Author Topic: Ukraine  (Read 147388 times)



Crafty_Dog

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D1: Iranians in Ukraine, more
« Reply #1002 on: October 21, 2022, 07:21:50 PM »
Second

October 21, 2022   
         
The White House says Iranian troops are in occupied Crimea directly advising Russian forces during drone attacks inside Ukraine. "Russian military personnel that are based in Crimea have been piloting Iranian UAVs, using them to conduct strikes across Ukraine, including strikes against Kyiv in just recent days," retired Navy Rear Adm. John Kirby of the National Security Council said Thursday. "We assess that Iranian military personnel were on the ground in Crimea and assisted Russia in these operations," he alleged in a call with reporters.

Kirby also flagged allegations Moscow is acquiring ballistic missiles from Tehran. The U.S., he said, is especially "concerned that Russia may also seek to acquire advanced conventional weapons from Iran, such as surface-to-surface missiles that will almost certainly be used to support the war against Ukraine."

"The fact is this: Tehran is now directly engaged on the ground and through the provision of weapons that are impacting civilians and civilian infrastructure in Ukraine," Kirby said Thursday. "In fact, they are killing civilians and destroying civilian infrastructure in Ukraine," he said, drawing attention to the seemingly deliberate campaign to destroy or significantly degrade Ukraine's electricity grid, as we've noted several times in our newsletter this week.

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However, "We don't believe it's going to change the course of the war," the former Pentagon spokesman said. "And the other thing that's not going to change is our determination to continue to provide Ukraine with the security assistance and financial assistance that they're going to need to defend themselves."

So, what will the U.S. do about it? Military officials are looking into ways to deliver air defense systems to Ukraine securely, but Kirby cautioned, "I can't tell you today what that's going to look like." (One system to watch: a counter-drone kit known as the Vampire, from L3Harris Technologies, Inc.; but the Wall Street Journal reports it's not at all clear how soon that will even be available.) In the interim, "We're going to continue to vigorously enforce all U.S. sanctions on both the Russian and Iranian arms trade," he said. "We're going to make it harder for Iran to sell these weapons to Russia; we're going to help the Ukrainians have what they need to defend themselves against these threats. And we're going to continue to stand with our partners throughout the Middle East region against the Iranian threat."

The British just added new sanctions on Iran for its drone attacks in Ukraine, which violate United Nations Security Council resolutions (2231, in particular). "By supplying these drones Iran is actively warmongering, profiting off Russia's abhorrent attacks on Ukrainian citizens, and adding to the suffering of the people and the destruction of critical infrastructure," the British said in a statement Thursday. The new sanctions target three military officials as well as the drone manufacturer, Shahed Aviation Industries. Details here.

The European Union added its own sanctions to the same batch of entities, the bloc announced Thursday as well. "This is our clear response to the Iranian regime providing Russia with drones, which it uses to murder innocent Ukrainian citizens," Czech Prime Minister Petr Fiala said Thursday. Read over the sanctions here.

The EU also just donated €175 million in humanitarian aid to help Ukraine "get through the winter," Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said Thursday. It's also "providing emergency shelter [to Ukrainians] in the Rivne, Bucha and Kharkiv regions," she announced on Twitter.

=========================

Also see

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/west-and-russia-clash-over-probe-of-drones-in-ukraine/ar-AA13f4Ga?ocid=msedgntp&cvid=f77617aea7874cb68d3080877bfec36c

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Crafty_Dog

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #1004 on: October 24, 2022, 11:34:42 AM »
Well curated!

Crafty_Dog

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Kherson, and Russian threats to the dam
« Reply #1005 on: October 25, 2022, 11:50:10 AM »
Very interesting military analysis here


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W3aR2nGJ1gc
« Last Edit: October 25, 2022, 11:55:32 AM by Crafty_Dog »

Crafty_Dog

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US troops already in Ukraine
« Reply #1006 on: November 02, 2022, 06:18:15 AM »
Obviously, keeping track that what we send them goes to where it should is a most worthy task, but what happens if/when any get killed?

https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/pentagon-confirms-us-boots-ground-ukraine-close-front-lines?utm_source=&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=1042

Crafty_Dog

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GPF: The Battle for Kherson
« Reply #1007 on: November 07, 2022, 02:47:18 PM »
November 7, 2022
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The Inevitable Battle for Kherson
Given the region’s strategic importance, neither side is willing to accept defeat.
By: Ridvan Bari Urcosta
In September, Russia was caught off guard when Ukraine launched a counteroffensive in Kharkiv region in the northeast instead of Kherson region in the south. Two months later, indications are that the Kherson offensive is all but ready for launch. Russian authorities ordered the evacuation of tens of thousands of civilians late last month, declared martial law and accused Kyiv of planning a large-scale assault on the region soon. Meanwhile, Kyiv has made advances in recent weeks on the western bank of the Dnieper River, retaking dozens of villages and towns, striking ammunition depots and bridges, while Russia has attacked energy infrastructure and imposed martial law in eastern regions, including Kherson. Though the timing of the strike still isn’t clear, it seems both sides are making preparations for the inevitable.

Why Kherson Matters

Located on the Black Sea and the strategically important Dnieper River, Kherson was one of the first major territories captured by the Russians after Moscow invaded Ukraine. The region, about the size of Belgium, has served as the main gateway to the annexed Crimean peninsula and hosts the biggest port Russia has managed to control in southern Ukraine. Before the war, it was a regional economic hub and home to a major shipbuilding industry. The North Crimean Canal, the main water delivery system for the Russian-annexed Crimean peninsula, also runs through Kherson.

Since February, thousands of Russian troops have been deployed to Kherson as part of Moscow’s push to advance into Mykolaiv and Odesa and seize southern Ukraine. It has been a focal point for Kyiv for months, which is why the Kremlin was taken by surprise when Ukraine’s counteroffensive in September targeted Russian-controlled regions in the northeast instead. Moscow has already lost Kharkiv – and as a result was forced to replace its army commander in charge of the war. It can’t afford to lose Kherson, too.

But Russia is facing both logistical and personnel problems. Its new recruits, acquired through the “partial mobilization,” will need to be trained fast to support troops already deployed to the region. Still, the Russian military is fighting back near Kupyansk and Lyman, building defensive lines from both sides of the Siverskyi Donets River, and continuing offensive operations in Bahamut, Soledar and Ugledar. It’s hoping this strategy will destabilize Ukrainian positions and avoid a concentration of Ukrainian forces near the Kherson region.

Battle Lines, Nov. 4, 2022
(click to enlarge)

For Ukraine, one benefit of taking back Kherson is that it would push Russian forces farther away from other key locations in the south of the country, such as Mykolaiv and Odesa, as well as central Ukraine. Kyiv could also then control the North Crimean Canal. Without control over Kherson region, Russia can’t guarantee water supplies for its annexed peninsula. Kyiv understands that taking away this capability from the Kremlin could instigate a political crisis in Moscow, which could weaken Russia’s resolve and its negotiating position in future talks.

Why the Evacuation Matters

Thus, news about the evacuation of Kherson should be taken seriously. The evacuation was ordered on Oct. 19, just as fighting around Kherson city, the regional capital, intensified. A few days later, on Oct. 24, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu spoke with his counterparts in Britain, France and Turkey, and warned of an “uncontrolled escalation” from Kyiv. The warnings came after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy expressed concern that Moscow was plotting to blow up the Kakhovka hydroelectric power plant in the occupied part of Kherson. Russia then accused Kyiv of plotting to destroy the plant’s dam, and said the evacuation of civilians was necessary to protect them from the flooding.

The evacuation plan suggests two important possibilities. First, Russia may be planning to withdraw from Kherson and wants to make sure it doesn’t leave anything important behind – i.e., Russians who were brought over to live in the occupied territory. Second, Russia may actually be increasing its defense capabilities in the region, and wants to clear the area of civilians so the military can better prepare for battle, logistically and otherwise.

The first possibility, however, isn’t likely. There are indications that Russian troops are pulling out of Kherson city: Some administrative buildings are no longer flying the Russian flag, and a Russian-installed official there said on Thursday that Russian troops would likely leave for the eastern bank of the Dnieper River. But a full-scale withdrawal from the region is too risky for Moscow. It would mean acknowledging failure on one of Russia’s most important objectives in the war: controlling Ukraine’s southern coast, including Kherson’s neighboring Mykolaiv region and Odesa. Moreover, the Kremlin couldn’t tolerate the internal political backlash that would result from a full withdrawal, considering the strategic importance of the south.

Both countries are now likely facing a long battle ahead to control Kherson, with both logistical and geographic challenges. The region is located in the Black Sea Lowland, much of which is covered in shrubs and forest, planted as windbreakers to shelter villages located among grain and corn fields. In the summer, the Ukrainian military could hide from Russian artillery and drones in these forests. But it’s now November, and this tactic is no longer feasible.

Moreover, the two major rivers of the region – the Inhulets and the Dnieper – are used by the Russian military as natural defense lines, meaning Ukraine will have to fight in more populated areas to recapture the region. Kherson, however, is mainly rural and one of the least populated regions in Ukraine. It has just two urban centers: the capital and Berislav, a city of just 12,000 people that’s currently under Russian control, as is most of the west-bank of the Dnieper.

Fighting in a low-density area will present challenges for both armies. In such areas, manpower and reconnaissance (i.e., drones and satellite intelligence) are key. Russia will need a greater concentration of forces, and Ukraine will need capabilities that enable its army to advance covertly – in the dark of night, for example. Going from village to village through open plains risks exposure. Both armies will also have to contend with difficult weather conditions. Heavy rain in the fall can make the terrain muddy and hard to penetrate. Winter will also present challenges in terms of moving troops, tanks and equipment.

Long Battle Ahead

Reports suggest that Russia has been preparing for weeks for a Ukrainian offensive in the region. Moscow has reportedly already sent some of its newly mobilized forces to the front line in Kherson. It also reportedly fortified its trenches and positions underground. Ukraine, meanwhile, has been advancing slowly and is likely considering attacking Russian positions elsewhere in the south to increase its chances of success in Kherson, though its ability to sustain heavy fighting in more than one location in the south is unclear.

Despite the apparent retreat of some Russian forces from the regional capital, a battle for Kherson can’t be avoided. Considering the terrain and logistical constraints, it will be a long, grinding affair as neither side is willing to accept defeat. To maintain its strategic advantage in the south, Russia could also resort to other tactics: escalating offensives in other territories, launching airstrikes or using tactical nuclear weapons in low-populated areas. This may explain Kyiv’s hesitance in attacking Russian positions in Kherson. It’s worried about what might follow if it succeeds.


Crafty_Dog

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Stratfor: Russia's Syrian tactics won't work as well in Ukraine
« Reply #1009 on: November 08, 2022, 06:59:49 AM »
Russia's Scorched-Earth Tactics in Syria Won't Prove as Successful in Ukraine
8 MIN READNov 7, 2022 | 22:25 GMT





In Ukraine, Russia will continue to utilize military tactics learned in Syria, like depopulation and even potentially the use of banned weapons. But without a break in Western support for Kyiv, these tactics will not make a strategic difference in the war, incentivizing Russia's military to increase its pace of attacks on civilian infrastructure and Ukrainian civilians. On Oct. 8, Russia appointed a new military commander for its Ukrainian war — General Sergei Surovikin, whose most recent military experience was in the Syrian civil war in a series of rotations from 2017-2020. Surovikin's appointment led to widespread speculation that in the face of a depleted Russian ground force and successful Ukrainian counterattacks, he would more heavily shift Russia's military tactics to those utilized in its Syrian campaign, like widespread attacks on civilians to displace the population and the potential use of banned weapons like chemical attacks. Indeed, throughout October, Russia began to escalate its attacks against Ukraine's civilian infrastructure, striking power plants and causing widespread blackouts, while also renewing attacks on the capital of Kyiv for the first time in months.

General Surovikin succeeds another Syrian campaign veteran as commander of the war effort in Ukraine. U.S. officials said that General Aleksandr Dvornikov was also reportedly appointed full commander of the war this past spring following Russian troops' retreat from Kyiv in March. But Dvornikov's tenure saw few major gains besides the fall of besieged Mariupol and Sievierodonetsk. Dvornikov also oversaw the targeting of civilians and non-military infrastructure, largely in Mariupol and the Donbas, where the Russian campaign refocused its efforts. Dvornikov was replaced after a Ukrainian offensive in September captured the key city of Izyum in the Kharkiv oblast in a rapid offensive.

Russia's intervention in Syria in 2015 focused heavily on the use of special forces, the air force and military police to support the Syrian government and its Iranian allies on the ground. Often under Russian leadership, these combined forces besieged rebel enclaves, regularly targeted civilian infrastructure, and utilized banned weapons like sarin gas to force surrenders that often would see the civilian population forced to relocate to another rebel-held territory. Russian air force units were a particularly important part of breaking the years-long battle for Aleppo in late 2017, where these tactics eventually broke rebel resistance. Today, Russian jets continue to strike civilian targets in the rebel-held Syrian province of Idlib as Moscow backs pressuring rebel groups by undermining humanitarian conditions in the war-torn region.

The United States and European allies did not respond to most Russian-led human rights violations in Syria with a strategic shift against Moscow or its ally, Syrian President Bashar al Assad, concerned about the risks of escalation in a country of comparatively marginal strategic importance to all sides. For Russia, this lack of response from the West fed into a narrative of success in Syria that now informs Russian military thinking in Ukraine.

Russia attacked only a limited set of civilian targets during the first few weeks of the war, based on the assumption that Ukraine's government would collapse quickly. But since the defeat at Kyiv in March, Moscow has adopted a more intense and widespread campaign against Ukrainian civilians that has started to look increasingly similar to its military campaigns in Syria and Chechnya.
Intercepted Russian communications from before the war indicate that Moscow expected a fast military victory against Ukraine, leading the initial phase of the campaign to focus on a drive to Kyiv and a rapid seizure of much of the country's south without widespread targeting of civilian infrastructure. When Ukrainian resistance forced a Russian retreat from Kyiv in March and bogged down Russian forces around Mariupol in the south, Moscow utilized its scorched-earth tactics seen in Syria and, before that, in the Chechen Wars in the 1990s. Mariupol's civilian infrastructure was targeted and destroyed, with much of the population displaced, until the city fell in May. Russian warplanes and missiles also began to strike civilian targets in other Ukrainian cities (like Kyiv, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv and Odesa) to intimidate the population and create political and military pressure on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's government to retreat forces or surrender. Instead, the attacks rallied the Ukrainian population in favor of the war effort. Russia also brought around 2.8 million Ukrainians to Russia itself, some against their will, from captured territories, in a bid to demographically engineer these regions.

