Africa

[ccp]

Ndubuisi Ekekwe

Ndubuisi Ekekwe is a founder of the non-profit African Institution of Technology. He recently edited Nanotechnology and Microelectronics: Global Diffusion, Economics, and Policy.

Africa Is Open for Business
9:24 AM Monday February 6, 2012
by Ndubuisi Ekekwe | Comments (2)

Angola is offering financial aid to debt-ridden Portugal. The Economist recently declared Africa a "hopeful continent" after years of writing it off as "hopeless." More than a million Chinese are in Africa exploring opportunities in villages and cities. The continent is attracting top global brands and has a growing middle class. There's a sense of upbeat optimism with possibilities that seem endless. As the lions roar from Kenya to Ghana, and cheetahs from South Africa to Mali, young Africans are unleashing their entrepreneurial energy and most governments are offering stronger leadership, a more business-friendly economy, and less corruption.

But, Africa is not an isolated island in the world, and ongoing uncertainty with some of its trading partners could imperil any sustainable progress. A trade shock is just around the corner, as the continent remains reliant on a mineral-based economy. And new, rosy economic statistics have not managed to stop strikes, riots, and other protests, which are the result of the continued reality of economic inequality. What's more, Africa is complex, fragmented and multicultural. What works in Nigeria is not guaranteed to work in Kenya.

But, none of this should keep businesses from expanding into African markets. The international community should not ignore a growing market of roughly a billion people. Africa needs about $50 billion to meet its development goals over the next few years, and it needs the help of the international community to tackle the vicious cycle of poverty, disease and hunger in Africa today.

African economies are growing, and millions have moved into the middle class category within the last decade. And Africans are buying things, from iPads to Porsches. Africans are also becoming global players, with some of their banks — such as United Bank for Africa and Guaranty Trust Bank — opening offices in the U.S., France Flag Like ReplyReply Real-time updating is paused. (Resume)
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Angola is offering financial aid to debt-ridden Portugal. The Economist recently declared Africa a "hopeful continent" after years of writing it off as "hopeless." More than a million Chinese are in Africa exploring opportunities in villages and cities. The continent is attracting top global brands and has a growing middle class. There's a sense of upbeat optimism with possibilities that seem endless. As the lions roar from Kenya to Ghana, and cheetahs from South Africa to Mali, young Africans are unleashing their entrepreneurial energy and most governments are offering stronger leadership, a more business-friendly economy, and less corruption.
But, Africa is not an isolated island in the world, and ongoing uncertainty with some of its trading partners could imperil any sustainable progress. A trade shock is just around the corner, as the continent remains reliant on a mineral-based economy. And new, rosy economic statistics have not managed to stop strikes, riots, and other protests, which are the result of the continued reality of economic inequality. What's more, Africa is complex, fragmented and multicultural. What works in Nigeria is not guaranteed to work in Kenya.
But, none of this should keep businesses from expanding into African markets. The international community should not ignore a growing market of roughly a billion people. Africa needs about $50 billion to meet its development goals over the next few years, and it needs the help of the international community to tackle the vicious cycle of poverty, disease and hunger in Africa today.
African economies are growing, and millions have moved into the middle class category within the last decade. And Africans are buying things, from iPads to Porsches. Africans are also becoming global players, with some of their banks — such as United Bank for Africa and Guaranty Trust Bank — opening offices in the U.S., France and the U.K. Investments in the continent will grow, and the following areas remain the most promising:
Energy: Despite the abundance of resources like solar, oil, water and gas, most Africans still have no reliable energy supply. The challenge has been the cost-intensive, long-term reward nature of these projects in unpredictable political systems. It's simply too risky for businesses to invest in this sector. Minerals: As the world economy recovers, African minerals such as crude oil and gold will remain important to the global economy, as demand increases. Investing in extracting and processing these minerals will remain a lucrative venture. Agriculture: Africa is unfed in a continent with good, arable land. Africa imports its food, despite the fact that it produces enough to feed its citizens. The problem is that harvests are poorly managed due to a lack of preservation techniques, which means that much of the food goes to waste and Africa goes hungry even after bumper harvests. Food production, processing, and preservation will remain a profitable growth area. Technology: Africa has not attracted capacity-building investments, such as R&D centers and hi-tech manufacturing. In the coming years, as global buyers become more sophisticated, companies that differentiate their products within local markets will have a strong competitive advantage. Africa is no exception. For example, telecoms can be profitable in Africa not for selling airtime, but for powering value-added services such as mobile banking and mobile business, among others, that address the needs of this unique population. Four things will drive the African economy in this decade:
African diasporas: The diasporas who have acquired world-class skills with international networks will drive sustainable African development. As the global economy recovers from recession, their impact will continue to expand. Education: Education is a weak link in the development of the continent. Major foreign investment has not come to the sector owing to low return, but some African governments are working hard to change that. For instance, Rwanda and Carnegie Mellon University have teamed up to offer a graduate-level program in East Africa. The new campus will train talent for companies who want to make products closer to Africans. Better education will also serve to advance the entrepreneurial ecosystem on the continent. Intra-trade: The trade route to colonial links will become weaker as these nations become richer and make choices purely based on market factors. For instance, Cameroon could choose South Africa, rather than France, to process some of its food. Infrastructure: Though the regional economic communities (RECs) have not lead to monetary unions, Africa is poised to benefit from the integration of its various economies, and can learn from the euro zone crisis when strategizing about its own single currency program (PDF). The RECs will form free trade areas, which will help modernize infrastructure, among other things. Africa's biggest risk is its political system. New governments have cancelled mine contracts and leases executed by predecessors. The continent faces challenges if it cannot prepare for its post-mineral era. As I drive by dead mines that generated billions of dollars of wealth around the world, but left no sustainable community development behind, I have to wonder: What will the domino effect be if the continent cannot transmute effectively into a post-mineral era? Africa needs a redesign of its economy towards a knowledge-driven one. New industries remain underfunded and quality startups are scarce.
Africa is open for business, and tomorrow's global leaders should understand both the risks and the opportunities that are available here. There is the potential for corporations to make billions of dollars in profits in Africa. But, much more importantly, contributing to a strong and sustainable Africa could just be the next generation of global leaders' greatest legacy.

[Crafty_Dog]

Folks:

While this article does not seem to fall into any of them, as the Seach function reveals please be aware that there are a number of threads dealing with various parts/aspects of Africa see e.g. "US-Africa" http://dogbrothers.com/phpBB2/index.php?topic=1541.0

[ccp]

 
Yahoo! News
As Africa welcomes more Chinese factories, a new wariness sets in

In Congo, Chinese are settling in with businesses and bargains that locals love. But at a giant copper smelting plant, Chinese and locals work together but live apart.

Christian Science Monitor
Jacob Kushner 2 hours ago 
 
Some 6,000 miles away from his home in China, Robin Wei awakes on a cot beneath a white mosquito net. He gets dressed, opens the door of his bunker, and walks out into the rainy season toward the factory where he works.

Four years ago, Mr. Wei bade goodbye to his wife and daughter in Shanghai and boarded a flight to the heart of Congo's mineral belt. He lives and works at a Chinese-owned smelting plant that extracts copper from the rich ore, which is then sold for wire and pipes that go into building skyscrapers and cargo ships.

Congo also holds nearly half the world's known reserves of cobalt. It has vast reserves of high-grade copper, tantalum, and tin. Just 10 years ago, a ton of copper could fetch $1,700 on the world market. Today it goes for about $8,000.

Wei is one of hundreds of thousands of Chinese men and women – as many as 1 million by some estimates – who, at least for now, call Africa home. (Wei goes home to visit his wife and daughter once a year.) China has been investing heavily in Africa for more than a decade, and both China and its migrants are in what could be called a settling-in period as the story of a fast-growing Africa and a rising China unfolds.

Congo is increasingly influenced by the penetration of all things Chinese, and that in turn is bringing high hopes for development.

But it is also raising wariness here that Africa's new benefactor may sometimes be driven by the same self-interested motives as the Western nations that preceded it in the colonial and postcolonial periods.

Like most Chinese here, Wei lives a separate life, socializing exclusively with his Chinese co-workers except for an occasional foray down the street to buy groceries and exchange pleasantries with a Congolese street vendor.

Yet to the Congolese, the Chinese have increasingly become a necessary part of everyday life. To buy a cellphone, people go to Chinese electronics shops that offer knock-off Blackberry models at a third of the market price. When people want to enjoy a soccer game, they take a seat in the bleachers at Kinshasa's "Martyrs Stadium," a gift from China in 1993. A drive through downtown Kinshasa runs along a grand central boulevard, newly widened and repaved by a Chinese construction company.

Down the road from Wei's copper-smelting plant in the town of Lubumbashi, a Chinese doctor treats Congolese and Chinese patients with a combination of modern pharmaceuticals and ancient Chinese acupuncture. Grocery stores sell Chinese rice and sauces; there is even a Chinese casino.

Many Africans have welcomed Chinese migrants and their businesses. In a 2009 survey of 250 people in nine African countries, three-quarters said the Chinese way was a "very positive" or "somewhat positive" model of development.

Increasingly that Chinese model is defined by huge deals in which Chinese companies mine minerals or extract oil and build needed infrastructure for the African nation, often using Chinese skilled labor to do so.

The rising price of copper, for example, has prompted two Chinese state-owned companies to open the largest mine Congo has ever seen. In exchange for the rights to mine potentially billions of dollars' worth of copper for more than two decades, these companies are spending $3 billion upfront to build roads, bridges, and hospitals in Congo.

The Chinese are replicating this minerals-for-infrastructure model in other African countries, notably Zimbabwe, Guinea, and Angola. In 2009, China surpassed the United States as Africa's largest trading partner.

That China has moved 600 million people out of poverty over the past 35 years is a source of admiration for some African elites.

When asked in a different survey which model of development offers more promise for Africa's future – the Western one, which tends to keep private business separate from infrastructure that is considered "aid," or the Chinese model, which blends the two – Africans responded overwhelmingly with the latter. Many see China as more welcoming than the US. Twice a week, a line forms outside the Chinese Embassy in Kinshasa as Congolese students and businessmen arrive to apply for visas to work or study in China. They say it's far easier to get a visa to go there than to the US.

As relations deepen, however, a wider rift is opening between Chinese and Congolese at the workplace. Congo's leaders laud Chinese investors for creating jobs. But some here note that large Chinese companies often employ Chinese workers to do jobs that could easily be done by Congolese. Even Congolese who do get hired by Chinese companies may find their high expectations dashed.

On a rainy morning in Kinshasa, a group of Congolese men huddle under the overhang of a tin roof. The men are employed by the China Railway Engineering Corp. (CREC), a large construction company that is widening and paving the road that connects Kinshasa's airport to its downtown.

The men have been hired to dig trenches, direct traffic, and carry supplies, for which they earn $65 per month, just slightly above the minimum wage here.

The workers say they hardly interact at all with their Chinese managers. They eat and live separately from them. And they say most Chinese don't learn the local languages, French and Lingala, making conversation impossible. The men dress in street clothes because CREC doesn't provide them with uniforms.

"They don't give us boots or helmets. We work like this," says Maba Litile, pointing to the sandals he's wearing. "We work really hard, but the money is too little. If I found another job, I'd leave."

Far away on the outskirts of a mining town called Kolwezi, men, women, and often children spend their days digging with picks and shovels for bits of copper ore. Each week they push bicycles and wheelbarrows laden with bags of those rocks to sell to the Chinese.

In a riverbed that runs through town, Kayenda washes and cleans a batch of rocks before selling them. Like most Kolwezi miners, Kayenda says she's grateful to the Chinese for providing a means by which her family can earn an income. But also like many, she resents that the Chinese are getting rich off her hard work and her nation's minerals. "The way they are helping is giving jobs, but also they are stealing from us," she says.

Some see China as merely the newest player in a centuries-old pattern of foreign powers coming to make their fortunes from Congo's natural resources.

In theory, Congo should be rich, given its vast mineral wealth. But one wouldn't know it by looking at how the majority of Congo's 76 million people live. Rural families sleep in huts that flood when it rains. Only 4 percent have electricity.

Life in cities can also be bleak, as urbanites hustle to earn enough income to subsist. Despite its resources, Congo is the least developed country in the world, and it is also the world's most unlikely place for an individual to improve his or her livelihood, according to the United Nations.

It is hardly lost on Congolese that billions of Western aid and investment dollars have not alleviated Congo's poverty. Some say the West has had its chance. Yet the question of whether China will improve life in Congo more than did the investors who came before it remains unanswered.

On a rainy morning back at the copper-smelting factory where Wei works, a group of muscular Congolese men swing sledgehammers over their heads, then bring them crashing down upon black boulders. More men enter the machinery yard through a metal gate.

"Congolese, they really don't have a sense of time and distance. They're supposed to work at 7:30 but they come at 8 or 8:10 or 8:20," says Wei, who seems more intrigued than concerned.

Behind them, the three-story furnace melts the ore into copper lava, sending dust particles into the air. After an hour of watching rocks transform into molten copper, it becomes impossible to take a full breath without a burning sensation in the lungs. Yet only the few Congolese workers who handle the molten copper are given protective face masks.

All week, Wei and his Chinese colleagues work side by side with the Congolese men. As is typical for first-generation Chinese abroad, they eat only Chinese food while their Congolese employees place a pot atop the hot copper at the factory to cook cassava flour – a traditional East African lunch.

But on the weekends, Chinese workers struggle to feel at home in a place that remains largely foreign to them. Wei is one of only a few who speak the local languages. Some of Wei's Chinese co-workers say they have come seeking adventure. They are often new college graduates who face scarce job prospects at home, or they are leaving jobs in China to earn more money in Africa.

But in reality, Wei's co-workers tend to stay isolated from Congolese society altogether, rarely venturing beyond the concrete walls of the smelting complex. They spend their weekends tending gardens planted with Chinese vegetables, playing table tennis, and singing karaoke. Many are simply reconstructing their lives in China, here.

For many, China's influence in Congo will depend upon whether the Chinese stick around.

Some Chinese have lived here for more than a decade and intend to stay. But the business that brings so many Chinese migrants to Congo today could one day lure them away again as opportunities arise in other places. Whether the Chinese will be transient or put down roots here in Congo remains to be seen.

•This story was adapted from the new e-book "China's Congo Plan." Reporting was supported by the Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting and the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism.

[G M]

Heh. The more powerful China becomes, the more Africa will recall fondly the days of european colonialism.

[Crafty_Dog]

The Battle of the Regimes

AUG. 4, 2014


James Mwangi grew up on the slopes of the Aberdare Mountains in central Kenya. His father lost his life during the Mau Mau uprising against the colonial authorities. His mother raised seven children, making sure both the girls and the boys were well educated. Everybody in the family worked at a series of street businesses to pay the bills.

He made it to the University of Nairobi and became an accountant. The big Western banks were getting out of retail banking, figuring there was no money to be made catering to the poor. But, in 1993, Mwangi helped lead a small mutual aid organization, called Equity Building Society, into the vacuum.

The enterprise that became Equity Bank would give poor Kenyans access to bank accounts. Mwangi would cater to street vendors and small-scale farmers. At the time, according to a profile by Anver Versi in African Business Magazine, the firm had 27 employees and was losing about $58,000 a year.

Mwangi told the staff to emphasize customer care. He switched the firm’s emphasis from mortgage loans to small, targeted loans.

Kenyans got richer, the middle class boomed and Equity Bank surged. By 2011, Equity had 450 branches and a customer base of 8 million — nearly half of all bank accounts in the country. From 2000 to 2012, Equity’s pretax profit grew at an annual rate of 65 percent. In 2012, Mwangi was named the Ernst & Young World Entrepreneur of the Year.

Mwangi’s story is a rags-to-riches Horatio Alger tale. Mwangi has also become a celebrated representative of the new African entrepreneurial class, who now define the continent as much as famine, malaria and the old scourges.

But Mwangi’s story is something else. It’s a salvo in an ideological war. With Equity, Mwangi demonstrated that democratic capitalism really can serve the masses. Decentralized, bottom-up capitalism can be the basis of widespread growth, even in emerging markets.

That theory is under threat. Over the past few months, we’ve seen the beginning of a global battle of regimes, an intellectual contest between centralized authoritarian capitalism and decentralized liberal democratic capitalism.

On July 26, for example, Prime Minister Viktor Orban of Hungary gave a morbidly fascinating speech in which he argued that liberal capitalism’s day is done. The 2008 financial crisis revealed that decentralized liberal democracy leads to inequality, oligarchy, corruption and moral decline. When individuals are given maximum freedom, the strong end up stepping on the weak.

The future, he continued, belongs to illiberal regimes like China’s and Singapore’s — autocratic systems that put the interests of the community ahead of individual freedom; regimes that are organized for broad growth, not inequality.

Orban’s speech comes at a time when democracy is suffering a crisis of morale. Only 31 percent of Americans are “very satisfied” with their country’s direction, according to a 2013 Pew survey. Autocratic regimes — which feature populist economics, traditional social values, concentrated authority and hyped-up nationalism — are feeling confident and on the rise. Eighty-five percent of Chinese are very satisfied with their country’s course, according to the Pew survey.
Continue reading the main story Continue reading the main story

It comes at a time when the battle of the regimes is playing out with special force in Africa. After the end of the Cold War, the number of African democracies shot upward. But many of those countries are now struggling politically (South Africa) or economically (Ghana). Meanwhile, authoritarian Rwanda is famously well managed.


China’s aggressive role in Africa is helping to support authoritarian tendencies across the continent, at least among the governing elites. Total Chinese trade with Africa has increased twentyfold since 2001. When Uganda was looking to hire a firm for an $8 billion rail expansion, only Chinese firms were invited to apply. Under Jacob Zuma, South Africa is trying to copy some Chinese features.

As Howard French, the author of “China’s Second Continent,” points out, China gives African authoritarians an investor who doesn’t ask too many questions. The centralized model represses unhappy minority groups. It gives local elites the illusion that if they concentrate power in their own hands they’ll be able to move decisively to lift their whole nation. (Every dictator thinks he’s Lee Kuan Yew.)

French notes that popular support for representative democracy runs deep in most African countries. But there have to be successful examples of capitalism for the masses. There have to be more Mwangis, a new style of emerging market hero, to renew faith in the system that makes such people possible.

President Obama is holding a summit meeting of African leaders in Washington this week. But U.S. influence on the continent is now pathetically small compared with the Chinese and Europeans. The joke among the attendees is that China invests money; America holds receptions.

But what happens in Africa will have global consequences in the battle of regimes. If African nations succumb to the delusion of autocracy, we’ll have Putins to deal with for decades to come.

[Crafty_Dog]

 Has France Found an African Solution to an African Problem?
Chad's president Idriss Deby Itno (2nd L) speaks with French President Emmanuel Macron (C) as they gather with President of Burkina Faso Roch Marc Christian Kabore (front L), Mali's President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita (rear L), Niger's President Mahamadou Issoufou (front R) and Mauritanian President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz (rear R) for a meeting during the G5 Sahel summit in Bamako, July 2.
(CHRISTOPHE ARCHAMBAULT/AFP/Getty Images)


The days of the French colonial empire may be long gone, but Paris' involvement in the unstable region of the Sahel is not. French forces have been offering support for countries in the region — notably Group of 5 (G5) members Burkina Faso, Mali, Chad, Niger and Mauritania — for years. But as French concerns about the overmilitarization of the Sahel have grown, Paris seeks to find another solution in the form of the G5 Sahel Force. Made up of African troops from the G5 states, this counterterrorism and counter-trafficking entity may eventually play a critical role in stabilizing the Sahel region.

As recently as Aug. 2, French Minister of the Armed Forces Florence Parly visited the Sahel states of Chad, Niger and Mali to engage with soldiers and speak with leaders. The subtext for Parly's trip was a desire to reaffirm French support for the Sahel Force. France and its allies are hoping that the entity will one day offer regional security using local forces, enabling Paris and other Western nations to lessen their involvement in the Sahel.

The Long Struggle

Africa's Sahel region is most commonly associated with a handful of countries stretching across the sub-Saharan portion of the continent, including the G5. These nations are prone to several forms of state weakness, including a lack of resources and investment, poverty, corrupt and ineffectual armed forces and an inability to assert control over vast territories. Thus, the region has historically been a hotbed for terrorism, political instability and the trafficking of arms, drugs and humans. As a result, Western nations — particularly France, a former Sahel colonizer — have often stepped in to help stabilize the area. The French military, for example, has been conducting counterterrorism operations there under the auspices of Operation Barkhane since 2013, when Paris intervened to prevent Mali's collapse amid an assault from Tuareg and Islamic militant forces.

France has been fairly successful as the region's security guarantor, pulling its diplomatic and security weight to aid Mali and shore up other relatively weak regional allies such as Niger. But recently, Paris has sought to lessen its defense burden in the Sahel by increasingly offloading onto African and European allies. (The U.S., for its part, is already involved in the region, engaging in special operations, drone operations and logistical support.) All European states are ultimately threatened by the problems of the Sahel, given that its relative proximity to the Mediterranean Sea provides a thin barrier for transnational issues. It is therefore understandable that France would expect these nations — especially Germany — to increase their contributions.

