Author Topic: Israel, and its neighbors  (Read 982293 times)

Crafty_Dog

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US Congress passes Taylor Act
« Reply #2350 on: November 20, 2017, 08:55:03 AM »
The Important Symbolism, but Probable Futility, of the Taylor Force Act
by A.J. Caschetta
The New English Review
November 17, 2017
http://www.meforum.org/7023/important-symbolism-of-taylor-force-act

 
Taylor Force likely won't be the last American killed as a result of Palestinian terror incitement.

The Taylor Force Act (TFA) passed the House of Representatives' Foreign Affairs Committee unanimously on Wednesday and is expected to pass the full house with wide bipartisan support. The Taylor Force Act marks a noble and long overdue departure from the "anything goes" attitude toward Palestinian terror incitement of previous administrations, but it's unlikely to have a decisive impact on how the PA operates.

The bill is named for US Army veteran Taylor Force, who was murdered while studying in Israel by Palestinian terrorist Bashar Massalh in March 2016. As it does with all other Palestinian terrorists who die carrying out their attacks, the Palestinian Authority (PA) has been making monthly payments to Massalh's family ever since. These funds, from the PA's "Martyr's Fund," are directed through the PLO, which Abbas also controls.

U.S. congressional leaders responded to Force's murder with rare unanimity and determination to put an end to the so-called "pay-to-slay" program and other forms of PA incitement. Sort of.

The Taylor Force Act is designed to trigger a cutoff of US aid to the Palestinians unless the PA takes steps to end terrorism by "individuals under its jurisdictional control," publically condemns and investigates terror attacks, and stops paying monthly stipends to the families of terrorists.

Authority to certify PA compliance with the law's criteria is vested solely in the State Department.

First, authority to certify PA compliance with these three criteria is vested solely in the State Department (in both House and Senate versions), which for years had refused to budge from its traditional depiction of the PA as a force of moderation and peace partner. Fear of the alternatives to PA President Mahmoud Abbas (now in the 12th year of his 4-year term) has led the department to engage in absurd defenses of his regime in the past, and there is no sign of that changing. Indeed, State has already all but certified PA compliance with the first two of the three criteria in its 2016 Country Reports on Terrorism, which commends Abbas's counter-terrorism efforts.

Moreover, the legislation has been watered down to allow some public entities and projects in Palestinian areas to continue receiving US funding on humanitarian grounds regardless of whether the PA is in compliance. Palestinian water projects, childhood vaccination programs and East Jerusalem hospitals are untouchable. "What good is there in punishing women and children for something they did not do?" explained Senate co-sponsor Lindsay Graham in August.

The legislation has been watered down to exempt some public entities and projects from an aid cutoff.

While no one wants Palestinian women and children to go without medical care, vaccinations, or clean water, the history of terrorism funding teaches us that all aid is fungible. With a little imagination, most aid dollars can be construed as benefiting innocent Palestinians somehow or another. The real peril for ordinary Palestinians is a governing apparatus so indifferent to their welfare that it spends over $190 million annually encouraging them to sacrifice their lives.

Like most autocracies, the PA isn't likely to change its ways until its grip on power becomes unsustainable. Nothing short of a total cessation of US funding has much chance of instigating such change.

Palestinian leaders aren't impressed by what they've seen so far. Shortly after the Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved TFA in August, the Abbas-led PLO Executive Committee issued a blistering statement pledging to continue providing "aid to the families of the martyrs and prisoners," which it called a "national, moral, and humanitarian responsibility towards the occupation's victims."

The TFA is an important first step in divesting from nearly a half-century of failed PLO leadership.

Others will surely step in to make up for any shortfall of funding in the "pay-to-slay" program. During the Second Intifada, Saddam Hussein sent $10,000 checks (later raised to $25,000) to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers, and the King of Saudi Arabia held telethons to raise money for them. Perhaps this time around, as Daniel Pipes succinctly tweeted: "#Qatar will pay."

But at least it won't be us subsidizing terrorist blood money. If nothing else, the Taylor Force Act marks an important first step in divesting America from nearly a half-century of failed PLO leadership. That alone makes its passage worth celebrating.

A.J. Caschetta is a Shillman-Ginsburg fellow at the Middle East Forum and a senior lecturer at the Rochester Institute of Technology

ccp

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thinking outside the box ; from JPost
« Reply #2351 on: December 06, 2017, 04:28:21 PM »
ANALYSIS: UPENDING THE APPLECART

> Trump announces US moving embassy to Jerusalem
> Netanyahu: There is no peace that doesn’t include J'lem as Israel’s capital
BY HERB KEINON   DECEMBER 7, 2017 01:31 
Along comes Trump, the most untraditional and nonconformist of all US presidents, and says “enough is enough.” What has been tried didn’t work, so it’s time to try something new.

2 minute read.

In a brief speech of 1,240 words, US President Donald Trump did more on Wednesday than “just” recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and begin the process of moving the embassy there from Tel Aviv. He also upended the orthodoxy that has dominated the approach to Middle East peacemaking for a quarter century.

 Over the last 24 years, since the beginning of the Oslo peace process, certain tenets have come to be accepted as truths: that the only solution is a two-state solution; that there can be no long-term interim agreements; that dozens of settlements will have to be removed; that a future Palestinian state must be free of Jews; and that Washington cannot recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital until there is a final peace deal.

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On and off over this period, a lot of intelligent people have devoted a great deal of time and energy towards trying to bridge the chasm between the most Israel would offer and the minimum the Palestinians were willing to accept. And despite their best efforts, they couldn’t bridge the gap.

Along comes Trump, the most untraditional and nonconformist of all US presidents, and says “enough is enough.” What has been tried didn’t work, so it’s time to try something new.

“When I came into office, I promised to look at the world’s challenges with open eyes and very fresh thinking,” Trump said. “We cannot solve our problems by making the same failed assumptions and repeating the same failed strategies of the past. Old challenges demand new approaches.”

Every US president for the last 20 years has signed the presidential waiver keeping the embassy out of Jerusalem, but it did nothing to promote peace, he said. “It would be folly to assume that repeating the exact same formula would now produce a different or better result.”

ccp

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2 nd post
« Reply #2352 on: December 06, 2017, 05:17:44 PM »
Prof Dershowitz points out is was OBAMA who broke with tradition when dealing with Israel among Presidents - not Trump:

https://www.newsmax.com/alandershowitz/trump-jerusalem-israel-obama/2017/12/06/id/830325/

Crafty_Dog

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Stratfor on Jerusalem
« Reply #2354 on: December 08, 2017, 03:58:52 AM »


    Washington's decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel will give jihadist groups a rallying cry to galvanize supporters and recruit new members.
    By dimming the prospects for a two-state solution, the move will push Israelis and Palestinians alike toward a one-state model, however reluctantly.
    Though the change in Jerusalem's status will present a challenge for most countries in the region, Iran and Turkey could turn it to their advantage.

