April 4, 2025
For the US, Deep-Sea Mining Is a Matter of Urgency
Washington is devising a strategy that will impinge on several geopolitical dynamics.
By: Allison Fedirka
Outside the clamor of tariffs, the negotiations over Ukraine and various institutional reforms, the U.S. government has been devising new ways to strengthen its security and autonomy of critical minerals supplies – a process to which deep-sea mining is a necessary adjunct. It’s a long-term project, the success of which will be determined by the foundational steps being laid today. And how Washington pursues deep-sea mining in international waters may well influence other geopolitical dynamics, including U.S.-China competition, relations in North America, the relevance of Pacific Islands, and technological and commercial cooperation.
U.S. interest in securing critical mineral supply chains has gained momentum in recent years. In 2022, Washington published an updated list of 50 minerals it considered essential to its economic and national security. Criteria for the list included supply chain vulnerabilities, scarcity of national deposits and the role played by certain minerals in manufacturing strategic products. In 2023, Frontiers in Marine Science published a study that identified four regions within U.S. territorial waters that were conducive for deep-sea mining. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 included instructions for the Department of Defense to conduct a feasibility study on the harvesting of deep-sea minerals – especially polymetallic nodules – and their potential for defense applications. (This study was due in March 2025 but has yet to be completed.) Under the Trump administration, a new executive order called for more funding and less regulation to support domestic mining and processing of critical minerals and rare earths. It also floated the idea of building refining plants on existing defense bases. More recently, the government said it would issue another executive order calling for the mapping of seabed resources, regulatory support for seabed exploitation, domestic processing and strategic stockpiling. These measures are meant to do in the ocean what similar ones were meant to do on land: reduce dependence on China, diversify sources, increase global demand and secure supply chains.
Though many countries feel a similar sense of urgency to exploit the seafloor for its minerals, most will be unable to do so. For one thing, it is prohibitively expensive. The costs associated with drilling and extraction will make it difficult for companies to get financial support and offtake agreements in place – two components necessary for the mining process. Environmental concerns, meanwhile, will cast uncertainty over what kind of regulation drillers expect to encounter. Last, the technology for deep-sea drilling is still in a state of relative infancy. Thus, there are only a handful of companies in the world that can vacuum nodules from the ocean floor, drill into the crust and bring extracted materials to the surface.
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The biggest question, however, centers around the legality of mining in international waters. Parameters for domestic deep-sea mining are clear in that, for the most part, the extension of national borders into the sea has been firmly established in most places. This facilitates the mining of ferromanganese crusts or cobalt-rich crusts that contain cobalt, manganese, nickel, platinum and some metallic rare earth elements. These deposits occur at shallower depths and thus fall within countries’ exclusive economic zones. However, polymetallic nodules, which are considered the most valuable deposits, are found on the ocean floor at depths ranging from 3,000 meters to 6,000 meters (or 10,000 feet to 20,000 feet). These depths put the deposits in international waters, which is where legal claims get much murkier.
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In 1982, the U.N. established its first comprehensive, international legal framework regarding seabed mining. This law was updated in 1994 to include the creation of the International Seabed Authority – charged with regulating mineral-related activities in international waters by adherents to the U.N. agreement – and stricter seabed mining provisions to address various concerns. Though the ISA has issued 31 exploratory licenses, it has not issued any exploitation licenses because it has yet to establish the regulatory features for exploitation, despite working on them for over a decade. The U.S. never ratified these agreements. Instead, it operates off domestic law. In 1980, the U.S. passed the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act to regulate how U.S. citizens and companies engage in seabed mining activities in areas outside national jurisdiction. But the legislation was initially meant as a stopgap for future international regulations, and since Washington never ratified the U.N. agreement, it remains in place today. Thus, in 1984, the U.S. issued four exploration licenses for the Clarion-Clipperton Zone, a highly coveted area awash in polymetallic nodules. Only two of these licenses remain active. Both are owned by Lockheed Martin and are set to expire in 2027. Even so, the U.S. has sent representatives to observe ISA meetings and has generally respected ISA moves. The urgency to secure minerals as a matter of economic and national security, however, has changed its calculus.
