Author Topic: US Foreign Policy & Geopolitics  (Read 479313 times)

Crafty_Dog

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WSJ: Will Trump help Ukraine Win?
« Reply #1600 on: November 24, 2024, 08:32:38 AM »
Not a stupid piece at all, it makes it points with reason, ones with which we need to engage. 

For example, as best as we can tell, the Ukes are losing.

For example, there was the US $1B into a Uke election/Orange revolt.

For example, there were the plans to bring Ukraine into NATO.  Is not Russia entitled to a Reactionary Gap?

Peace is not the absence of conflict, peace is the management of conflict.  Trump had it managed, and now we have this fustercluck.

============================



Will Trump Help Ukraine Win?
The former Soviet dissident Yuri Yarim-Agaev believes he will, because you can’t make a deal with a totalitarian like Vladimir Putin.
By Barton Swaim
Nov. 22, 2024 2:26 pm ET


If you believe the media, Donald Trump’s election cast Ukrainians into a state of misery. In fact, according to every source I queried, most Ukrainians now have a halting sense of hope. Mr. Trump’s ascendancy means that the bloody standoff to which the Biden administration has consigned them for nearly two years might, emphasis on might, begin to change.

For more than a year, the U.S. administration has supplied Ukraine with enough materiel not to lose the war, but not enough to win it. Several times, and for a variety of reasons, Washington has delayed military aid authorized by Congress, often ensuring the weapons showed up too late to do much good. The administration has restricted the Ukrainian military from firing U.S.-supplied missiles beyond certain ranges into Russian territory. The justification for these and related restrictions seems to be that Ukrainian strikes on Russian targets could provoke Vladimir Putin into nuclear retaliation. The fact that he required no provocation to invade Ukraine in the first place doesn’t seem to register. The policy’s upshot was to allow the Russians to move their materiel out of range, and to maneuver and resupply with impunity.

Most unpardonably, President Biden has almost totally neglected to explain to the American public his reasons for arming the Ukrainians. Into the silence, his critics on the right have inserted a variety of arguments for not arming them: Ukraine’s government is corrupt, Russia has legitimate territorial claims against it, the war is a distraction from China, and so on. Meanwhile the war in Europe has faded from the news (how’s that for a remarkable sequence of words?), Ukrainian flags have mostly disappeared from the windows of well-wishing American homes, and the war barely figured in the 2024 election.

This week, as if to concede its failure in Ukraine in its final weeks, the Biden administration scrapped its restrictions on the use of long-range missiles. Days later six U.S.-made ATACMs hit an ammunition warehouse in Russia’s Bryansk region, on Ukraine’s northern border. The policy reversal and consequent battlefield benefits to Ukraine come grievously late, but plainly Kyiv has fight left in it. Nearly three years after its leadership was expected to flee and its government to fall, Ukraine has managed to hold off its much larger foe. Thanks to a brilliant surprise attack last summer, Ukraine occupies several hundred square miles of Russian territory in Kursk. That Ukraine has performed so well despite the fetters placed on it by the U.S. administration tempts one to think that an emancipated Ukrainian military could win the war after all.

Mr. Trump has no easy choices on Ukraine. Continuing aid would displease some of his most committed and highest-profile supporters and require him and his national security advisers to articulate America’s interests in ways Mr. Biden never did.

On the other hand, cutting off Ukraine and forcing it to accept humiliating terms would make him what Mr. Biden became after the Afghanistan withdrawal—betrayer of a viable U.S. ally. The look for Mr. Trump will be worse: Unlike Afghanistan, there are no American soldiers in Ukraine, only American hardware. And with no U.S. troops to enforce a land deal, as in South Korea, very little time would pass before Mr. Putin recommences the war. Worst of all: Just as the Afghanistan debacle of 2021 occasioned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and, in turn, the Oct. 7 attack on Israel, America’s abandonment of Ukraine would, as sure as the sun rises in the east, invite aggressions elsewhere around the globe.

There is a simple reason malign regimes can be counted on to capitalize on American retreat, as the Soviet dissident Yuri Yarim-Agaev put it to me in a conversation this week. Those regimes, he believes, each serve not separate and distinct ideologies but a single one.

Mr. Yarim-Agaev, 75, was born in Russia and attended the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology. In the 1970s he worked in physics, chemistry and applied mathematics at the Soviet Union’s Academy of Sciences. There, in 1976, he joined the Moscow Helsinki Group, an association of dissident scientists, writers, intellectuals and activists who openly demanded the U.S.S.R. abide by its commitments under the 1975 Helsinki Accords and guarantee its people freedom of thought, conscience and religion. (The government of Leonid Brezhnev had signed the accords in bad faith, as everybody knew.)

Some members of the Helsinki Group, such as Yuri Orlov and Natan Sharansky, were imprisoned for years. Others, like Mr. Yarim-Agaev, were exiled. He came to America in 1980 and taught at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Stanford. Later he worked for major banks and hedge funds, for which he developed mechanisms to measure financial risk. Mr. Yarim-Agaev is also a longtime campaigner for human rights. Over the decades he has begun several organizations that provide dissidents in totalitarian countries with laptop computers and other publishing tools.

Mr. Yarim-Agaev isn’t famous—he lacks even a Wikipedia page. But he has earned a reputation as someone who speaks perceptively on the global aims of antidemocratic regimes. He maintains many contacts in the Russian government.

“Can I offer drink?” he asks, pointing to a table laden with bottles in his New Jersey home, about an hour from Manhattan. At first I decline, but I note bowls of nuts and pretzels on the coffee table between us. It seems ungrateful not to accept.

I’m barely able to explain what I want to ask him when he begins: “The main thing to understand about this war is that it is not a war between Russia and Ukraine. It’s a war between totalitarian bloc and democratic alliance. It’s proxy war.” (Mr. Yarim-Agaev speaks excellent English but with a pronounced Russian accent; articles, which don’t exist in Russian, often go missing.) Russia’s invasion had nothing to do with territorial claims or security concerns, he insists. “It is first and foremost war against America. Putin’s aggression is for one and only one reason: Ukraine shows democratic way of development and pro-Western way, pro-American way, and becoming ally with America and the West.”

That doesn’t sound to me like a situation from which lasting peace terms are likely to emerge.

“No,” Mr. Yarim-Agaev says, “in totalitarian country, individual leaders don’t rule. Ideology rules. . . . Stalin, Mao, they never had power. They were always first priests and servants of ideology, and they couldn’t deviate from that ideology. If they did, that would be death for them. To stay in power, they must serve it.” Mr. Yarim-Agaev cites the example of Nikita Khrushchev, Soviet premier from 1958-64, whose modest attempts to soften state control of Soviet life ultimately got him ejected from power. To ask a dictator like Mr. Putin or Xi Jinping to behave in a way that contradicts his totalitarian ideology, Mr. Yarim-Agaev says, “would be to ask him to commit political suicide. He is not going to do that.” Mikhail Gorbachev was the exception that proved the rule.

With regard to Russia and its aims in Ukraine, he says, we aren’t dealing with an individual tyrant, Vladimir Putin. “We are dealing with ideology. And you cannot charm totalitarian ideology, you cannot have a good relationship with totalitarian ideology, you cannot make deals with it.”

So the question of Ukraine will have to be settled on the battlefield? “Yes,” he says.

In Mr. Yarim-Agaev’s view, Russian objectives in Ukraine aren’t substantively different from Iran’s designs on Israel, the Taliban’s on America, North Korea’s on South Korea and China’s on Taiwan. The vast cultural and political differences between these regimes obliges me to ask him to explain what he means by that term “totalitarian ideology.”

“It’s very simple,” he begins. “There is such a thing as totalitarian socialism. Now, all those countries are forms of totalitarian socialism. Totalitarian socialism can exist in three forms: international totalitarian socialism, which we also call communism; national totalitarian socialism, which we call Nazism, and religious totalitarian socialism, which we know in form of Islamism.” What these forms of tyranny have in common is an absolute commitment to destroy democratic capitalist nations, especially America.