One key component of this redistribution of resources has been the European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM), designed to advise and train the Malian military. As noted, Mali has been at the epicenter of the region's terrorism problem, and since 2013, the EUTM has been critical in building up the Malian armed forces following a coup and decades of corruption. Training missions such as the EUTM have been particularly useful in encouraging involvement from European countries — including Germany — that are more reticent about exercising hard power overseas.

The EUTM mission and Operation Barkhane are successes in many respects. But the overall picture of Sahel security in the coming years is one that will heavily feature French forces, simply because of the limited capacity of regional governments and militaries. From Mauritania to Niger, countries on the continent continue to struggle with border security: On July 12, the Mauritanian minister of defense declared the country's border with Algeria closed and its immediate area a military zone, with the Mauritanian armed forces considering all individuals in the zone to be legitimate targets. The decision was no doubt the result of increased drug trafficking and terrorist group operations in the area.

And the degradation of the security environment in recent months and years is not exclusive to Mauritania's remote north. Other zones, such as the tri-border region between Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, have seen increases in terrorist activity: militants have attacked wayward government outposts to steal provisions, wreak havoc on locals and sometimes kidnap the few Westerners left in the vast space. Thus, the local authorities of formerly stable zones are now under additional pressure to address the metastasizing threat.

An African Solution

The reality is that France cannot significantly reduce its security burdens in the Sahel right now. The former colonial power has instead been attempting to broaden the scope of its strategy. French President Emmanuel Macron has expressed concern about France's strategy in the region becoming overly militarized in recent years, to the detriment of longer-term state building. Since May 2017, Macron's administration has accelerated efforts to get the G5 Sahel Force up and running. Designed to tackle the more transnational nature of terrorism and crime, the standing force has been touted as "An African solution for African problems" (a term no doubt used to drum up international support). But as with everything in the instability-plagued region, the launch of the G5 Sahel Force has been marked by almost equal parts success and setbacks.

There are countless examples of African forces struggling to make progress without being totally dependent on the financial and logistical support of the United Nations, the European Union and other global powers. For instance, the standby forces of the Economic Community of West African States and the Economic Community of Central African States both faced serious difficulties in their efforts to become productive and autonomous. The G5 Sahel Force is almost certainly headed in the same direction.

On June 5, the European Union committed $56 million to the force following a visit to Mali by EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini. France has also ponied up, reportedly providing an initial $9 million along with 70 tactical vehicles, in addition to $228 million in regional development aid over the next five years. As Macron put it, France's real contribution will be "advice, material and combat." Moreover, Berlin is expected to host an international donors conference in September to partially fund the G5 Sahel Force.

In spite of these initial and prospective gains, the financial viability of the force is still in question. Reportedly, each G5 Sahel member state will contribute $10 million each, bringing in another $50 million. But Malian President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita recently noted that current levels of funding were nowhere near the estimated $500 million annual budget that he sees as necessary to fund the 5,000-member force.

A "two steps forward, one step back" dynamic was further on display at the United Nations on June 21, when the U.N. Security Council unanimously passed a resolution that backed the Sahel Force. U.S. objections to additional U.N. spending obligations forced France to water down the resolution's text. (The Trump administration has sought to cut its international commitments, including in the realm of peacekeeping.) The version of the resolution that ultimately passed states only that the U.N. Security Council "welcomes the deployment" of the force; it does not commit the international organization to any funding.

Putting the Sahel Force Into Action

Nevertheless, Macron is pushing hard to have the G5 Sahel Force up and running by October, so that it can "prove itself" on the ground. Some facts about the entity have already been revealed: For example, it will be headquartered in Sevare in northern Mali and will reportedly focus on three critical border regions: the West Zone (Mali-Mauritania), the Center Zone (Mali-Burkina Faso-Niger), and the East Zone (Niger-Chad). This follows the emphasis on cross-border security challenges implemented by the Multinational Joint Task Force, which was designed to address the threat posed by the Boko Haram insurgency. And in a broader sense, the regional focus continues a trend of Sahel states pooling their resources. In one such recent instance, Mali, Chad and Niger signed an agreement in May allowing the three countries to expedite potential terrorist or criminal suspects, exchange judicial records and obtain information about travelers.

However, the exact number and composition of the Sahel Force remain uncertain. It will reportedly be composed of battalions of 750 soldiers from each country, although this would tally up to a 3,750-member force, well short of the oft-cited 5,000-member figure. Moreover, it has been stated that these soldiers will operate under their own respective flags rather than being part of a supranational group. This could prove problematic if political leaders become unwilling to spread various burdens across the broader force. Chadian President Idriss Deby recently complained that his country's armed forces — a key French ally and the region's most capable military — are "overstretched" in their struggle to combat terrorism. The G5 request for more troop contributions comes amid Chad's continued financial difficulties in the wake of falling crude oil exports prices. Deby is likely hoping to drum up more financial support from Western allies, namely France.

Overall, it remains to be seen how much interoperability can truly be achieved by the five nation, seven battalion Sahel Force — and how heavily the entity will rely on France. There have been joint African military operations in the past, such as Mali and Burkina Faso's Operation Panga, which focused on rooting out militants in the Fhero Forest. But while that operation was hailed as a success because militants were killed and captured, materiel was seized and intelligence was gained, it relied heavily on the French military as its backbone. France's Operation Barkhane furnished soldiers, tactical vehicles, fighter jets and drones.

One thing is clear: Along with limited help from other international actors, the French military is instrumental in holding the Sahel region together. Getting the G5 Sahel Force up and running is a big step forward in finding regional solutions for regional problems. But even in the best case scenario, France is still many years away from being able to significantly reduce its security burden in the Sahel.

[Crafty_Dog]

Before 1819, there was no Zulu nation.

Shaka kaSenzaghakohona was born in ~1787. Through force, murder and intimidation he united a number of small tribes into the Zulu nation around the year 1819.

The Zulu nation came into existence 167 years after the arrival of Jan Van Riebeeck.

So what did the Europeans take away from the Zulu people?

Next, when and how did black people establish themselves in South Africa? The answer lies in the Mfecane: Mfecane (Zulu: [m̩fɛˈkǀaːne],[note 1] crushing), also known by the Sesotho name Difaqane (scattering, forced dispersal or forced migration[1]) or Lifaqane.

This was a period of widespread warfare and chaos among indigenous ethnic communities in southern Africa during the period ~1815 to ~1840.

As King Shaka created the highly militaristic Zulu Kingdom in the territory between the Tugela and Pongola Rivers, his forces caused a wave of warfare and disruption that swept over other peoples in the region. This was the prelude of the Mfecane.

The movement of people fleeing the violence caused many tribes to attempt to dominate those in new territories, leading to widespread warfare; consolidation of groups such as the Matabele, the Mfengu and the Makololo; and the creation of states such as the modern Lesotho.

Mfecane is used primarily to refer to the period when Mzilikazi, a king of the Matabele, dominated the Transvaal. During his reign, roughly from 1826 to 1836, he ordered widespread killings and devastation to remove all opposition. He reorganised the territory to establish the new Ndebele order. The death toll has never been satisfactorily determined, but the whole region was nearly depopulated.

Normal estimates for the death toll range from 1 million to 2 million.

The black tribal order we know today was established in undeveloped land by primitive warring tribes a full 180 years AFTER the European settlers had made much of this land their own.

#southafrica #shaka #zulu

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.nytimes.com/1997/12/04/world/winnie-mandela-s-ex-bodyguard-tells-of-killings-she-ordered.html

[DougMacG]

Africa's population will triple by the end of this century.  Lancet

https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(20)30677-2/fulltext?utm_campaign=gbd20&utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=social

What could possibly go wrong.

[Crafty_Dog]

Straight line projections like this are usually wrong IMHO.

Entirely possible that the entire birth dearth dynamic will hit Africa just as it has elsewhere.

Back in the mid 70s when Latin America was my region of specialization for my International Relations degree, I remember the extraordinary pop growth rates of that time.  They are WAY less now.

This appears to be a world-wide phenomenon.

[Crafty_Dog]

May 27, 2021
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Brief: Why Russia Would Want to Mediate the GERD Talks
Rumors of Moscow’s involvement are unverified but unsurprising.
By: Geopolitical Futures

Background: Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt remain locked in fruitless negotiations over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Sudan and Egypt are downstream countries that fear the project could flood their countries and threaten their water supply, and as such are looking to international partners to resolve the conflict. Naturally, Russia is at the top of the list.

What Happened: Egypt and Sudan will hold joint exercises dubbed “Guardians of the Nile” from May 26 to May 31 that will include ground, air and air defense maneuvers. The exercises coincide with reports that Ethiopia has already started the second filling of the dam. Ethiopia quickly denied the allegations. True or not, rumors have since circulated that Russian President Vladimir Putin will visit Egypt in the near future in what may be a good opportunity to sign new arms contracts.

Bottom Line: As the name Guardians of the Nile implies, the exercises are all about sending a message to Ethiopia. But Russia’s involvement in talks — which, to be clear, remains unverified — shows that military options are not the only options. Russia, for its part, would love to help negotiate a settlement since doing so would buy Moscow a lot of goodwill and political capital in Egypt, which has direct access to the Mediterranean, and Sudan, in which it wants to revive negotiations over the creation of a military base.

[ccp]

https://qz.com/africa/1333946/global-slavery-index-africa-has-the-highest-rate-of-modern-day-slavery-in-the-world/

Must be due to white colonialism 

[DougMacG]

https://qz.com/africa/1333946/global-slavery-index-africa-has-the-highest-rate-of-modern-day-slavery-in-the-world/

Must be due to white colonialism 

Africa - has highest rates of slavery in modern world.  With numbers higher than held in the American south, 150-200 years ago.

If whites owned slaves (in Africa now) it would be the biggest issue in the world, not just something covered in Thomas Sowell books. 

[ccp]

https://www.wsj.com/articles/south-africa-riots-whats-happening-11626280457

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.revolver.news/2021/07/south-africa-riots-looting-critical-race-theory/

[G M]

https://www.revolver.news/2021/07/south-africa-riots-looting-critical-race-theory/

The destruction is part of the plan. It's what they have planned for here as well.

[Crafty_Dog]

In Africa, U.S.-Trained Militaries Are Ousting Civilian Governments in Coups
Insurrections are disrupting American security strategy in the region and giving Russia an opening to gain sway

A Green Beret conducted U.S.-led special-operations exercises with a Guinean soldier in Nouakchott, Mauritania, in 2020.
PHOTO: MICHAEL M. PHILLIPS/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
By Michael M. PhillipsFollow
Apr. 9, 2022 8:00 am ET

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FORT BENNING, Ga.—A flurry of military coups across Africa has disrupted the U.S. strategy of enlisting local armies to counter Islamist extremists and other security threats.

The U.S. has trained thousands of African soldiers, from infantrymen rehearsing counterterrorism raids on the edge of the Sahara to senior commanders attending the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. The programs are a linchpin of U.S. policy on the continent, intended to help African allies professionalize their armed forces to fight armed opponents both foreign and domestic.

But U.S. commanders have watched with dismay over the past year as military leaders in several African allies—including officers with extensive American schooling—have overthrown civilian governments and seized power for themselves, triggering laws that forbid the U.S. government from providing them with weapons or training.

“There’s no one more surprised or disappointed when partners that we’re working with—or have been working with for a while in some cases—decide to overthrow their government,” Rear Adm. Jamie Sands, commander of U.S. special-operations forces in Africa, said this week. “We have not found ourselves able to prevent it, and we certainly don’t assess that we’re causing it.”

The strategic setback was apparent in recent weeks here at Fort Benning, where the U.S. Army hosted its annual gathering of top ground-force commanders from around Africa. Senior soldiers from three dozen African countries watched American recruits tackle boot-camp obstacle courses, witnessed parachute training and saw live-ammo tank and mortar demonstrations.

The Army withheld invitations from coup leaders in Mali and Burkina Faso, West African countries engaged in existential struggles with al Qaeda and Islamic State. Guinean soldiers, who in Septembertoppled the West African nation’s civilian government, were left out of the Fort Benning events and are no longer included in U.S.-led special-operations exercises.


African soldiers watched American troops practice hand-to-hand combat last month at Fort Benning, Georgia.
PHOTO: MICHAEL M. PHILLIPS/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Sudan’s ruling junta, which last year reversed a U.S.-supported transition to democratic rule, was unwelcome at the Fort Benning summit. Ethiopia hosted the last such gathering in 2020; this year its military is on the outs with the U.S. over alleged human-rights abuses in its war against Tigrayan rebels.

“We don’t control what happens when we leave,” said U.S. Army Col. Michael Sullivan, commander of the 2d Security Force Assistance Brigade, a unit created to advise and train African armies. “We always hope we’re helping countries do the right thing.”

Last year, a logistics advisory team from Col. Sullivan’s brigade had just arrived in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia’s capital, and was waiting out its Covid-19 quarantine at a hotel when the Biden administration decided to cancel the deployment “due to our deep concerns about the conflict in northern Ethiopia and human-rights violations and abuses being committed against civilians,” according to a State Department spokesperson.

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The advisers completed quarantine and left the country.

“I think everybody is hopeful they will turn the corner again and we’ll be able to work with our Ethiopian partners,” Col. Sullivan said.

Meanwhile, America’s Great Power rivals can seek to take advantage of the U.S. pullback.

Malian commandos attended U.S.-led special-operations exercises in Mauritania in 2020, but were cut off from American training after its military overthrew the president last May. The Malian junta hired Russian mercenaries from the Kremlin-linked Wagner Group to provide security.


The coup and the presence of the Russian agents led to a falling-out between Mali and France, the former colonial power in much of West Africa, and the announcement that Paris would withdraw thousands of troops that were in Mali fighting Islamic State and al Qaeda.

Human Rights Watch alleged this week that the Russians and their Malian allies rounded up and massacred roughly 300 civilian men—some suspected militants—in the town of Moura last month.


Lt. Col. Paul-Henri Damiba, a veteran of U.S. military training, was sworn in as president of Burkina Faso in March following a coup.
PHOTO: OLYMPIA DE MAISMONT/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES
“The Malian government is responsible for this atrocity, the worst in Mali in a decade, whether carried out by Malian forces or associated foreign soldiers,” Corinne Dufka, a director of Human Rights Watch, said in a written release.

The Malian Defense Ministry reported that it had killed 203 “terrorists” in the operation and arrested 51 others, seizing weapons and ammunition. The military subsequently announced an investigation into the alleged massacre.

For years, the U.S. trained soldiers from Burkina Faso, which is facing waves of attacks from Islamic State fighters and a coalition of al Qaeda affiliates called Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin, or JNIM.

In 2019, Burkina Faso hosted 2,000 commandos from 32 African and Western countries for U.S.-led special-operations exercises, aimed at beefing up security in the Sahel, the semiarid strip just south of the Sahara.

In 2020, Lt. Col. Paul-Henri Damiba was among the Burkina Faso army contingent when the American-led exercises moved to Mauritania. Col. Damiba had previously attended a U.S.-sponsored military intelligence course in Senegal and a State Department peacekeeping-training program.

Early this year, the U.S. military was sufficiently concerned about the spread of militant violence in Burkina Faso to dispatch a Special Forces team to Ouagadougou, the capital city, to advise local commandos.

The Green Berets had just arrived when Burkina Faso soldiers, unhappy with the civilian government’s conduct of the war, surrounded the presidential palace, arrested President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, and announced that a military junta, the Patriotic Movement for Safeguarding and Restoration, would take power.

Eight days after the first burst of gunfire in front of the presidential palace, the junta named Col. Damiba president.

Instead of training local forces, the Green Berets reinforced security at the U.S. Embassy in Ouagadougou, in case the coup unleashed anti-American unrest. The U.S. also suspended work on plans to send one of Col. Sullivan’s advisory teams to the country.

Ghana, Ivory Coast, Benin and Togo dropped Burkina Faso from a joint task force being formed to prevent militants in the Sahel from pushing south toward the Gulf of Guinea—a prospect that alarms the Pentagon.

“Burkina was taken out because of the coup,” said Maj. Gen. Thomas Oppong-Peprah, Ghana’s army chief of staff.


Col. Mamady Doumbouya, who took part in U.S. training exercises before staging a coup in Guinea, is pictured on posters of the capital Conakry last year.
PHOTO: SUNDAY ALAMBA/ASSOCIATED PRESS
American officers say their work with African counterparts routinely includes discussion of the importance of civilian control of the military and adherence to the rule of law.

“So these coups are completely opposite to everything that we’re teaching,” Adm. Sands, the special-operations commander, said in a call with reporters.

Still, Michael Shurkin, a former Central Intelligence Agency analyst, questioned whether American lectures can successfully counter the political pressures Africa armies can face amid fierce insurgencies, ethnic divisions and corrupt civilian governments.

“Why is a year at Fort Leavenworth going to change how you behave politically in your own country?” asked Mr. Shurkin, now with 14 North Strategies, an Africa-focused consulting firm. “It just doesn’t make sense to me.”

American Green Berets were in the midst of training Guinean special forces last year when the local soldiers broke away to oust the country’s civilian president. The coup leader, special forces Col. Mamady Doumbouya, had headed Guinea’s delegation to the 2019 American-led commando exercises in Burkina Faso.

When they realized they were at the center of an insurrection, the U.S. commandos took shelter at the U.S. Embassy in Conakry, Guinea’s capital. “At this time, the U.S. Africa Command has suspended all training with the Guinea military,” said a U.S. Africa Command spokeswoman.

Sudan, which had forsaken past ties with terror groups, begun a democratic opening and embarked on a sweeping rapprochement with the U.S., was invited to the U.S.-African army summit in 2020. But a military junta retook power last year and launched a bloody crackdown on protesters, losing its invitation to the Fort Benning event.

U.S. officers say they have no choice but to work with other militaries in global security missions; the U.S. practice is to fight its wars alongside allies. “Our intent is to continue to extend a hand to African nations to help them and really help them address some of the underlying causes of these coups,” said Adm. Sands.

Over the past 20 years, Fort Benning, which specializes in infantry, airborne and Ranger training, has hosted 1,650 soldiers from 37 African countries.

“The military should always collaborate,” said Maj. Gen. Chikunkha Harrison Soko, Malawi’s U.S.–trained land-force commander.

Insecurity in one part of the world quickly leaks into others, he said, through refugee flows and the spread of extremist ideologies. “What affects Europe, affects Africa,” Gen. Soko said. “What affects Africa, affects the whole of Europe.”

Write to Michael M. Phillips at michael.phillips@wsj.com

WHAT TO READ NEXT...

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/18417/china-taking-over-africa

[Crafty_Dog]

Why Are African Countries Choosing Neutrality on the Russia-Ukraine War?
undefined and Stratfor sub-Saharan Africa Analyst at RANE
Clara Brackbill
Stratfor sub-Saharan Africa Analyst at RANE, Stratfor
7 MIN READApr 12, 2022 | 18:45 GMT


The increasingly multipolar world order is empowering some African countries to maintain a neutral stance on the war in Ukraine, despite pressure from the United States and its allies to condemn Russia. And with limited repercussions from the West, these nations will likely be free to continue prioritizing pragmatism over ideological alliances in their response to the ongoing conflict. 28 African countries supported the U.N. resolution on March 2 condemning Russia's invasion of Ukraine. 17 African states, however, abstained while eight other countries were absent from the vote. During a March 31 press conference, U.S. Ambassador to the African Union Jessica Lapenn said that the United States was looking for strong African responses to Russian aggression, and specifically welcomed the opportunity to work with Senegal, one of the African countries that voted in favor of the U.N. resolution. Lapenn's remarks align with the U.S. and Western European position that African states should condemn the Russian invasion, and that neutrality or abstention implies complicity with Moscow's actions in Ukraine.

Eritrea is the only African country that voted against the March 2 resolution, likely due to Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki's close relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin and animosity toward the West, which was recently punctuated by new U.S. sanctions imposed on Eritrea in November over its role in the war in neighboring Ethiopia.

Some African leaders have criticized the United States' insistence that Africa should condemn Russia's Ukraine invasion, saying it implies their countries need Western guidance for their foreign policy and are not free to choose their own diplomatic path.

For many African countries, neutrality is in itself a position on the war, influenced in part by an increasingly multipolar world order. For decades, anti-Western imperialism has motivated resistance in sub-Saharan Africa to U.S. and European global dominance. However, the growing shift from a U.S.-led unipolar world to a more ''multipolar world'' — with China, Russia and India forming some of those poles — is further motivating some African leaders to reject the idea they must choose between the East and the West. From the perspective of the developing world, with increased multipolarity comes more choices, leading to more flexible — and more volatile — alignments. This trend is visible in Africa's diverse political, economic, security, social and ideological partnerships with their U.S., European, Chinese and Russian counterparts. Africa's largest economies, including Nigeria, Kenya and South Africa, each pursue loans, arms deals and infrastructure projects with disparate partners, sometimes pitting global powers against one another in order to capitalize on the most advantageous deal. Western pressure to condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine flies in the face of the reality that the United States and its allies' dominance over the global order is weakening, thus reducing African countries' incentive for developing exclusive political or economic alliances with Western governments. Against this backdrop, neutral African states — many of which have had their own wars in the recent past — are focused on their own survival, growth and independence in an increasingly uncertain world.

