North and South Korea

[Crafty_Dog]

Who knows what is going on in the talks with Sec State Pompeo and the Norks, but I fear the President has made it harder by being too effusive since Singapore.

[DougMacG]

"... but I fear the President has made it harder by being too effusive since Singapore."

On the surface view of it, absolutely true, shameful if anyone but Trump did it.  I wrote that he shouldn't even shake hands and instead they took romantic walks.  But Kim knows full well Trump can turn on a dime back to "Fire and Fury" with an ego and a temper and the military muscle to back it up if this doesn't go through.

Not just DT, but Kim Jung Un is a world hero if he pulls this off.  He gets a peace treaty with the strongest power on earth and an opportunity to try out something like the hugely successful Chinese economic model, or he continues to rule the darkest corner of earth under more pressure and danger than ever before if he doesn't.

[Crafty_Dog]

http://carolineglick.com/the-donald-trump-negotiations-academy/

[Crafty_Dog]

Reality Check


By Phillip Orchard


Frozen Peace: Where the Korea Standoff Goes From Here


An indefinite “freeze for freeze” may be all that’s obtainable.


Predictably, last week’s Singapore summit was long on pomp and short on substance. The summit was rushed, leaving insufficient time to hammer out anything more than a symbolic statement in which Pyongyang committed to even less than it did in talks with the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush administrations in 1993, 1994 and 2005. More important, neither North Korea nor the U.S. was prepared to make any meaningful concessions on their red lines anyway. It’s doubtful that the U.S. will have the leverage to force the North to agree to a formal deal on complete, verifiable and irreversible disarmament anytime soon.

However, the outlines of a tacit deal on the size and shape of the North’s nuclear and missile arsenals are beginning to take shape. In fact, the bulk of such an arrangement might already be in place. And it could have considerably more staying power than the meatier deals with North Korea that were repeatedly inked and scrapped in the past.

Still Miles Apart

Ahead of the summit, to avoid backing itself into an untenable political position that would bolster Pyongyang’s negotiating position, the White House began lowering expectations for the talks. Since then, the Trump administration has been referring to it as merely the first step in a long process toward denuclearization.

This week, the U.S. took the next step by announcing the suspension of annual major joint military exercises with South Korea, with the stipulation that they will resume if the North bails on its commitments, though it’s still unclear what steps the U.S. expects to see. Whether or not the North is serious about giving up its nukes, we would expect a series of reciprocal good faith measures like Washington’s freeze on drills, Pyongyang’s freeze on missile and nuclear tests, dismantlement of test facilities and so forth. In any standoff with stakes this high, either side would need to move extremely cautiously to avoid getting played by the other, meaning this phase could easily take years.

But to demonstrate that it is indeed serious about denuclearization, the North would eventually need to take a step that can’t be quickly reversed. Test freezes can end with the flick of a match, and test facilities can be rebuilt (for missile tests, very quickly) – as was the nuclear cooling tower the North blew up in 2008 in exchange for concessions from the United States. Denuclearization will remain notional until the North concedes, at minimum, something on par with what Iran did in 2015, eliminating part of its stockpile of fissile material and giving inspectors the near-unfettered access needed to detect new weapons-grade enrichment.

The problem for the U.S. is the North has yet to express a willingness to hand over its nukes, particularly within the 2.5-year timeline laid out by the White House. In Pyongyang’s view, denuclearization means effectively the same thing as what the U.S. agreed to in 1968 when it signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which requires nuclear states to pursue disarmament at some point in a utopian future. And unless the U.S. is willing to go to war over the issue, there’s little reason to think that the North will back down. No U.S. guarantee can replace the sense of security that nukes give the North. China is unwilling to do what it would take to bring the North to its knees on Washington’s behalf. Ultimately, the North just isn’t important enough for the U.S. to go all in to disarm it.

Without movement on either of the two variables that matter most in the standoff – the North’s willingness to hand over its hard-won nukes, or the willingness of the U.S. or another power to try to take them by force – the center of gravity will shift to secondary aims. The diplomatic process will focus on servicing respective political needs, managing the North’s behavior as a nuclear power, and jockeying for regional influence as East Asia comes to terms with its new reality.

Living Without a Resolution

In this environment, the path of least resistance for both sides will be to accept that an indefinite “freeze for freeze” may be all that’s obtainable.

The U.S. can live with this arrangement if it thinks it’s stopping the North’s intercontinental ballistic missile program short of being able to strike the U.S. mainland with any sense of reliability. In other words, it could stomach a nuclear North for some of the same reasons it’s been able to tolerate a nuclear Pakistan: Islamabad doesn’t have the missile technology needed to strike the U.S., and disarming the country would require an exceedingly costly war. Politically, the Trump administration will want to show that it has, in fact, brought the North to heel, but this could conceivably be managed with occasional, even if symbolic, concessions by Pyongyang that sustain a sense of momentum toward denuclearization.

The North can live with this if it thinks the arrangement forestalls a U.S. attack in perpetuity, opens the door to sanctions relief, and undermines the ability of the U.S. and South Korea to oust the regime by force. It thinks the Trump administration now has a political imperative to stick with the diplomatic process. It already has a large enough nuclear arsenal to pose a deterrent, even if the lack of future testing may prevent it from obtaining larger-yield hydrogen bombs. And though its ICBM remain unproven, U.S. assets and allies are well within range of its more proven missiles, and its ICBMs – even if lacking proven re-entry and targeting technology – can at least fly far enough to theoretically put the U.S. within reach, potentially giving Washington still greater pause before attacking. More than anything, it effectively cements the North’s nuclear status, allowing Pyongyang to begin its pivot to economic development.

South Korea can live with this arrangement because it forestalls a war that would put Seoul at risk of annihilation and creates space for it to pursue its own, more substantive rapprochement with Pyongyang in a less tense environment. Reports this week that Pyongyang and Seoul may open talks on moving artillery back from the demilitarized zone suggest that the North now feels secure enough to join the South on the risky road to reunification, even if both sides will proceed forward at a glacial pace.

[Crafty_Dog]

Is North Korea Balking at Denuclearization?
North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un visits the Chemical Material Institute of the Academy of Defense Science on August 23, 2017.


    The political framework for North Korean denuclearization has been worked out at the top level, but the technical details still need to be fleshed out.
    Even if North Korea continues to overhaul parts of its nuclear program, the lack of any concrete agreement means that there will not necessarily be a return to the heightened tensions of 2017.
    The current situation is a continuation of the negotiation dynamic between the two countries in which the United States signals it is aware of all the details of North Korea's activities. As there is more disclosure, this dynamic will continue.
    As long as the political framework precedes the technical concerns, there will be hope for a lasting breakthrough.

The Key Takeaway

It appears that North Korea has, at least until recently, been conducting activities that contribute to the development of its nuclear and missile programs. However, with no agreements yet in place, such activities do not necessarily signal unwillingness to reverse course in exchange for trade-offs from the United States. Signs will emerge in the coming negotiations between U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and his North Korean counterpart that will show whether Pyongyang is truly committed to denuclearization – namely, through the disclosure of sites and clearer public statements by North Korea.
The Big Picture

In Stratfor's 2018 Annual Forecast, we noted that both the United States and North Korea would need to start the North Korean denuclearization process by first mustering a political framework around denuclearization before advancing dialogue into the thorny technical details. The dynamic has now entered this second, more fraught phase.
See 2018 Annual Forecast
See Asia-Pacific section of the 2018 Annual Forecast
See Coping With a Nuclear North Korea
What Happened

According to recently released satellite imagery acquired by the Middlebury Institute for International Studies, North Korea appears to have expanded one of its missile manufacturing plants, the Chemical Material Institute located in the city of Hamhung, between April and June.

The plant produces solid-fueled ballistic missiles and warhead re-entry vehicles, both of which are essential components in North Korea's development of a credible nuclear deterrent. The imagery, released July 2, shows the construction of several new buildings on the site, which North Korean leader Kim Jong Un visited in August 2017 to review expansion activities. It also revealed construction at two facilities nearby; a new entry road was built at one and demolition work was completed at the other.
Some Background

At the historic June 12 summit between Kim and U.S. President Donald Trump, Washington and Pyongyang agreed to cooperate toward the eventual goal of ensuring the total denuclearization of North Korea. But they didn't establish any formal details or agreements.

In the weeks following the Trump-Kim meeting, speculation – especially in the U.S. media – has been mounting over whether North Korea truly intends to denuclearize and what exactly the process of denuclearization would look like.

The first of the lower-level post-summit meetings between the United States and North Korea began July 1, when officials from both countries met in the village of Panmunjom in the demilitarized zone. Pompeo is also rumored to be preparing for a trip to North Korea soon, perhaps as early as July 6. This negotiation phase will be critical in determining whether the two sides can make real progress or whether they will fall back into the well-trodden territory of enmity.
The Broader Picture

The July 2 satellite imagery comes after a week of other reports that North Korea is continuing its missile and nuclear development program. The country has reportedly upgraded facilities around reactors at the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center and, according to U.S. intelligence leaks, maintained the operation of secret uranium enrichment sites while continuing to manufacture Transporter Erector Launchers for medium-range missiles. The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency is also reportedly circulating an internal assessment that North Korea does not intend to engage in full denuclearization.

