China vs. the World; Chinese political intimidation & penetration

[Crafty_Dog]

 the Coca Codo Sinclair hydroelectric plant near San Luis, Ecuador.
By Ryan DubeFollow
 and Gabriele SteinhauserFollow
 | Photographs by Isadora Romero for The Wall Street Journal
Jan. 20, 2023 9:45 am ET

SAN LUIS, Ecuador—Built near a spewing volcano, it was the biggest infrastructure project ever in this country, a concrete colossus bankrolled by Chinese cash and so important to Beijing that China’s leader, Xi Jinping, spoke at the 2016 inauguration.

Today, thousands of cracks have emerged in the $2.7 billion Coca Codo Sinclair hydroelectric plant, government engineers said, raising concerns that Ecuador’s biggest source of power could break down. At the same time, the Coca River’s mountainous slopes are eroding, threatening to damage the dam.

“We could lose everything,” said Fabricio Yépez, an engineer at the University of San Francisco in Quito who has closely tracked the project’s problems. “And we don’t know if it could be tomorrow or in six months.”

It is one of many Chinese-financed projects around the world plagued with construction flaws.

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During the past decade, China handed out a trillion dollars in international loans as part of Beijing’s Belt and Road initiative, intended to develop economic trade and expand China’s influence across Asia, Africa and Latin America. Those loans made Beijing the largest government lender to the developing world by far, with its loans totaling nearly as much as those of all other governments combined, according to the World Bank.

Yet China’s lending practices have been criticized by foreign leaders, economists and others, who say the program has contributed to debt crises in places like Sri Lanka and Zambia, and that many countries have limited ways to repay the loans. Some projects have also been called mismatches for a country’s infrastructure needs or damaging to the environment.

Now, low-quality construction on some of the projects risks crippling key infrastructure and saddling nations with even more costs for years to come as they try to remedy problems.

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“We are suffering today because of the bad quality of equipment and parts” in Chinese-built projects, said René Ortiz, Ecuador’s former energy minister and ex-secretary general of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries.

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Government engineers said there are thousands of cracks in the hydroelectric plant, built by Chinese company Sinohydro.
PHOTO: CRISTINA VEGA/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES
China’s Embassy in Ecuador didn’t respond to requests for comment on the hydroelectric project. In a recent letter published on the embassy’s Twitter account in response to a report by the Foundation for Citizenship and Development, the local chapter of anticorruption watchdog Transparency International, on China’s lending practices in Ecuador, the embassy said Chinese loans and projects provided “tangible benefits” to Ecuador at a time when the country was in urgent need of financing.

Chinese money has been used to build everything from a port in Pakistan to roads in Ethiopia and a transmission line in Brazil.

Chinese construction companies often bid for government projects or directly approach local officials with projects with a promise that they can easily arrange financing packages from Chinese banks and insurers.

That, developing-country officials say, has given Chinese companies a leg up, because it means governments eager to build a new dam or road don’t have to drum up their own funding. In Africa, more than 60% of the revenue major international contractors collected in 2019 went to Chinese companies, according to a 2021 paper by the China-Africa Research Initiative at Johns Hopkins University.

Critics say the relatively easy availability of Chinese loans for Chinese construction can lead to inflated project costs because there is less pressure on governments to minimize expenses.

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Construction defects
Flaws in some of the Chinese-built projects have come to light.

In Pakistan, officials shut down the Neelum-Jhelum hydroelectric plant last year after detecting cracks in a tunnel that transports water through a mountain to drive a turbine.

The head of the country’s electricity regulator, Tauseef Farooqui, told Pakistan’s senate in November that he was concerned the tunnel could collapse just four years after the 969-megawatt plant became operational. That would be disastrous for a nation that has been battered by rising energy prices, said Mr. Farooqui. The closure of the plant has already cost Pakistan about $44 million a month in higher power costs since July, according to the regulator.

Hydropower plants can have operating lives of up to 100 years, according to the World Bank.

image
The Chinese-built Neelum-Jhelum Hydropower Project in Nosari, Pakistan, shown in 2017, has been shut down because officials said they detected cracks.
PHOTO: SAJJAD QAYYUM/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES
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Uganda identified defects in the Chinese-built Isimba Hydro Power Plant, shown under construction in 2017.
PHOTO: ZHANG GAIPING/XINHUA/ZUMA PRESS
Uganda’s power generation company said it has identified more than 500 construction defects in a Chinese-built 183-megawatt hydropower plant on the Nile river that has suffered frequent breakdowns since it went into operation in 2019. China International Water & Electric Corp., which led construction of the Isimba Hydro Power Plant, failed to build a floating boom to protect the dam from water weeds and other debris, which has led to clogged turbines and power outages, according to the Uganda Electricity Generation Co., or UEGC. There have also been leaks in the roof of the plant’s power house, where the generators and turbines are located, UEGC said. The plant cost $567.7 million to build and was financed mostly through a $480 million loan from the Export-Import Bank of China.

Completion of another Chinese-built hydropower plant further down the Nile, the 600-megawatt Karuma Hydro Power Project, is three years behind schedule, a delay that Ugandan officials have blamed on various construction defects, including cracked walls. UEGC also said the Chinese contractor, Sinohydro Corp., installed faulty cables, switches and a fire extinguishing system that need to be replaced. Earlier this year, the government had to start paying back the $1.44 billion it borrowed from the Export-Import Bank of China to finance the project, even as the plant remains inoperational.

Sinohydro and China International Water didn’t respond to requests for comment on the Ugandan projects.

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In Angola, 10 years after the first tenants moved into Kilamba Kiaxi, a vast social housing project outside the capital of Luanda, many locals are complaining about cracked walls, moldy ceilings and poor construction.

The project, built by China’s CITIC Group, was initially funded through a $2.5 billion, oil-backed credit line from the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China that was later refinanced by the China Development Bank, according to William & Mary’s Aid Data Research Lab.

“Our building has a lot of cracks,” said Aida Francisco, who lives in a four-bedroom apartment in Kilamba with her husband and three sons. Like many other middle-class families in Kilamba, she is purchasing the apartment through a rent-to-buy program. Humidity collects in the apartment’s walls, causing mold, Ms. Francisco said, and a lot of the building materials, including doors and railings, are of poor quality.

When she first moved to Kilamba in 2016, Ms. Francisco said, Chinese contractors still came to fix problems. But in recent years many buildings, including hers, have fallen into disrepair, especially as many tenants, who are responsible for the upkeep, lost their jobs amid Angola’s economic crisis.

“If you see these buildings, they won’t last long,” said Ms. Francisco. “They’re falling apart bit by bit.”

