abandoned quickly, but the fact that it was reached to begin with is odd nonetheless.

Also startling is the firing of senior officials. Zelenskyy claimed that they were guilty of treason. General corruption is one thing, especially in the former Soviet Union. The invocation of treason is quite another. In some quarters of Kyiv, support for Russia is nothing new; Ukraine has more than its fair share of pro-Russia sympathizers. But if, say, the FSB had penetrated Ukrainian security – which is likely – then the weeks of speculation about their job security makes little sense. If senior officials are found to be compromised, their removal would be instant. Instead, Zelenskyy destabilized his government and unnerved his allies. (Of course, it could have been a foreign intelligence service that detected the breach, and Zelenskyy may have been reluctant until forced to act. As in all such matters, those who know don’t talk, and those who talk don’t know. What is clear is that this sort of matter in the course of war is not normal.)

Russians and Ukrainians sitting side by side can’t help but bring to mind the possibilities of a peace treaty. The firings in Kyiv seem to indicate a degree of instability and discord in Ukraine, creating the possibility, however remote, that new considerations are being made that could lead to some kind of larger deal.

The war has been raging for five months – six months if we count the noisy leadup. It has not gone as Russia hoped. Moscow’s initial offensive, a three-pronged attack on Kyiv, Odesa and Donetsk, failed for a variety of reasons: the limits of Russian logistics, the difficulty of coordinating an armored system at distance, and above all Ukrainian tactics and American weapons. The Ukrainians fought an infantry battle with a decentralized command structure and tactical mobility, and they did so with weapons such as Javelin missiles that were ideally suited for combatting the Russian army.

The Russians were forced to retreat to the east as they fought for the Donetsk region, a relatively small area along the Russian border in which Moscow already had a large presence. Moscow has been engaged there for five months, with mercifully short supply lines to Russia proper, and is now almost in control of the area. Even this highly vulnerable region predisposed to Russian victory took months to subdue. The experience there signals a long war in which Russia will struggle to project force over increasingly large areas of a country it does not really occupy.

Ukraine, meanwhile, may have had the luxury of resting and training its infantry to the west and north, but it cannot be sure of how it’ll fare against new Russian tactics. Kyiv has the advantage of American weaponry and intelligence, and in theory it has the capability to at least resist a Russian offensive even if it cannot launch a larger one of its own. This is why instability at the top of the Ukrainian command is a problem. It’s possible that Zelenskyy is simply cleaning house in preparation for a Russian offensive, but that doesn’t explain why he dragged his feet on the dismissals. Russia might strike sooner rather than later, but the unrest at the top is likely going to trickle down to lower levels. Officers linked to offenders may lose focus, or troops might lose confidence in the chain of command. It is one thing to fight a war based on unity of purpose. It is another thing to fight the war with the chain of command uncertain.

Though it’s unclear what exactly is happening in Kyiv, the Americans and the Russians are likely well informed. Assuming they didn’t force the firings for reasons unknown, the Americans will be pressing to contain the purge until a later date. The Russians, who certainly have assets in the Ukrainian government and military, will seek to destabilize.

Of course, there’s a chance that the firings were a minor event amounting to little more than domestic political machination. But that doesn’t seem likely. More likely is that the war has created tension and risk at the highest levels of authority. The immediate challenge for Ukraine is to contain the issue before it affects the army.

Both sides, then, would seem to have an interest in a negotiated settlement. The problem is that neither side can afford one. Russia’s objective was to make Russia, and Moscow in particular, secure against NATO (read: American) actions. So far, the distance to Moscow is where it was when the war started. Russia cannot accept a peace that does not move Russian control far to the west. Ukraine, and by extension the United States, might be interested in a stand-still. Russia can’t accept that without risking confidence in the government.

And it’s not a given that Ukraine would settle for it either. There is clearly dysfunction at the top. If Kyiv were to cede major portions of territory to Russia, things would get only more dysfunctional. For the West, moving the Russian border closer to Eastern Europe would not end the war; it would only create the pretext for the next. The closer Russia is to the western Ukrainian border, the more it must be assumed that Russia would choose to move farther still. True or not, it must be assumed.

As the risks mount for both sides, a settlement seems likely. The agreement on grain was obviously signed with some notion of what it could mean. The concept of a peace agreement is sound, but the geography of such an agreement, and the imperatives on both sides, seems to make this impossible. What is needed here is fear.

G M

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Ukraine is done
« Reply #713 on: July 31, 2022, 10:03:24 PM »

Crafty_Dog

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #714 on: August 01, 2022, 06:04:33 AM »
It is war.  Both sides are lying.

G M

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #715 on: August 01, 2022, 07:21:55 AM »
It is war.  Both sides are lying.

True. However, the Ukes are bled white from casualties and the land seized by Russia isn't in doubt.

Crafty_Dog

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #716 on: August 01, 2022, 12:16:04 PM »
Russia too.

G M

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Ukraine goes under the bus
« Reply #717 on: August 02, 2022, 05:59:06 PM »
https://ace.mu.nu/archives/400295.php

Shockingly, there is corruption in Ukraine!


Crafty_Dog

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Stratfor: Is time on Kyiv's side?
« Reply #719 on: August 03, 2022, 12:28:27 PM »
Bracing for a Protracted War in Ukraine, Part 1: Is Time on Kyiv's Side?
undefined and Stratfor Eurasia Analyst at RANE
Matthew Orr
Stratfor Eurasia Analyst at RANE, Stratfor
11 MIN READAug 2, 2022 | 21:23 GMT





Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stands in the town of Bucha, northwest of the Ukrainian capital Kyiv, on April 4, 2022.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stands in the town of Bucha, northwest of the Ukrainian capital Kyiv, on April 4, 2022.