The African countries that voted in favor of the U.N. resolution to condemn Russia's invasion largely cited what Kenya's U.N. ambassador referred to as a duty to safeguard Ukraine's territorial integrity. Those that abstained from the vote, however, cited equally principled reasons for their decision; Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, for example, alluded to Western ''double standards'' in justifying his country's neutral position on the conflict, and said that he prefers maintaining diplomatic ties with China over the United States because Beijing does not advocate for interfering in the domestic affairs of other countries.

The United States has repeatedly criticized South Africa, in particular, for remaining neutral on the war in Ukraine, to which President Cyril Ramaphosa responded by lambasting what he calls NATO's encroachment in Ukraine. During a debate in the U.N. General Assembly on March 2, South Africa's ambassador Mathu Joyini suggested Western countries had committed their own violations of the U.N. Charter throughout history and were using the resolution condemning Russia's actions to increase their own geopolitical advantage over Moscow.

Although the West appears to view African support as crucial to the global ideological response to Russian aggression, leaders across the Continent will likely continue to prioritize pragmatism as the war rages on.





Multipolarity is visible in sub-Saharan African countries' diverse — and sometimes conflicting — global partnerships on issues like economic development, territorial sovereignty and political stability. As the saying goes, all politics is local. Undoubtedly, leaders across Africa are considering how the myriad possible outcomes of the war in Ukraine will impact their international partnerships and ability to maintain governance. Arms deals, loans, infrastructure agreements, foreign aid, trade agreements, treaties and tariffs with disparate partners (some of whom are on opposite sides of the Ukrainian conflict) factor into the equation. For some of the African states that either abstained or weren't present for the vote on the U.N. Ukraine declaration (like Ethiopia, Uganda, Mali, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo), condemning Russia would risk setting a precedent for international intervention that could later see foreign powers investigate security, political and humanitarian issues within their own borders. Separately, Western sanctions against Russia are driving food crises and price surges across Africa, which make leaders more vulnerable to internal threats of political and social instability. Maintaining a neutral diplomatic stance on the war in Ukraine does not alleviate these challenges; it does, however, grant African leaders flexibility as they attempt to leverage the situation to support negotiations with the United States, China and other international partners.

Russia's bilateral trade with sub-Saharan Africa amounted to about $7 billion dollars in 2021 (the United States and Europe's combined trade totaled roughly $44 billion by comparison). Russia also remains the largest arms exporter to Africa and weapons frequently cross political borders. Russian arms are being used in ongoing conflicts in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Ethiopia, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia, among others.

China has strong financial ties with many African nations and has also begun expanding its role in maintaining the Continent's peace and security. Beijing has announced several diplomatic initiatives focused on promoting the stability of Ethiopia and Somalia, both of which have ongoing civil wars within their borders.

In a region plagued by conflict and military coups, rising food insecurity brought on in part by price hikes resulting from Western sanctions against Russia makes African countries even more vulnerable to insurgencies, political instability and overall unrest. West Africa is currently facing its worst food crisis on record, with a 40% increase in hunger from 2021.

Despite its rhetorical condemnation, the West is ultimately unlikely to sanction African countries for retaining a neutral stance on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, reducing the risk of direct economic consequences for states that chose to do so. While states like South Africa and Uganda may not currently curry favor with the United States, Washington is unlikely to punish African neutrality given its preoccupation with the war and other urgent issues. As such, neutral African states are pursuing what they likely view as a low-cost method of maintaining distinct partnerships through the conclusion of the Ukrainian war. It is in the interest of most (if not all) African states to maintain political, economic and security ties with a diverse array of global partners, particularly if the cost of doing so is minimal to nonexistent. Although the West appears to view African support as crucial to the global response to Russian aggression, African leaders will likely continue to pursue pragmatism as the war rages on.

[Crafty_Dog]

What Zambian Debt Talks Could Mean for Chinese Borrowers in Africa
9 MIN READAug 2, 2022 | 20:05 GMT





Newly elected Zambian President Hakainde Hichilema delivers a speech during his inauguration at the Heroes Stadium in Lusaka on Aug. 24, 2021.
Newly elected Zambian President Hakainde Hichilema delivers a speech during his inauguration at the Heroes Stadium in Lusaka on Aug. 24, 2021.

(SALIM DAWOOD/AFP via Getty Images)

Ongoing negotiations to restructure Zambia's debt are most likely to end in a compromise that will offer insight into China's potential position in other countries' creditor talks, especially if Beijing decides to grant debt forgiveness to Lusaka. On July 30, Zambia's bilateral creditor committee co-chaired by China and France released a statement committing to negotiating with the Zambian government under the terms of the Group of 20 (G-20) Common Framework. Zambia's finance ministry also announced on July 29 that it will cancel $2 billion in undisbursed loans from Exim Bank of China, Jiangxi Bank, Intesa Sanpaolo Bank and Israel Discount Bank, marking the first update on Zambia's multilateral debt negotiations in months. The cancellation of undisbursed funds is tangential to the ongoing restructuring talks over Zambia's estimated $32 billion in debt (money that has already been spent by the Zambian government). But China's participation under the G-20 Framework and willingness to engage — even if only over undisbursed loans — could bode well for future talks. Given that Zambia was the first African country to default on its debt in the COVID-19 pandemic era, and is also the first country to have China co-chair its debt committee, the outcome of debt negotiations will provide a case study for understanding how China could treat restructuring in other African contexts.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) awarded the Zambian government a $1.4 billion support package in December 2021, but the IMF review board will not give final approval for disbursement to occur until Zambia's creditors agree to a restructuring package.
A consortium of approximately 18 different Chinese creditors holds a total of $6.6 billion in Zambian debt, accounting for about a third of Zambia's external debt sources. China's commitment comes after months of delays in attempting to restructure Zambia's $32 billion debt (120% of GDP, $17 billion of which is external), during which China was widely perceived to be the lone holdout.
In April, China agreed to Zambian debt negotiations under the Common Framework debt restructuring process, which the G-20 launched in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Common Framework seeks to restructure low-income countries' unsustainable debt on a case-by-case basis, bringing together bilateral creditors in a coordinated process.
An estimated 45% of Zambia's total external debt is owed to external private lenders (excluding China), 37% to Chinese lenders (public and private), 8% to other governments, and 10% to multilateral lenders. Zambia's external debt service in 2021 was 45.9% of government revenue.
In November 2020, Zambia formally defaulted on about $3 billion in eurobonds after a 30-day grace period to pay a $42.5 million coupon due in October ran out, becoming the first African country to default since the onset of the Continent's COVID-19 crisis.
The Zambian government is pursuing domestic reforms to service its debt and achieve growth, but cooperation with Western and Chinese creditors is essential for long-term debt sustainability. Since Zambian President Hakainde Hichilema took office in 2021, he has embarked on a domestic reform agenda to accompany external debt restructuring. As part of the reform package, Zambia will cancel more than $2 billion in projects financed by commercial loans to reduce the risk of racking up more non-concessional debt. The Zambian parliament is also debating a Public Debt Management bill that caps total borrowing at 65% of GDP. On July 9, the country's finance ministry also announced plans to fund social programs with tax increases in an effort to keep the Zambian economy on track to meet its targeted growth rate of 4.4% by 2025. While such measures have had a positive impact on Zambia's growth outlook, the country's ability to service its debt in the long term hinges on inking deals with external creditors.

The Public Debt Management bill mandates that total government borrowing cannot exceed 65% of the previous year's GDP, and that the cost of serving external debt cannot exceed 20% of average annual recurrent revenues of the prior three years. Under the bill, all government agencies would also be required to receive written approval from the Treasury Secretary before taking on new debt or face up to five years in prison.
The slow progress in negotiations appears to be due to coordination problems, lack of transparency, and likely disagreement between Chinese and Western governments on debt relief measures. Opaque loan terms, private contracts and hidden debt are common challenges in negotiating Chinese loans, and the same is true in Zambia. Lack of transparency in Chinese contracts has made Western bilateral creditors weary of Chinese commitments to debt restructuring, although it is also likely that Chinese negotiators themselves are experiencing difficulty coordinating the disparate creditors belonging to Chinese state institutions and private companies as they navigate negotiations for the first time. As Zambia is China's first foray into debt restructuring under the G-20 framework, previous debt negotiations have limited applicability to China's position on Zambian talks. However, Sri Lanka and Pakistan's recent attempts to pursue debt forgiveness with China have illustrated Beijing's tendency to restructure loans rather than to forgive them, in contrast to most Western creditors. Chinese restructuring often means extended time horizons, so that while the immediate debt servicing costs are postponed for the borrower — thereby averting default — the debtor country ends up paying more interest in the long term. In other cases, such as Pakistan, China addressed debt sustainability by granting new loans to cover old ones without dipping into foreign currency reserves. China's finance ministry is the biggest shareholder of policy lenders like China Development Bank and Exim Bank, which means that it will suffer the losses of write-offs and restructuring interest-free loans, which could explain the reported hesitancy.

The following Chinese creditors have given loans to the Zambian government from 2001 to 2019: China International Development Cooperation Agency; Eximbank of China ($5 billion); Eximbank/ICBC ($1.5 billion); China Development Bank ($.5 billion); Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (1.5 billion); and the Bank of China ($.4 billion). Zambia also received $1.3 billion from various other, smaller Chinese creditors during this time period.
In 2020, China agreed to defer payments on an undisclosed amount of loans to Zambia in bilateral negotiations.
On June 24, Pakistani Finance Minister Miftah Ismail announced that a consortium of Chinese state banks had agreed to give Pakistan's central bank $2.3 billion in new loans as a way of rolling over $2 billion in previous loans coming due in June and July.
In 2018, China forgave some existing interest on a 10-year $4 billion loan for an Ethiopian railway, but also extended the loan's repayment term by 20 years.
While the Zambian finance ministry's recent cancellation of undisbursed loans shows Chinese willingness to make concessions, China's economic slowdown and concerns over setting costly precedents may curtail the extent to which China is willing to extend debt forgiveness, thereby making some form of compromise the most likely outcome. In February, local activist organizations and the Jubilee Debt Campaign U.K. estimated that Zambia had the capacity to repay between $2.8 billion and $3.5 billion of debt over the next 14 years, leaving the remainder for external and/or domestic creditors to write off. This would mean that some private and bilateral lenders would have to forgive the majority of their loans, which appears unlikely given Chinense lenders' histories. China's recent economic downturn likely further reduces the possibility of ''haircuts,'' as alleviating foreign debt could come with domestic political costs and additional economic constraints. Additionally, Reuters reported on May 31 that a source involved in negotiations said that China's central bank is willing to move ahead. But China's finance ministry has been wary of setting a costly precedent — in particular for Chinese development banks — if it grants large concessions by way of a debt write-off, or ''haircuts'' to Zambia. On the other hand, Beijing has spent billions on its political and economic influence campaign in sub-Saharan Africa in recent decades, which means that — despite the myriad factors constraining debt forgiveness — it is unlikely to abandon negotiations in Zambia due to the negative message it would send to its African partners. As negotiations stretch on and the disbursement of the $1.4 billion IMF package becomes more urgent, it is possible that Western creditors will be more willing to accept Chinese concessions falling short of write-offs, making some combination of relief the most likely outcome.

Zambian Finance Minister Situmbeko Musokotwane told reporters in May that the relief program could require a ''haircut,'' stretching the payment period, adjusting interest rates, or some combination of these measures.
The Zambian negotiations will provide other borrowers with a sense of how China could handle debt talks in the future, particularly in Africa. Over the next seven years, 35% of African governments' external debt service is due to non-Chinese private lenders, compared with 19% due to Chinese lenders. Even so, China's role in debt restructuring will become increasingly relevant for particular cases in which China owns a large proportion of debt, especially as the list of African countries at high risk of debt distress grows. Angola, Ethiopia and the Republic of Congo are three cases that meet both criteria, as each country has a high percentage of external Chinese debt and faces a high risk of default. Of these three, Ethiopia is the only country pursuing debt restructuring under the G-20 Common Framework and therefore likely has the most to glean from China's position on Zambia. Given the differences in debt composition, Zambian negotiations do not represent a ''one-size-fits-all'' approach. However, the results of the Zambian creditor committee's negotiations could provide insights into how willing China may be to forgive (rather than restructure) debt if and when defaults occur.

Ethiopia's $44 billion of public debt is increasingly difficult for the government to service, given rising inflation and its depreciating currency. China accounts for an estimated $13.7 billion (almost a third) of Ethiopia's total public debt, and Addis Ababa spends almost twice as much to service Chinese debt than private debt. China has a key role to play as Ethiopia also attempts to secure debt restructuring under the G-20 Common Framework.

[Crafty_Dog]

How Coastal West Africa Is Responding to an Expanding Jihadist Threat
12 MIN READSep 2, 2022 | 14:30 GMT





A British soldier leaves the Hombori area aboard a Chinook helicopter on March 28, 2019 during the start of the French Barkhane Force operation in Mali's Gourma region.
A British soldier leaves the Hombori area aboard a Chinook helicopter on March 28, 2019 during the start of the French Barkhane Force operation in Mali's Gourma region.

(DAPHNE BENOIT/AFP via Getty Images)

By David Newman, RANE Global Security Analyst

Growing insecurity in Mali, Burkina Faso and Nigeria is forcing littoral West African nations to reckon with a rising jihadist threat to their territories, but their military-led approach is unlikely to be successful absent broader improvements to governance, economic development and regional coordination. Mali and Burkina Faso have faced worse deterioration in their security environments than has Nigeria. After the junta seized power in May 2021, Mali has grown increasingly alienated from the international community, as evidenced by France's recently completed withdrawal from the country in August 2022; the EU suspension of elements of its training mission in April 2022; Mali's withdrawal from the Group of Five (G5) Sahel in May 2022; and its ongoing tense relationship with the U.N. peacekeeping mission (MINUSMA, short for the U.N. Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali). Especially since France began its withdrawal in February, jihadist groups like Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) have exploited the resulting security vacuum and expanded their activities southward from Mali's northern and central regions to the capital of Bamako, which they now directly threaten. In Burkina Faso, a January 2022 coup — ostensibly driven by frustrations over the government's inability to stop jihadist attacks — has not led to any clear improvements in security, and jihadists continue to expand their geographic reach. As a result of the western Sahel's deteriorating security, Cote d'Ivoire, Togo, Benin and Ghana have experienced a spike in jihadist activity, and militants in Mali and Burkina Faso have increasingly carried out cross-border attacks. To the east, Nigeria's security has not meaningfully improved — and in some cases has deteriorated — under President Muhammadu Buhari's administration, most notably demonstrated by the fact that the Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP) continues to expand geographically and stage attacks farther from its northeast operating bases to the point that it threatens the capital of Abuja. In conjunction with an ever-turbulent northwest region plagued by bandit gangs and the al Qaeda-linked Ansaru jihadist group, this expansion has allowed Islamist militant groups to forge relationships and transport resources across borders.

Highlighting jihadist geographic expansion in Mali, on July 20, Katibat Macina, a local group affiliated with JNIM, attacked Mali's main military base and the residence of interim President Assimi Goita, located approximately 15 kilometers (about 9 miles) from Bamako.

Togo, Benin and Cote d'Ivoire have all experienced cross-border jihadist attacks from neighboring Mali and Burkina Faso over the past year. The tri-border region between Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger has been a hotbed for JNIM and ISGS attacks and cross-border transport for years now, and ISWAP continues to wage an insurgency in Niger's Diffa region in the Lake Chad Basin region it shares with Nigeria and Cameroon. Ghana has not yet experienced such attacks, but in early July, militants from Burkina Faso crossed into Ghana's Upper East Region in pursuit of Burkinabe citizens fleeing attacks in the notoriously porous border region.

Reflecting jihadist groups' focus on local recruitment and suggesting an emerging threat to Benin, JNIM featured two fighters speaking Bariba — one of the languages used by local communities living in northern Benin — in a recruitment video the group circulated on social media in early August. Meanwhile, a recent report from a local Ghanaian news source estimated that jihadist organizations have recruited 200-300 Ghanaian citizens in Burkina Faso.

A March 2022 report by the South Africa-based Institute for Security Studies noted that violent extremists take advantage of local conflicts and porous borders to traffic resources like arms and motorbikes from Nigeria through Benin and Togo to Burkina Faso. Such a free flow of resources enables groups to fund their operations, make valuable contacts, support recruitment efforts, and more deeply infiltrate the coastal states overall.

In response to the expanded threat, coastal West African states have adopted a military-led approach to counterterrorism through increased border security and bilateral agreements. Over the past year, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo and Benin have all increased troop deployments to their northern border regions in an attempt to stave off jihadist encroachment. With relatively small and generally poorly trained and equipped militaries ranging from approximately 10,000-16,000 active personnel, however, governments are attempting to bolster their defense capabilities through bilateral agreements with regional states and major foreign partners. Having just completed its withdrawal from Mali, France is repositioning a reduced troop deployment in Niger and has offered further security cooperation with other West African states including Benin and Cote d'Ivoire. West African states are also seeking arms, training and other forms of security cooperation from major global partners like the United States, the European Union, Turkey, China and Russia. With a heightened focus on border security, governments have been particularly interested in acquiring drone technologies for border surveillance and perhaps targeted strikes. Beyond major foreign partners, West African states are also seeking to strengthen regional bilateral relationships to carry out joint operations and share intelligence. Since July 2022, for example, Niger has signed a military cooperation agreement with neighboring Benin and agreed to begin conducting joint operations with Burkina Faso in its border regions, while Togo reportedly increased its intelligence sharing with Burkina Faso and Ghana following a July 15 attack in its northern Savanes region.

In 2021, West Africa accounted for more than 40% of defense spending in sub-Saharan Africa, according to the U.K.-based International Institute for Strategic Studies. Highlighting the worsening threat environment, Benin, Ghana, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Senegal all increased defense spending by more than 20% from 2020-2021, even as the majority of other sub-Saharan African countries decreased defense spending. The largest arms exporters to sub-Saharan Africa from 2016-2020 were Russia, China, France and the United States, in that order.
France intends to keep about 2,500 troops in the Sahel, including about 1,300 troops in Niger, 700-1,000 troops in Chad and a few hundred troops in Burkina Faso. French President Emmanuel Macron has also stated his intent to ensure that France offers further security cooperation with littoral West African states, as evidenced by his July 27 visit to Benin, which was preceded by the French Armed Forces Minister Sebastien Lecornu's July 16 visit to Cote d'Ivoire. That said, rising anti-French sentiment in the region (which had helped drive its departure from Mali) will likely make coastal governments more likely to seek less-visible French military support, such as weapons and training, rather than large troop deployments.

Despite U.S. Africa Command being notably under-resourced compared to other U.S. regional combatant commands, the United States maintains a military presence in Ghana, Senegal, Niger and Burkina Faso. In February 2022, the annual U.S.-led Operation Flintlock exercise, a counterterrorism and counterinsurgency training program, was for the first time held in Cote d'Ivoire with Niger, Ghana and Cameroon as additional participants.

Turkey has reached various military cooperation agreements with several West African states — including Niger, Benin, Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire — with the most recent deals signed with Togo in August 2021 and Senegal in February 2022. Some of these deals include the Turkish sale of its acclaimed TB2 Bayraktar armed drones, which African states likely intend to bolster their airstrike and surveillance capabilities without the costlier equipment and training required for more technically complex conventional airstrike capabilities with manned aircraft.

Despite these military moves, poor governance and economic challenges will limit coastal states' ability to limit jihadist expansion. In addition to securing borders, the effectiveness of each state's counterterrorism efforts will also hinge on its ability to win the "hearts and minds" of border communities most vulnerable to jihadist recruitment and/or coercion. This will be a challenge, however, because many coastal states possess a clear "north-south" divide, where there is a Muslim-majority north that feels neglected if not outright discriminated against. In addition to being closer physically to Sahelian jihadist groups, these northern areas have seen far less economic development, have vastly less physical infrastructure, and receive far fewer government services compared to the southern parts of the country that typically house the centers of government power and economic activity. Residing in countries that are already some of the least developed in the world amid rising food insecurity, global commodity prices and youth unemployment, these communities are particularly susceptible to violent extremists, who have proven adept at exploiting local grievances to recruit and insinuate themselves into local communities. While West African states have acknowledged the importance of addressing terrorism's root causes, and some have launched development and education initiatives to supplement their heightened security deployments, these efforts are in their infancy and largely more rhetorically than practically significant. This means that the balance remains heavily on the side of military initiatives, with the attendant risk that they either mistakenly or even deliberately harm civilians and risk communal alienation that jihadist groups could exploit.