A spokeswoman for CITIC said humidity issues in a small number of units in Kilamba were due to tenants making improper renovations and that the company had completed required maintenance.

The Chinese government didn’t respond to requests for comment on criticism of Chinese-built infrastructure in Africa and Asia. A spokesman for Angola’s ministry for Construction and Public Works didn’t respond to requests for comment.

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Many Chinese projects fulfill real development needs, especially in countries that struggle to get other financing to build necessary infrastructure. In Argentina’s poor, northern province of Jujuy, PowerChina built the Cauchari solar park, South America’s biggest solar project. At more than 13,000 feet above sea level, it is able to power some 160,000 homes, according to Argentina’s government. In Brazil, China’s State Grid built one of the world’s longest transmission lines, connecting the Belo Monte dam in the northeast to southern cities some 1,550 miles away.

image
Erosion along Ecuador’s Coca River, which some geologists blame on the Coca Codo Sinclair plant, has destroyed stretches of a highway, an oil pipeline and part of a nearby town.
Surge in Ecuador spending
In Latin America, Ecuador was at the forefront of Beijing’s push into the region, with Quito accessing more in loans than any country except two much bigger nations, Venezuela and Brazil, according to the Inter-American Dialogue, a think tank.

After a 2008 sovereign-debt default, then-president Rafael Correa, a leftist who during his tenure from 2007 to 2017 often clashed with the U.S. and railed against multilateral lenders, turned to China to finance a surge in public spending. In total, Chinese banks lent Ecuador $18 billion during Mr. Correa’s term.

Ecuadorean lawmakers, former government ministers and anticorruption activists say the loans lacked transparency, with contracts given to companies without public bids, resulting in shoddy construction, high costs and graft.

In the recent letter published on the Chinese Embassy in Ecuador’s Twitter account, it said the financing was agreed on during friendly negotiations with Ecuador and fully complies with laws and regulations in both countries.

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Current government officials and Ecuadorean economists said some projects made little sense, including the expropriation of thousands of acres of farmland in an Andean valley to build a new metropolis called Yachay City that was supposed to turn Ecuador into a regional tech power. The Export-Import Bank of China provided a $200 million loan for early infrastructure works. Today, the project has been abandoned, with a $6.3 million supercomputer that was supposed to be used by researchers sitting out of doors and unused.

In 2019, the comptroller general’s office reviewed the construction of 200 Chinese-built schools, reporting that some of the buildings had problems with their foundations and others had classrooms with sloping floors and exposed cables. Fifty-seven of the schools were finished behind schedule, the comptroller general’s office said.

“Correa spent on many projects that were not adequate,” said Vicente Albornoz, an economist at the University of Las Americas in Quito. “And China was funding Correa’s spending [on the projects].”

Mr. Correa said in an interview the money boosted Ecuador’s development with new highways, hospitals and schools. Four Chinese-built hydroelectric projects provided clean power and reduced reliance on imported fossil fuels. The Chinese projects also improved a once unreliable power grid that led to regular blackouts in Quito. Today, 90% of Ecuador’s electricity comes from hydro, compared with 55% in 2007, according to the state utility.

“China’s relationship with Ecuador was an example in Latin America,” said Mr. Correa. “We did things that changed the history of the country.”



Sinohydro did the construction and flew in hundreds of Chinese workers to build the Coca Codo Sinclair plant. Detail of a book in Chinese and Spanish with information and photographs about the project.
The former president, who was convicted in 2020 of corruption charges in a case involving payments to his party in exchange for public contracts, is in exile in Belgium. He denies wrongdoing.

China’s most ambitious project in Ecuador was Coca Codo Sinclair, which Ecuadorean engineers first studied for the Coca River in the 1970s. Back then, they considered it a risky venture due to its steep cost and location near an active volcano.

But Ecuador wanted the dam to improve an electrical grid that regularly suffered blackouts and relied on costly energy imports. Today, it supplies about a third of Ecuador’s electricity.

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During Mr. Correa’s term, the China Development Bank agreed to finance 85% of Coca Codo Sinclair’s initial cost, with a 6.9% interest rate. Sinohydro did the construction and flew in hundreds of Chinese workers to build the power plant between 2010 and 2016.

The China Development Bank and Sinohydro didn’t respond to requests for comment.

In September, prosecutors searched the office of Sinohydro over allegations it paid bribes to people close to Mr. Correa’s vice president, Lenin Moreno, when the contract was awarded to the Chinese firm. No one has been charged in that ongoing investigation. Mr. Moreno, who later served as president from 2017 to 2021, has publicly denied wrongdoing.

Larger capacity
Some engineers questioned the project early on, saying that the environmental studies were out of date. The plant’s 1,500-megawatt capacity was much larger than the originally envisioned capacity of about 1,000 megawatts, adding to costs and creating more capacity than the river could power, according to former energy officials and congressional investigators. In 2014, 13 Chinese and Ecuadorean employees were crushed to death in a construction accident.

Since the 2016 opening, officials from the state electricity utility have found more than 17,000 cracks in the power plant’s eight turbines, according to the state utility. It blames the fissures on faulty steel imported from China. In 2021, the utility took Sinohydro to international arbitration in Chile, which is ongoing, over demands to repair the damage.

“No crack is acceptable,” the utility said in response to questions from The Wall Street Journal. “They could result in the equipment losing its structural integrity, causing it to collapse.”

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President Guillermo Lasso’s government has refused to officially take over management of the plant from Sinohydro, as was planned at the completion of construction, until the cracks are repaired. Numerous attempts to fix the cracks have failed, utility officials said.

“Over my dead body will I accept this poorly built plant,” Energy Minister Fernando Santos told local media in November.

In San Luis, locals like Adriana Carranza got jobs with Sinohydro, which hired her to cook for Chinese workers. The 14-hour days were long, and her Chinese boss didn’t speak Spanish. But the job allowed her to save enough to build a house for her family, she said. At home, she still cooks sweet-and-sour chicken and other Chinese dishes.

But in 2020, the Coca River’s slopes began collapsing, creating thunderous crashes and rattling the ground like an earthquake. The erosion destroyed Ecuador’s biggest waterfall. It took out a stretch of a key road and oil pipeline. The Pink House, a brothel in San Luis that locals say was popular with both Chinese and Ecuadorean workers, tumbled into the river. Ms. Carranza said a neighbor’s home went over the cliff.

