US Foreign Policy & Geopolitics

[G M]

Fantasy

Huh?

========================


   
US Credibility After Afghanistan
It’ll be fine, for better or worse.
By: Phillip Orchard
Over the past week, there's been a perplexing amount of consternation and, in some corners, elation about how the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan might damage U.S. credibility elsewhere in the world. Much of it is disingenuous, of course; President Joe Biden’s political enemies smell blood in the water and are eager to criticize his strategic judgment as the U.S. heads into Cold War 2.0, while Beijing is, as expected, trying to cement global perceptions of the U.S. as a capricious power that can't be trusted. Still, there’s also been seemingly genuine alarm about whether the debacle in Afghanistan will make, say, Taiwan or South Korea or any other U.S. ally conclude that they can no longer rely on Washington to defend them.

This is, to put it plainly, a bit of a head-scratcher. To be sure, U.S. friends and allies across the world already had reason to question whether Washington’s ever-changing strategic interests would compromise its defense commitments. And the chaotic denouement of the U.S. war in Afghanistan – the mere six days it took for the Taliban to sack Kabul, the images of desperate Afghans hanging from the fuselage of U.S. planes booking it out of there – wasn't a great look for a superpower's intelligence or diplomatic chops. The whole thing is sad and betrays the ugly reality that superpowers are typically much better at breaking things than building them.

But the U.S. following through on an overdue decision to cut its losses in a staggeringly expensive, largely unwinnable two-decade war that had, at most, become marginal to core U.S. strategic interests will do minimal damage to U.S. “credibility” in its chief area of strategic concern: the Indo-Pacific. That's not how credibility works in geopolitics. If anything, it's likely to have the opposite effect.

What Makes a Country Credible

Academic theories on military power and credibility vary wildly, but most share a handful of key elements. It starts with capability. Does a country have the weapons, manpower, logistics, leadership and industrial plant to back up its threats or commitments? Then there's the willingness to get in a fight and stay the course until the objective is achieved – taking into account risks, political backing, long-term costs, strategic and diplomatic trade-offs, and so forth. There are also several more abstract elements like the alignment of threats and commitments with motivations and interests; others will be much more likely to believe a country will do what it says when it has sound reasons to do so.

A country's historical record in such matters also plays a role in perceptions of credibility. But studies have shown that countries tend to overrate the need to preserve credibility as a reason to act. In other words, if Country A threatens war against Country B, whether Country A followed through on previous such threats will have little bearing on Country B's determination about whether, this time, Country A is serious. The present circumstances – the correlation of forces, the strategic calculus, etc. – are essentially all that matters.

There's plenty to learn from a country's past wars. In Afghanistan, the U.S. showed a willingness to fight and to keep fighting for decades, even as the scope of its mission set expanded and contracted multiple times. Early on, it showed lightning-quick mobilization capacity and brutally efficient conventional warfighting abilities capable of overwhelming a weaker enemy. As mission creep set in, it showed that U.S. capabilities and/or commitment were not enough to wipe out an entrenched insurgency and transform a failed state into a stable, vibrant democracy. It showed that supposed “war weariness” among the U.S. public is no match for inertia and the fear of leaving without a clear-cut victory. It showed the U.S. penchants for distraction, for overestimating its ability to achieve wide-ranging outcomes through brute force, and for struggling to identify, communicate and pursue clear, obtainable objectives.

Little of this was new, though, nor is much of it relevant to the situation in the Western Pacific. U.S. allies have long questioned Washington’s appetite to stand against threats from China, North Korea, and the like. After all, the U.S. was openly threatening to leave South Korea just a few years ago. It has no formal commitment to defend Taiwan. Its mutual defense treaties with formal allies like Japan and the Philippines are intentionally vague, since the U.S. does not want to get pulled into a war not of its choosing. China has become very strong and capable of, at minimum, inflicting tremendous pain on the Americans should the U.S. try to come to the defense of its friends on China's doorstep. A combination of problems – political constraints at home, its wide-ranging security commitments across the globe (and thus possibility of getting bogged down elsewhere), strains of political discontent with allies free-riding on U.S. military power, and the real possibility that the U.S. one day concludes that dominating the Western Pacific simply isn't important enough to take on the risks and costs of fighting China – is enough to make regional states deeply uncomfortable with depending on the U.S.

‘We’ll See’

Put differently, U.S. credibility is not a fixed resource; it must be diligently maintained. But a different course of U.S. action in Afghanistan would do little to reassure any of its friends and allies in the Indo-Pacific (with the possible exception of India, which benefited somewhat from U.S. counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan). Would the U.S. continuing to divert resources from the Indo-Pacific into Afghanistan really do anything to persuade Taipei or Tokyo or Manila that the U.S. is willing and capable of coming to their defense? Does the U.S. giving up on a 20-year occupation few ever wanted really deepen fears in Seoul that the highly successful, 70-year U.S. presence on the peninsula – something still immensely valuable to core U.S. strategic objectives in the region – is about to end? Do U.S. struggles with nation-building, misadventures and asymmetric warfare really make anyone doubt the U.S. conventional capabilities that would most likely come into play in an Indo-Pacific conflict scenario? It’s apples and oranges, and it's hard to come up with a scenario where any key U.S. partner in the region makes any meaningful strategic adjustments based on the U.S. getting embarrassed in Kabul.

If anything, the opposite is true. Despite its outsize strategic importance, the Indo-Pacific has been getting a relatively small slice of U.S. resources since 2001. Fighting prolonged land wars in the Middle East was very expensive and naturally dominated the Pentagon's budget and attention for two decades. Now, the U.S. appears finally ready to “pivot” to the Pacific for real this time in terms of military structure and spending, diplomatic and economic support, and so forth.

It’s also worth noting that the handwringing about the U.S. ceding “influence” in Central Asia to China and Russia is misplaced. It's generally a very bad idea to wage a zero-sum competition with other great powers in all corners of the globe. Empires fall from that kind of overstretch. In some ways, China and Russia have actually benefitted from U.S. counterterrorism operations in the area. A power vacuum in Afghanistan is a much bigger problem for them than for the U.S., and now they'll have to bear more responsibility for dealing with the mess there themselves – and more risk of falling into the same traps of so many of their predecessors.

Whether or not this ultimately works in favor of U.S. strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific is impossible to say at this point. There's potential for China and Russia to get bogged down in South Asia like the U.S. before, forcing them to draw resources away from priorities in Eastern Europe and the South and East China seas. There's also potential for China to leverage Pakistan's and/or Iran's fear of another failed state in Afghanistan into a strategically invaluable network of military bases across the Indian Ocean rim. There's potential that India gets drawn into the power vacuum as well, derailing its renewed push to become an indispensable naval partner for the U.S. in its own right.

Afghanistan has had a way of making fools of strategic planners ever since the British East India Company became the first of many Western empires to lose their way in the Hindu Kush centuries ago. To borrow an apocryphal quote from Gust Avrakotos: "We'll see." Damaged U.S. credibility from its hasty exit won’t have anything to do with it.

[Crafty_Dog]

Not sure what I make of this:

September 1, 2021
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Facing Reality: China’s Strategy
By: George Friedman

China is the definition of dynamic. Until the 20th century, the regions of Tibet, Xinjiang, Manchuria and Inner Mongolia were not under the political control of the Chinese government. They have been or are heavily influenced by the power of others — Tibet by India, Xinjiang by Turkey, Inner Mongolia by Russia, and Manchuria by both Russia and Japan. These four buffer regions create security for China but also vulnerability in that they have resisted Chinese rule at various times. Han China, the China we think of as true China, which is found mostly along the coast, is surrounded by these regions and potential enemies and, historically, has been predisposed to dynastic and civil war. Meanwhile, foreign powers have intruded on Han China through the Pacific, either through formal colonies (Britain, Portugal and Japan) or through informal economic pressure (the United States).

China's Buffer Regions
(click to enlarge)

The internal pressures within Han China, the pressures from China’s neighbors and the pressures from the sea have historically kept China in a state or at the risk of fragmentation. The communists who forged modern China understood as much. Using Marxism as a political tool, the most significant outcome of the Chinese Communist Party’s victory in 1947 was the unification of China by force. One means of achieving that was enforcing Beijing’s will on the buffer areas, and another was isolating itself from much of the global trading system, eliminating the power of foreign nations along the coast. The result, of course, was poverty throughout much of the country.

And though Mao unified China at the cost of Chinese wealth, Deng Xiaoping sought to moderate isolation to decrease China’s poverty and prevent unrest. His strategy was economic. China’s advantage was a disciplined workforce operating at extremely low wages. Like the United States in the 1880s and Japan in the 1950s, Deng envisioned China using its cost advantage and discipline to compete with foreign countries by exporting goods. He believed that this time, through the strength of the Communist Party of China, foreign engagement would not mean fragmentation.

And he was right. China has retained its buffers, minimized internal tension in Han China and massively enriched itself. The strategic problem China now faces is whether economic growth, crucial to internal stability, can be reconciled with national unity by deflecting the pressures of foreign powers drawn in or repelled by China’s economic growth.

China’s Geopolitics

Rainfall is perhaps the most important geopolitical factor for China. In order to have sustained agricultural production, a minimum annual rainfall of 15 inches is necessary. But a substantial part of the country lacks that much rain and therefore lacks agriculture. The line of demarcation is called the 15-inch isohyet, which cuts modern China roughly in half. The line also compresses China’s population, 94 percent of which lives east of the 15-inch isohyet. That means about 1.3 billion people live on less than half of China’s land. That chunk of land must produce all of China’s domestically grown food. Among the 6 percent of the population living west of this line, most are Tibetans, Uyghurs, Inner Mongolians, etc. These are the most recently acquired regions and thus the most unstable regions over the past few years.


(click to enlarge)

So China’s geopolitical problem is fairly unique. The acquisition of territory normally is accompanied by settlement by elements of the core population in order to bind the region to the core or to add resources. That wasn’t readily possible for China.

This compounded China’s vulnerability from the west. Foreign powers invading from this direction were one thing; poverty and attendant political instability were another. Hence why the communists under Mao used these regions to form a military force to overthrow the nationalists. In fact, Mao sought to start an uprising in Shanghai in 1927 but failed. Part of the reason for the failure was that the Chinese coastal region was the most prosperous, open as it had been to trade with Europe and the United States. The coastal region and the interior were fundamentally different both in their perspective of the world and the way they lived. The coast was cosmopolitan and integrated. The interior was poor and isolated. So Mao took the long march to Yenan, in the interior, raised an army of poor peasants and over the course of about 20 years overthrew the existing regime and imposed communism. In a sense, the western peasants overthrew the cosmopolitan business class.

Per Capita Disposable Income by Administrative Division - 2019
(click to enlarge)

The distinction between coast and interior remains in place today. China has the world’s second largest GDP. But on a per capita basis, it ranks just 75th in the world. This explains much of China’s behavior, like keeping zombie companies afloat, developing the interior through the Belt and Road Initiative, and, at times, ruthlessly cracking down on opposition in the west.

China’s core geopolitical challenge is therefore economic:

It must generate sufficient wealth to prevent fragmentation and unrest between regions.
It cannot generate sufficient wealth domestically to do so.
So it must generate whatever GDP it can through exports.
It must have unrestricted access to global markets, particularly through the waters off its east coast. Anything that denies its access is an existential threat.
Chinese exports can undermine foreign economies. This can invite retaliation, economic or otherwise.
China must maintain control over the non-Han buffer areas in the face of internal unrest or foreign agitation.
China’s Strategy

1. China must at least maintain, if not increase, the quality of its exports. Ideally these would be products that could be manufactured in the poorer regions of the west to close the economic gap. However, the fact that many other countries are now engaged in low-wage production makes this more difficult. China must therefore compete in more advanced, higher-margin products, but doing so brings China into competition with industries in advanced economies that make up China’s main export markets. These countries in turn might react with tariffs and non-tariff barriers. China’s strategic imperative is to constantly balance between domestic requirements and foreign reactions, and to broaden the range of options available to it.

2. China must deal with military threats, particularly from the United States. The current cycle of tension began with U.S. tariffs on some Chinese products. Under these circumstances, Beijing had to reconsider its security in areas from Japan to the Indian Ocean. The danger was that the U.S. could decide to blockade Chinese ports, or close off chokepoints between the islands surrounding China, and thus block China’s access to the Pacific. China must act under the assumption that an American threat is possible. One countermove is to widen the chokepoints into Chinese-controlled passages by, for example, seizing Taiwan or some other point. It’s a dangerous strategy, and if it fails it will leave China in an even more precarious economic and political situation. China must therefore try to force negotiation. Failing that, Beijing must search for other pressure points around the globe that could induce the U.S. to reduce its pressure on China.

U.S. Partners and Chinese Maritime Chokepoints
(click to enlarge)

3. A strategic alternative for China is to accept the U.S. threat in the South China Sea and find another route for distributing exports. The Belt and Road Initiative was considered for this purpose, but it suffers from several challenges, including the cost of land-based transportation and the sheer number of countries it would pass through (not to mention the poor security in many of these places). Chinese investment in countries to its west is used less to create such a passage than it is for building political coalitions based on investment.

China's Belt and Road Initiative
(click to enlarge)

4. Given the strategic difficulties facing China, Beijing must maintain control of its buffer regions, especially where an international threat might exist. In Tibet, China must maintain internal security and contain India. In Xinjiang, it has gone to extremes to maintain internal security and suppress dissent.

Conclusion

China is a defensive power, not an offensive one. Its fundamental strategic interest is to preserve the unity of Han China and to protect the country from intrusion via the strategic depth of its buffer regions and from internal opposition by a domestic-oriented military. Historically dangerous states such as Japan, Russia and Turkey are currently weak and not motivated to intrude. Therefore, the primary strategic interest of China is to prevent the United States from blocking its ocean outlets. All of this is driven by the need to maintain a robust economy in order to pacify Han China.

China maintains its economy by being the largest exporter in the world. Inasmuch as the United States is the world’s largest importer, an underlying tension exists. China needs access to U.S. markets without giving the U.S. equivalent access to Chinese markets. China must build up its domestic economy for national security reasons, but that economy is under pressure, and permitting U.S. firms to compete in China, beyond a certain limit, is unacceptable. This has created a military dimension in which China hopes to force the U.S. away from its ports and chokepoints and eliminate the possibility of a U.S. blockade. Beijing understands the possibility of a blockade is remote, but the consequences to China if the unlikely happens are too great to risk.

In other words, modern China needs to maintain Deng’s approach to economics but must achieve Mao’s outcome of a united China. China’s national strategy is odd in that China is a great power that must concentrate on economics — and it has been thrust into an economic and military confrontation with an important customer and major military power. China’s strategic goal must be to disengage from this position while preserving national unity.

[DougMacG]

quote author=Crafty_Dog:  "Not sure what to make of this"
Facing Reality: China’s Strategy  By: George Friedman
...
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I'm also not sure what to think either but he is always interesting to read.

The real threat to the regime of China is from the oppressed within and the regime addresses that threat every minute of every day with every tool available.  Sadly, the tools of authoritarianism such as monitoring people and information and controlling communications have never been stronger. 

Control over the 'outer areas' Tibet, Xinjiang, Manchuria and Inner Mongolia was asserted long ago, mostly mid 20th century, not under Xi who is trying to keep that buffer.  The war (or 'skirmish') with India is about an outer geographic and strategic area of control and not about a Chinese desire to conquer the country or rule the people of India.  On another border they certainly could have taken over DPRK and most clearly don't want it.  Hong Kong and Taiwan, it seems to me, are the areas where the PRC want to expand their governance - and they already did with Hong Kong.

The point about the US posing a threat to its shipping lanes in the South China Sea is upside down to me.  In a war scenario initiated by China that response might be true.  We pose a threat IF they attack Taiwan for example.  That seems easy to avoid.

China, with its new wealth, could feed its people easily if it wasn't throwing its money into everything else.

China faces the threat that another Donald Trump becomes the next President of the US (or maybe the same Donald Trump) as Biden Harris, whom they helped elect, flail and flounder.  That could take China back to the pre-covid trade war, which could have been resolved by merely agreeing to compete fairly in the world market.  In that scenario, they still keep all their gains from cheating and stealing and then compete going forward with an economy and military close to that of a rapidly disintegrating US.

The real threat they face in my view comes from potential responses their own aggressive mis-steps.  The fight against India positions a mostly neutral India against them.  Their open threat to Taiwan awakens and emboldens Japan, and Taiwan and the US.  Their perpetuation of the North Korea threat keeps South Korea on edge, also Japan and the US.  Their broken promises in Hong Kong are a slap in the face to the UK and strengthens a potential US alliance against them.  Their feuds with Australia and others, same thing.  Their provocation and militarizing of the South China Sea puts the whole region on notice - unnecessarily.

I doubt the next round of conflict is fought with battalions, warships and aircraft carriers.  Those seem to be used for positioning and deterrence.

Very hard to declare war on your biggest customer (US) or shut down your main trade route when your real challenges are internal and economic.

In their next offensive mis-step I would like to see the US intervene in the information monopoly in China with something like space based uncensored internet to the people perhaps coupled with a take down of the Chinese existing information control system.

China's best strategy is the status quo.  Don't rock the boat.  They are already cheating, stealing, infiltrating.  They are helping to destabilize their greatest adversary and on a path to become the largest economy and military in the world.  Almost everything is going their way.  From their point of view, don't screw it up.

[G M]

They are not rational on the topic of Taiwan.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/17724/afghan-fallout-india-china

[Crafty_Dog]

second post



September 10, 2021
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John F. Kennedy and the Origin of Wars Without End
Thoughts in and around geopolitics.
By: George Friedman

I’ve spent the past few weeks trying to answer a fundamental question: Why did the United States, economically and militarily the most powerful nation in the world, lose three wars during my lifetime? Given that tomorrow is the anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, the immediate cause of the last disastrous war, it is proper that this question be asked and that we all try to answer it.

For me, the origin of these wars is to be found in words from John F. Kennedy’s inaugural address:

“Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty.”

At the time it was met with great applause. Kennedy was merely summarizing a moral principle that had become commonplace after World War II. During the conflict, Franklin D. Roosevelt presented the United States as the moral savior of a corrupt world. It’s true that the world was corrupt, and it’s true that the United States saved the lives of my parents and millions of others. But the war had a powerful geopolitical rationale: If Germany and Japan were not defeated, the security and the fundamental interests of the United States would be in danger. Roosevelt meant what he said about salvation, but he carefully calculated the cost of being the savior.

The Roosevelt theory of salvation embedded itself at this time. The struggle against the Soviet Union was a moral struggle but not one beyond the consideration of costs. When he became president, Dwight D. Eisenhower, who was previously Roosevelt’s commander in Europe, shared a moral abhorrence of the Soviet Union. But he refused to send U.S. troops to Indochina to support France, he insisted that France and Britain, however morally superior they may be to Egypt, withdraw from attempting to seize the Suez Canal, and with meticulous care, he managed to leave office having not engaged in nuclear war. He petted the geopolitical shark, a moral cause carefully calibrated with resources, risks and rewards.

In his inaugural address, Kennedy wrote a blank check from his country. This was the moment the United States left the world of Roosevelt’s prudent savior. The United States would as a matter of principle bear any hardship to support any friend and oppose any foe to assure liberty. In assuming the burden, he assumed the cost of war if needed, and he did not ask the question of whether our hardships would bring success or failure, and at such a price that the nation might not be able to bear it militarily, financially or morally. It is hard to imagine that he understood the promise he was making.

Kennedy’s principle was not a meaningless moment in a speech. It expressed a sensibility that had emerged in World War II in which war was an instrument to be used against evil. It was easy to regard America’s enemies as evil, because they were. There was no tension between the geopolitical imperative of the war and the moral imperative.

It was after Kennedy’s speech that the principles of World War II began to emerge as conscious principles, and this has dominated American strategy imperfectly as such things always do. There were three wars following Kennedy’s stated principles that lasted for many years and were unsuccessful: Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq. But they were only the long and agonizing cases. The United States used military force in Iran during the hostage crisis but failed to achieve its desired outcome. The United States invaded Grenada. It succeeded, I suppose. The United States sent troops to Beirut and withdrew when hundreds of Marines were killed by explosives. The United States succeeded in Desert Storm. It conducted an extended bombing campaign in defense of Kosovo. And it has sent troops into Libya, Syria, Chad and northern Africa.

I am no pacifist, but the tempo of operations imposed on the U.S. military and the widely varying environments it went into, frequently with a mission that was opaque, made little sense. In World War II, there was a clear moral and geopolitical reason for combat, a clear if flexible strategy that would withstand reversals. Most important, the military was configured for this war. Training a force takes time, and a force cannot be trained for “whatever comes up.” Having been trained to face the Soviets in Germany, the U.S. military was then unreasonably asked to fight limited wars in the jungle, the desert and so forth. In other words, it was asked to go anywhere to fight any foe and protect any friend. So that’s what it did.