What Really Matters

In the wake of these reports, the media has speculated that North Korea's construction activities indicate a lack of dedication to the denuclearization process. But as Stratfor noted even before the June 12 summit, the most difficult part of making progress in an outreach effort such as this is always the technical details. And those concrete details can't even be arranged without the greater political will and open communication of those at the top.

This will be a back-and-forth process, in which North Korea attempts to bluff and the United States uses a variety of tools to call Pyongyang out.

The United States and North Korea have provided evidence of that political will, and they are beginning the process of hammering out the details. And since no formal deals have yet been made, the North Korean actions between April and June cannot be construed as violations of any agreement.

The first concrete action in the process of denuclearization will be for North Korea to disclose the full scope of its weapons program and facilities. Washington is worried that Pyongyang may try to obfuscate that information. And indeed, it's possible that the week of media leaks about North Korean actions may be an organized attempt by the United States to show that it already has a deep knowledge of the country's weapons program.

[Crafty_Dog]

second post

y Andrew Jeong
Updated July 6, 2018 11:28 a.m. ET
69 COMMENTS

SEOUL—North Korea is thought to be developing a new submarine capable of launching nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, a senior South Korean lawmaker said, signaling an increased threat to U.S. and allied forces while raising doubts about the regime’s pledges to disarm.

Evidence gathered by South Korea’s military suggests Pyongyang is working on the submarine on its east coast, said Kim Hack-yong, who chaired the legislature’s defense committee until his term ended a few weeks ago. Mr. Kim, who belongs to a conservative opposition party that is skeptical of dialogue with Pyongyang, cited intelligence provided last week by defense officials.

Satellite imagery reviewed by South Korean intelligence officials showed the movement of laborers and materials at the port of Sinpo, where the submarine appears to be under construction at an indoor facility, an aide to Mr. Kim said.

A Defense Ministry spokesman said he couldn’t comment on details pertaining to intelligence activities but stressed that Seoul and Washington continue to monitor North Korea’s military facilities.
Related Video
What Would Peace Look Like on the Korean Peninsula?
The two Koreas have technically been at war for more than six decades. That's about to change, say North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and South Korea's Moon Jae-in. But what would peace on the peninsula look like?

North Korea’s submarine-launched ballistic missile program was first publicized in 2014. North Korea is believed to have undertaken four to six test launches of its SLBM model known as the KN 11. The test firing of a missile in 2016 that traveled 300 miles signaled that the program was progressing.

Pyongyang’s ability to mount nuclear weapons on those missiles and what the firing range would potentially be with a newly built submarine remains unanswered—as does the question of where North Korea is getting the technology.

U.S. officials consider the program a threat because such missiles are harder to identify and destroy before launch, potentially giving North Korea a greater element of surprise in an attack. The U.S. Embassy in Seoul couldn’t immediately comment.

As Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visits Pyongyang, North Korean weapons developments have raised questions about North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s commitment to denuclearize following his agreement with President Donald Trump in Singapore last month. Their joint statement lacked specifics, leaving the regime wiggle room as to what exactly constitutes denuclearization.

In Pyongyang on Friday, Mr. Pompeo was expected to press North Korean officials for concrete steps to deliver on those pledges, such as a timeline for disarmament.

In recent days, though, satellite images have indicated North Korea is expanding a missile-production facility and erecting a new building at one of its plutonium-producing reactors.
Related Coverage

    North Korea’s Secret Army: How Operatives Abroad Aid the Regime (May 18)
    Trump, Kim Begin New Phase of Diplomacy (June 15)
    Denuclearization Means Different Things to Kim and Trump, North Korean Defector Says (May 14)

North Korea also appears to be preparing for its annual summer military exercises and hasn’t ceased sending orders to its spies in South Korea through coded messages, said Mr. Kim, the lawmaker.

The latest evidence shows the need to maintain pressure on North Korea and force the regime to negotiate, said Yang Uk, the chief defense analyst at Korea Defense and Security Forum, a Seoul-based private think tank.

“It’s too early to say if the North Koreans have defaulted on the Singapore agreement to denuclearize,” he said. “But earlier satellite images have already shown enough evidence proving North Korea has not abandoned its SLBM program.”

Hwang Jin-ha, a retired South Korean Army lieutenant-general and the former chairman of the defense committee at the country’s legislature, said he believed the latest information to be credible. Mr. Hwang, a former lawmaker, belongs to the same party as Kim Hack-yong.

North Korea’s navy operates a fleet of about 70 submarines, alongside 430 surface combat ships, according to South Korea’s Defense Ministry. It also maintains 250 amphibious vessels and 20 minesweepers.

South Korea’s navy has about 10 submarines, according to the ministry. It maintains 110 surface combat ships and 10 amphibious vessels. Seoul, however, possesses advanced assets, including three Aegis-equipped warships able to intercept incoming ballistic missiles.

The North’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles has led to several rounds of sanctions against the regime and threats of U.S. military action from Mr. Trump.

But a detente has emerged this year, driven in large part by South Korean President Moon Jae-in, bringing the U.S. and North Korean leaders to their first meeting.

Mr. Kim, the third-generation dictator, has declared his nuclear force complete and said he wanted to focus on rebuilding his sanctions-strained economy.

After the Singapore summit, the U.S. and South Korea agreed to suspend military exercises that had angered Pyongyang and that Mr. Trump had described as provocative and expensive.

The regime, meanwhile, agreed to return the remains of U.S. military personnel killed in the 1950-53 Korean War. That hasn’t happened; it wasn’t immediately clear whether Mr. Pompeo’s trip to Pyongyang would yield progress on that front.

[Crafty_Dog]

third post

North Korea nuclear talks have hit a speed bump. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo left Pyongyang on Saturday and arrived in Japan, where he spoke of the progress made on all issues – though he admitted that further talks were needed to iron out details. North Korea’s Foreign Ministry released a statement, however, calling the meeting “regrettable” in light of what it called unilateral U.S. demands to denuclearize. This may be part and parcel of the negotiation process, but it’s hard to ignore that North Korea has not agreed to concrete steps going forward, has contradicted U.S. assessments of meetings and has cozied up to China even more than usual.

======================

FWIW I'm sensing it is time for President Trump to tell them it is time to shit or get off the pot and if the latter go full tilt sanctions-- hitting the Chinese firms involved as well.

If not, he will be taken as a blowhard here and elsewhere.

Shit or get off the pot applies to President Trump as well.

[G M]

third post

North Korea nuclear talks have hit a speed bump. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo left Pyongyang on Saturday and arrived in Japan, where he spoke of the progress made on all issues – though he admitted that further talks were needed to iron out details. North Korea’s Foreign Ministry released a statement, however, calling the meeting “regrettable” in light of what it called unilateral U.S. demands to denuclearize. This may be part and parcel of the negotiation process, but it’s hard to ignore that North Korea has not agreed to concrete steps going forward, has contradicted U.S. assessments of meetings and has cozied up to China even more than usual.

======================

FWIW I'm sensing it is time for President Trump to tell them it is time to shit or get off the pot and if the latter go full tilt sanctions-- hitting the Chinese firms involved as well.

If not, he will be taken as a blowhard here and elsewhere.

Shit or get off the pot applies to President Trump as well.

Yes

[Crafty_Dog]

July 19, 2018
By Phillip Orchard
North Korea Talks Are Still at Square One


The U.S. has less leverage now than before.


When U.S. President Donald Trump agreed to meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in Singapore in June, he flipped the script on the normal diplomatic approach with an adversary like Pyongyang. The strategy was basically to celebrate the optics of the unprecedented high-level summit, get some sort of agreement, and figure out the details later.

The impulse to do this was understandable; previous strategies hadn’t worked. In the face of long stretches of withering sanctions pressure and threats of fire and fury, punctuated by fruitless periods of engagement and economic inducement, North Korea built nuclear weapons anyway, plus a healthy ballistic missile arsenal. And by helping to reduce tension and start a dialogue, the summit could make it easier for both sides to agree on a viable roadmap forward.

But diplomatic ingenuity and imagination will lead to little more than symbolism and stagecraft if out of step with underlying realities. Nimble diplomacy can pry open a window of opportunity, but it cannot hammer one out of a brick wall. Trump has been just as captive to this reality as his predecessors. Willingness to buck orthodoxy goes only so far.

The White House is evidently still searching for a way to backfill the Singapore agreement with substance. By all indications, the U.S. and North Korea are still miles apart on where to start.

Over the past few weeks, particularly since U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo came home reportedly exasperated and empty-handed from his trip to Pyongyang, the White House has been seeking to reduce expectations for quick progress with North Korea. On Tuesday, Trump himself said there’s now no time limit for North Korea’s denuclearization. This is a marked departure from the days following the summit when Trump said the North Korean nuclear threat had been resolved, and when the U.S. was still touting a timeline that would see North Korea hand over its nukes before the end of Trump’s first term.

The fact remains that North Korea has yet to explicitly declare in public an intent to hand over its nukes. In the Trump administration’s view, denuclearization needs to be complete, verifiable and irreversible – CVID for short. In Pyongyang’s view, denuclearization means effectively the same thing as what the U.S. agreed to in 1968 when it signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which requires Washington and other nuclear states to pursue disarmament – some day.