Highlighting the north-south divide in coastal states, a 2019 World Bank report noted that while the extreme poverty rate in Ghana has drastically declined over the past three decades, inequality in the country has widened, with poverty now heavily concentrated in three northern regions. The same is true for neighboring coastal states: for example, the poverty rate in Togo's northernmost region was 74.6% but just 23.7% in its southernmost region in 2015.

A May 2022 report by the Morocco-based Policy Center for the New South noted government discrimination and social exclusion directed toward ethnic Fulani pastoralists in both the Sahel and coastal West Africa. Al Qaeda-linked groups have historically exploited this dynamic to recruit from Fulani populations across the region, as evidenced in June 2021, when JNIM used an ethnic Fulani Ghanaian to carry out a suicide bombing against French forces in Mali.

On July 9, the Togolese military carried out an airstrike in the northern Tone prefecture of the Savanes region that killed seven teenagers after mistaking them for a group of militants. Within a week, the Beninese army killed a Fulani pastoralist after mistaking him for a JNIM fighter in its northern Alibori region. While these two incidents reflect the risk of mistakenly targeting civilians, a July 2022 Amnesty International report noted that heightened security deployments in Togo and Benin have also led to the arbitrary arrests of individuals based on their ethnic Fulani identity, among other human rights abuses. If such abuses continue, they risk leading to direct targeting of civilians in military operations and extrajudicial killings, which in Mali resulted in its soldiers (and allegedly Russian private contractors) summarily executing more than 300 civilians (the majority of whom were ethnic Fulani) in the village of Moura in March 2022.

Togo's Inter-Ministerial Committee for the Prevention and Fight Against Violent Extremism was formed in 2019 and seeks to study the vulnerabilities in local communities that can push young people toward extremist groups and to promote civil-military relations in its north. In July 2022, the Ghanaian government launched a "See Something, Say Something" campaign and created a hotline for citizens to report suspicious activity. While it is too early to evaluate the efficacy of such preventive measures, it will likely hinge on governments addressing much deeper and harder to combat socioeconomic and political challenges in regions vulnerable to jihadist exploitation. For example, according to Ghanaian government statistics, the majority of populations living in the northern regions of the country do not own a phone of any kind nor have access to the internet — both of which would be essential to contacting the hotline to report suspicious activity.

At the broader regional level, multilateral institutions and initiatives will continue to face funding shortfalls, disputes among members, and command and control challenges that will limit effective counterterrorism cooperation and coordination. Among many others, the most notable components of the regional security architecture are the G5 Sahel Joint Force (now effectively G4 Sahel following Mali's departure in May); the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Standby Force, which is currently deployed in Guinea-Bissau; the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) that combats ISWAP and Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin; and the Accra Initiative, a multilateral security cooperation mechanism established by Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Togo in 2017 (with Mali and Niger as observers). While varied in terms of size and structure, all of these share common challenges including insufficient funding, overlapping responsibilities, and disunity among member states that hinder consistent and effective operations; this is especially because they risk overcrowding the security space with overlapping and at times conflicting geographic spheres of responsibility that regional states with severe capacity constraints are ill-equipped to balance. Finally, the effectiveness of all these initiatives depends on what often can be tense relations among member states, meaning interstate disputes can hamper counterterrorism progress.

ECOWAS has the most developed and institutionalized counterterrorism mechanisms, but the bloc has yet to actually implement such strategies despite their being years old, causing member states to look to coalitions of the willing like MNJTF and G5 Sahel Joint Force for counterterrorism support. These coalitions, however, are heavily reliant on external funding from the United States, France and the European Union meaning that the support will wax and wane with the political will and policy changes of these countries regardless of the urgency with which coastal states perceive it.

The most prominent recent demonstration of interstate disputes hampering regional counterterrorism efforts can be seen in Mali's May 15 withdrawal from the G5 Sahel due to the other member states' refusal to allow the Malian junta to assume the rotating presidency. Even before Mali withdrew, an April U.N. monitoring report noted that the G5 Sahel defense ministers had not met since November 2021, and a follow-up report in June said that since the start of 2022, the joint force conducted only three reconnaissance missions in the tri-border region between Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso.

While some member states may seek to revive or restructure the G5 Sahel Joint Force, littoral West African states may also look to the Accra Initiative as another avenue for multilateral counterterrorism operations in the region. Having only conducted four joint operations since its founding in 2017, the Accra Initiative will also struggle to acquire sufficient funding for future operations and will have to manage interstate tensions to be fully effective.

[Crafty_Dog]

Africa’s Ukraine Dilemma
Why the Continent Is Caught Between Russia and the West
By Nanjala Nyabola
September 5, 2022
A tank destroyed in Ethiopia’s civil war, Afar region, Ethiopia, February 2022
A tank destroyed in Ethiopia’s civil war, Afar region, Ethiopia, February 2022
Tiksa Negeri / Reuters
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/africa/africa-ukraine-dilemma-between-russia-west


As Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine enters its seventh month, many African countries have yet to show strong support for Kyiv, to the chagrin of Western leaders. In the early days of the conflict, after 17 African countries declined to back a UN resolution condemning Russia, several European diplomats assigned to African capitals made a grand show of browbeating African leaders for not taking a stand against the invasion. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, in particular, was the target of some strikingly undiplomatic tweets, with Riina Kionka, at the time the EU’s ambassador to Pretoria, writing that “we were puzzled because [South Africa] sees itself and is seen by the world as a country championing human rights.”

Despite continued Western pressure, however, the situation has not changed much in the months since. In July, for example, French President Emmanuel Macron traveled to central Africa and West Africa to rally support for Ukraine, yet he managed only to rankle many African leaders when he accused them of “hypocrisy” for refusing to condemn the war. By contrast, during a visit to multiple African countries that same month, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov emphasized Russia’s ties with the continent and portrayed Russia as a “victim” in Ukraine. To date, only a handful of African countries—Ghana, Kenya, and Nigeria among them—have taken a strong stance on the war, and even these have focused primarily on denouncing aggression more broadly and on general calls for diplomacy and peace rather than on specific criticism of Moscow.

Although leaders in the West are puzzled by these developments, there are clear reasons for African countries’ reluctance to embrace the Western narrative about Ukraine. For one thing, Africa is a huge, complicated, and highly diverse continent, and its 54 countries and territories each have unique circumstances and histories, as well as different relations to both Russia and the West. It would be unreasonable—and condescending—to assume that the continent's leaders could unify around a single position instantaneously. When African countries have come together around a common position in the past, it has often been after years of deliberation, as with the transition from the Organization of African Unity to the African Union, which took place in 2002 but had been in the works since the late 1990s. On other occasions, a common front has been driven by a specific and urgent threat such as the Mano River Ebola outbreak or the COVID-19 pandemic, which African countries knew they could not weather without a united front. For Africa, Russia’s war in Ukraine has neither of these qualities.

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Moreover, the skepticism in African capitals about taking the Western side in a faraway war in Europe is also rooted in a power imbalance between the West and African countries that routinely plays out as structural violence. Beyond many historical injustices that go unacknowledged—let alone accounted for—contemporary forms of injustice persist. Leaders of Western nations are quick to sweep violent colonial and neocolonial histories under the rug while African countries continue to deal with their consequences. Consider the COVID-19 pandemic, in which African countries were left begging for medicines and vaccines that Western nations were throwing away by the millions, compounding the sense of conditional friendship. Once Russia’s own efforts to sway African countries are added to the mix, history makes it difficult for the United States and its European allies to build an African coalition against Moscow.

PUTIN AND THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS
Of course one explanation for African reluctance to fall into line with the West on Ukraine is Russia’s own activities in Africa. As Western governments and analysts have noted, Moscow has been engaged in a large-scale disinformation campaign, particularly online, to shape African opinion about the conflict. This effort builds on previous Russian disinformation campaigns that have affected political processes elsewhere, including in the United States. In May, The Economist published a study of Twitter accounts used to spread Russian disinformation about the war; a large number of these accounts were based in Africa and seemed to be deliberately targeting African communities.

One doctored image shared widely by African Twitter accounts since the war began purportedly showed a young Putin with former President of Mozambique Samora Machel in a Tanzanian training camp for freedom fighters in the 1970s. In reality, no such meetings could have occurred: Putin is not old enough to have been in Tanzania when these photographs would have been taken. But the images went viral, in part because they served to reinforce African grievances about the West’s colonial legacy on the continent. Indeed, Machel later died in a mysterious plane crash that South Africa’s Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission linked to the Apartheid government in South Africa, at the time a Western ally.


Russia claims it is on the right side of African history.
The wars of decolonization in Africa are not ancient history. As recently as 2018, a group of living victims of the British colonial government in Kenya successfully sued the British government for the torture they endured in internment camps during Kenya’s independence war in the 1950s. Other Cold War injustices are only beginning to be addressed. In June of this year, the Belgian government returned, to the descendants of the victim, a gold-crowned tooth that belonged to Patrice Lumumba, the first prime minister of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), who was assassinated by a Belgian execution squad in 1961 in a U.S.-backed plot.

For many of these countries, communism provided an alternative to Western colonialism and a basis for twentieth-century African independence movements—a legacy that has allowed contemporary Russia, as a successor state to the Soviet Union, to portray itself as on the right side of African history. Of course, Soviet support for decolonization movements did not come only from Russia: much of it came from other parts of the communist bloc including Ukraine. But Russia has adeptly claimed this reputation and exploited Africa’s complicated relationship with the West.

BETTER ARMED THAN ALLIED
A second reason African countries have been slow to support Ukraine stems from differences between the way African countries and their Western counterparts view contemporary geopolitics. Many of the governments currently pivoting to Russia—including Mali, Ethiopia, and Uganda —owe their political survival to Russian support. For instance, Russia is a key weapons supplier, and has provided military support through mercenary forces like the Wagner Group, to many of the African countries that abstained from the UN vote condemning Russian aggression. Today, Russia is the largest weapons exporter to Africa, accounting for 44 percent of weapons purchases between 2017 and 2021 on the continent, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (Ukraine is also a weapons supplier to some African countries, particularly South Sudan.)

Notably, several African leaders with longtime Western backing have not hesitated to cultivate Russian military support. With Western support, for example, Yoweri Museveni has ruled Uganda for 38 years; Paul Biya has ruled Cameroon for 40. Both have been able to remain in office, in the face of copious evidence of crimes against their people. (Macron was in Cameroon when he made his remark about hypocrisy.) Yet, although the United States trains Ugandan soldiers to fight on its behalf in countries like Somalia, Uganda primarily buys its arms from Russia and  had the sharpest increase in military expenditure in Africa in 2020. Similarly, Cameroon, which is a major beneficiary of French largesse, signed a weapons deal with Moscow in April 2022, shortly after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. For authoritarian regimes, efforts to play off both sides ties has reinforced the continent's ambivalence toward Ukraine.


The last time Africans were asked to take sides, countries were devastated and millions died.
But for other countries, what Macron calls hypocrisy is more plausibly understood as conflict fatigue.  After all, Africa has experienced, and continues to experience, many intractable wars of its own. During the Cold War, many African wars were proxy battles between the Soviet Union and the United States. Although Western powers have been slow to recognize it, the legacy of those conflicts—including in Angola, the DRC, Mozambique, and elsewhere—continues to cast a long shadow on many parts of the continent. The last time Africans were asked to take sides in a war between West and East, countries were devastated, and millions of people died.

In his classic essay on decolonization, “Concerning Violence,” published in his 1961 book The Wretched of the Earth, the psychiatrist and political philosopher Frantz Fanon wrote that “neutralism produces in the citizen of the third world … a fearlessness and an ancestral pride resembling defiance.” He argued that for African countries, staying neutral was necessary for survival. But he criticized African leaders for allowing neutralism to fuel foreign efforts to militarize the continent. Today, the same pattern is emerging and the warning stands. Russia has already promised to expand weapons supplies to African countries in what is clearly an effort to buy their allegiances. Now, many activists and leaders in pro-democracy circles  fear that the continent is entering another period in which efforts by foreign powers to buy friends in African governments will herald a new era of poor leadership.

THE MISSING PEACE
African countries have a unique vantage point toward Russia’s war in Ukraine. Rather than inviting more of them to join in war, Western countries could use this opportunity to allow Africans to put into practice the lessons they have learned from generations of war on their own soil. The African Union has declared that one of its aims is “silencing the guns by 2030,” and African countries have some of the most complex mechanisms for peace and security in the world, in part because they are so frequently called into use. The Peace and Security Council of the African Union, for example, is a standing decision making body within the union, while sub-regional organizations such s the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have gone as far as building their own peacekeeping and early warning capacities. For those who have worked with such bodies, the overarching question about the war in Ukraine is, “Where are the peacemakers?” Aside from the UN Secretary General, they do not see much evidence of world leaders urging deescalation. Isn’t a conflict between Russia and the West the precise scenario that international diplomacy exists to address?

Indeed, African countries know how difficult ending wars can be. In East Africa alone, multiple conflicts are underway, including in eastern DRC, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan. Several of these have been devastating: there is mounting evidence of genocide in Ethiopia’s Tigray region, and Sudanese people continue to struggle for an end to military rule as other countries—including Russia—offer the military regime military and financial support. These conflicts have triggered interventions by the African Union, the Inter-Governmental Agency for Development, and the East African Community, not to mention a few bilateral efforts at mediation. Some of these wars have been raging for a generation. African countries’ collective hesitation to be drawn into Ukraine must be interpreted, in part, in light of this visceral awareness of the long-term harm that wars on the continent have produced.

History reminds African countries to approach the conflict in Ukraine with caution and to treat claims of friendship with suspicion. For many Africans, the current overtures from both Russia and the West are not about friendship. They are about using Africa as a means to an end. Authoritarian leaders like Biya can and have reaped benefits from the war. But the dominant African position, given the large uncertainties about the war and its outcome, has been to demand peace and urge diplomacy—and, whenever possible, to avoid having to take sides in a conflict that seems unlikely to offer much to Africa, particularly if it turns the continent into a new theater of proxy war

[Crafty_Dog]

Burkina Faso's Government Demands a French Military Withdrawal
5 MIN READJan 24, 2023 | 21:10 GMT


The French military withdrawal from Burkina Faso will likely accelerate the spread of the jihadist insurgencies already running rampant in the country, putting the capital and other coastal West African countries in greater danger of attack. This will increase the risk of political instability and worsen Burkina Faso's already poor economic outlook. Burkinabe government spokesman Jean-Emmanuel Ouedraogo on Jan. 23 confirmed that French troops must withdraw from Burkina Faso within one month — a call that first appeared on the state-owned Burkina Information Agency on Jan. 18 — ending days of uncertainty about the future of French operations in the country. French President Emmanuel Macron on Jan. 22 had said that he was awaiting clarification from Burkinabe interim President Ibrahim Traore directly, but Ouedraogo said the decision had been made and no confirmation was needed.

France has approximately 400 troops stationed in Burkina Faso to support local counterterrorism operations. The Burkinabe government now apparently has suspended the 2018 military accord that allowed this French military presence in the country.

The demand for France's withdrawal comes amid heightened anti-French sentiment and expanding jihadist insurgencies. Hundreds of protesters, some of whom held Russian flags, demonstrated Jan. 20-1 in the Burkinabe capital of Ouagadougou against France's continued military presence in the country. Similar demonstrations have occurred in the last few years given that many in Burkina Faso blame France for the various jihadist insurgencies that control nearly 40% of Burkina Faso's territory. While evidence suggests that French military cooperation in the Sahel has actually bolstered local military capabilities against jihadists, the insurgencies' spread has fueled allegations (in part perpetuated through Russian disinformation campaigns) that French operations represent Western imperialism and have failed to improve security. Traore took power in a military coup in September 2022, and so is not directly accountable to a public angry with the Burkinabe government's handling of rising insecurity and continued willingness to host French troops. That said, both Traore and his predecessor, Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba (who seized power in a January 2022 military coup after an intense round of anti-French protests), in part used anger over just these issues to overthrow two successive governments. Traore may now be attempting to preserve his own power within the military establishment by using France as a scapegoat for worsening insecurity.

Traore also tried and failed to secure new weapons contracts with both the United States and France, but reportedly has succeeded with some military equipment purchases from Russia in late 2022, so kicking France out will not necessarily mean Burkina Faso cannot still acquire weapons.

The French withdrawal from Burkina Faso may coincide with the introduction of Russian paramilitary forces, and will likely further degrade security in Burkina Faso and neighboring states, undermining political stability and economic growth. In December 2022, Burkina Faso's mines minister denied allegations by Ghanaian President Nana Akufo-Addo that the Burkinabe government paid Russian mercenaries from the Russian paramilitary Wagner Group by giving them rights to a mine on Burkina Faso's southern border with Ghana. While these allegations were never proved or completely dispelled, France's departure from Burkina Faso makes a Wager deployment far more likely, as several African states (including Burkina Faso's northwestern neighbor Mali) have turned to the paramilitary group for military support and private security in recent years when relationships with Western partners deteriorated. If Wagner troops are, or will soon be, in Burkina Faso, their presence will likely worsen insecurity due to their regular human rights violations. As seen in Mali, such violations have hardened negative attitudes toward the government and driven jihadist recruitment. Even without a Wagner intervention in Burkina Faso, France's withdrawal portends reduced intelligence, communications, logistics and materiel capabilities for the Burkinabe military, which will very likely create opportunities for local branches of al Qaeda and the Islamic State to expand their operations. Given already high public discontent with insecurity, further jihadist encroachment — perhaps including increased strikes near the capital of Ouagadougou — is likely to stoke public anger, providing future windows for opportunistic military leaders to seize power as happened with Damiba and Traore. The French withdrawal will also raise the threat levels in neighboring West African states, where jihadist groups already target northern communities in Ghana, Benin, Togo and Cote d'Ivoire. Burkina Faso is already one of the world's poorest nations, and strengthened jihadist insurgencies will reinforce this status by inhibiting local business activity and trade; investor hesitancy is also likely to increase in neighboring states where jihadist activity is a growing threat.

More than 40% of the Burkinabe population lives below the global poverty line, and the country ranks 184 out of 191 in the 2021-22 Human Development Index report produced by the United Nations. Poor infrastructure, an arid climate and limited natural resources, among other challenges, have hampered Burkina Faso's economic growth for decades. Ongoing insurgencies also have constrained gold exports and agricultural production, further reducing growth prospects.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.insider.com/generals-sudan-fighting-aided-russia-gold-ukraine-war-2023-4?fbclid=IwAR1M7mkGMJgDohLWbsxZHJMcb4fr-5ZsT-cLAns_LZ3ZwXgGsQ9owuisV24

[Crafty_Dog]

To Counter China, Look to the Democratic Republic of Congo
By investing in cobalt, the U.S. can protect its strategic and economic interests while supporting human rights.
By Melissa Skorka
April 27, 2023 6:43 pm ET

Winston Churchill in 1911 decided to replace the British coal that powered the Royal Navy with oil from abroad. The West’s security and prosperity have depended on foreign hydrocarbons ever since. In the months since Russia invaded Ukraine, the risks raised by that dependence have been on glaring display.

The coming decades will bring a change in energy production just as epochal as the shift from coal to oil, and with geopolitical risks that are equally fraught. As American industry weans itself from fossil fuels, demand for cobalt—a key ingredient in batteries and select parts in electric cars, mobile phones, laptops and other technologies—will skyrocket. By 2040, global use of the mineral could increase more than 20-fold relative to 2020 levels, assuming countries meet the pledges they made in the Paris Agreement to deploy clean energy technologies.

If tomorrow’s economy will depend on cobalt, so will tomorrow’s military. The mineral is essential for fighter jet parts, precision munitions, stealth technology and more. Countries’ abilities to stockpile and deliver weapons can determine outcomes on the battlefield, as increasingly happens in Ukraine. The competition for rare-earth materials will grow as competition heats up between China, Russia and the U.S.

American access to cobalt depends largely on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, home to more of the mineral than the rest of the world put together. But in recent years Chinese firms have locked up access to most of Congo’s productive reserves of cobalt, with relatively little response from Washington. Today, China refines 80% of the world’s cobalt and 60% of its lithium and dominates the production of other minerals essential to the energy transition and defense manufacturing. The U.S. has no major cobalt-refining capacity, and the country’s cobalt stockpile has withered, from 13,000 tons during the Cold War to 333 tons in 2021.


The U.S. desperately needs a plan to erode China’s market share. Beijing can use its refining capacity to disrupt supply chains the U.S. uses and threaten trade disputes to advance Chinese aims. Further consolidation of the global cobalt market would let China raise the threat of export restrictions on materials that will power America’s industrial and military future. Experts like Joseph Dunford, a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a retired Marine Corps general, know the risks of allowing China to control supply chains. “America’s dependence on China for materials critical to U.S. national security not only risks strengthening President Xi’s hand, but it could also affect the strategic calculus of Beijing, Moscow, and other potential adversaries in conflict,” he said in an interview.