Accordingly, Mr. Yarim-Agaev puts forward the provocative thesis that Iran wants to destroy Israel not because it’s a Jewish state. “Iran itself claims that Israel is little satan and big satan is the United States,” he points out. “So it always aims at America, and it does it through Israel. It’s not antisemitism, although the mullahs are antisemites. It’s because Israel is democratic country and American ally.”

Those of us who grew up during the Cold War aren’t accustomed to thinking of post-1991 Russia as a totalitarian country in the way Soviet Russia was. But Mr. Yarim-Agaev thinks Mr. Putin’s regime has combined some nationalistic elements of Nazism with the symbols and tactics of unreconstructed communism—“Lenin’s tomb still sits in the middle of Red Square,” he notes—to form a kind of hybrid totalitarianism.

Today’s Kremlin doesn’t repress and control Russian citizens the way it did under Soviet communism. Yet critics of the regime have a nasty habit of dying in unnatural ways. Two years ago the renowned ballet dancer Vladimir Shklyarov was quoted on Facebook as expressing opposition to the Ukraine invasion. On the day I spoke to Mr. Yarim-Agaev, Shklyarov “fell” from the balcony of his fifth-floor apartment in St. Petersburg. Police ruled it an accident. He was 39.

Mr. Yarim-Agaev moves around the globe to reinforce his point that totalitarian ideologies of all kinds are undergirded by anti-Americanism. Wars and conflicts are happening all over the globe, but North Korea sends 10,000 troops only to Ukraine to aid Russia, and Iran sends drone technology to Russia in its war with an American ally. Iran, he says, isn’t a theocratic country, although it is ruled in part by mullahs. “It is also, and maybe more so, ruled by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, which is a military and not a religious force.” If Iran considered the Islamic creed the most important thing, Mr. Yarim Agaev says, “it couldn’t have good relationship with China, which persecutes its Uyghurs population. It couldn’t have a good relationship with Russia, which twice made war on Chechnya,” a mostly Muslim region. “Anti-American totalitarian ideology is the important thing.”

What about the fear of provoking Mr. Putin into the use of tactical nuclear weapons? “It’s blackmail, and nothing but that,” Mr. Yarim-Agaev says. “And first of all, all military experts say that tactical nuclear weapon doesn’t work. It is senseless—you cannot conquer with it because you shoot it in front of you and then you cannot enter the territory.” Never mind the assurance of counterattack, in which case “there would be no more Russia, and Russia knows that.”

The larger point, he says, is that Russia, Iran, China, North Korea and lesser totalitarian states—Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua—will do anything to avoid direct confrontation with the U.S. “They fight against America,” he says, “but they always fight through somebody else. They attack Israel, they attack Ukraine. China may attack Taiwan at any moment, maybe even the Philippines. But they don’t want confrontation with United States because they know that’s suicide.”

On this point I suspect Mr. Yarim-Agaev could speak indefinitely, and owing to the bourbon and a particularly addictive brand of pretzel, I am inclined to let him. But one point I need him to address: What about the argument, heard on segments of the right since the war began—Vice President-elect JD Vance has repeated the charge—that Ukraine is corrupt and certain to squander whatever aid the U.S. sends?

“Baseless,” Mr. Yarim-Agaev says. “The best proof that it isn’t so is the effectiveness of Ukraine’s army in using American weapons, which has exceeded Western military experts’ expectations. This would not have happened if significant part of our equipment had not reached its destination.” The claim has more to do, in his view, with the “completely erroneous” perception that Ukraine had something to do with Mr. Trump’s December 2019 impeachment and Mr. Biden’s election the following year. The assertion that venality is a sufficient reason for one democratic nation not to aid another in a time of war sounds particularly odd coming from political figures, like Mr. Vance, who allege corruption at the highest levels of the U.S. government.

For Mr. Yarim-Agaev, the risks of arming Ukraine, corrupt or not, are nothing compared with the peril of communicating weakness to Mr. Putin. “There is no way to pretend that Ukrainian defeat would be not one more defeat for America,” he says. “We just lost war in Afghanistan, and if we give up on Ukraine now, it’ll be followed by another loss. If Putin gets territories he already occupies, it’ll be clear victory for him, clear loss and defeat for Ukraine, and clear defeat for America.”

Giving up on Ukraine, or forcing it to accept terms odious to its people, “is incompatible with position, peace through strength,” Mr. Yarim-Agaev says, employing a phrase Mr. Trump and those around him often use. “You cannot implement policy of peace through strength by losing wars.”

Crafty_Dog

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What do we do when the facts on the ground change?
« Reply #1601 on: December 20, 2024, 04:26:11 AM »
Prompted by my post a moment ago about Tucker seeing to it that Pompeo would not get a job because, in part, he was a "warmonger" I offer the following question/rumination:

My/Our center of gravity here has been that we needlessly provoked Russia with our Uke policies and that the war was stupid and unnecessary, and that the Russians ultimately would "win" in Ukraine.

However, with Israel totally overturning the realities of the Middle East, and thus upending Russia's geopolitical needs in Syria (which included the port in Tartus as part of supporting Russian activities in Africa, etc etc) is it time to make a fresh assessment?


Crafty_Dog

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FO
« Reply #1602 on: December 24, 2024, 06:06:18 AM »


(11) TRUMP TWEETS SHOW A TRADE SECURITY PLAN: President-elect Trump reiterated his desire to purchase Greenland from Denmark and re-establish control of the Panama Canal over the weekend due to their national security implications. The Chinese and Panamanian governments spoke out against potential American control of the Canal with China calling it “a great creation of the Panamanian people.” (Trump is identifying critical points for America to secure tropical and Arctic trade routes that China and Russia are beginning to contest. Greenland would give the U.S. a controlling share of the Arctic and build a redundancy to Alaska. If the U.S. controls the Panama Canal, it would also control Pacific-Atlantic trade, potentially raising the cost of Chinese goods to Brazil. – J.V.)

Crafty_Dog

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Complexities in US strategy w China and Russia
« Reply #1603 on: December 30, 2024, 07:59:17 AM »

Crafty_Dog

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US vs China and/or vs. Russia
« Reply #1604 on: December 31, 2024, 06:58:56 PM »

Crafty_Dog

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Walter Russell Mead: Trump vs. Xi
« Reply #1605 on: January 14, 2025, 04:20:21 AM »
Trump and Xi Face Off
Expect U.S.-China tensions as the two leaders pursue opposing agendas.
Walter Russell Mead
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Walter Russell Mead
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Jan. 13, 2025 4:29 pm ET




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U.S. President Donald Trump shakes hands with Xi Jinping in Osaka, Japan, June 29, 2019. Photo: kevin lamarque/Reuters
With Donald Trump’s second term about to begin, the world must gear up for what could be the most dramatic confrontation in international politics since Harry Truman squared off against Joseph Stalin at the start of the Cold War. Xi Jinping and Mr. Trump will be the two most powerful men in the world, and their ambitions and agendas are directly opposed to each other’s.

The two leaders have much in common. Both dominate their domestic political scenes. Mr. Xi is the most powerful Communist Party leader since Mao Zedong. Mr. Trump is the most dominant Republican since Ronald Reagan. Neither leader likes opposition, and both have struggled to purge their parties of dissent. Both are instinctive mercantilists and view trade deficits as bad. Both appear willing to devalue their currencies to promote exports. Both favor crushing Nimby opposition to important energy and infrastructure projects. Both hold in contempt the liberal internationalist ideals of the trans-Atlantic elite and regard Europe as a decadent swamp. Both want to make their countries great again.

As the Man from Queens faces off against the Red Princeling, China has much to celebrate. Its shipyards are turning out vessels that would be suitable to use against Taiwan, and its growing navy is showing off its strength in the South China Sea and beyond. Its laboratories are churning out nuclear weapons. China racked up its largest trade surplus in 2024, and its manufacturers dominate key industries ranging from automobiles to steel to solar panels.

