Author Topic: Ukraine  (Read 147371 times)

G M

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #852 on: September 26, 2022, 09:26:31 AM »
Here is the completely opposed POV.

This piece comes to me with high praise from someone highly qualified and seriously experienced:

===================

Open in browser
Ukraine Can Win This War
The experts said Ukraine was was ill-prepared, ill-equipped, and Russia’s military was simply too powerful. They were wrong.
Liam Collins and John Spencer
Sep 26
 
▷  LISTEN
SAVE
 
Ukrainian soldiers ride in an armored tank in the town of Izium, recently liberated by Ukrainian Armed Forces, in the Kharkiv region. (Oleksii Chumachenko/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images)
When Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the conventional wisdom among military experts was that it would all be over for Ukraine in a matter of weeks. Here was Russia, one of the world’s ostensible superpowers, its military five times the size of Ukraine’s, and with nuclear weapons to boot.  At the start of the conflict, Russia maintained an advantage of nearly ten-to-one in defense spending and weapons systems. Ukraine, they said, was ill-prepared, ill-equipped, and Russia’s military was simply too powerful.

It hasn’t turned out that way.

Since Ukraine’s counteroffensive began nearly three weeks ago, the country has reclaimed more than 3,400 square miles. By contrast, Russia’s offensive in the east gained only 2,000 square miles in the past five months. Ukraine continues its advance via a successful offensive in the Kharkiv region (in which they launched a massive surprise counterattack to overwhelm unprepared and unmotivated Russian forces) and through its ongoing success in the Kherson region (where Ukrainian forces have basically encircled and cut off up to 20,000 Russians).

Then there is the panic in Moscow. Days ago, Putin announced the mobilization of 300,000 Russian reservists while also threatening nuclear war. The draft—Russia’s first since World War II—will force thousands of Russians who had previously served to report for duty, receive two weeks of refresher training, and immediately deploy into Ukraine. Russian conscripts' time of service has been extended indefinitely, meaning they will not be able to leave the fighting when their time is up. It’s hard to conceive of how much lower the morale of Russian troops can get.

All of this indicates that Putin is deeply concerned about Ukraine’s ability to win this war. He is right to be.

It has now been seven months since the war began, and signs from Ukraine and Russia indicate quite the opposite outcome that most experts predicted. So, how did all this happen? 

Success in warfighting is a function of much more than the size of a nation’s military. It is also a function of strategy, allyship, doctrine, culture, and the will to fight, among many other factors. And Ukraine—not Russia—holds the advantage in every category except for military size.

Let’s take each in turn.

Strategy

Since Ukraine’s victory in preventing Russia from decapitating the capital city of Kyiv in April 2022, Russia’s strategy in eastern Ukraine can best be described as a war of attrition. Russia massed its combat power and conducted large artillery barrages. These battles were temporarily effective, as Russia was able to make incremental gains in the Donbas. But it came at great cost: Russia expended massive amounts of ammunition and soldiers to make those small gains.

By August, the Pentagon estimated that as many as 80,000 Russian soldiers had been killed or wounded. They lost thousands of tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery pieces, and have expended or lost tons of ammunition and supplies. They also lost at least a dozen generals and countless lower-level leaders. It will take Russia decades to train, educate, and ultimately replace these people. For Russia’s officer-centric military, these losses are particularly devastating as it greatly impacts their ability to mobilize a coherent fighting formation on the battlefield today. Military analysts were also surprised at the health and order of Russian equipment and positions—many resembled homeless encampments more than military outposts.

Ukraine had a very different strategy.

Over the past several months, Ukraine—being a much smaller military—wisely decided to surrender some territory in the East, pulling back to more defensible positions so that it could maintain the necessary combat power to fight another day. That day came on August 29, when Ukraine launched its massive counteroffensive. This offensive has been successful because Ukraine has a superior military by every measure other than quantity. As the war has progressed, Ukraine has also been able to replace worn down arms and ammunition, while at the same time acquiring new ones thanks to its relationship with the U.S. and other key allies.

Allyship

Western aid has been critical to Ukraine’s successful counteroffensive. They’ve been able to strike Russian ammunition depots, command and control centers, and supply lines thanks to weapons provided by the U.S., the U.K., Poland, and others. These weapons include HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems), counter artillery and missile radars, HARM (high-speed anti-radiation missiles) air-to-surface missiles, and other superior long-range weapons.

Western aid has not just been about weapons. It has also included battlefieldintelligence, planning assistance, and training for thousands of Ukrainian soldiers outside of the country. The Ukrainians have put that aid and know-how to work to immediate effect on the battlefield.   

NATO Doctrine

Just as critical to Ukraine’s success was the decision nearly eight years ago to have a professional force designed and trained so it could defend itself from Russian aggression. In 2016, Ukraine committed itself to building a modern military capable of meeting NATO standards. With the help of hundreds of Western trainers and advisers, Ukraine built an army that could execute maneuver warfare involving large-scale combined arms operations by the start of the most recent invasion. One of us was among them, and we were deeply impressed by their commitment to make such difficult reforms.

While Ukraine was adopting a NATO force and doctrine, Russia doubled down on their Soviet-era approach—a doctrine that relies on officer-centric orders and rigid, artillery-dependent formations. As Ukraine built a smaller, more nimble military, Russia continued to adhere to the outdated idea of amassing firepower and armor to overwhelm a stationary force.

Culture

In 2014, Ukraine’s military culture was much like Russia’s today: a highly centralized command structure where all decisions flow to the top. Risk-taking and battlefield initiative were not part of its military culture. But Ukraine learned through its experience in the Donbas in 2014—when Russia overwhelmed defending Ukrainian forces to take control of most of eastern Ukraine—that initiative was required when initial battlefield orders no longer fit the changing situation. Now, when the unexpected happens on the battlefield, lieutenants and captains are free to act immediately rather than having to seek permission and receive it after it is too late.

The second important component for Ukraine’s success is a national culture of military volunteerism. Russia’s active military may have been five times that of Ukraine at the start of the conflict, but few anticipated how significant a role volunteers would play in the defense of Kyiv. Tens of thousands of Ukrainian citizens who were civilians on February 23—the day before Russia invaded—went to recruiting stations on February 24, or simply used their own arms to support the war effort. The Territorial Defense Force now numbers in the hundreds of thousands, and these volunteers have allowed Ukraine to commit most of its active duty military to the current counteroffensive.   

Will to Fight

When the U.S. offered to evacuate him at the start of the conflict, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is famous for responding, “I need ammunition, not a ride.” The sentiment is common to many Ukrainians. Despite facing what was ranked as the second most powerful military in the world, ordinary Ukrainian men and women have demonstrated a strong will to fight for their country.

There is no greater test of a soldier or a people than war. The story of the Ukrainian people’s heroism is too rich to truncate here, but we are thinking of how thousands of civilians took up arms in February and March 2022, blocked streets, destroyed convoys, blew up bridges, and flooded rivers to prevent the fall of Ukraine’s capital. Or how just a few thousand men and women fought and held down 20,000 Russians for over 80 days in the city of Mariupol, ultimately withdrawing into their own version of an Alamo in the underground tunnels of a steel plant.

The most important difference between a Ukrainian soldier and a Russian one is their determination. Ukrainians prove every day that they are fighting for their freedom, families, and nation. By contrast, Russian soldiers have demonstrated their lack of motivation by refusing to fight, abandoning their positions when in danger, and attacking their leaders.

Despite Ukraine’s recent success, it’s important to remember that wars ebb and flow, and this war has been no different. Ukraine may be able to retake Kherson, but its current counteroffensive is not going to expel Russian forces everywhere. Ukraine’s military will eventually exhaust its capacity to continue this massive counterattack, and the larger Russian military will regroup and establish more effective defensive positions.

Nonetheless, the success of this counteroffensive provides a roadmap for Ukrainian forces: holding where they need to, slowly retreating where they must, and quickly counterattacking when the conditions are right. The ongoing offensive has demonstrated that Ukraine has a superior military that can overwhelm and defeat Russian forces, at scale, when they can achieve more favorable conditions. It has also provided a window into Russia’s military status: Russia cannot sustain their losses in this war.

