Author Topic: Islam, theocratic politics, & political freedom  (Read 142822 times)

objectivist1

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Muslim Moderates Rally Against Terror...
« Reply #200 on: July 28, 2015, 12:38:14 PM »
MUSLIM MODERATES RALLY AGAINST TERROR IN IRELAND

All fifty of them.

July 28, 2015  Robert Spencer   

Everyone has been waiting for this for years, and at last it has happened. The historic happening took place in Ireland, a nation hitherto not distinguished for standing in the cultural vanguard, but all that will change now, thanks to a rally hosted by a group calling itself the Irish Muslim Peace and Integration Council, which has finally delivered to the world the desire of the ages: Muslims rallying against terrorism!

Surely tens of thousands of Muslims attended, right? You know, that vast majority of Muslims who abhor and reject terrorism? Those moderates upon whom the leaders of Western countries are betting the very futures of their nations turned out in droves, didn’t they?

Well, not exactly. RTE News reported this on Sunday about the blessed event: “Up to 50 people took part in a rally organised by the Irish Muslim Peace and Integration Council to protest over the actions of the so-called Islamic State.”

That’s right. I’m afraid the turnout was, uh, fifty people. Not fifty thousand. Fifty. And not only that, but according to the Irish Examiner, the Irish Muslim Peace and Integration Council “faced resistance from a few members of the Islamic community, while promoting the event.” Not just verbal resistance, either: “Organisers said that a member of the council was assaulted by someone at a mosque who claimed to support ‘ISIS’, while he was handing out leaflets to promote today’s protest against terrorism.”

So not only did the vast majority of moderate Muslims fail to show up, but the group protesting against jihad terror faced active resistance from other Muslims. When have we heard about a Muslim who wanted to join the Islamic State facing active resistance, even to the point of assault, from moderate Muslims? We have seen Muslims express bewilderment that they went, and anger at the government (whether of the U.S. or Britain) for not stopping them from going, but we have not generally seen Muslims doing anything themselves to prevent them from going.

What’s more, this is not the first time that attendance at a Muslim rally against terrorism has been decidedly underwhelming. In October 2014 in Houston, a rally against the Islamic State organized by the Hamas-linked Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) drew the grand total of ten people. In August 2013 in Boston, about 25 Muslims rallied against “misperceptions” that Islam was violent. About the same number showed up in June 2013 at a progressive Muslim rally in Toronto to claim that their religion had been “hijacked.”

And back in 2005, a group called the Free Muslims Coalition held what it dubbed a “Free Muslims March Against Terror,” intending to “send a message to the terrorists and extremists that their days are numbered … and to send a message to the people of the Middle East, the Muslim world and all people who seek freedom, democracy and peaceful coexistence that we support them.” In the run-up to the event it got enthusiastic national and international publicity, but it ended up drawing about twenty-five people.

Contrast those paltry showings to the thousands of Muslims who have turned out for rallies against cartoons of Muhammad or against Israel. Here are some headlines from the aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo jihad massacre of Muhammad cartoonists in January 2015:

Chechnya: 800,000 Muslims protest Muhammad cartoons; protests also in Iran, Pakistan, Ingushetia, elsewhere

Pakistan: 10,000 Muslims protest against Charlie Hebdo’s Muhammad cartoons

Australia: 1,000 Muslims rally against Charlie Hebdo and the freedom of speech

Kyrgyztsan: 1,000 Muslims rally: “I am not Charlie, I love my Prophet.”

But given a chance to show how Muslims overwhelmingly reject “extremism,” only a handful show up.

This is just the opposite of what the situation should be if the mainstream narrative about Islam and jihad were true. We should be seeing pro-jihad terror Muslims opposed strenuously within their own community. Instead, those who oppose jihad terror are the real “tiny minority of extremists,” hounded and opposed by their fellow Muslims.

You’d think that some of the non-Muslim analysts who have been confidently telling us that moderate Muslims will any day now rise up against their “extremist” brethren and take back their religion from those who have “hijacked” it would get a clue from all this, and realize that the moderates have had almost fourteen years now since 9/11 to rein in the “extremists,” and have not done so, and are not going to do so.

But they won’t. They will be out there with their pom-poms again to cheerlead for the next “moderate Muslim rally against terror” – and they’ll not have to strain their pocketbook all that much to buy a nice halal dinner for everyone who shows up.
"You have enemies?  Good.  That means that you have stood up for something, sometime in your life." - Winston Churchill.

Body-by-Guinness

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Islamofascist Theology of Rape
« Reply #201 on: August 14, 2015, 08:21:56 PM »
I recall conversations where using the term "Islamofascism" was considered some sort of insulting sloganeering. And then I read a piece like this and wonder how folks who can get so worked up over a coined term that contains more than it's share of congruence to reality can't find a commensurate measure of outrage in face of information such as that found here:

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/14/world/middleeast/isis-enshrines-a-theology-of-rape.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=mini-moth&region=top-stories-below&WT.nav=top-stories-below&_r=1

G M

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Re: Islamofascist Theology of Rape
« Reply #202 on: August 14, 2015, 09:38:37 PM »
I recall conversations where using the term "Islamofascism" was considered some sort of insulting sloganeering. And then I read a piece like this and wonder how folks who can get so worked up over a coined term that contains more than it's share of congruence to reality can't find a commensurate measure of outrage in face of information such as that found here:

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/14/world/middleeast/isis-enshrines-a-theology-of-rape.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=mini-moth&region=top-stories-below&WT.nav=top-stories-below&_r=1

Waiting for the vast majority of peaceful Muslims to leap into action anytime now.

Crafty_Dog

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Koran older than Mohammed?!?
« Reply #203 on: September 01, 2015, 10:26:00 AM »
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3216627/Koran-Birmingham-thought-oldest-world-predate-Prophet-Muhammad-scholars-say.html

Apparently the Daily Mail is not considered a fully reliable source, so let's look for confirmation.

objectivist1

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Re: "Oldest Koran Fragments?"
« Reply #204 on: September 01, 2015, 01:46:02 PM »
This claim has been seriously challenged by more than one non-Muslim scholar, and I'll have to re-visit the details and post them here.
Further - there is serious doubt among non-Muslim scholars as to whether Muhammad actually existed as an historical figure.  See Robert Spencer's  superb book: "Did Muhammad Exist?"

www.amazon.com/Did-Muhammad-Exist-Inquiry-Obscure/dp/1610171330/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1441140289&sr=8-1&keywords=did+muhammad+exist

"You have enemies?  Good.  That means that you have stood up for something, sometime in your life." - Winston Churchill.

Crafty_Dog

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Re: Islam, theocratic politics, & political freedom
« Reply #205 on: September 01, 2015, 05:38:58 PM »
Thank you Obj.

objectivist1

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"You have enemies?  Good.  That means that you have stood up for something, sometime in your life." - Winston Churchill.

Crafty_Dog

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G M

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Crafty_Dog

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G M

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Re: Big Fatwa against ISIS
« Reply #210 on: November 17, 2015, 02:26:12 AM »

G M

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Re: Big Fatwa against ISIS
« Reply #211 on: November 17, 2015, 05:59:48 AM »
http://www.npr.org/2014/09/25/351277631/prominent-muslim-sheikh-issues-fatwa-against-isis-violence

"Somewhat controversial" per NPR.  :roll:

http://www.investigativeproject.org/4055/exclusive-banned-cleric-outspoken-deputy-visits#

Exclusive: Banned Cleric's Outspoken Deputy Visits White House

by Steven Emerson and John Rossomando
IPT News
June 26, 2013


Radical Egyptian cleric Yusuf Qaradawi is considered so radical that the United States bans him from entering the country.