China’s near-monopoly on Congolese cobalt is bad news for the Congolese people. Cobalt extraction there often entails grotesque human-rights abuses, such as forced child labor and dangerous working conditions. During a visit to Congo this year, Pope Francis condemned “terrible forms of exploitation, unworthy of humanity and of creation” in the country’s mining sector. Chinese mining companies, which often flout labor and environmental protections, are unlikely to ensure that the cobalt they extract from local dealers is untainted by these abuses. The Congolese government could in theory revoke and nationalize Chinese firms’ stakes in Congo’s mining sector, but it is unlikely to take such a step, which could potentially increase economic and political tensions with Beijing at a time of heightened strategic competition on the continent.

The U.S. government must act. As a first step, the president should reinstate the role of Special Envoy to the Great Lakes Region of Africa, who was charged with advancing U.S. democratic ideals and human rights in the region. The new envoy would also oversee the effort to stockpile essential minerals from Congo. The envoy should forge multilateral arrangements with allied countries such as France, Germany and Belgium over shared concerns about energy and economic security.

Market forces alone can’t guarantee prospective U.S. mining companies’ resource security, especially in the face of China’s near-dominance in the sector. Congress can reauthorize the African Growth and Opportunities Act, which would provide the Congo with tariff-free priority access to U.S. markets, before it expires in 2025. Helping Western firms acquire bigger stakes in critical mineral reserves will help reduce American dependence on Beijing and warn China to rethink some of its policies on trade restrictions and security engagements in Africa and beyond.

More U.S. investment in Congo’s rare-earth minerals could also help the African country’s mining communities by raising safety standards and supporting economic growth. U.S. companies will be required to uphold global standards in concert with democratic allies on transparency, human rights and climate-resilient issues. U.S. investment also could lead to allocation of more profit to clean-energy infrastructure and development needs, such as schools and health clinics, technology and safety training, traceability mechanisms to the mine, and open, secure digital networks that aren’t subject to Chinese surveillance. A joint-venture approach facilitated by the new U.S. Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, the U.S. Development Finance Corporation, and Prosper Africa could also facilitate public-private partnerships between American and Congolese governments and businesses.

China has raced ahead in the competition for critical minerals. But the U.S. still has special advantages, thanks to domestic market demand, cutting-edge technology, military alliances, and, vitally, its willingness to support the Congolese people. It is time to seize those advantages. Diplomatic and financial investments in Congo should be a humanitarian and strategic priority.

Ms. Skorka is a senior fellow at Oxford’s Changing Character of War Centre. She served as a strategic adviser to the Defense Department in national security and extractive industry, 2011-14.

[Crafty_Dog]

   
China’s New Approach in Africa
The Belt and Road Initiative hasn’t gone as planned.
By: Ronan Wordsworth

China is moving away from its landmark Belt and Road Initiative in favor of smaller direct investments in strategic projects like renewable power and communications. In 2013, Beijing unveiled the Belt and Road, consisting of huge loans for gargantuan infrastructure projects in the Global South. Africa was a major recipient of these loans. However, many BRI projects have not been completed or have been hamstrung by ballooning budgets, failure to repay debts or poor workmanship overseen by Chinese engineers. These disappointments are leading Beijing to reassess its strategy toward Africa.

Resource Security and Political Capital

China’s endgame in Africa is to create favorable trade relationships and a reliable pipeline of natural resources. The strategy behind BRI was to exchange investment for political capital. China would help its partners develop transit routes to promote trade, both within the continent and with the outside world. For Beijing, warm relations with BRI recipients would ensure supply chain security and cheap mineral extraction with reduced royalty payments. At the time, China was also concerned about the security of its oil supply. Improved relations would also support Africa’s imports of Chinese goods; in 2009, China surpassed the U.S. as the top trading partner for Africa, and today it trails only the EU.

Generally, Chinese capital has flowed to Africa in two forms: foreign direct investment or loans from the government, commercial banks or state-owned banks. Over the past few years, however, Beijing has poured less capital into things like transportation infrastructure, hydrocarbon pipelines and massive power projects. Instead, it is focused on buying equity in mining projects, funding smaller power-generation projects (especially renewable power), building internet and communications networks, and modernizing African government facilities. Renewable power projects are often profitable in the short term and generate goodwill with ruling parties, as do investments in government buildings.

One thing China has found is that it can access the continent’s critical minerals, oil and gas without the huge investments that it once thought were key. Of the $169 billion that Chinese development banks and the government have lent to Africa, for example, a quarter went to Angola to be invested in its state-run oil company in a bid to ensure China’s own oil supply. Today, 25 percent of China’s oil and gas comes from Africa, behind only the Middle East. Through long-term supply contracts and favorable political conditions, China has avoided its immediate supply security fears. The same has been true of critical minerals like lithium, copper and cobalt. In the past, Beijing overinvested in resource-rich countries and used the minerals as collateral. In fact, African politicians were grateful for the Chinese investment and the often-favorable partnership terms with Chinese mining companies.

China's Loan Value in Africa and Balance of Payments
(click to enlarge)

Chinese lending ramped up through the 2010s and peaked in 2016. From 2012 to 2018, when China stopped funding many of these projects, its Africa loans totaled $107.9 billion – a huge burden on China’s coffers. The massive scale of BRI lending globally brought China’s current account balance down to just $24 billion in 2018 from $293 billion in 2015, before rebounding after large external loans were drastically reduced. In 2020, China issued only $1.8 billion in loans – a massive drop. This slide looks set to continue.

Financial and Political Problems

China’s initial investment model ran into multiple problems. Financially, China has had trouble recouping much of the bilateral debt, and contrary to debt-trap fears, it has generally been accommodating when it comes to debt relief and deferred payments for emerging economies. Leniency is in China’s interest, as its African counterparts are major trading partners sitting on minerals that China processes into high-value goods.

Largest Bilateral Debtors to China
(click to enlarge)

Of its major loan recipients in Africa, Zambia has defaulted on repayments; Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya and Egypt are at high risk of default; and additional requests for debt relief are highly likely. Each of these countries has more than 30 percent of government revenue going toward interest payments on debt through 2023.

Politically, Beijing is faced with a choice between further debt reduction, which would keep the pressure on its own financial situation, or refusing the requests and jeopardizing the goodwill it has accrued. In addition, other creditors such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank would condemn Beijing’s intransigence. China is choosing the former. In March, Ghana’s finance minister visited Beijing to negotiate debt restructuring. Zambia has been negotiating with China and other creditors for three years on debt restructuring, a write-down on outstanding balances and reduced interest rates. The G-7 and U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen have accused China of dragging its feet on relief for highly indebted countries.

Moreover, some countries are questioning the value of Chinese loans and development finance that was earmarked for large infrastructure projects. For example, the Democratic Republic of Congo recently announced that it will reassess its mining concessions with Beijing. It believes the terms may be too skewed in China’s favor. Similarly, Nigeria has concerns about the sustainability of previously incurred debt to Beijing. By mid-2022, Nigeria’s debt owed to China accounted for 84 percent of its total $4.9 billion in bilateral debt. A large proportion of Nigeria’s government revenue is going toward debt servicing, and it has been attempting to negotiate lower interest rates, believing China’s rates are exploitative.

Finally, from China’s perspective, BRI loans are unnecessary for securing access to African natural resources. China has already established itself within the African market. One example is Zimbabwe, where China has secured significant lithium mining rights without huge infrastructure projects. Even as Zimbabwe has nationalized processing and refining, China has defended its position; the only companies with lithium refineries in Zimbabwe are Chinese-owned.

New Strategy

With this in mind, China has moved away from financing massive infrastructure projects in favor of smaller ventures. Earlier this year, Uganda canceled a contract worth $2.2 billion with China Harbour Engineering Co. to build a 273-kilometer section of a standard gauge railway, citing delays in China's financing. Kenya is also seeking funding to build its own line of the railway, but it received just $12.7 million from China this year for the project. Likewise, Nigeria has been seeking $22.8 billion for a new Kaduna-Kano railway. In 2016, China’s Exim Bank signed an agreement to fund the project. The Nigerian parliament approved the deal in 2020, but the bank pulled out in 2022. Last month, the Nigerian government announced that the China Development Bank would provide a significantly lower sum, $973 million, to finance the railway.

Beijing is now looking for less risky projects in which to direct its investments. For example, reports indicate that China could finance the East African Crude Oil Pipeline from Uganda to a port in Tanzania, after Standard Chartered Bank withdrew due to environmental concerns. The project, administered by French energy giant TotalEnergies, is considered relatively low risk. China will be a major destination for the oil once the pipeline is operational, and Chinese companies have taken over from European firms to construct multiple segments of the pipeline.

China's FDI in Africa
(click to enlarge)

Meanwhile, despite the declining appetite for large loans, China’s foreign direct investment in Africa is steadily rising. Chinese FDI in Africa increased to $44.2 billion in 2021 from $491 million in 2003 and has remained steady over the past five years, even during the COVID-19 pandemic. Its investments are focused on a small group of industries. In 2021, mining accounted for 22.6 percent ($9.9 billion) of Chinese FDI across Africa, while the construction sector accounted for 37 percent ($16.3 billion) and manufacturing for 13.4 percent. Chinese construction companies are still operating in Africa but are no longer working on government contracts paid for by BRI loans. China remains the continent’s single largest trade partner, accounting for 22 percent of Africa’s trade in 2021.

Smaller infrastructure projects are seen as long-term investments and are not funded through development loans. Many are small-scale green energy projects, including hydropower and solar and wind farms. For example, a Namibian-Chinese joint venture signed a deal worth $100 million to develop a 50-megawatt wind power plant. Such initiatives are seen as more sustainable and ultimately more profitable than the massive hydro and coal-fired power stations that previously attracted Chinese funding.

China-Built African Parliament Buildings
(click to enlarge)

Chinese investments in Africa have also been directed at the seats of power on the continent. Beijing has been involved in constructing or refurbishing parliament buildings in 10 countries and other official facilities in five countries across Africa, including the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa. These projects serve as subtle reminders to the political establishment of China’s continued engagement here. Though Beijing is shifting its focus on the continent, it’s clearly not leaving it

[Crafty_Dog]

The Wagner Group's 'New Path' in Africa
Jul 21, 2023 | 15:24 GMT



The recent suggestion that the Wager Group will refocus on operations in Africa could see small influxes of mercenaries support the longevity of military rule through enhanced personal security support, while the repercussions for ongoing conflicts ranging from Libya to Sudan will be much more varied. On July 19, Yevgeny Prigozhin, head of the Russian paramilitary Wagner Group, appeared in a video reposted by Prigozhin's press service on Telegram, in which he told soldiers and supporters that they would no longer take part in the Ukraine war for the time being but to prepare for "a new path to Africa." Prigozhin apparently spoke from Belarus and called the war in Ukraine "a disgrace that we do not need to get involved in," despite the Wagner Group's heavy participation in Russia's invasion of Ukraine until Prigozhin's failed mutiny on June 23-24, which ended with a reported deal between Prigozhin and Russian President Vladimir Putin to allow Wagner troops to relocate to Belarus from Ukraine, retire or join the Ministry of Defense. Since then, Wagner-aligned information outlets claim that up to 10,000 Wagner troops may relocate to Belarus.

On June 23-24, Prigozhin led a convoy of Wagner mercenary forces on a "march of justice" from the Russia-Ukraine border to about 300 kilometers (186 miles) short of the Russian capital Moscow. Prigozhin initially said that the march was to protest the Ministry of Defense's mishandling of the war, specifically naming Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu and General Staff Chief Valery Gerasimov — rather than President Putin — as the targets of the revolt. High-profile disputes between Prigozhin and the tandem of Shoigu and Garasimov had been escalating throughout recent months.

Since Prigozhin's failed mutiny, the Wagner Group's Africa operations have continued largely uninterrupted, despite uncertainty over the future of the paramilitary group. Wagner troops are deployed across the continent, including in the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, Libya, Sudan and potentially Burkina Faso (reports of a small Wagner presence are unconfirmed). Prigozhin's failed uprising generated significant uncertainty over the future of Wagner's command structure, its ability to pay troops, the loyalty of mercenaries to mid- and high-level commanders, and organizational cohesiveness — all of which have cast doubt on the longevity of Wagner deployments in Africa. However, Wagner operations in most, if not all, African theaters have continued business as usual. In CAR, Wagner forces numbering in the low hundreds arrived in the capital Bangui on July 17 to supplement the 1,000 mercenaries already in-country to ensure security ahead of a constitutional referendum scheduled for the end of the month. In Mali, approximately 1,200 Wagner troops continue to conduct training for the Malian military, provide close protection for government officials and carry out counterterrorism missions. In Libya, approximately 2,000 Wagner forces provide military hardware maintenance services and training to Khalifa Hifter's Libyan Arab Armed Forces and allied militias. In Sudan, Wagner has reportedly been supporting the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in its conflict with the Sudanese military by supplying weapons, training and military advising. Finally, reports suggest a small contingent of Wagner mercenaries present in Burkina Faso to support the transitional military government, although such activity is unconfirmed, and the junta denies Wagner's presence.

If the Wagner Group does, in fact, seek a "new path to Africa," small influxes of mercenaries across the continent could markedly bolster the personal security of authoritarian leaders, while the repercussions for ongoing conflicts will be much more varied. The Russia Africa Summit, scheduled for July 27-28 in St. Petersburg, Russia, may provide more insight into African interest in new or enhanced security partnerships. While cooperation deals are unlikely to be highly advertised, discussions of Wagner and other Russian private military groups' capabilities are likely to be a significant source of interest, discussion and speculation on the sidelines of the summit. However, it appears unlikely at this point that all — or even the majority — of Wagner's estimated 10,000 members allegedly destined for Belarus will deploy to Africa. The Wagner Group — and by extension Russia — has used a relatively light paramilitary footprint to gain immense influence in African states without the financial, logistical and other costs that would come from more troops. Despite Prigozhin's remarks in the July 19 video, there is little indication that Russia seeks to alter what has hitherto been a reasonably successful strategy. Furthermore, while some African governments have the financial means to pay for an influx of mercenaries, many do not and have already promised access to state-owned natural resources for years as payment. However, even a small increase in the number of Wagner forces deployed could supplant personal protection details enough to lengthen the tenure of some military leaders, support the Libyan Arab Armed Forces' potential military assault into Western Libya, prolong the civil war in Sudan and/or facilitate the introduction of Wagner troops into new African countries.

Burkina Faso, CAR and Mali: A small increase in Wagner forces to political protection details in these states where mercenaries are already stationed could further support authoritarian leaders' efforts to postpone elections and/or usurp existing constitutional term limits, potentially sustaining military rule in the three countries. However, more Wagner forces in Burkina Faso and/or Mali are very unlikely to turn the tide against jihadist encroachment, given that paramilitary forces have been failing to help regional militaries recapture territory for years, and in some cases, their human rights abuses have only fed jihadist recruitment.

Libya: Hifter and his allies in Eastern Libya have threatened a return to military action if their rivals in Western Libya do not meet their demands for an oil revenue-sharing mechanism by the end of August. A surge in Wagner forces in Libya aligned with Hifter may give the field marshal the confidence needed to launch another military assault into Western Libya. In his failed attempt to seize Tripoli in 2019-20, Wagner troops were instrumental in the fighting along the front lines. For Russia, any escalation of the Libyan conflict would be desirable strategically, as it would force Europe to divert more attention to another conflict theater on its border. Additionally, a flare-up in the war in Libya would serve Russian interests by forcing European states to divert more attention to another conflict theater besides Ukraine, given the likely resulting increase in refugee streams into the European Union.

Sudan: A surge in Wagner support for the RSF would likely extend the duration of the conflict at great humanitarian cost, as the two sides remain deadlocked and civilians continue to flee to neighboring countries. However, Russia's strategic interest in maintaining access to Sudan's port on the Red Sea, which is currently controlled by the Sudanese military, may constrain Wagner's support for the RSF in the long term.

New frontiers: Finally, Wagner expansion in Africa may include paramilitary forces' introduction to new countries, many of which may be amenable to the group's presence. The heads of state of Guinea (currently governed by Colonel Mamady Doumbouya, who is likely to seek to postpone the transition to democratic rule) and Cameroon (where President Paul Biya has ruled since 1982 and has been attempting to end an insurgency in the country's Anglophone regions since 2017) are two such leaders who may be interested in Wagner's security assistance.

[ccp]

can conservatives hire mercenaries

 

[Crafty_Dog]

Africa trip. Top U.S. Treasury Department official Brian Nelson is visiting Kenya and Somalia this week to discuss efforts to combat money laundering and terrorism financing. Nelson reportedly plans to highlight U.S. support for Russian grain and fertilizer deliveries to the continent despite Moscow’s exit from the Black Sea grain deal. Washington has not sanctioned Russian food exports, but the Kremlin claims that the U.S.-led sanctions regime has blocked critical food supplies from reaching African nations.

[Crafty_Dog]

second

   
South Africa’s Difficult Balancing Act
The war in Ukraine has complicated the country’s relations with rival powers.
By: Ronan Wordsworth
Though South Africa has remained outwardly neutral on Russia’s war in Ukraine, its recent actions have increasingly frustrated Western countries. Ahead of a BRICS summit in Pretoria in August and amid U.S. concerns over the country's close military ties to Moscow, a host of South African ministers have been sent on diplomatic missions to G-7 countries to try to smooth the waters. The effort is part of a balancing act that will grow increasingly difficult to maintain as the country is pushed, from both sides, to take a firmer stance.

Foreign Policy

Since gaining independence in 1994, South Africa has consistently been one of the continent’s most developed economies. It has benefited from maintaining strong trade relations with major powers, including the U.S., China and Europe, while also keeping close ties to Russia, a legacy of the Soviet Union’s support for South Africa through the apartheid struggle in the 1970s and 1980s. It’s a resource-rich nation, home to vast reserves of gold, platinum group metals, coal, iron ore and diamonds. It also accounts for over 60 percent of the world’s mined platinum, a metal that's essential in the manufacturing of catalytic converters, electronics, chemicals, communications cables and medical devices. Its role in this critical industry has helped South Africa establish itself as a vital partner for the West, exporting around 80 percent of platinum supplies to the U.S., Japan, the U.K. and Germany.

But the war in Ukraine has complicated the country’s relations with some of its long-standing partners. Both Kyiv and Moscow have spent significant resources lobbying for support from various African countries, some of which have helped Russia evade Western sanctions. The U.S. and the EU have continuously pressed African countries at international forums to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. South Africa is seen as vital to this effort, as it has significant sway over southern Africa’s global outlook.

Officially, South Africa remains neutral, but there have been reports that cargo ships and planes containing weapons and ammunition have departed from South African ports and airports for Russia. Last month, the country led an African peace delegation to both Kyiv and Moscow. President Cyril Ramaphosa was the most prominent African leader on the mission calling for a cease-fire and deescalation of the conflict, stressing that soaring grain, fertilizer and energy prices resulting from the war had an impact on African nations. The presidents of both Ukraine and Russia, however, effectively shot down a peace plan proposed by the delegation.

Meanwhile, South Africa has also adopted a renewed focus on the BRICS – a grouping of fast-growing economies that also includes Brazil, Russia, India and China – as the country looks to expand trade and defense ties with Moscow and Beijing. In February, South Africa, Russia and China held joint naval exercises, drawing criticism from Washington. In economic terms, South Africa is by far the smallest member of the BRICS, but it sees the grouping as a prestigious international forum through which it can exert influence on global issues as the sole African member.

Internal Challenges

Domestically, South Africa is also going through a turbulent period. Ramaphosa’s African National Congress party has been in power since independence. It began as an activist group aimed at overthrowing the apartheid government in the 1970s and 1980s. The Soviet Union supported its anti-government efforts, while the U.S. had a mixed response, wary that the government’s downfall could usher in a communist regime. Russia has maintained a close relationship to the party ever since, seen by the ANC as a strong political ally that supports its desire to remain in power.

South Africa is facing several internal economic and political issues ahead of elections next year. Major protests have erupted amid the country’s faltering economy, repeated power outages and soaring unemployment. Supporters of ex-President Jacob Zuma and his ally Julius Malema have organized anti-government demonstrations – some of which have led to violence and damaged property, further deteriorating an already volatile security situation. The country’s second-largest party, the Democratic Alliance, has pushed the government to denounce Russia, while the third-largest party, the Economic Freedom Fighters, is supportive of Moscow and critical of the West.

Although the ANC will likely remain the largest party following the upcoming vote, it likely will have to form a coalition. The party has lost local elections in many cities, something that would have been almost unthinkable a decade ago. It’s been rocked by allegations of corruption involving prominent ministers following the release of the Zondo report commissioned by Zuma. Ramaphosa has himself faced serious allegations of hiding significant sums of cash at his farm.