(RONALDO SCHEMIDT/AFP via Getty Images)

Editor's Note: This assessment is the first of a two-part series that explores whether Ukraine or Russia is more capable of emerging victorious from a protracted war.

Since the start of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and particularly in the last several weeks, competing narratives have emerged regarding the future trajectory of the war. These debates are often framed as a question regarding time — namely, on whose side is time in the war?

The Prospect of a Protracted War
This question came to the fore in May as it became clear that the peace talks that began shortly after Russia launched its invasion in February had, unsurprisingly, ground to a halt. Today, a peace deal remains distant due to Russia's insistence that it maintains control over — and likely eventually annexes — the land corridor to Crimea. But Ukraine has refused to even discuss surrendering this territory as it would effectively enshrine Moscow's control of the banks of the Dnieper River, which is the economic and ideological backbone of the Ukrainian state.

Russia controlling even one of the banks at the mouth of the Dnieper River would permanently neuter Ukraine from a strategic standpoint by granting Moscow control over traffic on the river. Russia's presence on the river would, therefore, function similarly to the Russian troops positioned just miles from Georgia's capital of Tbilisi as a result of its 2008 war with Russia, which have contributed to Georgia's struggles to develop its economy and foster closer ties with Europe.

The Ukrainian government will thus resist any cease-fire (let alone a peace accord) that involves Ukraine de facto accepting the loss of this territory. Ukraine will therefore continue to reject Russia's likely unilateral attempts to offer an end of hostilities, instead planning to achieve a stronger negotiating position after building up Western weapons for eventual counteroffensive operations.

In Russia, the popularity of the increasingly costly war largely hinges on the eventual annexation of Ukrainian territories, which will likely also see the Kremlin maintain its strategy of constantly reminding the United States and Europe of the alleged existential nature of the conflict for Moscow. Russia will continue to demonstrate, including through nuclear blackmail, that it will always be ready to pay a higher cost than the West is willing (or, in Ukraine's case, able) to pay for in order to retain the territory Moscow has already seized during the war, while maintaining ambitions on as much of Ukraine as possible.
 
In Ukraine, political leaders continue to insist an end to the ''active phase'' of the war will come some time this winter. However, the inability of either side to achieve sufficiently favorable conditions to do so means the conflict is increasingly likely to extend into 2023 and beyond, as the war becomes a protracted stand-off with the possibility of acute flare-ups. Peace talks will probably eventually resume, but they are unlikely to yield much progress so long as Russia, Ukraine and the United States continue signaling that maintaining the war is sustainable and preferable to the painful concessions at the negotiating table.

The Argument That Time Is on Ukraine's Side
The argument that time favors Ukraine largely rests on its continued access to modern NATO weaponry (specifically artillery systems and ammunition, including precision-guided munitions) — drawing a contrast with Russia's logistical, supply and military equipment production challenges. Statements from Western officials like U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks — who on June 13 said the Pentagon was ''well-equipped'' to support Ukraine ''for five, 10, or 20 years into the future'' — support the notion that Ukraine will receive a steady supply of modern equipment in the long term. Russia, meanwhile, is increasingly economizing its use of precision munitions and certain systems amid doubts over its ability to replace them. A point could thus be made that the growing disparity in the two sides' weaponry will,eventually, enable Ukraine to not just hold the frontline, but conduct its own strategic counteroffensives.

This argument also points to Russia's manpower constraints. The fact that Moscow has repeatedly declined more extensive mobilization measures so far, when doing so would have been more beneficial the earlier they came, is strong evidence that the Kremlin is afraid to do so now or in the future because it could result in a drop in domestic support for the war. Russia is struggling to attract sufficient volunteers, many of whom are older and less fit for combat service. Ukraine, by contrast, is continuing to mobilize highly-motivated personnel who can be trained in the West. This means, over time, Russia will face force quality and availability issues that will put Russian soldiers' lives at risk during a Ukrainian counteroffensive.

Ukraine retaking Crimea or much of the Donbas is off the table for both military and political reasons. But if it retains its manpower and equipment advantage, the Ukrainian military could, so the argument goes, take back sufficient pieces of its territory to stop Russia from annexing or continuing to occupy some territory by making the political and economic costs of doing so unviable from Moscow. Indeed, Ukraine recovering or even just threatening a significant portion of the administrative borders of the Donbas region could throw a monkey wrench in Moscow's plans to annex the region or additional areas of Ukraine. This is because Russia is most likely to annex territory along easily defendable natural borders, such as the Dnieper River, or along administrative boundaries that will contribute to a veneer of legitimacy to Russia's actions. Denying Moscow full control over these administrative regions in a situation where it has not achieved its stated strategic goals could, over time, become politically untenable for Moscow. This, so it is hoped, could force Russia to eventually withdraw from some areas of Ukraine, easing the strain on Russia's military in what Moscow would call a ''goodwill gesture.''
 