If the West continues its level of aid and support, while Ukraine continues to build military capability and execute a superior war plan, the path to victory is clear. Under those conditions, it's only a matter of when—not if—Ukraine will win this war.

About the authors:

Liam Collins is the executive director of the Madison Policy Forum. He served as a defense advisor to Ukraine from 2016-2018 and is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces colonel with deployments to Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, the Horn of Africa, and South America. He is co-author of the forthcoming bookUnderstanding Urban Warfare.

John Spencer is the chair of urban warfare studies at the Madison Policy Forum. He served 25 years as a U.S. Army infantryman, which included two combat tours in Iraq. He is the author of the book Connected Soldiers: Life, Leadership, and Social Connection in Modern War and co-author, with Liam Collins, of Understanding Urban Warfare.

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G M

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #853 on: September 26, 2022, 10:32:59 AM »
I seriously respect these gentlemen, but since WW II, the US military has demonstrated that despite its ability to win battles, it cannot win wars.

Here is the completely opposed POV.

This piece comes to me with high praise from someone highly qualified and seriously experienced:

===================

Open in browser
Ukraine Can Win This War
The experts said Ukraine was was ill-prepared, ill-equipped, and Russia’s military was simply too powerful. They were wrong.
Liam Collins and John Spencer
Sep 26
 
▷  LISTEN
SAVE
 
Ukrainian soldiers ride in an armored tank in the town of Izium, recently liberated by Ukrainian Armed Forces, in the Kharkiv region. (Oleksii Chumachenko/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images)
When Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the conventional wisdom among military experts was that it would all be over for Ukraine in a matter of weeks. Here was Russia, one of the world’s ostensible superpowers, its military five times the size of Ukraine’s, and with nuclear weapons to boot.  At the start of the conflict, Russia maintained an advantage of nearly ten-to-one in defense spending and weapons systems. Ukraine, they said, was ill-prepared, ill-equipped, and Russia’s military was simply too powerful.

It hasn’t turned out that way.

Since Ukraine’s counteroffensive began nearly three weeks ago, the country has reclaimed more than 3,400 square miles. By contrast, Russia’s offensive in the east gained only 2,000 square miles in the past five months. Ukraine continues its advance via a successful offensive in the Kharkiv region (in which they launched a massive surprise counterattack to overwhelm unprepared and unmotivated Russian forces) and through its ongoing success in the Kherson region (where Ukrainian forces have basically encircled and cut off up to 20,000 Russians).

Then there is the panic in Moscow. Days ago, Putin announced the mobilization of 300,000 Russian reservists while also threatening nuclear war. The draft—Russia’s first since World War II—will force thousands of Russians who had previously served to report for duty, receive two weeks of refresher training, and immediately deploy into Ukraine. Russian conscripts' time of service has been extended indefinitely, meaning they will not be able to leave the fighting when their time is up. It’s hard to conceive of how much lower the morale of Russian troops can get.

All of this indicates that Putin is deeply concerned about Ukraine’s ability to win this war. He is right to be.

It has now been seven months since the war began, and signs from Ukraine and Russia indicate quite the opposite outcome that most experts predicted. So, how did all this happen? 

Success in warfighting is a function of much more than the size of a nation’s military. It is also a function of strategy, allyship, doctrine, culture, and the will to fight, among many other factors. And Ukraine—not Russia—holds the advantage in every category except for military size.

Let’s take each in turn.

Strategy

Since Ukraine’s victory in preventing Russia from decapitating the capital city of Kyiv in April 2022, Russia’s strategy in eastern Ukraine can best be described as a war of attrition. Russia massed its combat power and conducted large artillery barrages. These battles were temporarily effective, as Russia was able to make incremental gains in the Donbas. But it came at great cost: Russia expended massive amounts of ammunition and soldiers to make those small gains.

By August, the Pentagon estimated that as many as 80,000 Russian soldiers had been killed or wounded. They lost thousands of tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery pieces, and have expended or lost tons of ammunition and supplies. They also lost at least a dozen generals and countless lower-level leaders. It will take Russia decades to train, educate, and ultimately replace these people. For Russia’s officer-centric military, these losses are particularly devastating as it greatly impacts their ability to mobilize a coherent fighting formation on the battlefield today. Military analysts were also surprised at the health and order of Russian equipment and positions—many resembled homeless encampments more than military outposts.

Ukraine had a very different strategy.

Over the past several months, Ukraine—being a much smaller military—wisely decided to surrender some territory in the East, pulling back to more defensible positions so that it could maintain the necessary combat power to fight another day. That day came on August 29, when Ukraine launched its massive counteroffensive. This offensive has been successful because Ukraine has a superior military by every measure other than quantity. As the war has progressed, Ukraine has also been able to replace worn down arms and ammunition, while at the same time acquiring new ones thanks to its relationship with the U.S. and other key allies.

Allyship

Western aid has been critical to Ukraine’s successful counteroffensive. They’ve been able to strike Russian ammunition depots, command and control centers, and supply lines thanks to weapons provided by the U.S., the U.K., Poland, and others. These weapons include HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems), counter artillery and missile radars, HARM (high-speed anti-radiation missiles) air-to-surface missiles, and other superior long-range weapons.

Western aid has not just been about weapons. It has also included battlefieldintelligence, planning assistance, and training for thousands of Ukrainian soldiers outside of the country. The Ukrainians have put that aid and know-how to work to immediate effect on the battlefield.   

NATO Doctrine

Just as critical to Ukraine’s success was the decision nearly eight years ago to have a professional force designed and trained so it could defend itself from Russian aggression. In 2016, Ukraine committed itself to building a modern military capable of meeting NATO standards. With the help of hundreds of Western trainers and advisers, Ukraine built an army that could execute maneuver warfare involving large-scale combined arms operations by the start of the most recent invasion. One of us was among them, and we were deeply impressed by their commitment to make such difficult reforms.

While Ukraine was adopting a NATO force and doctrine, Russia doubled down on their Soviet-era approach—a doctrine that relies on officer-centric orders and rigid, artillery-dependent formations. As Ukraine built a smaller, more nimble military, Russia continued to adhere to the outdated idea of amassing firepower and armor to overwhelm a stationary force.

Culture

In 2014, Ukraine’s military culture was much like Russia’s today: a highly centralized command structure where all decisions flow to the top. Risk-taking and battlefield initiative were not part of its military culture. But Ukraine learned through its experience in the Donbas in 2014—when Russia overwhelmed defending Ukrainian forces to take control of most of eastern Ukraine—that initiative was required when initial battlefield orders no longer fit the changing situation. Now, when the unexpected happens on the battlefield, lieutenants and captains are free to act immediately rather than having to seek permission and receive it after it is too late.

The second important component for Ukraine’s success is a national culture of military volunteerism. Russia’s active military may have been five times that of Ukraine at the start of the conflict, but few anticipated how significant a role volunteers would play in the defense of Kyiv. Tens of thousands of Ukrainian citizens who were civilians on February 23—the day before Russia invaded—went to recruiting stations on February 24, or simply used their own arms to support the war effort. The Territorial Defense Force now numbers in the hundreds of thousands, and these volunteers have allowed Ukraine to commit most of its active duty military to the current counteroffensive.   

Will to Fight

When the U.S. offered to evacuate him at the start of the conflict, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is famous for responding, “I need ammunition, not a ride.” The sentiment is common to many Ukrainians. Despite facing what was ranked as the second most powerful military in the world, ordinary Ukrainian men and women have demonstrated a strong will to fight for their country.

There is no greater test of a soldier or a people than war. The story of the Ukrainian people’s heroism is too rich to truncate here, but we are thinking of how thousands of civilians took up arms in February and March 2022, blocked streets, destroyed convoys, blew up bridges, and flooded rivers to prevent the fall of Ukraine’s capital. Or how just a few thousand men and women fought and held down 20,000 Russians for over 80 days in the city of Mariupol, ultimately withdrawing into their own version of an Alamo in the underground tunnels of a steel plant.