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Adriana Carranza, shown with her daughter, Darina Zambrano, and their dog, had to flee San Luis last year because of dangerous erosion along the Coca River.
Fearing for her family’s safety in her own home, Ms. Carranza fled San Luis in March, salvaging anything she could from her house, taking windows, doors and even the roof. “I became deeply depressed, I couldn’t get out of bed,” Ms. Carranza said. “We’ve lost everything.”

Ecuador’s state utility said the erosion is a natural phenomenon in an area prone to natural disasters. Some geologists agree, but others blamed Coca Codo Sinclair, saying that its concrete structures so disrupted the river’s natural flow and accumulation of sediments that the fast-moving water began to cut into the river banks as it descends from the Andes on its way to the Amazon rainforest.

“The erosion is a process that would normally occur over thousands or millions of years, but the dam has accelerated it in a matter of just five years,” said Carolina Bernal, a geologist at the National Polytechnic School, a public university in Quito.

Ecuador has unsuccessfully tried to stop the erosion as the river nears Coca Codo Sinclair, including by placing shipping containers in the water to slow the current. They were quickly washed away.

Ms. Bernal said the government will likely need to relocate a key part of the plant—the project’s water intake—which would cost millions of dollars, before that structure is destroyed by the erosion.

Nancy Chicaiza, a San Luis resident, has little hope for the survival of her town, which once bustled with Chinese workers who bought drinks and snacks at her bodega. She now expects the erosion will eventually wipe out all of San Luis.

“Coca Codo was initially seen as really good,” said Ms. Chicaiza. “Nobody thought we’d be facing these consequences.”

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Nancy Chicaiza and others stood on the edge of an eroded area that they blame on faulty construction of the Coca Codo Sinclair plant.
Nicholas Bariyo contributed to this article.

Write to Ryan Dube at ryan.dube@dowjones.com and Gabriele Steinhauser at gabriele.steinhauser@wsj.com

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[DougMacG]

https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/13/china-belt-and-road-initiative-infrastructure-development-geopolitics/

China’s Belt and Road to Nowhere: Xi Jinping’s signature foreign policy is a “shadow of its former self.”

Foreign Policy ^ | 02/13/2023 | Christina Lu
Nearly a decade after its inception, momentum behind China’s sweeping Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) appears to be slowing as lending slumps and projects stall—forcing Chinese President Xi Jinping to again rethink a floundering initiative that he once hailed as his “project of the century.” After doling out hundreds of billions of dollars, experts say China’s lending for BRI projects has plummeted, largely a casualty of the COVID-19 pandemic and the country’s own economic slowdown. Support has also waned as partner countries drown in debt and fractures emerge—literally—in projects, fueling uncertainty about the future of the sprawling initiative.

[ccp]

BRI

failing.

Great news ! 

[G M]

BRI

failing.

Great news ! 

Belt and Loansharking Initiative.

[Crafty_Dog]

   
China as a Lender of Last Resort
Beijing's high interest loans have been criticized for creating “debt traps” for cash-strapped borrowers.
By: Geopolitical Futures
Chinese Rescue Lending
(click to enlarge)

China has become a major rescue lender for heavily indebted countries. In 2022, loans to countries in debt distress accounted for 60 percent of China’s overseas lending portfolio – up sharply from just 5 percent in 2010.

Over the past two decades, Chinese institutions have provided $240 billion in rescue lending to 22 developing countries. Of that sum, $170 billion was provided through the People’s Bank of China’s swap line network – a system whereby central banks agree to exchange currencies. The rest was offered through other means such as bridge loans or balance of payments support by Chinese state-owned banks and enterprises, including the China Development Bank. They're provided, generally with high interest rates, mostly to middle-income countries, which account for four-fifths of China’s overall lending. Low-income countries are given grace periods and maturity extensions.

However, these loans, often doled out as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, have been highly criticized for creating “debt traps” for cash-strapped borrowers. Countries like Sri Lanka, Zambia and Ghana are currently in talks with Beijing to restructure their debt. But as more governments struggle to make payments amid a global downturn, there’s growing concern about China’s ability to refinance the loans and avoid financial problems at home if debtors can’t repay them.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/the-eu-s-divided-approach-on-china-might-be-coming-to-an-end-and-the-u-s-is-unlikely-to-be-happy-about-it/ar-AA1a00so?ocid=msedgntp&cvid=1cc858e5d86d474b855ec0ed48089646&ei=28

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/19555/west-training-china-military

[Crafty_Dog]

MYANMAR

With U.S. focused elsewhere, China stokes Asian hot spot in ‘cold war’

BY GUY TAYLOR THE WASHINGTON TIMES

A violent civil war between the Chinabacked military junta ruling Myanmar and a patchwork of pro-democracy rebels in the Southeast Asian nation is not getting much attention in the West, but China’s leadership increasingly views the clash as a strategic front line of a “cold war” in its global competition with the United States.

The Biden administration is slowpedaling in response, say regional analysts, who add that the White House lacks a clear strategy for halting Beijing’s growing influence in Myanmar, a vital land bridge between China and the Indian Ocean.

The lack of attention could lead to a clear strategic loss for the U.S. and its allies in an area of growing interest to China’s communist leadership.

“China has been steadily expanding its influence in Myanmar for a considerable period,” said Ye Myo Hein, a prodemocracy scholar and visiting fellow with the U.S. Institute of Peace and the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington.

He told The Washington Times that China views Myanmar “as a strategic hot spot at the intersection of its borders, South Asia, Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean.”

Beijing’s increased focus contrasts with the Biden administration’s “traditional view of Myanmar as strategically unimportant,” said Ye Myo Hein, who is pressing U.S. officials to “develop a clear strategy to enhance [Washington’s] strategic influence in the country.”

In a geopolitical competition, successive U.S. administrations have scrambled to shore up alliances with countries across the Indo-Pacific to counter China’s economic and diplomatic rise in the region. Beijing’s development model is sharply at odds with U.S. support for free markets and democracy.

Meanwhile, Myanmar’s junta is pulling no punches to crush a prodemocracy insurgency. Ye Myo Hein said the junta has carried out “more than 700 airstrikes, primarily in civilian areas,” since 2021.

“These airstrikes have been largely indiscriminate, resulting in significant casualties to innocent civilians,” he said. He pointed to one strike in April that killed nearly 170 people in central Myanmar.

A recent Peace Research Institute Oslo report said at least 6,000 civilians have been killed and more than 1 million have been internally displaced since 2021.

The conflict has spiraled since a military coup overthrew Myanmar’s elected civilian government led by Aung San Suu Kyi, a Nobel Peace Prize laureate and head of the country’s largest political party. Despite complaints about the government, U.S. policymakers highly regarded Myanmar under Ms. Suu Kyi. Some refer to the country by its old name, Burma.

