Author Topic: Egypt  (Read 176991 times)

ccp

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Re: Egypt
« Reply #400 on: February 14, 2019, 05:47:12 AM »
***Egypt pumps poison gas into terror tunnel from Gaza – 9 Muslim terrorists missing***

That WILL  work.

You mean they do not offer the Palestinians jobs benefits
and a chance to vote for liberals ?

Crafty_Dog

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Stratfor: Pompeo threatens Egypt with CAATSA
« Reply #401 on: April 11, 2019, 05:15:05 PM »
What Happened

During a Senate budget hearing on April 9, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that the United States would penalize Egypt under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) should Egypt buy Russian Su-35 fighter jets. A bipartisan group of U.S. senators sent a letter to Pompeo before the hearing, urging him to pressure Egypt to avoid the arms deal while Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi was in Washington. Pompeo responded to the senators' concerns by saying he believed Egypt understood the warning, and he said he was hopeful it would not go through with any such deal.
Why It Matters

The United States has so far been hesitant to use CAATSA-related sanctions against friendly countries for fear of irking its allies. As a result, there are signs countries have ignored the 2017 law, as evidenced by Turkey's current arms deal with Russia. But now, Washington is using CAATSA to threaten one of its strongest allies in the Middle East. In doing so, the United States is likely looking to boost CAATSA's credibility — using Egypt as an example to warn others that just because it's provided waivers in the past, doesn't mean it will do so in the future.

The United States' threat of imposing CAATSA-related sanctions against Egypt could be the start of a more robust U.S. push to combat Russia's global influence.

This is also the first time the United States has attempted to block an arms deal between Russia and Egypt in recent years, and could indicate the start of a more robust U.S. push to stem Moscow's global influence. In which case, Washington could begin coming down on other allies that are seeking to purchase military weapons from Russia, such as Saudi Arabia, India, Serbia and Algeria. The move also signals that the United States believes its relationship with Egypt is strong enough to withstand CAATSA-related sanctions, underlining the closeness displayed during al-Sisi’s recent visit with U.S. President Donald Trump.
Background

CAATSA was initially passed into law to impose sanctions on Iran, North Korea and Russia in an effort to combat these countries' global influences. The first CAATSA-related sanctions were applied to punish China for importing Russian arms in September 2018. The act is currently being used against Turkey as it attempts to finish an arms deal with Russia to buy the S-400 missile system. Over the past two years, other U.S. allies have repeatedly received waivers protect them from coming under CAATSA-related sanctions.

In their letter, the U.S. senators also urged Pompeo to press al-Sisi on Egypt's human rights record and the detention of American citizens. Pompeo deflected these concerns at the Senate hearing, saying he did not want to characterize the Egyptian leader as a "tyrant."


Crafty_Dog

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GPF: Egypt
« Reply #403 on: January 03, 2020, 10:28:05 AM »
January 3, 2020   Open as PDF

In Egypt, el-Sissi’s Economic Vision Falls Flat
By: Hilal Khashan

Since the 1952 military coup that overthrew the Egyptian monarchy, Egypt has had a long tradition of rule by military officers. The first three presidents from 1954 until 1981 (Mohammad Naguib, Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar Sadat) were members of the Free Officers movement, which carried out the 1952 coup. After Sadat’s assassination in 1981, air force commander and vice president Hosni Mubarak took office. In 2012, however, the election of Mohammed Morsi, a civilian with links to the Muslim Brotherhood, ended decades of military leadership.
The Egyptian military viewed Morsi with disdain; from its perspective, having a civilian president, especially one hailing from the Muslim Brotherhood, was unacceptable. And so, a year after Morsi’s election, he was ousted in a coup that involved the chief of General Staff and current President Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi, restoring the military’s prominent role in the country’s political affairs. Since then, el-Sissi has allowed the military to assume an ever-larger role in Egypt’s economy and introduced two massive projects that he promised would revive the country’s stagnant finances. These projects, however, have fallen flat.

A Legacy of Suspicion and Betrayal

El-Sissi has tried to avoid his predecessors’ mistakes. In 1953, Gen. Mohammad Naguib abrogated the monarchy and declared Egypt a republic. He believed the mission of the army had ended with the overthrow of King Farouk and wanted it to surrender political authority to civilians. Naguib’s preference for a civilian government did not suit Nasser, who overthrew him in 1954 and placed him under house arrest. Nasser also attempted to dismiss the chief of the General Staff, Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer, whom he blamed for the 1961 coup in Damascus that led to the dissolution of the United Arab Republic, a unified state consisting of Egypt and Syria. Nasser accused Amer of negligence and mistreatment of Syrian army officers. Amer, who enjoyed the full support of the Egyptian army, threatened to stage a coup and overthrow Nasser. The two men reached a compromise according to which Amer would not seek to oust Nasser from office, provided that he stayed out of military affairs. This arrangement worked until the 1967 Six-Day War, when Nasser finally decided to get rid of Amer after the humiliating military defeat.
When Amer attempted to launch a coup, Nasser had him arrested and eliminated him with a lethal dose of cyanide.
Sadat, who took over after Nasser’s death in 1970, had no tolerance for sharing power with political and military competitors. In May 1971, he launched what he called the Corrective Revolution and purged all rivals. After the 1973 war with Israel, Minister of Defense Gen. Ahmad Badawi, whom Egyptians admired as a war hero and a man of good intentions, disapproved of Sadat’s decision to turn to the U.S. and downscale Egypt’s political and military ties with the Soviet Union. Many Egyptians claim that Sadat orchestrated Badawi’s death in a helicopter crash that also killed 13 ranking officers in March 1981. Following Sadat’s assassination in October 1981, his successor, Hosni Mubarak, immediately discharged 18 ranking officers because he had suspicions about their loyalty to him.

The Army Shifts Gear

In 1954, Nasser introduced sweeping social, political and economic reforms. After his adoption of socialist reforms in 1962, he appointed army officers as bank and plant managers, in part because he thought they cared about the well-being of fellow Egyptians but also to dissuade them from seeking political power. But Nasser did not transform the army into a political or economic player. Under Amer’s command, the military retained its autonomy and generous financial allocations.

The military’s shift in focus to economic matters occurred soon after Mubarak took office and Israel completed its withdrawal from Sinai following the Camp David Accords. Mubarak was worried that, after Egypt’s disengagement from the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Egyptian Armed Forces might refocus its attention from war to domestic politics. He understood the implications of the army perceiving itself as the guardian of society and the instrument of social change.

Mubarak built on Sadat’s 1975 infitah (open-door policy) and adopted neoliberalism. The implementation of the new economic orientation relied on an alliance between a small group of businesspeople close to Mubarak and the top military brass.

Preparing the Egyptian Armed Forces to assume an economic role required adding civilian lines of production to existing military industries. The strategy of the Ministry of Military Production that Nasser founded in 1954 needed revision. During the Cold War, Nasser was unsuccessful in securing weapons from the West because he refused to join the anti-Soviet Baghdad Pact. To achieve a modicum of self-sufficiency in military procurement, he launched a modest weapons industry program. Signing the peace treaty with Israel and adopting neoliberal economics created new opportunities for the EAF. No longer content with manufacturing light weapons, such as grenade launchers, rifles and machine guns, military plants expanded their lines of production to include consumer items. For example, Al-Maadi Company for Engineering Industries, which has links to the Ministry of Military Production, began manufacturing a wide range of civilian goods, such as culinary and electrical appliances, agricultural equipment and medical instruments.

Mubarak took advantage of the high social regard for the military and arranged for the establishment of lucrative joint ventures with the EAF. The military’s role in the economy grew at the same time that the EAF’s mission shifted from preparing for war against Israel to counterterrorism and special operations. Still, Mubarak’s economic alliance with the military failed to protect his regime against a massive popular uprising in 2011 that led to his political demise.

El-Sissi Transforms the Military Into an Economic Driver

When el-Sissi assumed the presidency in 2014, he chose to cement his ties with the military establishment and gradually broke ties with the business elite. Egyptians had come to believe that the Mubarak government and its partners in the business world robbed the country blind. El-Sissi used this as an opportunity to give senior military officers a greater role in the country’s economic affairs. He reasoned that the armed forces are more trustworthy and committed to the public good than greedy civilian entrepreneurs. The military’s commercial operations do play a social justice role by making strategic staple foods – such as meat, poultry, cooking oil and formula milk – available to the public at affordable prices, though not for noble reasons.

El-Sissi insists that the military’s commercial projects do not exceed 3 percent of Egypt’s gross national product, but in reality, they account for more than 50 percent. Since Morsi’s ouster in 2013, military sector companies have flourished. El-Sissi has pushed to list army business establishments on the stock exchange, a sign of their growing role in the Egyptian economy. The move would have significant implications, establishing a firm link between the interests of the army and those of the people, and potentially preventing another uprising.

The army now owns 600 hotels and resorts, major asphalt and concrete batching plants, and organic fertilizer facilities. It also constructs roads and highways, bridges, sewage treatment plants, swimming pools and irrigation systems. The range of civilian goods produced by the army covers nearly every part of daily life, from food to medicines and clothing. All 16 factories owned by the Ministry of Military Production likely are now involved in manufacturing civilian goods, and this number does not include many private companies run by the military.

