Author Topic: Stratfor: Geopolitics of The Pacific Ocean  (Read 1358 times)

Crafty_Dog

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Stratfor: Geopolitics of The Pacific Ocean
« on: June 02, 2022, 08:36:48 AM »
The Pacific Islands Emerge as the Next Theater for Great Power Competition
7 MIN READJun 1, 2022 | 19:21 GMT





Visiting Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi (left) and Fiji's prime minister Frank Bainimarama attend a joint press conference in Fiji's capital of Suva on May 30, 2022.
Visiting Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi (left) and Fiji's prime minister Frank Bainimarama attend a joint press conference in Fiji's capital of Suva on May 30, 2022.

(LEON LORD/AFP via Getty Images)

China's troubled agreement with Pacific Island nations highlights the growing competition with the United States and Australia for regional influence, which will grant bargaining power to the often-overlooked island countries. On May 30, China failed to reach an agreement with Fiji and nine other Pacific Island nations on a joint communique that laid out a five-year plan for trade and security cooperation with the region.

Despite Foreign Minister Wang Yi's assurances of the deal's mutually beneficial nature, the prime minister of Fiji — where the deal was supposed to be announced — claimed that the region could not yet agree to a deal as it prized consensus. Other leaders pushed to delay or amend the deal, though few details are available on their specific concerns. This comes after the president of Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) urged his fellow Pacific Island nations on May 25 not to subject the region to great power competition by signing the deal. China's failed pitch also follows U.S. President Joe Biden's May 20-24 visit to South Korea and Japan, where he launched the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework with 13 founding member countries (though Fiji became the 14th on May 28). Biden attended a meeting of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue on May 24 as well, which saw the United States, Australia, India and Japan launch a regional initiative to combat illegal fishing — a practice for which China is the primary culprit.

The Pacific Islands is a critical strategic space for all three powers. China is interested in projecting power beyond the Second Island Chain and thus buffering U.S. efforts to project military power and surveillance capabilities from the Pacific Islands into China's near seas and provide strategic depth for U.S. troops in Guam and Hawaii. Australia, for its part, sees the Pacific Islands as its strategic ''backyard'' and thus is highly motivated to maximize its own military access to the region while minimizing the ability of rival countries like China to project naval and economic power in the region.

The United States and China have high political stakes in 2022. President Biden is heading into the November midterm elections at a time of bipartisan hawkishness on China, while Chinese President Xi Jinping is aiming to secure an unprecedented third term in late 2022. Both leaders are also navigating the domestic economic hangover from the COVID-19 pandemic.

Australia is also deeply invested in the region, with newly elected Prime Minister Anthony Albanese attempting to quell domestic concerns that he may ease up on his predecessor Scott Morrison's efforts to protect the Pacific Islands — or what Morrison referred to as Australia's strategic ''backyard'' — from Chinese threats.

All three regional heavyweights have deep interests in the Pacific Islands, a region that has historically been a quieter theater for U.S.-China and Australia-China competition but is now receiving greater political attention amid recent developments in the Solomon Islands. In late March, China signed a security agreement with the Solomon Islands that permitted Chinese naval vessels to replenish in the country and Chinese police to deploy there at the request of Honiara, the country's capital. This follows the November 2021 protests in the Solomon Islands, which targeted the Chinatown on the island of Malaita and saw Australia deploy police to restore order at the request of the Solomon Islands. Amid these developments, along with rising tensions between China and both Australia and the United States, all three governments are more intentionally engaging with the region to avoid losing influence in the strategic middle ground of the Pacific.

Besides the Solomon Islands agreement, Beijing has signed wide-ranging deals with the 10 Pacific Island countries that have diplomatic relations with China, including memoranda of understanding related to China's Belt and Road Initiative focused on trade, investment and infrastructure development. These countries also hope to access China's massive tourism market, jointly develop maritime mineral and fuel resources, and counterbalance relations with Australia and the United States.

U.S. interaction with the region has been focused on nations in Micronesia — namely, the Freely Associated States (FAS) of Palau, the Marshall Islands and the FSM, which provide Washington exclusive naval access to the region in return for aid and the right of local citizens to live and work in the United States. However, Washington's attention to the region has lapsed in recent years. President Biden only appointed a new lead negotiator in March 2022 to renew the Compacts of Free Association with the Marshall Islands and FSM (set to expire in 2023), over a year after the last meeting in December 2020.

Australia's relations with the Pacific Islands are region-wide and heavily focused on investment. But Canberra's closest ties are concentrated in Melanesia in the form of agreements with Fiji, Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea that give the island nations access to Australia for foreign workers in exchange for providing the Australian navy regional maritime access. In September, Australia also signed onto AUKUS, a weapons access deal with the United States and the United Kingdom that secures Canberra long-term access to nuclear submarines. This technology will allow Australia to boost maritime deterrence and surveillance in the broader Indo-Pacific, but especially in the Pacific Islands.