It’s certainly possible that North Korea has been much more explicit behind the scenes about denuclearizing on U.S. terms. It has a long and distinguished track record of duplicity. Such tactics have helped put it in the position it finds itself in today: a nuclear power, for all intents and purposes, stringing along the world’s sole superpower. And given its interest in staving off a war, easing sanctions pressure and exploring opportunities for major concessions from the U.S. – in particular, a substantially reduced U.S. presence on the Korean Peninsula – Pyongyang would have an interest in saying whatever Washington needed to hear to get a protracted diplomatic process going.
But the joint communique signed at the Singapore summit didn’t contain an explicit commitment to CVID, nor did it outline any concrete steps toward that goal. And since then, none of Pyongyang’s actions have hinted that it’s willing to budge on the core issue, despite even the U.S. suspension of joint military drills with South Korea. It has continued work on nuclear facilities and stalled on dismantling missile test sites. When Pompeo tried to push CVID as the basis for negotiations, according to widespread reports, the North essentially shut down and politely waited for him to leave. So long as the U.S. is unable or unwilling to bear the risks of attempting to deal with the issue by force, it just doesn’t have much leverage. And there’s an argument to be made that it has even less leverage now that there are strong political incentives to show some kind of tangible progress.

In effect, North Korea is returning the negotiations to the format of those conducted with past U.S. administrations: a protracted slog over minor concessions that do little to bring about a grand bargain. The difference now is that North Korea is bargaining as a nuclear power, and the sanctions front is already starting to unravel. The sorts of tangible concessions the U.S. would normally be pushing for publicly at this point – controls on the shape, size and safety of the North’s nuclear program – would likely require an unpalatable admission by the U.S. that CVID is not actually on the table. Otherwise, a tacit “freeze for freeze” deal – in which the U.S. refrains from conducting major joint military drills with the South, while the North refrains from testing any ballistic missiles capable of striking the U.S. – may still be all that is obtainable. Most parties with a stake in the issue (Japan excepted) can likely live with such a deal, even if it would be inherently fragile. That’s only a failure if measured against successes declared after Singapore that never were.

[ccp]

any better result would have been a shock

While it is good Trump is trying I don't know why anyone thinks anything else would change .  A big question is how much of this is China turning up the screws on us now in are behind at least some of this:

http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-trump-north-korea-negotiations-20180721-story.html#

Trump has shown himself to be more naive then Obama is some regards
lately at least

[Crafty_Dog]

http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/399604-us-intelligence-agencies-determine-that-north-korea-is-constructing



https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/23/world/asia/north-korea-dismantling-missile-facilities.html

[DougMacG]

http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/399604-us-intelligence-agencies-determine-that-north-korea-is-constructing

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/23/world/asia/north-korea-dismantling-missile-facilities.html

"U.S. intelligence agencies indicate North Korea is building new missiles, "

Sounds to me like Trump is putting his knowledge of this out to Un publicly. A development like this might actually help the process, it gives Trump cause to make a military strike during the so-called negotiations..

It doesn't make sense that Un was just going to give it all up based on a charm offensive.

[ccp]

"It doesn't make sense that Un was just going to give it all up based on a charm offensive."

Yes , hard to believe the prospect of a hotel gambling golf resort for the rich and famous with the gigantic letters TRUMP atop the building is going to buy him over.

(maybe the beautiful girls could.)

[Crafty_Dog]

So, what now?

Do we keep "negotiating" without bringing something more to our game?  Or?

Or is Trump going to wait until after the elections?

[ccp]

So, what now?

Do we keep "negotiating" without bringing something more to our game?  Or?

Or is Trump going to wait until after the elections?

Well if Kim has nucs and ICBMs we don't have forever to negotiate
seems like we really need to know what Kim is doing .  One would think he is using this negotiating process to delay for more development of his nucs
we can't just trust him.

Just don't know.
I feel safer not less  with Bolton in there
but I am not a South Korean sitting in Seoul praying not to wake up to fire and brimstone and roof caving in and my sheets on fire

[DougMacG]

So, what now?

Do we keep "negotiating" without bringing something more to our game?  Or?

Or is Trump going to wait until after the elections?

Armchair: if we were Trump... 

First, can we predict what Mattis, Bolton and Pompeo each with present options and advice, then what should and what will Trump do?

Mattis respects and fears the start of using force there but has a menu of options already prepared for the President.  Bolton is a hawk but takes a little different level of confidence to be talking to the Commander in Chief while his finger is on the button than network work or giving debate advice.  Pompeo I believe is the go-to guy.  If I were Trump I would lean toward what Pompeo thinks will sway Un from the options presented by Mattis.  Then I would tell Un in almost specific terms the details of the impending attack, but not the timing.  Give enough notice to either change course or at least not panic knowing the first strike will be a limited strike versus the second if needed that would not.  I expect Trump to lay out in public what Un faces if what they are discussing in private isn't working.

If a full scale war is needed, maybe they can schedule it between the American election and our Christmas break, and let Un know that as well. 

Another video we could share:    General Mattis, what keeps you awake at night?  Mattis: "Nothing.  I keep other people awake at night."

[Crafty_Dog]

Phillip Orchard |September 5, 2018



The denuclearization process with North Korea is going nowhere fast. Last week, U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis said the U.S. has no plans to suspend any more major military exercises with South Korea. Mattis also said that smaller-scale exercises in the South would continue, lending credence to the North’s accusation that a nuclear submarine recently dropped off a fresh contingent of U.S. special operations forces at the Jinhae naval base for training. Halting these kinds of exercises was Washington’s portion of the tacit “freeze for freeze” agreement the United States and North Korea appeared to have reached a few months ago.

Also last week, U.S. President Donald Trump abruptly canceled a long-planned visit to Pyongyang by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, just days after Pompeo finally named a special envoy to spearhead working-level negotiations with the North. Trump’s decision was reportedly motivated by a letter he received the same day from Kim Jong Un’s spy chief, Kim Yong Chol, who warned that negotiations may fall apart if the White House fails to take steps toward negotiating a peace treaty with the North.

There’s no reason to believe North Korea is holding up its end of the bargain either. Most available evidence suggests Pyongyang continues to develop its ballistic missiles and its enrichment capabilities.

North Korea never pledged to denuclearize on the timeline the White House said it would, of course, and since Singapore, it has stymied the diplomatic process over largely symbolic issues. The two sides are at an impasse over how to move forward. The White House wants full denuclearization. Full denuclearization is a non-starter for Pyongyang. Surrendering its nuclear program would only invite an attack. A partial handover is possible, but the U.S. won’t abide by an agreement that simply allows the North to rebuild what it just gave away. A peace treaty is possible, but the North would demand that the U.S. withdraw its 28,000 troops from the peninsula – a nonstarter without full denuclearization. And even if Washington signed a peace treaty, it would be sacrificing its one source of leverage over the North.

(click to enlarge)

The issue is simple, if not easy. Unless the U.S. is willing to address North Korea’s nuclear program by force, the White House doesn’t have much leverage to induce capitulation. Washington can try to influence the size and shape of the North’s nuclear and missile arsenals, as well as its behavior as a nuclear power, and it could tolerate a nuclear North Korea for many of the same reasons it’s learned to live with a nuclear Pakistan: Islamabad doesn’t have the long-range missile technology needed to strike the U.S., and the alternative would be an exceedingly costly war. But it doesn’t exactly have much leverage for these lesser aims, either. International sanctions pressure has been gradually weakening, and South Korea has been busy pursuing its own reconciliation with the North in ways that are likely to further ease international pressure on Pyongyang. The U.S. has already played its military exercises card, and it won’t pull U.S. forces from the peninsula – at least not right now. It has promised economic investment to appeal to Kim’s designs on economic development, but Kim can’t do so without threatening his regime’s continued rule. And with Trump having declared in June that North Korea was no longer a nuclear threat, there’s political pressure on the White House to show results. Time is on the North’s side.

The U.S. is now attempting to regain some of the leverage it lost. It’s why the U.S. is threatening to restart military exercises that Pyongyang believes are a rehearsal for invasion. It’s also why the U.S. has tried to reinvigorate the sanctions regime. Yet it’s hard to see military drills or sanctions doing much to break the impasse. They haven’t yet – not even when international pressure peaked in 2017. That means the U.S. likely has bigger issues in mind in crafting its North Korea strategy — namely, China and Russia, the two countries most responsible for keeping the Kim regime afloat.

Over the past month, for example, the U.S. (unsuccessfully) sought a U.N. Security Council resolution to halt shipments of refined petroleum products to the North. It also slapped new penalties on Russian banks accused of laundering money on behalf of North Korean front companies (one of them based in China) and on a pair of Russian shipping firms accused of conducting ship-to-ship oil transfers with sanctioned North Korean ships. Last week, Vox reported that the U.S. is considering new secondary sanctions targeting Chinese and Russian banks and firms. The recent sanctions were too small to hurt much, but the sanctions could be read as warning shots of worse things to come. Given the fragility of the Russian and Chinese economies, it’s doubtful that either government missed the message.

The White House and the U.S. State Department, meanwhile, have both singled out China and Russia in their statements on North Korea. It’s safe to assume that they shifted the blame for political reasons, but China and Russia have always been bigger strategic threats than North Korea. The U.S. may not be able to resolve the North Korea nuclear crisis, but it can certainly weaponize it against its enemies. (In fact, it already has. Trump said Pompeo’s visit may not be rescheduled until after U.S.-China relations are repaired, suggesting the White House is eager to bind the two issues together.)