Qaradawi, considered the spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, has called for the killing of Jews and Americans.

That history makes the June 13 White House meeting with Sheik Abdullah Bin Bayyah all the more inexplicable. Bin Bayyah is vice president of the International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS), a group founded by and headed by Qaradawi. The IUMS has a long history of supporting Hamas –a top Hamas leader is an IUMS member – and of calling for Israel's destruction.

Bin Bayyah's website claims that he met June 13 with senior Obama administration officials at the White House.

Nonetheless, it was the Obama administration which sought the meeting with Bin Bayyah, his website's account said.

"We asked for this meeting to learn from you and we need to be looking for new mechanisms to communicate with you and the Association of Muslim Scholars (another name used for the IUMS)," Gayle Smith, senior director of the National Security Council, reportedly said.

Bin Bayyah's June 13 account placed other senior officials in the meeting, including: Rashad Hussain, the U.S. special envoy to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), National Security Adviser Tom Donilon and White House spokeswoman Jennifer Palmieri. But the account was later changed to delete the reference to Donilon's presence at the meeting.

Smith also thanked Bin Bayyah for "his efforts to bring more understanding amongst humanity" during the meeting, the Bin Bayyah account said.

The White House did not respond to repeated requests for comments between June 14 and Tuesday.

Sheikh Abdullah Bin Bayyah posted this photo of his June 13 White House meeting.

Bin Bayyah lobbied the White House to "take urgent action" to help Syrian rebels. "We demand Washington take a greater role in [Syria]," Bin Bayyah told Al-Jazeera. President Obama later announced plans to arm Syrian rebels.

In granting Bin Bayyah a visa, White House officials ignored his radical statements as well as his close connection to Qaradawi. The IUMS's hostility toward Israel, and its support of terrorists, is well documented. Bin Bayyah falls comfortably in line with that view.

For example, in a 2011 statement on his Arabic-language website, he criticized the West for placing Palestinian terrorist groups such as Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and others in the same category as al-Qaida:

"[P]lacing the Palestinian resistance, which defends internationally recognized rights, on an equal footing with intercontinental terrorist organizations (al-Qaida) is not based on any moral principle and would be detrimental to the cause of the fight against terrorism and mix the cards and raises questions to the world conscience and serves terrorists."

The IUMS welcomed Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh as a member in February 2012. The "Union will spare nothing in the service of the Palestinian people, praising the jihad of the Palestinian people with the leadership of the Hamas movement for resistance," Haniyeh's induction certificate said.

A 2004 fatwa, issued while Bin Bayyah was an IUMS board member, sanctioned "resistance," meaning attacks on American troops in Iraq as "a duty on every able Muslim in and outside Iraq."

Jamal Badawi, a longtime ISNA board member, also is listed as a member of the IUMS Board of Trustees. Badawi has repeatedly defended Palestinian terrorism including suicide bombings. His name appears on the first page of a 1992 telephone directory of Muslim Brotherhood members in the United States, and he is listed as a fundraiser in records from the 2008 Holy Land Foundation Hamas financing trial.

Badawi's radical views fit in well with the IUMS, which has issued numerous statements against peace with Israel, calling for the "liberation of Palestine" from Jewish control. Each statement has been unyielding in calling on Muslims to destroy Israel and in forbidding them from making peace with the Jewish state.

After a board of trustees meeting in December, the IUMS issued a communique calling on Hamas and Fatah to reconcile in the name of "the core Palestinian values (including the right of return and resistance until the liberation of Palestine and its capital Jerusalem) … Meanwhile, the union calls on the scholars of the nation to continue their religious role in enlightening the local and international public concerning the dangers that this Judaization policy in Jerusalem poses for the historic unity of the Palestinian territories which is religiously impermissible to give up one inch of it."

Sheikh Abdullah Bin Bayyah, circled in red, is shown at the International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS) board meeting in Doha, Qatar in December. The trustees issued a concluding statement at the meeting calling for Israel's destruction and the return of Palestinians exiled after the Israeli War of Independence in 1948. (Photo:IUMS)

A photo on the group's website shows Bin Bayyah was present at the meeting.

In 2009, it issued a fatwa forbidding any normalization of relations with Israel. It came on the 42nd anniversary of the Six-Day War, and Israel's capturing of the Temple Mount.

"All political, economic, and cultural dealings and all forms of normalization with the Zionist entity are considered to be a form of supporting and sustaining the occupier in its occupation of land and holy places," the fatwa said. "Moreover, such actions are considered a form of loyalty to the enemy, which is religiously prohibited; as Allah (Exalted and Glorified be He) says: 'And if any amongst you takes them as Awliya' (friends, protectors, helpers, etc.), then surely he is one of them.'(Al-Ma'idah 5: 51). In conclusion, we call on all Muslims, rulers and citizens, to undertake their role, and embark on rescuing Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Blessed Land and freeing them from the clutches of the Zionist occupation."

Just last month, an IUMS-affiliated Egyptian cleric blamed the United States and Israel for driving Egyptian opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood-dominated government. Khaled Kholif invoked the anti-Semitic forgery, The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, as evidence of his argument, the Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Watch reported.

"America and Israel are pleased with [the Egyptian opposition] movements, which are led by the brainless," Kholif said during an appearance on Egypt's Al-Hafez television flagged by the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI). "They have said so in The Protocols. Let me tell you exactly what they said in The Protocols: 'We will strive to undermine security in the lands of the Gentiles, through reckless revolutions, led by the brainless.' It says so in The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, as translated by Khalifa Al-Tunisi.

"If you haven't read it," Kholif said of the Protocols, "you should."

Embraced by American Islamists

Bin Bayyah previously met with White House envoy Rashad Hussain when Bin Bayyah participated in a July 2012 Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) conference in his native Mauritania.

His website also indicates he spoke at the ADAMS Center, a large northern Virginia mosque, while he was in Washington June 12.

In addition to his role as IUMS vice president , Bin Bayyah also is a member of the similarly anti-Semitic Qaradawi-founded European Council for Fatwa and Research and the OIC's International Islamic Fiqh Academy, the latter of which issued a resolution in January 2003 sanctioning Palestinian suicide bombings.

Qaradawi and Bin Bayyah show a keen mutual admiration of each other in their writing. Bin Bayyah notably referred to Qaradawi as "a mountain upon whose peak there is light" and as "a great reformer" who "spreads knowledge and wisdom" in a 2008 article published by Boston cleric Suhaib Webb. Qaradawi returned the favor three days later: "The reality is that the more I have come closer to him and got to know him better, the more I have loved him…"

That article also was published on Webb's site.

And like Qaradawi, Bin Bayyah claims Palestinian violence is acceptable under international law. Islamic law's approval is a given.

"He who adheres to international covenants can resist. The Palestinians. There are international conventions and there are international resolutions which give them rights but do not provide them with the means to obtain these rights. It is their right to resist," Bin Bayyah said during a 2010 Al-Jazeera broadcast. "So, that which says resistance, says kinds of resistance, including the use of weapons. So, international conventions do not stray too far from the interests Islamic Sharia oversees."

