Afpakia: Afghanistan-Pakistan

[Crafty_Dog]

As Afghan Clerics Label Suicide Bombs a Sin, One Explodes Among Them
An attacker blew himself up outside a meeting of religious leaders, who also declared the 17-year war there illegal under Islamic lawsobhani/Reuters
By Craig Nelson,
Habib Khan Totakhil and
Ehsanullah Amiri
June 4, 2018 7:26 a.m. ET
5 COMMENTS

KABUL, Afghanistan—A suicide bomber struck a meeting of Afghanistan’s top clerics and religious scholars in the capital on Monday, killing seven people shortly after the large gathering declared such suicide attacks a sin and the country’s 17-year war illegal under Islamic law.

The Taliban, Afghanistan’s largest insurgency, issued a statement denying involvement in the bombing. The blast occurred at an exit from Kabul Polytechnic University, where the convocation of the Afghan Ulema Council was winding up.

Islamic State’s affiliate in Afghanistan, which has asserted responsibility for a spate of attacks in the Afghan capital in recent months, had no immediate comment.
One of those injured in the attack, center. The gathering of clerics and religious scholars declared suicide attacks a sin.
One of those injured in the attack, center. The gathering of clerics and religious scholars declared suicide attacks a sin. Photo: stringer/Reuters
Related

    Afghan President Offers Opening to Talks With Taliban
    Nine Journalists Among Dozens Killed by Kabul Bombs
    Kabul Suicide Bomber Targets Voter-Registration Center in Deadly Blast

Kabul police spokesman Hashmat Stanikzai said the seven people killed in the blast included a police officer. Nine other people were also wounded, he said. Other Afghan security officials put the death toll as high as 12.

Shortly before the attack, the estimated 2,000 religious figures attending the gathering from across Afghanistan had issued an Islamic ruling, or fatwa, declaring suicide attacks forbidden.

“Suicide attacks, explosions for killing people, division, insurgency, different types of corruption, robbery, kidnapping and any type of violence are counted as big sins in Islam and are against the order of the Almighty Allah,” they said.

Suicide bombings are a relatively recent phenomenon in Afghanistan, having been rejected as a form of combat during the uprising against the occupation of Soviet forces in the 1980s and the takeover by Taliban forces in the mid-1990s.

Rather, they became a feature of the Afghan war in the mid-2000s, as the tactics used by Islamist militants against U.S. forces in Iraq rebounded here.

The clerical gathering also denounced the 17-year war in Afghanistan as illegal under Islamic law, calling it nothing but “shedding the blood of Muslims,” and urged the Taliban to take up the Kabul government’s offer of unconditional peace talks.

In perhaps the most public peace overture since the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 to remove the Taliban from power, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani in late February offered political recognition to the Taliban in exchange for a stop to the fighting.

The Taliban hasn’t replied formally to the bid. It has said it will only negotiate with the U.S. since, it says, America is the main engine of the war and the Kabul government is illegitimate.

[Crafty_Dog]

What Lies Beneath the Enduring Stalemate in Afghanistan
An Afghan soldier on patrol in southern Afghanistan, Dec. 11, 2014.
(ROBERTO SCHMIDT/AFP/Getty Images)


    The stalemate in Afghanistan endures, with the Afghan government continuing to control the country's urban areas while the Taliban command large areas of the countryside.
    Foreign support, the Afghan government's failures and the Taliban's deep ties within Afghanistan's rural social fabric are central to the persistence of the Afghan insurgency.
    Negotiations are the only real alternative toward ending the conflict in the short term, but myriad obstacles stand in the way.

Almost 17 years after the start of the war in Afghanistan, the Taliban insurgency rages on with no end in sight. And despite the launch last summer of a new strategy and a considerable ramp-up in air power, the United States appears no closer to breaking the stalemate, in which the central government in Kabul continues to control Afghanistan's urban areas and the Taliban exerts influence over wide swaths of the countryside. Foreign support and the failure of the Afghan state are central to the continued endurance of the Afghan insurgency. Another key element — often overlooked — is the Taliban's success in establishing deep ties within Afghanistan's rural social fabric.

The Big Picture

As the first half of 2018 comes to a close, Stratfor's forecast on the war in Afghanistan is on track. In our 2018 Annual Forecast, we said the addition of a few thousand U.S. troops would be insufficient to break the stalemate between Kabul and the Taliban, while U.S.-Pakistan relations would deteriorate. Both have borne out thus far. Even as U.S. defense policy shifts toward a focus on great power politics, the threat of transnational jihadism emanating from Afghanistan remains a serious threat that will continue to require U.S. and NATO resources for the foreseeable future.

See South Asia section of the 2018 Annual Forecast
Foreign Support for the Taliban

The Taliban have benefited greatly from foreign support over the course of the Afghan war. In particular, the Taliban's relationship with Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency has allowed the insurgency to develop a relative sanctuary within Pakistan where it could recuperate and regenerate and from where certain leadership elements of the Taliban continue to direct parts of the war effort. Recently, there also has been considerable evidence that factions of the Taliban are receiving substantial assistance from Iran and Russia. Assistance from Iran has likely played a role in facilitating the Taliban's recent gains in western Afghanistan, particularly in Farah province. The Taliban, through their links to the outside world, have also been able to import everything from fertilizer for their improvised explosive devices to night vision gear, which has enabled them to conduct a growing number of nighttime operations.

The National Unity Government between President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah, ridden with corruption and mismanagement, has also failed to provide rural Afghans an enticing enough alternative to the Taliban. Corruption exacerbates the systemic problems besetting the central government in Kabul, which include not only a heavy reliance on external sources of funding but also the historic difficulty of bringing the mountainous and demographically diverse country under effective central rule. Afghanistan's fragmentation affects the Taliban, too. The movement is broken into different factions, which greatly complicates peace negotiation efforts.

The Taliban's Shadow Government

While the Afghan government struggles to extend its authority over the country, the Taliban have their own significant problems gaining popular support. Polling over the past decade has consistently highlighted the Taliban's weak popularity in Afghanistan. Annual polls by the Asia Foundation routinely find that more than 90 percent of Afghans fear the Taliban because of their extremist views. Nevertheless, these figures mask the significant support for the Taliban in the Pashtu-dominated rural areas of the country. Further, the Taliban increasingly have recognized the need for even greater popular support before they can ever hope to make long-lasting gains in Afghanistan's urban and minority-populated areas and have bolstered their efforts in this regard. In February, for example, the Taliban offered to guard the construction of the Afghan portion of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline. More recently, the movement's main branch, the Pakistan-based Quetta Shura, implemented an unprecedented three-day cease-fire against the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces in response to Ghani's own cease-fire in honor of the Eid holiday marking the end of Ramadan. Over the past several years, the Taliban have increased their efforts to establish their movement in the north and recruit from the minority Uzbeks and Tajiks who live there under its Shura of the North, another of its main branches operating in Afghanistan. The group has also conducted large-scale food distribution campaigns, which it has heavily publicized as part of its propaganda efforts.

Ethno-linguistic groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan

Underpinning these efforts is the Taliban's deep-rooted social presence in Afghanistan through its local shadow governments. A detailed study published June 21 by the Overseas Development Institute highlights how the Taliban have been able to build a significant governance structure in practically all of the significant districts that they contest in Afghanistan. The study depicts how the Taliban have moved away from attempting to coerce people into falling into line and instead are attempting to build influence by providing functional services, particularly in health, justice and even in education.

These findings underline how the Afghan government is in many ways its own worst enemy. Fed up with the pervasive corruption in the Afghan governance system, local Afghans have long turned toward the Taliban to provide alternative services. Recognizing this dynamic, the Taliban have begun to capitalize on this advantage over the past few years by attempting to build up a widespread, accountable and effective alternative governance structure in the areas it contests. The success of the Taliban's shadow government system undercuts Kabul's attempts to extend its authority over much of Afghanistan's conservative rural terrain, reinforcing the underlying stalemate between the Afghan government and the Taliban.

Maintaining Local Support

One of the greatest challenges for any insurgency is financial sustainability. Insurgents usually need multiple funding streams, both for the sake of redundancy in case one avenue gets cut off as well as to sustain the high costs of the war effort. Invariably one of the most important sources of funding for an insurgency is taxation. In pursuing this approach, however, the insurgents must be careful to not alienate the local population by demanding too much and must also seek to provide a service in return.

This is another area where the Taliban's shadow government has been quite successful. The sustainability of the Taliban's taxation model is clear; after almost two decades of war, the Taliban is still able to extract considerable funding from the local population. Again, the Taliban have been greatly aided by the fact that the Afghan government is seen as highly corrupt in the particularly important area of opium cultivation — and is even seen as a threat to the local livelihood. Despite their previous opposition toward opium cultivation in the 1990s, the Taliban have long since altered their stance on the issue and have worked to extend their governance and taxation over its cultivation. In fact, in the last few years the Taliban have even begun to process opium syrup into heroin themselves, setting up some 500 makeshift labs across Afghanistan.

Afghanistan's opium poppy cultivation and opium production, 2008-2017

In contrast, the Afghan government's poppy eradication efforts have been notoriously ineffective. Opium production remains at record levels. Moreover, the government's eradication efforts, often done with the urging of its foreign supporters, like the United States, have often backfired by driving local cultivators toward the Taliban. Government corruption once again exacerbated the problem, with corrupt local officials siphoning off large amounts of funding that had been earmarked to pay farmers for the destruction of their crops. Further complicating the government's eradication efforts is the fact that it has struggled to offer farmers alternative sources of livelihood to opium cultivation, part of the ongoing challenge of diversifying the $19.4 billion economy while simultaneously waging a war.

With international forces backing the Afghan National Security Forces, and with the Taliban deeply unpopular in urban and minority areas, it will be very difficult for the insurgency to seize and hold Afghanistan's cities. On the flip side, however, the Afghan government is not in a position to restore its authority over much of the Afghan countryside. The resulting stalemate, in which the Taliban's deep bond within the rural social fabric of the country plays a key part, is unlikely to be broken by military force alone. That leaves negotiations as the only real alternative toward ending the conflict in the short term — negotiations that remain highly vulnerable to the byzantine interests within the country and the shifting positions of external parties.

[ccp]

https://www.westernjournal.com/army-general-trumps-complete-reversal-obamas-strategy-working/

[Crafty_Dog]

I confess I'm not impressed with how things are going in Afpakia.

