North and South Korea

[Crafty_Dog]

https://washingtontimes-dc.newsmemory.com/?token=2edc004d88747c50f446b862f39f1b71_61488849_6d25b5f&selDate=20210920

[Crafty_Dog]

The Reach of North Korea’s Weapons
2 MIN READJan 25, 2022 | 23:23 GMT





People watch a news broadcast with file footage of a missile test at a railway station in Seoul on Jan. 25, 2022, after North Korea fired two suspected cruise missiles according to South Korea's military.
People watch a news broadcast with file footage of a missile test at a railway station in Seoul on Jan. 25, 2022, after North Korea fired two suspected cruise missiles according to South Korea's military.

(JUNG YEON-JE/AFP via Getty Images)

North Korea’s January missile tests highlight Pyongyang’s continued focus on strengthening its conventional military deterrent capability while keeping pace with advancements in South Korea’s missile developments, as well as expanded anti-missile systems in Korea and the broader region. A more robust conventional deterrent would give North Korea more confidence in its relations with the United States and its neighbors, and may offer Pyongyang greater room for escalation if political or security relations worsen.

North Korea has tested eight missiles since Jan. 1, including two hypersonic missiles, two rail-launched short-range ballistic missiles, two tactical guided missiles, and two cruise missiles. January is an unusual time for North Korea to test missiles, and the pace of tests this year is significantly higher than the past two years amid the COVID-19 pandemic. Pyongyang also recently suggested that it may lift its self-imposed moratorium on long-range ballistic missile and nuclear tests, though South Korean officials have yet to report any unusual activity at North Korea’s primary nuclear test site.


Since the collapse of U.S.-North Korea nuclear negotiations in early 2019, Pyongyang has primarily tested shorter-range missile systems and larger-caliber multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), which are designed to overwhelm or evade missile defense on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea has also continued to test its second-strike capabilities, including its rail-launched missiles and its submarine-launched ballistic missiles. 

In addition to ballistic and cruise missiles, North Korea has expanded the range and accuracy of its MRLS systems over the past several years — moving away from its old dependence on outdated artillery systems that primarily targeted major population centers, and shifting to more tactical systems that can strike at key military targets in South Korea.

[DougMacG]

https://www.cbsnews.com/news/south-korea-election-president-yoon-suk-yeol-teach-rude-boy-kim-jong-manners/

[ccp]

vowing to teach "rude boy" Kim Jong Un "some manners"

outstanding !

while Kim is testing new long range missile:
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-60702463

[Crafty_Dog]

The U.S. Needs to Bankrupt North Korea’s War Machine
Diplomacy won’t stop Kim Jong Un from launching missile tests. That happens only when the money runs out.
By Nicholas Eberstadt
March 28, 2022 6:43 pm ET


Rocket Man is on another blasting spree. Last week Pyongyang tested a “monster” intercontinental ballistic missile, reportedly designed to strike any spot in the U.S. and overwhelm American missile defenses with multiple warheads. Since the beginning of the year North Korea has conducted more than a dozen launches—including cruise, rail-based, hypersonic and intermediate-range ballistic missiles—as well as an unsuccessful long-range missile test earlier this month. But why now? What does Kim Jong Un want from his sudden fireworks display?

The explanations from Washington and Asian capitals for these latest launches sometimes sound like the naive foreign-policy punditry from the 1990s, at the very start of Pyongyang’s methodical march to nuclear status. We hear that the Kim regime is trying to get our attention, for example, or that it is shoring up its domestic legitimacy.

Have we really learned so little from a generation of confrontation with this revisionist state? By now it should be clear to observers that Pyongyang fires off new weapons because their development is vital to its fundamental strategic goal of unifying the Korean Peninsula under Kim rule.

To achieve unconditional unification on its own terms, North Korea would first have to break the U.S.-South Korean military alliance. Pyongyang hopes to do that through a nuclear showdown with America. We don’t need to guess about this. Immediately after the latest ICBM launch, one North Korean media outlet explained Mr. Kim’s reasoning for building these new armaments: “the long-term demand of our revolution,” the North Korean term for conquest of the South, presupposes “the inevitability of the longstanding confrontation with the U.S. imperialists.” The logic is simple: No weapons testing, no unification.


This is why regular and recurrent missile launches and nuclear detonations are an essential and entirely predictable feature of North Korea’s behavior. New weaponry has to be tested before the North’s scientists and generals can be certain that it works. Pyongyang is totally committed to strategic modernization, for which Mr. Kim laid out a program in detail at the Party Congress early last year. Advancing that agenda will require continual performance checks on the new equipment, just as past progress in nuclear and missile capabilities necessitated North Korea’s previous experiments.

But why the current flurry of launches? The likely answer is that this is simply Pyongyang’s first opportunity to conduct them. Though Pyongyang has proved adept at keeping outsiders in the dark about its weapons programs, the record suggests North Korea tests prototypes essentially as soon as it can.

The regime seems unwilling (perhaps doctrinally incapable) of waiting until later to test its munitions when it can launch them now—hoping to rush them to mass production as soon as possible.

Planned tests are of course sometimes scheduled for propagandistic considerations—July 4 and North Korean national holidays being especially favored dates for launches and explosions. But the North generally seems to test its new equipment as soon as it is deemed ready, which sometimes turns out to be before it actually is, as this month’s launchpad failure of a long-range missile attests.

Yet for all its haste, Pyongyang also takes curiously long breaks between launches. It’s been more than four years since the North last tested an intercontinental ballistic missile.

