A New Tripartite Alliance in Syria?
By: Caroline D. Rose
As the coronavirus pandemic continues to consume the world's attention, Syria is hanging by a thread. The March 5 cease-fire agreement between Russia and Turkey that formalized new lines of control in Idlib province is proving extremely fragile. Both of the cease-fire deal’s brokers, especially Turkey, seem to be flouting the terms of the agreement. Though direct conflict has not broken out, Turkey has quietly ramped up its presence in Idlib, deploying over 20,000 light infantry brigades, armored units and special operations (commando) forces to reinforce its positions in eastern and southern Idlib. Meanwhile, the Syrian government has deployed more weapons to the front lines, and Russia has sent two more Su-24 fighter jets to its air base in Latakia. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu recently visited Damascus to discuss the next steps with Syrian officials.
Joint Russia-Turkey patrols along the security corridor, a 6-km-deep (3.7 miles) zone running along the M4 highway, have already broken down over security concerns. Frequent attacks by jihadist militants and Turkey-backed groups like al-Nusra Front and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham targeting regime positions risk escalating the fighting even more. The two powers have counted on the coronavirus pandemic to distract the rest of the world while they reinforce their positions, raise the stakes for confrontation and reshape the power dynamic in Idlib in their favor.
Meanwhile, the Syrian Kurds are waiting patiently in the wings. But to navigate Syria’s bloody war, the Kurdish Democratic Union Party and its militant wing, the People’s Protection Units, or YPG, have had to form new alliances. Since 2014, the U.S. had been the Kurds’ main security guarantor. Now that the U.S. is withdrawing most of its forces from the conflict, Turkey – the Kurds’ main adversary – is becoming an even bigger player in the war. And as the security landscape changes, the Kurds are being forced to adapt and look to some unlikely allies for support, namely Russia and the Syrian regime.
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The Kurds’ Changing Alliances
The Kurds and the Syrian government share a difficult history. The Kurds have long been marginalized by the ruling Assad family. Throughout the civil war, the YPG, a branch of the Syrian Democratic Forces, has fought against the regime, and the regime has excluded the Kurds from multilateral talks over Syria’s postwar future. For example, the Syrian Constitutional Committee allows Russia, the regime and the United Nations to each select one-third of the representatives on the panel, while the YPG and SDF have no representation.
Still, the Kurds’ greatest enemy is not Damascus but Ankara. Since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey has considered Kurdish militants in Turkey an existential threat and has sought to sever their ties to Kurdish communities abroad. This includes eliminating links between Kurdish groups in Turkey and the Syrian YPG, an organization Ankara views as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers' Party, which is classified as a terrorist group in Turkey.
The U.S. has served as the YPG’s main security guarantor since the group in 2014 joined Operation Inherent Resolve, the U.S.-led campaign against the Islamic State. The U.S. needed troops to fight battles against IS on the ground, and the Kurds needed an ally that would protect them against Turkey and Russia. With the aid of American weapons and training, the Kurds proved to be an effective fighting force against groups like IS and al-Qaida, and managed to maintain control over large swaths of territory in the northeast.
However, in late 2019, the U.S. decided to withdraw from Syria, pulling thousands of troops from the country and leaving the Kurds hanging in the balance. Though the U.S. had managed to balance its relationships with the Kurds and Turkey for a long time, ultimately it had to choose sides, and it chose Turkey, the stronger and higher-value ally.
Protecting the East Euphrates
The Kurds have two main priorities in Syria: maintaining control over areas of the northeast, and driving Turkey out of an area of northern Syria known as the Euphrates Triangle, which was captured by Turkish forces in the 2016-17 Operation Euphrates Shield. After its successful campaign against IS, the YPG focused on advancing and sustaining control over territories east of the Euphrates along the Turkey-Syria border and in the Abu Kamal desert near the Syria-Iraq border. For years, thanks to U.S. support, the Kurds have held this region, which became one of the last areas of Syria outside the control of either the regime or Turkish forces. But as Turkey increased its presence in Syria by threefold and the regime made considerable gains in the west, the Kurds have been losing their grip.
On Oct. 9, Turkey launched Operation Peace Spring against Kurdish-held areas in the northeast. It established a new zone of influence – what Turkey calls its “peace corridor” – along the Turkey-Syria border. And as the U.S. drew down its presence in the country, the Kurds suddenly found themselves alone in the fight to maintain an autonomous region in the northeast.
Though the U.S. still provides the Kurds with arms, training and limited political support, Washington has blocked the YPG (and the SDF) from militarily engaging with Turkey, its NATO ally, by making aid conditional on refraining from engaging with Turkish forces. Though U.S.-Turkey relations have been strained of late, the U.S. has repeatedly told YPG officials that it would not offer its support if the Kurds entered into conflict with Turkey. Moreover, the coronavirus outbreak is forcing the U.S. to scale down its presence in the region. Operation Inherent Resolve has handed over three of its Iraqi bases to the government in Baghdad and transferred most of its troops to bases in the Gulf or more fortified locations in Iraq.
In addition, the Kurds have received mixed messages from Washington. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said the U.S. would “stand by Turkey.” But U.S. Special Envoy to Syria James Jeffrey said the U.S. would supply Turkey with only limited aid, and National Security Adviser Robert O’Brien said that, beyond sanctions, the U.S. will play only a modest role in Syria.