[ccp]

"I confess I'm not impressed with how things are going in Afpakia."

where is your friend who used to post about AFghanistan?

did he finally get out of there?

he would know how things are going

[Crafty_Dog]

Pakistan is beginning to understand just how isolated it really is. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Joseph Dunford are in Islamabad today for a tense meet and greet with Pakistan’s new government. Earlier this week, Pompeo said the U.S. would cancel some $300 million in military aid to Pakistan because of the country’s alleged support for terrorist groups. (The U.S. withheld $500 million in assistance earlier this year.) Islamabad is still searching for a way out of its debt crisis. On Monday, it promised that no funds from a new bailout under consideration from the International Monetary Fund – a bailout the U.S. opposes – would be used to pay off the tens of billions of dollars it owes to China. China is a welcome ally for Pakistan, but without more options, Islamabad is at risk of becoming overly dependent on Chinese aid – and is thus becoming something Beijing can use against India to slow its orientation toward the U.S. It’s notable, then, that senior Pakistani leaders have been quietly trying to open talks with India on easing tensions in Kashmir, reportedly to little avail, according to The New York Times. Islamabad has too much on its plate to feel good about the risk of finding itself going it alone.


 

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2018/09/05/heres-the-blueprint-for-erik-princes-5-billion-plan-

[Crafty_Dog]

Afghanistan: Russia Attempts to End America's Longest-Running War
(Stratfor)

The Big Picture

The United States is working to extricate itself from the long-running war in Afghanistan, but Washington's repeated failures to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table has created a diplomatic opening for Russia. As Moscow forges a stronger security partnership with Pakistan, the Taliban's principal external backer, Russian attempts to mediate peace talks will only increase.

What Happened

As it seeks advantage in its long-running standoff with the West, Russia has used a variety of tools, including diplomacy. In its most recent attempt to gain a diplomatic edge against Washington, it has launched a bold attempt to wind down four decades of war in Afghanistan. In Moscow on Nov. 9, the Russian Foreign Ministry hosted a multinational conference on the conflict that included officials from Afghanistan, China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, the United States and Uzbekistan. Most significantly, however, the roster of attendees included representatives of Afghanistan's Taliban. The insurgent group, which previously had spurned attendance at any multinational conferences dealing with the conflict, sent a five-member delegation to the Moscow meeting. While details of the meeting have yet to be released, the Taliban unsurprisingly rejected calls from Afghan representatives to start peace talks without preconditions.

Why It Matters

Participation in the Moscow talks is the latest sign of the Taliban's desire to emphasize their legitimacy as a political movement. The group wants to demonstrate that it is capable of rubbing shoulders with diplomats in faraway capitals, even as it spearheads a campaign of violence against NATO-backed Afghan forces in a bid to reconquer the country it had ruled during the 1990s. Even as the conference was underway, Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan continued their campaign against Afghan security forces, reportedly killing at least 17 officials over the past two days alone.

The talks also demonstrate Russia's desire to insert itself into Afghan negotiations as a peace broker and prove it can succeed where Washington has failed. Currently, the United States maintains backchannel communications with the Taliban through Zalmay Khalilzad, U.S. President Donald Trump's special envoy for Afghan reconciliation who is currently on a tour of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates to push for negotiations. But although the United States has backed various multinational dialogue formats — including the Quadrilateral Coordination Group, which included Afghanistan, China and Pakistan — it failed to convince the Taliban to participate.

Background

Russia's current interest in Afghanistan marks the latest chapter of its involvement in the landlocked country of 35 million. In 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan to support the tottering Marxist government in Kabul, resulting in a nearly decadelong occupation that pitted Soviet and Afghan troops against the U.S.- and Pakistani-sponsored mujahideen. After that conflict ended, Afghanistan entered another phase of instability that led to the Taliban's rise and subsequent conquest of the country in 1996. With Afghanistan under its control, the group hosted al Qaeda, enabling Osama bin Laden to plot the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States. In retaliation, the United States led the invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 that ousted the Taliban from power.

Today, Moscow's interest in Afghanistan stems from its concerns that the Islamic State's Khorasan group could use the country as a base from which to threaten Russia. Moreover, Russia's relationship with Pakistan, the most significant external actor in Afghanistan, has begun to warm as the increasing pressure that the United States has put on Islamabad has prompted it to seek allies elsewhere. In 2019, Russia will continue to deepen its security relationship with Pakistan, which will facilitate Moscow's contacts with the Taliban. The United States, on the other hand, will maintain its current strategy of applying diplomatic pressure against Pakistan while reinforcing Afghan forces on the battlefield.

[Crafty_Dog]

Trump Orders Big Troop Reduction in Afghanistan
About half of the 14,000 U.S. forces will return home in the coming weeks, the start of a total pullout that could take at least man
By Gordon Lubold and
Jessica Donati
Updated Dec. 20, 2018 7:29 p.m. ET

WASHINGTON—A day after a contested decision to pull American military forces from Syria, officials said Thursday that President Trump has ordered the start of a reduction of American forces in Afghanistan.

More than 7,000 American troops will begin to return home from Afghanistan in the coming weeks, a U.S. official said. The move will come as the first stage of a phased drawdown and the start of a conclusion to the 17-year war that officials say could take at least many months. There now are more than 14,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan.

Mr. Trump announced Wednesday that he would pull all of the more than 2,000 American troops from Syria.

Taken together, the Syria withdrawal and the likely Afghan drawdown represent a dramatic shift in the U.S. approach to military engagement in hot spots around the world, reflecting Mr. Trump’s aversion to long-running military entanglements with their high costs and American casualties.

“I think it shows how serious the president is about wanting to come out of conflicts,” a senior U.S. official said of how the Syria decision affects his thinking on Afghanistan. “I think he wants to see viable options about how to bring conflicts to a close.”

The shifts may have proven too drastic for some in the administration. On Thursday, Defense Secretary Jim Mattis submitted a letter expressing his intent to leave, saying, “you have the right to have a secretary of defense whose views are better aligned with yours.”

Mr. Mattis’s unexpected departure raises questions about whether Mr. Trump’s plans will proceed as he directed.

The plans for troop withdrawals also reflect Mr. Trump’s campaign promises and his “America First” approach to overseas involvements. In a Twitter message on Thursday, he wrote, “Time to come home & rebuild.”

In both the Afghan and Syrian conflicts, Mr. Trump earlier this year voiced an interest in bringing troops home within the year or less, moves that were widely opposed within the U.S. national security establishment.

But Mr. Trump’s impatience has deepened, and in recent days, the debate has grown more pointed, according to those familiar with the discussions. The Pentagon over the last weekend fended off a push by Mr. Trump to start bringing troops home from Afghanistan starting in January, officials said.

Mr. Trump’s decision on Syria, like earlier foreign-policy decisions including his decision to leave the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement, was made without a formal consultative process within his cabinet, officials and lawmakers said, cementing his inclination to make key national security decisions on his own or in small groups that include national security adviser John Bolton and a few others. He also apprised few international leaders of his intentions.

The Pentagon and U.S. Central Command declined to comment on the Afghanistan plans. The move to reduce U.S. military involvement in the Middle East and Africa comes alongside a new national security strategy that designates geopolitical competitors such as Russia and China greater threats than terrorists or failed states.

Mr. Trump’s decision on Syria was widely criticized by Democrats and Republican alike in Congress and national security experts across the government, an outcome that also is likely to greet his decision on Afghanistan.

In Afghanistan, the U.S. is part of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization mission that includes dozens of other countries. Unlike the withdrawal ordered in Syria, the Afghanistan drawdown is expected to be more deliberative because of the presence of treaty allies.

The NATO force has enforced a longstanding view that deploying troops overseas is necessary to prevent a repeat of the plot that led to the 2001 terrorist attacks.

The disclosure of the Afghan troop reductions comes as U.S. officials had begun to voice greater confidence about negotiations to end to the war with the Taliban. The Trump administration has made negotiating a deal with the Taliban a priority, appointing former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan and Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad, as the top envoy for talks.

The preemptive move to withdraw troops before a deal is reached to the Taliban risks endangering that process. But it was also possible the Taliban might reciprocate with a goodwill gesture, said a person familiar with the talks.

Commanders consider Afghanistan a military stalemate, and officials have long feared that Mr. Trump could at any time tweet the end to the war in Afghanistan. There have been six American troop deaths in the last two months, marking the deadliest period of the year. In all, the U.S. has lost 14 troops in Afghanistan this year.

As an allied military campaign has ratcheted up, Mr. Khalilzad has shuttled between Qatar, Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates and Afghanistan to jump-start a peace process. This week, Mr. Khalilzad’s moves appeared to bear fruit with a high-profile round of talks with the Taliban in Abu Dhabi, joined by delegations from Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E.

The meetings concluded without a final agreement, but people familiar with the discussions said that talks included the possibility of a cease fire in exchange for a U.S. commitment on troops. A second round of meetings is expected to take place in early January, around the time U.S. troops are expected to start the withdrawal. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo is also due to visit the region around the same time.

“No agreement on cease fire,” said a person who attended the talks. “Right now, only discussion.”

On Thursday, Saudi Arabia’s top envoy to the U.S., Khalid bin Salman, echoed the January timeline, tweeting that the Afghan talks in Abu Dhabi were “productive” and that “we will start to see very positive results by the beginning of next year.”

Mr. Khalilzad has been under pressure to reach an agreement with the Taliban before the Afghan presidential elections in April, a process that U.S. and Western officials fear may fail to due the risk of fraud and insecurity, propelling the country into a deeper and potentially irretrievable state of uncertainty. But the January deadline makes the task even more urgent.

U.S. troop numbers in Afghanistan reached a peak of more than 100,000 in 2010. In 2014, President Obama announced the end of major combat operations there, drawing down troops to under 10,000 by 2015. As part of his 2017 Afghanistan strategy, Mr. Trump said he would send roughly 3,000 more U.S. troops, putting the current level at just over 14,000.

—Nancy A. Youssef in Washington and Craig Nelson in Kabul contributed to this article.

[ccp]

https://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2018/12/21/pakistan-defends-ally-chinas-crackdown-muslims-foreign-media-sensationalized-issue/

[Crafty_Dog]

Editor’s note: We will be off tomorrow for Christmas, but the Daily Memo will resume on Wednesday. We wish those celebrating a wonderful Christmas.

Pakistan’s balance of payment crisis continues. Pakistan’s talks with the International Monetary Fund are going poorly, according to Finance Ministry officials who spoke with Dawn, an English-language Pakistani newspaper. The crux of the disagreement is the IMF’s belief that Pakistan has not fulfilled its commitments in prior IMF agreements. The organization is asking for large cuts to current, rather than future, expenditures, including defense spending. Pakistan doesn’t believe this is feasible. The IMF is also requesting that Pakistan raise interest rates, which would make borrowing and servicing debts more expensive for both the government and private sector. The IMF is also pushing the government to float the Pakistani currency, but Pakistani officials claim that the currency market isn’t large enough to make that happen. In the meantime, Pakistan received a loan package from Saudi Arabia and is awaiting further Saudi investment in its Gwadar Port. Abu Dhabi committed to depositing $3 billion in Pakistan’s state bank (Pakistan hopes part of this will be a deferred payment for an oil program), and Pakistan is hoping to strike a similar deal with China, worth $2.2 billion. Islamabad is also discussing liquefied natural gas exports with Qatar.