Army businesses don’t disclose financial information to government agencies, so their finances are shrouded in secrecy. All army enterprises are exempt from import fees and income taxes, and those that build their plants on free land owned by the EAF are not subject to taxation. Investors both at home and abroad therefore feel discouraged from investing in the economy. Army companies are often awarded no-bid contracts for government infrastructure projects, allowing the military to increase its share of the Egyptian economy steadily. The Armed Forces Engineering Authority, an agency of the Ministry of Defense, has expanded its non-military projects to include psychological rehabilitation and supply of civil servants.

In addition to expanding the military’s economic role, el-Sissi embarked on two massive, controversial projects. Two months into his presidency, he ordered the construction of a parallel Suez Canal, which he claimed would more than double the canal’s revenue of $5.5 billion. Government officials described the expansion, undertaken by seven foreign contractors, as Egypt’s gift to the world. One year after completing the controversial project, which cost more than $8 billion and depleted Egypt’s foreign currency reserves, revenue from the two parallel canals dropped to $5 billion. In 2016, revenue started to rise modestly, not because of increased traffic but because of rising toll fees. After seeing the disappointing economic returns, el-Sissi changed the objective of the project from invigorating the stagnant economy into giving the Egyptian people a morale boost.

The second controversial project was a new administrative capital near Cairo at the edge of the Nile Delta. The army owns 51 percent of the shares of the company that is currently developing the new administrative capital at an estimated cost of $45 billion. In January 2019, el-Sissi inaugurated the largest cathedral in the Middle East and a large mosque, second only to the Grand Mosque in Mecca, in the new city.

Dubai Ports World was granted a concession to operate the Ain Sokhna transit port near the southern terminus of the Suez Canal, angering Egyptians who know that the UAE would never develop the port to the point that it could compete with Dubai’s Port of Jebel Ali. El-Sissi compromised the economic development of the Suez Canal area in exchange for receiving UAE financial aid and recognition of his political legitimacy. For the same reasons, he also relinquished Tiran and Sanafir islands – seen as national icons because Egypt fought two wars with Israel in 1956 and 1967 over the Tiran Passes – to Saudi Arabia.

El-Sissi’s ambitions are personal. He has no economic vision that promotes investments. He is interested more in glorifying himself than in embarking on real economic development. He follows in the footsteps of Nasser but lacks his charisma. Egyptians remember Nasser for nationalizing the Suez Canal and constructing the High Dam. El-Sissi, on the other hand, has built two unnecessary projects and failed to defend Egypt’s vital interests in the waters of the Nile River.   




Crafty_Dog

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Stratfor: Biden likely to question ties with Egypt
« Reply #404 on: December 24, 2020, 07:36:53 PM »
As Biden Takes Office, the U.S.-Egyptian Bond Comes Into Question
Emily Hawthorne
Emily Hawthorne
Middle East and North Africa Analyst, Stratfor
6 MINS READ
Dec 23, 2020 | 10:00 GMT

Egyptian tanks take part in joint military exercises at a base near the Mediterranean coast, located northwest of the capital of Cairo, on Nov. 15, 2018.
Egyptian tanks take part in joint military exercises at a base near the Mediterranean coast, located northwest of the capital of Cairo, on Nov. 15, 2018.

(KHALED DESOUKI/AFP via Getty Images)

HIGHLIGHTS

The U.S.-Egypt accord, one of the cornerstone bilateral relationships shaping stability in the Middle East and North Africa, will come under pressure as the Biden administration enters the White House promising greater scrutiny of Egyptian actions and as Egypt prioritizes regional stability in areas of less U.S. interest....

The U.S.-Egypt accord, one of the cornerstone bilateral relationships shaping stability in the Middle East and North Africa, will come under pressure as the Biden administration enters the White House promising greater scrutiny of Egyptian actions and as Egypt prioritizes regional stability in areas of less U.S. interest. Congress and the incoming Biden administration have already threatened the government of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi with sanctions and conditions on economic aid tied to human rights concerns. On top of this, Cairo is already reconsidering whether it needs to maintain its historic economic, security and diplomatic reliance on Washington at the same level. Even so, the United States is unlikely to terminate its substantial arms sales and aid to Egypt.

Egypt And The United States: A Long History Of Strong Cooperation.

Egypt is the fourth-largest recipient of U.S. aid in the world, with transfers of Foreign Military Financing and Economic Support Funds worth over a billion dollars annually for many years, in large part because Egypt has long been aligned closely with the United States on all regional conflicts.

The United States is Egypt's strongest Western partner diplomatically and economically, based on a bedrock of decades of cooperation on counterterrorism and mediation of regional conflicts.

Ever since modern Egypt's independence, Cairo has oscillated between its dependence on the United States as its near-sole security guarantor, economic patron and source of investment and its ties with Russia.

Egypt has been especially valuable to the United States in the Middle East because of its longstanding peace agreement with Israel; at a time when regional relationships with Israel are shifting, Egypt's deal with Israel serves as a model for maintaining normalization over the long term.

Domestically, Egypt's focus on political and economic stability at the cost of personal freedoms will clash with the Biden administration's renewed focus on human rights. This increases the risk of U.S. sanctions and stipulations related to economic aid, which could disrupt Egyptian economic stability. Under the al-Sisi administration, disappearances and arrests of nongovernmental organization workers, journalists and human rights campaigners have reached their peak in modern Egyptian history. The trend has been part of the government's effort to maintain political stability by sharply managing dissent. The instability following the Arab Spring and the resurgence of jihadist violence in the Sinai and Western desert have also focused the al-Sisi administration's attention on eliminating the Muslim Brotherhood and related groups, often leading Cairo to categorize any dissent as Brotherhood-linked. Such actions increasingly concern Western partners of Egypt, and the Biden administration has promised to review relations with Cairo with an emphasis on policing human rights violations.

According to organizations like the Project on Middle East Democracy, repression in Egypt reached high levels in 2020 under al-Sisi.

U.S. President-elect Joe Biden tweeted during the campaign in July 2020 that there would be "no more blank checks for Trump's favorite dictator" in reference to al-Sisi and the increasing number of forced disappearances and arrests of human rights campaigners in Egypt.

Al-Sisi did enjoy good ties with U.S. President Donald Trump, who indeed referred to the Egyptian leader as his "favorite dictator" and said in al-Sisi's presence in May 2017 that the United States seeks "partners, not perfection." Congressional Democrats has already made clear, most recently via a letter to the al-Sisi government in October 2020, that Egypt's behavior is under increasing scrutiny and that arms sales and economic aid will be evaluated with Egypt's actions in mind. The Trump administration, which had little tolerance for political Islamist movements and took its partners' concerns at face value, embraced Cairo's campaign against the Muslim Brotherhood in a way the Biden administration might not.

Meanwhile, Egypt's increasing focus on ensuring stability in its immediate neighborhood does not match the top U.S. priorities in the Middle East, lessening opportunities for coordination and collaboration between the two over mediating regional conflict. As Egypt has emerged from a post-Arab Spring period of severe instability, it has shifted its mediation efforts toward issues abroad that directly impact Egyptian stability. This includes Eastern Mediterranean energy competition; ensuring stability in the Nile River Valley; border security with Libya and Sudan; and containing state supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood, like Turkey. Cairo is not convinced that these priorities align with U.S. priorities, which remain intensely focused on containing Iran and countering terrorist groups in Iraq and Syria.

Egypt has engaged in a series of unusual military drills in recent months with regional partners, indicating a desire to display its independence.

Egypt traditionally has not deployed its military forces abroad to places like Iraq and Syria per its domestic military doctrine, reducing opportunities for direct coordination with the U.S. military.
While Egypt will remain a key U.S. partner and recipient of aid, it will also seek closer relations with partners like Russia, which does not pressure Egypt over human rights abuses, and France, which has promised not to condition arms sales on human rights and is more active in the theaters in which Egypt is keenly interested. As Biden's Middle East policies take shape once he takes office, the future of Egypt as a key partner in regional counterterrorism and intelligence operations will become clearer. The Biden administration will not want to lose Egypt's valuable counterterrorism cooperation. Egypt meanwhile is likely to continue in 2021 to experience greater macroeconomic stability than most other countries in the region, which will boost support for government and domestic stability — as well as Cairo's willingness to challenge pressure by foreign governments like the United States over its politics.

So far, Egypt is the only Middle Eastern country expected by the IMF and World Bank to experience economic growth in 2020, giving it a substantial head start in 2021, a time when most countries worldwide will still be grappling with COVID-19 related contractions.

Egypt is the third-largest military arms importer in the world; Russia and France are major suppliers, increasingly so in recent years.

French President Emmanuel Macron told al-Sisi in December 2020 that French arms sales to Egypt would not be conditioned on human rights abuses, a reflection of the economic importance of this relationship to France.

Crafty_Dog

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GPF: Egypt as a declining regional power
« Reply #405 on: June 10, 2021, 10:22:08 AM »
   
Egypt as a Declining Regional Power
Cairo’s main focus is maintaining stability at home rather than projecting power abroad.
By: Hilal Khashan

In June 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama delivered an address to the Muslim world proposing a new start in Arab-U.S. relations. He chose to deliver his potentially trailblazing speech at Cairo University in Egypt as a recognition of the country’s historic role in the Muslim world. (Subsequent developments, including the Arab uprisings and the rise of the Islamic State, dashed hopes for a shift on both sides.)