In Vietnam, a military built around armor and clear fields of fire was thrown into a jungle that curbed numbers and limited visibility. In Afghanistan, what started (and should have ended) as a covert mission conducted by the CIA and special operations forces ballooned into something quite different. In Iraq, the military was never trained or equipped for a battle that featured improvised explosive devices and light vehicles.

The thing is, it takes time and experience to develop a concept for fighting a war, identify the troops needed for a war and train a force to fight a war. Eisenhower’s mission was to conquer Germany. He refused to act for over two years. Marshall first trained the army for the war at home, and then Eisenhower trained them again in North Africa, losing battles and learning about the Germans. The army that landed at Normandy and the Navy that delivered and protected them were built for that moment, and even then suffered failures. To have landed an army there trained for Vietnam would have been insane.

Even so, in World War II the U.S. emerged with a sense of invincibility. The first duty of the senior commanders was to ruthlessly extract this feeling from the military and from its civilian leadership. If you go into combat without an appropriate force, and with a sense of invincibility, you may not lose, but you won’t win. And if you go in unprepared for the terrain, weather and horrors of the battlefield, the failures will mount, the politicians will deny any failures, the machine will pump more soldiers into the war, and the public will rightly determine that the war was a horrible failure. And then the soldiers who broke their hearts trying to win will feel betrayed by their nation.

The more wars the U.S. fights in shorter intervals, the less likely it is to win. Kennedy’s doctrine, then, should be expunged from our minds. That doctrine leads to endless war and continual defeat. War is not an action designed to do good. It is the use of overwhelming force against an opponent that threatens your nation’s fundamental interest. War is not an act of charity for deserving friends, not even an act of vengeance for a vicious enemy.

A fundamental foundation for peace is an unsentimental understanding of geopolitics, the discipline that distinguishes sentiment from necessity, capability from boast, and the enemy who matters from the one who doesn’t. We are now more at peace than usual. Minor conflicts in Africa and the Middle East still rage. Only a few are justified; the others are undertaken out of habit, a bad habit at that. “America First” has somehow become an ugly concept. It is as with children: Whoever does not put his children first, above other children, is morally questionable. Those who do not put their nation ahead of others are in my view the same. Once your own love is cared for, and you have the ability, helping another is praiseworthy. But nothing is more immoral than putting others first and failing to protect your own.

Which brings us back to Afghanistan. There are those who argue that leaving Afghanistan puts American lives at risk from future terrorist attacks. But terrorists are tied to no country, and their numbers are small. They keep it that way to gather weapons and plan their operations usually from the country they intend to attack, not a country half a world away.

Kennedy assumed that the U.S. could afford to fight any enemy anywhere. It can’t. And Washington better be certain that the next war it fights can be won, and that the next enemy is actually an enemy.

[DougMacG]

"Democrat" President 1961:
“Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty.”

"ask not what your country can do for you - ask what you can do for your country."
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/kennedy.asp

Democrat President 2021:
"C'mon man." "You know.  It's the thing."

[G M]

Washington is planning on fighting us, here.

[Crafty_Dog]

Subject: Facing Reality: A New American Strategy



August 17, 2021
   

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Facing Reality: A New American Strategy


By: George Friedman




The United States has been at war for almost the entire 21st century, and it’s only 2021. In contrast, the United States was at war for just 17 percent of the entire 20th century, during which it won the world wars, defeat in which may have led to existential transformations of the country and thus of the international order. But just as it lost Korea and Vietnam – wars that were not an existential threat – so too has it lost in Iraq and Afghanistan.

This may suggest that the U.S. engages in too many conflicts that are subcritical and is careless in how it fights them, while it fights critical wars with great precision. But to understand why, we must begin by understanding the geopolitical reality of the United States. Geopolitics defines the imperatives and constraints of a nation. Strategy shapes that reality into action. And the defeat of the United States in Afghanistan after 20 years compels a reevaluation of American national strategy, not only of how we fight wars but also of how we determine which wars should be fought.

The thing about major wars, though, is that they are rare, or should be. The international system typically doesn’t develop quickly enough for major powers to challenge each other for a long time. And yet, only five years passed from World War II to Korea. Vietnam came 12 years after that, then Desert Storm and Kosovo in the 1990s, and of course Iraq and Afghanistan in the early 2000s. The frequency of wars raises the critical question of whether they were imposed on the U.S. or selected by it, and whether history is moving so quickly now that the tempo of war has likewise accelerated. If the latter isn’t true, then there is a strong possibility the U.S. is following a defective strategy that profoundly weakens its power by curbing its ability to control world events.


(click to enlarge)

The key measure of strategy is its relative simplicity. Geopolitics is complex. Tactics are detailed. Strategy should, in theory, be straightforward insofar as it represents the main thrust of a nation’s imperatives. For the United States, that strategy might be controlling ocean chokepoints while avoiding detailed plans for other areas of the world. A successful strategy must represent the essential core of a nation’s intent. Excessive complexity represents uncertainty or, worse, a compendium of strategic imperatives that outstrip a nation’s ability to execute or understand. A nation with an excess of strategic goals has not made the difficult choices on what matters and what doesn’t. Complexity represents an unwillingness to make those decisions. Deception is a tactical matter. Self-deception is a strategic failure. Only so much can be done, and understanding priorities without ambiguity and resisting the creeping expansion of strategy is the indispensable craft of the strategist.

The Geopolitical Reality of the United States

1. The United States is virtually immune to land attacks. It is flanked by Canada and Mexico, neither of which are capable of mounting a threat. This means U.S. armed forces are primarily designed to project power rather than defend the homeland.


(click to enlarge)

2. The United States controls the North Atlantic and Pacific oceans. An invasion from the Eastern Hemisphere would have to defeat U.S. naval and air forces in one of these oceans in such a way as to prevent interdiction of reinforcement and resupply.

3. Any existential threat to the United States will always originate from Eurasia. The United States must work to limit the development of forces, especially naval forces, that could threaten U.S. control of the oceans. In other words, the key is to divert Eurasian military energy from the sea.

4. Nuclear weapons are a stabilizing force. It is unlikely that the Cold War would have ended as it did without two nuclear powers managing the conflict. Nuclear weapons essentially prevented World War III. Maintaining a nuclear force stabilizes the system, and preventing new nuclear powers from emerging is desirable but not entirely essential.

5. The United States’ position in North America has made it the largest economy in the world, the largest importer of goods and the largest source of international investment. The United States is also a generator of international culture. It also defines IT culture worldwide. This can be a substitute for military power, particularly before near-war situations.

6. The primary interest of the United States is to maintain a stable international system that does not challenge U.S. boundaries. It has little interest in risk-taking. The greatest risk comes from attempts to retain control of the seas since only great powers can threaten U.S. maritime hegemony.

7. The great weakness of the United States since World War II is being drawn into conflicts that are not in the U.S. geopolitical interest and that diffuse U.S. power for an extended period of time. This is done primarily but not exclusively by strategic terrorism carried out by nations or non-national actors.

8. The United States is a moral project and, like all moral projects, thinks its model superior to others. Moral intervention is rarely in the geopolitical interests of the United States, and it almost never ends well. For the United States, the temptation to engage in these wars should be avoided to concentrate on direct interests and because these interventions frequently do more harm than good. If intervention is deemed necessary, it should be ruthlessly temporary.

Implementing the Strategy

1. North America: Maintaining U.S. dominance and harmony in North America is central to all U.S. strategy. Mexico and Canada cannot threaten the United States militarily, and both are bound to the United States economically. However, any power hostile to the United States would welcome an opportunity to draw either country into a relationship with it. It is imperative that the United States follow a strategy that always makes a relationship with the U.S. far more attractive than a third-party alliance.

2. Atlantic and Pacific: Command of the oceans is primarily a technical problem. Whereas it was once achieved by battleships and then aircraft carriers, it is now an issue of long-range missiles and other weapons. The key to this is to know the location of the enemy in an environment in which aircraft cannot easily survive over a fleet. Since the key to command of the sea is now reconnaissance for targeting information, space-based systems followed by unmanned aerial vehicles are the critical variable in controlling the sea. The U.S. Navy and the U.S. Space Force (as it matures) will be the most important services controlling the seas henceforth.

3. Eurasia: The United States faces Eurasia on two fronts: Across the Atlantic it faces Europe, and across the Pacific it faces East Asia. After World War II, Europe was Washington’s primary focus. The threat of the era was the Soviet Union. The idea was that a European peninsula conquered by the Soviet Union would provide the technology and personnel to construct a fleet that could challenge the U.S. The solution was to create NATO. NATO and the concept of mutually assured destruction blocked Soviet westward expansion and, in the event war broke out, would direct the Soviet navy from trying to control sea lanes to trying to interdict U.S. convoys reinforcing NATO. The threat now is China’s seeking to secure access to the sea. The U.S. has created an informal alliance stretching from Japan to the Indian Ocean to contain China. It has also used economic power to pressure China. The key in both strategies was an early response and to use military power to increase the risk of war on the Soviet or Chinese part and then wait to see if they make a move.


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4. Nuclear Weapons: The awe and sense of doom generated by nuclear weapons have died down since the end of the Cold War, but nukes are still the quintessential American weapon. U.S. strategy post-World War II is to construct boundaries against significant enemies to see how they react – i.e., push the boundaries or invite a stable confrontation. In this case, nuclear weapons are the wall. They are not an offensive tool for a country that should avoid offensive operations. They are stabilizers for a country that needs to pursue the status quo.

5. Economics: In most countries, economics limits both the readiness and deterrent power of a military. In the United States, the economy actually provides both. In terms of purchasing power, it creates a stable domestic base that can generate military technology and a significant force. In terms of managing global relations, the economy provides non-military incentives and penalties. As the largest importer in the world, the ability of the U.S. to limit purchases can reshape policy. Used prudently, the willingness to purchase goods from a country can create relationships that prevent the need for military action. Washington needs to develop a strategic economic program that reduces the risk of combat and increases potential allies that might be prepared to carry the burden on shared conflicts. This requires a redefinition of how the private sector makes decisions to some degree.

6. Attaining the primary interest: The primary interest of the United States is to protect the homeland against foreign invasion. The purpose of that security is to maintain an economic system able to provide wealth to the American public and to maintain the regime. Put simply, some things will threaten security, and some will not. For those things that threaten the nation, there must be careful calculus of whether the threat and the cost of mitigating the threat are aligned. The great danger of the United States has been to recognize threats without recognizing either the cost or the probability of successfully containing them. This has led to a series of wars that the United States did not win and that averted attention from core interests while at times destabilizing the nation.

7. Terrorism: Terrorist groups are small and diffuse and are therefore unable to be countered with traditional military action. Time and again, militaries struggle to determine where these groups are and contain them, even if they are in a country known to harbor them (Afghanistan, for example). Intelligence organizations and special forces are essential in this regard. National strategy cannot be diverted from geopolitically defined interests because doing so disperses U.S. power against a group that poses no existential threat against the United States.


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There are, of course, foreign policy issues that need to be managed but that do not constitute a significant part of the national strategy. The dilemma is that those who work on such matters regard them as supremely important, as they should. But this turns into a bureaucratic matter or a political one. Minor State Department officials will search for importance, and presidents will search for votes. National strategy may be clear, but its administration is complex. It ultimately falls to the president to set the ever-shifting boundaries and preserve the essential character of national strategy. Otherwise, minor matters may become major wars and destroy a presidency.

Non-Strategic Wars: Vietnam and Afghanistan

The decision to go to war in Afghanistan was rooted in a misunderstanding of American geopolitics and strategy, not unlike what happened in Vietnam decades earlier. The United States fought World War II to prevent the consolidation of Europe under a single power. That was based on an overriding American imperative: preventing a challenge to U.S. domination of the Atlantic. World War II broke up Germany, but the Soviet Union emerged as the new threat capable of dominating Europe. An American alliance, NATO, and the danger of thermonuclear war blocked Soviet expansion. Europe was effectively locked down.

The United States understood this as a struggle against communism. In part, this was correct, since the Soviets wanted to weaken the United States. With nuclear weapons rendering direct confrontation impossible, the only strategy open to the Soviets was to attempt to increase the presence of communist regimes outside of Europe in the hopes that the U.S. would reduce its presence in Europe to deal with them. The U.S. was sensitive to the spread of communist regimes but generally responded only with political and economic pressure and covert operations. One exception was the Cuban missile crisis, which was a fundamental threat to North America’s security and which the U.S. countered by threatening war, leading to Soviet capitulation. After Korea, there were no more full-scale anti-communist wars until Vietnam. The U.S. took the rise of a communist insurgency in Vietnam as more threatening than when the same occurred in Congo or Syria.

Vietnam did not pose a strategic threat to the United States. Even unified it could not threaten U.S. control of the Pacific, and the fall of Vietnam would represent only an extension of North Vietnam. But the U.S. saw two reasons for intervening there. One was the domino theory, in which the fall of Vietnam would lead to the spread of communism throughout Southeast Asia. The second reason was credibility. The U.S. alliance system, particularly NATO, depended on the belief that the United States would carry out obligations to resist communist expansion. The U.S. was particularly concerned about Europe, where French President Charles de Gaulle was raising questions about American reliability and advocating an independent nuclear deterrent. Any shift in the alliance would be partial but would weaken the wall containing the Soviets.

The words “domino” and “credibility” dominated the case for intervention in Vietnam. Not mentioned was the possibility that a defeat might accelerate these processes. In the end, the fact that this was a communist expansion trumped any consideration that this was a non-strategic war. Another fact was ignored. During World War II, the United States was responding to aggression rather than initiating war. That made a critical difference in the domestic political dynamism. In Vietnam, the U.S. had to be successful in a non-strategic war – a war that didn’t appear essential and wasn’t essential.

The need to maintain a political consensus for the Vietnam War was not a luxury. It was crucial. But American leaders believed U.S. forces could rapidly crush the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army. The problem was that the U.S. military was created for a European war, a strategic war. It was trained to fight against a Soviet armored thrust using aircraft, armor and the complex logistics needed to support such an operation. The military was not shaped to fight a war against light, mobile infantry in terrain ranging from hills to jungles. Washington assumed that airstrikes on Haiphong would force capitulation, and it accounted for neither the near-religious commitment of Vietnamese troops nor the ruthlessness of the North Vietnamese regime. The U.S. came as close as possible to winning after the failed Tet Offensive, but command failures, logistical problems and operational constraints, along with rapid reinforcement by the North, rendered that impossible. And that was supplemented by a misunderstanding of the event by the American press that was instrumental in turning the U.S. public against the war.

The problem with the Vietnam War was that it was not strategically necessary. The U.S. public would sanction a cheap victory but not an endless war. It knew that neither the domino theory nor America’s credibility depended on it. The commanders in the war had fought in World War II, where both fronts were strategically essential. They and their troops were not accustomed to accepting a war that would run for seven years before American capitulation.

A similar process happened in Afghanistan. As a nation, Afghanistan was not strategic to the United States. Al-Qaida had planned the attack on 9/11 from there, and the initial use of the CIA, some U.S. special operations forces and anti-Taliban tribes in defeating the group made sense. But al-Qaida escaped to Pakistan, and a decision had to be made either to withdraw or to attempt to take control of Afghanistan. The obvious answer was to leave, but the one chosen was to stay and to begin by launching airstrikes on various Afghan cities. The Taliban controlled those cities, and the air attack was intended to break them. They left the cities, and there was hope that the war was won. But the Taliban had simply retreated and dispersed, and over time they regrouped in the areas they came from and knew best.

The mission evolved into trying to destroy a force deeply embedded in Afghan society and geography. The Taliban could be contained in their areas, at a cost in casualties, but it was impossible to break them. If the Viet Cong fought with near-religious commitment, the Taliban fought with genuine religious commitment. The U.S. tried to create a pro-American Afghan National Army as it had created the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. The idea of creating an army in the middle of a war has many flaws, but the greatest is that the first recruits they got would be sent by communists or the Taliban. The result was an army that had its enemy in strategic positions. The enemy would anticipate any offensive the new army might mount.

A military force is created to satisfy strategic imperatives. When a non-strategic war is fought, the chances are overwhelming that the force, and particularly the command structure, will not be ready. Vietnam took seven years. Afghanistan took 20 years. Neither war ended because of a lack of patience by Americans. They ended because the enemy had matured; in Vietnam and Afghanistan, while U.S. troops rotated in and out, the enemy was at home. And they ended because what had been true for years had become manifest: The U.S. couldn’t win, and no great damage to American secrets would flow from the end of the war.

Neither war fit into the strategy imposed on the U.S. by geopolitical reality. Neither military was designed to fight a war against a committed, experienced, agile light infantry. Fighting a non-strategic war inevitably weakens the military deployed. And in both wars, the enemy might have been underestimated, but an ill-prepared American force was greatly overestimated. What ensued was not the failure of the troops on the ground. It was a failure of training, command and, most of all, the fact that U.S. troops wanted to go home. The Taliban were home.

Geopolitics defines strategy. Strategy defines the force. The price of engaging in a non-strategic war is high, and the temptation to fight non-strategic wars is great. They open with real alarm and slowly descend into failure. As important, they distract from the nation’s strategic priorities. The Vietnam War significantly weakened U.S. capabilities in Europe, a weakness the Soviets did not take advantage of. Afghanistan didn’t undermine the force, but it once again shook its confidence and the confidence of the U.S. public. It did not, however, diminish American power.

The two wars lasted as long as they did because the presidents involved (it is always the president) found it easier to continue them than to end them. Losing a war is hard. Deciding that you lost a war still underway and stopping it is harder. And that is the price you pay for non-strategic wars.

From the Non-Strategic to the Extremely Strategic: China

The Soviet threat to Europe and the Atlantic was managed without war. The strategic nature of the threat compelled a clear understanding, appropriate forces and political support. In due course the weaker party, the Soviets, cracked under the economic pressure imposed by the United States. That is the ideal strategic outcome.

The threat in Europe has diminished greatly. The Russians are seeking to regain lost territories but are in no position to threaten Europe. The trans-Atlantic alliance structure the United States created is no longer relevant and will not be for years, if ever. Alliances are vital in generating additional military and economic power. They provide geographical advantages and shift the psychology of adversaries. But as the strategic condition evolves, so does the alliance. The strategic reality of 1945 was a powerful Russia and a weak Europe. The strategic situation today is a weakened Russia and a prosperous Europe. The need for NATO, therefore, shifts to something less central in U.S. policy and less defined by what is to be done, just as it shifts in other members. The danger of alliances that outlast their utility is a distortion of national strategy such that they can weaken the United States instead of strengthening it. The worst-case scenario is that they can draw the United States into policies and wars that undermine rather than enhance its national security.


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The diminution of the European theater leaves the United States free to deal with the Pacific Ocean and the potential threat from China. China urgently needs to force the United States back, away from its shores and deeper into the Pacific. This began with the American demand for equal access to the Chinese market, China’s refusal and the United States’ imposition of tariffs on China. The economic issue was not critical, but China reasonably drew the conclusion that the U.S. view of China had changed and that China had to be prepared for a worst-case scenario.

The worst case would be that the U.S. would impose an embargo on China’s east coast ports and/or along the island chokepoints east of China. China is a mercantile power dependent on maritime trade. Closure of the ports, as well as the Strait of Malacca, would cripple China. The U.S. has not threatened this, but China must act on the worst-case scenario. The United States has created an informal alliance structure that concerns China. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam and Singapore are all formally or informally aligned with the United States, or simply hostile to China. In addition, India, Australia and the United Kingdom are actively involved in this quasi-alliance. China must assume that at some point the U.S. will try to bring pressure if not on the ports then by a blockade of this line of islands.


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The United States is roughly in the position that it was in during the Cold War. It has an alliance that provides it the geography needed to meet a Chinese attack, to launch an attack or simply to hold its position. China must act to change this reality. One option is major economic concessions to the United States and others in this group. Another option is to launch an attack designed to break the blockade line. Another is to simply hold this position unless and until the U.S. moves. Or possibly China could do what the Soviets did: create a non-strategic threat that the U.S. can’t resist, given its well-known appetite for the non-strategic.

Launching a war opens the door to defeat as well as victory. China cannot be certain what would happen, and it is not clear what the bill for a defeat would be. The Chinese economy is always under pressure, with vast numbers of relatively poor people. Economic concessions are not a possibility. Staying in this position allows the U.S. to make the first move, and given what China sees as U.S. military adventurism, Beijing is not sure the U.S. won’t overestimate China’s power. Therefore, the most likely choice would be a diversion.