Jerusalem is a place where deep belief and international politics collide. As a result of this powerful convergence, it's easy to overestimate the city's influence on regional relations. U.S. President Donald Trump's recent announcement that his administration would recognize Jerusalem as the Israeli capital met with praise, scorn and warnings of impending catastrophe from various corners of the world. Many of the proposal's critics argue that moving the U.S. Embassy to the city from Tel Aviv would cause violence and unrest, while dashing any hope of peace between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. But fears that war and widespread violence would follow the announcement are overblown. Nevertheless, the move will not be free of consequences. Beyond the manifold security implications it entails, the decision will produce unwelcome disruptions for many and opportunities for a few, even if its repercussions fall short of apocalyptic.
Where Interests Collide

Since the U.S. Congress passed the Jerusalem Embassy Act in 1995, a hard-line pro-Israel faction in the United States has pushed to recognize the holy city as the Israeli capital in keeping with the legislation's provisions. (Successive presidential administrations had continually delayed the law's implementation through waivers issued every six months.) But the United States' spiritual ties to Jerusalem reach back nearly 200 years. In the early 1800s, Boston missionary Levi Parsons urged Americans to settle Palestine to compel Jesus' return. A group of Chicagoans fleeing the Great Fire founded the American Colony of Jerusalem several decades later in 1881 as a Christian utopia; today, the American Colony Hotel in East Jerusalem is a historical landmark. Though the city has little strategic importance to the United States, and though Americans never constituted a major contingent of its diverse population, Jerusalem's enduring mark on the popular imagination has given it a unique place in U.S. foreign policy.

Regardless of the United States' spiritual imperatives, however, the fact remains that Jerusalem is also Islam's third-holiest city. Its symbolic loss will resonate throughout the Muslim world. The Palestinian Islamic party Hamas has called for a day of rage to protest the U.S. decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital. And even after all the demonstrators have gone home, activists will keep the furor alive on social media. The city is a prime military objective for extremist groups as it is. Its change in status will offer various jihadist outfits, including the nearby Islamic State franchise Wilayat Sinai (formerly known as Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, or "Defenders of Jerusalem"), a propaganda opportunity and rallying cry to galvanize disaffected Muslims. On the heels of the Islamic State's defeat in Iraq and Syria, moreover, the U.S. administration's decision to move its embassy to Jerusalem will boost the extremist group's recruitment.
Disturbing the Peace Process

The decision will also jeopardize the United States' position as a neutral broker between the Israelis and the Palestinians, as some have warned. By acknowledging Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, Washington will undermine its role in the peace process and, in turn, dim the prospects for a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. No other country or institution, after all, is ready to step up in the United States' place. Then again, the peace process has been moribund since long before Trump announced his intentions for Jerusalem on the campaign trail in 2016. Discord between Hamas and rival party Fatah has stalled negotiations and enabled Israel to forge ahead with its settlements in the West Bank. Furthermore, Hamas, as well as states such as Iran, have long doubted the United States' intentions as a mediator. At most, Washington's revised stance on Jerusalem will only expedite the inevitable collapse of the peace process.

As the odds of realizing a two-state solution become more remote, Palestinians may start pushing for a single state instead. But rather than achieving this goal through conquest — the solution Hamas has always espoused — Palestinians would accept annexation by Israel with full citizenship. The plan so far has support only among liberal Palestinians, and no major Palestinian leaders endorse it. Without the possibility of a two-state solution, however, the single-state alternative will become the only option for Palestinians going forward.

Israel, meanwhile, will also move toward a one-state solution. Giving recognition for Jerusalem as its capital city has for decades been a valuable bargaining chip for the United States. Now that the United States has satisfied that demand without asking for any further concessions, Israel will feel even less pressure to address the Palestinian issue. Its settlement process will continue apace, bringing Israel closer, if inadvertently, to a single-state model. The one-state solution has its drawbacks for Israel, though: Adding millions of Palestinians to the voter rolls will doom the country's Jewish majority, but denying them suffrage would spell the end of Israel as a democracy. So though the current situation may appear to be a political victory for Israel today, it will bring difficult decisions down the line.

For most states in the region, a change in Jerusalem's status in Jerusalem is an unwelcome distraction from more pressing problems.

A Decision of Regional Consequence

In addition, the change in Jerusalem's status will complicate the budding partnership between Israel and Saudi Arabia. The United States' decision will spur majority-Muslim countries around the world to band together in outrage against Israel and prompt the kingdom, as the custodian of Islam's holiest sites, to distance itself from its would-be public ally. Otherwise, Riyadh's deepening security ties to Israel would highlight the extent to which concerns over Iran's power in the region have overshadowed the question of Palestinian statehood in Saudi policy. The kingdom still will try to mitigate popular outrage against Israel, but to retain its religious legitimacy, it will have to halt or delay trade deals, official visits and changes to state curriculum, which currently depicts Israel as an invader of Muslim lands.

Jordan, where Palestinians make up nearly half the population, will also have to deal with the fallout from Jerusalem's new designation. Just five months after a security guard at the Israeli Embassy in Amman killed two Jordanians, one of them by accident, the United States' announcement will further fuel outrage in Jordan against Israel. Jordanians will take to the streets to try to force their king to justify the existence of the country's 1994 peace treaty with Israel. At the same time, the powerful Jordanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood will capitalize on the incident to gather strength in the country's parliament while eroding the monarchy's legitimacy. Attacks on the monarchy, in turn, could slow, if not reverse, Jordan's efforts at structural economic reform.

Similarly, the threat of unrest will compel Egypt to downgrade its relations with Israel and with the United States. President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi will face scrutiny over his relationship with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, over Egypt's peace treaty with Israel and over his efforts to prevent arms from flowing over the Gaza border to Hamas. With elections slated for the spring, al-Sisi can't afford to put his security credentials — the foundation of his platform — at risk.

Though the United States' revised position on Jerusalem will complicate matters for many countries in the region, others may turn the situation to their favor. Washington's recent announcement, for instance, will seem to vindicate Iran's staunch anti-Israeli, anti-American stance in the coming weeks. And in Turkey, it will give President Recep Tayyip Erdogan an opportunity to boost his image as a pan-Islamic leader by reducing or altogether severing relations with Israel, which he recently accused of undermining Jerusalem's Islamic character. Turkey, of course, has an underlying geopolitical incentive to restore diplomatic ties with Israel eventually, but in the meantime, suspending them will help Erdogan as he confronts his country's wobbly economy.

But Turkey and Iran are the outliers. For most states in the region, a change in Jerusalem's status is an unwelcome distraction from more pressing problems. The decision, in fact, will have undesirable side effects even for the countries that it ostensibly stands to benefit the most — the United States and Israel. Whether the repercussions live up to worst-case scenarios swirling around in the public discourse is another story.

Crafty_Dog

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"You have enemies?  Good.  That means that you have stood up for something, sometime in your life." - Winston Churchill.

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MEF offers $1M to UNRWA
« Reply #2363 on: January 20, 2018, 11:47:49 AM »
MEF Offers One Million Dollars to UNRWA
News from the Middle East Forum
January 18, 2018
http://www.meforum.org/7168/mef-offers-one-million-dollars-to-unrwa
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A few minutes ago, we sent out a press release offering one million dollars to UNRWA provided it meets one simple condition (see below), adding that the "offer is valid until June 30, 2017." No, this wasn't a punch line; it was a regrettable first-of-the-year typo. The deadline is June 30, 2018, and the offer is serious. To the many subscribers who pointed this error out to us, our sincere thanks.

The Middle East Forum
 
PHILADELPHIA – January 18, 2018 – The Middle East Forum announces a donation of one million dollars to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).

After the U.S. Government partially withheld funding, UNRWA's head called on "people of good will in every corner of the globe where solidarity and partnerships exist for Palestine Refugees" to "join us in responding to this crisis and #FundUNRWA."