Beijing tacitly supported the 2021 junta takeover. Widespread protests sparked a harsh military crackdown, the arrests of Ms. Suu Kyi and top government officials, and a continuing armed resistance to the new military leadership.

Anti-coup militias, known as the People’s Defense Forces, have banded with smaller separatist groups long active in the country to wage a guerrilla war against the junta-controlled army and air force across Myanmar’s seven ethnic states.

The military government has imported more than $1 billion worth of arms and raw materials to manufacture its weapons since 2021, according to the United Nations. The U.N. says China, Russia, Singapore, India and Thailand are the most prominent suppliers.

How the anti-junta rebels acquire arms is less clear.

In a complex twist, Ye Myo Hein said, a key avenue is through the pro-democracy movement’s ties to ethnic armed groups along China’s border, many of which also fall under China’s sway, suggesting that Beijing has been wielding influence on both sides.

The insurgency’s dynamics are murky, particularly with rebel efforts to lure some military sectors to shift their allegiance to the prodemocracy movement.

Units of one ethnic militia in eastern Myanmar that are nominally part of the military switched sides in June. The Associated Press reported that units from the Border Guard Forces were thought to be the first militaryaffi liated militia units to change sides since the junta took power.

Several U.S. lawmakers are pressing the Biden administration to develop a more robust strategy to support the rebels. In April 2022, the Democratic-controlled House passed the Burma Act, calling on the White House to engage with Myanmar’s rebels.

The Senate has yet to take up that bill, but the fiscal 2023 National Defense Authorization Act that President Biden signed in November incorporated language from the Burma Act, including a requirement that the administration clarify its policy and an authorization for expanding U.S. sanctions against the junta.

The language notably authorized funding for “non-lethal assistance” for armed People’s Defense Forces rebels in Myanmar and “technical” support for the militias and the broader pro-democracy movement.

It remains to be seen how the support will be conveyed and how much impact it will have. The administration has expanded sanctions that began after the 2021 military coup.

The Treasury Department sanctioned a group of Myanmar arms dealers in March 2022. A press release did not mention China or other foreign providers of weaponry.

More recently, the Treasury Department sanctioned Myanmar individuals and entities involved in importing jet fuel for the junta and two junta-connected banks. The measures freeze their assets in the United States.

“The United States will not waver in its support for the people of Burma as they seek peace, justice and a genuine democratic future for their country,” Secretary of State Antony Blinken said upon targeting the banks on June 21.

Critics are skeptical. The group Justice for Myanmar praised the financial sanctions but said “far more needs to be done to systematically target the junta’s financial and arms procurement networks.”

The group specifically urged sanctions against Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise, “which continues to bankroll the junta’s ongoing war crimes and crimes against humanity.”

The U.S. administration’s focus on countering Russia in Ukraine has overshadowed its gradual sanctions, and China’s backing for the junta in Myanmar has been quietly expanding.

“With the world distracted by the war in Ukraine, and having little bandwidth to focus on the brutality and bloodshed in Myanmar, China has … dramatically ramped up support for Myanmar, further entrenching a growing split between the world’s autocracies and democracies,” Joshua Kurlantzick, a Southeast Asia fellow with the Council on Foreign Relations, wrote for the think tank’s website last year.

China’s growing influence Identifying the parameters of Chinese support for the junta can be difficult, but Beijing appears to be profiting strategically and economically from business with Myanmar’s hard-line military rulers.

An analysis by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace noted that the Chinese state mining company Wanbao continues to invest in Myanmar. Many multinational corporations withdrew after the 2021 military coup.

An August 2022 report by the London-based Business & Human Rights Resource Center said Wanbao Mining, a subsidiary of Chinese arms manufacturer Norinco, has been operating a controversial copper mine in Myanmar’s Sagaing Region in partnership with the military- owned Myanma Economic Holdings since 2010.

Jason Tower, director of the Burma program at the U.S. Institute of Peace, is among those suggesting that China’s support is conditioned on a junta pledge to support Beijing’s sovereignty claims over disputed islands in the South China Sea. The United States and China’s smaller neighbors throughout the region reject China’s claims.

Mr. Tower tweeted last year that the Chinese government is “propping up” the junta by vowing to work toward implementing the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor and expand cross-border electrification, connectivity and industrial zones. Beijing gave the junta roughly $90 million for the work last year.

Ye Myo Hein told The Times that the recent inclusion of Burma Act language in the NDAA was “perceived by Beijing as an increased U.S. involvement in Myanmar and a threat to China’s interests.”

“China responded by actively supporting the junta as a countermeasure to the U.S.’s actions,” he said, and “recent actions by China in Myanmar clearly serve as clear indication that Beijing perceived the crisis in Myanmar through a cold war lens.”

“It appears that U.S. policymakers may not be fully aware of such development, as Washington has not yet recognized Myanmar as a strategically significant hot spot and has yet to formulate a comprehensive policy and strategy in line with the Burma Act,” Ye Myo Hein said.

“The administration has exhibited a clear reluctance to fully and effectively implement the Burma Act, appearing more focused on mitigating the associated risks,” he said. The White House, he said, should “emphasize the shared interest between the United States and China in promoting regional stability” in a way that “implies that the military junta in Myanmar must be removed as it undermines this shared objective.”

The administration should also convey to Beijing that U.S. assistance to the People’s Defense Forces is “not a threat to China, but rather in line with Beijing’s own goals,” as the junta “will only consider a peaceful negotiated settlement if it sees no path to military victory, making U.S. assistance an avenue to support this objective.

[Crafty_Dog]

Germany Sets Out on 'De-Risking' Its Relations With China
Jul 20, 2023 | 17:40 GMT



Germany's new push to de-risk its relations with China highlights growing operational, reputational and financial risks for German companies that are particularly exposed to the Asian giant. On July 13, the German government published its long-awaited, first-ever China strategy, which focuses on ''de-risking'' its ties with the Asian superpower (a view that Berlin shares with the broader European Union) through a three-prong approach. The most important element of the strategy is diversifying Berlin's trade and economic ties with other countries as a way to reduce its reliance on the Chinese market as an export and investment destination, as well as its reliance on China for supplies of critical raw materials (such as lithium and rare earth minerals). Secondly, Germany will seek to further reduce the presence of Chinese companies (like Huawei) in the country's critical infrastructure (like its 5G network). And as the final pillar, the strategy document promises to address calls from the European Union to reduce sensitive technology transfers to China that could increase the Asian country's intelligence and military capabilities by, for example, implementing the outbound investment screening and export controls proposed in the European Commission's new Economic Security Strategy.