The Chinese have the ability to force regime change in any number of countries that would appear to the United States as a direct challenge, like Vietnam and Afghanistan did. The U.S. tendency to accept these non-strategic challenges also includes Iraq and, to some extent, Korea. China might draw the same conclusion the Soviets did, which is that the U.S. will respond to a threat even if it is non-strategic. China has not engaged in such activities for a long time, but the current situation is riskier than before. Creating a diversion could be seen as the low-risk option.

This is the ultimate problem with the American century: It is reactive, and it sometimes reacts to chum cast on the water by its enemies in the hope the U.S. will bite. The central problem is that U.S. strategy is not driven by the strategic, and as a result, distinguishing the non-strategic from the strategic has been difficult. A new American strategy is needed to provide the discipline to avoid a Chinese attempt to divert the United States.

The ideal outcome of the U.S.-Chinese dispute is a negotiated settlement. Neither can absorb the cost of war, although the U.S. has a geographic advantage that can neutralize any weapon advantage China might have gained. And this is the point of the strategy. First, war is to be rare, not the norm. Avoiding war requires geopolitical, strategic and disciplined thinking. The U.S. stood on the line in Europe for 45 years and ended the conflict with the Soviet Union peacefully, except for the Vietnam War, which was not material. The U.S. and China will maneuver over the Western Pacific, but if the U.S. focuses on strategy, it will likely not end in war. Preparation for war is essential. Throwing away that preparation on non-strategic and bloody distractions is the American habit it must overcome.

[G M]

All China has to do is let us fall apart from internal rot.

[Crafty_Dog]

September 14, 2021
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On Geoeconomics
There's a shift underway that could change the rules in the global system.
By: Antonia Colibasanu
Last week, I spoke and moderated at several conferences in person – a rare thing since the pandemic began – whose topics ranged from defense and security to regional commerce to European affairs. The common denominator, of course, was geopolitics, but what struck me most about my conversations was that, rather than the withdrawal from Afghanistan or the elections in Germany, nearly everyone was concerned foremost by inflation and the green economic shift underway in Europe.

In fact, nearly every conversation had one thing in common: Our society’s economic challenges in light of the pandemic. Until August, inflation was generally triggered by the energy sector and by a narrow set of goods such as semiconductors whose price increases were linked to the supply chain crisis. But, as evidenced by recent upticks in food and services prices, it seems as though the effects are widening. Bad weather conditions, unusual droughts and floods that destroyed harvests, often cited as the collateral damage of climate change, have contributed to an increase in food prices.

And though that was the case even before the pandemic started, the pandemic has indeed exposed the vulnerabilities in the food system, impacting production, supply and delivery. Increased ocean freight rates, higher fuel prices and a shortage of truck drivers are pushing up the cost of transportation services. Moreover, the pandemic created difficulties for producers to access the labor force they need to get crops delivered in due time (to say nothing of the workers needed to deliver and distribute other goods). Such was the case for tomatoes, oranges and strawberries producers in Europe in 2020. In Australia, industry groups fear that pandemic-related challenges could derail what is expected to be a stellar crop of winter grains this season.

The food industry is hardly the only industry grappling with these kinds of challenges. An explanation put forward by HR specialists cites the fact that there seems to be a mismatch between the industries hiring and those seeking jobs, a development apparently borne out by the uneven recovery in different industries. Another explanation refers to the fact that, during the pandemic, many workers moved away from the cities where they worked, leaving their jobs unfilled until there is a better sense of when the pandemic may subside. This speaks to the importance for the workforce to be able – and willing – to migrate from one place to another.

Global Socioeconomic Polls
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For the first time, we’re seeing both high unemployment and high inflation – something that is abnormal when economies are recovering from recession, and just generally abnormal. Inflation typically comes alongside recovery and growth, which typically lowers unemployment. The problem is that inflation is unbalanced: There are too many jobs and too few people willing to take them.

Rising Unemployment and Inflation
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The summer of 2021 has been anything but normal, of course. The pandemic is not over. The Delta variant, combined with low vaccination rates, has pushed COVID-19 infections up again and has thus slowed the service sector's recovery. In addition to supply shortages cutting into both consumer and business spending worldwide, a steady wave of grim news concerning Afghanistan, global political stability, and also extreme events like hurricanes and wildfires have eroded consumer confidence.

Composite Leading Indicator (CLI)
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Confidence is essential for an economy to function. The pandemic has shown once more how vulnerable our current social system is. As with the 2008 global financial crisis, people are witnessing firsthand the negative effects of globalization, even as they reconcile the fact that interconnectivity and interdependency are realities that cannot be quickly undone. It’s only reasonable that they question the current rules of the game if those rules create pain and suffering.

And, after all, it is the people’s tolerance for pain that triggers political change. With so much general discontent with the way that the global system works, the idea that there is something inherently wrong with our society has in its own way advanced the conversation on sustainability and climate change. The perception that we live in a fragile world demands that we ask our governments to fortify our very existence – all while stabilizing the economy. To be sure, it’s a radical change, one that requires socio-economic restructuring.

From a geopolitical point of view, states are asked to make use of their economic power to secure safe and stable living conditions for their people. This has long been the case, but the urgency of needed changes at a time of intense international economic competition makes for the transformation of geopolitics into geoeconomics. The traditional meaning of geoeconomics is that nations employ foreign trade tools to achieve imperatives. In the current context of deeply uncertain times – thanks to the pandemic, climate change and the digital revolution – the geoeconomic function of the nation-state refers to making use of economic tools to achieve political goals and to increase the nation-state’s power. Controlling the markets, managing trade surpluses and making use of economic sanctions or strategic investments to enhance political influence are part of the arsenal a country can use to build, maintain and increase its economic power.

But what is economic power? How can we measure it, given the complexity of the pandemic times we live in? Real gross domestic product growth and trade dependencies give just some basic ideas of the economic stability of a country. With the pandemic, we have learned that the power of disposition over strategic raw materials plays an important role in keeping strategic sectors alive. What constitutes a strategic sector, and therefore a strategic raw material, also changes by location and time. Oil is not as powerful now as it was in the 1970s. Water supply, while essential for everyone, is more strategically valuable in some places than others. Extreme phenomena attributed to climate change also pose specific questions in the longer term. The ability to produce technological innovation will give countries influence over critical infrastructure and therefore enable them to secure their stability in times of extreme events such as droughts and pandemics.

At the same time, the ability for a country to enforce international standards and norms is key to setting the rules for the global economic system and for exerting influence over other states. With globalization, we already have countries using different norms operating in the same market economy, but accessing strategic markets is still difficult due to the prevalence of Western-based standards.

There are therefore three elements a state should focus on in building its geoeconomic strategy. First, it needs to retain the economic strength it currently has. Second, it needs to reduce one-sided economic dependencies. Third, it needs to develop a strategy that captures and expands on the value of its economic strength. In taking these three steps, the state focuses on defining its economic strengths, which are ultimately shaped by the population. The state’s human resources are its most valuable asset for geoeconomic strategy, particularly in uncertain times.

This is why the unstable relationship between inflation and unemployment needs to be taken as a serious signal of economic restructuring. Human behavior wrought by human pain is potentially triggering a revolution that could change the rules in the global system.

[Crafty_Dog]

September 20, 2021
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Rolling in the Deep of the Indo-Pacific

Big things are happening beneath the surface in the increasingly crowded waters of East Asia.
By: Phillip Orchard

In a landmark announcement Thursday, Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom unveiled a new trilateral Indo-Pacific security alliance. The pact is expected to focus on all sorts of things, including cybersecurity, artificial intelligence and emerging technologies. The centerpiece of the pact, though, is good, old-fashioned hard power: The British and U.S. are going to sell Australia nuclear-powered submarines. South Korea, meanwhile, has quietly been making waves of its own. Over the past few months, it’s unveiled a host of new indigenous weapons systems and arms procurements. The biggest came last week, with an apparently successful test of a submarine-launched ballistic missile. This makes South Korea the only non-nuclear power with such a capability. Both developments could have profound implications for the regional security landscape, but they signal very different things about the state of the U.S. alliance structure.

Ending the Debate

It’d be easy to see all the hype around the new security alliance as more than a little overblown. After all, the three countries were already treaty allies. Each is also a member of the crucial Five Eyes intelligence-sharing pact. They’ve had deep cultural, economic and strategic affinities dating back to the days when the U.S. and Australia were still British colonies. There are U.S. Marines in Darwin, Australia, and U.S. troops all over the U.K. And British warplanes make routine landings on U.S. carriers. The British had already announced plans for long-term warship deployments to the Indo-Pacific.

But AUKUS, as the pact is known, is still a huge deal. The hysterical reactions from France (which has seen its own submarine deal with Australia scrapped, and which recalled its ambassadors to both Australia and the U.S. as a result) and China (which should but probably isn’t taking a long hard look in the mirror after unwittingly pushing Australia in this direction) – make as much clear.

The thing is, not all alliances are created equal. It’s what allies are willing and capable of doing for each other, particularly during times of stress, that gives pacts their weight. And it’s the tight alignment of interests that gives alliances their longevity.

Australia has long been a stalwart U.S. ally in just about every respect – even continually getting its hands dirty in U.S. conflicts of marginal Australian interest in the Middle East and elsewhere to demonstrate its continued value as an ally and keep the U.S. attuned to Australian needs. But beneath the surface there’s often been quite a bit of ambivalence in Canberra about tying its fate so closely to a superpower half a world away. In most practical aspects, Australia is an Asian power. Its economy is overwhelmingly orientated toward East Asia, where the biggest buyers of its commodities, its biggest sellers and its most important investors reside. Its most vital sea lanes run through East Asia’s most contentious waters. So every few years or so, a robust debate reemerges in Australia about whether to reorient itself more toward its regional neighbors, including in the security realm.

Australia’s dependence on East Asia is only intensifying, but the debate around how to manage this dependency appears now to be over. The decision to purchase nuclear subs from the U.S. and U.K. ended it. The submarine deal Australia signed with France in 2016 made sense as a purely defensive move. The cutting-edge diesel-electric attack-class submarines France agreed to build would’ve substantially enhanced Australia’s ability to patrol waters in its near abroad – giving it a leg up if and when the simmering contests for maritime dominance farther north along the first island chain came down to the South Pacific. There was a diplomatic component, too, in the decision to go with France rather than Japan, which until the last minute had been widely expected to land the deal. By doing so, Australia made sure to steer clear of any potential blowback from Beijing, which is none too keen to see Japan make good on its ambitions to jumpstart an arms export industry. (Despite the self-imposed limits on its military, Tokyo has long been an elite player in submarine operations.) Australia could credibly claim it was tending its own garden. But Chinese blowback has come Australia’s way anyway, repeatedly, over matters both big (e.g., Australia’s support for the Quad) and trivial (milquetoast calls for a World Health Organization investigation into COVID-19’s origins).


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At least partly as a result, Australia is making a profound strategic leap and thus pursuing nuclear subs. These are very different from diesel subs, both tactically and diplomatically. The biggest difference is range. While diesel subs need to refuel relatively frequently, nuclear subs can stay underwater more or less indefinitely; the only real limitation is their crews’ food supply. This would make them more effective in any sort of operation to impose a blockade on China around the string of chokepoints spanning from the Sulu Sea to the Lombok, Sunda and Malacca straits. Crucially, it also allows Australia to take on intelligence-gathering in the South and East China seas, and, if push comes to shove, combat operations. As it happens, anti-submarine surveillance and warfare are widely considered to be some of the Chinese military’s major weaknesses.

U.S. Partners and Chinese Maritime Chokepoints
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The move also signals a clear intent by Australia to take on these sorts of operations. The U.S. probably wouldn’t be willing to share such sensitive technology with the Aussies otherwise. (The U.K. had been the only recipient of such technologies.) And China has little choice but to assume that the Australians will soon be poking around near its doorstep. So Australia is effectively saying that it’s adopting the U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific as its own. If you fear Chinese blowback or even are merely interested to keep your options open, this isn’t the move you make.

A Louder Voice

South Korea’s moves are, in essence, saying the opposite: that it needs to put itself in position to act apart from the Americans. This isn’t to say the U.S. opposes South Korea’s build-up. Most of the South’s recent major arms purchases came from the U.S., after all. And the U.S. has basically green-lit the South’s missile build-up through a series of moves beginning in 2012, lifting long-held restrictions on the range and payload capacities of South Korean rockets. (The original intent of these was to keep Seoul from attempting to restart the war with the North and possibly pulling the U.S. back into a war not of its choosing.)

Still, the alliance is on shaky footing for several reasons. There are the U.S. threats to abandon South Korea over stalled burden-sharing negotiations – a reflection of latent anti-alliance political sentiment in the U.S. that never really goes away. (There’s a widespread assumption in Seoul that the U.S. troop deployment on the peninsula would not have survived a second Trump term.) There’s the recent resurgence of historical South Korean-Japanese tensions, resulting in a brief trade war and a near-collapse of a trilateral intelligence-sharing pact that the U.S. had spent a decade trying to forge. There are also inevitable signs of strategic divergence between Washington and Seoul over China – as well as some disenchantment in Seoul over a lack of U.S. support when Beijing took aim at the South Korean economy over the installation of a U.S. missile defense system.

Most important, there are major tactical disagreements over the best way to deal with Pyongyang at a time when the North is sowing doubts in Seoul (and Tokyo) that the U.S. will remain willing to come to its defense amid an attack from the North. The bottom line is that South Korea has legitimate reasons to fear both abandonment by the U.S. and entanglement in a U.S. war it doesn’t want to fight. Fear of one or the other is common in any alliance. For an ally to fear both simultaneously is fairly rare because in such cases the weaker ally, feeling extorted, tends to look for a way out before the partnership turns into a politically unsustainable vassalage.

So the South is steadily preparing for the day when it needs to stand on its own. It says quite a bit that this is happening under the center-left administration of President Moon Jae-in, whose North Korea strategy puts a lot more faith in engagement with Pyongyang. Under Moon, defense spending has accelerated compared to previous administrations, increasing by around 7 percent per year.

In most ways, South Korea’s build-up could ultimately benefit the U.S., which needs its allies to be capable of both looking after their own needs and contributing more to multilateral initiatives. A stronger South frees up U.S. resources for other needs. And though Seoul is reluctant to challenge China with the same intensity of Japan and the U.S., China is still a problem for the South. It can speask with a louder voice whenever it so chooses.

But its pursuit of submarine-launched ballistic missiles hints at a strategic logic in Seoul that could end up introducing profound complications to the regional landscape. There’s a reason no other non-nuclear power has SLBMs: The main point of them is the ability to hold the threat of mass destruction over an enemy indefinitely, and South Korea thinks it needs this to hold a nuclear North at bay. It’s currently snuggled under the U.S. nuclear umbrella and has no nuclear program of its own. But it has been pursuing conventional missiles with payload capacities large enough to at least credibly threaten decapitation strikes against the government of Kim Jong Un. And, like Japan, the South is generally considered to be “a quarter-turn of the wrench away” from going nuclear.

In other words, it has the expertise and the civilian nuclear base needed to develop a nuclear weapons program of its own relatively quickly. It dabbled with nuclear weapons programs in the 1970s, and according to a 2015 NPEC report, South Korea already has enough plutonium to produce thousands of nukes. It’s even believed to have nuclear submarine technologies quietly under development. As the proverbial “minnow among whales,” it has obvious strategic reasons to go this route. And, unlike Japan, polls regularly suggest it has the political backing at home to do so. Certain South Korean papers and politicians regularly agitate for it.

There are any number of reasons, both strategic and economic, for the South to steer clear of this path. The U.S. and many of the South’s friends will oppose it. Seoul is loath to push Japan in a similar direction. China would flip out. Even taking steps to go nuclear would threaten the South’s access to uranium imports that it needs for civilian purposes. Nuclear programs are wildly expensive, and the South Korean military has more pressing needs for many other things. The protection provided by the U.S. umbrella has allowed the South to focus most of its energies instead on getting fabulously rich. But it’s apparent that the South is serious about keeping this option available. The SLBM program makes this much clear.

[Crafty_Dog]

Editor's Note: This assessment is the second of a four-part series that explores China-Taiwan relations through the lens of the latter's economy, politics, military affairs and regional relations. Part one can be found here.

A more aggressive mainland leadership and more skeptical Taiwanese populace are forcing Taiwan's two main political parties to emphasize national sovereignty, which will amplify cross-strait tensions in advance of Taiwanese elections in 2022 and 2024, setting the stage for a more antagonistic relationship in the long term. Since 2019, Chinese President Xi Jinping has increasingly used public remarks to associate the 1992 Consensus — an ambiguous bilateral agreement on the statehood of Taiwan — with the "one country, two systems" model of governing Hong Kong. This rhetoric has combined with Beijing's 2019 crackdown on Hong Kong protesters and the 2020 National Security Law in Hong Kong to cast doubt on the sustainability of the cross-strait status quo, in which Taiwan functions as a de facto independent country. It has also spurred a marked shift in Taiwanese sentiment against China, which in turn has led Taiwan's conservative Kuomintang and the Democratic Progressive Party to refocus on protecting Taiwan's sovereignty.

As of June 2021, data from Taiwan's National Chengchi University showed that 56% of Taiwanese support the status quo in cross-strait relations (no independence, no reunification), while 31% support independence and only 7% want reunification. This compares to the June 2017 distribution of 58% status quo, 22% independence, and 12% reunification.

Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council, which plans Taipei's policy toward China, showed the share of Taiwanese perceiving Beijing as hostile toward the Taiwanese people had increased from 46% in June 2017 to 60.5% in March 2021, the second-highest figure after March 2020 (61.5%), when President Tsai Ing-wen was reelected.
A line graph showing Taiwanese political sentiment regarding the island's status vis-a-vis the mainland
In advance of the 2022 local and 2024 presidential elections, Taiwan's two main political parties are seeking to redefine themselves as staunch defenders of sovereignty in a new era of contentious cross-strait relations without sacrificing its economic growth, which is dependent on the mainland. Historically, the KMT has downplayed issues of sovereignty and emphasized cross-strait economic ties in the hope of deterring China's territorial ambitions, while the DPP has highlighted sovereignty issues, been circumspect about making political agreements — like the 1992 Consensus — with China, and sought to diversify Taiwan's economic relations away from China. Now, however, the KMT is reconsidering its stance on sovereignty matters, the DPP is realizing the difficulty of replacing China as a trade partner and both parties must cater to a more China-skeptic electorate set to grow as China's deepening tensions with the United States embolden pro-independence voices in Taiwan.

KMT chairman Johnny Chiang has defended Taiwan's sovereignty since Xi's 2019 remarks and criticized Beijing's military threats while maintaining support for cross-strait trade. His rival for the Sept. 25 election for KMT chair, Eric Chu, favors restoring "conciliatory" relations with China. Given the electorate's distaste for China, Chiang seems the more likely KMT candidate to gather votes from centrists during the 2022 and 2024 elections.

President Tsai Ing-wen of the DPP, who favors the status quo, increasingly must soften anti-China legislation from the party's pro-independence faction while still pushing for Taiwan's sovereignty in cross-strait interactions. She is struggling to implement economic decoupling, as her policies have coincided with deepening trade ties with China amid the pandemic. Nonetheless, given the electorate's pro-status quo views, a moderate DPP candidate like Tsai will poll better in 2022 and 2024, assuming the winner can maintain economic growth and defend Taiwan’s ability to represent itself in global forums.

As they prepare to contend with a likely less amicable Taiwanese leadership, Beijing's efforts to influence Taiwan's upcoming elections are likely to be less effective against improved Taiwanese defenses against propaganda, forcing Beijing to rely on overt military threats, diplomatic pressure campaigns and small-scale economic coercion. In November 2018 local elections, China successfully used online influence tactics, like fake campaign groups and social media content farms generating fake coverage, as well as close relationships with Taiwanese news outlets to promote pro-China views and KMT candidates to help the KMT sweep local elections. Ahead of the 2020 presidential and legislative elections, however, Tsai's administration took a number of steps it is likely to replicate in 2022 and 2024 to reduce the impact of Chinese influence efforts and leave Beijing more reliant on other coercive measures likely to generate comparatively more public discontent in Taiwan.

Taipei cooperated with Facebook to take down Chinese inauthentic online content farms, passed a law to punish entities (including news outlets) that abet foreign campaigns to sway elections and mobilized a volunteer fact-checking group to respond to fake news inquiries on social media. Along with these efforts, the KMT's poorly run campaign and China's handling of the 2019 Hong Kong protests helped Tsai get reelected with 57% of the vote.

After the 2020 defense campaign against online influence tactics, DPP lawmakers are now looking to strengthen laws on national security, trade secrets, the transparency of foreign political influence, media influence, illegal donations and other foreign political activities in the current legislative session from September to December and the next from February through May, all ahead of the November 2022 local elections.

