The Middle East: War, Peace, and SNAFU, TARFU, and FUBAR

[Crafty_Dog]

By Xander Snyder

In Syria, An Opportunity for US-Russian Cooperation

A political settlement between the U.S., Russia and Israel could address Iran’s presence in Syria.

The U.S. and Russia may be at odds from Ukraine to North Korea, but they appear to be much more aligned in Syria, where neither wants to see Iran gain a substantial foothold. As the Syrian civil war winds down, Moscow wants to make sure that it – not Tehran – remains the primary benefactor of President Bashar Assad; that it retains its bases at Tartus and Hmeimim; and that Iran’s presence in the Middle East is curbed. These interests may account for the reports of increasing competition between Russia and Iran in Syria, including skirmishes between groups supported by each.

(click to enlarge)

The U.S., of course, is trying to halt Iran’s advance across the Middle East. It’s unlikely the U.S. can fully displace Iran from Syria, but at minimum it wants to limit the number of Iranian ground forces in Syria to prevent Tehran from having a contiguous overland route to the Mediterranean Sea. And so, as U.S. and Russian interests converge and an opportunity for cooperation arises, Russian, U.S. and Israeli officials will meet next week to discuss what’s next in Syria.

Israel: The Linchpin

Israel's participation is crucial because Israel has in its estimation the strongest interest of the three to keep Iran out of Syria – protecting its territorial integrity. And while both Russia and the U.S. need to curb Iran’s influence, neither wants to attack Iran directly. Both are happy to let Israel do the heavy lifting, at least in southern Syria, where Israel has its own direct interest in pushing Iran and its proxies in Syria away from its borders. While Russia did provide Syria with S-300 missile defense systems, nominally to protect itself from airstrikes, it’s done little else to halt Israel’s attacks on Iranian positions in Syria. Instead, the two have maintained backchannel communications so that Moscow can be notified when Israel intends to strike. Russia has, moreover, reportedly refused to sell S-400 missile defense systems to Iran. Moscow would be wary of providing Iran with air defense systems that could frustrate Israeli airstrikes targeting Iran in Syria. (Iran denied ever seeking to purchase S-400s.)

Still, Israel can’t do it alone. While it hammers southern Syria with airstrikes, the U.S. and Russia will have to play their parts in what is, if not an outright alliance, at least a collaborative effort among the three. Russia will continue to support Assad’s ground forces as they reclaim territory and provide ground support through militias like the Tiger Forces, hoping to reduce Assad’s dependence on Iran-backed ground forces. Russia may also play a more political role, trying to lessen Iran’s influence on the Assad regime. In this, it may already be somewhat successful. A recent reshuffle of Syrian security forces weakened the position of Maher Assad, a brother of the president who is believed to be particularly close to Iran. The U.S., meanwhile, will hold onto positions in northeastern Syria, ostensibly in support of its allies like the Syrian Democratic Forces, but also to prevent Iran from seizing the oil fields in that part of the country that could increase Iran’s power in a final political settlement. Iran won’t be willing to directly attack those U.S. forces for fear of retaliation.

And while Russia may complain about the continued U.S. presence in Syria, it at least temporarily serves Russia’s interests by preventing Iran from seizing territory in northern and northeastern Syria and keeping the Islamic State contained to a limited insurgency with no real ability left to threaten the Assad regime. For its part, the U.S. may be willing to exchange cooperation against Iran in Syria for sanctions relief for Russia.

Turkey: The Wild Card

The U.S. presence in northern Syria serves another purpose for Russia: It mitigates the threat of a Turkish invasion from the north. A complete U.S. withdrawal – the kind that U.S. President Donald Trump threatened in December 2018 but subsequently backtracked from – would open the path for Turkey to push further into northern Syria. Russia would rather reach a settlement between Damascus and the SDF than have to account for Turkish demands, which would inevitably be far greater if Turkey held more territory – and therefore greater negotiating power – in northern Syria.

(click to enlarge)

But even in a settlement between the U.S., Russia and Israel, Turkey is the wild card. It’s not that its interests are unclear – it would want to trade its current semi-occupation of Idlib province for greater control over its shared border with northern Syria, where the majority of Syria’s Kurds live. The question is what that control looks like, and how much Assad and Russia would be willing to cede to Turkey in the north in exchange for relinquishing its hold on Idlib to Assad.

Turkey’s issue is that it wants substantially greater control over northern Syria east of the Euphrates River, but on its own timeline. Despite Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s incessant threats to invade northern Syria, he urged temperance when Trump unexpectedly announced a U.S. pullout back in December. Turkey was not ready for the kind of deployment that would be necessary to move into northern Syria on Washington’s timeline and at a scale necessary to hold the territory and eject the Kurdish forces it wanted gone, all the while preventing a recapture of territory by IS. No, Turkey would much prefer to have its cake and eat it too. If the U.S. stays where it is, providing stability in portions of northern Syria, Turkey can selectively and gradually assert control over small pockets of that region.

In a U.S.-Russia-Israel agreement on Iran, Turkey may have to give up Idlib so that Assad can eliminate the rebel presence there without the support of Iranian ground forces. But Turkey would want something in exchange, and it’s possible that Turkey will not be capable of a full-scale invasion of northern Syria before Assad reaches some sort of agreement with the SDF to surrender its autonomy, or before the U.S. decides to withdraw its own forces. Turkey may talk a big game, but having to confront the Syrian government is a different game entirely from attacking ground militias, which is what Turkey has done on its two incursions into Syria so far.

So, what would Turkey get out of such a settlement? Most likely it would take some form of an updated Adana agreement, the 1998 settlement between Turkey and Syria in which Syria agreed not to harbor members of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and Turkey was allowed limited incursions into Syrian territory (up to 5 kilometers, or 3 miles) to pursue any PKK members that Syria didn’t control. Russia would guarantee the terms of the agreement, Turkey would cede Idlib while retaining some buffer space in northwestern Syria and rights to move into northern and north eastern Syria in order to eliminate specific PKK-related threats when necessary. Turkey may not be thrilled with the result, but it would be enough to meet some of its security needs and wouldn’t necessitate a full-scale occupation of northern Syria, which may be more of a strain on its resources in the long-term than Turkey could handle.

A three-way agreement between Russia, Israel and the U.S. to counter Iran wouldn’t immediately end the Syrian civil war, and neither would it guarantee a complete expulsion of Iran from Syria. But it would be a major step toward establishing shared cause to find meaningful political resolutions to problems that have mired the country in an all-consuming war for nearly a decade.

[ccp]

Kushner condos in Gaza and West Bank?

https://www.newsmax.com/politics/us-united-states-mideast/2019/06/22/id/921569/

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.defenseone.com/politics/2019/06/exclusive-countries-may-begin-backfilling-american-ground-troops-syria-within-weeks-envoy-says/158097/?oref=defense_one_breaking_nl

[Crafty_Dog]

The Syrian Civil War Grinds On, Largely Forgotten
By Charles Glass
Board of Contributors
Charles Glass
Charles Glass
Board of Contributors
Fighters with the U.S.-backed, Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces guard women and children waiting to leave the al-Hol camp in northeastern Syria on June 3, 2019.
(DELIL SOULEIMAN/AFP/Getty Images)
Contributor Perspectives offer insight, analysis and commentary from Stratfor’s Board of Contributors and guest contributors who are distinguished leaders in their fields of expertise.