In its new China strategy, Germany pledges to continue strengthening the country's military presence and cooperation with partners in the Indo-Pacific. When it comes to Taiwan, the document confirms Germany's formal adherence to the ''One China'' policy, but also reiterates Berlin's intent to expand its ties with Taipei and its stance that a change in the island's status quo would be acceptable only through peaceful means and mutual consent.

On June 20, the European Commission presented its first-ever economic security strategy, which stressed the need to ''de-risk'' the bloc's economic relations by restricting EU members' exports to and investments in adversarial countries. While not explicitly called out by name, China was heavily implied as the main target of the strategy, which highlighted the risk of becoming too reliant on ''a single country, especially one with systemically divergent values, models and interests.''

Germany's new China strategy acknowledges that Beijing is increasingly becoming a ''systemic rival'' due to its efforts to change the rules-based international order and to expand its relationship with Russia. This largely echoes the National Security Strategy that Berlin published in June, which described China as a ''partner, competitor and systemic rival'' and noted that Berlin's competition with Beijing had increased in recent years amid the latter's push to ''deliberately exe[rt] its economic power to reach political goals.'' Similarly, the Bundesamt fur Verfassungsschutz (BfV), Germany's domestic intelligence agency, deemed China as ''the greatest threat'' in terms of foreign direct investment and scientific and economic espionage in its annual report published in June.

The three parties in Germany's ruling coalition agreed to formulate a new China strategy as part of government formation talks in late 2021. However, infighting within the fractious coalition government significantly delayed the process.

The strategy confirms Germany's desire to abandon its former policy of pure economic engagement with autocracies (namely, China and Russia), which underpinned its economic success of the past decades but has proven increasingly risky in today's changing geopolitical landscape. Its new China strategy marks a shift from the policy Germany had pursued for almost two decades under the leadership of former Chancellor Angela Merkel, which focused on engagement with China under the guiding principle of ''Change through Trade.'' Through this strategy, Berlin had hoped to influence Beijing (and autocratic regimes in general, including Russia) to become more liberal and democratic in exchange for a mutually beneficial strengthening of trade relations. As a result, China became Germany's largest trading partner, a key source of critical raw materials and technologies for the energy transition, and a crucial market for German industries in the automotive, technology and chemical sectors. However, China's growing authoritarianism, human rights violations, increasingly aggressive posture in the Taiwan Strait and in the South China Sea, and ever-closer ties with Moscow (coupled with long-standing concerns over the lack of protection and unfair conditions for German companies operating in China) have led to a fundamental rethinking of this strategy both in Brussels and Berlin in recent years. On top of this, as Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the energy and economic crises that followed underscored the risks associated with Germany's deep reliance on Russian natural gas, the need to reduce economic dependence on other non-democratic countries such as China acquired even more urgency. While Germany has been able to wean itself off of Russian energy exports over the past year, its economy is still heavily reliant on China, leaving the European country exposed to risks that its new strategy document seeks to mitigate.

Critics of Germany's strategy of trade and economic engagement with China argue this was a way for Berlin to profit from China's economic rise while ignoring (or at least putting off) difficult conversations about non-economic issues concerning democracy and human rights.

Germany's trade relations with both China and Russia significantly contributed to its economic success and were in fact seen by many as a model of globalization. Access to China's ever-growing market enabled Germany to weather the 2008-09 global financial crisis and the 2010-11 eurozone crisis that followed by providing a vital export destination for German industries. Since then, Germany's economic dependence on China has only grown, with the volume of bilateral trade (imports and exports) reaching a record of nearly 300 billion euros ($337 billion) in 2022.

Prior to the war in Ukraine, Russia served as Germany's largest gas supplier. Now, Russian oil and gas exports to Germany are near zero following cut-offs in supply through the Nord Stream pipeline from Russia and thanks to efforts from the German government to phase out the remaining energy imports from Russia.

But while the document confirms Berlin's intent to recalibrate its relationship with Beijing, Germany will seek not to cut trade and economic ties with China. China remains a vital market and supplier for some of Germany's largest companies, including chemical producer BASF, tech giant Siemens, and carmakers Volkswagen and BMW. Berlin will thus still seek to avoid severing ties with Beijing, which would prove economically catastrophic. This will see the German government largely leave the onus of de-risking its relationship with China to profit-motivated companies and investors. In fact, the strategy urges German companies particularly exposed to China to take geopolitical risks into account in their decision-making ''so that state funds do not have to be tapped into in the event of a geopolitical crisis,'' but it fails to mention any concrete policy measures to ensure such warnings do not fall on deaf ears.

According to the German Council of Economic Experts' most recent annual report, China ranks first among the countries on which Germany is most dependent regarding strategically important imports, with 45.1% of total German imports of products with strong import dependencies coming from China.

A February 2023 report by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy shows how China dominates global and German supplies of rare earths and raw materials needed to produce technology classified as critical by the European Union, as well as supplies of a number of products (mainly electronics) that ''could not be replaced as a supplier in the short term.''

Although Germany's de-risking strategy does not include specific policy measures, future regulations may expose German companies to growing operational, reputational and financial risks. So far, Germany has not enforced its de-risking strategy with any concrete policy measures, enabling German companies to keep investing in China. However, Berlin may eventually adopt foreign trade regulations to block or downsize Chinese acquisitions of German companies in sectors of the economy considered of strategic importance. The government could also prohibit critical infrastructure operators from contracting Chinese vendors and using Chinese equipment, with upcoming measures to ban certain Chinese components in the country's 5G network offering an important indication of how far the government intends to go in pursuing this goal. Finally, Berlin may decide to interrupt or impose caps on investment guarantees (which the government normally offers to German companies in emerging markets to protect their investments from political risk) for German investment in China. As a result, German companies could face increasing pressure to reduce critical dependencies on China, diversify supply chains and export markets, and create contingency plans to decouple from China should a geopolitical crisis arise. German companies that fail to do so risk losing access to investment protection schemes and/or lowering their creditworthiness and company valuations on financial markets due to perceived high levels of geopolitical risk. Moreover, should Germany's de-risking efforts significantly escalate, Beijing may retaliate by more strictly regulating German firms operating in China or by limiting exports of critical raw materials to Germany.

A 2021 study from Germany's Kiel Institute for the World Economy estimates that an abrupt break in Germany-China trade relations would cost Germany about 1.4% of GDP (roughly 48.4 billion euros, or $54.21 billion) in real income. The study also estimates that this decoupling would cost the European Union 1% of GDP.

In a study published earlier in 2023, the Cologne Institute for Economic Research estimated that Germany's exports to China accounted for 2.7% of its total economic added value and 2.4% of employment.