Though Beijing will certainly try again to influence Taiwan’s 2022 local and 2024 presidential elections, Taipei’s improved countermeasures will leave China increasingly reliant on other methods to coerce Taiwan, like military flyovers — China launched the most aerial incursions into Taiwanese airspace in 2020 than any year since 1996 — and trade restrictions targeting Taiwan's farmers and other economic sectors dependent on mainland markets. Compared to more covert online influence efforts, these more overt coercive measures will provoke greater Taiwanese frustration with the mainland.

Through 2024 and beyond, Taiwan's more sovereignty-focused politics and Beijing's deeper reliance on overt and belligerent military and economic intimidation over more discreet political influence campaigns will result in a more antagonistic status quo in cross-strait relations. This new normal will push the United States and regional partners to expand their political and security engagement with Taiwan, which will heighten overall tensions and create sporadic flashpoints that disrupt business and political links amid expected Chinese retaliation. Even as all sides seek to limit escalation and have incentives to limit disruptions, a much less likely — but more provocative — U.S. or allied decision to formally recognize Taiwan or make a formal defense pact with the island could push China to seek reunification with the island by force, especially if Beijing perceives room for cross-strait political negotiations as having disappeared or if societal efforts for Taiwanese independence have become the new norm.

Whether under the KMT or DPP, Taipei will make bolder commitments — mainly rhetoric from the KMT and punitive policies from the DPP — to defend Taiwanese sovereignty. Both parties will continue to recognize the importance of Chinese ties to the economy, but the DPP will become more creative and possibly more intrusive in economic decoupling efforts aimed at businesses, like the amendment proposed in August to ban Taiwanese workers from employment on the mainland.

Taipei will likely supplement its more defensive political posture toward Beijing with tighter informal military partnerships and a greater focus on attaining recognition in international forums. To do so, Taiwan will try to capitalize on governing accomplishments like its effective COVID-19 management to pitch itself as a responsible international partner.

As it rebalances to the Indo-Pacific, the United States will likely double down on its support for Taiwan. This will take the form of more diplomatic meetings, like the June meeting between three U.S. senators and Tsai, and perhaps even clearer statements of U.S. defense obligations toward Taiwan as China's threats to Taiwan become bolder. The United States has already pushed the envelope in 2021 on its defense relation with Taiwan, as seen by the agreement on coast guard cooperation signed in March and (more subtly) the July stopover of a U.S. military plane in Taiwan under the auspices of delivering a package to a U.S. diplomat.

Regional powers like Japan may also more clearly define their political and security relationships with Taiwan, as shown by Japanese Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi's August remarks on the importance of Taiwan's survival for regional stability. But these diplomatic shifts will be limited by the deep economic dependence on China for countries like Japan, South Korea and the Philippines.

China will become more sensitive to perceived changes in cross-strait relations and in how other countries treat Taiwan, reacting with stronger economic and diplomatic retaliation that causes short-term but severe disruptions for affected companies and/or governments. Recent examples of such retaliation include China's March 1 ban on Taiwanese pineapple imports after a proposal to downplay the prospect of reunification in the Taiwanese Constitution and the Sept. 20 ban on Taiwanese apple imports after the United States considered changing the name of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office to the "Taiwan Representative Office."

Should the United States and regional powers deepen their diplomatic relations with Taiwan, Beijing will boost military coercion (e.g. aerial flyovers), cyberattacks and trade restrictions against the island. Much less likely — but much more likely to escalate matters, would be the United States and its allies take clear defense stances about Taiwan, and especially if Taiwanese politicians seek de jure independence or close off cross-strait avenues for political dialogue — China would likely trigger forceful reunification with Taiwan, including either a naval blockade to force Taiwanese political concessions or an outright military invasion of Taiwan's outlying islands or the entire country. These military and diplomatic dynamics will be discussed in the next installations of this series on how Taiwan handles China.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2021/09/deter-china-relearn-lost-art-dissuasion/185638/

[DougMacG]

https://greenwald.substack.com/p/ben-rhodes-book-proves-obama-officials

Ben Rhodes' Book Proves Obama Officials' Lies, and His Own, About Edward Snowden and Russia
It is hard to overstate the sociopathy of US national security officials: their casual willingness to blatantly lie about the gravest matters is limitless.

[Crafty_Dog]

Needed: A Military Strategy for China
The Pentagon, with its outdated policies, may not have the luxury of time when a crisis develops.
By Seth Cropsey
Nov. 2, 2021 6:37 pm ET

‘Strategic ambiguity” is the longstanding U.S. policy toward Taiwan, but President Biden’s approach has been more ambiguous than strategic. Asked at an Oct. 21 town hall whether he would defend the island nation against a Chinese attack, Mr. Biden replied, “Yes, we have a commitment to do that.” The White House then “clarified” his answer by reasserting its commitment to ambiguity.

All this begs the question: What should the U.S. do in defense of Taiwan? And it raises a broader one: What should the U.S. do to counter China’s military challenge?

These two inextricable questions are united by U.S. policy makers’ failure to answer either. China’s strategic objective is to monopolize the South and East China seas and use the resulting economic power to reshape the global order. But doing so requires breaking the U.S. Indo-Pacific alliance system, which in turn requires shattering the First Island Chain, which runs through the Japanese archipelago, Luzon in the Philippines, and Borneo, terminating with the Vietnamese coastline. The First Island Chain limits China’s maritime exit points into the Philippine Sea and the Indian Ocean, making control central to Chinese strategy. Taiwan lies at the center of the First Island Chain.

In such a conflict, deterrence and warfare become synonymous in policy. The U.S. has yet to articulate what victory would mean in a war with China. The Biden administration has suggested no desire to overthrow the Chinese Communist Party and replace it with a regime that respects international order. Rather, the objective seems to be to maintain the status quo, which means defending the sovereignty of all Pacific states, the territorial integrity of regional allies including Taiwan, and the freedom of navigation that undergirds the international system. Accomplishing these objectives means convincing China to stand down from its increasing regional aggression or in a war, to sue for peace. Accomplishing that requires identifying what China holds most valuable.

The answer is simple. The Chinese Communist Party desires survival. President Xi Jinping fears that the managed capitalism of his predecessors won’t prevent the emergence of a middle class that challenges the party domestically. He has turned for inspiration to three past Chinese rulers: Mao Zedong ; Qin Shi Huang (247-221 B.C.), the first Chinese emperor; and Gaozu (202-195 B.C.), the first Han emperor.

The most effective way to destroy the Chinese economy is a long-term blockade. A Sino-American confrontation would trigger a global economic depression that would harm Americans and their allies. But democracies’ electoral legitimacy makes them more resilient to such shocks than authoritarian regimes. A war-generated economic downturn in the West would bring high unemployment and tighter household budgets in the U.S. and, at the very least, an energy crisis elsewhere in the world. In China, such a downturn would usher in cascading power failures, production stoppages, soaring unemployment, and likely riots challenging the Communist Party’s legitimacy.

The huge Chinese social-media site Weibo reveals discontent with some government acts. For example, despite being accused of murder, Ou Jinzhong, who died Oct. 18 while awaiting arrest by Chinese police, received widespread public support on Weibo. He had lived in a shack for five years while local officials denied his requests to build a proper home. Similarly, although the Communist Party appears to have the Evergrande default under control, protests in Shenzhen and Hubei broke out when the full extent of the disaster was revealed.

China isn’t on the cusp of revolution. But the party understands that a sustained economic downturn would trigger unrest that could overwhelm its internal security. A blockade carries risks, not least because it is a long-term strategy that the U.S. would conduct over months or years. The People’s Liberation Army may believe that it can destroy enough U.S. combat ships in the first weeks of a war that such a blockade would become unfeasible, or that co-belligerents—likely Iran, Pakistan and Russia—would complicate the blockade enough to reduce its viability. Beijing may—understandably—assess that the U.S. logistics fleet is unlikely to sustain a multimonth conflict, and that Washington lacks the political will to do so.

Or Beijing may miscalculate, encounter its worst-case scenario, and adopt Russia’s mentality to “escalate to terminate”—that is, use nuclear weapons. The general assumption that the U.S. and its allies are better equipped to handle a long war than the Chinese Communist Party, and that the party therefore hopes to avoid a long war, is likely correct.

The alternative to blockade is to “fight forward” or, as Lord Nelson signaled at the Battle of Trafalgar, to “engage the enemy more closely.” That means defending Taiwan and the sovereignty of U.S. allies by denying China its short-term operational objectives. This would require much more naval and amphibious basing in East Asia than the U.S. currently maintains.

American aircraft carriers must be equipped with long-range antiship missiles, and U.S. Marines with ground-based antiaircraft and antiship missiles, to disrupt an amphibious assault on Taiwan. The U.S. Navy must deploy more submarines to Guam, Yokosuka, Sasebo and perhaps the Australian cities of Sydney and Perth to exploit the PLA’s undersea vulnerabilities and sink Chinese merchantmen and warships. A Marine expeditionary force or Army airmobile division must be deployed within range of the Taiwan Strait, likely to Southern Japan or Darwin, Australia. Air Force and Marine fighter squadrons must be placed in new bases throughout the First Island Chain, supported by ground-based antiaircraft missile units, to deny the PLA immediate air control.

Achieving this would entail the most sweeping reorientation of American force structure and deployment since the end of World War II. But it is the safer strategic choice given the dangers of a longer conflict.

There is no articulated plan for the U.S. to defend our allies while conducting offensive operations against China. We build ships, buy aircraft and tanks, and train solders with no strategy in mind, lumbering forward under institutional inertia, guided by policies 10 to 30 years out of date. In Iraq it took the U.S. military three years to grasp the nature of the conflict, another year to implement a new strategy, and another year for the country to stabilize. We won’t have five years from China’s first missile launch. We may not have five months.

Mr. Cropsey is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and director of Hudson’s Center for American Seapower. He served as a naval officer and as deputy undersecretary of the Navy.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2021/11/new-tech-will-erode-nuclear-deterrence-us-must-adapt/186634/

[Crafty_Dog]

Biden Admin Silent as EU, Iran and China Freely Violate US Sanctions
by Majid Rafizadeh
November 6, 2021 at 5:00 am

The Trump administration sent a robust message that violating sanctions would not be tolerated. But since the Biden administration came to power, it seems that almost everyone has been violating the US sanctions in Iran, China or wherever, and no one is being held accountable.

The Biden administration appears not to be taking any action against countries such as China or Iran, which continue freely to violate sanctions while using the revenues to bulk up their war machines.

This US passivity seems due an emerging pattern from the Biden administration of serial surrenders, as seen recently in Afghanistan, on the pretext that "We still believe diplomacy is the best path forward" -- without the threat of an alternative outcome.

This US inaction also seems due to the false belief and myth, which the Obama administration seems to have held as well, that if you appease predatory regimes -- if you side with the mullahs rather than your old regional allies such as Israel -- then the ruling mullahs will suddenly change their behavior and become constructive players in the Middle East. The eight years of appeasement towards them by the Obama administration only further empowered the Iranian regime and happily bankrolled their military adventurism and nuclear program.


Since the Biden administration came to power, it seems that almost everyone has been violating the US sanctions in Iran, China or wherever, and no one is being held accountable. The Biden administration appears not to be taking any action against countries such as China or Iran, which continue freely to violate sanctions while using the revenues to bulk up their war machines. Pictured: Iran's Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif (right) and China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi, at the signing of the China-Iran comprehensive strategic 25-year partnership agreement on economic and security cooperation, in Tehran, Iran on March 27, 2021. (Photo by AFP via Getty Images)

One of the reasons behind US sanctions is to financially pressure a rogue state, such the Iranian regime, to halt its destabilizing behavior and its march towards acquiring a nuclear bomb. But if sanctions are being freely violated without any consequences, there is no incentive for a predatory and dangerous regime such as Iran to stop its malign activities.

Although the US sanctions did have a negative impact on Iran's economy when they were first re-imposed by the Trump administration in 2018, they have become far less effective as many countries ignored and violated them -- all while the Biden administration has not been taking any action to deter, disincentivize or punish those who breach the sanctions.

According to the US Treasury Department, persons and entities that are neither American nor Iranian will be sanctioned if they trade with the Iranian regime. The Treasury Department has clearly warned that the Iran sanctions are not limited to just Iranian or US entities:

"Consistent with this guidance from the President, the Department of State has revoked certain statutory waivers issued to implement the JCPOA sanctions relief, issued the necessary sanctions waivers to provide for an appropriate wind-down period, and plans to take appropriate action to keep such waivers in place for the duration of the relevant wind-down period, i.e., until August 6, 2018, or November 4, 2018, depending on the activity. Non-U.S., non-Iranian persons are advised to use these time periods to wind- down their activities with or involving Iran that will become sanctionable at the end of the applicable wind-down period."

The Trump administration was holding those who violated sanctions and did business with sanctioned entities accountable. In 2018, for instance, Communist China's Meng Wanzhou, the Chief Financial Officer of Huawei, the world's largest telecom equipment maker, was arrested in Canada at the request of American authorities. Under the Biden administration, however, she was released to return to China. China's ZTE Corp pled guilty to breaking US sanctions against the Iranian regime during the Trump administration. The Trump administration sent a robust message that violating sanctions would not be tolerated. But since the Biden administration came to power, it seems that almost everyone is freely violating the US sanctions on Iran, China or wherever, and no one is being held accountable.

The Iranian regime, for its part, is finding customers to buy its oil and with whom to trade in spite of the sanctions. The sanctions therefore are not crippling the regime financially even slightly, let alone bringing it to its knees. Before the US Department of the Treasury leveled secondary sanctions against Iran's oil and gas sectors in 2018, for example, Tehran was exporting more than two million barrels of oil a day. In 2019 and 2020, Iran's oil exports went down to fewer than 200,000 barrel a day, representing a decline of roughly 90%. This shift took place after the Trump administration decided not to extend its waiver for Iran's eight biggest oil buyers; China, India, Greece, Italy, Taiwan, Japan, Turkey and South Korea.

In 2021, though, right after the Biden administration took office, China ramped up its oil imports from by Iran increasing them from 200,000 a day to nearly one million barrels a day. In other words, Iran is exporting approximately five times more oil than at its nadir in 2019 and 2020. Central Asian countries are also continuing to trade with the Iranian regime. As the sale of oil accounts for more than 80% of the country's export revenues, Iran's regime relies heavily on oil exports.

Additionally, in spite of the US sanctions, the European countries are freely trading with Tehran. From January to July 2021, the EU's trade with Iran brought roughly $3 billion to the regime. The Financial Tribune reports:

"Germany remained the top trading partner of Iran during the seven months under review, as the two countries exchanged €1.01 billion worth of goods."

"Italy came next with €347.96 million worth of trade with Iran.... The Netherlands with €264.48 million (down 9.23%), Spain with €178.33 million (up 9.25%) and Belgium with €140.14 million (up 6.79%) were Iran's other major European trading partners. Estonia registered the highest growth of 709.52% in trade with Iran during the seven months under review. Malta with 471.77%, Romania with 284.86% and Croatia with 169.12% came next."

Iran's commodities exports to the EU in the first six month of 2021 was worth nearly half a billion:

"Iran exported €475.75 million worth of commodities to EU during the seven-month period, indicating an 8.08% growth compared with the similar period of the previous year. Germany with €162.38 million, Italy with €96 million, Spain with €48 million, Romania with €35 million and Bulgaria with €22 million were the main export destinations."

The objectives behind the sanctions are to cut off the flow of funds to the Iranian regime and significantly impact its efforts to advance its nuclear program as well as fund and sponsor terrorist and militia groups across the region.

The Biden administration appears not to be taking any action against countries such as China or Iran, which continue freely to violate sanctions while using the revenues to bulk up their war machines.

This US passivity seems due an emerging pattern from the Biden administration of serial surrenders, as seen recently in Afghanistan, on the pretext that "We still believe diplomacy is the best path forward" -- without the threat of an alternative outcome.

This US inaction also seems due to the false belief and myth, which the Obama administration seems to have held as well, that if you appease predatory regimes -- if you side with the mullahs rather than your old regional allies such as Israel -- then the ruling mullahs will suddenly change their behavior and become constructive players in the Middle East. The eight years of appeasement towards them by the Obama administration only further empowered the Iranian regime and happily bankrolled their military adventurism and nuclear program.

History has proven again and again that appeasing a rogue state will only embolden it. As Winston Churchill warned:

"Each one hopes that if he feeds the crocodile enough, the crocodile will eat him last. All of them hope that the storm will pass before their turn comes to be devoured. But I fear, I fear greatly, the storm will not pass."

Dr. Majid Rafizadeh is a business strategist and advisor, Harvard-educated scholar, political scientist, board member of Harvard International Review, and president of the International American Council on the Middle East. He has authored several books on Islam and US foreign policy. He can be reached at Dr.Rafizadeh@Post.Harvard.Edu

[Crafty_Dog]

November 9, 2021
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Canada, Mexico and America’s Reality
By: George Friedman

The United States lives in a fundamentally unique geopolitical reality. It’s the only major power that doesn’t face the risk of a land war, so it doesn’t need a massive force to defend the homeland. Instead, it can concentrate on maintaining control of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. If it retains control of the seas, the only threat to the United States would be air and missile attacks. These are not trivial threats, but they are far more manageable without having to worry about an invasion by land or sea. The United States itself has offensive options it can indulge in – even if it doesn’t always use them prudently, and even if it leads to defeat elsewhere. The U.S. has not faced a foreign presence on its soil since the 19th century. Even nuclear weapons are countered by mutual assured destruction, which has protected the U.S. homeland for over half a century.

This happy condition is the foundation of American power. During the harshest of wars, World War II, where much of Europe and Asia was torn asunder, the American homeland remained untouched. This is such an obvious fact that it tends to be neglected.

So too are the geopolitical reasons behind American security. Any attack on the United States must either be an amphibious assault from across the sea or a land assault from either Canada or Mexico. The U.S. fought numerous times with Mexico in the 19th and very early 20th centuries, and in the 1960s, the Quebec independence movement prompted fears in the U.S. that an independent Quebec might align with the Soviet Union. But today, neither country can attack the U.S. itself, hence the first layer of American security. The second layer is that neither country wants to align with powers hostile to the United States. Had Germany secured their allegiance in World War II, or had the Soviet Union in the Cold War, or had China in the past few decades, the risks to American security would have soared, and the U.S. invulnerability to war on the homeland would have evaporated. American history would have been very different, along with the history of humanity.

Therefore, in any discussion of American strategy and of its strategic priorities, the most important issue is not the South China Sea or NATO but the maintenance of relations with Canada and Mexico. It’s true that at the moment each country has an overriding interest in maintaining their relationship, for reasons ranging from trade to social links. It’s also true that the United States could impose its will militarily on either country. However, waging war on neighbors is dangerous and exhausting. America is a global power pursuing global interests, and its domestic stability would be the first casualty of a land assault against Canada or Mexico.

On the surface, this whole line of reasoning sounds preposterous. But the fact that it seems so arises from the misconception among Americans that the current relationship with Canada and Mexico is unchangeable, and thus requires no care. But one of the most obvious observations of history is the speed at which the apparently obvious dissolves and a new normal takes its place. Given the overwhelming importance to the U.S. that neither neighbor shift its national strategy, the comfortable assumption of continuity is perhaps the most reckless element of U.S. policy. Certainly, there is no current danger of a shift, nor any danger on the horizon. But this is precisely the time when a prudent power devotes significant attention to an issue. Reversing a shift in policy is far more difficult than preventing one.

There are forces driving the U.S. apart from these two countries, countries that are not in a position to cause a break, but which in the future, when other issues are added to them and enticing new relationships show themselves, might change the equation. In the case of Canada, the manner in which the United States canceled the Keystone XL pipeline, a project that was important to Canada, signaled a profound indifference to Canada’s interests. There was little consultation, no offer of compensation, nor any attempt to create an alternative project. By itself, this is not enough to cause a break with the United States, but it certainly reminds Canada that Washington sees it as subordinate to its interests rather than as the object of its interests.

In the case of Mexico, the U.S. obsesses over immigration, an issue that is nonessential to Mexican interests. There has been a surge of migrants at that border, most on their way to the United States, but all creating significant problems on their way north. The United States views Mexico as a source of illegal immigration. Mexico sees the problem of immigration as having its origin at Mexico’s southern border with Guatemala. Mexico has therefore requested American help in closing its southern border, which has been refused. Instead, Mexico is demonized for the immigration the U.S. will not help stop. (I have no interest in the question of which country is right. All such matters are complex, and every nation is certain that another nation is at fault.)