Highlights

    Though Syrian President Bashar al Assad's government won the Syrian civil war two years ago, large parts of Syria remain beyond its reach.
    These areas are scenes of continuing fighting between the Russian-supported Syrian army and rebel forces dependent on Turkish assistance. Jihadists are also nearby, with nowhere left to go.
    Meanwhile, the United States fears a Turkish assault against its Kurdish allies, and Hezbollah, Iran's surrogate in Syria, is redeploying some of its fighters home to Lebanon to threaten Israel if the United States and Iran go to war.

While the United States and Iran risk all-out war with their game of chicken in the Persian Gulf, their proxy war is still playing out in Syria. Iranian ally and Syrian President Bashar al Assad won the war two years ago, but his victory was incomplete. Al Assad secured his throne, but two large swaths of the country remain beyond his reach. The Turkish army and rebel militants control the northwest. The mainly Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces, supported by a small but unspecified number of U.S., British and French special forces, hold the area northeast of the Euphrates River near the Syria-Turkey-Iraq border triangle. Al Assad has said he will not give up the struggle until both areas revert to his dominion. The only other part of the country under foreign occupation is the Golan Heights, but al Assad is in no position to expel the Israelis.

Combat rages on the periphery of Idlib province in Syria's northwest, where hundreds of civilians have lost their lives and as many as 300,000 have fled to relative, if uncomfortable, safety since the Syrian army launched its latest offensive two months ago. Rebel leaders told Reuters that Russian special forces were fighting alongside Syrian troops, although Russia has yet to comment on the allegation. What is known is that Russian warplanes from the Hmeimim air base have bombed towns in the rebel-held areas. On the rebel side, dependence on Turkish army protection, logistics, communications, ammunition and other supplies balances Russian help to al Assad. The Turks expelled the U.S.-backed Kurdish militia, the People's Protection Units and Kurdish civilians from Afrin province near Idlib last year. That left a large zone abutting government-held areas around Aleppo, Hama and Latakia under Turkish occupation with local and foreign fighters to sustain pressure on al Assad's forces.

Nowhere Else to Go

An estimated 3 million people — about half of them displaced from other areas in Syria — dwell in the Turkish zone. Added to their number are 60,000 rebels, according to Charles Lister, who has tracked the Syrian opposition from early in the war for the Washington-based Middle East Institute. "About half of that number," Lister writes, "owe their allegiance to factions from the broad-spectrum opposition mainstream, and the other half belong to jihadi groups, some loyal to al Qaeda." Primary among the al Qaeda affiliates is the rebranded Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, formed from the merger of Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra, and other militant groups in 2017. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham enforces Islamic State-like control in its areas, where Armenians, other Christians, Yazidis and Kurds endure murder, rape, torture and other crimes. Many Arab Sunni Muslims, however, have adapted to the Turkish-jihadi presence and do not welcome the return of al Assad's army.

For al Assad to dislodge the jihadists and other fighters from their last bastions in Syria, he cannot replicate his successful removal of them between 2016 and 2018 from Aleppo, Homs and the Damascus suburbs. In those encounters, the Syrian government besieged the militants and offered them what it called "reconciliation." That meant a choice of safe conduct to rebel-held areas, removal to displaced-persons camps or giving up their weapons and remaining at home. Tens of thousands chose to ride buses with their families, observed for their safety by the United Nations and Russian troops, to Idlib. With only Idlib and the surrounding areas left to them, there is nowhere else to go. Turkey, despite having enabled them to cross its frontiers into Syria in years past, does not want them back on its territory. One Syrian security source admitted to me, "They have no use out of the chessboard, and now they are squeezed in a corner." That leaves them little choice but to fight or die unless Turkey and Russia contrive an imaginative solution. While relations between the two formerly hostile powers have improved with the sale of Russia's S-400 air defense missiles to Turkey, they have not brought a resolution any closer in Syria.

The Kurds still rely on U.S. guarantees to maintain the autonomy they enjoy from Damascus and protection from a Turkish offensive.

In the northeast, al Assad has discussed a peaceful restoration of government sovereignty with the Kurds without achieving an agreement. He and the Kurds have consistently avoided attacking each other, undoubtedly in the belief that the Syrian army will return one day without a fight. The Kurds still rely on U.S. guarantees to maintain the autonomy they enjoy from Damascus and protection from a Turkish offensive to expel Kurds from the northeast as it cleared them from Afrin. The United States, despite its pique over NATO ally Turkey's purchase of Russian weaponry and its retaliatory cancellation of F-35 stealth jet sales to Turkey, is discussing a buffer zone between Turkey and the Kurds. At the same time, American observers fear that Turkish mobilization near Tal Abyad and Ras al-Ayn in Syria presages an assault against America's Kurdish allies that the United States must either ignore or oppose.

A Broken U.S. Policy

Four American officials with newly coined titles — James Jeffrey, Joel Rayburn, William Roebuck and David Schenker — are coordinating U.S. policy in Syria. But the policy has yet to gel. "The bottom line is Syria policy is broken, but the proliferation of diplomats taking charge only makes matters worse," former Pentagon adviser Michael Rubin, an American Enterprise Institute fellow and advocate of war with Iran, wrote in the Washington Examiner. Rubin maintains that the Syrian Kurds negotiating with the plethora of American diplomats have no idea who is in charge or what the plan is.

Hezbollah, which has been Iran's surrogate in the Syrian war, is redeploying some of its shock troops home to Lebanon. "We are present in every area (of Syria) that we used to be," said party chief Hassan Nasrallah on his Al-Manar TV channel. "We are still there, but we don't need to be there in large numbers as long as there is no practical need." The unstated element is that Hezbollah's experienced warriors may be needed in Lebanon to support Iran by threatening Israel with its store of surface-to-surface missiles in the event of a U.S.-Iran conflict.

So, the war in Syria grinds on, denying Syrian civilians peace and keeping the United States, Turkey, Russia and Iran with daggers poised at one another's throats. It is not unreasonable to ask whether those countries should end one war before starting a new one. Or perhaps avoid war altogether? If anyone thought the wars in Iraq from 2003 and Syria from 2011 were disastrous, just wait for the Iran debacle.

[Crafty_Dog]

second post

Turkey's Delicate Dance in Iraqi Kurdistan
Kurdish officials attend a signing ceremony in Suleimaniyah, Iraq, on May 5, 2019.
(FERIQ FEREC/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images)

Highlights

    After a brief hiatus following the September 2017 failed independence referendum, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) has reclaimed its place at the helm of the Kurdish government in northern Iraq.
    The return of the political status quo in the region will open the KDP up to deeper diplomatic and economic cooperation with Turkey, its most important external ally.
    The KDP will continue to grant Turkey leeway to increase its military operations against the Kurdistan Workers' Party in exchange for closer economic and trade ties with Ankara.
    But in its effort to curtail an independent Kurdish state, the Turkish government will further irk its own Kurdish population, thus exposing itself to additional security and political risks at home.

On July 17, a Turkish diplomat was shot and killed in eastern Arbil, the capital of Iraq's northern Kurdish region. The assassination was likely perpetrated by a sympathizer of the Kurdistan Workers' Party, the Kurdish group that Turkey has been targeting in regional military operations for decades. Ankara's high-risk tolerance will serve it well in the months ahead, as it continues to prioritize building its Iraqi-Kurdish ties — taking advantage of the economic leverage it wields over the newly formed Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). But just how much violence and political backlash Turkey can endure to prevent the formation of an independent Kurdish state will be tested because the ricks in the region, as evidenced by the latest incident, remain as high as ever.
The Big Picture

Iraqi Kurdistan contains roughly a third of the known oil and gas reserves in Iraq, one of the world's most oil-rich countries. After a tumultuous couple of years, politics in the region are now seemingly returning to equilibrium. Meanwhile, its most important economic and political ally, Turkey, is eager to capitalize on this renewed stability for its own gain.
See Rebalancing Power in the Middle East
See Turkey's Resurgence
A Return to the Political Status Quo

The KRG has operated as a semi-autonomous region of Iraq since the United States backed a no-fly zone over the province in 1992 to help shield ostracized Kurds from then-Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. In September 2018, the country held an election that failed to produce a government due to inter- and intraparty fighting over coveted Cabinet positions. The election was the first attempt to return to political normalcy after a long-promised independence referendum in September 2017 yielded only lost territory and lost political capital for the Kurdish government. But after a couple of tumultuous years, Kurdistan politics are now seemingly returning to equilibrium.