A report in December 2022 from Denmark-based telecommunications consultancy Strand Consult showed that Chinese companies Huawei and ZTE, which the EU considers high-risk vendors, account for about 59% of Germany's 5G infrastructure. In 2021, the German government passed measures allowing it to ban or recall certain components from the country's telecommunications infrastructure in case security risks were identified (pursuant to the 2020 EU toolbox for 5G security) but has yet to apply them.

[Crafty_Dog]

Europe Avoids China’s Belt and Road Forum, Keeping a Distance From Xi and Putin
Russia’s president has confirmed his attendance at planned summit, deterring Western countries that Beijing wants to win over
By
Chun Han Wong
Follow
 in Singapore, in Berlin and
Drew Hinshaw
Follow
 in Madrid
July 28, 2023 5:01 am ET




After three years of Covid isolation, Chinese leader Xi Jinping is planning a blowout bash for his signature Belt and Road infrastructure initiative.

The R.S.V.P.s aren’t exactly rolling in.

European countries, in particular, are skipping the festivities, a reflection of souring relations between the continent and China. Beijing had hoped that Europe would plug into its Belt and Road network of global trade and transportation links, but European leaders are backing away, sharing Washington’s wariness about increasing their economic dependence on China.

The one prominent guest who has said he is attending—Russian President Vladimir Putin—has further driven away European leaders, many of whom have hardened their stance toward China because of Beijing’s support for Moscow since the start of the Ukraine war.

Beijing envisioned the Belt and Road Initiative to direct what some experts estimated to be $1 trillion toward Chinese-financed rail, roads, pipelines and ports that would link Asia with Europe, Africa and Latin America.

Just five years ago, China was quickly signing up new members across the developing world and making inroads among rich economies more closely aligned with Washington—including Italy, Greece and the Czech Republic—with goods arriving in European ports and railways financed by Belt and Road.

Now, many of those countries are distancing themselves from the project, as Europe seeks to reduce China’s economic influence in the region. 

French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz currently have no plans to attend this year’s Belt and Road Forum, according to senior government officials. Nor does Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni of Italy, the only Group of Seven country to sign up to the Belt and Road, said a person coordinating her schedule. Historically neutral Switzerland, which sent its president to the past two summits, is reviewing whether it will participate this year, a foreign-ministry spokeswoman said.

Greece, which joined the Belt and Road Initiative in 2018, has already told Beijing its prime minister won’t attend. The Czech Republic, which signed up to the initiative in 2015, doesn’t expect to send its president or senior officials, government spokespeople said. Xi made three-day state visits to each of those countries after they committed to Belt and Road cooperation with Beijing.

Beijing’s pursuit of Belt and Road is one of the signs that “the Chinese Communist Party’s clear goal is a systemic change of the international order with China at its center,” European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said in March.

The Belt and Road Initiative, which Xi first pitched in 2013 as a broad campaign to boost global development and expand China’s international influence, is the world’s biggest infrastructure program—much larger than Washington’s postwar Marshall Plan—and the U.S. hasn’t been able to field an alternative thus far.


Heads of state posing for a photo at the last Belt and Road forum, in Beijing in 2019. PHOTO: VALERY MELNIKOV/SPUTNIK/KREMLIN/SHUTTERSTOCK
But Belt and Road spending has fallen short on early estimates and Beijing’s ambitions have been dampened by Covid-19, rising borrowing costs and Russia’s war in Ukraine. This year’s Belt and Road Forum—the first since the pandemic and the third since the inaugural edition in 2017—will test the appeal of Xi’s signature platform for economic diplomacy, with Chinese diplomats working to fill guest lists and demonstrate China’s global influence.

“In past years, European countries approached the [Belt and Road Initiative] with an open mind,” said Noah Barkin, who focuses on Europe and China at research firm Rhodium Group. Now, the narrative has shifted and the program is largely seen, Barkin says, as “a vehicle for spreading Chinese influence abroad.”

The lackluster response from Europe so far suggests a more challenging global landscape for Xi’s diplomatic ambitions. If European countries once flirted with joining Belt and Road, they are now competing with it.

In late October, European governments will invite business leaders, officials and heads of state from Africa, Latin America and Asia—but not China—to their own rival forum, promoting Global Gateway, the European Union’s $333 billion infrastructure-building program.

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Chinese officials, meanwhile, are working toward a mid-October time frame for the Beijing forum and have been courting the participation of foreign governments, according to people familiar with the matter.

Xi and Putin: A Friendship Forged Against the West

PHOTO: PAVEL BYRKIN/SPUTNIK/KREMLIN/PRESS POOL
State media has previously reported that Xi, during a state visit to Moscow in March, invited Putin to attend. This week, the Kremlin said Putin would participate.

Putin’s presence has made it all but impossible for China to secure commitments from governments that have condemned Russia’s Ukraine invasion and imposed sanctions on Moscow, people familiar with the matter say.

Low attendance would undercut Beijing’s efforts to project an image of growing global clout. The previous forum in 2019 featured senior leaders from 38 countries, whereas 30 national leaders appeared at the inaugural event in 2017—to which the Trump administration sent a midlevel delegation led by a White House adviser.

Spokespeople for China’s Foreign Ministry didn’t respond to a request for comment.

The Belt and Road program has faced criticism at home and abroad as projects stall, debtors struggle to repay loans and allegations of overspending and misallocation of resources crop up. Western officials have blamed the initiative for heaping onerous debt onto poorer countries—a notion that Beijing rejects. Some private businesses have also lost interest after failing to reap the benefits they hoped for, following an early buzz that prompted many entrepreneurs to find ways to associate themselves with the program.

“‘Belt and Road’ sloganeering is outdated,” said one China-focused business lobbyist in Singapore who works with companies from both countries, adding that many entrepreneurs have moved on to new buzzwords, such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, or RCEP—a 15-member Asian trade pact of which China is a member.


The Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Railway is one of many infrastructure projects under China’s Belt and Road Initiative. PHOTO: REN WEIYUN/ZUMA PRESS
Beijing, for its part, has defended the Belt and Road as beneficial for global trade and development in partner countries, while promising to improve its implementation. At the 2019 forum, Xi pledged to introduce a “debt-sustainability framework” for Belt and Road projects and encourage compliance with international standards in infrastructure contracting. Chinese officials have also set stronger risk controls and become more willing to accept some losses and renegotiate debt.

Europe’s turn away from Belt and Road started before the pandemic, as the continent’s major powers re-evaluated their relationship with China. Since 2019, the EU’s official China policy has labeled Beijing a “systemic rival,” not just a commercial partner. The following year, the EU Chamber of Commerce in China said European companies were only getting “crumbs from the table” from Belt and Road, since most financing is routed through Chinese state-owned entities.