For the United States, obsessing without alienating either Canada or Mexico is essential to its national interest, if not its national policy. The physical security of the United States and its trade system depends on these two countries. A rational policy of extreme awareness of their internal processes and a willingness to indulge their needs even to the disadvantage of the United States is a low-cost, high-return policy. When someone takes a client to lunch, he picks up the tab, even if the client has ordered the most expensive items on the menu. The cost of lunch is vastly less than the business you will get.

The most interesting part of geopolitics is that a current state of affairs feels eternal. Nothing in geopolitics’ past should give anyone that confidence. Maintaining a beneficial status quo requires effort, painful until the alternative is considered. But since the belief is that nothing will change, then no effort is needed. The U.S. is a dominant global power because its homeland is secure from attack. Its homeland is secure because Canada and Mexico secure it. The failure to understand that they have options – and are far from exercising them – means their treatment is determined by America’s passing interests. From a geopolitical point of view, this is understandable: Power blots out vulnerability. From a policy standpoint, it ignores reality.

[G M]

Both our neighbors are parasites, but Mexico is worse.

November 9, 2021
View On Website
Open as PDF

    
Canada, Mexico and America’s Reality
By: George Friedman

The United States lives in a fundamentally unique geopolitical reality. It’s the only major power that doesn’t face the risk of a land war, so it doesn’t need a massive force to defend the homeland. Instead, it can concentrate on maintaining control of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. If it retains control of the seas, the only threat to the United States would be air and missile attacks. These are not trivial threats, but they are far more manageable without having to worry about an invasion by land or sea. The United States itself has offensive options it can indulge in – even if it doesn’t always use them prudently, and even if it leads to defeat elsewhere. The U.S. has not faced a foreign presence on its soil since the 19th century. Even nuclear weapons are countered by mutual assured destruction, which has protected the U.S. homeland for over half a century.

This happy condition is the foundation of American power. During the harshest of wars, World War II, where much of Europe and Asia was torn asunder, the American homeland remained untouched. This is such an obvious fact that it tends to be neglected.

So too are the geopolitical reasons behind American security. Any attack on the United States must either be an amphibious assault from across the sea or a land assault from either Canada or Mexico. The U.S. fought numerous times with Mexico in the 19th and very early 20th centuries, and in the 1960s, the Quebec independence movement prompted fears in the U.S. that an independent Quebec might align with the Soviet Union. But today, neither country can attack the U.S. itself, hence the first layer of American security. The second layer is that neither country wants to align with powers hostile to the United States. Had Germany secured their allegiance in World War II, or had the Soviet Union in the Cold War, or had China in the past few decades, the risks to American security would have soared, and the U.S. invulnerability to war on the homeland would have evaporated. American history would have been very different, along with the history of humanity.

Therefore, in any discussion of American strategy and of its strategic priorities, the most important issue is not the South China Sea or NATO but the maintenance of relations with Canada and Mexico. It’s true that at the moment each country has an overriding interest in maintaining their relationship, for reasons ranging from trade to social links. It’s also true that the United States could impose its will militarily on either country. However, waging war on neighbors is dangerous and exhausting. America is a global power pursuing global interests, and its domestic stability would be the first casualty of a land assault against Canada or Mexico.

On the surface, this whole line of reasoning sounds preposterous. But the fact that it seems so arises from the misconception among Americans that the current relationship with Canada and Mexico is unchangeable, and thus requires no care. But one of the most obvious observations of history is the speed at which the apparently obvious dissolves and a new normal takes its place. Given the overwhelming importance to the U.S. that neither neighbor shift its national strategy, the comfortable assumption of continuity is perhaps the most reckless element of U.S. policy. Certainly, there is no current danger of a shift, nor any danger on the horizon. But this is precisely the time when a prudent power devotes significant attention to an issue. Reversing a shift in policy is far more difficult than preventing one.

There are forces driving the U.S. apart from these two countries, countries that are not in a position to cause a break, but which in the future, when other issues are added to them and enticing new relationships show themselves, might change the equation. In the case of Canada, the manner in which the United States canceled the Keystone XL pipeline, a project that was important to Canada, signaled a profound indifference to Canada’s interests. There was little consultation, no offer of compensation, nor any attempt to create an alternative project. By itself, this is not enough to cause a break with the United States, but it certainly reminds Canada that Washington sees it as subordinate to its interests rather than as the object of its interests.

In the case of Mexico, the U.S. obsesses over immigration, an issue that is nonessential to Mexican interests. There has been a surge of migrants at that border, most on their way to the United States, but all creating significant problems on their way north. The United States views Mexico as a source of illegal immigration. Mexico sees the problem of immigration as having its origin at Mexico’s southern border with Guatemala. Mexico has therefore requested American help in closing its southern border, which has been refused. Instead, Mexico is demonized for the immigration the U.S. will not help stop. (I have no interest in the question of which country is right. All such matters are complex, and every nation is certain that another nation is at fault.)

For the United States, obsessing without alienating either Canada or Mexico is essential to its national interest, if not its national policy. The physical security of the United States and its trade system depends on these two countries. A rational policy of extreme awareness of their internal processes and a willingness to indulge their needs even to the disadvantage of the United States is a low-cost, high-return policy. When someone takes a client to lunch, he picks up the tab, even if the client has ordered the most expensive items on the menu. The cost of lunch is vastly less than the business you will get.

The most interesting part of geopolitics is that a current state of affairs feels eternal. Nothing in geopolitics’ past should give anyone that confidence. Maintaining a beneficial status quo requires effort, painful until the alternative is considered. But since the belief is that nothing will change, then no effort is needed. The U.S. is a dominant global power because its homeland is secure from attack. Its homeland is secure because Canada and Mexico secure it. The failure to understand that they have options – and are far from exercising them – means their treatment is determined by America’s passing interests. From a geopolitical point of view, this is understandable: Power blots out vulnerability. From a policy standpoint, it ignores reality.

[Crafty_Dog]

Not my experience of Mexico, or of Canada.

[G M]

Not my experience of Mexico, or of Canada.

After 9/11, the Mexican government couldn't even be bothered to offer an official condemnation of the attack. They are happy to send their worst for us to feed and clothe. Canada glides along in our wake while maintaining a snotty anti-Americanism as one of the few weak strands of what passes as a Canadian national identity. It's an even weaker and feckless ally, even when compared to our weak and feckless european allies.

[Crafty_Dog]

I'm thinking of the people, but I also remember Canada being outstanding during the Iran hostage crisis and strongly present with us in Afghanistan. 

As for Mexico "Poor Mexico!  So far from God and so close to the United States"  Porfiorio Diaz

[G M]

How long ago was the Iran hostage crisis? I was elementary school then. Canada’s weak, fake and gay military is a laughing stock until our fake and gay military took center stage recently.

As far as Mexico, it is far from god and close to 100% endemic criminality at every level of it’s society.

I'm thinking of the people, but I also remember Canada being outstanding during the Iran hostage crisis and strongly present with us in Afghanistan. 

As for Mexico "Poor Mexico!  So far from God and so close to the United States"  Porfiorio Diaz

[Crafty_Dog]

Honor Veterans by Having the Will to Win a War
If civilian leaders send troops into battle without a commitment to victory, who will sign up to serve?
By H.R. McMaster
Nov. 10, 2021 5:13 pm ET


Marines who had been deployed to Afghanistan are welcomed as they return to Camp Pendleton in Oceanside, Ca., Oct. 3.
PHOTO: MIKE BLAKE/REUTERS

On Veterans Day, it’s hard to look away from the catastrophe in Afghanistan. The consequences of a war lost through incompetence, delusion and self-defeat will reverberate beyond South Asia. In America, the lack of commitment to win in war, apparent in a humiliating surrender to the Taliban and an ignominious retreat from Kabul, risks eroding trust between servicemen and -women and their civilian and military leaders.

If leaders send men and women into battle without dedicating themselves to achieving a worthy outcome, who will step forward to volunteer for military service? Who will offer to endure hardship, take risk and make sacrifices? Winning in Afghanistan meant ensuring that Afghanistan never again became a haven for jihadist terrorists. America and its coalition partners had the means to do so with a low, sustained level of support for Afghans who were bearing the brunt of the fight on a modern-day frontier between barbarism and civilization.

But three presidents in a row told the American people that the war in Afghanistan wasn’t worth continued sacrifice. It became typical for citizens to profess support for the troops but not the war. That sentiment was preferable to the derision directed at veterans who fought under difficult conditions in Vietnam. But American warriors won’t long trust a society that doesn’t believe in what the nation is fighting for—as they kill others and risk their own lives.

Winning in war also means convincing the enemy that he is defeated. America’s quick-fix approach to Afghanistan, with persistent promises of imminent withdrawal, made the war longer and more expensive than it needed to be. It weakened Afghan allies; it strengthened the Taliban, their terrorist allies and their Pakistani sponsors.


Winning in war also requires consolidating military gains to achieve an enduring political outcome. In Afghanistan this meant an Afghan government hostile to jihadist terrorists, with security forces capable of withstanding the regenerative capacity of the Taliban. But the Obama and Trump administrations stopped actively targeting the Taliban, gave the enemy a timeline for U.S. withdrawal, and then pursued a negotiated settlement. To rationalize their ambivalence about the outcome of the war, civilian leaders and even some generals used terms like “responsible end” as a substitute for victory. Many leaders simply didn’t show the same determination to win as the warriors they sent into combat.


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The long war against jihadist terrorist organizations isn’t over; it is entering a new, more dangerous phase. America’s rivals—including China, Russia, North Korea and Iran—are emboldened. They are watching a Defense Department that seems to focus more on climate change than being prepared to fight, one that promotes postmodernist theories that undermine the warrior ethos and valorize victimhood. Our leaders have an obligation to protect the warrior ethos and build America’s military capabilities, rather than promote destructive philosophies and attempt to solve problems better handled by other departments.

On Veterans Day, we should thank the men and women who served in Afghanistan and the families who gave their last full measure of devotion. We should assure them that America’s war in Afghanistan was a just response to the most devastating terrorist attack in history.

As President George W. Bush observed on the 20th anniversary of 9/11, “You have shielded your fellow citizens from danger. You have defended the beliefs of your country and advanced the rights of the downtrodden. You have been the face of hope and mercy in dark places. You have been a force for good in the world. Nothing that has followed—nothing—can tarnish your honor or diminish your accomplishments. To you and the honored dead, our country is forever grateful.”

But we might also ask American veterans to serve again on the day designated to honor them. Veterans are best equipped to explain to those on active duty that they are part of a living historical community that is proud of them for volunteering to serve at a critical time. Veterans might tell young warriors that we need them to remain ready to fight because wars don’t end when one party disengages.

And we might ask veterans to explain to those considering military service the intangible rewards, especially being part of an endeavor larger than themselves and working on a team that takes on the qualities of a family. America needs our best young men and women to volunteer to serve in the armed forces—even more after our withdrawal from one theater in a war that continues.

Mr. McMaster, a retired U.S. Army lieutenant general, served as White House national security adviser, 2017-18. He is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and author of “Battlegrounds: The Fight to Defend the Free World.”

[ccp]

the original blinks is Don Blinken:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donald_M._Blinken

a favorite of guess who
George Soros

what a small world

Soros who throws his money to every and anyone who wants to delegitimize the our country

now the kid is our SOS

how f'ked up is this ?

[Crafty_Dog]

Fk.

[Crafty_Dog]

November 12, 2021
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A Shift in US-Chinese Relations
Thoughts in and around geopolitics.
By: George Friedman

China’s ambassador to the United States read a letter from Chinese President Xi Jinping at a dinner hosted by the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations in Washington on Tuesday. It said in part that China is willing to “enhance exchanges and cooperation across the board” with the United States and bring relations between the two back on track. Meanwhile, reports emerged that Xi and President Joe Biden would meet virtually within the next couple of weeks. Given the hostile rhetoric and military posturing between the U.S. and China, the expectation has been that relations will deteriorate further, possibly leading to open warfare.

This letter is significant in that it seems to indicate China's desire to change course. Whether this was Xi’s decision, a decision forced on him, or merely a trial balloon matters little at this point. The door has been opened for a reversal. And though these kinds of announcements made at Washington dinners usually mean little, in this case, it seems more important because it addresses a dangerous confrontation between two major powers. Notably, the letter specifically mentioned that the U.S. and China are two global powers. China is making clear the parity of the two countries, emphasizing that China may change the atmosphere and its policies but that it is not capitulating. That is vital and makes the letter more credible.

The shift to open hostility was accelerated by the American demand for access to Chinese markets on terms comparable to China’s access to the United States. China declined to comply, which led to tariffs being imposed on Beijing. Meanwhile, China continued to become more aggressive with military gestures, demanding the U.S. withdraw from the South China Sea and threatening an invasion of Taiwan. The Chinese goal was to confront the United States with the strong possibility of war and compel it to accept China’s aims on all fronts since war with China would not be in the interest of the United States. Over time, the Chinese used the military dimension to increase its stature as a world power.

As I have argued, this was always a bluff. The threat to Taiwan was rooted in the idea that China could project multidivisional forces across the Taiwan Strait and keep them supplied in the face of U.S. submarine and missile attacks. It might be possible, but the risk of defeat is too great to attempt. Similarly, forcing the U.S. out of the South China Sea was unlikely. The trade situation was frozen, and so was the military situation.

Accompanying this was a significant shift in the Chinese financial system. The financial foundation of China – real estate – was shaken by a massive crisis in a major Chinese firm called Evergrande that is currently cycling through the system. That crisis has raised serious doubts among American and other investors who had been critical in fueling Chinese economic development. Caution or negativity among foreign investors would compound the financial crisis, which has now spread to shortages in China as it has in much of the world.

It was clear that the United States would not attack China. It was equally clear that launching a war against the United States was a risky operation at best. The risk of defeat outweighed the benefits of victory since defeat would have domestic consequences. Therefore, the military option became less credible than it has ever been, and threatening military action had clearly failed as a strategy. The U.S. had not capitulated and the status quo on military and trade issues remained intact, while the economic situation inside China weakened.

China thus had two choices: to escalate by threatening U.S. interests outside the South China Sea or to deescalate while maintaining China’s status as a great power. Beijing seems to have adopted the latter strategy, or at least that’s what it’s feeling out with its letter.

The United States has no interest in a minor conflict with China, let alone a war. Nor is the ongoing trade dispute that severe. The U.S. has far more pressing economic and social problems than trade equity with China. If China accepts the status quo or even a minor shift in it, the U.S. will be more than content.

There is one key issue in all this: Beijing is insisting that the U.S. acknowledge China as a great power to be treated as an equal and with respect. Xi needs this in the short term to be able to be the one who delivered China to greatness, which only the U.S. can grant. In the long term, such an understanding buys China time to solidify its claims. There is an argument that the U.S. ought to increase pressure on China now to prevent it from becoming too dangerous later. But later is later, and pressing a nuclear power when it is under significant internal pressure is not a risk worth taking.

Everything could fall apart, of course. The current state of U.S. politics can generate all sorts of disruptive forces. The same is true in China. In the U.S., there may be a view that an understanding with China is tantamount to appeasement. In China, there may be a view that Xi gambled and failed. I don’t think either will happen, but then Biden and Xi might insult each other in their virtual conference. I think the most likely course is a shift in relations that gives both countries the breathing room they need.

[G M]

China declares war after Xi is sprayed with explosive diarrhea.

November 12, 2021
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A Shift in US-Chinese Relations
Thoughts in and around geopolitics.
By: George Friedman

China’s ambassador to the United States read a letter from Chinese President Xi Jinping at a dinner hosted by the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations in Washington on Tuesday. It said in part that China is willing to “enhance exchanges and cooperation across the board” with the United States and bring relations between the two back on track. Meanwhile, reports emerged that Xi and President Joe Biden would meet virtually within the next couple of weeks. Given the hostile rhetoric and military posturing between the U.S. and China, the expectation has been that relations will deteriorate further, possibly leading to open warfare.

This letter is significant in that it seems to indicate China's desire to change course. Whether this was Xi’s decision, a decision forced on him, or merely a trial balloon matters little at this point. The door has been opened for a reversal. And though these kinds of announcements made at Washington dinners usually mean little, in this case, it seems more important because it addresses a dangerous confrontation between two major powers. Notably, the letter specifically mentioned that the U.S. and China are two global powers. China is making clear the parity of the two countries, emphasizing that China may change the atmosphere and its policies but that it is not capitulating. That is vital and makes the letter more credible.

The shift to open hostility was accelerated by the American demand for access to Chinese markets on terms comparable to China’s access to the United States. China declined to comply, which led to tariffs being imposed on Beijing. Meanwhile, China continued to become more aggressive with military gestures, demanding the U.S. withdraw from the South China Sea and threatening an invasion of Taiwan. The Chinese goal was to confront the United States with the strong possibility of war and compel it to accept China’s aims on all fronts since war with China would not be in the interest of the United States. Over time, the Chinese used the military dimension to increase its stature as a world power.

As I have argued, this was always a bluff. The threat to Taiwan was rooted in the idea that China could project multidivisional forces across the Taiwan Strait and keep them supplied in the face of U.S. submarine and missile attacks. It might be possible, but the risk of defeat is too great to attempt. Similarly, forcing the U.S. out of the South China Sea was unlikely. The trade situation was frozen, and so was the military situation.

Accompanying this was a significant shift in the Chinese financial system. The financial foundation of China – real estate – was shaken by a massive crisis in a major Chinese firm called Evergrande that is currently cycling through the system. That crisis has raised serious doubts among American and other investors who had been critical in fueling Chinese economic development. Caution or negativity among foreign investors would compound the financial crisis, which has now spread to shortages in China as it has in much of the world.

It was clear that the United States would not attack China. It was equally clear that launching a war against the United States was a risky operation at best. The risk of defeat outweighed the benefits of victory since defeat would have domestic consequences. Therefore, the military option became less credible than it has ever been, and threatening military action had clearly failed as a strategy. The U.S. had not capitulated and the status quo on military and trade issues remained intact, while the economic situation inside China weakened.

China thus had two choices: to escalate by threatening U.S. interests outside the South China Sea or to deescalate while maintaining China’s status as a great power. Beijing seems to have adopted the latter strategy, or at least that’s what it’s feeling out with its letter.

The United States has no interest in a minor conflict with China, let alone a war. Nor is the ongoing trade dispute that severe. The U.S. has far more pressing economic and social problems than trade equity with China. If China accepts the status quo or even a minor shift in it, the U.S. will be more than content.

There is one key issue in all this: Beijing is insisting that the U.S. acknowledge China as a great power to be treated as an equal and with respect. Xi needs this in the short term to be able to be the one who delivered China to greatness, which only the U.S. can grant. In the long term, such an understanding buys China time to solidify its claims. There is an argument that the U.S. ought to increase pressure on China now to prevent it from becoming too dangerous later. But later is later, and pressing a nuclear power when it is under significant internal pressure is not a risk worth taking.

Everything could fall apart, of course. The current state of U.S. politics can generate all sorts of disruptive forces. The same is true in China. In the U.S., there may be a view that an understanding with China is tantamount to appeasement. In China, there may be a view that Xi gambled and failed. I don’t think either will happen, but then Biden and Xi might insult each other in their virtual conference. I think the most likely course is a shift in relations that gives both countries the breathing room they need.

[ya]

Overheard "What would Biden and the West do, if Putin went for Donetsk/Odessa, while Xi went for Taipei at the same time?"

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/17942/biden-xi-meeting?fbclid=IwAR0Xwyry3jvOdi9feR1xxqJDUIO6_qce42Wruz9RmC3c_7cMHUC2hlQAg38

[G M]

Overheard "What would Biden and the West do, if Putin went for Donetsk/Odessa, while Xi went for Taipei at the same time?"

A lot of people in DC would join Biden in pants-shitting.

[Crafty_Dog]

Blinken first and foremost among them , , , wonder if Milley's counterpart will give him/us a heads up?

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10200413/Chinese-diplomat-warns-Australia-faces-ARMAGEDDON-supports-fight-protect-Taiwan.html

[Crafty_Dog]

second

November 15, 2021
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A New Mutually Assured Destruction
Deterrence is different this time around.
By: Phillip Orchard
15To whatever extent the U.S. and China are truly sliding toward a zero-sum Cold War-type rivalry, Beijing appears to be game at least for a good old-fashioned nuclear arms race.

In July, satellite imagery analysis produced by the Middlebury Institute of International Studies appeared to show the construction of at least 120 new nuclear silos in China. With earlier Pentagon estimates putting China’s arsenals at no more than 100 intercontinental ballistic missiles and just around 250-350 nuclear warheads, the findings suggest a major expansion is in the offing. Last month, the Pentagon began telling multiple U.S. news outlets that China had caught everyone off guard with at least two tests over the summer of a dazzlingly sophisticated new hypersonic cruise missile, one theoretically capable of zig-zagging around in low-orbit space to confuse U.S. early warning and missile defense systems before releasing multiple independently targeted warheads via what's known as a "fractional orbital bombardment system."