In early July, the government selected a new, streamlined Cabinet. Longtime energy and foreign ministers have stepped down in recent weeks, creating space for fresh blood in the government for the first time in almost 15 years. But any new faces must still be approved by the old guard, which is led by the Barzanis — the leading family of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). On July 10, Mansour Barzani was sworn in as prime minister of the KRG, shortly after Nechirvan Barzani (the nephew of the former longtime President Massoud Barzani) was selected as the Kurdish government's president in June, thereby extending the clan's long reign as the dominant political force in the region.
A chart listing the major Kurdish groups in Iraq.

The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) is the KDP's primary rival, run by the Talabani clan. Other smaller parties, including Gorran, speckle the playing field and contest elections. But Iraqi Kurdish politics still primarily centers around the KDP and the PUK, with the latter jostling for dominance and the former typically coming out on top. Despite lacking both leadership positions in Arbil, the PUK is still a force to be reckoned with. In addition to having influence with the presidency in Baghdad via Iraqi President Barham Salih, the party has so far been able to thwart the KDP's ability to name a Barzani member to the now-vacant energy ministry position, and also maintains seats in the Kurdish parliament. Several key points of contention, such as control of the oil-rich Kirkuk province, will cause the two parties to butt heads in the coming months — thus reinstalling the familiar tug-of-war that has long defined Kurdish politics in Iraq.
A New Chapter for Turkey-Kurdish Cooperation in Iraq

The KDP's renewed place in power, along with its perpetual need to edge out the PUK,  opens the door for Turkey to fortify its own economic, political and security ties in northern Iraq. Ankara has historically worked closely with the KDP because of its proximity (the Barzanis' tribal reach includes swaths of Iraqi Kurdistan that borders Turkey) and power (the Barzanis have always controlled the levers of the Iraqi Kurdish government including, most importantly, oil and gas policymaking).

Although the KDP-Turkish relations have hit low points over the years, Ankara has recently solidified its relationship with Arbil. Turkey is well-positioned as a much needed economic partner of the Kurdish government (and thereby, the KDP), providing the semi-autonomous region with a valuable trade route out for Kurdish oil. The two border crossings between Turkey and northern Iraq help facilitate $10 billion in annual trade flow. And Turkey is currently in discussions with Arbil to open yet another border crossing to facilitate even more trade.

But for the KDP, this inflow of Turkish funds comes at a cost. Turkey and the KDP have a tacit understanding of Ankara's ability to target the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) militant group — that is, as long as the KDP grants Ankara the freedom to conduct anti-PKK activities in the region, Ankara will continue to provide economic support to the Kurdish government in Iraq. This is possible in part because, among all the many inter-Kurdish rivalries across the region, there is none as pronounced as the animosity between the KDP and the PKK. So while there is an inherent tension in allowing Turkey to target fellow Kurds, the KDP's own deep-rooted distrust for the PKK helps facilitate this unspoken policy.
Turkey's Renewed Anti-PKK Push

Here, it is important to understand that when it comes to its regional strategy, Turkey's primary imperative is preventing the PKK or any of its secessionist sympathizers from forming an independent Kurdish state. Some within Turkey's own Kurdish population, which makes up roughly 20 percent of its population, have threatened to secede for decades. And Ankara knows that the establishment of a Kurdish state elsewhere in the region could fan the secessionist flames back home, which would have dire consequences for Turkey's territorial integrity, social stability and economy.
A map of Kurdish regions in Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq.

Thus, for years, one priority within Ankara's regional strategy has largely focused on keeping the PKK from gaining ground and spreading its message. In Syria, this has included amassing troops near Tel Abyad to fight against a PKK ally, the People's Protection Units. And in northern Iraq, this has meant going head-to-head against the PKK itself in places like Qandil (which is the militant group's current hub) and Sinjar.

Eager to secure more Turkish economic cooperation, the ruling KDP in Arbil will continue to grant Turkey leeway on its military operations in northern Iraq. And in turn, Ankara will capitalize on that added freedom to move more aggressively against the PKK, which it is already doing. Turkey is deepening its existing military presence in the province via a military operation against PKK militants called Operation Claw, which just recently entered its second phase. And as part of this phase, Turkish forces have also begun killing high-ranking PKK leaders.
The Inherent Risks

These deepening operations, however, will complicate Ankara's relations with its own Kurdish population at home. Ramped up military action against the PKK will ultimately hamper the prospects for negotiation between the Turkish government and Kurdish interest groups across the political spectrum while fueling the Peoples' Democratic Party's (the dominant Kurdish political party in Turkey, also known as the HDP) opposition against the country's ruling Justice and Development Party.

Allowing Turkey to continue fighting against the PKK also poses political risks for the KDP. Some Kurdish groups in the region are opposed to Arbil working so closely with Turkey, which they see as actively fighting against the whole of Kurdish interests. This delicate balance of allowing certain Kurds to be killed in order to maintain its lucrative ties with Ankara has always been difficult for Arbil to navigate. With its solidified place in power, the KDP is now in a better political position to withstand some of the potential domestic pressure from anti-Turkey Kurdish groups. But the more Turkey pushes against the PKK in the region, the harder it will be for the KDP to justify Ankara's actions with its citizens.

Targeting Kurdish insurgents in northern Iraq will make Anakara a target of retaliation anywhere their sympathizers reside.

But perhaps most importantly, the recent assassination of a Turkish diplomat in Arbil serves as an acute reminder that there is a direct link between what Turkey does in Iraq and what Turkey does at home. In other words, targeting Kurds in one place makes Anakara a target of retaliation anywhere their sympathizers reside. As Turkey broadens its anti-PKK operations in northern Iraq, it exposes itself to more risk of blowback and retaliatory attacks.

Violent clashes between PKK and Turkish forces are already a common occurrence in parts of the country. And this renewed anti-Kurd push in Iraq could result in even more frequent or deadly acts of violence in retaliation. But Ankara sees curtailing the PKK's ability to extend its reach as more important than protecting Turkey's overseas presence from overseas attack. And thus, the country will continue to take advantage of the KDP's renewed power to do just that — opening the door for more political backlash and bloodshed on both sides in the process.

[Crafty_Dog]

The Iran-Israel War Is Here
More than a decade of civil strife has opened up the region for the escalating state-to-state conflict.
By Jonathan Spyer
Aug. 27, 2019 7:09 pm ET
The scene of a drone attack against Hezbollah in Lebanon, Aug. 25. Photo: ANWAR AMRO/AFP/Getty Images

Israel and Iran are at war. Israeli strikes this week in southern Syria, western Iraq and eastern Lebanon—and possibly even Beirut—confirm it.

This war is a very 21st-century affair. For now it involves only small circles among the Israeli and Iranian populations. Parts of the air force, intelligence services and probably special forces are active on the Israeli side. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, its expeditionary Quds Force and proxy politico-military organizations in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon are engaged on behalf of Iran.

