Author Topic: Decoupling from China  (Read 9817 times)


ccp

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Re: Decoupling from China
« Reply #51 on: November 06, 2022, 09:48:06 AM »
I can't believe I am saying this but good for Canada!

Crafty_Dog

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McCarthy showing promise
« Reply #52 on: November 22, 2022, 05:40:21 AM »
Top House Republican Plans Special Committee on China
By Dorothy Li November 21, 2022 Updated: November 21, 2022biggersmaller Print

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House Republican leader Kevin McCarthy (R-Calif.) said on Nov. 20 that if he becomes the speaker of the chamber, he will set up a committee with its sole focus on the Chinese communist regime.

“China is the No. 1 country when it comes to intellectual property theft,” McCarthy said in an interview with Fox News on Nov. 20. “All the nations combined, Chinese steals more than them.”

The Chinese regime’s ongoing theft of intellectual property, which has continued for more than two decades, costs the United States an estimated $200 billion to $600 billion a year, according to Michael Orlando, acting director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

McCarthy accused the Biden administration of failing to stand up to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

“We will put a stop to this and no longer allow the administration to sit back and let China do what they are doing to America,” he said.

“When I become speaker, I’m going to have a select committee on China.”

The House minority leader will likely become the chamber’s speaker after Republicans won a majority during the midterm elections. McCarthy was elected as the House Republicans’ leader last week, clearing the first step of gaining the speaker’s gavel.

But hurdles remain for winning the majority support from his colleagues. Several Republicans, including Rep. Andy Biggs (R-Ariz.), had publicly said they wouldn’t back McCarthy, who needs 218 votes when the entire House casts ballots for speaker in January 2023. McCarthy on Nov. 20 urged House Republicans to “work as one” so they can move forward with the party’s agenda.

McCarthy said he is eyeing issues such as China-manufactured fentanyl flooding into U.S. borders, the technology and intellectual theft from Beijing, the Chinese police outposts in U.S. cities, and the origin of COVID-19.

“This is where the fentanyl from China comes that will kill 300 Americans today, the No. 1 killer of the next generation,” he said.

Epoch Times Photo
The America ChangLe Association in New York on Oct. 6, 2022. An overseas Chinese police outpost in New York, called the Fuzhou Police Overseas Service Station, is located inside the association’s building. (Samira Bouaou/The Epoch Times)
The Republican congressman vows to stop the Chinese police facilities on U.S. soil.

“We will stop these police stations in America,” McCarthy said.

The “overseas police service stations” have raised concerns among lawmakers in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and European countries after a September report by the nongovernmental organization Safeguard Defenders revealed that the existence of such outposts is part of the CCP’s global, transnational repression.

Chinese police authorities have set up dozens of such stations across the world, including in New York, Toronto, London, Paris, and Dublin, according to a review by Safeguard Defenders of China’s state media reports.

The Chinese authorities claimed that the sites are for administrative purposes, such as helping the Chinese diaspora abroad to renew their driver’s licenses.

However, the Europe-based watchdog noted that the CCP’s “service stations” serve a “sinister goal,” including intimidating and surveilling overseas Chinese nationals and pressuring those wanted by the regime to return to China to face criminal charges.

FBI Director Christopher Wray said last week that Washington is aware of these offices in the United States.

“To me, it is outrageous to think that the Chinese police would attempt to set up shop—you know, in New York, let’s say—without proper coordination,” Wray told lawmakers on Nov. 17. “It violates sovereignty and circumvents standard judicial and law enforcement cooperation processes.

“I’m deeply concerned about this and I’m not going to just let it lie.”

Crafty_Dog

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US bans Huawei and ZTE equip
« Reply #53 on: November 26, 2022, 06:21:09 PM »
US Bans Huawei, ZTE Telecom Equipment Citing Threats to National Security
By Andrew Thornebrooke November 25, 2022 Updated: November 26, 2022biggersmaller Print


U.S. regulators have imposed a ban on electronic equipment created by several major Chinese tech corporations, citing national security concerns.

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) adopted new rules on Nov. 25 that will prohibit the import or sale of Chinese communications equipment deemed to pose an unacceptable risk to national security.

The new rules will bar equipment from Chinese telecom firms Huawei and ZTE from being imported into or sold in the United States. The order will also prohibit telecommunications equipment and video surveillance equipment produced by Hytera, Hikvision, and Dahua, as well as the companies’ subsidiaries or affiliates

By unanimous vote, the FCC concluded that the products posed an “unacceptable risk to [the] national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons,” according to a statement.

“The FCC is committed to protecting our national security by ensuring that untrustworthy communications equipment is not authorized for use within our borders, and we are continuing that work here,” said Chairwoman Jessica Rosenworcel.

“These new rules are an important part of our ongoing actions to protect the American people from national security threats involving telecommunications.”

Products from the companies will not be allowed for import, marketing, or sale until the FCC approves the measures taken by the companies to remedy how their products might be used against the national interest.

Congress voted to bar all federal agencies from purchasing products from the five listed companies back in 2018. The new rules will expand and modify the FCC’s “Covered List” of banned products to prevent private entities from bringing the items into the United States.

“Today, the FCC takes an unprecedented step to safeguard our communications networks and strengthen America’s national security,” said FCC Commissioner Brendan Carr.

“Our unanimous decision represents the first time in the FCC’s history that we have voted to prohibit the authorization of communications and electronic equipment based on national security considerations.  And we take this action with the broad, bipartisan backing of congressional leadership.”

The order on Friday implemented requirements from the Secure Equipment Act of 2021, which was signed into law by President Joe Biden last November, the FCC said.

Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK, and the United States have all declared the use of Huawei telecommunications equipment, particularly in 5G networks, to pose significant security risks to infrastructure. U.S. officials and experts have also sounded the alarm that the company’s ties to the Chinese Communist Party mean that its products could be used to spy on Americans or interfere with the free flow of data worldwide.

“This is the culmination of a bipartisan effort spanning multiple presidential and FCC administrations, and it will help make Americans more secure by preventing hostile governments from using their technology exports to establish footholds in our networks,” said FCC Commissioner Nathan Simington.

“But as we celebrate this victory, we cannot forget that our work to secure our country from insecure and untrustworthy equipment is only just beginning. In addition to banning equipment from untrustworthy state-controlled companies, as we have done here, we need to address the proliferation of insecure devices more generally.”

The Epoch Times has reached out to the Chinese firms for comment.

Crafty_Dog

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POTP: US Widens ban
« Reply #54 on: December 15, 2022, 02:59:09 PM »
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/12/15/china-military-tech-export-ban/?utm_campaign=wp_post_most&utm_medium=email&utm_source=newsletter&wpisrc=nl_most&carta-url=https%3A%2F%2Fs2.washingtonpost.com%2Fcar-ln-tr%2F3894be1%2F639b5459ef9bf67b2320c814%2F61cdf026ae7e8a4ac205b2b3%2F30%2F70%2F639b5459ef9bf67b2320c814&wp_cu=10fdb05edea8f32c1b02f6dfec609335%7CD462DD329F9C56B3E0530100007F597F

U.S. widens ban on military and surveillance tech sales to China
The Commerce Department added 36 entities to a U.S. export blacklist, including one of China’s largest chipmakers
By Ellen Nakashima, Jeanne Whalen and Cate Cadell
December 15, 2022 at 8:45 a.m. EST

Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo speaks about subsidies for semiconductor chips on Sept. 6 at the White House. (Kevin Lamarque/Reuters)

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The Biden administration doubled down Thursday on its high-tech containment of China, expanding a ban on commercial exports of advanced U.S. technology that it said aids Beijing’s military and hypersonics programs and enables human rights violations.

The addition of some three dozen Chinese companies to a U.S. export blacklist, including one of the country’s largest chipmakers, follows the Commerce Department’s crackdown in October on the sale of advanced semiconductor chips to China for use in artificial intelligence and supercomputers.

U.S. imposes tough rules to limit China's access to high-tech chips

The administration also blacklisted a company that The Washington Post recently reported facilitated sales of U.S. technology to military institutes involved in China’s hypersonics and missile programs.