This is being treated by many as a Sputnik moment for the U.S., whose own nuclear arsenal is aging and whose hypersonics program is believed to be lagging considerably behind those of China and Russia. And it's easier than ever for foreign powers to hurt each other, even without resorting to military hardware. This makes the U.S.-China relationship appear destined for an era defined by a new interpretation of the doctrine of mutually assured destruction. Ultimately, it'd be unwise to assume the logic of deterrence that kept the last Cold War from escalating toward the apocalypse will prove as effective this time around.

Why Nukes Are Not a Big Deal

It's tempting to dismiss nuclear arms races as little more than a sideshow, the result as much of opportunistic threat inflation, doomsday profiteering and tactical posturing as strategic necessity. After all, the consequences of even a relatively modest nuclear exchange between two countries are catastrophic enough to make governments think twice before heading down that road.

China already has the capability to obliterate much of the United States. And the U.S., with a stockpile estimated to hold around 3,750 nuclear weapons, has the capability to obliterate China too. Both countries have mastered the nuclear triad, with land-, sea- and air-based delivery systems ensuring a second-strike capability (that is, making it so your entire nuclear arsenal can't be wiped out in a surprise attack).

One could argue that incremental advances in missile defense make it necessary to invest heavily in ever-faster, more maneuverable delivery systems. But missile defense has, to date at least, consistently proved ineffective, especially against the kinds of ballistic missiles that form the bedrock of U.S. and Chinese nuclear strategies. No country has come close to developing a system that can reliably shoot down incoming ICBMs – a task equivalent to hitting a bullet with a bullet in space. Technology will improve, but the attacker will always have the advantage.

One could also argue that it’s smart to compel an adversary to divert precious resources to building weapons they're extremely unlikely to use, as the U.S. did to the cash-strapped Soviets in the 1980s. But at best this is an expensive and inefficient way to maintain conventional military superiority. (The U.S. itself is planning on spending some $1.5 trillion on nuclear upgrades.) The U.S. has budgetary constraints of its own, however arbitrary, and the U.S. Navy has immense modernization needs, in particular.

So does it really matter if China doubles or triples the size of its warhead stockpile? Would it gain any coercive power over the U.S. if it succeeded in developing nuclear-capable cruise missiles that, per reports, left stunned Pentagon scientists “struggling to understand” how the Chinese mastered such technologies? Does anything change if the U.S. spends what's required to attack every Chinese city at once – or, inversely, falls hopelessly behind China in the nuclear hypersonics race?

Why Nukes Are Still a Big Deal

The answer is a resounding: sort of. In theory, the mutual buildup of doomsday capabilities should provide a hard cap on escalation between two powers, ultimately creating conditions for bilateral stability. If there's even a slim chance of a conventional military clash spiraling out of control and resulting in a nuclear exchange, then it’s simply not worth the risk to fight in the first place. This, of course, proved broadly true for the U.S. and the Soviet Union. If such a risk compels the U.S. and China to talk out their problems, contain military standoffs to the realm of posturing, and sharply limit coercive actions, that would be a very good thing. It could, in theory, eventually result in a restoration of equilibrium in the bilateral relationship and even encourage them to shift focus to areas of mutual interest.

But it's a myth that mutually assured destruction has bred anything more than an exceedingly narrow and fragile definition of stability. For one, the U.S. and the Soviets were as much lucky as prudent in avoiding a nuclear exchange. There were countless close calls, particularly in the 1950s and 1960s, but also as late as 1983, when the Soviet Politburo nearly convinced itself that a massive NATO exercise was a precursor to a surprise nuclear assault. While it's true that it would be irrational in most cases to conduct a first nuclear strike against an adversary capable of retaliating, it's perfectly rational to act if you think a nuclear strike is inbound. It's just too easy to misinterpret the evidence at hand – famously, to mistake even a weather balloon or flock of geese as a cluster of ICBMs – and too short a window for action to put much faith in assumptions that rationality will always prevail.

Moreover, there's always been, and will continue to be, elements within governments that wonder if using nuclear weapons is, in fact, taboo. This is partly why the U.S. remains unwilling to declare a “no first use” nuclear doctrine, and why the U.S. is routinely toying with the idea of arming troops with low-yield nukes for limited use on the battlefield. Whether or not advocates of weaker nuclear restraint ever prevail over U.S. nuclear policy, the mere fact that these debates exist will sustain the perception abroad that the U.S. might just be willing to pull the nuclear trigger if push comes to shove.

The Cold War was massively destabilizing for much of the world, even if the U.S. and Soviet Union managed to avoid a hot war themselves. Instead, the Americans and the Soviets fought proxy battles across the globe, and for some countries the results were nearly just as apocalyptic. It's likely to look different this time around, given that the U.S.-China rivalry is much less ideological in nature and since the world is less likely to be carved up into discrete spheres. It's harder to see something flimsy like the domino theory compelling U.S. military action to counter Chinese influence.

Even so, the U.S.-China arms race could prove profoundly destabilizing for third parties in other ways, most importantly by accelerating arms races among regional powers. If, say, U.S. allies worry that China can threaten the U.S. so much that the U.S. nuclear umbrella in the region starts to fray, then they may not have much faith in the U.S. ability or willingness to come to their defense. Such powers may eventually conclude that to carve out space to operate and maintain a degree of military parity with their various regional rivals, they must go nuclear themselves.

A regionwide nuclear arms race would be inherently destabilizing in any number of ways. There could be major differences in nuclear use doctrine from one government to the next, in the strength of their command-and-control systems, in risk-reward calculations and political and strategic incentives, and in what their behavior as a nuclear power may look like. The concern with North Korea among most regional states, for example, is less that Pyongyang might launch a nuclear strike and more that it may become more aggressive in other, sub-nuclear ways if it thinks it's made itself immune to retaliation. The India-Pakistan nuclear balance is also instructive in this regard. India launched cross-border airstrikes for the first time in 2019 in large part because it felt that Pakistan, exploiting India's concerns about Pakistani nuclear command and control, was greenlighting militant attacks in India on the assumption that New Delhi’s fear of nuclear escalation would prevent it from retaliating.

Why This Time Is Different

There's one other fundamental factor in the U.S.-China dynamic that wasn't really in play during the Cold War: The U.S. and China are already capable of hurting each other in major ways without resorting to military force. And such capabilities will almost certainly only strengthen as technology continues its rapid pace of development.

At the most basic level, the U.S. and Chinese economic systems are tightly integrated. There are of course many efforts underway on both sides to “decouple,” but the cost of doing so fully – or at least to the point where neither side can find leverage to use against the other – would be devastating to both sides and is highly unlikely to happen short of a catastrophic precipitating event like a war. Since conflicting interests aren't going away, both sides will remain interested to find ways to exploit the other's dependency.

Now, none of the dimensions of U.S.-China trade, technology and financial conflicts alone generate direct risks of nuclear escalation. If bilateral confrontations were confined to this realm, then it would be a good thing for stability. But these dimensions nonetheless make continued friction and non-military conflict inevitable. Combine them with the myriad other high-stakes strategic issues complicating the U.S.-China relationship, and they inflate incentives for each country to be capable of doing serious harm to the other – at a time when it's becoming increasingly easy for countries to do so.

Perhaps the biggest vulnerabilities for both the U.S. and China exist in the cyber realm. It no longer takes a missile for one country to shut down or even destroy critical infrastructure. They can inflict real, tangible damage to a community more than an ocean away with only the push of a button. We've seen countless examples of how this would look in practice in the past couple of years alone. As emerging technologies improve and become ever-more integrated into the operations of critical infrastructure, the vulnerabilities will only proliferate.

Here, too, the theory of mutually assured destruction should act as something of a deterrent. If the U.S. is capable of shutting down the Beijing subway in retaliation for a Chinese cyberattack on a power plant in Tampa, then there's a strong incentive for China to hold fire. But there's a couple of big complicating factors. One, there's not the same sort of norms militating against cyberattacks as against military strikes, particularly nuclear ones. Two, it’s difficult in the dark recesses of cyberspace to quickly and conclusively identify who was responsible for an attack. This makes deterrence less effective to the extent that it rests on the assumption the retaliation is forthcoming. It also raises the risk of miscalculation and escalation by governments, for political reasons or otherwise, concluding they need to strike back even if they're not quite sure where the attack came from.

It's not hard to see how this could set off an escalatory cycle that quickly turns martial, especially since cyber operations themselves will play an increasingly central role in military conflicts of the future. Countries could reasonably suspect that a cyberattack that would make it more difficult for military forces to mobilize was a precursor to a military move and be compelled into action. And once the U.S.-China cold war starts to turn hot, the still-unresolved nuclear question comes back into play.

This is why the U.S. has been trying to narrow the distinction between military attack and cyberattack. Last spring, President Joe Biden warned that cyberattacks could result in major military retaliation. Back in 2018, the Pentagon went even further, proposing that the White House warn that cyberattacks would result in nuclear retaliation. For the logic of mutually assured destruction to prevail as a deterrent and result in bilateral stability, the U.S. seems to be saying there needs to be a much more expansive definition of mutually assured destruction. Given the ease and inevitability of continued cyberattacks, putting the credibility of your military threats at stake with such warnings probably isn't great for the prospects of long-term stability. But neither is stumbling down the road to doomsday, blinded by historical assumption and misplaced faith in rationality.

[DougMacG]

Overheard "What would Biden and the West do, if Putin went for Donetsk/Odessa, while Xi went for Taipei at the same time?"

I hadn't thought of it but that is exactly what they would do.  What else would they be talking about, if both were ready to move.

OTOH, they don't have to be that clever to outwit the Biden administration, or the EU military!

What stops Xi from risking military conflict with the US is economic.  The US and EU are their biggest customers.  Throw Japan and other Asian neighbors in there and nearly all of their export driven economy could be disrupted.

https://www.worldstopexports.com/chinas-top-import-partners/

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/17944/china-military-modernization

[Crafty_Dog]

second

   
What We're Reading: Delusional Foreign Policy
Weekly reviews of what's on our bookshelves.
By: Francesco Casarotto
The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities
By John J. Mearsheimer

I was looking for something that explained U.S. behavior in the international system after the Cold War, not from a geopolitical point of view but from a philosophical one. That’s how I crossed paths with John Mearsheimer’s “The Great Delusion.” An international relations scholar, Mearsheimer explains that the guiding light of U.S. foreign policy after the fall of the Soviet Union was liberalism. With the Cold War over, the international system entered the so-called unipolar moment: The U.S. was the sole pole of international politics, incomparably stronger than any other state, facing no direct threat to its national security.

In this context, Mearsheimer argues, U.S. foreign policy assumed that liberal democracy, a market-based economy and human rights protection could and therefore should be spread, by force if necessary. That’s what drove NATO expansion to the east and interventions in the Middle East and in Afghanistan. He then starts to make a case against liberalism-based foreign policy, arguing that NATO’s eastward enlargement unnecessarily antagonized Russia and that the Iraq and Afghanistan interventions turned out to be long and costly wars with vague and unachievable goals that did more harm than good to the United States.

In fact, Mearsheimer claims, Washington should embrace a realist, national interest-based foreign policy, since doing social engineering abroad – this is how he defines interventions aimed at spreading democracy – is costly and useless. Nationalism is stronger than liberalism, especially when liberalism is imposed by a foreign power. Moreover, exporting liberalism abroad could jeopardize liberalism at home, as a state that fights constant wars could lose its domestic liberal values. Finally, a liberal foreign policy ignores the ubiquitous great-power competition that characterizes international politics, distracting a state from its true national interests to the advantage of emerging regional or global rivals.

This short review doesn’t do justice to Mearsheimer’s work: He not only makes his case with an almost flawless logic, but he proves himself to be one of the most knowledgeable and influential international relations scholars. “The Great Delusion” is not a book about geopolitics in the strict sense; it’s a theory-based work, written not only for scholars but also for the public. It offers a policy recommendation, but it’s not a political manifesto that ignores the other side of the topic. I highly recommend it for those interested in a different kind of U.S. foreign policy.

[Crafty_Dog]

The Campaign to Distract Biden From Asia
China and Russia form an entente to hobble America, with a little help from Iran.
By Walter Russell Mead
Nov. 22, 2021 6:35 pm ET


Asia First does not mean Asia Alone. That is the hard lesson the world is busy teaching the Biden administration and the U.S. In Europe, American diplomats last week scrambled to respond to Belarus’s weaponization of migration on its border with Poland, warned that Russia is positioning itself to invade Ukraine, and worked to defuse a crisis in the western Balkans. In the Middle East, as Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin tried to reassure key allies about America’s continuing commitment to their security, U.S. naval forces participated with Israel, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates in the unprecedented joint Arab-Israeli military exercises in the Red Sea.

This shift from an Asia First policy to Global Engagement isn’t something the Biden administration is voluntarily choosing. It is a change forced on the U.S. by the actions of adversaries who believe that by keeping America off-balance and overcommitted, they can hasten the process of American decline.

President Biden’s original plan to focus on Asia made good political sense. Progressive Democrats are dead-set against the military spending and political engagement that a truly global American foreign policy would require. And it isn’t only progressive Democrats who are weary of endless wars, freeloading allies, and American diplomatic and sometimes military engagement in faraway hot spots like the western Balkans and Sudan. If we could get Iran back into the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action nuclear deal and reach at least a temporary understanding with Russia on some issues, Team Biden hoped, reduced engagement in Europe and the Middle East would help make a tougher China policy easier to sell back home—and to pay for.

Team Biden is right about that. Unfortunately, China, Russia and Iran understand the situation as clearly as the White House does, and these powers want Mr. Biden and the nation he leads to fail. They are doing what they can to keep the president from focusing on Asia. Iranian hard-liners are not only slow-walking any return to the JCPOA; with carefully calibrated help from both Russia and China they also are exploiting every weakness and testing every boundary in the Middle East. And Russia—far from fading into the background so the U.S. can concentrate on China—is backing Belarus, threatening war against Ukraine, demonstrating its growing stranglehold over Europe’s power supply (Marc:  Thanks in part due to Biden green lighting the Nord Stream 2 Gas Pipeline!), and raising its profile from Southeast Asia to sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America.
Our adversaries—and some of our allies as well as several American policy makers and commentators—believe that a polarized America is locked into decline and retreat. This is not, the revisionist powers feel, a good reason to offer Mr. Biden help in rebalancing his commitments. On the contrary, it is the time to double down on their assaults on the American world order. The logic is so obvious that they don’t need to coordinate their response. If America stands tall in the South China Sea, the revisionists will chip away in the Black Sea. If we toughen our stance in the Baltics, they will push harder in the Balkans. If we try to escape the Middle East, they will drag us back in.

Much of the American political establishment, to say nothing of the public at large, has yet to understand how serious and deadly a challenge the Sino-Russian entente poses to American power. China is a much more sophisticated and powerful opponent than the ramshackle Soviet Union ever managed to be—and Russia, while still a shadow of the Soviet Union and now the junior partner in the Eurasian entente, has in Vladimir Putin a daring leader of utter ruthlessness and extraordinary diplomatic talent. No leader in the West is in his league.

China and Russia don’t like or trust each other very much, and should they succeed in marginalizing the U.S., they would quickly fall out. But for now their mutual distrust turns them both against the U.S. as they compete to seize enough spoils from the declining American order to position themselves for the future. As the West weakens, for example, Mr. Putin is raising the stakes in Ukraine and the Black Sea partly because he can, and partly because he needs to grab everything on the table to prepare for the day when Russia and China face off.

The “pivot to Asia” is failing as an American grand strategy because our adversaries are willing and able to disrupt it. To recognize this reality and respond to it requires the kind of foreign-policy leadership that the U.S. hasn’t seen in decades. Mr. Biden and those around him should look to Harry S. Truman’s example of a Democratic president who—in the face of a polarized country and a divided, mostly dovish Democratic Party yearning for more social spending at home rather than activism abroad—prepared the American people for the Cold War. Nothing less will do.

[DougMacG]

Thank you for posting Walter Russel Mead.  He is one of my three favorite Democrats and always insightful in these matters.

Why doesn't Biden put someone like him is his inner circle instead of strictly domestic political operatives?

Main lesson:   America in decline and American weakness leads us to an exponentially more dangerous world.

WRM doesn't give Trump much credit, but he did quite a few things right in this regard:
1) Strengthened the US economy,
2) Stated to fund the rebuilding of our military and defense capabilities,
3) Showed strategic vision with SpaceForce etc.
4) Stood up to China,
5) Weakened the Kremlin in their wallet with drilling and fracking,
6) Put the N.K. dictator back in his shell,
7) Killed arch terrorist Soleimani, putting others on notice,
8.) And didn't fire a single shot in terms of starting new wars.

That's a pretty good record, especially compared to the 10 months since:  Put America in decline, put the military in decline, make it a social program, end strategic thinking and new initiatives, empower the Kremlin by attacking oil and gas at home, and coddle the Chinese.

[Crafty_Dog]

Russia and China Eye a Retreating U.S.
Beijing will push for more sway in Pakistan; Moscow will try in Central Asia’s former Soviet republics.
By John Bolton
Aug. 30, 2021 1:59 pm ET


America’s retreat from Afghanistan is ending tragically—and that has sweeping strategic implications. One major misjudgment underlying the “ending endless wars” mantra was that withdrawing affected only Afghanistan. To the contrary, the departure constitutes a major, and deeply regrettable, U.S. strategic realignment. China and Russia, our main global adversaries, are already seeking to reap advantages.

They and many others judge Afghanistan’s abandonment not simply on its direct consequences for global terrorist threats, but also for what it says about U.S. objectives, capabilities and resolve world-wide.

In the near term, responding to both menaces and opportunities emanating from Afghanistan, China will seek to increase its already considerable influence in Pakistan; Russia will do the same in Central Asia’s former Soviet republics; and both will expand their Middle East initiatives, often along with Iran. There is little evidence that the White House is ready to respond to any of these threats.

Over the longer term, Beijing and Moscow enjoy a natural division of labor in threatening America and its allies, in three distinct theaters: China on its periphery’s long arc from Japan across Southeast Asia out to India and Pakistan; Russia in Eastern and Central Europe; and the Russian-Iranian-Chinese entente cordiale in the Middle East. U.S. planning must contemplate many threats arising simultaneously across these and other theaters.


This underscores how strained our defense capabilities are to protect our far-flung interests, especially given the unprecedented domestic spending demands President Biden is now making. Washington’s most important task, therefore, is somehow to secure significant increases in defense budgets across the full threat spectrum, from terrorism to cyberwar. Diplomacy alone is no substitute.

Xi Jinping will be unimpressed by Mr. Biden’s assertion that America needs to end military activities in Afghanistan to counter China more effectively. Instead, Beijing has new opportunities: shoring up its interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan; protecting against the spread of Islamic terror into China; and increasing efforts to establish hegemony along its periphery, especially regarding Taiwan, the South China Sea and India.

These initiatives fit seamlessly into Beijing’s existential threat to the West, extending well beyond our Afghan debacle. By contrast, Washington is floundering in tactical maneuvering and improvisational responses to particular Chinese ploys. Afghanistan is the urgent impetus to marshal our deeper conceptual and strategic thinking; while doing so, we can immediately seize several points of policy high ground. To eliminate ambiguity about our Taiwan defense commitment, for example, we should station military forces there. Theaterwide, we need those budget increases to boost our naval presence in the East and South China seas, thereby establishing deterrence and countering Chinese sovereignty claims.


Our defense relations with India, Vietnam and others must intensify. The scope of the “Quad” (India, Japan, Australia and the U.S.) should expand dramatically to include collective-defense issues and the Quad itself should consider expanding. We also must increasingly hold China accountable for its dangerous policy of proliferating ballistic-missile and nuclear technology to the likes of Pakistan and North Korea.

Russia’s Vladimir Putin was undoubtedly heartened by seeing a weak, flagging U.S. president at their June summit, recalling Khrushchev after meeting John F. Kennedy in 1961. Mr. Biden’s subsequent capitulations on Nord Stream 2 and Afghanistan now surely have Mr. Putin smiling broadly. He will act aggressively in Central Asia to stanch any resurgent Islamic terrorism, but his long-term focus remains Russia’s European neighbors.

Mr. Putin sees disarray in Europe, which fears the resurrection of endemic conflict, largely because it fears America faltering, even substantially withdrawing from world affairs. Although Presidents Trump and Biden don’t constitute a trend—the former was an aberration; the latter is merely a typical Democrat—Mr. Biden’s failure to warn North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies of his Afghan exit shattered already weak confidence levels. The inevitable calls for a larger “European” politico-military role will meet the fate of previous efforts. The European Union can never be a global geostrategic player because it habitually deploys more rhetoric than resources.