However, Egypt’s prominence as a regional leader has been declining for years. Beginning in the early 1970s during Anwar Sadat’s presidency, the country became increasingly inward-focused. It prioritized combating political opposition and Islamist militancy at home rather than projecting power abroad. Since Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi’s 2013 coup, which overthrew Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated President Mohamed Morsi, Egypt’s foreign policy has been a reflection of its internal affairs. Countries that support the Muslim Brotherhood, such as Turkey and Qatar, are considered ideological adversaries, while those that oppose political Islam, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, are seen as tactical allies.

From Pan-Arabism to Egypt First

Britain’s occupation of Egypt in 1882 cut off Egypt from its traditional foreign policy theaters, especially in West Asia. Under British occupation, Egyptian nationalism developed differently from the nationalist movements in West Asia and North Africa. Most Egyptian heads of state did not try to project power beyond Egypt’s borders, though there were two notable exceptions: King Farouk and President Gamal Abdel Nasser.

Farouk was a descendant of Muhammad Ali, who seized power in Egypt in 1805 and aspired to create an Arab kingdom. Farouk decided to lead Egypt into the 1948 Arab-Israeli war against the wishes of his own government and army command. In 1950, he closed the Tiran Passes to Israeli shipping, and the following year, he played an instrumental role in drafting the Joint Arab Defense Treaty to confront Israel.

Nasser, meanwhile, had distinct Arab roots, unlike most Egyptians, and hailed from the Asyut governorate in Upper Egypt. He militarily and economically supported the Algerian war of independence in 1954-62. In 1957, he sent troops to Syria to defend the country against a possible Turkish invasion. In 1960, he dispatched army units to Kuwait after Iraqi President Abdul Karim Qasim threatened to occupy it. Two years later, he sent one-third of the Egyptian army to Yemen to defend the fledgling republican regime after a coup overthrew its king. Even after Egypt’s staggering defeat in the 1967 Six-Day War, Nasser remained a powerful figure in the Arab world. Though many Arab leaders viewed him as an enemy, the vast majority of the Arab public saw him as the uncontested champion of Arab nationalism.

Since Nasser’s death in 1970, however, Egypt’s regional ambitions have been limited. Egyptian presidents have recognized that the poor state of the country’s economy disqualified it from playing a leading role in regional politics. Anwar Sadat, who succeeded Nasser, opposed sending a single Egyptian soldier to fight on behalf of Arabs. During his presidency, he was boycotted by most Arab leaders because he made unilateral peace with Israel. Hosni Mubarak, who became president in 1981 after Sadat’s assassination, sent Egyptian troops to Saudi Arabia in 1990 as part of the U.S. coalition to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. But his move was not motivated by a desire for Egypt to become a regional power but by a desire to stop Iraq from becoming one.

El-Sissi’s Politics of Regime Survival

Current President Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi has mostly followed suit. Since becoming president, he has been preoccupied with internal security matters. As the only Egyptian president to stage a coup to seize power since 1952, his top concern has been staying in control, not reestablishing Egypt’s leadership of the Arab world. His focus has been on safeguarding Egypt’s borders from incoming militants and arms, which could be used to support Egypt’s homegrown militant movements.

El-Sissi has no regional power ambitions. However, he doesn’t want the aggressive foreign policies of the Saudi and Emirati crown princes to overshadow Egypt’s historical role in the region. He has deep concerns about the Gulf countries’ peace deals with Israel, which threaten to limit the need for Egypt’s regional mediation. Cairo gained its reputation as a regional peace broker after the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference. But since then, the Palestinians have turned to Turkey to facilitate a reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah, while Hamas has sought Qatar’s help to ease Israel’s blockade on Gaza. Egypt is also increasingly economically alienated. Last October, Israel Pipeline Company signed a deal with the UAE to transport oil from Abu Dhabi to Europe via the Eilat-Ashkelon Pipeline. The agreement effectively reduces oil shipments via the Suez Canal by 17 percent and compromises Egypt’s Sumed oil pipeline from the Gulf of Suez to Alexandria.

Egypt-Israel Oil and Gas Pipelines
(click to enlarge)

Egypt adopted a relatively proactive and pro-Palestinian approach to Israel’s recent operation in Gaza. (By comparison, it was relatively passive during similar bouts of violence in 2009 and 2014.) In 2014, Egypt pressured Hamas to accept Israel’s terms for a cease-fire, but this time around, it brokered a deal that took effect without any preconditions. It painted Israel as the aggressor in the conflict, and a prominent Egyptian Islamic scholar called on Muslims to seize Jerusalem and halt Israel’s West Bank settlements.

Still, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu thanked el-Sissi for facilitating the cease-fire. As for Hamas, it was skeptical of Egypt’s offer of $500 million for Gaza’s reconstruction, knowing that Egyptian companies run by the armed forces would lead the reconstruction efforts and that these efforts would increase Egypt’s influence over Gaza.

Egypt’s government-controlled media referred to Cairo’s efforts to negotiate a cease-fire deal as the dawning of a golden era in Egyptian foreign policy. The media lauded Egyptian officials’ negotiation skills, ignoring the fact that Biden played the decisive role in stopping the fighting. The claim that Egypt was restoring its relevance as an international peace broker rings hollow because in Egypt, Gaza is often considered more of a domestic matter rather than a regional one. (Cairo occupied the Gaza Strip from 1948 until 1967.) In any event, successful mediation does not make a country a regional power.

Egyptian media have exaggerated el-Sissi’s achievements. They claimed that his forceful diplomacy protected the Palestinians against Israeli aggression. It also spread propaganda about his military coup, claiming it was a popular revolution that saved Egypt from the Muslim Brotherhood. The media also glorified Egypt’s massive troop mobilization in the northwest – which it claimed resolved the Libyan crisis to Egypt’s advantage.

Egypt has myriad other problems with which to contend. It has a weak economy, heavy debt, poor educational system and high unemployment. According to the World Bank, Egypt’s per capita income in 2019 was $3,000 compared to $8,000 for the Middle East and North Africa region. Although real incomes saw modest growth over the past few years, they are not sustainable in the long term because Egypt’s economic reforms are superficial. The Egyptian economy relies heavily on the public sector, led by the armed forces. The International Monetary Fund strongly recommended that the government promote the private sector, but instead, it increased the military’s involvement in the economy.

Adjust Net National Income Per Capita, 2011 - 2019
(click to enlarge)

The 1952 military coup ended a century of capitalistic development. Nasser’s nationalization of the economy had devastating consequences for Egypt’s economic growth. When Sadat made peace with Israel, he slashed the military budget but allowed the armed forces to play an active role in the economy to generate revenue. Under Mubarak, the military effectively dominated the economy, a trend that only grew under el-Sissi, who’s dependent on the loyalty of senior army officers who oppose any attempts at privatization.

Egypt is also facing a low-intensity insurgency in northern Sinai and an intensifying water dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. (The project, which is still under construction, has already decreased Egypt’s production of staple crops – wheat, rice, and sugar – by more than 25 percent.) El-Sissi believes Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is seeking to transform his country into an economic hub and marginalize Egypt’s role in the region.

The Nile River
(click to enlarge)

A country with an economy controlled by its military and facing an existential threat to its water supply can hardly expect to become a regional power. El-Sissi has shifted Egypt’s focus from the Middle East to Africa, in part because of the dispute over the dam, but he remains too preoccupied with the existential threat from the south to worry about restoring Egypt’s regional power status.

Egypt enjoys geostrategic advantages that qualify it to play a leading regional role. It straddles Africa, Asia and Europe and controls one of the world’s most important maritime routes. It is the Arab world’s most populous country and has its most homogeneous population. However, Egypt remains inwardly focused, and its people have little interest in non-Egyptian affairs. Considering the state of the country’s economy, it’s unlikely these conditions will change any time soon.

Crafty_Dog

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As predicted by Michael Yon
« Reply #406 on: March 31, 2022, 08:50:53 AM »
GPF

March 31, 2022
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Egypt’s Food Crisis Pushes the Country to the Edge
The war in Ukraine has exacerbated the country’s food security problems.
By: Hilal Khashan
Russia’s war on Ukraine has adversely affected the Arab region, which heavily depends on wheat imports, including from these two countries. The fallout from the war varies from country to country, but it has hurt one Arab nation more than the others: Egypt. In Egypt, wheat shortages have further exacerbated supply issues precipitated by poor government planning and the country’s rapid population growth. For example, Egypt’s agricultural sector has been under pressure because of reduced flow from the Nile River as a result of the government’s mismanagement of the dispute over the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.

These problems have been compounded by inflation, which accelerated after the 2013 coup led by current President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi. Many expected the new political leadership to stabilize the country and relaunch the economy, but the situation only worsened. In response to surging inflation, el-Sissi angered many Egyptians by urging them to refrain from buying expensive food items and to start losing weight. A revolt is inevitable, and it’s only a matter of time before a minor incident ignites a full-blown rebellion.