Adding to the argument that time is on Ukraine's side are challenges to the Russian economy stemming from sanctions and the departure of Western companies. Despite years of funding ''import replacement'' programs, Russia's civilian and military production remains woefully reliant on imports of foreign (usually Western) equipment, most notably in technologically sensitive components and electronics. Russia may be able to withstand the fallout from Western sanctions through the rest of the year. But if sanctions remain in place in 2023 and beyond, the weakening of Russia's economy could reach a point where Moscow is forced to reduce its war aims due to military and civilian production shortfalls or subsequent political turmoil. Russia's ability to maintain budgetary stability could be severely undermined by an inability to paper over its economic challenges with oil sales. As Russia's breakeven price for oil production has likely gone up, a fall in oil prices could force Moscow to exhaust its foriegn currency reserves to make up the shortfall.

Another factor that could see time favor Ukraine is the Russian public's growing wariness of President Vladimir Putin's ongoing war. Domestic polling shows that, while Putin's popularity and support for his so-called ''special military operation'' in Ukraine spiked following the start of hostilities, both are now trending downward — and will likely continue to do so (albeit slowly) as the war drags on.

Versions of the above argument are of course popular in the West and in Ukraine. It is essential for Kyiv to spread this narrative because it – likely correctly — assesses that maintaining the public's attention and support in the West is contingent on the idea that Ukraine can not just survive the war, but ''win.'' Without this ''vision of victory,'' Western powers may be less inclined to keep providing material and financial support. The fact the Western support partially hinges on notions that Kyiv can ''win'' the war is well understood by Moscow, which will continue pushing the opposite narrative – that weapons deliveries will only lead to additional destruction among the Ukrainian army and people, while never allowing Ukraine to retake sufficient territory to change Moscow's position at the negotiating table.

The Caveats: Ukraine's Weak Position and Western Hesitance
It's true that Ukraine has been remarkably successful at preventing a vastly more powerful foe from taking control of even more of the country (especially given its poor preparations for a full-scale invasion). However, Russia's continued occupation of southeastern Ukraine and attacks on the rest of the country will make it hard for Ukrainians to take solace in this achievement. This is because true strategic Ukrainian victory would involve, at a minimum, Kyiv pushing Moscow's forces entirely out of the Kherson and Zaporizhzhya regions and thereby denying Russian access to the Dnieper River. In addition to Mariupol and the rest of the eastern Donbas region, the current lines would see Ukraine lose control over not only the river but strategic cities like Energodar (the site of Europe's largest nuclear power plant), Melitopol (an industrial center between the Donbas and Crimea) and Berdyansk (a major grain-exporting port on the Sea of Azov).

Western officials' rhetoric stressing that weapons are merely intended to help Ukraine's negotiating position, rather than achieve victory or defeat Russia, are intentionally ambiguous and reflect the grim reality that Ukraine faces a narrow military path for recapturing the territory it's lost since Russian troops began invading on Feb. 24, let alone Ukraine's internationally recognized borders. This strategic ambiguity will continue to dissuade Western officials from clearly defining the pace and limits of their support, as clearer commitments would admit to a definition of Ukrainian ''victory'' that is not one. This would provide information for Moscow to better pursue its own strategy, while severely demoralizing the Ukrainians. Instead, the West's approach involves draining Russian resolve and resources to continue the war over a long period, hoping this will lead to economic and political instability in Russia that will prompt Moscow to de-escalate.

The overall picture suggests that Western politicians are too concerned about the escalation with Russia and the political ramifications of war fatigue — both of which are poised to only grow as market disruptions brought on by the war further destabilize the global economy — to sufficiently supply Ukraine to achieve a victory. But war fatigue in Ukraine and the West was likely bound to increase with time, no matter the pace of support and weapons deliveries in the opening months of the war. Therefore, the West's policy of strategic ambiguity poses dangers for Ukraine because it belies the conditionality of Western support, and has put the onus on the Ukrainians to take risky action without sufficient support before Russian forces have time to fortify their positions. A premature attack would weaken the Ukrainians in a drawn-out conflict, and is therefore something Moscow is likely seeking to provoke.

Knowing that Ukraine's ability to conduct a counteroffensive now and in the future is entirely based on Western weapons supplies, Moscow does not need to break the will of the Ukrainians to keep fighting. Moscow needs only to break the will of the West to continue funding weapons deliveries and supporting Ukraine's civilian economy or eventual reconstruction, and to get the West to stop allowing its weapons to be used to attack its forces in the seized areas of Ukraine.

Reports that Moscow is preparing referendums as soon as September to justify subsequent annexation of the seized areas would align with that strategy. Given the administration of U.S. President Joe Biden's indication that one of its top priorities is preventing World War III, Moscow likely calculates that annexing seized areas and claiming they are under Russia's nuclear shield would help deter Ukrainian attacks on Russia using Western weapons. U.S. officials have said they are opposed to providing weapons that Ukraine ''could use to attack Russia'' — a logic that could be applied to a growing proportion of equipment at Kyiv's disposal. This would, of course, come with a major credibility risk for Moscow. But Russia's ability to blackmail the West (by, for example, raising its nuclear threat level) remains extensive, and would likely see more Europeans and Americans call for de-escalation. Russia's annexation plans serve as a wild card that could potentially most alter the future trajectory of the war, bringing new factors into play regarding each side's strategy.

In the second part of this series, we'll explore the argument that time may be on Russia's side in the war.