The most important difference between a Ukrainian soldier and a Russian one is their determination. Ukrainians prove every day that they are fighting for their freedom, families, and nation. By contrast, Russian soldiers have demonstrated their lack of motivation by refusing to fight, abandoning their positions when in danger, and attacking their leaders.

Despite Ukraine’s recent success, it’s important to remember that wars ebb and flow, and this war has been no different. Ukraine may be able to retake Kherson, but its current counteroffensive is not going to expel Russian forces everywhere. Ukraine’s military will eventually exhaust its capacity to continue this massive counterattack, and the larger Russian military will regroup and establish more effective defensive positions.

Nonetheless, the success of this counteroffensive provides a roadmap for Ukrainian forces: holding where they need to, slowly retreating where they must, and quickly counterattacking when the conditions are right. The ongoing offensive has demonstrated that Ukraine has a superior military that can overwhelm and defeat Russian forces, at scale, when they can achieve more favorable conditions. It has also provided a window into Russia’s military status: Russia cannot sustain their losses in this war.

If the West continues its level of aid and support, while Ukraine continues to build military capability and execute a superior war plan, the path to victory is clear. Under those conditions, it's only a matter of when—not if—Ukraine will win this war.

About the authors:

Liam Collins is the executive director of the Madison Policy Forum. He served as a defense advisor to Ukraine from 2016-2018 and is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces colonel with deployments to Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, the Horn of Africa, and South America. He is co-author of the forthcoming bookUnderstanding Urban Warfare.

John Spencer is the chair of urban warfare studies at the Madison Policy Forum. He served 25 years as a U.S. Army infantryman, which included two combat tours in Iraq. He is the author of the book Connected Soldiers: Life, Leadership, and Social Connection in Modern War and co-author, with Liam Collins, of Understanding Urban Warfare.

If you appreciated this piece and the work that we do every day at Common Sense, please subscribe:

Crafty_Dog

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #854 on: September 26, 2022, 11:59:50 AM »
1) Were the various absences of victory the fault of the military or the civilian leadership?

2) Here, it aint the US military that is fighting overseas.  It is the Ukes fighting in and for their homeland against an enemy they know well.

G M

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #855 on: September 26, 2022, 12:35:50 PM »
1) Were the various absences of victory the fault of the military or the civilian leadership?

2) Here, it aint the US military that is fighting overseas.  It is the Ukes fighting in and for their homeland against an enemy they know well.

1. Irrelevant. A loss is a loss. We spent 20 years and how much money training and equipping our Afghan allies and when the money and equipment spigot got turned off, they collapsed faster than a Chinese made lawn chair.

2. Again, our Afghan allies had all the motivation in the world not to lose to the Taliban, but they sure did.

Pets.com wasn’t just a bad business model, it’s a bad way to fight wars. Yet, this is how we do it.

We plan on bleeding Russia, but who is bleeding faster?

Crafty_Dog

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #856 on: September 26, 2022, 03:43:00 PM »
Your words placed blame squarely on our military.

"(T)he US military has demonstrated that despite its ability to win battles, it cannot win wars."

Fair of me to ask whether the blame was always theirs or sometimes it belonged to the civilian leadership.


G M

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #857 on: September 26, 2022, 04:22:52 PM »
Your words placed blame squarely on our military.

"(T)he US military has demonstrated that despite its ability to win battles, it cannot win wars."

Fair of me to ask whether the blame was always theirs or sometimes it belonged to the civilian leadership.

There is serious rot within the U.S. military, especially at the top. It’s the core of the problem. It’s the guys at the tip of the spear that suffer the most because of it.

ccp

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #858 on: September 26, 2022, 04:58:37 PM »
"(T)he US military has demonstrated that despite its ability to win battles, it cannot win wars."

we win only open battlefield wars

not wars against guerrillas etc

while we are trying to keep civilian casualties down
etc.

what good is all our might if we can't simply blow up the enemy to smitherenes
for political reasons

why could we not wipe out the Taliban ? did we try ?


G M

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #859 on: September 26, 2022, 06:22:45 PM »
"(T)he US military has demonstrated that despite its ability to win battles, it cannot win wars."

we win only open battlefield wars

not wars against guerrillas etc

while we are trying to keep civilian casualties down
etc.

what good is all our might if we can't simply blow up the enemy to smitherenes
for political reasons

why could we not wipe out the Taliban ? did we try ?

Lots of profits for military contractors and lots of jobs for retired generals on the executive boards of those companies if the Afghan war drags on for 20 years. Not so good for the 19 year old marine that loses both legs to an IED because the general had restricted ROEs that prevented the talibs planting the IEDs from being sniped.

DougMacG

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #860 on: September 26, 2022, 07:08:51 PM »
The US loses wars it isn't fully committed to win.
« Last Edit: September 26, 2022, 08:57:05 PM by DougMacG »

G M

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Endless money and weapons for Ukraine?
« Reply #861 on: September 26, 2022, 09:59:10 PM »
"Despite Ukraine’s recent success, it’s important to remember that wars ebb and flow, and this war has been no different. Ukraine may be able to retake Kherson, but its current counteroffensive is not going to expel Russian forces everywhere. Ukraine’s military will eventually exhaust its capacity to continue this massive counterattack, and the larger Russian military will regroup and establish more effective defensive positions.

Nonetheless, the success of this counteroffensive provides a roadmap for Ukrainian forces: holding where they need to, slowly retreating where they must, and quickly counterattacking when the conditions are right. The ongoing offensive has demonstrated that Ukraine has a superior military that can overwhelm and defeat Russian forces, at scale, when they can achieve more favorable conditions. It has also provided a window into Russia’s military status: Russia cannot sustain their losses in this war.

If the West continues its level of aid and support, while Ukraine continues to build military capability and execute a superior war plan, the path to victory is clear. Under those conditions, it's only a matter of when—not if—Ukraine will win this war."

https://www.ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/news/2022/08/23/biden-us-ukraine-russia-aid-3-billion-six-months

To date, the U.S. has provided about $10.6 billion in military aid to Ukraine since the beginning of the Biden administration, including 19 packages of weapons taken directly from Defense Department stocks since August 2021.

Good news for the MIC! How much will it cost, and how long will it take to replace those weapons ?

When General Winter invades europe and euopeans are literally freezing to death, how will that affect the funding and resources sent to Ukraine?

How long can we keep funding Ukraine at the current burn rate?




G M

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Re: Endless money and weapons for Ukraine?
« Reply #862 on: September 26, 2022, 10:16:04 PM »
"Despite Ukraine’s recent success, it’s important to remember that wars ebb and flow, and this war has been no different. Ukraine may be able to retake Kherson, but its current counteroffensive is not going to expel Russian forces everywhere. Ukraine’s military will eventually exhaust its capacity to continue this massive counterattack, and the larger Russian military will regroup and establish more effective defensive positions.

Nonetheless, the success of this counteroffensive provides a roadmap for Ukrainian forces: holding where they need to, slowly retreating where they must, and quickly counterattacking when the conditions are right. The ongoing offensive has demonstrated that Ukraine has a superior military that can overwhelm and defeat Russian forces, at scale, when they can achieve more favorable conditions. It has also provided a window into Russia’s military status: Russia cannot sustain their losses in this war.

If the West continues its level of aid and support, while Ukraine continues to build military capability and execute a superior war plan, the path to victory is clear. Under those conditions, it's only a matter of when—not if—Ukraine will win this war."

https://www.ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/news/2022/08/23/biden-us-ukraine-russia-aid-3-billion-six-months

To date, the U.S. has provided about $10.6 billion in military aid to Ukraine since the beginning of the Biden administration, including 19 packages of weapons taken directly from Defense Department stocks since August 2021.

Good news for the MIC! How much will it cost, and how long will it take to replace those weapons ?

When General Winter invades europe and euopeans are literally freezing to death, how will that affect the funding and resources sent to Ukraine?

How long can we keep funding Ukraine at the current burn rate?

https://media.gab.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=1050,quality=100,fit=scale-down/system/media_attachments/files/116/395/040/original/08431348794c399e.jpeg



G M

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #863 on: September 26, 2022, 10:32:09 PM »
"(T)he US military has demonstrated that despite its ability to win battles, it cannot win wars."

we win only open battlefield wars

not wars against guerrillas etc

while we are trying to keep civilian casualties down
etc.

what good is all our might if we can't simply blow up the enemy to smitherenes
for political reasons

why could we not wipe out the Taliban ? did we try ?