Outsiders know precious little about the workings of the overall North Korean economy and even less about its defense sector, but it’s a fair guess that protracted hiatuses between weapons tests are often the result of resource constraints. North Korea’s economy is tiny, inefficient and undependable, while missile and nuclear programs are exacting and extremely expensive (and all the more costly for technologically backward societies). Furthermore, the North Korean economy is painfully prone to unexpected dislocations and severe slumps.

The most recent tests signal that the North Korean economy is finally recovering after Mr. Kim’s draconian Covid lockdowns all but incapacitated it. Economic constraints may also be a reason Pyongyang’s weapons testing dropped off after the United Nations Security Council’s 2017 spate of comprehensive economic sanctions. And they could help explain why the tempo of missile and nuke tests under Kim Jong Il (a notoriously miserable economic manager, even by North Korean standards) was so much slower than under his son Kim Jong Un before those 2017 sanctions. Declaring a self-imposed moratorium—as the North did in 2018—sounds so much better than saying you are unable to scrape together the cash.

President Biden caught a break by entering office while North Korea was suffering from acute, if self-inflicted, economic woes. The recent spate of missile tests suggests North Korea’s weapons programs are back in the black. Further menacing tests may lie in store—we shouldn’t rule out nuclear ones. And the return to testing means we should also expect a resumption of North Korea’s brand of nuclear diplomacy.


Rather than trying to appease Mr. Kim, the Biden administration and the rest of the international community would be well served in identifying, and squelching, the new resource flows funding the North Korean war machine. Pyongyang has launched a lucrative new career in cybercrime. The Kim regime has also benefited from Russian and Chinese sanction-busting. There could well be other illicit revenues worth pursuing; the U.S. intelligence community should find out.

Thirty years of fruitless attempts at diplomatic engagement with the North have demonstrated that outsiders can’t alter the regime’s determination to become a nuclear power. But forceful international economic penalties, tirelessly and creatively applied, can throw sand in the gears of the North’s military programs. We should address this task with the seriousness it deserves. If we don’t try to stop North Korea from becoming a greater threat, we will enter a world in which Pyongyang can credibly threaten the American homeland with nuclear missiles.

Mr. Eberstadt holds a chair at the American Enterprise Institute and is a senior adviser to the National Bureau of Asian Research.

[Crafty_Dog]

The Constraints and Drivers of Japan-South Korea Rapprochement
8 MIN READSep 5, 2022 | 14:00 GMT





South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin (left) and Japanese Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi attend a meeting in Tokyo on July 18, 2022.
South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin (left) and Japanese Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi attend a meeting in Tokyo on July 18, 2022.

(KIM KYUNG-HOON/POOL/AFP via Getty Images)

Foreign and domestic constraints will limit the scope of the ongoing rapprochement between South Korea and Japan, though steps to normalize trade relations and increase intelligence sharing are likely in the years ahead. South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol is attempting to make good on his campaign promise to restore and re-normalize relations with Japan, with Park Jin, the South Korean Foreign Minister, regularly meeting with his Japanese counterpart, Yoshimasa Hayashi, to find ways to resolve bilateral disagreements. South Korean and Japanese relations traditionally go through an up-and-down phase depending on the political leanings of the South Korean president, while Japanese views are slightly more standard in what they want out of South Korea for good relations. Liberal South Korean leaders would like Japan to take more responsibility for its World War II-era atrocities and thus hold a colder view of cooperation with Japan, while conservative South Korean leaders tend to view Japan as a necessary part of northeast Asian security (South Korea-U.S.-Japan) against communism from North Korea and China and have a warmer attitude toward Japan. Most Japanese conservative leadership would like South Korea to stop bringing up World War II-era atrocities committed by Imperial Japan, abide by previous treaties or agreements, and move forward with contemporary security, economic and social concerns. The two countries have been in a trade war since 2019 that started when Japan removed South Korea from the ''whitelist'' of favored trading nations because of a 2018 South Korean court ruling that Japanese firms were still liable to pay damages to victims of wartime atrocities. South Korea responded by boycotting some Japanese goods and Japanese-style stores and restaurants like Izakayas (popular drinking establishments) in South Korea, and many of its citizens stopped traveling to Japan for tourism. Seoul also dropped the term ''partner'' from its description of Tokyo in a defense white paper in 2021, which is a downgrade in how South Korea views the trustworthiness of Japan and prevents the countries from working closely.

The two nations continuously argue over Japan's responsibility for wartime atrocities committed by the Japanese empire from 1910-1945. Tokyo contends the issues were settled under the 1965 Treaty of Basic Relations, but Seoul has argued that those deals were made by South Korea's then-military dictator Park Chung-hee so the terms must be renegotiated.
In 2015, after negotiating with South Korea's conservative president Park Geun Hye, Japan paid $8.3 million to settle the longstanding complaints from former South Koren ''comfort women,'' who the Japanese army used as sex slaves during World War II. In 2017, under liberal President Moon Jae-in, South Korean courts argued that the 2015 deal was invalid and must be renegotiated. In 2018, South Korean courts ruled that Japanese automobile company Mitsubishi was liable and owed roughly $750,000 to victims of WWII-era forced labor, which Mitsubishi has since refused to pay, backed by Tokyo who cites the 1965 Treaty of Basic Relations treaty.
South Korean civic groups and the government routinely protest that some Japanese textbooks omit some of the worst actions the Imperial Japanese Army took during its occupation of South Korea from 1910-1945.
Japanese officials sometimes visit the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, which commemorates convicted war criminals from World War II along with other fallen Japanese soldiers. The site also has enshrined some Koreans against their will, which garners strict rapprochement from South Korean officials and citizens.
In the coming years, shared views on North Korea and China, along with U.S. pressure, will drive South Korea and Japan to improve their bilateral relationship. South Korea is concerned about a more bellicose North Korea and will seek to rely more on Japan to protect South Korea's eastern flank with overlapping missile defense systems and naval patrols, and threaten North Korean territory with conventional arms in the event of a conflict on the peninsula. To achieve this, Seoul and Tokyo must have robust intelligence-sharing and regular military coordination. Japan would like South Korea to present a credible first-strike threat to North Korean leadership and ballistic missile launchers that threaten Japanese territory. Additionally, in the case of a conflict in Taiwan, China is likely to attack Japan because they would need to cripple U.S. forces on Okinawa. This would result in war between the two countries and economic ties being cut. If such a war is declared, Japan will need a closer relationship with South Korea to maintain access to the South Korean trade and tourism market, and, in turn, cushion the blow of losing that access to China (Japan's largest trade partner). The U.S. military leadership also wants South Korea and Japan to maintain close bilateral relations to lessen the United States' security burden in Northeast Asia (namely, leading actions against North Korea), which would free U.S. forces to focus on a potential Taiwanese conflict.