The war marks a hinge point in Middle Eastern geopolitics. For the past decade and a half, the region has been engaged mainly with internal strife: civil wars, insurgencies and mass protests. These are now largely spent, leaving a broken landscape along the northern route from Iran to Israel.
Trump at the G-7
Subscribe

The three “states” in between—Iraq, Syria and Lebanon—are fragmented, partly collapsed and thoroughly penetrated by neighboring powers. Their official state structures have lost the attribute that alone, according to German sociologist Max Weber, guarantees sovereignty: “monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force.” These nations’ territory has become the theater of the Iran-Israel war.

The regime in Tehran favors the destruction of the Jewish state, but this is a longstanding aim, dating to the 1979 Islamic Revolution and before it, in the minds of the revolutionaries. What’s brought it to the fore is that Iran has emerged in the past half decade as the prime beneficiary of the collapse of the Iraqi, Syrian and Lebanese states. This has substantially increased its capacity to menace Israel, which has noticed and responded.

Iran’s Revolutionary Guard has no peer in the Middle East—and perhaps beyond—in the practice of irregular warfare. Its proxies today dominate Lebanon (Hezbollah), constitute the single strongest politico-military force in Iraq (Popular Mobilization Units, or PMU), and maintain an independent, powerful military infrastructure in Syria, in partial cooperation with the Assad regime and Russia. This nexus, against which Israel is currently engaged, brings Iran de facto control over much of the land from the Iraq-Iran border to the Mediterranean and to the Syrian and Lebanese borders with Israel.

Iran treats this entire area as a single operational space, moving its assets around at will without excessive concern for the notional sovereignty of the governments in Baghdad, Beirut and Damascus. Lebanese Hezbollah trains PMU fighters in Iraq. Iraqi Shiite militias are deployed at crucial and sensitive points on the Iraqi-Syrian border, such as al-Qa’im and Mayadeen. Revolutionary Guard and Hezbollah personnel operate in southwest Syria, close to the Golan Heights.

Israeli attacks in recent days suggest that Israel, too, has begun to act according to these definitions and in response to them. If Iran will not restrict its actions to Syria, neither will Israel.

There is a crucial difference between the Israeli and Iranian positions in this conflict. Iran’s involvement in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon is deep, long-term and proactive. Tehran seeks the transformation of these areas into Iranian satrapies, and it has made considerable advances toward its goal. Israel’s involvement is entirely reactive, pushing back against Iranian domination and destroying the missile caches that bring it within Iran’s range. Israel has no interest in the internal political arrangements of Lebanon, Syria or Iraq, except insofar as these constitute a danger to Israel itself.

This imbalance defines the conflict. Iran creates political organizations, penetrates state structures, and seeks to make itself an unchallengeable presence in all three countries. Israel has been wary of entering the mire of factional politics in neighboring countries since its failed intervention in Lebanon leading up to the 1982 war. Jerusalem instead uses its superior intelligence and conventional military capabilities to neutralize the military and paramilitary fruits of the Iranian project whenever they appear to be forming into a concrete threat.

Israel is largely alone in this fight. The U.S. is certainly aware of Israel’s actions against Iran and may tacitly support them. Yet the Trump administration shows no signs of wishing to play an active part in the military challenge to Iranian infrastructure-building across the Middle East. This White House favors ramping up economic pressure on Tehran, but both its occupant and his voter base are wary in the extreme of new military commitments in the Middle East.

Saudi Arabia is targeted by the Ansar Allah, or Houthi, movement, another Iranian proxy closely assisted by the Revolutionary Guard. The Saudis’ interests are partly aligned with Israel’s, but Saudi Arabia is a fragile country, requiring the protection of its allies rather than constituting an asset for them.

So it is war between Israel and Iran, prosecuted over the ruins of Iraq, Lebanon and Syria. But it won’t necessarily stay that way. A single kinetic and successful Iranian response to Israel’s airstrikes could rapidly precipitate an escalation to a much broader contest. State-to-state conflict has returned to the Middle East.

Mr. Spyer is director of the Middle East Center for Reporting and Analysis and a research fellow at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security and at the Middle East Forum. He is author of “Days of the Fall: A Reporter’s Journey in the Syria and Iraq Wars.”

[ccp]

one can only speculate what would be if Iran had a few nuclear weapons

have not seen anything about how close they are to this lately.

[DougMacG]

one can only speculate what would be if Iran had a few nuclear weapons

have not seen anything about how close they are to this lately.

Let's assume they are close, just need testing, stockpiles, delivery systems.

Sec of State Mike Pompeo made clear this morning that the US has Israel's back in this conflict. 

Nuclear weapons are the red line but the problem is the regime. How about having state sponsored terror be the red line?  We are in danger as long as the Mullahs are in power.

Along those lines and with everyone saying now how wrong the US war in Iraq was, without toppling Saddam Hussein he would have nuclear weapons by now.

How do you deter a regime not afraid of taking any number of casualties? 

US timidity toward NK, even under Trump, incentivizes rogue nations like Iran to go nuclear. 

US Presidents kept hands off of NK because of China.  Would Russia really protect Iran in this conflict?
https://www.asiatimes.com/2019/08/article/attack-on-iran-would-be-an-attack-on-russia/

Or would an Israeli attack expose the weakness in Russian technology and in the Russian 'red line'?

Israel should do whatever is in its own best national security interest including attacking tose who threaten to destroy them.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.meforum.org/59223/us-syria-presence-blocks-iranian-gains?utm_source=Middle+East+Forum&utm_campaign=cea8c46430-mef_frantzman_2019_08_30_04_08&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_086cfd423c-cea8c46430-33691909&goal=0_086cfd423c-cea8c46430-33691909&mc_cid=cea8c46430&mc_eid=9627475d7f

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.meforum.org/59236/the-images-and-maps-behind-irans-land-bridge?utm_source=Middle+East+Forum&utm_campaign=3ab7d9bbce-MEF_Frantzman_2019_08_29_10_02&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_086cfd423c-3ab7d9bbce-33691909&goal=0_086cfd423c-3ab7d9bbce-33691909&mc_cid=3ab7d9bbce&mc_eid=9627475d7f

[DougMacG]

https://mosaicmagazine.com/observation/politics-current-affairs/2019/09/seven-black-swans-in-the-middle-east/

Nassim Nicholas Taleb, argued that the most dramatic changes in politics, economics, and technology come out of the blue. A black-swan event, ran his definition, “lies outside the realm of regular expectations, because nothing in the past can convincingly point to its possibility”
...
In hindsight, all the evidence was there. (It always is.)