The moves come a month after President Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping met in Bali and sought to put a “floor” under the downward spiraling relationship. Beijing has accused the administration of “abusing” export controls to “wantonly block and hobble” Chinese enterprises and to “maintain its sci-fi hegemony.”


The 36 companies placed on the Entity List are effectively barred from receiving U.S. technology. All but one, which is a Chinese subsidiary located in Japan, are in China. And significantly, 21 of those newly listed firms are also being hit with a further control — known as the foreign direct product rule (FDPR) — that bars foreign companies from selling to the Chinese entities goods that are produced with American technology or equipment.

“Today we are building on the actions we took in October to protect U.S. national security by severely restricting the [People’s Republic of China’s] ability to leverage artificial intelligence, advanced computing, and other powerful, commercially available technologies for military modernization and human rights abuses,” said Alan Estevez, undersecretary of commerce for industry and security. “This work will continue, as will our efforts to detect and disrupt Russia’s efforts to obtain necessary items and technologies for its brutal war against Ukraine, including from Iran.”

The most high-profile company listed is Yangtze Memory Technologies Co. (YMTC), a Chinese “national champion” that makes memory chips used to store data, which are vital to consumer goods but also emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, 5G communications and cloud computing — fields that are key to China’s goals of achieving technological dominance and a world-class military.

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Earlier this year, the Financial Times reported that the Biden administration was investigating reports that YMTC appeared to have violated U.S. export controls by selling chips made with American technology to Huawei, a Chinese tech giant that has been on the Entity List since 2019 and more recently subjected to the foreign direct product rule.

The administration feared that YMTC might sell chips to other companies on the Entity List, Commerce said. Among those companies, according to the rule the Commerce Department issued Thursday, were Huawei and Hikvision. Hikvision was put on the Entity List in 2019 for “activities related to human rights violations and abuses” in China’s Xinjiang region.

The Commerce Department's rule adding three dozen Chinese companies to a U.S. export blacklist.

Entity List decisions are made jointly by the Commerce, State, Defense and Energy departments.

YMTC’s designation is largely symbolic, analysts said, in that the rules rolled out in October by Commerce already barred U.S. companies and individuals from supporting firms that make chips with 128 layers of NAND flash memory and above. YMTC recently announced that its fourth-generation 3D NAND chip contains 232 layers of memory.


“They’re basically already entity listed and subject to something like a foreign direct product rule — just under a different name,” said Kevin Wolf, a former assistant secretary of export administration at the Commerce Department.

The Oct. 7 rules prompted some U.S. suppliers to halt installation of new equipment at YMTC facilities. China filed a dispute over chip-related trade restrictions this week with the World Trade Organization.

In technological prowess, YMTC still lags global rivals such as Micron of the United States and Samsung of South Korea, but it has made progress closing the gap in recent years.

The blacklist included several other firms of note, including “PXW Semiconductor Manufactory Co.” in Shenzhen. Officially known in China as Pengxinwei IC Manufacturing Co., it is run by a former Huawei executive and is building a plant near Huawei’s headquarters. Some industry insiders have said they suspect that the plant was being built to help the tech giant evade export controls.


Another is Shanghai Micro Electronics Equipment Group, a key player in Beijing’s semiconductor ambitions and the only Chinese firm capable of producing advanced lithography equipment, which is used in the development of high-end semiconductors.

Also listed was Tianjin Tiandi Weiye Technologies, one of China’s biggest surveillance firms, which provided technology and training to police in Xinjiang during a multiyear crackdown on ethnic Uyghurs. The firm, which has an expansive overseas presence, also sold surveillance tools to authorities in Russia and Iran.

The administration took aim at a number of research labs that work on aerospace and missile technology, including Beijing Hifar Technologies, a military technology supplier that The Post reported resold U.S. aerospace software to a top Chinese missile group. The group was instrumental in the design of China’s 2021 hypersonic missile test, according to two Chinese military scientists familiar with the program.


The test alarmed U.S. military and intelligence officials. It was part of a broader strategic and nuclear weapons buildup: The Pentagon recently warned that China conducted more ballistic missile tests last year than the rest of the world combined and is on course to possess 1,500 nuclear weapons within the next decade.

American technology boosts China’s hypersonic missile program

Commerce also blacklisted a Chinese firm that it says facilitated the illegal export of U.S. electronics to Iran to build drones and missile systems. Russia’s military has been using Iranian-made drones to attack Ukraine, according to U.S. and Ukrainian officials.

The administration on Thursday added nine Russian parties to the export blacklist after they didn’t fully submit to U.S. government inspections. And it slapped the FDPR on two Chinese firms that were blacklisted in 2018, for supporting Russia’s military since the imposition of export controls earlier this year.


The application of the foreign direct product rule to 23 entities — following a similar move in October against 28 Chinese entities — is notable, analysts say. The FDPR was initially imposed to stanch the flow of tech support to Huawei by requiring even overseas companies to abide by the export restriction if they used U.S. tools or technology in making their product.

Then, in a novel move, it was used to counter Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. The October FDPR targeted companies that provide support to advanced computing applications like AI. The new application of the FDPR will target AI and chip entities that support the Chinese military and defense industry.

“This clearly showcases that the United States is getting more comfortable with more liberal usage of the FDPR,” said Reva Goujon, a director with the Rhodium Group research firm. “It’s also a signal to partners that the U.S. is willing to apply those extraterritorial measures if necessary.”




ccp

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Apple moving more into India
« Reply #58 on: April 05, 2023, 05:01:30 AM »
https://www.scmp.com/tech/big-tech/article/3216055/made-india-iphones-surge-apple-moves-production-away-china

not sure how this will play out in long run.......... :?
but for now seems like good idea to get out of China

I guess costs are just toooooo high to simply come home to US




Crafty_Dog

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Trump's trade chief on decoupling from China
« Reply #62 on: July 25, 2023, 04:54:09 PM »
https://www.theepochtimes.com/china/trumps-trade-chief-lays-out-plan-to-beat-china-at-its-own-game-5416052?utm_source=China&src_src=China&utm_campaign=uschina-2023-07-25&src_cmp=uschina-2023-07-25&utm_medium=email

Trump’s Trade Chief Lays Out Plan to Beat China at Its Own Game
Robert Lighthizer's new book calls for strategic decoupling from China

By Jan Jekielek and Terri Wu
July 24, 2023Updated: July 24, 2023


Former U.S. trade representative Ambassador Robert Lighthizer views the decades of U.S. trade deficit with China as a “wealth transfer.” In his recent interview with EpochTV’s “American Thought Leaders” program, he outlined a playbook to beat China at its own game through strategic decoupling, very much the same thing China has been doing to the United States, he said.

In his new book “No Trade Is Free: Changing Course, Taking on China, and Helping America’s Workers,” he recalled a meeting he attended in Beijing in November 2017, during which he told Xi Jinping, general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), that the U.S.-China trade relationship was unbalanced.

And from there, Mr. Lighthizer said he changed the tone of the trade talks that used to be rounds of vague commitments with no follow-ups on actions, which reset with each new U.S. administration.


“I was never interested in one of these things where the status quo favors the other side by definition,” he told The Epoch Times. “And as long as they can kick the can down the road, they’ll maintain that benefit, that preference, in many cases, that transfer of wealth.”

‘Net Transfer of Wealth’

To Mr. Lighthizer, it’s not a problem when a country runs a trade deficit with another over short-term periods. However, decades of deficit in the amount of hundreds of billions of dollars—as is the case of U.S. trade with China—is essentially a “net transfer of wealth,” he said.

Epoch Times Photo
The U.S. trade deficit with China has nearly quadrupled since December 2001, when China joined the World Trade Organization. (Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis)

The U.S. trade deficit with China has nearly quadrupled since December 2001, when China joined the World Trade Organization, according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The total trade deficit from 2002 to 2022 totals over $5 trillion—one-fifth of the U.S. GDP in 2022.

During the same period, the U.S. net investment position—how much Americans own all over the world versus how much the rest of the world owns in the United States—grew nearly six times to a negative $16 trillion in 2022.