The Middle East Forum has responded: "Despite UNRWA's long record of misbehavior: incitement against Israel, supporting violent attacks on Jews, and corruption, we are prepared to help UNRWA, conditional on it making some reforms," said Daniel Pipes, president of the Middle East Forum. "We are delighted to contribute in solidarity if UNRWA takes steps to end the Palestine refugee problem.

"The Forum's contribution requires UNRWA to end the automatic registering in perpetuity of (1) the descendants of refugees, (2) those who hold a nationality, and (3) those who live in their purported homeland, the West Bank and Gaza. Making these technical changes puts it in line with all other refugee agencies and reduces the number of Palestine refugees from 5.3 million to around 20,000. Our one-million-dollar donation will go a long way to meet the humanitarian considerations of this small and diminishing number."

The Middle East Forum has long pressed for a tightening of requirements for the "Palestine refugee" status, seeing this as both improving Palestinian lives and diminishing the threat to Israel.

"The current UNRWA definition breeds a victimhood mentality that perpetuates Palestinian-Israeli conflict," notes Gregg Roman, director of the Middle East Forum. "We hope our funding can inspire improvements in the lives of those in need while bringing the conflict closer to resolution."

On its own, UNRWA can adjust the definition of a refugee and has done so. In 1950, UNRWA defined a refugee as "a needy person, who, as a result of the war in Palestine, has lost his home, and his means of livelihood." There was no reference to descendants. In 1965 and 1982, UNRWA unilaterally decided to extend refugee status to all descendants, which meant the number of "Palestine refugees" now expands without limit.

The Middle East Forum is ready to help UNRWA out of this predicament. The offer is valid until June 30, 2018. MEF's management alone will decide when the conditions for payment have been fulfilled.

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Hizballah helping Hamas develop infrastructure to attack Israel
« Reply #2364 on: January 25, 2018, 12:03:56 PM »
Hizballah Helps Hamas Enhance Terrorist Infrastructure on Israel's Northern Border
IPT News
January 25, 2018
https://www.investigativeproject.org/7289/hizballah-helps-hamas-enhance-terrorist

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Glick: How Israel needs to see American politics
« Reply #2365 on: January 26, 2018, 10:11:54 AM »

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POTH: Hamas-- Life is tougher when you are stupid
« Reply #2371 on: February 12, 2018, 10:59:12 AM »
With Gaza in Financial Crisis, Fears That ‘an Explosion’s Coming’
By DAVID M. HALBFINGERFEB. 11, 2018

GAZA CITY — The payday line at a downtown A.T.M. here in Gaza City was dozens deep with government clerks and pensioners, waiting to get what cash they could.

Muhammad Abu Shaaban, 45, forced into retirement two months ago, stood six hours to withdraw a $285 monthly check — a steep reduction from his $1,320 salary as a member of the Palestinian Authority’s presidential guard.

“Life has become completely different,” Mr. Abu Shaaban said, his eyes welling up. He has stopped paying a son’s college tuition. He buys his wife vegetables to cook for their six children, not meat.

And the pay he had just collected was almost entirely spoken for to pay off last month’s grocery bills. “At most, I’ll have no money left in five days,” he said.

Across Gaza, the densely populated enclave of two million Palestinians sandwiched between Israel and Egypt, daily life, long a struggle, is unraveling before people’s eyes.


At the heart of the crisis — and its most immediate cause — is a crushing financial squeeze, the result of a tense standoff between Hamas, the militant Islamist group that rules Gaza, and Fatah, the secular party entrenched on the West Bank. Fatah controls the Palestinian Authority but was driven out of Gaza by Hamas in 2007.


At grocery stores, beggars jostle with middle-class shoppers, who sheepishly ask to put their purchases on credit. The newly destitute scrounge for spoiled produce they can get for little or nothing.

“We are dead, but we have breath,” said Zakia Abu Ajwa, 57, who now cooks greens normally fed to donkeys for her three small grandchildren.

The jails are filling with shopkeepers arrested for unpaid debts; the talk on the streets is of homes being burglarized. The boys who skip school to hawk fresh mint or wipe car windshields face brutal competition. At open-air markets, shelves remain mostly full, but vendors sit around reading the Quran.

There are no buyers, the sellers say. There is no money.

United Nations officials warn that Gaza is nearing total collapse, with medical supplies dwindling, clinics closing and 12-hour power failures threatening hospitals. The water is almost entirely undrinkable, and raw sewage is befouling beaches and fishing grounds. Israeli officials and aid workers are bracing for a cholera outbreak any day.

A Palestinian cancer patient at a hospital in Gaza City. United Nations officials warn that Gaza is nearing total collapse, with medical supplies dwindling, clinics closing and 12-hour power failures threatening hospitals. Credit Wissam Nassar for The New York Times

Israel has blockaded Gaza for more than a decade, with severe restrictions on the flow of goods into the territory and people out of it, hoping to contain Hamas and also, perhaps, to pressure Gazans to eventually oust the group from power.

For years, Hamas sidestepped the Israeli siege and generated revenue by taxing goods smuggled in through tunnels from Sinai. But President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi of Egypt, after taking power in 2013, choked off Hamas — an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, which Mr. Sisi sees as a threat — by shutting the main border crossing at Rafah for long stretches. Egypt, which has no interest in becoming Gaza’s de facto administrator, used that pressure to force Hamas to close the Sinai tunnels.

For Hamas, the deteriorating situation is leaving it with few options. The one it has resorted to three times — going to war with Israel, in hopes of generating international sympathy and relief in the aftermath — suddenly seems least attractive.

Hamas can count on little aid now from the Arab world, let alone beyond. And Israel, in an underground-barrier project with a nearly $1 billion price tag, is steadily sealing its border to the attack tunnels into Israel that Gaza militants spent years digging.

The collapsing tunnel enterprise, in a way, neatly captures where Hamas finds itself: with no good way out.


Last year, the Palestinian Authority’s president, Mahmoud Abbas, ratcheted up the pressure on Hamas, stopping its payments for fuel for Gaza’s power station and to Israel for electrical transmission into the Gaza Strip. It slashed the salaries of thousands of its workers who remained on its payroll in Gaza, even though they no longer had jobs to do after Hamas took power. Those measures forced Hamas into reconciliation talks that kindled new hopes, reaching their peak in a much-heralded October agreement in Cairo.

Hamas, eager to rid itself of the burdens of governing — though unwilling to disarm its military wing — showed flexibility at the talks, quickly ceding control over border crossings like the one with Israel at Kerem Shalom, and the tax collections there that had provided it with some $20 million a month.

But a series of missed deadlines for handing over governance to the Palestinian Authority, and the removal last month of the Egyptian intelligence chief who had brokered the reconciliation talks, have dashed hopes and left the two factions squabbling, the rapprochement slowly bleeding out.

Hamas now refuses to relinquish its collection of taxes inside Gaza until the Palestinian Authority starts paying the salaries of public employees. But the authority is refusing to do that until Hamas hands over the internal revenue stream.

“The most hard-line people in the P.A. believe they need full capitulation from Hamas, including the dismantling of its military,” said Nathan Thrall, an analyst for International Crisis Group who closely monitors Gaza. “The vast majority of Palestinians see that as wholly unrealistic. But the P.A. thinks that strategy is working. So they think the pressure should continue, and they’ll get even more.”