Backed by the almost limitless resources of the state, Chinese computer researchers are racing to dominate fields such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing, challenging once-unchallengeable American leads in one cutting-edge technology sector after another. Chinese hackers have turned America’s cyber infrastructure into their playground, penetrating everything from the Treasury Department to cellphone networks and healthcare records. Countries across the Middle East, Africa, Eastern Europe and Latin America that once relied on the West for technology, investment and trading opportunities are now turning toward China’s rising sun.

Read More Global View
Nations Prepare for a Post-European WorldJanuary 6, 2025
The Obama Era Is Finally History in the Middle EastDecember 23, 2024
But Mr. Xi is worried, and rightly so. Despite its strengths, Mr. Xi’s “China Dream”—the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation—rests on shaky foundations. The U.S. remains the world’s most dynamic and resilient society, with an extraordinary capacity to confound critics and disappoint doomsayers. In round two of the Xi-Trump struggle for the heavyweight championship of the world, Mr. Trump may face an opponent more militarily powerful and technologically advanced than in 2017. But China is also more economically and diplomatically vulnerable than it was in Mr. Trump’s first term.

Many of Mr. Xi’s policies haven’t worked. China misjudged the effect that the 2008-09 financial crisis would have on the global balance of power, thinking that the crisis heralded America’s inevitable and irreversible decline. China also failed to deal with rising problems in its real-estate sector, where years of ill-judged state policy created the most expensive housing bubble in history. Further, while overdependence on an export-oriented manufacturing strategy made China an industrial powerhouse, its staggering trade surpluses are turning much of the world against Beijing—while the country desperately needs to export its way out of its domestic troubles.

Mr. Xi’s third big bet—that clamping down on Chinese personal and intellectual freedom would stabilize communist rule—also seems to be going wrong. Imposing party control on businesses, building huge state-owned enterprises, censoring frank talk about economic problems, and punishing successful entrepreneurs for speaking their minds all undermine innovation and growth.

As a result, Mr. Xi now faces a vicious circle. To secure his power in the face of bad economic news, he needs to stir up nationalist fervor at home while clamping down more tightly on dissent. But nationalist fervor makes other countries more wary of China as a trading partner and investment destination, while domestic authoritarianism stifles entrepreneurs and embitters young people. Mr. Xi’s policies increase his economic difficulties, and these difficulties lead him to double down on his policies.

Neither Mr. Trump nor Mr. Xi wants a war, but Mr. Xi’s economic and strategic objectives require American defeat. Mr. Trump’s MAGA agenda, meantime, can succeed only if China’s rise is curbed. One of these leaders is going to be disappointed by the outcome of the next four years.

Mr. Trump must secure the foundations of American power against China’s attempt to erode them without stumbling into war. We should all wish him success.

Crafty_Dog

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What is a War?
« Reply #1606 on: January 14, 2025, 05:11:41 AM »

Crafty_Dog

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FO: Rubio articulates Trump's American Strategy Pivot
« Reply #1607 on: January 16, 2025, 09:23:15 AM »
Pithily stated, and I approve.  So glad to have President Trump at the helm again!

This might be articulated as transitioning from playing Win-Win when the other side is playing Zero Sum, to acknowledgement of the fact that we too must play Zero Sum.

=============

(2) RUBIO SIGNALS AMERICAN STRATEGY PIVOT: During a Senate confirmation hearing yesterday, Sen. Marco Rubio (R-FL) signaled the Trump administration will pivot away from previous U.S. grand strategic thinking that focused on reinforcing the liberal international order, and focus on pragmatic diplomacy and advancing U.S. strategic interests.

According to Rubio, the Trump administration will reduce U.S. supply chain reliance on China, bolster the U.S. military presence in the Indo-Pacific to deter Chinese aggression, and increase U.S. engagement in the developing world to counter
China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

Why It Matters: China has made significant strategic advances into the Western Hemisphere with the goal of containing the United States. Rubio’s statements reinforce previous analysis that the Trump administration will pivot to containing China directly and using regional allies, and decouple the U.S. economy and supply chains from China’s economy. – R.C.
« Last Edit: January 16, 2025, 09:26:32 AM by Crafty_Dog »

Crafty_Dog

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GPF: China and Strategic Realignments in South Asia
« Reply #1608 on: January 16, 2025, 10:48:27 AM »
January 16, 2025
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China and Strategic Realignments in South Asia
Bangladesh split with India, while Pakistan is looking in unfamiliar places for an ally against the Taliban.
By: Kamran Bokhari

South Asia is in the throes of a major geopolitical realignment. In the east, Bangladesh is gravitating away from India following the ouster of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and her pro-Indian regime. Meanwhile, in the west, Pakistan is in conflict with the Afghan Taliban, Islamabad’s ally for decades and ruler of Afghanistan since 2021. These developments could complicate India’s ongoing emergence as a global economic player, not to mention efforts by China – which is in the midst of a serious political and economic downturn – to exert greater control in Eurasia and the Indian Ocean basin.

Rarely does the status quo in a region evolve so quickly. It began with a New Year’s Eve visit to Tajikistan and a meeting with Tajik President Emomali Rahmon by the new head of Pakistan’s premier intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate. Then on Jan. 14, a senior Bangladeshi armed forces official traveled to Pakistan to meet with high-ranking Pakistani generals, including the country’s army chief and the head of the air force.

Neither visit is routine. Decades have passed since the last high-ranking Bangladeshi general visited Pakistan, and no Pakistani spymaster had ever met with a president of Tajikistan. Given the depth of their historical disagreements, the visits underscore the magnitude of the changes underway.

Eastern Flank

For decades, Bangladesh was firmly aligned with India, Pakistan’s archrival. India helped secure Bangladeshi independence from Pakistan in 1971 and subsequently maintained a dominant influence over the country, even as relations normalized between Dhaka and Islamabad. However, this balance changed when public protests forced Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to resign and flee the country last August. With Hasina seeking refuge in India, Bangladesh’s military-led interim government immediately distanced itself from New Delhi.

Eastern Flank - China, India, Bangladesh
(click to enlarge)

Five months into its tenure, this interim administration, led by Nobel laureate economist Muhammad Yunus, is warming up to Pakistan. It’s understandable that the countries’ militaries would lead the way; Bangladesh’s military, like Pakistan’s, has historically dominated the country’s political system – a legacy of their history as a unified state for 24 years, when Bangladesh was called East Pakistan. But despite these steps toward closer ties, significant political and economic challenges in both countries – but especially in Pakistan – will hinder meaningful cooperation on regional security.

From Dhaka’s perspective, forging closer relations with Pakistan’s longtime ally China offers more strategic value. Gen. Waker-uz-Zaman, Bangladesh’s army chief, outlined the new strategy in a Jan. 1 interview. While acknowledging that Bangladesh has no intention of acting against India, he criticized New Delhi’s dominance and described relations with India as transactional. In contrast, he highlighted China’s role as a strategic partner, citing its investments in Bangladesh’s development and its sales of military hardware.

China, eager to remedy setbacks to its strategy in the Indian Ocean basin, will want to make the most of India’s loss of influence in Bangladesh. Closer ties with Bangladesh would also enable China to put greater stress on India’s conflict-ridden northeast, which is wedged between China to the north and Bangladesh to the south. To that end, on the same day that Zaman’s interview was published, the leading Bangladeshi newspaper carried an op-ed by the Chinese ambassador pledging Beijing’s support for Dhaka’s new “independent” (that is, not dictated by New Delhi) foreign policy.