Lots of profits for military contractors and lots of jobs for retired generals on the executive boards of those companies if the Afghan war drags on for 20 years. Not so good for the 19 year old marine that loses both legs to an IED because the general had restricted ROEs that prevented the talibs planting the IEDs from being sniped.

https://media.gab.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=1050,quality=100,fit=scale-down/system/media_attachments/files/116/637/924/original/e789edbc51271190.jpeg



DougMacG

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Re: Endless money and weapons for Ukraine?
« Reply #864 on: September 27, 2022, 05:04:51 AM »
Bold highlight from G M's post:

"To date, the U.S. has provided about $10.6 billion in military aid to Ukraine since the beginning of the Biden administration, including 19 packages of weapons taken directly from Defense Department stocks since August 2021."


$10 billion?  [Actual number may be higher]  I hate to say it but wow that's a small amount of money to thwart such a major offensive of evil rival Putin Russia.

The student debt tranference program rounds to a trillion, one hundred  times as much, without even a vote, for no national gain whatsoever.

Oops our national debt just went up another 10 billion while I was writing this, just writing checks to each other.

We've got bigger money problems than helping Ukraine and thwarting Putin.

And no, I don't support endless, limitless amounts, just saying we haven't hit that level yet IF these numbers are accurate.  But, from my secure midwest location, I shamelessly take some solace in seeing Putin's violent trampling on international law and neighbor sovereignty turn into a losing quagmire for him.
« Last Edit: September 27, 2022, 06:55:07 AM by DougMacG »

ya

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #865 on: September 27, 2022, 08:03:10 AM »
So with NS-1 and NS-2 blown up...qui bono ?. US ? Ukr ?responsible ? Germany definitely in recession. Putin loses a negotiation tool.

Crafty_Dog

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WSJ
« Reply #866 on: September 27, 2022, 08:22:29 AM »
"And no, I don't support endless, limitless amounts, just saying we haven't hit that level yet IF these numbers are accurate.  But, from my secure midwest location, I shamelessly take some solace in seeing Putin's violent trampling on international law and neighbor sovereignty turn into a losing quagmire for him."

YES.

With variations in how we articulate it, this forum has had consensus that America has considerable responsibility for provoking this war. 

My personal term was "feckless stupidity".

That said, there is more variety among us concerning what to do now.

I continue to think it was feckless stupidity to have provoked all this, and that it was done with astounding incompetence (e.g. green lighting Nord Stream 2, cancelling the missile defense deals with Poland and Czech Republic, cancelling Navy movements in the Black Sea, etc etc etc).  Contrast the way that Trump had SOCEUR train up the Ukes during the entirety of his term-- and witness the results from this in the quality of the Uke military and population!  Contrast MREs and Javelins!

IMHO IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE GRASP THIS AND ARTICULATE IT SHOULD THINGS GO WELL NOW SO THAT BIDEN ET AL'S CLAIMS GREAT WISDOM IN CONTRAST TO PUTIN LOVER TRUMP- which are sure to come- ARE PROPERLY REFUTED

WE ROOT FOR AMERICA, AND IF THINGS GO WELL NOW, IT WILL ACCOMPLISH MANY THINGS-- RE-ESTABLISHING CREDIBILITY FOR AMERICAN ARMS AND RELIABILITY, AND LIKELY PUTTING HESITATION IN CHINESE THINKING FOR TAIWAN AND GREATER CONFIDENCE OF OUR ALLIES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC.  Yes, yes, we have driven Russia into China's arms-- and this will have grave consequences that likely will go uncredited, and much of Ukraine has been leveled, and uncounted numbers have died of famines that all this has provoked, but these are no small thing!  As the saying goes, "Better lucky than good!"

Pulling the rug from under the Ukes now would be an even bigger act of feckless stupidity.

I love Tucker, but on this he is utterly wrong.

OTOH if things go bad (the Iranian drones turn things around for Putin, things go nuclear, etc, we can still say-- "We told you so!"

================

Ukraine’s New Offensive Threatens Moscow’s Control of Lands It Seeks to Annex
Wrecked Russian armor and corpses of Russian troops line the roads in northern Donetsk as Ukraine pushes deeper into Donbas
By Yaroslav Trofimov
WSJ
Sept. 27, 2022 9:36 am ET

RUBTSY, Ukraine—The Ukrainian military offensive that ousted Russian troops from the Kharkiv region early this month has now crossed deep into the northern part of the nearby Donetsk region, increasingly threatening Russian control over lands that Moscow seeks to annex as sovereign territory in coming days.

Here in Rubtsy, a village in Donetsk that Russia captured in late April, advancing Ukrainian forces stream east past burned-out carcasses of Russian tanks and the bloated bodies of Russian soldiers that remain on roadsides. Trophy pieces of Russian armor are being towed in the opposite way, to be repaired and reused.

The Ukrainian push here, east of the Oskil River, aims to encircle the strategic town of Lyman, where street battles have begun, and ultimately target the northern parts of the nearby Luhansk region. Russia is wrapping up sham referendums it is staging in Donetsk and Luhansk, collectively known as Donbas, and two occupied regions of southern Ukraine, aiming to formally incorporate them into Russia as soon as this week.

Demoralized by recent defeats in Kharkiv, Russian soldiers on this front line continue to retreat, despite arriving reinforcements. On Sunday, Ukrainian forces took several prisoners in a nearby village because many of the Russian soldiers were drunk, said a Ukrainian soldier. “The ones who were sober ran away, and the ones who were drunk didn’t even realize that the village was being attacked, and got caught,” he said.

The soldier showed off two recently captured Russian T-80 tanks that had been towed to his position, the Russian tactical sign Z on their armor overpainted with the white cross marking Ukrainian armor on this front. One only needed a battery change, he said. The other would require more intensive repairs because the retreating Russian crew had thrown a hand grenade into the barrel. “We’ll fix them and use them against the Russians,” he said.

In addition to the offensive in northern Donetsk, Ukrainian forces in recent days also expanded their foothold east of the Oskil river in the area of Kupyansk, the seat of Russian administration for the roughly 3,500 square miles of the Kharkiv region that Ukrainian forces liberated this month. That defeat forced Russia’s President Vladimir Putin to mobilize hundreds of thousands of reservists, and to call the annexation referendums. A separate Ukrainian push south of Lyman this month reclaimed the town of Svyatohirsk that Russian forces seized as recently as July.

Ukrainian forces remain on the defensive in other parts of the Donetsk region, such as the city of Bakhmut that Russian troops led by the Wagner mercenaries have been trying to storm for over two months, and Avdiivka near the regional capital. Russia currently controls about two-thirds of the region.

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Re: WSJ, Ukraine
« Reply #867 on: September 27, 2022, 08:41:49 AM »
"With variations in how we articulate it, this forum has had consensus that America has considerable responsibility for provoking this war."


  - By my count, we are all but one (?) in agreement on that.     :wink:

In my book, this is 100% on Vladimir.
« Last Edit: September 27, 2022, 08:50:12 AM by DougMacG »

G M

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Re: Endless money and weapons for Ukraine?
« Reply #868 on: September 27, 2022, 10:33:45 AM »
Bold highlight from G M's post:

"To date, the U.S. has provided about $10.6 billion in military aid to Ukraine since the beginning of the Biden administration, including 19 packages of weapons taken directly from Defense Department stocks since August 2021."


$10 billion?  [Actual number may be higher]  I hate to say it but wow that's a small amount of money to thwart such a major offensive of evil rival Putin Russia.

The student debt tranference program rounds to a trillion, one hundred  times as much, without even a vote, for no national gain whatsoever.

Oops our national debt just went up another 10 billion while I was writing this, just writing checks to each other.

We've got bigger money problems than helping Ukraine and thwarting Putin.

And no, I don't support endless, limitless amounts, just saying we haven't hit that level yet IF these numbers are accurate.  But, from my secure midwest location, I shamelessly take some solace in seeing Putin's violent trampling on international law and neighbor sovereignty turn into a losing quagmire for him.