The longer the stalemate lasts, the more Hamas hemorrhages funds and Gaza’s economy suffocates. While thousands of Palestinian Authority workers in Gaza like Mr. Abu Shaaban were forced into early retirement, and those who remained saw their pay cut 40 percent, some 40,000 Hamas workers — many of them police officers — have not been paid in months, officials say.

As Gaza’s buying power plummets, imports through Kerem Shalom are falling — from a monthly average of 9,720 truckloads last year to just 7,855 in January — which will only cut Hamas’s revenue more.

“Abu Mazen has punished all of us, not only Hamas,” Fawzi Barhoum, the chief Hamas spokesman in Gaza, said in an interview, using Mr. Abbas’s nickname.

From Israel, a Conflicted View

A debate raged in Israel this past week, which sees the possibility of war both to its north and south, between military leaders warning about the looming crisis in Gaza and politicians questioning just how much and how soon the situation there would threaten national security.

Such a conflicted view has characterized Israeli policy ever since the blockade was imposed, analysts say, as the country sought to protect itself by cordoning off the strip.


But that meant keeping an enormous degree of control over the flow of people, cargo, energy and international aid across the border — and as it clamps down, the resulting social harm in Gaza can blow back against Israel.

Nowhere is that more palpable than just across the border in Israel, where soldiers patrol close enough to wave at the Hamas militants eyeing them from watchtowers, and commanders talk of Gaza’s unemployment and poverty rates as fluently as of their battle preparations.

Brig. Gen. Yehuda Fox, who leads the army’s Gaza division, recently showed Hamas and Islamic Jihad tunnels discovered and destroyed in the past few months. The tunnels were supplied with air, electricity and water, and dug by an estimated 100 men working in shifts.

The showpiece of the army tour, though, was not the tunnels, but the construction of a concrete-and-electronic barrier, dug deep into the earth, that General Fox said will eventually detect other tunnels and stop more from being built.


About three miles of the barrier is finished, with about 38 miles to go. It is an impressive display of ingenuity, but comes at an enormous cost: Five concrete plants have been set up, supplying 20 digging sites, at a cost of nearly $1 billion. Enough concrete is being poured into the desert sand, the general said, to “build Manhattan.”

But he also acknowledged that the underground-barrier project had increased the pressure on Hamas to use its existing tunnels soon, or risk losing them forever — heightening their dangers to Israel.

As moribund as the reconciliation process has become, General Fox said, Hamas and the Palestinian Authority were keeping it alive because “no one wants to be blamed for destroying it.” If it does fail, Hamas will likely deflect Gazans’ anger: “They’ll say Israel is the problem — ‘Let’s go to jihad and start a war.’”

Climbing back into an armored vehicle, the general drove past an Iron Dome antimissile battery to a park where hundreds of picnickers and mountain bikers — Jews and Arabs alike — had flocked to see meadows blooming with scarlet anemones. Israel calls this February festival “Red South.”

Photo
An Israeli Arab woman sitting in a park where hundreds of picnickers and mountain bikers — Jews and Arabs alike — had flocked to see meadows blooming with scarlet anemones. Credit Uriel Sinai for The New York Times

It was well within mortar range of the border.

“It’s their decision what to do,” the general said of Hamas. “Three times in the past 10 years they’ve chosen war. They wasted many lives and a lot of money and destroyed Gaza. And they can try to do it a fourth time.”

Then again, he said, “Everybody learns.”

Photo
Israel, in an underground-barrier project with a nearly $1 billion price tag, is steadily sealing its border to the attack tunnels that Gaza militants spent years digging. Credit Uriel Sinai for The New York Times


Israel recently called on donor countries to fund some $1 billion in water and energy improvements in Gaza, measures that would take time. But there is more it could do to alleviate the crisis quickly, according to the Israeli advocacy group Gisha — like easing the way for cancer patients to travel for treatment, or renewing exit permits for traders, which Israel slashed to just 551 at the end of 2017 from about 3,600 two years earlier.

The United States has done the opposite, withholding $65 million from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, which supports Palestinian refugees, including some 1.2 million in Gaza, many of whom rely on its regular handouts of flour, cooking oil and other staples.

Hamas itself has few ways to alleviate the crisis, according to Mr. Thrall and other Gaza experts.

It could retake control of Kerem Shalom, regaining vital revenue but inviting blame, and retribution, for the demise of reconciliation. It could seek intervention by Muhammad Dahlan, a Fatah leader exiled and reviled by Mr. Abbas, in hopes that Mr. Dahlan’s patron, the United Arab Emirates, might pour money into Gaza. Or it could muddle along, perhaps hoping that an expected American peace initiative might entail quieting Gaza with aid.

For the moment, those with money in Gaza are trying to help those without. A few merchants have forgiven customers’ debts. The Gaza Chamber of Commerce paid $35,000 to get 107 indebted merchants temporarily released from jail. A donor gave 1,000 liters of fuel to a hospital for its generator.

Photo
The Gaza Chamber of Commerce paid $35,000 to get 107 indebted merchants temporarily released from jail. Credit Wissam Nassar for The New York Times

But the fuel quickly ran out. Gestures only help so much. And Gaza residents invariably say that war is coming.

Hamas is under no illusions that it would fare better in the next fight than it did after its 2014 battle with Israel, Mr. Thrall said.

“Hamas sees how isolated they are in the region, and how isolated the Palestinians are at large,” he said. “Before, in wars, they could hope to light up the Arab street and pressure Arab leaders. But in 2014, there was barely a peep, and now it’s even more so.”

Still, whether out of bluster or desperation, Gazans both in and out of power have begun talking openly about confronting Israel over its blockade in the kind of mass action that could easily lead to casualties and escalation.

A social-media activist, Ahmed Abu Artema, is promoting the idea of a “Great Return,” a peaceable encampment of 100,000 protesters along the Israel-Gaza border. Mr. Barhoum, the Hamas spokesman, envisioned a million or more Gazans taking part, though perhaps not so peacefully.

One way or the other, “an explosion’s coming,” said Mr. Abu Shaaban, the cash-strapped Palestinian Authority pensioner. “We have only Israel to explode against. Should we explode against each other?”

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stratfor
« Reply #2372 on: February 12, 2018, 07:32:31 PM »
With its enemies distracted, Israel is seizing the opportunity to act. Early Feb. 10, the Israeli military detected an Iranian drone encroaching on Israeli airspace and shot it down. Taking things a step further, the Israeli air force then targeted the base in Syria that the drone operated out of. In the process, its aircraft came under heavy fire and an Israeli jet was shot down. The Israelis then launched another strike against 12 Syrian and Iranian sites in Syria, focusing primarily on infrastructure for air defense.

The large number of targets struck by Israeli forces in such a short period of time and the downing of an Israeli aircraft are both uncommon events. However, Israel routinely sends planes into Lebanese and Syrian airspace, and the country regularly carries out strikes on potential threats such as Syria's chemical weapons program or what Israel believes to be shipments of weapons to Hezbollah.

It's not clear what the Iranians were seeking to gain from a drone flight over Israeli positions beyond intelligence, but Iran, Syria and Hezbollah all have a strong incentive to once again deter Israeli actions. Even if all three want to avoid becoming embroiled in a major war with Israel at a time when their forces are already heavily committed to the Syrian battlefield, regional dynamics require that Israel be reminded it cannot simply continue to strike targets in Syria with impunity. If Iran, Syria or Hezbollah refuse to fight back, Israel will only be incentivized to carry out more airstrikes against them.