That leaves NATO, which Mr. Biden had eased back toward complacency, only to jilt the allies over Afghanistan. Instead of blaming Washington for being too interventionist and then for not being interventionist enough, Europe needs to decide whether it prizes collective self-defense in NATO seriously, or merely prizes dabbling in it. When Germany and others match their defense capabilities with their economies, their opinions will matter. While waiting, the U.S. should work with sub-NATO coalitions, mostly Central and Eastern Europeans, and threatened non-NATO countries just beyond, to counter Mr. Putin’s imperial instincts. Our force posture in Europe can be adjusted accordingly.

In the Middle East, Iran is China’s oil supplier of choice and Russia’s partner in bolstering Syria’s Bashar al-Assad. For Beijing and Moscow, Tehran is a surrogate for destabilization work and a foil to expand their influence throughout the region, recently demonstrated by the military-cooperation agreement between Russia and Saudi Arabia. Riyadh is hedging against U.S. disapproval and a possible Obama-style alignment with Tehran. Gulf Arabs fear America’s Afghan withdrawal could foreshadow the same in Iraq, or even from major U.S. air and naval bases in their countries. Who wouldn’t hedge?


Washington should emphatically not rejoin the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. That part is easy, although the Biden administration still doesn’t get it. The key lies in recognizing that Iran’s objectives are fundamentally contrary to America’s, Israel’s and most of the Arab world’s. Only changing Tehran’s government stands a chance of reducing threats across the region, which is the last thing China and Russia want.

Sadly for those believing withdrawal from Afghanistan was a one-off decision with limited consequences, the world is far more complicated. The results are already deeply negative, and China and Russia are invested in making them worse. Over to us.

Mr. Bolton is author of “The Room Where It Happened: A White House Memoir.” He served as the president’s national security adviser, 2018-19, and ambassador to the United Nations, 2005-06.

[Crafty_Dog]

November 24, 2021
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The World Ocean Versus the Continent
The dominant maritime power is gathering strength for a contest with a rising land power.
By: Jacek Bartosiak

For centuries, the power that controls the seas – the “World Ocean” – has successfully stymied continental rivals and dictated the rules of world trade. The German geographer Friedrich Ratzel described this contest as one between the Leviathan and the Behemoth, respectively. The Behemoth tries to tear the Leviathan to shreds using his horns and teeth, while the Leviathan tries to smother the Behemoth so that he cannot breathe, eat or drink. Classically, this refers to naval blockades, but in the modern world the Leviathan – the United States – has other, less risky options, such as cutting off the Behemoth’s access to the global reserve currency. This was by design.

Halford Mackinder believed that over time the Continent would gain a clear advantage over the World Ocean because the Eurasian Heartland, though inaccessible to merchant ships, is also inaccessible to warships, and is thus immune to the World Ocean’s authority. At the same time, innovations in rail, road and air travel would dramatically improve land connections. The Eurasian land mass, Mackinder argued, possessed all the elements for economic and military mobility (what today we would call the free projection of power) over very long distances. As an added benefit, the Continent would enjoy internal communication lines throughout the Eurasian land mass, as opposed to the inefficient external communication lines of the power controlling the World Ocean around Eurasia.

Today, China is implementing Mackinder’s ideas for Eurasian consolidation via its Belt and Road Initiative. Highways, railways, air connections, ports, cables, 5G and data flows are all symptoms of Eurasian consolidation. Beijing’s decision-makers have not forgotten Nicholas Spykman’s teachings – their Belt and Road also runs along the coast and across Eurasian coastal seas – but the Continent will necessarily come first.

China's Belt and Road Initiative

(click to enlarge)

The signing of the EU-China investment pact in December 2020 was a signal that the trans-Atlantic unity that has defined the balance of power since 1945 could very quickly disappear and that Eurasia could become one system for the first time. The Eurasia-centric system would be highly complex, and competition for markets and money would be intense. Such a turn of events would be a threat to the status of the World Ocean – one that the United States cannot tolerate.

The battle for supremacy has always been about value chains and the resulting global division of labor. These determine new technology and investment cycles, which confer money and power on those who enter the market first or in a better structural position. The ultimate arbiter is the military power capable of dominating the escalation ladder, which for the most part is determined by wealth.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States enjoyed unquestioned domination (or, as the Americans prefer to call it, leadership or primacy). It has been the only hegemon in the past 30 years of globalization, buoyed by the dollar, the U.S. Navy and its aircraft carriers, GPS, Silicon Valley, the New York Stock Exchange, Hollywood, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The United States sets the rules, which gives it massive influence over the division of labor in production, services and value chains; prices and strategic flows; the currency in which transactions occur; the direction and objectives of investment; technological cycles and new scientific breakthroughs; and regulations that shape the market.

The wealth and power of the U.S. rests on the size of the American middle class, its immense demand capacity, and the strength of the U.S. internal market, but that power would not have arisen without sea trade in the World Ocean. Nor would the Americans hold primacy without control of the World Ocean, where most of the world’s strategic flows take place. The rules of the World Ocean are made in America and defended by the U.S. Navy, which dominates its foes with its flagship fleet of aircraft carriers capable of projecting force far from North America’s shores.

In the modern world, global power projection through the oceans and control of maritime traffic increasingly make use of many space-based observation and communication systems that aid in both navigation and warfare. This greatly reduces the fog of war, which was the bane of the maritime domain, especially offshore. It helped the U.S. control the course of globalization and promote principles of world trade that worked in its favor, all while the U.S. maintained its dominant position in international finance, and the dollar serves as the world currency. The U.S. was able to spread its influence through investment as well as the maintenance of military alliances beneficial to Washington, such as bilateral accords with Japan, Australia and South Korea and collective security arrangements like NATO.

For the past 500 years, the North Atlantic has been the world’s geostrategic linchpin. Control of the North Atlantic in the 19th and 20th centuries helped the United States and Britain coordinate and jointly implement policies through the major European wars of the time. During both world wars and the Cold War, uninterrupted communication from the U.S. East Coast to Western Europe was the basis of NATO’s strength and the foundation of America’s forward presence on the Continent, which made credible U.S. security guarantees in Europe against the Old Continent.

The basic goal of both powers’ strategy is to protect their interests and security and to ensure the stability and predictability of an international system that serves their interests. The key elements of this system are lines of communication, including across borders, which ensure social and economic stability and military assistance when necessary. There are significant differences between land and sea borders, and thus between lines of communication. Land-based communication lines are always less secure because people live on land, and their actions and interactions (capital flows, remittances, migration, etc.) mean land borders are much more prone to change, especially in the absence of natural barriers like mountains, swamps or forests.

Moreover, balancing behaviors against pressure from land powers is much more common because on land every threat is more immediate. The history of Europe is a striking example. Land borders generate more conflict, which was another reason Eurasia was structurally weaker than the World Ocean.

Alfred Thayer Mahan is famous for claiming that naval powers that control the sea lanes are inherently more powerful than land powers. This is true, but there were and still are important overland routes. In fact, for some Eurasian countries, like Kazakhstan, there is no alternative. One such route was the old Silk Road, connecting China to Europe and running through the Middle East and the Levant. A network of oil and natural gas pipelines, railroads and highways essential to the functioning of the global economy still ensures connectivity between resource-rich areas.

Eurasia – inhabited by many nations, states, empires, ethnic groups and even tribes bound together in a web of conflicting interests – is extremely volatile, especially over long horizons. Alliances are mutable, and trust is scarce. By contrast, the stability of sea lanes can lull us into a false sense that navigation of the oceans is free and open, beyond the control of any one power. This perception persists in times of domination by a single maritime power – formerly Britain, and now the United States. But the sea hegemon may at any time deny to others the right to free and undisturbed navigation, cutting off strategic sea flows. Germany’s maritime trade was cut off during World War I, and the U.S. cut off Cuba during the Cuban missile crisis. The same could be tried at any time along the approaches to Malacca or in the South China Sea, whether by the Chinese or U.S. navies.

[Crafty_Dog]

November 30, 2021
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The Debate Over America First
By: George Friedman

Since the 1930s, there has been a debate in the United States over a foreign policy based on “America First,” a nationalistic policy that prioritizes U.S. objectives over others’. It’s an idea that has at different times been central to Democrats and Republicans alike. The positions have ranged from the right urging that the U.S. not take responsibility for the fate of other nations, and the left condemning the United States for acting as the world police. The left has supported a strategy that the United States must remain enmeshed in the world through alliances. On the right, there has been the belief that the U.S. must remain enmeshed in the world in order, for example, to defeat communism. It has taken on the character of a moral principle and prudent action in both ideological tendencies, and as a moral obligation in both as well.

The question of the proper relationship of the United States to the rest of the world has been a central issue since America was founded. Thomas Jefferson warned against entangling alliances, while George Washington and Benjamin Franklin were maneuvering to try to get France engaged in the American Revolution. America was founded as an alternative to Europe and a new order of the ages. It was also one nation among many, and for a while a very weak one. The American relationship to the world has always been ambiguous as a practical and a moral matter and at different times for both sides.

The modern notion of America First emerged in the years before World War II. The United States had been drawn into World War I, in many ways against its will, and the general and reasonable view was that little was gained by the war, which was about to reignite. The left saw intervention against Hitler as a moral obligation. The right argued that the primary moral obligation of the United States was to the well-being of Americans, and that if intervention was a moral necessity, Stalin would be a more appropriate target.

The United States assumed that the oceans separating the U.S. from Europe would protect America from Europe’s follies. The problem with this reasoning was that it wouldn’t. As Hitler conquered France and launched a war against Europe, a vast danger appeared. Britain had the world’s most powerful navy. If Germany defeated Britain, it might take control of its vessels, and it followed that it would take control of the North Atlantic and pose an existential threat to the United States. The America First movement saw intervention as a charitable act, not as a strategic imperative. America First overestimated the security of the United States in a dangerous world. Isolationism was dangerous.

After World War II, the American view was that the cost in American lives was the result of a failure to act sooner against Germany and Japan. As a result, it reacted to Soviet power by reducing its wartime force but never actually demobilizing. The United States created the most entangling alliance possible, NATO, and undertook a policy whereby, as President John Kennedy, put it, "we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and success of liberty." This was, of course, the most extreme commitment any nation could make. It was the logical continuation of liberal interventionism, and it opened the door to a series of wars, beginning with Vietnam, that continue to this day. And he was supported on the whole by the right wing. Isolationism and America First had become discredited, seen as they had been as immoral principles, and Kennedy’s vast commitment was simply the summary of the American interest.

In Vietnam, the war went neither badly nor well. It simply went. And as it went, the mood contained in Kennedy’s statement withered. The Kennedy Doctrine was attacked by the left, which argued that the U.S., in assuming responsibility for the world, had become an imperialist monster, waging a ruthless war that was none of its business. The view went beyond Vietnam to the notion that American influence and power throughout the world was exploiting and crushing the rights of other nations. The left made the case for American withdrawal from the world, not as an America First doctrine but as a doctrine by which it was immoral for the United States to be the world police. Nuances aside, the practical application was America First without the celebration of America.

The interventionism in Kennedy’s speech was a reaction against pre-World War II America First. Under attack from the left, the principle survived. The United States has spent more time at war since 2000 than in any prior century in total. (And since 9/11, it has waged war largely unsuccessfully.) Time is not intensity, but it still reshapes the nation’s understanding of itself.

America First is a self-evidently reasonable doctrine if it means placing American interests at the center of consideration. Every nation in the world places its own interests first. Alliances must serve the national interest, as must isolation. None are strategic doctrines themselves. They are means to an end. The government has a moral obligation to protect the nation. Sometimes that requires allies and sometimes war, but to undertake Kennedy’s vision would be to create a set of obligations that can break a nation and has in fact cost the United States a great deal.

And if the idea of Americans putting America first is self-evident, then what that means in practice is subtle and complex. The isolationists on the right thought the United States invincible as it stood. Isolationists of the left thought the United States a brutal oppressor. Both analyses were simplistic, harmful and untrue. But at the core of any national strategy must be an understanding of the national interest, which is never simple, nor self-evident. And it defies simplistic ideologies. The world is a dangerous place, and even if we don’t want war, war may want us. And a moral principle that demands constant war is unbearable.

The issue is always what we shall do now. Not what we did before, nor even what we will do later. The future always surprises us. The issue is to be thoughtful and subtle and to always put America first, which may take us to many parts of the world. America First is not isolationism, it is our moral commitment to the nation.

[Crafty_Dog]

Biden’s invites for democracy summit boggle global minds

Pakistan, Iraq on list; Singapore excluded

BY GUY TAYLOR THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The goal behind President Biden’s upcoming “Summit for Democracy” was to feature U.S. leadership and unify like-minded democracies, including many the administration hopes will work together to counter communist China’s rise as a rival, autocratic global power.

But the summit, a key promise of Mr. Biden’s 2020 presidential campaign, might backfire before the virtual Dec. 9-10 event kicks off. Critics and news outlets around the world are questioning the White House’s picky invitations, and U.S. adversaries are scrambling for favor among nations left off the list.

Singapore is among the major democracies conspicuously left off the list of 110 participating countries, while the inclusions of Pakistan and others have triggered speculation about the strategic calculus behind the invitations.

Turkey, a critical NATO ally, didn’t make the cut. Iraq did, despite having a parliament heavily influenced by the nearby theocracy in Iran.

Turkey instead got lumped with China, Russia and other nations left off the list. Moscow and

Beijing are now seizing the moment to attack the very idea of the summit and delighting in the tensions it has generated.

The Russian Foreign Ministry said it is hypocritical of the U.S. to claim to be “a ‘beacon’ of democracy, since they themselves have chronic problems with freedom of speech, election administration, corruption and human rights.”

Chinese officials accused the White House of using the summit to ratchet up Cold War-style tensions with Beijing. “This year marks the 30th anniversary of the end of the Cold War,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin told reporters this week. “The U.S. hosting of the summit for democracy is a dangerous move to rekindle the Cold War mentality, to which the international community should be on high alert.”

Even some on the invitation list have raised questions. A high-level source from one participating Indo-Pacific nation said it appears “strange” for Pakistan to have an invitation while Bangladesh and Sri Lanka do not. Sri Lanka is widely regarded as the oldest democracy in Asia.

The source, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, questioned whether the administration used the invitation to smooth over ill feelings in Islamabad stemming from Mr. Biden’s failure after more than 11 months in office to phone Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan. The administration, the source said, may be trying to appease the Khan government in exchange for assurances that U.S. forces can rely on Pakistan to be a partner for regional counterterrorism operations, including in Afghanistan.

Such assurances would be welcome when the White House seems to be struggling to reach basing agreements in the wake of the messy troop pullout from Afghanistan. Tajikistan, left off the summit invite list, is a key Central Asian prospect.

Patrick Cronin, the Asia-Pacific Security chair with the Hudson Institute in Washington, cautioned against “rushing to judgment” about why some countries were invited while others weren’t. Still, he said “there are practical reasons some friends of the United States were probably not invited.”

He pointed to Singapore as an example. The Southeast Asian economic hub is known for its vibrant parliamentary democracy and for being caught in the middle of U.S.-Chinese geopolitical jockeying.

“Singapore is being spared the awkwardness of appearing to side with the U.S. and against China,” Mr. Cronin told The Washington Times. “Singapore likes to focus on being a trading hub, rules and good governance, but it also likes to avoid unnecessarily ruffling feathers. That is why it is a partner of the United States and not an ally.”

Still, Mr. Cronin emphasized that the “simple act of inviting countries to participate in a summit for democracy sends a signal that Washington expects participants to live up to democratic norms and non-invitees should step away from authoritarian governance.”

Such logic could explain why Turkey didn’t make the cut, given widespread perceptions in Washington of the increasingly authoritarian nature of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Biden administration officials have emphasized that a central aim of the summit is to gather government, civil society and private-sector leaders to work together to fight authoritarianism and global corruption and to defend human rights.

A message from Mr. Biden touting the summit on the State Department’s website says the administration is consulting with experts from government, multilateral organizations, philanthropies, civil society and the private sector to solicit “bold, practicable ideas “around three key themes: defending against authoritarianism, addressing and fighting corruption, and promoting respect for human rights.

“Since day one, the Biden-Harris administration has made clear that renewing democracy in the United States and around the world is essential to meeting the unprecedented challenges of our time,” the message states.

Some perceive the reference to “renewing” democracy in the United States as an attempt to stoke Democratic partisan fervor around the notion that President Trump represented a significant decline in U.S. democracy. Many on the left say that was underscored by the Jan. 6 storming of the U.S. Capitol by pro-Trump demonstrators.

With that as a backdrop, some observers question the extent to which internal or foreign autocratic forces are challenging democracies.

Financial Times opinion writer Janan Ganesh said in a column this week that the summit “risks flattering the unfree world.”

“Its premise, that a contest is going on between democracy and its opposite, is right. But the fault line runs mostly through countries, not between them,” Mr. Ganesh wrote. “By calling nations together, and barring Russia, Turkey and China, the event reframes a largely domestic problem as a geopolitical one. It encourages the idea that foreign subversion (which is real enough) is to blame for Donald Trump in the U.S., the dark vaudeville of Brexit, the numerous flavors of Italian populism and the great mass of anti-liberal votes in France.”

Others have focused on the geopolitics of the summit itself.

The Australian newspaper cited critics questioning whether U.S. strategic interests may have been as vital to the invite list as any given country’s democratic bona fides.

“Important U.S. allies Pakistan and the Philippines made the list despite endemic corruption and human rights abuses,” an analysis by the paper stated this week. “Yet Singapore and Thailand — respectively one of America’s closest regional security partners and one of its oldest regional allies, notwithstanding their deeply-flawed democracies — have been excluded alongside one-party-state Cambodia, communist Vietnam and Laos, the kingdom of Brunei and the murderous Myanmar junta.”

Ben Bland, Southeast Asia program director at the Sidney-based Lowy Institute, told the paper that the “Biden administration seems to have picked some states because of their genuine commitment to democracy while others appear to be there more because of their strategic relevance.”

The invitation list has exposed inherent tensions in U.S. efforts to build a broad-balancing coalition against China while framing competition with Beijing in ideological terms, said Mr. Bland. “The fact that only three ASEAN members are invited,” he said, “shows that pitching competition with China as a grand battle between democracy and authoritarianism will not get Washington very far in Southeast Asia.”

Mr. Cronin said the administration is approaching the summit “not from a position of supreme confidence born of some unipolar moment, but from a position of necessity to push back on illiberal governance at a moment of profound crisis in democracy.”

“In our age of plurilateralism, in which various constellations of countries can choose to partner or opt out of specific frameworks, it would be great for most participants to sign onto an agreed set of democratic principles regarding rules of the road, including for digital technology,” he told The Times. “Over time, a summit process might enhance not just the confidence but also what some have called the operating system of world order.”

‘Strange’ choices

Fighting the autocrats

Geopolitical focus


Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan has not received a phone call from President Biden since he took office in January, but he is on an exclusive invitation list for the upcoming “Summit for Democracy.” Even NATO ally Turkey wasn’t asked to participate. ASSOCIATED PRESS

[Crafty_Dog]

The Xi-Putin Entente Rises
Both share a goal of undermining the U.S.-led global order.
By The Editorial Board
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Dec. 15, 2021 6:59 pm ET


The gushing remarks at Wednesday’s video meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping have drawn renewed attention to an underplayed story: The tightening strategic embrace between America’s two most formidable geopolitical competitors. Moscow and Beijing have held each other at arm’s length for decades, but as the world becomes less stable, both see regional advantages from rolling back American power and prosperity.


“China-Russia relations have emerged from all kinds of tests to demonstrate new vitality,” said the Chinese Foreign Ministryaccount of the discussion. It added that “Russia will be the most staunch supporter of the Chinese government’s legitimate position on Taiwan-related issues.” In his introductory remarks, Mr. Putin hailed “a new model of cooperation” between the two countries. He will travel to Beijing and meet Mr. Xi in person early next year.

This is more than talk. Joint military exercises between the two powers have been accelerating, including a naval demonstration in the Sea of Japan in October. Russian and Chinese warplanes have repeatedly intruded on South Korean airspace since 2019, most recently last month. Moscow surged its supply of military equipment to Beijing in the years after seizing Crimea in 2014.


The nations don’t need to present a single strategic front to imperil American interests. They can do so by pushing on different fronts simultaneously in hopes of sapping American power.

The military crisis Mr. Putin has generated over Ukraine works to Mr. Xi’s advantage, drawing U.S. focus from the defense of Taiwan. And if China starts a shooting war in Asia, Moscow could calculate that it’s more likely to get away with its own territorial expansion. A war in either region could trigger conflict in the other.