What's the line? "A billion here, a billion there and pretty soon you are talking real money".

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Re: Endless money and weapons for Ukraine?
« Reply #869 on: September 27, 2022, 11:04:08 AM »
Bold highlight from G M's post:

"To date, the U.S. has provided about $10.6 billion in military aid to Ukraine since the beginning of the Biden administration, including 19 packages of weapons taken directly from Defense Department stocks since August 2021."


$10 billion?  [Actual number may be higher]  I hate to say it but wow that's a small amount of money to thwart such a major offensive of evil rival Putin Russia.

The student debt tranference program rounds to a trillion, one hundred  times as much, without even a vote, for no national gain whatsoever.

Oops our national debt just went up another 10 billion while I was writing this, just writing checks to each other.

We've got bigger money problems than helping Ukraine and thwarting Putin.

And no, I don't support endless, limitless amounts, just saying we haven't hit that level yet IF these numbers are accurate.  But, from my secure midwest location, I shamelessly take some solace in seeing Putin's violent trampling on international law and neighbor sovereignty turn into a losing quagmire for him.

What's the line? "A billion here, a billion there and pretty soon you are talking real money".

https://www.zerohedge.com/political/zelensky-reveals-how-much-us-taxpayers-give-ukraine-monthly


ya

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #870 on: September 27, 2022, 12:31:38 PM »
Annexation of 4 Russian speaking Uki states complete. Now, they will be fighting Russia. Assuming that the NS-1/2 pipelines were not blown up by Russia, stronger retaliation is coming.

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #871 on: September 27, 2022, 12:42:36 PM »
Annexation of 4 Russian speaking Uki states complete. Now, they will be fighting Russia. Assuming that the NS-1/2 pipelines were not blown up by Russia, stronger retaliation is coming.

It wouldn't make sense for Russia to do it.

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #872 on: September 27, 2022, 12:51:08 PM »
I suspect the Ukrainians or the US did it. No one else would have the guts and motivation to do it.

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #873 on: September 27, 2022, 01:04:08 PM »
I suspect the Ukrainians or the US did it. No one else would have the guts and motivation to do it.

Poland.

The US would be my prime suspect.

https://twitter.com/ABC/status/1490792461979078662?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1490792461979078662%7Ctwgr%5Ecb15c2d8e80bafb1a553ad0ab29cf3b1b972c77c%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Face.mu.nu%2F

If someone with dementia sits in on classified planning sessions, they might say things they aren't supposed to say to the press...

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Re: Endless money and weapons for Ukraine?
« Reply #874 on: September 27, 2022, 01:45:36 PM »
https://sonar21.com/more-on-the-referendum-game-changer/

"To date, the U.S. has provided about $10.6 billion in military aid to Ukraine since the beginning of the Biden administration, including 19 packages of weapons taken directly from Defense Department stocks since August 2021.

We can magically create dollars, weapons, ammo, equipment, FOOD and energy, not so much...


Bold highlight from G M's post:

"To date, the U.S. has provided about $10.6 billion in military aid to Ukraine since the beginning of the Biden administration, including 19 packages of weapons taken directly from Defense Department stocks since August 2021."


$10 billion?  [Actual number may be higher]  I hate to say it but wow that's a small amount of money to thwart such a major offensive of evil rival Putin Russia.

The student debt tranference program rounds to a trillion, one hundred  times as much, without even a vote, for no national gain whatsoever.

Oops our national debt just went up another 10 billion while I was writing this, just writing checks to each other.

We've got bigger money problems than helping Ukraine and thwarting Putin.

And no, I don't support endless, limitless amounts, just saying we haven't hit that level yet IF these numbers are accurate.  But, from my secure midwest location, I shamelessly take some solace in seeing Putin's violent trampling on international law and neighbor sovereignty turn into a losing quagmire for him.

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« Last Edit: September 27, 2022, 08:07:17 PM by DougMacG »

Crafty_Dog

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Mobilization and falling oil prices weaken Putin's hand
« Reply #876 on: September 28, 2022, 04:37:29 AM »
Russia’s Mobilization, Plunging Oil Prices Weaken Putin’s Economic Hand
Economic storm clouds come as Russian president orders more financial resources directed at war in Ukraine

People bid farewell to reservists drafted during the partial mobilization in the Omsk region, Russia.
PHOTO: ALEXEY MALGAVKO/REUTERS
By Georgi Kantchev
Sept. 28, 2022 5:30 am ET


A costly troop mobilization, plunging energy prices and a new round of Western sanctions threaten to bear down on Russia’s already embattled economy and undermine the financial underpinnings of President Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine.

The economic storm clouds come as Mr. Putin orders more financial resources directed at the war in Ukraine. The Kremlin’s decision to call up more than 300,000 soldiers will require new funds to equip, train and pay the new reinforcements, analysts said. It has also spread disruption among Russia’s private businesses, which face a fresh challenge as workers report for duty or flee the country.

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And it is happening as the windfall from soaring energy prices—Russia’s main economic strength—appears to have peaked. Russia’s federal government budget was in deficit last month because of diminished energy revenue. That was before the latest leg down in prices for oil and before Moscow shut down most of its remaining natural-gas flows to Europe.

“Mobilization is another serious hit on the Russian economy, especially because of the increased uncertainty,” said Maxim Mironov, professor of finance at Madrid’s IE Business School. “And it happens when oil and gas revenues are beginning to dry up.”

Wars are often won by the side that has the economic wherewithal to support fighting over the long haul. Ukraine’s economy has been battered, but receives a gusher of aid from the West to stay afloat.

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Western sanctions staggered Russian commerce, but Moscow succeeded in stabilizing the economy thanks to a jump in energy prices. The ruble, which plunged at the start of the war, rose sharply against the dollar and inflation moderated. The Russian government and independent economists now predict a shallower recession this year than previously assumed.

While there is no evidence of an imminent economic collapse, business owners and investors inside the country reacted with dread to the news of the mobilization. Activists and analysts said Mr. Putin’s order opens the door to a much larger draft. Russia’s stock market, limited mostly to domestic investors, tumbled after the draft announcement.

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How do you think Putin will respond to a tightening economic outlook? Join the conversation below.

“It’s really impossible to count,” said Mihail Markin, head of the business development department at Moscow-based logistics company Major Cargo Service. “If it’s five people in a 1,000 person company, that’s one thing, but what if it’s half?”

“And then who knows how businesses will act without the people who are drafted,” he said.

Before the draft, official data showed the government veered into a big budget deficit in August. It reported the budget surplus for the year narrowed to 137 billion rubles, or $2.3 billion, for the first eight months of the year, from about 481 billion rubles in July.

The government has come up with several measures to plug the gap, including raising taxes on the energy industry. It issued government bonds this month for the first time since February and promised to run a deficit next year. The bonds will have to be financed by local savers. Foreign investors, who owned 20% of government bonds before the war, are barred from the market. Moscow is shut out of foreign debt markets.


Russian President Vladimir Putin has mobilized hundreds of thousands of reservists for his war in Ukraine.
PHOTO: GAVRIIL GRIGOROV/ASSOCIATED PRESS
Russia’s economic problems are partly a boomerang effect of the country’s own policies. High energy prices caused by the war in Ukraine initially created huge revenues for Russia. Around 45% of Russia’s total federal budget revenues came from oil and gas in the first seven months of the year, according to the Institute of International Finance.

But high energy prices have put a brake on global growth and led to a widespread slowdown in demand for oil. Benchmark Brent crude has fallen by almost a third from its June high to trade at less than $85 a barrel.

Factoring in the discount of about $20 for Russian crude, Moscow is already selling its oil below the price needed to balance the budget, estimated at $69 a barrel in 2021 by S&P Global Commodity Insights. The strong ruble complicates matters for the Kremlin by reducing the value of oil exports when the proceeds are converted into Russia’s currency.

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Exports of oil have fallen as well as the price in recent weeks, analysts and ship-tracking firms say. The drop has likely been driven by a combination of a slowing world economy and looming European Union sanctions on Russian fuel, which come into effect in December.