[Crafty_Dog]

https://mailchi.mp/meforum.org/the-us-cannot-neglect-iraqi-kurdistan-frantzman-at-jerusalem-post?e=9627475d7f

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.meforum.org/59451/does-israel-have-secret-arab-allies?utm_source=Middle+East+Forum&utm_campaign=855feb246b-MEF_Frantzman_2019_09_29_07_34&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_086cfd423c-855feb246b-33691909&goal=0_086cfd423c-855feb246b-33691909&mc_cid=855feb246b&mc_eid=9627475d7f

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/10/us-trying-restore-deterrence-gulf-wont-be-enough/160394/?oref=defense_one_breaking_nl

[ccp]

https://news.yahoo.com/white-house-says-u-forces-034659131.html

[Crafty_Dog]

Leaving the Syrian Kurds high and dry. According to an official White House press release, U.S. President Donald Trump informed Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan that U.S. forces would withdraw from areas in northern Syria that are soon to be the target of a Turkish military operations. Trump tried to withdraw U.S. troops from Syria before, only to be reined in by the faction of foreign policy advisers that think doing so would hurt U.S. interests. It seems as though that is no longer the case. By giving Turkey the green light, the U.S. has effectively declared it will no longer protect Syria’s Kurds, whose People’s Protection Units were the vanguard for much of the U.S.-supported military operations against the Islamic State. The development means a short-term improvement in U.S.-Turkish relations – but in the long term sets the two on a collision course. It is also hard not to see the similarities between this move and former President Barack Obama’s military withdrawal from Iraq – short-term moves designed to please domestic political constituencies but that will have dangerous unintended consequences for both the region and U.S. interests.




also see

https://clarionproject.org/us-allies-face-slaughter-by-turks-after-trump-retreat/?utm_source=Clarion+Project+Newsletter&utm_campaign=f40f67f008-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_10_07_12_49&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_60abb35148-f40f67f008-6358189&mc_cid=f40f67f008&mc_eid=d7eaaa3130

https://special-ops.org/52019/american-special-operations-forces-to-retreat-from-northern-syria/

[Crafty_Dog]

https://havokjournal.com/national-security/defense/u-s-abandons-its-allies-in-syria/

[ccp]

The question is
why did Trump make this decision NOW?

seems like it was done to change the subject a bit in DC.

remember when Clinton was getting impeached.  He would announce something every day to change the topic
trying to "triangulate" if one wants to use the MSM adjective

is Trump trying to do the same?

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.jpost.com/International/Trumps-abandonment-of-Kurds-will-reinforce-Israels-sense-it-604006?fbclid=IwAR1tE5t4j96Ecr_7czV9LkafzhuerqsFn4GJyaeScSQ8pBjTXwW3yf7fiOU

[Crafty_Dog]

https://ivn.us/2014/08/19/kurds-americas-greatest-ally-middle-east?fbclid=IwAR07xyiIu2iLzJE2J8o0jcKKq3EOf1DUdTU3dVB-BWPZAatzDN4nwW33d-I

[Crafty_Dog]

third post

I had not appreciated the point about Turkey wanting to get millions of Syrian Arab refugees out of Turkey.

https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2019-10-07/why-are-syrias-kurds-accusing-the-united-states-of-betrayal?utm_source=Today%27s+Headlines&utm_campaign=b7fb8e996b-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2016_12_12_COPY_01&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_b04355194f-b7fb8e996b-80108809

[Crafty_Dog]

4th post

https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/10/syria-trump-withdrawal-isis/160451/?oref=defense_one_breaking_nl&fbclid=IwAR1BU697g7FrzNsKUIzEHuKauR7QUkOJ-nRFcsYOYGB2_ed9glAs-gUWRzo

[DougMacG]

Obama abandoned Iraq - and ISIS took over, destroying people and villages.  Now it looks like Trump is making the same mistake, abandoning our allies and our victories in Syria - and similar or worse results could come from it.  One of our best allies in the region, the Kurds, is about to be annihilated by our pretend NATO ally Turkey, at least that's the way it appears.

36 months ago Donald Trump didn't know Kurds from Quds and didn't know what the nuclear triad was.  Is this a boneheaded move by a Commander in Chief who should be listening better to his military advisers?

Or is he one step ahead of us?

American troops pulling out doesn't mean the Kurds are defenseless.  They are perhaps the most underrated fighting force on the planet.  In the 10 months and longer this has been brewing, maybe Sec. Pompeo has made arrangements with others to help in our place, UAE, Qatar, Egypt, Israel, or Saudi for examples.

Also he has put Turkey on notice not to take advantage of what he has opened up for them.

Trump, in his mind, needs to extract the US from "endless wars".  Keeping that promise and showing restraint militarily could put him in a the better position to pass a good defense, which would do more for our strategic preparedness (with China for example) than keeping a small presence in Syria.

My 2 cents, let's see how this goes before we make a final judgment.

[G M]

https://townhall.com/columnists/kurtschlichter/2019/10/08/critics-aghast-as-trump-keeps-word-about-no-more-wars-n2554328

Obama abandoned Iraq - and ISIS took over, destroying people and villages.  Now it looks like Trump is making the same mistake, abandoning our allies and our victories in Syria - and similar or worse results could come from it.  One of our best allies in the region, the Kurds, is about to be annihilated by our pretend NATO ally Turkey, at least that's the way it appears.

36 months ago Donald Trump didn't know Kurds from Quds and didn't know what the nuclear triad was.  Is this a boneheaded move by a Commander in Chief who should be listening better to his military advisers?

Or is he one step ahead of us?

American troops pulling out doesn't mean the Kurds are defenseless.  They are perhaps the most underrated fighting force on the planet.  In the 10 months and longer this has been brewing, maybe Sec. Pompeo has made arrangements with others to help in our place, UAE, Qatar, Egypt, Israel, or Saudi for examples.

Also he has put Turkey on notice not to take advantage of what he has opened up for them.

Trump, in his mind, needs to extract the US from "endless wars".  Keeping that promise and showing restraint militarily could put him in a the better position to pass a good defense, which would do more for our strategic preparedness (with China for example) than keeping a small presence in Syria.

My 2 cents, let's see how this goes before we make a final judgment.

[Crafty_Dog]

Continuing my research: Perhaps Erdogan has a point to consider here?
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

Addressing his ruling Justice and Development Party on September 5, Erdogan said, in part:

"We have been hosting about 3,650,000 Syrian refugees for the last eight years... [The West] sometimes thanks us [but]... gives us no support. Our expenses have reached $40 billion. The EU has given only $3 billion, but it is not sent to our budget. It goes to AFAD [Turkey's Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency] and Kızılay [the Turkish Red Crescent] through international organizations... [Europe] has not kept its promises. But we will continue taking that step [to establish a safe zone], whether it supports us or not.

"The number of Syrians that have returned to the areas that we have made safe is now 350,000. But we do not find this sufficient. We want to create such a safe zone... and we have talked about it with Trump and Putin – as well as with Merkel and with Britain -- and asked them to build houses there with us and transfer people to those houses. If we do that, Turkey will relax.

"We have container cities and tent cities [for refugees]. But there is no humane living there. On the one hand, [the West] talks about humane living; on the other hand, they call our offer of a safe zone 'beautiful'... [But when we say], 'Let's start,' they say 'no.'...

"If they do not do [what we are demanding], we will have to open the gates... We have tolerated [housing so many refugees] to a certain extent. Are we the only ones to carry that burden?...

"I am saying this today: We have not got the required support from the world -- particularly from the EU -- to share the burden of the refugees we have been hosting, so we might have to [open the gates] to get the support."

[ccp]

"they call our offer of a safe zone 'beautiful'... "

I wonder who said that 

If it was Obama he could have said , you should be happy with the refugees , diversity is your strength.

We have 20+ million illegals in our country of 300 mill. which we are told is great .  Some work .

so I could see 3.6 million refugees in a country of 79 million is a lot.  I guess Turkey doesn't have the jobs to give them for cheap labor.
that is progress .  few hundred yrs ago Turkey might have made them into slaves.

sarcasm aside Turkey is by far the largest "host" of Syrian refugees:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Refugees_of_the_Syrian_Civil_War

[DougMacG]

Isn't there another answer to this short of Americans on the ground in the battlefield?

https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/kurds-desert-isis-jails-to-face-turkish-attack-9q8t3spqv

[ccp]

Doug,

I am confused

didn't trump say we were only talking about 50 ? troops

so what was the big deal about such a small number?

were they at risk? I suppose.

[DougMacG]

Doug,
I am confused
didn't trump say we were only talking about 50 ? troops
so what was the big deal about such a small number?
were they at risk? I suppose.