Up until recently, Ukraine's electrical grid had largely been functioning without major interruptions. But since Surovikin took over as Russia's lead military commander in the war on Oct. 8, Kyiv says over 30% of the country's power plants have been targeted and destroyed, which has led to widespread blackouts across Ukraine.

Since Russian troops retreated from Kyiv earlier this year, the capital city had seen a decrease in attacks by Russian air power. But this, too, has changed in recent weeks amid a series of airstrikes targeting Kyiv, as Russia's military shifts back to its former strategy of trying to displace and demoralize civilians across the country with the help of newly supplied missiles from Iran.

Russian strikes on civilian infrastructure and non-combatants will harden Ukraine's resolve to fight on and reinforce NATO's resolve to keep providing Kyiv military support. While causing panic inside Ukrainian cities, Russia's attacks also inspire anger and solidify public support for the counter-offensives against its military occupation of Ukrainian territories. The Russian attacks are also not widespread enough to interrupt Kyiv's command and control of its armed forces, interrupt the logistics that resupply troops on the frontline or displace enough civilians to seriously hamper the war effort. Meanwhile, Russian human rights violations reinforce the political narratives that help justify public support for Ukraine in NATO nations.

Russian strikes on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure have been unable to cut supply routes to NATO, partially because they haven't been widespread enough to break the rail and road links between Romania, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the frontlines. NATO equipment and logistics are also not as dependent on railways. But most importantly, Ukraine's wide land borders give NATO numerous major and minor road routes to access that are either out of range for Russian drones and warplanes or risk interception by Ukrainian air defenses. This contrasts with Russia's position in Crimea, which is far more vulnerable to being cut off from other countries due to its isolation by the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, and because Russia relies heavily on rail lines to support its forces.

Europe and, to a lesser extent, the United States are facing rising energy prices and an overall cost of living crisis. But despite this, neither the U.S. government nor any European government has openly considered ending its military support to Ukraine in exchange for the resumption of cheap energy exports from Russia. This is due in part to documented Russian military atrocities at places like Bucha, Izyum and Russia's continued strikes on Ukrainian civilians, which make it difficult for Western governments to justify ending support for Ukraine to their constituents.

Ukraine's military has also made advances near the Russian-occupied city of Kherson, where Russian forces are reportedly withdrawing under military pressure — signaling that Russia's attacks on civilian infrastructure are not halting Ukraine's military counter-offensives.
Russia's military leadership is likely to escalate its use of attacks on civilian infrastructure to show even limited progress to the Kremlin, which could lead to more focused efforts to depopulate regions along the frontlines like Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Izyum and/or Kharkiv, including through the use of banned weapons. The use of scorched-earth tactics in Syria generated praise in Russia for General Surohivkin and other generals, creating a precedent for advancement in the military career through the utilization of such tactics. With Russia's mobilization campaign still unlikely in the near term to rebuild the Russian military to the point where it can conduct wide-scale offensive operations or even hold territory already gained, these scorched-earth tactics could increasingly become a metric of success for the Kremlin. As Ukrainian forces take territory, Moscow could focus more heavily on civilians near the frontline in an attempt to increase the refugee burden on Kyiv and Europe, destroy infrastructure that might be used by the Ukrainian military, and demoralize Ukrainian forces re-taking territory to find their cities and homes in ruins. Russia could utilize banned chemical weapons in this effort — especially chemical weapons that are harder to track, like mustard or chlorine gas. Any confirmed use of chemical weapons, however, would probably be met with increased support for Ukraine by NATO and other countries, along with more Western sanctions against the Russian economy.

Despite Russia's mobilization of around 300,000 conscripts, reports indicate that Russian units are understrength and that most of these new soldiers will take many weeks to be ready for combat. Many of their units are also underequipped, making it unlikely they'll be able to halt Ukrainian counter-offensives in the near term.

Russia maintains large stockpiles of numerous chemical weapons, including the highly deadly VX and sarin gasses, as well as the less-lethal mustard and chlorine gasses.

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D1
« Reply #1012 on: November 10, 2022, 08:57:35 AM »
second

November 10, 2022   
         
America's top military officer estimates Russia and Ukraine have both lost around 100,000 troops each, he told an audience Wednesday at the Economic Club of New York. That estimate includes killed and wounded troops, he said; and he suggested around 40,000 civilians have also died from the Russian invasion, which has shaken up energy markets around the world since it began over eight months ago, in late February.

"You're looking at well over 100,000 Russian soldiers killed and wounded," Joint Chiefs Chairman Army Gen. Mark Milley said. "Same thing probably on the Ukrainian side." The last public Pentagon estimate of Russian casualties was delivered in August, putting the figures somewhere between 70,000 and 80,000.

In perspective: The BBC reports that "By comparison, 15,000 Soviet soldiers were estimated to have died in the 1979-89 Afghanistan conflict."

Russia still has around 20,000 to 30,000 forces in the occupied city of Kherson, Milley said on the same day that Russia's military chief announced a withdrawal of troops from the southern provincial capital, the only one Moscow has captured so far. "They made the public announcement they're doing it," Milley said, referring to the withdrawal from Kherson. "I believe they're doing it in order to preserve their force to re-establish defensive lines south of the [Dnieper] river," he said, noting with skepticism, "but that remains to be seen."


Ukraine's military says it advanced about four miles in two directions near Kherson, sweeping up about 100 square miles of previously occupied land, top officer Valeriy Zaluzhnyi said Thursday on Telegram. Reuters has a bit more.

The view from the White House: Russia's apparent Kherson withdrawal is "evidence of the fact that they have some real problems," U.S. President Joe Biden told reporters Wednesday at the White House. And "it will lead to time for everyone to recalibrate their positions over the winter period," he said. Additionally, Biden said, "I found it interesting they waited until after the election to make that judgment [about a military withdrawal from Kherson City], which we knew for some time that they were going to be doing."

"My hope is that now that the election is over, that Mr. Putin will be able to discuss with us and be willing to talk more seriously about a prisoner exchange," the president said. And that includes former WNBA player Brittney Griner, who has been detained in Russia on alleged drug trafficking charges since February. "My intention is to get her home. And we've had a number of discussions so far. And I'm hopeful that, now that our election is over, there is a willingness to—to negotiate more specifically with us," Biden said.

But Ukraine isn't getting a blank check from the U.S., the president said, anticipating possible Republican opposition to helping Ukraine should the GOP retake control of the House, as expected following this week's elections. "There's a lot of things that Ukraine wants [that] we didn't do," Biden said. "For example, I was asked very much whether we'd provide American aircraft to guarantee the skies over Ukraine. I said, 'No, we're not going to do that. We're not going to get into a third world war, taking on Russian aircraft and directly engage.' But would we provide them with all the rational ability to defend themselves? Yes."

He also pointed out the limitations of HIMARS long-range artillery delivered by the U.S. "There's two kinds of, in the average person's parlance, rockets you can drop in those: one that goes over 600 miles and one that goes about 160 miles," Biden said. "We didn't give them any ones that go to 600 miles, because I'm not looking for them to start bombing Russian territory."

Biden's big-picture view of the war: It's "the ugliest aggression that's occurred since World War Two on a massive scale," he told reporters. "And there's so much at stake," he added.

Crafty_Dog

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RANE (Stratfor)
« Reply #1013 on: November 10, 2022, 03:21:13 PM »
third

What Russia's Retreat From Kherson Means for Its War in Ukraine
7 MIN READNov 10, 2022 | 22:26 GMT





Ukrainian artillery unit members fire toward the city of Kherson in southern Ukraine on Oct. 28, 2022.
Ukrainian artillery unit members fire toward the city of Kherson in southern Ukraine on Oct. 28, 2022.

(BULENT KILIC/AFP via Getty Images)

Russia's withdrawal from the strategic southern city of Kherson will shift the fighting in Ukraine eastward, make it harder for the Kremlin to justify its war at home, and spur unsuccessful talk in Moscow and the West of renewing cease-fire negotiations with Kyiv. On Nov. 9, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu ordered the withdrawal of troops stationed in Kherson, the strategic Ukrainian city located along the Black Sea and the Dnieper River that Russia captured in the opening days of its war. Shoigu made the decision at a staged briefing released to Russian state media with the general in charge of Russia's war in Ukraine, Sergei Surovikin, who explained that Ukrainian shelling had made it impossible to properly supply his troops on the right bank of the Dnieper River. The retreat follows reports of several Ukrainian attacks along the Kherson front, as well as rumors that some Russian forces in and around the city (including elements of the 76th and 106th Air Assault Divisions and the 22nd Army Corps) had already fled eastward to the other side of the Dnieper.

Surovikin was appointed the commander of Russia's ''special military operation'' on Oct. 18. In his first interview with state media under the new role, Surovikin hinted at the possibility of Russian forces leaving Kherson by noting he would not rule out making ''difficult decisions'' regarding the region. Reports suggest that Surovikin had likely been pushing for a retreat from Kherson for weeks, but that Russian President Vladimir Putin had previously overruled the new commander's requests.
Kherson was seized just days after the start of Russia's invasion on Feb. 24. It was the first significant urban center in Ukraine that Russia captured after launching its invasion, and remains the only regional capital in the country that has fallen under Russian control since the invasion began.
Russia's retreat will likely take several days or possibly weeks in order to prevent Ukraine from disrupting the withdrawal and further endangering Russian forces. The goal of Russia's withdrawal is to maintain the combat capability of its troops by preventing losses to men and equipment. To ensure those men and equipment aren't harmed as they exit Kherson, the retreat will strive to be methodical. Russia will rely on several lines of defense in order to gradually pull back from line to line, maintaining battle order and control to prevent the several thousands of pieces of Russia's modern military equipment from being destroyed or abandoned. High proportions of Russia's elite airborne troops, as well as formations of the 22nd army corps and the 49th combined arms army, will also remain on the western bank of the Dnieper to screen the troops from Kherson. Ukraine, meanwhile, will likely launch attacks throughout the withdrawal to ensure it is as chaotic and costly as possible for Russia. Ukraine will also be tempted to try to prevent some of Russia's most combat-capable formations from leaving Kherson by effectively encircling them in the area. But given Russia's extensive mining and construction of fortifications in and around Kherson, such an operation would risk resulting in significant casualties for Ukraine, which must conserve manpower whenever possible against its much more populous opponent.


The Kherson retreat will compel Russia to double down on its scorched-earth strategy of targeting Ukrainian civilians and infrastructure. The Russian forces withdrawn from the western bank of the Dnieper will likely be repositioned eastward to the Zaporizhzhia and Donbas regions where Ukraine has recently been deploying more troops. But the growing concentrations of both sides' forces in those areas will make a major breakthrough in the war unlikely. Indeed, the retreat from Kherson is the latest in a series of setbacks Russia has faced on the battlefield in recent months amid persistent Ukrainian advancements. Moscow will perceive the loss of the strategic southern city as further evidence of its inability to break the Ukrainian military's unyielding resistance, which will in turn compel the Russian military to further focus its efforts on breaking the Ukrainian people's and the West's will instead. This will see Russia increasingly use precision weapons to launch attacks that result in civilian casualties and the widespread destruction of critical infrastructure — including Ukraine's electrical grid, communications facilities and decision-making centers.

The loss of Kherson will lead to further disenchantment and alarm among Russian citizens about the trajectory of the war in Ukraine. But the retreat won't keep Moscow from continuing to frame its special military operation as a success, despite the dwindling amount of Ukrainian territory that remains under Russian control. The retreat doesn't come as a surprise for Russians, given the Nov. 9 announcement followed weeks of reports that Russian forces had begun withdrawing from the city. This reduced shock value will, in turn, mitigate the public backlash in Russia from both hard-line and liberal factions casting the retreat as an embarrassment. But the loss of Kherson will nonetheless still cast further doubt in Russians' minds about the possibility of a victory in Ukraine. To justify the invasion as worth the costs to the Russian populace, it will be crucial for the Kremlin to retain control over the areas of Ukraine still occupied by Russian forces, with the land corridor to Crimea being the most important, followed by newly seized areas of Donbas. This means Russian forces are likely to expend large amounts of human and material resources to prevent further Ukrainian advances toward these annexed territories, to where fighting will inevitably shift as the eight-month war grinds on.

Prior to the announced withdrawal from Kherson, high-ranking Russian officials had repeatedly indicated that Russia would never leave the city or other annexed territories of Ukraine. In a strongly-worded speech on Sept. 30, Putin said he wanted ''the Kyiv authorities and their real masters in the West'' to understand that Russia viewed the people living in the Russia-occupied regions of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia as ''our citizens[,] forever.'' In early May, the Secretary of the General Council of the ruling United Russia party reportedly told Kherson city residents that ''Russia [was] here forever,'' and that there would be ''no return to the past.''
Notably, many pro-war Russian military bloggers and regime hardliners such as Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov and Private Military Company Wagner head Evgeniy Prigozhin praised Russia's decision to withdraw from Kherson. This suggests that public condemnation of Russia's withdrawal from the nationalist segment of Russia's information ecosystem will be relatively muted in the short term, but may still grow with time.
Russia's withdrawal from Kherson may lead to increased Western calls for renewed negotiations with Russia and a possible cease-fire over the winter, but Ukraine currently remains unlikely to rejoin talks. On Nov. 9, NBC reported that some Western officials increasingly believe that neither side can achieve their goals in the Ukraine war and believe the expected winter slowdown in fighting is an opportunity to restart diplomatic talks between Russia and Ukraine. Such reports of U.S. and EU officials either informally hinting at or openly calling for negotiations will likely increase amid the likely impending stalemate on the frontlines in eastern Ukraine. But Kyiv remains unlikely to return to negotiations, where it would likely once again face demands from Moscow to de facto relinquish control over all the Ukrainian territory Russia currently occupies, which is politically untenable for Kyiv. Additionally, a cease-fire could threaten Ukraine's currently advantageous position on the battlefield by granting Russia time to rearm and prepare troops for future offensives.

On Nov. 10, U.S. President Joe Biden said Russia's order to evacuate troops from Kherson showed Moscow was having ''real problems'' with its military. Biden told reporters it was ''interesting'' that Russia had waited until after the U.S. congressional election to announce the withdrawal. Biden also said the retreat would allow both sides to recalibrate their positions over the winter, but it remained to be seen whether Ukraine was prepared to compromise with Russia.