Volatile Issue

Bread – which in colloquial Egyptian Arabic translates as aish, literally meaning life – is more than just a staple food for most Egyptians. Egypt is the world’s largest wheat importer, with its domestic production covering only 50 percent of consumption. Moreover, at least 80 percent of Egypt’s wheat and cooking oil imports come from Russia and Ukraine. Though there is no immediate food shortage, Egypt must now find new, more expensive providers from farther afield because of the disruption in supplies from two of its traditional sources. (It’s notable that the war has also affected the tourism sector, reducing the flow of travelers into Egypt from Russia and Ukraine. The loss of revenues from tourism and the sudden flight of foreign investment makes it extremely difficult for the government to meet its financial obligations.)

Egyptian Imports of Wheat and Cooking Oil

(click to enlarge)

Since the war began last month, food prices have increased 25-50 percent and are likely to keep rising. But el-Sissi has responded to the problem with insensitive remarks, imploring the Egyptian people to pray to God for relief, thus leaving their welfare and survival up to divine intervention. Some on social media have lamented the president’s reaction.

Food supplies and prices have historically been a volatile issue in Egypt. Attempts by previous governments to reduce bread subsidies resulted in massive public protests. In 1977, President Anwar Sadat decided to slash subsidies on staple food items, causing violent riots that he blamed on Egyptian communists. Despite the International Monetary Fund’s insistence on curtailing subsidies, Sadat reinstated them, deeming that his political survival was more important than financial reform. During the 2011 uprising, Egyptian demonstrators chanted “bread, freedom and social justice.” When the government considered cutting bread subsidies in 2017, protests erupted again. Demonstrators blocked traffic and were undeterred by the deployment of the army. El-Sissi responded by ordering the immediate issuance of temporary bread ration cards to defuse the crisis.

Last week, el-Sissi announced that Egypt’s Solidarity and Dignity Program would secure around $7 billion to mitigate the consequences of the international food and energy crisis. But the funds are unlikely to make much difference in a country with more than 100 million people, where malnutrition is responsible for more than 65 percent of child mortality. Egypt, after all, is one of three dozen countries that account for 90 percent of the world’s malnutrition.

Economic and Political Condition

Moreover, the food issue needs to be examined against the backdrop of Egypt’s economic and political decline. With a per capita income estimated at $3,570, compared to the world average of $11,000, Egypt is an economically underdeveloped country. The Egyptian economy does not run according to economic principles but instead according to el-Sissi’s whims. The Central Bank recently devalued the Egyptian pound by 17 percent to the dollar. It also raised the interest rate by 1 percent in response to rising inflation as the government sought an $8 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund. El-Sissi doesn’t show a genuine desire to establish inclusive and sustainable economic growth. Corruption, nepotism, and consolidation of the public sector’s share of the market are driving the competition out of business.

Egypt's GDP Per Capita, 2020

(click to enlarge)

After investing in megaprojects such as the new administrative capital and impressive palaces under el-Sissi’s administration, the government is also severely in debt. When el-Sissi staged the coup in 2013, Egypt’s public debt was less than $17 billion. Last year, it reached a record high of $138 billion. Servicing this debt equals three times the combined revenue accrued from the Suez Canal and tourism.

The United Arab Emirates has taken advantage of Cairo’s financial difficulties. It has acquired substantial business assets in Egypt, with its investments now exceeding $6 billion. Roughly 1,200 UAE companies are already active in Egypt, and Abu Dhabi’s sovereign wealth fund aims to buy the Egyptian government’s shares in several firms, including the International Commercial Bank, for $2 billion. The UAE also dominates Egypt’s arts, film and media industries.

Under el-Sissi’s management, authoritarianism has also been on the rise in Egypt. The country at least had the pretense of democracy under former President Hosni Mubarak. Egyptians tolerated his despotic rule until he began grooming his son to succeed him. El-Sissi, however, doesn’t hide behind a veneer of democracy. He brutally eliminated the opposition and even oppressed officials, party leaders, activists and army officers who backed his 2013 coup to overthrow Mohammad Morsi, Egypt’s first civilian president. When he took power, he tried to charm the Egyptian people by telling them: “Do you not know that you are the light of my eyes?” But he lacked the charisma of former Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and became a tyrant instead.

El-Sissi depoliticized and suppressed Egyptian civil society, either jailing its leaders or driving them to seek asylum abroad. He brands anyone who disagrees with him a foreign agent threatening the fabric of the nation. He also doesn’t trust the people around him. In the tradition of other Arab presidents, he is grooming his son, Mahmoud, to play a crucial role in Egyptian politics and eventually succeed him. He recently promoted him to deputy head of Egyptian general intelligence and put him in charge of Egyptian relations with Israel. El-Sissi’s son is involved in secret talks with the Israelis to create an industrial city in northern Sinai as part of a plan to resettle Palestinians. Considering the declining quality of life in Egypt, his authoritarianism could accelerate attempts to oust him.

Pushed to Revolt

So where is this situation leading? For years, the common perception was that most Egyptians were politically passive because they felt powerless. Even informed and educated people won the reputation as being members of the “couch party,” an Egyptian term referring to the silent majority. The 2011 uprising, however, debunked the claim that the masses will not rebel.

El-Sissi has appeared insensitive to Egyptians’ concerns about rising food prices, suggesting they purchase less expensive food. He also invested billions in palaces and a new administrative capital, and purchased expensive military hardware, including two helicopter carriers and Rafale fighter jets, even though Egypt hasn’t gotten involved in foreign conflicts, not even to defend its claims to the Nile River.

El-Sissi therefore shouldn’t feel secure about his political position. The army – which was historically very popular among Egyptians, though its support has been waning of late – doesn’t support the establishment of dynasties, including the one Mubarak tried to hand over to his son. Given its disapproval of el-Sissi’s erratic economic and regional policies, it’s unlikely he will remain in power long enough to see his own son succeed him. El-Sissi lost the military’s support in part because he eliminated the ranking officers who backed his coup against Morsi and in part because the military did not want to associate with a ruler who failed to deliver on his promises to the people. It was a professional army until Mubarak and el-Sissi used bribery to curry favor within its ranks. Its second-tier officers are politically disinclined and elicit a sense that el-Sissi will be Egypt’s last military ruler.

Arab satellite TV stations have devoted round-the-clock coverage to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, describing it as a war between the forces of democracy and authoritarianism. With the Russian army’s failures there, Arabs suddenly woke up to the reality that dictatorships are inherently weak despite their impressive array of munitions. U.S. President Joe Biden said, “the world’s democracies must prepare for a long fight against autocracy.” As the conflict unfolds, his strong words will echo in the Arab region. One would expect Egypt – the most populous Arab country with a brief, if unstable, democratic interlude in 2011-12 – to lead the second phase of the Arab uprisings.

One potential spark for such a revolt is the recent protests at the Maspero Television Building, the headquarters of the Egyptian Radio and Television Union, over a decision to scale down operations, lay off several thousand employees, slash salaries and reduce benefits. The state-controlled union was generally supportive of el-Sissi’s government, defending his policies, defaming his critics, and legitimizing his regime after the coup. So far, security forces have not suppressed the protests. Should they spread to Cairo, however, the police will crush the unrest with a force that could ignite a new uprising.

The Arab region is often described as a volcano ready to erupt. Egypt, the Arab region’s historical pacesetter, will likely be the site of the first eruption thanks to its population and its heavy cultural, literary and political influences.

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GPF: Egypt's Coptics
« Reply #407 on: April 21, 2022, 02:11:52 PM »
April 21, 2022
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Egypt’s Coptic Christians: A History of Exclusion and Discrimination
The rhetoric about national unity doesn’t correspond to reality.
By: Hilal Khashan
Two incidents earlier this month highlighted the discrimination facing Egypt’s Coptic Christians. In Alexandria, a Coptic priest was stabbed to death by someone whom the police described as a mentally deranged elderly person. Then, a leading Egyptian magazine apologized to its readers after publishing a controversial religious edict about stores selling food to the infidel, an implicit reference to Copts, during the day in the fasting month of Ramadan. These incidents cast doubt on President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi’s pledge to guarantee equal treatment to Copts and Muslims and end centuries of persecution and discrimination.

From Persecuted Majority to a Pariah Minority

Coptic Christians in Egypt constitute the largest concentration of Christians in the Arab world, totaling at least 10 percent of the country’s almost 106 million inhabitants. The word “Copt” is a synonym for “Egypt” and evolved from “Hikuptah,” the earlier name of Memphis, Pharaonic Egypt’s ancient capital southwest of present-day Cairo. Egypt became part of the Eastern Roman Empire (Byzantium) when it was established in 330. In 451, the Council of Chalcedon split Christianity between the Chalcedonians, who believed Jesus had two distinct natures (divine and human), and the Miaphysites, who believed Jesus had only one nature. The Byzantine rite subscribed to Chalcedonianism and the Copts to Miaphysitism, leading to the latter’s religious suppression and persecution. When the Muslim armies invaded Egypt in 639, the Copts did not support the Byzantines, hoping the new conquerors would grant them the freedom to worship.