These developments will test the United States, Australia and China's regional engagement strategies and give Pacific Island nations unique leverage to maximize foreign assistance from these major global powers. Though most Pacific Island nations have minuscule populations and economies, this new attention from Beijing, Canberra and Washington will enable the Pacific Islands to rebalance external involvement toward domestic development and regionally salient issues like climate change. It will also require them to deftly balance strategic issues like foreign military access without ceding territorial or resource sovereignty, a consideration evidenced in the delayed Chinese joint communique. Though the Pacific Islands may face some risk of retaliation (i.e. Chinese trade coercion) if they push back too strongly on such deals, the deep-seated fear in China of losing regional influence to the United States or Australia — and vice versa — puts these small nations in a strong bargaining position.

Amid an election year in which hawkishness against China is a widely accepted measuring stick for governing effectiveness, Washington will be under pressure to up its trade and investment game in the Pacific Island region and bolster ties with nations outside the FAS to counter China's influence. The United States may also seek to expand the IPEF to more Pacific Island nations. To avoid losing influence in Micronesia, the United States will push to make meaningful progress on FAS negotiations as well — lest it risks ceding its strong military footing in the region to China, which has long looked for ways to boost its influence in the traditionally pro-U.S. states of Palau, the Marshall Islands and the FSM.

The recent setback with the regional development deal will test China's ability to tailor its engagement to the needs of Pacific Island nations, which are currently more concerned with climate change and local economic issues than they are with the region's security. Addressing such local needs, however, is not usually Beijing's strong suit in matters of development assistance. Should China be able to salvage the deal, this would serve as a much-needed diplomatic win as Beijing fends off global opprobrium for its tacit support of Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

In Australia, heightened competition for influence in the Pacific Islands will test new Prime Minister Albanese's ability to maintain (and perhaps improve) trade ties with China, while also rebuffing Beijing's regional military advances — partly through continued elevated security engagement with the United States. Likewise, in New Zealand, the administration of Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern will be under pressure to boost both its trade and security engagement in the Pacific Islands region. This will challenge Ardern's preferred approach toward China of prioritizing trade relations and reserving ''competition'' mainly for issues of human rights and less for the military realm.

Crafty_Dog

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Foreign Affairs: A New Fault Line in the Pacific
« Reply #1 on: June 04, 2022, 05:05:30 AM »
Have not read this yet, but the subject is on point to this thread:

A Fault Line in the Pacific
The Danger of China’s Growing Sway Over Island Nations
By Charles Edel
June 3, 2022


https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-06-03/fault-line-pacific



The last time most Americans paid attention to the Solomon Islands was in the middle of World War II, when the United States and Japan waged a prolonged naval battle in the waters and skies surrounding Guadalcanal. That grinding fight had outsized strategic effects—halting the Japanese advance into the South Pacific, ensuring that allied nations such as Australia and New Zealand were neither surrounded nor cut off from supply by hostile forces, reversing the war’s momentum in the Pacific, and providing a base to launch a counteroffensive against a totalitarian enemy. Pointing to the hundreds of small islands spread across the Pacific, U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt explained to the American public that while they might “appear only as small dots on most maps . . . they cover a large strategic area.”

That large strategic area, key to fighting and winning World War II, suffered from considerable neglect over the last several decades as U.S. strategy and policy focused elsewhere. That now must change. In April, the government of the Solomon Islands announced that it had signed a tentative security pact with China, and in late May, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi traveled to the region in an effort to secure more agreements from Pacific Island countries. The Solomon Islands security pact contained vague and expansive language that appears to open the door for China to play a role in quelling internal unrest in the Solomon Islands by allowing Beijing to deploy Chinese police and military forces at the Solomon Islands’ request to “maintain social order.” The pact, and potential future deals with other Pacific Island states, could undermine regional security by extending the reach of the Chinese military, giving it access to a critical maritime chokepoint, and thrusting the Pacific Islands into the middle of a globe-spanning geopolitical competition.

China’s deal with the Solomon Islands and its efforts to obtain similar agreements with other Pacific nations have set off alarm bells both inside and outside the region. China certainly has the ability to provide much needed investment in infrastructure in the region, but local populations are wary due to their well-founded view that Chinese investments are as much about advancing Beijing’s interests and corrupting local politics as they are about meeting local needs. Nowhere is this truer than in the Solomon Islands, where more than 90 percent of people said that they preferred their country aligning with liberal democracies instead of China, and nearly 80 percent said they did not want their country receiving financial aid from China.


And yet, in Manasseh Sogavare, the prime minister of the Solomon Islands, Beijing found a willing partner. Sogavare’s decision to sign this deal not only put him at cross-purposes with many of his own citizens, but also the broader Pacific Island community, which is not favorably disposed to an authoritarian power setting up military bases in their midst. New Zealand’s foreign minister condemned the agreement as both “unwelcome and unnecessary,” while Micronesia’s president wrote to Sogavare that he feared such a deal would make the Pacific Islands “the epicenter of a future confrontation.” The reaction has been most anguished in Australia, with some likening the deal to the Cuban missile crisis and others claiming it as the worst failure in Australian foreign policy since World War II.