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Zeihan-- the Russians are fuct
« Reply #1015 on: November 15, 2022, 02:55:06 PM »
« Last Edit: November 15, 2022, 03:07:51 PM by Crafty_Dog »


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George Friedman: A near miss in Poland
« Reply #1017 on: November 18, 2022, 05:11:24 AM »
November 18, 2022
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A Near Miss in Poland
Thoughts in and around geopolitics.
By: George Friedman

Perhaps the best novel by Tom Clancy, who often wrote about Cold War confrontations between the United States and the Soviet Union, was "The Hunt for Red October." In it, a state-of-the-art submarine whose captain and crew were defecting to the U.S. crossed the Atlantic while avoiding kill and capture by their former comrades. The stakes were high and tensions rose. In a critical scene, U.S. and Soviet aircraft maneuvered around each other, and when a U.S. sub-hunter tried an emergency landing on a U.S. aircraft carrier, it crashed. The admiral commanding the fleet said, “This business will get out of control.” Snagging a Soviet submarine, from his point of view, wasn’t worth the risk the U.S. was running.

When I heard the initial reports that two Russian missiles had struck Poland, I remembered those words: “This business will get out of control.” It appeared that the Russians were attacking a non-combatant country, one filled with American troops, advisers and contractors, and with systems that monitored Russian actions. It appeared that the Russians had just expanded the war to another country, and perhaps to the rest of NATO. I didn’t know where the missiles had fallen, but I assumed it was a depot for American equipment moving to Ukraine or some surveillance site.

If the Russians had decided to expand the war to Poland, the United States would counter by striking Russia, something it had not yet done. The danger was that with missiles flying, it would be difficult to determine which were carrying nuclear warheads and which were carrying conventional ones. The uncertainty would potentially push the war into a nuclear exchange.

It was vital that the missiles that hit Poland not be Russian. Very quickly, the United States issued statements that the missiles were from Ukrainian air defenses, and eventually Ukraine agreed. I tend to believe this version; spending precious long-range missiles to deliver conventional payloads onto rural Poland is not useful to the war effort and thus not credible. But given the stakes, I did for a moment wonder if the U.S. would deny it was a Russian missile so that it wouldn’t feel compelled to retaliate. But the initial panic gave way to the calming notion that this was simply the whole business getting out of hand.

It also raised the question of why the war continues. The rationale makes enough military sense: Russia wanted strategic depth, and the West doesn’t want a Russian presence on the border of NATO. But the current combat doesn’t. Russia has all but lost the war. Its intent was to take control of Ukraine and block an anti-Russian force from using it as a base. There appears to be no circumstance under which Moscow will succeed in that regard, given the capability of Ukrainian troops and the mass of American weapons. More Russian forces are being readied, but they are unlikely to turn the tide.

The Ukrainians understandably want to regain their entire country. But any viable negotiation will give Moscow the opportunity to save face. If Russia comes back from talks empty-handed, President Vladimir Putin’s position will become even shakier than it is now, forcing him to reject talks and continue the war. To cede a small amount of territory in Donbas, a region with a large Russian population anyway, would be painful to Ukraine, but the number of Ukrainians that would die if the war continues would have to be measured against the pain of making concessions.

The United States holds the cards. Ukraine can’t continue the war without the U.S., which has already made it clear to Kyiv that it’s high time to start negotiating an end. Washington hasn’t lost any of its own troops, of course, but it has spent a great deal of money on the war, some of it weakening the American economy, and the economy of Europe has been sufficiently affected that it raises the question of whether the alliance could last the winter. The U.S. has achieved the mission it set for itself, and it understands that peace will involve concessions to Russia – thus is the nature of negotiations. Ukraine has to weigh the cost of continuing the war, with all the attendant casualties and damages, against whatever concessions may emerge.

If the war does continue, then we are at the point where the business gets out of hand. Though Russia has failed to win, it can still fight, however fruitlessly. If put in a position where there is no room to negotiate, the nuclear option might become attractive to Moscow. I actually don’t think this would be the case, but the risk of Russian irrationality is not worth the price.

As the incident in Poland shows, wars have a tendency to surprise us. As necessary and well-fought as the conflict may be for Ukraine, the country is paying a terrible price. Russia has found its military limit, and it is now facing a reckoning that cannot be predicted. The U.S. has achieved its goal. Moving on will require a negotiation in which Russia asks for something, and deserving or not, it will end this episode of human loss. Those who want everything are often surprised to have received nothing.

Crafty_Dog

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Who are the Ukrainian Integral Nationalists?
« Reply #1018 on: November 18, 2022, 02:35:15 PM »

https://archive.ph/2022.11.16-151912/https://www.voltairenet.org/article218395.html

Who are the Ukrainian integral nationalists ?
by Thierry Meyssan

Who knows the history of the Ukrainian "integral nationalists", "Nazis" according to the terminology of the Kremlin? It begins during the First World War, continues during the Second, the Cold War and continues today in modern Ukraine. Many documents have been destroyed and modern Ukraine forbids under penalty of imprisonment to mention their crimes. The fact remains that these people massacred at least four million of their compatriots and conceived the architecture of the Final Solution, that is, the murder of millions of people because of their real or supposed membership in the Jewish or Gypsy communities of Europe.

VOLTAIRE NETWORK | PARIS (FRANCE) | 15 NOVEMBER 2022
DEUTSCH ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΆ FRANÇAIS ITALIANO NEDERLANDS


The German agent, thinker of Ukrainian “integral nationalism” and criminal against humanity, Dmytro Dontsov (Metipol 1883, Montreal 1973).

Like most Western political analysts and commentators, I was unaware of the existence of Ukrainian neo-Nazis until 2014. When the president-elect was overthrown, I was living in Syria at the time and thought they were violent groupings that had burst onto the public scene to assist pro-European elements. However, since the Russian military intervention, I have gradually discovered a lot of documents and information on this political movement which, in 2021, represented one third of the Ukrainian armed forces. This article presents a synthesis of it.

At the very beginning of this story, that is to say before the First World War, Ukraine was a large plain which had always been tossed between German and Russian influences. At the time, it was not an independent state, but a province of the tsarist empire. It was populated by Germans, Bulgarians, Greeks, Poles, Rumanians, Russians, Czechs, Tatars and a very large Jewish minority supposedly descended from the ancient Khazar people.

A young poet, Dmytro Dontsov, was fascinated by the avant-garde artistic movements, believing that they would help his country to escape from its social backwardness. Since the Tsarist Empire had been immobile since the death of Catherine the Great, while the German Empire was the scientific center of the West, Dontsov chose Berlin over Moscow.

When the Great War broke out, he became an agent of the German secret service. He emigrated to Switzerland, where he published, on behalf of his masters, the Bulletin of the Nationalities of Russia in several languages, calling for the uprising of the ethnic minorities of the Tsarist Empire in order to bring about its defeat. This model was chosen by the Western secret services to organize the "Forum of Free Peoples of Russia" this summer in Prague [1].

In 1917, the Bolshevik revolution turned the tables. Dontsov’s friends supported the Russian revolution, but he remained pro-German. In the anarchy that followed, Ukraine was divided de facto by three different regimes: the nationalists of Symon Petliura (who imposed themselves in the area held today by the Zelensky administration), the anarchists of Nestor Makhno (who organized themselves in Novorosssia, the land that had been developed by Prince Potemkin and that had never known serfdom), and the Bolsheviks (especially in the Donbass). The war cry of Petliura’s followers was "Death to the Jews and Bolsheviks". They perpetrated numerous murderous pogroms.

Dmytro Dontsov returned to Ukraine before the German defeat and became the protégé of Symon Petliura. He participated briefly in the Paris peace conference but, for some unknown reason, did not remain in his delegation. In Ukraine, he helped Petliura to ally with Poland to crush the anarchists and Bolsheviks. After the capture of Kiev by the Bolsheviks, Petliura and Dontsov negotiated the Treaty of Warsaw (April 22, 1920): the Polish army undertook to push back the Bolsheviks and to liberate Ukraine in exchange for Galicia and Volhynia (exactly as the Zelensky administration is negotiating today the entry of Poland into the war against the same lands [2]). This new war was a fiasco.

Vladimir Jabotinsky, born in Odessa, thinker of "revisionist Zionism". For him Israel was "a land without a people, for a People without a land">.

To strengthen his side, Petliura secretly negotiated with the founder of the Jewish battalions in the British army (the "Jewish Legion") and now administrator of the World Zionist Organization (WZO), Vladimir Jabotinsky. In September 1921, the two men agreed to unite against the Bolsheviks in exchange for Petliura’s commitment to forbid his troops to continue their pogroms. The Jewish Legion was to become the "Jewish Gendarmerie. However, despite his efforts, Petliura did not succeed in pacifying his troops, especially as his close collaborator Dontsov was still encouraging the massacre of Jews. Finally, when the agreement was revealed, the World Zionist Organization rebelled against the Petliura regime. On January 17, 1923, the WZO set up a commission to investigate Jabotinsky’s activities. Jabotinsky refused to come and explain himself and resigned from his position.

Simon Petliura took over northern Ukraine. Protector of the "integral nationalists", he sacrificed Galicia and Volhynia to fight the Russians.

Petliura fled to Poland and then to France, where he was murdered by a Jewish anarchist from Bessarabia (now Transnistria). During the trial, the latter assumed his crime and pleaded to have avenged the hundreds of thousands of Jews murdered by the troops of Petliura and Dontsov. The trial had a great impact. The court acquitted the murderer. The League against Pogroms, later Licra (International League against Racism and Anti-Semitism), was founded on this occasion.

Not only were the nationalists defeated, but the anarchists as well. Everywhere the Bolsheviks triumphed and chose, not without debate, to join the Soviet Union.

Dmytro Dontsov published literary magazines that fascinated the youth. He continued to promote a Central Europe dominated by Germany and became closer to Nazism as it rose. He soon referred to his doctrine as Ukrainian "integral nationalism ". In doing so, he referred to the French poet, Charles Maurras. Indeed, the logic of both men was initially identical: they sought in their own culture the means to affirm a modern nationalism. However, Maurras was a Germanophobe, while Dontsov was a Germanophile. The expression "integral nationalism" is still claimed today by Dontov’s followers, who, after the fall of the Third Reich, are careful to refute the term "Nazism" with which the Russians describe it, not without reason.

According to him, "Ukrainian nationalism" is characterized by:

"the affirmation of the will to live, power, expansion" (it promotes "The right of strong races to organize peoples and nations to strengthen the existing culture and civilization")
"the desire to fight and the awareness of its extremity" (he praises the "creative violence of the initiative minority").
Its qualities are:
"fanaticism" ;
" immorality".

Finally, turning his back on his past, Dontsov became an unconditional admirer of the Führer, Adolf Hitler. His followers had founded, in 1929, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) around Colonel Yevhen Konovalets. Konovalets called Dontsov "the spiritual dictator of the youth of Galicia". However, a quarrel arose between Dontsov and another intellectual about his extremism that led to war against all, when Konovalets was suddenly murdered. The OUN (financed by the German secret service) then split in two. The "integral nationalists" reserved for themselves the OUN-B, named after Dontsov’s favorite disciple, Stepan Bandera.

In 1932-33, the Bolshevik political commissars, who were mostly Jewish, levied a tax on crops, as in other regions of the Soviet Union. Combined with significant and unpredictable climatic hazards, this policy caused a huge famine in several regions of the USSR, including the Ukraine. It is known as "Holodomor". Contrary to what the nationalist historian Lev Dobrianski says, it was not a plan for the extermination of Ukrainians by the Russians, since other Soviet regions suffered, but an inadequate management of public resources in times of climate change. Lev Dobrianski’s daughter, Paula Dobrianski, became one of President George W. Bush’s aides. She led a merciless struggle to have historians who did not adhere to her father’s propaganda excluded from Western universities [3].

In 1934, Bandera organized, as a member of the Nazi secret service and head of the OUN-B, the assassination of the Polish Minister of the Interior, Bronisław Pieracki.

From 1939, members of the OUN-B, forming a military organization, the UPA, were trained in Germany by the German army, and then still in Germany, but by their Japanese allies. Stepan Bandera offered Dmytro Dontsov to become the leader of their organization, but the intellectual refused, preferring to play the role of a leader rather than an operational commander.

The "integral nationalists" admired the invasion of Poland, in application of the German-Soviet pact. As Henry Kissinger, who could not be suspected of pro-Sovietism, demonstrated, it was not a question of the USSR annexing Poland, but of neutralizing part of it in order to prepare for the confrontation with the Reich. On the contrary, for Chancellor Hitler, it was a question of beginning the conquest of a "vital space" in Central Europe.

From the beginning of the Second World War, under the guidance of Dmytro Dontsov, the OUN-B fought alongside the Nazi armies against the Jews and the Soviets.

The collaboration between the Ukrainian "integral nationalists" and the Nazis continued with constant massacres of the majority of the Ukrainian population, accused of being Jews or Communists, until the "liberation" of Ukraine by the Third Reich in the summer of 1941 to the cry of "Slava Ukraїni!" (Glory to Ukraine), the war cry used today by the Zelensky administration and the US Democrats. At that time, the "integral nationalists" proclaimed "independence" from the Soviet Union in the presence of Nazi representatives and Greek Orthodox clergy, not in Kiev, but in Lviv, on the model of the Hlinka Guard in Slovakia and the Ustasha in Croatia. They formed a government under the leadership of Providnyk (guide) Stepan Bandera, whose friend Yaroslav Stetsko was Prime Minister. Their support in Ukraine is estimated at 1.5 million people. That is, the "integral nationalists" have always been in the minority.

Celebration of independent Ukraine with Nazi dignitaries. Behind the speakers, the three portraits displayed are those of Stepan Bandera, Adolf Hitler and Yevhen Konovalets.

The Nazis were divided between the Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine, Erich Koch, for whom the Ukrainians were subhuman, and the Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, Alfred Rosenberg, for whom the "integral nationalists" were true allies. Finally, on July 5, 1941, Bandera was deported to Berlin and placed under Ehrenhaft (honorable captivity), i.e., under house arrest as a high-ranking official. However, after the members of OUN-B murdered the leaders of the rival faction, OUN-M, the Nazis sanctioned Stepan Bandera and his organization on September 13, 1941. 48 of their leaders were deported to a prison camp in Auschwitz (which was not yet an extermination camp, but only a prison). The OUN-B was reorganized under German command. At that time all Ukrainian nationalists took the following oath: "Faithful son of my Fatherland, I voluntarily join the ranks of the Ukrainian Liberation Army, and with joy I swear that I will faithfully fight Bolshevism for the honor of the people. This fight we are waging together with Germany and its allies against a common enemy. With loyalty and unconditional submission I believe in Adolf Hitler as the leader and supreme commander of the Liberation Army. At any time I am prepared to give my life for the truth.

The oath of loyalty to Führer Adolf Hitler by members of the OUN.