To be clear, neither Russia nor China are interested in a nuclear North Korea. It’s just that the threat it poses to them is subordinate to the threat the U.S. poses. North Korea, then, is just a bargaining chip. Moscow has sustained low-level economic support to Pyongyang as a way to bolster its image as global power-broker and seek concessions from the U.S. on, say, Ukraine and Syria. China supported the U.N. sanctions to forestall a war that might end with U.S. forces back on its border, but it continued to play ball because it thought doing so would keep the U.S. satisfied on trade.

In other words, every party to the Korean crisis – except for the two Koreas – is once again playing a bigger game. This is a familiar role for North Korea, which has long served as a pawn between outside powers. That’s why the North went nuclear in the first place. And in three weeks, Kim will celebrate the 70th anniversary of his country’s founding (reportedly with an envoy from Chinese President Xi Jinping) with Pyongyang in the rare of position of being able to bend this game to its advantage.

[ccp]

maybe if Trump promised to rename all of his buildings "Kim towers"...

meantime Kim cooled off some things and just bought another six months of time.

[G M]

maybe if Trump promised to rename all of his buildings "Kim towers"...

meantime Kim cooled off some things and just bought another six months of time.

So, to play the same game China plays with the NorKs, put US nukes in Taiwan. If Xi wants the nukes out, he will insure the NorKs are nuke-free as well. Tit for tat. Enough screwing around.

[ccp]

" So, to play the same game China plays with the NorKs, put US nukes in Taiwan. If Xi wants the nukes out, he will insure the NorKs are nuke-free as well. Tit for tat. Enough screwing around."

Cuban missel situation in reverse.

Would Taiwan go for that?

[Crafty_Dog]

The U.S. is continuing to put Russia at the center of the North Korea nuclear issue. On Friday, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo accused Russia of actively working to undermine U.N. Security Council sanctions on the Hermit Kingdom. This came a day after similar comments were made by U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Nikki Haley, who called for an urgent meeting of the UNSC for Monday, and following the U.S. imposition of new sanctions on two firms, one Russian and one Chinese, that have allegedly been acting as front companies for North Korean interests. Sanctions enforcement is certainly key to getting any kind of substantive concessions from Pyongyang, and Russia has certainly been acting as a lifeline for North Korea. But the U.S. is also motivated by its broader strategic concerns regarding China and Russia here, putting North Korea in a familiar role at the center of a burgeoning competition between larger powers.

[Crafty_Dog]

Dissonance between the U.S. and South Korea. The United States is opposing plans made by Seoul and Pyongyang to set up a no-fly zone over the demilitarized zone, Reuters reported, citing unnamed sources. On Tuesday, the U.S. State Department expressed concern over how quickly the two Koreas are moving to develop a cross-border railway. Meanwhile, bilateral talks on sharing the cost of stationing U.S. troops in South Korea apparently have stalled. (The current arrangement expires at the end of 2018.) These reports come a week after a minor tiff broke out between the U.S. and South Korea over North Korean sanctions. The short version: Washington objected to deliberations Seoul held for lifting sanctions it imposed on Pyongyang in 2010. U.S. and South Korean interests in denuclearizing North Korea were never going to fully align, but the differences between them are becoming more apparent now that Seoul is getting much of what it wants. Watch for efforts by Pyongyang and Beijing to try to exploit these divides.

[Crafty_Dog]

The elections are over.  Over to you President Trump-- what are you going to do?

https://www.dailywire.com/news/38239/breaking-north-korea-moves-forward-missile-ben-shapiro?utm_source=shapironewsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_content=111218-news&utm_campaign=position2

[Crafty_Dog]

I have speculated here that the Iranians (using the Obama-Kerry $150 billion?)  may be behind the sudden acceleration in the Nork missile progress.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FoGklkSeq3g&utm_source=Clarion+Project+Newsletter&utm_campaign=429a4bf28d-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_03_03_09_50&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_60abb35148-429a4bf28d-&mc_cid=429a4bf28d&mc_eid=%5BUNIQID%5D&utm_source=Clarion+Project+Newsletter&utm_campaign=9c4339e10c-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_03_03_09_50&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_60abb35148-9c4339e10c-6358189&mc_cid=9c4339e10c&mc_eid=d7eaaa3130

[G M]

I have speculated here that the Iranians (using the Obama-Kerry $150 billion?)  may be behind the sudden acceleration in the Nork missile progress.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FoGklkSeq3g&utm_source=Clarion+Project+Newsletter&utm_campaign=429a4bf28d-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_03_03_09_50&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_60abb35148-429a4bf28d-&mc_cid=429a4bf28d&mc_eid=%5BUNIQID%5D&utm_source=Clarion+Project+Newsletter&utm_campaign=9c4339e10c-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_03_03_09_50&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_60abb35148-9c4339e10c-6358189&mc_cid=9c4339e10c&mc_eid=d7eaaa3130

No way! I'm sure Obama/Kerry got them to promise they wouldn't!

[Crafty_Dog]

North Korea, post-conference. After the Hanoi conference between U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un ended early, satellite images published by Washington think tank 38 North and confirmed by South Korea’s National Intelligence Service show that North Korea is rebuilding a launch site that it had previously agreed to destroy. The construction apparently began before the Hanoi summit. The launch site isn’t as important as it’s being made out to be; neither of North Korea’s two intercontinental ballistic missile tests in 2017 was launched from the site. Regardless, U.S. National Security Adviser John Bolton responded by making clear that, if the construction is in fact underway, North Korea can forget about sanctions relief. In the U.S. Senate, a bill was introduced Tuesday that seeks to impose additional sanctions on banks that do any business with the North Korean government. Yesterday, the United Nations reported that North Korea’s food production last year was the worst in a decade, and studies from South Korea-based research institutions suggest that the North’s economy could have shrunk by between 3.5 and 5 percent in 2017. This raises the question of how bad the North’s domestic situation really is, but, as we’ve written before, it remains extremely unlikely the North would give up its nuclear weapons in exchange for anything that the U.S. is willing to give.

[Crafty_Dog]

The Logic of Trump’s North Korea Approach
He’s wisely stuck with sanctions, and it isn’t as if his predecessors ever had much success.
59 Comments
By Michael O’Hanlon
March 5, 2019 7:19 p.m. ET

There is lots to criticize in President Donald Trump’s North Korea policy. He sounds insensitive to the case of Otto Warmbier, displays more warmth toward Kim Jong Un than South Korea’s leaders, depicts military exercises with the South as “very provocative” and exaggerates his progress. Yet there may be a method here.

Mr. Trump’s approach to the North Korea problem has developed a certain logic: First, maintain strong international sanctions until a deal is struck. These sanctions cut North Korea’s trade by at least half in 2018, according to the Korea Development Institute. Second, sustain the U.S.-South Korea military deterrent. Although Mr. Trump’s rhetoric regrettably wavers, American troops remain in South Korea, and small-scale exercises have continued even as large ones have been curtailed. Third, use Mr. Trump’s personal chemistry with Mr. Kim to keep the risks of war within bounds while also giving Mr. Kim time to decide if he will accept a reasonable deal at the negotiating table.

Mr. Trump’s willingness to walk away in Hanoi, when Mr. Kim apparently insisted on the lifting of almost all key sanctions in exchange for limited nuclear concessions, was welcome in this regard. So, as my colleague Jung Pak points out, was Mr. Trump’s willingness to consider a peace treaty and the opening of diplomatic offices between the U.S. and North Korea during the same summit—a smart way to keep President Moon Jae-in, who is eager for rapprochement with Pyongyang, on board.

Mr. Trump’s approach to North Korea harks back in some ways to that of the Clinton administration, when former President Jimmy Carter and later former Defense Secretary Bill Perry made special efforts to reach out to Pyongyang. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice made similar efforts in George W. Bush’s administration. But these démarches were undertaken with Kim Jong Il, a particularly mercurial North Korean leader who was more interested in acquiring nuclear weapons than opening up to the world. They also were pursued in fits and starts, with misalignment between leaders in Seoul and Washington often impeding any sustained strategy.

As a result, over their 24 years in office Presidents Clinton, Bush and Obama failed to curtail Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions in any meaningful way. By the end of that period, North Korea had conducted five nuclear tests—a sixth followed, in 2017—and built an arsenal of several dozen nuclear warheads that continues to grow even as testing has been suspended. The U.S.-South Korea alliance was sustained through those two dozen years—but otherwise the record of traditional approaches to North Korea policy has been unblemished by much success. Mr. Trump’s strategy today should be evaluated partly against this sad legacy.

Kim Jong Un may be as brutal a leader as his father. But youthful perspective could change the situation substantially. With decades of rule potentially ahead of him, and with a nuclear arsenal already in place, he shows some interest in reform and détente. His byungjin strategy of development aspires to maintain a nuclear deterrent while reforming the economy. By showing a willingness to tolerate some parts of the North Korean arsenal at least for some time while lifting sanctions and encouraging foreign investment in exchange for elimination of nuclear production capabilities, Mr. Trump is making a smart offer to Mr. Kim. It may prove hard for the dictator to turn down.

No American or South Korean strategy can ensure success in nuclear negotiations; Washington and Seoul can only establish the parameters and boundaries within which Mr. Kim will decide on his next course of action. Mr. Trump has, with his outreach to Mr. Kim, effectively taken “bloody nose” military options off the table. But they were never advisable to begin with.