[Crafty_Dog]

second post

Marines Deployed Abroad Seek Answers Amid Washington’s Turmoil
Commandant faces questions on the troop drawdowns. His answer: ‘I have no idea.’
Gen. Robert Neller greets Marines deployed to southern Afghanistan during the Marine Corps commandant’s holiday visit to troops abroad.
Gen. Robert Neller greets Marines deployed to southern Afghanistan during the Marine Corps commandant’s holiday visit to troops abroad. Photo: Ben Kesling
255 Comments
By Ben Kesling
Dec. 23, 2018 9:00 a.m. ET

BOST AIRFIELD, Afghanistan—On a holiday visit to American troops overseas, Gen. Robert Neller, the Marine Corps commandant, was asked by a Marine about President Trump’s orders to withdraw troops from Syria and Afghanistan.

What, the Marine wanted to know, did the orders mean for those on combat deployments?

“That’s a really good question,” the commandant said. “And the honest answer is I have no idea.”

At every stop on his tour, Gen. Neller has faced questions about what the recent drawdown orders and the resignation of Defense SecretaryJim Mattis mean for Marines and for the broader U.S. military strategy in the Middle East.

The questions have come from Marines bundled in parkas while training in Norway as well as those sweating in the heat of Afghanistan, who are eager to know how the turmoil in Washington affects them.

“Are your families asking if you’re leaving?” he questioned a group of Marines in Helmand province. Many nodded yes.

“You’re not leaving,” he deadpanned, to laughs from troops midway through a months-long deployment.

At this point, commanders regardless of their rank have few details on Mr. Trump’s plans—with no timelines, hard numbers or orders to Pentagon brass about the matter.  During the trip, Gen. Neller has worked to quash scuttlebutt and motivate troops, warning them to avoid complacency and homesickness.
Earlier

    Trump’s Envoy in War Against Islamic State Resigns
    In Shift, Trump Orders U.S. Troops Out of Syria
    Trump Orders Big Troop Reduction in Afghanistan
    James Mattis to Depart as Defense Chief
    U.S.’s Mideast Pullout, Mattis Exit Alarm Europeans
    Mattis Was Blindsided by Trump’s Syria Decision

The Marines have laughed with their leader and his honesty, but it belied a frustration among officers and personnel about the lack of details from Washington: If Gen. Neller, one of the highest-ranking officers in the American military doesn’t know what’s happening, who does?

Navy Secretary Richard Spencer joined Gen. Neller in Afghanistan for a leg of the holiday visit and in an interview said he had received no order from the White House or Pentagon on drawing down troops.

“Nothing formal, just tweets,” he said Saturday, adding that he might be in the dark because he’s been on the road for three days.

The head of U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces in Afghanistan, Gen. Austin Miller, hadn’t been issued orders about the drawdown, according to multiple officers familiar with the matter. Morning intelligence briefings for days had focused on publicly available news stories because no official information was available internally.
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“I don’t think anybody really knows exactly what’s going to happen,” Gen. Neller told one gathering of Marines, on Friday. “I’ve read the same stuff in the newspaper you did, I have a little more knowledge than that, but not a whole lot more.”

Mr. Trump last week tweeted that Islamic State in Syria had been defeated and ordered the withdrawal of U.S. troops there. A day later, officials said he also had ordered the start of a withdrawal of approximately 7,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan, about half the U.S. troops in the country.

In an interview Friday, the Marine Corps’ top officer said he wasn’t in a position to comment on the announced plans for troop withdrawals but said “the best military advice was offered and a decision was made.”

“I don’t make policy, I execute orders,” he added, not specifying what advice was given.

He likewise had little to say about Mr. Mattis’ resignation.

“He wrote a letter, I’m not going to comment on it,” Gen. Neller said. “I understand and respect his decision.”

Gen. Neller said the defense secretary isn’t scheduled to step down until late February, which can allow time for a successor to be appointed and confirmed by the Senate, and for adequate continuity at the top of the department.

At Bagram Air Field in northern Afghanistan, Gen. Neller spoke to a relatively small contingent of approximately 60 U.S. Marines, a fraction of the estimated 14,000 U.S. troops in the country. The Marines here advise, train and support hundreds of soldiers from the country of Georgia, who provide base security.


They also illustrate the complexity of troop withdrawals. While the few dozen Marines here seem like they might be able to be sent home with relative ease, the reality is more complicated.

The more than 500 Georgians here don’t just stand guard, but conduct routine patrols around the base, and need Marines or other U.S. troops to call in air support if they find themselves under attack. The U.S. relationship with the Georgian forces is part of a broader bilateral relationship. An abrupt U.S. pullout could sour an alliance with strategic repercussions as the U.S. faces down an ever-more aggressive Russia.

Maj. Richard Bates, the Marine contingent’s officer in charge, said that all they have heard about the drawdown has come from media reports.

“It was a surprise, but I’m sure it was a surprise for the guys who withdrew from OIF,” he said referring to the abrupt announcement by then-President Barack Obama in 2011 that most U.S. troops would leave Iraq and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

The Georgian troops have likewise had no word on what to expect, according to a person familiar with the matter.

For many, a withdrawal could mean a welcome end of a long overseas deployment. Marines across Afghanistan said family members have asked them when they’re coming home.  Maj. Bates said the word of Mr. Mattis’ resignation was the bigger news to him, seeing that the defense secretary, a retired Marine general, is held in high esteem by his fellow service members.

“His resignation is more devastating than the troop drawdown,” Maj. Bates said. “It’s going to be hard to fill those shoes.”

Write to Ben Kesling at benjamin.kesling@wsj.com

[ccp]

I would not say our mission is not "clearly defined" per se , as many phrase the problem.

It is defined by holding back Jihadists and their terror campaign
The problem is while we are holding them down we are not defeating them.

We do not simply kill them all so we cannot eradicate them and thus there are no foreseeable end to our missions :

https://www.conservativereview.com/news/now-pull-the-plug-on-afghanistan/

That said suppose we did leave .  
we would be exposing those who helped us.
we could well see a resurgence in terror.

but is it worth being there for many years or decades with out clearly winning ?  We could wait it out like the cold war which could mean another 30 yrs ..........

[Crafty_Dog]

Editor's Note

With the current conflict in Afghanistan in its 18th year, the United States has yet to find a way to escape its longest war. The United States and its NATO allies are but one component invested in Afghanistan's future, as the country finds itself once again a focal point for great power competition. Despite the rhetoric of the current U.S. administration and a revised strategic approach relying more heavily on air power, the stalemate on the ground has yet to be broken. The NATO-backed central government in Kabul continues to control the country's urban areas while the Taliban exerts influence over wide swaths of the countryside.

On the diplomatic front, Russia has made more significant gains — seeking to needle its Western opponents — while Pakistan continues to muddy the waters. All the while, China watches and waits. As we take stock of what transpired in 2018, two late developments have the potential to affect the trajectory of the embattled country in 2019: the impact of a proposed 50 percent reduction of U.S. forces in Afghanistan and a new U.S. secretary of defense, replacing James Mattis.

In our 2018 Annual Forecast, we wrote that the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump would continue to increase pressure on Pakistan over the country's continued support for militants in Afghanistan. Less than 24 hours into the new year, the White House made clear its intent to punish Pakistan for its perceived meddling in one of South Asia's most enduring conflicts.

    On Jan. 1, U.S. President Donald Trump fired off his first tweet of 2018, saying that the United States has received nothing but "lies & deceit" in return for the over $33 billion in aid it has provided to Pakistan over the past 16 years. Later that day, the White House announced it would continue withholding $255 million in foreign military financing that had been designated for Pakistan in 2016, but not delivered. Read the full article: Pakistan: The Subtext of Trump's New Year's Tweet.

This is not the first time Islamabad has found itself in Washington's sights, accused of not taking sufficient action against militants on the Pakistani side of the border. For Pakistan, though, it's an intentional strategy because it can exert influence over its neighbor, using militant proxies to ensure Kabul remains amenable to Islamabad's interests and, more importantly, isolated from Indian influence.

    Despite harsh rhetoric from the United States and Pakistan, both countries are seeking to balance cooperation with coercion as they advance their respective strategies in Afghanistan. Recently, Islamabad revealed that it had been in discussions with NATO officials hoping to use Pakistan's southwestern port of Gwadar — a Chinese-built facility in the insurgency-wracked Balochistan province and a key element of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, itself part of China's ambitious Belt and Road Initiative — to ferry supplies for the war effort in Afghanistan. For NATO convoys, Gwadar serves as a faster, cheaper alternative for transporting supplies than the port they currently use, Karachi. Read the full article: U.S., Pakistan: A Carrot-and-Stick Approach to Ports.

In a year of great power competition, China's interest in South Asia encapsulates both Pakistan and Afganistan, something that was very clear in early 2018 when China announced plans to build a military base for Kabul's armed forces in the northeastern province of Badakhshan, confirming a deal that was discussed during an Afghan military visit to Beijing in December 2017.

Afghanistan has long been a locus of geopolitical competition among external powers, great and small. Countries such as the United States, Russia and, increasingly, China have a shared interest in containing the spread of militancy and securing their own imperatives.

An increasingly important component of Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative, Afghanistan is part of the Central Asian corridor that runs all the way to China. Beijing is in the process of expanding its economic and security cooperation in Central Asia. As we noted in our assessment on China's Increasing Security Buffer on Its Western Frontier:

    Ultimately, such basing plans are in line with China's strategy to contain the spillover of militancy from Afghanistan and broaden its security presence beyond its borders as it deepens its economic involvement in Afghanistan and the broader Central Asian region. Beijing, as is the case with many other involved parties, is concerned about the future of Afghanistan if the United States and NATO eventually withdraw, so China is working to set up a limited buffer ahead of that a possible outcome. The United States is well aware China is in Badakhshan and does not view its presence there as a threat.

As if a reminder was needed about the poor security situation in Afghanistan, the Taliban claimed credit for the Jan. 20-21 storming of a hotel in Kabul that saw four gunmen kill 18 people, including 14 foreigners, and injure 22 others.
Afghan security forces inspect the site of an attack on the office of the British charity Save the Children in Jalalabad on Jan. 24, 2018.