The Nazis announced that many bodies had been discovered in the prisons, victims of "Bolshevik Jews. So the "integral nationalists" celebrated their "independence" by murdering more than 30,000 Jews and actively participating in the roundup of Jews from Kiev to Babi Yar, where 33,771 of them were shot in two days, on September 29 and 30, 1941, by the Einsatzgruppen of SS Reinhard Heydrich.
In this tumult, Dmytro Dontsov disappeared. In reality, he had gone to Prague and placed himself at the service of the architect of the Final Solution, Reinhard Heydrich, who had just been appointed vice-governor of Bohemia-Moravia. Heydrich organized the Wannsee Conference, which planned the "Final Solution of the Jewish and Gypsy Questions" [4]. He then created the Reinard Heydrich Institute in Prague to coordinate the systematic extermination of all these populations in Europe. The Ukrainian Dontsov, who now lived in Prague in great luxury, immediately became its administrator. He was one of the main architects of the largest massacre in history. Heydrich was assassinated in June 1942, but Dontsov retained his functions and privileges.

Reinhard Heydrich speaking at Prague Castle. He was in charge of managing Bohemia-Moravia. However, his real function was to coordinate the "final solution" of Jewish and Gypsy questions. Dmytro Dontsov joined his team in 1942 and oversaw massacres across Europe until the fall of the Reich. Prague Castle was the scene of the meeting of the European Political Community against Russia last October.

Stepan Bandera and his deputy Yaroslav Stetsko were placed under house arrest at the headquarters of the General Inspectorate of Concentration Camps in Oranienburg-Sachsenhausen (30 km from Berlin). They wrote letters to their supporters and to the Reich leadership in complete freedom and were not deprived of anything. In September 1944, as the Reich army retreated and Bandera’s followers began to rebel against it, the two leaders were released by the Nazis and reinstated in their previous positions. Bandera and Stetsko resumed the armed struggle, among the Nazis, against the Jews and the Bolsheviks.

Centuria Integral Nationalist Order Ceremony. According to George Washington University, by 2021 it had already penetrated the main NATO armies.

But it was already too late. The Reich collapsed. The Anglo-Saxons got Dontsov, Bandera and Stetsko. The theorist of integral nationalism was transferred to Canada, while the two practitioners of mass murder were transferred to Germany. MI6 and the OSS (predecessor of the CIA) rewrote their biographies, making their Nazi involvement and responsibility for the "Final Solution" disappear.

Stepan Bandera during his exile, celebrating the memory of Yevhen Konovalets.

Bandera and Stetsko were installed in Munich to organize the Anglo-Saxon stay-behind networks in the Soviet Union. From 1950 onwards, they had an important radio station, Radio Free Europe, which they shared with the Muslim Brotherhood of Said Ramadan (the father of Tariq Ramadan). The radio station was sponsored by the National Committee for a Free Europe, a CIA offshoot of which its director Alan Dulles was a member, as well as future president Dwight Eisenhower, newspaper magnate Henry Luce and film director Cecil B. DeMilles. Psychological warfare specialist and future patron of the Straussians, Charles D. Jackson, was chairman.

Vladimir Jabotinsky, for his part, after living in Palestine, took refuge in New York. He was joined by Benzion Netanyahu (the father of the current Israeli Prime Minister). The two men wrote the doctrinal texts of "revisionist Zionism" and the Jewish Encyclopedia.
Bandera and Stetsko moved around a lot. They organized sabotage operations throughout the Soviet Union, particularly in the Ukraine, and parachuted leaflets. For this purpose, they created the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN), which brought together their Central European counterparts [5]. The British double agent, Kim Philby, informed the Soviets in advance about the actions of the Bandera.
Bandera met with Dontsov in Canada and asked him to take the lead in the struggle. Once again, the intellectual refused, preferring to devote himself to his writing. He then drifted into a mystical delirium inspired by Viking myths. He announced the final battle of the Ukrainian knights against the Russian dragon. As for Bandera, he allied himself with the Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek whom he met in 1958. But he was assassinated the following year by the KGB in Munich.

Funeral of Criminal Against Humanity, Stepan Bandera.

Chiang Kai-Shek and Yaroslav Stetsko at the founding of the World Anti-Communist League.

Yaroslav Stetsko continued the struggle through Radio Free Europe and the ABN. He went to the United States to testify before Senator Joseph MacCarthy’s Commission on Un-American Activities. In 1967, he and Chiang Kai-shek founded the World Anti-Communist League [6]. The League included many pro-US dictators from around the world and two schools of torture, in Panama and Taiwan. Klaus Barbie, who assassinated Jean Moulin in France and Che Guevara in Bolivia, was a member. In 1983, Stetsko was received at the White House by President Ronald Reagan and participated, along with Vice President George Bush Sr., in Lev Dobrianski’s "Captive Nations" (i.e., peoples occupied by the Soviets) ceremonies. He finally died in 1986.

But the story does not end there. His wife, Slava Stetsko, took over the leadership of these organizations. She too travelled the world to support any fight against the "communists", or rather, if we refer to Dontsov’s writings, against the Russians and the Chinese. When the USSR was dissolved, Mrs. Stetsko simply changed the title of the League to the World League for Freedom and Democracy, a name it still has today. She then devoted herself to regaining a foothold in Ukraine.

Slava Stetsko ran in the first elections of the independent Ukraine in 1994. She was elected to the Verkhovna Rada, but having been stripped of her nationality by the Soviets, she could not sit. However, she brought the Ukrainian president, Leonid Kuchma, to the CIA offices in Munich and dictated parts of the new constitution to him. Even today, Article 16 of the new constitution states: "Preserving the genetic heritage of the Ukrainian people is the responsibility of the state. Thus, Nazi racial discrimination is still proclaimed by modern Ukraine as in the worst moments of World War II.

Slava Stetsko opening the 2002 session of the Verkhovna Rada.

Slava Stetsko was re-elected at the next two sessions. She solemnly presided over the opening sessions on March 19, 1998 and on May 14, 2002.
In 2000, Lev Dobriansky organized a large symposium in Washington with many Ukrainian officials. He invited Straussian Paul Wolfowitz (a former collaborator of Charles D. Jackson). During this meeting, the "integral nationalists" put themselves at the service of the Straussians to destroy Russia [7].

Dmitro Yarosh when founding the Anti-Imperialist Front against Russia with the jihadists. He is now special adviser to the head of the Ukrainian armies.

On May 8, 2007, in Ternopol, on the initiative of the CIA, the "integral nationalists" of the Ukrainian People’s Self-Defense and Islamists created an anti-Russian "Anti-Imperialist Front" under the joint chairmanship of the Emir of Itchkeria, Dokka Umarov, and Dmytro Yarosh (the current special adviser to the head of the Ukrainian army). The meeting was attended by organizations from Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine and Russia, including Islamist separatists from Crimea, Adygea, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, Ossetia and Chechnya. Dokka Umarov, who was unable to go there due to international sanctions, had his contribution read out. In retrospect, the Crimean Tatars are unable to explain their presence at this meeting, if not their past service to the CIA against the Soviets.

The pro-US president, Viktor Yushchenko, created a Dmytro Dontsov Institute, following the "Orange Revolution". Yushchenko is an example of Anglo-Saxon whitewashing. He has always claimed to have no connection with the mainstream nationalists, but his father, Andrei, was a guard in a Nazi extermination camp [8]. The Dmytro Dontsov Institute would be closed in 2010, and then reopened after the 2014 coup.

President Viktor Yushchenko, shortly before the end of his term of office, elevated the criminal against humanity Stepan Bandera to the title of "Hero of the Nation".

In 2011, the mainstream nationalists succeeded in passing a law banning the commemoration of the end of World War II because it was won by the Soviets and lost by the Banderists. But President Viktor Yanukovych refused to enact it. Enraged, the "integral nationalists" attacked the procession of Red Army veterans, beating up old men. Two years later, the cities of Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk abolished the Victory Day ceremonies and banned all manifestations of joy.

In 2014, Ukrainians in Crimea and Donbass refused to recognize the coup government. Crimea, which had declared itself independent before the rest of Ukraine, reaffirmed its independence a second time and joined the Russian Federation. The Donbass sought a compromise. The "Ukrainian nationalists," led by President Petro Poroshenko, stopped providing public services there and bombed its population. In eight years, they murdered at least 16,000 of their fellow citizens in general indifference.

It was also from the 2014 coup that the full nationalist militias were incorporated into the Ukrainian Armed Forces. In their internal regulations, they enjoin each fighter to read the works of Dmytro Dontsov, including his master book, Націоналізм (Nationalism).
In April 2015, the Verkhovna Rada declared members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) "independence fighters." The law was enacted, in December 2018, by President Poroshenko. Former Waffen SS were retrospectively entitled to a pension and all sorts of benefits. The same law criminalized any claim that OUN militants and UPA fighters collaborated with the Nazis and practiced ethnic cleansing of Jews and Poles. Published in Ukraine, this article would send me to jail for writing it and you for reading it.

Inauguration of a commemorative plaque of the Criminal Against Humanity Dmytro Dontsov on the facade of the state news agency Ukrinform. During the ceremony, the general director of Ukrinform assured that Dontsov had founded, in 1918, the first Ukrainian press agency, UTA, of which Ukrinform is the successor.

On July 1, 2021, President Volodymyr Zelenski enacted the Law "On Indigenous Peoples of Ukraine" which places them under the protection of Human Rights. By default, citizens of Russian origin can no longer invoke them in court.

In February 2022, the "full nationalist" militias, which made up one-third of the country’s armed forces, planned a coordinated invasion of Crimea and the Donbass. They were stopped by the Russian military operation to implement UN Security Council Resolution 2202 to end the suffering of the people of Donbass.

Canadian Deputy Prime Minister Chrystia Freeland demonstrates her support for President Zelensky with members of the Canadian branch of the OUN. Today, Ms. Freeland is a candidate for the General Secretariat of NATO.

In March 2022, Israeli Prime Minister Nafatali Bennett, breaking with the "revisionist Zionism" of Benjamin Netanyahu (the son of Jabotinsky’s secretary), suggested to President Volodymyr Zelensky that he should agree with Russian demands and denazify his country [8]. Emboldened by this unexpected support, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov dared to mention the case of the Jewish Ukrainian president, saying: "The Jewish people in their wisdom have said that the most ardent anti-Semites are usually Jews. Every family has its black sheep, as they say." This was too much for the Israelis, who always worry when someone tries to divide them. His counterpart at the time, Yair Lapid, recalled that the Jews themselves never organized the Holocaust of which they were victims. Caught between its conscience and its alliances, the Hebrew state repeated its support for Ukraine, but refused to send it any weapons. In the end, the General Staff decided and the Minister of Defense, Benny Gantz, closed any possibility of support to the successors of the mass murderers of Jews.

Ukrainians are the only nationalists who are not fighting for their people or their land, but for one idea: to annihilate the Jews and the Russians.
Main sources:
› Ukrainian Nationalism in the age of extremes. An intllectual biography of Dmytro Dontsov, Trevor Erlacher, Harvard University Press (2021).
› Stepan Bandera, The Life and Afterlife of a Ukrainian Nationalist. Fascism, Genocide, and Cult, Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe, Ibidem (2014).
Thierry Meyssan
Translation
Roger Lagassé
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Selon le rapport de l’IERES de l’Université George Washington (2021), l’Ordre Centuria a déjà pénétré les armées en Allemagne, au Canada, en France, en Pologne, au Royaume-Uni et aux États-Unis
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[1] “The Western strategy to dismantle the Russian Federation”, by Thierry Meyssan, Translation Roger Lagassé, Voltaire Network, 17 August 2022.
[2] “Poland and Ukraine”, by Thierry Meyssan, Translation Roger Lagassé, Voltaire Network, 14 June 2022.
[3] “The Holodomor, new avatar of “European” anti-communism” (excerpt from Le Choix of defeat), Annie Lacroix-Riz (2010).
[4] «The Wannsee Conference in 1942 and the National Socialist living space dystopia», Gerhard Wolf, Journal of Genocide Research, Vol 17 N°2 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2015.1027074
[5] [Bulletins of the Anti-Bolshevik Nations Block are available in the Voltaire Network Library. ABN Korrespondenz (auf Deutsch), ABN Correspondence (in english).
[6] “The World Anti-Communist League: the Internationale of Crime”, by Thierry Meyssan, Translation Anoosha Boralessa, Voltaire Network, 12 May 2004.
[7] “Ukraine : the Second World War continues”, by Thierry Meyssan, Translation Roger Lagassé, Voltaire Network, 26 April 2022.
[8] “Israel stunned by Ukrainian neo-Nazis”, by Thierry Meyssan, Translation Roger Lagassé, Voltaire Network, 8 March 2022.
« Last Edit: November 18, 2022, 02:37:38 PM by Crafty_Dog »

DougMacG

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #1019 on: November 19, 2022, 05:27:09 PM »
I've been thinking 40B is pretty cheap to defeat Russia.  This is the first source I've seen saying that:

https://cepa.org/article/its-costing-peanuts-for-the-us-to-defeat-russia/

Of course there are more costs to come.

 
« Last Edit: November 19, 2022, 05:32:57 PM by DougMacG »

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Crafty_Dog

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #1021 on: November 20, 2022, 02:15:24 PM »
Paywall blocked.

Care to paste it?

DougMacG

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #1022 on: November 21, 2022, 07:16:30 AM »
https://www.ft.com/content/2aa769e3-c0f1-430b-bb26-c6cf10e4b529
Paywall blocked.
Care to paste it?

I'm not able to get back in either.  The gist I took from it:  Author can't imagine how Russia can spin this as anything other than defeat.  A short time ago we feared Russia would take the entire Black Sea coast from Ukraine, and it seems to be going the other direction.  I took the article as documentation that Russia did retreat from this city of key strategic location.  BBC map:



https://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/ny-kherson-ukraine-rejoice-russian-retreat-20221119-fyuv4qcwuzgwtorpjbwlybcz6y-story.html

Ukraine retaking the prized port city could mark a decisive moment, Western officials and military analysts said.
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/russia-kherson-retreat-putin-war-ukraine-what-it-means-rcna56537


Crafty_Dog

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #1023 on: November 21, 2022, 08:03:57 AM »
Thank you.

Crafty_Dog

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Russian morale
« Reply #1024 on: November 22, 2022, 05:50:23 AM »
Russian struggles prove morale to be potent weapon in war

BY BEN WOLFGANG THE WASHINGTON TIMES

It commands less attention than a perfectly executed battle plan, and it is much harder to quantify than a numerical edge in shells, tanks or fighter planes.

Yet morale has been a deciding factor in battles throughout human history and ultimately could spell doom for Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Scholars and military analysts say low morale in the Russian ranks is one of the biggest reasons why Moscow has failed to achieve many of its key strategic objectives in Ukraine despite its far larger army and massive advantage in virtually all other quantifiable metrics.