The trend of U.S. net investment position—how much Americans own all over the world versus how much the rest of the world owns in the United States—mirrors the trend of U.S. deficit with China between 1999 and 2022. (Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis)
“We are getting these T-shirts and our third and fourth televisions cheaper, but we’re paying for it by transferring assets of our country overseas,” he said in the interview.

He called it a “fool’s bargain”: “That’s a bad deal; that’s not a good deal. In many cases, it’s current consumption for a long-term loss of value.”

His essay “The Free Trade Folly” summarized the same problem earlier this year: “We are literally trading the future control of our country, the wealth of our children and grandchildren, for current consumption—cheaper TV sets and sneakers. This is madness.”

The Myth of Free Trade
Mr. Lighthizer thinks of free trade as a “false religion.”

“Nobody practices free trade. For sure, if you look at the great countries that run big surpluses, they don’t have free trade. In China, it’s not remotely close. It’s not even capitalism. Germany doesn’t have free trade. Europe doesn’t have free trade. It’s all just a false God, and it literally doesn’t exist,” he added.

According to him, China has plans for achieving global dominance and has capitalized on foreigners hungry to make money in the country.

“It’s China deciding, ‘I’m going to make you rich because it’s going to help me.’ Those people then become advocates for China. That’s more or less the trade-off,” he said.

“The notion of using Americans to help a foreign power and having individuals make money is certainly not a new thing,” said Mr. Lighthizer. “It’s certainly not something that the Chinese have invented.”

Strategic Decoupling Playbook
The United States needs to strategically decouple with China, “very much like the Chinese have towards us,” Mr. Lighthizer said.

He said that “de-risking,” a strategy adopted by G7 countries to diversify their supply chains away from China, was “a tiny step in the right direction,” calling the move “strategic decoupling-lite.”

“I think it’s a way of trying to do what is right, but still make all the very rich American companies who import from China happy. They are trying to kind of have it both ways,” the former trade official said.

Mr. Lighthizer’s strategic decoupling playbook includes the following elements: achieving balanced trade, cutting off the flow of U.S. technology to China, and managing inbound and outbound investments.

To balance U.S.-China trade, Mr. Lighthizer said President Donald Trump’s tariffs worked. Since the first tariffs were slapped in July 2018, the U.S. trade deficit with China decreased until 2020. His explanation for the trade deficit bounceback in 2021 was that the combination of demand stimulated by the U.S. government’s pandemic relief packages and the shutdown of domestic manufacturing drove purchases from overseas.

Another tool that would potentially work to reduce the trade deficit, according to Mr. Lighthizer, is Warren Buffett’s idea of import-export certificates. In a 2003 article, Mr. Buffett illustrated a proposal that companies would get import certificates on a dollar-to-dollar value based on their export amounts. Therefore a company that does more imports than exports would have to purchase import certificates on the market. That was his idea of letting the market figure out how to balance trade.

While all countries do what’s in their best interest in international trade, China’s trade has a “sinister overlay” of technology theft, said Mr. Lighthizer. Combatting this, according to him, requires stopping the regime’s forced technology transfer and managing the investment from and going to China, and would put an end to America’s facilitation of the CCP’s ambition of global dominance with technology or funds.
« Last Edit: July 25, 2023, 04:57:40 PM by Crafty_Dog »

Crafty_Dog

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FA: The Case for a Hard Break from China
« Reply #63 on: July 25, 2023, 04:56:07 PM »
second

The Case for a Hard Break With China
Why Economic De-Risking Is Not Enough
By Oren Cass and Gabriela Rodriguez
July 25, 2023
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/case-for-hard-break-with-beijing-economic-derisking


Never in human history have nations with such radically different economic and political systems as the United States and China attempted economic integration. Before the modern era, neither the markets nor the technology existed to facilitate such a project. During the Cold War, facing similar differences, Washington and Moscow stayed economically far apart. PepsiCo’s opening of a Soviet bottling plant was front-page news in 1972, and because rubles were not convertible to dollars, the Soviets paid for the bottling equipment with vodka. No wonder that globalization gained steam only after the Berlin Wall fell.

In the early post–Cold War years, U.S. theorists and policymakers ignored the potential risks of integration with an authoritarian peer. Globalization was predicated on liberal economic standards, democratic values, and U.S. cultural norms, all of which were taken for granted by economists and the foreign policy establishment. The United States set the rules for international institutions and multinational corporations, most of which were either American or heavily reliant upon access to U.S. technology and markets. Under these conditions, economic entanglements were regarded as opportunities for Washington to exert leverage and impose its rules. Incursions in, and distortions of, one market by another were Washington’s strategy, not its problem.

When welcomed into the international community in the late 1990s, China was still a developing nation. Its GDP was roughly one-tenth of the United States’ GDP, and in 1999, it was still one of the world’s poorest countries per capita, ranked between Sri Lanka and Guyana. U.S. leaders across the political spectrum were confident that by encouraging China’s integration into the global economy, they could ensure that the country would become a constructive participant in a U.S.-led world order. U.S. President Bill Clinton spoke for many when he declared that China’s accession to the World Trade Organization was about “more than our economic interests; it is clearly in our larger national interest.”


It has not turned out that way. Instead, China has rapidly become—by some measures— the world’s largest economy and a powerful counterweight to U.S. influence. Its state-controlled economy and increasingly authoritarian leadership have subverted U.S. investment, supply chains, and institutions. Beijing’s efforts to use global integration to enhance Chinese power and harm U.S. interests have proliferated. The Chinese government has leveraged market access to force technology transfers from U.S. firms including Westinghouse, General Electric, and Microsoft. It has dominated global markets by flooding them with subsidized goods, including solar panels, and it has forced the National Basketball Association and its players into humiliating silence on Chinese human rights abuses.

The fundamental problem is that the United States’ free-market economy is incompatible with a Chinese state-controlled one. U.S. liberty and democracy are antithetical to the authoritarianism of the Chinese Communist Party. The United States must break from China or else become irrevocably corrupted by it.

TIME TO WALK

Presumably, had U.S. policymakers known in 2000 what they know now about China’s trajectory, they would not have conducted the reckless experiment of tightly coupling the U.S. economy to a larger one controlled by a communist, authoritarian dictatorship. But rather than admit their error, many in Washington seem determined to stay the course under the illusion that they can constructively influence Chinese policy through continual efforts at conciliation, even though Beijing has shown no desire to reciprocate.

U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Janet Yellen said as much in April, envisioning “a growing China that plays by the rules” and fosters “rising demand for U.S. products and services and more dynamic U.S. industries.” In June, she told the House Financial Services Committee that “we gain and China gains from trade and investment that is as open as possible.” National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan made a similar argument in an economic policy speech in April, describing the Biden administration’s strategy as “de-risking and diversifying, not decoupling.” Sullivan says that he wants only a “small yard and high fence” to safeguard a narrow set of critical U.S. military technologies. Commerce, otherwise, should continue to flourish.

This posture misunderstands the challenge posed by the integration of the U.S. and Chinese markets, which is not only, or even primarily, one of national security. Although that challenge is immense, even if China were to disarm tomorrow, credibly forswearing any aspirations beyond its borders, its economic influence would remain deeply corrosive to the U.S.-led system of democratic capitalism. That system relies upon the assumption that economic actors in a free market pursuing their self-interest—namely, profit—will also advance the public interest. If everyone plays by the same rules, government constrains unproductive behavior, and maintains a strong social fabric that supports workers and their families, this kind of market can generate unparalleled prosperity. But if the free market comes into contact with a powerful state-controlled one, in which foreign policymakers have made serving their nation in word and deed the path to greatest profit, too many companies and investors will do just that.

Asking U.S. firms and workers to compete with their China-based counterparts and operate in the Chinese market grants the Chinese Communist Party the power to shape American capital allocations and labor-market conditions from the far side of the Pacific. If U.S. firms seek to maximize their profits, and the greatest profit can be had by kowtowing to the CCP, that is what U.S. business leaders will do. Distortions that Beijing introduces in the Chinese market become distortions in the U.S. market. Washington is left with little choice but to counter with interference of its own. Free trade ceases to be a logical extension of the free market and instead undermines it.