Middle Ground

But despite its historical political ties to Moscow, South Africa has significant trade relations with the West. It has benefited immensely from the U.S.’ African Growth and Opportunity Act, adopted under the Clinton administration in 2000, which offers favorable trade conditions to participants with some requirements on the rule of law, elimination of barriers to U.S. trade and investment, and anti-corruption and anti-poverty measures. Under AGOA, South Africa exported up to $2.7 billion worth of goods to the U.S. in 2021. Now, however, members of the U.S. Congress have raised the possibility of ending South Africa’s participation in AGOA over its ties to Russia.

Indeed, the economic rationale of supporting Moscow is diminishing, as Russia’s economy flounders and Western countries pressure governments around the world to help isolate the Russian economy. The pressure will be particularly hard to withstand for the South African government considering its dependence on trade with the West. Europe accounts for 21.5 percent of South Africa’s exports, the U.K. for 7.1 percent and the U.S. for 9.7 percent. They account for 77 percent of foreign direct investment in the country. Russia, meanwhile, accounts for less than 0.5 percent of South Africa’s exports.

A senior delegation of South African officials led by three Cabinet members was recently sent on a diplomatic tour of G-7 countries. High on the agenda on the U.S. visit was AGOA. Industry experts in the country believe that losing preferential access to the U.S. market would severely slow development of key industries such as automotive and agriculture. For its part, the U.S. does not want to criticize South Africa too harshly, as this could push the country into the Russian or Chinese orbit. The U.S. is also reliant on South African platinum and doesn’t want to give Russia another avenue to expand its gold and diamond dealings on the continent. Thus, it is in both parties’ interest to seek a form of reconciliation.

As a result of initial talks, the U.S. has softened its stance on South Africa. Putin has confirmed that he will not attend the BRICS summit in August, relieving Ramaphosa of having to decide whether to comply with an international arrest warrant for the Russian president. While some senior officials within the ANC still sympathize with the Russian regime, they have focused on mending ties with the West, at least in public.

South Africa is at a crossroads. It needs to reassess the impact its foreign policy will have on its domestic and regional outlook. While industry is demanding closer ties with the U.S. and a reaffirmation of Washington’s commitment to AGOA, other interests are remaining loyal to Russia’s anti-imperialist narrative. As frustrations grow on both sides, Ramaphosa’s government appears to be stepping back, in search of a middle ground.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2023/jul/31/us-fears-fallout-military-coup-dangerous-region/?utm_source=Boomtrain&utm_medium=subscriber&utm_campaign=newsalert&utm_content=newsalert&utm_term=newsalert&bt_ee=8rNhA9P%2BCNllVituNuAj2GGQ25s%2BPU0S5NDmtV81Uq%2BRmAkdlLGJ0GIh9YXKKJ0G&bt_ts=1690893698539

[Crafty_Dog]

The analysis here is complex and I have no opinion on its merits:

https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/change-is-in-the-air-in-africa?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email

[DougMacG]

The analysis here is complex and I have no opinion on its merits:

https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/change-is-in-the-air-in-africa?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email

I imagine there are true facts in here but the author seems to have serious bias against the west (colonial powers).

From the article:
"It’s clear that Russia’s David vs. Goliath performance in the Ukrainian war against the combined powers of the West is seen by the world as a reinvigorating and animating inspiration."

(Doug). Russia invaded Ukraine and Russia is the little power, underdog? 

I didn't read all the way through but doubtful he dwells on all the charitable work and money the west puts into Africa for no return.

What is wrong in Africa causing poverty is the absence of all the foundations of wealth.  Natural resources alone never seems to get you there.  Government has a role, rule of law and protecting private property ownership and investment.

Quote from formerly left wing singer philanthropist Bono, U2:

“Aid is just a stop-gap,” he said at Georgetown University, “Entrepreneurial capitalism takes more people out of poverty than aid…. In dealing with poverty here and around the world, welfare and foreign aid are a Band-Aid.  Free enterprise is a cure.”
https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/bonos-right-its-free-enterprise-not-food-aid-that-will-lift-africa-to-prosperity.amp

(Doug) Africa has all kinds of other problems.  When you don't have private ownership, investment, pursuit of wealth, that's what you get, all kinds of other problems.

[Crafty_Dog]

"the author seems to have serious bias against the west (colonial powers)"

Agreed!

OTOH such rancor is not devoid of evidence.

Anyway, given the ignorance and the globalist puppetmasters of our Pravdas I decided to post this article not as a stand alone, but rather as having some flags of things to look for.
 

[DougMacG]

https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/rand-paul-wants-the-biden-administration-to-answer-about-us-troops-in-niger

[Crafty_Dog]

Don't always agree with him, but I am really glad he is in the Senate!

[Crafty_Dog]

What the Niger Crisis Means for France's Counterterrorism Strategy in Africa
Sep 19, 2023 | 16:36 GMT





French soldiers of the Barkhane force patrol the streets of Timbuktu, Mali, on Dec. 5, 2021.
French soldiers of the Barkhane force patrol the streets of Timbuktu, Mali, on Dec. 5, 2021.
(Photo by THOMAS COEX/AFP via Getty Images)

France's inability to engage in broad counterterrorism cooperation with Niger would mark a failure of Paris' latest strategy in the Sahel. Since announcing its withdrawal from Mali in February 2022, France's strategy in the Sahel has focused on greater training and intelligence sharing with local militaries. Close cooperation with Niger had become the cornerstone of this strategy, given the Malian and Burkinabe juntas' hostility toward Paris. However, despite the comprehensive support it received from France, the Nigerien military ultimately rallied behind coup leader Abdourahamane Tchiani against Nigerien President Mohamed Bazoum following the July 26 putsch. In the absence of a military intervention by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Nigerien junta will continue to strengthen its grip on the country by shifting the domestic narrative against France and ECOWAS. The junta's insistence that French troops leave the country suggests that France will likely be compelled to at least scale down its military presence in Niger in the medium term, but it is unclear whether Paris will yield to these demands in the coming months. Regardless, Macron's unwavering condemnation of the junta, together with the latter's ongoing consolidation of power, suggests that broad counterterrorism cooperation between France and Niger is unlikely for the foreseeable future, short of a reinstatement of President Bazoum. Given the central role played by Niger in France's recent regional counterterrorism strategy and the impossibility of cooperation with Mali and Burkina Faso, this would mark a failure of Paris' latest approach to the Sahel.

France first intervened in the Sahel in January 2013 at the demand of the Malian government to halt rapid progress by jihadist groups toward the capital city, Bamako. Thereafter, France expanded its presence to most of the Sahel through Operation Barkhane, which was terminated in November 2022 following a series of coups in Mali and Burkina Faso.
Prior to the July 26 coup, Niger's relatively democratic institutions had made it an appealing ally in the fight against jihadist groups in the Sahel for France, other EU countries and the United States. Washington currently retains 1,100 troops in Niger.
On Aug. 3, the junta denounced Niger's five bilateral military agreements with France, which formed the basis of the two countries' defense cooperation. This included an agreement on basing 1,500 French troops in the country.
France's Uranium Supply

Although Niger did not halt exports of uranium to France in the immediate aftermath of the July 26 coup, misinformation on social media claiming otherwise prompted concerns over a potentially imminent supply shock that would disrupt France's electricity production, which heavily relies on nuclear power. But even if Niger does halt uranium supplies to France, France's power production would not be threatened given that state-owned utility company EDF has sufficient uranium stockpiles to produce electricity for two years. Additionally, Paris would be able to accelerate long-standing efforts to diversify its supply of uranium by tapping Canada and Kazakhstan and accelerating new mining projects in Uzbekistan and Mongolia.

Even in the unlikely event that Bazoum is reinstated, the Niger crisis will fuel the decline in French influence over West Africa in the long term. France has been on the back foot in the Sahel since Mali's August 2020 coup, and it has proven unable to effectively counter Russian misinformation in the region. This weakened position is highlighted by the impossibility of a French intervention to reinstate Bazoum — which might have been straightforward a decade ago — given the profound backlash it would generate across the Global South and the risk of vindicating narratives that Paris remains a neocolonial overlord. Cognizant of these new political realities, France has instead thrown its support behind ECOWAS' strong stance against Tchiani's coup. But regardless of the outcome of the Niger crisis, it appears set to fuel a progressive decline in French influence across West Africa in the long term. On one hand, a successful ECOWAS intervention to reinstate Bazoum would cement the fact that West African states — not France — are taking the lead on the region's defense and security matters. Conversely, the Nigerien military's consolidation of power for the next several years would risk paving the way for more coups across the region, which could further isolate Paris given local militaries' propensity to leverage anti-French sentiment for their own political gains. Nonetheless, France’s influence is likely to decline at a slower pace in countries that remain close French allies, such as Senegal and Cote d'Ivoire.

While France's inability to press ahead with a unilateral intervention in Niger partly stems from its weakened position in the region, it also is a result of a new generation of French decision-makers coming to power who reject unilateral involvement in the affairs of African countries. Such involvement characterized France's approach to its former colonies in the second half of the 20th century.
Although Paris will look to sustain close military cooperation with Chad in the aftermath of its likely departure from Niger, Chad's political instability will likely prevent it from replacing Niger as the cornerstone of France's counterterrorism strategy in Africa. France has maintained tight-knit political and military ties with Chad since decolonization, which it retains to this day in spite of transitional President Mahamat Idriss Deby's violent takeover in April 2021 and his unilateral extension of an 18-month transition period by a further two years in October 2022. But Deby's hold over the country remains fragile, as he lacks legitimacy in the eyes of many Chadians. Together with the country's deteriorating security environment, Deby's weak grip on power makes fertile ground for a military coup. As in other Sahelian countries, potential new coup leaders would likely look to leverage anti-French sentiment to consolidate their power and demand a departure of French troops from Chad. A major redeployment of French troops to Chad is thus an unattractive option for both Deby and Paris, as it would risk hindering the Chadian leader's legitimacy ahead of the country's 2024 presidential election by fanning the flames of anti-french sentiment, while also increasing the political risk to which France would be exposed in the event of a coup. Instead, France is more likely to sustain its military cooperation with Chad at its current level, which could involve redeploying some of its  military assets and a small number of troops to Chad following its likely military drawdown from Niger.

France currently retains around 1,000 troops in Chad.

​​Chad faces a plethora of security challenges, including a recent resumption of clashes with rebels in the north, intercommunal violence in the south, attacks by the Islamic State West African Province in the Lake Chad tri-border region with Niger and Nigeria, and the risk of a spillover of the Sudanese civil war in the eastern part of the country.

In January, Deby's junta announced that it foiled a "destabilization attempt" by a group of 11 officers, which hints at growing discontent against him within the ranks of the Chadian military.

The Niger crisis will lead France to shift the focus of its counterterrorism strategy in Africa from fighting jihadist groups in the Sahel to strengthening the defense capabilities of coastal West African states. The deterioration of the security environment in the western Sahel in recent years has heightened security risks in the northern parts of coastal West African states like Benin, Togo, and Cote d'Ivoire with which Paris holds good relations and shares a strong opposition to military coups. While France would rather prevent the formation of jihadist safe havens in the Sahel from which attacks can be launched toward littoral West Africa, the impossibility of engaging in broad military cooperation with western Sahelian states following the Niger crisis means that Paris' best option will be to focus on limiting the spillover of militant activity to neighboring countries, namely Chad and coastal West African states. France is likely to prioritize ramping up military cooperation with the latter given its already-strong security partnership with Chad and the fact that the northern parts of coastal West African states are most exposed to the likely deterioration of the western Sahel's security environment in the coming years. But as part of Macron's desire to overhaul France's relations with its former colonies, Paris is unlikely to press ahead with significant new troop deployments in littoral West Africa, instead favoring greater training, intelligence sharing and equipment provision with local militaries. In addition to strengthening bilateral security cooperation, France will likely leverage its remaining influence in the region to encourage greater multilateral counterterrorism cooperation between coastal West African states, including Nigeria.

France currently retains 950 troops in Cote d'Ivoire. While Paris was due to scale down its military presence in the country prior to the coup in Niger, it may reverse its decision should the Ivorian government express concerns about a further deterioration of the security environment in northern parts of the country.

As part of its outreach to coastal West African states, France will attempt a rapprochement with Nigeria, but historical mistrust and Nigeria's domestic challenges will likely limit the scope of this partnership. While French influence in West Africa is set to shrink in the long term, France will nonetheless retain strategic and financial interests in the region that it will seek to preserve. Many of Paris' interests in the region are in line with those of Nigerian President Bola Tinubu, including a resolute opposition to military coups, the fight against jihadist groups, support for ECOWAS-led regionalism and opposition to more deployments by Wagner Group personnel in West Africa. Together with Nigeria's political, military and economic heft, this makes Abuja an appealing partner for Paris, and France will likely seek to increase cooperation with Nigeria in the hope of encouraging it to expand its role in West Africa's security. But while Tinubu's firm stance against the Nigerien junta suggests that he may be more willing to cooperate with Paris than his predecessor, the fraught history of Franco-Nigerian relations and France's colonial legacy will remain important constraints that are likely to discourage Abuja from striking a strategic partnership with France for the foreseeable future. Furthermore, Nigeria's ongoing economic difficulties, political turmoil and domestic jihadist militancy will limit its ability to play a more proactive role in preserving regional stability. Despite this, both countries' shared interests at a tactical level mean that there is room for greater bilateral counterterrorism cooperation, as well as coordination in strengthening ECOWAS' "anti-coup" coalition.

France supported Biafran secessionists during Nigeria's civil war (1967-70) in the hope of breaking up the West African giant and strengthening its influence in the region. This history continues to fuel Nigerian mistrust of Paris to this day.

[Crafty_Dog]

Assessing the Risk of Future African Coups, Part 1: The Sahel and Central Africa
8 MIN READSep 25, 2023 | 20:32 GMT





People holding Gabon national flags celebrate in Libreville on August 30, 2023, after a group of military officers announced they were ''putting an end'' to President Ali Bongo Ondimba's regime.
People holding Gabon national flags celebrate in Libreville on August 30, 2023, after a group of military officers announced they were ''putting an end'' to President Ali Bongo Ondimba's regime.
(AFP via Getty Images)

Editor's Note: In the first of this two-part series exploring political instability across sub-Saharan Africa, we examine the governments in Central Africa and the Sahel that are most at risk of experiencing a coup in the near future. In part two, which can be found here, we examine the most at-risk governments in West Africa and East Africa, as well as the greater implications of such mass upheaval.

Countries across Africa — from the embattled governments of the Sahel to the dynastic leaders of Central Africa, and even the former French colonies of West Africa and the authoritarian regimes of East Africa — face risks of military overthrows amid perceptions of weak consequences for coup leaders, posing heightened threats of political and economic instability across the sub-continent. The Aug. 30 coup in Gabon, the July 26 coup in Niger and prior coups in Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali and Sudan have raised alarms over a ''coup contagion'' across sub-Saharan Africa. While the precise triggers for additional coups vary widely by country, would-be coup plotters' perceptions that they can successfully overthrow a government without major domestic or foreign repercussions — regardless of veracity — has laid the groundwork for opportunistic military leaders to attempt their own power grabs in the future. An unexpected military takeover could happen in tens of countries across the continent amid perceptions of limited resulting fallout.

In Central Africa, dynastic presidents, potential succession crises and patronage politics present favorable circumstances for opportunistic military leaders in Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea and the Republic of Congo (ROC). Central Africa's propensity for geriatric presidents without clearly appointed successors presents heightened risks of political crises amid a coup-prone environment. The regimes in Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea and the Republic of Congo employ heavy-handed tactics to suppress dissent, limit freedom of the press and prevent opposition groups from mobilizing, while popular opposition to all three regimes is muted and their organizing power is weak. Authoritarian tendencies very likely obscure the true extent of simmering discontent, although this does not necessarily translate into widespread support for popular opposition to Cameroon's 90-year-old president Paul Biya, Equatorial Guinea's 81-year-old president Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, and the Republic of Congo's 79-year-old president Denis Sassou Nguesso. International media and human rights organizations report widespread disillusionment resulting from each administration's willingness to employ violence against civilians, electoral fraud, corruption and nepotism to serve the ends of political elites. Against this backdrop, military elites who are either afraid of losing access to state resources or who see an opportunity to gain access and resources may use ''prevention of a political crisis'' — and potentially align with political leaders to increase their legitimacy — before or during a succession scramble as an excuse to seize power. As seen in Gabon, coup leaders would likely position themselves in opposition to the political dynasty as a means of gathering popular support, rather than relying almost exclusively on anti-French sentiment to build support as recent coup leaders have done in the Sahel.

Cameroon: President Paul Biya's son, Franck Biya, is widely suspected of attempting to secure his father's blessing to succeed him. But no official announcement has been made, and several additional political insiders are reportedly also in the running, including Finance Minister Louis-Paul Motaze, Director of the Civil Cabinet of the Presidency Samuel Mvondo Ayolo, and Economy Minister Alamine Ousmane Mey. In the event that 90-year-old Biya dies before he chooses a successor, elites within the ruling Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (CPDM) party will compete for the top spot and associated opportunities for self-enrichment, potentially triggering a larger political crisis. The president of the Senate, 88-year-old Marcel Niat Njifenji, would be constitutionally responsible for organizing a presidential election within 120 days of the presidential post becoming vacant — a period that would very likely be fraught with potentially violent infighting. Anticipating this, opportunistic Cameroonian military leaders could attempt to ''prevent a political crisis'' by taking control of the government either before or after Biya's death. Conversely, the military could seize upon turmoil triggered by a scramble for power following Biya's death or incapacitation.
Republic of Congo: Allegations of a military coup in the ROC surfaced online after President Denis Sassou-Nguesso landed in New York for the U.N. General Assembly on Sept. 17. Information Minister Thierry Lezin Moungalla quickly took to social media to deny the allegations and the Nguesso regime still appears to be in control. However, the rumors highlight Nguesso's heightened vulnerability following the coup in neighboring Gabon. If Nguesso were to die or become incapacitated before choosing a successor, ROC opposition parties — including the Democracy and Development Party, the Movement of Republicans party, and the People's Party — would very likely call for free and fair snap elections to decide the next president. However, given political elites' dominance over the political system, deep patronage networks and limited opposition organizational capacity, the success of these demands would likely depend heavily on levels of popular support. While opposition parties have some grassroots support and economic discontent runs high (especially against the backdrop of exorbitant wealth displayed by the Nguesso family), it is unclear whether this support would be sufficient to catalyze a movement large enough to displace the political establishment. Opportunistic military leaders could seek to capitalize on this uncertainty.
Equatorial Guinea: 81-year-old President Obiang is Equatorial Guinea's longest-serving president, having spent more than half (44 years) of his life reigning over the country. Obiang has no clear successor, similarly providing the military with an opportunity to seize power in the event of a succession crisis. In general elections in 2020, Obiang's ruling Democratic Party of Equatorial Guinea (PDGE) and coalition won all of the 55 seats in the senate and 100 seats in the lower house, after which the president appointed the remaining 15 senate seats, illustrating the absence of opposition parties in Equatorial Guinea's political establishment. Mbasogo's son Teodoro Obiang Mangue, who is speculated to be his father's successor, was convicted on embezzlement charges in 2020 and is currently being investigated by the Spanish high court in tandem with federal security forces for allegedly kidnapping and torturing two Spanish citizens in 2020. While the security apparatus has been loyal to Obiang and his inner circle for decades, a succession crisis could cause splintering and heightened competition if certain factions perceive power structures to be in flux.
The Wild Card: Democratic Republic of Congo

In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), there are several factors that will leave President Felix Tshisekedi vulnerable to a coup in the months surrounding his likely reelection, although likely less so than other Central African leaders. Those factors include a highly contentious political climate, upcoming elections in December that will likely suffer from fraud and violence, an ongoing civil war in the country's eastern provinces, pervasive state capture, and deep factionalism within the military. Members of the military who remain loyal to former President Joseph Kabila (a political rival of Tshisekedi) and/or those loyal to opposition leaders popular in the country's southeast and eastern provinces could attempt to overthrow the embattled government, particularly if they perceive the possible blowback to be limited and/or the December elections to be fraudulent.

In the Sahel, rampant insecurity and factionalism create a permissive environment for opportunistic military leaders to harness anti-French sentiment to overthrow their predecessors, posing heightened threats to Chad and risking repeat coups in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. Expanding insurgencies drive discontent among civilians and within security establishments in the Sahel region of sub-Saharan Africa. Major jihadist attacks on Burkinabe security forces preceded both of the country's last two coups. In Mali, transitional President Asimi Goita's rise to power was also facilitated by the civilian government's failure to curb jihadist attacks. The recent military coup in Niger against civilian leader Mohamed Bazoum was justified to the public by Bazoum's closeness with France and failure to stop jihadist groups encroaching on Niger's eastern border. In all three cases, government failure to address insecurity bred public discontent, which opportunistic military leaders then blamed on France's presence in the country and catalyzed into support for the new regime. Given that subsequent regimes have not successfully stemmed the jihadist threat, factionalism among regional militaries persists. This — combined with the fact that the Economic Community of West African States failed to follow through on the regional bloc's threat to intervene after Niger's last coup — raises the possibility for subsequent coups in these three countries. Circumstances are slightly different in Chad as jihadist groups do not occupy territory to the same extent, but a similar sequence of events could lead to a military overthrow. Chadian President Mahamat Deby, son of former President Idriss Deby, took power when his father unexpectedly died in April 2021, and despite the non-democratic transfer of power, his rule has been strongly backed by France. French troop presence and training in Chad have significantly bolstered the capabilities of the Chadian military, but some factions within the security establishment are critical of what they see as a continuation of French imperial influence in sovereign affairs. This, coupled with a resurgence of rebel activity in the country's north that adds pressure to already-stretched security resources, could create an opportunity for Deby's overthrow, especially amid perceptions of lackluster regional and international response.