From their disastrous effort to capture Kyiv to their humiliating retreat from Kherson, Russian forces appear to have been at a massive psychological disadvantage. Ukrainian soldiers believe deeply in their cause and have been buoyed by successes, but Russian troops by nearly all accounts appear to doubt the competence of their leaders. In some cases, they simply don’t share President Vladimir Putin’s belief that it is necessary to put their lives on the line in Ukraine.

The result has been a massive gulf in motivation, energy level, initiative and confidence. That gap has appeared on the battlefield in several ways, specialists say, because troops with low morale simply don’t perform well.

“They will do the bare minimum,” said retired Army Lt. Gen. Tom Spoehr, now director of the Center for National Defense at the conservative Heritage Foundation. “If you as a leader declare that we’re going to do a mission or raid, they will go the absolute minimum amount of distance they have to to avoid getting in trouble. They won’t push further. They won’t exploit opportunities they see. In some cases when morale

gets horrible, they won’t even do that.

“Maybe the conscripted [Russian] soldier, maybe he or she believes that they’re in Ukraine to fight the danger of Ukrainians,” Gen. Spoehr said in an interview. “But anybody past the age of reason … knows better. They know that Ukraine was not posing a danger to Russia. That impacts what they do. They’ll do those actions that will cause them to stay out of prison, but no more.”

The influx of hundreds of thousands of conscripts in recent weeks called up by the Putin government has only accentuated the morale problems. Despite strict government controls, families of the drafted recruits have posted videos of their difficulties in the field, with minimal training, absent leaders and no clear sense of their duties as they try to hold off Ukrainian forces advancing in the east and south.

Throughout history, high morale in the ranks — the combination of believing your cause is just, that your military can win, and that your commanders are competent and concerned about an individual soldier’s well-being — has proved to be a decisive factor. As the U.S. entered World War II in December 1941, historians and psychologists highlighted the game-changing effect morale could have on the outcomes of battles.

“Morale wins wars, solves crises, is an indispensable condition of a vigorous national life and equally essential to the maximum achievement of the individual,” historian Arthur Upham Pope wrote in a 1941 piece for The Journal of Educational Sociology.

“In battle, morale gives victory,” he said. “The outnumbered, ill-equipped or even outmaneuvered may triumph if their morale is markedly superior.”

Pope cited battles in the Punic Wars, the French Revolution and a host of other conflicts in which outnumbered, outgunned armies defeated their foes largely because of higher morale, belief in their cause and superior leadership. In the Civil War, Confederate units racked up early wins over much larger Union forces partly because of their morale and motivation. That morale declined throughout the war, however, especially after a landmark Union victory at the Battle of Gettysburg and the grinding battle of attrition adopted by commander Ulysses S. Grant.

More recently in Afghanistan, a Taliban insurgent force outlasted the U.S. military and overthrew the Western- backed Afghan government after a 20-year conflict, partly because of its unwavering commitment to drive Western forces out of the country and restore its harsh version of Islamic law.

The defensive force for the weak, corruption-riddled government in Kabul fought well at times but virtually dissolved after political leadership deserted the troops.

In Ukraine, evidence of Russian troops’ low morale has been building since the war began in late February. In September, a New York Times report revealed numerous intercepted phone calls from Russian troops to friends and family. In one message, a soldier declared that “Putin is a fool.”

This month, the Russian military blog Grayzone published a letter supposedly written by members of Russia’s 155th Marine Brigade who blasted military commanders after a disastrous attack on Ukrainian positions in the Donetsk province.

“As a result of the ‘carefully’ planned offensive by the ‘great generals,’ we lost about 300 people killed, wounded and missing in the course of four days. [And] half of our equipment,” the Russian troops wrote, according to Englishlanguage media accounts.

The Russian Defense Ministry publicly denied the claims that it had suffered massive losses in Donetsk, even though Western intelligence services and other observers seemed to confirm the soldiers’ accounts.

It’s little surprise that Russian troops would doubt the intelligence, competence and sympathy of their leaders. From the start, their claims have been divorced from reality, most notably Mr. Putin’s declaration that Russia needed to eliminate Nazis who were secretly running Ukraine.

Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu has come under fierce criticism for Russia’s unrealistic battle plan, and Mr. Putin has cycled through a string of senior commanders looking for someone who can conduct the invasion campaign competently.

On the battlefield, the Russian troops’ anticipated advantages never materialized. The campaign to take Kyiv was doomed by Russian commanders’ failure to bring enough fuel for military vehicles. Russian military leaders initially didn’t deploy electronic warfare systems and other mechanisms to ward off Ukrainian drone strikes, which destroyed Russian armored columns.

Russia also was expected to quickly gain air superiority in Ukraine, but the skies remain uncontested nearly nine months into the fighting.

Despite its presumed status as a premier cold-weather fighting force, recent reports suggest that the Russian military has failed to provide coats, hats, gloves and other mission-critical materials for its troops. That lack of basic supplies fuels doubts among soldiers that their leaders can provide for their basic needs.

“Forces lacking in winter weather clothing and accommodation are highly likely to suffer from non-freezing cold injuries,” the British Defense Ministry said in a recent analysis of the Russian war effort. “The weather itself is likely to see an increase in rainfall, wind speed and snowfall. Each of these will provide additional challenges to the already low morale of Russian forces” and create new logistical headaches for them.

The Washington-based Institute for the Study of War, in one of its daily analyses of the fighting last week, highlighted the demoralized state of Russian forces in one strategic area.

“Multiple reports indicate that the morale and psychological state of Russian forces in the Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts are exceedingly low,” the institute survey noted. “Significant losses on the battlefield, mobilization to the front lines without proper training, and poor supplies have led to cases of desertion.”

The survey cited a report in a Russian independent media outlet that said some 300 Russian soldiers were being detained in a basement in a part of Russian-occupied Ukraine for refusing orders to return to the front lines.

Setting aside the fact that many Russian soldiers may not believe in the mission itself, each of those shortcomings reveals systemic problems at the highest levels of the Russian military. If Russian troops can’t trust their commanders, successful missions become all but impossible.

“There’s no question but that the No. 1 corrosive factor in undermining morale is a lack of trust in leadership,” said Col. Timothy Mallard, director of ethical development and college chaplain at the U.S. Army War College.

“Such trust must be both vertical and horizontal at every level of war, beginning within a single unit and extending to the nation — a critical marker of a professional military force,” he told The Washington Times. “Soldiers must trust those who are charged to lead both them and their units in combat, and when they don’t, military effectiveness quickly erodes.”

The results of low morale, Col. Mallard said, include “poor coordination within or amongst units, poor execution of published plans or orders, and poor obedience to the chain of command.”

Furthermore, there is an obvious difference in the leadership styles of Mr. Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Mr. Zelenskyy has given daily video addresses throughout the war, stayed in Kyiv in the darkest early days of the fighting, and now regularly leaves the capital for morale-building visits with the troops. He most recently visited Kherson after the Russian retreat.

Mr. Putin, meanwhile, has been nowhere near the front lines.

“Men and women will do great things if they have some leader next to them, out in front of them, saying this is the way to go,” Gen. Spoehr said. “History is filled with examples of people who went above and beyond as long as their leader was there sharing it.


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Pravda on the Potomac: Pressure to track the weapons and money builds
« Reply #1026 on: November 27, 2022, 03:39:25 PM »
Pressure builds to step up weapons tracking in Ukraine
Legislation would require greater scrutiny of the $20 billion in military aid President Biden has sent Ukraine, and it has bipartisan support
Image without a caption
By Karoun Demirjian
November 27, 2022 at 2:00 a.m. EST


Emboldened by their success in the midterm elections, House Republicans, who will hold a slim majority in the next Congress, have warned the Biden administration to expect far tougher oversight of the extensive military assistance it has provided Ukraine.

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The administration, anticipating such demands as the commitment of military aid under President Biden fast approaches $20 billion, has worked in recent weeks to publicize its efforts to track weapons shipments. Both the State Department and the Pentagon have outlined plans, including more inspections and training for the Ukrainians, meant to prevent U.S. arms from falling into the wrong hands — initiatives that have failed thus far to quell Republican skeptics calling for audits and other accountability measures.

Most in Washington are in agreement that, generally, the push for more oversight is a good thing. But experts caution there are credible limitations to ensuring an airtight account of all weapons given to Ukraine that are likely to leave Biden’s harshest critics unsatisfied.


“There are shortcomings of end-use monitoring in the best of circumstances, and of course Ukraine isn’t in the best of circumstances,” said Elias Yousif, a researcher on the global arms trade with the Stimson Center. “There has to be some willingness to be practical about what we can achieve.”

With GOP House win, Biden faces added curbs on foreign policy

To date, the megaphone for demanding change has been controlled primarily by the GOP. Congress “will hold our government accountable for all of the funding for Ukraine,” Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene (R-Ga.) said this month in announcing a measure to audit the aid program after Biden requested another $37 billion for the government in Kyiv. “There has to be accountability going forward,” Rep. Kevin McCarthy (Calif.), House Republicans’ current leader, told CNN in the interview in which he warned against giving Ukraine a “blank check” to fight off Russia’s invasion.

Yet the reckoning could begin before the Republican takeover. A series of provisions on offer in the House-passed version of this year’s annual defense authorization bill would require a web of overlapping reports from the Pentagon and the inspectors general who police transfers of articles of war, plus the establishment of a task force to design and implement enhanced tracking measures.


And unlike the rising GOP chorus of Ukraine skepticism, such line items — while yet to be reconciled with the Senate’s version of the bill, which is still pending in that chamber — largely enjoy bipartisan support.

“The taxpayers deserve to know that investment is going where its intended to go,” Rep. Jason Crow (D-Colo.), a veteran-turned-lawmaker, said in an interview.

Crow led an effort in the House Armed Services Committee to include in the defense bill instructions to the Defense Department Inspector General to review, audit, investigate and otherwise inspect the Pentagon’s efforts to support Ukraine. He called the directive “necessary,” even if he does not count himself among the critics insinuating the Defense Department and the Ukrainians have failed to take the matter seriously enough.

U.S. races to track American arms in heat of Ukraine war

“In any war, there can be missteps and misallocation of supplies,” he explained. But Crow also acknowledged that there were likely to be limitations to the scope of accounting that the United States can provide.


“We’re not playing a mission of perfection here. This is a brutal, large-scale land war — house to house, street to street, trench to trench. There will be things lost,” he said. “We’re not trying to prevent every single piece from falling into the hands of the Russians, but we want to make sure it’s not happening at a large scale.”

Lawmakers, Pentagon officials and experts all note that, thus far, there are few tangible reasons for concern. Ukraine, they said, has been a proactive steward of the assistance it has received, readily reporting back about how U.S. military aid has been put to use — a gesture officials believe is in no small part a function of Kyiv’s effort to secure more of it. There also is a sense the Ukrainians have too much existential national pride at stake to risk compromising their effort to drive out the Russians by siphoning off weapons to the black market.

But even the specter of deadly materiel falling through the cracks has many alarmed — especially with the West pouring smaller, less-traceable arms into the country as Ukrainian civilians face desperate challenges to their basic survival.

Part of the concern is due to practical limitations. According to Pentagon press secretary Brig. Gen. Patrick Ryder, the United States conducts weapons inspections in Ukraine “when and where security conditions permit,” at locations that “are not near the front line of Russia’s war against Ukraine.” Ryder declined to offer further details about the inspections program, citing concerns about operational security and force protection.


Yet the State Department has a limited budget for weapons inspectors positioned in Ukraine, and thus cannot examine every incoming shipment, according to officials. As of early November, U.S. monitors had performed just two in-person inspections since the war began in February — accounting for about 10 percent of the 22,000 U.S.-provided weapons, including Stinger surface-to-air missiles and Javelin antitank missiles, that require enhanced oversight.

Ukraine wants more air defense. Here’s how it works.

Crow and others want to see the State Department expand its roster of specialists to conduct more regular checks at in-country depots and transfer points.

Another reason is the law. “End-use monitoring” is governed by the Arms Export Control Act, which requires the presidential administration to provide “reasonable assurance” that recipients of military assistance are using the weapons for the purpose they were intended, and complying with any conditions set by the United States.

In most cases, that checkup happens solely at the point where weapons are transferred to Ukrainian custody. Only in special cases, usually when the weapons in question contain sensitive technology, is “enhanced” monitoring required of the recipient nation. That entails tracking serial numbers and submitting reports from the field. In Ukraine, such items include Stingers, Javelins, Avenger air defenses and night-vision devices.


The existing system is not good enough, some lawmakers argue, noting that before the war, Ukraine ranked fairly low on global corruption indexes.


“With the volumes of goods that we’re pushing, it’s our responsibility to have third-party oversight. We do it all over the world,” Rep. Mike Waltz (R-Fla.) said in an interview. He pointed out that such practices are used everywhere from India to Israel and in countries “that are much higher on the corruption and transparency index” than Ukraine.

Waltz, who worked with Crow and others to push several of the defense bill’s bipartisan measures calling for increased oversight, supports keeping Ukrainian fighters well armed. But he believes the Biden administration has been too skittish about using Americans to get a clearer view of how U.S. weapons are being handled.

Private groups work to bring specialized combat gear to Ukraine

“There are veterans’ groups running all over the country right now,” Waltz said, suggesting that they could be subcontracted to report back to the Pentagon and State Department on how weapons are being used closer to the front. Short of that, Waltz argues it ought to be possible to send U.S. inspectors not just to Ukraine’s central weapons depots, but “down to the brigade or even the battalion headquarters level,” without undue risk.


Thus far, the Biden administration has resisted pressure to send inspectors or other military personnel too deeply into Ukraine, for fear of fomenting a wider conflict. According to U.S. officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss operational matters, American specialists currently conduct weapons inspections unarmed — a condition that would likely be unsustainable if they were sent closer to the front lines.

The Biden administration has been adamant, officials and lawmakers who have been briefed by them say, that it will not tiptoe into a situation that risks being interpreted by the Kremlin as direct American involvement in the war.

But Waltz noted that Russian President Vladimir Putin is waging a propaganda campaign accusing the United States and NATO of clandestinely operating in Ukraine to turn the population against Moscow. “That’s a self-limitation on the administration’s part,” he argued. “There is an acceptable risk to having people behind the front lines checking on where all this aid is going and helping the Ukrainians use it more effectively.

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Zeihan: Outcome will be known by May
« Reply #1027 on: November 28, 2022, 07:59:33 AM »

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Kissinger
« Reply #1030 on: December 17, 2022, 05:34:26 PM »
merges the past (WWI) , the present (Ukraine/Russia) ,

and the future (AI control of weaponry and strategy)

https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/the-push-for-peace/

I recall he is worried about how AI might wind up be the destroyer of our world

[not bad for a 99 yo.]