Rather than seek out so-called market failures and craft tailored interventions that might enhance economic efficiency, Washington must turn to the blunt and the bold. The goal should not be to make an integrated Chinese-U.S. market work better but to obstruct and discourage the operation of such a market altogether. Trade in goods can still occur at arm’s length and subject to tariffs that protect U.S. interests. But investment should not flow in either direction. Joint ventures and research partnerships should end. Perhaps someday China will liberalize and a strong economic relationship can develop. But U.S. policymakers should be under no illusion that such reform is coming soon or that further cajoling or tinkering with the U.S.-Chinese relationship will help. Washington must stop trying to repair this marriage and, citing irreconcilable differences, move toward a prompt divorce.

DANGEROUS ENTANGLEMENTS

Both the United States and China have large-scale investments in each other’s economies, which has created serious problems for protecting U.S. interests. U.S. citizens and firms channel capital and technology into China, seeking to advance their financial profits—generally, without consideration of whether it helps or harms the United States. In fact, by doing so, U.S. investors are furthering the goals of an authoritarian government that has shown no compunction manipulating foreign investors and leveraging market access to advance its national interests. The most recent instance of this came in July when, at Beijing’s behest, Tesla signed a letter pledging to curtail its competition on price with rival Chinese manufacturers and enhance “core socialist values” in China.

In the other direction, Chinese investments in the United States are almost always implicitly or explicitly controlled by the CCP. “Part of China’s economic strategy relies on acquiring foreign companies and their technology and data through government-supported acquisitions,” warned Ambassador Robert Lighthizer in his congressional testimony in May. “As a result, when Chinese firms acquire American assets, they frequently are not making profit-motivated business decisions. Instead, they are acting to advance China’s national interest.” Yet Washington has done little to constrain how that foreign control is used. On its own, the U.S. model of private actors choosing freely has clear advantages. In contact with the Chinese model, however, it is deeply vulnerable.

U.S. law is not designed to address the problems caused by economic integration with a state-controlled market. Only specified entities, technologies, and transactions are addressed, otherwise leaving commerce free and investment unconstrained. This is the Biden administration’s “small yard and high fence,” which facilitates further entanglement of financial flows and ownership and thus further subversion of the American market. Even with respect to national security, limiting interference to narrow exceptions does not address China’s “Military-Civil Fusion” strategy, which, as the U.S. State Department described it in 2020, aims at “acquiring the intellectual property, key research, and technological advancements of the world’s citizens, researchers, scholars, and private industry in order to advance military aims.”

U.S. law must, then, address the challenge of preventing CCP control over U.S. investors in China and investments in the United States. Washington should prohibit capital flows, technologies transfers, and economic partnerships between the United States and China by default.

To prevent inbound investment, U.S. law should define a class of “Disqualified Foreign Investors.” These should include Chinese nationals who are not permanent U.S. residents, China-based entities, and any other entities that are affiliates of the CCP or subject to CCP control. These investors should be prohibited from conducting transactions, forming corporations or partnerships, participating as limited partners in U.S.-based investment funds, and acquiring real estate. Addressing outbound U.S. investment, the new law should prohibit U.S. citizens and entities from pursuing transactions that entail the acquisition of equity, debt, or real estate in China. Joint ventures between U.S. and China-based entities should be prohibited, preventing them from conducting business in any jurisdiction and transferring advanced technology to the Chinese. Washington should also ensure that the Defense, Treasury, and Commerce Departments harmonize their various export and investment restrictions. China-based firms should be denied access to U.S. capital markets and stock exchanges.

NEITHER FREE NOR FAIR
In principle, trade in manufactured goods could be the least concerning element of the U.S.-Chinese economic relationship: the United States puts things on boats, China puts things on boats, the boats pass one another somewhere in the Pacific and get unloaded on the far side. But that form of trade bears little relationship to the imbalanced and distorted exchange occurring between the two countries today. In 2022, the United States imported $537 billion in goods from China and exported $154 billion.

For Beijing, this trade imbalance is part of a deliberate strategy; the Chinese government mostly refuses to open its country’s markets to U.S. exports and instead trades its own exports for U.S. assets while implementing an aggressive industrial policy to dominate critical supply chains. Demand from U.S. consumers is met from offshore, hollowing out U.S. industry with no commensurate foreign demand emerging for American products.

The existing U.S.-Chinese trade relationship must be changed to end this situation and Washington should invest heavily in creating domestic capacity. A sharp reduction in imports from China will have real costs, especially in the short term as the United States redevelops its own industrial muscles, but those costs tend to be wildly overstated. Tariffs imposed by the Trump administration on broad categories of Chinese goods caused dramatic declines in U.S. imports from China in those categories but had little to no perceptible effect on domestic prices. U.S. manufacturing may have a lot of catching up to do, but production moving out of China can go many places—indeed, the break from China presents the United States with a significant opportunity to support the economic development of Asian and Latin American allies.

Currently, China enjoys “most favored nation” status and therefore receives the same trade terms that the United States offers to all World Trade Organization members. Revoking this status would impose high tariffs on nearly all categories of Chinese imports. Washington should then identify situations where Chinese imports dominate a market and impose rising tariffs on those products until market share of Chinese imports falls to an acceptable level. 

Domestically, the United States must embrace a robust industrial policy. In their own pursuit of profit, private investors and multinational corporations give little consideration to the health of the U.S. manufacturing base and industry—a reality vital to the CCP’s strategy. The federal government must step in to alter this equation. Washington will need new institutions, including a cabinet-level National Development Council and a development bank that can cooperate to reshore manufacturing and strengthen the defense industrial base with financial and technical assistance. U.S. law should then stimulate demand for domestic production by requiring goods sold in the United States to contain a certain proportion of U.S.-produced components manufactured by U.S. workers. The free market should determine how best to fulfill that demand through investment and innovation.

CALLING OUT BEIJING’S ABETTORS
Action must also be taken to safeguard institutions vital to U.S. democracy—not only formal centers of learning and discourse but also the broader public square. The U.S. culture of free speech and inquiry is built upon an assumption that no one in the system will possess the power to coerce or manipulate individual citizens, and the one that does, the government, will be constrained by law and custom from doing so. China alters that calculus. An open society cannot tolerate the imposition of authoritarian incentives and penalties from afar and must be insulated from them.

China has long targeted U.S. universities, think tanks, and research institutes to extract economic gain and advance its own ideological agenda. These organizations, whether operated by government, within academia, or as tax-exempt nonprofits, rely to some degree on public funding and are expected to operate in the public interest. That means they must accept processes and controls designed to ensure the integrity and security of their work. U.S. law should be changed to prohibit these institutions from entering into any partnerships with China-based and affiliated entities. Any funding flowing from one nation’s institutions to the other’s must be stopped. U.S. universities should be prohibited from collecting more in tuition and fees from any Chinese national than the average amount collected from American citizens and permanent residents enrolled in the same program of study.

China also uses the powerful incentive of market access to force American investors into promoting its propaganda. The United States cannot outbid these incentives, nor should it. What Washington can do is lower the economic stakes by foreclosing profits in China. U.S. law should impose cultural export controls that prevent U.S. firms from making profits on the sale of films, musical recordings, broadcasts of sporting events, personalized footwear and apparel lines, and live performances in China. If making money in China is as difficult while complimenting the CCP as while criticizing it, the incentive to curry favor with the Chinese government will vanish.


A hard break remains the best course for the United States.
Washington should also seek to raise the reputational stakes for public figures by calling them as witnesses before the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party to testify about their experiences with the CCP and their operations in China. The CEO of the Walt Disney Company and the commissioner of the National Basketball Association, for instance, would both make excellent witnesses. The financier Stephen Schwarzman has surely learned much that he can share from his experience attempting to launch the “Schwarzman Scholars” program at Tsinghua University. The same is true of former New York mayor and financier Michael Bloomberg, who hosted the Bloomberg New Economy Forum in Beijing.