Egypt's Religious Demography
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The Copts enjoyed greater freedoms during the Rashidum Caliphate, which ended in 661. The Umayyad Caliphate was more Arab than Islamic in orientation, employing Christians and Jews in the administration. The state assured them freedom to worship provided they paid the poll tax, from which 70 percent of Christians and Jews (clerics, minors, ill people, women and elderly) were exempt. Treatment of Copts took a turn for the worse during the reign of Caliph Umar bin Abdulaziz (717-720). Under the Abbasids, the status of Copts reflected the personal orientation of the ruler, not sharia law, which assured Christians of state protection and freedom to worship.

The Fatimids (909-1171) founded Cairo in 973 as their capital, employed Copts to administer their finances, and granted them freedom of religion. However, with the rise of the Mamluks to power, the Copts witnessed a reversal. In 1260, the Mamluks decisively defeated the Mongols in the Battle of Ain Jalut, preventing them from capturing Egypt and ending their sweep into Syria and Iraq. The Mamluks punished the Copts severely because the Mongols used Christian auxiliaries from Armenia and Georgia to slaughter Muslims while sparing the lives of Coptic villagers. This period generated among Muslims the enduring conviction that the Copts were eager to collaborate with foreign Christians against them.

In 1805, Muhammad Ali established a dynasty and set out to transform Egypt into a modern state. At that time, Egyptians saw France as a beacon of liberalism. In 1831, a Muslim cleric returned to Cairo after completing his studies in Paris and promoted a form of secular nationalism in which the Copts would stand on equal terms with Muslims. But European meddling in Egyptian affairs in the second half of the 19th century and Egypt’s occupation by the British in 1882 led Muslims to see Islam as the answer to their problems and Copts as foreign agents. The last religious reform took place in 1855, when Khedive Muhammad Said abolished the poll tax and admitted the Copts into the military. However, his sectarian reforms didn’t end discrimination against the Copts – which was embedded in folk culture and medieval religious values.

Impact of British Colonialism

The Khedives’ corruption, financial mismanagement and reckless borrowing from British and French banks imposed Anglo-French dual control over Egypt’s finances, undermining Egyptian sovereignty. Blatant European intervention aroused Egyptian nationalism and resentment of foreigners who dominated the country. It also caused anguish over the Copts’ ties with the British and their unwillingness to take a decisive stand in support of the Urabi Revolt, which started in 1879, to end foreign meddling in domestic affairs. In 1882, the British occupied Egypt, declared it a protectorate and administered it through high commissioners.

In 1906, Coptic Christian judge Boutros Ghali sentenced four Egyptians to death over the Denshawai incident involving a British army officer who died from heatstroke after being chased by Egyptian villagers. In 1910, an Egyptian nationalist assassinated Ghali, marking the beginning of a crisis between Copts and Muslims that persists to this day. The following year, the Copts organized a Christian conference in Asyut to end discrimination against them, demanding equality in public offices, proportionate representation in the parliament and declaration of Sunday as a public holiday.

In 1919, the Copts actively participated in a spectacular demonstration of solidarity with Muslims in Saad Zaghlul’s uprising, demanding an end to British occupation. In 1921, Coptic politician Makram Ebeid cofounded with Zaghlul the Wafd Party, which emerged as Egypt’s premier nationalist political force. Ebeid was the party’s secretary-general from 1936 until 1942 when the British suspended Egyptian political life during the Second World War.

Violence Against the Copts

Less than two years after overthrowing the monarchy, Gamal Abdel Nasser emerged as Egypt’s strongman. He promised to create a modern economy, institute democracy and deliver social justice. His erratic policies ruined the economy, exacerbated repression and failed to improve the lives of the poor. Nasser’s economic and social policies negatively impacted the Coptic entrepreneurial class and ended their distinguished status in professional occupations.

Nasser was a towering and charismatic figure, and the Copts avoided making any public demands during his presidency. His successors were no more sympathetic toward the Copts than he was. In 1981, President Anwar Sadat banished the leader of the Egyptian Coptic Church, Pope Shenouda, to a Sinai monastery because he articulated Coptic demands for justice and equality. Sadat’s presidency from 1970 until his assassination in 1981 saw the rise of violence against Copts, a trend that dramatically accelerated in subsequent years.

The violence coincided with massive demographic changes, triggered by the Six-Day War and fighting across the Suez Canal. Exacerbated by severe economic difficulties and internal migration from rural areas to urban centers, the demographic shift brought millions of Muslims and Copts to Egypt’s large cities, causing friction between them and frequent violent outbursts. In contemporary times, most acts of violence against the Copts are driven by three factors: religious bias, church building and interfaith relationships.

In 2000, a disagreement over a business transaction in el-Kosheh village led to the death of 21 Copts. The court acquitted all 96 suspects. A Coptic bishop commented on the court’s extraordinary ruling, saying: “If the perpetrators of the murder are allowed to walk free, it will be seen as a green light to kill Christians.” After each massacre of Copts, the Interior Ministry frequently organizes reconciliation sessions in the name of national unity to avoid making the aggressors face justice. In 2017, the Islamic State killed seven Copts in Arish, Sinai’s central city, forcing most Christians to flee because they doubted the army’s ability or willingness to protect them against further attacks. In 2011, 13 Copts lost their lives after radical Islamists stormed a church to free a young woman, claiming that she had converted to Islam and was jailed by her family. A few days before the 2011 uprising, an attack on al-Qudiseen Church in Alexandria killed 23 worshippers, and a similar attack on St. Peter’s Church in Cairo in 2016 killed 25 Copts. No one claimed responsibility for either massacre. After such attacks, the Coptic church usually calls for calm, stressing that they originate from abroad, aim to wreck Egyptian unity and target citizens rallying behind the government against terrorism.

Attacks on Copts, July 2012-Nov. 2019
(click to enlarge)

The building of churches is also a contentious issue. Based on the Ottomans’ 1856 Hamayouni Decree, the church building law limited the construction of new churches in Egypt to 25 per year, pending the sultan’s approval. The decree applied mainly to Copts. Egyptian presidents abided by the Ottoman decree despite Coptic protestation that the community needed many more new churches because old ones were being torn down and the population was growing. Nasser, who was on good terms with Egyptian Coptic leader Pope Kyrillos VI, temporarily resolved the issue by informally allowing the construction of 50 churches every year, a practice that his successors did not continue.

The Copts resorted to unauthorized church building, often leading to bloody clashes between Muslims and Copts. In 1972, Muslim protesters in al-Khanka village burned the Holy Bible Society, which Copts were converting into a church. In 1981, an angry mob in a Cairo neighborhood destroyed a church under construction, killing 20 Copts. President Anwar Sadat refused to call the incident sectarian sedition, dismissing it as a petty neighborhood disagreement.

Interfaith marriages, though rare, are another source of discord between Muslims and Copts. Punishments for marrying someone of another faith can range from being disowned by the family to violent assault. Such relationships are frowned upon, and Coptic clerics often urge young people to find their soulmates within their own religious community. Police reports never indicate when romantic relationships are the cause of violent incidents, often attributing them instead to frivolous personal feuds. In addition, Egyptian authorities do not recognize marriages between Muslim women and non-Muslims, even if they are performed abroad.

El-Sissi’s Sincerity

Under current President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi’s leadership, Coptic participation in the political system is still minimal. Until recent years, the government had not appointed a single Coptic Christian governor of the country’s 27 governorates. There are now two Coptic governors, one appointed by el-Sissi. There are only 33 Copts in Egypt’s 568-member parliament, several of them directly appointed by the president. El-Sissi chose a Copt to head the supreme constitutional court in a departure from historical practices. But the Copts remain grossly underrepresented in public life. There are no Coptic university presidents, military generals, or newspaper and magazine editors, and very few ambassadors and attorneys in senior judicial positions.

Last month, el-Sissi promised to build a church next to each mosque in government housing projects. He also oversaw passage of the celebrated 2016 Church Construction Law, which many hoped would make church building easier. However, it still applied restrictions to the building of churches, especially the requirement that their size correspond to the size of the Christian community in the area. Under the law, church building applications also require official approval for security reasons.

It’s unclear if el-Sissi’s concern for Coptic Christians is sincere. Critics accuse him of expressing support for the community to win the West’s support. Irrespective of how he feels about the Copts, their full integration in society is a stubborn issue in a country where religious identity determines an individual’s station in life. Coptic students complain that some classmates refuse to talk to them because they are Christian, and others say that all they want is to walk safely in public without being harassed. They lament that the rhetoric about national unity doesn’t correspond to reality.