I heard this morning it is something like 2000 troops in the area.  This article says 500. 
https://abcnews.go.com/International/us-troops-syria-heres-theyre/story?id=46020582
In any case it is a relatively small number - unless they get killed and  then it was a large number 

Personally, I am on both sides (or more than two sides) of this issue.  Leaving the Kurds sure looks like deserting an ally.  But they have had more than 10 months notice and people like Kushner and Pompeo have been working at building alliances wider.  Why not have Arab allies provide on the ground support.

Turkey is either a lousy ally or not an ally at all.  Those are the trickiest relationships.  Driving Turkey further into the Putin orbit is a big potential step backward, but the inevitable outcome of the US telling Erdogan to go to hell right now.

The Kurds might win a war with Turkey.  On the other side of it, maybe Trump loses his Presidency for allowing what the news now calls a genocide.

The next real big thing in the Middle East is most likely what Nassim Taleb calls the black swan event, that which no one expects (but all the signs were there).  Sorry I can't tell you what that is.

What changed in the Middle East is US fracking.   Saudi lost half its production capability to a surprise Iran attack and I paid 2.44'9 to fill my Prius a week later.  They don't have us by the short hairs anymore. 

We want no terror groups to have a safe haven.  Not a lot more directly affects us in the Middle East.  If we stay it is endless war and being 'the world's policeman' and if we leave, we caused the genocide.  It's hard to win.

[DougMacG]

https://nypost.com/2019/10/08/how-obamas-team-set-up-trumps-syrian-dilemma/

"How Obama’s team set up Trump’s Syrian dilemma"

[Crafty_Dog]

By GPF Staff

Turkey takes the fight to northern Syria. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced on Wednesday the start of a long-awaited major Turkish operation to take control of Kurdish-held areas of northern Syria. Behind the scenes, Turkish officials have been trying to portray this as a peaceful, largely political operation, but Turkish TV networks have been broadcasting footage of airstrikes and/or artillery strikes on Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units positions in areas around Tal Abyad and Ras al-Ayn. Turkish media is also reporting a broad buildup of Turkish forces along the border. There are also unconfirmed reports that Syrian forces, with Russian and Iranian backing, are eyeing a move on Syrian Democratic Forces-held areas from the south. According to Kurdish media, Iran also held an unannounced drill near its border with Turkey. All this comes after the Trump administration announced the abrupt withdrawal of the small number of U.S. forces stationed in the area earlier this week following a phone call with Erdogan. The Kurdish SDF has claimed that it would have no choice but to abandon a network of jails holding captured Islamic State fighters as it moves forces into positions along the border. On Wednesday, Trump said it would be up to Turkey to take responsibility for the detainees. What’s left of the Islamic State is evidently trying to take advantage of the situation, reportedly activating sleeper cells to launch an attack in Raqqa, the Syrian city that just two years ago was serving as the Islamic State’s capital.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/10/trumps-wise-turkey-policy/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=NR%20Daily%20Monday%20through%20Friday%202019-10-09&utm_term=NRDaily-Smart

[Crafty_Dog]

Turkey: For Ankara, Strategic Gains in Syria Are Worth the Economic Pain of Sanctions
4 MINS READOct 10, 2019 | 21:45 GMT
The Big Picture

The United States and European Union are looking at new sanctions on Turkey because of its military operation in northeastern Syria. But Ankara has signaled clearly that no matter what comes down the pipe, it will absorb the economic pain for the strategic gain of a new buffer zone along its Syrian frontier.
See The Syrian Civil WarSee Turkey's Resurgence

The U.S. Congress and the European Union are mulling sanctions to punish Turkey for its military operation in northeastern Syria. U.S. Sens. Lindsey Graham, a Republican, and Chris Van Hollen, a Democrat, have introduced legislation that targets high-level officials in President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's government and Turkey's defense industry. Their bill would also activate sanctions against Turkey that Congress previously passed under the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). The Europeans are more broadly considering action against Turkey, and Norway and Sweden, which supply Turkey with small arms, already have suspended new arms exports. To prevent Turkey from ending its 2016 refugee agreement with Europe and flooding the Continent with refugees from Syria, the European Union has offered up to $1 billion in additional support to help Ankara feed and shelter them in Turkey.
Threatening Sanctions

International outrage over Turkey's military operation in Syria is forcing nominally allied states to condemn Ankara. In the United States, in particular, this outrage is propelling sanctions legislation. For now, President Donald Trump appears positioned to veto the legislation in part because of his political desire to reduce the U.S. footprint in the Middle East, and in part because of his warm relationship with Erdogan, whom he has invited to visit the White House on Nov. 13.

But Congress may have the bipartisan support it needs to override Trump's veto — which would be a first during his presidency. The Republican Party is less unified behind Trump on Turkey and Syria, and the party's base is more split on the Turkish incursion against the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) than just about any other issue, in large part because of the SDF's positive reputation as a partner in the campaign against the Islamic State. The strong political incentives to punish Turkey also means the current sanctions legislation may herald more action: Members of Congress can expand or add to the penalties as they see fit.

Though Congress is likely to pass sanctions in some form, the measures are not necessarily as wide-ranging as they appear. They are meant to intimidate and to deter Turkey's incursion. But it will still take time for Congress to vote on and implement them, if they survive a Trump veto. By then, the Turkish operation might be over, and the United States and Turkey can negotiate to reduce the threat of sanctions.
Willing to Endure the Pain

Turkey will take the sanctions pain. Its military operation is broadly popular with the Turkish public, which largely sees the SDF as an extension of Turkey's own insurgent Kurdistan Workers' Party. Erdogan also has little left to lose on his economic record. A rebellion within the ranks of the ruling Justice and Development Party is already in full swing, attacking Erdogan for his economic stewardship, and Turkey has not yet recovered from a recession early this year. Instead, Erdogan is leaning on nationalist policies to maintain legitimacy, especially with his parliamentary majority dependent on the Nationalist Movement Party to govern.

Moreover, Turkey's economic problems and fortunes are bigger than the sanctions threat. The penalties may worsen its economy, but other major factors such as the weak lira, slowing construction and manufacturing sectors, large private debt and weakened investor sentiment drive the ups and downs of its economy. For Turkey, disruptions to its economic relationships will be worth the payoff if it succeeds in stopping a Kurdish statelet on its border.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/10/10/turkeys-erdogan-threatens-send-millions-refugees-europe-eu-calls/?fbclid=IwAR2ooX8lMCd_EsjUf9Q9P77c_XieZIWkLP_ZzozI9q-OiTdyddTDyV_ZyqM

[Crafty_Dog]

second post

FWIW

https://www.jihadwatch.org/2019/10/dont-romanticize-the-kurds?fbclid=IwAR1uy02aY_XEkXFPXwLN7ShvWmSQDE_Z9hausW8F7jTGj4J6g-iv1q1zEnE

[Crafty_Dog]

http://carolineglick.com/trump-did-not-betray-the-kurds/

https://havokjournal.com/politics/international/why-the-kurds-may-be-behind-the-u-s-pullout-from-syria/?fbclid=IwAR207tKMnkx6ocSS-6k_iEGrFUena9MAtlDSl5eH2cGC0EUKoeEfUFtrYHA

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.meforum.org/59554/state-department-distrust-of-syrian-kurds?utm_source=Middle+East+Forum&utm_campaign=cf944af252-MEF_Frantzman_2019_10_11_10_19&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_086cfd423c-cf944af252-33691909&goal=0_086cfd423c-cf944af252-33691909&mc_cid=cf944af252&mc_eid=9627475d7f

[Crafty_Dog]

https://m.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/jan/22/deciphering-confusion-about-the-kurds/?fbclid=IwAR2uYPbgCqUrHWuK5qbBiItnp2o_Dc8XL9eeKGSq9nr8ImfdZhzdeOkliOo

[Crafty_Dog]

The Turk and the President
The Syrian retreat is all too typical of Trump’s decision-making.
By The Editorial Board
Oct. 11, 2019 6:52 pm ET
Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan addresses a conference of parliament speakers in Istanbul, Oct. 11. Photo: /Associated Press

President Trump prides himself on one-on-one diplomacy, but too often it results in rash and damaging decisions like his abrupt order Sunday for U.S. troops to retreat from northern Syria. Turkish strongman Recep Tayyip Erdogan is now dictating terms to the American President, and the consequences are likely to be felt far beyond Syria and Turkey.