To be sure, throughout any future attempts at diplomacy, economic pressure must be preserved even in the face of Chinese, South Korean and Russian efforts to relax it. And the U.S. military alliance with South Korea must be undergirded by more numerous, smaller exercises as well as various modernization and readiness enhancements, even as large exercises are suspended. Mr. Trump probably should not reward Mr. Kim with a third summit absent some real reason to think he will deliver. But maybe, just maybe, as his choices become clearer, Mr. Kim will be inclined to do so.

Mr. O’Hanlon is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/13885/north-korea-human-rights

[Crafty_Dog]

A raid on North Korea … in Spain. On Tuesday, a Spanish judge ruled to unseal details regarding a raid of the North Korean embassy in Madrid. Ten masked men entered the embassy on Feb. 22 carrying fake guns, ordered people tied up, and stole a number of computers and documents. Cheollima Civil Defense, a group that says it helps North Korean defectors, claimed responsibility for the raid but said it did not use force to enter the embassy out of regard for Spain. Following the raid, which came just a week before the U.S.-North Korea summit in Hanoi, several members of the group flew to the U.S. and turned over information stolen from the embassy to the FBI. Madrid is now asking that the intruders be extradited to face justice in Spain.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2019/03/29/a_revolution_against_north_koreas_guerrilla_dynasty_and_gulag_state_114294.html?fbclid=IwAR2RmGEtKRuyM2jF8WrYifOuSDY6rplyYXqedTW-_XSSxTsqtJksKOmcQag

[Crafty_Dog]

Deter? Detente? NATO Has Lessons for the North Korean Conundrum
A U.S. Air Force F-22 Raptor from Kadena Air Base, Japan, conducted a flyover in the vicinity of Osan Air Base, South Korea, in response to recent provocative action by North Korea in 2016.

    By Brad Roberts Lawrence Livermore National Lab, Council on Foreign Relations Read bio

April 22, 2019

Topics

    Commentary


   

The U.S.-ROK alliance needs a strategy that supports best-case outcomes — and hedges against worst-case scenarios.

In the current moment of uncertainty and debate in the U.S.-ROK alliance about how to proceed in dealing with North Korea, it is useful to look for lessons in the experience of the transatlantic alliance. For decades, NATO has debated how to best balance deterrence and détente. The debate has its origins in the 1960s, as NATO adjusted to a changing world, and the Harmel Report of 1968, which argued that alliances serve both military and political purposes and must set agendas to maintain adequate defenses while promoting dialogue with the aim of resolving conflicts. NATO has also debated how to ensure that its deterrence and defense posture remains “fit for purpose” in an ever-changing security environment. NATO heads of state and government have for decades repeatedly expressed a commitment to maintain an “appropriate mix” of nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities for deterrence at the lowest levels necessary in the security environment as it exists.
Related: The US and North Korea Are Back to Talking Tough
Related: The Plan to Resurrect the North Korea Nuclear Talks
Related: After Raising the Stakes for North Korea Summit, Trump Walks Away

The necessary balance between deterrence and détente is nowhere in more debate than in Seoul. On the one hand, there is broad agreement that the peace process with the North should be given a chance. This persists despite widespread disagreement about its prospects for success. In order to give peace a chance, various forms of military restraint have been put in place, including the cancellation of major exercises. Also on hold are the joint U.S.-ROK efforts to strengthen and adapt the regional deterrence architecture that began a decade ago. On the other hand, there is widespread recognition that North Korea continues to develop its deterrent forces even while engaging in the détente process. There is also rising concern about the negative impacts of China’s military modernization on the regional security environment. Thus in Seoul there is a rising debate about whether and how long to sustain the current deterrence restraint. As I heard repeatedly in a recent visit: “give peace a chance…don’t let the deterrence agenda get in the way…but will we know when it’s time to give up our cautious optimism?”

What should be done? How should deterrence and détente be balanced in the current circumstances?
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Strengthening Deterrence, 2010-2018

The need to strengthen the alliance’s deterrence posture is not new. A decade ago, in recognition of the emerging nuclear and missile threat from the North, the U.S.-ROK alliance committed to a joint effort to strengthen and adapt the regional deterrence architecture to address new challenges. To that end, they agreed to tailor deterrence strategy, including extended nuclear deterrence, to new circumstances. To focus this effort, the bilateral Extended Deterrence Policy Committee, or EDPC, was formed in 2010. The EDPC helped identify the necessary adaptations through joint studies and analysis, including with the use of tabletop exercises. In 2012, it produced a tailored deterrence strategy to guide bilateral planning and force development. In April 2015, the EDPC and the Counter-Missile Capabilities Committee merged to become the Deterrence Strategy Committee. In 2016, an additional venue was added within the 2+2 framework, called the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group, to address broader regional security issues. The Trump administration has continued the dialogue on deterrence and the process of adapting the U.S. deterrent, as reflected in its reviews of nuclear and missile defense policy and posture. But there appears to be no practical agenda for further steps at this time to strengthen and adapt the regional deterrence architecture at this time.
Pursuing Détente from 2018
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The process of dialogue and summitry has not yet taken a decisive turn to success or failure. At this time, we can conceive of three possible outcomes.

First: definitive success. This would bring a peace treaty, denuclearization, and the termination of the United Nations Command. Whether it would also bring an end to the U.S. role as a security guarantor on the peninsula is an open question. A key uncertainty would be the extent to which China is seen as a military threat.

Second: definitive failure. This would bring a renewal of “maximum pressure” and debate about whether something more is needed in the way of preventive war, given the failure of the pressure campaign in this scenario. This would stoke great anxiety about the credibility and effectiveness of the alliance’s deterrence posture and the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent.

Third: stalemate. This would bring incomplete progress—an armistice without a peace agreement or denuclearization, or perhaps a peace agreement without denuclearization. An alternative outcome could involve removal of the North Korean threat to the United States but not to South Korea or Japan. These outcomes would stoke great anxiety about deterrence. Peace without denuclearization would bring especially complex questions about the future of U.S. extended deterrence.

As of spring 2019, we face neither clear success, nor clear failure, nor stalemate, but prolonged uncertainty. There is piecemeal progress on détente, but also continued evidence of North Korea’s further development of a medium-sized nuclear strike force. Anxieties about the consequences for the balance of confidence in the separate deterrent postures of the North and South are taking shape in Seoul. A rising sense of vulnerability has driven new debates, including deliberation over whether to maintain the posture of deterrence restraint or return to strengthening.

Some in Seoul argue that the Deterrence Strategy Committee should stand down entirely while the experiment in peace-making proceeds, as another sign of good faith by the U.S.-ROK alliance to help renew momentum. This is a distinctly minority view. Others in Seoul argue that the DSC should continue to identify steps to strengthen deterrence and that the alliance should take them, given the advances North Korea is making in operationalizing its nuclear deterrent. This too is a minority view. The majority view is that the effort to identify potential next steps in the strengthening and adaptation process should continue, but that those steps should be held in reserve for the moment.

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In my assessment, the DSC process can serve three useful purposes in the current period of uncertainty. It can serve as a hedge against a breakdown of the peace process by defining what the alliance would be prepared to do in such a contingency. It can also serve as an incentive for Kim Jong-un to stay at the table by reinforcing the alliance’s message that further pursuit of nuclear capabilities will bring not advantage but risk. Finally, it can serve as a partial foundation for exploring how deterrence challenges might evolve over the coming decade if and when competition for advantage in cyber space and outer space intensifies.

At this time of uncertainty, the alliance needs a strategy that supports best-case outcomes but also hedges against worst-case scenarios. Harmel would advise that because the alliance serves both military and political purposes, it should sustain the process of strengthening and adapting deterrence while continuing to pursue denuclearization. But it doesn’t make sense to put this approach front-and-center in the alliance’s public diplomacy. Until there is some clarity about the results of the current détente and the real prospects for denuclearization, further steps to strengthen the alliance’s deterrence posture should speak for themselves. As one expert in Seoul put it, let’s keep the process “on simmer.”
Back to the NATO Analogy

As the U.S.-ROK alliance tries to re-balance deterrence and détente in light of new evidence about Kim’s intentions and rising anxiety in the South, we should expect an intensifying political debate. But when it comes to deterrence, we should not simply expect a return to the discussion that was underway before the Trump-Kim opening. Rather, we should expect a different debate—one involving more difficult questions for the United States. What is the “appropriate mix” of deterrence and defense capabilities for the U.S.-ROK alliance? What would make it “fit for purpose?”

Over the last decade, the U.S.-ROK alliance has sought to strengthen its deterrence posture comprehensively with political measures to signal collective resolve, strong leadership messages, a balance of conventional forces favorable to the alliance, improved long-range strike capabilities, missile defenses, resilience in cyber space, and what the United States calls “a tailored nuclear component.” That is, the United States has maintained (and is modernizing) the ability to deploy nuclear bombs into the region with both strategic and non-strategic aircraft, with the expectation of potentially doing so during mounting political-military crisis. It has also committed to two supplemental capabilities in the U.S. nuclear posture for bolstering extended deterrence. The United States backs these capabilities with a clear declaratory policy, reserving the right to employ nuclear weapons when the vital interests of an ally are at risk.

Both capitals have broadly supported this overall approach over the last decade. But a minority camp deems it inadequate and its voice is becoming more insistent. Policymakers in the United States should expect a spike of interest in South Korea in restoring a permanent U.S. nuclear presence (all U.S. nuclear weapons were removed from South Korea at the end of the Cold War). They should also expect a rising debate in South Korea about whether it should provide for its own nuclear deterrence requirements if the United States is unwilling to do so.