The announcement of the security agreement between Honiara and Beijing, and China’s diplomatic push, should serve as a wake-up call to the United States and its allies. Their engagement with the countries of the region has fallen short. Washington must expand its diplomatic presence in the Pacific Islands, support multilateralism in the region, back development initiatives, and take seriously the existential concerns many of these countries harbor about climate change. An urgent change in approach is needed to prevent Beijing from further undermining democracy and expanding its military footprint across the Pacific.

BEIJING’S PACIFIC STRATEGY

The security deal between China and the Solomon Islands did not materialize out of thin air. China has ramped up its presence and extended its influence across the Pacific over the past decade by courting the region’s elite, building bonds with regional institutions, and increasing both its aid and its investments across the region. As it has done so, Beijing has been on the hunt for strategically located real estate that would allow it to project power outward and further influence the politics of the broader Indo-Pacific region. Reports have emerged of Chinese-owned companies seeking to develop deep-water ports and airfields in Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, and other locations across the Pacific.


Washington must expand its diplomatic presence in the Pacific Islands.

Despite repeated claims from China that it has no intention of establishing a military base in the Solomon Islands or elsewhere in the region, its track record and its ambitions suggest otherwise. In Cambodia, Djibouti, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, China has initiated major infrastructure projects that have resulted in China obtaining access to strategically significant port facilities. And as Beijing has demonstrated in the South China Sea when it claimed and subsequently militarized unoccupied islands, the Chinese government has a track record of publicly denying its true intentions while taking steps to enlarge its global military footprint. 

Beijing’s search for a military foothold in the Pacific represents an expansion of what it has already done elsewhere. Establishing a presence in this region could accomplish several strategic goals at once—securing Chinese sea lines of communication, increasing intelligence collection on allied forces, keeping Australia and New Zealand boxed in, and complicating any U.S. plans to move forces into the region. With this deal, the Solomon Islands has now opened the door for a Chinese military presence in the Pacific. The question for the United States and its allies now is how to respond.

A NEW FOCUS ON THE ISLANDS

There has been intense debate—especially inside of Australia— about how exactly the Solomon Islands deal occurred, and whether Australia, the United States, or any other country could have done more to forestall such a deal. This has hit a particularly raw nerve in Australia, where every government in the postwar era has worked to prevent a hostile power from gaining a military presence in the South Pacific. Although it may be worthwhile to conduct an inquiry into why this happened, a blame game is less productive than using this moment to focus on how the United States and its allies can work together to mitigate further fallout and prevent China from signing similar deals elsewhere.

For the past several decades, the Pacific has not been an area of focus for U.S. foreign policy.  That seems to be changing, but unless the new attention is directed on genuinely trying to meet the region’s needs, it is unlikely to be greeted with much enthusiasm. The Pacific Islands governments are concerned about the nature of Chinese activities in the Pacific states, but it is not their primary concern. Rather, regional leaders emphasize the importance of finding ways to drive development, build needed infrastructure, and address the existential risks of climate change to which low-lying Pacific Island states are especially vulnerable. The easiest way to earn trust and become a better regional partner will be to work with the Pacific Island states—individually, collectively, and regularly—to address these concerns, which were laid out by Pacific Island leaders in the 2018 Boe Declaration on Regional Security that embraced an “expanded concept of security” to deal with the range of challenges facing the Pacific.


What happens in the Solomon Islands has security implications for the region.

Doing so will require pursuing more robust commitments to offsetting climate change, closely monitoring the Pacific Islands’ coastal waters to curb illegal fishing, and preventing resource exploitation by Chinese fisherman. In addition, the United States and its partners should promote more open labor markets to allow for residents of the Pacific Islands to work elsewhere in the region based on employment needs and support educational initiatives to offer more opportunities for Pacific Island youth to pursue an education overseas. The United States and its partners should invest in projects that improve basic infrastructure and expand access to health care and Internet connectivity in the Pacific Islands. Legislatures in Australia, New Zealand, the United States, and elsewhere can also find ways to collaborate with their democratically elected counterparts across the Pacific Islands to discuss ways to improve governmental accountability. All of these commitments will require greater resources from the United States and its partners, changes in domestic legislation in multiple countries to allow for expanded work permits, and more sustained engagement with the region.

The United States can also demonstrate a renewed commitment to the Pacific Islands by making some key bureaucratic changes. Washington may be planning to reopen the U.S. embassy in the Solomon Islands that it closed in 1993, but the Biden administration has not yet appointed ambassadors to either Fiji or Papua New Guinea. It does not have resident ambassadors in Kiribati, Nauru, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu, or Vanuatu (they are currently represented by U.S. regional ambassadors). It is hard to make an argument for serious and sustained engagement with the Pacific community without an active U.S. presence. Beyond those posts, Washington should consider naming an ambassador to the Pacific Islands Forum, modeled on the position of the U.S. ambassador to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Additionally, Washington needs to renew its compacts of free association with the Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, and the Marshall Islands. For decades, these deals have allowed the United States to limit other states’ military access to compact countries in exchange for U.S. political, development, and defense guarantees.