On the other hand, this latest flurry of strikes was highly indicative of Israel's continued restraint. Though recent events have demonstrated Israel's willingness to increase airstrikes while its adversaries are overstretched in the Syrian civil war, they have also highlighted the country's willingness to de-escalate attacks. Shortly after conducting airstrikes in response to the downing of its jet, Israel announced that it did not want the situation to escalate further and called on Russia to intervene to prevent further Iranian action.

Israel's restraint is likely caused largely by the considerable damage that a war with Hezbollah, Iran and the Syrian government would bring, but Russia's presence in Syria is likely also a factor. Because Russia is heavily invested in Syria and has personnel on the ground in the country, Israel will need to be very careful in its campaign against Syrian targets to avoid escalating animosity beyond the tiny country's control.


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Re: Israel, and its neighbors
« Reply #2374 on: February 15, 2018, 08:19:50 AM »
An Israeli friend with strong IDF experience in his background comments on the Glick article:

"As for the article you sent..
It’s all biased depending on which political views you hold.
Personally I think BiBi is corrupt to the core, and the claim of his supporters that it is a conspiracy to overthrow him is ridiculous..

"He appointed the chief of police, he appointed the attorney General, and he appointed the state comptroller.
Now he cries they are all out to get him..?
Gimme a fucken break..

"The asshole got cought and I really hope they put his ass in Jail."

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Israel, Turkey: Hamas up to no good in Turkey
« Reply #2375 on: February 15, 2018, 10:49:45 AM »
Shin Bet Investigation Exposes Depth of Turkey's Hamas Support
February 15, 2018
https://www.investigativeproject.org/7349/shin-bet-investigation-exposes-depth-of-turkey

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AEI: Israel, and the coming war with Iran
« Reply #2376 on: February 16, 2018, 09:28:18 AM »


    Danielle Pletka @dpletka

February 15, 2018 12:16 pm | AEIdeas
What’s new in foreign and defense policy

Give ‘maximum pressure’ a chance

The coming conflict between Iran and Israel


Last Friday night, the Iranian military crossed into Israel using a drone launched from a Syrian base. It’s not clear whether the UAV was armed or not, but it was likely a Saeqeh model based on designs reverse engineered from a downed US model.

Fragments of a Syrian anti-aircraft missile found in Alonei Abba, about 2 miles (3.2 km) from where the remains of a crashed F-16 Israeli war plane were found, at the village of Alonei Abba, Israel February 10, 2018. REUTERS/ Ronen Zvulun

Israel retaliated by striking the Tiyas air base from which the UAV was being controlled, prompting the launch of several volleys of anti-aircraft missiles which brought down an Israeli F-16I craft over Israeli territory. (The two pilots ejected.) Israel returned fire with a major air incursion into Syria, striking Iranian and Syrian targets.

This is a significant escalation on the part of the Iranians, and comes on the heels of the visit to Lebanon and Syria of a senior Iranian cleric, Ayatollah Sayyed Ibrahim Raisi, to the border with Israel. (Raisi is among those in contention to take over as Supreme Leader when Khamenei dies.) And for the Israelis, it sharpens the challenge they face with not just Hezbollah, the Iranian controlled terrorist group on its borders in Lebanon, but now a substantial Islamic Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) presence in Syria as well.

Israel has not been idly watching as Iran builds up its proxies in Syria and Lebanon. The IDF has hit Syria repeatedly, taking out shipments from Iran designed to up Iran’s proxy capabilities. But plenty has also happened without Israeli action, including new missile factories on Lebanese soil and a continued major build-up that will mean that when the next confrontation happens, it will be large, ugly, and with substantial collateral damage.

The steady escalation by Iran on Israel’s border belies the notion that Tehran is feeling any heat from the departure of the more pro-Iran Barack Obama and the arrival of Donald Trump, with his pledge to take the Iranian threat more seriously. Rather, Iran has continued to cut a wide swath throughout the Middle East, destabilizing the Iraqi government, continuing to cooperate with Russia in their campaign to restore Bashar al Assad to power in Syria, marching apace through Yemen via their proxy Houthi government, and, of course, consolidating their growing dominion over Lebanon.

I’ve written about Iran’s tightening grip on Beirut, only helped by the recent bizarre detention of Lebanon’s Prime Minister Saad Hariri in Riyadh. But the US government appears determined to ignore the Lebanese Armed Forces’ increasingly obvious cooperation with Hezbollah, as well as Hezbollah’s swelling arsenal throughout Lebanese territory.

Somehow, both Centcom and the State Department have persuaded themselves, despite ample evidence to the contrary, that Lebanon is somehow independent despite massive Iranian infiltration through Hezbollah. And even though Treasury officials have cottoned on to Hezbollah/Iran’s financial shenanigans ongoing in the Lebanese banking system, a stealthily passed add on to Lebanese election law now insulates all targeted parties from the effects of sanctions, anteing up Lebanese government cash to rescue any political party subject to financial action.

How does this all end? Simple. The United States has not availed itself of sufficient soft or hard power options vis a vis Iran in Syria, Yemen, or anywhere else in the region. Iran is rising inexorably, and inevitably, at least for Israel, there will be no choice but conflict.

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Hamas stealing from Gaza
« Reply #2378 on: March 05, 2018, 11:08:03 PM »
Hamas Continues to Steal Energy From Gaza's Residents
by IPT News  •  Mar 5, 2018 at 2:07 pm
https://www.investigativeproject.org/7361/hamas-continues-to-steal-energy-from-gaza

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Glick: Firing Tillerson removed an obstacle to peace
« Reply #2382 on: March 16, 2018, 07:29:41 AM »
This very good piece is about quite a bit more than Tillerson/

http://carolineglick.com/firing-tillerson-removed-an-obstacle-to-peace/


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Pipes: Peace through Victory
« Reply #2383 on: March 27, 2018, 09:50:26 PM »
Why Palestinians Need an Israel Victory
by Daniel Pipes
The Australian
March 24, 2018
meforum.org/articles/2018/why-palestinians-need-an-israel-victory


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GPF: George Friedman: The Strategic Implications of the Gaza Deaths
« Reply #2386 on: April 02, 2018, 08:08:54 AM »
Gaza Deaths and Strategic Possibilities
Apr 2, 2018
By George Friedman

Israeli troops killed 17 Palestinian demonstrators in Gaza on March 30. Israel claimed that the demonstrators were armed with Molotov cocktails and other weapons and that the majority of those killed were terrorists. The Palestinians claimed that they were unarmed demonstrators demanding their human rights. Which side is right is academic. The hard fact is that the Israel-Gaza frontier, after an extended period of relative quiet, has become more active in recent months, and the Israelis have devoted substantial military assets to control the border.

The events in Gaza have to be viewed in a broader strategic context. There were unconfirmed reports last weekend that the Israeli air force bombed Hezbollah forces operating on the Lebanon-Syria border. Surveillance of Lebanon and attacks on Hezbollah forces near or in Syria are not new, but a pattern is emerging. All of Israel’s frontiers have become, or threaten to become, active. In Syria, Iran has substantial power and deep influence over the Assad regime and its actions. In Lebanon, Hezbollah, an Iranian-dominated force, is a serious power. Hezbollah has also played a major role in the Syrian civil war. The group has suffered losses in Syria, but as the Assad regime becomes more secure, Hezbollah’s losses are being replaced. Its ability to launch rockets and missiles at Israel remains intact, while its ground forces, which fought Israel to a standstill in 2006, are being restored.