Ideally, other developed economies would break from China, as well. But collective action is not necessary and a hard break remains the best course for the United States, regardless. For Washington, preserving democratic capitalism must be the nonnegotiable starting point; other policy priorities are secondary to that imperative. A commitment to free markets has meaning only if it is matched with the actions necessary to ensure that the U.S. market remains free. That objective can still be achieved by going it alone and is preferable to not going at all.

The United States should build a broader partnership of allied countries willing to make similar commitments in their own supply chains and on issues including technology transfer and research funding. Participants in such a trading bloc should have preferential access to the U.S. market. Nations declining to join should face worse terms of trade, and nations committing fully to the Chinese sphere should face the same treatment as China.

For policymakers and analysts committed to globalization and conditioned to fear any inefficient overstepping in the market, a hard break from China may seem implausible. But only last year, in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the United States revoked Russia’s “most favored nation” status and imposed aggressive sanctions designed to separate Russia from the international economic system. This was the hardest of breaks and was supported most strongly by those who are most vocally enthusiastic about global engagement and a rules-based international order. Whether the United States should take action on a similar scale against China is not a question of legality or capacity but of values and will




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Re: Decoupling from China
« Reply #67 on: August 10, 2023, 12:56:49 PM »
cannot see Economist article

no entry

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Actually, this sounds rather feeble
« Reply #68 on: August 11, 2023, 08:54:21 AM »
Biden's Ban on AI, Quantum and Chip Investments Opens a New Theater in the U.S.-China Tech Rivalry
7 MIN READAug 10, 2023 | 19:49 GMT




While a new U.S. executive order restricting AI, quantum and semiconductor investments in China is alone unlikely to have a significant impact, it is probably only a harbinger of future such restrictions that together could hamper China's technological rise. After many delays, U.S. President Joe Biden signed an executive order on Aug. 9 that will eventually restrict some overseas investments by U.S. companies into China's technology sector. The regulations are more narrow in scope than the initial proposals and only cover certain investments into China's artificial intelligence (AI), quantum information technologies and semiconductor sectors. Even within those sectors, the restrictions do not cover the entire industry and instead focus on specific sub-technologies, such as investment into AI software for military purposes. For broader investments in those three sectors, as well as a list of other sectors, the mechanism merely sets up a notification process.

Concurrently with the executive order, the U.S. Treasury Department published an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) detailing its proposed scope of the regulations that the order directed the department to create, opening up a 45-day comment period on the proposal.

The ANPRM defines subsets of the technologies and products within the three sectors covered by the order:

For semiconductors, the rules cover electronic design automation software, chipmaking equipment and the packaging of advanced semiconductors.

For quantum information technologies, the rules cover the production of quantum computers and certain components, quantum sensors and quantum communication systems.

For AI, the rules only relate to software designed for military or intelligence organization applications that pose a national security risk. The Treasury is also requesting comments on how to prohibit investment into software that utilizes AI and is also designed to have military or intelligence end-use.

In addition, the ANPRM's scope only includes transactions that convey intangible benefits, like greenfield investments, joint ventures and the acquisition of equity interests (such as mergers and acquisitions, private equity and venture capital). The scope of transactions the regulations cover would also not include passive portfolio investments into stocks and bonds.

This executive order is part of the growing U.S. campaign to stifle China's development of its AI, semiconductor and quantum computing sectors and ensure that U.S. companies are not financing that development. In Washington, U.S. private equity and venture capital (VC) investments in China have become a source of growing scrutiny amid fears that such funding is bolstering Chinese startups in emerging technologies. A February report published by Georgetown University's Center for Security and Emerging Technology found that between 2015 and 2021, U.S. investors were involved in $40.2 billion worth of transactions involving Chinese AI companies, accounting for about 37% of the $110 billion raised by those companies during that time period. Moreover, 91% of those transactions were at VC investment stages — the exact type of transactions that Biden's executive order appears designed to block. In July, the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) sent letters to four U.S.-based VC firms — GV Capital, GST Ventures, Qualcomm Ventures and Walden International — expressing ''serious concern'' about their investments into Chinese startups. Last month, the U.S. Senate also voted 91-6 to amend the annual must-pass National Defense Authorization Act requiring companies to notify the Treasury when they invest in sensitive technologies (including semiconductors, AI and quantum computing, as well as satellite-based communications and hypersonics) in adversary countries like China. While the Senate's amendment does not outright block transactions like Biden's executive order, it covers a wider range of investments, including passive investments and debt transactions.

Given the narrow scope of the executive order, the investment restrictions will likely only modestly disrupt the development of China's AI, quantum computing and advanced semiconductor industries. Still, they may curb some funding and knowledge transfer opportunities for Chinese startups. Overall, U.S. investment in China's AI, semiconductor and quantum computing sectors remains small and is dwarfed by Chinese investment in those technologies. For large Chinese companies, export controls on U.S. technology — such as on advanced chipmaking technology and chips utilized in the training and operation of large AI models — will likely have a much more significant impact on China's technology sector as China is investing heavily in those sectors. But compared with passive investments, early-stage investments from U.S. companies can yield significant benefits for Chinese start-ups beyond the funding itself, including opening up opportunities for collaboration with other established entities, management and technology transfers through a more hands-on role. Attracting VC in an early stage from prominent investors can also boost a startup's reputation, further facilitating support to help the company succeed. Because Biden's new executive order only prohibits investments into AI for military use, it is unclear how many investment opportunities into Chinese AI startups will now be blocked. In many cases, it can be difficult to disentangle Chinese startups' relationships and client base, including any connections they may have to the military. But at a minimum, the executive order will force firms to increase scrutiny over the startups they invest in. Such increased scrutiny, however, will prove challenging amid China's ongoing crackdown on due diligence firms, which has made thorough investigations into Chinese companies, especially ones with murky connections to the military, more difficult. Some VC and private equity firms may take an expansive approach, given how the line between military use and civilian use for AI is difficult to discern.

China's National Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund Co. (also known as ''Big Fund'') — which serves as a major source of capital for the country's semiconductor companies — raised about $45 billion after it was founded in 2014. In its report published earlier this year, Georgetown University's Center for Security and Emerging Technology also found that 71% of the transaction value in Chinese AI companies between 2016 and 2021 came from Chinese investors with no U.S. participation. This confirms that overall, U.S. VC and private equity capital is relatively small beyond the early stages for start-ups.

The startup path has previously proven to be successful for certain Chinese AI companies, such as facial recognition Chinese AI company SenseTime, which arguably became the world's most valuable startup five years after its 2014 founding.

But the new executive order may only be the first step toward larger restrictions as policymakers in the United States consider broader measures to curb investments in China amid the two countries' escalating rivalry. The order represents, arguably, the most narrow restrictions the United States could implement. Other proposals have ranged from higher restrictions on the three sectors affected to the creation of a CFIUS-like review committee that would have the power to block outbound investments if the committee finds that they harm U.S. national security. It's likely that Congress — and potentially a new presidential administration if Biden isn't re-elected in 2024 — adopt expanded outbound investment restrictions over the next few years. While the three sectors highlighted in the executive order (semiconductors, AI and quantum computing) will remain a key focus of escalating U.S.-China tensions, competition in other technology areas — including biotechnology and increasingly EV battery technology — will likely be just as fierce and could represent expansion areas in the future. Washington and Beijing's intensifying rivalry will, in turn, likely see more U.S. policymakers support expanded restrictions on China's tech sector. However, corporate lobbyists will probably remain somewhat effective in keeping those restrictions narrow, slowing down the process and contributing to some delays (as was the case with the recent executive order). U.S. regulations on outbound investment have always been a difficult sell in Washington due to the U.S. government's typically hands-off approach to such matters, barring very specific national security considerations. But Biden's executive order suggests that the taboo may be breaking, which could pave the way for future Congressional leaders and administrations to expand restrictions to other sectors in China.

As the Aug. 9 executive order was being drafted and debated, Congress in December 2022 requested the U.S. Treasury and Commerce departments to determine the funding and staffing they would need for an outbound investment screening program.