Just days after the attack in Kabul, militants associated with the Islamic State attacked the Jalalabad office of British charity Save the Children on Jan. 24, 2018. Gunmen blasted their way into the British aid group's compound, killing three people and wounding 24.
(NOORULLAH SHIRZADA/AFP/Getty Images)

Bookending the violent month, on Jan. 31, the BBC released a detailed study on the extent of militant presence and control over Afghanistan. According to the report, the Taliban possessed full control over 14 districts and maintained an open presence in 263 more. In other words, jihadist insurgents were active in 70 percent of Afghanistan's 398 districts. The situation is exacerbated by endemic corruption and mismanagement in Afghanistan's National Unity Government, which has failed to provide rural Afghans with an enticing alternative to the Taliban. In turn, the success of the Taliban's shadow government system undercuts Kabul's attempts to extend its authority over much of Afghanistan's conservative rural terrain, reinforcing the underlying stalemate between the Afghan government and the insurgency.

The Taliban have also benefited greatly from foreign support over the course of the Afghan war. As a result of the organization's links to the outside world, the Taliban has been able to import everything from fertilizer for improvised explosive devices to night vision gear. Among the Taliban's powerful backers is Iran, which has long been involved in Afghan affairs. For instance, the Islamic republic recruited fighters from Afghanistan's Shiite Hazara community — and from Iran's own 3 million-strong Afghan refugee population — to fill out the Fatemiyoun Brigade Tehran has deployed alongside government forces in Syria. Iran's support for the Taliban is unlikely to dwindle in the coming years, as we noted in our March 8 assessment on why Iran is backing the Taliban:

    Supporting the Taliban offers Iran a way to counter the Islamic State's expansion to its east, and Tehran will feel justified in backing the insurgents so long as the transnational jihadist group has a presence in Afghanistan. Beyond counterterrorism, though, Iran wants to maintain contact with the Taliban to be in their good graces if they eventually assume a role in the Afghan government. Even the United States, which has been battling the Taliban for more than a decade and a half, has admitted that a power-sharing deal in Afghanistan likely would involve the Taliban. In that case, Iran will be well-placed to expand its reach in the South Asian country, having kept its ties with both the Taliban and the government's NATO-backed components.

In May, the Taliban kicked off its annual spring offensive. Besides staging attacks across the country, the movement directed its energies toward capturing the provincial capital of Farah province in an effort to replicate its brief takeover of Kunduz in 2015. Despite the movement's stated intent to reconquer Afghanistan, the Taliban could pragmatically enter prospective peace negotiations from a strong position should they continue to make gains. However, despite the organization's deepening hold over large swathes of Afghanistan, internal divisions threaten the cohesion of the Taliban as an entity. At least four main branches exist, whose relations range from pragmatic cooperation to active hostility. As we explored in our March 23 assessment, For Afghanistan, a Divided Taliban Poses an Obstacle to Peace:

    The fragmented nature of the Taliban will complicate the chances of success in any peace negotiations, as assent from all factions is a prerequisite for any lasting deal. Given that fissures within the group are forging rival centers of power, Pakistan is likely to bolster its support for the Haqqani network in the hopes of bringing other factions to heel. But because the United States has designated the network as a terrorist organization, Islamabad's support for the faction is likely to drive a greater wedge between itself and Washington.

Despite intense fighting during the 2018 spring offensive, neither side achieved meaningful gains, as we explored in our assessment, What Lies Beneath the Enduring Stalemate in Afghanistan:

    With international forces backing the Afghan National Security Forces, and with the Taliban deeply unpopular in urban and minority areas, it will be very difficult for the insurgency to seize and hold Afghanistan's cities. On the flip side, however, the Afghan government is not in a position to restore its authority over much of the Afghan countryside. The resulting stalemate, in which the Taliban's deep bond within the rural social fabric of the country plays a key part, is unlikely to be broken by military force alone. That leaves negotiations as the only real alternative toward ending the conflict in the short term — negotiations that remain highly vulnerable to the byzantine interests within the country and the shifting positions of external parties.

Afghan Taliban militants took to the street to celebrate an unprecedented cease-fire on the second day of Eid in the outskirts of Jalalabad, June 16, 2018.

Afghan Taliban militants celebrate an unprecedented cease-fire on the second day of Eid in the outskirts of Jalalabad, June 16, 2018.
(NOORULLAH SHIRZADA/AFP/Getty Images)

Beyond the conflict between Kabul and the Taliban, Afghanistan provides fertile ground for other groups, such as the Islamic State's Khorasan chapter and Chinese Uighur militants. The prospect of transnational extremist groups using Afghanistan to launch attacks into other parts of Central Asian was enough to draw closer attention from another great power, Russia, which shares Pakistan's concern over creeping militancy:

    For Russia, its deepening relations with Pakistan overlap with growing attempts to involve itself as a mediator in Afghanistan. Beginning in December 2016, Moscow hosted the first of several conferences aimed at jump-starting talks between Kabul and the Taliban. Although the Taliban did not attend any of these gatherings, they have accepted Moscow's invitation to take part in an upcoming conference; that acceptance is a sign of the movement's desire to elevate its diplomatic profile by positioning itself as a serious political actor. If Russia succeeds in bringing both Kabul and the Taliban to the same table, the accomplishment would heighten President Vladimir Putin's leverage over negotiations to end a NATO-backed conflict that Washington has failed to resolve. Read the full assessment here.

Moscow seeks a diplomatic victory to strengthen its leverage while its relations with Washington remain tense, as we mentioned in our 2018 Fourth-Quarter Forecast. This plays into the Taliban's desire to become a serious political actor, with Russia's help to elevate the organization's diplomatic profile.

Parliamentary elections played out in October, another key component of Afghanistan's war-ravaged path to democracy. The polls — to elect members for the lower house of parliament — were originally scheduled for 2015 but were repeatedly delayed by the inability of the National Unity Government to implement key electoral reforms. Because of this failure and other infighting, presidential elections set for April 2019 will be a complicated affair. As we wrote in our assessment, For Afghanistan, Parliamentary Elections Are Another Step on the Rocky Road to Democracy:

    At the core of Afghanistan's political instability is an unresolved debate involving ethnic competition, regional intervention and the structure of the state. With 42 percent of the population, the Pashtun and their many tribes account for the largest and most dominant ethnic group in the country. But they are outnumbered by the non-Pashtun populations as a whole, which include the Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks. The Pashtun favor a centralized form of government under a strong president wielding sweeping powers to enable rapid and controlled political and economic reform. This, in their view, is the key to maintaining the unity of the country — under Pashtun rule. The non-Pashtuns favor a federalized model that hinges on a prime minister elected by the parliament who — along with provincial governors elected by the people — can function as checks on the president. The Pashtuns fear the decentralization model will erode their power, weaken the unity of the state and enable regional powers to have greater leverage in domestic affairs.

Meanwhile, Pakistan welcomed in its newly elected prime minister, Imran Khan. Khan's hands-off approach to the country's military means little change for Pakistan's foreign and defense policies on Afghanistan, which will remain under army control.

On Nov. 9, Russia launched a bold attempt to wind down four decades of war in Afghanistan, hosting a multinational conference on the conflict. Hosted by the Russian Foreign Ministry, the conference included officials from Afghanistan, China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, the United States and Uzbekistan. Most significant among the roster of attendees, however, was a five-member delegation from the Afghan Taliban. That group, unsurprisingly, rejected calls from Kabul's representatives to start peace talks without preconditions.

As 2018 concludes, we look ahead to what the coming year will hold for Afghanistan. As we wrote in our 2019 Annual Forecast:

    U.S. pressure will continue to drive Pakistan toward a stronger security partnership with Russia and Iran as part of its regional foreign policy pivot. And Islamabad, Moscow and Tehran will use the threat of the Islamic State to strengthen their security partnership. As the United States runs out of medium-pressure tactics (such as cutting off funding, revoking Pakistani officer training and curbing defense sales), it is more likely to impose harsher measures such as revoking Pakistan's non-NATO major ally status. The Taliban will express more serious interest in negotiations, but talks will only begin if NATO commits to a drawdown.

We considered a drawdown unlikely given concerns that the Afghan army isn't strong enough to handle security on its own. But taking into account the unexpected Dec. 20 announcement from the White House to slash U.S. personnel in Afghanistan by half, 2019 could be the year that the Taliban take their seat at the negotiating table.

[Crafty_Dog]

Why Washington's Foes Won't Welcome a Quick U.S. Pullout From Afghanistan
By Omar Lamrani
Senior Military Analyst, Stratfor
Afghan commandos patrol the Achin district of Nangarhar province during a U.S.-Afghan military operation against Islamic State militants on Jan. 3, 2018.
(NOORULLAH SHIRZADA/AFP/Getty Images)


    Although the Taliban has welcomed the prospect of a U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, the group will have to decide whether to press for a greater advantage after the pullout or pursue a deal out of fear of a growing Islamic State.
    Pakistan, Iran, China and Russia might not like having U.S. troops on their doorstep, but they worry about the implications of any rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces.
    Because no neighboring country can assume the United States' mantle in Afghanistan, each will seek to guarantee only a modicum of stability in their areas of interest in the country.

U.S. President Donald Trump's announcement late last month about the imminent withdrawal of U.S. forces from Syria grabbed all the headlines, but it wasn't his only notice about a coming pullout. According to reports, Trump has also ordered the withdrawal of half of the 14,000 American forces in Afghanistan. Although the White House subsequently contradicted the reports on Dec. 28, Trump has made no secret of his distaste for the long U.S. involvement in the country. What's more, Washington's current efforts to reach a peace deal with the Taliban highlight its increasing impatience with the enduring war in Afghanistan and its desire to leave the conflict.

While the Taliban and the Afghan government will celebrate and bemoan, respectively, a big reduction in U.S. troops in Afghanistan, the pullout will force regional neighbors Pakistan, Iran, China and Russia to weigh their options and consider their strategies in an Afghanistan with few or no American forces. Their differences notwithstanding, all these countries have a significant stake there, yet none is likely to adopt a significant, on-the-ground presence in the wake of an American withdrawal. Instead, they are all likely to enhance their ties with Afghanistan's various dominant actors and carve out zones of influence in the country to promote their interests and insulate themselves from the scourge of transnational terrorism.
The Big Picture

After more than 17 years of conflict, the White House has signaled its intent to withdraw from Afghanistan. But in the absence of any regional power willing — or able — to step into the breach left by departing U.S. forces, neighbors such as Pakistan, Iran, China and Russia will have to develop strategies to manage a post-American Afghanistan.
See 2019 Annual Forecast
See South Asia section of the 2019 Annual Forecast
The Taliban's Choice

Afghanistan's war is currently locked in a stalemate. The Taliban dominate large swaths of the countryside while the U.S.-backed government holds the urban areas. Meanwhile, the Islamic State maintains a small but dangerous presence, frequently clashing with both the Taliban and the central government. International forces assisting Kabul, including the 14,000 U.S. troops and smaller NATO and other allied contingents, are indispensable to the government. While a significant drawdown or outright withdrawal of these forces would not necessarily prompt the immediate collapse of the Afghan security forces, there is little doubt that a pullout would allow the Taliban to seize and maintain the initiative and gradually capture ever more territory. 