A statement issued by the U.S. Department of Defense in June stressed the need for improved bilateral ties between South Korea and Japan, which would relieve the United States from serving as the middle-man for intelligence-sharing and military coordination between two of its closest regional allies.
North Korean ballistic missiles tend to land between the Korean peninsula and Japan. In 2019, North Korea threatened then-Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe with a ballistic missile strike.
However, South Korea and Japan's economic dependence on China, as well as domestic social pressures, will limit the scope of any bilateral agreements. China is the largest trading partner for both South Korea and Japan, and is willing to exercise economic coercion against its neighbors for pursuing policies that overtly displease Beijing. Without a formal agreement, tensions over the disputed Dokdo/Takeshima Island, while in essence settled as South Korean territory, will remain a thorn in the side of future discussions and negotiations between Seoul and Tokyo. In addition, anti-Japanese sentiment among South Korean voters will continue to dampen Seoul's appetite for increased cooperation with Tokyo, while the nationalistic sentiments in Japan will similarly restrict Japanese politicians' willingness to publicly pursue rapprochement with South Korea.

China accounts for roughly 25% of South Korea's exports and 21.6% of Japanese exports. The United States is second with 15% and 18%, respectively.
Chinese citizens organized a boycott of Lotte, a South Korean chaebol (conglomerate) in 2017 following the South Korean deployment of THAAD, a missile defense system that Beijing heavily criticized as threatening Chinese territory; the last Lotte store in China will close by the end of this year. During an address to Japanese officials this past June, the U.S. ambassador to Japan warned against Chinese economic coercion and intellectual property theft.
South Korea and Japan claim ownership of an island that sits between the two countries, called Dokdo in South Korea and Takeshima in Japan (the international community calls it the Liancourt Rocks). Currently, South Korea has de-facto ownership over the island, with a South Korean family living there, and a police force stationed on the island as well. But the Japanese government still claims the island.
Japan and South Korea will not become treaty allies anytime soon, though they will likely resume small-scale bilateral naval exercises and military cooperation. Conservative President Yoon's five-year term will not see South Korea sign a formal alliance agreement with Japan, as the bilateral problems that inhibit such a treaty will not be quickly resolved. But Yoon will restore the normal business ties with Japan that were cut during his predecessor's term, with red tape being reduced or eliminated on key industrial exports, and tourism resuming to pre-trade war levels. Bilateral naval exercises are likely to take place as well, but they are extremely unlikely to occur in South Korean waters as long as the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force flies the controversial Rising Sun flag. It is extremely likely that the two nations will proactively share intelligence specifically regarding North Korea (they never truly stopped sharing reactive intelligence related to missile launches, such as trajectories and impact locations). But it is somewhat unlikely that South Korea and Japan will agree on a single North Korea containment strategy, nor will the nations agree on a Chinese or Russian strategy. Seoul and Tokyo will also likely discuss cooperating on supply chains as part of the CHIPS 4 alliance, a U.S. proposal to boost semiconductor manufacturing between Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the United States.

The election of a liberal South Korean president in 2027 would threaten continued Japanese-South Korean rapprochement. Like his conservative predecessors, Yoon supports building closer relations with Japan within the U.S. security umbrella. But liberal South Korean presidents have tended to lean closer toward China, and have traditionally supported more autonomy from the U.S.-led security umbrella in the region.
The Rising Sun flag was adopted in 1870. It was the main flag of the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy during World War II. Many liken it to the Nazi swastika and believe it should be removed from contemporary use.

[Crafty_Dog]

A more confident and desperate North Korea

America should just say ‘no’ to normalizing a nuclearized adversary

By Joseph R. DeTrani

On Sept. 9 Kim Jong-un, at a session of the Supreme People’s Assembly, made it officially clear that North Korea will remain a nuclear weapons state with an expansive nuclear doctrine that includes the preemptive use of nuclear weapons.

Clearly, this was a message from Mr. Kim to the United States and South Korea. He was telling the United States that any future negotiations will focus on arms control issues, not denuclearization. And in this context, Mr. Kim now appears confident that the United States eventually will relent and accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state, something the North has been pursuing since the Six Party Talks from 20032009. North Korea was told then and continues to be told now, that the United States will never accept the North as a nuclear weapons state, concerned that other countries would pursue their own nuclear weapons program, despite U.S. extended deterrence commitments, and that a nuclear weapon or fissile material for a dirty bomb would be provided to a rogue state or terrorist organization.