Western Flank

Meanwhile, another massive shift is underway on Pakistan's western frontier. Since the Taliban reestablished their emirate in Afghanistan more than three years ago, relations between Pakistan and its former proxy have deteriorated into open hostility. The conflict centers on the Taliban emirate’s desire for strategic depth, which has led it to support Pakistan’s own Taliban insurgents, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

Western Flank - China, Pakistan, Afghanistan & Tajikistan
(click to enlarge)

Islamabad’s attempts at diplomacy – both with the Taliban regime in Kabul and the TTP – have failed. Instead, those efforts have emboldened the TTP, which operates under sanctuary provided by Afghanistan’s rulers. The results have been devastating: In 2024 alone, the TTP carried out nearly 450 attacks against Pakistan’s security forces, causing over 1,600 fatalities. The Taliban regime’s support for a potential sister emirate on Pakistani soil has brought Islamabad to the brink of a military intervention.

Following a major TTP attack on Dec. 22 that killed 16 Pakistani servicemen, Pakistan retaliated with airstrikes on Christmas Day, targeting TTP facilities in Afghanistan. These strikes reportedly killed 46 people, most of them civilians. In response, Taliban forces launched more attacks inside Pakistan three days later. Highlighting the extent of the dispute, the Taliban’s Defense Ministry spokesperson said of the attacks’ locations: “We do not consider it to be the territory of Pakistan … but it was on the other side of the hypothetical line.”

Compounding this escalating conflict, Pakistan is also grappling with unprecedented economic and political crises, which severely limit its military options. This precarious situation prompted Pakistan to reach out to Tajikistan, the only Central Asian state openly opposed to the Taliban. Not long ago, the two countries supported opposing sides in Afghanistan: Pakistan backed the Pashtun-dominated Taliban, while Tajikistan supported Afghan minorities, including fellow Tajiks. Now that the Taliban are in power and threatening Pakistan, they are moving toward a potential alliance. However, Pakistan and Tajikistan are both weak states, and each is vulnerable to cross-border Taliban activity. Any partnership between them is unlikely to produce a coalition strong enough to counter the Taliban’s growing influence.

China has significant stakes in this mountainous region, even more than in the maritime areas around India and Bangladesh. Developments here could exacerbate China’s security concerns with its Uyghur minority, which Beijing has worked aggressively to suppress. More critically, stability in this region directly affects China’s geoeconomic ambitions in Central Asia, including its Belt and Road Initiative. It remains to be seen at what point the Taliban’s attacks could provoke China to become more involved.


Crafty_Dog

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GPF: US bargaining with China and Russia
« Reply #1609 on: January 26, 2025, 03:40:40 PM »


January 23, 2025
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US Bargaining With China and Russia
Proclamations of friendship aside, each is wary that the other will cut a deal that leaves it out in the cold.
By: Kamran Bokhari

With the arrival of the second Trump administration, great power competition is at an inflection point. Both Russia and China face internal crises that compel them to engage with the United States. To increase their leverage, Beijing and Moscow are attempting to coordinate their efforts. However, their ability to support each other is severely limited, giving the U.S. considerable room to maneuver.

In recent days, the leaders of the world’s three great powers have engaged in a flurry of diplomacy. A few days before his inauguration, Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping held a phone call that both sides described as positive. Then, hours after taking the oath of office, Trump told reporters that Russian President Vladimir Putin was “destroying Russia by not making a deal [on Ukraine]” and that Russia was “in big trouble” given the state of its economy. Finally, on Jan. 22, Putin held a 95-minute video call with Xi, during which they discussed their interactions with the new Trump administration.

World leaders are typically quick to engage any new administration in Washington, although it’s uncommon for these interactions to occur even before the inauguration. However, this moment is different for two key reasons. First, Trump’s political comeback heralds a campaign to reshape the U.S. political system and overhaul U.S. foreign policy. Second, the world is beset by a level of crisis not seen since World War II.

The United States is managing two wars – in Europe and the Middle East – while confronting the potential for a third in East Asia. China’s economy is in steep decline, forcing Beijing to focus on stabilization. And Russia needs a resolution to its extremely costly war against Ukraine. In essence, all three powers are under immense pressure to deescalate and stabilize their geopolitical positions.

The common thread for China and Russia is that they both need to make a deal with the U.S. to solve their respective crises. Each recognizes the limits of what the other can do to help. Beijing is not in a position to aid Moscow’s war effort in Ukraine, while the Kremlin cannot help the Chinese Communist Party fix its economic problems – which are increasingly becoming political in nature. Both see their best paths forward as reaching agreements with Washington.

Russia hopes to leverage Trump’s pledge to end “forever wars” and his proclivity for dealmaking to retain as much Ukrainian territory as possible after nearly three years of conflict. Similarly, Xi hopes to convince Trump to offer some relief from U.S. restrictions on trade, technology and investment, which could help stabilize China’s faltering economy.

Though in some ways the second Trump administration presents opportunities for both China and Russia, Trump’s unpredictability and the looming threat of punitive measures mean that bargaining will be difficult, to say the least. This uncertainty was underscored by Sergei Ryabkov, the Kremlin’s top official for arms control and relations with the U.S., who warned on Jan. 22 that the window for a deal is narrow and that Moscow lacks clarity on Washington’s intentions. Similarly, Chinese Vice President Han Zheng acknowledged after meeting with his U.S. counterpart, JD Vance, that while there is potential for cooperation, significant disagreements remain.

The lengthy video call between Xi and Putin signals a recognition of their shared reality. The leaders are said to have compared notes on how they see the U.S. behaving in this new era. But setting aside their tireless rhetoric about their strong bilateral friendship, both leaders are wary that a deal between one of them and Washington could harm the other’s interests. Therefore, in addition to coordination, their call was also intended to assess how far the other was willing to compromise.

From the U.S. perspective, negotiations with Russia have a clearer path, given Washington’s interest in ending the Russia-Ukraine war. The key question is how much of Ukraine’s territory Washington is willing to let Moscow retain in a ceasefire. Talks with China are far less straightforward due to the complexities of the geoeconomic relationship. In both cases, however, Washington holds significant leverage, knowing that both Beijing and Moscow have no choice but to engage.

Crafty_Dog

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Trump buries Wilsonian Foreign Policy
« Reply #1610 on: February 11, 2025, 08:05:32 AM »
A direct challenge here to fundamental assumptions.

What say we?


===============
Trump Buries Wilsonian Foreign Policy
The old rules of inviolable state borders don’t apply in a world of trade wars and terrorist regimes.
By Amit Segal
Feb. 10, 2025 11:41 am ET


President Trump is working to undo the domestic policies of Joe Biden. In foreign policy Mr. Trump is undoing the work of Woodrow Wilson.

The general understanding after World War I was that violations of national sovereignty and borders constituted the key threat to global peace. Addressing a joint session of Congress in January 1918, Wilson called for a “general association of nations” that would afford “mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.” This was the League of Nations. It aimed to forestall conflict by making states sacred and their borders inviolable.

Meanwhile, European diplomats began drawing new borders throughout the globe. In the Middle East they established Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and Syria. Mirroring Wilson, they spoke of self-determination in Africa, though decolonization didn’t truly begin until after World War II. In Europe, borders were redrawn to divide empires into nation-states.

Mr. Trump is rejecting that vision. According to him, the primary danger to global peace isn’t the infringement of state sovereignty but the actions of authoritarian terrorist regimes. Borders drawn in the 20th century haven’t provided security or self-determination; they’ve led to armed conflict. Syria has devolved into a brutal multiethnic dictatorship. Jordan’s majority-Palestinian population is ruled by an authoritarian monarchy with Bedouin roots. Gaza started as a territory under Egyptian control and turned into a vicious terrorist state. The Panama Canal has become a Chinese outpost.

Those shocked by Mr. Trump’s seemingly imperialist threats to take over Greenland, intervene in Panama, unilaterally rename the Gulf of Mexico and build American hotels in Gaza are using 20th-century principles to interpret 21st-century policy. Mr. Trump recognizes that the old rules don’t apply in a world of trade wars and terrorist organizations. What he proposes isn’t imperialism but a new line of Western defense against insidious forces.