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What about “fit for purpose?” Over the years, I have regularly heard South Koreans argue that “the nuclear deterrence you give your European allies is more and better than what you give your Asian allies.” This argument has become much more frequent and impassioned, despite persist U.S. efforts to explain the logic of the different extended deterrence postures in Europe and Asia. There is a steadily rising demand in Seoul for “NATO-like” nuclear deterrence arrangements, but there are many misperceptions of what “NATO-like” actually means.

NATO’s nuclear deterrent has three main elements. The first is political: high-level political statements about the roles of nuclear weapons in alliance strategy, along with supporting declaratory policies from the capitals of its three nuclear-armed members. The second is military-technical: the capabilities to employ nuclear weapons. For NATO, this means the “sharing arrangements” provided by fighter-aircraft certified for both conventional and nuclear munitions, which are operated by some NATO members and prepared to deliver weapons in war under the authority of the U.S. president. These offer deterrent value because they demonstrate to potential adversaries that an attack on one will be treated as an attack on all and will necessarily implicate the United States in a response. The third is procedural: a consultative process that informs policy development and planning in peacetime, that would inform leadership decision-making in a crisis, and that would share the burden of decision in war.

Some of these elements are already in place in the U.S.-ROK alliance. Additional elements might be adopted and new elements might be created. Each would involve benefits, costs, and risks, though advocates and opponents of different options generally focus on only one aspect or another. In assessing costs and risks, it will be important to look beyond the peninsula for the consequences of different U.S.-ROK deterrence postures for regional security more broadly and for the global nonproliferation regime.

In sum, the next big deterrence debates in the U.S.-ROK alliance will likely focus on the needed “tailored nuclear component” that will be “fit for purpose” for deterring a North Korea that has not denuclearized. As nuclear policy is inherently controversial, stakeholders in a sound approach should start the homework required to promote informed debate now.

The views expressed here are those of the author and should not be attributed to any institution with which he is affiliated.

[Crafty_Dog]

By Phillip Orchard


North Korean Missiles and the US Red Line


For perhaps the first time in decades, Pyongyang feels like it’s operating from a position of strength.


The tacit deal between the U.S. and North Korea is still holding: In exchange for scaled back joint U.S.-South Korea military exercises, North Korea has held off on intercontinental ballistic missile testing. U.S. President Donald Trump affirmed as much during his state visit to Tokyo this weekend, brushing off Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s concerns about North Korea’s tests of new short-range missiles, which it launched into the sea of Japan earlier this month – Pyongyang’s first ballistic missile tests in more than a year and a half. So long as the North refrains from resuming ICBM testing, the U.S. can be content to let the impasse drag out indefinitely, even if in public Washington continues to demand full denuclearization.



 

(click to enlarge)


But the test of the North’s newest missiles, which appear curiously similar to Russian Iskanders, along with other recent developments, illustrates the reality that Pyongyang can’t as easily stand pat. It needs sanctions relief and economic aid. It’s keen to drive a wedge between the U.S. and its allies and further reduce U.S. military options. And now, with a growing capability to deposit a nuclear weapon just about anywhere in the region, it can move more aggressively to try to meet its needs – even without crossing Washington’s red line of testing missiles that can hit the U.S. mainland.

South Korea in the Crosshairs

North Korea’s primary reason for going nuclear was regime security. Pyongyang watched as Moammar Gadhafi and Saddam Hussein abandoned their nuclear programs and met inglorious deaths. It noted that when China, India and Pakistan went nuclear, the West briefly raised hell before quickly shifting to engagement.

But there are other benefits to its nuclear program. For example, there’s newfound prestige abroad and, perhaps more important for the regime of Kim Jong Un, at home. It also allows Pyongyang to act more aggressively in the region without worrying about an overreach that would trigger major blowback. The risks of going to war with a nuclear state are simply too high to respond to a provocation with enough conventional force to deter future provocations, typically forcing other regional powers to hold or at least limit their fire out of fear of escalation. This paradigm has kept a lid on India and Pakistan’s conflict over Kashmir since the late 1990s.

North Korea could put this dynamic in play with the South. Reunification of the Korean Peninsula is a geopolitical imperative for both Seoul and Pyongyang. Neither can reunify by force without significant outside help. Under President Moon Jae-in, South Korea, in an effort to stave off another U.S. war on the peninsula, align the strategic interests of the two Koreas, and lay the groundwork for a long-term reconciliation, has pursued a robust engagement agenda with the North. Pyongyang, which needs economic assistance and is keen to see the U.S. gone from the peninsula, would prefer that these happen through reconciliation rather than provocation. But, constrained primarily by the inflexibility of the U.S. position on sanctions and by other factors like his declining popularity at home, Moon’s outreach has largely stalled. And U.S.-South Korea exercises, though scaled back and redesigned to avoid simulating an invasion of the North, have continued.

Thus, one goal of North Korea’s latest missile and artillery tests is to persuade Seoul that, if forced by Washington to pick a side, Pyongyang is its best long-term bet. The particular missile tested reinforces this message in two ways. One, it is the North’s first solid-fuel short-range ballistic missile with a range covering all of South Korea, including major U.S. military bases in the southern parts of the country and key ports where U.S. forces would arrive to support an invasion. (Unlike their relatively unstable liquid fuel counterparts, solid fuel engines don’t need to be fueled up right before use, allowing for quicker launches, greater mobility, camouflaging and pre-positioning options.) Two, the Iskander can fly on a flat trajectory at an altitude of 25-30 miles (40-50 kilometers). This would potentially allow it to exploit a coverage gap in the U.S. missile defense architecture currently deployed on the peninsula; that altitudeis just outside of the range of Patriot missile interceptors and just below the engagement floor of THAAD and Aegis systems. For good measure, it’s also believed to have greater maneuverability at low altitudes than most ballistic missiles, further complicating missile defense plans.

In other words, Pyongyang is trying to make the case to Seoul that preserving U.S. security guarantees is no longer worth the cost of derailing reconciliation with the North. The new missile alone won’t do the trick; South Korea can’t abandon the leverage of U.S. backing just yet, and it still needs U.S. counterstrike guarantees to remain in place. But, at a time when the White House is repeatedly threatening to pull up stakes if Seoul doesn’t pay the full cost of the U.S. presence on the peninsula (plus, per Donald Trump’s insistence, as much as a 50 percent premium), it deepens the wedge between Washington and Seoul and tilts Seoul’s long-term calculus in Pyongyang’s favor.

South Korea is certainly preparing for the day when it needs to stand on its own. Recent moves by the South, such as the launch of new military exercises aimed at accelerating the return of wartime operational control over its own forces from the U.S., should be viewed in this light.

Getting Washington’s Attention

The new missile tests were also aimed at nudging Washington away from its Hanoi summit position of refusing any sanctions relief until the North fully denuclearizes. Sanctions have never been able to bring the Kim regime to its knees. But Kim is increasingly staking his legacy on his ability to deliver economic prosperity – repeatedly pledging in public that while a nuclear program brought isolation and poverty, nuclear statehood will bring the opposite. Now, he needs to show some results. The international sanctions regime could unravel even if the U.S. declines to relent; Russia or China could block renewal of U.N. sanctions. But with these and other countries wary of getting slapped with secondary sanctions by the U.S., Pyongyang is eager to get Washington to back off as well.

In this context, that the North’s new missile appears at minimum inspired by Russian missile designs is noteworthy. There’s currently no evidence that Moscow helped the North build its new missile. North Korea has proved adept at swiping and cloning other military technologies in the past, and since Russia has exported Iskanders to other countries and used them in Syria, it’s not hard to imagine the North accessing the technology in other ways. (South Korea and Ukraine also have missile programs inspired by the Iskander.)


 

(click to enlarge)


But it’s also not far-fetched to hypothesize that there’s indeed a fresh set of Russian fingerprints on North Korea’s new missiles. The tests occurred less than three weeks after Kim’s high-profile visit with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Vladivostok in late April. Russia shares the North’s interest in seeing the U.S. alliance structure in Northeast Asia unravel. And for decades, Moscow has sought to retain influence in Pyongyang primarily as leverage against Washington on other more pressing issues in Central and Eastern Europe. Whether or not Moscow actually transferred missile technology to Pyongyang, the tests serve as a reminder that it could if the U.S. doesn’t play ball elsewhere – perhaps even helping Pyongyang overcome critical hurdles in its ICBM program.

This suits Pyongyang’s interests. At present, the North has yet to demonstrate that it has mastered ICBM re-entry capability – the trickiest part of long-range missile development. Its Hwasong-15 ICBMs can fly far enough to hit the U.S. mainland, but there’s no evidence they can hit their target with any degree of certainty. To keep the U.S. from stalling indefinitely on sanctions relief, Pyongyang wants to persuade Washington of its ability (with a bit of outside help) of making this last leap in missile technology. It’s attempting to make the case that the suspension of its ICBM program was a good faith move meriting reciprocal concessions and that, most important, it was a choice – one that Pyongyang could choose to reverse.