The United States should also support multilateralism in the region. Washington should commit to more consistent and high-level attendance as a dialogue partner at the Pacific Islands Forum’s annual summit. It should express interest in associate membership in the forum for two U.S. Pacific Island territories—American Samoa and Guam—and establish a regular meeting with the Pacific Islands Forum akin to Japan’s biennial meeting with leaders of Pacific Island countries.

COMMITTING TO THE PACIFIC

Of course, neither long-term policy adjustments nor near-term bureaucratic adjustments answer the more immediate challenge posed by the influx of Chinese investment and the potential establishment of a Chinese military presence in the region. In tackling the former, democratic partners should support anticorruption and transparency initiatives and fund independent media in the Pacific Islands. On dealing with the latter, diplomatic efforts should prioritize circumscribing Beijing and Honiara’s secret agreement, to ensure that it remains an agreement in theory but not in practice. And because Beijing’s denials are so often precursors to further activity, Washington should begin the work of warning regional leaders about what the Chinese militarization of the Pacific would look like and what responses such militarization would necessitate from the United States. Chinese militarization in the region would result in environmental damage, the Pacific Island countries ceding sovereignty, and an inevitable response by the United States and its allies, which could draw the Pacific Islands into a future conflict.

What happens in the Solomon Islands has broader security implications for the region and should be seen as part of a systematic effort by Beijing to extend its presence in the Pacific, advance the tools of authoritarian control, undercut U.S. access to the region, and constrict the freedom of movement of U.S. allies. The ongoing developments in the Pacific should underscore the critical importance for the United States of engaging the many oft-neglected countries of the Pacific Islands. They should also serve as an opportunity to assess the effectiveness of U.S. and allied policy toward this vital region, and encourage Washington to be more creative, more proactive, and more committed to the Pacific.

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Re: Stratfor: Geopolitics of The Pacific Ocean
« Reply #2 on: June 27, 2022, 06:02:06 AM »
Pacific Islands Push Against Great Power Competition
1 MIN READJun 20, 2022 | 10:00 GMT





A P-3K2 Orion aircraft flying over Tonga's Nomuka island shows heavy ash fall from the recent volcanic eruption within the Tongan Islands on Jan. 17.
A P-3K2 Orion aircraft flying over Tonga's Nomuka island shows heavy ash fall from the recent volcanic eruption within the Tongan Islands on Jan. 17.

(Photo by New Zealand Defense Force via Getty Images)

On June 17, Samoan Prime Minister Fiame Naomi Mata'afa said the Pacific Islands should look inward for security agreements and not solely rely on external powers, a comment directed at least partially at the Solomon Islands. The Solomon Islands signed a security agreement with China in April that has ignited concerns that great power competition between China and the West in the region will escalate. The West views the Pacific Islands as critically important for shipping, trade and freedom of navigation, and seeks to prevent China from expanding its sphere of influence, which would threaten U.S. security interests in the region. Most countries in the region are more concerned about issues like climate change, which presents an ever-growing threat to their economic and physical security, and as a result, they would prefer to avoid being caught in the middle of a great power struggle focused on security issues. Still, some Pacific Island nations will use their newfound leverage to obtain better trade and cooperation agreements with both sides.


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Re: Stratfor: Geopolitics of The Pacific Ocean
« Reply #3 on: June 27, 2022, 11:50:59 AM »
US Indo–Pacific Chief Sees Largest Military Buildup in Chinese Army’s History
By Mary Hong June 26, 2022 Updated: June 27, 2022biggersmaller Print

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China’s army is undergoing the largest buildup in the Chinese regime’s history since World War II, according to Adm. John Aquilino, commander of the U.S. Indo–Pacific Command.

Aquilino made the comment in a conversation hosted by the research institute the Foundation for Defense of Democracies on June 24 (pdf).

The buildup encompasses all army domains and capabilities, such as naval ships, fifth-generation aircraft, missile forces, cyber capability, capability in space, and strategic nuclear capability.

He said that “the concern for all Americans should be the pace, scale, and scope [with which] China is growing and what does that mean with regard to intent for a future peaceful globe?”

Allies and Homeland Security
In the conversation, Aquilino discussed the importance of Guam to American military posture and deterrence in the region.

He said that Guam has a 360-degree threat from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Rocket Forces. It is absolutely critical “with a sense of urgency in order to provide the capabilities that both defend and we can project power from Guam,” Aquilino said.

Epoch Times Photo
In this photo provided by U.S. Navy, the Los Angeles-class fast attack submarine USS Oklahoma City (SSN 723) returns to U.S. Naval Base in Guam on Aug. 19, 2021. (Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Naomi Johnson/U.S. Navy via AP)
He emphasized that Guam is extremely important, and with “125,000 United States citizens—it’s the homeland.”

He emphasized that partners in Japan and South Korea are also important, saying, “The places we operate with our allies and partners across the region [are] important to deliver deterrence.”

He referred to the Indo–Pacific region as “half the globe,” and “the United States can operate as a joint force, synchronized, integrated in all domains across vast distances,” as proved over many years.