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The U.S. has three general options for pursuing deep-sea mining, two of which would drastically reshape the geopolitics of the practice. The first option would be for the U.S. to approve the U.N. agreement and adhere to the ISA. It will almost certainly not do that.
The second option would be for the U.S. to ignore international law and proceed under its existing domestic legislation. This very scenario has been raised by The Metals Company, a Canadian firm that recently consulted with U.S. regulators over the application process to obtain exploration and exploitation licenses in international waters via the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act. If the company and Washington move forward with this option, it would add a new strategic element to bilateral cooperation in the field of critical minerals. But if the company (any company, really) receives a license, and if that license overlaps with an ISA license, then that company has little international recourse. (The location of the Clarion-Clipperton Zone – between Hawaii and Mexico – also opens the possibility to consider a more active role by Mexico in some capacity. That scenario, however, would introduce more complications into an already complicated process.)
The ability to act independently of the ISA ultimately comes down to the enforcement capabilities of the U.S. and the ISA. Currently, the ISA does not have any enforcement mechanisms in place; no entity is charged with evaluating the security of projects or enforcing rules on parties (think boycotting materials sourced by independent parties) that do not adhere to ISA practices. Companies, those licensed by the U.S. or otherwise, have the option to contract private maritime security firms for operational security. These companies have a reputation of being flexible and cost-effective, making them more suitable than a national armed force for commercial deployment in international waters. They come equipped with long-range surveillance optics, radar systems and, in some cases, mounted light arms. Additionally, the companies use commercial VTOL drones and fixed-wing unmanned aerial vehicles equipped with electro-optical/infrared cameras to monitor maritime approaches and track surface traffic in real time. They are particularly well-suited for low- to medium-risk zones and for commercial operators who require tailored and scalable solutions. However, national naval forces could come into play if security threats are too much for the private companies to meet. And in this regard, the U.S. Navy has strong capabilities. Notably, the Department of Defense has launched initiatives like the MARSEC Consortium meant to encourage collaboration between government, industry and private security entities as they address maritime challenges in strategic regions. The U.S. also supports the integration of defense-grade technology into commercial operations.
The third course of action would be for the U.S. to engage strategic allies to access mineral deposits through the ISA without formally adhering to the agreement. This is the most likely scenario since it allows the U.S. to obtain the desired minerals without instigating confrontations with others. To receive an ISA license (for exploration or exploitation), the applying company must be sponsored by a country that ratified the U.N. agreement. Typically, a company uses its home country for sponsorship. However, companies can also use a subsidiary located in a nation that is a party to the U.N. agreement. For example, The Metals Company used its subsidiary, Nauru Ocean Resources Inc., to get the Republic of Nauru to sponsor its ISA license application. The U.K. branch of Lockheed Martin created U.K. Seabed Resources to get British government sponsorship and ultimately acquire two ISA exploration contracts.
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In this scenario, the value of Pacific Island countries – Kiribati, Nauru, the Cook Islands and Tonga, among others – could skyrocket. Most would likely welcome the investment and development opportunities that would come with their sponsorship. And many have valuable seabed mineral deposits within their own economic zones, giving companies the opportunity to test out technology, equipment and, presumably, progress at a faster pace by working exclusively and directly with the national government rather than having to work through a slower international organization weighed down by bureaucracy. Moreover, these subsidiaries could conduct mining operations with the backing of U.S. security. International law allows for the U.S. Navy to protect U.S. nationals, companies and strategic interests under the justification of defending freedom of navigation or maritime security. This means protection of U.S.-flagged vessels or U.S.-owned assets is permissible even if the resource extraction zone is not within U.S. sovereign territory. And this is to say nothing of the fact that ties with these nations align with Washington’s objective of countering Chinese influence in the region.
Last, deep-sea mining will help shape U.S. commercial and technological alliances regardless of how Washington decides to approach it. The technology needed for deep-sea mining – including various forms of artificial intelligence – is still developing. Because advancements are still needed to create more cost-effective operations, there is room for potential cooperation among industry leaders and financiers. And besides, the U.S. was never going to take absolute control of every aspect of the supply chain – extraction, processing, refining, metallurgy and manufacturing. Depending on cost and distance, the U.S. may consider strategic partners to help support different parts of the process