We’re doubtful that Pyongyang will push forward with ICBM testing again anytime soon, with or without Moscow’s help. There just wouldn’t be that much to gain by provoking the U.S. in such a manner, and potentially a lot to lose. At minimum, doing so would make it easier for the U.S. to sustain a broad sanctions front. But for perhaps the first time in decades, the North feels like it’s operating from a position of strength and has every interest in seeing just what nuclear statehood entitles it. Don’t expect Kim to stay quiet.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2019/06/north-koreas-nuclear-bomb-much-bigger-previously-thought/157469/?oref=defense_one_breaking_nl

[ccp]

just wait till they get to megaton size  a bomb in next few yrs

[Crafty_Dog]

https://americanmilitarynews.com/2019/07/north-korean-icbm-can-hit-anywhere-in-the-united-states-us-forces-korea-acknowledges/?utm_campaign=DailyEmails&utm_source=AM_Email&utm_medium=email

[G M]

https://americanmilitarynews.com/2019/07/north-korean-icbm-can-hit-anywhere-in-the-united-states-us-forces-korea-acknowledges/?utm_campaign=DailyEmails&utm_source=AM_Email&utm_medium=email

A nuclear Japan and/or Taiwan could reach all over Asia.

[DougMacG]

North Korea Likely Suffering Worst Downturn Since 1990s
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-07-16/north-korea-likely-suffering-worst-downturn-since-1990s-famine

Or he could make a deal with Trump and change the course of history...

[ccp]

" .Or he could make a deal with Trump and change the course of history..."

This could be N Korea:

http://acerealty.co.kr/sale/for_sale.php

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.theepochtimes.com/huawei-secretly-helped-north-korea-build-maintain-wireless-network-washington-post_3011690.html?utm_source=Epoch+Times+Newsletters&utm_campaign=b3ef5a181f-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_07_22_09_19&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_4fba358ecf-b3ef5a181f-239065853

[Crafty_Dog]

By GPF Staff


Daily Memo: North Korea’s Missile Tests,


All the news worth knowing today.


North Korea’s missile tests. North Korea launched two short-range ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan early on Friday. The first, which traveled an estimated 430 kilometers (270 miles) at an altitude of just around 50 kilometers, appears to be another KN-23 – the solid-fueled missile that Pyongyang first tested back in May. This particular missile is important for two reasons. First, it represents another step forward in North Korea’s effort to develop missiles with solid-fuel engines, which are much easier to move, camouflage and launch quickly – and which could have major implications for its development of submarine-launched ballistic missiles. (It’s notable that the test came just two days after North Korean state media showed Kim Jong Un checking in on the construction of a new submarine.) Second, the KN-23 is believed to be a clone of Russia’s Iskander missiles, which can fly on a low trajectory with a greater degree of maneuverability than most ballistic missiles, posing major challenges for missile defense systems. Notably, the second missile, which flew some 690 kilometers, is a new type of missile. It flew at the same altitude at the first, but with the range to potentially put U.S. bases in Japan in the crosshairs. It’s tempting to interpret every North Korean missile test as intended to increase pressure on the Trump administration in the nuclear negotiations. And, indeed, this one came as U.S. national security adviser John Bolton was visiting South Korea, and it follows North Korean grousing about upcoming U.S.-South Korean military exercises and frustration over U.S. inaction on sanctions relief. But North Korea has practical reasons to do these tests, which are critical to the development of more sophisticated missiles. And after the May tests, the U.S. effectively made it clear that so long as it doesn’t test intercontinental ballistic missiles, Pyongyang is free to test as many shorter-range missiles as it likes.

=========================================================

South Korea, Russia: What to Make of a Midair Interception Over Disputed Waters
Seoul said it fired warning shots at a Russian aircraft in its claimed airspace on July 23, but Moscow denied that it intruded on South Korean airspace.
(KOREA POOL/AFP/Getty Images)
Stratfor's geopolitical guidance provides insight on what we're watching out for in the week ahead.
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The Big Picture

With Russia and China cooperating more closely in the Asia-Pacific and Seoul-Tokyo tensions at a high, a series of incidents in South Korea's Air Defense Identification Zone and claimed airspace raises questions about Seoul's place amid broader regional shifts.
See Asia-Pacific: Among Great Powers
What Happened

An odd set of confrontations unfolded July 23 around the Korean Peninsula involving South Korea, Russia, China and Japan. According to an official South Korean account of the events, early on July 23, two Chinese H-6 bombers entered South Korea's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) near Ieodo, a submerged rock claimed by both South Korea and China in the Yellow Sea. They later entered the ADIZ once again at Ulleung island off South Korea's east coast in the Sea of Japan before being joined by Russian TU-50 bombers and re-entering the ADIZ for a third time. After this, a Russian A-50 early warning aircraft and two Tu-95 bombers entered the ADIZ around Dokdo Island — a maritime space that Japan also claims as the Takeshima Islands — before the A-50 passed into South Korean-claimed airspace, leaving it and then reentering it again. South Korea scrambled jets to respond to both alleged entries by the A-50, firing both warning shots and flares.
This map shows the overlapping air defense identification zones in the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan.

Moscow, on the other hand, insists its aircraft did not impinge on any country's airspace and that their movement was part of a maiden joint long-range Sino-Russian patrol that had been previously scheduled to overfly international waters in the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea. Russia also underscored that it does not recognize the South Korean-declared ADIZ. South Korea filed formal diplomatic protests with Russia over the incidents. Japan followed suit, saying the Russian and Chinese bombers entered Japan's ADIZ in the East China Sea and that it had also scrambled jets in response. Tokyo also specifically condemned both South Korea and Russia for the actions in its airspace.
What It Could Mean

The anomalous series of events raises several questions. Intrusions into East China Sea airspace claimed by both China and Japan are fairly common — even sometimes involving South Korea. While the Japanese routinely scramble aircraft to counter East China Sea intrusions, it's unusual to see Russian aircraft in the area near South Korea in which the July 23 incident took place, making this encounter the first of its kind.

While a navigational error due to human error or equipment malfunction could have sent Russia's A-50 over Dokdo, the Russian flight path reported by South Korea shows a fairly tight loop around the disputed feature, raising the possibility that the Russian pilot's course was deliberate. Even if accidental, the Sino-Russian joint exercise and other ongoing activities highlight that infractions will inevitably become more frequent as Russia and China continue to increase aerial patrols in the airspace over the Sea of Japan, raising the risk that further incidents will occur. If it was an intentional act, the aircraft's entry into South Korea's claimed airspace would be both a brazen and risky maneuver, raising questions about Russia's intent — and, in the broader context of the joint exercise, perhaps China's as well. Notably, the alleged Chinese entry into South Korea's ADIZ was limited to Ieodo, a feature that China also claims and the site of frequent challenges to South Korean claims.

If it was an intentional act, the aircraft's entry into South Korea's claimed airspace would be both a brazen and risky maneuver, raising questions about Russia's intent.

South Korea's response was also unusually vehement — warning shots are rarely part of such an interception. For South Korea, the passage through the airspace around Dokdo is particularly troublesome given that the land feature there is its anchor in its efforts to extend its ADIZ to the northeast. That this was part of long-planned Russia-China joint patrols that included incursions in other corners of the ADIZ is doubly concerning for Seoul. It also marks an actual Russian flight over South Korean-claimed airspace — which is of much greater significance than an ADIZ fly-through.
Background

This series of incidents, which comes amid greater alignment between Russia and China in the Asia-Pacific, echoes an apparently coordinated action between the two countries in 2016 to sail through Japanese-claimed waters in the East China Sea around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. The Dokdo/Takeshima incident also comes amid a dispute between South Korea and Japan that has morphed into a low-level trade war — providing increased incentive for South Korea to underscore its sovereignty over the disputed geographical features.

[Crafty_Dog]

More weapons tests. For the fifth time in just over two weeks, North Korea carried out a weapons test, this time launching two short-range ballistic missiles early Saturday morning off its east coast. U.S. defense officials said the missiles, which flew about 250 miles (400 kilometers), resembled other recent tests. U.S. President Donald Trump shrugged off the launches – noting that they were of short-range missiles – while praising a new letter from North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Trump acknowledged that the tests were intended to show Pyongyang’s discontent with U.S.-South Korean military exercises and voiced his own displeasure with the cost to the U.S. of such joint drills. North Korea has not tested any long-range intercontinental missiles since late 2017, a sign that, the White House says, the diplomatic track has borne fruit. American allies in the region like South Korea and Japan, which are within range of the missiles now being tested, are less enthusiastic about the fact that the North has effectively been given a green light to test increasingly sophisticated short-range weapons. South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said more missile tests were highly probable. Meanwhile, Trump tweeted today that Kim expressed an interest in restarting U.S.-North Korean talks once the ongoing U.S.-South Korea drills are over.

[DougMacG]

Japan says South Korea fails to understand North Korea threat with ending of intelligence pact

Ties between the East Asian neighbours, both important US allies, were already at their lowest ebb in years before South Korea’s decision to end the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA)

https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/east-asia/article/3024106/japan-says-south-korea-fails-understand-north-korea-threat

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/290884/north-korean-israeli-shadow-war

[Crafty_Dog]

U.S. Targets North Korean Hacking as Rising National-Security Threat

For Pyongyang, cyber prowess is crucial source of revenue, political leverage
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s willingness to talk about denuclearization may stem from a belief that the country’s cyber arsenal can partially supplant its weapons as a threat to other nations. Photo: KCNA/KNS/Associated Press
By Ian Talley and
Dustin Volz
Sept. 15, 2019 7:00 am ET

WASHINGTON—New U.S. sanctions against North Korean hackers and revelations about North Korean malware show how Pyongyang’s cyber operations have become a crucial revenue stream and a security threat that soon could rival its weapons program, U.S. and industry officials say.