Since Israel’s founding, the Arabs and Israelis have faced fundamental strategic problems. The Arabs have never been able to create a unified command around the Israeli periphery to wage extended, coordinated warfare, taking advantage of their superior numbers. The Israelis are incapable of absorbing extensive casualties (in the tens of thousands) given the country’s small population and relatively small effective fighting force. Israel’s strategy has always been to either take advantage of divisions in the Arab world or encourage them. In addition, Israel’s war-fighting strategy has been to impose a rapid end to fighting, even if this means an inconclusive war, to minimize casualties.

The ideal strategy for the Arabs has been forcing Israel into a war along its entire periphery, from Lebanon and Syria, down the Jordan River line to Eilat, and in the southwest from Egypt, in the Sinai-Negev area. The Arabs would use larger numbers, accepting much higher casualties to neutralize the effect of Israel’s technology and superior forces, and impose a war of attrition on Israel, in due course breaking Israeli forces.

Something of this sort was attempted in 1948 with insufficient coordination to succeed. In 1970, the Egyptians and Israelis fought a war of attrition, but that was along only one sector of the Israeli frontier. In 1973, the Syrians and Egyptians opened a two-front war that had major initial successes for them, but they were eventually blocked by the Israelis. In none of these conflicts were the Arabs able to impose a full peripheral war, forcing Israel to defend the long Jordan Rive line and disperse its forces in defensive positions for an indeterminate time. Israel’s political strategy allowed its forces to concentrate and defeat the enemy.

Gaza’s Role

And so the Gaza events are important. Unlike previous episodes when the Iranians provided Hamas with material support from far away, the Iranians are now in Syria and Lebanon. A full peripheral war is still impossible, since the Sinai-Negev line is manned by Israeli and Egyptian troops coordinating against jihadists, and the Jordan River line is held by the Jordanians, who have far greater worries than Israel. Still, the possibilities of active fronts in Lebanon and Syria, coupled with another threat from Gaza, including rockets that cannot be rapidly suppressed by Israel, pose a threat to Israel. From the Arab (and now Iranian) point of view, a sudden victory is not the goal. Rather, the goal is to impose casualties on Israel’s military and civilian population for an extended period to undermine Israel’s ability and will to fight. Before the Iranian presence, this was difficult to achieve. It remains difficult but not impossible.

This is why the Israelis are extremely sensitive to anything happening in Gaza, and why the Palestinians in Gaza are carefully testing the Israelis. Hamas was on the ropes a short while ago, but now with Iran (Sunni and Shiite cooperation), opportunities emerge. For Israel, the key at the moment is political. It must do what it can to assure that President Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi remains in control of Egypt and that the Hashemites remain in control of Jordan. The Iranian strategy must be to destabilize both, particularly Jordan. Given Iran’s power in Iraq and the expansion of Iranian logistics, it could place a substantial force on the Jordan River line, vastly thinning out Israeli troops and undermining Israel’s strategy of massed force.

For all the talk of Iranian nuclear weapons, this is an early stage of the real Iranian threat – a war of attrition against Israel. Of course, Turkey, a major power and neighbor of Iran, is not interested in seeing Iran control the Arab world, nor are the other Arab states. The divisions in the Arab world might finally coalesce not against Israel, but against Iran.

All of this, of course, is quite premature. But given recent events in Gaza and Iranian power in Syria and Lebanon, it is not premature to consider the potential shape of a conflict. Hezbollah rockets from the north, Hamas rockets from the south, and Israeli forces dispersed on multiple fronts in ground operations would likely not break Israel, but they would strain it and would be a step in reshaping the balance of power in the region, which is the goal for Iran. This would be less about destroying Israel than about dominating the Arab world, the most interesting outcome for Iran.

 

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Re: Israel, and its neighbors
« Reply #2387 on: April 02, 2018, 08:44:22 AM »
one can only imagine what this would look like if Iran starts producing nuclear bombs


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Re: Israel, and its neighbors
« Reply #2388 on: April 03, 2018, 07:37:30 AM »
Looks like they are thinking about getting them off the shelf from Pakistan

https://gellerreport.com/2018/04/iran-pakistan-axis-evil.html/

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GPF
« Reply #2389 on: April 18, 2018, 01:09:16 PM »




Israel: The Israeli army has canceled its participation in U.S.-led international air force exercises. Israeli officials said the country remains on high alert as it anticipates a response from Iran to alleged Israeli strikes on an Iranian base in Syria. That it has pulled out of the exercises indicates its high level of concern about an attack. Now is a good time to take stock of Israel’s air force. How large is the force, and what type of planes does it have? Has Israel ever canceled participation in exercises due to security concerns at home?

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The Kite as Weapon
« Reply #2390 on: April 28, 2018, 08:35:05 AM »
The Palestinians’ Kite Jihad
by A.J. Caschetta
The Algemeiner
April 24, 2018
https://www.meforum.org/articles/2018/the-palestinians’-kite-jihad

In the history of weaponizing the mundane, no one beats the Palestinians.  When they have been unable to acquire conventional weapons, they have resorted to the unconventional — such as kitchen knives and screwdrivers.  When unable to acquire conventional vehicles of war, they have resorted to the unconventional — such as cars, truck, and even bulldozers.

In the latest round of attacks against Israel — the “March of Return” — they have yet again demonstrated ingenuity by weaponizing the simplest of children’s toys: the kite.

Their method involves fashioning a wire tail onto  a kite, with an explosive attached to it. The kite is then flown from the relative safety of the Gaza side of the border into Israel. Once it has reached far enough into Israeli territory, the string is cut and the kite — explosive attached — falls into Israeli territory.  Some of the kites have been used to deliver incendiary devices, while others have used explosives. Some of the weaponized kites are made to resemble the Palestinian flag, while others more ominously feature swastikas.

Reporters from the Agence France Presse (AFP) found Palestinian children boasting of their new “means of struggle,” one of whom enthused: “They [the IDF] are firing explosives bullets and tear gas, we are flying kites to burn the farmland.”

On Tuesday, April 17, one such weaponized kite — with a Molotov cocktail attached — started a fire in a field outside Kibbutz Be’eri, several miles into Israeli territory. According to The Times of Israel, it took four teams of firefighters to put out the fire, which had spread over nearly 25 acres.

Using toys as weapons recalls the tactic that the Soviet Union used against the children of Afghanistan in the 1980s. The idea was to maim, but not kill, Afghan children in order to fill hospital beds that therefore couldn’t be used to treat mujahideen fighters attacking Soviet troops. So the ingenious minds of Soviet scientists designed bombs disguised as toys.  In 1985, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights — which was inquiry conducted by an Felix Ermacora — asserted that many Afghan “children had been very seriously wounded, having their hands or feet blown off, either by handling booby-trap toys they had picked up along the roadway, or by stepping on them … booby-trap toys encountered include those resembling pens, harmonicas, radios or matchboxes, and little bombs shaped like a bird. This type of bomb, consisting of two wings, one flexible and the other rigid, in the shape and colors of a bird, explodes when the flexible wing is touched.”

