Author Topic: Israel, and its neighbors  (Read 927587 times)

ccp

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exactly as predicted
« Reply #3000 on: May 29, 2024, 05:56:16 AM »
I read the delay of the invasion would give Hamas more time to set booby traps
and place hostages next to the traps:

https://www.breitbart.com/middle-east/2024/05/29/three-israeli-soldiers-killed-in-booby-trapped-gaza-building/

delay was/is a military mistake

VDH recently had podcast that Eisenhower removing Patton and caving in to the ego of Montgomery resulted in the battle of the bulge.
Montgomery MO was to advance a small amount the dig in , advance then dig in.
Patton was full speed ahead no delay.
The delay gave Nazis time to mount the offense later labelled battle of the bulge
the "bulge" describing their push through a weak gap in the allied lines.

This VDH guy is really something.  He writes two or more articles a week as well as his books.
He is writing machine.

Like Katherine tells me ,  real true writers can write and write and write.

ccp

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VDH on why we should support Israel
« Reply #3001 on: May 29, 2024, 06:07:54 AM »
he answers callers question who felt Israel is a leech who we support with $$$ and yet seemingly they do not provide us with much.
He also talks about how the Jews were mentioned in Egypt hieroglyphics 1200 BC then of course the Christians 1200 yrs later and not until the 600s did the Muslims come along and thus the notion of the "right of return" the Palestinians speak of is rather absurd.

Should Erdogon give Constantinople back to the Pope, etc.

Same March 28th podcast:

https://victorhanson.com/podcasts/

Body-by-Guinness

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The Value of Classical Studies
« Reply #3002 on: May 29, 2024, 02:51:35 PM »
VDH demonstrates that classical studies indeed have value and provide a powerful lens through which the decisions of the day can be evaluated and measured.

Is it any surprise American colleges are deemphasizing those studies?

Crafty_Dog

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Body-by-Guinness

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Secondary Explosions Cause of Palestinian Refugee Deaths?
« Reply #3004 on: May 30, 2024, 10:12:43 AM »
Support pics at the X post:

CNN Defense Analysts have now determined that the Israeli Airstrike on May 26th against a Hamas Compound in Western Rafah, which was believed to have possibly caused an Explosion and Fire which resulted in the Death of between 35-45 Palestinian Refugees, could not have been “Completely Caused” by the Israeli Airstrike due to the Size of the Explosion. Shrapnel and Parts which were Discovered in the Rubble of the Hamas Compound, which was roughly 200 Meters from the UNRWA Refugee Camp, suggest that the Strike was carried out using 2 GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb with 250lb Warheads; these Bombs would have not been nearly Powerful enough to have caused the Explosion at the Camp nor would the have been Large enough to cause any kind of “Splash Damage” to the Camp, which again was over a Kilometer from the Strike Location. This Analysis suggests that what Israeli Defense Officials have so far suggested is likely True, which is that Hamas Munitions which were Hidden roughly Half-Way between the Compound and Camp were Detonated by Shrapnel from the Airstrike, causing the Explosion of multiple Fuel Tanks at the Refugee Camp and the eventual Fire.

https://x.com/sentdefender/status/1796023788552778155?s=12

Crafty_Dog

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Re: Israel, and its neighbors
« Reply #3005 on: May 30, 2024, 02:40:27 PM »
Useful follow up for the cranial rectal interface crowd.

Pleasant surprise it comes from CNN.

Crafty_Dog

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Convo with an IDF soldier
« Reply #3006 on: June 06, 2024, 01:02:19 PM »
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Interview With an IDF Soldier


Jillian Butler

Interviewer’s note: A wise old mentor of mine told me that the dissemination of media, and its subsequent effect on public opinion and foreign policy boils down to the “recreational use of digitally augmented outrage.” This sentiment has rung true every day since October 7th, with the pseudo intellectuals, warhawks, and conspiracy theorists co-opting mass loss of lives and hard to look at images for their own benefit. Recently, the opportunity to interview a childhood friend serving as an officer in the IDF arose. I jumped at the opportunity to hopefully gain and share firsthand insight on the conflict, and bring humanity back to the increasingly polarized world and field of journalism. There is no political aim in this piece.  I have no desire nor intent to make you feel, think, or vote a certain way. The individual interviewed will remain anonymous. 

Q: What were you doing on October 7th? What was going through your mind?