Bin Bayyah endorsed a push by Muslim intellectuals to get the United Nations to criminalize blasphemy against the Muslim prophet Muhammad and Islam, saying that it causes violence.

"To people of reason and understanding: We ask everyone to ponder the ramifications of provoking the feelings of over one billion people by a small party of people who desires not to seek peace nor fraternity between members of humanity," Bin Bayyah wrote in a post last fall. "This poses a threat to world peace with no tangible benefit realized. Is it not necessary in today's world for the United Nations to issue a resolution criminalizing the impingement of religious symbols? We request all religious and political authorities, as well as people of reason to join us in putting a stop to this futility that benefit no one."

Considering that this information is readily available on the Internet, it would not have been too difficult for White House officials to uncover that both Bin Bayyah and the IUMS support Palestinian terrorism and Israel's destruction. The White House visit also raises questions relative to the degree the Obama administration is willing to go to court the Muslim Brotherhood both at home and abroad.

Body-by-Guinness

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Atlantic on ISIL
« Reply #212 on: November 17, 2015, 11:42:30 AM »
Older piece from The Atlantic that speaks to current events:

http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/384980/

DougMacG

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Re: Atlantic on ISIL
« Reply #213 on: November 18, 2015, 09:03:56 AM »
Older piece from The Atlantic that speaks to current events:

http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/384980/

BBG, Yes, a must-read to understand current events.


Crafty_Dog

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Body-by-Guinness

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Crafty_Dog

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Re: Islam, theocratic politics, & political freedom
« Reply #217 on: November 24, 2015, 12:01:25 PM »
Not a stupid piece but the far better call IMHO is to establish safe,no-fly zones over there and to keep them there.

Crafty_Dog

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Egyptian Cleric: ISIS grows out of Islamic Mainstream
« Reply #218 on: November 28, 2015, 08:49:27 AM »
Egyptian Cleric: ISIS Grows out of Islamic Mainstream
by Raymond Ibrahim  •  Nov 25, 2015
Cross-posted from Coptic Solidarity
http://www.meforum.org/blog/2015/11/isis-byproduct
 
 
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Originally published under the title "Al Azhar and ISIS: Cause and Effect."
 
Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah Nasr heads a group of former Al Azhar graduates who support a civil government.

Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah Nasr, a scholar of Islamic law and graduate of Egypt's Al Azhar University—regularly touted as the world's most prestigious Islamic university—recently exposed his alma mater in a televised interview.

After being asked why Al Azhar, which is in the habit of denouncing secular thinkers as un-Islamic, refuses to denounce the Islamic State as un-Islamic, Sheikh Nasr said:

It can't [condemn the Islamic State as un-Islamic]. The Islamic State is a byproduct of Al Azhar's programs. So can Al Azhar denounce itself as un-Islamic? Al Azhar says there must be a caliphate and that it is an obligation for the Muslim world [to establish it]. Al Azhar teaches the law of apostasy and killing the apostate. Al Azhar is hostile towards religious minorities, and teaches things like not building churches, etc. Al Azhar upholds the institution of jizya [extracting tribute from religious minorities]. Al Azhar teaches stoning people. So can Al Azhar denounce itself as un-Islamic?

Nasr joins a growing chorus of critics of Al Azhar. Last September, while discussing how the Islamic State burns some of its victims alive—most notoriously, a Jordanian pilot—Egyptian journalist Yusuf al-Husayni remarked on his satellite program that "The Islamic State is only doing what Al Azhar teaches... and the simplest example is Ibn Kathir's Beginning and End."
 
Al Azhar, which the New York Times calls "Sunni Islam's leading religious institution," refuses to denounce ISIS as un-Islamic.

Ibn Kathir is one of Sunni Islam's most renowned scholars; his Beginning and End is a magisterial history of Islam and a staple at Al Azhar. It is also full of Muslims, beginning with Muhammad, committing the sorts of atrocities that the Islamic State and other Islamic organizations and persons commit.

In February, Egyptian political writer Dr. Khalid al-Montaser revealed that Al Azhar was encouraging enmity for non-Muslims, specifically Coptic Christians, and even inciting for their murder. Marveled Montaser:

Is it possible at this sensitive time — when murderous terrorists rest on texts and understandings of takfir [accusing Muslims of apostasy], murder, slaughter, and beheading — that Al Azhar magazine is offering free of charge a book whose latter half and every page — indeed every few lines — ends with "whoever disbelieves [non-Muslims] strike off his head"?

The prestigious Islamic university—which co-hosted U.S. President Obama's 2009 "A New Beginning" speech—has even issued a free booklet dedicated to proving that Christianity is a "failed religion."

In short, the phenomenon known as "ISIS" is not a temporal aberration within Islam but rather a byproduct of what is considered normative thinking for Al Azhar—the Islamic world's most authoritative university.

Raymond Ibrahim is a Judith Friedman Rosen Fellow at the Middle East Forum

Crafty_Dog

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Hating Americans is official Saudi and Qatari policy
« Reply #220 on: January 20, 2016, 04:55:26 PM »

Hating Americans Is Official Saudi and Qatari Policy
by Raymond Ibrahim
The Daily Caller
January 18, 2016
http://www.meforum.org/5800/saudi-qatar-hating-americans

Jihadi hate for non-Muslims is not limited to the Islamic State, which U.S. leadership dismisses as neither a real state nor representative of Islam. Rather, it's the official position of, among others, Saudi Arabia — a very real state, birthplace of Islam, and, of course, "friend and ally" of America.
Saudi Arabia's Permanent Committee for Islamic Research and Issuing Fatwas — which issues religious decrees that become law — issued a fatwa, or decree, titled, "Duty to Hate Jews, Polytheists, and Other Infidels." Written by Sheikh Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz (d. 1999), former grand mufti and highest religious authority in the government, it still appears on the website.

According to this governmentally-supported fatwa, Muslims — that is, the entire Saudi citizenry — must "oppose and hate whomever Allah commands us to oppose and hate, including the Jews, the Christians, and other mushrikin [non-Muslims], until they believe in Allah alone and abide by his laws, which he sent down to his Prophet Muhammad, peace and blessings upon him."

To prove this, Baz quotes a number of Koran verses that form the doctrine of Loyalty and Enmity — the same doctrine every Sunni jihadi organization evokes to the point of concluding that Muslim men must hate their Christian or Jewish wives (though they may enjoy them sexually).

These Koran verses include: "Do not take the Jews and the Christians for your friends and allies" (5:51) and "You shall find none who believe in Allah and the Last Day on friendly terms with those who oppose Allah and His Messenger [i.e., non-Muslims] — even if they be their fathers, their sons, their brothers, or their nearest kindred" (58:22; see also 3:28, 60:4, 2:120).

After quoting the verses, Baz reiterates:

Such verses are many and offer clear proofs concerning the obligation to despise infidels from the Jews, Christians, and all other non-Muslims, as well as the obligation to oppose them until they believe in Allah alone.

Sheikh Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz

Despite documenting its official hatred for all non-Muslims (albeit on a website virtually unknown in the West), in the international arena, Saudi Arabia claims "to support the principles of justice, humanity, promotion of values and the principles of tolerance in the world," and sometimes accuses the West for its supposed "discrimination based on religion."
Such hypocrisy is manifest everywhere and explains how the Saudi government's official policy can be to hate Christians and Jews — children are taught to ritually curse them in grade school — while its leading men fund things like Georgetown University's Prince Alwaleed bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding (the real purpose of which appears to be to fund influential "Christian" academics to whitewash Islam before the public).

