Bringing Doug's post here, the banking thread:
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Hardly a buffoon? Watch the video and try to help me with a better description. Maybe he is diabolically clever and just plays a buffoon on television, and on policy matters.
Quite a career (usually one will credit source when cutting and pasting into your own text), Geithner is illustrative of the Peter Principle where people rise to their own level of incompetence. Head of the NY Fed, at a time when monetary policy was out of control and a major factor pulling us into collapse and scandal. He is the epitome of the botched policies/regulation/oversight that brought us the collapse and Great Recession. His face with a red circle and a line through it should be on every Occupy Wall Street sign.
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Geithner has more recent scandals brewing:
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/what_did_tim_know_NQ113lKVCrJPZHUhVCVVfMWhat did Tim know?
Geithner’s Libor labors
Last Updated: July 11, 2012
The latest development in the Libor-manipulation scandal is that the banks weren’t really fixing the price of the key interest rate in total secret — US regulators were aware of the sleazy activities at the time, and seemed to have done nothing.
Which should surprise no one.
I can’t tell you how much federal officials knew about the activities of Barclay’s, JPMorgan, Citigroup and the other big banks at the center of the maelstrom. In coming weeks, both Federal Reserve chief Ben Bernanke and Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner will inevitably discuss the mess when they appear before Congress.
Geithner: Boss of New York Fed during alleged fixing of the key Libor financial benchmark.
Bernanke testifies before the Senate Banking Committee next week, but the more important hearing by far will come a week later — when the House Financial Services Committee questions Geithner, who headed the New York Fed when the sleaze was going down.
If the right questions get asked, the American people will get a firsthand account not just about how much our government knew about the Libor mess, but also of the cozy, corrosive relationship between the nation’s big banks and the bureaucrats who are supposed to regulate them.
Long before President Obama tapped him for Treasury, Geithner was one of those bureaucrats. He worked at the Clinton Treasury, the IMF and then as president of the New York Federal Reserve Bank for five years — where he played a key role in the bailouts and the rest of the government’s response to the financial crisis.
The New York Fed has two main functions: It handles the transactions whereby the overall Federal Reserve controls the nation’s money supply, and it’s supposed to be the chief regulator of the big banks in its region.
When Obama named him for Treasury, the banking industry hailed Geithner as a godsend. Shares shot up on his announcement, and CEOs called it a wise choice for a key job at a time of crisis.
But the dirty little secret on Wall Street is that the New York Fed is a horrible regulator: It sees its chief job as keeping the banking system intact. Since it needs its member banks to buy US government debt and to control the money supply, the last thing it wants to do is shed light on the banks’ shady practices.
Which is why the Wall Street power brokers loved Geithner so much: On his New York Fed watch, he basically let them get away with the financial equivalent of murder, letting them take on the astronomical amounts of risk that ultimately blew up the system in 2008.
And then, when they needed a bailout, he was there with a plan that made sure their banks and jobs were safe.
That’s why I’m saying Geithner is such an important witness as the Libor investigation expands to include the possibility that banking-industry cops like himself looked the other way.
The London Interbank Offered Rate, keep in mind, is one of the world’s most important financial benchmarks. Both Wall Street financiers and average consumers are charged interest based on Libor, which is set by a banking trade group that calculates an average of the big banks’ borrowing rates.
So the last thing you want is for the rate to be manipulated in any way. Yet that’s what the banks are accused of doing, as their borrowing rates started rising in the runup to the crisis.
The incentive for banks like Barclays to rig Libor by reporting falsely low borrowing costs is obvious: They could make money and disguise the extent of their distress.
We know that Barclays — so far the only firm charged in the matter — met with officials at the New York Fed to discuss the Libor mess back in 2007 and 2008, when it complained that banks might be manipulating the benchmark.
And we know that now-deposed Barclays CEO Bob Diamond met with Geithner during this time. Maybe they were only talking about the broader market upheaval; maybe they discussed the Libor rate-fixing, too.
Geithner has declined repeated requests for comment. The New York Fed stated that it “received occasional anecdotal reports from Barclays of problems with Libor . . . and we subsequently shared analysis and suggestions for reform” with regulators in the UK, where Libor is set.