Washington remains especially critical to Kabul's security operations, because it provides much-needed air power, logistics and training. The United States also conducts the lion's share of strikes and special operations raids on key Taliban targets, often at night. Critically, the Western presence in Afghanistan also brings in desperately needed funding that foots most of the bill for the Afghan security forces, as well as the wider Afghan economy. The cessation of such funding would deal an even bigger blow to Kabul than the withdrawal of U.S. forces.

It is little surprise, then, to read that the reports of a U.S. drawdown have shaken and dismayed many Afghan government and security officials. In contrast, Taliban social media accounts erupted in jubilation at the news. Although the Taliban have yet to formally enter peace talks with Kabul, any withdrawal could harm the chances of an end to hostilities because the militant group might withhold concessions in the hopes of waiting Washington out. At the same time, the Taliban might be more amenable to a transition deal with the United States due to their concerns about the growing strength of the Islamic State and other more radical extremist groups. Regardless of how a drawdown occurs, it is clear to all concerned that the Taliban will remain a pivotal political player in the future of the country.

As the United States signals its intention to leave Afghanistan — at least partially — neighbors such as Pakistan, Iran, China and Russia will have to develop their own strategies to deal with the vacuum. For all their critical differences with the Washington, none will be particularly happy to see the United States leave, especially since they all lack the desire and, in some cases, the capability to deploy a replacement force. Instead, the foursome will focus on building influence with key Afghan actors while placing a special emphasis on securing the areas that abut their territory.

As the United States signals its intention to leave Afghanistan — at least partially — neighbors such as Pakistan, Iran, China and Russia will have to develop their own strategies to deal with the vacuum.

Pakistan: Taking Care of Imperatives

Islamabad's overarching goal in Afghanistan is to ensure that Pakistan does not become encircled by India and a hostile government in Kabul, although it also wishes to convince any post-conflict Afghan administration to renounce its territorial claims to Pakistani soil. To this end, Pakistan has long cultivated its ties with the Taliban as a relatively friendly force to counter the emergence of a more India-aligned Afghan government. Pakistan has also been loath to sever its support for the Taliban, even at the cost of harming its wider relationship with the United States. For Islamabad, securing its northern front from potential threats is simply more urgent.

Even so, Pakistan's differences with the United States do not mean that a rapid U.S. withdrawal will please Islamabad. It would prefer to see a methodical, negotiated drawdown that ensures its preferred Afghan factions retain a significant stake in Kabul. This preference is driven by increasing concerns over the emergence of radical transnational forces such as the Islamic State, which would likely grow in strength if a vacuum emerges in Afghanistan.

As a result, Islamabad will likely encourage the Taliban to engage in negotiations while attempting to maintain its own seat at the table so it may advance its interests. But to the United States' likely chagrin, Pakistan won't sever its ties with the Taliban when the group is on the cusp of acquiring an even more pivotal role in Afghanistan's future — a development that would certainly help insulate Pakistan from threats from the north.
Iran: Shifting Sands

Even before the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001, Iran had to contend with threats from its eastern neighbor varying from spillover fighting to drug trafficking. In 1998, Iran even came close to invading Afghanistan after Taliban forces murdered 10 Iranian diplomats after they seized the Afghan city of Mazar-e-Sharif. At the time, Tehran largely backed the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, which eventually partnered with the United States to remove the Taliban from power. But their ties have since shifted. Iran has begun supporting certain factions of the Taliban in recent years to gain more traction and influence in western Afghanistan amid an increasingly tense standoff with the United States.

Tehran will be somewhat relieved to see Washington leave Afghanistan, if for no other reason that it would eliminate a possible staging post for an American attack on Iran. (A U.S. RQ-170 spy drone that crossed over into Iran in December 2011, for instance, reportedly departed from a base in Afghanistan.) Still, Tehran will also harbor worries about a quick U.S. pullout, because that would elevate the risk of Afghanistan's instability spilling over into Iran. Tehran's previous enmity with the Taliban aside, Iran has suffered a number of high-profile Islamic State attacks, meaning it is keen to insulate itself from such a threat as much as possible. Accordingly, Iran will likely work to expand its influence in western Afghanistan and pursue closer ties with Pakistan in the aftermath of a U.S. withdrawal.
China: Worried About a Spillover

China's primary interests in Afghanistan relate to its concern over militancy, especially in relation to the wider unrest in its Xinjiang region, as well as how instability in the country could complicate its Belt and Road Initiative. Beijing is already alarmed at the growing strength of the Turkistan Islamic Party in northwestern Syria, where the group has acquired significant combat experience and has also amassed a powerful arsenal of weapons. China fears that members could end up closer to home in a place such as Afghanistan if they are pushed out of the Middle East. Militants in both Afghanistan and Pakistan have already attacked Chinese interests, meaning Beijing will be apprehensive that a U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan will provide room for extremist groups to develop and eventually launch cross-border attacks in China proper.

Fearful of such a prospect, China will likely accelerate its security involvement in northeastern Afghanistan, particularly in Badakhshan province, whose Wakhan corridor borders China. The People's Armed Police has been conducting patrols in the corridor, while Beijing has reached agreements with Kabul to train mountain troops for the Afghan security forces. In such a situation, China is likely to be receptive to strengthening its ties with the Taliban if it emerges as a dominant player in the northeast that can keep transnational extremist groups at bay.

None of Afghanistan's neighbors is willing or, in some cases, even able to assume the U.S. mantle.

Russia: Hedging Bets

Russia is another country that, despite significant tensions and adversity with the United States, would be alarmed by a hasty U.S. pullout on its southern front. Although it does not directly border Afghanistan, Russia harbors deep concerns about the robust drug trade there, as well as the threat from terrorist groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and, more recently, the Islamic State. The Kremlin had previously supported the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, especially during the first decade of the war, when the aftermath of the invasion effectively crippled the IMU. Russia provided logistical support to the U.S. effort through the Northern Distribution Network, assisted in the establishment of the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan and provided military equipment to Afghan government forces.

In recent years, however, Russian actions have increasingly challenged the U.S. mission there. These moves, in part, reflect the increasingly acrimonious ties between the two countries, but they are also tied to Russian concerns about growing Afghan instability and the potential for spillover into Central Asia. While the United States continues to focus on bolstering the central government, for instance, Russia's fears that it could lose significant strength — or see a collapse — have led it to hedge its bets by fostering ties with the Taliban and perhaps even provide the group with weapons and funding. A U.S. withdrawal would galvanize Russia into solidifying its security presence in neighboring countries such as Tajikistan in an attempt to insulate Central Asia from any spillover. At the same time, Moscow would look to strike up ties with a number of other groups in northern Afghanistan in addition to the Taliban, as well as former strongmen from the Northern Alliance, such as the Uzbek Abdul Rashid Dostum.
Band-Aid Solutions

Although they don't see eye to eye with Washington on many things, Afghanistan's neighbors have relied upon the long U.S. presence in the country to limit spillover from the conflict. Whether this has worked remains a topic of debate, because drug production has exploded over the past decade and dangerous transnational terrorist groups such as the Islamic State have established a foothold in the country. But there is a real possibility that these threats will only worsen if the United States withdraws hastily, leading Pakistan, Iran, China and Russia to brace themselves to engage more actively with Afghanistan. None of these countries is willing or, in some cases, even able to assume the U.S. mantle, but they hope to maintain a strong enough buffer on their respective borders by establishing relationships with various powerful local groups. Such action, however, might be little more than a cosmetic solution — if not a cause of greater problems down the road — as Afghanistan continues to come apart at the seams.

[DougMacG]

This interview drew attention for other reasons but as they moved to foreign policy, part of Graham's approach to Afghanistan is to get more help from Pakistan so we can reduce our own footprint.  What do people here think of that?  Isn't Pakistan part of the problem?

https://www.theblaze.com/news/lindsey-graham-explodes-on-cnn-anchor-who-defends-obamas-iraq-strategy-thats-a-bunch-of-bulls-t?utm_medium=referral&utm_source=mixi&utm_campaign=theblaze

[Crafty_Dog]

Several years ago YA posted a very interesting piece (by someone of Indian intel background?) suggesting a strategy of

Working from memory:

a) giving the Pashtuns their own country (i.e. peeled off in equal part from Afghanistan and Pakistan) i.e. an end to the Durand line;
b) fomenting the Baluchs with similar intent to peel off from Pakistan and Iran
c) seizing Kashmir and Jammu (?)
d) seizing Pak nukes

essentially a strategy of dismembering Pakistan.

Would be wonderful if someone could help dig it up.

[Crafty_Dog]

FWIW, my quickie sense of the timeline:

2001:  We gloriously kick ass and overthrow the Taliban, but then hesitate and OBL escapes.

Bush could have left at this point with a "Don't do it again" but instead hang around with vague neocon nation building noises AND decide to go to Iraq as well.

2006:  Michael Yon reports we are losing in Afghanistan.  I agree.  On this forum I repeatedly pound the table, asking "What is our strategy?"

2008-16:  Obama takes over a very unenviable situation.  He tries ignoring it too, and then pretends to Surge while announcing timeline for withdrawal.  I continue to ask "What is our strategy?"

2016:  Trump wants out but generals persuade him to stay, at least minimally.

2019:  No good options and all are getting worse.  Globally we are overextended and there is no prospect for success, let alone victory, in Afghanistan. 

Maybe we can hand it off to India to manage the situation?  Surely they are motivated, willing, and able to fukk with Pakistan , , ,

YA?

[G M]

The surrender in Afghanistan is a major signpost in the end of America. AQ/ISIS and whatever new global jihad entity will be back in business. Our enemies globally have seen that our massive military still can't win a war, even against savages 10 minutes out of the stone age. The PLA generals mock our weakness.

[Crafty_Dog]

That was said after Vietnam too.

[G M]

That was said after Vietnam too.

Do you remember when the NVA/ Vietcong butchered 3000 Americans in NYC?

[Crafty_Dog]

Right-- they didn't come after us even though we left in defeat-- and within eight years or so we elected President Reagan, who went on to defeat the Soviet Empire.


What I am contesting here is your assertion that exiting Afg inherently means we are done. 

[G M]

Why did we go into Afghanistan? Did we accomplish the mission?

[Crafty_Dog]

To overthrow the Taliban for having hosted OBL and to get OBL and his posse.

The former was done in mere months-- magnificent victory!  Then we flinched at going into the caves to go after OBL.

Col. Ralph Peters called for declaring victory and leaving-- with a "Fukk up again and we will be back."

Instead we stayed to nation build, , , , and then went off to Iraq with Afghani nation building on the back burner.  Now, some 15 years later, there is no victory to be had-- either eternal "mowing the lawn" so we don't have to admit we lost, or handing the problem off to India-- it would appear they are in a mood to non-nuclear fukk with Afghanistan.  BTW, this would free up about $60 plus free up the assets in play for playtime elsewhere.