===============================

Henry Kissinger
How to avoid another world war
From magazine issue:
17 December 2022


The first world war was a kind of cultural suicide that destroyed Europe’s eminence. Europe’s leaders sleepwalked – in the phrase of historian Christopher Clark – into a conflict which none of them would have entered had they foreseen the world at war’s end in 1918. In the previous decades, they had expressed their rivalries by creating two sets of alliances whose strategies had become linked by their respective schedules for mobilisation. As a result, in 1914, the murder of the Austrian Crown Prince in Sarajevo, Bosnia by a Serb nationalist was allowed to escalate into a general war that began when Germany executed its all-purpose plan to defeat France by attacking neutral Belgium at the other end of Europe.

The nations of Europe, insufficiently familiar with how technology had enhanced their respective military forces, proceeded to inflict unprecedented devastation on one another. In August 1916, after two years of war and millions in casualties, the principal combatants in the West (Britain, France and Germany) began to explore prospects for ending the carnage. In the East, rivals Austria and Russia had extended comparable feelers. Because no conceivable compromise could justify the sacrifices already incurred and because no one wanted to convey an impression of weakness, the various leaders hesitated to initiate a formal peace process. Hence they sought American mediation. Explorations by Colonel Edward House, President Woodrow Wilson’s personal emissary, revealed that a peace based on the modified status quo ante was within reach. However, Wilson, while willing and eventually eager to undertake mediation, delayed until after the presidential election in November. By then the British Somme offensive and the German Verdun offensive had added another two million casualties.


In the words of the book on the subject by Philip Zelikow, diplomacy became the road less travelled. The Great War went on for two more years and claimed millions more victims, irretrievably damaging Europe’s established equilibrium. Germany and Russia were rent by revolution; the Austro-Hungarian state disappeared from the map. France had been bled white. Britain had sacrificed a significant share of its young generation and of its economic capacities to the requirements of victory. The punitive Treaty of Versailles that ended the war proved far more fragile than the structure it replaced.

Does the world today find itself at a comparable turning point in Ukraine as winter imposes a pause on large-scale military operations there? I have repeatedly expressed my support for the allied military effort to thwart Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. But the time is approaching to build on the strategic changes which have already been accomplished and to integrate them into a new structure towards achieving peace through negotiation.


Ukraine has become a major state in Central Europe for the first time in modern history. Aided by its allies and inspired by its President, Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine has stymied the Russian conventional forces which have been overhanging Europe since the second world war. And the international system – including China – is opposing Russia’s threat or use of its nuclear weapons.

This process has mooted the original issues regarding Ukraine’s membership in Nato. Ukraine has acquired one of the largest and most effective land armies in Europe, equipped by America and its allies. A peace process should link Ukraine to Nato, however expressed. The alternative of neutrality is no longer meaningful, especially after Finland and Sweden joined Nato. This is why, last May, I recommended establishing a ceasefire line along the borders existing where the war started on 24 February. Russia would disgorge its conquests thence, but not the territory it occupied nearly a decade ago, including Crimea. That territory could be the subject of a negotiation after a ceasefire.

If the pre-war dividing line between Ukraine and Russia cannot be achieved by combat or by negotiation, recourse to the principle of self-determination could be explored. Internationally supervised referendums concerning self-determination could be applied to particularly divisive territories which have changed hands repeatedly over the centuries.

The goal of a peace process would be twofold: to confirm the freedom of Ukraine and to define a new international structure, especially for Central and Eastern Europe. Eventually Russia should find a place in such an order.

The preferred outcome for some is a Russia rendered impotent by the war. I disagree. For all its propensity to violence, Russia has made decisive contributions to the global equilibrium and to the balance of power for over half a millennium. Its historical role should not be degraded. Russia’s military setbacks have not eliminated its global nuclear reach, enabling it to threaten escalation in Ukraine. Even if this capability is diminished, the dissolution of Russia or destroying its ability for strategic policy could turn its territory encompassing 11 time zones into a contested vacuum. Its competing societies might decide to settle their disputes by violence. Other countries might seek to expand their claims by force. All these dangers would be compounded by the presence of thousands of nuclear weapons which make Russia one of the world’s two largest nuclear powers.

As the world’s leaders strive to end the war in which two nuclear powers contest a conventionally armed country, they should also reflect on the impact on this conflict and on long-term strategy of incipient high–technology and artificial intelligence. Auto-nomous weapons already exist, capable of defining, assessing and targeting their own perceived threats and thus in a position to start their own war.

Once the line into this realm is crossed and hi-tech becomes standard weaponry – and computers become the principal executors of strategy – the world will find itself in a condition for which as yet it has no established concept. How can leaders exercise control when computers prescribe strategic instructions on a scale and in a manner that inherently limits and threatens human input? How can civilisation be preserved amid such a maelstrom of conflicting information, perceptions and destructive capabilities?


CLAIM
Ukraine has become a major state in Central Europe for the first time in modern history

No theory for this encroaching world yet exists, and consultative efforts on this subject have yet to evolve – perhaps because meaningful negotiations might disclose new discoveries, and that disclosure itself constitutes a risk for the future. Overcoming the disjunction between advanced technology and the concept of strategies for controlling it, or even understanding its full implications, is as important an issue today as climate change, and it requires leaders with a command of both technology and history.

The quest for peace and order has two components that are sometimes treated as contradictory: the pursuit of elements of security and the requirement for acts of reconciliation. If we cannot achieve both, we will not be able to reach either. The road of diplomacy may appear complicated and frustrating. But progress to it requires both the vision and the courage to undertake the journey.


WRITTEN BY
Henry Kissinger



« Last Edit: December 19, 2022, 01:58:26 PM by Crafty_Dog »


Crafty_Dog

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A friend's response to Kissinger
« Reply #1032 on: December 19, 2022, 01:56:44 PM »
Kissinger makes many historical errors of fact.

1) Germany started WWI on purpose, not "sleepwalking," to pre-empt Russian dominance of the European continent, since Russia was the fastest-growing economy in Europe before WWI, well on its way to continental hegemony. Obviously, Germany failed to achieve that goal.

2) If House was right about a negotiated peace, then why did fighting continue for 2 more years? Germany wasn't ready to surrender until after 2 million US troops entered the war, that's why.

3) Versailles was a negotiated peace that failed after 20 years. WWII ended in unconditional surrender, which has lasted more tha 70 years. Why would a negotiated peace 2 years earlier in WWI have been stronger than Versailles?

4) Russia's "contributions" to the global "balance of power" have been either as one of the aggressor powers we needed to balance against, or as an ally of last resort for the West in the Napoleonic Wars, WWI, and WWII, on the rare occasions that a greater threat than Russia arose. Other than that, Russia has been a rather steadily expansionist land empire for the past 500 years. Since 1991, Russia has gone to war with Georgia (twice), Azerbaijan, Chechnya (twice), Estonia (cyber-attack), and Ukraine (also twice). That's 8 wars in 31 years - an average of one war every 3.8 years. Additionally, since 1991 Russia has allied with Saddam, Qadaffi, Milosevic, Iran, Assad, the Taliban, ISIS, China, Venezuela, Cuba... it's actually difficult to think of a significant regional security threat where Russia wasn't on the side of the aggressor. Milosevic alone started 3 wars, against Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo.

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #1033 on: December 21, 2022, 02:19:57 PM »
I'm watching a joint press conference of Biden with zelenski.  A rare moment where the president of the United States raises his stature by being seen on the podium with the president of another country.

I thought our support was to be more low-key. This intentional media event raises the impression that this is a war of the US versus Russia. I didn't think that's what we wanted.

Stated previously, I support US support but not a blank check and I don't know exactly where I would draw the line.

With biden, you can tell he knows this is just play money. With his new budget out, everyone can see that he is making no sacrifice in anything else in order to print more pretend dollars to send in every direction.
« Last Edit: December 21, 2022, 03:08:53 PM by DougMacG »

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Ten thoughts about US Aid to Ukraine
« Reply #1034 on: December 22, 2022, 01:02:53 PM »
https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/ten-myths-us-aid-ukraine-luke-coffey?fbclid=IwAR2qTbWa46G_nJ1GDdwPAbLYKBvX_wXGgEw9qdgG6B4gTeDpC50T4OWHUl0


Ten Myths about US Aid to Ukraine


Ukraine is in a national struggle that will determine its geopolitical future: the country will either be a firm member of the Euro-Atlantic community or become a Russian colony. The outcome of this struggle will have long-term implications for America’s global interests, the future of the transatlantic community, and the notion of national sovereignty in the twenty-first century.

Russia is a top geopolitical adversary for the United States. For Americans who believe in strong and secure national borders, the primacy of national sovereignty, and the right to self-defense, support for Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression is natural. Considering America’s other geopolitical concerns, such as a rising China and a healthy economic relationship with Europe that benefits the American worker, US support for Ukraine is an imperative.

Ukrainians are not asking for, nor do they want, US troops to help them fight Russia. All they ask for is the equipment, weapons, munitions, and financial resources required to give them a fighting chance. Providing Ukraine what it needs to fight Russia effectively will not be cheap.

So far this year, the US Congress has voted on three different supplementals for Ukraine: $13.6 billion in March, $40.1 billion in May, and $12.4 billion in September. The cost that American taxpayers incur to help Ukraine is money well spent and will pale in comparison to the cost of deterring a victorious Russia or an emboldened China on the global stage.

As the war continues, Congress will likely pass additional spending. It is in America’s interest that Ukraine wins the war, and that Russia is decisively defeated. Even though polling overwhelmingly shows broad and bipartisan support for Ukraine, some in Congress are against further US aid for Ukraine.

Here are the top ten myths and misconceptions about US aid for Ukraine and why they are wrong:

Myth 1: There is not enough oversight of US aid to Ukraine.

Reality: There has likely never been more accountability or transparency measures in place for US foreign assistance than what is available for Ukraine aid. Take the biggest (and most controversial) supplemental from last May, which allocated $40.1 billion. This bill was 699 lines long. Of these, 110 lines dealt with accountability, transparency, and reporting requirements. Therefore, 16 percent of the bill’s text was dedicated to oversight. May’s bill also included 16 separate reporting requirements to the US Congress for the Department of Defense, Department of State, US Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Department of the Treasury. To date, the three Ukraine supplementals have allocated an additional $14 million for the Inspectors General of the Department of Defense, Department of State, and USAID to increase oversight. There is plenty of accountability and oversight. Those who argue that there is not enough have failed to outline in detail what additional oversight is needed.

Myth 2: We have written more than $66 billion worth of “blank checks” for Ukraine.

Reality: This claim is misleading. The sum of the three Ukraine supplementals totals $66.1 billion, but not all this money goes to Ukraine. Billions of dollars have gone toward other items like replenishing US military stocks, deterrence measures in Eastern Europe outside Ukraine, and energy-related issues. For example, so far $14 billion has gone to replenish US stocks of equipment, $9.7 billion to US European Command to increase the military presence in Eastern Europe, and $2 billion to address the increase of energy costs related to the war in Ukraine. The billions of dollars allocated for military assistance to Ukraine never leave the United States. Despite the perception that opponents of American aid to Ukraine create, funds for military support are not wired to Ukrainian government bank accounts. Instead, the US president uses the appropriated funds for a drawdown of military equipment to be sent to Ukraine. For the US to give funds to the Ukrainian government, like the $13.2 billion for the Economic Support Fund, the secretary of state and administrator of USAID have to jointly submit a report to the relevant congressional committees on the proposed uses of these funds. There are no “blank checks.”

Myth 3: Congress hasn’t had “enough time to debate” US aid to Ukraine or “read the bill.”

Reality: In 2022, Ukraine has been the single most discussed, reported, and debated foreign policy issue in the United States. Lawmakers, policymakers, and commentators routinely discuss the war in Ukraine and the US role in supporting Kyiv. Far from there not being enough time to debate Ukraine, the war is continuously debated throughout the public square and the halls of Congress. Also, lawmakers have had plenty of time to read the supplementals—which have been relatively short in length—before each vote. The Ukraine supplemental from May has been the longest one in length to date, and it received the most criticism on the grounds that there was not enough time to consider it. The text of this bill was 29 pages long and approximately 4,900 words in length. The average adult can reportedly read around 250 words per minute, meaning someone would need approximately 20 minutes to read the text of May’s bill.

Myth 4: This money to Ukraine would be better spent on “the wall” or “baby formula.”

Reality: This is like saying that a man must choose between being a committed husband, a loving dad, or a hard worker. Sometimes in life, one must do more than one important task at a time. The same applies to when governing a superpower. Furthermore, the issues of US support to Ukraine, the horrific and chaotic situation at the southern border, and the shortage of baby formula are not connected issues. When lawmakers voted on the supplemental in May, they did not have to choose between either alleviating the baby formula shortage or supporting Ukraine.

Myth 5: Europe needs to “spend more” before America does.

Reality: Yes, Europe needs to spend more, but it is misleading to suggest that it is not doing much. The US leads in total financial commitments to Ukraine. However, according to the respected Kiel Institute for the World Economy’s Ukraine aid tracker, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Lithuania, Norway, Slovakia, and Czechia have given more to Ukraine than the US as a percentage of GDP. (The United States and United Kingdom are tied for eighth place.) Also, because a lot of aid is unannounced, it is impossible to know how much European countries have given to Ukraine. Of course, Europe can do more, but complaining that it is not spending enough is no excuse for the US to stop supporting Ukraine.

Myth 6: The US should only give “military aid.”

Reality: Some propose this argument to find a middle ground or compromise with those who do not want to provide any aid to Ukraine. However, this proposal is a half-measure that would only get partial results. The Ukrainian military is not the only actor at war with Russia. As shown by Russia’s indiscriminate use of Iranian drones to target civilians, the whole of Ukrainian society is at war. The war has eliminated an estimated 45 percent of Ukraine’s GDP. Even so, the Ukrainian government and essential public services need to function properly for the nation to remain on a total war footing. For years, critics of America’s approach to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan complained that Washington focused too much on the warfighting and not enough on nonmilitary aspects of the conflicts. Now that the US is doing the opposite in Ukraine, many of the same people now criticize this comprehensive approach to US aid. This support needs to be broad in scope. Those who call for the US to give only military support fail to see the bigger picture in Ukraine.

Myth 7: US weapons are ending up on the black market or are not getting to the front lines.

Reality: There is no evidence that weapons are going missing. A CBS report from August (which opponents to US aid for Ukraine often use to make their case) suggesting that a significant percentage of weapons never make it to the front lines was immediately debunked and then retracted. On the contrary, the recent progress Ukraine has made in its counterattacks near Kharkiv and Kherson proves that US weapons are reaching their intended destination—and proves that US aid is effective. There is no evidence that weapons recently supplied to Ukraine have ended up on the black market. For that matter, there is no evidence that weapons provided to Ukraine since 2014 have appeared on the black market in any meaningful sense.