Equally concerning was Mr. Kim’s other pronouncement that North Korea now has a nuclear “first use” doctrine that includes the preemptive use of nuclear weapons in response to an attack or an imminent attack on the leadership or its nuclear command structure or, indeed, a threat to the existence

of the state. South Korean President Yoon Suk yeol, during his campaign, had publicly stated that a pre-emptive strike was an option for his country in response to an imminent attack from North Korea. It appears that this may have been Mr. Kim’s response — we also have a preemptive use policy — to Mr. Yoon’s comments about a pre-emptive strike.

Although Mr. Kim’s Sept. 9 expansive commentary on the preemptive use of nuclear weapons was not too surprising, since he had made similar comments about the preemptive use of nuclear weapons on April 25 at a military parade celebrating the 90th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People’s army, it was noteworthy in that Mr. Kim now stated clearly — what many suspected — that North Korea will never give up its nuclear weapons, seemingly dashing any hope for the resumption of denuclearization talks.

On Sept. 16, the United States and South Korea will convene a session of the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group. At the May 2022 summit of President Biden and Mr. Yoon, it was agreed that the EDSCG would be reactivated since its last meeting in 2018. Both presidents agreed to enhance extended deterrence capabilities and resume robust annual joint military exercises. Accordingly, from Aug. 22 to Sept. 1, the largest joint military exercise in five years, Ulchi Freedom Shield, was successfully conducted with live-fire exercises that involved thousands of troops and land, sea, and air forces. These developments on the Korean peninsula are happening at a time when North Korea has been supportive of Russia in its war with Ukraine. Pyongyang has recognized the breakaway Donetsk People’s Republic and the Luhansk People’s Republic and reportedly is providing Russia with rockets and millions of artillery shells.

Unconfirmed reporting also mentioned North Korea sending workers to these breakaway provinces of Ukraine and possibly also sending troops to aid Russia and these breakaway provinces in the war with the government of Ukraine. No doubt this is a calculated move on the part of Mr. Kim to secure Russia’s support — its veto power as one of the five permanent members of the Security Council — in the United Nations to ensure that no further sanctions will be imposed on Pyongyang, regardless of their reckless behavior, to include a seventh nuclear test. Additionally, North Korea would receive needed oil, natural gas, and wheat from Russia, in exchange for Pyongyang’s support in the war with Ukraine. Although North Korea has had close relations with Russia, going back to Joseph Stalin and the Soviet Union’s support of North Korea during the Korean War and through the 1980s when the Soviet Union was helping North Korea with its missile and nuclear programs, to include the provision of a research nuclear reactor in the 1980s, and aid that abruptly ceased with the implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991. However, aligning with a revanchist Russia probably isn’t the option Mr. Kim and his father, Kim Jong-il, wanted to pursue. Rather, it was normalizing relations with the United States. This goes back to former President Jimmy Carter’s meeting in Pyongyang with Kim Il-sung in 1994, former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s meetings in Pyongyang with Kim Jong-il in 2000 and Mr. Kim’s meetings with former President Donald Trump in 2018 and 2019.

North Korea wants a normal relationship primarily with the United States. We know this from almost 30 years of negotiations and informal meetings and exchanges. The problem was and is that North Korea wants this normal relationship on their terms — accepting them as a nuclear weapons state. This has been and is the rub — we correctly continue to say “no.” Normalization is available with complete and verifiable denuclearization and significant progress on human rights. We should hold to this principled decision.

Joseph R. DeTrani is the former special envoy for negotiations with North Korea and the former director of the National Counterprolif-eration Center. The views are the author’s and not any government agency or department.

On Sept. 16, the United States and South Korea will convene a session of the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PvNfHJcJeKg

[Crafty_Dog]

Gauging South Korea's Response to the North's Upcoming Nuclear Test
6 MIN READOct 26, 2022 | 20:05 GMT





File footage of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is seen on a television screen at a train station in Seoul, South Korea, on Sept. 9, 2022.
File footage of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is seen on a television screen at a train station in Seoul, South Korea, on Sept. 9, 2022.

(ANTHONY WALLACE/AFP via Getty Images)

South Korea will likely react to North Korea's upcoming nuclear test with its own show of force, but the risk of Chinese retaliation and triggering another war with Pyongyang will limit how far Seoul can go in its response. Late last month, South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) said it expected North Korea to conduct a nuclear test between Oct. 16 and Nov. 7. It's highly unlikely that South Korean authorities would have made this timeline public if they weren't extremely confident in their intelligence and had a response prepared. Since the test hasn't occurred yet, it's widely expected to happen within the next two weeks per the NIS timeframe. North Korea has not tested a nuclear weapon since it began a self-imposed moratorium on such tests in 2017 amid increased outreach to South Korea and the United States. But while notable, the restarting of North Korean nuclear tests does not inherently alter the security situation in the region since Pyongyang has already demonstrated it is a nuclear power with advanced, high-yield devices. This means that barring an exceptionally unlikely scenario in which North Korea conducts an unprecedented above-ground or atmospheric nuclear test, tensions on the Korean Peninsula will remain high but will not become critical. But while the test may not significantly alter the North Korean nuclear threat, South Korea's response will still be key in gauging the greater trajectory of Seoul's national security policies and relationship with Pyongyang.

The last nuclear weapon that North Korea tested in 2017 was a supposed hydrogen bomb with an estimated yield as high as 250 kilotons. The bomb the United States dropped on Hiroshima in 1945, by comparison, had a 20-kiloton yield. The current U.S. arsenal of nuclear weapons includes the W80 and W87, which have yields of up to 150 kilotons and 300 kilotons, respectively.