Earlier in May, Aquilino also warned of the PLA’s threat to world order.

In the statement before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense on May 17 (pdf), Aquilino said, “The PRC seeks to become a global military power and acquire the ability to seize Taiwan, while developing conventional weapons that can reach the U.S. homeland.”

According to the 2022 National Defense Strategy (pdf), the Pentagon identified the Chinese regime as the “most consequential strategic competitor and the pacing challenge for the Department.”

Chen Ting contributed to this report.

Crafty_Dog

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WSJ: Solomon Islands
« Reply #4 on: August 30, 2022, 06:58:11 PM »
Beijing sure is getting its money’s worth from the “security pact” it signed in the spring with a tiny Pacific nation. Witness how the Solomon Islands in recent days has started turning away port visits by U.S. and allied ships.

OPINION: FREE EXPRESSION
Free Expression
Can the U.S. and China Coexist Peacefully?


The island chain’s government last week denied permission for a U.S. Coast Guard cutter, the Oliver Henry, to make a routine port call. This followed a refusal for Britain’s HMS Spey. Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare says the refusals were the result of paperwork snafus, but the U.S. Embassy in Australia on Tuesday said the island nation has imposed a moratorium on naval visits pending development of new procedures.

This shouldn’t be dismissed as routine bureaucratic confusion. The Solomons in the spring signed a security pact with Beijing. The deal opens the door to a direct Chinese military and police presence that could eventually include a base on the islands, which sit to the northeast of Australia. It’s China’s most direct foray into the South Pacific to date, a region Beijing previously sought to influence primarily via trade and investment.

This isn’t to say someone in Beijing picked up a phone and instructed officials in Honiara, the Solomons capital, to block the U.S. and British port calls. We may never know for sure. It could be that Mr. Sogavare and his government acted pre-emptively in an attempt to curry favor with China. Either way, by developing its relationship with the Solomons, Beijing has succeeded in giving the U.S. and its allies an unpleasant surprise.


Beijing is growing more assertive in naval matters, especially when it comes to throwing its weight around with recipients of its economic largess. This month China prevailed on Sri Lanka’s government to allow a “research ship” to dock for several days at the Chinese-built Hambantota port in the south of the country. Beijing and Colombo said the ship was on a civilian research mission, but India suspected it could be gathering data for military purposes and Washington raised concerns.

All of this amounts to a major naval challenge when U.S. capabilities have been allowed to wither. The Biden Administration has been slow to awaken to the danger, although it now has dispatched several officials for a series of visits to the Pacific region. Washington last month announced the opening of two new embassies in the South Pacific nations of Kiribati and Tonga, and it is committing more financial aid to the region.

Americans who remember the bloody World War II battle of Guadalcanal in the Solomons know the region can be strategically important. The U.S. needs to show it can be a constant ally in a region it has often overlooked.

But Pacific island governments owe it to their citizens to tread carefully as they weigh cooperation with China against alliances with the West. The U.S. is a distractible ally but China can be a ruinous one, especially when payments for its loan-based “investments” come due. Ask Sri Lanka. The Solomons would be wise to think carefully about its friendship with Beijing.

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US bids Pacific Islands to counter China
« Reply #5 on: September 30, 2022, 05:10:30 AM »
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-63084876?fbclid=IwAR0rQFVhWTt0EvzJFfV2Qv8-f9JcAExeQXw9gR3g1ltKCUVyceD4Q90BJwQ

US makes Pacific Islands pledge in bid to counter China
By Yvette Tan
BBC News
re
President Biden Hosts U.S.-Pacific Island Country Summit At The White House
IMAGE SOURCE,CHIP SOMODEVILLA
Image caption,
It is the first time that Pacific leaders have been invited for an in-person summit
The US has struck a partnership agreement with Pacific island nations amid concern in Washington over growing Chinese influence.

It also announced $810m (£725m) in financial support and said it would recognise Niue and Cook Islands as sovereign states.

Fourteen nations signed the deal including the Solomon Islands, after reports said its leader would not sign.

The region has strategic importance as the gateway to Asia from the Pacific.

Its location and its need for assistance, particularly to help it deal with the impact of climate change, has triggered a battle for influence - with China keen on playing a prominent role.

In June Beijing proposed a sweeping trade and security deal with 10 countries in the region. But it was shelved after many of the countries declined to sign.

Have China's Pacific ambitions been thwarted?
Pacific Islands urge unity in face of China ambition
Island trip lays bare US-China tussle in the Pacific
Washington's 11-point declaration covers matters from security to climate change. The White House said the deal came amid an "increasingly complex geopolitical environment".

"The security of America, quite frankly, and the world depends on your security, and the security of the Pacific Islands," said US President Joe Biden during the two-day meeting - the first time Pacific nations had been invited to Washington for an in-person summit.

Much of the new US funding is in the form of a 10-year package to clean up dirty waters in the South Pacific.

Between 2006 and 2017, Beijing provided close to $1.5bn in foreign aid to the region through a mixture of grants and loans, according to the Lowy Institute.