A: So it was a Saturday, or maybe a Friday, I remember waking up in the morning because there were sirens going off. It could happen…but here in Tel Aviv, it doesn’t really happen that often…it could happen sometimes. So anyways, we woke up and were a bit surprised, so we went to the bomb shelter.  We came back and I looked at my phone to see if anything strange happened, but there wasn’t anything going on, so I went back to sleep actually. About half an hour later, again there were sirens, which was pretty strange, so I turned on the TV. It still wasn’t clear what was going on, but after watching TV and reading the news, it was still clear something’s going on, but it was clear it was something very bad. There were people calling from the bomb shelters in the southern part of Israel and the kibbutz and cities next to Gaza…saying they were hearing gunfire and Hamas is in the village and come help us.

In the beginning, as someone who was in the military for 5 years and have been next to Gaza a lot, it was kind of hard for me to believe that actually happened, because we always believed that Hamas isn’t really capable of doing a large attack like that. So, it's kind of sad to say right now, but I thought that maybe they were exaggerating a lot…maybe they heard some rockets and gunfire and were stressed and called the police and news station.  I didn’t really believe it.  But a few hours later, I got a phone call from my commander in the Army, and he told me that something serious is going on and, um, come to the South and bring all the soldiers with you. Then I understood finally, that was around 2PM…that something serious is going on.

Q: Do you think there is a “hearts and minds” aspect of the IDF strategy? If so, do you think the Rafah Offensive will hinder that?

A: Definitely in Israel, of course I am biased, but definitely we feel that we are not really fighting…the orders are very strict. You only fire if they fire back at you, like you don’t do the first move, always when you enter somewhere in Gaza, like you see a bunch of notes that were dropped from the sky…and they are saying “the Army is coming, go away”. Basically, you’re ruining the surprise, which is a very important strategy. But still, people are talking a lot about that in Israel, like we are doing everything so carefully, but on the other hand, there are reports of many casualties in Gaza that have nothing to do with Hamas, which of course is making Israel look bad.  I read something recently about war and war history; so like in every war there are innocent casualties, but they do think that there are more than usual wars.  There are more innocent casualties right now, so that’s definitely making us look bad in the global sense.

Q: Is there one thing that you always bring with you on a deployment?

A: Yes, definitely the one thing is the dog tags, I have the same dog tags around my neck since the first day in the army. Also, I do have a lucky magazine for my rifle. I think that’s it, nothing too special.

Q:What are your thoughts on the international reaction to the war?

A: I’m very frustrated about that situation (regarding the ICC). It's really interesting for me, I don’t completely understand why that’s going on.  A lot of people hearing the news and people you talk to about these protests and the ICC thing, they say “thats antisemitic”, maybe it is, but it feels like it's too simple….like life or death, black or white, so I still haven’t figured out why….in Syria at least, definitely in Syria and Yemen more people are dying on a daily basis and the wars going on over there are much more brutal, like people are suffering on a day to day basis, but still people are not going out and protesting about that, like as close to what’s going on in Israel. That’s very interesting for me.

Q: How high is your concern on the Lebanese front regarding Hezbollah?

A: It's definitely a much bigger concern than Hamas. On one hand Hamas got us with this much surprise, if Hezbollah surprised us, it would be much worse than what went on down there. On the other side, Hezbollah is not close in any way to the IDF, the war will be much harder, and I suppose there will be much more casualties. At the end of the day, everyone in Israel is sure that, if Israel goes to war with Hezbollah, everyone knows and is certain here that it is going to cost a lot of casualties but they have no chance. I suppose they know that as well.

When we fight in Gaza, it is obvious that the IDF and Hamas, they are not even in the same…it's just not fair, it's really not fair. There are a lot of casualties, but they just can’t compare to our forces. In a strange way, we really admire that kind of, their willpower, like if I was on Hamas’s side, I’m not sure that I would have the guts to go and fight against us. So there is kind of like a lot of admiration for what they are doing. I wouldn’t see myself doing the same thing. It’s very interesting to think about.

Q: Do you think part of that has to do with the religious aspect of their ideology?

A: So yeah, that’s what most of the people say, that there are two sides.  The first is the religious side, that if they will die…like during a fight or taking lives with them, they will be in their kind of heaven, some kind of brainwash thing like that. And the other side is that they are a group that has been trained for this day their whole lives, so they kind of like now are ashamed to run away from the fight, now that the fight has come to them. Like a psychological aspect, like you know in certain places you can be a little of a different person? So, you are in a Hamas group of soldiers, you have been trained for this your whole life, you can’t now when there is a war just walk away.