Up next: Assessing the Risk of Future African Coups, Part 2: West and East Africa

=====================================

Assessing the Risk of Future African Coups, Part 2: West and East Africa
7 MIN READSep 26, 2023 | 17:47 GMT





People flee their neighborhoods in Khartoum, Sudan, amid fighting between the army and paramilitary troops on April 19, 2023.
People flee their neighborhoods in Khartoum, Sudan, amid fighting between the army and paramilitary troops on April 19, 2023.
(AFP via Getty Images)

Editor's note: In the second of this two-part series, we examine the governments in West Africa and East Africa that are most at risk of experiencing a coup in the near future, as well as the greater implications of such mass political instability. In part one, which can be found here, we looked at the most at-risk governments in the Sahel and Central Africa.

In West Africa, the relatively robust institutional strength of governments means that the risk of military coups is comparatively low. However, opportunistic leaders may still attempt to take advantage of a potential succession crisis in Togo and simmering social unrest in coastal countries like Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal. Beyond Guinea, West Africa has not experienced coups at the same frequency as its Sahelian neighbors in recent years. This is likely due to the relative institutional strength of governments in littoral West Africa, where most countries hold elections on reliable schedules (although not necessarily free and fair), have established judiciaries (although not necessarily independent), and experience militantism at far lower rates than countries in the Sahel.

Togo: Togo poses somewhat of an exception to West Africa's relative institutional strength. President Faure Gnassingbe has ruled over the country for nearly 20 years, and has maintained power by using security forces to prevent dissenting groups from assembling, as well as through self-enrichment, fraudulent elections and state capture. At only 57 years old, Gnassingbe could remain in power for many more years. However, the government's reliance on patronage and relationship-based politics means that the system is vulnerable to instability if Gnassingbe becomes unable to govern and/or does not appoint a clear successor. Togo has also experienced increasing jihadist attacks in its northern border areas in recent months as jihadists in neighboring Burkina Faso expand southward, perhaps granting military leaders an excuse to depose Gnassingbe.
Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal: Elections in these countries are far from fair, and anti-French sentiment simmers in both nations as well. However, institutions are in place that give their governments a higher degree of legitimacy than their Sahelian neighbors. Senegal, in particular, has experienced high levels of social unrest in recent years resulting from ruling party abuses (including persecution of opposition leaders, egregious police violence and purging of voter rolls), prompting some observers to raise alarms about a potential military takeover. Senegal has never experienced a coup, and while it's not off the table, it would require an unprecedented break between the military and the executive, which appears unlikely.
In East Africa, the risk of military coups is low relative to Central Africa and the Sahel, but embattled leaders in Sudan and South Sudan and potential succession crises in Eritrea and the Great Lakes countries still pose latent risks. In general, East African governance institutions tend to be more robust than those in Central Africa and the Sahel. While this does not necessarily translate into democratic tendencies (most governments in the region lean authoritarian), the risk of military coups is lower relative to other regions due to the strength of central governments and (barring Sudan) civilian political dominance over the military. In addition, anti-colonial sentiment — namely, anti-French sentiment in Rwanda, anti-British sentiment in former United Kingdom colonies like Sudan and Uganda or anti-Italian sentiment in Eritrea) does not carry the same political utility in the East as it does in other parts of Africa. As such, would-be coup leaders are far more likely to tap into security, economic and governance concerns in order to vilify the deposed regime as a common enemy, rather than seek to blame colonial influences for popular grievances.

Sudan and South Sudan: In both of these countries, opportunistic military leaders and/or politicians aligned with security forces could attempt to oust their president. In Sudan, General Fattah al-Burhan, the head of the country's transitional council and army, is leading a war effort against the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, which has so far killed 20,000 people and displaced over 5 million from their homes since April. While Burhan's grip on power appears to be strong, the ongoing war and the history of factionalism within the Sudanese military means his grip could eventually weaken, particularly considering that he himself seized power in a military coup in 2021. Meanwhile, in South Sudan, spillover effects of the war to the north, along with inter-communal violence and deep-seated political rivalries, risk undermining the rule of Salva Kiir — especially as opposition leader and Vice President Riek Machar seeks to depose Kiir in the 2024 presidential elections.
Eritrea: President Isaias Afwerki's long domination over Eritrean politics raises risks similar to those faced by Central Africa's dynastic leaders, as widespread popular resistance to the Isaias regime's abuse of power could catalyze a military take-over should a succession crisis arise. Given Isaias' strict repression of political dissent, rejection of civil liberties and embedded system of political clientelism, the 77-year-old's incapacitation or death could trigger a crisis. Even if he appoints a successor ahead of time, a new, younger strongman may still struggle to dominate Isaias' patronage network, particularly as opportunistic individuals seek to capitalize on political uncertainty for personal gain. The military's outsized role in politics suggests that it may be more likely to intervene under such circumstances, especially if a former Isaias ally attempts to seize power.
Uganda: 79-year-old president Yoweri Museveni faces a fairly robust opposition movement, despite attempts by security forces to shut down opposition demonstrations and severely restrict press freedoms. The president's son, General Muhoozi Kainerugaba, is widely thought to be his father's successor. But Muhoozi's tendency to take to social media to air diplomatic grievances (occasionally triggering political disputes) has cast doubt on his ability to maintain his father's power structure, perhaps opening the door to an internal power struggle within the military.
Rwanda: President Paul Kagame is perhaps the least likely East African leader to suffer a coup. Kagame has been in power since 2000, but despite the absence of credible elections or strong civil liberties, the 65-year-old enjoys the support of the majority of Rwandans, largely due to the country's development progress and economic stability.
In addition to breeding further political instability, subsequent military overthrows would likely worsen investor sentiment, hamper economic growth and risk exacerbating existing security crises in both the African countries experiencing the coup and their neighbors. Military overthrows tend to worsen investor interest due to market uncertainty and the possibility of policy change, including the nationalization of resources and assets. However, worsening investor sentiment does not only affect the country with the deposed regime, as investor interest in neighboring countries also tends to decline as investors perceive a heightened regional risk. In Central Africa, for example, the yields on dollar-denominated debt in Cameroon and the Republic of Congo increased by 100-basis points (12.34%) and 16-basis points (12.46%), respectively, in the days following the Aug. 30 coup in nearby Gabon. Additionally, international sanctions on military coup leaders and regimes can significantly curb trade, create supply chain disruptions and depress economic activity, depending on their severity. For example, in response to the July 26 coup in Niger, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) imposed its strictest sanctions on Niger's new junta since Mali's 2021 coup. The consequent border closures and trade restrictions have significantly reduced Niger's economic activity with West Africa in recent months, leading to the decay of food stores meant for export. Lastly, military coups tend to exacerbate security crises, as security forces' preoccupation with maintaining a grip on power draws attention and resources away from other threats. This bodes ill for containing the Anglophone separatist conflict and Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP) insurgency in Cameroon, the jihadist insurgencies in the Sahel, and/or the rebellion in northern Chad, among other security challenges. Furthermore, regimes fearing for their own longevity — whether the threat is real or perceived — are more likely to call on external security support. Given Russia's demonstrated interest in ingratiating itself in African countries via paramilitary forces, the heightened threat of coups in Cameroon and elsewhere could facilitate the Wagner Group's entry into more African countries, which would likely exacerbate conflict drivers given the Russian paramilitary organization's propensity for violence against civilians.

[Crafty_Dog]

American-trained Somali National Army commandos, known as Danab, at Baledogle Airfield last month.
American-trained Somali National Army commandos, known as Danab, at Baledogle Airfield last month.
By Michael M. PhillipsFollow
 / Photographs by Jonathan Torgovnik for The Wall Street Journal
Sept. 27, 2023 12:01 am ET

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MOGADISHU, Somalia—There finally came a point when al-Shabaab militants went too far, and Somali farmers and herders just wouldn’t take it anymore.

It started in Hiiraan, a region of a half-million people in central Somalia. Islamist insurgents from al-Shabaab, the Somali branch of al Qaeda, had controlled much of the area for a decade. In May 2022, they dialed up the repression.

They shot a well-known clan elder. They dragooned local teens into their ranks of suicide bombers and fighters. And during the longest drought in living memory, al-Shabaab taxed herders three or four cows each time they brought their parched livestock to drink at public wells.

That set off a chain of events that has at last given the U.S. and its allies the upper hand in a 16-year campaign against one of the most potent and intractable Islamist insurgencies in the world.

One of the American military campaigns unleashed by the Sept. 11 attacks, the fight against al-Shabaab has been marked by years of setbacks and stalemates. Now Somalia has become a surprising bright spot in the global battle pitting the West and allied countries against insurgents who use terror tactics in the name of political Islam.

Within weeks, Hiiraan clan militiamen took up arms in a spontaneous uprising that blindsided al-Shabaab. Somali government forces, led by American-trained commandos called Danab, or Lightning, joined the fray. Some other clans followed suit and ousted al-Shabaab from their own turf.

Over the course of months, clan militiamen and Somali troops, backed by American drones, drove al-Shabaab out of some 20 towns and 80 villages, regaining about a third of the territory militants previously held nationwide, according to the U.S. embassy in Mogadishu, the country’s capital.

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Last month, Somali forces, led by Danab commandos, launched the next phase of the offensive to dislodge militants from their last two strongholds in central Somalia. “The government is winning the war. I wouldn’t have said it two years ago, but I’d say it now,” said Maj. Aydarus Mohamed Hussein, commander of the 2,000-strong Danab special-forces brigade.



Danab forces in training.
Initial fighting has been fierce, with government troops sweeping into El Buur, a key al-Shabaab bastion, then ceding the town back to militant counterattacks. Government forces moved so quickly that they outran their supply lines, according to Western diplomats in Mogadishu. Now the army is slowing the offensive to allow troops to recuperate. Government strategists plan to renew attacks in a more methodical way, putting clan militias in charge of defending towns and villages once the army has cleared them, Western diplomats say.

“They have retaken more territory in the last year than they had in the previous five years,” U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said during a visit to Kenya Monday. “But we know that progress is not always a straight line.”

Somalia, located on the strategic tip of eastern Africa, offers a whiff of success against a backdrop of failure. On the other side of the continent, in the semidesert strip called the Sahel, unchecked Islamist violence contributed to military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso and, in July, Niger. Al Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates now control some 40% of territory in Mali and Burkina Faso, and insurgent attacks in Niger have displaced some 350,000 people, according to the Pentagon’s Africa Center for Strategic Studies.

Some West African states along the Gulf of Guinea have experienced probing attacks by al Qaeda-affiliated fighters, and authorities fear Ghana, long a regional bedrock of stability, could be next.

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Under Attack
Somalia and countries in the Sahel have seen more than 3,000 incidents of Islamist violence in the first half of this year.
Incidents of militant violence, Jan. 1–June 30

Al Qaeda affiliates

Islamic State affiliates

Unaffiliated

MALI

NIGER

SUDAN

MAURITANIA

CHAD

THE SAHEL

NIGERIA

ETHIOPIA

SOMALIA

Atlantic Ocean

KENYA

1,000 miles

Indian Ocean

1,000 km

Note: Somaliland, in the country's northwest, declared itself independent in 1991 but is internationally recognized as part of Somalia.

Sources: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project data analyzed by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies; European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (Sahel boundary)
Carl Churchill/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Farther afield, the U.S. pulled out of Afghanistan two years ago, ceding the country back to the Taliban after a 20-year war.

Backed by U.S. air power and advisers, the Somali army, by contrast, has been making headway against an estimated 10,000 to 12,000 al-Shabaab fighters, plus a few hundred Islamic State, or ISIS, adherents in the country’s mountainous northeast.

“If you look at where this country was 10 years ago, and even two years ago, the progress made by the government and by the international community gives everybody hope that we can see a future of Somalia without Shabaab and without ISIS,” said Shane Dixon, the top U.S. diplomat in Mogadishu.

Western diplomats and military commanders say they have seen a fundamental shift in the war since President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud took office last year. Mohamud promised to go after al-Shabaab with an aggression his predecessor, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, hadn’t mustered, and the Biden administration has stationed some 450 U.S. troops in Somalia to help.

Analysts wonder whether the latest advances can be sustained. Somalia has suffered 35 years of natural calamities, clan warfare and Islamist insurgency. Corruption and political infighting have weakened past counterterrorism efforts, while al-Shabaab has proven resilient.

The number of Somalis killed in political violence grew to almost 9,000 over the past year, up from 3,500 deaths the previous year, according to Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, or Acled, a U.S.-based nonprofit monitoring service.

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Somali officials are optimistic. They initially predicted that clearing operations in central Somalia would take about two months, and in October or November they’ll be able to turn to larger al-Shabaab positions in southern Somalia, along the Kenyan border.

“This is our plan—to finish them off before August next year,” said Somali National Security Adviser Hussein Sheikh-Ali. “It might take longer, but definitely we’re going to defeat them.”

Somalia, a former Italian colony, began its descent into civil war in the late 1980s, when dictator Mohamed Siad Barre bombarded the independence-minded Somaliland region, a one-time British protectorate.


Islamist fighters loyal to al-Shabaab perform military drills in Somalia in 2011. PHOTO: MUSTAFA ABDI/AFP/GETTY IMAGES
Widespread hunger and a failed United Nations intervention followed in the early 1990s, culminating in the infamous 1993 Black Hawk Down battle that left 18 U.S. Army Rangers, Delta Force operators and other troops dead. Uncounted hundreds of Somalis, many of them clan fighters, were killed in the clash.

Al-Shabaab rose out of the anarchy that followed the U.S. and U.N. withdrawal. The group grew to control the Indian Ocean port of Kismayo and parts of Mogadishu, only to be forced out by an international force deployed by the African Union.

In 2007 President George W. Bush sent a small contingent of commandos to Somalia to battle al-Shabaab. President Barack Obama intensified that effort, ordering targeted airstrikes on al-Shabaab leaders.

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President Donald Trump initially escalated the campaign, authorizing 203 airstrikes on al-Shabaab targets. Then, weeks before leaving the White House in January 2021, he stunned American commanders by withdrawing all 700 U.S. troops from Somalia.

The Pentagon relocated many to neighboring Kenya and Djibouti, from which they visited Somalia to coach local forces. But U.S. commanders complained that al-Shabaab gained ground without the full-time presence of American troops and the Pentagon pressed the new Biden administration to reverse the withdrawal.


U.S. special operations troops help train Danab forces.

Danab commandos in training.
Shortly before the Hiiraan uprising began, Biden ordered U.S. Navy SEALs, Army Green Berets and other troops back to Somali bases to advise and train Danab commandos.

Now the U.S. has special-operations teams in Mogadishu, Kismayo and Baledogle, aided by some 60 military advisers from Bancroft Global Development, a contractor hired by the State Department. Bancroft advisers accompany Somali commandos on missions but are only authorized to use force in self-defense. Uniformed U.S. troops, though allowed to accompany Somalis in rare cases, almost always advise from safe positions in the rear.

“There is no appetite for U.S. casualties,” said Col. David Haskell, commander of American special-operations troops in Somalia.

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In a typical operation in July, a company of Danab commandos attacked an al-Shabaab camp in dense brush near Bud Bud, in central Somalia. The militants were armed with heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenade launchers.

The Somali commandos lost a couple of men and pulled back.

The next night they approached the campsite in Toyota pickup trucks mounted with machine guns, reinforced by Turkish-trained Somali infantrymen.

A U.S. drone sent live overhead video to Haskell’s team at Mogadishu’s heavily defended airport complex.


Col. David Haskell, commander of American special operations troops in Somalia.

The Joint Operations Center headed by Haskell, where forces oversee operations and drone activities.
The Americans spotted some 80 militants converging on an isolated group of Danab, who were running low on ammunition. The U.S. team warned the Somali soldiers that they were stepping into an ambush. “They had those guys pinned down,” recalled Haskell.

The Biden administration has been far less willing than Trump’s administration to use lethal U.S. air power, in part out of concern about causing civilian casualties and stirring public resentment.

U.S. special operators can order airstrikes if their Somali partners are in a disadvantaged position or in immediate danger of being overrun, Haskell said. If the situation looks grim, Haskell calls a U.S. embassy official, who informs President Mohamud, day or night. A U.S. military lawyer must also give approval, and only if there’s virtual certainty that no civilians are at risk.

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The U.S. has carried out 15 airstrikes in Somalia this year.

One took place during the Danab mission in Bud Bud, when the Somali unit appeared likely to be overrun. The drone, launched from a U.S. base in neighboring Djibouti, hit a cluster of militants, killing 25, according to U.S. estimates.

“This is the first time I’ve felt the U.S. is very serious about this fight against Shabaab,” said Malik Abdalla, a dual U.S.-Somali national and member of parliament representing Hiiraan.

Turkey operates drones in Somalia with fewer restrictions than the U.S., and the United Arab Emirates are starting to provide close-air support for Somali troops, said Sheikh-Ali, the national security adviser.

“Without air support, we don’t have much clear advantage in the battles,” he said.


Troops unload cases of AK-47s.

Danab forces at Baledogle Airfield.
The U.S. provides medical care for wounded Somali commandos, a critical morale booster. Contract helicopter crews evacuate the injured to an American field hospital. The surgical team in Mogadishu treated 64 Somali military casualties between December and the end of July.

This month, U.S. Africa Command said it evacuated two children injured during a Somali army operation against al-Shabaab in El-Lahelay. One child later died, in addition to one woman and three children killed at the site of the operation. U.S. forces advised the Somali troops but weren’t in El-Lahelay during the operation and didn’t conduct any airstrike, an Africa Command spokesperson said.

In a recent video released by al-Shabaab, Mahad Karate, a senior figure in the group, blamed U.S. forces for the civilian deaths in what he called a “Satan-inspired invasion.”

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“We say to the Americans—we will avenge the death of our people, however long it takes,” Karate said. “You have the watches; we have the time.”

Some 280 clan militiamen have died in the Hiiraan uprising, according to Ali Jeyte Osman, who, as regional governor, helped lead the fight. “People were tired of al-Shabaab,” said Jeyte.

Initially Mohamud’s government only intended to deploy commandos to Hiiraan for a few weeks but, inspired by the success of the popular uprising, the president ordered last year’s offensive, Jeyte said.

In response, militants torched villages and set off car bombs in city centers. They dumped dirt into some wells, blew up others and poisoned many that remained.

Al-Shabaab fighters ambushed a convoy of civilian mini buses, killing 27 people, including a toddler, Jeyte said. One 6-year-old child ran for it; militants chased him and killed him, Jeyte said. Al-Shabaab fighters hunted down and killed a dozen wounded militiamen who had been taken to Mogadishu for treatment, Jeyte said.


The aftermath of an al-Shabaab attack on a police station on the outskirts of Mogadishu last year. PHOTO: HASSAN ALI ELMI/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES
The latest phase of the government campaign is being closely fought in central Somalia, with both sides recruiting allies among rival clan militias, according to Acled. The government has poured thousands of troops into the back-and-forth battle.

The militants have adapted their tactics, deploying battlefield car bombs and infantry rigged with explosives, said Hussein, the Danab brigade commander. “You’ll have a whole platoon running at you and detonating themselves,” he said.

The next phase, in southern Somalia, is expected to prove an even tougher slog.

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Complicating the government’s military plans is the impending departure of an African Union force that first deployed to Somalia in 2007. The Somali government, unsettled by the ferocity of al-Shabaab counterattacks, appealed to the U.N. last week to delay the imminent withdrawal of 3,000 of the 18,000 African Union soldiers.

“This unforeseen turn of events has stretched our military forces thin, exposed vulnerabilities in our frontlines and necessitated a thorough reorganization to ensure we maintain our momentum in countering the al-Shabaab,” Sheikh-Ali wrote in a letter to the U.N. Security Council.

The remaining African Union troops are slated to leave Somalia by the end of next year.

U.S. and Somali officials say the African Union troops haven’t carried out major offensive operations this year, largely remaining in bases where they have absorbed repeated al-Shabaab attacks.

Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti have pledged thousands of troops for 90 days to help Somali forces push al-Shabaab out of southern Somalia. Those units have yet to materialize, according to U.S. officials.