South Korea will react to North Korea's upcoming nuclear test with an immediate display of force, while increasing military cooperation with the United States and Japan in the medium-to-long term. While North Korea hasn't tested a nuclear device despite signs it is fully prepared to do so, it has conducted over 40 tests of other weapons since the beginning of this year. South Korea has reacted to these recent weapons tests with proportionate demonstrations of military force, including by testing its own homegrown ballistic missiles. For South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, failing to react to North Korea's upcoming nuclear test with an even greater show of force than demonstrated in response to North Korea's ballistic missile tests would convey a major sign of weakness that would have disastrous domestic political effects, with Yoon's approval ratings likely sinking even further below its current 32%. It would also give North Korean leader Kim Jong Un a major propaganda victory by enabling him to claim that his Juche (or ''self-reliance'') strategy is working. In response to North Korea's nuclear test, Seoul will thus seek to showcase its military's capacity to conduct ''decapitation'' strikes against North Korean leadership from all sides with conventional weapons — likely by having South Korean naval vessels deploy airstrikes, ballistic missiles and/or long-range artillery against either island targets or dummy targets in the East Sea/Sea of Japan. In the medium-to-long term, South Korea will also look to speed up the development and deployment of a localized missile defense program similar to Israel's Iron Dome, and will seek to increase the size and scope of bilateral military drills with the United States. In addition, South Korea will look to potentially conduct bilateral military drills with Japan, which likely also use the nuclear test to further justify its own remilitarization efforts. Tokyo may even use the common threat of North Korea to broach new bilateral military cooperation with Seoul (though this could be complicated by the two countries' ongoing tensions over World War II-era grievances, like the use of forced labor and sexual slavery during Imperial Japan's occupation of South Korea).

South Korea maintains a ''decapitation'' strategy as a conventional way to counter North Korea's nuclear weapons. This would see Seoul launching fast, precision airstrikes, bombing raids, surface-to-surface missile attacks and/or potential commando raids aimed at taking out North Korean leadership and key military installations before North Korea could react, if South Korean leadership believes that a nuclear attack is imminent.

On October 4, North Korea tested a missile over Japan for the first time in five years. In response, South Korea conducted long-range rocket artillery and air strike demonstrations, and also tested one of its own homemade ballistic missiles.

In 2021, Reuters reported that South Korea was developing its own indigenous missile defense system, using a combination of Patriot Missile batteries and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) batteries, with an expected completion date of 2035.

Fears of provoking painful Chinese retaliation, however, will ultimately limit the scope of South Korea's response to the North Korean nuclear threat. A growing number of South Koreans support an increase in deterrence against the North, which includes nuclear weapons. According to recent polls, roughly 70% of South Koreans support the development of a domestic nuclear weapons program, and more than half (56%) support rehosting U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korean territory. The placement of such deadly warheads so close to China's border, however, would infuriate Beijing, given the extremely grave security threat it would pose. Should Seoul make such a decision, China would retaliate more swiftly and painfully than it has to previous transgressions, like South Korea's deployment of THAAD batteries in 2017. For example, instead of boycotting a single South Korean industry (as it did in 2017), Beijing could introduce a blanket boycott on most South Korean goods. Alternatively, China could ban its nationals from traveling to South Korea, which would severely harm the South Korean economy. South Korea is also limited in its ability to conduct physical military actions against North Korea, as even a low-level shelling or strike on a military base or infrastructure could restart the Korean conflict by breaking the unsigned cease-fire. In addition, the United States remains highly unlikely to support a direct attack on North Korea, which would give China a stronger casus belli to build up its military forces and potentially speed up the timeline for an invasion of Taiwan by labeling the West as the aggressor, in addition to renewing the Korean war. And South Korea remains highly unlikely to conduct such an attack without first consulting the United States, since doing otherwise would cause irrevocable harm to Seoul's alliance with Washington.
Given these risks, South Korea will thus refrain from taking any actions that could destabilize the region, despite mounting domestic pressure for a more hawkish approach to North Korea.

Before COVID-19 disrupted travel, Chinese tourists in South Korea spent an average of $3,000 per person. In 2020 alone, the loss of Chinese tourists cost South Korea an estimated $2 billion in revenue.

China has directly supported the development of the North Korean nuclear program and the impending test by continuing to send Pyongyang economic aid in violation of U.N. sanctions. This means that China will likely vote against any additional U.N. sanctions proposed in response to North Korea's upcoming nuclear test.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WARJLEjDQRg&t=4s

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LTCceQcogD4

[DougMacG]

https://rumble.com/vqmkwn-why-north-korea-is-the-hardest-country-to-escape.html

[ccp]

https://nypost.com/2023/06/03/trump-congratulates-kim-jong-un-on-north-korea-entry-into-who-board/

Not sure I get the head game here
Trump thinks the way to deal with a mass murderer is making him a friend, and that he is gullible naive and just needs some tender love and recognition.

Well, Kim still has not allowed Trump to build condos on the N Korean Bch to my knowledge .

[ccp]

could she on the right politically
because in S Korea conservatives a staunchly against the Kim regime
and the libs there are more conciliatory?

https://www.nknews.org/2021/06/north-korean-defector-yeonmi-park-muddles-human-rights-message-with-partisanship/

some reported inconsistencies of Yeomi 's story ?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yeonmi_Park

OTOH hand is the NK news sympathetic with  N Korea government ?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NK_News

hard to know who to believe
but Ms Park's story while possible "embellished" is still valid and her comparison to Columbia Univ is also valid  whether the Left will admit it or not.