Our other "good friend and ally," Qatar, also officially documents its hate for every non-Muslim — or practically 100 percent of America's population. A website owned by the Qatari Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs published a fatwa titled "The Obligation of Hating Infidels, Being Clean of Them, and Not Befriending Them."

Along with citing the usual Loyalty and Enmity verses, the fatwa adds that Christians should be especially hated because they believe that God is one of three (Trinity), that Christ is the Son of God, and that he was crucified and resurrected for the sins of mankind — all cardinal doctrines of Christianity that are vehemently lambasted in the Koran (see 5:72-81).

Incidentally, this same Qatari government-owned website once published a fatwa legitimizing the burning of "infidels" — only to remove it soon after the Islamic State justified its burning of a Jordanian pilot by citing several arguments from the fatwa.
In short, it's not this or that "radical," who "doesn't represent Islam," or isn't a "real state," that hates non-Muslim "infidels." Rather, it's the official position of the governments of Saudi Arabia and Qatar, which are presented to the American public as "friends and allies."

Thus, as American talking heads express their "moral outrage" at Donald Trump's call "for a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our country's representatives can figure out what is going on," perhaps they should first consider the official position of foreign Muslim governments — beginning with U.S. "friends and allies" — concerning Americans: unmitigated hate and opposition "until they believe in Allah alone and abide by his laws."

ccp

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We are not phobic so go to the other place that is not heaven
« Reply #221 on: January 21, 2016, 09:36:06 AM »
Inappropriate use of the word "phobia".  Such as Islamaphobia.  This connotes an IRrational fear of Muslims.  But protecting ourselves against a group of which a significant percentage want to enslave us or kill us is a rational response.   We are not neurotic we are rational. 

http://www.vox.com/2016/1/20/10801948/fox-news-muslims-threat


Crafty_Dog

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Eight things that show that ISIS is Islamic
« Reply #223 on: July 18, 2016, 07:40:38 AM »
Go to  http://counterjihad.com/indian-muslim-scholars-vs-common-sense-al-azhar for clickable links

These 8 Things Show How ISIS is Islamic

A group of Muslim scholars in India try to challenge the view that the Islamic State is Islamic. Al-Azhar University disagrees. Our resident Muslim Scholar takes sides.
BY Immanuel Al-Manteeqi · @Al_Manteeqi | July 11, 2016

In 2014, after President Obama and numerous others stated that ISIS was not Islamic, and indeed that it was anti-Islamic, al-Azhar University, the seat of Sunni learning in the Arab world, refused to denounce ISIS members as non-Muslims. The contrast was stark: Western leaders and Muslim apologists residing in the West denounce ISIS members as non-Muslims while the main representative of Sunni Islam refuses to do so.

Al-Azhar’s stance has drawn severe criticism from many quarters, and Al-Azhar ulema (i.e., religious scholars) have come under pressure to denounce ISIS members as non-Muslims.

However, in 2015, Sheikh Ahmad al-Tayyib, the grand imam of al-Azhar, doubled down on the official stance taken by the university, as he refused to condemn ISIS members as non-Muslims. He justified this position by stating that al-Azhar follows the Ash’ari theological school, which states that one cannot condemn as non-Muslim apostates people who profess the shahada (the testimony of faith in the oneness of God and the prophethood of Muhammad)[1] and who direct their prayers toward the Ka’ba in Mecca.

But recently, a reportedly massive meeting of Indian Muslim scholars challenged this view. The ulema taking part in this meeting unanimously passed a resolution that condemned the recent attacks Islamist attacks and suicide bombings in Saudi Arabia and other parts of the world. The resolution also denounced ISIS as not only un-Islamic, but anti-Islamic as well. The following is a relevant excerpt from the resolution:

    The ISIS has nothing to do with Islam and its principles and tenets, and, in fact, all its activities and terror attacks are meant to strike at the very roots of Islam. The ISIS is not only unIslamic but acts as a tool in the hands of Western forces who are enemies of Islam. In the garb of Muslims, they are defaming Islam. [emphasis mine]

It is good to see many Muslim scholars coming together to condemn ISIS. However, this condemnation has to be grounded in facts and evidence, not upon wishful thinking. Indeed, the above excerpt itself hints at a primary motive for this resolution. These Muslim scholars believe that Western “enemies of Islam” are using ISIS to defame the name of Islam. To these Muslim scholars, ISIS members are “defaming Islam,” particularly in the hostile West, and so they want, as much as they can, to rectify the image of Islam to Westerners. Therefore, their resolution is nothing more than another mentally strained attempt at Islamic apologetics. The simple fact of the matter is that there is hardly any ground for claiming that ISIS “has nothing to do with Islam”—and that is why al-Azhar has refused to condemn ISIS members as non-Muslims. In what follows, I offer prima facie considerations that ISIS is indeed an Islamic movement.[2]

1. All ISIS members are Muslims

Not a single member of ISIS holds to a faith other than Sunni Islam. What unites all ISIS members, who hail from many different countries and positions in the socioeconomic ladder, is their shared commitment to a particular militant interpretation of Islam.

2. The idea of a caliphate, a central notion in ISIS’s philosophy, is incontrovertibly an exclusively Islamic notion.

3. The leader of ISIS, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, has a PhD in Islamic studies from Saddam University.[3]

4. Al-Azhar University, the scholarly seat of Sunni Islam, has refused to denounce ISIS militants as non-Muslims.[4]

Indeed, as various commentators have pointed out, some of al-Azhar’s books and professors teach violent subjugation of infidels through jihad, and the acquirement of female sex slaves, both staple doctrines of ISIS.

5. ISIS is an offshoot of Al-Qa’ida, a self-proclaimed Islamic organization whose doctrines are very similar to those of ISIS.[5]

6. Tens of millions of Muslims the world over support ISIS, and more than 200 million do not express an explicitly unfavorable view towards ISIS.[6]

7. The symbols and features of ISIS are Islamic: the black flags that they fly (which refer to Muhammad and Allah), the growing of their beards (which comes from the ahadeeth), the “nasheeds” or hymns that they play in their videos, and their citation of Islamic authorities like Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328)).

8. The type of punishments that ISIS carries out, from slicing the hands of thieves (Q 5:38), to crucifying people (Q 5:33), to the stoning of adulterers, are all distinctive punishments found in the earliest Islamic source texts.[7]

Cumulatively, these eight points make a prima facie good case for ISIS’ being an Islamic movement. So, in the absence of adequate evidence to the contrary, one should believe that ISIS is an Islamic movement.

Indeed, Bernard Hayekel, Professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University, thinks that the debate over whether ISIS is islamic is a waste of time because it abundantly clear that they are. The following are his concise and poignant words here:
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    To say that IS is not Islamic is inaccurate. IS is definitely an Islamic movement; they are an extreme Islamic movement, but to say that they are not Muslims or that they are outside the interpretive parameters of Islam is factually incorrect. You know, ending up in this debate [about whether IS] is Islamic or not Islamic is a total waste of time. There is no question that these people are drawing inspiration from Islamic texts. There is no doubt. And they know these texts better than most Muslims.[8]

It is time to face the facts. The people who join ISIS, no matter how immoral they might be, are Muslims, and ISIS is a thoroughly Islamic organization. ISIS members are not non-Muslims, and certainly are not anti-Islamic, as Western Islam apologists like Hamza Yusuf would have you believe.[9]

The fight against ISIS and its cohorts cannot be won until world leaders in the West follow the advice of Sun-Tzu—viz., “know your enemy.” We must know who our enemies are, and should not ignore the influence of the ideologies that they claim to follow.