Earlier this year US Vice President Kamala Harris said the US would triple its funding for economic development and ocean resilience for the Pacific Islands.



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GPF
« Reply #7 on: October 31, 2022, 11:43:36 AM »
The U.S. in the Pacific. The U.S. will deploy up to six B-52 bombers to new facilities it is planning to build near Darwin in northern Australia. The nuclear-capable bombers would be within range of mainland China. The move is part of a series of changes, including significant upgrades to the U.S.’ Pine Gap base. Meanwhile, China’s aid funding to the Pacific has fallen to its lowest level in over a decade, as Australia increased its funding for the region by hundreds of millions of dollars last week.

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Re: GPF
« Reply #8 on: October 31, 2022, 01:49:32 PM »
The U.S. in the Pacific. The U.S. will deploy up to six B-52 bombers to new facilities it is planning to build near Darwin in northern Australia. The nuclear-capable bombers would be within range of mainland China. The move is part of a series of changes, including significant upgrades to the U.S.’ Pine Gap base. Meanwhile, China’s aid funding to the Pacific has fallen to its lowest level in over a decade, as Australia increased its funding for the region by hundreds of millions of dollars last week.

I approve of this and maybe one more thing Biden is doing as President.

It's a sign there are still people in the Pentagon who care about winning wars.

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Economist: Guam
« Reply #9 on: April 29, 2023, 07:29:00 PM »
Shashank Joshi
Defence editor

Guam, a tiny island surrounded by the vast expanse of the Pacific, is America’s westernmost speck. It is also, as we recently wrote, where its next war may begin. Though the island is just 30 miles (48km) long, Guam helps to project American power across the Pacific. But it is surprisingly vulnerable. Its missile-defence battery is not always switched on; China, meanwhile, has a missile that has been dubbed the “Guam killer”. America is racing to better equip the island for invasion, but will that make Guam more safe or less?

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second

CCP Infiltrating Solomon Islands, Preparing Pacific Expansion, Ousted Premier Says
Daniel Suidani, former premier of the Malaita Province in Solomon Islands, in Washington on April 25, 2023. (Wei Wu/The Epoch Times)
Daniel Suidani, former premier of the Malaita Province in Solomon Islands, in Washington on April 25, 2023. (Wei Wu/The Epoch Times)
Andrew Thornebrooke
By Andrew Thornebrooke
April 28, 2023Updated: April 28, 2023
biggersmaller Print



WASHINGTON—An ousted Solomon Islands politician is speaking out against China’s communist regime, which he claims has infiltrated his own government and is seeking to do the same elsewhere.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which rules China as a single-party state, is bribing politicians throughout the Solomon Islands and weaponizing the Pacific Islands nation for its own purposes, said former Malaita Province Premier Daniel Suidani.

“People need to be aware of the way that the CCP is dealing with development in our country,” Suidani said at an April 28 talk at the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank.

“They do not share our values at all.”

Suidani was ousted from his post as premier after a no-confidence vote by the provincial legislature in February.

He maintains that multiple members of the Solomon Islands national government who promoted his ouster have been receiving bribes from the CCP, and has condemned the government’s decision to sign a security pact with the regime last year that will allow China to deploy its military in the Solomon Islands to protect its own people and companies from anything it deems to be a threat.

The national government also moved in 2019 to revoke its diplomatic recognition of Taiwan in favor of the CCP, which Suidani also opposed.

Suidani said the CCP and its companies in the Solomon Islands are degrading the nation’s national resources, supplanting the local culture, and taking jobs from indigenous Solomon Islanders.

“We haven’t seen anything good [from the CCP]. We have seen destroyed environments.”

Suidani added that “the market is for China,” and that CCP companies coming to the Solomon Islands brought their own labor force, often encouraging Chinese to marry into the local population to earn the legal right to run local businesses.

Indigenous Solomon Islanders, meanwhile, were left without opportunity and with critical resources like water tarnished and polluted by Chinese efforts.

Persecuted by CCP-Backed Agents
Suidani has been the target of CCP-backed persecution efforts for some time now, largely due to his vocal support for the people of Taiwan and his efforts to enforce a moratorium on new CCP-backed ventures in his country.

“We are trying to do away with the CCP companies in the province and speaking out against the national government’s decision to transfer diplomatic ties from Taiwan to the CCP,” Suidani said, noting that the national government switched its recognition from Taiwan to the CCP without referendum to gauge popular support.

His efforts have not been without their own trials.

While in Taiwan for medical treatment for instance, a prominent journalist published a story claiming  that Suidani was fomenting insurrection and meeting with Americans to plot the assassination of the Solomon Islands President Manasseh Sogavare.

The story did not present any evidence for its claims and quoted only anonymous sources. Nevertheless, Suidani was briefly arrested and detained for questioning.

The journalist who wrote those allegations, Alfred Sasako, is the Vice President of the Solomon Islands chapter of the Chinese Friendship Alliance, a key organization in the CCP’s United Front propaganda network which conducts many of the regime’s overseas influence operations.

Sasako has also previously been quoted by Chinese state-owned propaganda outlets like the Global Times.