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Diplomatic spats also made closer trade links with China less palatable. In 2020, Chinese diplomats threatened to import fewer pianos from the Czech Republic, whose then-president was a staunch Belt and Road supporter, if a Czech senator flew to Taiwan, a self-governed island that Beijing claims as its territory. The incident sparked a wave of China skepticism that helped elect a new president who is one of Europe’s most outspoken China hawks.

The following year, China curbed imports from Lithuania by 80% after the Baltic country allowed Taiwan to open a local office under a name suggesting the island is an independent state. The EU sued China at the World Trade Organization and intensified efforts to reduce trade dependencies on China.

China’s ambivalent reaction to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine further alienated many European officials, who began working more closely with the U.S. to curb Beijing’s global influence—including the Belt and Road Initiative. At a May summit in Hiroshima, the G-7 advanced democracies established a partnership for global infrastructure in which leaders pledged to raise $600 billion in investments for developing countries. The EU is committed to mobilizing private and public investments worth more than half of that.

Margherita Stancati in Rome contributed to this article.

[DougMacG]

John Lennon:
"if you go carrying pictures of Chairman Mao
You ain't going to make it with anyone anyhow"
---------------------
Odd turn of events, it's Chairman Xi who wants to revolutionize the world and it's Putin's picture he shouldn't be carrying.

These countries (rest of the world) are crazy to 'partner' with either of these sinister crime syndicates, and the US and free world should be offering a better alternative.

[ccp]

from the American Spectator:
https://spectator.org/edward-luttwak-the-u-s-must-end-the-russia-ukraine-war/

[DougMacG]

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3231798/china-and-iran-pledge-cooperation-ahead-brics-summit-tehran-seeks-join-bloc?module=lead_hero_story&pgtype=homepage

[Crafty_Dog]

Meeting in Beijing. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met in Beijing with his Italian counterpart, Antonio Tajani. Wang praised the recent expansion of bilateral ties, while Tajani said Italy looks forward to working with Beijing to deepen cooperation on trade and investment, science and technology, environmental protection and tourism.

[Crafty_Dog]

My Encounters With a Suspected Spy
He invited me to join a Westminster panel on China. Later we met for coffee. What did he learn?
By Joseph C. Sternberg
Sept. 12, 2023 12:06 pm ET




14

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(7 min)


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The Palace of Westminster in London, Sept. 11. PHOTO: TAYFUN SALCI/ZUMA PRESS
London

When the email from the alleged spy for China landed in my inbox, it took me a moment to realize I should pay attention to it.

It was a speaking invitation and arrived on the afternoon of Jan. 2. Would I participate in a panel discussion for a forthcoming book about the contest between democracies and autocracies? Such requests cross my transom from time to time, and I admit I don’t always respond quickly. I almost overlooked this one until a few details caught my eye.

The invitation came on behalf of the China Research Group, a caucus of members of the British Parliament with hawkish views on Beijing. I respect one of the CRG’s founders, Tom Tugendhat, who is now security minister. And I’d met the author of the book a few years before and was happy to help him launch his new work even though I suspected I wouldn’t agree with parts of it. I accepted the invitation.

The one thing that didn’t stand out at all about the email was the name of the CRG staffer who had sent it: Chris Cash. I’d never heard of him. Now everyone has, since the Times of London reported this weekend that he was arrested earlier this year on suspicion of spying for Beijing. A law firm on Monday issued a statement on behalf of the person arrested, without naming Mr. Cash, in which its client said he is “completely innocent” of the allegations.

If the allegations are true, this ranks as one of the most serious espionage incidents in the U.K. since the height of the Cold War. As a parliamentary staffer, Mr. Cash would have had access to nonpublic (although apparently not classified) information. His perch at the CRG offered him insight into the thinking of British lawmakers who are most suspicious of the Chinese Communist Party. And he had a window into the activities of other members of society, such as the human-rights activists who interact with those lawmakers—and of journalists.

The main surprise is that it took so long for allegations of this sort to emerge here. Before this weekend, Britain’s Parliament was one of the few major legislatures in the West not to have become embroiled in a Chinese spying scandal of this magnitude. The U.S. Congress has suffered such cases, as have the Canadian and Australian parliaments.

Beijing’s intentions globally appear to stretch beyond information gathering. Influence also is a goal, as the Chinese allegedly plant individuals who can shape attitudes and policies. It’s hard to believe such an effort would have worked in the U.K. given the stature and experience of CRG members.

No matter. If Chinese espionage has happened here, Beijing can claim a win even now if it has been exposed. The mere suggestion of such influence plants seeds of doubt about the integrity of Western democracy. Certainly this episode threatens to embarrass Mr. Tugendhat, one of Beijing’s most vocal British critics—albeit undeservedly and only by distant association through the CRG, since he appears not to have worked closely with Mr. Cash.

As for my bit part: I participated in the panel discussion on Feb. 7 in a meeting room in Westminster Palace, home to Parliament. The audience appeared to be a mix of parliamentary staffers and activists of various sorts. I assumed at least one attendee would be from the Chinese Embassy, there to monitor the event and perhaps intimidate some of the other audience members merely by his or her presence as is Beijing’s standard practice these days.

At the end of the event, the other panelists, Mr. Cash and I posed for a photograph, which the Times republished this weekend.

Mr. Cash and I subsequently met one-on-one in early March at a coffee shop. I don’t remember who first suggested the idea in person during the panel event, but he reached out first via email to schedule the follow-up. Our chat was intended to be off the record, so I won’t share what he said. But under the circumstances I feel at liberty to tell Journal readers about my half of the conversation:

My aim was to determine whether Mr. Cash might be a helpful source, but I concluded he wouldn’t be. He hadn’t told me anything interesting that I couldn’t have inferred from reading a newspaper. I didn’t bother trying to maintain the connection after that meeting, which is why until the Times published its article this weekend I didn’t realize he had become incommunicado following his reported arrest later in March.

What might Mr. Cash have learned from me? As a matter of course, in such meetings I don’t discuss other sources or my private conversations with colleagues on any topic. As I recall, I asked him mostly about Britain’s economic relationship with China. I also asked if he had any insight into Prime Minister Rishi Sunak’s dilatory approach to the case of jailed Hong Kong journalist and British citizen Jimmy Lai. But my interest in these matters is well-known because my colleagues and I have published our views on them. The meeting may have been a dud all around.