Crafty_Dog

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GPF: Russia's protracted war strategy
« Reply #720 on: August 03, 2022, 12:39:48 PM »
second

August 3, 2022
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Russia’s Protracted War in Ukraine
Moscow's war of attrition is meant simply to exhaust its enemies.
By: Ridvan Bari Urcosta

The war in Ukraine is raging with no end in sight. Neither Russia nor Ukraine is ready to sit at the negotiation table. Both claim that their goals are absolute and non-negotiable. With negotiations not an option, both are determined to exhaust the enemy’s resources, manpower and technological potential, and to finally “throw his adversary, and thus render him incapable of further resistance,” in the words of Clausewitz. In the meantime, Russia’s actions in Ukraine paint a clear picture of Moscow’s doctrinal thinking about warfare, and illustrate that Ukraine is only one part of Russia’s broader economic and geopolitical objectives.

The invasion of Ukraine marks the next stage in the global confrontation between East and West. The East, led by China and Russia, wants to revise the political-economic order, which has the U.S. at the center. The confrontation’s military expression, in Ukraine, could easily spill over into other parts of Eurasia. Neither side wants this, and perhaps a unique feature of this 21st-century confrontation will be its localization. There were many localized military confrontations between East and West during the Cold War, such as Vietnam and Afghanistan. So far, it is unclear who is benefiting more from the prolongation of the war in Ukraine. In fact, one could argue that all involved parties are losing; all are experiencing economic and other hardships that will only grow.

To understand the course of the war, it helps to understand the influences of contemporary Russian military doctrine. Russian doctrine begins with the Marxist theory of war, which teaches that war is a continuation of politics, a premise taken from Clausewitz. The mainstream Russian military school also inherited the dialectical vision of war, where any local war is part of the global geopolitical rivalry with “Western imperialism.” Russian doctrine is also influenced by the Maoist view, which pursues multiple fronts in the event of protracted wars. In practice, this means Russia (and the Soviet Union before it), as well as China, targets the so-called Third World as a means to undermine Western power.

Finally, it is now obvious that when Russia initiated the war, the Kremlin decided on the theory of permanent mobilization. This was developed by the Soviet military theoretician Alexander Svechin, who proposed that the state must avoid “over-mobilization,” which he defined as mobilization of all of society and the economy and which can set off political crisis or even revolution. Svechin suggested that the economic situation must be deeply assessed before and throughout the war. The economic rear should be secure and out of the enemy’s reach.

These perspectives help explain Russia’s economic and military approach to the Ukraine conflict. At the global level, Russia launched ideological, resource, energy and economic-financial wars against the West. The goal is to exhaust the West’s economic and financial potential, particularly the dominance of the U.S. dollar. Ukraine is one of the biggest countries in Europe in terms of population and territory, so it can easily absorb a massive amount of dollars. Russia hopes that the enormous burden of economic and military support for Ukraine will create divisions inside NATO and the European Union. On the battlefield, Russia has not given up its primary goal to occupy the Donbas region and other areas of "Novorossiya" in southern and eastern Ukraine. It continues its hidden mobilization campaign, and continues to threaten Kyiv and the rest of Ukraine.

Russia understood the war to be against the West from the beginning, but since more advanced Western weapons started arriving in Ukraine, particularly HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System), it’s become an inescapable reality. Effective rocket strikes on the Russian army’s rear, bridges and ammunition depots were a wake-up call. The Ukrainians surprised with their ability to grasp and incorporate new technologies into the war. Russia responded with a change of tactics and strategy. It is now avoiding closing the front or concentrations of ammunition depots and hardware. Further, it is seeking new ways to counter the HIMARS, for example by using the Buk-M3 and Pantsir anti-aircraft missile systems to attempt to intercept the rockets.

But the geopolitical and military realities are such that Russian officials must continue to prosecute the war because they have yet to achieve their goals. To stop the assault without taking Donbas would be political suicide, even for Putin. Disruptions to food supplies, migration patterns and energy markets are the only real leverage Russia has left.

Indeed, the situation will escalate in spite of the red lines issued by both sides. Russia wants to keep the conflict an indirect one with the West, and it wants the West to limit military support and weaponry that could, for example, threaten the Russian homeland or undermine Russian control of its own airspace. The West, and especially NATO, wants to keep the conflict from spilling into more sensitive regions such as the Baltics and Poland. So far, no one seems ready to give up the ghost despite heavy losses.

Red lines aren’t inviolable, of course, but they provide a sense of what it would take to kick off a much greater war, or even a nuclear exchange. So far, all sides, including Ukraine, are ready to continue apace. Russia hasn’t yet directly attacked Ukraine’s political and military centers, nor has it carpet bombed Ukrainian cities en masse. But the weaker the Russian army gets, the more tempting it will be for it to take more drastic actions. The West is still an important source of military assistance, but that assistance consists of older aircraft and other air-defense platforms. If it starts to send more sophisticated and cutting-edge technologies, it would alter the balance of power in the conflict and thus potentially draw the West and Russia into an escalated war. The West is not currently prepared to take this risk.

The Putin regime intends to survive, so it is more than willing to play the long game. Moscow sees the war in Ukraine as just the military front in an economic, political and diplomatic conflict with the West. At a recent economic forum in St. Petersburg, Putin even said that actions against Russia will only further aggravate divisions in the West, as evidenced by Russia's retaliation in the energy market.

Military theorist B. H. Liddell Hart said that “Grand strategy should both calculate and develop the economic resources and manpower of nations in order to sustain the fighting services.” Putin seems to have taken this to heart. Russia’s protracted war of attrition is meant to simply exhaust its enemies; making Ukraine a black hole that absorbs money and resources is central to this goal. For Russia to achieve its geopolitical objectives, it may only have to take its time.