Neil Crosby, senior analyst at OilX, said Russian crude exports have fallen to about 4.5 million barrels a day in September, down from over 4.8 million a day in August, because of a drop in flows to Turkey, China and India. Those three countries scooped up much of the Russian crude shunned by the West and its allies in the wake of the invasion.


Before the draft, official data showed the government veered into a big budget deficit in August
PHOTO: MAXIM SHIPENKOV/SHUTTERSTOCK
Capital Economics estimates that Russia’s total oil-and-gas export revenues will halve from around $340 billion this year to $170 billion in 2023, a loss equivalent to more than twice Russia’s defense budget last year.

The West is also preparing to tighten the vise on sanctions, after already hitting Moscow with an unprecedented barrage of measures over the course of the year. A price cap on Russian oil organized by the Group of Seven nations is also in the works.

Just as Russia suffers setbacks on the battlefield, the costs and complications of the draft have rattled confidence.


“Mobilization is the sword of Damocles now hanging over all Russian households,” said Janis Kluge, an expert on Russia at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. “This will hurt the optimism of the average Russian consumer.”

The anxiety has triggered a run for the Russian borders by thousands of fighting-age men, adding to an already sizable brain-drain wave earlier in the year.

“People are escaping where they can,” Mr. Mironov said. “These are mainly highly skilled, educated workers. So this mobilization is going to have a severe economic effect not just for the next year but for decades.”

Russian businesses are trying to figure out which employees are likely to be called up, and how to reduce those numbers.

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The chief executive of a food-production facility in central Russia said he received a blank form from the local town administration on Saturday that he was told to fill out with the information about his employees who might be eligible for military service. The form, reviewed by The Wall Street Journal, asks for information including name, address, military rank, reserve status, family status and work role of the employees.

At Major Cargo Service, the Moscow logistics company, current shipment orders are being fulfilled as planned but fewer clients are contacting the company to discuss new business. The No. 1 priority his clients have now is assessing risks related to staff leaving the workforce due to the draft, Mr. Markin said.

“We are in a pause,” Mr. Markin said. “It’s as if everyone put on an invisibility cloak and quieted down.”


Capital Economics estimates that Russia’s total oil-and-gas export revenues will halve this year, a loss equivalent to more than twice Russia’s defense budget in 2021.
PHOTO: ANATOLY MALTSEV/SHUTTERSTOCK

Write to Georgi Kantchev at georgi.kantchev@wsj.com, Yuliya Chernova at yuliya.chernova@wsj.com and Joe Wallace at joe.wallace@wsj.com

Crafty_Dog

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GPF: Russia's mobilization may be a game changer
« Reply #877 on: September 28, 2022, 04:54:01 AM »
September 28, 2022
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Russia’s Mobilization May Be a Game-Changer
With the war likely to go deep into 2023, Ukraine needs to disrupt Moscow’s momentum.
By: Ridvan Bari Urcosta

At no small cost, the Russian military managed to stop the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the northeastern Kharkiv region. Kyiv’s rapid success sent Moscow searching for an answer. Officially, it decided on a partial mobilization, though every piece of evidence says the mobilization is overwhelming and widespread. It looks like Moscow is preparing a considerable force to enable it to fully dominate the war’s front line. Russian President Vladimir Putin is signaling to Russians that the regime is ready to increase the tempo of the war and fight to the end, and to the West and NATO that Russia accepts their challenge of a prolonged conflict. Russia’s mobilization will keep its military options open and improve its position in Ukraine, particularly with regard to effective control of the front lines, during any attempts at reaching a settlement over the winter months.

The Logic and Pitfalls of Mobilization

Putin and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced the partial mobilization on Sept. 21. There are four critical aspects to highlight. First, in general Russia is mobilizing against the West. Officially, it sees the war in Ukraine as against the “entire military machine” of NATO. Second, Moscow is anxious not to repeat the errors of previous Russian mobilizations; both in 1905 and 1914, they ended in defeat and revolution. Moscow is trying to meticulously organize the process and avoid economic and political repercussions for the Russian state. Third, the decision called for the immediate mobilization of 300,000 troops, but there are no indications that this will be the limit. Russia is capable of mobilizing several million soldiers, according to Shoigu. Finally, the new troops will need several months of training, which means that in the short term, mobilization is unlikely to significantly shift the balance at the front line.

Russia’s main tasks for now are to create a layered defense along the line of contact, reassert strict control of the occupied territories and control the Russian border. In addition, according to the Kremlin’s estimates, the mobilization will enable Russian combat units to focus on fulfilling the objectives of the war: to gain strategic depth by seizing Ukrainian territory. Russia long since recognized that it needed more troops to defend occupied areas and overcome Ukrainian guerrilla warfare. Integration of the new troops could free up experienced Russian units – currently tied up with patrols and so forth – to launch offensive operations in the late winter and early spring.

But there are downsides as well. First, mobilization takes time. For new troops to pose a serious threat to the enemy, they need to be properly trained, which requires several months at a minimum. Therefore, any mobilized fighters will not be combat-ready until after the winter. In the present circumstances, when Ukraine is conducting offensive operations in Donbas (along the Lyman-Oskil line), Russia is under intense pressure. As a last resort, it could send untrained men to the battlefield. Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests this is already happening.

Second, mobilization has provoked a social backlash that challenges Putin’s grip on power. In the days following the mobilization announcement, protests broke out in several cities across Russia, particularly in ethnically non-Russian regions. For example, in the North Caucasus, anti-war protests turned violent in recent days. The turmoil has not disrupted mobilization, but with time it could pose a formidable political threat. There are also many reports of hundreds of thousands of Russians leaving the country to avoid recruitment.

Russia/Ukraine Battle Lines, Sept. 27, 2022
(click to enlarge)

A potential advantage, however, is Russia's ability to mobilize new forces beyond its national borders, as well as hybrid units. From the start of the war, Russia has used proxy forces from the breakaway Ukrainian republics along the front line. Mercenaries and convicts have also helped to plug gaps. This isn’t always a good thing. For example, one explanation given for Russia’s shocking defeat in Kharkiv was its reliance on a concentrated proxy force of Ukrainian separatists. By contrast, the infamous Wagner Group mercenaries employed better supplies and weapons to take ground near Bakhmut in northern Donetsk. Already, the Luhansk and Donetsk separatist forces have announced an increase in their training efforts, and the Wagner Group has launched its own recruitment drives in and around Russia. Moscow also intends to find recruits in soon-to-be annexed parts of Ukraine.

Moreover, anticipating further mobilization efforts later, Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov recently called on the heads of all 85 Russian regions to prepare at least 1,000-2,000 soldiers – in addition to those called up by Moscow – over the next several months. Separately, the Kremlin decided to recruit foreign soldiers with Slavic backgrounds, such as Ukrainians, Belarusians and Moldovans. Some non-Slavic men will likely join Russia’s side in the war in hopes of acquiring Russian citizenship.

According to Russian estimates, a total of 500,000 to 600,000 troops should be added to the Russian army as a result of mobilization. This would triple the Russian force already in Ukraine and extend Russia’s numerical advantage.

The Belarus Factor

An additional card that Russia could play concerns Belarus. Given its location, Belarus could pose a major threat to Ukraine were it to enter the war. Belarusian forces could strike Ukraine’s rear and disrupt supplies of Western military aid. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko has been vocal about leaving his country’s options open. At the same time, he has repeatedly said Russia has enough men and materiel to defeat Ukraine without Minsk’s direct assistance, and stressed Belarus’ contributions to the war by serving as the first line of defense to prevent NATO from “stabbing Russia in the back.”

Immediately after the Kremlin announced its mobilization, Lukashenko declared that mobilization was not on his government’s agenda and that Belarus was already prepared to respond in the event of a military threat. The secretary of the Belarusian Security Council added that the country was already mobilized and thus had no need to declare additional moves. (Belarus has conducted regular military exercises along its borders with Ukraine and Poland since the start of the war.)

There is also significant disagreement among experts about Belarus’ actual military power. Officially, the country has nearly 48,000 soldiers and officers, with an additional 20,000 people listed as military personnel. Reserves are in the vicinity of 290,000. In June, Ukraine’s General Staff said Belarus was planning to increase its army to 80,000 troops. In other words, Minsk may be conducting a quiet mobilization.