***
At that panel discussion, I argued that democracies defeat autocracies by being more like ourselves. That means more transparency, more tolerance for free debate, and also more care by each institution to carry out its role diligently within an open society. The new global wave of Chinese spying is so pernicious because it challenges our ability to do that.

Concerning legislatures, those bodies require trust to function on our behalf. In Britain there are already calls to tighten rules on the issuance of parliamentary passes to staffers. Perhaps there’s room for improvement, but such tweaks aren’t necessarily cost-free. They come at the risk of limiting the ability of lawmakers to draw on the expertise of many talented staffers, and such rules risk embedding a broader climate of distrust.

Meanwhile, should citizens be wary of lobbying lawmakers for fear that sensitive information (personal or commercial) could find its way into the wrong hands? This isn’t a trivial concern for human-rights activists, who play a vital role in our democracies by informing and persuading lawmakers about events in China. They already face substantial risks of harassment from the Chinese agents we too often allow to operate unrestrained on our shores, where they intimidate students on campuses, marchers at protests and more. Not even a congressman’s or member of Parliament’s office can be taken for granted as a safe zone.

Inevitably we’ll find there are no easy ways to protect ourselves. But understand that Beijing’s global espionage operations are about more than intelligence gathering. They are attempts to transform our democratic cultures from within, to make us less like ourselves. That may be the most dangerous threat of all.

Mr. Sternberg, a member of the Journal’s editorial board, writes the Political Economics column.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-67142161

[Body-by-Guinness]

Apple cancels John Stewart, citing planned segments about China and AI, among others. It’s difficult not to issue a sardonic grin when a culture warrior is given hoist by the petard he totes, but if does serve to illustrate just how deeply China has its claws sunk into sundry corners of the US. Indeed, while recovering from various surgeries I caught a lot of flicks that not only had Chinese heros inexplicably inserted into them, but likely were then re-edited to make the Chinese character(s) the star(s) of the show in other markets:

https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2023/10/report-apple-cancels-the-problem-with-jon-stewart-over-china-ai-topics/

[Crafty_Dog]

Thread nazi here    That would be Chinese Penetration of America.

[Body-by-Guinness]

Thread nazi here    That would be Chinese Penetration of America.

Hey, I’ve been gone a while and am still wrapping my head around what topics are out there…..

[Crafty_Dog]

No worries, thread nazi is here to help 

[ccp]

since they are allowing these posts
whether they say so publicly or not.

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/antisemitic-comments-increase-across-chinese-social-media/ar-AA1j2WE6?ocid=msedgntp&pc=DCTS&cvid=8e924f3652ad4c70a701aa33b501380c&ei=8

I am presuming for influence and oil from Muslim countries

Plus anything to stick a thumb in the eye of the US.

Ironic since they treat their own Muslims as garbage

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.thefp.com/p/a-world-spinning-out-of-control-521

The implications of this act run deep on many levels.

[Body-by-Guinness]

China supplies Iran who supply the Houthis that are interrupting Red Sea trade:

https://weapons.substack.com/p/china-the-red-sea-and-trade?r=1qo1e&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=email&fbclid =IwAR1ebiIj1_iEBM9yQkMD6WWE2ljzllb7OU7YYjsvwgYituKtOItbuUCdrFM

[Body-by-Guinness]

I was unaware that we subsidize China’s shipping rates for the cheap crap they sell consumers online. Indeed, the USPS has to raise its rates & run a deficit in part to cover this:

https://joannenova.com.au/2024/01/how-cheap-postage-from-china-is-another-un-bureaucratic-scam/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=how-cheap-postage-from-china-is-another-un-bureaucratic-scam

[Crafty_Dog]

Did not know this.

[Body-by-Guinness]

Did not know this.

Explain's a lot of the "free shipping" found on eBay....

[ccp]

https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2024/jan/23/with-assist-from-russia-chinas-plutonium-reactors-/

for purposes of climate control [just kidding]

[Body-by-Guinness]

I was not aware of this series of related China v. Australia incidents:

Shh! Nobody mention why China launched that trade war on Australia…

China, Lion statue

By Jo Nova

That which must not be spoken
Every news outlet today is saying how good it is that “relations” with China have thawed, like it was just a bad patch of weather, and now the clouds have cleared they’ve allowed us to sell them wine again. But there is a kind of collective amnesia about why relations froze in the first place.

Just to recap, through incompetence or “otherwise” naughty-citizen China leaked a likely lab experiment, lied about it, and destroyed the evidence. They stopped it spreading at home but sent it on planes to infect the rest of the world. Then when Scott Morrison, Australian Prime Minister, dared ask for an investigation in April 2020, within a week China threatened boycotts, and followed up with severe anti-dumping duties on Australian barley. After which the CCP discovered “inconsistencies in labelling” on Australian beef imports, and added bans or tariffs on Australian wine, wheat, wool, sugar, copper, lobsters, timber and grapes. Then they told their importers not to bring in Australian coal, cotton or LNG either. The only industry they didn’t attack was iron ore, probably because they couldn’t get it anywhere else. In toto, the punishment destroyed about $20 billion dollars in trade, and everyone, even CNN, knew this was political retribution and a message to the world.

As Jeffrey Wilson, Foreign Policy, described it in November 2021

“… its massive onslaught against Australia was like nothing before. Whereas China usually sanctions minor products as a warning shot—Norwegian salmon, Taiwanese pineapples—Australia was the first country to be subjected to an economywide assault.”

But perhaps the communist party had nothing to hide?

Not to put a fine point on it, but on January 14th, 2020, China told the world they had “found no clear evidence of human-to-human transmission “. A Chinese CDC expert said “If no new patients appear in the next week, it might be over.” They didn’t mention that things were already so bad in Wuhan in December 2019, that even doctors one thousand kilometers away in Taiwan suspected it was spreading human to human. Taiwan demanded answers from the WHO on December 31. The next day, the CCP destroyed all the virus samples, information about them, and related papers.  But perhaps it was just an innocent bat-pangolin thing, yeah?

So after four years of pain in order to stand bravely against the bully, what concessions, exactly, did our current leadership win? There’s no investigation, no answers, no apology, no nothing and no reason to think it won’t happen again.

In fact to smooth the wheels, Australia dropped the WTO cases against China for their bad behaviour with barley and wine. But the negotiation geniuses didn’t insist that China drop its WTO case against us (which was instigated two days after the Australian cases). And so it comes to pass that this week China won the WTO steel case against us.

https://joannenova.com.au/2024/03/shh-nobody-mention-why-china-launched-that-trade-war-on-australia/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=shh-nobody-mention-why-china-launched-that-trade-war-on-australia