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GPF: Transdniestria
« Reply #722 on: August 04, 2022, 04:31:28 PM »
More drills. Russian forces in Transdniestria, a separatist region in Moldova, conducted military exercises.


ccp

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where is all the money and weapons going in Ukraine?
« Reply #724 on: August 06, 2022, 08:08:18 AM »
"https://www.revolver.news/2022/08/even-cbs-news-asks-where-all-those-weapons-are-going/"

what a surprise

but this endless throwing away billions at problems

allows the next election candidate
to insist they are going to save money by going after Fraud Waste and Abuse

only to spend up the arse
so the next election candidate can scream the same crap

no reason to be disillusioned  :wink:

ccp

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PS more spending
« Reply #725 on: August 06, 2022, 08:55:56 AM »
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/exclusive-us-readies-new-1-billion-ukraine-weapons-package-2022-08-05/

how the hell do we need to spend more multiple times AFTER supplying them with 30 bill ?

is the US military in on the scams and want their cut

or is hunter in on the action ?

 :-o


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An optimistic take from "Foreign Affairs":

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russian-federation/upside-putins-delusions

Pretty easy to draw the opposite conclusion.  Russia got the land, port and control it wanted.  Xi is poised to do the same, while Russia can regroup and attack another neighbor next.

Same thinking as US Democrats.  Fixed pie, you only gain by taking from others with force, coercion or threat of same.  A magnitude or two of evil beyond covet.

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #732 on: August 17, 2022, 11:48:16 AM »
Could be.

G M

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #733 on: August 17, 2022, 11:59:36 AM »

Crafty_Dog

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #734 on: August 17, 2022, 12:41:41 PM »
Not a bet I would take!

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George Friedman: When Russia Prepared for the Inconceivable
« Reply #735 on: August 19, 2022, 06:27:50 AM »
ugust 19, 2022
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When Russia Prepared for the Inconceivable
Thoughts in and around geopolitics.
By: George Friedman

Many of our readers have challenged my idea that Russia invaded Ukraine out fear – fear that, deprived of the strategic depth Ukraine provides, Russia might be invaded and occupied. Rather than debate the moral implications of Russia’s decision to invade, I have argued that having Europe’s easternmost “border” less than 300 miles from Moscow was for Russian leaders unacceptable, and that the invasion was, rightly or wrongly, an act of premeditated self-defense.

The counter to this argument, of course, is that the war is based on a nonexistent threat. Ukraine was not in a position to invade Russia, and no potential enemy had any intention of invading Russia. How, then, could Moscow feel justifiably threatened?

It’s true that at the time of the invasion no one was threatening to attack Russia. But it’s also true that international relations are dynamic. The interests and powers of potential enemies may change over time, and the fact that a country is immune to attack right now doesn’t mean it is immune in perpetuity. As interests evolve, absurd fears can turn into dangerous realities. As balances of power shift, and as the unthinkable emerges, acting preemptively can become a national imperative. For Russia, ignoring the vulnerability of Moscow due to the short distance for a military drive from a now powerful Ukraine, equally afraid not of Russia’s current intent but its intent and power in the future, would have been irresponsible. I am American and I also have fears of a Russian victory that brings them to the border of NATO and forces us to assume the worst case and engage in a new Cold War. Neither fear is frivolous, even if it isn’t currently real. Anyone buying stocks is playing the future. Nations play for higher stakes, with each nation obsessed with its own fears, and both playing the future.

This is compounded by the nature of war. One of the rules of war promulgated by Clausewitz and universally acknowledged is the overriding advantage of surprise, particularly when initiating war with a powerful enemy. Surprise comes in three parts: the political goal of war, the vulnerability of the enemy, and the timing of the attack. The classic case of the surprise attack was Pearl Harbor. Japan had to secure the Western Pacific to import raw material that the U.S. had embargoed or sealed up. The Japanese understood they could not defeat the United States in a full-scale war but hoped to bring the U.S. to a negotiated settlement. That was the political goal. The attack on Pearl Harbor was intended to be psychologically stunning, and Japan had to initiate the war in order to generate American insecurity. U.S. officials assumed that if there was war it would start in the Philippines, astride Japan's trade routes. Therefore, the Japanese attacked a place the U.S. regarded as invulnerable, if only because of its sheer distance from Japan. The attack was a failure. It destroyed the Pacific fleet but did not force the United States to negotiate a settlement. Japanese fear crafted a desperate strategy that failed to understand that the loss for the U.S. of any part of the Pacific would open the door to invasion of the U.S. homeland, which, however it might have appeared, was too dangerous to risk. Japan drove into a war it could not win.

The attack on Pearl Harbor is instructive for a variety of reasons. First, an attack can come at any time and indeed will likely come in unexpected ways. Second, initiating a war without understanding the enemy’s imperatives can lead to disaster. Third, understanding an enemy’s military capabilities is essential.

For Russia, surprise is what they feared and what they achieved. The Russians did not anticipate a national imperative in Ukraine that created unity. And they did not understand the weapons that were being supplied to Ukraine and how those weapons would stymie the Russian advance. Russia fundamentally miscalculated Ukraine’s imperatives and thus failed to appreciate its military capability.