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Re: Decoupling from China
« Reply #75 on: September 17, 2023, 09:51:49 AM »
kudos to Congress

tip of the iceberg for sure

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WSJ: Wall Street puts a Sell on its China Holdings
« Reply #77 on: December 07, 2023, 03:23:15 PM »
Wall Street Puts a ‘Sell’ on Its China Holdings
By Lingling WeiFollow
Dec. 7, 2023 12:01 am ET

One of Washington’s biggest China critics traveled to New York in mid-September to meet with some of Wall Street’s best-known financiers. His mission was to persuade them to stop investing in China.

Wisconsin Republican Mike Gallagher, who chairs a House committee on China, was surprised to find they didn’t need much coaxing. They told him they already were ratcheting back their investments there.

Their motivation wasn’t China’s human-rights record, but its economic one. In closed-door meetings at the Council on Foreign Relations, the financiers ticked off their concerns: China’s economic slowdown is deepening. An unprecedented property slump is scaring investors who hold hundreds of billions of dollars of debt issued by Chinese developers. And Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s emphasis on national security has restricted access to data and sparked raids and investigations involving foreign firms assessing investment risks in the country.

The amount of money that institutional investors have in Chinese stocks and bonds has declined by more than $31 billion this year, through October, the biggest net outflow since China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, official Chinese data show.

Hedge funds, including Bridgewater Associates, whose founder Ray Dalio has long been a China bull, have significantly reduced their holdings of Chinese securities.

Private-equity firms, including Carlyle, have slashed fundraising targets for their Asia funds or stopped raising China-oriented funds altogether. Mutual-fund managers such as Vanguard and Van Eck Associates have either pulled out or aborted their China plans.

Over the past decade, private-equity funds targeting China have raised an average of nearly $100 billion each year. So far this year, they have raised a meager $4.35 billion, according to data firm Preqin.

For years, U.S. companies have been wary of the risks of doing business in China. Wall Street, however, saw huge profit potential and went all in. The retreat now by the sector that became one of Beijing’s most trusted cheerleaders in the U.S. is more evidence that China’s decadeslong boom is ending.

 No one on Wall Street, though, wants to close the door on reversing course if there is money to be made in China again. Publicly, many financiers have signaled they remain committed to China, and they appear to be wary of offending Beijing.

“Wall Street has been very slow and will continue to be very slow to count China out,” said Amy Celico, a partner at Albright Stonebridge Group, a Washington-based consulting firm that advises multinational companies. “They will be ready to ramp up activity as soon as the Chinese economy stabilizes.”

Blackstone Chief Executive Stephen Schwarzman, BlackRock CEO Larry Fink, and Bridgewater’s Dalio led some 350 U.S. business leaders in a standing ovation for Xi when he rose to speak at a dinner in San Francisco on Nov. 15. All three sat with Xi at the head table at the event, held after the Chinese leader’s meeting with President Biden earlier that day.

Blackstone and BlackRock were among the corporate underwriters of the event, and Dalio was also listed as an individual underwriter.

Executives had hoped for some reassurance from the Chinese leader, whose policies have made it riskier for foreign firms to operate in China. But Xi made no pitch to win back American investors. He spoke blandly about people-to-people exchanges and U.S.-China friendship, disappointing some known China bulls in the room.

The remarks drew compliments from some of the Wall Streeters. “Xi delivered a great speech,” Schwarzman said on his way out, according to people in attendance. A person close to Schwarzman said he appreciated Xi’s comments on the need for a stable U.S.-China relationship.


Xi Jinping speaking to U.S. business leaders at a dinner in San Francisco on Nov. 15. PHOTO: CARLOS BARRIA/REUTERS
Dalio said in a written statement that he has been interacting with China for more than 38 years and has been trying to foster mutual understanding between the U.S. and China. “The dinner was great because there were many old friends from both sides gathered in a spirit of camaraderie,” he said.

That two-track approach to China also helps explain why almost all the Wall Street executives who met with Gallagher on Sept. 11 made it a condition of the meeting that their names not be disclosed. The group included representatives of JP Morgan Chase, Goldman Sachs and Citigroup, people familiar with the matter said.

Wall Street for years has profited enormously from investing in Chinese startups, managing money for Chinese institutions and taking Chinese companies public. Its relationship with Beijing has always been transactional. The prospect of big rewards from its Chinese investments meant Beijing could count on Wall Street to lobby Washington to loosen trade and investment restrictions.

The reduction of that Wall Street money is another blow to a Chinese economy already facing an exodus of foreign manufacturers and other companies. In the third quarter, for the first time since the late 1990s, more foreign investment in assets such as factories and stores left China than flowed in.

When the financiers met in September with Gallagher and his aides, some said China’s policy-making had become harder to predict, and they could no longer rely on historical data to construct China-focused funds.

There has been “a bit of an awakening” among the U.S. financial executives about investment risks in China, said one of the people who attended the discussions.

Not everyone, though, has thrown in the towel. BlackRock and Fidelity International, which have China’s approval to set up mutual-fund businesses in the country, are still hoping to tap in to its trillion-dollar pension market. Still, in an August report, BlackRock warned that China’s growth was set to fall below the trend line before the Covid pandemic.

Wall Street’s interest in China goes back decades. In the late 1990s, then-Premier Zhu Rongji asked American investment bankers to help restructure a mountain of bad debt held by big Chinese banks. Zhu backed the Americans’ proposal to sell stakes in the country’s biggest four state-owned banks to U.S. investors.

China agreed to liberalize its financial sector as part of its entry into the WTO, but for decades American banks, brokerages and others remained bit players in the country. In recent years, Beijing has doled out more licenses for Western financial-services firms to manage Chinese investors’ money.

Dalio, who is no longer involved in day-to-day decisions at Bridgewater, first traveled to China in 1984, and in the mid-1990s sent his 11-year-old son to live in Beijing with a local family for a year. He has repeatedly cautioned Bridgewater’s investment researchers against writing outright negative outlooks about China. In 2018, Bridgewater won a coveted license to raise money in China to invest within the country. Its premier China-based fund now has about $4 billion in assets under management.

Lately, Bridgewater has substantially reduced its holdings of Chinese securities. In the third quarter, the fund’s regulatory filings show, it liquidated or reduced its positions in some three dozen Chinese companies, including electric-car maker Xpeng and e-commerce giant PDD Holdings. As of the end of September, the value of its equity ownerships in Chinese companies was 60% lower than a year earlier.

“China is in the midst of secular deleveraging that will likely take many years to work through,” it said in a Sept. 30 research report. “Growth remains weaker than desired.”


In 2013, soon after Xi came to power, Blackstone’s Schwarzman donated $117 million to fund a scholarship program to bring U.S. and other international students to Tsinghua University, the Chinese leader’s alma mater. Since then, Schwarzman has been involved in U.S.-China relations and has forged ties to senior Chinese leaders. He was among the financiers who served as an interlocutor during the conflict between the Trump administration and Beijing over China’s trade practices.

Nevertheless, in 2021, during a sweeping regulatory crackdown on private businesses, Blackstone had to scrap a $3 billion acquisition of a majority stake in property developer Soho China as a review by Chinese regulators dragged on.

Gallagher, chairman of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, has been critical of Wall Street’s involvement with China.

“Too many American investors—venture capitalists, endowments and asset managers—are funding Chinese companies complicit in human-rights abuses and building weapons for the Chinese military,” he said in a written statement to The Wall Street Journal. “This needs to stop.”

He asked the organizers of the San Francisco dinner—the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations and the U.S.-China Business Council—for lists of individuals and entities that paid to be in the room with Xi. He called their participation unconscionable given what he said were China’s human-rights abuses in Xinjiang. China has denied allegations of mistreatment of Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities in Xinjiang.

In China, the U.S. financiers had long been immune from official criticism.

Now, though, they are facing suspicion in Beijing, especially by Chinese “securocrats” elevated by Xi who watch investors they think are betting against China. Earlier this year, a state-owned newspaper took aim at Goldman Sachs after its analysts recommended selling shares in some big Chinese banks, saying the firm’s analysis was based on “pessimistic assumptions” about the country’s banking sector.