After the Russians were expelled from Afghanistan, the Taliban infamously forbade Afghan children from playing with kites which they deemed “un-Islamic.” Yet they too came up with ingenious ways to disguise weapons, especially bombs — for instance, in turbans. Burhanuddin Rabbani, head of the Afghan High Peace Council, was assassinated by a Taliban bomber who defeated security measures by hiding explosives in his turban.

Al Qaeda has used the human body to disguise their bombs, either as suicide vests (which they learned from the Tamil Tigers) or by shoving bombs in their rectums. In Iraq, bombs were disguised as the pregnant abdomens of women, packing a larger payload that the slim vests.

The ingenuity displayed by jihad warriors to disguise their weapons shows just how adaptable they are, always a step or two ahead of Western thinkers in their deviousness. It also shows that the Palestinians are willing to sacrifice their children.

AFP reporters in Gaza not only found children willing to talk, but also adults, who had put the children up to their treachery. One said that the aim was “to destabilize, creating confusion,” and to “burn … crops.” A man named Jamal al-Fadi, identified as a professor of political science in Gaza, said that,  “The Palestinian people, frustrated and desperate due to the Israeli siege … have had their hope renewed” by the new “means of struggle.”

If the Palestinians devoted a fraction of the ingenuity they have shown in devising and hiding weapons to diplomacy, compromise, and to building in the territory that Israel abandoned in 2005, they would be far closer to achieving the state they crave. Unfortunately, they prefer killing over negotiating, protesting over compromising, and burning over building.

A.J. Caschetta is a Ginsburg-Ingerman fellow at the Middle East Forum and a senior lecturer at the Rochester Institute of Technology.

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Abbas: Jews caused the holocaust
« Reply #2393 on: May 02, 2018, 08:34:52 AM »
Palestinian President Claims Jews' Behavior Caused the Holocaust
by IPT News  •  May 1, 2018 at 12:09 pm
https://www.investigativeproject.org/7428/palestinian-president-claims-jews-behavior-caused

In yet another long and disoriented rant, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas on Monday took his anti-Semitic sentiment to a new level.

Abbas told a Palestinian National Council session that the Jewish people – not anti-Semitism or the Nazis – caused the Holocaust through their "social behavior," the Times of Israel reported.

According to Abbas, the mass genocide of more than 6 million Jews was a result of the Jews "social behavior, [charging] interest, and financial matters."
Abbas also claimed that Israel is a European colonial project, that European Jews have "no historical ties" to Israel, and that "those who sought a Jewish state weren't Jews."

Denying Jewish identity and Jewish rights to any part of Israel are other forms of anti-Semitism that Abbas frequently embraces.  He also repeated his stubborn rejection of any peace plan proposal led by the Trump administration, even before it has been formally presented.

In a series of public statements since Trump's announcement to move the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem, Abbas has propagated claims that are outlandish even by his own, often radical, standards.  In a Jan. 14 address to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Central Council, Abbas spent more than two hours ranting about the history of Zionism in a conspiratorial fashion. He claimed that Jews moved to Israel solely for ideological and colonial reasons, not because of persecution "even during the Holocaust."
In the same speech, he went off on a blatantly anti-Semitic tirade that attempted to de-legitimize any Jewish presence in the state of Israel: "The significance of Israel's functional character is that colonialism created it in order to fill a specific role; it is a colonialist project that is not connected to Judaism, but made use of the Jews so they would serve as pawns..."

These anti-Semitic comments are reminiscent of his Holocaust denying doctoral thesis, which grossly underestimates the number of Jews killed in the genocide and focuses on an unsubstantiated relationship between Zionists and Nazis.

While trying to present a moderate face for years, recent developments show that the Palestinian president has become a hostile and outwardly racist leader that continues to alienate the Palestinian people.

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GPF: Iran prepares in Syria for war with Israel 2.0
« Reply #2394 on: May 05, 2018, 09:28:06 AM »
By Jacob L. Shapiro

Another war between Israel and Hezbollah may well be approaching. Iran, Hezbollah’s primary patron, continues to ship weapons to the Lebanese militia despite Israel’s insistence that doing so is something it cannot allow. Israel has conducted airstrikes on Iranian and Syrian targets in the past month accordingly, but to no avail. The more aggressively Israel behaves, the sooner a direct fight with Iran will come.

Of course, the two have been engaged in a war of words for some time, but this contest has been confined to the battlefield of rhetoric for a simple if overlooked geographic reason: The two countries are too far away from each other to wage war. Now, though, Iranian bases are coming under attack, and casualties are beginning to mount, but Iran has yet to respond. Eventually it will have to, and when it does it will come in the form of Hezbollah.

That’s because Iran itself can’t do much right now. It can try to take away Israel’s advantage in the air by lobbying Russia to provide the Syrian government with S-300 missile defense systems. And indeed there are reports that Syria may soon be so equipped. According to the Russian media agency Kommersant, Moscow has already decided to offer the S-300s to Damascus, though Russia’s official position is still that it is undecided. S-300s can certainly make it more difficult for Israel to stage attacks in Syria, but they cannot stop Israel completely. And the fact that Iran has not offered its own capabilities in this regard speaks volumes.

Otherwise, Iran could, in theory, attack Israel with missiles of its own. But here, too, there are consequences. Even if all its munitions penetrated Israel’s impressive missile defense system – such systems have their drawbacks, but they would at least blunt the attack – the act would only invite a counterattack. If Iran unleashed its missiles on Israel, the United States would very likely stand with its traditional ally.


(click to enlarge)

This is why Iran tends to avoid direct conflict against enemies in the region. (The last time Iran engaged directly was the Iran-Iraq War, which ended in a bloody stalemate.) Its preferred method of fighting is through the empowerment of proxy groups. Iran provides weapons, money and political cover. In return, it gets plausible deniability. The disadvantage of proxies is that their allegiance has limits. In Iraq, for example, Iran-backed Shiite militias played a crucial role in weakening the Islamic State, and though they now give Iran notable leverage inside Iraq, they can’t change the fact that Iraq is largely populated by Arab Iraqis who have no desire to become subjects of a Persian vassal state.


(click to enlarge)

Iran, then, has only two options in responding to Israeli attacks: Hamas and Hezbollah. Hamas can be deployed to distract Israel, but it cannot seriously threaten it. The Gaza Strip is a densely populated and isolated piece of land that Israel has proved capable of containing. Giving Hamas money and encouraging it to protest at the Israeli border may annoy Israel, but it is hardly a viable deterrent to Israeli attacks. Hezbollah is the far more likely Iranian pawn in this scenario. It is a highly capable albeit small fighting force located right on Israel’s northern border, and, having acquitted itself well in the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, it has been the chief concern of the Israel Defense Forces.

But Hezbollah has its limitations too. It has been bogged down in Syria fighting for Bashar Assad since 2012, a move that provoked Lebanese Shiite protests and, if some reports are to be believed, dissension within Hezbollah itself. Hezbollah has gained tactical experience in Syria, but with experience comes exhaustion. The government in Damascus has yet to suppress the rebellion, and for all the years it has spent fighting, Hezbollah has not had the time to rest, regroup and take stock of what it has learned. The group, moreover, has lost some of its best fighters in the Syrian war and has had to ease its recruiting standards to refill its ranks. Asking Hezbollah to start a major conflict with Israel on the heels of its campaign in Syria may be asking too much. The Israeli attack that would surely follow could degrade not just Hezbollah’s numbers but its legitimacy in Lebanon as well, reducing its value as a proxy group in the first place.