Wilson believed that when authoritarian countries are given self-determination, democracy can emerge. George W. Bush and Barack Obama clung to this doctrine, advocating democratic elections in the Palestinian territories, Iraq and Egypt. Instead, fundamentalist Islam rose, endangering the region. Thousands paid with their lives. Where would you rather live, “democratic” Gaza or authoritarian Dubai?

In Wilson’s world, the preservation of state sovereignty was essential for free trade. In Mr. Trump’s world, it’s unreasonable to let major ports on both sides of the Panama Canal—which was built by the U.S.—be controlled by Chinese companies. U.S. intervention in the canal may compromise Panama’s sovereignty and impede trade, but the risks of Chinese influence in such a crucial waterway are far greater.

Wilson saw self-rule as the way to uplift nations and humanity as a whole. But it’s absurd for today’s U.S. to relinquish Greenland’s shipping routes, mineral resources and strategic benefits simply because the territory has enjoyed effective self-government for more than four decades. This is particularly true amid Russian and Chinese attempts to make economic and military encroachments on the island.

Wilson was right when he demanded in his 1918 speech that all armed forces withdraw from Belgium and honor the country’s sovereignty after years of devastating trench warfare. But Gaza isn’t Belgium. Gaza’s “sovereignty” was exploited by Hamas to perpetrate a massacre against Israelis, and Mr. Trump is right to try to abrogate its freedom to do so again.

As a child, I vacationed at a hotel on one of Gaza’s breathtaking beaches, which are unmatched in beauty throughout the Middle East. There’s no reason why, in the name of Wilsonian idealism, those beaches should host Iranian-funded terrorist squads rather than cocktails at sunset.

Mr. Segal is chief political commentator on Israel’s Channel 12 News and author of “The Story of Israeli Politics.”
« Last Edit: February 11, 2025, 08:07:07 AM by Crafty_Dog »

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Former Danish PM: The World's Policeman Goes Rogue
« Reply #1611 on: February 12, 2025, 06:44:08 AM »


The World’s Policeman Goes Rogue
If America is going to threaten its allies, Europe will have to step up and defend itself.
By Anders Fogh Rasmussen
Feb. 11, 2025 5:04 pm ET


The first weeks of the Trump administration have been difficult, even painful. I have dedicated much of my life to a rules-based international order led by the U.S., and I worry that it is ending.

The world needs a policeman—and since World War II the U.S. has filled that role. But what if the policeman no longer exercises his authority over geopolitical gangsters—or becomes abusive toward the world’s most steadfast rule followers?

I never imagined I would hear a U.S. president declare his intentions to “expand our territory,” as Donald Trump did in his inaugural address. He continues to suggest that Canada should become the 51st state, and he has refused to rule out military force to secure America’s control of the Panama Canal and the autonomous Danish territory of Greenland.

Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping are watching. If the U.S. can take Greenland for America’s security, Mr. Xi will claim he can invade Taiwan for Chinese security. Mr. Putin’s absurd arguments about conquering Ukraine for Russia’s security would be validated by Mr. Trump.

As a child I admired John F. Kennedy, who said that America would “pay any price, bear any burden . . . to assure the survival and the success of liberty.” As a young politician, I cheered Ronald Reagan’s 1985 State of the Union address, in which he said America’s “mission is to nourish and defend freedom and democracy.” As Danish prime minister, I worked with President George W. Bush because I believed Denmark’s security was best guaranteed by a close alliance with the U.S.

After Mr. Trump’s threats against some of America’s closest allies—including Denmark—I have had to revise my views. Today, we Europeans must be prepared to protect ourselves from those who lie in wait just outside our borders. Europe must develop a stronger and more effective defense to deter Russia and any other nation. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is still the cornerstone of European defense. But given that Mr. Trump has raised doubts about America’s willingness to fulfill its NATO obligations and has threatened two allies, Canada and Denmark, I see no option other than to ensure we can stand on our own in any situation.

We must build a coalition of willing European countries that are prepared to provide a robust European defense. We should strengthen the European Union’s security dimension, move to majority voting to prevent pro-Russia members from vetoing important security measures, and sign a security agreement between the EU and the U.K. as soon as possible to protect ourselves and our shared critical infrastructure.

History tells us that trade wars have only losers. Consumers pay more, inefficient domestic companies are protected from competition, and the result is less economic growth, lower productivity and less prosperity for everyone. But if Mr. Trump brings a tariff war to our door, we must fight back aggressively. Europe’s response should be dollar-for-dollar retaliation, targeted at the U.S. industries and businesses where it will hurt the most. Mr. Trump respects only strength.

I hope that the new U.S. administration doesn’t end an international order that has created more security and more prosperity for more people than any other in history. But hope is no strategy. Europe must be prepared or suffer the consequences.

Mr. Rasmussen served as secretary general of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2009-14) and prime minister of Denmark (2001-09)

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Re: US Foreign Policy & Geopolitics
« Reply #1612 on: February 12, 2025, 07:51:47 AM »
Mr Rasmussen implies Europe has come to expect and feel the US is obliged to protect them.

Interesting take. 

Trump feels they need to step up and do more for themselves.

Seems reasonable to me.

We can still be close allies but not necessarily their adoptive parent.

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Re: US Foreign Policy & Geopolitics
« Reply #1613 on: February 12, 2025, 01:12:12 PM »
"I never imagined I would hear a U.S. president declare his intentions to “expand our territory,” as Donald Trump did in his inaugural address. He continues to suggest that Canada should become the 51st state, and he has refused to rule out military force to secure America’s control of the Panama Canal and the autonomous Danish territory of Greenland.

"Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping are watching. If the U.S. can take Greenland for America’s security, Mr. Xi will claim he can invade Taiwan for Chinese security. Mr. Putin’s absurd arguments about conquering Ukraine for Russia’s security would be validated by Mr. Trump."

How to answer this argument?

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Re: US Foreign Policy & Geopolitics
« Reply #1614 on: February 12, 2025, 06:12:10 PM »
"I never imagined I would hear a U.S. president declare his intentions to “expand our territory,” as Donald Trump did in his inaugural address. He continues to suggest that Canada should become the 51st state, and he has refused to rule out military force to secure America’s control of the Panama Canal and the autonomous Danish territory of Greenland.

"Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping are watching. If the U.S. can take Greenland for America’s security, Mr. Xi will claim he can invade Taiwan for Chinese security. Mr. Putin’s absurd arguments about conquering Ukraine for Russia’s security would be validated by Mr. Trump."

How to answer this argument?

It can’t be answered to the satisfaction of anyone silly enough to ask the question, so why bother?

Vlad and Xi’s countries have all sorts of expansionist acts under their belts, not to mention an utter disregard for human rights, which makes this sort of equivocation absurd. Trump’s rhetorical excesses are well known, his habit of laying out an extreme position as an opening gambit a consistent feature of the way he carries himself, he enjoys tossing out pieces of what appears to be raw meat that his enemies snap at only to discover they are tofu with a bit of food coloring coating them, a lot of these supposed expansionist impulses have a tongue in cheek element, witness the Danish petition to purchase California, then there’s the bleeping Monroe Doctorine where Panama is involved and, hells bells, you would have to be irredeemably lost to TDS to cast a democratically elected leader’s theoretical misadventures as equivalent to despots’ empiric ones.

“Progressives” have a long history of casting their fever dreams as raw reality while dismissing raw reality as right wing—or gasp, fascist—fever dreams, and then calling you a “denier” if you point out the absurdity of it all. As such what’s the point of playing a game where the conclusion is so foregone and the upside of playing along so difficult to identify?