Lukashenko’s first priority is clearly to preserve his room to maneuver. Minsk has not even decided whether it will support Moscow’s annexation of four Ukrainian regions. But Putin is sure to increase pressure on Lukashenko over time, and it may eventually become too much to resist.

Ukraine’s Strategic Conundrum

Russia’s announced mobilization was not a surprise in Ukraine, but it creates two major challenges for the Ukrainian armed forces. First, Kyiv needs to answer Russia’s move by commencing its own next wave of mobilizations. Ukraine’s first mobilization concluded in midsummer and brought in more than 700,000 troops, who now reinforce Ukraine’s defensive lines. How successful an expanded mobilization effort would be is hard to predict. More so than Moscow, Kyiv is limited by the need to leave a large enough population to carry out daily economic activities. On the other hand, new Ukrainian forces are likely to be trained in NATO countries and will likely be better prepared for combat than their Russian counterparts who were rushed to the front lines.

Second, Kyiv urgently needs to demonstrate the ability to strike Russia in the south, in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, and to continue the counteroffensive in Kharkiv. Despite Ukraine’s recent successes, Russia has managed to stem the bleeding. Compared to Russia, Ukraine has fewer reservists to draw upon. Moscow believes it is gaining momentum through sheer numbers, and Kyiv needs to find a way to thwart this momentum. There is a window of opportunity for Ukraine. Russia expects to need the fall and winter to train and coordinate its new personnel, so they are not expected to tip the scales until late winter or early spring. It’s at this point that Russia may outnumber the Ukrainians along the line of contact, which would facilitate further Russian offensive operations.

A related dilemma for Kyiv is whether to press ahead with its counteroffensive to prevent Russia’s annexation of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, or to hunker down for a longer war. While the former calls for urgency, the latter entails the accumulation of manpower and Western weapons through the winter. The onset of winter will complicate offensive operations for both sides. Without foliage, it is difficult to move and also hide from drones and artillery. Winter weather can also blind satellites, hurting the side that relies on them more. These conditions will naturally slow the pace of fighting and give Russia time to train its new recruits, and it may put a time limit on Ukraine’s ability to disrupt Russia’s strategic pivot.

Unwilling to accept the status quo, both sides are preparing to fight well into 2023. Western arms stockpiles are nearing their limits, while Russia is zeroing in on new gains before considering any settlement. But Russia must be careful of two potential pitfalls: the risk that it draws the West deeper into the conflict, and the risk that Putin’s regime becomes Russia’s latest to fall victim to defeat and revolution. Historically, when Russia mobilizes, it has had enormous implications for Europe and Russia. Today, a Russian mobilization once again threatens European peace.

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Re: Gatestone: Biden has opened door on Russian nuke strikes
« Reply #879 on: September 28, 2022, 08:03:51 AM »
second

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/18942/biden-russia-nuclear-strikes

Keep in mind that the Soviets never stopped doing extensive chem/bio weapons research. Putin probably has multiple nasty options without going nuclear.

The easiest is taking down the Uke infrastructure in midwinter.

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #880 on: September 28, 2022, 05:27:30 PM »



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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #883 on: September 29, 2022, 01:19:21 PM »
I'm playing that one forward haha.

Meanwhile, some pretty good military analysis here IMHO:

https://www.understandingwar.org/

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A friend born and raised in that part of the world
« Reply #886 on: October 01, 2022, 05:49:14 PM »
"I love how western media portrays the referendums as a sham. Not knowing the history of Lugansk or Donetzk. Did they ever inform people that neither one wanted to be part of Ukraine even in 1917-1918 and they were forced to be part of it? Or that Donesk voted to be independent in 1991 (way before Putin)  and NOT part of Ukraine but it was ignored. And that BOTH regions voted in 1994 90% that they wanted Russian to be their official language but they were ignored by Ukranian government who wanted to hold on to their metallurgy industry. But Yeltsin was too weak and Clinton didn't want Russia to have more territory...  And that they willingly decided to separate in 2014 again When Poroshebko came up with all those anti-Russian speaking laws.  There is 100 years of history of these regions being unwilling to be part of Ukraine OR speak the Ukranian language. Like I said even my grandpa who was born in 1929 didn't speak Ukranian and always wanted to go and live in Russia as did most people in that area which is why so many people who live in Russia now have relatives in Donbas.

"And my friends who live here in US who are from Eastern Ukraine all openly say that those areas should have been returned to Russia when the Soviet Union fell apart bc that is what they always wanted. Either independence or be part of Russia.  Why is that being ignored?

"Of course, if I say that, I will get stoned. Or better yet, I will be "taught" and "informed" about Russian culture and history and about what Russians "really want"


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2014
« Reply #888 on: October 02, 2022, 03:49:26 AM »

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The War Has Just Begun
« Reply #889 on: October 02, 2022, 08:04:27 AM »
This is a very interesting read, what Russia may be planning.

https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/war-has-just-begun
« Last Edit: October 02, 2022, 01:11:29 PM by Crafty_Dog »

G M

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #890 on: October 02, 2022, 08:09:16 AM »
This is a very interesting read, what Russia may be planning.

https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/war-has-just-begun

"Depleting NATO
One of the more fascinating aspects of the war in Ukraine is the extent to which Russia has contrived to attrit NATO military hardware without fighting a direct war with NATO forces. In a previous analysis I referred to Ukraine as a vampiric force which has reversed the logic of the proxy war; it’s a black hole sucking in NATO gear for destruction.

There are now very limited stockpiles to draw from to continue to arm Ukraine. Military Watch Magazine noted that NATO has drained the old Warsaw Pact tank park, leaving them bereft of Soviet tanks to donate to Ukraine. Once these reservoirs are fully tapped, the only option will be giving Ukraine western tank models. This, however, is much harder than it sounds, because it would require not only extensive training of tank crews, but also an entirely different selection of ammunition, spare parts, and repair facilities.

Tanks are not the only problem, however. Ukraine is now staring down the barrel (heh heh) of a serious shortage of conventional tube artillery. Earlier in the summer, the United States donated 155mm howitzers, but with stockpiles of both guns and shells dwindling, they’ve recently been forced to turn to lower caliber towed trash. After the announcement of yet another aid tranche on September 28th, the USA has now put together five consecutive packages which do not contain any conventional 155mm shells. Shells for Ukraine’s Soviet vintage artillery were running low as early as June.

In effect, the effort to keep Ukraine’s artillery arm functioning has gone through a few phases. In the first phase, Warsaw Pact stockpiles of Soviet shells were drained to supply Ukraine’s existing guns. In the second phase, Ukraine was given mid-level western capabilities, especially the 155mm howitzer. Now that 155mm shells are running low, Ukraine has to make do with 105mm guns which are badly outranged by Russian howitzers and will be, in a word, doomed in any kind of counterbattery action.

As a substitute for adequate tube artillery, the latest aid package does include 18 more of the internet’s favorite meme weapon - the HIMARS Multiple Launch Rocket System. What is not explicitly mentioned in the press release is that the HIMARS systems don’t exist in current US inventories and will have to be built, and are thus unlikely to arrive in Ukraine for several years.

The increasing difficulties in arming Ukraine coincide with the rapid closing of Ukraine’s window of operational opportunity. The forces accumulated over the summer are degraded and fought out, and every subsequent rebuild of the Ukrainian first tier forces will become harder as manpower is destroyed and NATO arsenals are depleted. This depletion comes precisely as Russian force generation is surging, foretelling the Winter of Yuri."


Crafty_Dog

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My friend continues
« Reply #892 on: October 02, 2022, 09:48:08 AM »
"Ok course. He's a cold heated ruthless tyrant. And he had no remorse about killing people. The fact that he is the aggressor is not even a question. My issue is not with demonizing Putin. My issue is with the facts being skewed to make it seem like this is somehow another Hitler who is insane and bloodthirsty and will take over the world unless we get involved.