Mr. Trump made his decision after a phone call with Mr. Erdogan in which we now know the Turk said he wanted to follow through on his threat to invade. U.S. officials had been negotiating for months with Turkey to establish a safe zone in the region that would protect Kurdish and Turkish interests while maintaining the gains against Islamic State.
California Goes Dark, Intentionally
Subscribe

Jennifer Griffin of Fox News reports that Mr. Trump was supposed to tell Mr. Erdogan to stay north of the border. When the Turkish bully made his threats, Mr. Trump could have said that the U.S. military controls the air above the region and would respond to protect the Kurds and U.S. soldiers. Ms. Griffin reports that Mr. Trump instead “went off script” during the call and agreed to stay out of Turkey’s way.

Turkey’s invasion has now begun, and State Department officials are left to plead on background that it is a “very big mistake.” Mr. Erdogan can be forgiven if he pays more attention to Mr. Trump’s comments this week that he acceded to Turkey’s invasion because he wants to end America’s “endless wars.” The Turk called the President’s bluff.

How this will play out isn’t clear, but the early signs are troubling. Mr. Trump claimed Mr. Erdogan would take control of the more than 10,000 Islamic State prisoners under Kurdish control, but a senior adviser to Mr. Erdogan told CNN this week that Turkey “never said” it would “shoulder the burden” of holding the prisoners.

Watch out if the Kurds stop holding the prisoners as they flee the invading Turks. The ISIS fighters could break free to rejoin the estimated 15,000 jihadists who haven’t been killed or captured. They could hoist their flag again over territory in Syria or Iraq.

Kurds and Syrians took nearly all of the ground casualties in the previous fight against the caliphate. Why would they do so again after Mr. Trump abandoned them against the Turks? And especially after Mr. Trump said this week that the Kurds might have helped against ISIS but they were well paid and hadn’t helped us at “Normandy”—as in D-Day.

Mr. Trump’s retreat is also a thumb in the eye to our friends in Europe. The State Department spent months seeking Europe’s help to share the burden of maintaining a safe zone in northern Syria, and with some success. Mr. Trump’s decision undercuts that effort, and now Mr. Erdogan is threatening Europe with a new refugee wave if its leaders criticize his invasion. “We will open the gates and send 3.6 million refugees your way,” he said this week.

Some sages claim Mr. Trump made this concession to Turkey as part of a strategy to win Mr. Erdogan’s support against Iran. But Mr. Erdogan has undermined America’s Iran sanctions in the past. And on Friday Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin said Mr. Trump had given him “very significant new sanctions authorities” against individuals in the Turkish government if their invasion goes too far.

The hope is that this sanctions threat will deter Mr. Erdogan, but it also contradicts the win-over-Turkey strategy. This looks like one more tactical U.S. gambit to offset the tactical mistake of bowing to Turkey’s invasion.

Tell us again what the benefit of this retreat is beyond appeasing the isolationist wing of the GOP? With the departure of John Bolton as national security adviser, Mr. Trump’s most significant security counselor is Kentucky Senator Rand Paul, who would withdraw to a Fortress America if he had the chance.
***

As Commander in Chief, Mr. Trump has been mostly tactical and rarely strategic. He shifts positions from week to week, even day to day, for the sake of a summit or short-term appearances. Allies are informed about his reversals after the fact and left to wonder if they can still rely on the United States of America.

As Mr. Trump runs for re-election, this habit of impulsive judgment will be front-and-center. As an incumbent he should be the safer presidential choice. But Mr. Trump’s judgment can be so reckless that many voters who took a risk on him the first time will ask if he’s worth a second gamble when he would no longer be disciplined by having to face the voters again. Impeachment won’t defeat Donald Trump in 2020, but Donald Trump might.

[Crafty_Dog]

https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/10/kurds-syrian-democratic-forces-us-donald-trump/?fbclid=IwAR3Zn0Y4qgTGQ04EzJAl3V_NMvIepTKGFxI4lbsh6E8axhZAUYJAHOtEDJY

[Crafty_Dog]

https://theweek.com/speedreads/871455/kurdish-general-either-protect-move-aside-let-russians

[DougMacG]

Previous post:
Re: Kurd general:  Protect or we will bring in the Russians
This is how allies talk?
----------------------------
This is a very difficult issue with no good choices.  If we defend Syria, we are defending Iran's Assad.  If we fought with the Kurds before, we have to defend them forever or we have betrayed them?  The people who wanted a stronger US footprint in the Middle East, right or wrong, lost the last several elections at home.  What is the mission if we stay?  What is the end game?  What defines victory?  What is the US stake in it?  What is the cost of it?  When did Congress, eager to criticize, declare war?  On whom?  All very hard to answer. 

We have been in Afghanistan going on two  decades.  I'm not judging that except to say it's costly in dollars and lives, politically unpopular, and the marginal utility of staying longer keeps falling.  We have been in Syria for 5 years?  We defeated Hitler in 4 1/2 years.  With no vision of victory or commitment to achieve it, this fits the definition of endless wars.  Trump made an important campaign promise and he won on it.  He stole the Iraq war issue from the Democrats and this is an extension of it from America's point of view.  Once in a while, when we don't a dog in a fight, they may have to fight without us.
----------------------------
Good readings on both sides of this.  Here is some narrative busting by Caroline Glick:
https://carolineglick.com/trump-did-not-betray-the-kurds/

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.timesofisrael.com/kurdish-politician-among-9-civilians-killed-by-turkey-backed-rebels-monitor/?fbclid=IwAR35G71tIJLy40ScyNOPr_cuq7bzr3W6dYhTpxkcTnNyJfxRnSXdRixBPts

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/13/kurds-say-785-isis-affiliates-have-escaped-camp-after-turkish-shelling?CMP=fb_gu&utm_medium=Social&utm_source=Facebook&fbclid=IwAR1rKnLyG04ZWzAp8h9djlC5jNvuyxvFfpoCKSRBuwBDYm048iY--LflVrI#Echobox=1570967968

[Crafty_Dog]

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/10/13/kurds-agree-russian-brokered-plan-allow-assad-territory/?fbclid=IwAR3LyY-kWgVE_XXhlMZDe5FpsEix4Ggh8CxC8OYPA1tptjtDHbPseBz1_I0

[Crafty_Dog]

In Syria, Turkey Will Pay the Price for an Imperfect Buffer
6 MINS READOct 14, 2019 | 10:00 GMT
This photo shows fighters with the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army gathered near the Turkish border in northeastern Syria on Oct. 11, 2019.
(ANAS ALKHARBOUTLI/picture alliance via Getty Images)

Fighters with the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army gather near the Turkish border in northeastern Syria on Oct. 11, 2019. Turkey has long sought to establish a buffer zone in Syria to protect itself from the effects of that country's civil war.
Highlights

    Turkey will expand its buffer zone along its border with Syria to buttress it from the effects of the Syrian civil war, but the expansion will bring repercussions from Syria, Russia, Iran, the United States and Europe.
    Turkey will endure the risks of U.S. and European sanctions to gain as much as it can from a new, northeastern Syrian buffer zone, but it will not want a military clash with Syrian, Russian or Iranian forces that enter the northeast.
    Turkey's expanded buffer zone will also be subject to insurgent attacks by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces or the Islamic State.