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GPF:George Friedman: Russia-US negotiations, next phase of restructuring world
« Reply #1615 on: February 13, 2025, 05:42:41 AM »
This strikes me as rather glib concerning the Chinese threat.
==============

February 13, 2025
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Russia-US Negotiations Open the Next Phase Of Restructuring the World
By: George Friedman

From 1945 until the early 1990s, the global order was based on the hostility between the United States and the Soviet Union. It was an order filled with conflict, danger and ideological discord, as all such orders are, but there was at least a system of organization based around the two powers. After the Soviet Union fell, Russia, though intact, was in a state of disarray in no small part because it had lost the satellite states that had insulated it from its enemies in Europe – NATO and the United States. The war in Ukraine was initiated largely to reclaim these buffer states. But it was also undertaken to resurrect the Russian state and rehabilitate it as a global power.

The war has been a failure. Moscow has taken only about 20 percent of Ukrainian territory, thus failing to rebuild a decisive buffer. It has weakened the Russian economy. And it imperiled the regime by sparking unrest and coup attempts, which Moscow successfully suppressed. Russia has done what it does best: It has failed but survived. It must now devise a strategy for the future that is more than just survival.

On Feb. 11, the U.S. and Russia exchanged prisoners after President Vladimir Putin said U.S.-Russia relations were in danger of collapsing. For his part, President Donald Trump said phone calls between them were constant. Rumors of summit planning were in the air and have since been validated by reports that Trump and Putin spoke on the phone, with both agreeing to start negotiations to end the war. (Trump spoke later with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.) This is all a fairly normal negotiation process: One side threatens to leave the table, the other side displays patience, and both sides ultimately reach small agreements. In order to understand the geopolitical meaning of all this, we must consider the positions and strategies of both Russia and the United States in these negotiations.

Russia is in the process of redefining its relations with the rest of the world while preserving the state, building a healthy economy and wielding foreign influence. Strategically, Russia’s problem is that it is a vast country vulnerable to potential adversaries. The nation could not regain its position without unity, and unity required a powerful military and economic center. Throughout history, the government has been stable, but it had limited options, which forced it into strategies it did not have the resources to execute.

Russia’s failure to conquer Ukraine has created an economic – and even military – threat from Europe. To its east, Russia faces China, which is a historical Russian enemy with which it fought border wars even when both were communist states. China did not vote to support Russia in its invasion of Ukraine at the first United Nations meeting on the matter. (It abstained.) China was far more interested in relations with the United States and Europe than anything Russia had to offer. Strategically, Russia had to win the war outright to demonstrate its power. It failed, and now it has no strategic ally with an interest in supporting it. In other words, Russia has no strategic counterweight.

Russia’s long-term adversary is the United States, which thwarted Russia’s strategy in Ukraine. The U.S. has no existential threat facing it. Europe is divided. China has significant economic and internal problems, and its military is currently in no position to challenge the United States. Russia therefore must accept its current weakened position or deal with the United States.

The U.S. has a history of getting into unthinkable alliances with former enemies. U.S. grand strategy is founded on opportunism and flexibility, its passions reserved for domestic conceptions. Trump has demonstrated systematic unpredictability, which means that he has given himself maximum flexibility in negotiating with Russia. That the U.S. is fundamentally unthreatened on the world stage gives it options in negotiations. In stating – during his election campaign – that Ukraine was a European war and not an American war, Trump told Russia that it could deal with the U.S. For Washington, the fear was that Russia would, under Soviet rule, dominate Europe and thus radically shift the balance of power in the global system. If that was still a concern before 2022, Russia’s subsequent failure has put it to rest.

Without a sufficient military that is able to fully defeat Ukraine militarily, Russia is left to focus on economic development to return to power. This is a very long and potentially dangerous path as it leaves Russia militarily exposed. The other option is to reach an accommodation with the United States. Washington has no moral qualms in overlooking ideology and behavior to form worthwhile relationships. If an understanding were reached, the U.S. would be free of its responsibility for European security, eliminating China’s already vain hope of establishing an alliance with a powerful ally, and giving it more room to tend to its own interests. National interest rules all, and national interest is determined by power.

Ending a war is easier if one side has won and the other side has lost. It’s much trickier if the goal is to create long-term peace, rather than a brief suspension, absent a decisive outcome. That is the issue now. Russia, like Germany after World War II, must demand economic growth in which the U.S. would likely participate. (Russia is Russia, of course, so caution must be exercised as it recovers.) The negotiations will seem painful and filled with insults, breakdowns and threats. And hanging over all of this is the threat of nuclear weapons, which I believe are irrelevant to the negotiations; mutually assured destruction means that whoever attacks will be dead with his family within the hour. But, in time, the negotiations will bear the fruit that the diplomats will take credit for, even though it was raw power that decided the outcome.

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George Friedman
« Reply #1616 on: February 17, 2025, 06:17:55 AM »


February 17, 2025
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Speculating on the Summit in Saudi Arabia
By: George Friedman

At its heart, Geopolitical Futures is a forecasting company. But before we forecast, we analyze. And before we analyze, we speculate. We rarely publish our speculations, because they are ultimately errant thoughts meant to make sense of chaos. Worse yet, they are often wrong. But as U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin prepare to meet in Saudi Arabia, I thought it worthwhile to speculate, especially since we recently forecast that the world order is restructuring itself. As always, the normal caveats apply.

I am unable to understand Trump’s repeated desire to occupy Gaza. Trump knows that taking over Gaza would be impossible without a military presence, and he knows that a stream of casualties flowing back to the United States, where a new round of Islamist militarism could take root, would utterly undermine his presidency. So I initially wrote the Gaza statements off as a low-cost bluff.

It makes sense that Trump and Putin would want to talk about and likely move toward a bilateral settlement on Ukraine. It’s unusual that they decided to exclude European leaders, including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, from the talks, especially since Trump has long characterized the Ukraine war as a European war. Perhaps Trump thinks European attendance would be a de facto invitation for Europe to participate in Ukraine’s reconstruction. Perhaps he believes bringing Europe to the table, with all its many divergent views and interests, would bring the talks to a halt. Perhaps he means to signal intentions to redefine relations with Russia or Europe. (It is likely Putin feels the same.) And maybe they wanted to exclude Zelenskyy because they knew he wouldn’t agree to anything they discussed. Besides, there may be more subjects discussed between Trump and Putin at the meeting than Ukraine.

Notably, France has since called a summit of selected European nations to discuss the issue. Which makes sense: Europe was secure and prosperous during and after the Cold War, but that security and prosperity have begun to fray. A reconciliation of any sort between the U.S. and Russia removes what was Europe's anchor. The stalemate in Ukraine, Russia’s failure to win and the limited U.S. and European responses signaled the end of the post-Cold War era. Russia failed to overwhelm in days or weeks a smaller and weaker country – which the old Russia would have done. Russia must redefine its national strategy based on this reality. This gives the United States a need to redefine its own strategy. Relationships are now forced to change.

My reasoning on all this might be wrong, but at least some of it seems plausible. What’s surprising is the location for the talks. Putin and Trump couldn’t meet in Moscow or Washington, of course, as neither could visit the other without appearing weak. But there are plenty of other places they could choose, including Hungary, whose prime minister, Victor Orban, has excellent relations with both Trump and Putin. Unless they wanted to just go somewhere warm, it’s hard to understand why it ought to be Saudi Arabia. Importantly, Trump’s secretary of state, national security adviser and Middle East envoy are going to hold parallel meetings with their Russian counterparts. This preliminary meeting will likely result in a common plan, already roughly sketched out, that the official Trump-Putin summit will serve to bless.

This brings us back to the mystifying emphasis that Trump has placed on Gaza, talking up the impossible idea of the U.S. taking ownership of what is essentially a death trap. There are three issues on the table. The first is Ukraine. The second is the Arab-Israeli conflict. The third and most important is seeking an accommodation with Russia, not only in Ukraine but also globally. In the end, the significance of the Ukraine war was tragically not Ukraine. It was a measure of Russian power and the unwillingness of the United States and Europe to do more than give aid. What would have been a nuclear standoff during the Cold War never came close to escalating to that level for this reason. No one’s interest in Ukraine rose that high. The rivalry between Moscow and Washington played out countless times in the Middle East, and the Saudis, who have never been more than reluctant sponsors of the Palestinians, diffused their confrontations and frequently played one side against the other.