Q: So like you mentioned before, do you think both the IDF and Hezbollah know that if there was a major conflict, it would be a bloodbath, and do you think that’s what’s deterring Hezbollah?

A: Yes, I think so…war is always an ugly thing, so as much as Israel doesn’t want, and I personally don't want to go and fight against Hezbollah, I’m sure that most of the people in Lebanon are very much against that, and even in Hezbollah. They hate Israel, but I think most of them don’t really want to pay the price to go into a war with Israel.  But you know, every time, they are shooting rockets here and we are shooting rockets back–it's very risky, like one rocket hitting the wrong place could cause the other side to retaliate. Kind of like a snowball to make a bigger strike, and a bigger strike back.

Q: What do you think the endgame is?

A: I really, really hope that people are talking now about some kind of peace treaty, or like an agreement, and on the same deal maybe getting all the hostages back, and getting things tackled down in Lebanon as well. So, it's pretty optimistic, but I very much hope that will happen. I do think that if the hostages are still there, whether alive or dead, we still need to have some kind of mission, like a statement in Israel that we need to get them back, I am also kind of biased about that because, one of the hostages, Hadar Goldin, he’s a hostage from the previous war in 2014 – Protective Edge, that's the name.  So, he’s been kidnapped there, he’s a very good friend of mine, so I do want them to bring his body back as well, because his family is kind of religious and it’s very important for them that his body will be buried in Israel.

So, I hope for the optimistic endgame, maybe the more possible one will be that after we are done in Rafah, I think there is a good chance we’ll be sent also to Lebanon, and we will start a much more serious war there. As someone who has been an officer in the Army for a few years, a lot of very serious weapons that you don’t really use in Gaza will be used and it will be all in…I’m sure that we also wouldn’t have electricity and water here in Israel and it will be very serious. I think that is the most possible outcome.


Body-by-Guinness

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Al Jazeera News & Hostage Hosting Service
« Reply #3008 on: June 09, 2024, 02:49:39 PM »
There is so much asshattery being mewled in the wake of Israel’s rescue of their hostages it’s difficult to know where to start. However the fact these hostages were being held in the home of an Al Jazzera reporter, something that speaks volumes regarding numerous aspects of the whole post-Oct. 7 war, and that the usual suspects are notably silent about:

https://legalinsurrection.com/2024/06/confirmed-three-rescued-israeli-hostages-were-held-captive-by-gaza-journalist/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=confirmed-three-rescued-israeli-hostages-were-held-captive-by-gaza-journalist

ccp

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Re: Israel, and its neighbors
« Reply #3009 on: June 09, 2024, 02:52:45 PM »
The hostages appeared to be in good shape with the tiny public images.

Thank God.

God Bless IDF


Body-by-Guinness

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UN “Special Rapporteur” to Mid East & Antisemitic Activist
« Reply #3010 on: June 11, 2024, 01:39:27 PM »
Not acquainted with this source but, if true, it appears quite damning where the UN, UNRWA, the “peace process,” et al are concerned:

https://unwatch.org/exposed-francesca-albaneses-global-influence-network-targeting-israel/




ccp

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DougMacG

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Body-by-Guinness

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We Ordered a Famine, but All We Got were these Lousy Food Trucks
« Reply #3016 on: June 17, 2024, 09:40:04 PM »
Don’t you hate it when the pain and suffering you were planning to strut across the world stage fails to materialize?

The Famine Has Been Canceled

by Seth Mandel

Hamas’s desire to maximize Palestinian suffering is well known, but there’s an easy way to tell whether supposed pro-Palestinian advocates share that revolting instinct: How do they react to good news?

For example, thanks to a report issued quietly earlier this month by the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification’s Famine Review Committee (quite the name), we now know there is no famine in Gaza. Yet you will only see this discussed among pro-Israel Jews online. The vast digital army of Twitter martyrs is quiet. Western media appear to be experiencing a self-imposed blackout. The Palestinian cause seems nothing less than deflated at the news that children will not be dying of hunger.

As of this morning, two weeks after the UN agency that monitors “food insecurity” debunked its own hysteria, the closest thing to a reference in the New York Times is an item in a running liveblog that mentions Israel’s latest humanitarian pause. The Times says this brief pause could help “alleviate a severe hunger crisis.” But —hilariously—those words link to the paper’s April report warning that a famine would set in by May. Which is to say, there’s no mention of the fact that famine has been averted. But the Times does mention its own past report, which has been discredited by actual subsequent events.