No, just labeling ISIS as Islamic radicals is not a sufficient condition for ending the Islamic violence that we see the world over, but it is a necessary condition.

It must be realized that that we are not in war with terrorism; terrorism is just a tactic used by radical Islamists. Rather, we are in war with Islamists and radical Islam, a type of Islam that has plausible justification in Islamic history and Islamic source texts.

Further, it must be admitted that ISIS members the world over are acting out of primarily religious beliefs, and not out of socio-economic reasons.

Indeed, since ISIS members are signing up to put their lives on the line for the Islamic state, the latter reason is certainly not their primary motivation. Their primary motivation is jihad fi sabeel i’llah, or Jihad for the sake of Allah. They seek nothing less than the subjugation of the entire world to Islam and sharia.

[1] The shahada is considered to be the first of the five pillars of Islam.

[2] An analysis of the Islamicity of ISIS’ most notorious actions is beyond the scope of this short article.

[3] William McCants, “The ISIS Apocalypse,” 74, 117.

[4] General Secretariat of the Supreme Council of Al-Azhar, “الأزهر: مفتي نيجيريا لم يكفر داعش في مؤتمر مكافحة الإرهاب,” Al-Azhar University, December 11, 2014, www.azhar.eg/en-us/الأمانة_العامة_للمجلس_الأعلى_للأزهر/الأزهر-مفتي-نيجيريا-لم-يكفر-داعش-في-مؤتمر-مكافحة-الإرهاب.

[5] William McCants, “The ISIS Apocalypse,” 5-31.

[6] This data is ultimately based on the Pew Research Center’s November 2015 poll. See Jacob Poushter, “In nations with significant Muslim populations, much disdain for ISIS,” Pew Research Center, November 17, 2015, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/11/17/in-nations-with-significant-muslim-populations-much-disdain-for-isis. The above figures are inferred from the Pew Research Center’s data in conjunction with the July 2015 population estimates found in the CIA World Factbook.

[7] For the prescription of stoning for adultery, see Sahih Al-Bukhari, Vol. 2, Book 23, Hadith 413, et al.

[8] “Bernard Haykel: How Islamic is the Islamic State?,” YouTube video, 3:08, posted by “Buno Braak,” Nov. 23, 2014.

[9] “The Crisis of ISIS: A Prophetic Prediction | Sermon by Hamza Yusuf,” YouTube video, 12:38, posted by “Zaytuna College,” Sept. 19, 2014.

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WSJ: Iman Malik: Sufi Islam
« Reply #225 on: March 03, 2017, 01:22:45 PM »
A Suicide Bomber and the Sufi Soul
Sufism’s pluralistic tenets have made it a prime target for Islamic extremists.
At the Lal Shahbaz Qalandar in Pakistan shrine after the suicide attack, Feb. 17.
At the Lal Shahbaz Qalandar in Pakistan shrine after the suicide attack, Feb. 17. Photo: PPI/Zuma Press
By Iman Malik
March 2, 2017 6:54 p.m. ET
35 COMMENTS

Thousands of worshipers were gathered at a prominent Sufi shrine in Sehwan, Pakistan, last month when a suicide bomb ripped through the courtyard, killing more than 80. As a counterterrorism analyst, I had long expected that something terrible would happen at the site—the mausoleum of Hazrat Lal Shahbaz Qalandar, revered as a Sufi saint. And I wasn’t surprised that an Islamic State affiliate quickly claimed responsibility for the bombing. But as a human and a Muslim who practices Sufism, it wrenched my heart.

Many Westerners today associate Islam with the doctrinaire tradition of Salafi jihadism, embodied by organizations like ISIS and al Qaeda. Yet Islam is so far from monolithic that sectarian differences often lead to violence and hatred among Muslims. Islamic State attacked the shrine precisely because of its importance to adherents of Sufism.

Sufism is an esoteric, mystical dimension of Islam whose adherents focus on maintaining a direct, personal relationship with God. It isn’t a sect. Rather, Sufism is an approach to understanding Islam. Sufis seek conciliation, rather than confrontation, among all religions. They can be found throughout the world, and Sufism is apolitical. Its adherents are on a quest not for temporal power but for self-knowledge and an understanding of the divine. To Sufis, all those who believe in a higher power and divine connection are Sufis.

Lal Shahbaz Qalandar is one of Sufism’s most important figures. Born during the 12th century in what is now Afghanistan, he traveled extensively, seeking spiritual guidance before ensconcing himself in Sehwan. A poet and philosopher, he spent his life preaching and writing. Devotees visit his shrine to satisfy their social and physical needs, but also to find spiritual enlightenment. People bring red and green shawls with Quranic calligraphy in silver and gold threads, along with tributes for their votive offerings.

Many of those killed and wounded last month were performing a devotional ritual of “dhamaal,” an ecstatic and coordinated swirl of the head and body that represents a spiritual ascent through the mind to God’s love. The lights on the shrine’s trees and walls, the crimson hues of oil lamps and candles, and the smell of incense sticks sedate the divine lovers as they whirl faster and faster. Drums, bells, gongs, horns and cymbals make a deafening cacophony.

The devotees believe their prayers are answered and their wounds are healed—that spiritual guidance is sought and solace is attained. The shrine symbolizes the tolerant, pluralistic and syncretic essence of Islam. All people are the creation of one God, and the connection to the divine is direct, serene and pious.

Salafi jihadism is associated with literal, puritanical and political approaches to Islam. It employs guilt and fear as motivators. Sufism, on the other hand, embodies love and kindness: Obedience to God should come not from fear of hell, but from a desire to be closer to Him. Sufism attests that God has created man with a mind and a free will. It accepts the existence of anti-Islamic authorities and does not seek to replace them by force.

Sufism and its pluralistic tenets are embedded in Pakistani society, but they have been targeted systematically for decades. Former President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, a hard-line Deobandi Sunni who ruled for more than a decade, infested the country with a program of Islamization and sowed the seeds of extremism. Over the decades, Pakistan has been disfigured as the lines blurred between national and Islamist politics, and as good governance gave way to a fixation on the rivalry with India and the military’s narrative of patriotism.

Islamabad’s policy of “good and bad” jihadi proxies—in which the military establishment considers some elements of the Taliban good, and others bad—has made the situation worse and paved the way for splinter groups. This in turn provided space to those who seek to import one of the most lethal versions of global jihad, that espoused by ISIS. Officials at the country’s National Counter Terrorism Authority had previously denied the presence of ISIS in Pakistan. Yet last month, the world witnessed the truth as ISIS turned worshipers of love into dust.

No attack, however, can shatter the Sufi soul, which is free from the dimensions of time and space. “We are having Dhammal this evening as it has continued each evening since centuries,” a descendant of Lal Shahbaz Qalandar told me in a phone call shortly after the attack. I could hear the music and the beating of Middle Eastern drums in the background. “My message from the shrine,” he added, “is of love, humanity, peace and tolerance.”