Myth 8: Ukraine is too corrupt to receive aid responsibly.

Reality: To date there have been “no high-profile cases of corruption involving donated military equipment, budget funding, or humanitarian aid.” It is no secret that corruption is a problem in Ukraine. This is the case with most of the states that gained independence after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Since 2014, Ukraine has taken positive steps at fighting corruption. However, US policymakers and commentators need to be realistic about how much and how quickly Ukraine can reform during a war of national survival. In the meantime, the US should continue with the comprehensive and strict oversight measures in place for US aid, and when possible continue helping Ukraine with its anti-corruption reforms.

Myth 9: Russia is a distraction. US focus must be on China.

Reality: Russia is China’s junior partner. A weakened or defeated Russia means a weaker China. Beijing is also watching how Western powers support Ukraine, so a strong and victorious Ukraine makes Taiwan stronger too. Some have suggested that the US should sacrifice its security interest in Ukraine to focus on the threat from China. Many of Russia’s and China’s strategic goals in Europe overlap. Both want a weakened and divided Europe that both can exploit. Both want to eclipse the US partnership with Europe so that the free world is divided and more vulnerable. Russia shifted many of its forces involved with the invasion of Ukraine from its Eastern Military District, so the number of troops near Russia’s border with China is at a historically unprecedented low level. This point demonstrates how much Russia trusts China. The choice between security in Europe or security in the Indo-Pacific is a false dichotomy. In terms of US national interests, these two regions are intimately linked.

Myth 10: Aid to Ukraine puts “America last.”

Realty: America’s foreign policy challenges are too complex to be boiled down to bumper sticker slogans like “America first” or “America last.” Anyone who uses these terms to describe the US role in the world knows little about foreign affairs and is best ignored.

Crafty_Dog

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Arguments for a Marshall plan for Ukraine
« Reply #1035 on: December 22, 2022, 01:04:49 PM »
https://www.dw.com/en/ukraine-what-could-a-marshall-plan-look-like/a-62262435?fbclid=IwAR3JCvTfRq3QcJF3jmTQImPgjglMiqNOeR83sjXYWY1OD08dSdpV6Rsd-UM

A 'Marshall Plan' for Ukraine?
Silja Thoms
10/25/2022October 25, 2022
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen have appealed for a "Marshall Plan" to rebuild war-scarred Ukraine. What would that entail?

https://p.dw.com/p/4DFIp
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Faced with great challenges, politicians commonly advocate for equally substantial remedies. One often reached-for comparison is the US Marshall Plan, which helped rebuild Western Europe after World War II. Decision-makers have launched subsequent programs modeled on the Marshall Plan to support pandemic-stricken economies, protect the environment, and much else.

Ahead of the G7 summit in June, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz called for such a Marshall Plan to rebuild Ukraine.

In a government address ahead of the June summit, Scholz had said his  visit to Ukraine had reminded him of the widespread destruction that had characterized many German cities after World War II.

"Just like war-scarred Europe then, Ukraine today needs a Marshal plan to rebuild," he said. This, he added, was a job for the coming generation.

Speaking at Tuesday's international reconstruction conference for Ukraine in Berlin, Scholz repeated his appeal, and stressed that this amounted to "nothing less than creating a new Marshall Plan for the 21st century, a generational task that must begin now.''

What was the Marshall Plan?
In 1947, then-US Secretary of State George C. Marshall suggested setting up the European Recovery Program (ERP) to help rebuild much of Europe, which had been destroyed in the war. Today, this scheme is commonly known as the Marshall Plan.

People rebuild in Berlin following the war, in a black and white imagePeople rebuild in Berlin following the war, in a black and white image
The Marshall Plan was devised to help postwar Europe get back on its feetImage: akg-images/picture-alliance
The program entailed the US providing loans to finance European reconstruction efforts, as well as importing goods, raw materials and foodstuffs to Europe. More than $12 billion (approximately $150 billion in today's dollars; €142 billion) were provided to 16 different countries — among them West Germany, Italy, France and Great Britain — between 1948 and 1952. West Germany received roughly $1.5 billion. The cash infusion not only kick-started Europe's economic recovery, but also opened up new markets for the United States.

The Marshall Plan had a political dimension, too. Not all European countries received US money. While the US was keen to limit Soviet influence in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union barred Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland from joining the Marshall Plan, fearing US control over the region.









8 images
8 images
In Germany and the rest of Europe, the Marshall Plan is largely remembered as a successful program that helped rebuild the continent. It sparked economic recovery but also helped democratic structures entrench themselves in Europe. That is why, after various wars and crises in the world, many have pointed to the Marshall Plan as a good example for postwar reconstruction.

A Marshall Plan for Ukraine?
Scholz expects the war in Ukraine will not end anytime soon. Just like the original Marshall Plan was geared toward long-term reconstruction, he said so too must the West expect that rebuilding Ukraine will take time.

"We will need many more billions of euro and dollar for reconstruction purposes — for years to come," Scholz told the German parliament back in June. He added that he wants to see Ukraine continue to receive broad European support in financial, economic, humanitarian and political terms, as well as "arms deliveries."

Ukraine estimates that reconstruction costs could amount to $750 billion (€760 billion) . The EU puts those costs at $349 billion.

Werner Hoyer, who heads the European Investment Bank, expects billions in financial aid for Ukraine. He said there is a need for a program targeting "a global audience, rather just EU taxpayers."

The EU has suggested reconstruction efforts should be coordinated by Ukraine in conjunction with EU, G7 and G20 states, as well as international financial institutions and organizations

ya

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #1036 on: December 24, 2022, 06:41:39 AM »
Via Twitter from Simon Mikhailovich

Feels like something big in the works. All these "in person" consultations can't be coincidental:

Putin & top ministers visited Belarus

Medvedev visited Xi w/Putin's "personal message"

Putin attending Defence Ministry's board meeting

Zelensky visiting DC

Something is up.
-------------------------------------



DougMacG

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #1038 on: December 24, 2022, 10:22:59 AM »
Via Twitter from Simon Mikhailovich

Feels like something big in the works. All these "in person" consultations can't be coincidental:

Putin & top ministers visited Belarus

Medvedev visited Xi w/Putin's "personal message"

Putin attending Defence Ministry's board meeting

Zelensky visiting DC

Something is up.

Very interesting.  I wonder what's up.  The Zelensky US visit didn't seem out of place, more money affects everything for him.  I thought the financial support became more public than it needed to be, but maybe it is intended also as a sign of strength aimed at deterrence.

Belarus behaves as part of Russia today.  Putin doesn't need Belarus permission to mount offensives there, I didn't think, unless there is new resistance there and in person persuasion needed.

With China, isn't Russia losing China's support as they lose the war?  Maybe they need to shore up a big energy deal in order to cut Europe off further. 

I still don't see the point of introducing nuclear weapons from Putin's perspective but I would admit he is unpredictable.

This war is a mess for all sides. 

Next for Ukraine it seems to me is to (survive winter and) decide about trying to take back Crimea or to accept peace deals that give it permanently to Russia.

If Putin has a big escalation offensive available to him, why did he wait most of a year to do it?  Why knock out their grid and infrastructure if you still plan to occupy, and use the grid and infrastructure?

Crafty_Dog

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #1039 on: December 24, 2022, 01:57:18 PM »
"With China, isn't Russia losing China's support as they lose the war?"

The way I see it is that China loves seeing us using up bandwidth here while also taking notes (cf.  Spanish Civil War of the 1930s) Kabuki theater satisfied by pretending not to send weapons while green lighting Norks and Iran.

"(W)hy did he wait most of a year to do it?"

Because it was not winter then."

"Why knock out their grid and infrastructure if you still plan to occupy, and use the grid and infrastructure?

When the original blitzkrieg plan failed, the strategy shifted to "Grozny meets Winter".

DougMacG

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #1040 on: December 25, 2022, 02:49:23 AM »
Via Twitter from Simon Mikhailovich

Feels like something big in the works. All these "in person" consultations can't be coincidental:

Putin & top ministers visited Belarus

Medvedev visited Xi w/Putin's "personal message"

Putin attending Defence Ministry's board meeting

Zelensky visiting DC

Something is up.
-------------------------------------


https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/12/sudden-increase-in-russian-navy-activity-in-black-sea/


ccp

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Russia ready to negotiate
« Reply #1042 on: December 25, 2022, 09:03:12 AM »
https://sports.yahoo.com/putin-says-russia-ready-negotiate-093854014.html

but are we?

or are we just interesting in killing more Ukrainians
spending endless dollars to send message we are so tough not to be messed with
and
to protect democracy
and protect borders    :roll:

while we do the opposite in our own country

Crafty_Dog

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George Friedman: The State of Play in Ukraine
« Reply #1043 on: December 27, 2022, 08:39:44 AM »
December 27, 2022
View On Website
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The State of Play in Ukraine
By: George Friedman

The war in Ukraine seems permanent. Neither side appears capable of destroying the opposing force or articulating what it would take to reach a peace agreement. The Russians are speaking to Belarus, India and anyone else they might find, but no one can help enough on the battlefield or in the munitions factory to turn the tide. The Ukrainians are speaking to the United States, NATO and anyone else who will listen so that they will continue to receive weapons – perhaps even some new ones. But Ukraine hasn’t broken Russia yet, concerned as it is with preventing the collapse of the country, and doing so may prove difficult. On the battlefield, there is movement on both sides, but movement doesn’t carry with it the taste of victory. When, then, do wars end if the leadership will not concede?

History shows there are several answers to that question.

1. A war ends when one side lacks the material to continue. Germany's campaign in World War II ended when it was unable to produce and field the weapons needed to fend off the Allied powers.

2. A war ends when one side’s morale is exhausted – when soldiers and civilians are simply unwilling to bear the burden of war, even if victory is possible. This was the case for the United States in the Vietnam War.

3. A war ends when there is no hope of a radical increase in military power, and when foreign intervention is impossible. In WWII, Britain persevered knowing it could not defeat Germany but reasonably expecting an American intervention.

4. A war ends when the consequences of defeat seem tolerable to civilians. In World War II, the Italian public saw Allied occupation as a preferable alternative. (Conversely, nations will continue to fight when the cost of defeat is catastrophic.)

There are certainly other circumstances in which a nation would resist beyond hope, and others under which the nation would readily capitulate instead of endure war. But in judging war, the key is less about the military’s appetite for resistance, since fighting is what militaries do, and more about the appetites of the civilians, who produce war material and bear a burden of loss and pain that can make the war unwinnable.

To try to understand how the Ukraine war ends, we must consider all these matters and more, but with a particular focus on the willingness of civilians to continue to fight. The publics are undoubtedly tired on both sides, the Russians by the causalities and subsequent calling up of more conscripts, and the Ukrainians by the constant attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure. The Russians would wish for an end but not at the cost of rebellion by families whose sons were called up. The Ukrainians are constrained by their fear that conceding to the Russians might bring a reign of terror. In this case, the nation most tired of war is also most frightened of the consequences of defeat.

Neither country is concerned with the loss of material. Both would wish for more, but wanting more won’t lead to capitulation. Lack of materials could cause one or both to at least look for a resolution. Both sides are currently fighting with a certain level of weaponry. They are not breaking the other side and have no reason to believe their current supplies will do so. The Russians have their own industrial plant, plus imported weapons from places like Iran. Ukraine has a massive flow of weapons from the West, particularly the United States. This has created a stable but unending war. If this continues, there is a serious possibility of loss of civilian morale. Moscow will therefore try to make sure that its industrial plant and relations stay intact while seeking to undermine shipments to Ukraine. Ukraine will try to make sure the U.S. will at least sustain its weapons deliveries while trying to minimize weapons flowing to Russia from abroad.

Because both face the problem of civilian morale, both will try to minimize the civilian fear of defeat. But so long as Ukraine fears a defeat by Russia, capitulation is practically impossible. The same cannot be said of Russia. Thus the most likely outcome will be peace talks, forced by domestic unrest in both countries. There is already some unrest in Russia, but little in Ukraine. The Russians have not been able to stoke unrest there and will therefore have to engage in an even more intense campaign of terror, if they can. But peace talks will not happen until there is a sense of imbalance as described on both sides. There must be an element of compulsion. So the key is the manipulation of the foreign civilian population, defense of the domestic populations and the introduction of new and practical weapons that will impose pain without triggering foreign intervention.

Over time, then, the sense of the impossibility of victory will trigger peace talks, but not until reality forces it.

ya

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Col. McGregor on Ukraine
« Reply #1044 on: December 31, 2022, 11:30:00 AM »
US Col. Douglas McGregor on Ukr

https://youtu.be/D4WIdDStqeE
« Last Edit: December 31, 2022, 03:32:16 PM by Crafty_Dog »

ccp

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Kunstler : Zelensky will not survive
« Reply #1045 on: January 01, 2023, 11:14:04 AM »
"The open questions: how much punishment does Ukraine seek to suffer before it capitulates? Will Zelensky survive? (Even if he runs off to Miami, he may not survive.)"

from what gets leaked to us in the news Putin may not be long for this Earth .

Then what?

ya

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Re: Kunstler : Zelensky will not survive
« Reply #1046 on: January 01, 2023, 03:25:01 PM »
"The open questions: how much punishment does Ukraine seek to suffer before it capitulates? Will Zelensky survive? (Even if he runs off to Miami, he may not survive.)"

from what gets leaked to us in the news Putin may not be long for this Earth .Then what?

There are some analysts (eg Martin Armstrong), who think that Putin is actually a moderate and if he goes, expect hardliners to replace him.

Crafty_Dog

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Re: Ukraine
« Reply #1047 on: January 01, 2023, 07:10:41 PM »
Tucker regularly asks that question.

Crafty_Dog

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FA makes the case for taking Crimea
« Reply #1048 on: January 02, 2023, 07:57:58 AM »
The Case for Taking Crimea
Why Ukraine Can—and Should—Liberate the Province
By Andriy Zagorodnyuk
January 2, 2023
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/case-taking-crimea

For Ukrainians, 2022 was a year of both tragedy and historic achievements. Russia invaded Ukraine in February with nearly 190,000 troops, inflicting untold destruction and killing tens of thousands of people. But within a few weeks, the Ukrainian military managed to stall the offensive. Then, it began forcing the Russians back. Since August, Ukrainian troops have recaptured more than half the territory Russia had seized, upending Moscow’s hopes of success. To try to demonstrate some gains, Russian President Vladimir Putin declared that he had annexed four Ukrainian provinces—Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia—at the end of September. But it was for naught. Russia had full control over none of the provinces when Putin made his announcement, and his forces have lost even more ground since then.