The argument I am making is that the Russian invasion of Ukraine flowed from its vulnerability in an uncertain future, as did the Ukrainian, European and American responses. If Russia isn’t doing this to defend itself, then it has merely done this because it is greedy or evil. Evil certainly exists in the world, but I have found that most people and nations do not on the whole regard themselves as evil. Nations tend to act militarily out of a fear that is not obvious to anyone else.

War yields the unexpected as well as a fear of the future. When there is too much of both, the results can be catastrophic.

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Crafty_Dog

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #737 on: August 21, 2022, 08:53:32 AM »

G M

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Ominous if true
« Reply #738 on: August 24, 2022, 09:16:45 AM »

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Return Crimea to Ukraine, Turkish President,
« Reply #740 on: August 25, 2022, 10:13:50 AM »
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/russia-ukraine-war/return-of-crimea-to-ukraine-a-requirement-of-international-law-turkish-president/2667680

Return of Crimea to Ukraine a requirement of international law: Turkish president
Ensuring safety, well-being of Crimean Tatars among Türkiye's priorities, Recep Tayyip Erdogan says
---------
(Doug)  Much stronger statement than Biden or NATO has made.


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WSJ: Ukes giving it a shot to take Kherson
« Reply #743 on: August 30, 2022, 07:04:28 PM »
MYKOLAIV, Ukraine—After a crescendo of long-range strikes on Russian military facilities and bridges in the dark of night early Monday, Ukrainian forces launched a southern offensive with attacks along the front lines.

Ukrainian armor crashed over the Inhulets River and established a bridgehead, the main gains that Kyiv has made in two days of fighting.

Whether Ukraine can capitalize on its initial thrust and retake territory in its south that Russia seized at the start of its invasion will go a long way to shape the next phase of the war.


Area controlled by Russia

UKRAINE

Mykolaiv

Inhulets River

Dnipro River

Kherson

UKRAINE

Area of detail

CRIMEA

Source: Institute for the Study of War and the American Enterprise Institute's Critical Threats Project (areas of control)
After repelling the Russians from the outskirts of Kyiv in the spring, Ukraine had been slowly losing ground in the east in the face of intensive shelling and airstrikes. But after all but halting the Russians there, Ukraine sought to cut off enemy forces on the western bank of the Dnipro River in the south by using precise, long-range rockets provided by the U.S. to strike bridges and military facilities.

Russia has indicated it wants to annex the lands it holds in Ukraine’s south and has sought to play down the Ukrainian assault.

Further Ukrainian gains would boost national morale and show the country’s military and financial backers in the West, who are facing a winter of economic troubles, that Ukraine’s military can halt the Russians and also take back territory.

“Not only would this be their first substantial offensive, it would be a demonstration to the West that they should continue supporting Ukraine to fully push the Russians out of their territory,” said retired Australian Army Maj. Gen. Mick Ryan.


A warning sign marks a minefield that surrounds a skate park in Mykolaiv, Ukraine.
PHOTO: JOSEPH SYWENKYJ FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
A Ukrainian advance would also be crucial for residents of occupied areas holding out hope that Ukraine will liberate their towns.

“I think the political dimensions of this offensive are as important as the military ones,” Gen. Ryan said.

Ukrainian officials have cautioned against excessive optimism. They say the offensive will be slow and grinding.

“This will be a tough fight for the Ukrainians,” said Gen. Ryan. “Offensive operations are hard to coordinate and support, compared to defensive operations.”

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has said he wants to retake Kherson, the only regional capital Russia captured since launching its invasion on Feb. 24. That would give Ukraine a gateway for attacks on Crimea, which Russia seized in 2014.

‘The political dimensions of this offensive are as important as the military ones’

— Retired Australian Army Maj. Gen. Mick Ryan
The southern offensive is the latest sign that Ukraine is seeking to seize the initiative. Ukrainian sabotage groups this month struck an air base and ammunition depot in Crimea, which acts as a rear base for Russian forces in the south of Ukraine. They were the first major strikes there and sent many Russians fleeing to the mainland while Ukrainians celebrated.

“Ukrainians can sense that momentum is shifting in their favor,” said retired Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, a former commander of the U.S. Army in Europe. “This will make it much more feasible for Ukraine’s supporters, as well as Ukrainians, to envision the recovery of Ukraine. It will continue to remove the idea that Russian victory is inevitable.”

Thousands of Russian troops on the western bank of the Dnipro River are now all but trapped, with Ukraine saying it had damaged bridges across the river sufficiently to prevent any heavy vehicles from crossing.

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“They haven’t been properly resupplied,” said Gen. Hodges. “Their chances of getting out of there are not good.”


Residents collect water on Tuesday in the southern Ukrainian city of Mykolaiv.
PHOTO: JOSEPH SYWENKYJ FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Ukraine is well aware of the importance of the offensive. The military has restricted access for reporters to the front lines and demanded that officials, media and semiofficial propagandists hold their tongues.

Ukrainian officials say little more than that things are going to plan. They have long said they don’t have sufficient armor and troops to mount a broad, overwhelming offensive.

Instead, they wanted to cut off the Russian troops from their supplies and now are seeking to destroy them piece by piece.


Andriy Zagorodnyuk, a former Ukrainian defense minister, played down the significance of Monday’s events, saying it is a continuation of operations that had been taking place for weeks.

“I can’t say that something has dramatically changed,” he said. “They are slowly pushing forward.”

Still, he said, “we’re destroying their capacity to hold territory.”