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Bill aimed at Chinese Biotech
« Reply #78 on: January 26, 2024, 10:10:49 AM »
WuXi Company Shares Tumble on U.S. Bill Aimed at Chinese Biotech
The proposed bill would restrict federally funded medical providers from working with biotech companies of concern
By
Sherry Qin
WSJ
Jan. 26, 2024 2:54 am ET

View of a logo of WuXi Biologics in Wuxi city, east China’s Jiangsu province. PHOTO: IMAGINE CHINA/REUTERS

Shares of the WuXi family of companies tumbled on concerns that a proposed bill will block the U.S. government from doing business with Chinese biotechnology companies due to alleged military ties, potentially broadening sanctions already existing in sectors from semiconductors to cotton trade.

In Hong Kong, WuXi Biologics closed 18% lower. WuXi AppTec, a sister company, shed 16%, and WuXi XDC, the recently listed medical-research unit of WuXi Biologics, lost 20%. Shanghai-listed shares of WuXi AppTec fell by their daily limit of 10%.

The selloffs in Asia afternoon trading on Friday came after U.S. lawmakers introduced a bill Thursday barring contracts with Beijing Genomics Institute and some Chinese biotech entities due to alleged connections with the People’s Liberation Army.

The WuXi companies were among those named in the bill. Lawmakers said WuXi AppTec “presents a national security threat to the United States,” naming examples of its connections with the military. It said WuXi Biologics’ chief executive was once an adjunct professor at China’s Academy of Military Medical Sciences.

The companies didn’t immediately respond to requests for comment by Dow Jones Newswires.

The proposed legislation would restrict federally funded medical providers from working with biotech companies of concern.

Analysts were skeptical, however, that the bill would turn into law.

“It’s highly unlikely,” said Christopher Lui, Jefferies’s head of Asia healthcare. “It’s the election year so there will be a lot of volatility,” with China featuring as a topic of debate, he said.

Sonija Li, head of retail research at Maybank, said the selloff appeared to be a knee-jerk reaction as the bill circulated in the trading community.

“I think traders are evaluating the potential impact from this act and fear spread rapidly when share price slumped,” she said.

Write to Sherry Qin at sherry.qin@wsj.com


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confronting Tiktok - sounds bipartisan
« Reply #80 on: March 07, 2024, 05:11:20 AM »
https://redstate.com/benkew/2024/03/06/why-an-outright-ban-on-tiktok-is-now-closer-than-ever-n2171046

appears bipartisan

This could be a win for the country if they don't screw it up.

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Re: confronting Tiktok - sounds bipartisan
« Reply #81 on: March 07, 2024, 05:12:42 AM »
https://redstate.com/benkew/2024/03/06/why-an-outright-ban-on-tiktok-is-now-closer-than-ever-n2171046

appears bipartisan

This could be a win for the country if they don't screw it up.

Worry not! Someone will find a way to append several billion in counterproductive spending to this effort.

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Re: Decoupling from China
« Reply #82 on: March 07, 2024, 07:21:55 AM »
Well, they will have to deal with my wife and daughter too.  They LOVE TikTok.

Solution seems simple to me-- mandate sale of TikTok to American company. 

Question:  Why hasn't the market come up with an American alternative?

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WSJ: Chinese must divest TikTok
« Reply #83 on: March 12, 2024, 10:53:31 AM »
Tackling the TikTok Threat
A House bill to force the social-media site from Beijing’s control deserves support.
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The House on Wednesday is expected to vote on a bill that would give popular social-media app TikTok an ultimatum: Break up with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), or break up with the U.S. It didn’t need to come to this, but Beijing and TikTok’s Chinese-owner ByteDance left Washington with no choice.

Congress has spent years debating how to mitigate the national-security risks of TikTok’s Chinese ownership that have grown with the site’s popularity. About 150 million Americans use TikTok, and the app is a top source of news and search for Generation Z.

Donald Trump tried in 2020 to force ByteDance to divest TikTok, but his executive order was blocked in court, partly because the President lacked clear authority from Congress. Legislation by Wisconsin Republican Mike Gallagher and Illinois Democrat Raja Krishnamoorthi aims to overcome the legal obstacles.

***
Their bill would ban TikTok from app stores and web-hosting services in the U.S. if the company doesn’t divest from ByteDance. It also establishes a process by which the President can prohibit other social-media apps that are “controlled by a foreign adversary.” The bill is narrowly tailored while giving the President tools to combat future threats.

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Banning TikTok should be a last resort, but ByteDance and Beijing have demonstrated that they can’t be trusted. Reams of evidence show how the Chinese government can use the platform for cyber-espionage and political influence campaigns in the U.S.

Numerous reports have found that posts about Uyghur forced labor in Xinjiang province, the Tiananmen Square massacre, Hong Kong protests, Tibet and other politically sensitive content in China are suppressed on TikTok. A December study by the Network Contagion Research Institute found significant disparities between hashtags on Instagram and TikTok. The site also appears to amplify content that sows discord and ignorance in America. Pro-Hamas videos trend more than pro-Israel ones. Videos promoting Osama bin Laden’s 2002 “letter to America” went viral on TikTok last autumn.

How has TikTok responded to allegations that its algorithms are controlled by the Chinese government? In January it restricted researcher access to its hashtag data to make it harder to study. “Some individuals and organizations have misused the Center’s search function to draw inaccurate conclusions, so we are changing some of the features to ensure it is used for its intended purpose,” a TikTok spokesperson said.

Yet TikTok can’t explain why posts that are divisive in America go viral, while those that are sensitive for the CCP get few views. TikTok tried to ameliorate concerns about CCP wizards behind the screen with its Project Texas, which houses American user data on Oracle servers and gives the U.S. software company access to its algorithms.

But TikTok’s algorithms are still controlled by ByteDance engineers in China. The Journal reported in January that TikTok executives have said internally that they sometimes need to share protected U.S. data with ByteDance to train the algorithms and keep problematic content off the site. Like protests for democracy in Hong Kong?

***
TikTok’s other major security risk is cyber-espionage. The app vacuums up sensitive American user information, including searches, browsing histories and locations. This data can and does flow back to China. “Everything is seen in China,” a TikTok official said in a leaked internal recording reported by Buzzfeed.

ByteDance employees tried to uncover internal leakers by spying on American journalists. After this surveillance was reported, ByteDance blamed “misconduct of certain individuals” who were no longer employed. But there’s nothing to stop CCP puppets in ByteDance back-offices from spying on Americans.

Meta ignited a firestorm several years ago when it was found to have given British consulting firm Cambridge Analytica access to user personal data. Political campaigns used the data to target ads. TikTok’s privacy risks and malign political influence are more disturbing since it answers to Beijing.

Xi Jinping has eviscerated any distinction between the government and private companies. ByteDance employs hundreds of employees who previously worked at state-owned media outlets. A former head of engineering in ByteDance’s U.S. offices has alleged that the Communist Party “had a special office or unit” in the company “sometimes referred to as the ‘Committee.’”

Chinese law requires ByteDance to comply with Beijing’s surveillance demands. This is why there’s no way to mitigate TikTok’s security risks besides a forced divestment. U.S. investors have expressed interest in buying TikTok, though a Chinese government official last year said it would block a sale. If TikTok is banned, users can blame Beijing.

***
Mr. Trump and some conservatives are opposing the House bill. The former President groused last week that banning TikTok would help Meta, which he called on Truth Social a “true Enemy of the People!” He’s apparently still angry that Meta banned him after the Jan. 6, 2021, Capitol riot. But conservatives who dislike U.S. Big Tech censorship should fear Beijing speech control even more.

In any case, the House bill doesn’t restrict First Amendment rights. It regulates national security. It also has ample precedent since U.S. law restricts foreign ownership of broadcast stations. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States forced the Chinese owners of Grindr, the gay dating app, to give up control of the company.