[G M]

To overthrow the Taliban for having hosted OBL and to get OBL and his posse.

The former was done in mere months-- magnificent victory!  Then we flinched at going into the caves to go after OBL.

If we are negotiating with them, we sure didn't overthrow them, did we? Once we leave, they will rule and it will be as if we were never there. Oh, except for at least 2,400 dead and thousands of our troops horrifically maimed. Oh and 2.4 trillion debtbucks spent, at the minimum. 

The constant thread that applies here and most every other topic of concern is the rotting of our institutions. The rot of the institutions is downstream of the rot in our culture.

[ya]

I have been reading a lot about bitcoin, and one of the central ideas is that it is decentralized and cannot be shut down or controlled. Sort of reminds me of the taliban and their related islamic franchises. Very difficult to kill a decentralized enemy. We could knock out Saddam/Gaddafi etc, but these were centralized. Might be time to think in terms of centralized and decentralized enemies.

[G M]

I have been reading a lot about bitcoin, and one of the central ideas is that it is decentralized and cannot be shut down or controlled. Sort of reminds me of the taliban and their related islamic franchises. Very difficult to kill a decentralized enemy. We could knock out Saddam/Gaddafi etc, but these were centralized. Might be time to think in terms of centralized and decentralized enemies.

You can kill a decentralized enemy. You have to possess both the means and the will to do so.

[Crafty_Dog]

GM:  Isn't that what the Russians tried to do in Afghanistan?

YA:  I remember you posting here several years back a fascinating piece (of Indian provenance if I remember correctly) suggesting dismembering Pakistan by offering the Pashtuns their own country (half peeled away from Afghanistan, half from Pakistan i.e. getting rid of the Durand line) fomenting the Baluchs (including eastern Iran) with India kicking ass over the remainder and while the Paks were distracted we would seize their nukes , , , or something like that.   

Maybe I'm missing something, but that still seems like an interesting idea to me.

[ya]

These days with a nationalist and non-corrupt govt in India, the thinking is that war is to be avoided, as the Indian economy will be in the top 3 within the decade. Once its a 10 Trillion economy, Pak can be  easily dealt with, if it has not self destructed by then. Current approach is to shut down the water flowing into Pak. So India is building a lot of dams  and reservoirs to reduce the flow of river water into Pak. The Indus water treaty allows for waters from 3 rivers to India. Once this is done, India might abrogate the treaty and renegotiate it as the upper riparian and claim even more river waters. Nehru the peacenik gave substantial amount of river waters to Pak! and many in India consider that as a big blunder.

This does not preclude the govt from slapping Pak periodically and humiliating them. If Pak continues to support terror, I see the Indian govt increasing support to independence movements and Pashtuns inside pak. The Indian NSA (Mr.Ajit Doval) is a very smart and strategic thinker, who is also a hawk. He has openly said that if there is a large terror attack in India, Pak will loose Balochistan. It is essential that Modi win a second term. If he wins big, he could get rid of some artificial restraints that Indians have put on themselves, eg Article 370 etc, which do not allow other Indians to settle in Indian Kashmir!. Once these restraints are removed Kashmir valley can be controlled. The so called "Kashmir" area is actually several regions, Jammu, Leh and Kashmir. Of these Jammu and Leh are very peaceful and majority hindu/buddhist. Even in Kashmir, its only a small area of sunni muslims which is problematic, the Shia areas are very pro-India.

Pakis are brilliant at scoring self goals, one can count on that. Imagine that the US leaves Afgh and the talibs  take over. Nature abhors a vacuum. What stops them (Pashtun) from getting all nationalistic and abolishing the Durand line and turning on Pak ?. Pakis are however hoping the Pashtun can be turned against India/Kashmir. This is unlikely to happen as even today Indians are liked very much in Afghanistan while Pakis are not. India has civilizational links with Afghans, in recent times they have constructed dams, parliament building, hospitals, military and educational training, etc and there is a lot of goodwill for India.

I think the US has made its point in Afghanistan, and can bring the soldiers home. Let the afghans and the pakis duke it out...and inshallah the taliban may reclaim the Durand line.

[DougMacG]

Great information and insights as always YA.  I will be pulling for Modi to win reelection beginning April 11.

Some background perspective here on Pashtun, Durand Line, Taliban, etc.
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/taliban-and-changing-nature-pashtun-nationalism-41182?page=0%2C1

[ya]

Thanks, by the way I am super impressed as to how you and other forum contributors keep up with a gazillion topics and at a very high level of understanding.

[G M]

Great information and insights as always YA.  I will be pulling for Modi to win reelection beginning April 11.

Some background perspective here on Pashtun, Durand Line, Taliban, etc.
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/taliban-and-changing-nature-pashtun-nationalism-41182?page=0%2C1

I agree with Doug. I really appreciate your posts.

[Crafty_Dog]

Tail wags for the kind words YA, they are much appreciated.

"Some background perspective here on Pashtun, Durand Line, Taliban, etc.
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/taliban-and-changing-nature-pashtun-nationalism-41182?page=0%2C1 "

Do we have to subscribe to see this?

[DougMacG]

...
"Some background perspective here on Pashtun, Durand Line, Taliban, etc.
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/taliban-and-changing-nature-pashtun-nationalism-41182?page=0%2C1 "

Do we have to subscribe to see this?

Sorry, I think I gave you the link to page 2 which identified the author as a Professor at Michigan State.  Try this:

https://nationalinterest.org/feature/taliban-and-changing-nature-pashtun-nationalism-41182

With American withdrawal from Afghanistan distinctly on the cards, it is imperative that one makes an objective assessment of the future of Afghanistan by factoring in the variable of Pashtun nationalism now primarily represented, even if in distorted fashion, by a resurgent Taliban. What has given the Taliban’s appeal potency is its ability to couch in religious terminology traditional Pashtun aspirations for dominance in Afghanistan as well as the tribes’ aversion to foreign interference in their land. Both these factors have been constants in Afghan politics going back at least to the nineteenth century. They are likely to continue to assert themselves with great vigor following the American withdrawal.

Most Pashtuns, who comprise over forty percent of the population of Afghanistan, believe that they are the rightful rulers of the country based on the history of the past three hundred years when Pashtun dynasties ruled Afghanistan most of the time. While the Persian-speaking Tajiks, who form around a quarter of the population, are more urban and educated than the Pashtun tribes and staffed a substantial portion of the Afghan bureaucracy, the ruling dynasties were invariably Pashtun.

What many Pashtuns considered to be the “natural” political order in Afghanistan was radically altered, first by the Soviet invasion of 1979 and then by American assault in 2001 that was aided by the largely Tajik Northern Alliance that became the de facto ruler of the country in the initial period after the invasion. These events rankled the Pashtun tribes and the elites representing them and were in part responsible for the emergence of the Pashtun Taliban in 1994. The immediate causes for the advent of the Taliban were a reaction to the fear of Tajik domination and the mayhem and anarchy produced by the “mujahedin” factions fighting each other for control of Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal. The Taliban imposed a degree of order and ruled approximately three-quarters of Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001. Despite their distorted interpretation of Islam and violent behavior, they succeeded in providing a degree of dignity to the Pashtuns who appeared in control of the country’s destiny once again.

Pashtun resentment against foreign intervention, which drove their opposition to the Soviet invasion and now fuels antipathy towards American military presence, has a long history going back to their resistance to British intrusion during the nineteenth century. It was heightened by the British success in dividing the Pashtun lands in eastern and southeastern Afghanistan by drawing the Durand Line that attached a large portion of Pashtun populated territory to British India, now Pakistan. This drastically reduced the Pashtun demographic superiority in Afghanistan. Opposition to the Durand Line was the principal reason why Afghanistan cast the lone vote against Pakistan’s admission to the United Nations in 1947.

Traditionally, Pashtun nationalism in Afghanistan was based on ethnicity, tribal loyalties and the commitment to Pashtunwali, the traditional tribal code of ethics. It was not driven primarily by religious beliefs. This explains Afghanistan’s antagonism toward fellow-Muslim Pakistan in the first three decades of the latter’s existence. Before the Daoud coup of 1973 that overthrew the monarchy, the government was normally restrained in its hostility toward Pakistan, which was mostly limited to bouts of anti-Pakistani rhetoric. However, Pashtun parties, such as the Afghan Millat, were far more uninhibited in their expressions of animosity toward Pakistan over the irredentist “Pashtunistan” issue. Nonetheless, the two countries came to the verge of armed conflict several times, especially after Sardar Daoud Khan, who represented a much more Pashtun nationalist position, took power in Kabul in 1973.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 fundamentally changed the nature both of Pashtun nationalism and its relationship with Pakistan. It led to American and Saudi support for the Afghan insurgency with Pakistan acting as the conduit for American arms and Saudi financial support to the tribes fighting the Soviets and their proxy government in Kabul. It also led to the import of Saudi-Wahhabi ideology through madrasas set up with Saudi funding for refugee children on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. The Taliban (literally students) were products of these madrasas. These madrasas preaching the Wahhabi form of Islam infused Pashtun nationalism with an extremist version of political Islam that combined with Pashtun fears and aspirations came to define the Taliban phenomenon. This had far reaching implications for the nature of Pashtun nationalism in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Simultaneously, the Soviet invasion altered the nature of Pakistan’s relationship with Pashtun nationalism, turning it from hostility to support and sustenance. Pakistan’s support to the tribal insurgency against the Soviet invasion made the Pashtun tribes dependent on Pakistani goodwill and also changed Pakistan’s image among Pashtuns from potential enemy to reliable friend. Pakistan saw the mayhem in Afghanistan following the Soviet withdrawal as a great strategic opportunity and extended military and political aid to the Pashtun Taliban that emerged from Kandahar in 1994. This strategy culminated in the installation of the Taliban regime in Kabul with Pakistan’s military help in 1996.

The Taliban in power provided Pakistan with strategic depth in the event of a future conflict with India that Pakistan had been seeking since its dismemberment by Indian arms in 1971. It also offered Pakistan the opportunity to use Afghan territory and tribal manpower to establish and train terrorist organizations that were used in Indian-administered Kashmir that has been in turmoil since 1990. Equally important, Pakistan’s support to this religiously inspired manifestation of Pashtun nationalism largely solved the problem of Pashtun sub-nationalism within Pakistan by portraying Islamabad not as a suppressor of Pashtun ethnic aspirations but as the natural ally of Pashtun political ambitions.