I hear her story , her opinions and agree with them.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2023/jun/2/north-korea-targets-us-intel-figures-secret-cyber-/?utm_source=Boomtrain&utm_medium=subscriber&utm_campaign=newsalert&utm_content=newsalert&utm_term=newsalert&bt_ee=CpW6EdlhoPs7nQzDrtz7cQnNlI5PL8E7rjV75i6GgjUvasWeXagYHVL9KH357QXV&bt_ts=1685718705182

[Crafty_Dog]

https://washingtontimes-dc.newsmemory.com/?token=fa0b1df5a98444eee5677945f4b93f7e_659577e1_6d25b5f&selDate=20240103

[Crafty_Dog]

second

Seoul's priorities. South Korea’s Foreign Ministry published its annual diplomatic white paper on Wednesday. For the first time, the document describes Japan as South Korea’s “cooperative partner” and highlights Seoul’s efforts to fully restore relations with Tokyo. It also emphasizes South Korea’s desire to advance its relationship with the United States to the “highest level.”

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/south-korea-vows-unbearable-retaliation-against-north-korea-over-its-launch-of-trash-balloons/ar-BB1ntIMd?ocid=msedgntp&pc=DCTS&cvid=c019948b2b93495e9bdd84abbef04333&ei=50

[Crafty_Dog]

https://x.com/DD_Geopolitics/status/1803516550785425456

================

[Crafty_Dog]

August 13, 2024
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Why China Shuns the Russia-North Korea Alliance
Mending fences with the U.S. takes priority over their temporary affair.
By: Victoria Herczegh

Early this year, there was no greater advocate of a China-Russia-North Korea alliance than Kim Jong Un, the leader of North Korea for more than a decade. Trade with China would continue to normalize and grow after a sudden stop during the COVID-19 pandemic; Russia would exchange advanced military technology for North Korea’s spare ammunition and weaponry. Together, they would provide another layer of security for Kim’s regime. Russia, with its all-consuming focus on defeating Ukraine, was and is eager to upgrade relations with any country willing and able to support it, but China has conspicuously kept its distance from anything resembling a trilateral partnership. For Beijing, propping up Pyongyang is less important than mending ties with the United States, maintaining Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific and containing the confrontation on the Korean Peninsula. Over the longer term, Moscow’s interest in Pyongyang will wane, and Kim’s regime will be driven back into Beijing’s arms.

Trade with China is the lifeblood of the North Korean economy. In 2023, after three years of economic contraction and pandemic-related border closures, North Korea and China resumed cross-border trade. Though it traded almost exclusively with China (the rest of the world accounted for less than 2 percent of North Korea’s trade by volume), the North Korean economy expanded by 3.1 percent for the year, its highest growth rate since 2016. Speaking in January, an exuberant Kim declared 2024 the “North Korea-China friendship year.” China’s president, Xi Jinping, appeared to reciprocate, emphasizing Beijing’s readiness to cooperate with Pyongyang and its “strategic and long-term perspective” on their relationship.

By mid-June, things had changed. For weeks, there were rumors of an imminent trilateral summit, during which Kim, Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin were expected to sign a major defense agreement. Kim and Xi last met face to face in 2019, since which time Putin and Xi have become “all-weather friends.” But when the day arrived, only Kim and Putin were in attendance. While they signed a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty, Beijing seemed intent on distancing itself from whatever might transpire in Pyongyang, even scheduling meetings with South Korean officials for the same week.

The Chinese-North Korean relationship is complicated. The stability of the Korean Peninsula is a critical strategic priority for Beijing. A nuclear war would be in no one’s interest, but Beijing must also keep the North Korean regime from collapsing and sending millions of refugees over the border. Therefore, it is vitally important that China provide North Korea with substantial economic and diplomatic support. In China’s ideal version of the relationship, North Korea would be its vassal. When it suited Beijing, it could encourage Pyongyang’s erratic and threatening tendencies to coerce South Korea and the United States. Then, when Seoul and Washington were ready to give Beijing what it wanted, it could bring Pyongyang to heel. In this way, China could exact concessions from its foes while maintaining an air of magnanimity. Crucially, this strategy depends on North Korea’s isolation.

At the moment, however, North Korea and China need different things. North Korea needs all the financial, economic and humanitarian help it can get. China needs U.S. investment to help revitalize its sputtering economy, and it wants better relations with South Korea, which it hopes will translate into a more stable relationship with Washington and progress on denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. What Beijing does not need is Pyongyang making threats and fueling a regional arms race and U.S. military buildup.

Were North Korea devoid of other sponsors, this might not be a problem. But while China is keeping its distance in the name of neutrality, Russia is more than willing to deal. Two and a half years into a war many expected would last only weeks, Moscow badly needs ammunition, weapons and workers. Since late last year, it has received missiles and 5 million artillery shells from North Korea, according to South Korean estimates. The other side of the transaction is murkier, but Moscow may be assisting Pyongyang in developing ballistic missiles, satellites and launchers, air defense systems and other weapons. It could even help North Korea with its nuclear weapons program.

Secure in the belief that Russia will continue to need its help, North Korea has communicated to China its dissatisfaction with the recent level of Chinese support. For example, Pyongyang switched from a Chinese to a Russian satellite to broadcast its state television, and when hit with severe flooding this month, it turned down Beijing’s offer to support rescue efforts – reportedly leading to several drownings. China has not taken these slights lying down. According to reports in July, China ordered all North Korean workers in the country on expired visas to return home immediately, not gradually as Pyongyang had planned.