Despite it all, Suidani has hope. He is suing Sasako for libel and planning to return to power through legal means, challenging the fiat decision to oust him.

The choice of whether he should remain premier, he said, was for the people to decide.

“I was voted for by my people and mandated by my people. It would be right to [be voted] out by my people.”

Still, there is a real fear that pro-CCP forces in the national government will have him arrested, or worse, when he returns. It is a risk he accepts as the cost of maintaining the rights of his people in Malaita.

“We are so frightened to go back but we have no choice,” Suidani said. “We must go back to fight for the rights of our people.”

“Standing for our people will make them become strong in their own place.”

Fighting Back Against Communism
Suidani also spoke about the importance of fighting back against encroaching CCP authoritarianism during an interview with EpochTV’s “American Thought Leaders” program.

Preserving his people’s culture and values, he said, was more important than any short-term profit the CCP might offer.

“We are Christian people. We believe in God, and the CCP is atheist. They don’t believe in the values and the principles we believe in,” Suidani said.

Indeed, the Solomon Islands is estimated to be more than 97 percent Christian. That shared belief in a higher power, Suidani said, was antithetical to the materialism espoused by the communist philosophy.

Malaita, he said, traditionally valued communal development and working together, but the regime’s presence was destroying that culture, causing disunity, rampant inequality, and decreased quality of life for the indigenous people of the region.

“They don’t know about the damage they [the CCP] cause for local Indigenous people and their livelihood,” Suidani said.

“My biggest fear, actually, for the people of Malaita and even the Solomon Islands at large, is that… the country is really dominated by the enforcement of Chinese businesses.”

To that end, Suidani said that he hoped the United States and other democratic nations could help the Solomon Islands escape the crushing grasp of the CCP.

Freedom, he said, was necessary for all people.

“The freedom here in America is the founding father of freedom [everywhere]. So, I would like to tell the American government to look at these issues because we also need freedom.”

“Even if we are a small society, we need the same freedom that the Americans have. So if there is a way possible that Americans see fit, to help out in some ways, that would be something great for Solomon Islands as a country.”

Jan Jekielek contributed to this report.

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« Reply #11 on: May 19, 2023, 10:03:49 AM »
Competing With China in the Pacific
Biden’s canceled trip obscures real U.S. diplomatic progress.
By The Editorial BoardFollow
May 18, 2023 6:36 pm ET


President Biden this week canceled his trip to Papua New Guinea and Australia that was scheduled to follow the G-7 meeting in Japan, and that’s a shame. Mr. Biden could have delegated debt-ceiling talks, and the cancellation obscures the progress his Administration has been making in meeting China’s challenge in the Western and South Pacific.

Since China struck a security deal with the Solomon Islands in 2022, the U.S. has stepped up its diplomacy and strategic engagement. It’s paying off. Papua New Guinea (PNG) Prime Minister James Marape said Thursday that his country would sign two agreements with the U.S. on defense cooperation as well as maritime surveillance of illegal activity on the high seas. Mr. Marape told a press conference that “we are signing with the best military on the face of planet Earth.”

That’s a critical step forward for the U.S., which will gain greater access to facilities in the Pacific. The expected agreements would give American troops access to the island’s ports as well as a potential refueling stop at the airport. The agreement would be the first time in recent years the U.S. has gained access to new facilities in the Pacific outside of traditional allies such as Australia and the Philippines.

Earlier this week the Administration also announced it will renew its Compact of Free Association with Micronesia and Palau. The U.S. currently has COFA agreements with those two countries as well as the Marshall Islands, whose renewal remains under discussion. The U.S. recently appointed an envoy to the Pacific Islands Forum, providing greater engagement with the regional grouping of island nations.


All of this reinforces the U.S. presence in and near the so-called second island chain in the Western Pacific. The first island chain stretches south from Japan to include Taiwan, the northern Philippines and down to Borneo. The second island chain stretches farther east to include the Northern Mariana Islands, the U.S. base in Guam, Palau, and down to PNG.

China has sailed surveillance vessels into the waters near PNG and Australia. The new U.S. outposts, coupled with American maritime surveillance capabilities, will give the U.S. and its regional partners better eyes on what the Communist Party’s growing naval fleet is up to. Mr. Biden would be wise to reschedule his trip to the region at an early opportunity.


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« Reply #17 on: December 29, 2023, 04:38:18 AM »
U.S. Woos Pacific Nation Where China Has Stamped Its Mark
Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to Tonga comes after the country was devastated by a volcanic eruption and tsunami
By
Vivian Salama
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July 25, 2023 7:52 pm ET


​NUKU’ALOFA, Tonga—When the Hunga Tonga-Hunga Ha’apai volcano erupted last year, bringing ruin to this tiny island in the South Pacific, the U.S. raced to send desperately needed humanitarian aid. So did China.

The eruption was followed by a 50-foot tsunami that destroyed many of the homes on this archipelago located about 1,000 miles off the coast of New Zealand. Undersea cables were destroyed, limiting residents to only domestic phone calls. Diesel gas quickly became sparse and clean drinking water was almost impossible to find.