Although Pakistan ostensibly changed course under American pressure in 2001 and joined Washington’s “War on Terror”—thus once again alienating the Pashtuns—it clandestinely kept supporting Taliban factions within Afghanistan that were combating American and allied forces thus keeping some of its credibility among the Pashtuns intact. It also gave refuge to the Taliban leadership who made Quetta in Baluchistan its new headquarters. Despite American anger at Islamabad’s duplicity, this strategy paid Pakistan good dividends that are likely to increase with the anticipated American withdrawal. Pakistan is likely to end up as the primary power broker in Afghanistan in the wake of the American departure.

Although polls show that the majority of Afghans do not support the Taliban, the divided and infirm nature of the nominally ruling dispensation and its corruption and inefficiency has helped the Taliban gain renewed support among parts of the Pashtun population. Added to this is the vicarious satisfaction that many Pashtuns feel at the Taliban’s defiance of what they consider to be the American installed government in Kabul. This makes the Taliban a viable political force in Afghanistan.

The resurgent Taliban are driven only partly by religion. They are motivated equally, if not more, by the search for Pashtun dignity and revenge. While they are not in a position to rule over the entire country, and certainly not the urban areas, they do control large swaths of the rural areas in the predominantly Pashtun provinces of eastern and southeastern Afghanistan. In other words, they are in a position to make the country ungovernable and indefinitely continue the civil war especially because of their control of the drug trade that finances their military activities and helps them buy acquiescence if not active support. The withdrawal of American forces will provide the Taliban greater opportunity to expand their area of operations and will give them larger bargaining clout within the fractured Afghan polity.

Therefore, it is important that the Taliban must be consulted and included in the construction of any future dispensation in Afghanistan if it is to remain viable. The Trump administration is cognizant of the fact that the Taliban cannot be wished away and that a durable peace in Afghanistan can only be constructed on the basis of their participation. Washington has reached this conclusion both on the basis of the Taliban’s demonstrated staying power and its ability to disrupt any political order that does not satisfy at least some of its goals.

Consequently, the U.S. president’s special envoy for Afghan Peace, Zalmay Khalilzad, has met with representatives of the Taliban in Qatar twice in recent months. Whether these meetings will bear fruit is anybody’s guess. But it is a healthy sign that Washington has finally woken up to the fact that the Taliban is an indispensable part of the Afghan political landscape and must be included in the fashioning of the country’s political future. However, the U.S. administration has to go beyond merely recognizing the disruptive capacity of the Taliban and realize that they do genuinely express the political goals of a substantial segment of the Pashtun population, by far the largest ethnic formation in Afghanistan, and that Afghanistan cannot be ruled effectively without adequately satisfying Pashtun aspirations.

[Crafty_Dog]

Thank you Doug.  Good article.

[G M]

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-kashmir-crisis-insight/india-pakistan-threatened-to-unleash-missiles-at-each-other-sources-idUSKCN1QY03T

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.defenseone.com/news/2019/04/its-getting-harder-track-us-progress-afghanistan/156513/?oref=defense_one_breaking_nl

[Crafty_Dog]

 

Pakistan Puts Out Feelers for Dialogue With India

What Happened

Without getting ahead of themselves, rivals India and Pakistan are testing the waters for a revival of talks. On May 23, Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan tweeted his congratulations to his Indian counterpart, Narendra Modi, on the latter's landslide victory in India's general election; Modi returned the favor, expressing his gratitude to Khan for the gesture. Three days later, the two leaders spoke by phone.

Also last week, Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi reshuffled officials in 18 diplomatic posts. As part of the changes, Qureshi shifted the country's ambassador to France, Moin-ul-Haque, to the vacant post of high commissioner to India — indicating Khan's desire to inject fresh energy into a position that is critical for dialogue with India. This week, Qureshi also exchanged pleasantries with Indian Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization ministerial meeting in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.

The Big Picture
________________________________________
India and Pakistan's decadeslong dispute over Kashmir has the potential to trigger a war between the nuclear rivals. Following a February flare-up, the United Nations sanctioned Masood Azhar, a Pakistan-based militant who has been a bete noire for New Delhi for over two decades. Now, as Pakistan contends with a slowing economy, its need to offer a safe investment environment will run up against its enduring support for anti-Indian rebels in Kashmir. 
________________________________________
The India-Pakistan Rivalry

Diplomatic niceties notwithstanding, Pakistan's army did test the Shaheen II medium-range ballistic missile on May 22 — just a day before the announcement of India's election results. Without question, Pakistan's military conducted the test to communicate that India should not interpret Islamabad's overtures as a sign of weakness. And there was also a warning from the other side of the divide, as India's ambassador to the United States, Harsh Vardhan Shringla, said talks with Pakistan could not occur until the country ceased to use terrorism as an instrument of state policy.

Why It Matters

Khan's outreach comes in the wake of a crisis in bilateral relations. On Feb. 26, Indian warplanes entered Pakistani airspace to bomb what India claimed was a camp belonging to militant group Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), which had killed dozens of Indian soldiers in a convoy in Indian-administered Kashmir on Feb. 14. On Feb. 27, Pakistan retaliated by launching its own airstrikes across the Line of Control, the de facto boundary that divides Kashmir between the two countries, capturing an Indian pilot during an ensuing dogfight. Khan, however, prevented the standoff from escalating further when he ordered the pilot's release and repatriation on March 1.
 
More recently, the United Nations voted last month to impose a travel ban, asset freeze and arms embargo against the JeM's leader, Masood Azhar. The vote passed because China — Pakistan's major international ally — finally acceded to a decade of Indian demands for the international community to move against the senior militant. The U.N. vote represented a success for India's strategy to diplomatically isolate Pakistan by publicly censuring the country. Meanwhile, in an effort to seem like it's taking a more robust line on militancy, Pakistan acquiesced to the U.N. measure — as long as the international body decoupled Azhar from the wider Kashmir issue.

The latter provision is because Pakistan's army and intelligence services have supported anti-Indian rebels in Kashmir as part of a decadeslong campaign of asymmetric warfare aimed at achieving a balance against a larger adversary. However, the timing of JeM's attack on the Indian forces in Kashmir suggests that the army's senior leadership doesn't control all militant behavior; the raid took place just two days before Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman's visit to Islamabad, producing the kind of negative press Pakistan's civilian and military leaders would prefer to avoid. (As it is, the attack forced the crown prince to delay his visit by a day.) At the same time, Pakistan's army is aware of the danger of pushing Kashmiri rebels too hard, as it could spark a backlash and open yet another front in its war on militants, which includes battles with armed groups along the mountainous frontier with Afghanistan and separatist Balochi rebels who threaten one of the country's economic lifelines, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.

Pakistan's support for talks with India also comes against the backdrop of an economic slowdown. Growth in the $300 billion economy is expected to slow from 5.8 percent in the last fiscal year, which ended in June 2018, to 2.9 percent in the current fiscal year. And with Pakistan redoubling its efforts to attract foreign investment, Khan and powerful army chief Gen. Qamar Bajwa have even more reason to offer a safe destination for foreign investment. Indeed, Pakistan assented to sanctions against Azhar amid its continuing talks with the Financial Action Task Force, a global anti-money laundering watchdog, to demonstrate its desire to disrupt militant financing networks after the body gave Islamabad a rating that would threaten investments.

Islamabad will have to tread carefully as it seeks to maintain its proxy strategy while distancing itself from militancy to project a stable investment environment.

What to Watch Going Forward

Will state elections in Jammu and Kashmir shape Modi's outreach to Pakistan? State assembly elections in the contested Indian state are due by year's end. According to last week's general election results, Modi's Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) improved its vote share in the state from 34 percent in 2014 to 46 percent. The figures indicate that the party's hard line on Pakistan is reaping electoral rewards and that Modi, whose posture on Pakistan is intimately linked to developments in Kashmir, might be wise to wait until after those elections to publicly engage in talks with Pakistani officials (though private, backchannel talks are always a possibility). More immediately, Modi has chosen not to invite Khan to his inauguration ceremony on May 30, unlike the leaders of Bangladesh, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar, Mauritius and Kyrgyzstan.

Will Pakistan implement the sanctions against Azhar? Pakistan may have cut the militant leader loose, but it's highly unlikely that this single gesture heralds a strategic shift in Islamabad's strategy of cultivating militant proxies. It will be important to monitor Pakistan's implementation of the sanctions and whether Azhar retains freedom of movement. And because the sanctions against Azhar are occurring against the backdrop of economic problems and the Financial Action Task Force review, Islamabad will have to tread carefully as it seeks to maintain its proxy strategy while distancing itself from militancy to project a stable investment environment.

How will India respond in the event of future attacks in Kashmir? New Delhi and Islamabad's dispute over Kashmir could trigger a war in which Pakistan stages a tactical nuclear strike against India's superior conventional forces. The next time there's a major militant attack in Kashmir, India could — if the past is any guide — respond more forcefully in an effort to chip away at the deterrence capacity of Pakistan's tactical atomic weapons, albeit not to the degree that it would actually trigger a nuclear strike. Following a militant attack on India's Uri army base in 2016, New Delhi launched a ground-level "surgical strike" across the Line of Control into Pakistan. And in the wake of JeM's attack in February, India escalated its response by launching airstrikes in Balakot, a Pakistani town outside of disputed Kashmir, in an effort to demonstrate the vulnerabilities of Islamabad's air defense. If India delves further into Pakistan after a future attack, the ensuing tit-for-tat responses will only heighten the prospect of a bigger conflict between the neighbors.

[ya]

Modi is quite clear, Pak must show verifiable action against terrorists. So far Pak is still playing games, house arrest of terrorists, freezing of bank accts etc. The terrorist organizations just change their names and things go on as before. Pressure to respond forcefully to any pak inspired terror attacks is also building.

Something that might happen (keeping fingers crossed) is that the status of Kashmir will change. Articles 370 provides autonomous status to Kashmir and article 35A prevents other Indians from settling in Kashmir, even though Kashmiris can settle anywhere in India. If any of these articles are repealed, BJP wins again. More importantly, Pak will no longer have any business with respect to Kashmir. To accomplish this, Modi needs a majority in the Senate (Rajya Sabha), they already have a majority in the House (Lok sabha). It is expected that in about 2 years, Modi will get a majority in the Senate.

Another approach that Modi is taking is to first use up all the water that is allowed under the Indus Valley waters treaty to India and prevent anything from flowing into Pak. Once that is done, the bargaining chip will be that the entire Indus  Waters treaty will be renegotiated, since the peacenik Nehru was very generous to Pak in the distribution of water. India has pak over a barrel, most of the rivers originate in India. One originates in Afghanistan, and India is building dams on it and canals to redirect water.

Overall, Pak is a beggar nation, no money, no water....at some point in the future, India might even get back POK (Pak Occupied Kashmir)...but first things first.

[G M]

Pakistan is a master of pretending to fight terrorism.

Modi is quite clear, Pak must show verifiable action against terrorists. So far Pak is still playing games, house arrest of terrorists, freezing of bank accts etc. The terrorist organizations just change their names and things go on as before. Pressure to respond forcefully to any pak inspired terror attacks is also building.