Al-Shabaab is deeply embedded in many southern communities, where the group’s administrators provide some services and Islamic courts settle disputes. Al-Shabaab extracts taxes at roadside checkpoints and on the docks in Mogadishu, revenue the U.S. estimates has reached $130 million annually during the group’s best years.

Somali and Western officials say the campaign’s success or failure will depend heavily on whether the government will quickly provide liberated areas with healthcare, education, water, corruption-free courts and a long-term security presence.

If the Somali government comes through, said Haskell, the American special-operations commander, “we can continue winning without the negative effects of a large U.S. presence.”

Write to Michael M. Phillips at Michael.Phillips@wsj.com

[ccp]

former Nigerian President

"western democracy" does not work in Africa

instead he recommends "Afro democracy"  without explaining what that means

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/western-democracy-not-working-for-africa-obasanjo/ar-AA1ke3Ks?ocid=msedgntp&pc=DCTS&cvid=2504049df36e4d14808a19de0186ef9c&ei=21

in 30 yrs Nigeria will have 1/2 billion people
it is by far the most populous country in Africa

So what does Afro democracy mean?

Cannot find it anywhere, but "failure of Western Democracy" cannot  be blamed on white supremacy.

[DougMacG]

I'm afraid Western democracy and free market capitalism are a couple of things they have not tried. If they tried any of it, it was without rule of law.

This freedom stuff and consensual government isn't as easy as it looks.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FMIfXS1yZc4

[Crafty_Dog]

February 22, 2024
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Russian Influence in Congo
The government in Kinshasa may be the latest in a string of African countries that are turning from the West.
By: Ronan Wordsworth
Last week, protests erupted in the Democratic Republic of Congo. What began in Kinshasa near U.S. and French embassies and U.N. compounds eventually spread to smaller cities in the east, home to the ongoing M23 rebel conflict that sparked protests in the first place. The incident is part of a larger trend in which African nations are souring on the West, and where countries such as China and Russia are attempting to fill the void.

In fact, the sentiments expressed in Congo’s protests resemble those that eventually led to military coups in the so-called Alliance of Sahel States – Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso – where military regimes came to power after ousting elected governments with a promise of severing ties with former colonial powers and other Western partners, particularly France and the U.S. Their subsequent departure from the Economic Community of West African States and their threats to abandon the franc have only isolated them further. The new alliance, then, is meant to provide joint security against their perceived threats of regime change from within or without.

Russia immediately stepped in as an adjunct security guarantor, in keeping with its strategy to undermine the West and thus gain influence in Africa. Indeed, Moscow has pursued this strategy for some time but kicked it into overdrive after the war in Ukraine. The mercenary Wagner Group and affiliated organizations funded by the Kremlin led this campaign, but they were absorbed into Russia’s military following Wagner’s dissolution and the establishment of a new entity called the Africa Corps. The Africa Corps has been used to protect disillusioned regimes in exchange for access to minerals and other natural resources. Last week, for example, Russian forces based in Mali secured access to the country's largest gold mining field and began extractive operations. Similar operations are gaining steam in other countries, including the Central African Republic, Sudan and Burkina Faso.

Moscow’s larger objective is to create an alternative global bloc akin to what existed during the Cold War. This undertaking is replete with Russian propaganda that has at least partially contributed to the turn away from the West. Just last week, U.S. officials publicly said a new Russian intelligence agency operation across Africa had accused the Pentagon of testing biological research programs on African populations under the guise of public health programs. The purpose of the operation, of course, is to undermine U.S. influence, particularly by undoing any potential goodwill generated by public health programs and to unsettle the government's relations with Washington and Europe as populations react with outrage. Moscow’s efforts to manipulate and dominate the information game have ramped up significantly as it tries to frustrate Washington’s attempts at isolating Russia following its invasion of Ukraine. The protests suggest these efforts are paying off.

Yet the protests are not entirely exogenous. Congo is seen as a geopolitically vital country; its size and resources such as cobalt, copper and coltan are vital for the transition to green energy production. This explains the recent renewed competition there. (France alone has been attempting to deepen ties with Kinshasa for years.) The West is trying to displace China, which has enjoyed a solid foothold in the country, but Kinshasa has also recently accused China of being exploitative and called for a renegotiation of terms governing the mineral trade. Coupled with Russia’s propaganda push, it’s easy to see why Congolese could be fed up with Western influence. This is to say nothing of the M23 rebel group, which has displaced thousands as it advances in the east. Many accuse the group of being supported by Rwanda, which protesters claim could help end the cycle of violence if it were adequately pressured by Western governments.

For Russia, the diplomatic offensive serves a few purposes. Politically, cultivating non-Western allies is important as Moscow becomes increasingly isolated. Economically, the move is a no-brainer: Raw material exports are essential for African economies, which are happy to sell to Russia as it searches for non-traditional trade partners. Together, they mobilize support against the West and reduce the effectiveness of Western-led sanctions.

As the unrest in Congo unfolds, it will be important to monitor Chad, another country potentially vulnerable to anti-Western angst and Russian overtures. Chad is France’s last close ally in its former African holdings, and amid a sea of threats – ranging from rebel-controlled regions of Libya and Sudan, to a Russia-allied government in the Central African Republic, to an openly hostile military junta in Niger – the country has become a vital security partner that is home to several French military installations. Though Chad is still inside France’s sphere of influence, Moscow’s African outreach has indeed brought it closer to Russia. President Mahamat Idriss Deby visited the Russian capital last week, where he said not only that Russia was a friend of Chad’s but also that it could continue to be for years to come.

This is why the protests in Congo are important. Russian propaganda notwithstanding, Washington has realized its shortcomings in the region and has sought to overcome them, even if in some cases the damage to its image is already done. Clearly, Moscow has already made inroads at Washington’s expense, and there are plenty of other places in which it can do likewise in the future. Though the long-term impact remains unclear, a total shift away from the West would certainly deprive the West of its access to critical minerals – just as it appeared Washington and Europe were building better partnerships to extract them – and help Russia stave off economic and political isolation.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/niger-s-junta-revokes-military-agreement-with-us/ar-BB1k2cYd?ocid=msedgntp&pc=DCTS&cvid=356b68cb7d8441df8f4bc9b5faf66bbd&ei=42

[Crafty_Dog]

Africa Spins Toward the Axis of Disorder
Niger’s junta puts the U.S. antiterror base in the Sahel in jeopardy.
By
The Editorial Board
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March 20, 2024 2:04 pm ET



Wonder Land: If you were an adversary looking at a U.S. uncertainty about its global leadership, what would you do? Answer: Up the ante—which is exactly what Iran, Russia and others are doing. Images: AP/AFP/Getty Images/Zuma Press Composite: Mark Kelly

As Western and especially U.S. influence recedes around the world, disorder and America’s enemies are filling the vacuum. The latest front that could explode is Africa’s Sahel region, where Niger’s ruling junta has ended military cooperation with the U.S.

Junta spokesman Amadou Abdramane said Saturday that Niger is cancelling its status of forces agreement with the U.S. “with immediate effect.” That would expose U.S. personnel to increased legal risks if they continue to operate in Niger. Deputy Pentagon press secretary Sabrina Singh said Monday that the U.S. was “working through diplomatic channels to seek clarification.”

Before the coup last July, Niger was a reliable U.S. partner in a bad neighborhood. Boko Haram and affiliates of Islamic State and al Qaeda operate in the region, and Niger has hosted the second-largest U.S. military presence on the continent after Djibouti. Some 1,000 U.S. soldiers were present as of June 2023, and a $110 million U.S. drone base in Agadez has been a key outpost against jihadists in northern Africa, including in Libya and Algeria.

The European Union suspended security cooperation and financial support after the coup. The U.S. halted some development aid, trade benefits and security cooperation, though it maintained its military presence in Niger and has continued to conduct intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance operations. The Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas), a regional political and economic union, initially imposed sanctions on Niger, one of the world’s poorest countries, driving up prices.

One risk of this punitive approach was creating opportunity for the world’s rogue regimes. Senior Niger junta officials have since flown to Tehran and Moscow.

The Wall Street Journal reported Monday that U.S. officials have raised alarms about a possible deal to give Iran access to Niger’s abundant uranium reserves. Russia’s Ministry of Defense in January praised “the growth of bilateral military and military-technical cooperation” and “growing Russia-Niger relations in the defence sector.” Niger has also deepened its relationship with Burkina Faso and Mali, two neighbors with close ties to Moscow.

Niger has already expelled some 1,500 French soldiers, revoked a 2015 law aimed at curbing migration toward Europe, ended internal security cooperation with the European Union and canceled a planned EU military cooperation mission against terrorism. This puts particular importance on the French maintaining a presence elsewhere in northern and central Africa, as it traditionally has.

The trouble in Africa has been building for some time, with Chinese base expansions and Russia’s Wagner group offering security for hire. Now Iran is making a bid for uranium. The anti-Western axis is making a play to dominate the continent and its resources. If the Biden Administration has a strategy for countering this, it isn’t apparent.

Mr. Biden offers rhetorical alarm about the world’s growing disorder, but he refuses to put the U.S. on a footing appropriate for this new era of global conflict that would mobilize the military and covert resources to counter it. More trouble is coming.

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[ccp]

since culprits not to Whites or Israelis:

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/we-will-shoot-you-war-in-darfur-raises-new-fears-of-genocide/ar-BB1kg7qZ?ocid=msedgntphdr&cvid=c43b606f59fc49b5c6642e03102c81fd&ei=45

where are you Sharpton
     How about Hakeem Jeffries - another antisemite

[Body-by-Guinness]

This piece makes the point the Biden admin's gaffes in Niger are more of a gift to Putin than anything Trump ever did:

Bidenomics, meet Biden diplomacy
He sent white women to talk down to black men in Africa. They kicked us out
MAR 21, 2024

Biden just got America kicked out of Niger, a nation of 25 million people north of Nigeria, a nation of 215 million people. That may sound unimportant except Niger has uranium and having two U.S. military bases there helps in the battle against Muslim terrorists. Of course, having those bases along our border would stop more Muslim terrorists from entering America but that might interfere with pouring millions of Future Democrat Voters into the USA.

The Wall Street Journal said, “Niger’s decision to end its counterterrorism alliance with Washington came after senior U.S. officials accused the country’s ruling junta of secretly exploring a deal to allow Iran access to its uranium reserves, Nigerien and U.S. officials say.

“The decision to end military cooperation with the U.S. was announced Saturday night by a spokesman for the Nigerien junta. It deals a serious blow to the Biden administration’s efforts to contain a sprawling Islamist insurgency in the Sahel, the semiarid region south of the Sahara. It could affect a $110 million base that was built by the U.S. and is used to fly surveillance drones over West Africa. It could also possibly force the withdrawal of more than 600 American troops still stationed in Niger.”

We know how concerned Biden and Obama are about Iran getting nukes. The Damaging Duo believes Iran is behind schedule.

in Niger, a military junta took over in July.

The Hill reported, “The future of a U.S. military presence in Niger has been in question since a military junta in late July put the country’s president on house arrest and took control of the government.”

What kind of country replaces and prosecutes presidents? Imagine having to live under such conditions.

You’re soaking in it.

President Trump installed two bases in Niger. At the time, the border with Mexico was the most secure it had been in decades. As with the border, Biden is undoing everything Trump accomplished.

Rather than work with the new leaders, Biden decided to work against them. For three months, Biden refused to accept the change in governments.

The New York Times reported, “American officials say they have tried for months to prevent a formal break in relations with Niger’s junta.

“The new U.S. ambassador to Niger, Kathleen FitzGibbon, one of Washington’s top Africa specialists, has held regular discussions with the junta since taking office at the beginning of the year.

“In a trip to Niger in December, Molly Phee, an assistant secretary of state for African Affairs, said the United States intended to resume security and development cooperation with Niger, even as she called for a swift transition to civilian rule and the release of [President] Bazoum.”

I am no expert on diplomacy but telling a nation’s ruler — or in this case, rulers — that you want them to turn their government over to someone else does not show a willingness to work with their regime. I am not giving the Niger junta a pass. I am just saying that the reality is you work with others as they are. We used Stalin to defeat Hitler for crying out loud.

NYT quoted J. Peter Pham, a former special U.S. envoy to the Sahel, who said, “The potential fallout goes beyond the not insignificant damage to counterterrorism and intelligence efforts that loss of access to the bases in Niger entail, but to the broader damage to America’s standing on the continent.”

As readers may have suspected, Putin is moving in. For all the cries of Trump being Putin’s puppet, Putin sure has done well with Biden running our federal government. It is as if Biden were falsely accusing Trump of the things that he actually did, you know, like keeping classified documents in his garage.

Little did I know the profundity of “the smeller is the feller” when I first heard it 60 years ago.

In Niger, things finally came to a head. The Guardian reported, “The junta’s announcement follows a visit by U.S. officials this week which was led by assistant secretary of state for African affairs Molly Phee and included General Michael Langley, commander of the U.S. Africa command.” Langley is the first four-star in the Marines. Phee is just another career diplomat.

The Guardian said, “Colonel Amadou Abdramane said on Niger television on Saturday that the US delegation did not follow diplomatic protocol, and that Niger was not informed about the composition of the delegation, the date of its arrival or the agenda.”

Nothing quite shows disrespect by arriving at the spur of the moment. Thus, Niger is kicking us out.

The colonel said, “Niger regrets the intention of the American delegation to deny the sovereign Nigerien people the right to choose their partners and types of partnerships capable of truly helping them fight against terrorism.

“Also, the government of Niger forcefully denounces the condescending attitude accompanied by the threat of retaliation from the head of the American delegation towards the Nigerien government and people.”

The reaction was as one would expect. Given the willful ignorance of this administration, perhaps Phee and the rest are surprised. This reminds me of how Biden handled his first meeting with Saudi leaders. You may recall that the Saudis greeted Trump in 2017 like a conquering UFC champion with the nation’s media hailing and embracing his wife, his Jewish daughter and his Jewish son-on-law. Trump later became the first to fly directly from Saudi to Israel without a lame stopover in Cyprus to acknowledge that the Saudis officially do not accept the existence of Israel.

Biden went to Saudi and insulted its crown prince.

Reuters reported, “U.S. President Joe Biden said on Friday he told Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman he held him responsible for the murder of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi, shortly after exchanging a fist bump with the kingdom's de facto ruler.

“On a trip to reset relations with a country he had called a pariah after Khashoggi's killing in 2018, Biden said the crown prince, known as MbS, denied involvement in the murder and said he had held those responsible to account.”

Surely Biden cannot be that stupid. He looks like he is deliberately kneecapping our nation on the world stage. His plan may be to use his four years to ruin our reputation and our economy for the next hundred years.

His blunder in Africa seems planned as well.

NYT cited Abdoulaye Sissoko, a Nigerien columnist, who wrote, “The goal of American policy is not to help fight armed groups, but to maintain control and counter the growing influence in the region of countries such as Russia, China and Turkey. There is no public evidence that American bases in Niger have proven useful.”

That’s the thing about the Art of the Deal. The other guy must get something out of the deal — besides lectures on how to live his life from a regime that wants to jail and bankrupt the opposition.

Don’t get me wrong. I believe our forces are spread too thin across the world and Biden has depleted our military arsenal by financing a corrupt elf in Ukraine and leaving as tribute billions in weapons to the terrorist Taliban group in Afghanistan.

I will point out, though, that he just handed two new military bases to Putin. But Donald is the puppet, right?

https://donsurber.substack.com/p/bidens-latest-fafo?r=2k0c5&triedRedirect=true

[Crafty_Dog]

March 25, 2024
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What Washington’s Departure From Niger Means
There is now security vacuum that Riyadh and Moscow are looking to exploit.
By: Ronan Wordsworth

The U.S. responded to the Sahel’s string of military coups, especially in Niger, fairly pragmatically. Washington initially refused to call events in Niamey a coup, since doing so would have required cuts to military and financial assistance, and seemed willing to engage the new regime led by Gen. Abdourahamane Tchiani. In return, Washington was able to maintain important military bases in the country.

But it seems Niger has had a change of heart. Over the weekend of March 16, the leadership in Niamey essentially ignored a U.S. delegation scheduled to meet with the ruling party, and more important, it announced that it would immediately terminate its military contract with Washington. Tellingly, a junta spokesman said that “Niger regrets the intention of the American delegation to deny the sovereign Nigerien people the right to choose their partners and types of partnerships capable of truly helping them fight against terrorism.” The Pentagon responded by discussing the direct and frank conversations defense officials had had with the Nigeriens about the path their country is on and by expressing concerns over Niger’s growing relationship with Russia and Iran. The episode was an obvious signal of Niger’s shift away from the U.S. and toward new allies.

Niger is part of the wider Sahelian region, which, along with neighbors Mali and Burkina Faso, has been rife with jihadist groups for the better part of a decade. Longstanding, expensive EU and U.S. missions meant to stabilize them have been only marginally successful. The three were also part of the G5 Sahel grouping (along with Mauritania and Chad), which has received huge amounts of counterterrorism and humanitarian assistance. Since 2013, the U.S. has cooperated with whatever government ruled Niger to provide that assistance, culminating in the completion of an air base in Agadez from which Washington’s regional counterterrorism operations were based. The facility has enabled intelligence gathering and logistical support and has helped control illicit smuggling and illegal migration toward Europe.

Over the past three years, military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have upended this status quo. The new leaders have spurned traditional allies such as France and, under the premise of restoring order and reclaiming territory lost to Islamist insurgents, have delegated some of their security responsibilities to Russia. Unsurprisingly, Moscow’s influence in these countries has increased dramatically. For Russia, Niger represents another link in a nearly uninterrupted chain of potentially friendly Sahelian states that are also lucrative sources of resource extraction. Several mines in Mali, Burkina Faso, Sudan and Central African Republic have been handed to Africa Corps, which is formerly the Wagner Group’s contingent in Africa and operates under the aegis of the Russian Defense Ministry. Moscow is also courting Chad, which could give Moscow an even larger swath of territorial influence.

Russian Presence in the Sahel

(click to enlarge)

It’s no coincidence that just after the Nigerien junta announced the termination of its military agreement with the U.S., reports surfaced in Russian media of a new Sahelian rail corridor connecting the Central African Republic, Mali and Burkina Faso to Libyan ports via Niger. (The government in Tripoli, which is also cozy with Moscow, recently announced an end to various factional hostilities, providing a potential opening for this kind of agreement.) If the railway ever gets off the ground, it would give Russian mining operations a significant logistical boost in a trade that was already worth billions annually.

Proposed Trans-Saharan Rail Line

(click to enlarge)

For the U.S., the Nigerien government is not yet a lost cause; a Pentagon spokesperson recently told reporters, “We want to see our partnership continue if there is a pathway forward." However, Washington is doubtless assessing contingency plans already, looking at viable alternatives in places like Benin, Ivory Coast, Ghana and Mauritania. Perhaps more important are the rumors that Iran is now buying uranium from Niger, which accounts for 5 percent of global production, and that Saudi Arabia is similarly interested. The U.S. has been continuously warning Iran over its increasing enrichment program, which has seen Tehran create large stockpiles of 60 percent enriched uranium – levels suitable for the rapid production of a nuclear weapon.

Even so, Gen. Tchiani and his Cabinet are likely feeling very confident in their position after the Economic Community of West African States dropped its sanctions and the reopening of the border with Nigeria. Nigerian President Bola Tinubu once threatened military intervention to reinstate Niger’s ousted president, but the threat passed with a whimper, and Nigeria has since reinstated the power supply to Niger, while ECOWAS has shown that it lacks any real teeth as an organization. It’s possible that this, coupled with Russian interest, gave the junta the confidence to act against Washington.

Either way, the long and expensive U.S.-led mission in the country has been dealt a potential death blow. Operating from Agadez isn’t a long-term solution, at least not as long as the current government is in power. Washington is thus looking to shore up its allies in a region that is growing sparser of friendly faces. Russian security forces may help the military junta shore up its position, but don’t expect them to secure the peripheral regions that have become hot beds for Islamic terrorism. (They didn’t in Mali or Burkina Faso.) In the meantime, instability will affect the entire region. It could even spill over into Europe by reopening mass migration routes, and potentially facilitating a resurgence of jihadist groups that have been effectively diminished by U.S. assistance.

[Crafty_Dog]

Shared with permission:

This issue is far more important than people realize. I spent a lot of time in Africa, from Gabon and Cote d-Ivoire all the way around the bottom of the continent to Mozambique - 7 countries in all with substantial time and work in each - and the importance of Africa in global politics and defense strategy is impossible to overstate. It would give most people serious pause to learn how much of what we would call malign action and malign influence by actors like Russia, China, and North Korea take place quietly and effectively in hideouts like South Africa. It would likewise take your breath away to learn just how similar most of those Embassies are to mob rackets, and how much illicit money is flowing through them back to sanctioned countries. Ceding Africa to our enemies, even in small ways, blinds and cripples us. Doing it the way Biden has done it qualifies as malfeasance.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fiD24uEvY1U