China has blocked U.S. social-media companies that don’t comply with its censorship regime, and the House bill would prevent Beijing from applying its political speech controls and surveillance in the U.S. Despite America’s political divisions, this ought to be a shared goal.

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Congress comes through and puts National Security first
« Reply #84 on: March 13, 2024, 08:20:34 AM »
Now all eyes on the Senate:

https://www.cnbc.com/2024/03/13/house-passes-bill-that-could-lead-to-a-tiktok-ban-fight-shifts-to-the-senate.html

China is at WAR with us - seems like no brainer to me.

Crafty_Dog

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Re: Decoupling from China
« Reply #85 on: March 13, 2024, 02:09:41 PM »
Why is this being called "banning" Tiktok?  Isn't a matter of divesting Chinese ownership?

ccp

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Re: Decoupling from China
« Reply #86 on: March 13, 2024, 02:21:13 PM »
Sell OR ban.


Crafty_Dog

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Re: Decoupling from China
« Reply #87 on: March 13, 2024, 02:28:51 PM »
I am quite good with getting China out of TikTok but question:  What is the intelligible principle?   Is this a Bill of Attainder, or if not, who else meets the concern present here?



Crafty_Dog

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Re: Decoupling from China
« Reply #90 on: March 16, 2024, 04:30:15 AM »
I'm finding how this issue discussed incoherent.   It is not a "ban"!!!  It is DIVESTMENT, enforced by the threat of a ban!!!

If I understood Trump correctly, although he is going along with the misuse of the word "ban" he is calling for divestment.

ccp

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Re: Decoupling from China
« Reply #91 on: March 16, 2024, 05:07:26 AM »
"US House passes bill to force ByteDance to divest TikTok or face ban"

yes

but if they refuse to divest, then we must carry out our threat no?

Crafty_Dog

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Re: Decoupling from China
« Reply #92 on: March 16, 2024, 07:50:59 AM »
One would hope.

Crafty_Dog

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Guardian: Decoupling from China's CATL batteries
« Reply #93 on: March 18, 2024, 07:29:25 AM »
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/18/catl-chinese-battery-maker-evs-electric-vehicles



CATL, the little-known Chinese battery maker that has the US worried
It is the world’s biggest battery maker, it powers electric vehicles for Tesla, Volkswagen and BMW, and its EV technology is miles ahead of US offerings, say experts

Amy Hawkins Senior China correspondent
Sun 17 Mar 2024 20.34 EDT
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The world’s two superpowers are so intricately linked that it’s hard to think of a pillar of the economy that hasn’t been strained by tensions between the US and China.

And the next frontline in the economic conflict may be the most fundamental yet: a fight for power itself.

A Chinese company that most people have never heard of is at the heart of the global race to store the clean energy needed to power the green transition in the US and the rest of the world.

China’s Contemporary Amperex Technology Co Limited, or CATL, is an energy storage specialist that is the world’s largest battery maker for electric vehicles (EVs). But despite the fact that the company controls nearly two-fifths of the world’s EV battery market – and has powered cars made by brands including Tesla, Volkswagen and BMW – it has long flown under the radar of US politics. Until now.

In February, Duke Energy, a US energy company that serves more than 8 million customers, said it was phasing out the use of CATL batteries. Duke said it would replace the CATL products with technology from a “domestic or allied nation supplier”.

The decision came after lawmakers had raised concerns about the use of CATL batteries at a Marine Corps base, Camp Lejeune, in North Carolina. Duke, which provides electrical infrastructure to the military base, disconnected the CATL batteries in December and now plans to decommission them entirely, as well as phase them out from civilian projects.

an EV charging zone sign painted on the road
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Ford has also come under fire for doing business with CATL. A deal between the two companies to build a factory in Michigan to produce low-cost lithium iron phosphate batteries for EVs using CATL technology has repeatedly been questioned by US lawmakers. Marco Rubio, the vice-chairperson of the Senate intelligence committee, said the plan would bring “America’s greatest geopolitical adversary into the heartland” . In November, Ford scaled down its plans for the plant, reducing its capacity by about 40%.

“This is new,” says Tu Le, the founder of Sino Auto Insights, a consultancy, of the recent scrutiny on CATL. “This is not something that had been talked about or discussed by the US government. There were never any concerns before.”

aerial view shows cars parked at the Tesla Fremont Factory in Fremont, California.
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Tesla, which already uses CATL batteries, is reportedly planning to open a new battery factory using CATL machinery in Nevada this year. Photograph: Josh Edelson/AFP/Getty Images
US is ‘years behind’

Le says there is an increasing pressure on US companies not to use any Chinese batteries, “but if the US is going to be competitive on the global stage with EVs, through 2030 they’re going to have to use Chinese batteries”.

Critics are worried that using CATL batteries may create a dependence on Chinese technology that could become a vulnerability in the event of souring relations between Washington and Beijing. There are also concerns that US tax subsidies for green technology could flow towards Chinese entities.

Regardless, experts agree there is no clear roadmap for the US to decarbonise its streets without cheap Chinese EV batteries – most likely from CATL or its main rival, BYD.

Michael Dunne, the founder of Dunne Insights, an EV consultancy, says the US is “years behind when it comes to batteries, battery supply chains, critical minerals. This is where our cupboard is bare.”

Dunne says there is now a “sense of urgency” in the US to build up domestic battery capacity but that it would take between five and 10 years to catch up with China. That may not be fast – or cheap – enough to achieve Biden’s goal of two-thirds of new car sales being EVs by 2032.

Last week, energy secretary Jennifer Granholm told a discussion panel: “We are very concerned about China bigfooting our industry in the United States even as we’re building up now this incredible backbone of manufacturing.”

But Granholm also acknowledged that “we need to understand that it is important for people to buy electric vehicles in an affordable fashion,” something that experts say is impossible in the current market without Chinese batteries.

A Volkswagen employee works on the assembly of an ID.3 automobile on the electric cars production line at the Volkswagen (VW) vehicle factory in Zwickau, Germany
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Experts agree there is no clear roadmap for the US to decarbonise its streets without cheap Chinese EV batteries. Photograph: Martin Divíšek/EPA
A highly charged political climate

The pushback in the US is already having an impact. Research recently published by Rhodium Group concluded that “Chinese EV and battery companies are increasingly stuck between a rock and a hard place” as they try to navigate their rising unpopularity in the US while Beijing pushes them to internationalise. Between 2022 and 2023, Chinese overseas investment in the EV supply chain in north America decreased from $4.8bn to $2.7bn, according to Rhodium, “driven by regulatory uncertainty and fears over political backlash”.

Le says: “The national security aspect of it needs to be examined. That’s part of due diligence. But we also know that we don’t want to cut our nose off to spite our face either.”

CATL declined to be interviewed, but referred the Guardian to a statement published in December: “Accusations about CATL batteries posing security threats are false and misleading. As a global technology company, CATL welcomes responsible discourse on important safety and security issues, and we take questions about our business seriously. CATL’s business and products in the US do not collect, sell, or share data, and cannot directly interact with electrical grid or any other critical infrastructure.”

Le says many Chinese companies are “anxious” to see who the US will elect as their next president in November. But although Washington is unlikely to look favourably on firms such as CATL any time soon, US companies may struggle to find alternatives. Tesla is reportedly planning to open a new battery factory using CATL machinery in Nevada this year.


ccp

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Re: Decoupling from China
« Reply #94 on: March 18, 2024, 07:40:40 AM »
the sharks on Sharktank
would applaud those entrepreneurs who would make their products in China.

yes production costs are less but look at the long term security risks this has wrought.

we were sold out.




DougMacG

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Decoupling from China, tariffs? EVs with spyware?
« Reply #97 on: May 16, 2024, 06:15:18 AM »
Marsha Blackburn, US Senator from auto me state Tennessee said this morning we don't want Chinese Devs because they're loaded with spyware.

I believe that in the sense of how centrally controlled the teslas are, updating software overnight however they choose without your knowledge.

Of course the other problem is the price point will destroy the US auto industry.

If we accept the spyware issue, shouldn't Chinese EVs be banned in the US instead of just making American consumers pay more for Chinese spyware?