Yet Russia still controls one Ukrainian province: Crimea. In 2014, Russia seized the peninsula in a remarkable breach of international law. Putin actively exploits a narrative that claims Crimea’s transfer to Ukraine, carried out by the Soviet Union in 1954, was “erroneous.” In taking the peninsula, Putin believes he has both corrected what he called a “mistake” and improved Russia’s international position, restoring his country to great-power status.

But those premises are false. Crimea has a rich and unique history; it has not been a part of Russia since time immemorial. It became a rightful part of independent Ukraine after a 1991 nationwide referendum in which Ukrainians—including a majority of Crimean residents—voted for independence from the Soviet Union. It is easy to understand why Crimeans wanted out. The Soviet Union was a totalitarian state, whereas Ukraine was en route to becoming a pluralistic democracy. Moscow’s current rule has revitalized many of the Soviet Union’s dictatorial practices in Crimea, including oppressing minorities and subjecting citizens to a state media that peddles propaganda. Moscow turned the area into a giant, menacing garrison, which it then used to invade Ukraine. As long as the peninsula remains in the Kremlin’s hands, Ukraine—and Ukrainians—cannot be free of Russian aggression.

Western states are united in their belief that the 2014 annexation of Crimea was, and is, unacceptable. But the United States and its partners have been squeamish about endorsing any plans that would return Crimea to Ukraine. Many Western policymakers have suggested that Kyiv could not succeed in a military campaign for the province. In November, for instance, Mark Milley, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, said Ukraine’s odds of kicking the Russians out of Crimea were “not high.” Other analysts believe that reintegrating Crimeans into Ukraine might prove too tricky or that an attack on Crimea would prompt nuclear retaliation. Better, they suggest, that Ukraine not fight for the peninsula. Some even say that Kyiv should offer it up in exchange for peace.

The West’s fears are not entirely unfounded. Russia has had eight years to absorb Crimea and has built up a significant military presence in the peninsula. Crimea also has at least 700,000 Russian residents who moved in after 2014 (out of a population of 2.4 million): a fact that will complicate any reintegration effort. The world can never rule out the chance that Russia will use nuclear weapons, especially when it is governed by Putin. These are all good reasons why Ukraine should be careful in how it goes about freeing Crimea.

But they are not reasons for Ukraine to abandon the peninsula altogether. And there are plenty of reasons why Crimea must be returned. Russia’s military footprint, for example, is actually a reason to fight for Crimea, since a battle over the territory would seriously degrade Russia’s ability to wage war and terrorize Ukraine and other states. The other concerns about Ukraine’s ability to retake the peninsula and nuclear attacks are all at least somewhat overblown. After consecutive months of battlefield success, it is clear that Ukraine has the capacity to liberate Crimea. Although some Crimeans may want to remain part of Russia, many more of them would be happy to escape the Kremlin’s grasp. And Putin’s nuclear threats are likely just bluster. He did, after all, promise to use nuclear weapons earlier in the conflict, only to back down. Ukraine should therefore plan to liberate Crimea—and the West should plan to help.

CRIMEA IS UKRAINE
One of Russia’s key narratives, pushed by Moscow for decades and repeated by many international observers, is that Crimea has a special historical connection with Russia. It is true that the Sevastopol has long been a Russian naval base and that its southern coast is home to many nineteenth-century Russian aristocratic palaces. Most of the peninsula’s people speak Russian. As a result, Putin has reasoned that in taking back Crimea, he corrected a historical error.

But Crimean history is much richer and more diverse than this narrative suggests. The peninsula became a part of Russia only after the country invaded it, in 1783; it has been ruled by multiple empires over the course of the last millennium. Crimea has thousands of unique landmarks with no connection to Russia, and it is home to many ethnic groups. Russia’s version of Crimea’s past is cherrypicked, and its justification for the occupation rests on the ridiculous assumption that past possession and linguistics give one state the right to a neighbor’s land. The United Kingdom ruled Ireland for centuries, and under London’s governance, English became the island’s most widely spoken language. But that does not mean the United Kingdom would be justified in seizing it.

An honest evaluation of history makes clear that Crimea should be part of Ukraine, not Russia. It is legally recognized and accepted as Ukrainian territory by the entire world—including, until 2014, by Russia. Crimea has been governed by Kyiv for 60 of the past 70 years, and so most of its residents know it first and foremost as a Ukrainian peninsula. During the course of that time, the region went from being economically depressed to solidly middle class, thanks to Ukrainian water supplies, energy supplies, and—after Ukrainian independence—a boom in tourist activity. Putin may be right that millions of Russians have an affinity for the territory, but so do millions of Ukrainians—because they have either visited it or lived there. There is a reason that an overwhelming majority of U.N. General Assembly members strongly condemned Crimea’s annexation and deemed it invalid.


Crimea has not been a part of Russia since time immemorial.
Russia will never permit a real referendum on the peninsula’s future, and so it is impossible to know exactly how Crimeans themselves feel today. One poll, conducted in 2019 by the Levada Center, showed that a majority of the peninsula’s residents wanted Crimea to be part of Russia. But it is difficult to trust any polls done in a totalitarian state, and Russia has criminalized opposition to Crimea’s annexation. Polled Crimeans could have been afraid of admitting that they would rather be part of Ukraine. And there are many reasons to think that a free and fair vote on Crimea’s status today would yield the same results as the one held in 1991. Such a referendum would, for starters, have to include the over 100,000 Crimean residents that Russia intimidated, harassed, and even physically assaulted until they left the peninsula. A lot of these people were made to sell their property at a loss and abandon their businesses. (Most of the territory’s large Ukrainian companies and utilities also lost their assets.) These Crimean émigrés would almost certainly opt for Ukrainian governance, giving the pro-Kyiv faction a solid starting base. Many of the peninsula’s remaining residents would also vote for Ukraine, as might some new arrivals who would prefer to live in a liberal state. Crimean residents have been known to complain about how Russia treats the peninsula’s environment, as well as the economic disruptions created by sanctions.

Ukrainian liberation would prove particularly popular among—and meaningful to—hundreds of thousands of Crimean Tatars, a group that has been especially persecuted by Moscow. Unlike the Russians, they have inhabited the peninsula since the early medieval era. For centuries, Crimean Tatars even had their own state on the landmass. Crimea is their only homeland. But under Soviet and Russian rule, they have been violently persecuted. In 1944, for example, they were forcibly deported, allowed to return only in the late 1980s as the Soviet Union was about to collapse. Under Putin’s rule, they have been pressed to leave again. Those who have stayed are frequently forbidden from working, arrested without cause, and detained without being accused of wrongdoing. Some have been kidnapped. Some of their cultural monuments are being dismantled. They deserve an end to Russia’s totalitarian rule.

SAFE, NOT SORRY
Ukraine must retake Crimea for reasons that go beyond justice. Russia has turned Crimea into a large military base, which it used to launch its sweeping invasion. This use of the peninsula is why Russia has had much more success fighting in Ukraine’s south than in its north. Russia continues to use the Crimea-stationed Black Sea Fleet and the peninsula’s air bases to launch drone and missile attacks. This belligerence makes it clear that Ukraine cannot be safe or rebuild its economy until Crimea is out of Russian hands, and so Kyiv will not stop fighting until it regains the province.

Russian control of Crimea is not just a security risk for Ukraine. Moscow’s hold on the peninsula endangers the whole world. From Crimea, Russia projects power across both Europe and the Middle East, threatening the safety of many other states. By occupying the peninsula, Russia has gained authority in both the Black Sea and the Azov Sea, the latter of which Russian troops now completely surround. Controlling both bodies of water has been Putin’s goal for years: the two seas are a massive shipping route for all kinds of products on the Eurasian continent. By occupying Crimea, Russia can control access to many of the seas’ ports and passages, giving it power over vast supplies of many commodities, including coal, iron ore, various industrial products, and grain from Ukraine. (The Ukrainian ports of Berdyansk and Mariupol lost most of their traffic after Russia started restricting access to the Azov Sea in 2018.)

To see why Russia’s power over the peninsula is so dangerous to the rest of the world, consider the ongoing food security crisis—which was prompted by Russia’s invasion. Without Crimea, Russia would not have been able to threaten shipping in the Black and Azov Seas since the vast majority of these sea-lanes fall outside Russia’s exclusive economic zone. Moscow would certainly not be able to use Ukrainian territorial waters and ports to project power. But by occupying Crimea, Russia came to dominate these seas and their ports.

Occupying Crimea has also given Russia more control over the world’s energy supplies. The Black Sea is home to many resources, including significant natural gas deposits that Ukraine was once prepared to tap. In fact, just before Russia began occupying Crimea, Exxon Mobil signed a memo with Kyiv to drill for $6 billion worth of the sea’s natural gas deposits—one of many companies working with Ukraine to access these assets. Had the projects gone through, Europe’s energy map would have been forever transformed, and the continent could more easily have weaned itself from Russian energy. But when Moscow sent troops into Crimea in 2014, the companies all canceled their projects. As long as the province and other areas of the Black Sea remain in Russia’s hands, business will not come back.

WORDS AND DEEDS
So how would Ukraine liberate Crimea? Ideally, it would be done through diplomacy. Putin will never consider peacefully parting with the peninsula, but if he is booted from office, his successors may have a different calculus. They will inherit a severely sanctioned country with a dramatically weakened military. They will still be fighting Ukraine’s more talented armed forces—and therefore staring down more defeats. Finally, they will be facing international litigation, initiated by Ukraine, that demands hundreds of billions of dollars in damages. Moscow will likely lose in court, and Western states will make the government pay by simply transferring Russia’s frozen assets to Kyiv. Faced with such a situation, the Kremlin might offer to return Crimea as part of a deal that prevents Russia from going into bankruptcy and prevents the domestic unrest that would arise with any economic chaos.

But Ukraine cannot count on a change in leadership in Russia. It also cannot bank on Russia’s next leaders being ready for peace. Kyiv, then, needs to retain a military option, and it must start preparing to win such a fight.

Although retaking Crimea would not be easy, Ukraine has the capability to do so—a fact the West is starting to acknowledge. According to NBC News, in December, a Biden administration official told Congress that Kyiv would be able to liberate the peninsula. Ben Hodges, the former commanding general of the U.S. Army Europe, said that Ukraine has a chance to free Crimea by the end of this coming summer.


The most challenging part of a campaign for Crimea may not be outfoxing Russia.
There is a military justification for these projections. By the time Ukrainian forces are ready to move on the peninsula, most Russian capabilities will have been severely damaged. Russia’s surviving soldiers will be exhausted, and the country’s stockpile of precision missiles will have been depleted. Its naval bases, air bases, and resupply routes to Crimea will have been damaged by Ukrainian attacks. Because Crimea is connected to the Eurasian continent only by a narrow, vulnerable isthmus and a bridge, once Ukrainian troops enter the region, the remaining Russian forces will be trapped, making Russian military sites even more vulnerable to Ukrainian strikes. And for all its significance, the Crimean Peninsula is ultimately just land: something the Ukrainian military has been very successful at reclaiming.

Of course, Ukraine will have to consider the capabilities of the Black Sea Fleet, a keystone of Crimea’s Russian military presence. It is a force for which Ukraine has no real equivalent. But although Ukraine’s small navy does not measure up against Russia’s, the Black Sea Fleet is not the obstacle it might seem. The fleet has an assault capacity of roughly 20 old ships, all of which are so vulnerable to strikes that Russia has hidden them away from the Ukrainian coastline. But Ukraine can still acquire and produce enough unmanned vehicles and missile systems to destroy them. And the fleet is smaller than it was at the start of the war thanks to Ukrainian attacks. Ukraine succeeded, for instance, in sinking the fleet’s flagship. The Ukrainians will not have trouble further chipping away at the Russian navy in forthcoming months, at least to a point where the navy cannot effectively stop them. Ukraine, after all, has a good track record of getting around the Black Sea Fleet. If the Russian navy could not defend the Black Sea’s Snake Island, which is less than 0.1 square miles, it is hard to imagine how it would stop Ukraine from crossing the isthmus.

Ultimately, the most challenging part of a campaign for Crimea may not be outfoxing Russia. It could be winning over locals who back Moscow. Despite all of the Kremlin’s abuses, Crimea is home to far more Putin supporters than are other parts of Ukraine, especially given that the population has had an influx of Russian residents and has experienced years of nonstop Russian propaganda. It would be dangerous for Kyiv to assume that Ukraine’s military will be welcomed there as it was in Kherson. Ukraine will need to substantially research what policies it should adopt, including with regard to finance, banking, and law enforcement. It must also figure out how to provide restitution to the many Crimeans who were stripped of their jobs and property by the Russian government. It will need to rework the peninsula’s state services—particularly for education, which has been conducted for years using a Russian curriculum based in propaganda. Critically, it must ensure that residents who support Russia’s dictatorship will not want to destabilize the peninsula, and it must guarantee that law-abiding citizens have a balanced, fair, and democratic government.

STAND YOUR GROUND
Although the West uniformly, and rightly, condemned Russia’s annexation of Crimea, it effectively accepted Moscow’s act. The only tangible response that the United States and Europe could muster was a sanctions regime with countless loopholes, allowing the Russian economy to keep growing. Indeed, even the sanctioning states continued to expand their business ties to Moscow, including by increasing their dependence on Russian energy exports.

It is therefore little wonder that the Kremlin felt emboldened to invade the rest of Ukraine. Russia is bent on taking land and increasing its sphere of influence so it can restore its empire. When Moscow senses weakness, it jumps. This is why Kyiv cannot bargain away Crimea for peace, as some Western analysts have suggested. Doing so would further reward and incentivize Putin’s aggression. Additionally, such a deal would not be effective. As long as Putin runs Russia’s government, the Kremlin will never settle for a peace agreement in which Ukraine “just” gives up Crimea. It wants and will keep fighting for more. Indeed, should the West display indecision or hesitation in supporting Ukraine’s goals in Crimea, Russia will try to capitalize on the dithering by working to fracture the states supporting Kyiv.

As a result, Kyiv and its allies must press on, battling until it can make Moscow hand over Crimea via negotiations or until Ukraine has forcibly pried the peninsula from Moscow’s grasp. Doing so is the only way to inflict the kind of major defeat Russia must experience if it is to abandon its imperial ambitions and start abiding by international norms and laws. The United States and Europe should understand that they, too, will benefit from a total Ukrainian victory. It could mark the permanent end of Russian aggression, breathing new life into the liberal world order.

Liberating Crimea would also set an important historical precedent for the wider world. If Ukraine does not retake Crimea—if Russia gets away with annexation—other states will become more likely to wage wars of conquest. They will move to occupy their neighbor’s territory, reasoning that they can get away with certain kinds of land grabs. Winning in Crimea, then, is essential to preventing future conflicts and thwarting a return to conquest.
« Last Edit: January 02, 2023, 08:36:53 AM by Crafty_Dog »