Ms. Malik is a writer in Washington

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GPF: Shia Islam, theocratic politics: Rule by Jurist
« Reply #227 on: May 12, 2018, 07:46:45 AM »
Though the article is nominally about Iraq's elections, it also is about more than that:
===========================

By Xander Snyder


What’s at Stake in Iraq’s Elections


The government in Tehran will still have some degree of influence in Iraq regardless of who wins.


Iran’s influence in the Middle East is no secret. The government has made no effort to hide its regional ambitions, and it has barely balked in expanding its influence since the Islamic State was weakened. Its influence has always been kept in check by the fact that it is a Shiite country in a majority Sunni region. One notable exception is Shiite-majority Iraq, and the parliamentary elections on May 12 will be an indicator of just how deep Iran has sunk its roots into the organs of the state – and of just how divided Iraqi society is.

New and notable about the upcoming election is just how many political parties and coalitions there are in a contest that ordinarily sees just a few broad coalitions. These coalitions tend to run the gamut of political interests. In power currently is the State of Law coalition, which won more seats than any other coalition in 2014 but failed to win an outright majority. That year, Nouri al-Maliki, a member of the Islamic Dawa Party, which is part of the ruling coalition, lost his position as prime minister. At the time, he was Iran’s preferred candidate, but fearing his loyalties to Tehran could lead to civil war again, Iraqi Sunnis and Kurds, the United States, Iran and Iraqi Shiites all pressured him to step down from his post. He was replaced by current Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, who is also a member of the Dawa Party but who is considered more moderate and less hostile to Sunni and Kurdish interests.


 

(click to enlarge)


Now, the Dawa Party is fractured. Al-Maliki, who still has close ties to Iran, is running as the candidate from the State of Law coalition, which is attempting to appeal to the conservatives in Dawa, while al-Abadi is as the candidate from the Victory coalition, which seeks to draw support from younger and less conservative Dawa members. Then there is the Marchers Alliance, led by Muqtada al-Sadr, who also leads one of the biggest Shiite militias known as the Popular Mobilization Forces. Al-Sadr had Iran’s supported during the U.S. occupation in Iraq, but he has since resisted Iranian influence in favor of his own brand of Iraqi Shiite nationalism.

In all, there are five Shiite coalitions in the running for parliament, including the Conquest Alliance, which is led by the same man who heads an Iranian-backed PMF unit. Also in contention are two Sunni groups and multiple Kurdish factions that are even more divided than usual following the Kurdistan Regional Government’s failed independence referendum held last year.

Though Iran may prefer one group to beat the others, the government in Tehran will still have some degree of influence in Iraq regardless of who wins. After all, it still controls and funds plenty of PMF militias, at least one of whose leaders has publicly claimed that he would topple the Iraqi government if Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei so ordered. Several important government positions, moreover, are held by people sympathetic to Iran, including the one responsible for determining which PMF groups get funding from the Iraqi government. In this context, whether a pro-Iran militia leader is elected to office is less important than what their mere candidacy reveals about Iran’s efforts to exert influence in Iraq.

Underlying the competition between Iraqi nationalists and pro-Iran factions is a battle for leadership of the Shiite Muslim world itself. Iran’s regime derives its legitimacy from its unique interpretation of a Shiite theological concept called velayat-e faqih, which roughly translates to “rule by jurist.” According to this theory, management of social matters should be entrusted in a jurist who will lead Muslims until the true successor to the Prophet Muhammad re-emerges. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the first ruler of Iran, used this theory to argue that the Islamic Republic needed to be ruled by a supreme leader who would guide the nation in both religious and political affairs.


 

(click to enlarge)


Others, however, have interpreted the doctrine differently. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iraq’s leading Shiite cleric, believes that the jurist’s role should be limited to providing spiritual guidance. Al-Sistani has advocated for a democratic system in Iraq, one that incorporates all segments of society – Shiites, Sunnis, Kurds and Christians – into the body politic. Before Khomeini established the Islamic Republic in 1979, al-Sistani’s interpretation was the dominant one in Shiite theological circles, and even some ayatollahs in Iran opposed Khomeini’s doctrine.

This may seem like an arcane and nebulous theological distinction, but it has practical consequences. Al-Sistani’s approach lends itself to nationalism and conflicts with the transnational Shiite identity that Iran is trying to cultivate throughout the region in the hopes that it can ultimately build a Shiite empire. Al-Sistani, who ordered all able-bodied Iraqi – not Shiite – men to form militias to fight the Islamic State, told the PMF units loyal to him to disband after the Islamic State’s defeat and has advocated that religious leaders stay out of politics. But it is through those very PMF groups that Iran has exercised greater influence in Iraq. Nonetheless, Shiites loyal to al-Sistani remain wary of Iran’s role in Iraq and will seek to defeat the pro-Iran candidates in this weekend’s election.

Iran claims to be the true leader of Shiites in the Middle East, and since its clerical rule is based on the premise that religious leaders must also be political leaders, al-Sistani’s approach is a threat not only to Iran’s ability to project power in Iraq, but also to the legitimacy of the theocratic regime in Iran itself. The two interpretations therefore focus on two competing identities: one as a citizen of a Shiite empire, and the other as a citizen of a nation-state where politics and religion are mostly separate (at least by the standards of the region). The upcoming election therefore is about more than just politics; it is the latest battle in a war over leadership of the Shiite world itself.



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Ali used Islam to avoid the draft - or try to
« Reply #228 on: June 08, 2018, 09:39:07 AM »
https://www.yahoo.com/sports/muhammad-alis-lawyer-responds-president-trumps-pardon-offer-151838852.html

I am curious . What is it about Islam that Ali was able to cite some rational religious reason he could not go into the Army?

Are Jews Hindus and Christians and others able to find something in their religions to make the same claim?

So Ali was too peaceful to fight for the country but he had no problem bashing in heads.

BTW:    I did win a 10 $ bet in his first comeback fight against Frazier in 1971.  I bet on Frazier and won.   $ 10 was something in 7th grade in 1971!


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Re: Islam, theocratic politics, & political freedom
« Reply #229 on: June 12, 2018, 12:03:52 PM »
Wasn't he Nation of Islam at that point?

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Re: Islam tends not to integrate (Denmark)
« Reply #231 on: December 21, 2019, 08:50:29 PM »

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Re: Islam, theocratic politics, & political freedom
« Reply #235 on: January 28, 2020, 09:47:39 PM »
Things are looking rather all quiet on the Arab front with Trump's peace proposal today for Israel and the Palestinians , , ,

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Re: Islam, theocratic politics, & political freedom
« Reply #236 on: January 28, 2020, 09:57:31 PM »
Things are looking rather all quiet on the Arab front with Trump's peace proposal today for Israel and the Palestinians , , ,

I will be hosting the Oscars first.

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The long term strategy
« Reply #237 on: April 06, 2020, 10:36:44 AM »

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Turkey: Married at six, eighteen years later she sues father and husband
« Reply #243 on: March 30, 2023, 07:07:36 AM »
Turkish Fury Over 6-Year-Old Bride Could Change Country's Future
by Abigail R. Esman
IPT News
March 30, 2023

https://www.investigativeproject.org/9320/turkish-fury-over-6-year-old-bride-could-change


It was a game, the child's father and his friend told her. They would visit a photographer. She would wear a beautiful white dress.