The Turkish military is moving into Syria's northeast as Ankara chases its strategy of expanding a buffer space between Turkey and Syria's civil war. But while Turkey will succeed in building up this buffer zone from Afrin in the west to Iraq in the east, it will also pay a price. Turkey's actions will increase tensions not only between it and Syria and Syria's Russian and Iranian backers, but also between it and the United States, the region's former protector, and Europe. Meanwhile, an insurgency by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) will complicate Ankara's bid to establish a truly safe zone for Syrian refugees and Turkish security interests.

 
The Big Picture

Turkey has an opportunity to build a larger buffer zone along its border with Syria to prevent the growth of a Kurdish statelet and militancy and to push back against Russia and Iranian influence in Syria. But Turkey's gains will come at a price, including new tensions with Syria, Russia and Iran; additional U.S. congressional outrage; and increased anger from Europe.
See Middle East and North Africa section of the 2019 Fourth-Quarter Forecast
See The Syrian Civil War

Turkey is moving ever closer to its goal of establishing a broad buffer zone in Syria. It wants to prevent the Syrian border from becoming like its border with Iraq, where an autonomous Kurdish region hosts Kurdish militants in the form of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). Ankara also wants to build up space to slow refugees fleeing the Syrian civil war from entering Turkey or even to return some of the 3.6 million refugees it has been sheltering at great expense.

Finally, by establishing a zone of influence along the border, Turkey aims to maintain a degree of influence in neighboring Syria and thus the Arab world — and a means to create some counterbalance against the sometimes unfriendly Russian and Iranian influence inside Syria.
Why a Buffer Zone Is Tricky

Building this buffer zone, however, comes with costs, from rising tensions with Syria, Russia and Iran to problems with the United States and Europe, to an ongoing Kurdish insurgency. And the more Turkey expands the buffer, the more of these costs it will incur.

A bigger buffer will increase tensions between Turkey and Syria and, by extension, between Turkey and Russia and Turkey and Iran. The Turkish incursion is coming about because the United States is signaling it is no longer protecting the SDF, creating a power vacuum for Turkey to exploit. But the SDF will not just step aside as Turkey rolls in. It has already signaled it will reach out to Damascus for protection to offset the U.S. withdrawal. A partnership with Damascus will likely erode the SDF's goal of autonomy, but the SDF, without the United States, will have little choice.

By bringing in Damascus, the SDF will create a new front between Syria and Turkey — and, again by extension, with Russia and Iran, which Syria will rely on to help it take control of the northeast. A larger buffer zone in the northeast will require Turkish proxies and forces to extend their reach to maintain it, creating opportunities for mistakes and friction between Syria and its allies on one side and Turkey on the other. The recurrent de-escalation talks between Ankara, Moscow and Tehran will also increasingly have to factor in the northeast.
This map shows the location of Turkish, Kurdish and other forces along the Turkey-Syria border.

Even as the big powers seek to de-escalate the conflict, the SDF will build on the anti-Turkish insurgency already present in Afrin and extend it to whatever new buffer zones are built up in northeastern Syria. Once more, the larger the zone, the more targets there will be for the insurgency. This insurgency will also reflect the geographic reality of the region: With such a vast area to patrol, Turkey will not be able to wholly control the border, and thus will not completely cut off the SDF-PKK links it is seeking to sever. Smuggling of arms and supplies back and forth will continue on some scale. In addition to the increased risks from the SDF, the Islamic State's underground elements will also potentially strike Turkish proxies and forces as they stay in Syria. This situation will create a long-term drain on Turkish military and security resources while failing to fully address its security concerns.
A Place to Resettle Syrian Refugees

Turkey also will not be able to use the expanded buffer zone to solve all of its refugee-related problems. Many refugees are from Syria's west — which is under regime control — and will resist resettlement in the northeast; they will not want to move to an unfamiliar part of the country. The northeast also lacks housing and employment opportunities. Even in pre-civil war Syria, the Syria-Turkish border region was relatively underdeveloped, and its cities small. Housing will be hard to find, and many refugees will realize they will be placed in long-term camps, dependent on aid.

That does not mean Turkey will not force some refugees to go to the safe zones. With anti-Arab sentiment rising in cash-strapped Turkey, the Turkish government needs to show it is not prioritizing foreign refugees over its own citizens. But the harsher Turkey acts toward Syrian refugees, the more Ankara risks outrage from Europe and the United States, with disruptions in their relationships possible. In addition, to find suitable housing for refugees and to disrupt the connections between Turkish Kurdistan and Syrian Kurdistan, Turkey will be tempted to repeat its Afrin population strategy, ejecting people it considers disloyal and replacing them with other Syrian refugees. In doing so, Turkey once more would risk international outrage from its Western partners and create a new incentive for sanctions against it.

Building a buffer zone in Syria comes with costs. And the more Turkey expands the buffer, the more of these costs it will incur.

Finally, the more Turkey expands its buffer zones, the more it will risk its ties with the United States, particularly with the U.S. Congress, whose members are already outraged by Turkish military action against the SDF, a U.S. ally in the fight against the Islamic State. A larger or lengthier Turkish military operation will increase Congress' desire to penalize Turkey. Further humanitarian-related concerns may arise as Turkey resettles refugees and carries out military operations. Congress could introduce fresh legislation in response to such incidents, producing more tension between the United States and Turkey.

But because of its imperative to diminish Kurdish militancy that could lead to a Kurdish state, Ankara will have a high tolerance for some of these risks as it seeks to gain as much as it can from its current military operations. While it will not want to escalate the situation to a military confrontation with Syria, Russia or Iran, Turkey will brave sanctions from the United States and Europe to achieve its buffer zone — before Syria and its allies move into parts of the northeast.

[DougMacG]

I just heard a great call on Dr. Sebastian Gorka radio on this topic, points brought up on the forum, familiar voice...

[Crafty_Dog]

 

Very frustrating at my end-- on and off there was cross chatter from a completely other phone call then my call got cut off altogether before I could ask my big question:  What is the balance of power after we leave?  Does Turkey block Iran?  What is the Russians play viz each of the players? etc.

Someone was able to track down the URL for the audio of my previous call , , ,

[DougMacG]

Very frustrating at my end-- on and off there was cross chatter from a completely other phone call then my call got cut off altogether before I could ask my big question:  What is the balance of power after we leave?  Does Turkey block Iran?  What is the Russians play viz each of the players? etc.

Someone was able to track down the URL for the audio of my previous call , , ,

You handled the distractions well.  It sounded like he ran out of time and closed it with his answer to what you were asking.

I wonder if this is the White House statement he referred to:

Statement from President Donald J. Trump Regarding Turkey’s Actions in Northeast Syria
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/EG3SarFWsAUW-Ed.jpg
12:55 PM - 14 Oct 2019


I wonder if this was the statement

[DougMacG]

quote author=Crafty_Dog
Someone was able to track down the URL for the audio of my previous call , , ,
------------------
https://www.sebgorka.com/broadcast/10-14-19/

Hour 3, 40:10 mark