At the moment, China looks to be losing its influence over North Korea to Russia. But while Pyongyang’s interest in stabilizing its economy and earning international recognition of its status as a de facto nuclear-armed state is constant, Moscow’s pursuit of victory over Kyiv at nearly any cost is not. When the Ukraine war ends, Russia will not be as desperate for foreign weapons, though it may still be subject to sanctions by most advanced economies, in which case it could still benefit from cooperation with North Korea in the agricultural sector. At the same time, its recent gestures notwithstanding, Pyongyang cannot afford to alienate Beijing, its most important traditional ally. Similarly, China needs North Korea in the long term to support its strategic interests. The trilateral alliance of Kim’s dream is unlikely to happen, but China and North Korea’s partnership will be back on track sooner rather than later.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://hotair.com/jazz-shaw/2024/09/04/kim-jong-un-executes-dozens-of-his-own-officials-n3794028?utm_source=twdailyam&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=nl&bcid=a1714aba6c197395707aecde9ada65a65090b7be5f45291f6611e9cf3bd6bace&lctg=2677215

[Crafty_Dog]

Geopolitical Futures
October 9, 2024
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North Korea Sows Unease With Constitutional Changes
Kim’s regime expects others to engage with it rather than risk regional chaos.
By: Allison Fedirka

North Korea’s rubber-stamp legislature convened this week, tasked with amending the constitution to designate South Korea as a “hostile” country, remove clauses related to reunification and redraw the country's maritime borders. Kim Jong Un ordered the changes, likely anticipating that a few antagonistic maneuvers will frighten Pyongyang’s enemies, firm up its alliances and stabilize the regime at a time when its complete control is in doubt.

Greedy When Others Are Fearful

North Korea has long cultivated an image of itself as an irrational, volatile and dangerous state. Despite its decrepit economy and outdated weapons systems, Pyongyang preserves the credibility of its threats with periodic military drills and missile tests. South Korea and Japan are well within the North’s missile range, while the United States is constantly evaluating the capability of the regime’s intercontinental ballistic missiles to reach American soil. However, even North Korea’s friends pay a price for its bellicosity. For example, the U.S. and its allies often criticize China – the North’s largest trade partner and source of foreign aid – for failing to rein it in.

Korean Peninsula and Surrounding Area

(click to enlarge)

For a regime that thrives on disruption, the current global climate is a godsend. Among the major powers, the U.S. is busy trying to influence conflicts in the Middle East and Eastern Europe; Russia is heavily invested in defeating Ukraine; and China, whose biggest foe at the moment is a slowing economy, is clambering to maintain a semblance of neutrality. With their bandwidth limited, all three countries share an interest in preventing another major conflict, especially in the Pacific. A regime like Pyongyang’s can thrive in these circumstances. By leveraging its opacity and unpredictability, the Kim regime can squeeze more support from Russia and China, knowing they would rather engage with Pyongyang than risk regional instability.

North Korea sees no conflict in maintaining ties with both Russia and China. For most of the year, it has leaned toward Russia, culminating in a defense cooperation pact signed in June. This relationship is largely transactional – North Korea has provided munitions (and probably personnel, according to Seoul) for Russia’s war effort in Ukraine in exchange for much-needed economic assistance. They have explored cooperation in coal gasification and improving North Korea’s electrical grid, and Russian flour imports have contributed to a recent price drop, though not enough to resolve the North’s food crisis. (Washington also recently announced sanctions intended to disrupt the budding relationship between Moscow and Pyongyang.)

Meanwhile, North Korea and China just marked the 75th anniversary of their diplomatic relationship with a pledge to strengthen bilateral ties. Beijing has consistently maintained that North Korea's growing partnership with Russia does not threaten its relationship with China. Joint Russian-Chinese military patrols and exercises in the Pacific reflect their aligned interests in the region, highlighting that Moscow and Beijing view North Korea as a valuable, if erratic, player in the Pacific.

Cracks in the Facade

Despite the favorable context, all is not well in the Hermit Kingdom. Food shortages are a major issue. Crop theft is rampant, and the regime’s plans to double farmer-led night patrols have met resistance over the lack of state protection and compensation for injuries. Crop yields have suffered because of extreme weather. In July, the regime struggled to manage severe flooding, leading Kim to dismiss his public security minister and provincial committee chiefs. If South Korean media reports are to be believed, another 20-30 officials were executed for their mishandling of the floods – an unusually large number even for North Korea.

Meanwhile, cracks may be emerging in Kim’s inner circle. In September, North Korean media published a peculiar photograph of special operations forces conducting target practice while Kim’s rifle-wielding bodyguards stood over them and Kim watched from a short distance. The image may have been intended to display Kim’s authority over the troops, but it could also suggest that he fears a rogue soldier might take a shot at him. More quantifiably, the number of North Koreans who defected last year was 196, far below pre-pandemic levels but triple the figure in 2021 and 2022, according to South Korea’s Unification Ministry. Among the defectors, 10 were high-ranking officials, including Pyongyang’s second-highest diplomat in Cuba.

North Korea | Defectors to South Korea

(click to enlarge)

The most striking evidence of instability came in early October, when North Korea held its first national conference to address officials' performance in personnel administration. The meeting acknowledged multiple failures, called for improvements in policy implementation and introduced reforms to the personnel administration sector, underscoring the regime’s growing concerns.

North Korea, despite being a peripheral player, does not operate in isolation, especially in the context of U.S. regional ties. The U.S. and China have been engaged in economic negotiations, with China seeking U.S. investment to revive its struggling economy, while the U.S. urges China to restrain North Korea. The renewed closeness between China and North Korea complicates the picture, sending mixed signals about the status of U.S.-China talks. If negotiations were progressing well, China would likely work to reduce tensions by managing North Korea’s behavior. However, if talks are stalling, China’s closer ties to Pyongyang could serve as a strategic lever over Washington.

In either case, two regional dynamics remain constant. First, cooperation among the U.S., South Korea and Japan is robust. The trilateral alliance is focused on countering both North Korea and China as well as preventing Russia from expanding its influence in the region. Underscoring the importance of the trilateral partnership, two of the first phone calls made by new Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba were to the U.S. and South Korean presidents, and both calls covered North Korea and trilateral coordination.