Translation: We chose to do nothing.
But Congress has a duty to find out why — and what Tim Geithner knew about the banks’ dirty dealings.
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http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/geithner_yawned_at_epic_fraud_ixr2rjBL9s16VKG673U4GOGeithner yawned at epic fraud
July 15, 2012
Tim Geithner had evidence of a financial crime of epic proportion — so he wrote a memo.
That’s about the only way you can sum up the then-New York Fed boss’ actions several years ago, when he was confronted with fairly compelling evidence that banks under his direct supervision were manipulating Libor — a key benchmark of global finance.
The Libor scandal has become pretty big news, with Barclays ousting its CEO and agreeing to pay a large fine even as it cooperates with civil and criminal law-enforcement authorities now investigating other big banks.
What, me worry? Geithner only wrote a memo.
AP
What, me worry? Geithner only wrote a memo.
But it doesn’t end there: There’s also evidence that top regulators, including Geithner, now Treasury secretary, knew about and largely ignored the mess.
On Friday, the New York Fed released documents that supposedly exonerate Geithner. Selective leaks to friendly news outlets ensured kind first-day coverage, with one headline reading “Geithner tried to curb bank’s rate rigging in 2008.”
But that’s a bizarrely generous read of Geithner’s action (or inaction) on learning that Barclays actually admitted to one of his investigators that it had submitted false data for the computation of Libor, and that other banks were doing the same.
As I wrote last week, the New York Fed has long enjoyed a cozy relationship with the banks under its regulatory umbrella — ignoring even the stuff that brought down the financial system in 2008.
A close associate of former Clinton Treasury Secretary and top Citigroup exec Robert Rubin, Geithner has spent most of his professional life as a federal financial bureaucrat — a member of a community that keeps close ties with the heads of the major banks. Yet even by that standard, his behavior in the Libor scandal is incredible.
Libor, the London Interbank Offered Rate, is set by a UK banking trade group, which uses the big banks’ borrowing costs to compute a single benchmark rate that’s widely used on complex financial products as well as consumer loans.
In other words, rigging Libor is a pretty big deal. Yet Geithner treated it like a parking violation.
In 2007 and 2008, as the banking crisis began to heat up and big investors started demanding higher interest rates when lending to the banks, evidence began to build that banks were submitting falsely low borrowing costs to mask their financial distress.
Barclays was one such bank. Indeed, the New York Fed learned as early as December 2007 that Barclays may have been manipulating Libor — but Geithner’s crew waited until April 2008 to make its initial inquiry, documents show.
That’s when a New York Fed official contacted a trading executive at Barclays — who admitted the dirty deed with very little pressure: “We know that we’re not posting, um, an honest Libor.”
The trader’s rationale: If the bank posted its real borrowing costs, then spiking in the runup to the banking crisis, “It draws, um, unwanted attention on ourselves.”
The trader indicated that other banks were submitting fake info, too. The New York Fed regulator conducting the interview didn’t seem particularly outraged, answering with a simple “OK.”
Maybe the Fed official didn’t want to show her cards, but you’d think that a competent regulator hearing a concession like would get the wheels of justice moving pretty quickly. But not at Tim Geithner’s New York Fed.
Geithner was brought in right after the call — and his response was more of the same. He sent a single e-mail to his counterpart at the Bank of England recommending a handful of ways to address Libor rigging, including how UK regulators “should eliminate incentive to misreport.”
So here you have it: In Geithner’s world, rate-rigging fraud is “misreporting.”
His UK counterpart, Bank of England Governor Mervyn King, didn’t do much better. He e-mailed Geithner that he’d ask the trade group “to include in their consultation document the ideas contained in your note.”
Other than a few followup calls from his staff to traders, that’s about the end of Geithner’s real interest in the matter — until it came to light that the practices were much worse and more pervasive than even the Barclays trader had suggested, and that other big banks directly under the New York Fed’s jurisdiction were manipulating one of the world’s most important financial barometers.
Or, as Geithner put it, “misreporting.”
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http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-house-libor-20120717,0,1890104.storyHouse panel probes banks' alleged role in LIBOR-fixing scandal
It plans to question Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke and Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner about allegations that banks rigged the key interest rate.