Something that might happen (keeping fingers crossed) is that the status of Kashmir will change. Articles 370 provides autonomous status to Kashmir and article 35A prevents other Indians from settling in Kashmir, even though Kashmiris can settle anywhere in India. If any of these articles are repealed, BJP wins again. More importantly, Pak will no longer have any business with respect to Kashmir. To accomplish this, Modi needs a majority in the Senate (Rajya Sabha), they already have a majority in the House (Lok sabha). It is expected that in about 2 years, Modi will get a majority in the Senate.

Another approach that Modi is taking is to first use up all the water that is allowed under the Indus Valley waters treaty to India and prevent anything from flowing into Pak. Once that is done, the bargaining chip will be that the entire Indus  Waters treaty will be renegotiated, since the peacenik Nehru was very generous to Pak in the distribution of water. India has pak over a barrel, most of the rivers originate in India. One originates in Afghanistan, and India is building dams on it and canals to redirect water.

Overall, Pak is a beggar nation, no money, no water....at some point in the future, India might even get back POK (Pak Occupied Kashmir)...but first things first.

[ya]

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/pak-fails-to-fulfil-25-of-27-fatf-points-downgrading-by-imf-world-bank-to-continue/articleshow/69811158.cms

[DougMacG]

https://www.lrb.co.uk/v41/n14/owen-bennett-jones/one-screw-short

[ccp]

"Some of his messages are intriguing: ‘I have to admit that a machine learning start-up based in Pakistan that I have angel-invested in was tasked to manipulate Russian elections in favour of Vlad Putin. The team did a great job I must say. Kudos. Congrats Putin.’ Other tweets show his admiration for nationalist, authoritarian leaders (with the inevitable exception of India’s Narendra Modi): Kim Jong-un, he suggests, might make a good UN secretary general."

 

[ccp]

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2018-01-31/long-shadow-aq-khan

his confession 2004 :

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/feb/05/pakistan.jamesastill

One could argue he should get the Nobel Prize for *war and terror*.

[ya]

From time to time, one reads reports that the Saudis may have been delivered the islamic bomb (by pak) , since they are the ones who finance pak. Dont know enough about bombs to judge the veracity of such reports. Pak does everything they can to monetize the know-how and the danger of proliferation increases everytime they near bankruptcy. I would watch iran-pak relations carefully in the future. Saudi Barbaria needs to keep funding pak....

[Crafty_Dog]

Sounds plausible to me , , , this possibility has been raised here a couple of times over the years.

[G M]

Sounds plausible to me , , , this possibility has been raised here a couple of times over the years.

The Saudis have the money. What would stop them from obtaining nukes from Pakistan?

[Crafty_Dog]

Ties with Afghanistan go back to supporting the mujahadeen against the Russians.

[ya]

With a hardliner home minister and with full support from Modi and people of India, Paki intrusions have gone down and separatist leaders are behaving. The carrot and stick always works...but you need a big stick and ability to use it. This has some parallels for the USA where Trump is trying to stop illegal immigration but does not fully control govt (House) and thus is unsuccesful....YA

https://www.dailyo.in/politics/amit-shah-kashmir-politics-militancy-in-kashmir-kashmiri-dynasts-hurriyat/story/1/31477.html


For someone acclaimed as Bharatiya Janta Party’s ‘Chanakya’, who drove the party to a historic landslide victory in the 2019 Parliament elections, getting the crucial assignment to head the Home Ministry was supposed to be the next big challenge.

But for Amit Shah, his Chanakya-neeti as the country’s Home Minister seems to have worked out even better.

If well-begun is half-done, Shah looks already halfway through — at least with regard to how politics in Kashmir has changed since the day he assumed office on June 1, 2019.


From mainstream to separatist camps, some of the most vociferous faces have transformed. 

The winds of change started blowing from the historic Jamia Masjid, Nowhatta in Srinagar — otherwise seen as the hotbed of the “Azadi” sentiment. Addressing devotees from the mosque's pulpit, Kashmir’s head parson and senior separatist leader, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, now dedicates his Friday sermons mainly to social and environmental issues.

On June 15, 2019, addressing the Jamia gathering, the Mirwaiz, who heads the Hurriyat (M), highlighted how people and government were responsible for frequent threats of flooding in Kashmir.  The next Friday, he dedicated his weekly sermon to highlighting drug abuse.

As per the national media, this change is now perceptible across all such mosques in the restive region.

“Kashmir mosques that blared ‘Azadi’ slogans will now launch a war on drugs” read the headline of a Hindustan Times report published on July 3, 2019. “Mosques across the Kashmir Valley, which blared slogans for “Azadi” (independence) in the early nineties, amplifying a separatist movement, will soon be using their loudspeakers to spread a message against the use of drugs, rapidly becoming a huge problem in the state of Jammu & Kashmir,” the report said.


While Mirwaiz was already seen as a moderate face of separatism, even his hardliner counterpart from the Hurriyat (G), Syed Ali Geelani, now sounds a bit soft.

It was for the first time in the last 30-odd years of militancy, that when the Home Minister made his maiden visit to Kashmir on June 26, 2019, there was no strike call from Geelani or his colleagues. In another significant development, separatist leaders have joined hands with Kashmiri Pandits to find ways to facilitate the latter’s return to the homeland. As per a news report published in India Today on July 6, 2019, “This is the first such effort in 30 years after thousands of Kashmiri Pandits were forced to flee the state after facing widespread violence.”

Keeping the situation under control on July 8, 2019 — the death anniversary of Hizbul Commander Burhan Muzafar Wani — was supposed to be another challenge. However, as compared to last year, Burhan’s death anniversary this year passed off peacefully, and the public response to a hartal call was debatable.

As per news reports, despite a customary hartal call, traffic jams were witnessed on the Boulevard as many used the strike as an opportunity to visit the Mughal Gardens and Dal Lake.



This time, even social media wasn’t that provocative.

Otherwise, on Burhan’s second anniversary, the separatists had tweeted this:


Mirwaiz Umar Farooq
✔
@MirwaizKashmir
 Amidst severe restrictions imposed all over #Kashmir today remembers #BurhanWani his associates & over 200 civilians Killed By Armed Forces since then. Great sacrifices rendered by our #Martyrs is firmly impressed on our collective memory and moves us forward in our mission

1,334
1:37 AM - Jul 8, 2018

The change in regional mainstream parties is similarly palpable.

The National Conference (NC) and Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) — who had otherwise championed the “Kashmir cause” — have gone for posturing. Out of power, the Abdullahs and Muftis would usually sound no different from separatists. But now, the ‘pampered dynasts' seem to be behaving more responsibly.

During the previous ban on civilian movement on the national highway after the Pulwama suicide bombing on February 14, both the Abdullahs and the Muftis had personally led roadside protests to publicly defy the curbs, bravely asking people to do the same.

For the security of the Amarnath Yatra, a similar ban is again in place. However, this time, the senior leaders from both parties have refrained from taking the law in their hands.

main_omar-abdullah-m_071319064414.jpg
Dynasts of Kashmir: They are now busy tweeting about flowers and cricket jerseys, and not the 'burning Kashmir question'. (Photo: Reuters)

Instead of the NC and PDP, this time, such roadside protests have mainly been organised by the Peoples United Front (PUF), an alliance between Engineer Rashid’s Awami Etihad Party (AEP) and Jammu and Kashmir Peoples Movement (JKPM), led by Shah Faesal.

But then, it is no more of the traditional anti-India ranting by Engineer Rashid. His protests have reduced to serenading demonstrations — he either walks barefoot outside the Civil Secretariat or brings along drummers, who play the dhol.

Such musical demonstrations are constant reminders of a scene from the Shahrukh Khan-starrer Mohabattein wherein Shahrukh Khan’s character, Raj Aryan, protests by singing the song “Duniya Mein Jitni Hain Nafratein”.

For around a month, Omar Abdullah’s tweets are more on issues like his cabin baggage and pictures of blooming flowers in Gulmarg than the “Kashmir-issue”. His firebrand colleagues also sound equally softened.


Omar Abdullah
✔
@OmarAbdullah
 Lupin season in Gulmarg. Courtesy ⁦@highlands_park⁩  https://www.instagram.com/p/BzsRGDOlv_W/?igshid=1rjt8am4vp90m …

142
4:10 AM - Jul 9, 2019
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Controversial NC leader and former Speaker of the J&K Assembly, Muhammad Akbar Lone, who won the Baramulla Parliament seat, is yet to stoke any new controversy. Known for his reportedly controversial statements previously, especially an appreciation for Pakistan and use of abusive language, Lone is largely silent in Parliament.

Forget politicians, even the Srinagar-based media houses have reformed.

Previously, a section of influential newspapers would use phrases like “government forces” and “troopers”. Now, they have switched to “security forces”.

But then, though for Amit Shah, it is a well-begun moment, it is only a halfway point.

The other half is an altogether different story.

And that half is not about politicians pampered by New Delhi and Islamabad to be beneficiaries of the Kashmir conflict — the other half is about the Kashmiri youth, who either pick up guns or take to the streets.

And the dissent of this youth matters.

main_kashmir-protest_071319064720.jpg
Out on the street: The dissent of the Kashmiri youth remains a big challenge for Amit Shah. (Photo: Reuters)

On the one hand, the killing of the poster-boy of new-age militancy, Burhan Wani, led to months of unrest in the state and prompted New Delhi to appoint Dineshwar Sharma as Interlocutor. On the other, on February 14, 2019, a 20-year-old lesser-known local militant, Adil Dar, pushed India and Pakistan to a nuclear flashpoint through his suicide bombing in Pulwama.

Since killing the militants has failed to kill militancy, Shah’s Chanakya neeti is expected to be beyond Operation All Out.

And then, in a state where 70 years of corruption — allegedly fueled by the regional dynasts — has been among the reasons for alienation, things haven’t improved much during the last one year of Governor's Rule either.

On June 12, 2019, Raj Bhawan called an interaction with accredited journalists. I was one of the invitees. Five of the 10-odd questions were on complaints of rampant corruption, prevalent during the Governor’s rule, with the Raj Bhawan unable to give convincing replies.

So, though halfway there, Shah has bigger challenges ahead. But then, there is hope.

And this hope is strengthened by his historic speech on Kashmir in Parliament on June 28, 2019.



Shah said that taking the people of Jammu and Kashmir into confidence was the top priority of the Modi government “even if it means giving more.”

Call him a new-age Chanakya or Sardar Patel’s avatar, the strongman who brought perceptible change in Kashmir in just a month is expected to perform even better hereon.

All the best, Amit Shah!

[ya]

News is hafeez saeed is under arrest

https://twitter.com/i/status/1151894069011816448