If Saudi Arabia has a coalition comprising the U.S. and/or Russia, its economic domination of the region becomes strategic domination. Riyadh would be able to contain the Arab-Israeli war, as well as other regional conflicts. The threat of a U.S.-Russia confrontation in the most volatile region in the world would subside, and each would be free to form an economic relationship that, incidentally, marginalizes and even potentially threatens European unity.

It seems to me that this is the only coherent explanation of recent events. Of course, that assumes recent events are coherent, or that coherence is a sign of accuracy. But for the moment, I believe every word since it coheres with our view of a world redesigning itself. I think Trump sees a possibility of entente with Russia – which Putin would welcome. Allied with their joint backing, peace in the region becomes a conceivable possibility, considering the economic benefits to three great oil producers each without material conflict.

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US Geostrategy and the Old World Order
« Reply #1617 on: February 21, 2025, 02:57:56 AM »


February 20, 2025
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The US Geostrategy and the Old World Order
Disruptions are usually led by those who are not invested in the established order.
By: Kamran Bokhari

The United States is overhauling its entire foreign policy. In this new approach, Washington expects allies (as opposed to the United States) to take primary responsibility for managing their regions. The transition to this new order will be long and messy and entails risks, as is always the case with any such disruptive shift. But the current moment is opportune, as both of the United States’ principal adversaries, Russia and China, have serious domestic issues of their own.


(click to enlarge)

Speaking to reporters on Feb. 18 after meeting with Russian officials in Riyadh, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio outlined the Trump administration’s three-part plan to reengage with the Putin regime. The first step involves working to restore normal diplomatic ties. The next stage will involve bargaining over how to end the war in Ukraine. Finally, Washington will engage with Moscow on how to enhance relations at both the strategic and the geoeconomic levels.

Clearly, Washington’s goals for the U.S.-Russia dialogue extend well beyond achieving a ceasefire in Ukraine. The agenda described by the secretary of state points to nothing less than a revolution in the United States’ strategic perception of Russia. The Soviet Union menaced Western Europe for half a century after World War II, and for much of the three decades since the Soviet implosion, the West has viewed its successor state, the Russian Federation, as an adversary-in-waiting. Even as Europe’s ability to defend itself grew, the old anxieties remained. However, the Russian military’s performance in the war against Ukraine has clarified that it is not the power it once was.

As with all geopolitical changes, it takes time for states and their publics to recognize and adjust to the new reality. The adjustment does not necessarily happen simultaneously, as evidenced by Americans’ skepticism and even opposition to the White House’s diplomacy with the Kremlin. The status quo is familiar and comfortable; change is unsettling and often frightening. Disruptions are thus usually led by those who are not invested in the established order. The disruptors in the Trump administration do not appear to have a complete roadmap toward a new way of doing things. But they are propelled by the belief that business as usual is not working – a view broadly shared by the American public.

In the case of Russia, its invasion of Ukraine has shown that it does not pose any conventional military threat on a global scale. It does pose a threat to Europe, but one that the Europeans can handle. The United Kingdom, France and Germany already are entertaining the idea of a European defense architecture. The question is what role the United States will play in the future security of the Continent.

Meanwhile, NATO is still extant, but it has struggled to evolve from its original purpose to defend a war-ravaged Western Europe from a much larger military and ideological threat deeply embedded in Eastern Europe. NATO could be repurposed, with the Europeans assuming primary responsibility for European defense, but unlike international political partnerships, military alliances need clear command structures. New operational guidelines and rules of engagement must be developed, all of which takes time. Alternatively, Europe could establish a new collective security entity, adapting the lessons learned from the NATO experience.

Whatever form the future security arrangement takes, the United States will likely be involved. It is not in the U.S. interest for any one power to dominate western Eurasia – certainly not an authoritarian state such as Russia. The safe assumption is that any cessation of the war in Ukraine will be temporary.

Therefore, what happens if Russia goes on the march again? In theory, the Europeans will defend themselves. In reality, if they flounder, the United States will intervene as was the case in both world wars. The Trump administration must be well aware of this risk. Its challenge will be to forge a new European security order that preempts any such move by the Russians or at least makes it very costly.

Underlying the paradigm shift in U.S. foreign policy is the idea that the country’s current security commitments are misaligned with the potential threats. Russia is not the Soviet Union, and three years of attritional warfare have diminished it further. Iran has also taken a massive hit in the past year, especially since the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria. More important, China is in the midst of a major economic crisis that is constraining its ability to project power militarily, though it remains a challenge to U.S. preeminence, particularly on the technological front.

Therefore, the situation is somewhat different in the Western Pacific compared to the Atlantic basin. In the Atlantic, Washington’s European allies are capable of collective security. But in the Pacific, there are states that heavily depend on the U.S. to guarantee their security against a resurgent China, which now boasts the world’s second-largest economy. Although Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines and Australia are all significant players, they lack the framework to act in unison that the Europeans have.

The United States will likely continue to play a role in the western rim of Eurasia. After all, the U.S. is a maritime power and has an imperative to secure the world’s oceans. What it is apparently trying to do is disengage from being the primary security guarantor on land. For the many who have gotten used to the post-World War II order, this may seem an appalling idea. There are many obstacles along the path to this emerging order – both within the United States and overseas. But it is a historic moment, an interregnum between a dysfunctional order and a new one that will be long in the making.

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GPF: The Limits of US-Russia Detente
« Reply #1622 on: March 22, 2025, 12:12:03 PM »
I'm not getting the apparent hypothesis that we need Russian help to deal with Iran:

=========

The Limits of a US-Russia Detente
Washington’s challenges in the Middle East are too great for Moscow to resolve.
By: Kamran Bokhari

The wars in Ukraine and the Middle East are linked, at least in U.S. efforts to resolve them. In many ways, a contiguous shatter belt now stretches from the Black Sea to the Arabian Sea. The Trump administration seeks a deal with Russia to restore stability across this volatile landscape, but success is uncertain given the many competing stakeholders in the Middle East.

The White House readout of a 90-minute call between U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin underscored the linkage between Ukraine and the Middle East. The two leaders agreed that Moscow and Kyiv would immediately pause attacks on each other’s energy and infrastructure. They also agreed that impending talks in the Middle East would pursue a maritime ceasefire in the Black Sea, as well as a full ceasefire and permanent peace. In addition, the communique said Trump and Putin broadly discussed cooperation to prevent future conflicts in the Middle East and “the need to stop proliferation of strategic weapons.” Finally, it said both leaders “shared the view that Iran should never be in a position to destroy Israel.”

As part of a broader bargain, Washington hopes Moscow will pressure Iran into negotiations. Russia has signaled a willingness to cooperate but will demand serious concessions on Ukraine. Russian involvement is critical. Not only is Russia a great power ally of Iran, but it also has relied on Tehran for drones and missiles in its war against Ukraine, now in its fourth year. The Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” policy on Iran cannot succeed without Russian cooperation.

This approach is not new. The Obama administration secured crippling sanctions on Iran in 2012 by aligning with Moscow, which led to the 2015 nuclear deal – later scrapped by Trump during his first term. But the current landscape is different. The Russia-Ukraine war has shifted global dynamics, complicating Trump’s push for a new foreign policy paradigm in which regional allies take greater responsibility for regional security.


(click to enlarge)

Trump’s goal of detente with Russia will take time and faces a deep trust deficit dating back to the Soviet collapse. Moscow sees little reason to stop leveraging Iran in its dealings with Washington. Any cooperation will be tactical. At the same time, Russia does not want Iran to acquire nuclear weapons, and it must also consider that with sanctions relief Iran could become a competitor on its southern flank. After all, Iran’s current northern borders were established when the Russian Empire seized Persian territories in the Caucasus and Central Asia in the 19th century. Therefore, the Kremlin must balance its immediate U.S. dealings with long-term concerns about Iran, using a tactical realignment to prevent Tehran from obtaining nuclear weapons while preparing for a resurgent Iran after some sanctions are lifted.