But by the time the photo session ended, the little girl was married. It hadn't been a game at all.

Her father's friend, 29-year-old Kadir Istekli, was her new husband. And she was only 6 years old.

Now 24, that girl – known only by her initials, HKG – is pursuing a criminal case against both Istekli and her father, Yusef Ziya Gumusel, who had arranged the marriage. The trial resumes tomorrow.

The case has created significant uproar in their native Turkey, where Gumusel is a leading figure in the Islamist Ismailaga Brotherhood, considered by many to be a cult. With over 100,000 members, the Brotherhood – based in Istanbul's Fatih district – also is said to have ties to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his ruling AKP party.

Politicians from the opposition parties have condemned the marriage and sexual abuse of HKG and other girls in this and other religious sects as prosecutors call for a 27-year sentence to be imposed on each of HKG's parents and Istekli, with an additional 40-year sentence for Istekli for sexual assault. Meanwhile, the Ismailaga community is calling for the journalists who first broke the story last December to be arrested. Sentencing in the case is scheduled for May 22 – one week after Turkey's May 14 presidential elections, which many see as the most significant in the 100-year history of the Republic.

HKG's story is particularly horrifying: the journalists who first reported it uncovered evidence that she was sexually abused from the start of the marriage, and she has said that it was not until she was 18 that she first realized that it was not normal for 6-year-old girls to be wedded off – a discovery she claims she made only when she looked it up on her phone.

Moreover, her father warned her repeatedly against disobeying her husband and when she first attempted to escape, he found her, beat her, and sent her back home to Istekli. In November, 2020, however, HKG finally fled her marriage and filed charges against her husband and both parents.

But while hers was an especially shocking case, child marriages are not uncommon in Turkey, which has one of the highest rates of child marriage in Europe. Approximately one-third of all Turkish women marry before the age of 18. And sects such as the Ismailaga Brotherhood, a highly conservative Sunni Sufi group, are arguably a large contributor to the trend. Indeed, many Turks maintain that the Ismailaga's strong influence on Turkey's ruling party was behind the country's 2021 withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence.

That influence, and the suspected ties between Erdogan and the AKP and Ismailaga and other Islamist groups, may well have consequences for the upcoming elections. Already, opposition leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu, who leads Erdogan in the polls, has accused justice officials and the Minister of Family and Social Services of neglect and complicity, noting it took a full two years to arrest Istekli and Gumusel after HKG filed charges.

"Who have you been hiding behind for two years?" Kilicdaroglu demanded, speaking to reporters during a demonstration in support of HKG. "Do the people you take photos with put pressure on you to cover up this incident?" Members of Ismailaga are frequently photographed with AKP party members, and Erdogan himself wrote the official obituary for the Brotherhood's founder, Sheikh Mahmut Ustaosmanoglu (aka Mahmut Effendi) when he died last June, aged 93. The two had often been photographed together.

Yet for many young girls, matters are only getting worse. In February, Turkey's religious body, the Diyanet, decreed that those who adopt the orphaned children of earthquake victims can freely marry them. According to the fatwa, "The relationship between the adopter and adopted child does not create a barrier to marriage." Under Islam, stated the Diyanet, adopted children are not able to inherit from their adoptive parents; marriage could be a way to skirt the problem.

The edict followed a 2018 declaration that, in order to prevent sexual relations or pregnancy occurring out of wedlock, girls as young as nine could marry in religious ceremonies. The minimum legal age for marriage for girls in Turkey is supposed to be 16, and then only with parental permission.

Taken together, and especially with the withdrawal from the Istanbul charter, these events threaten to further harm Erdogan's reelection bid at a time when he is already struggling in the polls. A weak economy, record-high inflation, ongoing concern about the influx of Syrian and North African refugees, and the horrors of the recent earthquake in Eastern Turkey – combined with his government's poor management of the aftermath – have already taken a heavy toll on his popularity. And in recent personal conversations, many non-religious women who had remained loyal to Erdogan for economic reasons, expressed misgivings, citing concerns about women's rights and freedoms and the AKP's increasingly apparent ties to radical groups like Ismailaga.

True, in the face of public outrage, the Diyanet ultimately retracted its statement on marrying earthquake orphans. Nonetheless, the edict left no doubt where the country is headed should Erdogan win the May election – and it once again makes clear, as such things so often do, that a vote to preserve the rights of women is a vote to preserve democracy itself.

IPT Senior Fellow Abigail R. Esman is a freelance writer based in New York and the Netherlands. Her latest book, Rage: Narcissism, Patriarchy, and the Culture of Terrorism, was published by Potomac Books in October 2020. Follow her at @abigailesman.

Copyright © 2023. Investigative Project on Terrorism. All rights reserved.

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Re: Turkey: Married at six, eighteen years later she sues father and husband
« Reply #244 on: March 30, 2023, 07:17:07 AM »
After the Prophet Mohammed had marital relations with his 3rd wife, Aisha, she looked up at him and called him a pedophile. The prophet replied "That's a pretty big word for a 9 year old".


Turkish Fury Over 6-Year-Old Bride Could Change Country's Future
by Abigail R. Esman
IPT News
March 30, 2023

https://www.investigativeproject.org/9320/turkish-fury-over-6-year-old-bride-could-change


It was a game, the child's father and his friend told her. They would visit a photographer. She would wear a beautiful white dress.

But by the time the photo session ended, the little girl was married. It hadn't been a game at all.

Her father's friend, 29-year-old Kadir Istekli, was her new husband. And she was only 6 years old.

Now 24, that girl – known only by her initials, HKG – is pursuing a criminal case against both Istekli and her father, Yusef Ziya Gumusel, who had arranged the marriage. The trial resumes tomorrow.

The case has created significant uproar in their native Turkey, where Gumusel is a leading figure in the Islamist Ismailaga Brotherhood, considered by many to be a cult. With over 100,000 members, the Brotherhood – based in Istanbul's Fatih district – also is said to have ties to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his ruling AKP party.

Politicians from the opposition parties have condemned the marriage and sexual abuse of HKG and other girls in this and other religious sects as prosecutors call for a 27-year sentence to be imposed on each of HKG's parents and Istekli, with an additional 40-year sentence for Istekli for sexual assault. Meanwhile, the Ismailaga community is calling for the journalists who first broke the story last December to be arrested. Sentencing in the case is scheduled for May 22 – one week after Turkey's May 14 presidential elections, which many see as the most significant in the 100-year history of the Republic.

HKG's story is particularly horrifying: the journalists who first reported it uncovered evidence that she was sexually abused from the start of the marriage, and she has said that it was not until she was 18 that she first realized that it was not normal for 6-year-old girls to be wedded off – a discovery she claims she made only when she looked it up on her phone.

Moreover, her father warned her repeatedly against disobeying her husband and when she first attempted to escape, he found her, beat her, and sent her back home to Istekli. In November, 2020, however, HKG finally fled her marriage and filed charges against her husband and both parents.

But while hers was an especially shocking case, child marriages are not uncommon in Turkey, which has one of the highest rates of child marriage in Europe. Approximately one-third of all Turkish women marry before the age of 18. And sects such as the Ismailaga Brotherhood, a highly conservative Sunni Sufi group, are arguably a large contributor to the trend. Indeed, many Turks maintain that the Ismailaga's strong influence on Turkey's ruling party was behind the country's 2021 withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence.