With the U.S. downscaling its presence in Syria and Turkey upscaling its own, the Kurds’ options are limited. They have turned, therefore, to the Syrian regime and its allies, Russia and Iran, for support. Since 2015, the Syrian regime has been an enemy – both ideologically and militarily – of the YPG. But the Kurds no longer have the luxury of standing by their ideological principles. As the saying goes, “The enemy of my enemy is my friend” – and to avoid annihilation at the hands of the Turks, the Kurds are now looking to a former foe to ensure their very survival.
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Entente
This is not the first time that the YPG has cozied up to Russia and the Assad regime. YPG and SDF officials and generals met with Russian officials at Hmeimim air base in December to discuss cooperation. No agreement resulted, however, since Iran, another key regime ally that has its own Kurdish separatist movement at home, opposed partnering with the Kurds. In addition, despite Russian lobbying, the regime and the Kurds clashed over whether the YPG should be integrated into the Syrian armed forces under Damascus’ command and whether Kurdish autonomy in the northeast should continue.
But as the Kurds have become more desperate, they have also become more open to collaboration. Last week, the co-chair of the Democratic Union Party, Aisha Hasso, did an interview with Syria Direct, a Jordan-based publication funded by the U.S. Department of State. Hasso said the SDF could play a decisive role in the military balance in Idlib. Hasso indicated that the SDF was very interested in engaging in dialogue with the regime, and that the group would not rule out fighting alongside Russian, Iranian and Syrian forces. Notably, this time Hasso and the SDF defined vague conditions for collaboration: that the regime end its suppression of Kurdish semi-autonomy and that it recognize the success of Kurdish fighters against jihadist terrorist organizations. Essentially, they’re asking that Damascus allow the Kurds to maintain limited autonomy and political representation after the war.
An alliance of Kurdish and regime forces would alter the military balance in Idlib province. As it stands, Russia controls all of Syria’s airspace, though it’s been reluctant to launch strikes on Turkish forces. Turkey, meanwhile, has stronger ground capabilities, with effective commando and light infantry units. It has an estimated 25,000 to 30,000 forces on the ground and can deploy up to 40,000 total by dispatching personnel from Hatay province. Turkey can also call on its proxies like Hayat Tahir al-Sham and the Free Syrian Army.
But the regime’s ground capabilities would certainly get a boost with the support of Kurdish troops, who have been trained by the U.S. An alliance between the two would also mean the regime has one less enemy to fight, allowing Damascus to focus on eliminating other sources of opposition. If the regime wins Idlib, it will look next to Afrin, a Turkish-controlled province and part of the Euphrates Triangle. Afrin is a strategically important region connecting Idlib to Azaz. Regaining control there would enable the regime to unify territory as it pushes east of the Euphrates. The Kurds and Turkey have clashed over Afrin, Tel Rifat and Manbij, and the pro-YPG Afrin Liberation Forces have signaled their willingness to partner with Russia and the regime.
These locations are close to Turkey’s peace corridor, and if the Kurds join forces with the Russians and the regime, it would certainly jeopardize Turkey’s hold in the northeast.
Russia, however, has been cautious about cooperating with the Kurds. Though the prospect of winning over a former American ally is enticing, there are risks as well. The YPG wants a place at the decision-making table – something that Damascus, Moscow and Tehran have resisted. The regime is also less desperate for Kurdish support now than it was when it first tried to retake Idlib. That’s because Damascus and Moscow were able to capture villages in Aleppo province and consolidate most of the south relatively quickly. In fact, in roughly a year, the regime was able to force Turkey and its proxies into a corner, drawing new cease-fire lines that codified the regime's territorial gains.
The regime has remained open to working with the Kurds, hoping to either use the possibility of an alliance to restrain Ankara, or formalize a military alliance if clashes with Turkey escalate. The YPG, too, has occasionally used talks with Moscow to pressure the U.S. for further support. For the most part, however, negotiations between them have been kept private; Kurdish sources have merely confirmed that meetings have taken place. Russia understands that if collaboration with the Kurds is cemented, Turkey will have to raise the stakes in Idlib, so it prefers to keep the Kurds waiting in the wings until an alliance is necessary.
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The Syrian Kurds are now hedging their bets. The ugly truth is that, based on the current balance of power in Syria, Kurdish capitulation is inevitable. Since the Assad regime has cemented its position in postwar Syria, the YPG won’t be able to secure long-term, full autonomy in Syria’s northeast. The real question now is: Whom does the YPG want to capitulate to, and how much are they willing to lose? With Turkey at the helm, the Kurds would face total annihilation. But with the regime at the helm, there would be room for negotiation; the Kurds would have to sacrifice the limited American support they receive and some of the autonomy they enjoy in exchange for protection from the Turks. Bottom line: The Kurds would nonetheless survive if they partnered with Russia and the regime.
For now, the Russians will merely use the possibility of an alliance with the YPG to increase pressure on Turkey. A formal Kurdish-Syrian alliance would develop only in the event of an intense escalation of fighting between the Russians and the Turks. And if this does occur, the situation in Idlib would become even more complicated, as the Turks face a more capable, united ground force.