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RANE: The significance of Egypt's scrapped plan to make rockets for Russia
« Reply #408 on: April 18, 2023, 02:53:51 PM »
The Significance of Egypt’s Scrapped Plan to Make Rockets for Russia
Apr 18, 2023 | 20:56 GMT


Egypt's push to preserve its close ties with Russia amid Moscow's growing international isolation will expose Cairo to U.S. and international retaliation that could further weaken the Egyptian economy. According to leaked U.S. intelligence documents obtained by the Washington Post, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi proposed a plan in February to supply Russia with up to 40,000 rockets, as well as gunpowder and artillery. The top-secret Pentagon documents — which are dated Feb. 17 and were reported by the Washington Post on April 10 — also showed that el-Sisi had instructed his subordinates to keep the scheme a secret ''to avoid problems with the West,'' and to tell factory workers that they were building rockets for the Egyptian army (and not Russian troops fighting in Ukraine). On April 17, the Washington Post then published another set of leaked documents that showed el-Sisi ultimately abandoned the plan in early March after holding talks with senior U.S. officials, and agreed to send artillery rounds to Ukraine instead. U.S. officials have since confirmed that the Egypt-Russia weapon transfer never took place. But the fact that el-Sisi proposed such a plan in the first place — and sought to keep it quiet, only to later scrap the project amid U.S. pressure — nonetheless highlights the tricky balancing act Egypt finds itself in, as it tries to reduce its reliance on the United States by diversifying its foreign partnerships, without exposing itself to sanctions that could jeopardize the billions of dollars of U.S. aid that the Egyptian economy still heavily depends on.

For decades, Egypt has sought to offset its deep reliance on the United States by also maintaining close ties with Russia and other U.S. adversaries. But the scrapped weapons transfer shows how this balance is becoming increasingly difficult. Egypt has historically been a geopolitical power in the Arab world, Middle East, Mediterranean and Africa. But the economic and security challenges it has faced in the 20th and 21st centuries have left Cairo partially dependent on stronger external powers for aid and security support. In recent decades, the United States has served as Egypt's primary patron, annually providing the North African country with approximately $1.3 billion worth of aid. But over the years, Cairo has also cultivated strong relationships with Russia and, more recently, China — the United States' top two strategic rivals. This balancing act has enabled Egypt to maintain its strategic autonomy by keeping it from becoming too reliant on any one foreign partner. It has also enabled Cairo to maximize the economic benefits it can enjoy through aid, investment and trade cooperation from a wide array of powerful partners. Compared with the United States, Russia grants Egypt access to investment and support with fewer human rights and governance conditions as well, and additionally serves as a key source of wheat and energy exports. But as evidenced by el-Sisi's scrapped plan to supply Russia weapons, Egypt's traditional balancing act between the United States and Russia has become particularly risky amid Moscow's growing international isolation following its invasion of Ukraine last year, and the West's consequent sanctions campaign against the Kremlin and its supporters.

Since Egypt became a sovereign state in 1952, Egypt has maintained close ties with both Eastern and Western powers — particularly Russia and the United States, at times very pointedly playing them off each other for Cairo's benefit. This was particularly evident during the Cold War, which saw the government of then-Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser leverage his close relationships with the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, and eventually the U.S. government.
Egypt is the third-largest recipient of U.S. aid in the world. Since 1978, the United States has provided Egypt with over $50 billion in military assistance and $30 billion in economic assistance.
Egypt imported 80% of its wheat from Russia and Ukraine prior to the war.
China is also one of Egypt's key economic partners. Cairo and Beijing have recently been deepening their security ties as well, with the two countries working closely on industrial military projects.
The fact that el-Sisi was considering sending weapons to Russia indicates he believed that even if such a plan was made public, the United States would not cut off aid to Egypt for fear of destabilizing the Middle East. In addition to solidifying its political ties with Russia, el-Sisi's proposed weapons transfer was likely aimed at bolstering his country's economy by bringing new business to Egypt's defense sector. Egypt's macroeconomic fundamentals have been shaky over the past year; the Egyptian pound has steadily deteriorated, despite two devaluations seeking to stem the currency's decline, which has eaten into Egyptians' savings and has eroded their purchasing power. In a bid to access more foreign currency that can help Cairo prop up the pound and reduce its dependence on external debt, El-Sisi was likely trying to boost military equipment exports by producing rockets for Russia. The Egyptian president's desire to keep the scheme a secret (including from even those making the rockets) shows he was aware of its potential to roil ties with Washington. But his desire to propose the plan regardless also indicates he didn't think the United States would go so far as to cut off aid to Egypt in retaliation. This calculation was likely based on the fact that the aid Cairo receives from Washington is, according to the U.S. State Department, related to maintaining the two countries' ''mutual interests in Middle East peace and stability,'' which creates a strong imperative among U.S. leaders to continue sending cash to Egypt, even if Egypt periodically engages in controversial action at home and abroad. Indeed, the United States has yet to cut off most aid flows to Egypt, despite growing calls from lawmakers in Congress to do so amid the el-Sisi government's growing ties with Russia and domestic human rights violations.

Egypt provides stability in the Middle East by maintaining the longest peace accord with Israel of any regional state, and by remaining neutral in most regional conflicts. Egypt also closely with the U.S. military in counterterrorism missions. In recent years, the United States has only withheld small tranches of economic aid to Egypt over human rights violations.
But Egypt's desire to maintain ties with Russia nonetheless exposes it to greater risks at an especially precarious time for the Egyptian economy. In Washington, El-Sisi's proposal to manufacture and send rockets to Russian troops fighting against U.S.-armed troops in Ukraine is being perceived as a betrayal of U.S. national security interests. This will risk intensifying existing U.S. congressional pressure to cut aid to Egypt, especially in the wake of Cairo's recent moves to purchase Russian weapons. Most of Egypt's military arsenal is from the U.S. and other Western sources, including France. But under el-Sisi, Egypt has sought out larger purchases of higher-tech Russian equipment — including Sukhoi Su-35 aircraft — despite warnings from U.S. officials that this could lead to sanctions or cutoffs of U.S. military aid. Even though the Su-35 deal has run aground (in part due to fears of triggering U.S. retaliation), Cairo's desire to diversify its military suppliers — and foreign relationships more broadly — remains. And that desire will continue to expose Egypt to potential sanctions from both the United States and its allies, as European countries could also view the revelations about el-Sisi's aborted plan to give rockets to Russia as enough justification to scrutinize the economic aid they also provide to Egypt

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GPF: Some really interesting background context
« Reply #409 on: November 09, 2023, 06:05:48 AM »

November 9, 2023
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Egypt’s Singular Role in Gaza
For Cairo, there are risks and opportunities involved in managing whatever comes next.
By: Kamran Bokhari

As the international community struggles to figure out what to do with Gaza after the war, Egypt is poised to play its biggest role there in more than 50 years. Whether it likes it or not, it is the focal point of efforts that involve the United States, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Turkey, a responsibility that will present as many opportunities as risks.

Egypt and Neighboring Countries
(click to enlarge)

On Nov. 8, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said the Gaza Strip cannot continue to be run by Hamas, but that neither could it be reoccupied by Israel beyond a transition period after the end of the military offensive. He also mentioned that U.S.-led international efforts are meant to ensure that there is no displacement of the Palestinian population and to reinstate the “unity of governance” between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.

This is a difficult road map to follow. The key challenge will be to minimize the length of Israel’s occupation and administration of Gaza. Already there is mounting international and domestic pressure on the Biden administration to broker a cease-fire. That so many Palestinians have been killed – more than 10,000 as of Nov. 7 – has shifted the narrative on the war from condemnation of Hamas to criticism of the Israeli counteroffensive. Implicit in this pressure is the debate over the broader occupation of the Palestinian Territories, the rise of Hamas and the immorality of terrorism.

Under these circumstances, it is in neither America’s nor Israel’s interest to see Gaza reoccupied. After all, Israel unilaterally withdrew from Gaza in 2005, when the territory was still under the control of the Palestinian Authority, and when Israel Defense Forces had largely stopped Hamas’ suicide bombing campaigns. However, Hamas’ legislative victory the following year created a situation in which Hamas would rule Gaza while its rival, Fatah, would govern the West Bank. Toppling the Hamas government in Gaza would upend this 16-year arrangement, which allowed Egypt to step back from the conflict – other than to manage the flow of goods and people in and out of the Gaza Strip.

Gaza Strip Evacuation Zone, November 2023
(click to enlarge)

Egypt’s position on Gaza is defined by two different periods. The first began with the war in 1948, when Egypt, Syria and Jordan sought to seize control of what used to be British-ruled Palestine, large parts of which had become the state of Israel that same year. The Arabs lost the war, of course, but Egypt gained control of the Gaza Strip. After the 1952 coup – which essentially established the military-dominated regime that rules Egypt to this day – Cairo continued to advance an agenda of defeating Israel and liberating Palestine (if not necessarily as an independent state).

This would lead Egypt, Syria and Jordan to fight and lose the 1967 war, in which Cairo lost control of Gaza as well as the Sinai Peninsula – a much larger and more strategic piece of land. Thus, the final war between Egypt and Israel in 1973 was no longer about Palestine so much as it was about retrieving the Sinai, which the Egyptians eventually reclaimed per the 1978 peace treaty with Israel. In other words, a new normal was established in which Cairo no longer considered Palestine a strategic issue. And when, a decade or so later in this second era, the Palestine Liberation Organization decided to give up armed struggle to pursue its cause diplomatically, the Palestinian issue became, from Cairo’s point of view, an Israeli concern.