North Korea’s hacks of financial systems and critical infrastructure world-wide reveal sophisticated cyber capabilities developed to counter global sanctions and expand Pyongyang’s geopolitical power, according to these officials.

The U.S. Treasury Department, in blacklisting the three hacking groups allegedly run by North Korea’s primary intelligence service, said Friday they collectively were responsible for operations across 10 countries, stealing hundreds of millions of dollars from banks and cryptocurrency exchanges, pilfering military secrets, destabilizing infrastructure and intimidating adversaries.

Attacks that cyber experts suspect were orchestrated by North Korea are becoming more frequent.

Treasury says one collective, called Lazarus Group, and two subsidiaries, known as Bluenoroff and Andariel, have stolen around $700 million in the last three years and have attempted to steal nearly $2 billion.

U.S. security officials and cyber experts say those sums of money likely underrepresent the amount of cash Pyongyang’s hackers have secured. United Nations investigators last month tallied proceeds from all reported operations, including those carried out by other North Korean hacking groups, at $2 billion in recent years. Some thefts likely aren’t reported to authorities for fear of embarrassment and exposure, a senior U.S. official said.

North Korean officials didn’t respond to a request for comment but historically have denied accusations of engaging in malicious cyber activity.

Treasury said it also has been working with the Department of Homeland Security’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, as well as with the U.S. military’s Cyber Command in recent months to disclose malware samples to private industry. Last week, under its North Korean malicious cyberactivity rubric “Hidden Cobra,” the administration issued a public alert about a new version of malware dubbed “ELECTRICFISH” that burrows into victims’ computers to steal data.

Senior administration and industry officials say that many reported, but not publicly disclosed, attacks on banks and other companies bear hallmarks of North Korean involvement.

“Though these operations may fund the hackers themselves, their sheer scale suggests that they are a financial lifeline for a regime that has long depended on illicit activities to fund itself,” said John Hultquist, director of intelligence analysis at the U.S. cybersecurity company FireEye Inc.

Cyber Command ranks North Korea’s capabilities along with China, Russia and Iran as top strategic threats to U.S. national security.

Underscoring the geopolitical leverage its hacking abilities give Pyongyang, industry experts say North Korean leader Kim Jong Un ’s willingness to at least talk about denuclearization over the past year may be from a belief that the country’s cyber arsenal can partially supplant its weapons as a threat to other nations.
U.N. investigators and members of a North Korean defectors group in South Korea say the North’s hackers are carefully selected and groomed at an early age by the military and secret services and given specialized training. Photo: Wong Maye-E/Associated Press

“North Korea’s cyber operations broaden the Kim family regime’s toolkit for threatening the military, economic, and even the political strength of its adversaries and enemies,” said Mathew Ha and David Maxwell, North Korean experts at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a Washington nonpartisan think tank, in a report.

With the U.N. and U.S. squeezing traditional high-value revenue streams such as North Korean coal exports, the hacking operations appear to be so lucrative for the cash-hungry regime that cybersecurity experts say it is unlikely Pyongyang will be pressured through sanctions into curtailing its malicious behavior.

U.S. officials say their investigations show that some of the money from cyber-theft is channeled into Mr. Kim’s nuclear weapons and ballistic-missile programs. Cyber-enabled heists also have become an essential source of revenue keeping the regime in power and insulating the economy from the global sanctions meant to force Pyongyang into giving up its weapons of mass destruction, U.S. and U.N. officials say.

In addition, North Korea’s cyberattacks generate income in ways that are harder to trace than many of its other illicit activities, U.N. officials said in a report last month. The U.N. is investigating at least 35 reported North Korean cyberattacks across five continents targeting banks, cryptocurrency exchanges and mining companies.

The Trump administration previously has blamed the Lazarus Group for the WannaCry worm, which was unleashed in 2017, infecting more than 300,000 computers in more than 150 countries, crippling banks, hospitals and other companies. The Justice Department last year charged a North Korean operative, Park Jin Hyok, and unnamed co-conspirators, tying them to the WannaCry work, the 2014 hack on Sony Pictures and the $81 million stolen from Bangladesh’s account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in 2016.

It was only a typo in the Bangladesh heist that prevented the hackers from stealing $851 million they planned to transfer, officials say.

Since the beginning of 2019 alone, North Korean agents have attempted five major cyber-thefts world-wide, including a successful $49 million heist from an institution in Kuwait, according to the U.N.

U.N. investigators and members of a North Korean defectors group in South Korea say the North’s hackers are carefully selected and groomed at an early age by the military and secret services and given specialized training.

North Korean cyber collectives often use a variety of different schemes for revenue generation, as well as lay the groundwork for future hacks, according to experts on North Korea and cybersecurity.

U.S. intelligence, security companies and North Korea watchers say that while they believe many of the freelance operations are largely for revenue-generation purposes, they also represent a major threat because of their infiltration of Western security systems.

They do so by working as software programmers who contract their services through freelance platforms, concealing that they are North Korean agents.

Many companies rely on the freelance software platforms where “there’s no vetting process or validation to ensure you’re not working with sanctioned entities,” said a top official at a private technology company that sells its products to the U.S. government and other Western allies.

[ccp]

some good points:

https://patriotpost.us/articles/65971-video-bolton-vs-trump-on-north-korea-2019-10-09


John Bolton
from Pravda . (all very eager to publish ):
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/30/us/politics/bolton-trump-north-korea.html

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/30/us/politics/bolton-trump-north-korea.html

[DougMacG]

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/30/us/politics/bolton-trump-north-korea.html

Bolton is right but his approach is missing one step.  Trump needs to be reelected if NK is going to be denuclearized.

[Crafty_Dog]

Ding! Ding!  We have a winner!

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.zdnet.com/article/confirmed-north-korean-malware-found-on-indian-nuclear-plants-network/?fbclid=IwAR2ZgDweSaA1ncb3fLmG7IEN5EGMF5DQVHd5HjHyiH_T44JTPdm7KdCsH9g

[Crafty_Dog]

Trump's Defense Price Hike Rocks the U.S.-South Korean Alliance
4 MINS READ
Nov 15, 2019 | 22:08 GMT
The Big Picture
The U.S.-South Korean alliance, central to U.S. regional strategy in Asia, has gone through ups and downs due to South Korean political upheaval, Seoul's troubled relations with Tokyo and differences over North Korea. New disagreements over defense costs will add another challenge that could complicate their relationship.

What Happened

As far as price hikes go, it is a large one. U.S. President Donald Trump has reportedly demanded that South Korea pay $4.7 billion next year — or 400 percent more than what it currently pays — for continued U.S. defense protection. The move comes as the Special Measures Agreement, the burden-sharing pact that covers how much South Korea pays for the U.S. military presence on its soil, is once again up for renegotiation.

This is not the first time that Trump has sought to increase the price South Korea pays for the U.S. military presence. When the Special Measures Agreement came up for negotiation last year, Trump demanded a 50 percent increase before settling on an 8 percent rise. At the same time, the countries agreed to revisit the agreement every year. Ultimately, Trump's demand is likely to hurt the key U.S.-South Korean alliance and lead Seoul to seriously question its dependence on Washington and continue its push toward more self-reliance on defense.

Why It Matters
Reportedly alarmed at the abrupt price hike, the Pentagon and the State Department are struggling to justify the increase to their South Korean partners. The two institutions are reportedly seeking to do so by counting — for the first time — readiness, joint drills and force rotations into the payment scheme. To date, South Korea has rejected these reasons, arguing that they exceed the scope of the bilateral defense agreement and that Seoul should pay only for the direct basing upkeep of the U.S. presence in South Korea.

For South Korea, the request amplifies a growing sense that the United States is untrustworthy, as well as a desire to become more self-reliant in security and pursue more independent policies.

Given that Trump has come down on price before, he could compromise once more during negotiations that could last several months. But given its initial position, there is less chance that the United States will lower its demand enough to avoid tarnishing ties with South Korea. It is possible that the United States could reduce the price if South Korea agreed to renew its intelligence-sharing pact with Japan amid the East Asian neighbors' recent deteriorating ties, maintain a ban on Huawei technology, and/or agree to host U.S. intermediate-range missiles, but it is unclear whether Trump would view such issues as meaningful compromises.

The Upshot

The U.S.-South Korean relationship is a longstanding and important military alliance in the region. If Washington refuses to reduce its price for troop deployments, it could deal a significant blow to bilateral ties, especially as South Korea's government could hardly countenance the costs ahead of legislative elections in April 2020.

The request is symptomatic of two wider drives. For the United States, the price demand stems from the White House's push to renegotiate and potentially restructure its military commitments around the world, particularly with countries that have developed into wealthy states that can afford significant defensive outlays. For South Korea, the request amplifies a growing sense that the United States is untrustworthy, as well as a desire to become more self-reliant in security and pursue more independent policies, both of which could complicate Washington's regional strategies. Greater friction in the alliance would likely accelerate Seoul's move away from Washington to the extent that South Korea could even consider acquiring nuclear weapons in the long term — something that a number of former South Korean officials have already deemed a potential necessity.