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A National Guard soldier manning a checkpoint south of Mykolaiv, some 10 miles from the front line, said Ukraine has been wary of launching ground offensives because of the size of Russia’s forces. He said strikes on Mykolaiv, long a target of Russian missiles, had stepped up in the past two days.

“They’re trying to get their revenge, wherever they can and against whomever they can,” he said.

Residents of Mykolaiv on Tuesday also noted a rise in the number of Russian rocket and artillery strikes since Ukraine’s counteroffensive was announced.

Natalia Kirtenko, a 64-year-old retiree, was gathering water at a public well south of the city center on Tuesday evening when explosions rang out in the distance.

She said the increase in attacks on Mykolaiv has given people hope that the battlefield balance will shift. “At least we know this means our guys are moving forward,” she said. “So our mood has improved.”

Crafty_Dog

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The cost of supporting Ukraine
« Reply #744 on: September 01, 2022, 01:54:29 AM »
The Ongoing Wealth Transfer to Ukraine
Aid to Ukraine has increased astronomically with no end in sight
Stu Cvrk
Stu Cvrk
 August 31, 2022


The Biden administration and its congressional allies continue to transfer U.S. wealth and treasure to Ukraine with no end in sight. This includes lethal aid in the form of weapon systems and nonlethal aid in generic categories such as refugee assistance, energy security, anti-corruption activities, and logistics support.

Let us examine the topic in greater detail.

As reported by Fox News, these are the Ukrainian aid numbers from 2001 to 2016:

2001-2008 (George W. Bush presidency): $1.1 billion.
2009-2016 (Barack Obama presidency): $2.1 billion.

All of that was nonlethal aid, with the Obama increase coming after the Ukraine election of 2010 and the Russian invasion and annexation of eastern Ukraine and Crimea in 2014. The $320 million in aid provided in 2014 is detailed by an Obama White House fact sheet in the following categories: economic stabilization, reform, and growth; security sector capacity building and reform; national unity, democracy, human rights, and media; anti-corruption initiatives; energy security; humanitarian assistance and early recovery; trade diversification and promotion.

Former President Donald Trump provided the first lethal aid from the United States. According to a report by the Council on Foreign Relations, “In March 2018, the State Department approved the sale of anti-tank weapons [Javelin missiles] to Ukraine, the first sale of lethal weaponry since the conflict began [in 2014].”

This was accomplished under the existing authority as part of the U.S. Department of Defense’s budget that includes funds for “Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO),” which have been funded at up to roughly $65 billion per year. A special part of the OCO funding, called the European Defense Initiative (EDI), focuses on reinforcing allies in Europe and deterring Russian aggression.

Included in the EDI was the $250 million that Congress authorized for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, which can be used to replace any “weapons or defensive articles” provided to Ukraine by the United States. (Note: Trump’s deliberations in providing these funds to Ukraine ended up being included in the Democrats’ articles of impeachment during the Ukraine hoax in 2019.)


Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February, the Biden administration has dramatically increased aid to the country—with no strings attached. In May, Congress approved an aid package to Ukraine in the amount of $40 billion. However, the Senate refused to include language proposed by Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.) that would have required the appointment of a special inspector general to oversee the distribution of the money to ensure accountability for U.S. taxpayers. This is problematic since Ukrainian corruption is endemic, as summarized by the Borgen Project.

As of Aug. 2, the Ukraine Support Tracker estimated that U.S. aid to Ukraine had reached $44.38 billion (€44.5 billion: €25.0 billion in military aid, €9.2 billion in humanitarian aid, €10.3 billion in financial aid). The second-largest donor listed is “EU institutions,” with €16 billion already committed. Of the countries, the United Kingdom is the second largest donor behind the U.S. government, having committed €6.5 billion.

The total support pledged by Western governments (including “EU institutions”) reached almost €84 billion. Of the military aid, the United States had delivered about $2.06 billion, with $8.63 billion remaining committed. Additional aid was recently approved by Congress, bringing total U.S. aid to Ukraine in 2022 to roughly $54 billion. (The more than $40 billion in additional aid to Ukraine approved by Congress on May 19 brings the total U.S. commitment during the Russian invasion to roughly $54 billion, when combined with the aid package passed in March.)

According to the Defense Department, U.S. military aid so far has come in the form of mortar ammunition, counter-artillery radars, unmanned aerial systems and support equipment, laser-guided rocket systems, as well as funding for training, maintenance, and sustainment. Around 40 percent of the aid is directed to these weapons transfers, medical and intelligence support to European allies, and to support the deployment of additional U.S. troops to Europe.


Assuming an annual interest rate of 3 percent compounded annually over 30 years, the €84 billion commitment will cost Western nations over €200 billion. The U.S. commitment alone ($54 billion) will cost U.S. taxpayers more than $130 billion over the same period.

To put things in perspective, Ukraine spent about $5.9 billion on its military annually before the war. The financial aid commitment from Western nations (€84 billion) to Ukraine is more than 14 times Ukraine’s entire annual military budget. The cost to Western nations (€200 billion) will be more than Ukraine’s entire GDP (€155 billion).

Consider that Europe is facing catastrophic energy problems as Russian gas and oil supplies are being manipulated by Moscow. For example, as reported by Bloomberg News, “Europe’s industrial heartland faces a potential exodus as manufacturers of German car parts, chemicals and steel struggle to absorb power prices that rocket to new highs almost every day.”