The cherry on top of this agitprop sundae comes when the Times quotes a British activist complaining, “This is not what a famine response looks like.”

In fact, according to the international organizations that beat the steady drumbeat of famine, this is exactly what a famine response looks like. Sorry to disappoint the pro-Palestinian movement, but it appears the children will live.

The Famine Review Committee “does not find the [famine prediction] analysis plausible given the uncertainty and lack of convergence of the supporting evidence.” As Avi Bitterman, who spent months predicting there would indeed be no famine based on the available evidence, points out: “The food trucks FEWS NET used for its analysis is significantly less than reported by other sources. One of the reasons for this is the complete exclusion of private sector food trucks (something the UN currently still does, by the way — take note @UN). They also excluded [World Food Programme] deliveries to bakeries in northern Gaza in April.”

In other words, despite the availability of the full aid-truck data, the UN only counted some of the food being delivered to Gaza. What’s more, the WFP is an arm of the UN, which means the UN isn’t even counting all the food it delivers itself. And as Bitterman notes, the UN continues to do this. The methodology behind measuring Palestinian suffering, then, is: If you only count some of the food Gazans are eating, Gazans are not eating enough food.

I wish it were more complicated than this, but it really doesn’t appear to be.

How much does it matter? A ton: “Ultimately, these exclusions make the difference between 38-49% of coverage of caloric needs being covered and 75-109% of caloric needs being covered. This is a wild difference to not count, these figures literally make the difference between the plausible range of nutritional adequacy and straight up death in many cases. Also this is the conservative estimate range. The upper end is 157% of caloric needs being met.”

Mark Zlochin spells it out: “the daily kilocalories requirements have been clearly surpassed in April, even if the most conservative estimates are used.” (Zlochin had also questioned the data predicting a famine.)

Two questions remain. First, why isn’t everyone shouting this from the rooftops? The answer is reminiscent of a response I once heard a rabbi give to a young student, who asked if it were permissible for a Jew to be a nice person only to Jews but not to gentiles. The rabbi responded: You are either a nice person or you aren’t; it’s not possible to “be a nice person” only some of the time. Your essential character determines the rest. Similarly, one side in this conflict values life. There is no way to be a person who values life only some of the time. Israel takes pains to prevent the deaths of Israelis and Palestinians alike; Hamas seeks to maximize the number of casualties suffered by both. It is not surprising to see their supporters around the world reflect this.

Second question: Why the routine overexaggeration of suffering in Gaza? Just because there is no famine does not mean there is no hardship. Just because there is no genocide does not mean there is no death. Why must Israel’s misdeeds be invented or inflated?

I think the answer to that, too, is Hamas. Even if you are inclined to dislike Israel and oppose its every move, a war with Hamas must be deeply uncomfortable. Because whatever you may think of Israel’s security policies, the Jewish state exists within a framework of humanity and decency and ethics—and Hamas exists outside that framework. Seeing Israel as the perpetual bad guy must be difficult for even the most committed anti-Zionists when such a stance would require publicly supporting a barbarian terrorist gang such as Hamas. So the solution for the Israel-hater is to inflate Israeli perfidy to comparable levels.

The facts, of course, clearly contradict such positions.

https://www.commentary.org/seth-mandel/the-famine-has-been-canceled/?utm_source=facebook&utm_medium=website&utm_campaign=SocialSnap

Crafty_Dog

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GPF: If Israel wars with Hezbollah
« Reply #3017 on: Today at 07:41:43 AM »


June 20, 2024
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Open as PDF

The Incomparable Risk of an Israeli War With Hezbollah
A conflict could quickly spread to Syria and Iraq – before enveloping the whole region.
By: Kamran Bokhari

Israeli forces have been waging war in Gaza for eight months, yet the countries to Israel’s north currently pose its greatest security challenge. On June 18, Lebanon’s Hezbollah militant group released nearly 10 minutes of drone footage – filmed in daylight – apparently overlooking Haifa in northern Israel. Captured in the video were residential and commercial areas near the port city, a military complex belonging to Israeli weapons manufacturer Rafael (complete with Iron Dome batteries, radar sites and missile stores), military and commercial ships, and oil storage depots. On the same day, Israel’s military brass approved operational plans for an offensive in Lebanon. Israel is “very close” to a decision to “change the rules of the game against Hezbollah and Lebanon,” said Foreign Minister Israel Katz after Hezbollah released the drone footage.