"And he would not have invaded if after 2014, the Ukranians did not send the Azov to the Eastern areas and kill thousands of ppl over the last 8 years. Somehow that always gets left out.  Did he take advantage of the situation? Yes. Does he really care about the Russian speakers of Donbas? No. But it would also not be a good looking for him in Russia if he didn't do anything about the fact that it was happening for so long and no one in the world seemed to care.  How often in our media did they even talk about all the atrocities that happened there since 2014?"

Crafty_Dog

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The NS leaks set precedent for Russian attacks on Euro energy infrastructure
« Reply #893 on: October 02, 2022, 12:11:16 PM »
The Nord Stream Leaks Set a Precedent for Russian Attacks on Europe's Energy Infrastructure
7 MIN READSep 29, 2022 | 21:48 GMT


Russia could further undermine Europe's energy security long after it cuts off gas supplies, if Moscow begins to more aggressively target the continent's maritime oil and gas industry. On Sept. 26, the Norwegian Petroleum Safety Administration warned of potential ''deliberate attacks'' after energy companies reported multiple cases of unidentified drones flying near offshore oil and gas installations. Just a few hours later, officials in Denmark warned they had found a gas leak along a section of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline off the coast of the Danish island of Bornholm. The following day, the Swedish Maritime Administration announced it also detected two gas leaks on the Nord Stream 1 pipeline in a nearby area. Russia is widely believed to be behind the recent attacks on the Nord Stream pipeline systems, which are both operated by the Russian gas giant Gazprom. But while the Kremlin has not yet shown an intent to target foriegn-owned infrastructure, the gas leaks nonetheless set a dangerous precedent by showing that Russia is capable of attacking oil and gas infrastructure in its near periphery.

On Sept. 28, Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Store said Norwegian military forces were being deployed to help protect offshore installations. With Russia no longer shipping large volumes of natural gas to Europe, Norway is expected to supply about a quarter of the European Union's natural gas this year.

Following a meeting with NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg, Danish Defense Minister Morten Bodkov warned that ''Russia has a significant military presence in the Baltic Sea region and we expect them to continue their saber-rattling.''

Speaking on behalf of EU member states, EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell said on Sept. 28 that ''any deliberate disruption of European energy infrastructure is utterly unacceptable and will be met with a robust and united response.''

The U.S. CIA had reportedly warned the German government of possible attacks on Baltic Sea pipelines prior to the recent gas leaks on the Nord Stream pipelines.

A number of different factors — including the imposition of new sanctions — could drive Russia to adopt a more aggressive strategy to undermine Europe's energy security. In response to Western sanctions pressure, Iran has pursued an aggressive strategy of roiling global energy markets by covertly targeting regional oil and gas infrastructure. Russia could pursue a similarly aggressive strategy, as it shares many of the strategic drivers that have pushed Iran to adopt this approach — namely, the plausible deniability that covert attacks bring, a desire to impose a cost on rivals, interest in driving up energy prices in the short term to increase revenue, and using attacks as a way to gain leverage in negotiations. With its natural gas exports to Europe now nearing zero, Russia also appears to be exhausting its ''gas weapon,'' leaving attacks (or the threat of attacks) on oil and gas infrastructure as the primary way for the Kremlin to apply more pressure on European energy security, particularly for natural gas. In addition, the Russian government may assess that further provocative actions will have a negligible impact on its relationship with the European Union because it has already sunk to its lowest level. To this end, while Iran's attacks against tankers and Saudi oil and gas infrastructure in 2019 resulted in some additional sanctions on Tehran, the Western response was not decisive. This may lead Russia to assess the blowback risk in terms of military escalation and/or new sanctions is low because Western sanctions are already high and NATO countries have already demonstrated that they are seeking to avoid a NATO-Russia conflict. Finally, the Kremlin may even assess that occasional attacks against Europe's energy sector won't close the door to possible future peace negotiations with Ukraine to exit the war.

Should it adopt a more aggressive strategy against Europe's energy sector, Russia could physically attack more oil and gas infrastructure in the Baltic Sea, as well as potentially the Black Sea and North Sea. Russia would likely avoid any actions that could be construed as a physical attack on a NATO member's sovereign territory to avoid triggering a broader NATO-Russia conflict. But this does not necessarily extend to offshore oil and gas infrastructure (and other offshore critical infrastructure, such as submarine communications cables) outside the 12 nautical mile extent from the coast defined as territorial waters. Notably, the perpetrator behind the recent Nord Stream 1 and 2 gas leaks appeared to be extremely precise in terms of where it attacked the pipeline systems. The two attacks on Nord Stream 1 occurred in Denmark's exclusive economic zone but just before the pipeline entered Danish territorial waters, while Nord Stream 2 does not go through Denmark's territorial waters at all.

There is no indication that the drones the Norwegian authorities warned about were Russian. There have also not been any reports of Russian operations beyond the Baltic Sea, such as in the North Sea, which would be far more operationally difficult due to the greater geographic distance from Russia and the fact that it'd entail operating in deeper waters. Most critical oil and gas infrastructure in the North Sea also lies outside the territorial waters of the United Kingdom, Norway and the Netherlands.

The Nord Stream incidents occurred the same day that Poland and Norway were inaugurating the Baltic Pipe pipeline system, which carries natural gas from Norway to Poland, traverses through the Baltic Sea and goes through some international waters beyond the 12 nautical mile limit. Due to its proximity to Russia in the Baltic Sea and Poland's very pro-Ukrainian stance, the Baltic Pipe may be the piece of infrastructure that Russia is most likely to attack if it begins more aggressively targeting Europe's energy sector.

Beyond the Baltic, Black and potentially North Seas, Russia's ability to target offshore oil and gas infrastructure is limited. It could still target Europe's energy security through attacks against LNG tankers and other vessels, or LNG terminals (such as regasification lines going back to the mainland). But such attacks would carry a greater risk of triggering a greater military conflict, as LNG terminals are typically in national territorial waters. Any attacks on LNG vessels would also raise the possibility of casualties. While Russia has not demonstrated such a risk appetite outside of Ukraine, this could change amid further battlefield setbacks in Ukraine.

Beyond physical attacks, Russia's cyber capabilities — including its prolific use of data wipers that can paralyze computer systems by deleting data on hard drives — could also cause significant damage to Europe's energy sector. While it could seek to physically disrupt the European gas market with cyberattacks targeting pipeline operators and industrial control systems operating the pipelines, such acts carry a higher risk of escalation if they cause explosions or loss of life. Attacks on less sensitive aspects of the oil and gas industry (such as information technology systems instead of operational technology systems) are less likely to trigger a greater conflict with the West, but can still create social unrest and cause major financial market swings. Cyberattacks can also lead to occasional infrastructure shutdowns, as evidenced by the 2021 ransomware attack on the U.S. Colonial Pipeline company, which took its pipeline in the southeastern part of the United States offline for a week. Finally, Russia could leverage its well-known links with cyber criminals, hacktivists and other cyber threat actors to conduct attacks on its behalf. Russia's recent military mobilization campaign could even potentially bring in new cyber recruits to whom Moscow could offer roles to carry out the same types of cyberattacks they were previously doing as criminals instead of being deployed on Ukraine's front lines.

Crafty_Dog

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #894 on: October 02, 2022, 01:12:02 PM »
YA:

That "war has just begun" post is very interesting.



Crafty_Dog

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #897 on: October 03, 2022, 03:52:27 AM »
GM:  Note how I wrote the subject line.

DougMacG

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Re: Article 5 vs. Russian Donbas
« Reply #898 on: October 03, 2022, 04:24:36 AM »
Likely wouldn't have this war had we done that sooner.

Crafty_Dog

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #899 on: October 03, 2022, 04:30:41 AM »
But isn't that precisely what Putin said his red line was?  And weren't the movements towards bringing the Ukes into NATO precisely what triggered the invasion?

Anyway, here is this from Reuters:

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-russia-what-you-need-know-right-now-2022-09-21/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=newsletter&utm_campaign=daily-briefing&utm_term=10-03-2022

Looks like Zeihan's prediction of great capture of Russian guns and ammo as they are driven back across the Dnieper Rive could be reifying.

« Last Edit: October 03, 2022, 05:12:13 AM by Crafty_Dog »