In the aftermath of the disaster, USAID provided $2.6 million in humanitarian assistance to support the people of Tonga, which U.S. officials said was indicative of Washington’s commitment to the strategically important Pacific islands. On Wednesday, Secretary of State Antony Blinken was the first American cabinet member to visit Tonga, where he dedicated the newly opened U.S. Embassy and held discussions with leaders in the South Pacific’s last Polynesian kingdom.

The U.S. has been seeking to bolster its outreach to the Pacific as a counter to China’s growing influence. Blinken has visited the Pacific islands three times in three years, and Wednesday’s visit will mark his 12th to the Indo-Pacific. Still, some Pacific leaders see the Biden administration playing catch-up after years of lackluster U.S. engagement that allowed China to gain sway in the region.


There is a growing sense of urgency in the U.S. that closer alliances need to be forged quickly, particularly after China struck a security pact with the nearby Solomon Islands last year.

Across Tonga’s main island, China’s footprint is clear, with many storefronts and commercial vehicles bearing Chinese language signs. The main government building, where Blinken held his press conference Wednesday alongside Tonga’s prime minister, was completed in 2015 by the Shanghai Construction Group under a Chinese grant of $11 million.

“We have no objection to the investments by or engagements by any other country, including China,” Blinken said. “If it’s done in a productive way, if it really is responsive to the needs of the people…that’s a good thing.”       

After last year’s natural disaster, China deployed People’s Liberation Army planes and warships to deliver $100,000 in emergency assistance to Tonga, including drinking water and foodstuffs, and vowed to provide periodic assistance to address Tonga’s longer-term needs.


China’s relief force included navy and air force battalions from the PLA’s Southern Theater Command, including Y-20 transport planes and two warships—a ship primarily deployed in amphibious landing missions but can also conduct humanitarian aid and civilian evacuation missions, and Type 901 fast combat support ship, which are designed to support carrier groups, highlighting the PLA’s interest in conducting nonmilitary operations.

A Chinese foreign ministry readout, citing Tonga’s Deputy Prime Minister Poasi Tei, said the Tongan government praised Beijing as “a true friend.”

Last year, the Biden administration invited the leaders of more than a dozen small island nations in the Pacific to Washington, hosting a two-day gathering to underscore U.S. commitment to the region now at the forefront of rivalry with China. While many of the islands are small in size and population, they stretch across a vast expanse of waterways strategic for commercial shipping, fisheries and security.


A senior U.S. official said Tonga, like the other Pacific nations, has a keen interest in deepening U.S. commitments on climate change, public health and infrastructure investments.

Access to some strategic islands could allow China to hem in Australia and impede U.S. forces from intervening in large numbers in attacks on Taiwan or allies such as the Philippines, security experts said.


For that reason, America’s allies in the region also sense an urgency to bolster their influence across Oceania. Last October, defense ministers from nations in the South Pacific met in Tonga with an interest in forging closer military ties as an alternative to China. Tonga is one of only three Pacific island nations, including Papua New Guinea and Fiji, with a military. New Zealand, France, Australia and Chile also took part in the meetings.

Tonga has used its military in the past to contribute to international peace and security missions, including missions to Iraq and Afghanistan. This month, Tongan military forces are in Australia to participate in a biennial training exercise involving the U.S. and allies. The Nevada National Guard also entered into a State Partnership Program with Tonga in 2014. Now, the U.S. is hoping that Tonga can use its military for mutually beneficial missions closer to home.

“We want to be on the ground to improve the contacts, the lines of communication, the cultural ties with the people of Tonga; explore ways that we can deepen our cooperation,” a senior State Department official said. “Tonga is one of three countries in the Pacific that has a military and so that mil-mil cooperation has been important and will certainly continue and go forward.”

The official denied that the new American embassy in Tonga, officially opened in May, was geared at countering Chinese influence, but acknowledged that competition in the Pacific is a continuing reality. Some experts say Tonga could be a useful litmus test of whether the U.S. response is hitting the mark or falling short relative to China’s longer-term commitment.

Tonga has long asked the U.S. to set up consular services in the country to help facilitate visas for those wishing to visit, particularly since about 60% of Tongans belong to the Mormon Church and many have relatives living in the U.S.

“If the United States is to engage the region seriously, it needs to get the basics right, starting with having embassies in more countries,” said Brian Harding, a senior expert at the U.S. Institute of Peace. “Progress on this front is what Blinken is highlighting on the trip.”

Blinken was set to travel to New Zealand and Australia following his stop in Tonga. In Wellington, New Zealand, he will hold meetings with the country’s leadership before watching the U.S. women’s soccer team take on the Netherlands in the World Cup.

In Brisbane, Australia, he is expected to join Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defense Richard Marles, and Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong for the annual Australia-U.S. Ministerial Consultations, known as Ausmin.

The U.S., Australia and the U.K. formed a pact in 2021, known as Aukus, to boost the three nations’ collective deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.

Write to Vivian Salama at vivian.salama@wsj.com