Never mind the effect on individual citizens who are facing 20 percent to 30 percent cuts in gas supplies over the coming winter. And yet, Western nations are committing €200 billion to Ukraine aid over the next several years!

For the United States, the $130 billion committed dwarfs the roughly $5 billion needed to complete the construction of the U.S.-Mexico wall in order to stop the ongoing flood of illegals into America (nearly 5 million since January 2021). Never mind the cost to cities and states in providing services to all of the illegals, such as public school education, subsidized housing, healthcare, as well as the security and safety investments needed to combat the increased crime. The Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) estimated those annual costs to be $116 billion in 2017, and that was before the 5 million let in by the Biden administration over the past two years!

The bottom line: This is the biggest wealth transfer since COVID-19, which resulted in nearly $4 trillion transferred from the middle class to the ruling class in 2020 alone, as discussed here and here. Let the U.S. political class make personal investments in Ukraine if they so choose, but leave U.S. taxpayers out of it, as we have other priorities–such as covering the staggering costs of inflation.

Views expressed in this article are the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.

G M

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #746 on: September 04, 2022, 08:58:55 AM »
Frankly, that reads like Russian propaganda.

G M

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #747 on: September 04, 2022, 09:02:10 AM »
Frankly, that reads like Russian propaganda.

The author has been correct in his assessments from the start of the Uke war.

What of this sounds like propaganda to you?

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Winter War and Ethnic/Spiritual divide
« Reply #748 on: September 05, 2022, 07:20:36 AM »
https://twitter.com/abcnews/status/1543308190598643712 - Come what may, this winter will be the make it or break it time.

I've maintained since the war began (having followed the last 8 years of war between the Russian Separtist groups and the Ukranian Nationalists) that Russia wants the land they are currently garrisoning and not much else.

Looking at maps of language and religion, we see the currently occupied areas predominantly speak Russian and (more telling) are under spiritual authority by the Russian Church. There was a schism in the church recently which started the Ukranian Orthodox Church.

All that said, I believe highly that the initial attack on Kiev was a distraction while they took the current areas and began to entrench/fortify them. Ukraine has attempted to fire behind the enemy lines/work some assassinations etc to try and provoke an attack from these areas. The longer they're there, the more entrenched they become. After the Kherson offensive, we see how deep these defenses are becoming.

This winter, will be economically unsustainable for most Europeans. They will either not pay, pay and lose everything or the government will have to take on trillions in new debts to float the costs. 22 million refugee/migrants/and Islamic militants will be fighting for resources with the citizens of each country. I've noticed and seen this quite a bit. Once the cost of something becomes "I'm cold, I'm hungry, my kids are hungry" the pool of empathy and care many have is gone. This war will be done by the end of winter imo because of this. Which given everything, I'm glad since it will be the least bloody and save the most civilian lives.

The politics after though are going to be insane. We might heat back up once people recover in a year or two.


- - -

Maps! :

>Language map: https://andthewordsbecamebooks.files.wordpress.com/2015/09/imrs.jpg

>Religious map: https://billtammeus.typepad.com/.a/6a00d834515f9b69e20240a4eb435c200b-popup (this is an interesting one, notice which regions where switched from Moscow/Russian authority to Ukranian)

>Updating Geo Map w/ Videos (this one shows propaganda from various sides at times). That said it does also show some of the tactics being used in modern war including a mix of WW2 era weapons (like the rocket trucks): https://geoworld.space/ukraine/
« Last Edit: September 05, 2022, 08:33:17 AM by Valerick »

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Re: Winter War and Ethnic/Spiritual divide
« Reply #749 on: September 05, 2022, 07:30:12 AM »
I think there will be a level of suffering and violence experienced this winter that hasn't been possible since WWII.


https://twitter.com/abcnews/status/1543308190598643712 - Come what may, this winter will be the make it or break it time.

I've maintained since the war began (having followed the last 8 years of war between the Russian Separtist groups and the Ukranian Nationalists) that Russia wants the land they are currently garrisoning and not much else.

Looking at maps of language and religion, we see the currently occupied areas predominantly speak Russian and (more telling) are under spiritual authority by the Russian Church. There was a schism in the church recently which started the Ukranian Orthodox Church.

All that said, I believe highly that the initial attack on Kiev was a distraction while they took the current areas and began to entrench/fortify them. Ukraine has attempted to fire behind the enemy lines/work some assassinations etc to try and provoke an attack from these areas. The longer they're there, the more entrenched they become. After the Kherson offensive, we see how deep these defenses are becoming.

This winter, will be economically unsustainable for most Europeans. They will either not pay, pay and lose everything or the government will have to take on trillions in new debts to float the costs. 22 million refugee/migrants/and Islamic militants will be fighting for resources with the citizens of each country. I've noticed and seen this quite a bit. Once the cost of something becomes "I'm cold, I'm hungry, my kids are hungry" the pool of empathy and care many have is gone. This war will be done by the end of winter imo because of this. Which given everything, I'm glad since it will be the least bloody and save the most civilian lives.

The politics after though are going to be insane. We might heat back up once people recover in a year or two.


- - -

Maps! :

>Language map: https://andthewordsbecamebooks.files.wordpress.com/2015/09/imrs.jpg

>Religious map: https://billtammeus.typepad.com/.a/6a00d834515f9b69e20240a4eb435c200b-popup (this is an interesting one, notice which regions where switched from Moscow/Russian authority to Ukranian)

>Updating Geo Map w/ Videos: https://geoworld.space/ukraine/