That influence, and the suspected ties between Erdogan and the AKP and Ismailaga and other Islamist groups, may well have consequences for the upcoming elections. Already, opposition leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu, who leads Erdogan in the polls, has accused justice officials and the Minister of Family and Social Services of neglect and complicity, noting it took a full two years to arrest Istekli and Gumusel after HKG filed charges.

"Who have you been hiding behind for two years?" Kilicdaroglu demanded, speaking to reporters during a demonstration in support of HKG. "Do the people you take photos with put pressure on you to cover up this incident?" Members of Ismailaga are frequently photographed with AKP party members, and Erdogan himself wrote the official obituary for the Brotherhood's founder, Sheikh Mahmut Ustaosmanoglu (aka Mahmut Effendi) when he died last June, aged 93. The two had often been photographed together.

Yet for many young girls, matters are only getting worse. In February, Turkey's religious body, the Diyanet, decreed that those who adopt the orphaned children of earthquake victims can freely marry them. According to the fatwa, "The relationship between the adopter and adopted child does not create a barrier to marriage." Under Islam, stated the Diyanet, adopted children are not able to inherit from their adoptive parents; marriage could be a way to skirt the problem.

The edict followed a 2018 declaration that, in order to prevent sexual relations or pregnancy occurring out of wedlock, girls as young as nine could marry in religious ceremonies. The minimum legal age for marriage for girls in Turkey is supposed to be 16, and then only with parental permission.

Taken together, and especially with the withdrawal from the Istanbul charter, these events threaten to further harm Erdogan's reelection bid at a time when he is already struggling in the polls. A weak economy, record-high inflation, ongoing concern about the influx of Syrian and North African refugees, and the horrors of the recent earthquake in Eastern Turkey – combined with his government's poor management of the aftermath – have already taken a heavy toll on his popularity. And in recent personal conversations, many non-religious women who had remained loyal to Erdogan for economic reasons, expressed misgivings, citing concerns about women's rights and freedoms and the AKP's increasingly apparent ties to radical groups like Ismailaga.

True, in the face of public outrage, the Diyanet ultimately retracted its statement on marrying earthquake orphans. Nonetheless, the edict left no doubt where the country is headed should Erdogan win the May election – and it once again makes clear, as such things so often do, that a vote to preserve the rights of women is a vote to preserve democracy itself.

IPT Senior Fellow Abigail R. Esman is a freelance writer based in New York and the Netherlands. Her latest book, Rage: Narcissism, Patriarchy, and the Culture of Terrorism, was published by Potomac Books in October 2020. Follow her at @abigailesman.

Copyright © 2023. Investigative Project on Terrorism. All rights reserved.

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GPF: The Problem with Islamic Rule
« Reply #245 on: August 08, 2023, 06:06:11 AM »
   
Iran, Afghanistan and the Problem With Islamist Rule
Religious-political movements eventually are undone by necessary compromises.
By: Kamran Bokhari

A French scholar of Islamism named Olivier Roy wrote in 1994 that, as a form of governance, political Islam was doomed to fail. He argued that Islamists were essentially fundamentalists obsessed with medieval social norms and bereft of any political or economic program. He predicted that, if and when they came to power, they would become religious versions of the autocracies they replaced. The fact that only two modern countries – Iran and Afghanistan – have Islamist regimes, and that they are both facing crises of governance, attests to the difficulty of pairing religious fealty with matters of the state.

In about a week it will be two years since the Afghan Taliban achieved catastrophic success. After a 20-year insurgency, the jihadist movement forced the United States to withdraw troops from the country, and within nine days the Afghan state that Washington had built crumbled. In its place stood the Taliban emirate. But extremist Islamist insurgent groups that spend decades engaged in suicide bombings tend to lack the tradecraft to run a modern nation-state. Naturally, the Taliban are struggling to forge a viable political economy while they impose a medieval social order upon the country, especially its female population. To govern, the Taliban need to do business with the outside world, something that requires pragmatism and compromise. There are limits to how far the Taliban can be pragmatic before they lose coherence as a movement.

Rifts are already forming. Those emphasizing doctrinal purity have been pitted against those who recognize the need to embrace, however slowly, the art of governing a nation of 40 million in the 21st century. Leaders of the Taliban emirate are concerned, for example, that some of the defiance from neighboring Iran, where women have recently and openly ignored clerical edicts, could spread to Afghanistan. These concerns have taken a toll on the Taliban movement and have brought differences out in the open.

Earlier this year, the country’s interior minister and deputy head of the Taliban movement, Sirajuddin Haqqani, criticized supreme leader Mullah Haibatullah, saying: “Monopolizing power and hurting the reputation of the entire system are not to our benefit. The situation cannot be tolerated.” He went on to add that the Taliban must govern in a manner that does not lead to the people hating them and their religion. (It should be noted that Haqqani is no pragmatist; he’s the notorious leader of the radical Haqqani faction, which has close ties with al-Qaida.)

While deeply concerned about the fate of their nascent emirate, the Taliban take some comfort from the fact that the Afghan people are exhausted by two generations of unremitting conflict. Afghans also realize that the outside world is trying to form a relationship with their jihadist leaders, even if they aren’t formally recognized, to ensure that the chaos of the country doesn’t spill over into any other. That foreign officials engage with them at all gives the Taliban a window of opportunity to consolidate power. They don’t have to worry too much about domestic backlash just yet and can instead focus on information operations to counter external criticism of their oppressive rule.

To the extent that there is an appetite to learn from their interactions with the world, the Taliban cannot change who they are, certainly not in the foreseeable future anyway. Any semblance of behavioral change will be meager and slow. Ideological evolution is by nature a nonlinear, multi-generational process. Look no further than to Iran for proof. For years, Tehran’s hybrid theocratic-republican system has been in the throes of change and now is accelerating toward an inflection point.

Iran’s octogenarian supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has helmed the Islamic republic for 35 years despite chronic health issues. Soon he will leave office one way or another, and when he does, the country’s political system is likely to undergo significant changes. The most important of these is that the clergy will lose influence at the expense of a military that must deal with mounting pressure from a citizenry that is sick of the politics of ideology and an economy in disrepair. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, as well as the broader military establishment, will be forced to make compromises to ensure that the republic makes it to the other side of its existential crisis.

The process by which it does will have serious ramifications for southwest Asia. The Taliban cannot hope to maintain their emirate while their Shia counterparts next door lose authority. Regime change – that is, when an old order is replaced with a new one – is rare, but history shows that it is followed by long stretches of anarchy. It is reasonable to assume, then, that Iran will live in a state of chaos for some time before a new order is established. And it is unlikely that the Taliban in Afghanistan, where there has been no state since 1992, will succeed while Iran’s theocrats are neutered.

Therein is the problem with Islamists – or any kind of theocrats for that matter. They can come to power but they cannot govern, at least not without indulging in compromises, which eventually render their regimes as contradictions that cannot endure.

Crafty_Dog

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This is the thread you are looking for
« Reply #246 on: November 10, 2023, 08:04:49 PM »

Miss Iraq on the true agenda of Hamas:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JKsJCJtkKaM&t=1s

Crafty_Dog

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Great Douglas Murray rant
« Reply #247 on: December 13, 2023, 08:00:19 AM »

Crafty_Dog

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