A war between Israel and Hezbollah would be much larger and longer than what the Israel Defense Forces are facing in Gaza against Hamas. Syria and Iraq could join the war and greatly enlarge the battlespace. Most important, the fighting could draw in Iran, whether because it senses an opportunity to build influence closer to the Mediterranean or because Israeli gains threaten the survival of its clients in the region or both.

Geography of Conflict in the Middle East

(click to enlarge)

Hezbollah and Israel have traded blows for months. IDF airstrikes have killed several commanders in the Lebanese Shiite militia, whose lethal but measured counterstrikes resulted in the unprecedented evacuation of border areas that tens of thousands of Israelis call home. In recent weeks, Hezbollah rockets have sparked wildfires across large swathes of northern Israel. Israeli military and diplomatic pressure has failed to compel Hezbollah to withdraw its fighters north of the Litani River, some 30 kilometers (19 miles) from the border. Therefore, Israel appears to be moving toward a major military campaign.

Israel is reluctant to initiate a major conflict with Hezbollah while the IDF is still fighting to dismantle Hamas’ regime in Gaza, where a very high civilian death toll and the hostage situation have impeded operations. Hezbollah is similarly hesitant; a financial meltdown and ensuing political crisis have weakened the group at home, while its support for the Assad regime in Syria has stretched its resources. But although Israel is wary of overstretching its forces and losing its remaining international backing, equally threatening is the risk that Iran and its allies could seek to take advantage of Israel’s fragile position. With its spy drone video, Hezbollah hopes to remind Israel of its capabilities and deter a larger Israeli assault against Lebanon.

The last major war between Israel and Hezbollah was in the summer of 2006. It ended inconclusively with a cease-fire after only 33 days. The strategic situation has changed significantly since then. Syria was the dominant external power in Lebanon until the 2011 Arab Spring uprising, which in Syria rapidly devolved into a full-blown civil war. The Assad regime traditionally had kept a lid on Israeli-Hezbollah hostilities, but amid a Sunni rebellion, the regime could no longer play this role. By December 2016, it was evident that the Assad regime would survive, but vast stretches of terrain in the country’s east had been lost to Kurdish separatists and the Islamic State group. The regime had relied heavily on support from Hezbollah and Iran, which together mobilized as many as 100,000 transnational Shiite fighters to defeat the Sunni rebels. Significant help also came from Russia, but since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 the Kremlin has been unable to offer the same level of support.

Today, the Syrian regime is effectively a vassal of Iran, heavily dependent on assistance from Tehran and its proxies. The Iranians’ entrenchment in Syria was a key reason that Israel and Iran went beyond simply fighting by proxy and started directly attacking one another in April. For Israel, the threat on its northern flank is no longer just from Hezbollah in Lebanon but also from Iranian proxies in Syria. Therefore, any major Israeli military operation in the north will not be confined solely to Lebanon but will also be fought in Syria. Hezbollah would have to divide its resources to fight Israel while maintaining its presence in Syria, but on the other hand, Syrian territory would provide the group with strategic depth.

By extension, the Iran-backed Shiite militias in Iraq could also be expected to join the fray, especially if Hezbollah were to suffer setbacks. Tehran’s formidable position in the region took decades to build and came at great cost to the domestic political economy. Iran will mobilize all its assets accordingly. In the event of a major escalation – and now with the precedent of direct attacks on each other – Israel could decide to strike at Iran as well. Iran's direct involvement would take the conflict to another level.

If it materializes, this war will decide the balance of power in the region. Should Israel inflict heavy losses on Hezbollah and its partners in Syria, it could loosen Iran’s grip in the region. The Sunni Islamist insurgency in Syria could try to stage a comeback against the Assad regime and its allied Shiite militias. The Islamic State group could also try to take advantage of the disorder and try to resurrect its lost caliphate.

The Syrian Kurds, who control large parts of the northern and eastern areas of the country, could also be drawn into the conflict. Most significantly, Turkey, which is currently blocked by Iran in the Levant and sees the Syrian Kurds as a threat, would also want to exploit the situation and enhance its strategic position on its southern flank. For the Gulf Arab states, this would be a nightmare scenario, especially with the threat from Iran’s Yemeni ally, the Houthis.

Considering the circumstances, it is little wonder why the United States has been trying to contain the existing conflict. What is most alarming is that it is not succeeding.