Iran, then, is in a bit of a quandary. It has few good options for reprisal, but every day it fails to strike back makes it look weaker. It’s unclear how many Iranians died in Israeli strikes in Syria on April 29 – the lowest figure, reported by The New York Times, was 11. Castigating Israel and then failing to respond when it attacks Iranian citizens is not a good look for an administration struggling to maintain its grip at home.

Israel, for its part, appears to be making all the necessary preparations. According to NBC News, three U.S. officials said Israeli F-15s were responsible for last weekend’s attack against Syrian government targets in Hama and Aleppo. Haaretz reported that the officials also suggested that Israel “seems to be preparing for open warfare with Iran.” Meanwhile, reports in The New York Times and other Western news agencies cite a new law that grants the Israeli prime minister and defense minister the authority in “extreme circumstances” to declare war without consulting the security Cabinet as evidence that the Israeli government is readying for hostilities. And Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s recent presentation, in which he accused Iran of lying to the United States to get favorable terms in the Iran nuclear deal, could be interpreted as much as a battle cry as a plea for U.S. President Donald Trump to scrap the deal.

These reports make it sound like an Israeli-Iranian war is imminent, but by simple dint of geography, Iran and Israel cannot wage a conventional war against each other. Even so, the greater a foothold Iran establishes in Syria, the greater the threat it poses to Israel. For now, Israel is content to pick off Iranian weapons convoys intended for Hezbollah from the sky. The more Iranian targets it hits, though, the more it backs Iran into a corner, and the more pressure Iran will put on Hezbollah to fulfill its end of the proxy bargain. If Iran decides a military response to Israel is necessary, the hammer will fall in northern Israel, and if Israel learned anything from its 2006 fight with Hezbollah, it will know that this is not the type of enemy that can be defeated from the air – or one that will go down without causing some casualties of its own. Every Israeli strike in Syria against Iranian targets brings a second Israel-Hezbollah war that much closer.



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MEF: The Privileged Palestinian "Refugees"
« Reply #2397 on: May 14, 2018, 12:50:11 PM »
The Privileged Palestinian "Refugees"
by Efraim Karsh
Middle East Quarterly
May 14, 2018
https://www.meforum.org/articles/2018/the-privileged-palestinian-refugees

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Stratfor: Gaza looks out on a changing Middle East
« Reply #2398 on: May 16, 2018, 10:19:48 AM »
    For Turkey, Iran and Qatar, this new Gaza crisis is an opportunity to shore up their roles as patrons of the Palestinians and leaders within the Muslim world.
    Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, on the other hand, consider the Iran threat much more pressing than the Palestinian question.
    This is a view shared by Israel, which eyes its northern border, where Iran's military buildup is taking place in Syria, with greater concern than it does the Gazan frontier.

Another round of protests in Gaza — triggered by the May 14 opening of the U.S. Embassy in Jerusalem and the 70th anniversary of the nakba, or "catastrophe," the Palestinian term for their displacement during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war that followed Israel's creation — highlights how much has changed and how much, in many ways, has not. No one expects borders to change, alliances to shift quickly or the peace process to suddenly gain speed. In the background of this all-too-familiar round of unrest and violence, new opportunities — and new risks — await the old players.

On its broadest level, the Palestinian question has long represented a way for regional rulers to win or buttress their legitimacy at home and claim leadership in the Muslim world. But over the past decade, slow-moving forces have reshaped how legitimacy is derived from the Palestinian issue, and how much value different states see in seeking to be the leader of the region's Muslims.

The Big Picture

The Palestinian issue is a means for regional states to gain influence and appease domestic audiences. But how states do so has changed over time, with some, like Iran, gaining more with each new Palestinian crisis, while others, like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, have to navigate between the traditions of condemnation and a very real desire to get closer to Israel.


The proximate cause of this latest Gazan crisis is economic and political. Gaza's economy is in free fall. Foreign powers have substantially cut aid to the impoverished territory, power outages often last most of the day, leaving hospitals unable to guarantee electricity, and there's a shortage of schools. In addition, a much-hyped unity deal between Hamas, which rules Gaza, and Fatah, which governs the West Bank, has failed to bring about a working government. Outside the Palestinian territories, states look to take advantage of the crisis, or insulate themselves from it, even as they offer few workable solutions.

For Iran, this Gazan crisis offers greater opportunities than past crises. The Palestinians feel abandoned by much of the world, even by their own government, the Palestinian Authority. There seem to be few who will stand up to Israel. But Iran just fought an open battle with Israel, even if it came out battered, in the first state-to-state clash between the two countries. Accused by domestic critics of wasting money on overseas adventures, Iran's leaders find political value in showing that their foreign deployments put the Islamic Republic's missiles where its mouth is. The crisis also undermines Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian Authority president who has helped tamp down Iranian influence in the West Bank in cooperation with Israel. To weaken Abbas is to open a door for Hamas — and behind Hamas, Iran.

In this sense, Iran rivals Turkey, where President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is using the Gazan crisis to bolster his own Muslim credentials. An election called by Erdogan is coming in June, and the president is not quite certain he will win. To nudge the needle in his direction, he must convince pious Turks that his religious rhetoric has meaning. By offering aid to Gaza and by cutting diplomatic ties with Israel, Erdogan can score political points at home. Longer term, Turkey, with or without Erdogan, may yet find justification in the Palestinian question to play spoiler to Israel's hopes of exploiting the eastern Mediterranean's abundant hydrocarbon fields, should Ankara's relationship with Israel become negative enough.

For Qatar, the blockaded country has an opportunity to regain some of its lost influence. It was once Gaza's biggest patron, giving billions, but in the austerity of the blockade led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates and stung by Saudi and Emirati accusations that it was supporting Hamas' terrorism, Qatar has held back. Now the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, and the pan-Islamic condemnation of Israel's use of force that killed at least 59 Palestinian protesters on the Gaza border on May 14, can nudge the door open for Qatar to restore some of that support and return some shine to its reputation as a little power punching above its geopolitical weight.

For Saudi Arabia and many of the Arab Gulf states, the Palestinian issue is an unwelcome distraction from a budding alliance with Israel that is coalescing around a mutual fear of Iran. Few Gulf rulers get much domestic legitimacy from pandering to the anti-Israel lobby anymore; those Gulf citizens who are ardently against Israel are also increasingly against their monarchies as well, like members of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. For Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, Israel represents trade and defense opportunities — particularly against Iran — which are of greater value than the sheen of resistance to Israel.

Finally, for Israel itself, a Gazan crisis is no longer the preeminent defense challenge. The greater concern is Iran, and what it might do as it builds its influence in Syria and endangers Israel's northern border. As of now, there is little risk that Israel's use of force on the Gaza border will result in meaningful diplomatic or economic blowback, not with the United States standing solidly behind it. Even the risk of another intifada won't upend Israel, should protests spread to the West Bank. Having spent years preparing for this scenario, Israel is better positioned than ever to fend off such a challenge.

The core conflict — of Israelis against Palestinians, of two peoples in a crowded land, unable to agree on their roles within it — ensure that this latest round of protest and violence will hardly be the last. But while the conflict may recur with familiar patterns, the geopolitical currency that regional powers may gain — or risk — in the struggle will shift in response to their own needs.

Crafty_Dog

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