Second, North Korea’s actions are designed to exploit geopolitical fault lines to improve its standing. Strengthening ties with Russia and China and conducting multiple missile tests keep North Korea’s enemies on edge. Domestically, this saber-rattling helps Kim secure support from his patrons to bolster North Korea’s economy and security apparatus – crucial goals given the challenges to the regime’s absolute hold on power.

[ccp]

https://allthatsinteresting.com/room-39

and Kim's younger sister

Kim Yo Jong

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Room_39

[ccp]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Korea

SK $34,165

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Korea

NK $640

Amazing how a country of 24+ million can be controlled and brutalized like this.

[DougMacG]

Good find ccp.  More than 50 fold richer - every hour of the day. That's the difference between freedom and tyranny.

After you pay 50 times more for housing, you still have 50 times more to spend on healthcare, utilities, energy, transportation, etc.

People who scoff at prosperity haven't really thought about living without it.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-14153427/Chaos-South-Korea-Civilians-clash-military-choppers-land-parliament-president-stuns-world-declaring-MARTIAL-LAW-claiming-lawmakers-sympathetic-Kim-Jong-subverting-parliament.html

[Crafty_Dog]

second

December 3, 2024
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South Korea’s Standoff Over Martial Law
The president’s shock declaration took many by surprise.
By: Antonia Colibasanu

South Korea’s president took the extraordinary step on Dec. 3 of declaring martial law. In announcing the move, President Yoon Suk Yeol accused the opposition Democratic Party of “anti-state activities” and efforts to block the operation of government. Within hours, 190 of 300 lawmakers convened and voted unanimously to demand that Yoon revoke the martial law declaration – an order that the president must respect, according to South Korea’s Constitution. A few hours later, Yoon relented on what was bound to be a test to Seoul’s democratic institutions, the regional geopolitical order and the strength of South Korea’s alliances.

South Korean leaders have invoked martial law several times in the nation’s history, typically during turbulent times and often coincident with military coups, but the last time was in 1979. In the latter case, the ensuing pro-democracy backlash eventually led to the country’s complete adoption of democracy in 1987.

The type of martial law invoked by Yoon (emergency rather than security) is intended for times when a major crisis such as a war or rebellion prevents the state from executing its responsibilities. It essentially suspends civilian authority and grants broad powers to the military. Yoon’s order, in addition to dissolving parliament and banning public demonstrations, also required medical interns and residents, most of whom have been on strike since February, to return to work within 48 hours.



(click to enlarge)

South Korea is not at war or facing a rebellion, so Yoon’s order came as a shock. Instead, Yoon apparently meant for the declaration to break the political impasse gripping the South Korean government. Yoon’s administration has been at loggerheads with the parliament, where the opposition Democratic Party holds a majority, over several critical pieces of legislation, most notably the 2025 budget bill. The stalemate has left the government unable to address pressing issues involving the economy and disruptions to public services. Compounding the crisis were Democratic Party efforts to impeach prosecutors who opted in October not to charge Yoon’s wife over allegations of investment fraud and accepting inappropriate gifts. Besides the political gridlock, strikes by junior doctors and other health care workers have impeded the delivery of essential medical services and contributed to the sense of crisis. All this, according to Yoon, amounted to an attempt by “anti-state” forces and North Korea sympathizers to disrupt the constitutional order.

Although the declaration of martial law did not mention it, developments in North Korea also probably influenced the decision. In recent months, Pyongyang has intensified its military activities, including conducting multiple missile tests, and has made repeated threats against Seoul and its allies. By framing its domestic opponents as sympathizers with the communist North Korean regime, the Yoon administration sought to prove that martial law was a necessary measure to safeguard the nation’s security against internal and external threats.

Rather than stabilize the situation, however, the invocation of martial law was liable to trigger more instability. Lawmakers quickly gathered and voted down the declaration. Opposition parties and civil society groups described martial law as a threat to the nation’s democratic freedoms, which were secured only in the late 1980s after decades of authoritarian rule. Moreover, a paralyzed South Korean government would be ill-equipped to defend the nation against North Korean aggression, and it could have encouraged Pyongyang to exploit the situation to its benefit. In a worst-case scenario, it could have resulted in a military confrontation, but even developments short of war could have complicated efforts to manage North Korea’s provocations through diplomacy and upset the balance of power in East Asia. Finally, a prolonged bout of martial law would likely have strained the U.S.-South Korean alliance, a cornerstone of regional stability, as well as South Korea’s relationship with Japan. With approximately 28,500 troops stationed in South Korea, the U.S. has a vested interest in the country’s stability and democratic integrity.

[DougMacG]

Meanwhile, a key ally is nearly in a civil war.

I'm having a hard time figuring out who the good guys are. One side declares martial law and locks down the country. The other side is ambivalent about the threat of North Korea and China, if I'm reading this right.

https://www.asiasentinel.com/p/impeachment-crisis-splits-koreans?publication_id=23934&utm_campaign=email-post-title&r=9bg2k&utm_medium=email

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/feb/07/russia-withdraws-north-korea-troops-kursk-deaths-ukraine-war

[ccp]

missile range may be enough to reach California and certainly Hawaii and Alaska.

https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2024/10/31/north-korea-intercontinental-ballistic-missile-test/75958911007/

Their missle tests seem to be evidence of a rapidly expanding long and short range missle program technology:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_North_Korean_nuclear_program

[ccp]

in the first place:

some assistance of non military tech from Russia and China, and later help from Pakistan:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Korea_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction

[Crafty_Dog]

Also note they were building a nuclear reactor in Syria until Israel took it out.