For now, Russia’s priority is relieving its own economy of sanctions pressure and reducing NATO’s presence near its borders. Moscow sees a strategic opportunity: If it secures these objectives, it can strengthen its position despite losing some ground to rivals amid its preoccupation in Ukraine. It is keenly aware of Turkey’s expanding influence in the South Caucasus and, more important, China’s deepening geoeconomic presence in Central Asia.

From a U.S. perspective, this three-way competition serves U.S. interests in Eurasia. Turkey’s influence in the Black Sea and the trans-Caspian region serves as a check on Russia, while Russia’s rivalry with China in Central Asia and beyond complicates their shaky alignment against the United States.

Yet even a detente with Russia will not resolve U.S. challenges in the Middle East. Washington is trying to elevate Saudi Arabia’s regional role, especially as Iran has lost ground in the Levant. However, Turkey has emerged as the primary beneficiary of Iran’s setbacks, particularly in Syria. While Israel welcomes Iran’s diminished influence due to the fall of the Assad regime, it now faces a longer-term threat from Turkey’s Sunni Islamist proxies.

Moreover, Saudi Arabia remains years away from assuming a regional security leadership role. The Trump administration hopes Riyadh will at least engage with Israel to manage the Palestinian issue. Meanwhile, the Houthis will continue to threaten Saudi Arabia’s southern flank, even if the U.S. contains Iranian-backed disruptions of commercial traffic through the Red Sea. And in the north, Turkey and Iran will remain locked in competition over Iraq, a crucial arena for Turkish security interests.

These fault lines will persist. U.S. strategy can shape the broader landscape only to a limited extent, and there is only so much the Russians can do to help.

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GPF George Friedman: A New Asian Block in the Making?
« Reply #1623 on: March 24, 2025, 06:12:54 AM »


March 24, 2025
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A New Asian Bloc in the Making?
By: George Friedman

Senior officials from China, South Korea and Japan will soon meet in Tokyo to try to establish a more formal relationship, replete with security and economic benefits. Informal talks had already been held between China and Japan, so it appears the two found enough to agree on in principle to proceed to the next level. In practice, it’s unclear what a partnership entails. Japan has said it wants to increase agriculture exports to China and to force North Korea to abandon its nuclear program. Naturally, the latter point brought South Korea into the talks.

Beijing is in a dangerous geopolitical position. The emerging U.S.-Russia entente leaves China in an isolated position at a time when its economy has weakened dramatically. Contrary to appearances, Russia and China have never been truly aligned. Russia has been a threat to China throughout history, and several wars have been fought between them. Not even the commonality of communism could unite them. Under Mao, China was outright hostile to Russia, which it accused of betraying communism during the Khrushchev era.

Geopolitically, Mao worried that a U.S.-Russia detente would preface a joint policy against China. So when Henry Kissinger visited China to open relations in the 1970s, heavy fighting broke out along the Russia-China border – a significant row that lasted several months. Russia meant for the attack to pose as a warning to China about what could happen if its relationship with the U.S. threatened Russian interests. China understood it as such.

China opened diplomatic relations with the United States shortly thereafter in a move that would prove critical to China’s eventual emergence as a global power. The Chinese economy was in shambles at the time of Mao’s death. His successor, Deng Xiaoping, passed a series of reforms that resurrected the Chinese economy, thanks in no small part to the U.S., which first allowed Chinese products into its massive market and later invested heavily in Chinese industry.

The problem was that this was not a sustainable process. China’s meteoric rise was accompanied by a commensurate surge in military power. And under President Xi Jinping, China’s rhetoric toward the U.S. has tended to be more hostile the worse the economy is. This rhetorical hostility, coupled with the post-COVID-19 economic downturn, has led to declining levels of U.S. investment in China, as well as to capital flight, which has triggered crises in banking and the economically vital real estate industry.

Meanwhile, China’s relationship with Russia stayed mostly the same. It didn’t see Moscow as a threat, but neither did it see it as an economic savior. China’s stance on the Ukraine war could be described as rigorously neutral; rather than siding with Russia after the invasion, it abstained from the United Nations vote to denounce it. China sold weapons to Russia but never deployed troops.

It’s possible that this status quo could change. For China, even the prospect of reconciliation between the U.S. and Russia is a nightmare. A two-pronged threat from Russia and the U.S. would put China in an untenable position, and because the extent of the possible reconciliation is unknown, China has to act fast. Thus followed the Chinese initiative to form an Asian security and economic bloc.

Japan and South Korea are military allies of the U.S., and both sides want to maintain the arrangement. China cannot join a bloc with Japan and South Korea without abandoning its military posture – including dropping its bluff to invade Taiwan. But with a possible U.S.-Russia entente, China’s future becomes uncertain, and being in a security relationship with two of the United States’ closest allies may make China much safer than without. And this is to say nothing of the economic opportunities that would be available to China from its new partners.

I have consistently written that, despite its gigantic military, China is not much of a military threat to the U.S. (So far, I’ve been right.) And a formal Asian grouping might soften the U.S. position on China. So unless South Korea and Japan want to fully break with the U.S. and become completely dependent on China for their defense, the U.S. has nothing to lose. In a best-case scenario, Japan and South Korea could have a moderating effect on China, since challenging the U.S. would put both countries at risk.

Tellingly, Chinese Premier Li Qiang, who had not met with U.S. business leaders for two years, met with a delegation led by U.S. Senator Steve Daines that included the heads of Boeing, Qualcomm, Pfizer and Cargill. He did not meet with corporate heads of any other countries. A close Trump ally, Daines is on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and has done extensive business in China. The meeting might have been driven by China’s fears over U.S. tariffs, or it might be a sign that Japan and South Korea are less motivated by forging a local arrangement and more by moving into a different relationship with the United States.

To be sure, nothing could come from the meeting in Tokyo. There is tension between the U.S. and its Asian allies: Japan has resisted U.S. demands to increase military spending, and South Korea resents being designated a “sensitive nation” – that is, a nation engaged in nuclear weapons development. And diplomatic actions are just gestures. Still, even gestures can have significant meanings. In this case, they suggest China has been forced to reconsider its geopolitical imperatives and move closer to the U.S. Either way, it’s further evidence that in an unanchored world, countries are searching for an anchor.

DougMacG

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Re: GPF George Friedman: A New Asian Block in the Making?
« Reply #1624 on: March 24, 2025, 06:53:25 AM »
I like the recent work by George Friedman, thanks for posting. I mostly agree with his analysis. That said, I find this wording strange:

"... dropping its bluff to invade Taiwan".

Friedman writes: "despite its gigantic military, China is not much of a military threat to the U.S. (So far, I’ve been right.)"

(Doug) Take a look at what the Asia-Pacific map looks like after Communist- Expansionist China hypothetically takes the former Taiwan, and China's ability to project power outward from there. Not a small threat and not a reversible conditio situation.

But Friedman is right, economic interdependency is one key leg of the policy of dissuading China from attacking Taiwan.
« Last Edit: March 24, 2025, 07:01:51 AM by DougMacG »

Crafty_Dog

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Re: US Foreign Policy & Geopolitics
« Reply #1625 on: March 24, 2025, 06:59:49 AM »


"That said, I find this wording strange:

""... dropping its bluff to invade Taiwan".

"Friedman writes: "despite its gigantic military, China is not much of a military threat to the U.S. (So far, I’ve been right.)""

I concur.  The build up of its navy, its ability to effectuate amphibous landings, its drones, its nuke force, its space fighting capacity, its penetration of our networks, its placement of MAMs and presumed preparation of safe houses, its purchases of farmland near US basesetc are a very legit threat.