The Middle East Before and After the Six-Day War
(click to enlarge)

Even so, the rise of Hamas was a major problem for Cairo because Hamas is an armed offshoot of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt’s largest opposition movement. Yet Egypt took comfort in the fact that between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, Hamas would be contained. It wasn’t, and the group’s takeover of Gaza forced Cairo to take a more active role in managing the territory. The new Egyptian strategy was two-fold: coordinate with Israel on a blockade of Gaza and establish a working relationship with Hamas so that Cairo can serve as a mediator with Israel – which it did during the wars in 2008, 2012, 2014 and 2021.

This arrangement was tested in the wake of the Arab Spring uprising, when the Muslim Brotherhood briefly came to power in 2012. Though the group took a pragmatic approach to Gaza, the Egyptian establishment wasn’t taking any chances; it was too concerned about the prospect of a Muslim Brotherhood government in Cairo, Islamist militancy in the Sinai and a Hamas-led regime in Gaza. To the establishment, this was a threat not just to Egypt’s stability but to the peace treaty with Israel. Thus came the coup in 2013 that removed the Muslim Brotherhood from power and installed military chief Abdel Fattah el-Sissi as the country’s president.

While suppressing the Muslim Brotherhood at home, the new government continued its limited, pragmatic engagement with Hamas as a way to insulate itself from the brand of Islamism gaining ground next door. Meanwhile, el-Sissi had other major issues to deal with, including a floundering economy kept afloat by billions of dollars of assistance from the Gulf Arab states.

Regime stability was a stated priority of el-Sissi’s when he confirmed he would seek a third term – an announcement he made just four days before the Oct. 7 attacks radically altered Egypt’s strategic environment. Cairo will now have to do much of the heavy lifting. It’s unclear how the government will deal with the messy process of regime change in Gaza while maintaining regime stability at home, especially since the Egyptian public is highly sensitive to the suffering of the Palestinians in Gaza. It is so sensitive, in fact, that the government made the unusual move of allowing pro-Palestinian demonstrations to take place in Cairo on Oct. 20, during which protesters criticized Egypt’s handling of the economy.

However, Hamas’ dismantlement by Israel isn’t without opportunities for Cairo. Egypt is eager to weaken the Islamist movement, as are its benefactors in the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, which oppose Islamism on its merits but also want to deny Iran the ability to exploit the Gaza issue. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are therefore likely willing to invest in the efforts to re-establish a post-Hamas order in Gaza. No other country than Egypt would benefit as much from the arrangement. (This is especially important as Saudi Arabia recently said it would stop giving out money to countries such as Egypt with no strings attached.)

But it’s still a tall order. Once the dust settles, Hamas will be weakened but probably not eliminated. The Palestinian Authority in the West Bank will have to restore its writ over Gaza, but the group is famously corrupt and approaching a chaotic transition. Israel can bring down the Hamas regime in Gaza, but Egypt will have to take the lead in establishing a new order there, and fast in order to avoid the pandemonium of an Israeli reoccupation becoming longer than intended.

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Egypt: Suez Revenues down bigly
« Reply #410 on: February 05, 2024, 09:49:47 AM »
As a result, Egyptians are PO'd at the Houtis.

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GPF: Egypt's indecisiveness
« Reply #411 on: February 06, 2024, 09:00:57 AM »



February 6, 2024
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Israel-Hamas War Underscores Egypt’s Indecisiveness
Cairo is walking a tightrope, unwilling to either categorically condemn or support Hamas’ attack.
By: Hilal Khashan
Like many other states, Egypt was caught off guard by the Israel-Hamas war. The magnitude of Hamas’ attack on Oct. 7 left Egypt little room to mediate a cease-fire between Israel and the militant group, as it had done many times in the past. Cairo’s response underscores its pattern of indecisive decision-making. Rather than demand that the fighting stop, Egyptian officials merely urged against the expansion of the war into other parts of the Middle East. Egypt was essentially walking a tightrope, unwilling to either categorically condemn or support Hamas’ attack. President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi isn’t concerned about the fate of Hamas, which is a close ally of his arch enemy, the Muslim Brotherhood. Rather, he’s worried about the far-reaching implications of creating a new regional reality – especially at a time when the Israel-Palestine conflict appeared to be easing and when more Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, appeared to be accelerating peace talks with Israel.

Attitudes Toward Gazans

Egyptians have developed a perception of Palestinians as troublemakers who require continuous scrutiny by the country’s intelligence services. This attitude is the result of a number of high-profile incidents involving Palestinian groups. In 1978, members of the ultraradical Palestinian Abu Nidal Organization assassinated Egypt’s minister of culture. In 1985, members of the same organization hijacked an Egyptian airliner on its way to Malta. In an effort to rescue the passengers, an Egyptian commando force launched an operation that killed 56 hostages in the crossfire. In 2012, unknown attackers killed 16 Egyptian soldiers near the Kerem Shalom crossing in North Sinai Governorate. Many Egyptians accused Hamas of perpetrating the attack, which it vehemently denied.

Palestinians attempting to flee Gaza into Egypt have also faced discrimination and mistreatment. Palestinian travelers trying to enter Egypt through the Rafah crossing have long endured harsh humanitarian conditions, including shortages of drinking water and food, not to mention astronomical prices for basic necessities and a lack of public bathrooms. Those stranded at the border, including children, older people and those seeking medical treatment, must wait days to cross. Travelers have described their journeys as agonizing and humiliating.

When the crossing is open, Egyptian immigration officers approve just a small number of applications to leave Gaza. To have their applications accepted, travelers must pay $3,000 to agencies that work with a mafia of Egyptian officers and intelligence personnel. In times of crisis, bribes of up to $10,000 per person – more than 90 percent of which goes to Egyptians – are commonplace. Many people have fallen victim to scams that promise them passage if they pay bribes, only to find that their names have been left off the lists of approved applications.

These mafias have no mercy for the injured seeking treatment outside Gaza, as even they must pay $5,000 to enter Egypt. One Palestinian woman who accompanied her injured relative to a hospital in Cairo said hospital personnel prohibited wounded Palestinians from buying SIM cards or accessing the internet. They and their accompanying relatives also could not enter the cafeteria in the hospital and had to buy food from security personnel, who charged them exorbitant prices. After being attacked by el-Sissi’s supporters, she deleted her tweet and explained that she did not deny that Egypt was helping Palestinians.

Egyptian border guards charge Hamas $5,000 for each truck entering Gaza. Hamas covers the cost of food coming from Egypt, most of which is expired or nearly expired. Many Gazans report that they must pay Hamas for the food it provides them, whether donated by other countries or purchased from Egypt. Prices for all food products have skyrocketed. The price of salt, for example, soared from 10 cents per pound to $5.

Jordan’s King Abdullah has urged el-Sissi to open the Rafah crossing to bring in humanitarian aid. El-Sissi does not seem to want to antagonize the Biden administration, though Abdullah believes Washington would give the green light for the move, especially after the International Court of Justice ordered Israel to take steps to ensure the provision of humanitarian aid to Gazans.

Reluctance to Help

Egypt’s reluctance to open the border is part of its pattern of unassertive actions. After withdrawing from the Gaza Strip in 2005, Israel signed a deal with Egypt that would govern management of the Philadelphi Corridor, a narrow buffer zone along the Gaza-Egyptian border. Under the agreement, Israel handed over responsibility for border control on Gaza’s side of the corridor to the Palestinian Authority. The security situation in Gaza changed when Hamas expelled the Palestine Liberation Organization from the strip, and Israel and Egypt imposed a crippling blockade. Due to the movement of large numbers of Gazans to north Sinai in search of food and basic supplies, Egypt took control of the Palestinian side of the corridor. The last thing Egypt wanted was a heavily armed extremist group with close ties to the Muslim Brotherhood on its doorstep. Cairo even sent troops to the United States for training on locating and destroying tunnels used for smuggling weapons and other goods to Gaza. After President Hosni Mubarak was ousted in 2011, Egypt eased its restrictions. But following the 2013 coup against President Mohamed Morsi, Cairo again imposed severe restrictions on the movement of Gaza residents to Sinai. Egyptian workers bulldozed homes on the Egyptian side of Rafah City to create a buffer zone with Gaza. They also flooded the tunnels through which consumer items, weapons and militants were smuggled.

Israeli leaders now say they want to reimpose control over the corridor, angering Egypt, which argues that their bilateral agreement requires parties to obtain permission from the other party before carrying out any military action. Egypt also says Israel’s seizure of the Philadelphi Corridor would constitute a threat to its sovereignty and violate the 1978 Camp David Accords. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu downplayed the deterioration of relations with Egypt, stressing the depth of ties with el-Sissi and hinting that the leaks about his dissatisfaction with Israeli behavior are only for local consumption.

Indeed, Egypt cooperated with Israel in all of its previous wars against Hamas. For example, during the 2014 war in Gaza, several Israeli observers expressed astonishment at Egypt’s subtle approval of the conflict, which lasted 51 days. At the time, a political commentator for Israel’s Channel 13 broadcaster went so far as to say that anyone who would hear el-Sissi’s position would believe that he is a member of a Zionist movement and suggested that his stance stemmed from Hamas' being a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Egyptian officials say Israel’s attempt to control the Philadelphi Corridor will jeopardize bilateral relations, while the Israelis believe their close ties, fostered over decades since Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem in 1977, will survive the temporary occupation of the corridor. The most Egypt can do if Israel takes control of the corridor is freeze bilateral security coordination without severing diplomatic relations. Since the significant Israeli operations north of Gaza Sector and the city of Khan Younis are nearing an end, the Israeli military will soon turn to Rafah. Given that more than half the population of Gaza has taken refuge near the Egyptian border, an Israeli assault on the third and final part of the strip will force Palestinians into northern Sinai.