Both powers are also giving Iran crucial support as Tehran fights U.S.-led sanctions against its nuclear program. Mr. Putin’s new defense agreement with India also redounds to China’s benefit by pulling India away from the U.S.

The rising entente between Beijing and Moscow underscores the growing threats to the U.S.-led international order. The new reality means the U.S. needs to shore up its own alliances while also moving more quickly than it has to build military and cyber defenses that can meet this more dangerous world

[ccp]

"The rising entente between Beijing and Moscow underscores the growing threats to the U.S.-led international order. The new reality means the U.S. needs to shore up its own alliances while also moving more quickly than it has to build military and cyber defenses that can meet this more dangerous world"

well we are kicking there ass on gender studies..............

[Crafty_Dog]

Russia uses U.S., NATO threats as ‘pretext to war’ in Ukraine

BY BEN WOLFGANG THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Russia upped the ante Monday in its dangerous standoff with Ukraine, openly warning of military action if President Biden and America’s NATO allies ignore a list of demands Moscow announced late last week — a far-reaching list that some key U.S. lawmakers have dubbed a “pretext to war.”

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said his country is fully prepared to respond through “military-technical means” if Western powers fail to address those demands. He said NATO must not expand to include Ukraine or Georgia and the U.S. must not base additional military assets in former Soviet republics in Central Asia. Most of Moscow’s proposed security guarantees seemingly have little chance of becoming a reality. Still, some foreign policy specialists warn that Russian President Vladimir Putin could use their rejection to justify a major land invasion of Ukraine.

Russia’s proposal and the direct threat of military action put renewed pressure on the White House to defuse a crisis that seems to be nearing the boiling point.

U.S. officials have said Mr. Putin’s list of demands is unrealistic but could be the starting point for easing tensions in Ukraine and letting diplomacy take the place of saber-rattling. At the same time, the U.S. and the European Union say they are preparing unprecedented sanctions on Moscow if the Kremlin moves militarily against Kyiv.

How much of what Russia has sought is bluster and how much is non-negotiable are the big questions. Some of Mr. Putin’s key advisers are doing little to ease the tensions.

“I said that we would find forms to respond, including by military and military-technical means,” Mr. Ryabkov said, according to Russia’s state-run Tass news agency. “I reaffirm this. We will have to balance the activities that are of concern to us because they increase the risks with our countermeasures.”

He did not elaborate on what those actions might be, but Russia’s military posture offers unmistakable clues.

Nearly 100,000 Russian troops are stationed near the country’s border with Ukraine. The Russian military buildup has stoked fears that Mr. Putin is prepared to seize another portion of its smaller and weaker neighbor by force, just as he did with the Crimean Peninsula in 2014.

Russia also backs separatists who have been battling the Ukrainian military since 2014 in the country’s disputed Donbas region.

It’s not clear whether Mr. Putin is willing to endure the casualties and the economic blowback that would result from a long-term ground war in Ukraine, but some Western governments are growing increasingly worried that military action is on the horizon.

The British Daily Star reported Monday that intelligence officials privately warned U.K. officials that Russia might launch an invasion on Christmas Eve. U.S. intelligence analysts have said Russia’s buildup could give it an invasion force by early next year but Mr. Putin has not decided whether to invade or stand down.

In another sign of uneasiness in the region, the State Department issued a new travel warning for Ukraine. It specifi cally cited reports that war may be in the offing in the former Soviet republic.

“U.S. citizens should be aware of reports that Russia is planning for signifi cant military action against Ukraine,” the State Department said in its travel advisory. “U.S. citizens choosing to travel to Ukraine should be aware that Russian military action anywhere in Ukraine would severely impact the U.S. Embassy’s ability to provide consular services, including assistance to U.S. citizens in departing Ukraine.”

Further complicating Washington’s task is the hard-line stance of many smaller countries that border Russia with a long history of pressure and intimidation from Moscow.

The leaders of Poland and Lithuania met Monday with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. They called for even tougher sanctions on Russia and rejected any compromise in the face of Moscow’s security demands.

“Everything must be done” to prevent Russian military aggression against Ukraine, Polish President Andrzej Duda told reporters in the Ukrainian village of Huta. It is “absolutely undesirable to yield to such an ultimatum, to such blackmail.”

Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda called Russia’s attempts to unilaterally lay down security red lines “unacceptable in Europe in the 21st century.”

The Biden administration has doubled down on finding a diplomatic solution. Mr. Biden and Mr. Putin spoke via video conference earlier this month. White House National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan spoke with his Russian counterpart by phone Monday and “indicated U.S. readiness to engage in diplomacy through multiple channels, including bilateral engagement” and in other forums, according to a readout of the call.

State Department officials, meanwhile, tried to strike a balance between keeping the door open for negotiations with Moscow and taking a hard line against the Kremlin’s aggression.

“Any dialogue, any diplomacy has to be based on the principles of reciprocity,” State Department spokesperson Ned Price told reporters. “We are having this discussion in the context of Russia’s ongoing aggression against Ukraine, but in some ways this is bigger than any one country.

“No country has the right to dictate borders, to bully smaller countries, to intimidate, to coerce, to pursue their own interests,” he said. “That is not something the United States, that is not something our partners or allies will stand for.”

Russia’s demands ostensibly are about protecting national security. That includes preventing a military alliance formed to contain it — NATO — from bringing troops and arms to states along Russia’s western border. Still, many of the specifics are aimed at a much broader goal long advocated by Mr. Putin: establishing new limits on American military activities around the world.

One section of Moscow’s proposal states: “The parties shall refrain from deploying their armed forces and armaments … in the areas where such deployment could be perceived by the other party as a threat to its national security, with the exception of such deployment within the national territories of the parties.

“The parties shall refrain from flying heavy bombers equipped for nuclear or non-nuclear armaments or deploying surface warships of any type, including in the framework of international organizations, military alliances or coalitions, in the areas outside national airspace and national territorial waters respectively, from where they can attack targets in the territory of the other party,” it says.

Such an agreement would directly impact America’s military posture in Europe and elsewhere around the world.

Although the U.S. isn’t seriously entertaining such proposals, some lawmakers say Mr. Putin has a more sinister aim: creating the threat of a crisis in order to extract concessions from NATO and the U.S.

“The Russian government’s publication of ‘proposals’ for the United States and NATO is an insult to diplomacy and seeks to extort us into ending a crisis Russia itself created. These are not security agreements, but a list of concessions the United States and NATO must make to appease Putin,” Sen. James E. Risch, Idaho Republican and ranking member on the House Foreign Relations Committee, said in a statement over the weekend. “The Russian Federation made these demands with the full understanding they are impossible to accept. … Russia is clearly trying to create a pretext for war.”

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.theepochtimes.com/dont-expect-a-sino-russian-alliance-anytime-soon_4177072.html?utm_source=uschinanoe&utm_campaign=uschina-2022-1-3&utm_medium=email

That said, I'm not seeing why they can't play tag team against us.

[Crafty_Dog]

January 4, 2022
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America’s Wars and Failures
By: George Friedman

Sixty years ago, in 1962, the United States made the decision to go to war in Vietnam, deploying major ground and air forces to the battle for the first time. This was a fraction of the men and aircraft that would serve there over the years to come. It was a line that the Kennedy administration realized it was crossing. It saw U.S. involvement as a minor, even experimental, move. But when a nation sends its soldiers to war, a logic takes hold. As men die, the nation assumes it is for a vital interest. Leaders cannot declare the experiment a failure because they cannot admit they experimented with the lives of soldiers. A death requires a worthy reason, and establishing that the death was not in vain is incompatible with “cutting and running,” in Lyndon B. Johnson’s words. Intervention is difficult. Withdrawal under fire is agony.

To understand American strategy between 1962 and now, we have to understand what John F. Kennedy was seeing and thinking when he made the first major commitment. Kennedy was crafted by World War II, and the senior military men were as well. In World War II, America understood its enemy. Germany was ruled by Hitler, and Hitler and his subordinates were clever, ruthless and like us in that they fought a war of engines and industry. We understood that Hitler was an unprincipled tyrant. Japan was an empire ruled by a brutal government and, as we saw in China, merciless fighters. We also knew that like the Germans and Americans, they were fighting an industrial war. We knew the enemy, we never underestimated its strength, and we timed our war to coincide with industrial production. We knew the value of allies, the uses of aircraft carriers and tanks, and how to train men for war. We mastered this and more. And we would fight to the end, no quarter asked nor given.

The United States outstripped North Vietnam and the Viet Cong in every measure that won World War II. We did not realize that we didn’t understand our enemy. They were not industrial, nor were they divided between communists and a range of factions. Clearly the non-communists in the south hated the tyranny of the north. The anti-communist population had to be mobilized and armed with the best equipment, and the U.S. flag, along with the Vietnamese, would fly over Hanoi. Crowds in the south would line the roads welcoming the Americans even if the United States didn’t take Hanoi. The purpose of intelligence is to predict what others will do, and just as the CIA failed to understand the consequence of the Bay of Pigs, it didn’t understand Vietnam. It, too, was stuck in World War II.

Vietnam was not the SS fighting against the Maquis (French Resistance fighters). Vietnam was divided by treaty, but it was one country. The communists had seized the north and the non-communists ruled the south. The non-communists came in many forms, but the one thing they shared with the communists in the north was that they were Vietnamese. They were not shocked by a repressive communist regime as much as by the thought of a Vietnamese civil war, which is what the Americans were selling, whether they called it that or not. They did not want to fight other Vietnamese. What they wanted was to be left alone. The Vietnamese did not see the Americans as liberators and protectors. They saw them as delivering the terrors of industrial war. After enduring French occupation and oppression by Vietnamese whom the French had elevated to puppet rulers, they were not going to choose between a new imperialism and a communist dictatorship. This did not mean that anti-communism wasn’t present, nor that many did not view the Americans as a friendly force. It did mean that the passions of the Vietnamese were divided, complex and volatile.

The Americans made three mistakes. The first was that they thought that, as in Belgium, their arrival in Vietnam would be met with universal joy. They didn’t know that because the leadership didn’t listen to the intelligence.

Second, they did not understand the communist enemy. The communists drew much of their legitimacy from having driven the French out. Their communism and nationalism were bound up. This was also true of Mao’s Chinese Communism and Stalin’s Defend the Motherland speech. There are those who fight for abstract beliefs, but many more who fight for their homeland. I am not sure how many Americans in World War II fought for liberal democracy or America, but I suspect protection of the homeland resonated more. Vietnam had been ruled by many brutes, but the communists at least were Vietnamese brutes. They were understandable.

Finally, they fought the war from the standpoint of perception, particularly of the U.S. public’s perception. Rather than do what was done in World War II, which was to make clear that this would be a long and bloody war and thus bind the public to the truth, the government sought to align strategy with the idea that victory was approaching and casualties would decline. This meant that the Tet Offensive shattered all trust. Lying hopefully works best when reality cooperates.

The U.S. did not understand its enemy or its friends. It feared the communists less than American public opinion. In wars, the darkest moment might be just before success. Think of the Battle of the Bulge. The darkest moment could not be a moment like this because preposterous claims of success had not prepared the American public for it.

When we think of not understanding one’s enemy, of shaping a war to not upset the untruths of the conflict, and of trying to overwhelm through industrial warfare an enemy that is fighting a very different war, we can also think of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The enemy might or might not have hated the government, but enough people hated the Americans because they were not Iraqis or Afghans. Ideology and religion played a part but were not the key. A stranger was in their house, and they had to drive him out.

Americans should be aware of this, because our revolution was designed to drive out the haughty British, with their rules and regulations. The revolution was committed to the Declaration of Independence, but the real enemy was the Brits. They were a stranger in our house, and they had to be expelled. The moral principle is there, but men die for the love of their own.

There are few wars like World War I and II, thank God. Reasoning from how we won those conflicts is usually going to bring failure in other wars. The surge in American wars after World War II and their unsatisfactory outcomes should be a testament to this. Going to war and failing represents leadership without discernment, with irrational belief in one’s own strength and foolish dismissal of the motivation and intelligence of the enemy. Even if many welcome us as liberators, it will be these factors that determine our fate. Fortunately for America, it is too wealthy and strong to be brought down by failure. But it’s important not to push your luck.

Wars are necessary and will happen, but they should begin as World War II did: with fear and awe of your enemy. Anything else makes you careless. As Thucydides noted, war cannot be waged from a divided and frightened city. This proved true in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan. The most important question was never asked: How would the United States benefit from victory, and what would defeat cost? Defeat was never imagined, and the benefit of success was vastly overrated. The world did not end, nor did American power. But fearing the consequences of defeat, we put the inevitable off. Today, the U.S. cooperates with Vietnam against China. What was unthinkable and unbearable then is neither today. Wars, therefore, should be rare and utterly necessary.

[Crafty_Dog]

The Two-Headed Fight for Ukraine and Taiwan
These aren’t mere regional hot spots, as Russia and China work together to upend world order.
By Seth Cropsey
Jan. 4, 2022 12:48 pm ET


ILLUSTRATION: DAVID KLEIN

A crisis may be imminent in Ukraine as Vladimir Putin gathers troops on the Russian border for a possible invasion. American policy makers have also begun focusing on a potential conflict in Taiwan, one that is coming to a boil more slowly. But American statesmen ought to understand: These events can’t be viewed in isolation; they are connected and part of a larger political competition for Eurasia.

Whether Mr. Putin is seriously considering action against Ukraine is an open question. But Mr. Putin has achieved three objectives simply by posing a credible threat. First, he has gained President Biden’s attention, and the two had teleconferences on Dec. 7 and 30. Russia views itself as a great power and wants to deal with other great powers directly, not via the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, an execrable reminder of Russian weakness and Soviet collapse.

Second, Mr. Biden hasn’t committed to a military deployment in support of Ukraine, instead emphasizing an economic response, such as sanctions, to a Russian offensive. This is a signal that Mr. Biden is reluctant to intervene militarily. Third, and most important, Mr. Putin has mobilized the Russian military to allow almost immediate combat operations against Belarus, allowing him to swallow Minsk. Internationally, Mr. Putin still hopes to achieve the Soviet dream of dismantling the American-led European security system. This is similar to his objective in the Middle East: replacing the U.S. as the prime external force in the region.

Although separated by geography, Ukraine and Taiwan occupy similar positions in the Russian and Chinese strategic experience and historical imagination. Capturing each is essential to all other strategic objectives. For Russia, taking Ukraine would secure its hold on the Black Sea and open other pressure points against vulnerable NATO members Romania and Bulgaria. For the Chinese Communist Party, seizing Taiwan would allow the country to break out of the First Island Chain and conduct offensive operations against Japan, the Philippines and even U.S. territories in the Central Pacific.


Historically, post-Soviet Russia’s ruling oligarchy has cultivated intense grievances against independent Ukraine. It is a living reminder that Slavic peoples need not live under one flag. Taiwan is proof that Chinese-speaking peoples are fully capable of governing themselves. The modern Communist Party stems from a brutal revolutionary regime that savaged the Chinese people, murdering millions through its messianic ambitions and sheer incompetence. Only by consuming Taiwan can China confirm its superiority. Given the political capital the Communist Party has invested in subduing Taiwan, it may no longer have a way to de-escalate even if it wanted to.


The clearest obstacle to Russian and Chinese escalation is Ukraine’s and Taiwan’s affiliations with the U.S. and its allies. Mr. Putin understands that a spiraling conflict with NATO would overwhelm the Russian military. Unable to hide casualty counts as he did in Syria, Libya and Ukraine in 2014, he would face domestic opposition. Mr. Putin has an incentive to isolate Ukraine militarily and separate the issue from NATO, striking only when the time is right.

Similarly, a Sino-American conflict involving a broader Pacific coalition would prove dangerous for the Communist Party’s survival: A blockade against Chinese Middle Eastern resource imports could destroy the regime in weeks to months.

Yet a fait accompli against Taiwan is more viable than a similar strike against Ukraine. Russia’s likely strategic objective would be the capture of a land corridor between Donbas and Crimea. Yet in 2014, the Ukrainian armed forces, reeling from Russia’s annexation of Crimea and relying upon paramilitaries for additional combat power, repulsed a Russian offensive against Mariupol and drove Russian and separatist forces back to their current salient.

Seven years of warfare have given the Ukrainian military valuable combat experience. Ukrainian society, even in the east, is increasingly hostile to Russia. The Ukrainian public seems willing to accept casualties. While Russia may be able to strike deep into Ukrainian territory and pressure Kyiv from the north as it penetrates south, a Ukrainian political collapse is unlikely. And expect an insurgency against Russian occupation. Ukraine’s willingness and ability to fight hard, no less than NATO’s potential intervention, helps deter Russian action.

By contrast, Taiwan is small and densely populated. Its military isn’t equipped to sustain air and sea control around the island, a prerequisite for defending against amphibious invasion. And it is highly likely that the Communist Party has positioned intelligence assets on Taiwan ready to sow discord throughout Taiwanese society and disrupt civilian communications. The question for the People’s Liberation Army is less whether it can take Taiwan, but whether it can succeed before a potential American and allied coalition can respond.


With China and Russia in strategic cooperation, this is a very dangerous situation. The margin of force between potential enemies in the Western Pacific is far thinner than in Eastern Europe, given China’s increasingly capable military. Russia wouldn’t have to deploy major ground or naval units to the Asia-Pacific, nor time its offensives with China’s. The Russian Pacific Fleet has enough submarines to bog down Japanese and U.S. units needed to defend Taiwan in shielding the Japanese home islands. That would make China’s mission much more likely to succeed.

Roughly concurrent offensive operations in two hemispheres would overstress American and allied resources. Taiwan must become capable of defending itself. But more broadly, the U.S. must begin thinking about its strategic challenges globally, not in regional segments. This is a contest for Eurasia—and thus for the world.

Mr. Cropsey is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and director of Hudson’s Center for American Seapower. He served as a naval officer and as a deputy undersecretary of the Navy.

[Crafty_Dog]

Putin Is Running Rings Around the West
While U.S. and European leaders natter about soft power, Russia’s president is making power moves.

By Walter Russell Mead
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Jan. 12, 2022 1:25 pm ET


Nobody knows whether Vladimir Putin will invade Ukraine, but it is increasingly clear that a divided and confused Western alliance doesn’t know how to deal with the challenge he poses.

Lost in a narcissistic fog of grandiose pomposity, Western diplomats spent the past decade dismissing the Russian president as the knuckle-dragging relic of a discarded past. As then-Secretary of State John Kerry sniffed during Mr. Putin’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine, “You just don’t in the 21st century behave in 19th century fashion by invading another country on a completely trumped up pretext.”

Neville Chamberlain learned more from failure at Munich than the current generation of Western leaders learned from failure in Crimea. Convinced that the old rules of power politics don’t apply in our enlightened posthistorical century, Europeans nattered on about soft power only to find themselves locked out of key U.S.-Russia talks over Ukraine. As China and Russia grew more powerful and assertive, Americans enthusiastically embraced the politics of mean-spirited polarization and domestic culture wars. Now the Biden administration is simultaneously proclaiming overseas that America is back, in all its order-building awesomeness, and maintaining at home that democracy is one voting-rights bill away from collapse.

Pathetic throwback that he is, Mr. Putin used his time differently, rebuilding the Soviet Union under the nose of a feckless and distracted West. Because Russia hasn’t annexed breakaway republics, many observers underestimate how successful Mr. Putin’s reassembly of the U.S.S.R. has been. But it is hegemony, not uniformity, that he wants. Stalin insisted on enrolling Ukraine and Belarus as founding members of the United Nations while they were part of the Soviet Union; Mr. Putin might be happy to keep them nominally independent under Russian control. In many Soviet republics, Moscow ruled through local strongmen. When the Soviet Union collapsed, leaders like Azerbaijan’s Ayaz Mutalibov, Turkmenistan’s Saparmurat Niyazov and Kazakhstan’s Nursultan Nazarbayev made a seamless transition to running the republics as personal fiefs. Mr. Putin’s goal is to re-establish ultimate control while leaving subordinate rulers in place.

It’s working. In 2020 he reasserted Russian control over the South Caucasus by ending the Azerbaijani-Armenian war on his terms. Last spring as the West huffed and puffed, Mr. Putin kept Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko in power. Last week Mr. Putin established himself as the supreme arbiter of Kazakhstan, providing the political and military assistance that allowed President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to crush a revolt. In most of the former Soviet Union today, Mr. Putin decides who rules and who weeps. Of the 15 constituent republics of the old Soviet Union, only five (the three Baltic states, Moldova and Ukraine) have held him at arm’s length. Georgia clings precariously to the shreds of a once-robust independence; the American withdrawal from Afghanistan leaves countries like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan more dependent on Moscow than ever.