Lack of Interest

Egyptian attitudes toward Palestinians aren’t unique in the Arab world. Arabs often accuse the Palestinians of selling their land to the Jews and fighting among themselves while asking Arab countries for help. They frequently tell the Palestinians to try to solve their problems on their own before asking for assistance. Arab leaders and citizens, especially in Egypt, say they have given generously to the Palestinians and sacrificed thousands of their youth for the Palestinian cause. To rationalize their own failure to confront Israel, they blame the Palestinians, describing them as ungrateful traitors. They view the presence of Palestinians in any country as a bad omen for its people. Egyptians have detached themselves from the question of Palestine, viewing it as a matter for the Palestinian people to resolve. They argue that Egypt, caught in a maze of poverty, must focus on its economic development and extricate itself from foreign issues.

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GPF: Egypt- hunger revolt unlikely
« Reply #412 on: March 27, 2024, 11:41:32 AM »

March 27, 2024
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In Egypt, a Hunger Revolt Is Unlikely
No matter how bad the economy gets, the president is careful to maintain power.
By: Hilal Khashan

Egypt has been suffering an economic crisis for years, but now things are so bad that, according to observers, it threatens to result in a revolution of the hungry. Given that more than a quarter of Egypt's population lives in extreme poverty, this prediction may not seem so far-fetched.

Indeed, many analysts argue Egypt has a history of hunger revolts. The first documented hunger revolution in history was an Egyptian Pharaonic revolution against King Pepi II Neferkare in the third millennium B.C. It ended his rule but ushered in 180 years of chaos. Famines continued during the reign of Ptolemy III Euergetes, Ptolemy IV Philopator and the Romans, who burdened the Egyptians with heavy taxes. The first food revolts in the Islamic era occurred in the early years of the Umayyad dynasty, when hungry people attacked the governor's palace and forced him to flee to Syria. Famines continued during the days of the Abbasid Empire through the Mamluk period.

Current President Abdul Fattah el-Sisi's inability to manage his country’s resources has alienated him from much of the population. Yet the Egyptian people are unlikely to rise against him because, for all his policy mistakes, he does at least try to prevent them from starving. And his insistence on borrowing money to provide low-quality staple food items at heavily subsidized prices will only hurt the economy further.

Public Discontent

Which is not to say Egyptians are happy about the state of things. Egypt has periodically witnessed demonstrations denouncing the steady rise in food prices and rejecting el-Sisi's regime. A few days ago, hundreds of Egyptians demonstrated in Alexandria, dozens of whom were arrested by security forces, to protest the escalating prices, raising the slogan “Sisi, the enemy of God, we are hungry.” During the 2011 uprising, Egyptians chanted “bread, freedom, social justice,” making bread the top of their most important demands. (Bread has been a driver of Egyptian protests throughout history.)

Last year, the government imported frozen Brazilian chicken, which state-run media presented as a solution to the local chicken shortage and which officials considered a corrective to a government recommendation to eat chicken feet. Food scarcity led to a surge in theft, including a robbery at a post office and the looting of grocery stores. In some instances, people stole livestock and slaughtered them for free distribution to people experiencing food insecurity. Social media activists shared on YouTube scenes of people searching for food in garbage bags dumped on roadsides. One commenter said people were eating garbage because "a rabid dog” – a reference to el-Sisi – “stole their food and made them hungry."

Failed Economic Policies

The Egyptian government failed to rein in prices, carry out structural economic reforms and reduce the military's intrusion in the economy. Instead, el-Sisi resorted to loans from the International Monetary Fund and his allies in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to provide food for the Egyptians. El-Sisi opted for selling many of the Egyptian state's assets to Gulf countries in exchange for billions of dollars to postpone the total collapse of the economy.

But the collapse may be inevitable. Since el-Sisi took power in 2014, the Egyptian economy has faced many challenges, including a devaluation of the pound, foreign currency shortages, high inflation, increased debt, declining foreign investment and tourism, poor infrastructure and an aversion to structural reforms. Observers attribute el-Sisi's economic predicament to his failure to adequately address fundamental problems. El-Sisi also insisted on implementing giant projects financed with substantial foreign loans, such as the new administrative capital and a high-speed train, that did not generate a direct economic return. Spending is also a problem. He spent approximately $9 billion on an unnecessary expansion of the Suez Canal that failed to generate reliable revenue, and bought $45 billion worth of weapons that do not serve Egypt’s needs. The currency exchange rate for the dollar topped 60 Egyptian pounds a few weeks ago. Remittances from Egyptians abroad also decreased to $23 billion last year, compared with about $32 billion the previous year. Meanwhile, the military establishment continues to control the economy, leading to investment flight. The absence of parliamentary influence and oversight institutions further aggravates the financial burden.

The tens of billions of dollars of foreign aid throughout el-Sisi's rule have not helped. Saudi Arabia and the UAE provided more than $12 billion immediately after el-Sisi overthrew President Mohammed Morsi in 2013. (El-Sisi holds the January 2011 uprising responsible for Egypt’s economic plight, saying it cost the country $450 billion between 2011 and 2020.) The government is hard-pressed to provide essential services to its citizens, estimated at more than $35 billion annually, knowing that Egypt imports 85 percent of its food. The government is borrowing to survive, and the only way to fulfill its obligations to debtors is to borrow more. El-Sisi said a few days ago that he was aware of the extent of the suffering and economic pressures. Yet he held the people responsible for maintaining Egypt's security and stability and claimed that the war in Gaza was partly responsible for the current economic situation.

But el-Sisi does not have a development plan; he has tactics to buy time and remain in power. These include the Ras el-Hekma project on the northern coast near the Libyan border, part of a mysterious investment deal Egypt signed with the UAE in February, according to which Abu Dhabi will pay Cairo $35 billion within two months. The Egyptian government celebrated the agreement to develop tourism in the area as a victory. About $24 billion of the deal will serve Egypt's foreign debt. Public debt, meanwhile, remains a problem, as the value of interest payments is equivalent to 50 percent of government revenues, and the debt-to-GDP ratio is close to 100 percent. The debt service bill will likely rise to more than 62 percent of state revenues.

Moody's credit rating agency changed Egypt's outlook from stable to negative, indicating the increased risks of the country's continued weakness amid the difficulty of rebalancing the overall economy and the exchange rate. Despite the positive local and international outlook toward the substantial cash flows coming to Egypt, Cairo needs to be more convincing to amend its credit rating. If the exchange rate is not allowed to move flexibly and inflation remains high, the gains of the past few weeks could quickly erode, as happened after the 2016 currency devaluation.

This is to say nothing of Egypt's demographic problems. The population currently stands at 105 million people, compared to 19 million in 1952. Other factors that are no less important should be considered, such as the monopoly of power, arbitrary financial decisions, chaos, corruption and the dominance of individual interests at the expense of society.

In September 2023, el-Sisi told Egyptians they had to accept famine to achieve his development vision. But it is unlikely that he will allow Egyptians to go hungry because it would undermine his regime. El-Sisi constantly tells Egyptians that they must continue to sacrifice their rights and be patient and that criticism and opposition can destroy the country.

Egypt's Foreign Modernizers

Egyptians need to gain experience in self-rule. Gamal Abdel Nasser was the first native head of state to rule Egypt since the pharaohs. He and his four successors did not achieve their economic development goals, let alone their political ones. When Macedonian-born Muhammad Ali Pasha became the sole ruler of Egypt in 1805, he realized that the realities of European politics and their colonial pursuits impacted Egypt. He understood that the Ottoman sultan's power alone was insufficient to defend Egypt or shield it from European ambitions. He reasoned that it must build national instruments of power, so he endeavored to build a strong state inspired by Europe's experience. His modernization covered all aspects of life, making Egypt a primary driver of political events in North Africa and West Asia. Ali built a strong army, developed industry and agriculture, improved irrigation systems, opened schools and hospitals, and established a modern administration and a French-style judicial system.

Ismail Pasha, who ruled Egypt between 1863 and 1879, represented the true continuation of Ali’s developmental work, which shaped modern Egypt. Given the wide-ranging reforms and economic development that took place during his reign, it was clear that Ismail wanted to fashion Egypt into a European-style country. But he went too far into debt, opening the door for British intervention and occupation in 1882.

Since the early 19th century, primarily Italian, Greek, Armenian and Syrian-Lebanese expatriates heavily contributed to Egypt's economic and cultural development. Expatriates from other nations, mainly Russia and Germany, arrived in Egypt in the 20th century. When Nasser came to power, he purged them from public life, forcing most of them to leave the country. In doing so, he committed a severe disservice to Egyptian modernization.

Now there is el-Sisi, who has destroyed the foundations for a strong economy based on accountability and an enabling environment that could attract huge investments instead of obtaining unsustainable loans. He cannot change his course because he is unable to reform.